16-1393 

Lu v. Sessions 

BIA 

Christensen, IJ 

A205 901 290 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

23rd day of August, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 

 Chief Judge, 

JON O. NEWMAN, 

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

GUIFENG LU, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 16-1393 

 NAC 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Guifeng Lu, pro se, Alhambra, 

California. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General, Claire L. Workman, 

Senior Litigation Counsel, John B. 

Holt, Trial Attorney, Office of 
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Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C. 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 Petitioner Guifeng Lu, a native and citizen of the People’s 

Republic of China, seeks review of an April 4, 2016, decision 

of the BIA affirming an April 20, 2015, decision of an 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Lu’s application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 

Torture (“CAT”). In re Guifeng Lu, No. A205 901 290 (B.I.A. 

Apr. 4, 2016), aff’g No. A205 901 290 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 

20, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

 Because the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is 

dispositive, we reach only that determination and decline to 

consider the alternative grounds offered for the agency’s 

decision. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As 

a general rule courts . . . are not required to make findings 

on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results 

they reach.”). Among the factors upon which “a trier of fact 
3

may base a credibility determination” are “the consistency 

between the applicant’s . . . written and oral statements” and 

“the internal consistency of each such statement, . . . without 

regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 

goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility 

determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, 

it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an 

adverse credibility ruling.” Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 

(2d Cir. 2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“the 

administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 

contrary”). 

 The record here supports the agency’s determination that 

Lu was not credible. His testimony was both internally 

inconsistent and inconsistent with his written statement. In 

his asylum application, Lu described being beaten on the first 

and second days of his 2005 detention, but made no mention of 

any beatings on the third day. On direct examination, however, 

Lu testified that he was beaten on the first and third days of 

detention, without mention of being beaten on the second day. 

Finally, when cross examined regarding the inconsistency 
4

between his asylum application and direct examination, Lu 

provided a third version of events by testifying that he 

actually was beaten on all three days. 

 Lu contends that any inconsistencies in his application and 

testimony were minor. But changes regarding when and how many 

times he claims to have been beaten constitute “‘a material 

inconsistency in an aspect of [his] story that served as an 

example of the very persecution from which he sought asylum,’” 

which “afforded substantial evidence to support the adverse 

credibility finding.” Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 

289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 

77, 81 (2d Cir. 2005)). 

 Lu relies on Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1086 (9th Cir. 

2011), for the proposition that whether events occurred “on the 

second or third day of his detention says nothing about his 

truthfulness or the overall reliability of his account,” but 

the issue here is not solely the accuracy of Lu’s memory. In 

addition to providing inconsistent versions of events, there 

is also the fact that Lu appeared to change his story yet again 

when faced with this contradiction. Moreover, “[w]hen 

evaluating credibility determinations for substantial 

evidence, we afford ‘particular deference’ to the IJ,” 
5

recognizing that “[w]here the IJ’s adverse credibility finding 

is based on specific examples of inconsistent statements’ or 

‘contradictory evidence,’ a ‘reviewing court will generally not 

be able to conclude that a reasonable adjudicator was compelled 

to find otherwise.’” Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-66 (quoting Zhang v. 

INS, 386 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2004)). 

 Lu argues that he explained at the hearing that he may not 

have been very clear when completing his asylum application, 

but the agency was not required to accept this explanation. Lu 

swore to the application’s truth, he was instructed to say that 

he did not know or could not remember if necessary, and his 

explanation did nothing to resolve the internal inconsistency. 

See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80 (“A petitioner must do more than offer 

a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to 

secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable 

fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Lu also misinterprets 

part of the IJ’s decision by reading it to find that he suffered 

past persecution, but the IJ only assumed Lu’s credibility for 

the purposes of its alternative analysis. 

 Nor did the IJ err in finding that Lu failed to rehabilitate 

his testimony with corroborating evidence. First, the IJ could 
6

reasonably determine that a letter from Lu’s wife was entitled 

to minimal evidentiary weight “both because it was unsworn and 

because it was submitted by an interested witness” unavailable 

for cross-examination. Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d 

Cir. 2013). Second, the IJ could properly give little weight 

to a sterilization certificate that Lu failed to authenticate. 

As we have previously explained, “the weight to afford to such 

evidence ‘lies largely’ within the discretion of the IJ.” Chen 

v. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Asociacion de Compositores y Editores de Musica LatinoAmericana 

v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 854 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1988)). 

Here, the IJ did not exceed the bounds of that discretion. 

 In light of Lu’s testimony, the agency’s adverse 

credibility determination is supported by substantial 

evidence. That determination is dispositive of Lu’s claims for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three 

claims are based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. 

Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion 

for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 

 
7

 Judge Newman concurs in the result on the Immigration 

Judge’s ground that Lu has not established a well founded fear 

of future persecution in view of a fundamental change in 

circumstances. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk