UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4746

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LAMBERT DORELL SWEAT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior 

District Judge. (2:09-cr-00685-PMD-1)

Argued: September 19, 2012 Decided: December 11, 2012

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Cameron Jane Blazer, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jeffrey 

Mikell Johnson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William N. Nettles, 

United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Matthew J. 

Modica, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Lambert Dorell Sweat pleaded guilty to various drug and 

firearm charges. On appeal, he challenges the reasonableness of 

his 262-month sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

I.

In January 2009, a confidential informant with the 

Clarendon County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”) purchased 1.1 grams 

of cocaine, a bootleg copy of a DVD, and a bottle of liquor from 

Sweat at Sweat’s residence. Several days later, the CCSO 

executed a search warrant at Sweat’s residence, which revealed 

an additional 18.73 grams of cocaine, 22.89 grams of marijuana, 

a 12-gauge shotgun and shotgun shells, $4,708 in US currency, 

404 counterfeit DVDs, and 79 bottles of liquor. Sweat was 

charged with various state offenses related to the drugs, 

alcohol, and DVDs. While on bond for these state charges, Sweat 

was federally indicted and a bench warrant was issued. The 

three-count indictment charged Sweat with possession with intent 

to distribute marijuana and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

841(a)(1); possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and possession of a firearm 

in furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

924(c)(1). 
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When Clarendon County investigators subsequently happened 

upon Sweat in a Wal-Mart store and attempted to arrest him on 

the outstanding bench warrant, Sweat eluded the investigators 

and fled to his home, where he barricaded himself inside. The 

investigators proceeded to Sweat’s residence. After knocking on 

the door of the residence and announcing their presence proved 

unsuccessful, the investigators used the public address system 

from a marked patrol car to demand that Sweat exit his home. At 

that point, Sweat opened the door, yelled “F--- you,” and went 

back inside. A captain with the CCSO then arrived on the scene 

with tactical equipment and launched several canisters of pepper 

spray into Sweat’s residence. Sweat cursed at the officers 

again but eventually exited his home and was arrested. After 

securing the residence, law enforcement officers found an 

additional .23 grams of cocaine and 216 additional counterfeit 

DVDs. Sweat ultimately pleaded guilty to each count in the 

indictment. 

Sweat’s Sentencing Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months’ 

imprisonment, which took into account his acceptance of 

responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (2010), and the fact that 

he qualified as a career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Both 

before and at sentencing, Sweat sought a below-Guidelines 

sentence. He did not challenge application of the career 

offender Guideline but argued instead that a within-Guidelines 
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sentence would be more than necessary to achieve the sentencing 

purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Specifically, Sweat 

argued that he was susceptible to rehabilitation and that he had 

used his pre-sentence incarceration wisely by completing a drug 

treatment program, leading Bible studies, and mentoring other 

inmates. The government opposed any deviation below the 

Guidelines range and contested Sweat’s characterization of 

himself by emphasizing Sweat’s conduct in eluding and cursing at 

law enforcement officers when they attempted to arrest him. The 

district court ultimately sentenced Sweat to a bottom-of-theGuidelines sentence of 262 months’ imprisonment. Sweat now 

challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of this 

sentence. 

II.

We review a sentence “under a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41

(2007). We “first ensure that the district court committed no 

significant procedural error.” Id. at 51. A sentence is 

procedurally unreasonable if, inter alia, the district court 

fails to recognize its authority to deviate from the Guidelines, 

see id., or fails to provide an individualized sentence, see

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328-30 (4th Cir. 2009). 

If we find that the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we will 
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then consider its substantive reasonableness, taking into 

account the totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S. 

at 51. “An appellate court may presume that a within-Guideline 

sentence is substantively reasonable . . . .” Carter, 564 F.3d 

at 330 n.2 (emphasis omitted). 

III.

Sweat argues that the district court procedurally erred at 

sentencing for two independent reasons. He first contends that 

the district court failed to recognize its authority to deviate

from the Guidelines. Because the Guidelines are “effectively 

advisory,” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), a 

sentencing court has the discretion to deviate from the 

Guidelines range in order to impose a sentence that is 

“sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” Kimbrough v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). A sentencing court that treats the Guidelines range 

as mandatory, however, commits procedural error. See Gall, 552 

U.S. at 51. Sweat also argues that the district court committed 

procedural error by failing to provide an individualized 

sentence. A district court “must make an individualized 

assessment” and “must apply the relevant § 3553(a) factors to 

the specific circumstances of the case.” Carter, 564 F.3d at 

328 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). However, 
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when a within-Guidelines sentence is imposed, the 

“individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy,” 

id. at 330, “because guidelines sentences themselves are in many 

ways tailored to the individual and reflect approximately two 

decades of close attention to federal sentencing policy,” United 

States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The government disputes that the 

district court failed to provide an adequately individualized 

sentence and also argues, in the alternative, that any such 

error would be harmless. See United States v. Boulware, 604 

F.3d 832, 837-40 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying harmless error 

analysis to procedural error involving failure to provide 

individualized sentence). 

At sentencing in the instant case, the district court spoke 

to Sweat at length about his personal circumstances and his 

specific offenses. In doing so, the court clearly and carefully 

responded to the arguments presented by defense counsel and by 

the defendant himself. Defense counsel presented the best 

reasons she could for a sentence below the Guidelines, but those 

arguments were, in the final analysis, weak, as in Boulware. 

Thus, we can safely say that to the extent any error occurred, 

it was harmless. 

With respect to the argument that the district court failed 

to recognize its discretion to decline imposition of a sentence 
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under the career offender Guidelines, as occurred in United 

States v. Herder, 594 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2010), we have reviewed 

the totality of the court’s comments, during the taking of 

Sweat’s plea and at sentencing, and we are satisfied that the 

court understood its discretion in this regard and understood 

that it was not bound to follow the Guidelines, even in a career 

offender context. 

 

IV.

Sweat’s remaining challenge is to the substantive 

reasonableness of his within-Guidelines sentence. By relying on 

our decision in United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (4th Cir. 

2010), Sweat contends that his sentence was substantively 

unreasonable because the district court relied on a single 

sentencing factor—the Guidelines range in this case—to the 

exclusion of the other relevant factors. We disagree. The 

district court considered a variety of the sentencing factors, 

and Sweat simply disagrees with how the court evaluated those 

factors and arrived at the sentence. Therefore, the sentence 

was substantively reasonable. 

 

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Sweat’s sentence.

AFFIRMED