UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

________________________________

 )

CAROLINE ROBINSON, the Personal ) 

Representative of the Estate of )

Arnell Robinson, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 07-CV-1796 (EGS)

v. )

 )

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, )

 )

Defendant. )

________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is the District of Columbia’s 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Judgment on the 

Pleadings. The District of Columbia argues, inter alia, that 

plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed. 

Upon consideration of the motion, the response and reply 

thereto, the relevant case law, and the entire record, the 

motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in part. 

Specifically, the Court shall grant the motion insofar as it 

requests dismissal of plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim. The Court 

will REMAND the remaining claims to the Superior Court of the 

District of Columbia. 

I. BACKGROUND

Arnell Robinson filed a complaint on October 3, 2007, 

alleging various claims against the District of Columbia, 
2

Officer Earl Brown, and various “John Doe” officers. Mr. 

Robinson alleged that defendants violated his rights in 

connection with an arrest at the 400 Block of O Street, NW in 

Washington, DC on October 4, 2006. Specifically, Mr. Robinson 

alleged that while he was walking home from school, Officer 

Brown stopped his police cruiser, exited the vehicle, and began 

to verbally harass Mr. Robinson. Compl. ¶¶ 7-9. Mr. Robinson 

alleged that Officer Brown forcefully grabbed his right arm and 

twisted it behind him, throwing him face first into an iron 

fence. Compl. ¶ 10. Officer Brown also allegedly slammed his 

arm across Mr. Robinson’s neck. Compl. ¶ 11. Several years 

earlier, Mr. Robinson had been shot in the face and neck area 

and this injury prevented Mr. Robinson from being able to yell, 

scream, or speak in a loud voice, and also affected his ability 

to hear in his right ear. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 16-17. Although Mr. 

Robinson’s friends allegedly told Officer Brown about this 

injury, Officer Brown refused to remove his arm from Mr. 

Robinson’s neck. After he was arrested, Mr. Robinson was 

allegedly treated for pain in his neck and ribs and for ringing 

in his ears. Compl. ¶¶ 17-22. 

Upon the unrelated death of Mr. Robinson in early 2009, the 

Court granted plaintiff’s motion to substitute a party, and 

substituted Caroline Robinson, Mr. Robinson’s mother, as the 

Personal Representative of the Estate of Arnell Robinson. Jun.
3

1, 2009 Minute Order. On November 18, 2009, the Court granted 

as conceded Officer Brown’s motion to dismiss for failure to 

serve Officer Brown with process in accordance with the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Nov. 18, 2009 Minute Order. On 

January 11, 2013, the District of Columbia, the only remaining 

defendant in this case, filed the instant motion. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

“[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay 

trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(c). A motion pursuant to Rule 12(c) is appropriately 

granted when, at the close of the pleadings, “no material issue 

of fact remains to be resolved, and [the movant] is clearly 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Montanans for 

Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 542 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2008) 

(citations omitted).

When evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), courts employ the 

same standard that governs a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35–36 

(D.D.C. 2004). A court must treat the complaint's factual 

allegations as true, “even if doubtful in fact,” Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), but it need not accept as 
4

true legal conclusions set forth in a complaint. Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Accordingly, a court must 

accept the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations to the 

extent that “they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 

relief,” id. at 679, and “may thus only grant judgment on the 

pleadings if it appears, even accepting as true all inferences 

from the complaint's factual allegations, that the plaintiff 

cannot prove any set of facts entitling him to relief.” Lans v. 

