THE NATURE OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

THE WORLD IN THE YEAR 2000:

PROSPECTS FOR ORDER OR DISORDER

Charles William Maynes

REEXAMINING NATIONAL STRATEGY

William G. Hyland

March 1993
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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not reflect the official policy or position or the

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.

Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be

conveyed directly by calling the Conference Organizer, Dr. Gary

L. Guertner, commercial (717) 245-3234 or DSN 242-3234.

*******

These papers were originally presented at the U.S. Army War

College Fourth Annual Strategy Conference held February 24-25,

1993, with the assistance of the Office of Net Assessment. The

Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish them as part of

its Conference Series.
FOREWORD

The editors of the nation's two leading journals on foreign

policy were asked to examine the nature of the post-cold war

world and America's transitional role. These essays represent the

views of Charles William Maynes, editor of Foreign Policy, and

William G. Hyland, former editor of Foreign Affairs.

Charles Maynes reviews the major transitions that marked 45

years of Soviet-American strategic confrontation. Predictably,

the U.S. global role and defense resources are declining as old

threats decrease and domestic problems move higher up on the

policy agenda. Less predictably, the relative defense spending of

small powers is likely to increase, adding to the potential for

regional instability. These trends and the proliferation of

weapons technology, including weapons of mass destruction, will

drive the major powers toward their third attempt in this century

to deal with global instability through collective security.

Power will become more evenly distributed as America's military

dominance recedes and others' economic power increases. Such

trends, Mr. Maynes believes, should not be disturbing so long as

prudent retrenchment does not become a foolish retreat from an

American global role.

William Hyland believes that no president since Calvin

Coolidge has inherited an easier foreign policy agenda.

Presidents from Truman through Bush did the cold war "heavy

lifting," and the Clinton transitional era should mark the

ascendancy of domestic over foreign policy issues.

Economic power is essential to America's future and the

country faces the difficult task of economic recovery while

avoiding the political expedience of protectionism or other forms

of belligerence toward our trading partners. This would

accelerate international fragmentation, undermining the political

trends toward a collective security regime that is vital to the

new world order and is the best alternative to the extremes of

U.S. isolationism or global policeman.

Mr. Hyland advises against grand strategic visions. Instead,

selectivity based on national interests should be a guiding

principle while we put our economic house in order.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish these

essays as a contribution to the debate on U.S. national security

strategy.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES has served as Editor of Foreign Policy

magazine since April 1980. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Harvard

University, he was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford where he earned

First Class Honors in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. Over

the course of his career, Mr. Maynes has held significant

positions in the Department of State, U.S. Congress, and the

foundation world.

WILLIAM G. HYLAND was Editor of Foreign Affairs from 1984 until

1993. A graduate of Washington University, St. Louis, he also

earned an M.A. from the University of Missouri. Mr. Hyland served

on the National Security Council Staff and was Director of

Intelligence at the State Department. After government service he

joined the Georgetown Center for Strategic Studies and

subsequently became a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace.
THE WORLD IN THE YEAR 2000:

PROSPECTS FOR ORDER OR DISORDER

Charles William Maynes

Introduction.

Are we in a new era in world affairs? It has become

commonplace to assert this. But the best way to peer into the

future--perhaps the only way--is to examine the past and to look

for trends that appear to be shaping the present. If we

understand clearly the contours of the international system after

1945, it will probably be easier for us to determine the extent

to which we are now truly in a revolutionary era, one which will

give us, whether we wish it or not, a New World Order.

In 1945 all thoughtful observers realized that the world was

indeed at a turning point. Both domestically and internationally

strategists understood that the world could not return to the

policies of the interwar period.

The development of the atomic bomb guaranteed that. The

existence of a weapon qualitatively different from all that had

proceeded it convinced policymakers that the world was entering a

new age. Strategists began to assert that the very nature of war

had changed. Before the goal was to win wars. Now the goal was to

avert war.

Also convincing statesmen that a page had been turned was

the position of Europe after the war. In contrast to the First

World War, which despite its destruction still left Britain,

France and Germany as major international actors, the Second

World War brought Soviet and American troops to the heart of

Europe. The periphery of Europe, broadly considered, was now in

charge of the center. The world had not seen such a development

since 1815 when Russian troops marched in Paris and there was a

comparable sense that a new page in history was being turned.

In the domestic realm there was also a sense of dramatic

departure. Governments associated with the West announced their

determination to avoid the mistakes of the interwar period,

racked with social and class conflict. All parties agreed that

there had to be a new social contract, which we know as the

postwar welfare state. Even conservatives accepted that

government would have a new role to play in the economies of

their countries. All major parties recognized that society could

not permit the kind of domestic conflict that had spawned the

twin evils of fascism and communism. The major issue was not

whether to draw up a new social contract but what its provisions

should be and who should pay for the new state obligations.

Internationally the creation of the United Nations and the

development of the Marshall Plan reflected a feeling that a new
security and social contract were needed abroad as well as at

home. The consequences of unbridled nationalism were everywhere

to be seen. With the establishment of the United Nations and its

various affiliated organizations, the immediate postwar world saw

the second attempt in this century at collective security. The

international equivalent of the welfare state at home was

attempted in the creation of the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) and the World Bank as the notion emerged that economically

powerful states had an obligation to promote growth and welfare

not only in their own countries but throughout the globe.

Americans like to think that such attitudes reflect a

special vein of American generosity or altruism and that only

their country could have come up with the Marshall Plan. The new

course did represent an impressive policy departure, particularly

for the United States, but in retrospect it should be seen as

part of a more general international phenomenon. America stood

out, not because it was so much more generous than others in

terms of its national character, but because it was so much

richer than others in terms of its large treasury. Had other

victorious nations had the resources of America, it seems likely

that we would now be talking about the de Gaulle plan or the

Attlee plan or even the Chiang Kai-shek plan. For indeed, once

other nations recovered, they also began to display the same

pattern of generosity that many Americans like to believe is

restricted to themselves. Today other members of the OECD

contribute more to ODA than the United States by the standard

measure of per capita effort. Indeed, America is at the bottom of

the list of donors in per capita terms. If the American people

were inherently more generous than the people of other states,

such a transformation would never have taken place. It did take

place because of the general postwar tendency to believe that

governments had an obligation to promote an improvement in

economic and social conditions both at home and abroad that could

reduce the likelihood of civil strife and war.

Other characteristics of the postwar era are worth noting.

After 1945 the world witnessed the outbreak of two global wars

that literally touched every country in the international system.

The first was between white and non-white, European and

non-European and the issue was liberation. The result was

foreordained. Liberation prevailed. Colonialism ended.

The other global war was ideological. Indeed, the cold war

was our first truly world war. In the first and second world

wars, fighting did take place in several different regions. But

there were major areas of the globe that remained relatively

untouched, most of Africa, Latin America or South Asia for

example. Because of the cold war's ideological character, the

struggle was everywhere. All regions were touched. Every single

country or dependency became involved and the superpowers found

reason to intervene virtually everywhere.

With the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, this
global civil war is effectively over. The future of communism is

in the hands of aging leaders in China, Cuba, North Korea and

North Vietnam. Their days are numbered and so is the future of

the movements they lead. This fact appears to many of us to alter

radically the course of history, leading to the kind of turning

point we faced in 1945. It certainly seems to be the case that

the future of international relations will henceforth be

different if only because the foreign policies of the Soviet

Union and the United States are going to be so different. The

primary organizing principle of postwar relations--the

ideological struggle between the United States and the USSR--will

no longer exist. That seems to be almost as significant a change

as the arrival of American and Soviet troops in the heart of

Europe.

No major new weapon has appeared on the international scene

to rival the atomic bomb in its impact on international relations

but other new features of the international system convince many

that we are at a turning point: the rise of the trading state

whose international power derives from its economic strength

rather than its military might, the transformation of America

from the globe's leading creditor into its leading debtor, the

evolution of Japan into the world's most successful economy, the

reunification of Germany, the globalization of world capital

markets, and the rise of environmental dangers that affect the

security of all countries regardless of political orientation.

Yet of all the factors, the one that seems to have had the most

immediate and profound effect is the end to the cold war.

Whither the Cold War?

But if this war has ended, why did it end? Who was

responsible? Was it Mikhail Gorbachev, obviously a major figure

in modern history? Was it Ronald Reagan with his defense buildup,

the most massive peacetime arms effort in history? Or was

something more profound at work that will help us to understand

the world that is unfolding before us? The answer is not merely

academic. If we attribute the end of the cold war to the actions

of a few leaders whose appearance on the world stage can be seen

as an accident, then we can fear that the arrival on the scene of

a new leader might turn back the clock. Conversely, if more

fundamental factors were involved, then we have less reason to

fear the return of the cold war. A new leader would find it hard

to reverse a process that is deeply entrenched internationally

and had been set in motion not months before, but decades before.

In trying to assess the role of individuals as opposed to

larger trends, we start out with a dilemma. Machiavelli once

wrote that history's record is written half by statesmen and half

by fortune or fate. Statesmen, of course, claim all the credit

for themselves while fortune by definition keeps her council.

Hence the opportunity is created for self-serving memoirs by

retired statesmen who claim all the credit for themselves or the

opportunity is presented to analysts trying without full
confidence or knowledge to see beneath the surface.

I am in the second category and my proposition is that the

cold war, to remain cold, required a totalitarian enemy, one

constitutionally incapable of evolving into a more normal

international partner. By this definition, the cold war ceased

with the historic address of Nikita Khrushchev before the 20th

Party Congress, in which he unmasked Stalin before the elite of

the Soviet Union. There was a reason that the Communist movement

made strenuous efforts to keep this address secret. Knowledge of

what Khrushchev said, we can now see, was explosive. As news

spread of that speech, revolts broke out all over Eastern Europe.

They were suppressed but thereafter the Communist world and

especially the Soviet Union entered into an uneven process of

becoming normal participants in the international system. And as

the Soviet Union evolved so did the system that it led. The

progress was fitful and the process is not yet complete,

particularly in Asia, but the trend has been constant as we can

see by looking at the postwar period in 10 year segments.

The high point of the cold war was 1945-55. Joseph Stalin,

history's most accomplished totalitarian, died only in 1953.

While he lived, the Soviet Union was locked in fear as were those

states that copied the Soviet system. Children denounced their

parents, individuals were responsible for the imprisonment or

death of their neighbors. The control of the state over the

individual seemed almost total. But Stalin's methods and the fear

they engendered did not only affect the politics of the Communist

world. It is no accident that during this decade the United

States entered the self-destructive period of McCarthyism as

working colleagues denounced one another and the civil liberties

of all Americans were significantly curbed. The struggle between

Communists and non- Communists in other countries was often

conducted by war to the knife with hundreds of thousands of

innocents harmed or even killed and whole communities destroyed

as a result.

During this period the superpower relationship was largely

marked by the signs of intense confrontation. In retrospect we

can see that the two sides were involved in a struggle to

establish the boundaries of the new postwar order. Major events

were the Communist conquest of China, the Berlin Blockade, the

Korean War, the creation of the two great alliance systems, the

consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and the

consolidation of American influence in Europe and off-shore Asia.

Efforts by each side to test the boundaries of the postwar

division marked 1955-65. The Soviet Union encouraged militant

Communist parties everywhere and the Communist movement made

gains in such different areas as Latin America and Southeast

Asia. Communists succeeded in gaining total control in Cuba and

war broke out in South Vietnam. Meanwhile, the United States was

engaged in similar efforts to test the postwar boundaries,

primarily through the activities of the CIA. NSC directive 5412/1
of March 12, 1955, for example, authorized the CIA to enter into

a covert war with communism. According to the directive,

operations approved were to include "propaganda, political

action, economic warfare, preventive direct action, including

sabotage, antisabotage, demolition, escape and evasion and

evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states or groups

including assistance to underground resistance movements,

guerrilla and refugee liberation groups." The United States began

to train armies for the day of liberation in Eastern Europe and

China. Training camps were established on U.S. soil. On occasion

Americans found out about this activity inadvertently. On

December 7, 1961, a group of American civilians at Peterson Field

in Colorado Springs, which serves both as a municipal airport and

a U.S. Air Force base, found themselves ordered at gunpoint to

lock themselves inside a hangar. When they looked through the

window, they saw a group of oriental solders who turned out to be

Tibetan guerrillas being trained in a remote part of Colorado. At

government request the major papers in the United States

suppressed any news of this sensational encounter.

Most of these efforts collapsed with the Soviet invasion of

Hungary in 1956 to crush the Hungarian revolution. The man in

charge of the U.S. effort committed suicide a few years later.

The failure of the Communist side in the Korean War and of the

Western side during the Hungarian revolution made clear that the

boundary lines between East and West were being solidified. In

Europe the line between East and West soon became so clear that

no one could doubt where it was or dare to cross it. In Asia the

situation was a little less clear because of the continuing

struggle in Vietnam. But the United States interposed its fleet

in the Taiwan straits, signed a security pact with Japan and

stationed tens of thousands of troops semipermanently in Korea.

The end of the decade witnessed a devastating setback for the

Communist movement as a failed coup in Indonesia brought a savage

response. Perhaps 1/2 million people were slaughtered, and the

Communist party in the fifth most populous state in the world was

no more. The lines in Asia were also solidifying. Only the

continuing struggle in Vietnam blinded us to what was really

happening.

As the lines of division hardened and each side gained more

confidence that its core area of concern was not threatened, the

two superpowers cautiously began to explore, at first very

tentatively, the possibilities for a more normal relationship.

The Cuban Missile Crisis reminded them of the consequences of not

attempting to develop such a relationship. During this period the

two sides signed the Limited Test Ban treaty, they began to

expand trade and exchanges, and they started to institutionalize

arms control negotiations.

The years 1965-75 marked a period in which normalization was

pushed much harder. The two superpowers began to understand that

their special status depended on limiting the power of others as

well as preventing their own arms race from getting out of
control. The nonproliferation treaty was designed to accomplish

the former, and the ABM treaty and the SALT I treaties were

designed to accomplish the latter by putting a cap on the

superpower arms race. The two sides also began to cooperate when

they saw that wars at the periphery might disrupt their own

relationship at the center. So the United States and the Soviet

Union, after arming the parties to the conflict, worked together

to contain the spread of wars in the Middle East in 1967 and 1973

and in South Asia in 1967 and 1971. Although with less success,

the two sides even tried to cooperate to some extent to end the

war in Vietnam.

The rules of the game for superpower involvement in the

Third World were clarified from 1975 to 1985. A comparison of

Soviet behavior in Afghanistan with U.S. behavior in Korea and

Vietnam helps explain this point. The Soviet Union in Afghanistan

acted according to a certain code of conduct, brutal though it

was. Like the United States in Korea and Vietnam, the Soviet

Union used enormous power in Afghanistan but it stopped short of

using its full power. Like the United States in these two earlier

crises, the Soviet Union also did not allow its distress in

Afghanistan and its anger over the actions of its great rival in

feeding the rebellion to end its relationship with the United

States. Like the United States in Korea and Vietnam, the Soviet

Union drew back from decisive military action against neighboring

states supplying the force it was opposing in Afghanistan.

During this same period the United States made clear in

Central America that it was willing to use both legal and illegal

means to prevent a pro-Communist beachhead on the mainland in the

Western Hemisphere. So by the mid-1980s with the lines of

demarcation drawn in Europe and Asia, with attempts to cross

those lines largely defeated, and with the rules of the game

generally established in other parts of the world, the two powers

were in a position to treat one another like normal powers and to

make major gains.

Indeed the U.S. accommodation with China was an indication

that normal diplomacy was returning. The United States treated

China--despite its harsh Communist regime, which was, in fact,

much worse than that of Brezhnev's Soviet Union--no longer like

an ideological rival but as an important player on the diplomatic

chess board. Washington was beginning the process of moving

beyond cold war thinking. It was returning to an earlier or more

traditional geopolitical game. Facilitating this tendency of

ideological opponents treating one another as normal countries

rather than as unapproachable rivals was another important

development. By the early 1970s the Soviet Union had achieved

essential nuclear parity. Each side could destroy the other with

a second strike. It was becoming too dangerous to maintain the

cold war. The ground was prepared for a grand compromise, even a

grand bargain.

At this point someone may assert that the real reason the
ground was prepared is not that a 30-year process was at work but

that Ronald Reagan spent the Soviet Union into the ground with

his massive defense buildup. According to this point of view, we

have to keep our guard up because if we relax our effort, a new

leadership in Moscow will simply reassert Russia as a dominant

global rival. But an examination of the record does not support

such an explanation of the change in Moscow. Long before

Gorbachev came to power, the Reagan administration found that its

initial policy of frenzied anti-communism could not be sustained.

In other words, if the Soviets blinked, it was after it was clear

that the United States was also blinking. By December 1983 Ronald

Reagan was explaining to the editors of Time that he would never

again use terms like "the evil empire" to describe the Soviet

Union. In January 1984 he delivered a seminal address on

U.S.-Soviet relations that redirected his administration's Soviet

policy toward greater cooperation and laid the basis for the

rapproachment with Moscow, soon to be under the leadership of

Gorbachev.

Defense spending also slowed before the Gorbachev revolution

took hold. It reached its peak in 1985 at $351 billion in 1991

dollars but this figure represented plans made as early as 1983.

As defense and foreign policy analyst Earl Ravenal has pointed

out, the momentum of American restoration "had crested well

before the end of Ronald Reagan's first term" or before Gorbachev

became General Secretary.

So it was that, against a background of four decades of a

discernable process of normalization, Mikhail Gorbachev had the

great fortune of becoming the head of the Soviet Union when his

country needed a change in its relationship with the United

States and when the groundwork for such a change had been

completed. Gorbachev needed stability abroad in order to pursue

reform at home. He moved quickly to gain it. Soon the world saw

such astonishing developments as the INF treaty, which eliminated

one whole class of weapons; the destruction of the Berlin Wall,

which had divided East and West in Europe for decades; and

cooperation between Moscow and Washington, which began to work to

resolve a variety of regional disputes from Southern Africa to

Central America to Cambodia.

Extraordinary progress was being made in converting the

image of the other side in both countries to that of a normal

country. Polls began to show a fundamental transformation in the

American image of the Soviet Union, which was soon more favorable

than that of France, Israel, Japan and Taiwan, and in the Soviet

image of the United States, which was transformed from that of

enemy into that of model. Then the Soviet Union simply imploded--

the result more of internal contradictions than external

pressure. But a radical improvement in Washington's relations

with Moscow would have taken place even if this destruction of

America's great enemy had never taken place.
The New World.

Of course, while all this was happening to the superpower

relationship, other major developments were taking place that

were also helping to lay the groundwork for the New World we are

entering. All of the major European powers regained the place in

the international economy they had enjoyed before World War II.

In this respect the end of the cold war did not bring a new world

but the return to an old one. The share of world trade

represented by the European Community has shot from 22 percent in

1960 to roughly 40 percent today. Although France and Britain

lost their political place in the world because of the process of

decolonialization, Western Europe as a whole has become the

greatest trading area in the world.

But even greater changes were taking place in Asia. Few

could have predicted, or at least few did, that Japan, Korea,

Taiwan and now most of Southeast Asia would take off economically

in the way that they have. Their example is having a profound

effect on the way the world is configured and on the way that it

is managed. In the past a nation might employ military might to

acquire economic advantages--fertile land, oil fields, or water

rights. But because of the Asian miracle, it is possible that

much of the post-cold-war world may be different. The success of

Asian states suggests that few of the resources that are vital to

economic success in the modern world can be seized. Rather, they

must be created, for they are largely human and institutional in

nature. An effort to seize them will destroy them. For a sullen,

subjugated people is not the work force that will bring a modern

nation greatness. Indeed, this is the great dilemma that Beijing

faces as it prepares to assume control of Hong Kong.

It may be that the Middle East is one of the last areas of

the world where the wars of the past still make sense. Obviously,

it would pay a state in the Middle East to seize a major oil

field if the aggression were to stand. States in the Middle East

also lack water. One can imagine water wars there. More might be

lost than would be gained but there is a sort of traditional

logic to the struggle. Indeed, there is some evidence that the

root cause of the 1967 war was water.

In much of the rest of the world, however, except perhaps in

a few contested areas--the Spratly Islands might be one--states

are not trying to seize resources from others. Aggression no

longer pays in the way that it did in the past. That is a major

change in world history and Asian states can take much of the

credit for shifting mass and elite views.

Meanwhile, another form of traditional warfare has

reemerged--wars of national consolidation. As brutal as the

struggle in Yugoslavia is--and the pictures on television remind

us of the brutality every day--it is not too different from the

wars of national consolidation that took place through Western
Europe from the 15th century forward or from the wars in this

century between Greece and Turkey or between Israel and the

Palestinians. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe new nations

are being born and it would be a miracle if the process were

completed without violence.

The dilemma the outside world faces in dealing with such

conflicts is that there appears to be no easy way to exert

constructive influence. Wars of national consolidation involve

passions that are not easily controlled by foreign pressure or

diplomacy. Unless one takes the position that no borders should

be changed regardless of how illogical they may be, it is hard to

know what constitutes aggression in many of these struggles,

which are often triggered by unexpected developments.

Without question, continuing violence in the former Soviet

Union will trigger Western fears of a revived Russian threat. The

ethnic tensions dividing Russia and its neighbors could explode

at any moment, perhaps bringing to power authorities in Moscow

determined to rebuild Russia's military strength. Even in that

event, however, the West would not face the return of the

traditional security threat from Moscow that the world has known

since 1945. Moscow has lost its forward military position in

central Europe, its ideological allies in Eastern Europe have

been totally discredited, and the task of maintaining internal

unity will drain Russian energies for years to come. What is of

immediate concern to the West is the final disposition of the

Soviet nuclear arsenal. Civic disorder in Russia could create

opportunities for renegade military units to steal or sell

nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration should accord the

highest priority to efforts to reach agreement with Moscow for

the accelerated destruction of as many nuclear warheads as

possible under START and subsequent agreements.

Great Power Equalizers.

In the years ahead several factors are helping steadily to

erode the advantage the great powers have traditionally enjoyed

over their smaller rivals. The first is the spread of weapons

throughout the world. It is too often neglected that the era of

Western political dominance in world affairs was also a period

when it was heavily armed and the rest of the world was almost

completely disarmed. In such circumstances, it is not hard to

dominate others. Thus, by controlling the machine gun, the West

could inflict enormous casualties without suffering very many in

return. The model for war was the British conquest of the Sudan.

The British with superior weapons killed 11,000 Sudanese and

suffered 48 dead, of whom 3 were British officers and 25 were

British enlisted men. During the many wars the British fought in

Africa, even though the bulk of the troops were always African,

British officers controlled the machine gun and were under orders

under no circumstances to let one fall into the hands of the

enemy.
The wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam demonstrated that

although it is within the capability of Western states to win a

war--the Soviets or the Americans could always have won had they

used the full measure of their power--they could no longer win at

a cost they or their allies were willing to pay because the enemy

was so well armed. Of course, the Soviets or the Americans could

have used weapons that would have obliterated the other side but

these same weapons would have also destroyed their reputation

worldwide. Had the Soviets or the United States used such weapons

in either Afghanistan or Vietnam, one might have said that the

cost of victory was loss of the cold war in Asia and Europe.

The Gulf War was a modern Sudan. The United States and its

allies completely destroyed the opposing army while suffering

only a few hundred casualties. But before we are too celebratory,

we should consider this paradox about the war: Because Saddam

Hussein was so heavily armed, he dared to take on the largest

military power in the world and in the end, although he grossly

underestimated U.S. men, women, and equipment, he was correct in

his belief that his military power was sufficient to deter the

United States from conquering his entire country because of fear

of casualties. Given that fear, once again proven and quite

understandable in a democracy, one must question whether any

future target for the West's massive power will follow a strategy

as self-defeating as the one adopted by Saddam Hussein. Iraq

allowed the United States to maximize the effect of its military

power by refusing to attack when U.S. forces were at their

weakest. It took on a coalition that included three of the

largest and most efficient armies in the world. It committed an

act of aggression so egregious that not a single nation in the

world publicly approved of what Iraq had done.

There are other reasons that explain the decline in the use

of force besides the fact that the spread of weapons has served

as an international equalizer. In large parts of the world, but

primarily in the countries that are militarily and

technologically the most sophisticated, there has been a decline

in chauvinism even if there is at the same time often a rise in

nationalism. By this distinction I mean that even if many are

more proud of their country than ever before, there has been a

decline in a popular belief that one's own culture is so superior

to that of another that it justifies killing someone who does not

participate in it. The shift in positions on such matters is

astonishing. In World War II the U.S. Government and the American

news media worked hand-in-glove, as documented by John Dower in

his book on racial attitudes in World War II, War Without Mercy, to demonize the Japanese, who were often portrayed as some form

of subhuman. The most elite organs of the American press

participated willingly in this crude propaganda, which was

mirrored in a reverse fashion in the Japanese press, which,

however, was totalitarian. By the time of the Persian Gulf War,

the U.S. news media, like most Americans, may have been cheering

for an American victory, but it was also on the scene to make
sure that civilians were not being unnecessarily targeted.

Indeed, the Pentagon's most important ally in its effort to prove

that U.S. forces were not targeting civilians was CNN, whose

correspondents were on the scene.

In Russia the popular revulsion against war has become so

great that Gorbachev promised that Russian troops would never be

used again outside the country without the permission of the

legislature. This is a pledge that no American president has been

willing to make although I, for one, believe he should.

Regrettably, while there has been a decline in chauvinism in

some parts of the world, it is definitely on the rise in Central

and Eastern Europe. This is likely to trigger repeated conflict,

but unless the great powers become involved, it should not cause

a conflagration. Conflicts there will trouble the world's

conscience but if the great powers intervene, they are likely to

do this rarely, preferring to sequester conflicts and to allow

local hatreds to burn themselves out. One reason for this impulse

toward nonintervention will be that the old geopolitical calculus

will no longer hold. A shift of authority in Slovakia may trouble

Hungary but it will not greatly concern the major powers, which

understand that their place in the new international order will

be affected more by economic developments at home and

internationally than by diplomatic shifts in the Balkans.

