Sinking of the Amphibious Passenger

Vehicle Miss Majestic, Lake Hamilton,

Near Hot Springs, Arkansas, May 1, 1999

NTSB/MAR-02/01

PB2002-916401

National 

Transportation 

Safety Board

Washington, D.C.

A

A

N TION

L TRA SPOR

ATIO

N

B OARD

SAF E T Y

N

T

E PLURIBUS UNUM 

Marine Accident Report 

Marine Accident Report

Sinking of the Amphibious Passenger 

Vehicle Miss Majestic, Lake Hamilton,

Near Hot Springs, Arkansas, May 1, 1999

NTSB/MAR-02/01

PB2002-916401 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7222B 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted April 2, 2002 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2002. Sinking of the Amphibious Passenger Vehicle Miss

Majestic, Lake Hamilton, Near Hot Springs, Arkansas, May 1, 1999 Includes Marine Accident Brief

Reports Sinking of the Alvis Stalwart M/V Minnow, Milwaukee Harbor, Milwaukee, Wisconsin,

September 18, 2000, and Sinking of the M/V DUKW No. 1, Lake Union, Seattle, Washington, December

8, 2001. Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-02/01. Washington, DC.

Abstract: This report discusses the sinking of the amphibious passenger vehicle Miss Majestic during an

excursion tour of Lake Hamilton near Hot Springs, Arkansas, on May 1, 1999. Of the 21 people on board,

13 passengers, including 3 children, died. The vehicle damage was estimated at $100,000.

The Safety Boardís investigation of this accident identified safety issues in the following areas: vehicle

maintenance, Coast Guard inspections of the Miss Majestic, Coast Guard inspection guidance, reserve

buoyancy, and survivability. Based on its findings, the Safety Board made recommendations to the U.S.

Coast Guard and the Governors of the States of New York and Wisconsin.

Following this sinking accident, the Safety Board investigated two other accidents involving amphibious

passenger vehicles, which are the subjects of brief reports published in an appendix of the Miss Majestic

report. The first brief discusses the September 18, 2000, sinking of the Minnow, a 21-foot-long Alvis

Stalwart-type amphibious passenger vehicle in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, harbor. No deaths or injuries

resulted from this accident, and the vehicle damage was estimated at $170,000.The second brief discusses

the December 8, 2001, sinking of the DUKW No. 1, a 33-foot-long amphibious passenger vehicle, in Lake

Union, in Seattle, Washington. No deaths or injuries resulted from this accident, and the vehicle damage

was estimated at $100,000.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine,

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To

purchase this publication, order report number PB2002-916401 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Marine Accident Report

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Events Preceding the Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Personnel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Vessel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Waterway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Medical and Pathological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Survival Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

The Sinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Vehicle Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Coast Guard Inspections of the Miss Majestic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Coast Guard Inspection Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Reserve Buoyancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Survivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Actions Of The Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

New Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Previously Issued Recommendation Classified in this Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Concurring Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Appendixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

A: Investigation And Public Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

B: Minnow and DUKW No. 1 Accident Briefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
iv Marine Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

COI Certificate of Inspection

EMS Emergency Medical Service

gpm gallons per minute

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

MSO Marine Safety Office

NVIC Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular

OCMI Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection 

RHIB Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat

UTB utility boat
v Marine Accident Report

Executive Summary

On May 1, 1999, the amphibious passenger vehicle Miss Majestic, with an

operator and 20 passengers on board, entered Lake Hamilton near Hot Springs, Arkansas,

on a regular excursion tour. About 7 minutes after entering the water, the vehicle listed to

port and rapidly sank by the stern in 60 feet of water. One passenger escaped before the

vehicle submerged but the remaining passengers and the operator were trapped by the

vehicleís canopy roof and drawn under water. During the vehicleís descent to the bottom

of the lake, 6 passengers and the operator were able to escape and, upon their reaching the

waterís surface, were rescued by pleasure boaters in the area. The remaining 13

passengers, including 3 children, lost their lives. The vehicle damage was estimated at

$100,000.

The Safety Boardís investigation of this accident identified the following major

safety issues:

ï Vehicle maintenance,

ï Coast Guard inspections of the Miss Majestic,

ï Coast Guard inspection guidance, 

ï Reserve buoyancy, and

ï Survivability.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the uncontrolled flooding and sinking of the Miss Majestic was the failure of Land and

Lakes Tours, Inc., to adequately repair and maintain the DUKW. Contributing to the

sinking was a flaw in the design of DUKWs as converted for passenger service, that is, the

lack of adequate reserve buoyancy1

 that would have allowed the vehicle to remain afloat

in a flooded condition. Contributing to the unsafe condition of the Miss Majestic was the

lack of adequate oversight by the Coast Guard. Contributing to the high loss of life was a

continuous canopy roof that entrapped passengers within the sinking vehicle. 

As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board makes recommendations to the

U.S. Coast Guard and the Governors of the States of New York and Wisconsin.

1 Reserve buoyancy is the internal volume of a vessel that is not flooded or capable of being flooded.

1 Marine Accident Report

Factual Information

Events Preceding the Accident 

On Thursday, April 29, 1999, the Miss Majestic, an amphibious commercial

passenger vehicle that had been converted from a U.S. Army DUKW,2

 was nearing the

end of the waterborne portion of a tour in Lake Hamilton, Arkansas. (See figure 1.) As the

vehicle approached the shore, the operator said she saw that the Higgins pump, a

dewatering pump in the bilge system, was intermittently discharging water. In addition,

the forward electric bilge pump that automatically activated when water accumulated

amidships in the hull was continuously discharging water from the vehicle. The operator

radioed a report of her observations to Land and Lakes, Inc., (Land and Lakes) the

owner/operator of White and Yellow Duck Tours, before arriving at the usual return ramp,

where she drove the Miss Majestic out of the water.

2 A DUKW (pronounced ìduckî) is an amphibious landing vehicle that was designed to transport

military personnel and supplies for the U.S. Army (Army) during World War II. The Army acronym DUKW

indicates that the vehicle model was designed in 1942 (D) and that the vehicle is amphibious (U) and has

both front-wheel drive and rear-wheel drive capability (K and W, respectively). Records indicate that more

than 21,000 DUKWs were built. After the war, many DUKWs were sold as surplus and, like the Miss

Majestic, were converted to commercial excursion passenger vehicles that are in operation today.

Figure 1. The Miss Majestic. When the DUKW was converted for commercial passenger

service, a steel frame was installed around and over the passenger compartment. The

Miss Majestic had a vinyl canopy over the frame to protect passengers from the weather.
Factual Information 2 Marine Accident Report

In the meantime, Land and Lakes dispatched its senior mechanic, who arrived at

the exit ramp while the Miss Majestic was still in the lake. He, too, observed that the water

was discharging from the Higgins pumpís outflow point in a brief and intermittent manner

rather than in a steady stream. 

The operator said that after she drove the Miss Majestic up the ramp and onto dry

land, water continually leaked from the hull for about 10 minutes. During the same time,

water continuously discharged from the forward electric bilge pump.

After the mechanic examined the vehicle and determined that the source of the

leak was a tear in the forward rubber boot3 on the rear driveshaft housing (figure 2), the

operator drove the Miss Majestic to Hot Springs, where she completed the land tour and

dropped off passengers. She then drove the Miss Majestic to the company garage for

repairs.

On April 30, at the garage, the maintenance mechanic began work after 12004

 on

the Miss Majestic after conducting daily checks on three other DUKWs that were being

used for tours that day. To repair the leak, he replaced the forward boot with a rubber boot

that had been obtained from sources such as Army surplus. In the course of making the

repair, he discovered a small tear in the aft boot for the rear driveshaft housing; however,

he did not have time to replace the aft boot before the end of his workday. The next

morning, the day of the accident, the mechanic replaced the aft boot with a previously

used boot. The Miss Majestic was then returned to service. 

Accident Narrative

About 1130 on May 1, 1999, the operator of the Miss Majestic first picked up 18

passengers at the White and Yellow Duck Tours ticket office in Hot Springs and then two

passengers at a regular White and Yellow Ducks stop at a nearby park, for a total of 20

passengers. The operator served not only as the operator of the vehicle but also as the

narrator for the tour. After conducting a land tour of Hot Springs, the operator drove the

DUKW south on U.S. Route 7 to Lake Hamilton for the waterborne portion of the tour. 

On the northwest side of Saint Johnís Island, the operator arrived at the boat ramp

owned by Land and Lakes and, in preparation for entering the water, turned on the toggle

switch to power the three electric bilge pumps.5

 The operator then stood up, faced the

passengers, and briefed them on the water tour sights and safety instructions. She warned

them that smoking was prohibited by the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) and was

punishable by a fine. The operator pointed out that the lifejackets were stowed on wooden

3 The driveshafts for the wheels penetrated the hull and were protected by cylindrical steel housings.

The housings were fitted with rubber boots to maintain the watertight integrity of the hull. The boots were

held in place by hose clamps. If the boots had holes or were dislodged, water could freely enter the hull.

4 All times are central daylight times, based on a 24-hour clock.

5 The forward electric pump operated only when its float switch was activated by the presence of water.

The aft electric pumps were activated by the operator turning on a toggle switch on the dashboard.
Factual Information 3 Marine Accident Report

Figure 2. Top illustration shows the Miss Majesticís assembly and the approximate

locations of the Higgins pump and the three electric bilge pumps. Bottom illustration

shows a side view of the driveshaft housing and components as designed by the Army.

Transmission Transfer

Water Propeller Guardian

Bilge Pump Higgins

Pump

Proline

Bilge Pump

Proline

Bilge Pump

Aft Rubber

Boot Drive Shaft

Housing

Forward

Transfer Rubber Boot

Case

Hull

FWD

Plan view of the Miss Majestic's drive shaft and chassis assembly. The area indicated by a 

dotted line includes the drive shaft and its rubber boots, which were designed to provide a 

waterproof seal for the drive shaft's penetration into the hull.

Retaining

Ring

Forward

Rubber Boot

Shaft

Housing

Clamp

Rings

Hinge

Pin

Hinge

Assembly

Drain

Plug

Aft Rubber

Boot

Above is the drive shaft housing and hinge pin assembly as shown in the Army technical 

manual for DUKWs. The hinge pin assembly, which holds the housing in position relative to 

the hull, was missing from the Miss Majestic.
Factual Information 4 Marine Accident Report

shelving underneath the overhead canopy covering the passenger compartment of the

vehicle. 

While briefing the passengers about the lifejackets, the operator tried to pull one

out of the storage rack (see figure 3) to demonstrate how to don it. When she could not

pull a lifejacket free, the operator gave up trying.6 According to passengers, as the

operator retook her seat at the forward part of the vehicle, she pointed to the lifejackets

and said, ìTheyíre up there.î The passengers said that the operator neither offered

lifejackets to anyone nor explained how to get off the vehicle in case of an emergency on

the water. 

The operator then put the DUKWís transmission into neutral, engaged the

vehicleís propeller, and let the vehicle roll down the ramp into the water. The DUKW

followed along the shore of Saint Johnís Island, traveling about 4 knots. While she had

been driving on land, the operator had raised the windshield and secured the curtains on

the corner windows on either side of the windshield. She left the windshield up for the

lake tour. 

6 Safety Board investigators examined other DUKWs belonging to the company and found the

lifejackets jammed tightly into the storage racks. 

Figure 3. Postaccident view of the Miss Majesticís main passenger compartment looking

forward from the aft seating area. The lifejackets were stored in open racks above the

passengersí seats. 
Factual Information 5 Marine Accident Report

During an interview with Safety Board investigators, a 15-year old boy who had

been sitting in the third row on the port side stated that shortly after the DUKW entered

Lake Hamilton, he took off his shoes. After the DUKW had been on the lake about 4 to 5

minutes, he felt his feet getting wet and, upon looking down, saw that the deck area near

his seat was filled with water a little less than a 1⁄2-inch deep. The DUKW was riding so

low that, from his seat, he could reach down and touch the surface of the lake. He said that

he observed a stream of water pouring out of a plastic hose near the operatorís seat. The

boy likened the water discharge to that of a water stream from a 1-inch garden hose. Two

other passengers sitting on the port side also recalled seeing water discharging overboard

near the operatorís seat. The boy in the third row said that he thought the condition was

normal and that the operator did not notice the discharging water. 

The operator later stated that, about 5 to 7 minutes after the Miss Majestic entered

the lake, she noticed that the DUKW was handling sluggishly and had a small list to port.

She looked back at the passengers and asked a large man (6 feet 6 inches tall and 260

pounds) who was sitting in the sixth row on the port side to move to the starboard side of

the vehicle. (See figure 4.)

As he got up to change seats, the man saw water enter the vehicle over the stern

and realized the danger. He started pulling lifejackets from the overhead stowage area and

throwing them to other passengers, shouting at them to ìget out.î He said that passengers

in the row across from him initially remained in their seats and did not move.

At that time, the operator, who had been busy narrating the tour, looked aft and

saw water pouring over the stern into the passenger compartment. Upon seeing the inrush

of water, she immediately turned the Miss Majestic to port and headed towards shore. 

The operator later stated that she had not observed discharges from either the

Higgins pump or the forward electric bilge pump during the tour; the discharge pipes were

to her left. She had been turned to her right, to narrate the tour to the passengers, when the

vehicle had begun to flood. She had also throttled the engine down while narrating. The

operator stated that she radioed Land and Lakes on the designated VHF channel. The

owner stated that he and his employees were by their radios, but no one heard a call.

The operator and the passengers provided different time estimates of how long it

took the Miss Majestic to sink below the surface of the lake after the DUKW began to take

on water over the stern. Some individuals said that the DUKW sank within 15 seconds;

others stated that the Miss Majestic took up to about 1 minute to sink. A boater in the area

who had noticed that the Miss Majestic was riding very low in the water said that, as he

attempted to approach the vehicle to warn the operator, the Miss Majestic sank by the stern

and quickly disappeared below the surface. 

In the meantime, the 15-year-old male in the third row tried to assist other

passengers by providing lifejackets. He later stated that he was able to pull a few

lifejackets from the stowage area but said that doing so ìwas kind of hard.î Before the

vehicle submerged, he exited the port side window and crawled on top of the canopy as

the vehicle quickly slipped beneath the waterís surface.
Factual Information 6 Marine Accident Report

Figure 4. Passenger seating arrangement on the Miss Majestic.



	

	


	












	





	

   

 	



	

 	



	 	

	

   

 	


	

	



	

 

   

 	

	

 	



	

	



	

   

 	


	

  

   

 	



	

  

   

 	


	 	

	

	



	

	


	



 	



	 	

	

	


	



   

   	


	



	



	 	

	

	

 
 
	 


 


 
	

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Factual Information 7 Marine Accident Report

The large male passenger who had been tossing lifejackets to others said that water

rushing into the vehicle swept him forward and pinned him against the windshield. He

could not recall how he exited the vehicle. He said that he considered himself a strong

swimmer but that the waterís force overcame him. He said that his wife, one of the

accident fatalities, did not know how to swim.

A passenger in the second row said that, when he realized that the Miss Majestic

was submerging, he jumped out the port side window. His wife, at first, tried to use the

aisle to move to the front of the vehicle; however, upon observing other passengers

beginning to panic and seeing that the windshield blocked any exit from the forward part

of the vehicle, she returned to the portside opening where her husband had exited. As the

woman moved toward the opening, a child who had been in the sixth row grabbed and

held onto her. The woman said that she initially swam downward to free herself from the

vehicle before beginning her ascent to the surface. She said that her ascent took a long

time and that her nose was bleeding when she reached the surface of the lake. She later

stated that she was not aware that a child had grabbed hold of her until she surfaced and

people assisted the two of them into a recreational vessel. 

In the meantime, a woman in the seventh row had her feet propped up on the seat

across from her when water began pouring into the stern. The woman said that she had

hardly had time to put her feet on the deck when the incoming water was over her head.

The woman said that she was not a swimmer. As the vehicle sank deeper, she could see

nothing in the murky green, increasingly dark water. She said that she held on tightly to

the metal frame at the aft edge of the canopy; however, she was unable to overcome the

force of the water and was swept out the stern window opening. She floated to the surface,

where she was rescued. 

On the starboard side of the vehicle, a man and woman in the seventh and eighth

rows were attempting to place a lifejacket on a child when the incoming water poured over

them. The man said that he attempted to swim in what he thought was a forward direction;

however, he felt something in his way. He did not know through which opening he exited

the vehicle; he stated that it took him a while to get to the surface. 

The operator stated that she felt along the line of the roof and, upon finding an area

where the windscreen had become detached, pulled herself through the opening. She

stated that the water was dark. Although she was a strong and practiced swimmer, she

struggled to reach the surface of the lake. Upon surfacing, she noted that her clothing was

covered with dirt, which she thought was silt, indicating she had been on the lake bottom.

The operators of at least six pleasure boats that happened to be in the area

responded to assist the Miss Majesticís eight survivors as they surfaced. One of the

responders used a cellular telephone to call 911. The call was relayed to State and area

response agencies, including the Lake Hamilton Fire Department Emergency Medical

Services (EMS), the Garland County Sheriffís Department, the St. Josephís Regional

Health Center, the National Park Service, the Hot Springs Police Department, the

Arkansas State Police, and area representatives of the U.S. Red Cross. 
Factual Information 8 Marine Accident Report

The eight survivors advised responders that they were not injured physically.

Divers from the Garland County Sheriffís Department recovered the bodies of all of the

remaining passengers, 13 victims, over a 2-day period. 

Injuries 

The injuries sustained in the Miss Majestic accident, shown in table 1, are

categorized according to the injury criteria of the International Civil Aviation

Organization (ICAO). The Safety Board uses the ICAO injury criteria in all its accident

reports, regardless of transportation mode. 

Damage 

Examination of the vehicle after it was salvaged revealed that the DUKW did not

suffer any structural damage or failure and that all hull plugs were in place. Damages from

the accident were estimated at $100,000. The Safety Boardís observations of the DUKWís

condition during postaccident examinations are included in the section below, ìVehicle

Information.î 

Table 1: Injuries sustained in the Miss Majestic accident.

Injuries Passengers Crew Total

Fatal 13 0 13

Serious 0 0 0

Minor 0 0 0

None 7 1 8

Totals 20 1 21

49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.2 defines a fatal injury as: any injury that results in death within 30 

days of the accident. It defines serious injury as that which requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, 

commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received; results in a fracture of any bone (except simple 

fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; involves any 

internal organ; or involves second or third degree burns, or any burn affecting more than 5 percent of the body 

surface.
Factual Information 9 Marine Accident Report

Personnel Information

Vehicle Operator

The Miss Majesticís operator was hired by Land and Lakes in August 1998. Before

joining the tour company, she had worked as a substitute school bus driver in Mount Ida,

Arkansas, from 1997 though 1998, and as a school bus driver in Rockford, Illinois, from

1996 through 1997.7

 She had also worked as a machinist in Rockford from 1988 until

August 1995. She stated she had operated a motorboat and had 2 to 3 years experience

helping aboard ìparty bargesî and fishing craft.

The operator stated that, in preparation for her Coast Guard examination to

become certified to operate a DUKW, she had accompanied and observed licensed

DUKW operators for perhaps 3 to 4 months. On December 11, 1998, she was issued a

license as master of steam or motor vessels measuring less than 25 gross tons upon inland

waters that limited her to operating DUKW vehicles no more than 250 yards offshore in

Lake Hamilton.8 The license was valid for 5 years. The operator stated that, after receiving

her license, she drove various DUKWs under the supervision of more experienced

operators for ìprobably a week or two.î She was then permanently assigned by Land and

Lakes as operator of the Miss Majestic and, unless the vehicle was not available, normally

drove that DUKW.

The operator described herself as being in generally good health, with a history of

arthritis. She stated that she had been taking Motrin before the accident.

Contract Employees

Land and Lakes contracted with a senior mechanic9

 to perform maintenance and

repairs on its DUKWs. The senior mechanic, in turn, employed a maintenance mechanic

to assist him.

The senior mechanic had been associated with Land and Lakes for 1 1/2 years.

Before then, he had worked as a mechanic on automobiles, boats, and motorcycles, and

had done part-time maintenance for another DUKW company. His training included 2

years at a vocational school, where his instruction focused primarily on small engine

mechanics. 

7 The operator held an Arkansas State Commercial Driverís License (CDL) that was valid through

March 16, 2002. The Class B license included motorcycle and passenger endorsements and was restricted to

vehicles without air brakes. She had previously held an Illinois CDL.

8 The Coast Guard requirements for issuing an operatorís license for steam or motor vessels measuring

less than 25 gross tons, which are contained in 46 CFR Subchapter B, Part 10, Subpart D, include minimum

age, citizenship, physical suitability (including drug and alcohol testing), character (including criminal

history and driving record), training in first aid and CPR, successful completion of a written examination,

and vessel experience. 

9 Because he served in a supervisory capacity, this report will refer to the contract mechanic as the

senior mechanic. 
Factual Information 10 Marine Accident Report

The maintenance mechanic had been employed by the senior mechanic to assist

him with the Land and Lakes contract work for about 2 months. Before this contract job,

he had worked for 2 years for a company where he drove and performed maintenance on

dump trucks. The maintenance mechanic had previously worked for Land and Lakes for

11 years as a DUKW driver. During that time, he also had performed some maintenance

work on the DUKWs. 

As assistant to the senior mechanic, the maintenance mechanic said he performed

general work on DUKWs, including testing lights, checking fluid levels and pumps,

repairing brakes, and replacing starters, alternators, universal joints, and worn or damaged

boots.

Work and Rest Schedules

The Miss Majesticís operator regularly worked Tuesdays through Saturdays and

was off Sundays and Mondays. She provided a summary of her work and rest schedule

during the 3 days before the accident, which is shown in table 2. The maintenance

mechanic provided a brief account of his 72-hour history before the accident, which is also

included in table 2.

Table 2: Seventy-two hour history of the operator and mechanic

Day Miss Majesticís Operator Maintenance Mechanic

Thursday,

April 29

0600óArose, fed horses, had breakfast, showered, 

and went to work. Had coffee and took a 1-hour nap.

1100óGave first tour of day. Had two additional tours, 

the last of which was at 1800. During the last tour, 

noted and reported atypical bilge-pump operations. 

1915óLeft work and went home. Went to bed about 

2100.

Not scheduled for work. 

Performed light work at home.

2200óWent to bed. 

Friday,

April 30

0600óArose and prepared for work.

1100óDrove the Miss Andrea DUKW because the 

Miss Majestic was being repaired.

1600óDrove the Miss Sands DUKW because of gear 

shift problems experienced with the Miss Andrea. Went 

home after 1600 tour.

2130óWent to bed after riding horses and having 

supper.

0630óArose.

0730óReported to work. 

Performed routine daily 

maintenance on the DUKWs, 

including the Miss Majestic.

Time went to bed not provided.

Saturday,

May 1

0530óArose and prepared for work. Dropped off 

daughter at the Little Rock, Arkansas, airport and 

reported to work about 0815.

1130óDeparted with tour group.

Shortly before noonóMiss Majestic sinks.

Time arose not provided.

Performed maintenance on the 

Miss Majestic.
Factual Information 11 Marine Accident Report

Vessel Information

The DUKW that was converted to passenger use and became the Miss Majestic

was built in 1944 as an amphibious landing vehicle designed to transport Army military

personnel. According to the Coast Guardís Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular10

(NVIC) No. 1-01, Inspection of Amphibious Passenger Carrying Vehicles, the Army

DUKWs were designed:

Öfor the purpose of making beach landings and then proceeding onshore to

provide limited troop transportation away from the beachhead. These vehicles

were built with a life expectancy of only a few months. Although mechanically

rugged, hull construction was simplified for the sake of the accelerated production

schedule and the vehicleís anticipated short life expectancy.

The Miss Majestic was inspected and certificated by the Coast Guard as a small

passenger vessel11 meeting the requirements of 46 CFR Parts 175-185 (Subchapter T). The

Coast Guard Certificate of Inspection (COI) permitted the Miss Majestic to operate

voyages not exceeding 30 minutes on Lake Hamilton no more than 250 yards from shore.

The characteristics of the Miss Majestic are summarized below. 

The Miss Majesticís hull was constructed of 7/64 (0.109)- and 5/64 (0.078)-inch

steel sheet metal with welded stiffeners. The vehicle had no internal watertight

subdivision bulkheads; except for minor structural interferences such as tunnels and hull

stiffeners, the vehicleís internal hull was open forward to aft. The DUKW had a threebladed, right-hand-turning propeller in a half tunnel at the stern. When fully loaded, the

Miss Majestic trimmed by the stern with a freeboard of about 2 feet forward and 8 to

12 inches aft. 

10 The Coast Guard Headquarters issues NVICs to disseminate recommended [emphasis added] policy,

requirements, procedures, or guidance for Coast Guard marine safety personnel and the marine industry. 

11 A vessel of less than 100 gross tons carrying more than six passengers for hire.

Length: 31 feet

Beam: 8 feet 2 inches

Gross Tonnage: 5

Crew: 1 (operator)

Passenger capacity: 32 (24 in the main area, 8 in the raised rear platform)

Propulsion: 140 hp V-8 Chevrolet 350 gasoline engine,

radiator cooled

Transmission: Turbo Hydromatic 400 automatic 4 speed
Factual Information 12 Marine Accident Report

As part of the Miss Majesticís conversion for commercial use, the following

passenger accommodations were added: 

ï At the centerline of the stern, a hinge-mounted ladder was added for passenger

entry from and exit to land. After boarding, the ladder was hinged up and

secured. (See figure 1.) 

ï Eight rows of passenger seats were added, with the last two rows on a raised

deck aft. Each row had two seats on each side of the centerline aisle. (See

figures 2 and 3.) The aisle width in both the main passenger compartment and

the after deck area was 12 inches. The distance from seat front to seat front in

the main passenger compartment was 26 inches. The after deck area contained

two rows of seats that faced each other. The distance between the two facing

seat fronts was 14 inches.

ï A steel frame was installed around and over the passenger compartment. The

vertical members of the frame created 28-inch-high ìwindowsî at the seat

rows. From forward to aft, the six windows in the main compartment had a

clearance width of 33, 18, 33, 33, 33, and 40 inches, respectively. The width of

the window at the seat row on the raised deck was 51 inches.

ï A vinyl canopy was installed over the steel frame of the passenger

compartment to protect passengers from the weather. 

ï Clear, roll-up, vinyl side curtains were added along both sides of the passenger

compartment. When the curtains were rolled up, the window clearance was

21 inches. 

The aisle in the main passenger compartment was 14 feet long; on the after deck,

the aisle was 4 feet, 4 inches long. Thus, the entire length of the Miss Majesticís centerline

aisle was 18 feet, 4 inches.

Federal regulations contained in 46 CFR 177.30-1 stipulate that the width of aisles

more than 15 feet long should be no less than 30 inches and the distance from seat front to

seat front should not be less than 30 inches. According to the Coast Guard, the Miss

Majestic had been granted a waiver for meeting the aisle width and seat separation

requirements. Coast Guard files for the Miss Majestic contained no record indicating how

the acceptable dimensions were determined. 

According to Coast Guard documents, the Miss Majestic met regulations in

Subchapter T, which require that a vessel pass an intact stability test to demonstrate that its

freeboard will not immerse should passengers move from one side of the vessel to the

other. 

Design and Components 

Driveshaft Housing and Boot System. The aft driveshaft that ran from the

transfer case to the rear differential and drive wheels of the Miss Majestic had a housing

for watertight protection. In the DUKW design, the shaft housing was supported and held
Factual Information 13 Marine Accident Report

in position, relative to the hull, by a hinge assembly and, relative to the differential, by a

support bracket. The hinge prevented the shaft housing from shifting forward and aft. 

Each end of the aft shaft housing had an accordion rubber boot. The aft rubber boot

was attached to the aft end of the shaft housing and the differential using hose clamps. The

forward rubber boot was clamped onto the housing using a hose clamp and bolted to a

cutout in the chassis. The two rubber boots together with the shaft housing were to provide

a watertight barrier where the drive axle penetrated the hull.

The Miss Majestic had a similarly configured forward shaft housing to protect the

front wheel driveshaft. 

Bilge Pump System. Federal regulations contained in 46 CFR 182.520 stipulate

that vessels must be equipped with bilge pumps. The number of the required pumps and

their minimum capacity depends upon the length of the vessel and the number of

passengers that it carries. The Miss Majestic was required to have two bilge pumps: one

with a pumping capacity of 10 gallons per minute (gpm) and a second with a pumping

capacity of 5 gpm. The Miss Majestic had three electric pumps, one Guardian model 1100

and two Proline model 22702s. 

The Guardian 1100, manufactured by Attwood Corporation, was a submersiblestyle, 12-volt electric pump that automatically float-activated when water accumulated

amidships in the hull. The Guardian pump was equipped with a 1-inch diameter plastic

discharge hose and had a maximum discharge capacity of 18 gpm. On the Miss Majestic,

the Guardian pump was located on the hull bottom, immediately forward of the Higgins

pump. The Guardianís hose discharged athwartships to port at the port gunwale,

immediately to the left of the operatorís station. 

The Proline Model No. 22702, manufactured by Mayfair Marine, was a

submersible-style, 12-volt electric pump that activated when the operator turned on a

toggle switch. The Proline Model No. 22702 pump had a maximum discharge capacity of

12.5 gpm. On the Miss Majestic, the two Proline pumps were installed near the stern,

where water usually collected because of the vehicleís trim. One Proline pump was

located behind the port rear wheel well and the other Proline pump was behind the

starboard rear wheel well. The discharge points for the Proline pumps were at the stern

deck, on either side of the passenger embarkation step; the pump discharge hoses were

directed aft. 

A single toggle switch on the dashboard provided power to the three electric bilge

pumps. The operatorsí practice was to turn on the switch before entering the water and to

turn it off when exiting the water to prevent the Proline pumps from running dry and

failing prematurely while the vehicle traveled on land. A red light on the control console

indicated when the switch was on.

As with most amphibious vehicles converted from Army DUKWs, the Miss

Majestic had a Higgins pump, which was not required by Federal regulation. The Higgins

pump had a maximum capacity of 250 gpm. The pump was chain-driven from the water
Factual Information 14 Marine Accident Report

propeller driveshaft through a keyed sprocket on the pump shaft and operated whenever

the propellerís driveshaft was engaged. (See figure 5.) The Higgins pump discharged

straight upward and overboard through an opening on the port side gunwale, near the

second row of seats.

Figure 5. The Higgins pump arrangement. The centrifugal-type, bronze pump had a

4-bolt mounting bracket, which, in the case of the Miss Majestic, attached the pump onto

the port longitudinal girder (channel) under the passenger compartment. The face of the

pumpís intake (suction) strainer was about 1 1/2 inches above the bottom of the vehicle.

The 2 1/2-inch-diameter discharge pipe extending upward from the pump had three

sections: a lower discharge tube, a center discharge tube, and an upper discharge tube.

A short section of hose with clamps connected the lower discharge tube to the pump

discharge. 
Factual Information 15 Marine Accident Report

Bilge Alarm. In 1996, Subchapter T was revised to require that vessels at least

26 feet long be equipped with high-level bilge alarms. The regulations stated that existing

vessels, such as the Miss Majestic, had until March 11, 1999, to comply with the highlevel alarm requirement. On the day of the accident, the Miss Majestic was not equipped

with a bilge alarm.

Hull Plugs. For ease of maintenance, the Miss Majestic had three 4-inch screwtype access plugs on the hull bottom: one plug was under the transmission, one was under

the propeller transfer box, and one was under the main drive transfer casing. The vehicle

had five 1-inch screw-type drain plugs, including a plug at the differential end of each of

the forward and aft shaft housings, a plug on the hull centerline just forward of the front

axle chase tunnel, and a plug in each of the pods aft of the aft wheel wells. All plugs were

secured in place at the time of the accident.

Postaccident Examination of the Vehicle

Driveshaft Boots. Shortly after the Miss Majestic was salvaged from Lake

Hamilton, Safety Board investigators found that the aft rubber boot had separated from the

rear shaft housing. (See figure 6.) Upon attempting to replace the boot on the housing,

investigators found that the hose clamp holding the rubber boot onto the aft shaft housing

was sufficiently loose to enable them to turn the boot by hand. Investigators were able to

reclamp the boot onto the housing by tightening the hose clamp screw with two to two and

a half turns of a screwdriver. The hose clamp securing the boot on to the differential was

tight. 

Figure 6. Postaccident view of the rear driveshaft boot.
Factual Information 16 Marine Accident Report

Investigators found that the hinge pin assembly bracket at the forward end of the

shaft housing had been removed.

Hull. During the on-scene examination of the vehicle, Safety Board investigators

visually examined the hull and found an irregularly shaped 14-inch-long by 6-inch-wide

silicone rubber repair patch covering a corroded area above the right rear wheel leaf spring

support. The hull area below the waterline, near the vehicle centerline, had a 1⁄2-inch by oinch hole about 2 feet forward of where the propeller shaft entered the hull. The area

around the hole was corroded. Investigators also found a pinhole in the right rear wheel

well, about 1 foot from the rear end of the well. 

Higgins Pump. Safety Board investigators found that the key attaching the pump

shaft to its drive chain sprocket was missing. The sprocket appeared old and had excess

play on the pump shaft. Investigators noted that the play in the sprocket allowed the drive

chain to rub against the hull frame; they also observed several abrasion marks on the

frame. The pump impeller turned freely at the time of the examination. Investigators

found that a 1 1⁄2-inch portion of an impeller bladeís leading edge was sheared off. 

The intake strainer was found detached from the pump suction and lying on the

vehicleís bottom inside the hull.

The overboard discharge pipe had separated from the hose connecting it to the

pump discharge. The hose was rotted. The U-clamp that secured the discharge pipe to the

chassis girder was missing. (See figure 7.)

A description of the Safety Boardís laboratory examination of the Higgins pump

and other components appears under the ìTests and Researchî section.

Electrical pumps. Investigators tested the three electrical pumps on scene. The

Proline pump on the aft port side was inoperable; the other two pumps were operable. 

Waterway Information

The accident occurred in Lake Hamilton, an 18.5-mile-long man-made lake

located in the southwestern part of Arkansas, near the city of Hot Springs. The water depth

was about 60 feet where the Miss Majestic sank, about 200 yards from shore. 

Lake Hamilton was created by the construction of the Carpenter Dam on the

Ouachita River in 1932. After the dam was constructed, the created lake was regarded

locally as a State waterway. In 1976, the Coast Guard assumed authority over the

waterway. In 1982, Land and Lakes, the owner of the Miss Majestic and other DUKWs,

successfully contested in Federal District Court the Coast Guardís authority over the lake.

In 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the previous ruling stating that Lake Hamilton

was a navigable waterway because it had been formed from a portion of the Ouachita

River, which is a navigable river of the United States, and, therefore, was under the

jurisdiction of the Coast Guard.
Factual Information 17 Marine Accident Report

Operations

Company Information

The owner/president of Land and Lakes stated that he had operated DUKWs in

Hot Springs for 40 years. He had operated under State regulations for the first 20 years and

under Coast Guard regulations for the remaining time. Land and Lakes operated under the

business title ìWhite and Yellow Ducks.î Seven of the companyís 12 vehicles were

licensed for passenger operations. Four of the seven were in service at the time of this

accident.

The company employed three operators who were assigned to specific DUKWs.

Tours were scheduled to start at 0900, 1100, 1230, 1400, 1600, and 1800 (plus 2000 in

summer), depending upon the availability of at least six passengers, and lasted about

90 minutes. 

The owner had no written instructions or operational policies for the operators and

the mechanics. He stated that he believed frequent verbal instructions were sufficient for

Figure 7. The discharge hose of the Higgins pump was broken and missing the

U-clamp that connected the pump to a chassis girder of the vehicle.
Factual Information 18 Marine Accident Report

the operators and mechanics to know what was expected of them. He said that he

frequently asked the operators about the daily checks they made of their assigned vehicles.