Adduci Mastriani & Schaumberg LLP, 786 F. Supp. 2d 240, 265 

(D.D.C. 2011).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the 

“initial responsibility of informing the district court of the 

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which 

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat summary 

judgment, the non-moving party must “designate specific facts 

showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 
5

(internal quotation marks omitted). The existence of a factual 

dispute is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A dispute 

is “genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the 

non-moving party; a fact is only “material” if it is capable of 

affecting the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 248; Laningham 

v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In 

assessing a party's motion, “[a]ll underlying facts and 

inferences are analyzed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” N.S. ex rel. Stein v. District of Columbia, 709 

F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (D.D.C. 2010), citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

247.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Conceded Claims

In its motion, the District argues that plaintiff’s claims 

for punitive damages should be dismissed because a plaintiff 

cannot recover punitive damages against the District. The 

District also argues that plaintiff’s claims for injunctive 

relief must be dismissed because Mr. Robinson is deceased and 

thus cannot be in danger of sustaining a direct injury from 

Officer Brown. In his opposition, plaintiff agreed to dismiss 

those claims. Pl.’s Opp. at 26. Accordingly, plaintiff’s 

claims for punitive damages and for injunctive relief are 

DISMISSED. 
6

B. Municipal Liability Under Section 1983

The District argues that plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, 

alleged in Count I of the complaint, should be dismissed because 

the District cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat 

superior. The District is correct. 

Section 1983 provides that 

[any] person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 

be liable to the party injured....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

To establish that a municipality is liable under section 

1983, a plaintiff must prove both (1) “a predicate 

constitutional violation” and (2) “that a custom or policy of 

the municipality caused the violation.” Baker v. District of 

Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Collins 

v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 124 (1992)); see also Monell v. 

Dep't of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 

Indeed, the policy or custom must be “the moving force behind 

the constitutional violation.” Carter v. District of Columbia,

795 F.2d 116, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 

694); see also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985) 
7

(requiring an affirmative link between the city's policy and the 

alleged constitutional violation).

A municipality cannot be liable for the unconstitutional 

conduct of its employees based simply on a theory of respondeat 

superior or vicarious liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693; see 

also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Pembaur 

v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (“[W]hile 

Congress never questioned its power to impose civil liability on 

municipalities for their own illegal acts, Congress did doubt 

its constitutional power to impose such liability in order to 

oblige municipalities to control the conduct of others.”). “The 

‘official policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts 

of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, 

and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to 

action for which the municipality is actually responsible.”

Pembaur, 475 U.S at 479. This requirement flows directly from 

the statute itself. There are four basic categories of municipal 

action plaintiff may rely on to establish municipal liability: 

(1) express municipal policy; (2) adoption by municipal 

policymakers; (3) custom or usage; and (4) deliberate 

indifference. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-94. 

Although plaintiff did not allege a “custom or policy” 

theory of Section 1983 liability in the complaint, plaintiff 

responds to the District’s motion and argues that the District 
8

had a custom or policy of violating constitutional rights.1 

Plaintiff also argues that liability is appropriate because of 

the District’s deliberate indifference to constitutional 

violations. Section 1983 liability is not appropriate against 

the District under either theory. 

1. Custom and Policy

Plaintiff argues that two documents put the District on 

notice that there were MPD customs that violated constitutional 

rights. The first document is a 2001 Memorandum of Agreement 

(“2001 MOA”) between the Department of Justice and the 

Metropolitan Police Department regarding the use of excessive 

force by MPD officers. The second document is a 2003 report 

issued by the Citizen Complaint Review Board (“2003 CCRB 

Report”). Plaintiff argues that the reports put the District on 

notice of the problems with its officers’ use of excessive force 

and that they “establish the liability of the District” or at 

the very least, establish that there are genuine issues of 

material fact in dispute. 

The Court disagrees. Several courts have considered, and 

rejected, similar arguments regarding the 2001 MOA and the 2003 

 1 Because plaintiff did not allege this theory in his complaint 

and also because he relies on documents outside of the 

complaint, the Court will consider the “custom and policy” issue 

under the summary judgment standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) 

(when matters outside of the pleadings are presented to and not 

excluded by the court, a motion for judgment on the pleadings 

must be treated as one for summary judgment).
9

CCRB Report. See, e.g., Robinson v. District of Columbia, 403 

F. Supp. 2d 39, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying plaintiff’s claim 

that the 2001 MOA established a “custom or policy”); Byrd v. 

