LAND WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

General Gordon R. Sullivan

Lieutenant Colonel James M. Dubik

February 1993
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution unlimited. Portions may be quoted or represented

without permission, provided that a standard source credit line

is included.

*******

Comments pertaining to this publication are invited and may

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed by calling the Conference Organizer, Dr. Gary L.

Guertner, commercial (717) 245-3234 or DSN 242-3234.

*******

This paper was originally presented at the U.S. Army War

College Fourth Annual Strategy Conference held February 24-25,

1993, with the assistance of the Office of Net Assessment. The

Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish the paper as

part of its Conference Series.
iii

PREFACE

Land warfare in the 21st century will be shaped by the

cumulative effects of many revolutionary changes that have yet to

merge in a clear or predictable pattern. This paper identifies

three elements of change that are likely to have the greatest

impact on the Army and the joint conduct of land warfare.

First, the international system is undergoing its third

major transition of the 20th century in response to the end of

the cold war. The bipolar world has disappeared, replaced by

uncertainty and instability. The United States as the world's

sole superpower is debating its role and responsibilities in such

a world, a debate that is greatly influenced by domestic

pressures to resolve a complex set of economic and social issues

at home. Together these trends are forcing a dramatic shift in

strategy from the Soviet global threat to regional crises that

require collective applications of military power in "operations

other than war." These include humanitarian relief, peacekeeping,

peace-enforcement, and peace-building (nation assistance) that

will require a wide range of forward presence/peacetime

engagement operations.

Second, changes in military technology are culminating in

what many believe will be a "military-technical revolution" that

brings unprecedented depth and transparency to the battlefield.

Five of this "revolution's" most significant technological

developments for land warfare are lethality and dispersion;

volume and precision of fire; integrative technology; mass and

effects; and invisibility and detectability. These developments

will drive adjustments in tactics, organization, doctrine,

equipment, force mix, and methods of command and control. The

authors believe that these innovations indicate that smaller land

forces can create decisive effects IF technology is used by highquality, well-trained and well-led troops employing proper

doctrine. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that there

is a line below which technology can no longer compensate for

cuts in force structure. That line will ultimately be determined

by the capabilities of our adversaries and the will of the

American public.

Finally, this paper cautions that change will inevitably

coexist with at least three constants--the root causes of war,

the nature of war, and the essence of fighting power. Preparation

includes traditional non-quantifiable factors as much as

technology. Leadership, courage, self-sacrifice, initiative, and

comradeship under extreme conditions of ambiguity, fog, friction,

danger, stark fear, anxiety, death, and destruction--all remain

the coins of war's realm and no amount of technological advance

will degrade their value.
iv

A central message of this paper is for strategists to carry

the best of the present forward as we adapt to the revolutionary

changes on the horizon. Land warfare will remain a vital

component in the national military strategy, but only if we

understand and respond to the forces that are shaping the

battlefields of the 21st century.
v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

GENERAL GORDON R. SULLIVAN, Chief of Staff, United States Army,

was commissioned a second lieutenant of Armor and awarded a

Bachelor of Arts degree in history from Norwich University in

1959. He holds a Master of Arts degree in Political Science from

the University of New Hampshire. His military schooling includes

the Armor School, the Command and General Staff College and the

Army War College. He has served in a variety of command and staff

positions including four years in joint and allied assignments.

His overseas assignments include four tours in Europe, two in

Vietnam and one in Korea. General Sullivan also served in

assignments on the Army Staff in Washington, D.C., including a

tour as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and as

the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. General Sullivan has

commanded at platoon through division level. In United States

Army, Europe he commanded the 4th Battalion, 73rd Armor and the

1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division, followed by an assignment as

3rd Armored Division's Chief of Staff and the VII Corps

Operations Officer (G-3). Subsequently, he served as the

Assistant Commandant of the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky,

on the NATO staff as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Support of

Central Army Group in Germany, and as the Deputy Commandant of

the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas. He also served as Commanding General of the 1st Infantry

Division at Fort Riley, Kansas. In June 1991, General Sullivan

became Chief of Staff of the United States Army. He also serves

as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES M. DUBIK currently serves on the

personal staff of the Army Chief of Staff. A former philosophy

instructor at the Military Academy, he earned a Bachelor's degree

from Gannon University and a Master's degree from Johns Hopkins

University. He also holds a Master of Military Arts and Science

Degree in Theater Operations from the School of Advanced Military

Studies. He has written extensively in military and civilian

journals. Lieutenant Colonel Dubik's operational assignments have

included service with the 82d Airborne Division, 1st Ranger

Battalion, and 2d Ranger Battalion. He also commanded the 5th

Battalion, 14th Infantry.
vi

LAND WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war

have given rise to a national debate unmatched since the end of

World War II. Dramatic changes in the international system have

forced policymakers to reevaluate old strategies and look for new

focal points amidst the still unsettled debris of the bipolar

world. At issue is the role of the United States in a new world

order and its capabilities to defend and promote its national

interests in a new environment where threats are both diffuse and

uncertain and where conflict is inherent yet unpredictable. The

degree of uncertainty in the global security environment

parallels revolutionary changes in military technology and in the

traditional concepts of how we employ military forces. Together,

these trends require greater flexibility in U.S. military

strategy and significant departures from cold war concepts of

deterrence and war fighting. This paper examines their cumulative

effect on land warfare of the future. Only by dealing with these

questions today will we be able to make the investment and force

structure decisions to best position ourselves for tomorrow.

These are times of both continuity and change, and must be

understood as such. Complex changes are never complete breaks

from the past;1

 evolutionary and revolutionary changes coexist,

each shaping the other. This relationship between continuity and

change is discussed in the introduction to A.T. Mahan's famous

work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. There he tells

strategists, "While many of the conditions of war vary from age

to age with the progress of weapons, there are certain teachings

in the school of history which remain constant."2 Then he

cautions: "It is wise to observe things that are alike, it is

also wise to look for things that differ."3

This paper follows Mahan's advice. It will describe how much

in the realm of warfare is changing and where those changes are

headed. The essay is developed in three steps: changes in the

context within which war is fought; technological changes in the

conduct of land combat; and, continuities in the nature of

warfare. Change and continuity, when taken together, provide a

foundation for examining 21st century warfare.

CHANGES IN THE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH WAR IS FOUGHT

Warfare cannot be understood properly if viewed in

isolation; international and domestic realities form its context

and must be understood as well. A survey of some of the important
vii

changes in these two arenas, therefore, is the appropriate

starting point for understanding how warfare is and is not

changing.

International Trends: Integration and Fragmentation.

The end of the cold war has unleashed contradictory trends.

