Local Boundary Com missions: 

Status and Roles 

in Forming, Adjusting and Dissolving 

local Government Boundaries 

US. Advisory Commission on 

Intergovernmental Relations 

M-183 

May 1992 
U.S. Advisory Commission on 

Intergovernmental Relations 

800 K Street, NW 

South Building 

Suite 450 

Washington, DC 20575 

(202) 653

-5640 

FAX (202) 653-5429 

Executive Summary 

The initial creation of boundary review commissions in the 1960s reflected 

an effort by some states to respond to the rapid growth in the number of suburban communities that developed after World War I1 as a result of massive migration out of the nation’s older industrial central cities. This growth gave rise 

to concerns about unplanned and uncoordinated metropolitan development, 

local fiscal disparities, territorial disputes, and a proliferation of small local 

governments lacking viability. Boundary review commissions (BRC), therefore, were seen as a means by which a state could manage metropolitan development in presumably rational ways. 

Boundary review commissions now operate in 12 states. Eight states established BRCs between 1959 and 1969 (Alaska, California, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington). The other BRCs are in 

Iowa (1!372), Utah (1!379), Virginia (1980), and St. Louis County, Missouri (1989). 

Most BRCs were established with a set of broad policy goals. In general, 

BRC missions, as spelled out in legislation, were to (1) encourage orderly metropolitan development and discourage sprawl, (2) promote comprehensive 

land use planning, (3) enhance the quality and quantity of public services, (4) 

limit destructive competition between local governments, and (5) help ensure 

the fiscal viability of local governments. 

More specifically, the commissions exercise decisionmaking or advisory 

authority over the establishment, consolidation, annexation, and dissolution 

of units of local government, within the framework of state constitutional and 

legislative provisions. Six BRCs operate statewide (Alaska, Iowa, Michigan, 

Minnesota, New Mexico, and Virginia); the others operate within particular counties or metropolitan areas. Most BRCs are authorized to consider all types of 

boundary issues, but three of them (Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah) mayconsider only annexation. Eleven commissions have authority to approve or deny 

proposals, subject to judicial appeal or popular referendum. Virginia’s BRC 

has only an advisory role; boundary decisions are made by the state courts. 

To determine the current status of BRCs, ACIR interviewed commission 

staff members and conducted a survey of state associations of municipalities, 

townships, and counties. 

For the most part, the commissions are small and have limited funding. 

Some BRCs have their own staff, while others rely on part

-time staff (usually 

county employees). Some BRCs receive funding from the state; others rely on 

local government funds. Some of the commissions are active and influential; others are underutilized or inactive. Basic philosophical differences about local govll ... 

111 
ernment organization have a strong impact on the commissions’ functions, as do 

state laws governing boundq changes and the formation of local governments. 

The initially broad purposes of BRCs have changed over time. Today, annexation and mediation of interjurisdictional boundary conflicts top the BRC 

agendas. Because these issues require different types of analysis and assistance 

than originally envisioned for BRCs, some commissions have developed new 

techniques for resolving disputes and negotiating agreements for service delivery 

and tax sharing. These techniques can help reveal alternatives to annexations and 

consolidations, such as interlocal agreements and contracts. 

Boundary issues are often contentious. In some cases, it appears that BRCs 

have reduced the number of disputes, although it was not possible to determine 

whether reduced tension was the result of BRC problem solving or citizen reluctance to raise boundary issues. BRC states do not have obviously better patterns 

of urban development or fewer contentious boundary disputes than non-BRC 

states. Although BRCs can provide assistance in dispute resolution, most of them 

are not empowered to manage growth and boundary changes themselves. 

Boundary review commissions inevitably are drawn into controversy when 

they rule on or attempt to mediate proposals for boundary changes. Sometimes, these issues end up in court, especially in Michigan. In some states, 

there have been legislative challenges to the BRCs. Oregon abolished one of 

its three commissions, and Washington limited the role of its BRC. For the 

most part, the BRCs that have survived these challenges have done so by offering analytical and mediating services not available from other agencies. 