Affecting this reluctance to intervene is a rise in the

level of political consciousness around the world. Something very

profound is happening in the political culture of both

democracies and nondemocracies. Ordinary people are progressively

being brought into the decision-making circle on foreign issues.

Modern communications have given them a tool that greatly

enhances their power. Indeed, television empowers people who

might never have chosen on their own to become involved. Visual

coverage of wars or famines spills into the living rooms of

average Americans, creating interest and concern where decades

earlier there would have only been policy silence. Our leaders

hate this intrusion into the privileged realm of policy, but

there is little they can do about it.

We are not simply talking about television. We are also

talking about the cassette recorder, the computer, the fax and

the camcorder, which permit ordinary citizens to contest the

state's monopoly of information and its ability to determine an

official version of events. Evidence of the importance of these

new tools is present everywhere. In Los Angeles, Afro-Americans

have been able to document long-standing charges of police

brutality by using a camcorder to film a group of policemen

brutally beating a hapless black man. In Mexico, grass roots

groups used computers to prove after the earthquake that the

government had large numbers of uninhabited apartments it could

provide to the homeless. In Brazil, protesters used the fax and

computer to alert the world to the assassination of environmental

activist Chico Mendes.
So long as illiteracy or control of communications allowed

those in power to keep the majority of the population politically

inert, leaders could decide independently the issues of peace and

war with little political cost to themselves. They did not fight

the wars and if the decision to go to war was wrong, they did not

suffer unless the defeat was total. Kings or presidents in

victory or defeat usually returned to their castles or mansions.

Once knowledge is available, an element of accountability is

introduced. The head of state may be weakened or even driven from

power if he makes the wrong decision. Both Lyndon Baines Johnson

and Richard Milhouse Nixon can attest to that democratic reality.

Of course, even in democracies, for some time people have

accepted the undemocratic idea that foreign affairs is an area of

public policy where the ordinary rules of democratic rule and

accountability should not apply. Secrecy and executive branch

control are deemed so essential to the conduct of a successful

foreign policy that democratic principles and practice are often

pushed aside. But that mood is also changing. The line between

domestic and foreign policy is being erased and ordinary people

are insisting that they have a voice in the foreign affairs of

state.

In this regard the end of the cold war will deprive

governments of another tool that they have used to control

political debate. This is the sense of permanent crisis that has

controlled and distorted our politics for much of the postwar

period. Fear of a surprise nuclear attack and of Communist

subversion persuaded people in the United States that the

executive branch should be accorded extraordinary powers: a tight

circle of secrecy, which made it difficult to determine who was

accountable for decisions taken; covert tools, which were not

exposed to criticism or the restraints of law; and the right of

the executive to act alone in using military force, which limited

democratic debate. With the end of the cold war, there should be

a steady decline in this sense of permanent crisis. The need for

secrecy and covert action should continue to decline. In short,

there should be more opportunity for greater democratic control

of foreign policy.

Of course, greater popular participation in foreign policy

can also drive governments to take actions they might otherwise

avoid. It is difficult to believe that the United States would

have sent troops to Somalia during the cold war. Now public

opinion or at least pundit opinion has driven policymakers to

select a military option. Nonetheless, the congressional debate

over U.S. entry into the Gulf War was a harbinger of the future.

Of course, the security situation of each country is

different. But even in nondemocratic states, similar forces are

having some impact on policy. How else do we explain the

challenge to authority in both the Soviet Union and China in

recent years? As Fred Starr, an American scholar of the Soviet
Union, has pointed out about the Soviet Union, when Stalin was

conducting the purges, only 10 percent of the Soviet population

had a 10th grade education or more. By the time Khrushchev was

dominating the world stage and instituting important reforms,

that percentage had risen to 32 percent. By the time that

Gorbachev had gained power, the figure was close to 90 percent.

Or we can look at the Chinese population which is much less

educated than the Soviet one. Yet the degree of outside

penetration has increased enormously and urbanization has

increased significantly. As John Fincher, an American scholar of

China, has pointed out, in 1982 the Chinese census estimated that

the urban population was 20 percent. By 1987 the state

statistical services, reexamining the data, placed the figure at

40 percent, and it is growing. The change has profound

implications for the people in power. Urban populations are more

difficult to control ideologically. Information moves more easily

than in the countryside. There is more contact with foreigners.

And groups of opposition can mobilize quickly against the people

in power. In short, governments have to be more concerned about

the opinions of urban populations.

We must be clearheaded about these changes. There is nothing

that guarantees that every society will become a model democracy.

Nor is there anything that guarantees that the democracies that

exist will not regress diplomatically, economically, or

politically. History is not fixed in its course. But all over the

world the nature of the relationship between governor and

governed is changing because of the developments mentioned. It

will be harder and harder for the old methods to work. People

will resist leaders who try to use them.

Nor does the declining utility of force mean that force will

never be used. Passions can always dominant reason. People will

find reasons to fight even when they should not. The current

situation in Yugoslavia is an example. One can easily imagine

wars between India and Pakistan or in the Middle East or between

the two Koreas. But much less than in the past will the outside

powers play the great game of history in which the unwritten

requirement of being a great power is that one must take

advantage of opportunities whenever they arise even if the only

apparent advantage is to irritate or embarrass another great

power.

What About Tomorrow?

Against this backdrop, what can we say about the shape of

the future?

In the field of defense, we are likely to see a decline in

spending by the great powers and an increase in spending by the

small powers. The former will be attempting to lighten the burden

they have been carrying throughout the cold war. The latter will

be striving to increase the tendency of the larger states to
pause before threatening the smaller powers. The great powers

will not like the pattern of defense spending by the smaller

states but, except in the field of weapons of mass destruction,

their own national interest will not be sufficiently affected for

them to take decisive action. In particular, they will want the

export orders. Many smaller states will seek enhanced defense

capabilities for internal reasons.

The United States and Russia are likely to move cautiously

toward the concept of a minimum deterrent and no first use of

nuclear weapons. Long before the START agreement, expert studies

in the United States were concluding that in the new

circumstances there is no reason for the United States to have

more than approximately 3000 warheads, even allowing a very large

measure of insurance needed for defective rockets. Three thousand

warheads would permit coverage of all reasonable targets and

would permit a credible second strike. Now it seems inevitable

that pressure will develop to cut even further. U.S. Government

studies have suggested a force as small as a few hundred warheads

would be adequate; some arms control experts now believe even a

nonnuclear world is possible as precision weapons increasingly

give military planners options they never had.

As the superpowers begin to reduce their arsenals, pressure

will mount on the other major nuclear powers to join the arms

control negotiations. It may become possible to put a cap on the

nuclear arms race, and once it is there, it may be more likely

that the world will be able to limit the number of nuclear

powers.

As this process continues, the nuclear powers will have a

much stronger interest in cooperating with one another to prevent

nuclear proliferation. One can expect to see, therefore, much

more coordinated effort by the nuclear powers to pressure the

nonnuclear powers to remain so. In this regard, there will be a

third attempt at collective security in this century with the

focus on weapons of mass destruction.

We can expect the role of the United Nations in world

affairs to grow. International law has been employed in the past

more as a justification for policies already decided for other

reasons rather than as a guide to policy while it is being

shaped. But this approach will change and international law will

grow in importance.

In international affairs geoeconomics will begin to vie with

geopolitics for importance. This will also increase the role of

international institutions and will have profound implications

for the role of the various regions of the world. In theory,

Europe should become the world's powerhouse, with Germany united

and the European Community breaking down trade barriers. But

unless Europe can find a way to integrate Eastern Europe and the

former Soviet Union into the European system politically and

economically, Europe will find its political energies diverted
and its finances drained. It will suffer in the competition with

the United States or Asia. And in this competition because the

United States seems to have so much trouble addressing its

domestic affairs, it is a safe prediction that Asia will continue

to make gains over other regions in the world.

I am talking about the next 20 years. It is possible that

China could disrupt this optimistic outlook for Asia by

developing into a major international military power over the

next quarter century. Its demographic size permits this. If its

economy continues to grow at the current rapid pace and the rest

of the world does not succeed in integrating China into the world

system successfully and peacefully, China is more likely than any

other major state to pose a challenge to international stability.

This is one reason why the principal task of the international

community in the coming years is to find ways to include China in

the international system that is developing. It must not be

allowed to isolate itself.

If the role of economics continues to grow, then the

importance of Asia in world affairs can be expected to increase

steadily. This area already has several of the world's most

successful economies. China, North Korea, and Vietnam seem poised

to join and to give a fillip to the region's economy that most

other areas of the world will lack. Ironically, the European

Communist states are disadvantaged compared to the Asian

Communist states precisely because the former are more advanced

and have a large, antiquated industrial infrastructure that is

hard to discard quickly. Paradoxically, Asian Communist states

may be in a position to industrialize more quickly because they

are further behind.