Further, he said he was frequently present when the DUKWs arrived at the office, at which

time he would listen for noises that might indicate a mechanical problem. He also said that

he often asked the operators whether they had heard any new sounds or noises from their

DUKWs or whether they had experienced any problems. He stressed his opinion that it

was important for each driver to be assigned to a specific DUKW because each one had its

own characteristics and this knowledge aided the operators in recognizing any change in

noise or operation of their DUKW. 

The owner stated that he relied on the Coast Guard inspectors to provide guidance

regarding Coast Guard requirements and what he needed to do to be in compliance with

Federal regulations. 

Vehicle Maintenance 

According to the senior mechanic, the daily maintenance practice was for the

mechanics to visually inspect under the DUKWsí hoods each morning for leaks, turn on

the electric pumps and listen to them work, check the brakes, start the engines, and check

the fluid levels. 

The company did not have a preventive maintenance program. With the exception

of routine oil and seasonal antifreeze changes and periodic lubrication of joints, the

maintenance mechanics made repairs only after problems, including leaky boots, were

reported or discovered. The company also had no preventive maintenance schedule for the

Higgins pump. 

The company had no written procedures for conducting vehicle maintenance or for

testing or checking to verify the effectiveness of repairs, such as testing the boots while

the vehicle was in the water. The senior mechanic stated that the band clamp attaching the

rubber seal to the shaft housing could have been inadvertently installed in a cocked

position because of the difficulty of working under the vehicle, and that a cocked clamp

could have caused the boot to come loose. The senior mechanic said that he did not check

the maintenance mechanicís installation of the boot on the day of the accident. 

The senior mechanic stated that the company did not have a policy of keeping

regular written maintenance or repair records or logs. He stated that the maintenance

mechanic occasionally filled in maintenance logs on his own. The senior mechanic

provided logs to Safety Board investigators for work performed on December 31, 1997,

April 26, 1999, and May 1, 1999. No maintenance records for 1998 and for the period

preceding April 26, 1999, were available. The senior mechanic stated that the records

were stored in a file cabinet, but he was not aware of any follow-up process for reviewing

or taking action on the maintenance records. He stated that driveshaft universal joints

(U-joints) on all DUKWs were greased weekly; however, no records of the work were

kept.
Factual Information 19 Marine Accident Report

The maintenance log dated May 1, 1999, indicates only minor maintenance on the

Miss Majestic. It states that the bilge pumps were working, boots were installed on the aft

shaft housing, new caps were put on the U-joints, and the brakes were adjusted. The

maintenance sheet for April 26, 1999, indicates that the U-joints were greased, the brakes

were adjusted, and the bilge pumps were working; no other problems were noted. The

maintenance record for December 31, 1997, which is unsigned, shows that more

significant repairs were made, including installation of a new carburetor and fuel pump,

replacement of alternator wiring, and repair of the cooling system, the bushing in the

rudder shaft, and the front end bearing and seals.

Although technical manuals that provide maintenance guidance for the DUKWs

are still available from the Army, neither the company nor its mechanics had technical

manuals or drawings providing information about the DUKWsí special features. Some

portions of the manuals, however, do not apply to passenger DUKWs because of the

modifications made when they were converted to commercial service. The mechanics

stated that they did not know the purpose of the hinge pin assembly (which had been

removed earlier). The senior mechanic stated that the hinge assembly rattled and its

presence made accessing the U-joints for greasing more difficult. Further, he had seen the

hinge assembly removed from other DUKWs. He said that he did not know when the

hinge assembly had been removed from the Miss Majestic. 

The senior mechanic stated that it was difficult to obtain replacement rubber boots

as they were no longer manufactured.12 Land and Lakes generally used Army surplus

rubber boots. He further stated that often these boots had clamp marks, indicating previous

usage, and fine surface cracks.

The senior mechanic stated that he performed major repairs and overhauls for

engines, transmissions, and Higgins pumps at Land and Lakes; however, he was unable to

provide maintenance records, repair dates, or receipts for major overhauls or repairs. He

said that he represented the company during Coast Guard inspections. He usually

performed repairs that the owner directed.

The maintenance mechanic said he performed general maintenance work on

DUKWs, including testing lights, checking fluid levels and pumps, repairing brakes, and

replacing starters, alternators, U-joints, and worn or damaged boots. He said he also

performed a weekly greasing of the U-joints in the driveshafts, a procedure that involved

loosening the clamps on the boots and sliding the boots and housing back to gain access to

the U-joints. He said he usually performed repairs and maintenance at the direction of the

senior mechanic. His work was not checked or inspected by the senior mechanic. He had

never repaired a Higgins pump.

He said that the leaking forward rubber boot that he replaced before the accident

had dry-rotted and cracked. While replacing it, he noticed that the aft boot was also torn,

so he replaced that as well. He stated that, during his current and previous period of work

12 In discussions with other DUKW owners, Safety Board investigators determined that a few larger

companies either make their own rubber boots or have them made.
Factual Information 20 Marine Accident Report

with Land and Lakes, he had replaced numerous boots. He had found that most boot leaks

and failures had resulted from dry rot and cracking from age. 

Meteorological Information

The May 1, 1999, National Weather Service report issued for Hot Springs at 1150

stated that the weather was clear and sunny with a 25-mile visibility. The wind was

southeasterly at 6 knots, and the air temperature was 72° F. 

Medical and Pathological Information

Medical Findings

The eight survivors advised EMS personnel that they had no physical injuries.

Divers retrieved the bodies of the 13 fatality victims inside and outside of the sunken

vehicle and transported them to the Garland County Coronerís Office in Hot Springs on

May 1 and 2. The results of the postmortem examination determined that the cause of

death in each instance was fresh water drowning. The 13 victims, 7 female and 6 male,

varied in age from 3 to 50. Three of the victims were minor children ages 3, 4, and 5. One

adult victim was disabled.

Toxicological Testing 

The operator provided a blood sample at 1550 on May 1, within 4 hours of the

accident. The employer told the Safety Board that he did not realize that a urine sample

also was required until he was so advised by the Coast Guard. He then contacted the

operator about 2215 advising her that she had to provide a urine sample. She immediately

reported for testing and provided a sample about midnight.

The results of the urinalysis testing conducted pursuant to 46 CFR 4

(amphetamines, cocaine, marijuana, opiates, phencyclidine) were negative. The blood

sample analysis was negative for ethyl alcohol and positive for Ibuprofen (< 5 m/ml) and

the sedative Lidocaine. Although the concentration of Lidocaine was unspecified, the

Safety Boardís medical officer determined from discussions with the forensic laboratory

technicians conducting the test that the quantity was within the trace-to-therapeutic range

and was not indicative of excessive use. The operator advised Safety Board investigators

that she normally did not take sedatives, but did so that evening about 2030 in an attempt

to calm herself after the accident.
Factual Information 21 Marine Accident Report

Survival Aspects

Emergency Response 

First Responders. The first responders to this accident were pleasure boaters who

happened to be operating their boats in the area at the time of the accident. About 1200, a

pleasure boater left a waterfront restaurant and boarded his boat. He stated that he was

ìidling alongî and saw the Miss Majestic about 60 to 80 yards ahead of his boat. He

watched the Miss Majestic as it turned and noticed that the vehicleís stern appeared to be

riding low in the water. He said that within 6 or 7 seconds, he saw the Miss Majestic stop

and begin to sink by the stern. He did not see whether any of the occupants got off the

vehicle before it sank. The boater immediately went to the area where the vehicle sank,

where another boater joined him. They started throwing lifejackets into the water as

people began surfacing and then pulled the people into their boats. The operators of other

boats joined the first two responders and pulled people out of the water. One responder

used a cellular telephone to call 911. 

Area Response Agencies. The 911 operator notified the Lake Hamilton Fire

Department, which dispatched EMS personnel at 1158 to the accident site. In turn, the

Garland County Sheriffís Department (sheriffís department) was notified of the accident

at 1159, and immediately responded to the scene. The marine patrol supervisor from the

sheriffís department arrived on scene about 1204 and, after speaking with the first

responders, radioed for ambulances and additional emergency responders to be dispatched

to the accident site. St. Josephís Regional Health Center (St. Josephís) dispatched a

Lifemobile ambulance, and the National Park Service dispatched its area EMS personnel.

In addition, the Hot Springs Police Department and the Arkansas State Police responded

to assist. 

About 1300, personnel from the Red Cross and a grief counselor were sent to the

scene to provide comfort to the survivors.

In the meantime, the marine patrol supervisor served as the incident commander

overseeing the diving operations. A fireboat was sent to the scene for divers to use as a

recovery platform.

Divers reported that the average water depth was 57 feet and the maximum water

depth was 60 feet in the search area. The water temperature was 68° F at the surface and

59° F at the lake bottom; visibility was no more than 2 feet. When divers located the

DUWK, it was sitting in an upright position. The stern was in deeper water than the bow.

The DUWK appeared to have rolled backward for several feet leaving tire track ruts

behind. 

Over a 2-day period, divers from the Garland County Sheriffís Department

recovered the bodies of 13 victims. Seven bodies were found within the main passenger

compartment, including five near the forward bulkhead. Three victims were still in their

seats or on the deck; four victims were found floating in the canopy. The bodies of six
Factual Information 22 Marine Accident Report

victims were found on the lake bottom 45 to 105 feet from the vehicle. The diving

operations were completed at 1030 on May 2, 1999.

Tests and Research

JMS Flooding Calculations 

After the accident, the Safety Board contracted with JMS Naval Architects and

Salvage Engineers (JMS) of Groton, Connecticut, to calculate the flooding rate of a

DUKW in various scenarios. JMS calculated that a DUKW having the same number and

placement of passengers as the Miss Majestic would sink in about 6 to 7 minutes after

entering the water if the aft boot was loose and the Higgins pump was inoperative. 

The contractor was asked to explore the feasibility of making a DUKW capable of

staying afloat when flooded by equipping the vehicle with bulkheads or flotation material.

JMS determined that a DUKW carrying up to 28 passengers and an operator could be kept

afloat when flooded if watertight bulkheads were added aft of the main engine at the

firewall and aft of the rear wheel well and if buoyant foam were added between the fore

and aft wheel wells along the sides of the vehicle. The Safety Board did not contract JMS

to perform detailed engineering to implement the concept. 

Laboratory Examination

Investigators sent several of the Miss Majesticís parts that were involved in the

accident to the Safety Boardís Materials Laboratory in Washington, D.C., for examination.

The findings are summarized below.

Electric Pumps. A test in the laboratory confirmed field test results that one of the

Proline pumps at the vehicle stern functioned sporadically and shut down soon after

starting. The other Proline pump and the Guardian pump functioned normally.

Higgins Pump: The pump suction strainer is attached to the intake flange of the

pumpís housing by a setscrew. The intake flange of the housing for mounting the suction

strainer showed two sets of setscrew marks, about 90 degrees apart. Each set of marks

contained multiple circular impressions from multiple contacts with the setscrew. The

strainer body showed a brazed repair around the square headed setscrew. 

The filter element of the strainer was missing a triangular section with sides

2.5 inches by 4 inches.

The pumpís driving sprocket is attached to the pump shaft by 2 screws: one that

screws down on a key between the sprocket and shaft and another that screws down on the

shaft. The socket screw heads were cracked or rounded from over tightening. 
Factual Information 23 Marine Accident Report

The pump shaft was not of uniform diameter along its length and had necked down

in the area of the sprocket. Much of the surface of the shaft contained circumferential

rubbing marks. The shaft surface also had impressions consistent with contact from a set

screw. 

The driving sprocket was found to be installed with the sprocket hub facing toward

the pump. The Army Maintenance Manual TM-9-803 shows that the sprocket should have

been installed with its hub facing away from the pump. One side of the sprocket teeth was

discolored compared to the other, suggesting that one side was kept clean by the chain due

to misalignment of the sprocket. 

A section of an impeller blade was found missing, and the tips of the two

remaining ones were damaged. The roots of the blades were cracked. The inside of the

impeller housing showed discolored rub markings.

Rubber Boots. The Safety Board also examined the rubber boots and observed

that the rear boot that slipped off the housing had patches of dull green paint with a pattern

of cracks. Multiple circumferential lines adjacent to the clamp suggest numerous

installations of a hose clamp on this seal. The forward seal for the housing also showed

imprints of numerous previous installations of a hose clamp. 

Other Information

U.S. Coast Guard Inspection Policy

According to senior Coast Guard officials, the local Officer in Charge, Marine

Inspection (OCMI) reviews and approves the plans and design of DUKWs for conversion

to passenger service. Subchapter T vessels typically receive local reviews as opposed to

plan review by Coast Guard Headquarters. The approval of DUKWs is usually based on a

5-year history of successful service and compliance with Subchapter T regulations. The

local OCMIís review for initial certification involves the review of plans required to be

submitted by regulations, inspections during the conversion process, and the final

inspection of the hull and all systems before the vehicle is granted a COI. 

Under the Coast Guard inspection program, after an inspector determines that the

vehicle passes an inspection for certification, it is issued an initial COI, which is valid for

3 years. For the two anniversary dates following the issuance of the COI, the vehicle was

required to undergo annual reinspections. The COI would be reissued every third year,

upon satisfactory completion of a subsequent inspection. 

This inspection for certification includes examining and testing the vehicleís

structure, machinery, and equipment, including lifesaving and firefighting equipment. The

scope for inspection for certification is defined in 46 CFR 176.404, which states:
Factual Information 24 Marine Accident Report

The owner or managing operator shall conduct all tests as required by the marine

inspectorÖ.In addition, the OCMI may require the vessel to get underway as part

of the inspection for certification. The inspection is conducted to determine if the

vessel is in satisfactory condition, fit for the service intended, and complies with

the applicable regulations in this subchapter.

The scope of the reinspection is the same as the inspection for certification but in

less detail unless a major change has occurred since the last inspection. 

According to Coast Guard officials, at the time of the Miss Majestic accident,

about 63 DUKWs were under Coast Guard jurisdiction. The vehicles operated in 12

different marine inspection zones throughout the nation. Also at the time of the accident,

the Coast Guard had not developed uniform nationwide DUKW inspection policies.

Marine Safety Office (MSO) Memphis, Tennessee, which was the local Coast Guard

office in charge of inspecting the Miss Majestic, had no written policy for DUKW

inspections. However, MSO Chicago, Illinois, and MSO St Louis, Missouri, had

independently developed inspection policies addressing different inspection issues that

had arisen in their respective areas. These policies were not coordinated through

Headquarters for dissemination to other MSOs. MSO Chicago had issued ìDUKW

Inspection Procedures,î dated April 14, 1998, for inspectors in its local inspection zone,

while MSO St. Louis had issued Policy File Memo 1-89, Change 1 (2-91) on

ìWaivers/Equivalenciesî for DUKW inspections, for inspectors in its local zone. These

policies did not address inspecting the integrity of rubber boots and clamps or testing the

bilge pumps with water. 

Coast Guard Inspections of the Miss Majestic

The Safety Board reviewed the Coast Guard inspection records for the Miss

Majestic for the past 6 years and interviewed the inspector who conducted the last annual

inspection, which was on February 23, 1999. Table 3 summarizes the Coast Guard

findings for the inspections conducted between March 23, 1994, and February 23, 1999. 

The inspector who examined and who determined the Miss Majesticís fitness for

duty on February 23, 1999, said that he inspected the bottom of the vehicle from the side,

without getting under it. He stated he saw no deficiencies with the condition of the hull,

boots, or clamps. He reminded Land and Lakes to install a high-level bilge alarm by

March 11, 1999, and noted that the owner was making arrangements to obtain the alarm.

The inspector later testified that, because he had been assured by the senior mechanic that

the alarm would be installed by the March deadline, he did not follow up to ensure the

installation had taken place. After the Miss Majestic was salvaged, Safety Board

investigators found that the alarm had not been installed. 
Factual Information 25 Marine Accident Report

None of the inspections during the 6-year period were conducted in the water; all

inspections were conducted at the ownerís garage. The operation of the Higgins pump was

never tested with water13 during the 6 years. The Coast Guard policy required ìoperational

checksî for bilge pumps. According to Coast Guard officials, this did not mean that pumps

needed to be tested with water. The inspector who conducted the February 23, 1999,

annual examination of the Miss Majestic said that he believed that checking a pump

implied ìjust an overall visualî examination of the pump and turning the operating switch

on and off. 

Table 3. Coast Guard inspections of the Miss Majestic for 1994 through 1999 

Date

Inspection

Type Comments

February 23, 1999 Annual Inspection book states, ìBoarded vessel parked at the ownerís 

shopÖThe engine compartment, mid-body void, and the fuel 

tank compartment were entered and all areas of the hull interior 

and exterior were accessible and examined during this 

inspection. All drive shaft boots and clamps were found to be 

satisfactoryÖVisually examined the steering cable, main 

propulsion, bilge, ventilation, and electrical systems. Owner is in 

the process of installing the required high-level bilge alarms 

required by 11 Mar 99. Owner is also researching availability of 

flammable vapor detection system required by 11 Mar 99 iaw [in 

accordance with] CFR 182.480; issued CG-835 [ëNotice of 

Merchant Marine Inspection Requirementsí]. ì 

March 5, 1998 Annual No deficiencies noted. Inspection records states, ìThe engine 

compartment, mid-body void, and the fuel tank compartment 

were entered, and all areas of the hull interior and exterior were 

accessible and examined during this inspection. All driveshaft 

boots and clamps were found to be satisfactory.î

March 11, 1997 Recertification No deficiencies noted. The inspection record states that all 

driveshaft boots and clamps were in satisfactory condition, and 

that the inspector witnessed the satisfactory operation of the 

bilge pumps, the main propulsion, and the steering.

March 13, 1996 Annual No deficiencies noted.

March 15, 1995 Annual Inspection book states, ìRepair the chain driven bilge pump and 

prove operation prior to carrying passengers, but not later than 

15 April 1995,î and ìreplace all driveshaft tube rubber boots, all 

were checked and dry rotted.î

These deficiencies were subsequently rectified.

March 23, 1994 Recertification No deficiencies noted

13 Participants at the Safety Board forum and other inspectors stated that testing a 250-gpm Higgins

pump with water had practical difficulties. They indicated that a special testing arrangement would have to

be developed.
Factual Information 26 Marine Accident Report

Inspectorís Experience and Training

The Coast Guard inspector who had last inspected the Miss Majestic before the

accident had previously conducted a total of four inspections on two DUKWs about 5

years earlier, on his previous tour at MSO New Orleans. He had not received any special

training in inspecting DUKWs, and was not aware of any Coast Guard inspection policies

specific to DUKWs. He stated that he had talked to other inspectors to come up to speed

on DUKWs. In addition, the OCMI and the supervisor of marine inspectors at MSO

Memphis had never personally inspected a DUKW or were aware of any Coast Guard

inspection policy specific to DUKWs. The inspector was a qualified marine inspector for

small passenger vessels, barges and ships (hull and machinery), with 6 years of marine

inspection experience.

Postaccident Actions by the U.S. Coast Guard 

Following the Miss Majestic accident, on December 11, 2000, the Coast Guard

issued NVIC No. 1-01, Inspection of Amphibious Passenger Carrying Vehicles, which had

been developed in concert with the amphibious vehicle industry. The NVIC discusses

lessons learned from the sinking of the Miss Majestic, which were the basis for the

guidance for improving the safety of DUKWs in order to prevent similar accidents. The

NVIC discusses DUKWs only, and does not describe other types of amphibious vehicles

such as Stalwarts, Lighters, Amphibious Resupply, Cargo (LARCs), and Hydra-Terras. 

This document sets forth guidance for local Coast Guard authorities to follow for

conducting a plan review and inspection and certification of DUKWs. The stated purpose

of the NVIC is to:

ï Summarize and consolidate technical information pertaining to the design and

inspection of amphibious DUKW vehicles;

ï Promote uniformity in the approach to certification requirements among

various Coast Guard marine inspection offices; and

ï Consolidate best practices currently being used in the DUKW industry.

Further, the NVIC states that certification of DUKWs should be through a systems

approach that results in an equivalent level of safety to that of other conventional

Subchapter T vessels. Equivalencies or operational controls would be considered where

appropriate.

Some examples of the inspection guidance contained in the NVIC are summarized

below:

ï The external and internal hull should be inspected with special attention to

areas that are vulnerable to corrosion. 

ï The vehicle should be operated in the water and all through hull penetrations

checked for watertightness.
Factual Information 27 Marine Accident Report

ï The condition and function of all bilge pumps and all other mechanical

equipment should be operationally tested or simulated.

ï The shaft housing rubber boots, clamps, and housing brackets should be

examined. 

ï The drain plugs should be examined to verify proper fit and function. 

ï High-level bilge alarms should be installed.

ï A vehicleís regulatory history, including waivers and equivalencies, should be

documented.

ï The OCMIs should ensure that marine inspectors have proper training

regarding the operation and inspection of these vessels.

Postaccident Actions by the Safety Board

As a result of the Miss Majestic accident and recognizing that more than 1 million

passengers are carried each year on board more than 250 amphibious passenger vehicles

in the United States, the Safety Board conducted a public forum on amphibious passenger

vehicle safety December 8ñ9, 1999, in Memphis, Tennessee. The forum brought together

representatives of the Coast Guard, State governments, amphibious passenger vehicle

operators and refurbishers, and the public to discuss safety issues relating to the design,

regulation, maintenance, and operation of the vehicles. Forum participants considered the

following issues:

ï Conversion from military to civilian amphibious passenger vehicles,

ï Passenger egress and survival,

ï Lifesaving equipment,

ï Design and stability,

ï Maintenance and inspection policies and certification,

ï Operational safety, and

ï Operator qualifications.

At the forum, a JMS representative made a presentation on the flooding

characteristics of DUKWs and stated that he estimated that the cost of installing the

bulkheads and foam would be about $2,000 per DUKW plus about $10,000 for detailed

engineering of the installations.

Based on its investigation of the Miss Majestic accident and the information

presented at the forum about the vulnerability of amphibious passenger vehicles to

flooding and sinking, and recognizing that the regulatory process addressing the

deficiencies is time-consuming, on February 18, 2000, the Safety Board issued the

following safety recommendation to 30 operators and refurbishers of amphibious

passenger vehicles in the United States: 
Factual Information 28 Marine Accident Report

M-00-5

Without delay, alter your amphibious passenger vessels to provide reserve

buoyancy through passive means, such as watertight compartmentalization, builtin flotation, or equivalent measures, so that they will remain afloat and upright in

the event of flooding, even when carrying a full complement of passengers and

crew.

To date, the Safety Board has received responses or information from 16

amphibious passenger vehicle companies. Most of the responses expressed the opinion

that installing watertight bulkheads and flotation foam would be difficult and would

require detailed engineering. Some of the responses detailed other actions that companies

were taking such as installing flow restrictor plates, additional bilge pumps, and high

water bilge alarms. Only three companies indicated that they were trying to install reserve

buoyancy into their vehicles.

A Missouri company, Ride the Ducks, stated that it was building a prototype

aluminum DUKW that incorporated foam buoyancy into the design in accordance with

the recommended action. 

A South Carolina company, Cool Stuff, advised the Safety Board that it had built a

new type of amphibious vehicle called the Hydra-Terra, which was designed especially for

commercial passenger service. The vehicleís aluminum hull has foam-filled compartments

that provide sufficient flotation certified by the manufacturer to remain afloat even with

the drain plugs removed and the engine compartment flooded. The Coast Guard has

approved the Hydra-Terra for the carriage of up to 49 passengers and a two-person crew.

Several amphibious vehicle operators in Alaska, California, and Maine have purchased

these vehicles and have placed them in commercial passenger operations. 

A company in Massachusetts, Boston Ducks, stated that it had retrofitted a single

watertight bulkhead on one of its DUKWs on a trial basis; however, the company has not

had a naval architect evaluate the effectiveness of the bulkhead. 

In its correspondence with these three safety recommendation recipients, the

Safety Board stressed that Safety Recommendation M-00-5 did not limit companies to

using foam or watertight bulkheads as the only means for achieving passive flotation; the

recommendation states that other ìequivalent measuresî would be acceptable. The Safety

Board stated that equivalent measures would include adding buoyancy chambers, known

as sponsons, to the hull or installing inflatable buoyant bladders. Such inflatable bladders

are used on skids of helicopters that operate over water.

On March 23, 2001, Safety Board staff met with the operator of another

Massachusetts amphibious passenger vehicle company, Moby Ducks, and his naval

architect regarding Safety Recommendation M-00-5. During the meeting, the naval

architect stated that the companyís LARCs vehicles did not have the requisite internal

volume to add sufficient flotation foam so that the vehicles would remain afloat and

upright in the event of flooding. Further, watertight bulkheads could not be installed in the
Factual Information 29 Marine Accident Report

LARCs because their engineering systems relied on unobstructed airflow that would be

compromised by the barriers.

In a June 13, 2001, follow-up letter to Moby Ducks, the Safety Board stated that

the underlying premise of asking for ìstay afloatî measures was to ensure the survivability

of the passengers and crew by preventing them from being trapped in the event of

flooding, as occurred with the Miss Majestic. The Safety Board stated that the intent of the

recommendation could be achieved by the owner having his naval architect attest that

either the LARCs operated in water so shallow that they would not sink if they were holed

or they were designed in such a way to prevent occupants from being trapped in the event

of flooding. The Safety Board stated that the design arrangement could be achieved by the

LARCs not having a canopy and by their having a seating arrangement that did not hinder

emergency egress. In addition, to ensure passenger safety, the company would have to

require that all passengers wear lifejackets. 

Based on information received, the Safety Board classified Safety

Recommendation M-00-5 ìOpenóAcceptable Responseî to five companies (Boston

Ducks, Cape Cod Duck Mobile, Dells Duck Tours, Moby Duck Tours, and Ride the

Ducks) and ìClosedóNo Longer Applicableî to two companies (Peter Pan Bus Tours and

to White and Yellow Ducks) that are no longer in business.

The Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation M-00-5 ìOpenó

Unacceptable Responseî to Original Wisconsin Ducks, which indicated that filling the

hull with foam or installing a watertight bulkhead was not possible. 

The Safety Board received responses from five companies (Chicago Duck

Corporation, D.C. Duck Tours, Just Ducky Tours, Metro Ducks, and Ride the DucksSeattle.14) The information provided, however, did not include how they planned to

provide reserve buoyancy. Accordingly, the Safety Board classified Safety

Recommendation M-00-5 ìOpenóAwait Responseî to the five companies.

On August 17, 2000, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter to the recipients who

had not responded asking what action they had taken or were planning to take to

implement the recommendation. At the time of this report, responses from Lowcountry

Duck Tours and Plymouth Amphibious Tours are being reviewed. The recommendation is

classified ìOpenóResponse Receivedî to these two companies. Information was also

received during the course of the investigation from Cool Stuff. As of the date of this

report, 14 companies have not provided information to the Safety Board.15 

14 Correspondence from Ride the Ducks-Seattle was received after the Safety Board mailed its August

17, 2000, follow-up letter.

15 The 14 companies that have not provided information to the Safety Board are Aqua Traks, Inc;

Austin Ducks; Buffalo Point; Chattanooga Ducks; Chicago Duck Tours; Ducks Amphibious

Renovation/Sales; Land and Sea Tours; Maui Duck Tours; Naples Land and Sea Tours; National Park Duck

Tours; Outfitter Kauai; Ozark Mountain Ducks; Sterling Equipment; and South Padre Water

Sports/Breakaway.
Factual Information 30 Marine Accident Report

Other Amphibious Passenger Vehicle Accidents

After the Miss Majestic accident, the Safety Board investigated two other

amphibious passenger vehicle accidents, neither of which resulted in injuries to the

passengers or crews. The complete marine accident brief reports are contained in

appendix B. 

The Minnow. On September 18, 2000, the Minnow, a 21-foot-long Stalwart-type

amphibious sightseeing vehicle, with 2 crewmembers and 17 passengers on board, was

proceeding through the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, harbor when the operator heard a

ìmechanical noiseî and felt the vehicle ìshudder.î Shortly thereafter, the bilge alarm

sounded. The operator turned back to shore; however, the vehicleís engine stopped,

flooded and the operator had to radio for assistance. The marine police and Coast Guard

personnel responded and safely transferred all of the Minnowís passengers to their vessels.

The Minnow then sank in 25 feet of water.

The investigators observed that the blade of the port waterjet impeller had cut

through the waterjet tunnel housing the impeller, leaving a 1/8-inch-wide circumferential

gap through which water from the port waterjet tunnel could enter the amphibious vehicle. 

Investigators sent components of the vehicle to the Safety Board materials

laboratory for examination. The Safety Boardís laboratory determined that the port

propulsion unit failed because its aft shaft bearing failed from inadequate lubrication.

Severe corrosion on the shaft bearing retaining nut indicated that the integrity of the

bearing and oil cavity had been compromised for a significant period before the accident,

allowing water to enter the oil chamber, corrode the nut, and degrade the lubricating oil.

The laboratory determined that severe degradation of the bearing had occurred for a long

time before the accident voyage, during which the bearing finally broke up.

The DUKW No. 1. On December 8, 2001, DUKW No. 1, a 33-foot-long

amphibious sightseeing vehicle, with an operator and 11 passengers on board, began

flooding when it entered the water for a tour of Lake Union in Seattle, Washington. About

5 minutes into the tour, the bilge alarm sounded and the Higgins pump began discharging

water, whereupon the operator immediately headed for shore. After the DUKWís wheels

touched ground, a passing boat transferred all passengers ashore without injury. Later, the

DUKW sank when the Harbor Patrol attempted to tow it across the lake. After the vessel

was salvaged, investigators determined that a 4 1⁄2-inch access plug was missing from its

hull, which had allowed water to flood the hull. The Safety Board calculated the flooding

rate through the opening at about 330 gpm, which exceeds the maximum capacity of a

Higgins pump. DUKW No. 1 had features recommended in NVIC 1-01, including a

restrictor plate installed over the driveshaft hull penetration, double-clamped boot

assemblies, bilge alarms, and an intact hinge pin assembly. In addition, the companyís

operator and maintenance personnel used a maintenance checklist as recommended in the

NVIC.
31 Marine Accident Report

Analysis

General

This analysis first identifies factors that can be readily eliminated as causal or

contributory to the accident and determines why the Miss Majestic sank. The report then

discusses the following major safety issues, which were identified during the

investigation:

ï Vehicle maintenance,

ï Coast Guard inspections of the Miss Majestic,

ï Coast Guard inspection guidance, 

ï Reserve buoyancy, and

ï Survivability.

The analysis also considers the actions of the Miss Majesticís operator in this

accident.

Exclusions

The weather was clear and mild on the day of the accident. Toxicological testing of

the operator was negative for alcohol and showed no evidence of illicit drug use. The 72-

hour history provided by the operator revealed that she had maintained a fairly regular

schedule and had obtained ample nighttime sleep. Moreover, her work schedule allowed

her time to rest before her tours. The amount of sleep and rest that she received, together

with the short length of the DUKW tours and the limited demands of her work, suggest

that fatigue was not a factor in the operatorís performance. Therefore, the Safety Board

concludes that the weather, drug and alcohol use, and operator fatigue were not factors in

the sinking of the Miss Majestic. 

The maintenance mechanicís potential involvement in the accident was not

identified until after the Safety Board investigators examined the Miss Majestic.

Accordingly, no toxicological test was requested or available on this individual.

According to his supervisor, he did not exhibit any behavior that might suggest he was

impaired. Based on the maintenance mechanicís testimony, he had a comparatively light

work and rest schedule and did not deviate from his normal routine before the accident

occurred. However, because drug and alcohol testing of the maintenance mechanic was

not conducted and because a complete 72-hour history of his activities and sleep could not

be reconstructed, the effect of these factors on his performance cannot be determined. 
Analysis 32 Marine Accident Report

The Sinking

When the vehicle was salvaged from the water and examined, Safety Board

investigators found that the hull was wasted through in some areas, but the holes were not

large enough to allow the massive flooding experienced by the Miss Majestic. The leakage

through these holes would have been relatively light. Detailed examination of the

vehicleís hull and plugs did not reveal a structural failure through which massive flooding

could have occurred. However, the aft boot, which was supposed to maintain the

watertight integrity of the driveshaft housing, had separated from the housing at one end.

An annular opening existed between the 3-inch-diameter driveshaft and the 4 7/8-inch

housing around it. With the boot off its housing, water could freely enter the vehicleís hull

through this annular opening. When investigators fit the rubber boot back on the housing,

they found that the clamp used to attach the boot to the housing was loose. Upon further

examination, investigators found that the hose clamp setscrew needed an additional 2 1⁄2

turns to tighten the clamp so that the boot would be securely attached to the housing. 

On the morning of the accident, the maintenance mechanic replaced the aft boot

because the original boot had a tear and was leaking water into the vehicle. After replacing

the boot, he reattached the clamps. The senior mechanic testified that, although replacing

boots was not a complex task, it was possible to install a clamp improperly because

working in the cramped conditions underneath the DUKW was difficult. No one checked

the maintenance mechanicís work, and no checks were conducted with the vehicle in the

water after the repairs were completed. Thus, on the day of the accident, movements or

vibrations of the Miss Majestic after it left the repair shop, such as the drive to the lake or

the downward movement of the vehicleís rear axle and wheels as the DUKW entered the

water from the ramp, could have caused the unsecured rubber boot to slip off its housing.

The Safety Board, therefore, concludes that water initially entered the Miss

Majestic through the gap between the driveshaft and its housing because the securing

clamp for the watertight rubber boot had not been adequately secured by the maintenance

mechanic. 

As the Miss Majestic entered Lake Hamilton, water began to enter the vehicle and

progressed throughout its underdeck. The DUKW had no bulkheads to contain the water

within an interior division or other means of restricting the amount of water flooding the

vehicle. The Miss Majestic trimmed by the stern with a small aft freeboard of 8 to 12

inches; thus, the floodwater accumulated at the stern. The DUKW had no built-in flotation

or other reserve buoyancy to counter the flooding. The Higgins pump, which was the

primary dewatering pump, and one of the electric bilge pumps were inoperable. Although

the other two electric pumps were operating, their combined pumping capacity was

considerably less than the capacity of the Higgins pump. Thus, there was no active means

of eliminating the water build-up nor bilge alarm or Higgins pump discharge to alert the

operator to the vehicleís condition. The vehicle, therefore, sank deeper by the stern.

The Safety Board made calculations to simulate the time for the Miss Majestic to

sink and estimated that the rate of water inflow through the annular opening between the
Analysis 33 Marine Accident Report

3-inch driveshaft and the 4 7/8-inch housing was at least 170 gpm. At this rate of ingress,

the stern deck would have been awash within about 7 minutes. Once the stern slipped

below the surface of the lake, water poured into the passenger compartment and swamped

the vehicle, causing it to sink. 

To verify the accuracy of its estimates, the Safety Board contracted with JMS, a

recognized naval architectural firm, to perform detailed calculations. JMS confirmed that

a vehicle such as the Miss Majestic carrying 20 passengers would sink from uncontrolled

flooding in as little as 6.4 minutes after water started entering the vehicle. These estimates

reasonably agree with the operatorís estimate of about 7 minutes between the time the

vehicle entered the lake and water began to swamp it. The Safety Board, therefore,

concludes that the Miss Majestic sank because the DUKW had no watertight bulkheads

and no reserve buoyancy and because its Higgins pump, which had been designed for

significant dewatering capacity, did not operate. 

Vehicle Maintenance

The number and nature of deficiencies found during the on-scene investigation and

the laboratory examination prompted Safety Board investigators to take a close look at the

maintenance and repair policies and procedures used by Land and Lakes. 

The Safety Boardís laboratory examination of the rubber boots from the Miss

Majesticís shaft housing revealed cracks that indicated the boots were old. The boots had

been installed immediately before the accident. The Land and Lakes senior mechanic

confirmed that, because obtaining new boots was difficult, the company normally used

Army surplus stock, which showed signs of previous use. 

Portions of the underwater hull, near the rear axle, were severely corroded in easily

visible locations. A 1⁄2-inch by o-inch hole had wasted through the hull below the

waterline near the vehicleís centerline about 2 feet forward of the point where the

propeller shaft entered the hull. The area around the hole appeared weak when tested with

a mallet16 and was corroded. A pinhole was noted (daylight shining through) in the right

rear wheel well. Of even greater concern was an approximately 14-inch-long silicone

rubber repair patch that was used to seal a corroded area in the starboard hull. When

investigators removed the patch, it exposed a severely corroded area of hull plating. 

The use of silicone rubber patches on a steel hull is not an acceptable method of

making permanent repairs to steel plating and would likely exacerbate corrosion and

jeopardize hull integrity. Corrosion of a steel hull in fresh water is a long-term degradation

process. The degree of wastage on the Miss Majestic indicated that these conditions had

existed for a long time.

16 Striking a steel hull with a hammer is a standard testing procedure used by Coast Guard inspectors to

determine the integrity of the area.
Analysis 34 Marine Accident Report

Not only was the vehicleís hull in poor condition, but the vehicleís equipment was

as well. A review of the undercarriage determined that an essential hinge pin assembly

was missing. Without the hinge pin assembly, the housingís rubber boots would carry

higher stresses than intended, making them more vulnerable to failure. 

The Safety Boardís examination of the bilge pumps on board the Miss Majestic

showed multiple deficiencies. One of the Proline bilge pumps was practically inoperative,

operating sporadically for only about 20 seconds before shutting off.

The Higgins dewatering pump had so many deficiencies that it was inoperative.

The discharge hose was broken and rotted, the strainer had a large hole and was detached,

rendering it useless, and one of the pumpís impeller blades was badly damaged. Further,

the driving sprocket was loose and had been installed backwards; the key attaching the

sprocket to the shaft was missing. A setscrew had been used to attach the sprocket to the

pump shaft. Without a key, however, the sprocket could rotate freely on the pump shaft.

The pumpís impeller was missing a bolt, which was never found, indicating that it

probably had fallen out some time before this accident.

After observing the poor condition of the Miss Majesticís hull and equipment, the

Safety Board endeavored to determine the depth of understanding that the company and

its mechanics possessed concerning DUKWs. When investigators sought to review the

maintenance records for the Miss Majestic, they discovered that the company did not

routinely maintain such records. Investigators further discovered that the mechanics did

not have the technical manuals and drawings needed to understand the safety purpose of

special features of DUKWs, such as hinge pin assemblies, and to properly conduct

maintenance and repair. 

An effective preventative maintenance program should establish and implement,

among other things, procedures and schedules for planned maintenance; daily, weekly,

and annual inspections; postrepair testing and verification, retention of maintenance and

repair records; tracking of maintenance and repair trends; and verification that

maintenance and repairs were promptly and effectively conducted. However Land and

Lakes did not have an effective preventive maintenance program and did not routinely

keep maintenance records. According to the mechanics, the company only conducted

repairs after breakdowns or when leaks developed. 

After examining the condition of the Miss Majestic and reviewing the companyís

maintenance practices, the Safety Board is convinced that the threat to passenger safety

had existed for a long time. The problems described above could only have manifested

themselves after a long period of inadequate maintenance and repair. Had the rubber boot

not failed, it was only a matter of time before one of the aforementioned problems

probably would have manifested itself. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that Land

and Lakes long-term vehicle maintenance was inadequate and directly compromised the

safety of the Miss Majestic and its passengers.

Since this accident, Land and Lakes has gone out of business. Thus, the remedial

action on the part of the company is no longer possible. 
Analysis 35 Marine Accident Report

Coast Guard Inspections of the Miss Majestic

After reviewing the Coast Guard inspection records for the Miss Majestic,

examining the physical condition of the vehicle, and interviewing the inspector who last

examined the vehicle, the Safety Board found deficiencies with the Coast Guard

inspections. 

The Coast Guard inspector who conducted the last examination of the Miss

Majestic, which was on February 23, 1999, said that he inspected the bottom of the Miss

Majestic by looking underneath the vehicle from its side. He did not get under the vehicle. 

The Coast Guard inspector noted that the Miss Majestic did not have a high-level

bilge alarm. He later testified that he advised Land and Lakesí senior mechanic of the

regulatory requirement for existing T-boats to be equipped with high-level bilge alarms no

later than March 11, 1999. The inspector said that because the senior mechanic assured

him that the alarm would be installed by the March 11, 1999, deadline, he did not follow

up to ensure the installation had taken place. After the Miss Majestic was salvaged, Safety

Board investigators found that the alarm had not been installed. Had the Miss Majestic

been equipped with a high-level bilge alarm, the operator might have had positive early

warning that the vehicle was flooding. As it was, the operator remained unaware of the

flooding until it was too late for her to do anything about it. Because she was not aware of

the emergency until the very end, the operator could not inform passengers that an

emergency had developed and that they should don lifejackets and prepare to abandon the

vehicle.

Survivors stated that the lifejackets on board the Miss Majestic were packed so

tightly into their stowage area beneath the canopy that the operator could not even pull one

out for demonstration. The Coast Guard inspection record for the Miss Majestic does not

indicate any problems related to the stowage of lifejackets. The Land and Lakes owner

testified that, for each Coast Guard inspection, company personnel laid out the lifejackets

on the garage floor for examination. This procedure might enable the inspector to examine

each lifejacket for compliance, but it does not reveal problems with stowage. An effective

inspection should include looking not only at the lifejackets, but also their stowage

arrangements. 

The Safety Board determined that the last inspectorís lack of attention to detail was

not unique to him. None of the inspectors had noted any deficiencies regarding the hull

plating of the Miss Majestic since 1994. Safety Board investigators found pinholes in the

hull resulting from severe corrosion and a repair using a rubber patch to conceal a large

wasted area of the hull. Hull corrosion is a slow process, especially in fresh water where

the Miss Majestic operated. The hull, therefore, probably had been corroding for several

years. Although the corrosion was easy to see, none of the inspection records indicate that

the Coast Guard inspectors had either noted any difficulties with or required any repairs to

be made to the corroded areas. The identification of such obvious areas of corrosion,

improper patching, and degradation of hull integrity is rudimentary to Coast Guard

inspections of all steel vehicles and vessels. In the case of the Miss Majestic and other
Analysis 36 Marine Accident Report

DUKWs, the hull plating is so thin that it is susceptible to quicker holing through wastage

and harder to repair. 

The Safety Board found that none of the inspections during the last 6 years had

been conducted in the water. Coast Guard regulations do not require that inspections be

conducted in the water; however, examining the vehicle while it is in the water can

identify safety problems, especially those related to the watertight integrity of the hull,

that inspections on land do not necessarily reveal. 

Coast Guard regulation 46 CFR 182.520 requires that small passenger vessels like

the Miss Majestic carry one fixed bilge pump with a capacity of 10 gallons per minute and

a portable hand pump with a capacity of 5 gallons per minute. The Miss Majestic also had

a dewatering pump known as the Higgins pump, which was not required by regulation.

According to the March 15, 1995, Coast Guard inspection records, the inspector identified

deficiencies affecting its operation. 

The operation of the bilge pumps had not been tested with water. The Coast Guard

policy required ìoperational checksî for bilge pumps. At the Safety Boardís forum in

December 1999, a representative from the Coast Guardís Inspection Division said that he

interpreted this to mean that bilge pumps need not be tested with water. The inspector who

last examined the Miss Majestic said that he believed that testing of pumps implied

visually checking the pump and turning the operating switch on and off. Although the

pumps passed inspections, the Safety Boardís on-scene and laboratory analysis found that

one of the Proline pumps was practically inoperative and the Higgins pump and its

discharge piping showed evidence of longstanding poor maintenance. 

The Safety Board concludes that the Coast Guardís inspections of the vehicle were

inadequate and cursory. 

Coast Guard Inspection Guidance 

A number of different Coast Guard inspectors conducted inadequate inspections of

the Miss Majestic over several years. While these inspectors should have been able to

identify corrosion of the hull and problems with bilge pumps and lifejacket stowage, some

safety deficiencies relate to the unique features of the vehicle that require specialized

guidance for inspectors to understand and detect the problems. 

Although Coast Guard regulations place DUKWs in the same category as

conventional small passenger vessels, DUKWs are uniquely designed and pose safety

concerns that are different from those of conventional vessels. The Safety Board finds it

significant that the Coast Guardís report of the Miss Majestic sinking concluded, and the

Coast Guard Commandant concurred with, the following:

DUKWs have features which [sic] make them inherently less safe than

conventional commercial passenger vessels.
Analysis 37 Marine Accident Report

In support of this conclusion, the Coast Guard report cited the following features,

among other items:

ï Heavy metal chassis and heavy wheel drive systems, with minimal buoyancy;

ï Multiple external appendages with moving parts that are part of the watertight

envelope;

ï Use of a single band clamp on the smooth sealing surface of shaft housings;

ï Thin hull plating, susceptible to quicker holing through wastage and harder to

repair; and

ï Manufactured parts not readily available, largely due to the 54-years lapse in

DUKW production.

The Safety Board agrees with the Coast Guard that these features make DUKWs

inherently less safe than conventional commercial small passenger vessels, not only for

the reasons cited in the Coast Guard report. In addition, DUKWs have hull penetrations

for driveshafts that are made watertight by rubber boots and clamps, which are

unconventional sealing methods by standards for traditional small passenger vessels.

These boots require special attention for safety oversight. Similarly, the DUKW relies on a

high capacity Higgins pump in the event the vehicle is flooded, which in turn requires that

the pump be carefully maintained and inspected. However, neither the Subchapter T

regulations nor other Coast Guard guidance documents for Coast Guard field inspectors

mention how to inspect these vital items. 

Before the Miss Majestic accident, the Coast Guard had not developed any

nationwide guidance to field inspectors for inspecting DUKWs; the Marine Safety Manual

only addressed radiator cooling of DUKW engines. Although a few Coast Guard MSOs

had independently developed local policies for their inspectors, these policies did not

address or emphasize several critical areas, such as inspecting the integrity of seals,

clamps, or the need for operational testing of dewatering and bilge pumps. The local

policies addressed different inspection issues that had arisen in each MSO. These policies

were not disseminated to other MSOs. 

DUKWs are old vehicles that have been certificated for service by various local

Coast Guard officials over the years through waivers and equivalencies to Subchapter T

regulations. The waivers and rulings of equivalencies were not granted based on uniform

national criteria for DUKWs, but on various opinions and experiences of individual local

officials. The supporting rationale for the waivers and equivalencies were not documented

at MSO Memphis, the Coast Guard office with jurisdiction over the Miss Majestic, and

were not available to individual inspectors. Consequently, inspectors assumed that any

discrepancies from Subchapter T regulations, for example seat spacing and aisle widths,

had been previously accepted and they did not need to revisit those issues. An inspection

guidance document, coordinated and disseminated by Coast Guard Headquarters, would

have made plan review for DUKWs consistent among MSOs and would have clarified the

scope of work to field inspectors. 
Analysis 38 Marine Accident Report

Coast Guard inspection guidance for DUKWs would have been especially useful

to the inspector who last examined the Miss Majestic because his experience with

inspecting DUKWs was limited. He had received no special training in inspecting these

vehicles. He had only inspected two DUKWs about 5 years earlier during his previous

tour at MSO New Orleans. He told Safety Board investigators that he was unaware of any

Coast Guard inspection policies or procedures for DUKWs. He stated that he had only

talked to other inspectors to come up to speed on DUKWs. Neither the OCMI nor the

supervisor of inspectors at MSO Memphis had ever inspected a DUKW or were aware of

any Coast Guard inspection procedures for DUKWs. 

The Safety Board concludes that the lack of Coast Guard guidance and training for

the inspection of DUKWs contributed to the inadequate inspections of the Miss Majestic. 

While investigating the Minnow accident, the Safety Board found that, as in the

case with the principals in the Miss Majestic accident, the operators, refurbishers, and

inspectors had an inadequate understanding of the risks posed by amphibious passenger

vehicles. Following the Miss Majestic accident, the Coast Guard issued NVIC 1-01, which

is titled Inspection of Amphibious Passenger Carrying Vehicles, to provide its inspectors

and industry with necessary background information and guidance about DUKWs. In

reviewing the NVIC, the Safety Board found that it does not address the inspection issues

of other types of amphibious passenger vehicles such as Stalwarts. Thus, guidance and

background information relating to maintenance, inspection, and operation of Stalwarts is

not readily available for use by owners, operators, refurbishers, and inspectors. The Safety

Board concludes that industry and Coast Guard inspectors need to become familiar with

the unique safety issues and general background for all types of amphibious vehicles,

including Stalwarts, to improve the maintenance, inspection, and operation of specialized

amphibious vehicles. The Safety Board, therefore, believes that the Coast Guard should

develop and promulgate guidance for all amphibious passenger vehicles similar in

purpose to the NVIC 1-01.

Reserve Buoyancy 

After its on-scene investigation of the Miss Majestic accident, the Safety Board

researched the available accident history of amphibious passenger vehicles. Coast Guard

data show that between March 6, 1991, and May 1, 1999, at least 18 amphibious

passenger vehicles had been involved in accidents, and that six of the accidents had

resulted in some degree of flooding. As a result, the Safety Board decided to hold a public

forum in December 1999 on amphibious passenger vehicle safety to bring together the

Coast Guard, the amphibious passenger vehicle industry, and technical experts to discuss

amphibious passenger vehicle safety. 
Analysis 39 Marine Accident Report

As the Safety Board opened its forum, the Coast Guard issued its final report on

the sinking of the Miss Majestic, which concludes, in part: 

Had the Miss Majestic been fitted with watertight compartmentation or flotation

materials, the vehicle would not have sunk or would have sunk so slowly that

passengers would have had ample time to escape the vehicle. 

During the Safety Board forum, participants considered the following issues:

ï Conversion of amphibious vehicles from military to civilian use,

ï Passenger egress and survival,

ï Lifesaving equipment,

ï Vehicle design and stability,

ï Maintenance and inspection policies and certification,

ï Operational safety, and

ï Amphibious vehicle operator qualifications.

The forum produced important insights into the operation of such vehicles, safety

issues unique to them, passenger accommodations design, and industry practices. One

major outcome of the forum was the realization by participants that amphibious vehicles

pose unique and unresolved safety risks to the public, but that the vehicles could be made

safe by installing safety features that would prevent them from sinking when flooded.

JMS, the naval architect contracted by the Safety Board, evaluated whether retrofitting

DUKWs with foam and bulkheads would provide adequate reserve buoyancy to keep a

DUKW afloat when it was flooded and fully loaded with passengers. JMS found such

retrofitting to be feasible. 

On February 18, 2000, the Safety Board issued an advance safety recommendation

(M-00-5) calling for amphibious passenger vehicles to be altered to provide reserve

buoyancy through passive means so that they would remain afloat and upright in the event

of flooding, even when carrying a full complement of passengers and crew.

In support of this recommendation, the Safety Board stated that a passive safety

system is more reliable than active systems because it requires no deliberate action or

operation to deploy and generally facilitates fail-safe performance of the vehicle. For

example, a DUKW is equipped with a Higgins pump that is powered by the DUKWís

propeller shaft. Reliable operation of the pump cannot be assured because so many factors

affect its proper performance, including, but not limited to, the operating condition of the

pump, the operating condition of the main engine, and the vehicle operatorís continuous

depression of the gas pedal, which keeps the propeller shaft turning and the pump

operating. Any shortcomings in maintenance of either the pump or the main engine,

failure to identify a problem, use of poor repair techniques, or other causes can render the

active system useless in an emergency. In addition, realistically, operators cannot be
Analysis 40 Marine Accident Report

expected to remain seated and depressing the gas pedal during an emergency, when they

probably would have to move to instruct or assist passengers. 

In contrast, a passive safety system requires no deliberate action or operation to

deploy and generally facilitates fail-safe performance of the vehicle. Some examples of

passive safety systems that can prevent a vehicle from sinking include

compartmentalization with watertight bulkheads, installation of buoyant material inside

the hull, and incorporation of buoyant sponsons exterior to the hull. Only the inherent

reliability and fail-safe nature of a passive safety system can ensure the level of

dependability essential to safeguarding the lives of passengers. 

The Safety Board was pleased that the Coast Guard, in its final report on the

sinking of the Miss Majestic, agreed with the Safety Boardís position on the need for

adequate reserve buoyancy. With summer coming and the likelihood of a large number of

passengers being put at risk, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation M-00-5

asking that amphibious passenger vehicle operators and refurbishers take voluntary action

to ensure that their vehicles remain afloat and upright in the event of flooding by altering

them to provide reserve buoyancy through passive means such as built-in flotation,

watertight compartmentalization, or equivalent measures.

In the interim, the Coast Guard initiated action to address some of the safety

deficiencies identified at the Safety Boardís amphibious passenger vehicle forum and in

the Coast Guardís own investigation of the Miss Majestic accident. The Coast Guard met

for 2 days in February 2000 with representatives of the amphibious passenger vehicle

industry to develop comprehensive guidelines containing best practices on the inspection

and operation of these vehicles. In December 2000, when the Coast Guard issued NVIC

No. 1-01, agency officials stated that the NVIC was developed using the information

gleaned from this meeting. 

The NVIC contains 40 pages of information and guidance on such items as unique

design features, inspection and certification, construction and arrangement, intact stability

and seaworthiness, watertight integrity, lifesaving equipment and arrangements, and fire

protection equipment. The NVIC contains a short history segment, numerous pictures,

diagrams, and charts. The circular also provides inspectors with a list of 19 modifications

that might have been made to a DUKW when it was converted to passenger service.

Further, the NVIC offers sample calculations for flooding, as well as expected scantlings.

In the Safety Boardís opinion, the document is very well done as far as it goes; however, it

does not adequately address passenger egress and survivability. For further discussion, see

the analysis section entitled ìSurvivability.î

The response to Safety Recommendation M-00-5 by the amphibious passenger

vehicle industry has been disappointing. The Safety Board sent the recommendation to 30

different amphibious passenger vehicle companies and received responses or information

from only 16. Most of the responses expressed the opinion that installing watertight

bulkheads and flotation foam would be difficult and would require detailed engineering.