On the one hand there are fledgling democracies and market

economies that clamor to be incorporated in regional and global

systems; the increased importance of transnational organizations,

information and communication networks, and financial structures;

heightened awareness of transnational problems like

environmental, health, migration, and monetary issues; and the

readjustment of alliances and relationships among the major

industrial nations as well as among these nations and their

lesser-developed neighbors. As these changes generate movement

toward greater global integration, multinational organizations

assume more importance as actors in foreign affairs and

international relations. In turn, greater integration results in

partial erosion of the traditional concept of national

sovereignty. The Secretary General of the United Nations refers

to this trend when he says,

relationships among nations are increasingly shaped by

the continuous interaction among entire bodies politic

and economic. Such activity almost resembles a force in

nature, and indeed may be just that. Political borders

and geographic boundaries pose slight barriers to this

process.

4

Accompanying the movement toward global integration in some parts

of the international arena, however, is a countervailing trend

toward fragmentation in other parts.

Ethnic and religious hostility, weapons proliferation, power

struggles created by the disappearance of the Soviet Union,

elimination of the fear of regional conflicts escalating to

superpower confrontation, radicalisms of a number of varieties,

rising expectations of democracy and free markets coupled with

the inability of governments to meet these expectations--all are

forces that generate fragmentation, not integration.5

 For

example, "in the three years since the cold war ended, some 4.5

million new refugees have fled their native lands to escape the

civil wars and ethnic cleansing that too often have followed the

collapse of communism."6 Anyone who reads the newspaper or

watches television news knows that these forces of fragmentation

are as present around the world as are the forces of

integration.7

For many, the world is growing more dangerous, albeit the
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dangers are different and more subtle than those of the cold war.

Local and regional "bullies" are emerging following the collapse

of the former Soviet Union, and they are amassing more and more

military force. International arms sales make high-tech weapons

available to any customer who can afford them. These sales

significantly increase a third world military force's ability to

fight at extended ranges with increased accuracy and lethality,

thereby compounding the problems of an intervention force. A

sampling of this proliferation includes China's sale of shortrange theater ballistic missiles to Iran, Libya, Syria, and

Pakistan; North Korea's sale of similar missiles to Iran, Libya,

and Syria; the Commonwealth of Independent States' sale of T-72s

to Syria, SA-16s to North Korea, submarines to Iran, and T-80s,

ATGMs, and SAMs worldwide. Currently 18 countries have advanced

precision guided munitions; by early in the next century, that

number is expected to grow to over 40. Those who would consider

threatening U.S. global interests are hard at work buying the

hardware that they will need and learning their lessons from the

Gulf War. Future adversaries will try to deny American forces

information, prevent buildup, inflict mass casualties, and

prolong the conflict.8 They will seek to deny us the minimal

cost, decisive victory that we achieved in Panama and the Gulf

and which we seek to achieve elsewhere in the future.

Domestic Realities: New Threats to U.S. National Security.

As the forces of integration and fragmentation push and pull

to create international challenges different from those of the

cold war, our nation also faces a particularly difficult and

complex set of domestic problems. The victory in the cold war did

not come without costs to the United States, and America is only

now confronting some of those costs. By maintaining a primarily

outward focus for the last 45 years, America and its allies

defeated their main external threat--the former Soviet Union.

Nearly 50 years of external focus, however, has resulted in two

new sets of threats to U.S. national security.9

The first set consists of threats to our economic security,

which stem from both internal and external sources. The internal

threats involve declining competitiveness and productivity, loss

of jobs base--and its corresponding tax base, erosion of the

manufacturing base, fiscal and trade deficit, decline of the

middle class wage and standard of living, low savings and

investments, the savings and loan crisis, and the eroding

infrastructure, as well as others.10 Some of the major external

threats to the economic pillar of America's national security

involve our reliance on foreign oil, much of which is located in

areas of the world controlled or threatened by regional hegemons;

our foreign debt which will top $1 trillion before 1995;11 our

loss of market share and manufacturing base to other industrial
ix

nations;12 and political instability in areas that could offer

overseas markets for U.S. goods or opportunities for expansion of

U.S. companies.

To assess what these threats to American economic security

entail, strategists must understand that the rules governing U.S.

economic recovery have changed. The American economy will not

heal merely by the actions taken at home. Domestic action is

necessary, but not sufficient. "If this century has taught one

lesson," says Peter Drucker, it is that

no part of the developed world prospers unless all do .

. . it is to the self interest of every single

participant in the world economy to restore as fast as

possible the economic ties that war has cut, to restore

transnational confidence, and to restore the

transnational flow of goods and investments.13

In this sense, foreign and domestic policy are two sides of the

same coin; they cannot be viewed as two separate problems.

Adverse economic trends, however, are not the only dangers

to American national security that gestated as we fought the cold

war. During that period's extended external focus, a second set

developed: threats to the nation's political and social cohesion.

These involve "the disuniting of America"--to borrow Arthur M.

Schlesinger, Jr.'s, term.14 The problems of drug abuse and the

resultant disregard for the rights of other citizens and

disrespect for democratic values and institutions; the increasing

gap between the rich and the poor; the decline of public

education, the disintegration of the family, and the disregard

for the basic rules of civil behavior; the rise of crime and of

welfare dependence; the acceptance of vulgarity as "the

norm"--these problems have led author and sociologist Professor

James Hunter to conclude that America is in the midst of what he

termed a "culture war."15 In most major American cities, people

of comfortable circumstance live peacefully together, enjoy

quality schools, and live the American middle-class dream; those

afflicted by poverty do not. This ever-growing divergence is not

healthy for a democracy. Regardless of Hunter's description of

this condition as a "culture war," this much is clear: these and

other problems constitute a threat to the ultimate foundation of

our nation's security--an educated, civic-minded, participative

polity that is the basis of a democratic government.16

On the surface these two sets of threats--economic and

cultural--seem unrelated to the military or the nation's military

power; they are, however, relevant in at least three ways. First,

the United States must attend to the internal economic, social,

and cultural issues threatening the ultimate foundation of its
x

security. Heeding these threats should not, however, push the

nation to the extremes of isolationism. U.S. economic recovery,

for example, requires success both within the nation and

around the world. But solving internal threats will require

resources. Military strategists, therefore, must expect that

America will both reduce the military budget and, simultaneously,

ask that its military contribute to the challenges of domestic

regeneration.

Second, U.S. military strategists can expect that their

political leaders will seek ways in which to use the military

element of national power--in conjunction with, and usually

subordinate to, other elements of national power--to promote an

environment conducive to political and economic stability abroad.

Such uses of the military element of power follow from the fact

that American economic security is tied to the world at large, a

world in which the cold war's veneer of stability has been

lifted, thus revealing significant unrest, fear, hatred, and

jealousy. Thus the U.S. military should expect to conduct

operations, usually in conjunction with allies and friends, that

are aimed at creating or restoring conditions favorable to

economic development and trade.

When one thinks of "military operations," the image usually

includes combat forces. While such operations may be required,

strategists must begin to think differently about the use of the

military element of national power. Operations linked to

strengthening or restoring conditions favorable to global trade,

investment, and economic development may include combat

operations, but not necessarily.

The United States has established markets in nations with

whom it has alliances or friendships. America must maintain these

economic relationships and keep the normal, free-market

competition between the United States and these nations free from

instability or confrontation. Here, military operations might

mean continued presence in existing alliance organizations,

combined exercises, refinement of common operating procedures,

and continuation of exchange programs.