If security concerns continue to decline in importance, the

bargaining power of the United States in Asia will steadily

decrease. The United States will need the area as a source of

capital, yet its main trading currency, its role in the region's

defense, will be depreciated. Throughout the world we are likely

to see a struggle between finance and trade. The former is

increasingly globalized, and the latter is becoming regionalized.

Despite trends of a universal trading system, it seems likely

that the world will move increasingly into trading blocks. The

United States is moving to put into place the possibility of such

a system in its hemisphere. Europe will be driven by political

concerns to create such a bloc in Europe. Otherwise it will fear

social disorder in Eastern Europe and a flood of refugees

westward. Meanwhile, this year, for the first time since the end

of World War II, Japan's trade with Asia will be greater than its

trade with the United States. In other words, national interest

and natural forces are dividing the world up into major trading

blocs. These trends will be difficult to reverse. They can be

managed, and in this regard the globalization of finance should

soften somewhat the effects of creating trading blocs. The United

States, for example, will need Asian capital too much to take too

many counterproductive measures in the field of trade. Asia needs
the U.S. market too much to place too many onerous conditions on

U.S. access to Asian capital.

Politically, the trend of the coming 20 years will be for

power to flow away from the central government both down and up.

For the last 150 years technology and economic development

favored the nation state. Rail lines and air nets pulled

countries together. Radio stations propagated a single form of

the dominant language. The costs of communication were so high

that there were limited radio and television channels so that

only the dominant political forces could make use of them. The

prevailing patterns of economic development also favored

centralization. Economies of scale favored large firms, which

created national networks of suppliers and distributors. Demands

for protection from natural or economic disaster also favored the

creation of the nation state.

But now technology has moved to the point where it is

weakening the nation state. Communications are an example. The

real cost of hardware has decreased steadily over four decades by

an average of 20 percent, according to a study recently completed

by Sheldon Annis, a senior research associate at the Overseas

Development Council. A meter of optic fiber cable cost $3.50 in

1972 but only $.25 today. Instead of a few limited TV channels,

which the central government can easily control, cable TV opens

up hundreds of channels.

International travel and trade are breaking down barriers.

The international elite is still only a small portion of any

national population, but it is extremely important and growing in

size.

Knowledge industries appear to be the wave of the future,

and they are less prone to centralization. Indeed, the model of

the new form of economic development is Silicon Valley, where

individual entrepreneurs proliferate firms like mushrooms, each

attempting to provide an innovation the other has not yet

mastered. Recent news articles about the rise of a new

technological center in India, Bangalore, suggest the future. The

center of the Indian atomic energy industry, Bangalore has

engineers who provide at $500 a month services that cost $15,000

a month in Silicon Valley. American firms are pouring investment

into Bangalore, and it is now easier to call New York from an

office in Bangalore than it is to telephone a colleague across

town. The global net there has become tighter than the local net.

In such a world the ability of the state to control economic

activity at the national level seems to be steadily declining.

When Francois Mitterrand won the presidency of France the first

time, he ran on a platform of reducing unemployment. He soon

found that the state of France lacked the tools to carry out such

a program because of its membership in the Common Market. Two

years into his term he was forced to choose between his promises

to the French people and French membership in the Common Market.
He fired several members of his cabinet and chose the Common

Market.

Even a dominant economic power like the United States finds

that its fate is increasingly in the hands of others. Western

Europe, Japan, and Canada now account for 60 percent of U.S.

exports. During the period 1987-91 roughly 50 percent of U.S.

real growth reflected the expansion of exports. Export growth

equaled virtually all of real GDP growth in 1990 and cut the 1991

decline in growth by one third.

The Clinton program cannot succeed unless Europe, Japan, and

Canada continue to import U.S. products at high rates. For that

reason the much lower growth rates the OECD projects for Western

Europe, Japan, and Canada in the coming 2 years are therefore

very bad news for the Clinton administration. It is unlikely that

the new president can carry out his campaign promises in the

economic field unless he has cooperation from Western Europe and

Japan.

What will be the role of Asia in this new world? The

question is critical because so many of the world's most dynamic

economies can be found there. At this point we can only advance

possibilities. We probably will move much more decisively from

the Eurocentric world we have known for the last 100 years.

European civilization is not spent. Indeed, what we call world

civilization is in large measure the globalization of European

civilization. But Europe now has competitors, and these are

likely to become stronger rather than weaker. Most of these new

competitors are in Asia.

But for Asia to play a larger geopolitical role it must take

a number of key steps. It must develop a security order that

includes the United States but is not so dependent on it. Asia

must build on elements within the region. The United States has

been very resistant to any talk of changes in the security status

quo in Asia. But this seems a very shortsighted view. It is

important that Asian states begin talking to one another more

openly, in more detail about the security issues that trouble

them. Although the future of Asia in the coming decades looks

bright, security disputes could derail economic and social

progress in the region. An eruption of conflict in Korea or

skirmishes over the Spratly Islands or an arms race triggered by

misunderstandings--any or all are possibilities. Indeed, between

1980 and 1988 Japan increased its defense spending by 46 percent,

India and South Korea by 63 percent, and Taiwan by 42 percent in

1988 prices and exchange rates. Asia needs a forum in which

structured dialogue can take place among the major players--the

United States, Russia, China, including Taiwan, ASEAN, ANZUS and

Korea. Whether it would deserve the label CSCA is immaterial. The

forum is needed so that Asia can begin to develop common

understandings on how the current status quo, which is too

dependent on the U.S. presence, can begin to evolve in a way that

does not threaten the security of anyone. In this regard, Asian
states must thicken the patterns of regional cooperation and

involve all governments in the region, including the Communist

countries. It must heed American notes of caution, but it must

not allow its policy to be dictated from Washington.

The region will not be stable or able to play the role that

is naturally its own if there is not growing respect for

democracy and human rights. Progress has been made, but if Asia

is to have the vitality that is so necessary for the next stage

of economic development, it must convince individuals that their

rights will be protected within Asian states.

Finally, as the task for the coming 20 years, the Pacific

region has three priorities: It must find ways to harness

constructively Japanese dynamism, fulfill Chinese potential, and

limit American retrenchment. If these tasks can be handled

successfully, the people of this part of the world can look

forward to many years of peace and prosperity along with global

leadership.

In every region of the world the United States will be

present but decreasingly dominant. America's "unipolar moment,"

which some saw at the end of the Gulf War, will prove to be

extremely brief. Power will continue to become more evenly

distributed as America's military dominance recedes and as

others' economic performance improves. Such trends need not

disturb us too much as long as America remains an important world

power, and prudent retrenchment does not become foolish retreat.

The test of leadership in Washington will be to manage one

without calling forth the other.
REEXAMINING NATIONAL STRATEGY

William G. Hyland

Introduction.

America is redefining itself. A new generation is taking

over the White House, and the national focus has shifted from

foreign policy to domestic issues. At the same time, the end of

cold war has also liberated foreign policy. New issues and new

priorities are inevitable, but a new consensus on foreign affairs

has yet to take shape.

The United States has no broad international strategy.

Rather it pursues a collection of policies; some are left over

from the cold war, and some are relatively new.

The foreign policy agenda is far less dangerous and in most

respects easier to deal with than the agenda that confronted Mr.

Clinton's predecessors. Nowhere are American vital interests

under attack, or even seriously threatened. The United States in

1993 is able to deter any conceivable attack, and to deal with

any conceivable threat to its national security. Its

international position is probably better now than at any time

since 1920. Of course, attaining this unique position has been

quite costly, and has contributed to America's burgeoning

economic and social problems. This, of course, is one reason why

Governor Clinton was elected: not to solve the world's ills, but

to apply his laser-like concentration on America's ills.

One of the virtues of the end of the cold war is that the

new president, unlike his predecessors, is free to reexamine the

long-term interests of the United States in more propitious

circumstances than at any time since Pearl Harbor. The new

administration, if it chooses, can even reexamine a series of

major security issues that heretofore have been sacrosanct.

America's role in the so-called new world order is still not

clearly defined. Many observers believe the new world order is

primarily an American responsibility. In the summer of 1991,

President Bush said that "Our responsibility remains not only to

protect our citizens and our interests but also to help create a

new world in which our fundamental ideals not only survive but

flourish." This comes fairly close to remaking the world in our

own image.

It is not enough simply to invoke or rely on slogans about

America's responsibilities. It would be a tragedy if the first

post-cold war president sought refuge in reshaping the past. The

best service President Clinton can provide the nation is to force

an examination of the longer term national interest of the United

States, measured against the new international landscape. Why the

United States should want to bear the primary burden for creating
a new world order is not clear in light of its internal problems.

In any case, the first term for President Clinton is likely

to be a transitional period, if only because it is clearly a

transitional era in the history of international politics. After

50 years of war and cold war, it will take at least 4 years, and

probably more, to work out the so-called new world order.

The New Agenda.

Economics. There is much talk about the changes brought by

the end of the cold war. The change most remarked on is the "new"

primacy of economics. The current conventional wisdom is that

economics will replace geopolitics. The dreary litany of American

economic ills is familiar: deficits, underinvestment, lack of

competitiveness, etc. During the election campaign, candidate

Clinton went so far as to proclaim: "In this new era our first

foreign priority and our domestic priority are one and the same:

reviving our economy."

In a broad sense this is a truism: a country cannot conduct

a strong foreign policy based on a weak economy or a weak

society. And a misguided foreign policy can indeed weaken a

nation's economy and its social fabric. This nexus led some in

the past decade to speculate that America had entered a period of

strategic decline, brought on by "imperial overstretch." Others

stoutly refuted this notion, insisting that America was still

"bound to lead." The unexpected collapse of the Communist

structures in the USSR and Eastern Europe left this debate

suspended, but unresolved.

It will have to be revisited; perhaps not in the stark terms

of "imperial decline," but in the more practical terms of what a

nation with limited resources needs to do, and what it can do. In

the past the American national interest was supported by a

massive dose of resources from the Marshall plan through the

Reagan military buildup. Those days are past: a national security

crisis of cold war magnitude is not likely, at least for a

decade. But if by chance a serious security crisis were to arise,

the means available to deal with it will, for same period, be

sharply constrained. We are back to Walter Lippmann's admonition

that a nation's ambitions must match it resources, including some

reserve.

In the Iraq crisis, for example, the United States undertook

a major military campaign, as the leader of an international

coalition. The effort was quite costly; so costly, in fact, that

we proceeded to "beg" for assistance, to such a degree that in

the end the operation even turned a "profit." This was a

disgraceful display for a superpower, but nevertheless

symptomatic.

In plain terms, America can no longer do whatever if wants;
even if it is the only superpower. This is a major strategic

change, and its implications pervade all other issues.

Specifically it requires a rethinking of America's foreign

commitments, setting more precise priorities among them, a

reformulation of military strategy and on that basis

restructuring the shape and size of our armed forces.

Beyond the basic question of resource allocation, the most

immediate economic security issues involve trade and

competitiveness. America has never had free trade. This pristine

doctrine exists only in theory. America's real policy has been

managed trade. The new dimension is whether even a rough

international system can be maintained in the face of pressures

for regionalization and protectionism.

The decline of America's trading position has led to a new

growing belligerence toward our trading partners, and to a

revival of protectionism. The Bush and early Clinton

administrations have displayed an unusual aggressiveness. Indeed,

the Clinton officials sound even more bombastic on trade issues.

The new trade negotiator in the Clinton administration said

recently, "The days when we could subordinate our economic

interests to foreign policy or defense concerns are long past. "

This may be cheap tactics to create negotiating leverage, but the

frustrations with America's declining position may be leading to

a growing insularity.

A significant portent is the North American Free Trade

Association (NAFTA). This is surely not free trade, nor is it

international in its design. Indeed, it is based on a regional

discrimination, as is the European Economic Community (EC). It is

even justified as a counterweight to the EC, and the EC's

response has been to reinforce its own insularity. This conflict

occurs at a time when the prospects for the GATT are not

particularly bright.

In a world in which the overriding common security interests

of the cold war have dissipated, the emergence of large trading

blocs can only accelerate international fragmentation. NAFTA thus

runs counter to geopolitical efforts at the U.N. and elsewhere to

create new broader international coalition and a new

international consensus. Is the development of regional economic

blocs a trend this country wishes to strengthen?

A case can be made for moving toward a Western Hemisphere

political-economic zone, a sort of modern version of the Monroe

Doctrine. If the United States itself is evolving toward a

society with a strong Latin element, then such a foreign policy

might seem more rational than more Eurocentrism. But if so, it

has yet to be articulated or thought through. Meanwhile, our

trade policies contribute to international fragmentation.

Democracy. The end of the cold war is frequently portrayed

as a golden opportunity to provide stronger support for
democracies. Candidate Clinton called for a "pro-democracy

foreign policy," charging that Bush embraced stability at the

expense of democracy. This reflects an age-old debate in America,

starting with Jefferson and Hamilton: whether the United States

should conduct its foreign policy to advance certain liberal

goals abroad, or be content, as John Quincy Adams advised, not to

go abroad searching for monsters to slay. The current issue,

however, is not realpolitik versus idealism. There has always

been a broad consensus in the United States that America should

use its influence and weight to promote democratic practices. The

core issues have always been how, when and where.

At this practical level the consensus breaks down. For

example, should the United States intervene in Haiti? It is a

prime challenge in an area in close proximity. The elected

government was overthrown. The United States has applied economic

sanctions, but there the matter has rested. What message can be

derived from this record?

Or, to take a different example, what is the democratic

rationale for supporting Saudi Arabia or Kuwait? The answer, of

course, is the national interest defined in terms of security.

Our intervention in DESERT STORM was aimed at preventing Iraqi

domination of the Arabian peninsula, the Persian Gulf and the

international oil market. In other words power politics, not

idealism.

Ironically, despite the obvious but cold-blooded rationale

for DESERT STORM, the sweeping military victory has led to a

revival of old liberal internationalism, i.e., it was a victory

over aggression and an example of the new collective security.

Thus, some overtones of Wilsonianism are creeping back into

American policy. Recently, a group of American notables,

assembled by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, offered advice to

the new administration; its report concluded: "we are free to

move" away from a peace that rests on a balance of terror between

two armed camps toward a peace based on trust and shared

interests." (emphasis added). As was the case for Wilson, the

practical result of such a revitalization of liberal doctrines,

such as international "trust," will be that the gap between

rhetoric and action will increase, thus creating a new crisis of

credibility. This has been already evident in the reluctance to

intervene with force in Bosnia. Clearly, "shared interests" have

not been found. Unless a more realistic attitude is adopted in

Washington, the United States will find itself embarked on

endless crusades to make the world safe for democracy.

This focus on democracy also ignores, or conflicts with what

is probably the strongest new trend--nationalism, both in its

old- fashioned European version as evident in the Balkans, and in

its religious manifestation, evident in Muslim fundamentalism.

Those who argue that the purpose of American policy is to

safeguard democracies and democratic practices, also have to
confront its handmaiden--self determination.

This principle immediately complicates the effort to support

democracy. Do the Serbs in Bosnia have any right to an

independent existence? If so, do they have the right to fight for

their independence? Is the United States obligated to support,

with military means if necessary, self-determination? Or does it

have an obligation to support the territorial integrity of a

state such as Bosnia? How would such principles be applied in the

former Soviet Union?

One ominous by-product of the Bosnian debate is the

emergence of a "nascent" doctrine that claims America has an

obligation to protect ethnic minorities. Thus William Safire in

The New York Times argued that: "Collective security is no longer

limited to defending national borders; a nascent understanding

grows that ethnic minorities are entitled to international

protection." Rather than adopting such broad principles of

Wilsonianism, the United States would be better served by a

pragmatic approach: examining the issues created by the

resurgence of nationalism on a case-by-case basis.

A related issue arises from the Iraq crisis. What is the

American interest in this region? While there is no reason to

conciliate Saddam, Iraq does illustrate the kind of problem that

the new administration will have to deal with. What are the

longer term power relationships in the Gulf? Since the overthrow

of the Shah, this has been an area in extreme turmoil. Iraq was a

threat, but it has been reduced to more of an irritant. At the

same time, the United States and the U.N. are virtually

partitioning Iraq. Moreover, the coalition that opposed Iraq in

DESERT STORM is breaking up, as do all coalitions when the common

enemy is weakened. And more important, it is a good bet that 4

years from now the problem will be Iran--a potentially far

stronger, more aggressive country. Iraq is manageable, a

nuclear-armed Iran would be another story. In short, America

needs to put the Iraqi crisis into a broader perspective: how to

maintain a balance of power in the Gulf region.

Nonproliferation. The Iraq crisis bears on the third "new"

issue that is in fact an old one: nonproliferation of nuclear

weapons and longer range delivery systems. The shocking lesson of

Iraq is how easy it was to obtain technology and to hide the

various nuclear processes. Both the United States and the world

community are in disarray on the issues related to

nonproliferation. It cuts across many American departments, and

many competing U.S. economic and strategic interests, including

the much maligned Star Wars defense against third country

attacks. It must be straightened out. The issue is how to stop

proliferation? By closer monitoring and more intrusive inspection

regimes. How would they be enforced? By economic sanctions or

military intervention?

The U.N.'s involvement in the inspection of Iraq is a
valuable precedent, but such collectivity could turn into a

limiting factor as well. As the DESERT STORM coalition breaks up,

will the United States have to act alone? Will the United States

be prepared to act against the wishes of the Security Council?