Some of the responses detailed other actions that companies were taking such as installing

flow restrictor plates, additional bilge pumps, and high water bilge alarms. Only three
Analysis 41 Marine Accident Report

companies indicated that they had done or were doing anything to provide reserve

buoyancy to their vehicles as requested in the safety recommendation.

Cool Stuff advised the Safety Board that it had built a new type of amphibious

vehicle called the Hydra-Terra, which is designed especially for commercial passenger

service. The vehicleís aluminum hull has foam-filled compartments that provide sufficient

flotation certified by the manufacturer to remain afloat even with the drain plugs removed

and the engine compartment flooded. The Coast Guard has approved the Hydra-Terra for

the carriage of up to 49 passengers and a 2-person crew. Several amphibious vehicle

operators in Alaska, California, and Maine have purchased these vehicles and have placed

them in commercial passenger operation. The Safety Board is please that the Hydra-Terra

shows that it is practical and feasible to design an amphibious passenger vehicle to meet

the Safety Boardís reserve buoyancy criterion. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M00-5 is classified ìClosedóAcceptable Actionî for Cool Stuff.

Ride the Ducks, a Missouri company, stated that it was building a prototype

aluminum DUKW that incorporates foam buoyancy into the design. Once completed, this

prototype is expected to meet the reserve buoyancy criterion specified in recommendation

M-00-5, but it will not affect the other amphibious passenger vehicles in service

nationwide that do not meet the criterion. 

Boston Ducks, a Massachusetts company, stated that it had retrofitted a single

watertight bulkhead on one of its DUKWs on a trial basis; however, the company has not

had a naval architect evaluate the effectiveness of the bulkhead. 

Thus, with the exception of the Hydra-Terra, the Safety Board is not aware of any

other production model amphibious passenger vehicles that currently meet the intent of

Safety Recommendation M-00-5 or any effective retrofit to improve the reserve buoyancy

of existing DUKWs. 

The Safety Board notes that 14 companies have never responded to the Boardís

February 18, 2000, initial letter or the August 17, 2000, follow-up letter. Based on the lack

of information provided, the Safety Board classifies Safety Recommendation M-00-5

ìOpenóUnacceptable Responseî to the following: Aqua Traks, Inc.; Austin Ducks;

Buffalo Point; Chattanooga Ducks; Chicago Duck Tours; Ducks Amphibious

Renovation/Sales; Land and Sea Tours; Maui Duck Tours; Naples Land and Sea Tours;

National Park Duck Tours; Outfitter Kauai; Ozark Mountain Ducks; Sterling Equipment;

and South Padre Water Sports/Breakaway.

In its correspondence with the safety recommendation recipients, the Board

stressed that Safety Recommendation M-00-5 did not limit companies to using foam or

watertight bulkheads as the only means for achieving passive flotation; the

recommendation stated that other ìequivalent measuresî would be acceptable. Equivalent

measures would include, but not be limited to, adding buoyancy chambers, known as

sponsons, to the hull or installing inflatable buoyant bladders. Such inflatable bladders are

used on skids of helicopters that operate over water. 
Analysis 42 Marine Accident Report

Because NVIC 1-01 is only an advisory document, it is not certain whether all

amphibious passenger vehicle operators have incorporated the circularís advice into their

vehicles or vehicle operations. Furthermore, the OCMIs and inspectors need additional

training to interpret the NVIC, and because OCMIs rotate, the continuity in its application

is not assured.

Safety Recommendation M-00-5 was under consideration by the industry when

the Safety Board learned of another amphibious passenger vehicle accident. On

September 18, 2000, the Minnow, a 21-foot Stalwart-type amphibious sightseeing vehicle,

with 2 crewmembers and 17 passengers on board, was proceeding through the Milwaukee,

Wisconsin, harbor, when the bilge alarm sounded. The vehicle operator turned back to

shore; however, the vehicleís engine stopped when water entered the engine compartment.

Fortunately, the accident occurred within sight of Coast Guard personnel and the Marine

Police, who both dispatched boats to the scene and transferred all Minnow passengers to

their vessels. All passengers were taken ashore; no injuries resulted from this accident.

About 30 minutes after the flooding started, the Minnow sank in 25 feet of water.

Postaccident examination showed that the bearings for the port waterjet impeller had

failed, causing the impeller blades to cut a 1/8-inch gap in the waterjet tunnel housing

through which water entered the vehicle. This was another means of water ingress that had

not been previously identified, and it prompted the Safety Board to include information on

this accident when writing to recommendation recipients.

NVIC 1-01 had been in effect for a year when, on December 8, 2001, DUKW

No. 1, with an operator and 11 passengers on board, began flooding during a tour of Lake

Union in Seattle. When the bilge alarm sounded repeatedly and the vehicleís Higgins

pump began discharging water, the operator headed for shore. After the DUKWís wheels

touched ground, a passing boat transferred all passengers ashore without injury. The local

harbor patrol, not knowing that the problem was the result of a missing 4 1⁄2 inch-diameter

access plug, attempted to tow the DUKW No. 1 back across the lake. The harbor patrol

asked the operator to turn off the engine and to leave the DUKW. Because the engine was

not operating and, in turn, the Higgins pump was not operating to dewater the vehicle, the

DUKW sank when water continued to flood the hull through the access plug opening. The

Safety Board calculated that the flooding rate through the opening was about 330 gpm (a

greater rate than a failed rubber boot), which exceeds the maximum dewatering capacity

of a Higgins pump. Therefore, the vessel might have sunk even if the Higgins pump had

been operating.

The Safety Board investigated the sinking of the DUKW No. 1 and determined that

the vehicle owner had made improvements suggested in the Coast Guardís NVIC,

including installing a restrictor plate over the driveshaft hull penetration, double-clamped

boot assemblies, bilge alarms, and hinge pin assembly. The vehicle also had a structurally

sound hull and a working Higgins pump. Despite these attributes, the DUKW No. 1 sank

because of a simple human error that occurred during routine maintenance. For a DUKW

hull to have watertight integrity, perfect maintenance and operation is essential. In the case

of the DUKW No. 1, company procedures required that, before a tour is conducted, both

the mechanic and the operator sign the daily maintenance checklist attesting that they have
Analysis 43 Marine Accident Report

checked 55 items, including engine fluid levels, tires, brakes, driveshaft rubber boots and

clamps, and hull plugs. On the day of the accident, however, because the operator was in a

hurry to pick up waiting passengers, he did not take the time to examine all the items listed

on the safety checksheet; however, he told Safety Board investigators that he thought the

maintenance access plug had been in place. A review of the daily maintenance checklist

for DUKW No. 1 shows not only that all items were checked, but also that both the

operator and the mechanic had attested that the items had been checked. Therefore, a

checksheet is no guarantee that necessary maintenance will be performed.

If the DUKW No. 1 had been provided with sufficient reserve buoyancy through

passive means, the vehicle would not have sunk regardless of whether the plug had been

replaced. Consequently, the Safety Board concludes that flooding from failed boots, open

hull plugs, hull damage, collisions, groundings, mechanical failures, improperly

preformed maintenance, and other scenarios continue to present serious risks of rapid

flooding and sinking in amphibious vehicles lacking reserve buoyancy.

While three amphibious vehicle owners have attempted to comply with the intent

of Safety Recommendation M-00-5, most amphibious passenger vehicle operators have

either not responded to the Safety Boardís requested action or have taken other measures,

such as installing flow restrictor plates and carrier bearings, additional bilge pumps, and

high-water bilge alarm systems. The Safety Board does not consider the installation of

such devices to be equivalent to the safety measures stated in Safety Recommendation M00-5 and remains concerned about the safety of amphibious passenger vehicle operations

nationwide. While restrictor plates reduce the rate of water ingress and the carrier bearings

close the hull penetration at the shaft seal, these devices do not increase the vehicleís

reserve buoyancy. Further, while additional bilge pumps increase pumping capacity and

alarms provide warning of flooding, they are subject to malfunction and do not provide the

same level of safety as built-in sufficient reserve buoyancy. 

Despite the negative response from amphibious passenger vehicle owners

concerning the practicality of providing reserve buoyancy to DUKWs, they have not

disputed the concept. Owner comments have focused on the detailed engineering required.

Owners and manufacturers, however, have used and can use various methods to increase

the survivability of amphibious vehicles in the event of flooding. In addition to the

installation of transverse watertight bulkheads and the addition of built-in flotation

materials to the hull, owners could take equivalent measures. It is clear, however, from the

responses received from the industry, that with the exception of a few owners, voluntary

action will not be taken by the rest of the industry to address the need for adequate reserve

buoyancy on amphibious passenger vehicles. 

As a result, an unacceptable level of risk to passenger safety continues to exist on

these vehicles. Because the industry has, by and large, refused to take voluntary action to

address this risk, the Safety Board considers it imperative that the Coast Guard takes steps

to ensure that all amphibious passenger vehicles will not sink in the event of an

uncontrolled flooding event. The Safety Board believes that the Coast Guard should

require amphibious passenger vehicle operators to provide reserve buoyancy through

passive means, such as watertight compartmentalization, built-in flotation, or equivalent
Analysis 44 Marine Accident Report

measures, so that the vehicles will remain afloat and upright in the event of flooding, even

when carrying a full complement of passengers and crew.

The Safety Board is aware that Wisconsin and New York have commercial

amphibious vehicle operations that are not subject to Coast Guard jurisdiction and whose

vehicles carry thousands of passengers annually. The amphibious vehicles under State

jurisdiction in Wisconsin and New York pose the same risks as the amphibious vehicles

under Coast Guard authority. The Safety Board, therefore, believes that the States of

Wisconsin and New York should require the amphibious passenger vehicle operators

under their jurisdiction to provide their vehicles with reserve buoyancy through passive

means, such as watertight compartmentalization, built-in flotation, or equivalent

measures, so that the vehicles will remain afloat and upright in the event of flooding, even

when carrying a full complement of passengers and crew.

Survivability 

The Miss Majestic was certificated by the Coast Guard under a set of regulations

that required the Coast Guard to review the design and construction features of the vehicle

before it was placed into passenger service. The Miss Majestic, like similar amphibious

vehicles, was originally designed for landing military cargoes during wartime and not for

commercial passenger service. When the seats were retrofitted, the seating arrangement

did not comply with the regulations under which the vehicle was certificated. The width of

the aisle was 60 percent less than required (12 inches versus 30 inches) and space between

seats was about 12 percent less than required (26 inches versus 30 inches). Coast Guard

officials stated that they must have granted the Miss Majestic a waiver for the dimensions

of these spaces, although the agency had no documentation on the waiver. Further, agency

officials could provide no rationale for how the dimensions were determined. 

Although the survivors did not state that the reduced aisle width or space between

seats hindered their escape, the reduced spacing would have made seating cramped and

restricted their movement. In the circumstances of this accident, the impact of these

features on the egress of the passengers who did not survive cannot be definitively

determined. 

Following the Miss Majestic accident, the Coast Guard issued NVIC 1-01, which

provided new dimensions for fixed seating arrangements on DUKWs. Regarding aisle

width and seat separation, NVIC 1-01 states:

Because of the limiting design and construction of DUKWs and relatively short

in-water operations on protected waters, these vehicles should be granted special

consideration from the aisle width and fixed seating criteria. Aisle widths may be

allowed to be reduced to no less than 14 inches and the fixed seating criteria to no

less than 17 inches per passenger. In addition, the distance from seat back to seat

back may be reduced from 30 inches to 28 inches.
Analysis 45 Marine Accident Report

While the proposed ìspecial considerationî cited above for minimum aisle width

and fixed seating criteria for DUKWs exceeds those found on the Miss Majestic, the

Safety Board questions whether ìlimiting design and constructionî and ìrelatively short

in-water operationsî justify a departure from regulatory requirements. There is no basis

provided for the waiver to show that the minimum criteria will not impede emergency

egress. Be that as it may, the Safety Board considers that the major consideration in

assessing the ability of passengers to escape from a sinking DUKW is the overhead

canopy. All but one of the survivors stated that the canopy was an impediment to their

escape. One man said,

Öif you had the cover [canopy] off, everybody would have had a chance. With

that cover on, thereís too many people didnít have a chance because that thing [the

Miss Majestic] sank so quick [sic].

In the case of the Miss Majestic accident, the force of the water rushing in over the

stern was strong enough to sweep a 6-foot 6-inch, 260-pound man standing near the sixth

row forward and pin him against the windshield. As the Miss Majestic sank, the metal

framework on both sides of the passengers and the continuous canopy over their heads

essentially caged them, making escape in the limited available time extremely difficult. 

As the vehicle sank to the bottom of the lake, the natural buoyancy of the

passengersí bodies forced them into the overhead canopy, which acted like a net to entrap

them and to prevent their vertical escape. Of the seven fatalities found inside the vehicle,

four were found trapped in the canopy. At least two survivors testified that they had to

swim downward in order to escape from the canopy. Most of the survivors could not

explain how they were able to get out of the vehicle. 

Six victims were recovered from the lake bottom at various distances from the

vehicle. These six people might have been able to escape the vehicle but drowned before

they could reach the lakeís surface. If the vehicle had not had a canopy, the passengers

would not have had a barrier to vertical escape. They would not have been trapped inside

the vehicle, and fewer passengers might have been killed. The Safety Board therefore

concludes that the canopy on the Miss Majestic was a major impediment to the survival of

the passengers. 

The canopy on the Miss Majestic is a common feature in amphibious passenger

vehicles. The Safety Board notes that, while the Coast Guardís NVIC 1-01 recognizes

canopies as an impediment to passenger egress, it does not address the safety implications

of canopies over the passenger seating areas or their negative impact on passenger

survival in the event of sinking. Regarding canopies, the NVIC states:

Canopies and canopy supports can impede the egress of passengers. Again, the

primary egress on these vehicles is over the side. Canopy supports should be

positioned to allow the majority of passengers unobstructed egress. If a canopy

support is located directly adjacent to a passengerís seat it should be shown,

through a practical test, that the passenger can adequately egress the vehicle. The

window framing vertical distance should be sufficient for a passenger to exit

while wearing a lifejacket. A vertical distance of 32 inches from gunwale to
Analysis 46 Marine Accident Report

canopy appears sufficient for most installations. Overhead storage of lifejackets

should not impede the egress of passengers.

Once again, however, the Coast Guard provides no basis to show that the

minimum dimensions will not impede emergency egress. The Safety Board issued Safety

Recommendation M-00-5 not only because of concern for the vulnerability of amphibious

vehicles to rapid sinking but also in recognition of the extreme difficulty that passengers

would have trying to escape such vehicles, as demonstrated by the Miss Majesticís

sinking. Following this accident, almost all survivors stated that the canopy on the Miss

Majestic was an impediment to escape. 

In the Safety Boardís opinion, canopies present major safety risks that need to be

addressed, especially in light of the fact that amphibious passenger vehicles in service in

this country carry more than 1 million passengers each year, including a great many

children. This unique vehicle is often promoted to and used by school groups. Typically,

such groups of children are accompanied by a limited number of adults. Each of the four

children under age 15 on the Miss Majestic was accompanied by at least one adult. Of

these children, three did not survive and the fourth survived by mere happenstance.

Children are particularly vulnerable when traveling as passengers on amphibious

passenger vehicles and, even if an adult accompanies them, their survival can be

jeopardized. If children are permitted to board a DUKW without donning lifejackets,

adults will probably have insufficient time to help the children don lifejackets in the event

of an emergency. If the children don the lifejackets upon boarding and the canopy is

retained, the adults traveling with the children likely will not have time to help the

children egress the vehicle before it sinks. If the adults are not successful in placing the

children or themselves outside the vehicle before it sinks, all could likely become trapped

in the overhead canopy. The Safety Board is particularly concerned that both adults and

children wearing lifejackets are at risk of being drowned if entrapped by the overhead

canopy. 

A more realistic approach to ensure passenger safety would be to afford passengers

a reasonable opportunity to escape by removing the canopy. The Safety Board therefore

concludes that, on amphibious passenger vehicles that cannot remain afloat when flooded,

canopies can represent an unacceptable risk to passenger safety. 

In looking at the operation of DUKWs, the Safety Board recognizes that the

removal of the canopy, by itself, is not adequate to ensure survivability of passengers in

the event of sinking. Even though passengers would not be trapped inside the vessel when

it sank because the canopy was removed, they could still drown after they entered the

water. As shown by the Miss Majestic accident, DUKWs without adequate reserve

buoyancy will sink rapidly once water begins to flood into the hull, leaving little or no

time for passengers to retrieve and don lifejackets or to assist children in donning

lifejackets. Consequently the Safety Board concludes that wearing lifejackets before the

vehicle enters the water would enhance the safety of passengers on board DUKWs

without adequate reserve buoyancy where canopies have been removed. Therefore the

Safety Board believes that, where canopies have been removed on amphibious passenger
Analysis 47 Marine Accident Report

vehicles for which there is not adequate reserve buoyancy, the Coast Guard should require

that all passengers don lifejackets before beginning waterborne operations. 

Some of the owners of existing amphibious passenger vehicles have stated that the

installation of adequate reserve buoyancy through passive means to existing vehicles is

not practical. In the Safety Boardís opinion, if providing existing amphibious passenger

vehicles with sufficient reserve buoyancy through passive means to remain afloat and

upright in the event of flooding is not practical, then alternative action that prevents

passengers from being trapped inside the vehicle in the event of sinking should be taken.

Such action should include removing the roof canopy before water operations so that

passengers will float clear of the vehicle in the event of sinking and requiring passengers

to don lifejackets. In addition, owners should be required to reduce through-hull

penetrations. For example, some access holes used to perform maintenance inside the hull

could be sealed. Following the DUKW No. 1 accident, the owner of the vehicle decided to

seal the larger access plugs17 in all his DUKWs to reduce the likelihood of flooding. The

change required some reengineering. Instead of using the forwardmost access plug to

access the engine oil sump and filter, the plug was sealed and a portable pump is used to

drain the sump. The oil filter has been relocated to be accessible through the vehicleís

hood. Other amphibious passenger vehicle owners should be able to modify their vehicles

to eliminate the risk to passenger safety.