The existence of boundary review commissions raises some concerns 

about citizen self-determination. When the state creates a BRC, citizens, in many 

cases, can no longer petition the legislature to establish a new unit of government or expand one to meet their needs. Boundary adjustments approved by a 

BRC usually are submitted to a referendum. When a BRC vetoes a proposal, 

however, the decision does not go to the voters. Thus, boundary commissions 

can prevent incorporations even when the electorate favors them. 

As such, BRCs may undercut the value of having a variety of local governments that allows citizens to choose the jurisdictions that provide the services 

and tax rates most closely matched to their preferences. BRCs, it is argued, may 

interfere with citizen preferences regarding the creation and maintenance of local 

governments. In particular, BRCs may value large government units more 

highly than small ones. Those who take this view assume that BRCs generally 

would oppose new incorporations and favor annexations or consolidations. 

However, BRC analyses may not necessarily carry a “bigger is bettef’bias. 

The diseconomies of large-scale governments as well as small-scale governments are generally recognized. Legislative direction to BRCs, as well as the 

analytical criteria they have developed, may guard against bias in either direction. The strongest political value in the local government system is against 

consolidating existing units. This preference is enforced by state laws that all 

but rule out municipal consolidation under most circumstances. 

In general, BRCs respond to individual proposals for boundary changes rather than formulating broad strategies for metropolitanboundary adjustments. This 

situation is a disappointment to those who hope for a “rationalization” of local 

government patterns and a comfort to those who believe that an electoral-legal 

marketplace of boundary decisions is preferable to a centrally planned pattern. 

One question that cannot be answered definitively is whether BRCs are 

effective. No substantive or systematic evidence could be found on whether 

BRCs effectively assist urban growth management, ease competition for territory and tax base, or protect the public interest and promote fiscal equity. Despite 30years of experience with BRCs, no comprehensive evaluation of their 

work or effectiveness could be found. 

Nevertheless, most of the BRC staff and local association representatives 

opposed abolishing the commissions. Several respondents argued that without 

BRCs boundary issues might become more political and/or litigious. The ability of BRCs to conduct studies and analyses that assist citizens and officials in 

making boundary decisions was cited as a useful function, as were the mediation and dispute resolution roles. 

iv V 
Acknowledgments I 

This research was conducted by Debra Dean, who was the principal investigator for the project and also wrote the report. Andree E. Reeves edited and 

completed the project. Joan Casey did the final editing. 

In addition to ACIR staff, a number of persons contributed portions of the 

research base for this study. Persons interviewed and those who submitted 

written comments include: Ken Back, Washington ACIR and Department of 

Community Development; Ruth Benell, Los Angeles LAFCO; Dan Bockhorst, Supervisor, Local Boundary Commission Staff, Alaska Department of 

Community and Regional Affairs; Robert Braitman, Ventura LAFCO; Scott 

Burns, Mono County LAFCO; James Callahan, Michigan Association of 

Counties; Jim Campbell, Virginia Municipal League; Jim Coangelo, Orange 

County LAFCO; Bonnie Collins, Everett, Washington; Bill Davis, Michigan 

Municipal League; Phillip Fell, League of Oregon Cities; Stan Finkelstein, 

Association of Washington Cities; Claudia Fisher, Intergovernmental Resource Center, Vancouver, Washington; 

Steven Gordon, Lane County Local Government Boundary Commission; 

Steve Haivey, Cowlitz-Wahkiakum Governmental Conference; G. Flippo 

Hicks, Martin, Hicks and Ingles, Gloucester, Virginia; Jim Hyde, Michigan 

State Boundary Commission; Gunnar Isberg, Minnesota Department of Planning and Housing; Joel Jamnick, League of Minnesota Cities; Jack LaRose, 

MichiganTownship Association; Kent Lewis, Salt Lake County Attorney’s Office; Steve Lundin, House Local Government Committee, Olympia, Washington; Ken Martin, Portland, Oregon, Boundary Commission; Steven McCann, 

City Development Board, Iowa Department of Economic Development; 

Tkd McCormack, Virginia Commission on Local Government; Jane Merrill, San Diego LAFCO; Terrance Merritt, Minnesota Municipal Board; Ken 

Mohr, Riverside County LAFCO; John O’Farrell, Sacramento LAFCO; €? 