Many of the markets that might become available for global

economic investment, development, and integration are threatened

by regional instability. America--in conjunction with allies and

friends, as well as global and regional organizations--must do

what it can to promote the conditions in which corporations will

invest, products can be sold, and economies prosper.

The important point is: domestic actions alone will not

result in U.S. economic recovery; the current global economic
xi

conditions require action abroad to complement domestic policies.

American military presence and operations can contribute--again,

in conjunction with and usually subordinate to other elements of

national power as well as regional and global organizations--to

setting the conditions under which economic interests can

flourish. There are no historical precedents for long-term

economic prosperity absent a security umbrella that provides the

stability in which economic strategies succeed.

Third, although the cold war is won, America must remain

prepared to protect its global interests. Local and regional

power struggles were created by the lifting of the Iron Curtain.

Once restrained for fear of sparking a superpower confrontation,

a variety of bullies--some known and some yet-to-emerge, some

armed with advanced technology weapons and some not--await

opportunities to establish or expand their power, sometimes to

the detriment of U.S. national interests. When committed to

prevent a crisis from developing or to resolve one that has

arisen, America will expect its military to accomplish the

mission assigned--decisively and at the least cost in American

lives and resources.

Decisive use of military force does not necessarily entail

total war. Rather, it means overwhelming use of the military

element of national power relative to the strategic aims,

military mission, specifics of the situation, and threat

conditions. While preserving the principle of proportionality,

decisive force is the opposite of incrementalism or gradualism.

Thus, in those crises or conflicts involving U.S. military

forces, the action will be characterized by military power

employed in an overwhelming way with as much precision as

possible to complete the mission in the shortest time possible

and--again--at the least cost in lives and resources.

In sum, American political leaders are requiring the

military to contract in both size and budget, contribute to

domestic recovery, participate in global stability operations,

and retain its capability to produce decisive victory in whatever

circumstance they are employed--all at the same time. What these

four simultaneous requirements mean to military strategists is

this: (a) leverage quality in terms of soldiers, units, training,

and doctrine as well as technological superiority to

counterbalance reductions in size, (b) maximize the benefits of

maneuver and tempo used in conjunction with firepower, (c)

synchronize the contributions of all the services in ways that

were previously not achieved, and (d) maintain maximum

flexibility and balance in force structure and capabilities.

Simply put, international and domestic realities have

resulted in the paradox of declining military resources and
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increasing military missions, a paradox that is stressing our

armed forces. The stress is significant. It requires fundamental

changes in the way the nation conducts its defense business.

TWO CONCEPTUAL SHIFTS

Before even discussing the ways in which the conduct of land

warfare is changing, one must realize the extent of the shift in

the paradigm used by the last three generations of U.S.

strategists. The strategic paradigm of the cold war--preventing

the spread of communism--does not fit the realities of today's

world; to use it to solve new problems is to guarantee failure.17

This is the first--perhaps the most important and most difficult-

-conceptual shift that affects the way the conduct of land combat

is changing. America needs a different model by which to raise,

equip, deploy, organize, educate, train, fight, coordinate, and

sustain her armed forces. Containment and our "traditional"

concept of deterrence--elements of America's cold war strategic

defense--require rethinking in light of current realities. The

United States no longer has a negative aim--to prevent the spread

of communism.18 It has a positive aim--to promote democracy,

regional stability, and economic prosperity. What some are

calling "collective engagement" is coming to replace containment.

Deterrence has retained some of its meaning, but "prevention" is

beginning to emerge as a complementary, and possibly alternative,

strategic concept. This is a significant conceptual shift from

that of the cold war, but it is not the only shift required.

The second conceptual shift involves refining the

understanding of how to use military force. The concept of "war"

is usually understood in terms of conventional combat: the armies

of one nation-state or alliance of nation-states fighting those

of another. Every other act of violence, use of force, or form

of hostility is categorized as "operations other than war."19

Using these kinds of distinctions, some go so far as to draw the

following kinds of categories of violence: peacetime activities

with very low levels of violence, crises, conflicts, war, and war

termination activities.

These kinds of categories are quite useful, for they allow a

strategist to plan for the use of military force under a variety

of graduated circumstances. Further, they demonstrate that not

all uses of military force involve "going to war." Thus the

categories provide a convenient conceptual distinction and an

important political one. Politically, the United States, whether

acting unilaterally or in conjunction with friends and allies,

must be able to distinguish the use of military forces in "war"

from other uses. As Bernard Brodie explains,

As American citizens we expect and desire that our
xiii

nation will involve itself in war only...for political

ends that are reasonably consistent with [America's]

basic political philosophy....We...also expect that the

ends for which we fight are...sought through the kind

of war that is reasonable to fight,..[and has a]

possibility of success....[otherwise] resorting to war

is simply wanton destruction of life and goods on a

vast scale.20

The expectations that Brodie outlines remain part of the

American military, social, and political psyche. When the nation

wages "war," all understand that defining clear, achievable

political aims; raising and sustaining the required means to

attain those aims; and ensuring the support of the nation--i.e.,

national will, are absolutely vital to success. Without these

conditions, "resorting to war is simply wanton destruction."

Thus, military doctrine appropriately codifies the distinction

between "war" and "operations other than war."

As useful, convenient, and important as these categories

are, however, their simplicity can be seductive. Categorizing

"war" as separate from all other uses of military force may

mislead the strategist, causing him to believe that the

conditions required for success in the employment of military

force when one is conducting "war" differ from use of military

force in operations "other than war." For example, when planning

for war, no serious strategist would fail to ask, "Should we have

clearly stated, achievable political aims? or Should the nation

allocate the necessary means to attain its political aims? or

Should we have some assurance that the nation supports the war?"

Yet, when debating the use of military force in "operations other

than war," just such questions may not always arise.

As the nation begins the 21st century the strategist should

take seriously Michael Howard's suggestion. "It is quite

possible," Howard says,

that war in the sense of major, organized armed

conflict between highly developed societies may not

recur, . . . Nevertheless violence will continue to

erupt within developed societies as well as

underdeveloped, creating situations of local armed

conflict often indistinguishable from traditional

war.

21

Strategists must refine their understanding of how to use

military force to correspond with the realities of the day.

Clausewitz defined war simply as "an act of force to compel our

enemy to do our will" which "springs from some political

purpose."22 "No one," he says, "starts a war--or rather no one in
xiv

his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind

what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to

conduct it."23 While his definition of "war" is less applicable

given today's political realities, his admonitions concerning

using military force are instructive. They apply aptly to the

kind of violence that Michael Howard describes as "often

indistinguishable from traditional war."

One way a nation might use its military force is to compel

its adversary, sometimes by resorting to or threatening violence,

to do its will. Such uses are both consistent with what

Clausewitz called "war" and, as Howard says, are "often

indistinguishable from traditional war." American and allied

forces in Somalia, and their possible employment in Bosnia

provide two excellent examples. When a nation so uses its

military forces, a contemporary Clausewitz would caution that

nation not to begin without first being clear about its political

aims and how those objectives are to be achieved. Objectives and

concepts must be supported by allocating sufficient military

sources and by mustering the national (or international) will to

attain the political aim.