As shown earlier in this report, Higgins pumps require maintenance and are

subject to multiple failure modes. If a Higgins pump malfunctions and the DUKW vehicle

lacks sufficient reserve buoyancy to remain afloat, it can rapidly sink, risking serious

injury or death to passengers, as shown by the Miss Majestic accident. Further, the

operation of the pump is contingent upon the operation of the engine. The sinking of the

DUKW No. 1 in Seattle clearly demonstrates what can happen to a vehicle without

sufficient reserve buoyancy if it experiences flooding and if it relies on the Higgins pump

for dewatering. The Coast Guard NVIC 1-01 recognizes the need for an independent

backup for the Higgins pump sufficient to provide enough dewatering capacity to offset

flooding through the largest penetration of the vehicleís hull. In the Safety Boardís

opinion, dewatering capacity is essential to at least partially compensate for the lack of

installed reserve buoyancy. While such capacity is not the equivalent to built-in reserve

buoyancy sufficient to keep the vehicle afloat in the event of unrestricted flooding,

dewatering at least provides some measure of additional protection that may help to keep

the vehicle afloat longer, giving passengers more time to escape before the vehicle sinks. 

The Coast Guard NVIC 1-01 acknowledges the critical role dewatering pumps

play in the safety of DUKWs. The circular states:

The methodology to be used in calculating the bilge pump capacity should be

similar to that of the original military methodology. Provide bilge pumps for

normal operations and for emergency operations, which can offset uncontrolled

flooding of the largest penetration in the hull until the vehicle can be safely

beachedÖHence an originally equipped DUKW should have a bilge pumps or

17 The small (æ-inch-diameter) plugs used to drain the hull after the vehicle leaves the water were not

sealed.
Analysis 48 Marine Accident Report

pumps with a combined capacity of over 220 gpm to control flooding or it could

sink in approximately 8 minutes if left unchecked. 

While the Coast Guard NVIC 1-01 recommends the installation of such additional

pumps, the document is advisory in nature and not mandatory. Thus, compliance by

DUKW operators is more or less voluntary. In the Safety Boardís opinion, until such time

as reserve buoyancy requirements come into effect for DUKW passenger vehicles, a

provision for dewatering capacity should be made mandatory. 

As discussed above, the means exist to eliminate or reduce hull penetrations by

welding access plugs closed, installing restrictor plates or carrier bearings, and using

double clamped boots. An in-water inspection on each occasion that a through hull

penetration has been removed or uncovered would assure the maintenance of watertight

conditions before the amphibious vehicle was returned to service. Verifying the vehicleís

watertight condition before each waterborne departure would further reduce risks to

passengers in amphibious passenger vehicles.

Consequently, the Safety Board believes that, until such time as an amphibious

vehicle owner establishes sufficient reserve buoyancy to remain upright and afloat in a

fully flooded condition, the Coast Guard and the States of New York and Wisconsin

should require the following (1) removal of canopies for waterborne operations or

installation of a Coast Guard-approved canopy that does not restrict either horizontal or

vertical escape by passengers in the event of sinking, (2) reengineering of each

amphibious vehicle to permanently close all unnecessary access plugs and to reduce all

necessary through-hull penetrations to the minimum size necessary for operation, (3)

installation of independently powered electric bilge pumps that are capable of dewatering

the craft at the volume of the largest remaining penetration to supplement either an

operable Higgins pump or a dewatering pump of equivalent or greater capacity, (4)

installation of four independently powered bilge alarms, (5) inspection of the vehicle in

water after each time a through-hull penetration has been removed or uncovered, (6)

verification of a vehicleís watertight condition in the water at the outset of each

waterborne departure, and (7) compliance with all remaining provisions of NVIC 1-01. 

Actions of the Operator

In addition to evaluating the design and maintenance of the vehicle, the Safety

Board also evaluated the operatorís performance to determine the impact, if any, of her

actions upon the outcome of this accident. 

The Miss Majestic operator was required by Coast Guard regulations to provide

passengers with a safety briefing before the waterborne portion of the tour. The briefing

that she gave did not cover some safety issues. For example, she did not demonstrate how

to don lifejackets and did not mention procedures for abandoning the vehicle. Land and

Lakes did not have any formal policies or procedures for its vehicle operators to follow in

providing safety briefings to passengers. The Safety Board clearly recognizes the
Analysis 49 Marine Accident Report

importance of safety briefings and has made several recommendations for requiring such

briefings as a result of past accident investigations. 

Under the circumstances of this accident, however, the operator and passengers

had insufficient time between their first recognition of danger and the vehicleís sinking to

take any emergency actions. From the time that they recognized a problem until the time

that the Miss Majestic completely sank was a matter of seconds. Although survivors

indicated that a passenger had distributed lifejackets when he first saw the flooding, the

vehicle sank so rapidly that no one was able to don a lifejacket before the vehicle

completely submerged. The adult passengers did not have time to put lifejackets on the

children. The father of one surviving child said that his wife had tried to put a lifejacket on

their daughter, with no success. He said that he was convinced that if his wife had been

successful, the daughter would have perished. As it was, the child grabbed hold of another

passenger who was able to escape the vehicle.

While the safety briefing provided by the operator of the Miss Majestic was not

comprehensive, the lack of instructions to the passengers regarding emergency egress

most likely did not affect the survival of the passengers in this accident.

After her safety briefing, the operator turned on the electric bilge pumps and

entered the lake to begin the waterborne portion of the tour. She provided a continuous

commentary as part of her routine duties. In order to do this, she turned to her right, in the

direction of the passengers, as she proceeded along the lake. While her attention was

focused on steering the vehicle and narrating the tour, she did not notice that the forward

electric bilge pump, which was to her left, was discharging water over the side. As the tour

progressed, the vehicle began to list and to maneuver sluggishly, which was the operatorís

first indication of anything out of the ordinary. Moments later, as she was instructing a

passenger to move from the port to the starboard side, water began to flood over the stern

and the vehicle sank. Thus, between the time that the operator first recognized a problem

and the time that the vehicle sank was only a matter of seconds. In the Safety Boardís

opinion, the time factor precluded the operator from taking any action that might have

been effective in altering the outcome of the accident. 

Earlier warning that the vehicle was flooding would have provided the operator

with the opportunity to head for shore and to at least alert the passengers to the emergency.

Two days before this accident, the actions of the operator demonstrated that she

recognized the safety implications of water being discharged by the Higgins pump and an

electric bilge pump. Upon seeing the water streams, she immediately cut short the water

tour and exited to the safety of land. On May 1, however, she did not receive any such

warning because the Higgins pump was inoperative and the required high-level bilge

alarms had not been installed.

The Safety Board concludes that given the circumstances of this accident, the

operator could not have taken any meaningful action to avert or mitigate its fatal outcome. 
50 Marine Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. Water initially entered the Miss Majestic through the gap between the driveshaft and

its housing because the securing clamp for the watertight rubber boot had not been

adequately secured by the maintenance mechanic.

2. The Miss Majestic sank because the DUKW had no watertight bulkheads and no

reserve buoyancy and because its Higgins pump, which had been designed for

significant dewatering capacity, did not operate. 

3. The canopy on the Miss Majestic was a major impediment to the survival of the

passengers.

4. Land and Lakes Tours, Inc.ís long-term vessel maintenance was inadequate and

directly compromised the safety of the Miss Majestic and its passengers.

5. The Coast Guardís inspection program for the Miss Majestic was inadequate and

cursory. 

6. The lack of Coast Guard guidance and training for the inspection of DUKWs

contributed to the inadequate inspections of the Miss Majestic.

7. Industry and Coast Guard inspectors need to become familiar with the general

background and unique safety issues of all types of amphibious vehicles to improve

the maintenance, inspection, and operation of specialized amphibious vehicles.

8. Flooding from failed boots, open hull plugs, hull damage, collisions, groundings,

mechanical failures, improperly performed maintenance, and other scenarios continue

to present serious risks of rapid flooding and sinking in amphibious vehicles lacking

reserve buoyancy.

9. On amphibious passenger vehicles that cannot remain afloat when flooded, canopies

can represent an unacceptable risk to passenger safety.

10. Wearing lifejackets before the vehicle enters the water would enhance the safety of

passengers on board DUKWs without adequate reserve buoyancy where canopies

have been removed

11. Weather, drug and alcohol use, and operator fatigue were not factors in the sinking of

the Miss Majestic.
Conclusions 51 Marine Accident Report

12. Given the circumstances of this accident, the operator could not have taken any action

to avert or mitigate its fatal outcome.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the uncontrolled flooding and sinking of the Miss Majestic was the failure of Land and

Lakes Tours, Inc., to adequately repair and maintain the DUKW. Contributing to the

sinking was a flaw in the design of DUKWs as converted for passenger service, that is, the

lack of adequate reserve buoyancy that would have allowed the vehicle to remain afloat in

a flooded condition. Contributing to the unsafe condition of the Miss Majestic was the lack

of adequate oversight by the Coast Guard. Contributing to the high loss of life was a

continuous canopy roof that entrapped passengers within the sinking vehicle. 
52 Marine Accident Report

Recommendations

New Recommendations

To the U.S. Coast Guard and the Governors of the States of New York and

Wisconsin:

Require that amphibious passenger vehicle operators provide reserve

buoyancy through passive means, such as watertight compartmentalization,

built-in flotation, or equivalent measures, so that the vehicles will remain

afloat and upright in the event of flooding, even when carrying a full

complement of passengers and crew. (M-02-1)

Until such time that owners provide sufficient reserve buoyancy in their

amphibious passenger vehicles so that they will remain upright and afloat

in a fully flooded condition (by M-02-1), require the following:

removal of canopies for waterborne operations or installation of a

Coast Guard-approved canopy that does not restrict either

horizontal or vertical escape by passengers in the event of sinking, 

reengineering of each amphibious vehicle to permanently close all

unnecessary access plugs and to reduce all necessary through-hull

penetrations to the minimum size necessary for operation, 

installation of independently powered electric bilge pumps that are

capable of dewatering the craft at the volume of the largest

remaining penetration to supplement either an operable Higgins

pump or a dewatering pump of equivalent or greater capacity, 

installation of four independently powered bilge alarms, 

inspection of the vehicle in water after each time a through-hull

penetration has been removed or uncovered, 

verification of a vehicleís watertight condition in the water at the

outset of each waterborne departure, and 

compliance with all remaining provisions of Navigation and Vessel

Inspection Circular1-01. (M-02-2)

Where canopies have been removed on amphibious passenger vehicles for

which there is not adequate reserve buoyancy, require that all passengers

don lifejackets before the onset of waterborne operations. (M-02-3)
Recommendations 53 Marine Accident Report

To the U.S. Coast Guard

Develop and promulgate guidance for all amphibious passenger vehicles

similar in purpose to the Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 1-01.

(M-02-4)

Previously Issued Recommendation Classified in this Report

The following Safety Recommendation was issued to 30 operators and

refurbishers of amphibious passenger vehicles in the United States: 

M-00-5

Without delay, alter your amphibious passenger vessels to provide reserve

buoyancy through passive means, such as watertight compartmentalization, builtin flotation, or equivalent measures, so that they will remain afloat and upright in

the event of flooding, even when carrying a full complement of passengers and

crew.

Based on information received, the Safety Board classifies, in this report, Safety

Recommendation M-00-5 (previously classified ìOpenóAcceptable Responseî)

ìClosedóAcceptable Actionî for the following company: Cool Stuff.

Based on the lack of response to its February 18, 2000, initial letter and its August

17, 2000, follow-up letter, the Safety Board classifies Safety Recommendation M-00-5

ìOpenóUnacceptable Responseî to the following companies: Aqua Traks, Inc; Austin

Ducks; Buffalo Point; Chattanooga Ducks; Chicago Duck Tours; Ducks Amphibious

Renovation/Sales; Land and Sea Tours; Maui Duck Tours; Naples Land and Sea Tours;

National Park Duck Tours; Outfitter Kauai; Ozark Mountain Ducks; Sterling Equipment;

and South Padre Water Sports/Breakaway.

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

MARION C. BLAKEY

Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member

CAROL J. CARMODY

Vice Chairman

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

Adopted: April 2, 2002
Recommendations 54 Marine Accident Report

Concurring Statement

John J. Goglia, Member, filed the following concurring statement on April 9, 2002.

Member Goglia was joined in the following concurring statement by Members John A.

Hammerschmidt and George W. Black, Jr.

Notation 7222B

Member GOGLIA concurring:

The Board makes several important recommendations in its report. However, this

accident was initiated by a maintenance failure and the recommendations fail to fully

address the maintenance shortcomings that initiated this tragic accident.

More needs to be done to ensure the safety of the public on vessels within the

jurisdiction of the Coast Guard. The NTSB report could provide helpful guidance on the

maintenance aspects.

There was improper maintenance performed on this vessel. There were no

requirements that the technicians were capable or qualified. There was no oversight of the

contract maintenance performed on this vessel by the operator. There was no supervision

to ensure that the maintenance was properly performed. There were few or no records of

what maintenance was accomplished, or any documentation of proper maintenance

procedures and whether such procedures were followed. The Coast Guard has

maintenance standards and requirements for maintenance incidental to the operation of its

own vessels. The Coast Guard would improve public safety if it required the operators of

vessels carrying the pubic for hire to have maintenance standards and requirements similar

to what they require of themselves.

It should also be noted that there was disagreement among staff regarding

recommendation number 1 to the Coast Guard. Some staff believe it is improbable that the

passive measures as proposed in the Boardís early recommendation and the report can be

readily incorporated into existing DUKW vehicles. These staff point out that the Board

previously issued a similar recommendation to the industry and that no company has

managed to achieve this goal for existing vehicles to date. Rather, these staff believe the

remedial actions proposed by the Coast Guard NVIC such as the installation of restrictor

plated and carrier bearings over the drive shaft opening, the use of double clamps on drive

shaft boots, and the installation of additional high level bilge alarms, are sufficient to

prevent the recurrence of Miss Majestic type accidents in the future.

These same staff do not completely agree with conclusion number 9 and the

recommendation to remove canopies. They have requested the conclusion state, ìOn

amphibious passenger vehicles that cannot remain afloat when flooded canopies can

represent a grave risk to passenger safetyî because they do not agree that canopies

represent an unacceptable risk to passenger safety.
55 Marine Accident Report

Appendix A

Investigation And Public Forum

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the Miss Majestic

accident at 1700, on May 1, 1999. An eight-person investigative team, consisting of an

investigator-in-charge, the technical branch chief, and human performance and survival

factors investigators, arrived in Hot Springs at 0130, May 2, 1999, and began the

investigation later that morning. Representatives from the Safety Boardís Office of

Government, Public, and Family Affairs supported the team. A Board Member arrived

with the team on scene the same day.

The Safety Board investigated the accident under the authority of the Independent

Safety Board Act of 1997, according to the Safety Boardís rules. Team members

conducted witness interviews and examined the vessel after it was raised from the bottom

of Lake Hamilton. On December 8ñ9, 1999, in Memphis, Tennessee, the Safety Board

sponsored a public forum on amphibious passenger vessel safety, which brought together

representatives of the U.S. Coast Guard, State governments, amphibious passenger vessel

operators, other private sector organizations, and the public to explore safety matters

relating to the design, regulation, maintenance, and operation of these vessels. 

The designated parties to the Safety Boardís on-scene investigation were the

Garland County Sheriff Department and Land and Lakes Tours, the owner of the Miss

Majestic. Although offered party status, the U.S. Coast Guard declined to participate in the

Safety Boardís investigation.
56 Marine Accident Report

Appendix B

Minnow and DUKW No. 1 Accident Briefs

 

 

 

 
Appendix B 57 Marine Accident Report

NTSB/MAB-02/01 

E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA S PORTATION

B OAR D

SAFE T Y

N National Transportation Safety Board 

 Washington, DC 20594

 Marine Accident Brief 

Sinking of the Alvis Stalwart M/V Minnow 

in Milwaukee Harbor on September 18, 2000 

Accident No. DCA-00-MM-042 

Vessel: 

20-foot 10-inch long, 8-foot 7-inch wide, steel-hull amphibious 

passenger vehicle of Alvis Stalwart design, built in 1967 in the 

United Kingdom 

Accident Type: Flooding and sinking 

Location: Milwaukee Harbor, Lake Michigan 

Date: September 18, 2000 

Time: 11:55 a.m. Central Daylight Time 

Owner: Minnow Tours LLC, 3775 S. Packard Avenue, St. Francis, 

Wisconsin 

Property Damage: $ 170,000 (approximate) 

Complement: Nineteen people, including a licensed operator,1

 and an unlicensed 

deckhand. The Minnow was certificated by the U.S. Coast Guard to 

carry 1 operator, 1 deckhand, and up to 28 passengers. 

Injuries: None 

Vessel History 

The previous owner of the M/V Minnow, a 21-foot-long Alvis Stalwart amphibious 

passenger vehicle, contracted with Land and Sea Tours of Apopka, Florida, to refurbish and to 

sell the vehicle on his behalf. To prepare the Stalwart for sale, the refurbisher did some topside 

finishing work, such as replacing the canopy and seats, painting the vehicle, and making other 

aesthetic changes. He also rebuilt the main engine. 

The vehicle remained on the market and was not operated for about a year, when the 

owner of Minnow Tours, based in St. Francis, Wisconsin, bought it in May 2000. Before taking 

possession of the vehicle, the Minnow Tours owner visited the refurbisher to obtain a set of 

manuals and information about Stalwart operations and maintenance. The refurbisher did not 

 

1 The operator, age 26, held a Coast Guard license for “Master of not more than 50 Gross Tons upon Great 

Lakes and Inland Waters” that was issued June 5, 1998, and that expired on June 5, 2003. 
Appendix B 58 Marine Accident Report

2 NTSB/MAB-02/01 

provide formal training or an orientation program about the Stalwart; rather, he answered 

questions that the owner posed. 

Accident Narrative

About 1130 on September 18, 2000, the Minnow departed on a tour of Milwaukee, 

Wisconsin, with 19 people on board, including an operator, a deckhand, and 17 passengers. After 

an 8-minute road trip, the Minnow entered the waters of Milwaukee Harbor from a boat launch at 

the South Shore Yacht Club. The deckhand gave the passengers a safety orientation that included 

instructions on how to don lifejackets and what actions to take in the event of an emergency. The 

deckhand’s other duties included narrating the sightseeing tour. 

The Minnow followed its normal water tour route, hugging the shoreward side of the 

harbor breakwater. The operator said that, as he cruised at a speed of about 3 knots, he heard no 

unusual mechanical noises and had no operational problems. About 15 minutes after the water 

tour began, however, he heard a sudden “mechanical” noise on the port side of the vessel and felt 

the vessel “shudder.” The operator said that the engine speed then dropped 400 rpm. After a few 

seconds, the shuddering lessened somewhat but did not cease. The operator said that, at this time, 

the jet wash appeared normal, the gage readings were normal, and no alarms sounded. He said 

that, at the time, he thought a foreign object had been sucked in and out of the jet. 

About 1200, the high-water bilge alarm sounded. The operator said that he immediately 

turned on the two bilge pumps and headed the vessel back toward the dock. He said that he saw 

water issuing from the forward bilge pump discharge point on the starboard bow. From the 

driver’s position, he could not see whether water was issuing from the stern bilge pump 

discharge point. To avoid panic among the passengers, the operator silenced the bilge alarm. 

About 1202, the operator noted that the engine temperature was dropping and wondered 

whether the gage had an electrical problem.2

 He said the vessel was handling normally. When 

the mechanical noise and mild shuddering suddenly ceased, the operator observed in the 

rearview mirror that the left propulsion jet wash was mixed with air while the right jet wash was 

normal. 

As the Minnow came into view of the Coast Guard base, the vessel’s engine began to 

sputter. The operator steered the Minnow toward the concrete pier embankment. About 1206, the 

engine stopped just as the operator reached the last ladder on the embankment. The operator then 

observed that, from the vessel’s deck, the ladder was too high for the passengers to grasp. About 

this time, the deckhand pointed out to the operator that the vessel’s stern was low in the water, 

with a freeboard of 1 to 1 1⁄2 feet.3

Meanwhile, two marine police officers and a Coast Guardsman were eating lunch in the 

Coast Guard base mess when one of the police officers noticed a tour boat (the Minnow) heading 

toward the embankment and its operator reaching out toward a ladder on the embankment. The 

 

2

 At the time, the operator did not realize that water was flooding the vessel and that the engine was becoming 

submerged. 

3

 The Minnow normally had a freeboard of 4 feet. 
Appendix B 59 Marine Accident Report

3 NTSB/MAB-02/01 

Coast Guardsman immediately left to notify the Coast Guard Station of the situation. The police 

officers immediately proceeded to their boat, which was moored at the pier outside the mess. At 

1207, as they were casting off, they overheard the Minnow’s operator radio the Coast Guard, 

whereupon the marine police radioed the Stalwart operator, advising him that they were en route. 

The Minnow’s operator told the police that the Minnow was taking on water and needed 

assistance. The police relayed the information about the Minnow’s distress situation to the Coast 

Guard, which immediately dispatched response personnel in a rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB). 

The operator stated that, upon receiving an immediate response from the marine police 

and observing that a police boat was within 200 yards of the Minnow, he did not think it 

necessary to ask the passengers to don lifejackets. Rather, he told passengers that they would 

have to board the police boat when it came alongside. 

Soon after the police boat had moored port to port with the Minnow, the Coast Guard 

RHIB arrived and moored on the Minnow’s starboard side. According to the responders, no 

problems occurred during the evacuation. The marine policemen described the passengers as 

“very calm” and characterized their demeanor as “almost festive” during the transfer. Twelve 

people from the Minnow evacuated to the police boat. The remaining 7 people originally 

evacuated to the RHIB but subsequently transferred to the police boat, which took all the 

passengers and crew of the Minnow back to shore. No injuries requiring medical treatment 

occurred during the transfers. 

The marine police reported that the operator’s behavior seemed normal and that he did 

not seem to be impaired from drugs or alcohol. Within 2 hours of the accident, the Coast Guard 

gave the Minnow operator a Breathalyzer test; the test results were negative. 

After dropping off the Minnow’s passengers and crew, the Coast Guard crewmen 

returned in a 41-foot UTB with a dewatering pump to prevent the Stalwart from sinking. The 

effort was unsuccessful; the Minnow drifted around the embankment and sank in 25 feet of 

water. 

Postaccident On-Scene Examination 

After the Minnow was salvaged, Safety Board investigators found no evidence of 

blockage from debris in the intake and discharges for the port and starboard waterjets and no 

abnormalities in the starboard waterjet tunnel. They observed that the blade of the port waterjet 

impeller had cut through the waterjet tunnel housing the impeller, leaving a 1/8-inch-wide 

circumferential gap through which water from the port waterjet tunnel could enter the 

amphibious vehicle. 

When the port and starboard waterjets were disassembled, investigators observed that the 

port impeller shaft inside the stator bearing was severely damaged, and that the bearings inside 

the port stator were broken into fragments and discolored. Neither the stator bearing nor the 

conical fairwater at the end of the port stator had any lubricant. Investigators found that the 

lubricating fitting (spigot) for the port stator had broken off. The bearing’s retaining nut on the 

port impeller shaft was severely corroded. 
Appendix B 60 Marine Accident Report

4 NTSB/MAB-02/01 

The underwater area of the hull was in good condition and showed no evidence of leaks. 

The three drain plugs on the hull were secured in place. No other sources that potentially could 

have resulted in a significant flooding of the hull were identified. Investigators tested the 

Stalwart’s two 12-volt positive-displacement bilge pumps and found that one of the pumps was 

inoperative. Two of the six impeller vanes were broken and were blocking the suction and 

discharge openings inside the pump casing. 

Laboratory Tests 

The on-scene investigators sent components to the Safety Board’s Materials Laboratory 

in Washington, D.C., for further examination and analysis. The laboratory report states that the 

high temperature deformation of the bearing rollers indicated inadequate lubrication, which 

caused the failure of the aft shaft bearing, which, in turn, resulted in the failure of the port 

propulsion unit. Severe corrosion on the shaft bearing retaining nut indicated that the integrity of 

the bearing and oil cavity had been compromised for a significant period before the accident, 

allowing water to enter the oil chamber, corrode the nut, and degrade the lubricating oil. Over a 

period of time, water had entered through either a bad shaft seal or the fractured spigot. 

Laboratory analysis could not conclusively determine when the spigot had fractured. 

The report found that, although the final breakup of the bearing occurred during the 

Minnow’s final voyage, severe degradation of the bearing had occurred for a long time before the 

accident voyage. 

Follow-up Interviews 

The owner stated he could not remember whether the refurbisher had told him about 

servicing recommendations for the rear bearing that malfunctioned in this accident. The 

refurbisher said he could not recall whether the oil level or the condition of the bearing that 

broke had been checked before the sale. Both the owner and refurbisher stated that the 

refurbisher had repaired the main bearing forward of the propulsion plenum because water had 

entered the bearing and caused it to seize. 

According to the owner of Minnow Tours, he and the vehicle operator had performed the 

maintenance on the Stalwart. Both men had previous experience with automobile repairs. The 

company owner provided Safety Board investigators with a maintenance guide, Servicing 

Schedule Condensed Summary, which outlined daily, weekly, monthly, bimonthly, and annual 

maintenance schedules for the vehicle. Item 12 A under “weekly inspection and servicing” 

recommended that the rear hub bearing oil level be checked for the propulsion shafts. According 

to the company owner, the oil level for the rear bearings for the propulsion shafts had not been 

checked since he purchased the Stalwart. He had repaired the bevel gearing on the port power 

transmission shaft when mechanical problems occurred soon after purchase. He had made other 

minor repairs in the 4 months between purchase and the accident, including changing the 

lubricant in the wheel hubs because water in the lubricant had resulted in the hubs’ overheating. 

He had changed the distributor points “because of problems” and had had to replenish the engine 

oil frequently because the vehicle “blows a little engine oil.”
Appendix B 61 Marine Accident Report

Coast Guard Inspections 

At the refurbisherís Minnow was being modified for sale, a Coast Guard inspector from

MSO Jacksonville, Florida, examined the vehicle. The Coast Guard inspector did not conduct a

detailed plan review of the refurbished Stalwart; he approved the design of the Minnow based on the

Coast Guardís be successful in 5 years of service. 

The Coast Guard inspector in Milwaukee, who was tasked with certificating the Minnow,

had never inspected a Stalwart. He said that, after receiving 2 years of training, he had been

qualified in 1990 to inspect small passenger vessels, oceangoing ships, large passenger ferries, and

tank barges. He was qualified as both a machinery and hull inspector. He said that he had inspected

two DUKWs in 1988; however, he considered a Stalwart more complex mechanically than a

DUKW. He stated that MSO Jacksonville provided him with very limited background information

on the Minnow, merely an electrical diagram and stability information. He was not provided with

manuals or other Coast Guard guidance for inspecting Stalwarts. He had never inspected waterjet

propulsors before and, based on his lack of experience with Stalwarts, stated that he would likely not

have thought of inspecting the area where the mechanical failure occurred. He stated that he

considered checking the grease and oil levels in bearings a servicing and maintenance procedure

that was the responsibility of the owner. 

Before issuing the COI, the inspector checked the operation of the bilge alarm, the bilge

pumps, and the firefighting system. He also examined the hull condition and took the vessel for a

test ride in the water. Based on his inspection, he required that repairs be made to the electrical

wiring. 

As part of the requirements for issuing the COI, the Coast Guard inspector observed the

crew while they conducted man-overboard drills. He explained the responsibilities for distributing

lifejackets, firefighting, briefing passengers, and posting emergency placards. He gave the company

a mannequin for practicing man-overboard drills and made several suggestions on how to improve

passenger briefings. He stated he visited the company several times to ensure that it satisfactorily

completed these requirements. During the COI inspection, the company owner and the operator of

the Minnow were present. The deckhand who was on board the Minnow on the day of the accident

was a new employee who had not been present at the COI inspection. The company is required to

train its new employees in safety procedures and log its crew training. The Coast Guard witnesses

drills only during its annual inspections.

Probable Cause 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the

flooding and sinking of the Minnow was the inadequate prepurchase mechanical evaluation and

subsequent inadequate maintenance by Minnow Tours before placing the vessel in passenger

service. 

5 NTSB/MAB-02/01 
Appendix B 62 Marine Accident Report

NTSB/MAB-02/02 

E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA S PORTATION

B OAR D

SAFE T Y

N National Transportation Safety Board 

 Washington, DC 20594

 Marine Accident Brief 

Sinking of the DUKW No. 1

Lake Union, Seattle, Washington, December 8, 2001

Accident No.: DCA-02-MM-002 

Vessel: 33-foot long, 8-foot 2-inch wide, steel-hulled amphibious passenger 

vehicle DUKW No. 1, built in 1945 for the U.S. Army1

Accident Type: Flooding and sinking 

Location: Lake Union, Seattle, Washington 

Date: December 8, 2001 

Time: 1430 Pacific Standard Time 

Owner: Ride the Ducks of Seattle, Seattle, Washington 

Property Damage: $100,000 (approximate) 

Complement: 1 operator, 11 passengers. Certificated for 36 passengers maximum 

Injuries: None 

Preaccident Events

On December 8, 2001, the junior mechanic for Ride the Ducks of Seattle, Washington, 

arrived at the company’s garage about 0730 to perform maintenance on the DUKW that was to 

be used for the tours that day. For the winter months, the company had cut back operations, 

conducting tours only on weekends using one of its four DUKWs. In case problems arose with 

the first DUKW, the company maintained another DUKW on standby. The work hours of the 

company’s staff had been reduced commensurate with the operating demand. The senior 

mechanic and supervisor of the junior mechanic did not come into the garage that week. The 

junior mechanic worked part time between 0700 and 1000. 

 

1

 During the DUKW’s modification from Army cargo vehicle to civilian passenger vehicle, DUKW No. 1 was 

lengthened. 
Appendix B 63 Marine Accident Report

About 1000, the operator arrived, checked DUKW No. 2, which had been scheduled for

use that day, and departed to pick up passengers at the 1100 tour. The junior mechanic then left for

the day. 

According to the operator, the 1100 tour was completed without incident. During a walkaround inspection of the DUKW after the tour, however, the operator noted that a tire was low. He

drove the DUKW to a nearby automotive service station to inflate the tire where, coincidentally,

he met the junior mechanic who had stopped there on his way home. The tire would not hold air

and, rather than undertake the time-consuming process of changing the DUKWís tire, the operator

asked mechanic told him that DUKW No. 1 had been serviced. The senior mechanic later advised

the Safety Board that DUKW No. 1 was not originally scheduled to be the standby vehicle. DUKW

No. 4, the standby DUKW, had developed engine problems about a week before this accident. As

a result, about December 5, the company transferred its insurance to DUKW No. 1 and placed it in

a standby status. 

The junior mechanic said that he last changed the oil and completed a maintenance

checklist for DUKW No. 1 on November 28; however, the Safety Board investigators were not

provided a copy of the checklist. 

The Accident 

Company procedures required that, before a tour is conducted, both the mechanic and the

operator sign the daily maintenance checklist attesting that they have checked 55 items, including

engine fluid levels, tires, brakes, driveshaft rubber boots and clamps, and hull plugs. 

On the day of the accident, the operator said that he arrived at the company garage about

1300 and spent about 5 to 10 minutes inspecting DUKW No. 1. He said that because he was in a

hurry to pick up waiting passengers, he was unable to examine all the items listed on the safety

checksheet; however, he told Safety Board investigators that he thought the maintenance access

plug had been in place. A review of the daily maintenance checklist for DUKW No. 1 shows all

items were checked. 

The operator arrived about 1320 at the ticket booth, where 11 passengers boarded. The

operator stated that he gave a safety briefing, which included information about the location of

and donning procedures for lifejackets as well as procedures for exiting the vehicle in the event of

an emergency. 

After completing the land portion of the tour, the DUKW No. 1 entered the water and

proceeded on its normal route across Lake Union. The operator said that, about half way across

the lake, he felt the boat vibrating and thought that, because all the passengers were seated in the

forward area of the DUKW, the propeller was not completely immersed. He therefore asked

several passengers to move aft in the vehicle. 

The DUKW No. 1 had been in the water about 5 minutes when the bilge alarm sounded

briefly. About a minute later, the bilge alarm began sounding steadily, and the Higgins pump

began discharging water. In accordance with company safety procedures, which stipulated that an

operator proceed to the nearest open beach area if the Higgins pump discharged water, the

2 NTSB/MAB-02/02 
Appendix B 64 Marine Accident Report

DUKW No. 1 operator headed towards Good Turn Park. The DUKW No. 1 operator later

stated that he did not order the passengers to don lifejackets2

 because the vehicle was so close to the

park. 

The operator of a nearby boat noticed the Higgins pump discharge and followed the

DUKW No. 1 to see if it needed assistance. 

About 2-3 minutes elapsed from the time that the bilge alarm began sounding steadily to

the time that the DUKWís wheels loose gravel bottom, and the vehicleís onto the beach. The

DUKW No. 1 operator then asked the operator of the Good Samaritan boat to shuttle the DUKW

No. 1ís passengers had to enter the water or were injured during the transfer. 

The DUKW No. 1 operator contacted the tour company, which arranged for taxis to pick

up the passengers from Good Turn Park and return them to the ticket booth. The operator also

contacted the Seattle Harbor Patrol, which dispatched a patrol vessel that arrived on the scene after

all the passengers had safely disembarked. The Harbor Patrol vessel attempted to tow the stalled

DUKW No. 1 back across the lake; however, before reaching its destination, the DUKW No. 1 sank

by the bow in 27 feet of water.

Postaccident Findings 

Divers sent down to the vehicle found that a 4 1⁄2-inch hull access plug 3

 was missing,

which had allowed water to flood the hull and sink the DUKW No. 1.

4

 The company initially could

not find the spare access plug. To close the hole in the DUKW No. 1 before salvaging the vehicle,

the company installed a plug from another vehicle. The company later accounted for the access

plugs and the single spare plug for all four DUKWs. The companyís stated that, before the

accident, the company had moved to apresident and larger garage. The DUKW No. 1 plug and the

spare plug were found in a vehicle used for the garage move; thus, the plug had not become loose

in the vehicle but had been previously removed and not replaced by a mechanic. 

After the accident, the junior mechanic stated that he was puzzled by the absence of the

plug in DUKW No. 1 because he thought he had replaced the access plug when he had last changed

the oil. He said that, as an obvious reminder to himself, he had placed the plug on the nose of the

DUKW during the oil change. He stated, 

Something apparently went wrong with this reminder system. While I had

believed I had put the plug back in, I do also believe that the DUKW left the shop

 2 The DUKW No. 1 was equipped with 36 adult lifejackets, which were stored in the overhead above the

passenger seats and near the operatorís station. Ten child-size lifejackets were stowed under the seats.

 3 The access plug is located under the engine, forward of the front axle, on the centerline of the vessel.

When removed, the plug provides access to the engineís oil filter and drain plug from below the hull.

 4 Safety Board investigators calculated that the DUKWís dewatering pumps would not have had sufficient

capacity to keep up with the ingress of water through the missing access plug hole. 

3 NTSB/MAB-02/02
Appendix B 65 Marine Accident Report

4 NTSB/MAB-02/02 

on December 8, 2001, without the drain plug in place. It is not likely that someone 

took the plug out after I had put it in. 

DUKW No. 1 had a fixed overhead canopy made of solid sheet metal. Each side of the 

DUKW had a roller side curtain assembly that extended the length of the vehicle. In normal 

operation, the curtain on each side was moved up or down on a roller mounted on the canopy. In 

an emergency, the operator could use a lever at his station to release the entire roller assembly, 

allowing it fall away from the vehicle to facilitate emergency egress. The vehicle’s windshield 

was also hinged at the bottom, allowing it to open outward for egress. 

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the 

flooding and sinking of the DUKW No.1 was a missing access plug, which, in turn, was caused 

by inadequate supervision of company personnel and inadequate management oversight of 

amphibious passenger vehicle maintenance. Contributing to the sinking was a flaw in the design 

of DUKWs, that is, the lack of adequate reserve buoyancy that would have allowed the vehicle to 

remain afloat in a flooded condition.