Jerry Orrick, Association of Oregon Counties; Robert Perkins, Santa Barbara 

LAFCO; Michael Righter, Local Government Division, New Mexico Department of Finance and Administration; James Roddy, California Association of 

LAFCOs; John Strack, League of Iowa Municipalities; Kent Swisher, Asso- ciation of Washington Cities; and Ken Tollenar, Eugene, Oregon. 

The section on the St. Louis County Boundary Review Commission is 

based on research by James Brasfield of Webster University. 

Those who offered advice and comment at the critics’ session included: 

Ross Stephens, University of Missouri-Kansas City; James Svara, North Carolina State University; Janice Griffith, University of Bridgeport School of Law; 

Terry Allbritton, lblane Law School; James Roddy, California Association of 

LAFCOs; Enid Beaumont, Academy for State and Local Government; William N. Cassella, Jr., Institute of Public Administration; William G. Colman; 

Melvin B. Hill, Jr., Carl Vinson Institute of Government, University of Georgia; Otto Hetzel, George Washington University; Richard Israel, Maryland 

Department of Fiscal Services; Michael E. Libonati, Temple University Law 

School; David C. Mattek, New Jersey State Commission on County and Municipal Government; Terrance Merritt, Minnesota Municipal Board; and Mr. 

Yajima, Japan Local Government Center. 

The Commission and its staff are grateful for the help of all those who 

contributed information, advice, and criticism, but of course retain full responsibility for the content of the report. 

John Kincaid 

Executive Director 

Bruce D. McDowell 

Director, Government Policy Research 

vi vii 
Contents I 

Introduction ................................................... Traditional Processes for Establishing and Changing Local Government Boundaries .............................. Incorporation .............................................. Overlapping ............................................... Towns and Townships ....................................... Special Districts ............................................ Annexation ................................................ Consolidation and Merger. .................................. Joint Powers ............................................... Study Commissions ......................................... Summary .................................................. The Origins and Purposes of Boundary Review Commissions.. ...... Growing Numbers of Governments .......................... Changing Populations ....................................... 

The Current Status of Boundary Review Commissions ............. Alaska .................................................... California ................................................. Iowa ...................................................... Michigan .................................................. Minnesota ................................................. Missouri .................................................. Nevada ................................................... New Mexico ............................................... Oregon ................................................... Utah ..................................................... Virginia ................................................... Washington ................................................ Issues Facing Boundary Review Commissions ..................... Why Have BRCs? .......................................... What Functions Should BRCs Perform? 

How Should BRC Membership be Structured? 

Effects of Boundary Review Commissions on Annexation ........... Conclusion .................................................... BRCs: One Method of Boundary Adjustment 

BRCs Are Not All Alike .................................... BRCs Face Varying Degrees of Controversy ................... Shifting Functions of Boundary Review Commissions ........... Difficulty of Achieving Broader Objectives .................... 

Appendix A-Appendix Tables ................................... Appendix B-Methodology ...................................... 

Legislative Intent .......................................... 

...................... ................ 

................. 

The Influence of State Law on BRC Agendas ................. 

Appendix C-Questionnaire ..................................... 