No doubt, today's global realities are different from those

that Clausewitz contemplated. Contemporary strategists confront

representatives of feudal lords, religious groups, ethnic groups,

drug cartels, crime syndicates, even transnational corporations

using force or threats of force to achieve their objectives.

Furthermore, nations now use operations other than war--e.g.

peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, supervising cease-fires,

assisting in the maintenance of law and order, protecting the

delivery of humanitarian assistance, guaranteeing rights of

passage, and enforcement of sanctions--to compel adversaries to

do their will. While these endeavors do not qualify as "war" in

today's military-politico parlance, they are examples of acts "of

force to compel our enemy to do our will" which spring "from some

political purpose."

Once again, Brodie's ideas are applicable:

Those who talk abstractly...[about war] find themselves

matching discourse with those who speak of dead bodies,

burnt villages....The euphemisms of the strategists can

be counterproductive....the manipulators use jargon

that the man in the front lines...can hardly consider

relevant to his conditions.24

As useful and necessary as the distinction between "war" and

"operations other than war" is, strategists cannot allow these

conceptual categories to become the kind of euphemisms to which

Brodie alludes. Leaders and strategists must recognize the
xv

requirements essential to success whenever military force is

employed: identifying clear, achievable political aims; planning

and employing strategic measures for achieving those political

aims; raising and sustaining adequate means to implement the

strategic measures; and ensuring the support of the nation (or

coalition).

Expanding the traditional understanding of the use of

military force in war to "operations other than war" makes both

politicians and military leaders uneasy, for they find it is

difficult--albeit no less important--to identify clear,

achievable strategic aims. There is an emotional temptation to

want to "do something" without first

clearly understanding what political purpose that "something" is

supposed to accomplish. Yet, as Brodie reminds us, this

requirement remains paramount, else what we do is "simply wanton

destruction of life and goods."

Changes in the international and domestic political systems

have altered the context in which military force will be applied.

Reviewing these changes is important. Changes in the conduct of

land warfare result from the interaction of a multiplicity of

events, conditions, policies, beliefs, and even accidents.25 Some

of the changes occur in the international and domestic arenas,

others are rooted in history and technology. The changes in

military technology are as dramatic as those in international

politics.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES IN THE CONDUCT OF LAND WARFARE

Technological innovations, many of which were dramatically

demonstrated in the Gulf War, are giving rise to what is being

called a "military-technical revolution." This "revolution" will

have a dramatic effect on the Army and land warfare through five

dominant trends: lethality and dispersion; volume and precision

of fire; integrative technology; mass and effects, and

invisibility and detectability.

Lethality and Dispersion.

Over time, weaponry has become more lethal and individuals

and units more dispersed. Lethality and dispersion are linked.26

Rifling, introduced in mass during the mid-19th century, extended

the range and accuracy of the individual weapon and artillery

piece. This development forced individuals to go to ground and

disperse. As rifles and artillery became more effective, units

could no longer deploy in the dense, shoulder-to-shoulder

formations that marked the age of the musket.27
xvi

Throughout the history of land warfare, tactics,

organizations, doctrine, equipment, force mix, and methods of

command and control all changed in response to increasing

lethality and dispersion. These changes, in turn, had a

corresponding effect on training, soldiers, and leaders.28

The Gulf War saw an even greater increase in dispersion and

improvement in the ability to deliver long-range lethal fires. 

Table 1 indicates that this increase can no longer be described 

geometrically for the changes witnessed in the Gulf were 

exponential changes. MRLS, Apache, Patriot, Lance, ATACMs,

Abrams, Bradley--especially in conjunction with space-based

platforms, the weapons delivery and maneuver systems of other

services, and equipment like the laser designator and the

position guidance system--all confirm that the trend toward

increased lethality at greater ranges and increased dispersion of

individuals and units are still at work. Furthermore, the trend

will result in changes in tactics, organization, doctrine,

equipment, force mix, and methods of command--just as it did in

the past.

Post-industrial land forces will become more mobile,

creating the requirement to communicate over greater distances,

to maneuver more quickly, and to use fires from platforms of all

services that are dispersed over greater distances. This trend

will place a great premium on the commander's ability to make

decisions quickly, the staff's requirement to synchronize the

movements of greatly dispersed units, and the subordinate
xvii

leader's responsibility to make on-the-spot decisions within a

senior commander's intent.

Greater dispersion will also place a great premium upon unit

cohesion. Long acknowledged as one of the most fundamental, if

not the most essential, building blocks of fighting power,29 unit

cohesion will be much harder to sustain in widely dispersed

units, but no less required. One could build a good case, in

fact, that the importance of quality soldiers and leaders and the

need for excellent unit cohesion grows in parallel with the level

of dispersion.

Volume and Precision of Fire.

The second trend concerns two factors: first, volume of fire

(tonnage delivered in a given time) and precision. The volume of

fire was low during the age of muzzle-loading individual weapons

and artillery. The rate and volume of fire began to increase,

however, with the introduction of breach-loading rifles,

smokeless powder, magazines, belts, and other automatic loading

devices. The move from muscle to machine--i.e. mechanization,

motorization, and aviation--also contributed to the increased

rate at which fire could be delivered. Not only could weaponry

produce more lethal effects, but also produce them more

frequently. "Ultimately the net effect of the progress in weapons

technology," Martin van Creveld points out,

was to increase enormously the volume of fire that

could be delivered, the range, at which it could be

delivered, and the accuracy with which this could be

done. The combination of all three factors meant that .

. . the battlefield became a more deadly place than

ever before.30

The trend in increased volume of fire culminated in an Army's

ability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons.

Of course, with the increase in fire volume came

corresponding changes in other areas of land combat: the use of

entrenchments, the development of protected spaces on the

battlefield like the tank and infantry fighting vehicles, and

organizational changes like the U.S. Pentomic division of the

1950s and the flexible divisional structure of the 1970s and 80s.

These evolutions affected not only weapons, equipment,

organization, and tactics but also planning factors like casualty

rates, logistic resupply rates, and the balance among

combat/combat support/combat service support forces.

Along with an army's ability to deliver an increased volume

of fire came the rise in precision. Dragons, TOWs, laser-aimed
xviii

individual weapons; precision aiming systems such as those on the

Abrams and Bradley; longer range precision weapons systems like

Apache, LANCE, ATACMS, and MRLS; laser designators that guide

artillery rounds as well as the bombs delivered by aircraft of

other services; "brilliant" munitions now in development--all

confirm the trend toward increased precision accompanying

increased volume.

As was the case with the growth in the volume of fire, the

rise in precision will change the weapons, equipment,

organization, and tactics of 21st-century land forces. Planning

factors will be as different for the armies of the 21st century

compared to the 20th century as 20th century armies differed from

those of the 19th.

