COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Petty, Beales and Russell Argued at Richmond, Virginia

TAMMY T. WARE MEMORANDUM OPINION  BY v. Record No. 0673-16-2 JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY FEBRUARY 7, 2017 SUDARSAN SRINIVASAN

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF HENRICO COUNTY James S. Yoffy, Judge Janipher W. Robinson (Robins on & Greene, on briefs), for appellant. Kimberly L. Fitzgera ld (Rick A. Friedman, II; Friedman Law Firm, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Tammy T. Ware (“wife”) appeal s the trial court’s spousal sup port award. She argues that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the am ount of her spousal suppor t. Wife also argues that the trial court failed to consider all of the statutory factors in Code § 20-107.1 as required. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Wife argues that the trial court erred in reducing the amount of spousal support from her pendente lite award while increasing her expenses and failing to consider her health and cost of insurance. Because this Court does not have an adequate appe ndix from which to review the issue, we will not address the issue on the merits. It is an axiom of appellate law that “the judgmen t of the lower court is presumed to be correct and the burden is on the appellant to present to us a sufficient [appendix] from which we can determine whether the lower court has erred in the respect complained of.” Patterson v. City of

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Richmond, 39 Va. App. 706, 71 7, 576 S.E.2d 759, 765 (2003) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 630, 635, 432 S.E.2d 2, 6 (1993)). “The appendix must include ‘any testimony and other incidents of the case germane to the questions presented.’” Id. at 71 7, 576 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting Rule 5A:25(c)(3)). Indeed, its purpose is to assist this Court in determining the merit of the claims. The appendix is a tool vital to th e function of the appellate process in Virginia. Without it, the [three judges on this panel] would have to pass the original record from one to the other. Much of the contents, though material at trial, may be utterly irrelevant to the issues posed on appeal. By requiring the publication and distribution of an appendix which excludes all irrelevancies, the Rules of Court expedite the adju dication of the appeal and reduce the costs. By requiring the inclus ion of all parts of the record germane to the issues, the Rules promote the cause of plenary justice. Thrasher v. Burlage, 219 Va. 1007, 1009-10, 254 S. E.2d 64, 66 (1979). “Thus, the filing of an appendix that complies with the Rules, is ‘esse ntial to an informed collegiate decision.’” Patterson, 39 Va. App. at 717, 576 S.E.2d at 765 (quoting Thrasher, 219 Va. at 1009-10, 254 S.E.2d at 66). The appendix in this case is insufficien t because it does not contain a necessary transcript. Wife did not in clude the transcript from the September 28, 2015 hearing on the merits. Wife did include a transcript from a March 28, 2016 hearing on a motion to reconsider; however, no evidence was presented at that heari ng. Without the transcript from the September 28 hearing, we cannot determine whether the tria l court abused its discretion in setting the amount of spousal support. See Fadness v. Fadness, 52 Va. App. 833, 845, 667 S.E.2d 857, 865 (2008) (“A circuit court has ‘broad discretion in setting spousal support and its determination will not be disturbed except for a clear abus e of discretion.’” (quoting Brooks v. Brooks, 27 Va. App. 314, 317, 498 S.E.2d 461, 463 (1998))).- 3 - It is assumed that the appendix contains ev erything germane to the assignments of error, Rule 5A:25(h), and although this Court may consider other parts of the record, we decline to do so in this case. Wife did not provide a “clear and concise statement of the facts that relate to the assignments of error, with references to the page s of the transcript, writte n statement, record, or appendix” as required by Rule 5A:20(d). Inst ead, wife provided only three sentences in her statement of facts. We declin e “to comb through the record . . . in order to ferret-out for ourselves the validity of [wife’s] claims.” Fitzgerald v. Bass, 6 Va. App. 38, 56 n.7, 366 S.E.2d 615, 625 n.7 (1988); see Fadness, 52 Va. App. at 850, 667 S.E.2d at 865 (“To ignore [our procedural rules] by addressing the case on the meri ts would require this c ourt to be an advocate for, as well as the judge of the correctness of, [wife’s] position on the issues [s]he raises.” (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 51 Va . App. 730, 734-35, 660 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2008))). Wife also argues that the trial court erred be cause it did not set out each factor in Code § 20-107.1(E) and did not quantify the weight it gave each factor. We disagree. In determining the nature and amount of s pousal support, the trial court is required to consider the factors set out in C ode § 20-107.1(E). Failure to do so is reversible error. Joynes v. Payne, 36 Va. App. 401, 420, 551 S.E.2d 10, 19 (2001). Howe ver, “the trial court is not required to quantify or elaborate exactly what weight or co nsideration it has given to each of the statutory factors.” Id. (quoting Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986)). At most, in a contested case, the final order must include “written findings and conclusions of the

court identifying the factors in subsection E which support the court’s order.” Benzine v. Benzine, 52 Va. App. 256, 261, 663 S.E.2d 105, 108 (2008) (second emphasis added) (quoting Code § 20-107.1(F)). Here, a review of the trial court’s January 19, 2016 letter opinion de monstrates that the trial court complied with the statutory requireme nts. At the beginning of the letter opinion- 4 - section entitled “Spousal Support,” the trial court st ated that it considered the factors enumerated in Code § 20-108.1. Appellant conceded at oral argument that this was merely a typographical error and the court meant to cite Code § 20-107.1. Thus, the trial court properly considered the factors as required. Further, the trial court speci fically listed factors from C ode § 20-107.1(E) that supported its decision. The trial court stat ed that it considered its “eq uitable distribution decision, the earning capacity of the parties, th eir education and skills, the pa rties’ parenting arrangements, education expenses and health.” The court wa s not required to go be yond that and quantify or elaborate exactly what weight or consideration wa s given to each of the statutory factors. See Joynes, 36 Va. App. at 420, 551 S.E.2d at 19. Nor wa s it required to list the factors that weighed against its award. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in applying the statutory factors. In summary, we are unable to determine if th e trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount of spousal support because the appendix l acks a transcript necessa ry to the review of the issue. Therefore, this issue is waived on appeal. Moreover, the trial court properly considered the statutory factors in Code § 20-10 7.1(E) and set out the f actors that supported its decision. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. 1 We deny Srinivasan’s request for attorney’s fees. Affirmed.

1 Srinivasan moved to dismiss this appeal base d on the appendix and the lack of the trial transcript. Because this Court has jurisdiction to hear this case, dismissal is not the proper remedy. Smith v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 351, 356, 693 S.E.2d 765, 768 (2010) (holding that this Court cannot “dismiss an appeal ex cept on the grounds that this Court lacks jurisdiction”). Therefore, we de ny Srinivasan’s motion to dismiss.