District of Columbia, 297 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 (D.D.C. 2003) 

(rejecting plaintiff’s “lame attempt to transform the mere 

existence of a MOA into a policy or custom” of the District and 

noting that, if anything, the MOA indicated the District’s 

efforts to improve); Dormu v. District of Columbia, 795 F. Supp. 

2d 7, 25-27 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that the mere awareness of an 

issue and need for improvement, as indicated in 2003 CCRB 

report, was not sufficient to impose municipal liability for 

conduct that occurred at a later date); Hunter v. District of 

Columbia, 824 F. Supp. 2d 125, 134 (D.D.C. 2011) (2003 CCRB 

Report was insufficient to establish a District custom or policy 

in favor of the use of excessive force and false arrest for 

conduct that occurred prior to arrival at the police station). 

Plaintiff relies heavily on Huthnance v. District of 

Columbia for the proposition that the 2003 CCRB Report “put the 

District on notice that there was a problem with its police 

officers using excessive force and improper disorderly conduct 

arrests.” 793 F. Supp. 2d 183, 199 (D.D.C. 2011). Plaintiff 

argues that such conduct was precisely what happened to 

plaintiff and, thus, are the proper basis for municipal 

liability under Section 1983. In Huthnance, however, the 
10

alleged constitutional violation was the specific practice that 

was discussed in the 2003 CCRB Report. Specifically, the 2003 

CCRB Report detailed the “post and forfeiture” procedure used by 

MPD, under which an arrestee posted $25 in collateral and was 

released from custody several hours later. After resolving the 

charge by paying $25, little or no review occurred after the 

arrests were completed, and CCRB believed that there was “the 

potential for a significant number of improper or unlawful 

disorderly conduct arrests in the District that could go 

unnoticed.” CCRB Rep. at 24, ECF No. 106-28. In Huthnance, the 

court focused on the similarity between the arrest in that case 

and the problem identified in the 2003 CCRB Report. 793 F. 

Supp. 2d at 200. The court concluded that the 2003 CCRB Report 

put the MPD on constructive notice regarding the problems with 

its post and forfeiture policy. The court also noted, however, 

that there were several other ways in which the District could 

have been on notice of problems with its post and forfeiture 

policy. 

In this case, the facts are not those specifically 

identified in the 2003 CCRB Report. Plaintiff was arrested but 

was not subject to the post and forfeiture procedure. Similarly, 

in Hunter, the court noted that even if the 2003 CCRB Report 

established a policy or custom relevant to a plaintiff’s release 

from custody (the post and forfeiture procedure), it would not 
11

make the District liable for the alleged false arrest and use of 

excessive force that plaintiff alleges occurred prior to his 

arrival at the police station. 824 F. Supp. 2d at 134. The 

Court agrees and finds that the 2003 CCRB Report did not put the 

District on notice of a custom or policy of constitutional 

violations such that municipal liability under Section 1983 can 

be imposed on the District. Similarly, the Court finds that the 

2001 MOA also does not establish a custom or policy sufficient 

to impose municipal liability on the District. 

2. Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff also claims that the District acted with 

deliberate indifference to the constitutional violations of the 

MPD. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the District’s failure 

to accept and investigate citizen complaints about Officer Brown 

and failure to take disciplinary action against Officer Brown” 

amounts to deliberate indifference of plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights. 

For there to be municipal liability under a theory of 

deliberate indifference, a jury must find from admissible 

evidence that the District was “the moving force” behind the 

alleged constitutional violations based on a theory of 

deliberate indifference to a known risk of such harm. Muhammad 

v. District of Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 134, 138 (D.D.C. 2008). 

“Deliberate indifference means that ‘faced with actual or 
12

constructive knowledge that its agents will probably violate 

constitutional rights, the city may not adopt a policy of 

inaction.’” Coleman v. District of Columbia, 828 F. Supp. 2d 

87, 94 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Warren v. District of Columbia,

353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Furthermore, a 

municipality's failure to train its officers or employees 

adequately qualifies as a custom or policy that violates Section 

1983 only when that failure “amounts to deliberate indifference

towards the constitutional rights of persons in its domain.” 