The introduction of high-energy weapons, electro-magnetic

rail gun technology, super conductivity, and other

yet-to-be-identified technological improvements will continue the

upward trend lines of fire, volume and precision. The greatly

dispersed land forces of the 21st century will continue to

increase their ability to deliver a high volume of precisely

aimed fires with a very high first-round-hit probability. This

ability will be increased even further when one considers the

result of integrative technology.

Integrative Technology.

Integrative technology will introduce a level of precision

to the overall force, not just to individual and massed fires,

that has been impossible up to this point in the history of land

combat. In the 21st century, the systems of land forces will

become an integrated circuit that is, in turn, part of a network

of combined land/air/sea/space forces. With this integration

network will come improved precision at the point of battle.

Napoleon introduced a "visual telegraph," called the Chappe,

as a rapid means to transmit his orders. Under the right

conditions, he could communicate with his subordinates 120 miles

away in about an hour. This innovation increased his ability to

coordinate the actions of his subordinate forces.31

Modern integrative technology, however, started with the

telegraph and railroad--two systems that, when joined,

revolutionized warfare.32 The telegraph moved information around

the battlefield quickly. Information assisted command and

control, improved unity of effort, and increased the potential

for coordinated effort and agility throughout the theater of

operation or of war. The railroad provided the means to realize

the potential that the telegraph offered. Rail made it possible

to move large numbers of troops, equipment, supplies, and weapons
xix

systems quickly. Furthermore, the management and organization of

the railroad--from the operation of loading docks to the

computation of time/distance factors necessary to schedule rail

use--integrated the information system of the telegraph, the

delivery system of the railroad, and the command and control

system of the military.33

First by field wire, then by the introduction of radio and

aviation, the use of integrative technology expanded in scope.

Each improvement widened the ground commander's ability to

orchestrate all the intelligence assets, weapons systems,

maneuver forces, and logistical units at his disposal. Complexity

accompanied this growth, making staffs more necessary and

synchronization of functions more important. Interestingly, two

false beliefs accompanied each improvement: first, that some

extraordinary technological advance yet to take place would

result in the land commander acquisition of "perfect, real-time"

information upon which to base his decisions and direct his

subordinates; second, that greater centralization in decision

making would yield greater combat effectiveness at the point of

battle.

Realities on the battlefield, however, proved otherwise. The

very nature of war consists of fear, fog, danger, uncertainty,

deception, and friction--these are not conditions that can ever

generate "perfect information."34 Reports that a commander

receives are often incomplete and incorrect. An enemy commander

strives to deceive his adversary, hiding what he does as best he

can; what one sees on the battlefield, therefore, must be

interpreted. Interpretation faces the same impairments that we

noted above in connection with obtaining information. Certainly,

advanced technologies, multiple collection methods, and other

means can increase the reliability of information and aid in

decision making. The realities of what goes on in combat,

however, will frustrate forever those searching for "perfect,

real-time" information. To hope for technology that will be

capable of gathering and using such information to feed a

centralized military decision making system is to hope in vain.

Developing subordinate commanders who are able to make decisions

on-the-spot within the intent of their higher commander--that is,

decentralization not centralization--will remain vital even into

the 21st century.

Withal, the search for integrative technology on today's

battlefield goes on. The links between scout and attack

helicopter, between JSTARS and weapons delivery platforms (air

and ground), between forward ground elements and rear positioned

indirect fire systems, between tanks of an M1A2 unit--all have

produced a quantum leap in the use of integrative technology.

Like the leap produced by the increased volume of precision fires
xx

and greater battlefield dispersion, increased integrative

technology is important in its effects. Extensive, near-real time

communications among a number of intelligence gathering systems,

maneuver systems, fire systems, and logistical support systems

provide the ground commander with a potentially revolutionary

opportunity and with monumental challenges.

The opportunity is the integration of the reconnaissance and

intelligence gathering systems (technological and human) with

command and control, fire delivery, and maneuver nodes. Once all

are linked digitally to logistical support centers, these task

forces will become combined arms task forces qualitatively

different from the ones we now have. The degree of situational

awareness that a commander will have under these conditions will

be orders of magnitude better than he has now. It would not be

too bold to claim that his perception of the battlefield will

change. The computation of combat power and logistical planning

factors, the determination of the proper ratio among combat,

combat support, and combat service support, as well as a

definition of each of the operating systems and their

interrelationships--will require rethinking. Significant further

adjustments in doctrine, organization, and command and control,

as well as service relationships, also will be necessary.

The digitization of the battlefield is a major leap-ahead in

the conduct of warfare, but not a break from the past. The

limiting factor in the quest for making maximum use of

integrative technology will not be the hardware, it will be human

and organizational. Integrative technologies will enhance the

ability of commanders and their units to fight with scarce

assets. The complete use of integrative technologies will

revolutionize command and staff procedures. Software will allow

much of the information now transmitted by radio and synchronized

on acetate and charts to be self-synchronized automatically,

computer to computer. Smart command and control systems will

create a common perception of the battlefield and the theater

among members of a joint task force. This perception, in turn,

will facilitate the rapid massing of combat assets--precise

weapons systems and maneuver forces--to attain objectives

decisively. Such a development will not eliminate the necessity

for staffs and commanders, but the art and science of

decisionmaking and staff synchronization will change radically.

The challenges that accompany such revolutionary advances in

information gathering and use remain as before: increasingly

capable integrative technology may, once again, generate the

false belief that centralized decision making will result in

greater combat effectiveness at the point of battle. As explained

previously, however, realities of the battlefield and the nature

of war demonstrate otherwise.
xxi

Using an earlier leap-ahead technology, the telegraph,

Moltke knew that the flow of information would still never reach

him fast enough and in enough detail to allow him to command from

his headquarters. The cycle of action-reaction-counteraction on

the battlefield unfolded much faster than a headquarters could

gather information, process it, make a decision, then transmit

that decision to those who must execute. Rather than impose new

and stricter demands for information to feed a centralized

decision and command system, Moltke created units and chose

commanders who were able to operate under the conditions of

uncertainty and succeed with less information.35 Integrative

technology will increase the tempo of action-reactioncounteraction on the post-industrial battlefield; thus, it will

continue to emphasize decentralized decisionmaking and initiative

at lower levels of command.

The effects of the first three trends--lethality and

dispersion, volume of fire and precision, and the use of

integrative technology--join in reinforcing a fourth: the trend

toward the ability of smaller units to create decisive effects.

Mass and Effects.

Smaller units are able to create decisive effects in three

ways.36 The first is simply physical. The repeating rifle and

machine gun, in conjunction with increasingly accurate indirect

fires of artillery, began to allow fewer soldiers and smaller

units to concentrate the effects of more firepower than their

numbers alone would suggest. This is a natural outcome of the

first two trends. The volume of deadly fire "emptied"

battlefields, but those left on them were far more capable. As

motorization, mechanization, aviation, and communication

developed and improved, this capability increased. Ground forces

not only had at their disposal more lethal weapons that could

shoot more often and more accurately, but they could employ

weapons systems that were physically located at some distance

from the point of battle. Furthermore, ground forces developed

the capability to move across, or over, the battlefield much

faster, more easily, and with more safety than had their

predecessors.