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47 

local Boundary 

Commissions 

Introduction 

The constitutions and laws of the 50 states set the rules for establishing and 

revising the boundaries of local governments (e.g., counties and municipalities). Consequently, there are many variations in how this function is carried 

out across the United States. Until the mid-twentieth century, state laws governing local government formation and boundary changes largely provided 

that local governments, landowners, or citizens initiate proposals to be decided case by case by local governments themselves or by the voters. In some 

states, the process favored municipal expansion through easy annexation. In 

other states, annexation was more difficult. In Virginia, for example, with its 

unique system of city-county separation, such proposals are adjudicated by the 

courts. Some state legislatures act directly to establish local governments and 

adjust their boundaries. 

After World War 11, rapid suburbanization followed by massive migration 

into the Sunbelt states gave rise to conccrns about urban sprawl, unplanned 

and uncoordinated development, local fiscal disparities in metropolitan areas, 

territorial disputes, and the proliferation of so-called peanut governments. 

Numerous proposals were made, therefore, to manage metropolitan and exurban development in presumably rational ways. 

In 1959, Minnesota and Alaska established institutions to help with the 

task of changing local government boundaries. These institutions are referred 

to, generally, as boundary review commissions (BRCs). Since 1959, ten other 

states have created similar institutions (California, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, 

Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Washington). The federal 

government also entered the field of local boundary issues through the Vbting 

Rights Act of 1965 and its amendments. The legislation is intended to ensure 

that local jurisdictions are not formed or altered in ways that will create orperpetuate racial or ethnic discrimination.' As a result, local boundary issues have 

become intergovernmental issues. 

This report updates and elaborates on the Commission's earlier work on 

boundary review commissions and other boundary issues.2 The central questions concern (1) the extent of local freedom and flexibility in creating, changing, and eliminating local government structures, powcrs, and boundarics and 

... 

Vlll 1 
(2) whether implementation of state standards governing such matters should 

be controlled locally. This information also may help state and local 

policymakers decide whether boundary review commissions are a valuable institutional device for managing local boundary issues. 

The basic reason for establishing boundary review commissions is to provide a 

framework that facilitates long-range thinking about such matters as service 

availability and efficiency, the financial viability of local governments, equity 

among local citizens and taxpayers, and the political accountability of local 

governments. The traditional boundary review process in many states is based 

on a “market” system in which the strength of landowner and voter rights-or 

the political power vested in current officeholders-determines the outcome. 

The boundary commission approach allows BRCs, as administrative agencies 

with original jurisdiction, to take assertive policymaking roles based on a reasonably comprehensive view of local government organization needs and the potential impacts of reorganization. To get away from a piecemeal approach to 

boundary changes, BRCs can combine proposals or develop completely different 

proposals. In some cases, BRCs are authorized to initiate changes. 

In most states, when the courts get involved in boundary issues, they generally must decide each case on its own merits. In states with boundary review 

commissions, judicial review is based on the record developed by the commission. Thus, BRCs can significantly affect the legal framework of the boundary 

change 

This report reviews the traditional processes of local government creation 

and boundary change, outlines the pressures that led to the boundary commission movement, presents the results of ACIRs 1989 survey of boundary commissions, and evaluates the formation and adjustment issues facing state and 

local governments. 

Traditional Processes for Establishing 

and Changing Local Government Boundaries 

All states provide for the establishment of local governments. Many local 

governments are created by direct state action, for example, counties (except 

in Connecticut and Rhode Island), towns and townships in 20 northeastern 

and midwestern states, and certain municipalities that were granted charters 

by the state (most municipalities in New Jersey and five New England states). 

Other state enabling legislation allows the citizens of an area needing local 

services to establish their own units of local government. Many municipalities 

and most special districts (except in New Jersey and Pennsylvania) were established in this way.“ 

Special districts generally are created by local action pursuant to authorizing state law. Others are established directly by state legislation. 

Incorporation 

Each state has established requirements for municipal incorporation. The 

criteria vary among the states and among different classes of municipalities in 

some states. Generally, there must be at least a minimum population ordensity, and it is usually necessary to have (1) a petition from the community describing the boundaries and population of the proposed municipality, (2) an 

election to ascertain popular support, and (3) certification by the secretary of 

state that the election is favorable and that all the conditions have been met.s 

Overlapping 

The four types of local governments-counties, municipalities, townships, and special districts (not including school districts)-frequently overlie 

one another, although towns and townships do not overlie municipalities. Appendix A shows the number of each of these types of local governments by 

state for each Census of Governments between 1957 and 1987. Towns and 

townships, as well as most municipalities and special districts, generally lie 

within counties, although municipalities and special districts sometimes cross 

county boundaries. The primary exception is Virginia, where “independent” 

cities are separated from counties. Some other cities have been separated from 

their counties by state legislation. The Maryland Constitution recognizes the 

city of Baltimore as separate from surrounding counties. A number of cities 

-including Jacksonville, Denver, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, and 

San Francisco-are combined city-counties. 

Towns and Townships 

The 20 states that have towns or townships are fully organized into units of 

local government. Therefore, any annexation by municipalities in those states 

(and in Virginia) subtracts territory and tax base from another local jurisdiction. For example, in eight northeastern states, towns or townships havebecome 

municipalities. Annexation seldom is used in these states, but in the rare cases 

when it is used, the affected territory is deannexed from another municipality. 

Special Districts 

Special district creation and expansion do not take territory away from existing units of local government. Special districts often overlie county and municipal units,6 may cross state lines, and often add new local tax bases. Thus, in 

states where municipalities and counties face strict financial limits, special districts may provide a means to circumvent those limits. similarly, where annexation is difficult or impossible, where desirable service areas cross municipal 

boundaries, and where counties cannot finance or perform needed services or 

do not have the proper boundaries to do so, Special districts offer an alternative. 

Annexation 

Statutory rules make annexation much easier in some states than in others. In the “easy” annexation states, the municipality can add unincorporated 

territory pretty much at will. In the “tough” states, the landowners or voters in 

the territory to be annexed hold veto power. Some states allow municipalities 

to exercise limited types of service and regulatory authority in unincorporated 

areas beyond their borders. This extraterritorial authority frequently gives the 

municipality leverage to influence annexation votes in adjoining areas. 

Consolidation and Merger 

Incorporated territory generally cannot be annexed. Instead, a consolidation or merger procedure must be used if existing local governments are to be 

enlarged. These procedures usually require the approval of concurrent major2 3 
ities in each of the units tobe joined. More often than not, these majorities are 

hard to get. Thus, in completely incorporated states, such as New Jersey, 

Pennsylvania, and the New England states, boundary adjustment is rare. 

Joint Powers 

Joint powers legislation allows any unit of local government to work with 

any other local jurisdiction within the state by mutual agreement. Such legislation also may authorize interstate cooperation and agreements with units of 

the state and federal governments. 

In many states, counties are being empowered to provide urban services 

and to finance them through special taxing areas administered by county government. These taxing areas can perform much like special districts and municipalities, and their boundaries can be changed easily by local law. 

Study Commissions 

Finally, many states establish temporary study commissions from time to 

time to examine possibilities for “rationalizing” local government structures 

within the state or within a major metropolitan area. Often, the recommendations of such commissions go unimplemented because voters are satisfied with 

existing arrangements, and local officials whose positions might be jeopardized by 

proposed changes raise concerns about the allocation of power and tax-base 

resources. Local governments and boundaries have great staying power. 

Summary 

Boundary issues often are complex. They can present significant problems 

and are likely to be most difficult to address in rapidly growing areas where 

population and development are spilling across boundaries and creating new 

service demands not easily accommodated by existing local governments. Attempts to alter boundaries or to create new units will alwaysbe volatile and will 

need to be approached differently in different states in light of diverse laws, 

political traditions, community sentiments, and existing boundary arrangements. 