Nonproliferation concerns also impact specifically on

geopolitics, namely our alignment with Pakistan. The

deterioration in relations with Pakistan over nonproliferation

has reached the point where America ought to consider switching

our alignment to India. Supporting Pakistan in the name of

regional balance no longer seems necessary with the Soviets out

of Afghanistan; and the price of Pakistani support in the Muslim

world is becoming too high if it means tolerating the

proliferation of nuclear powers.

Other New Issues. Finally, a number of other "new" but

important issues have been treated haphazardly, as far as their

international dimension is concerned: refugees, population, and

the environment. Many argue that the environment is the primary

threat to the world. Others see the environment, as well as the

other such issues, as simply another round in the conflict

between the wealthy north and the impoverished south. Drugs are

an example: there is no international consensus, mainly because

the United States is affected far more than other countries. The

United States finds itself virtually paying bribery for

international cooperation. At the same time Washington is

expected to make concessions in the name of the new

environmentalism. The United States has thus far been more

reluctant than other countries to act in support of a radical

regime to control the international environment. The Clinton-Gore

administration supposedly will lead to a change. But at what

cost? Within this agenda there ought to be some trade-offs that

serve American interest and not just sacrifices in the name of a

new internationalism.

Underlying these newly emerging issues are the changes in

the broad international structure. The U.N. has enjoyed a

surprising revival. It is now closer to Roosevelt's original

visions--world policemen formed by the Great Powers in the

Security Council. But the Security Council does not reflect

international reality. It does not reflect the real power

structure, because it excludes key countries. Should the Security

Council be expanded to include Japan and Germany? If so, why

retain Britain and France as permanent members: why not a

European and an Asian seat?

The next question is should there be a permanent

peacekeeping force? If so would American troops serve under a

non-American U.N. commander in combat? Would this be

constitutional?

Is the current revival of the U.N. an aberration? It is

likely, indeed almost certain, that the interests of the Great

Powers will once again diverge? Sooner or later the United States
will have to act against the desires of the U.N.

In short, much of what appears to be new, in the aftermath

of the cold war, has not been thoroughly examined. Clearly there

are conflicts between a national and an international approach to

both specific issues and broad concepts. For America, the problem

may be one of balance: the "new" agenda seems to call for an

activist policy, at a time when other indicators suggest that the

nation wishes to turn inward.

The Old Agenda.

Turning now to the "old" agenda: during the cold war some of

the major underlying geopolitical premises of American policy

were (1) that the United States had global interests and

responsibilities; (2) that to carry them out the alliance with

Europe was necessary; the United States would provide the

required military protection and Europe for its part should

continue to unite; (3) that an alliance with Japan could be

created based on common interests that would transcend the common

threat; and (4) that Washington could and should maintain

friendly relations with China, in the name of the balance of

power, regardless of that country's internal organization.

These premises are questionable. True, the United States

remains a global power, perhaps the only one. But most of its

global responsibilities were a function of the cold war. The

claim that these interests still require certain commitments

abroad is questionable. It has been drastically undercut by the

ease with which the United States withdrew from the Philippines.

If there ever was a symbol of America's rise to global power it

was the naval base at Subic Bay.

Thus far, however, there has been a reluctance to undertake

a fundamental examination of the residual of requirements still

necessary to protect our global interests as opposed to those

situations that can be left to regional or local forces. Clearly,

with the end of the cold war, such a reappraisal is in order.

Surely some disengagement will be both possible and desirable.

The U.S. role as the world's leader or as a catalyst for

international action is becoming a tired cliche. It is not

persuasive to argue that because only the United States can

accomplish certain missions, we should therefore undertake them.

This line of reasoning is something of a fraud. Obviously,

American leadership in practice is exercised selectively: thus,

it has not been exercised in Burma or Cambodia, for obvious

reasons; it was invoked assertively in the Gulf, but only after

great hesitation in Somalia.

American leadership cannot be an end in itself, as it is

currently portrayed. It was a result of several factors: the

Communist challenge was perceived to be global, and the United
States was the only global power; our allies were weak, their

resources limited; our own resources were seemingly endless. And,

above all, our vital interests were threatened. All of that is

all changed.

Europe. American interests are clearest in Europe. There is

no reason to abandon the alliance with Western Europe. But it is

far less important than it was, and the United States should not

make concessions, political or otherwise in the name of the

alliance as such. The Europeans will have to do more for

themselves, without American leadership or participation. The

number of American ground troops ought to be reduced to a

minimum.

Three stunning geopolitical changes in Europe overshadow all

others at the end of the cold war: the emergence of Germany, the

liberation of Eastern Europe (and breakup), and the severe

weakening of the former Soviet Union. Few changes of such

importance have occurred so quickly in peacetime.

The impact of the end of the cold war, however, is quite

different from what we may have imagined. The rise of Germany and

the decline of Russia has changed the balance of power, and as a

consequence ended the dream of Monett's Europe. The old European

Community was designed as a counterweight to the USSR; but it was

not only based on the continuing division of Germany, some

measure to limit German influence and power.

Now one of Europe's oldest issues is back: how to cope with

German power? This question permeates any reexamination of the

future of Europe or its military alliance with the United States.

There is already some apprehension-- probably unjustified--over

internal events in Germany. But after an interim period of

consolidation after unification, the new Germany will inevitably

assert its own interests: German unilateral action in recognizing

Croatia and pressuring its European partners is a disconcerting

example. It illustrates the potential geopolitical power of

Germany in Central and Eastern Europe.

In any case, it seems clear that American influence in

Europe is declining, whether we like it or not, and German

influence is rising. American involvement in Europe will be

thinner and weaker. Selective disengagement by both sides of the

Atlantic has already begun.

Europe itself is in decline. The revival of nationalism

threatens the concept of Europe. Maastricht is almost dead as a

strategic plan. Indeed, it is no longer clear what is meant by

Europe.

This creates a new dilemma for the United States. For 3

decades, Washington has supported the Europeans though the

Europeans have often been irritating to America. After 30 years

Europe has turned out to be weak and self-centered, the
beneficiary of American protection, unable to act on its own even

on the continent itself. Now that a fundamental weakening is at

hand, the failure of Europe threatens to create a power vacuum

that only Germany can fill. America must be careful not to be

used by Britain and France as a counterweight to Germany.

The weakening of Western Europe aggravates another real

danger--the isolation of Eastern Europe. Instability there is

already spreading in the breakdown of two post-Versailles states,

Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Further east in such areas as

Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova there is a similar

disintegration. The new rump states are not likely to be viable

units, either economically or politically. Further disintegration

is thus probable, and therefore new conflicts. Even in those

states where territorial integrity has been maintained, there is

a danger that they will eventually be dominated by Germany, and

thus become a potential source of conflict with Russia.

Russia. The future of Russia is still the most fundamental

issue for this country; Russia still the only country capable of

destroying the United States. Thus far, American policy has been

improvised because the situation has been so volatile. The new

president ought to devise a basic political strategy and stick to

it, whatever the ups and downs of economic reform.

The new states of the former Soviet Union are in an

evolutionary stage for which there is no historical precedent.

After 70 years of Stalinist rule in which a strong central

government maintained control, the region is divided into 15

separate entities of varying degrees of viability. Many areas are

undergoing tremendous upheaval. It is likely that there will be

turmoil in Russia as well as in the other new states throughout

the next decade. The role of outside powers in this situation

will be limited; they may have some influence, but barring

military intervention it will not be decisive.

Given the disparate nature of the new states, it is

difficult to define the effects on U.S. interests posed by the

current situation. We need a more coherent analytical framework.

Without such a policy framework, there is a danger of going from

one fad to another.

Some insist, for example, that economic assistance should be

the cutting edge of U.S. diplomacy toward the former Soviet

Union. This is based in part on the fear that, if the West fails

to help Yeltsin, Russia will face a threat from either the

radical right or the radical left. For its part, America then

will be subjected to another divisive debate over who lost

Russia. There is a gap, however, between this rationale and what

is actually happening in Russia. Nationalist forces are becoming

stronger, and Yeltsin has accommodated them. If Yeltsin survives

politically, it will be as a Russian nationalist. This ought to

be a cause for caution.
Yeltsin's foreign policy in its pro-Western orientation is

already under attack. The United States will have to be tolerant

of tactical posturing to accommodate these political forces

inside Russia. It is already evident in the Russian government's

caution over further intervention in Iraq and especially in

Bosnia. Yet it seems inevitable that traditional Russian security

concerns will reassert themselves, if not now, then over the long

term. These concerns are bound to conflict with American

interests in some important areas.

Political and long-term security considerations should

therefore be given priority over short-term economic issues. U.S.

policy should focus on political realities--not on such abstract

objectives as creation of a free-market system; the prospects for

the emergence of a capitalist market are dubious in any case, and

the emphasis on economic reform gives influence to the wrong

institutions--specifically, the World Bank and IMF. These are not

the institutions that should be setting conditions on assistance;

conditions should be political, not economic.

U.S. policy should be to tie Russia (and Ukraine) into

Europe. This might require creation of a new European

organization because the existing institutions are ungainly and

inadequate. The United States should take the lead in drawing

Russia and Ukraine into Europe. The objective is to attain

Russian agreement to the territorial status quo and to reassure

the smaller states of the region that they will have support for

their independence. The argument for a new institution rests

ultimately on the need for the European process to receive a

psychological boost.

The new administration should reexamine existing

institutions in Europe to determine what institutional framework

would best serve this purpose. CSCE has failed, and NATO is not

relevant because the problems in Europe are no longer primarily

military in nature.

The most persuasive argument for a new institution is that

Russia should be surrounded by viable states. Russia is a

powerful nation state, possessing nuclear weapons. The United

States will have to deal with it, and should anticipate a

resurgence of a strong Russia. When Russia does revive, it may

well pose a real threat to its neighbors. The 25 million Russians

living outside Russia are a time bomb and will be the source of a

great disaster if there is a nationalist revival in Russia. The

territorial status quo can not be ensured without some guarantees

for protection of minority rights.

It is probably naive to expect that what will emerge on the

Eurasian land mass will be a collection of democratic, market

oriented and benign states, or that out of chaos and crisis will

come a well-ordered market. One can hope that Russia will break

with over 1,000 years of its history, but more likely is the
eventual revival of an autocratic state, probably well-armed and

potentially hostile toward its neighbors.

European security has hitherto been a question of cushioning

the East-West confrontation. Now it will have to be redefined to

cushion the inevitable conflicts within Europe itself.

Asia. The revolutionary changes in Europe are, on the whole,

positive. The changes that will take place in Asia are more

worrisome. America's proper role is still elusive. The problems

are the same--our uneasy relations with Japan and China. Usually,

we have managed to have good relations with one or the other, and

recently with both. Now the opposite seems more likely: that our

relations with both Japan and China will deteriorate.

Japan has achieved its World War II aims of preeminence in

Asia, except for a free hand in China. But the price has been to

antagonize its principal protector, the United States. What role

will Japan now play, when there is no common threat? What is the

nature of our relationship if and when Japan becomes more active

in Asia and internationally?

Many advocate a more equal partnership. The idea is based on

a probably erroneous estimate of Japan. Despite its economic

gains, Japan is a weaker country than it appears. Moreover, there

is an underlying racism in Japan that will be a formidable

barrier to a deeper relationship with the United States. While a

more mature partnership is a desirable goal, its attainment may

be impossible. It seems likely that American and Japanese

interests will become more and more antagonistic.

The United States, therefore, should not press Japan to take

on a larger global role. On the other hand, Washington should

stop supporting Japan's insistence that its aid to Russia be

conditioned on return of the Northern Territories. This is an

irresponsible position given the dangers in the region. The

United States should be more supportive of the Russian position,

since it was the United States that gave the islands to Russia at

Yalta.

There are more variables in relations with China. It is now

far less valuable as an ally against Russia. In an era of

democratization China remains an anomaly, and it is also the

country where a change in top leadership is likely to have a

profound impact over time.

What is American policy, and how are our interests defined?

It is high time to put aside the obsession with Tiananmen. We

should not isolate China. If one American purpose is to revive

its own economy, why jeopardize trade over an incident 5 years

ago? More relevant, perhaps, is that China will continue to play

a role in Cambodia, in North Korea, and in the U.N. Security

Council. Our interests in the manner in which that role is

executed will have to outweigh our revulsion over Tiananmen.
The American interest is not to permit either Japan or China

to dominate our Asian policy. We need a balance between China and

Japan, and a balance among China, Japan, and the United States.

One way to achieve this is to support Russia in the Far East.

The Middle East. The United States has now become the only

outside power of any consequence in this area. In the wake of the

Gulf War, President Bush and Secretary Baker saw a great

strategic opening. The radicals had been defeated. The United

States had demonstrated its willingness to intervene, and Israel

was more willing to heed American advice during the Gulf War, and

especially since the elections in Israel.

With elections in Israel and America now completed, a

strategic dialogue with Israel is needed, a dialogue that should

finally confront the basic issues of a settlement. Sooner or

later the United States must develop its own plan, and then

insist on it. Unlike in Europe and Asia, in the Middle East some

aggressive American diplomacy will be needed as well. There is no

other way, except a war sometime in the future.

Military Security.

It is surprising how little attention has been paid to

military security in the wake of the cold war. The conventional

wisdom is that the military establishment ought to be reduced,

and substantially so. This reduction has begun. The debate,

however, has degenerated into quarrels about "redundancy" themes

that were echoed in the election campaign. To make "redundancy"

(roles and missions) the major issue is not worthy of a

superpower. The real issues are difficult enough without becoming

bogged down in interservice quarrels, or conflicts between the

armchair strategists in the Congress and the Service Chiefs.

What threats are likely in the near term, and over the

longer term? There is a tendency to answer this question in terms

of the past. Thus, DESERT STORM is widely cited as an example of

the kind of operation that the United States should be ready to

execute in the future. The new Secretary of Defense, when he was

still in the Congress, advocated adding to the DESERT STORM model

an air and naval combat force capable of supporting the defense

of Korea, new lift capabilities, a capability for humanitarian

aid, and the capability to execute a Panama-sized operation.

(Statement of Les Aspin, August 3, 1992). This seems very close

to the forces in the current structure. But even this thinner

program is questionable in light of Bosnia. Intervention there

would be close to the kind of wars that were planned for central

Europe against the Russians; a subsequent occupation phase in

Yugoslavia might be like Vietnam. It is clear that the strategic

analysis required for this debate is still in its infancy.

The Gulf War was nonnuclear. If it is a model for future
conflicts, what is the role for nuclear forces? Pure deterrence?

Of whom? In the event both START agreements are realized, the

United States will find itself heavily dependent on sea-based

strategic forces, with all of the complications of command and

control and antisubmarine warfare that entails.

Finally, there is the question of strategic defense. With

the threat of new nuclear powers growing, and the probable

proliferation of long range delivery systems, how long should

America tolerate a strategic vulnerability with no defense

whatsoever? The entire complex of issues surrounding SDI ought to

be reexamined. Many of the objections related to deterrence

equations against a Russian threat that is disappearing; most of

the argument are now obsolete or no longer applicable. The

concept of cooperation on a worldwide warning system is highly

attractive. The SCUD attacks against Israel by Saddam ought to be

a lesson.

In the Gulf War, and then in the Bosnia crisis, an old issue

has resurfaced: What interests require a resort to the use of

force? President Bush attempted in his last days to define the

causes for American intervention. But the issue remains, and in

many respects it is too amorphous. It must be part of any

reexamination of the national interest. There can be no gap

between what we are willing to fight for, and the forces

available for conflict. How much is enough, is now replaced with

how much is too little?

The Outlook.

The character and structure of world politics has been

radically altered. Nationalism is rising everywhere; it manifests

itself as regionalism, as economic protectionism, in ethnic

conflict and revolutionary upheavals. But the forces of

international integration are also gathering force. It will take

years for the consequences of these changes to be absorbed.

No overriding principle will be sufficient to handle the

conflicts during this phase which could easily last for a decade.

The new world order will probably not be the result of a grand

design; more likely it will emerge by trial and error.

For some years to come, therefore, the guiding force of

American policy will have to be a far greater pragmatism. America

will have to resist the temptation to embark on crusades to

impose democracy, to enforce market principles, assist poor

countries, or settle every dispute. Such a policy would allow

ample room for humanitarianism. Moreover, when its interests are

challenged, America will have to resist, of course, as in DESERT

STORM. And it will need a rapidly deployable, potent striking

force, armed with high technology to support its interests. For

the most part, however, the United States can afford to treat

much of the world with benign neglect, while it puts its own
house in order. The operative concept abroad ought to be

selectivity.

During the presidential campaign, opinion polls revealed a

rather startling trend: a majority of those polled believed that

the country was heading in the wrong direction. Until this crisis

of confidence is overcome and the domestic sources of the crisis

are dealt with, foreign policy must necessarily be subordinated.

The rescue mission in Somalia, however laudable, does nothing for

poverty in America.

In sum, the national interest should be redefined. A project

along the lines of NSC 68 ought to be undertaken for the

post-cold war world. It could include a survey of options in

political strategy, defense requirements, and economic resource

allocation, analyzed against various world trends and threats to

American interests. It might take one year, but its results could

well be worth it. During the interim, American policy will have

to be circumspect and careful. Prudence, the late Hans Morgenthau

wrote, is the "supreme virtue in politics." Not a bad recipe for

American foreign policy.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Conference Organizer

Dr. Gary L. Guertner

Authors

Mr. Charles William Maynes

Mr. William G. Hyland

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Shirley E. Martin

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. Lawrence C. Miller