The second way that smaller units can create decisive

effects is organizational: mixing arms within a formation. The

19th century version of this phenomenon began with separate

infantry, artillery, and cavalry divisions being combined under a

single corps headquarters. Over time, mixing arms descended from

corps level to combat teams--that is, mixing arms within

divisions and regiments like those of the World War II era. The

next development produced what came to be called combined arms
xxii

teams as low as company and troop level. The development of these

teams at lower levels gave commanders the opportunity to

incorporate direct and indirect fires more easily. As the

inclusion of the weapons systems of fixed and rotary wing

aviation became a standard and essential element of the combined

arms team, commanders were able to add the effects of air

platforms to those of the armor, infantry, and field artillery.

The result was smaller units being able to produce decisive

effects.

Maneuver is the third way that smaller units can create

decisive effects. Initially maneuver resulted from muscle power--

the foot and horse. However, machine-powered ground systems--the

rail, truck, tank, armored personnel carrier, infantry fighting

vehicle, self-propelled artillery, and protected combat support

and combat service support vehicles--greatly increased land

maneuver. When land forces began to include machine-powered air

systems--the utility, cargo, scout, and attack helicopters--the

conditions were set for another leap in land maneuver. Like the

score of a great symphony, each of these movements--first from

muscle to machine-powered ground systems then to machine power

air systems--began quietly and developed gradually. Each

increased mobility, improved opportunities for maneuver, and

resulted in greater agility. At each step, improved maneuver

capability contributed to the land combat commander's ability to

move over increasingly dispersed areas and converge quickly at

the decisive point, thus concentrating effects of both fires and

maneuver. Each move thus increased the land force commander's

ability to operate at a faster tempo than before.

The history of land warfare reflects the manner in which

various arms have been integrated into the combat team. Initially

land combat moved from being conducted by unitary armies to being

fought by combined arms, ground-based formations. The second step

took place when combined arms, ground-based formations became

combined arms, ground/air-based units. Land combat units are

currently at this point; however, the movement is not over. The

third step will take place when land combat is waged by

formations consisting of combined arms, air/ground-based units.

This is the direction land combat is now taking. At each step,

decisive effects have resulted from ever smaller units.

This development is reinforced by the increased use of

integrative technology. Recent integration of land combat units

has been primarily, but not exclusively, internal. Internal

integration includes the ability of members of a combined arms

task force to talk and coordinate among the combat, combat

support, and combat service support units of the task force. This

integration was, and remains, absolutely essential. In the 21st

century, however, internal integration will not be sufficient. To
xxiii

maximize the benefits of maneuver and tempo, increase the

firepower available to a land force commander, and synchronize

the contributions of all the services, land forces must be fully

integrated with air and naval forces. Only then will the

commander be able to leverage completely the complementary powers

of the joint force.

Thus, when one includes the trend toward increased use of

integrative technology, another element in the trend toward a

smaller unit's capability to produce decisive effects can be

postulated: the evolution of combined arms into joint arms. The

result will be fully integrated joint task forces, including

combined arms task forces of multiple services, that can be

tailored to fit the specific set of geographic, political, and

threat conditions existing in a given situation. In such fully

integrated joint task forces, true qualitative change is

possible--the whole of such a force will be greater than the sum

of the parts. Based upon the situation, an Army brigade task

force in conjunction with a Marine Expeditionary Unit, Air Force

squadron, and Navy task force--fully integrated under the command

and control of a joint task force headquarters--could produce the

effects that required, during the World War II era, a much larger

force.

In sum, these trends indicate, and the Gulf War as well as

Operation JUST CAUSE corroborate, that as the size of the unit

decreases, there can be a corresponding increase in the effects

it is able to produce if it is equipped with the right technology

used by high-quality, well-trained and well-led troops employing

proper doctrine. These trends verify that smaller or fewer units

will be able to produce decisive effects because of the vast

array of weaponry they have at their disposal and the speed with

which they will be able to acquire targets, maneuver, employ

fires, and relocate. Think of the maneuver possibilities that

could be generated for ground or air commanders by very dispersed

special operations forces or of the potentially decisive effects

these very small forces--integrated into the forces of all

services--have when equipped with secure satellite

communications, laser designators, and position guidance systems.

Small teams in the right place, at the right time, and linked in

with the right systems have the potential to produce, or at least

contribute to, decisive results.

Once again, a paradigm shift is developing. Many of the old

rules of land warfare that concern the calculation of combat

power have been shattered already. Individually and collectively,

the implications of these moves toward compressing greater

firepower in smaller unit packages will require significant

adjustments in doctrine, leadership, organization, and command

and control as well as service relationships. The limiting factor
xxiv

will not be technological, it will be human and organizational.

Invisibility and Detectability.

The final trend helping to paint the picture of land combat

in the 21st century concerns a land force's ability to hide from

the enemy while being able to detect that enemy at greater

ranges. In the mid-19th century, invisibility--the ability to

hide from the enemy--took the form of movement at night, and the

use of trenches, vegetation, and terrain to cover the deployment

of troops, equipment, and supplies. Detectability was limited to

line of sight--scouts, spies, and cavalry. The balloon and field

glasses added range to the human eye as did the aircraft when it

was first introduced, but line of sight remained primary.

Electronic intelligence gathering and countermeasures as

well as electronic deception developed in the early-to-mid 20th

century. This added a new dimension to detectability and

invisibility. Electronic means, especially when employed as part

of a ground-air-space based system, also provide the ground

commander the capability to detect the enemy even beyond the

horizon. Using electronic means correctly, land forces can become

invisible to their enemy by appearing to be at one place while

actually being at another. General Patton's "dummy" headquarters

used to reinforce the German's belief that the invasion of Europe

would occur at the Pas de Calais and to cover Patton's Third

Army's deployment into France is but one of many examples of how

electronic means can produce "invisibility." Mock equipment,

dummy headquarters, phoney messages, faints, ruses, and other

deception operations also contribute to a land force's

invisibility.

Holography, virtual reality, the use of microelectromagnetic systems, nano-technology, televideo, and other

information networks have the potential to increase the land

force's invisibility to the enemy. Integrating the information

available from AWACS, JSTARS, UAVs, as well as other currently

available systems and those yet-to-be-developed further increase

the land force commander's ability to detect the enemy at

extended distances. Advanced technological and human intelligence

systems will continue to expand the commander's detection range,

improve the resolution of the information gathered, and

disseminate the data to the proper levels via near real-time,

digital transfer. The battlefield will become more transparent to

the commander of such a force and more opaque to his adversary.

Taken together, these trends enable one to forecast what

land combat in the 21st century may be like. That forecast has

two parts. First, how will political leaders use land forces?

Land forces of the 21st century will be involved in preventing
xxv

crises from occurring or from developing into conflicts;

resolving conflicts before they spread or become war; or ending

wars decisively on terms favorable to the United States and its

allies.