Kivanc v. Ramsey, 407 F. Supp. 2d 270, 278 (D.D.C. 2006) 

(quoting Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 

(D.C. Cir. 2000)) (other citation omitted). Similarly, the 

failure to investigate complaints cannot support a deliberate 

indifference theory unless the conduct was suggestive of the 

unconstitutional behavior on hand and put the District on notice 

of the possibility of constitutional violations. Muhammad v. 

District of Columbia, 881 F. Supp. 2d 115, 123 (D.D.C. 2012) 

(investigation of 13 complaints against officer did not 

constitute deliberate indifference where only two of the 

complaints were sustained and none of the complaints were for 

conduct suggestive of the asserted unconstitutional behavior in 

the case at hand). 

Here, there is no evidence that the MPD would have been 

aware of Officer Brown’s alleged likelihood of violating 
13

constitutional rights. Plaintiff avers that Mr. Butler, who had 

been with Mr. Robinson at the time of his arrest, attempted to 

file a complaint against Officer Brown on October 4, 2006, the 

day of the arrest, but was deterred from doing so. Even 

assuming this to be true, it does not provide evidence of the 

District’s prior knowledge of Officer Brown’s alleged propensity 

to violate constitutional rights. Plaintiff also argues that 

Officer Brown made false statements regarding the arrest under 

oath. Again, even assuming this is true, it does not provide 

any evidence of the District’s prior knowledge of Officer 

Brown’s conduct. Nor would a false statement under oath have 

been “suggestive” of the alleged constitutional violation in 

this case. See Muhammad, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 123. Accordingly, 

because none of the evidence cited by plaintiff would have 

provided the District with knowledge of Officer Brown’s alleged 

propensity to violate the constitutional rights of arrestees, 

the Court finds that the District cannot be held liable under 

Section 1983 under a “deliberate indifference” theory. 

Accordingly, Count I of plaintiff’s complaint, alleging a 

Section 1983 violation against the District, will be DISMISSED. 
14

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction

In light of the dismissal of the Section 1983 claim, the 

complaint contains no further federal causes of action over 

which this court has original subject matter jurisdiction. The 

Court must therefore consider whether to continue to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining claims pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which provides, in pertinent part, that 

“in any civil action of which the district courts have original 

jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental 

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims 

in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form 

part of the same case or controversy[.]” “Whether to retain 

jurisdiction over pendent . . . claims after the dismissal of 

the federal claims is a matter left to the sound discretion of 

the district court[.]” Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth., 642 F.3d 

1088, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 

In determining whether to dismiss supplemental state law 

claims, “the district court is to be ‘guided by consideration of 

the factors enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).’” Shekoyan v. 

Sibley Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 424 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citations 

omitted). “’[I]n the usual case in which all federal law claims 

are dismissed before trial, the balance of factors to be 

considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial 

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward 
15

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law 

claims.’” Id. at 424 (citations omitted). 

Here, although the claims have been pending for several 

years, most of that time has been spent in discovery, with very 

little Court involvement. The Court has thus not yet invested 

significant time and resources on the state law claims, and the 

District of Columbia Superior Court would naturally have greater 

familiarity and interest in the issues that remain, insofar as 

they require interpretation of the District’s own statutory and 

common law. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is in the 

interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity 

to remand the remaining state law claims to the Superior Court 

for the District of Columbia. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the District of 

Columbia’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Judgment on 

the Pleadings is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED WITHOUT PREDJUDICE 

IN PART. Specifically, the Court shall grant the motion for 

summary judgment insofar as it requests dismissal of plaintiff’s 

Section 1983 claim. The Court will also grant as conceded the 

motion for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff’s claims 

for punitive damages and for injunctive relief. The Court, in 

its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over the remaining claims. Instead, this case is hereby 
16

REMANDED for further proceedings to the Superior Court of the 

District of Columbia. 

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

August 30, 2013