Preventative measures will include alerts or deployment of

forces before a crisis occurs; exchanges and contacts to promote

confidence-building; and operations that nurture stability or

defuse instability--e.g. peace enforcement, supervision of

cease-fires, assisting in maintenance of law and order,

protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the

enforcement of sanctions.

Preventative measures also include those long-term

relationships that build or sustain strong regional friendships.

In many cases, the demonstrated ability and will to deploy forces

that are technologically superior and fully capable of decisive

victory in a variety of conditions contribute to preventing

crises from occurring or from developing into conflicts.37 Such

capability itself contains deterrent value.

While political leaders will use land forces, as well as

naval and air forces, in a preventative way whenever they can, to

focus solely on preventative measures would be wrong. American

land forces also will be called upon to end hostilities,

decisively and on terms favorable to the United States and her

allies.

Second, how will land combat be conducted in the 21st

century? Regardless of how land combat forces are used, they will

be capable--operating as part of a joint force--of detecting the

enemy at extended, over-the-horizon distances while remaining

invisible to that enemy; delivering fires--also over the horizon-

-to facilitate maneuver; thus destroying the enemy force and

disintegrating his cohesion throughout the depth of the theater

or battlefield. Further, land combat forces of the 21st century

will be raised, equipped, deployed, organized, and trained to

achieve overwhelming success in both traditional war and those

"operations other than war" that Michael Howard accurately

described as "often indistinguishable from traditional war."38

Each of the five trends is important in its own right. The

synergism they create, however, reinforces the changes occurring

in the international and domestic context where wars are fought

and military force is used. Together, the changes occurring in so

many areas that affect the conduct of land warfare result in a

crescendo of change.

The projections identified for each of the trends and the

resulting forecast concerning the conduct of future warfare are
xxvi

not the result of Buck Rogers-type speculation or Star Wars

science fiction or radical breaks with the past. Rather, they are

extrapolations--sometimes linear, sometimes not--of forces that

have come together, like natural forces combine into a

thunderstorm. In the midst of such change, one can only begin to

understand the scope of the paradigm shift required.39 However,

the details provided by the trends--lethality and dispersion,

volume and precision of fires, integrative technology, mass and

effects, and invisibility and detectability--and the background

provided by the conceptual shifts outlined earlier--the passing

of the cold war strategic paradigm and the refining of the

understanding of how to use military force--provide a forecast

clear enough to begin positioning the Army for these

developments.

CONTINUITIES IN THE NATURE OF WARFARE

As this positioning takes place and the Army of the 21st

century emerges, strategists should not be mesmerized either by

the amount of change taking place or by the expectations of

advanced technology. As much as the conduct of warfare will

change in the future, at least three aspects will remain the

same. First, the future will differ little from the past with

regard to the root causes of war. People--whether political

leaders of a nation-state or leaders of some other kind of

organization--still fight wars as a result of fear, hatred,

greed, ambition, revenge, and a host of other quite human and

ever-present emotions. They still fight when they perceive that

they can accomplish their objectives by resorting to force, or

that they have no other alternative, or that honor or pride or

principle or "the gods" demand it. In other words, they fight for

what are to them fundamental reasons, even if others do not share

or understand their rationale. Therefore, strategists must

clearly and completely think through the use of countervailing

force and its possible unintended consequences.

The future will also be similar to the past with respect to

a second important aspect of war: its nature. The nature of war,

even in "operations other than war"--peacekeeping, humanitarian

assistance, or enforcement of sanctions--remains a contest of

wills where one group attempts to force its will on others.

Ambiguity, uncertainty, fog, friction, danger, stark fear,

anxiety, and chance as well as leadership, courage, comradeship,

self-sacrifice, and honor--continue to describe accurately the

conditions with which military forces have had to contend and

will continue to contend. Death and destruction remain the coins

of war's realm, and no amount of technology or euphemistic labels

will alter their weight. As much as one would like to think that

simple solutions are possible, the reality is that wars are

messy.
xxvii

Perhaps the most important constant is this: war demands

both science and art from the leaders who wage it. To think that

one without the other will solve the problems posed by war is to

err and err seriously. The future will find predictive modelling,

integrative technology, precision guidance systems, and other

high technology increasingly useful--necessary, but not

sufficient. The artistic side of war will remain: creativity,

intuition, leadership, motivation, decisionmaking under

conditions of limited information. These will never lose their

importance, for they describe war's essence. Technology

contributed greatly to victory in the Battle of Britain for

example, but technology alone cannot account for British success.

Finally, the future will resemble the past with respect to

the essence of fighting power. Technology is important to the

process of generating combat power, but one must not let the

glitter of technology obscure other sources of fighting power.

"An army's worth as a military instrument," van Creveld explains,

equals the quality and quantity of its equipment

multiplied by [its] fighting power. The latter rests on

mental, intellectual, and organizational foundations;

its manifestations, in one combination or another, are

discipline and cohesion, morale and initiative, courage

and toughness, the willingness to fight, and the

readiness, if necessary, to die.40

The root causes of war, the nature of war, and the essence

of fighting power--these are several of the immutable elements

concerning war. As absolutely essential as maintaining

technological superiority is, especially in helping offset

reductions in size, the simple truth is that technology will not

solve all the problems associated with war. Prosecuting war

requires both science and art. Judgment, trust, cohesion,

creativity, flexibility, and just plain guts also are absolutely

necessary. Again, van Creveld is instructive,

When the chips are down, there is no `rational'

calculation in the world capable of causing the

individual to lay down his life. On both the individual

and collective levels, war is therefore primarily an

affair of the heart. It is dominated by such irrational

factors as resolution and courage, honor and duty and

loyalty and sacrifice of self. When everything is said

and done, none of these have anything to do with

technology, whether primitive or sophisticated.41

Those who would seek "silver bullets" must first acknowledge

that land warfare under Napoleon, Grant, Pershing, Patton,
xxviii

Ridgway, Westmoreland, Thurman, Stiner, Schwarzkopf, and Hoar is

surprisingly similar. War is a matter of heart and will first;

weaponry and technology second. Thus, while strategists must

understand the role that technology plays in changing how land

combat will be conducted in the 21st century, so too must they

acknowledge the ways in which the nature of warfare remains

constant.

Political and military strategists would also be wise to

remember what General Sherman wrote of General Grant's campaign

plan to end the Civil War. In April 1864, just one month prior to

starting his final campaign, Grant had sent Sherman a map upon

which was sketched the general plan for the 1864-65 campaign.

Seeing the map, Sherman understood what was in Grant's mind. In

response, he wrote: "this was as far as human foresight could

penetrate."42 Sherman knew that it would be folly to plan in

detail too far into the future, for there were too many variables

and too many unknowns. Grant and his subordinates would have to

remain flexible, ready to react to situations and events that

they had no way to predict. On one hand, Grant's overall vision

remained fixed throughout the campaign. On the other hand, the

specifics remained flexible.

Sherman's words provided good advice at the dawn of

industrial warfare, and they are equally instructive at the dawn

of post-industrial warfare. By understanding the two conceptual

shifts that have and are taking place relative to the context of

war, the five trends that affect the conduct of post-industrial

warfare, and what remains constant among all that is changing,

one can forecast how land combat may be conducted in the 21st

century. Like Grant's overall campaign plan, that forecast--

albeit in outline form--can act as the goal to guide near-term

plans.

One should be skeptical of any military strategist who

claims certainty about the future of warfare, especially those

who assert that technology changes the fundamental nature of war.

One should be even more skeptical of the political strategist who

believes that certainty in war is possible. "For precision cannot

be expected in the treatment of all subjects alike...", Aristotle

reminds us. "A well-schooled man is one who searches for that

degree of precision in each kind of study which the nature of the

subject at hand admits."43 Good advice for political and military

strategists alike.

ENDNOTES

1. Maurice Mandelbaum, The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge,

Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977, pp. 138,

140.
xxix

2. A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, twelfth edition, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1980, p. 2.

3. Ibid., p. 2.

4. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations,"

Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, p. 101.

5. For a different perspective on the forces of integration

and disintegration, see Paul Kennedy's "True Leadership for the

Next Millenium," The New York Times OP-ED, January 3, 1993, p. 9.

6. U.S. News and World Report, November 30, 1992, p. 36.

7. John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold

War," Atlantic, August 1990, pp. 35-50; personal unclassified

briefing from the United States Army Intelligence and Security

Command, December 1, 1992.

8. The information contained in this paragraph was taken

from a Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations Briefing on December 21,

1992. See also Murray Weidenbaum, Small Wars, Big Defense, New

York: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 14-16.

9. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American

History, Boston: MA: 1986, pp. 23-48, esp. p. 44.

10. Robert D. Hormats, "The Roots of American Power,"

Foreign Affairs, Summer 1991, pp. 132-149.

11. William S. Dietrich, In the Shadow of the Rising Sun,

University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press,

1991, p. 9.

12. Dietrich, pp. 10-31; Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The

Coming Battle Among Japan, Europe and America, New York: William

Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992, pp. 30, 35-39.

13. Peter F. Drucker, The New Realities, New York: Harper

and Row Publishers, 1989, pp. 137-138.

14. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America:

Reflections on a Multicultural Society, New York: W.W. Norton and

Company, 1992.

15. James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to

Define America, New York: Basic Books, 1991, pp. 31-64.

16. David Halberstam, The Next Century, New York: William
xxx

Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991, pp. 99-126; John Kenneth

Galbraith, The Culture of Contentment, New York: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1992, pp. 13-29, 154-183.

17. James M. Dubik, "On the Foundations of National Military

Strategy: Past and Present," School of Advanced Military Studies

Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 31, 1990; Thomas S.

Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press, 1970, second edition, pp. 52-91.

18. For a summary of the cold war in terms of the strategic

offense and defense, see Zbigniew Brezezinski's "The Cold War and

its Aftermath," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1992, pp. 31-49.

19. Preliminary Draft, Field Manual FM 100-5, Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 21, 1992,

pp. 5-1 through 5-6.

20. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, New York: Macmillan

Publishing Company, Inc., 1973, pp. 6-7.

21. Michael Howard, The Lessons of History, London: Yale

University Press, 1991, p. 176.

22. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael

Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1976, p. 75, 87.

23. Ibid., p. 579.

24. Brodie, pp. 7-8.

25. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the

Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 156.

26. Christopher Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land

Warfare: Theory and Practice, New York: Routledge, 1990, p. 47.

27. Richard Simpkin, The Race to the Swift: Thoughts on

Twenty-First Century Warfare, New York: Brassey's Defense

Publishers, 1985, pp. 1-18, 79-92; Martin van Creveld, Technology

and War, New York: The Free Press, 1989, pp. 81-97, 167-182;

Colonel T.N. DuPuy, U.S. Army retired, The Evolution of Weapons

and Warfare, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1980, pp.

190-202; James J. Schneider, "Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil

War and the Emergence of Operational Art," School of Advanced

Military Studies Net Call, Fort Leavenworth, KS: July 23, 1992,

pp. 16-20.

28. van Creveld, Technology and War, pp. 172-182.
xxxi

29. John Keegan, The Face of Battle, New York: Vintage

Books, 1977, pp. 295-298; S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The

Problem of Battle Command in Future War, Glouster, MA: Peter

Smith, 1978, pp. 36-49, 85-156; Ardant DuPicq, Battle Studies,

Ancient and Modern Battle, Harrisburg, PA: The Telegraph Press,

1946, pp. 94-102; Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The

Behavior of Soldiers in Battle, Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff

Publishing, 1982, pp. 41-49; John Ellis, The Sharp End: The

Fighting Man in World War II, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,

1980, pp. 315-352; Roger Spiller, "The Tenth Imperative,"

Military Review, April 1989, pp. 2-13; and, "Isen's Run: Human

Dimensions of Warfare in the 20th Century," Military Review, May

1988, pp. 16-31.

30. van Creveld, Technology and War, p. 171.

31. Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of

Napoleon, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980, pp.

109-114.

32. Bellamy, p. 68.

33. Schneider, pp. 25-26; van Creveld, Technology and War,

pp. 156-170.

34. Martin van Creveld, Command in War, Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. 261-275; Richard Simpkin, pp.

227-255; von Clausewitz, pp. 100-121.

35. van Creveld, Command in War, p. 146.

36. Richard Simpkin, pp. 79-86, 93-114, 133-143. Simpkin

explains his concept of "sufficient" mass on these pages. He

acknowledges that the argument that smaller forces can create

decisive effects is true only up to a point. That point is

identified as the one at which the mass involved is insufficient

to threaten the enemy force. To use this amount of mass is to err

on the side of deficiency. One can also err, Simpkin points out,

on the side of excess. One can employ too much mass--that is, a

force so large that all of it is not usable. Between these two

extremes is "sufficient mass," that amount sufficient to threaten

the specific enemy force in question. Clausewitz expresses a

similar notion in Chapter 14 of Book Three, "Economy of Force."

Here Clausewitz maintains that a commander achieves true economy

of force when "all forces are involved...[and] no part of the

whole force is idle.", p. 213.

37. Gary L. Guertner, "Conventional Deterrence and U.S.

Strategy," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1992, pp. 141-151.
xxxii

38. Howard, p. 176.

39. Kuhn, pp. 52-172.

40. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power, Westport, CT:

Greenwood Press, 1982, p. 3.

41. van Creveld, Technology and War, p. 314.

42. William T. Sherman, "The Grand Strategy of the Last Year

of the War," in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Retreat

with Honor, Secaucus, NJ: Castle Books, p. 248.

43. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by Martin Ostwald,

Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merril Educational Publishing, 1962,

1094b10-25.
xxxiii

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*******

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Gary L. Guertner

Authors

General Gordon R. Sullivan

Lieutenant Colonel James M. Dubik

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*******

Cover Artist

Lawrence C. Miller

Composition

Mary Jane Semple