The Origins and Purposes 

of Boundary Review Commissions 

American cities grew considerably in territory and population during the 

late 19th century, some of them even encompassing the “suburbs” of their 

day.’ During most of this period, many cities were able to annex territory so 

that city boundaries kept up with urban growth. Some residents of unincorporated areas desiring city services were willing-and sometimes even anxious-to be annexed by a city. Other residents wanted their own communities. 

Political bossism and its attendant abuses, however, resulted in a reaction 

against annexation. By the 1920s, many people living on the urban fringe had 

fled from what they regarded as high city taxes, poor resources, and corrupt 

city politicians. These people opposed annexation attempts.8 

Crowing Numbers of Governments 

Although American urban areas grew rapidly after World War 11, most 

cities were not able to keep up with this growth by annexing unincorporated 

territory. In some parts of the country, particularly the Southeast and the West, 

county governments attempted to serve urban and suburban needs. Nevertheless, the post-World War I1 period was characterized by a rapid increase in the 

number of incorporations of small municipalities around major cities. 

According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, there were 17,183 municipalities in the United States in 1957.9 By 1987, there were 19,200 municipalities, 

an increase of 2,017 in 30 years. Although the number of municipalities grew 

each year, the increase was particularly high in the five years between 1957 and 

1962-an average of 163 each year (see lhble 1). This was the time when the 

first boundary commissions were formed. 

Table 1 

Number of Municipalities in the United States, 1942.1987 

Year 

Number of Average Annual 

Municipalities Increase 

1942 

1957 

1962 

1967 

1972 

197 

1982 

1987 

16,220 

17,183 

17,997 

18,048 

18.5 17 

18,862 

19,076 

19,200 

64.2 

162.8 

10.2 

93.8 

69.0 

42.8 

24.8 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Government Organirafion, 1987 Census of Governments, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC, 1988). 

Growth has not been uniform throughout the country. For example, the 

number of municipalities in California increased from 286 in 1942 to 442 in 

1987, a 54 percent increase. In Texas, the number of municipalities climbed 

from 637 in 1942 to 1,156 in 1987, an increase of 81 percent. Table 2 shows the 

number of municipalities from 1957 to 1987 in the ten states with the largest 

populations in 1950, a year chosen to show the size and distribution of the immediate post-war population.I0 

Rapid growth in the number of municipalities helped create an impression 

of disorder and unplanned metropolitan “sprawl.” This impression played an 

important role in the decision taken by some states to establish boundary review commissions to regulate the growth of metropolitan areas. 

Historically, urban services have been supplied by incorporated municipalities, while unincorporated territory has tended to be rural. However, as 

the need for urban services, such as water and sewer systems, overran municipal boundaries, these services were provided by private companies or by counties, townships, and special districts. Of all forms of local government, the 

number of special districts increased the most (see Dble 3). 

4 5 
Table 2 

Number of Municipalities, 1957-1987 

(Ten States with the Largest Populations in 1950) 

1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 

New York 611 612 616 616 618 615 618 

California 331 373 400 407 413 428 442 

Pennsylvania 991 1,003 1,005 1,012 1,015 1,019 1,022 

Illinois 1,181 1,251 1,256 1,267 1,274 1,280 1,279 

Ohio 915 932 933 936 935 941 940 

Texas 793 866 883 981 1,066 1,121 1,156 

Michigan 498 509 52.2 532 531 532 534 

New Jersey 333 334 335 335 335 323 320 

Massachusetts 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 

North Carolina 412 449 437 454 472 484 495 

United States 17,183 17,997 18,048 18,517 18,862 19,076 19,200 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, StatisticdAbstract of the 

United States, various years. 

Table 3 

Number of Special Districts, 1957.1987 

(Ten States with the Largest Populations in 1950) 

1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 

New York 924 970 965 954 964 923 978 

California 1,650 1,962 2,168 2,223 2,227 2,506 2,734 

Pennsylvania 34 1,398 1,624 1,777 2,035 2,050 1,805 

Illinois 1,800 2,126 2,313 2,407 2,745 2,602 2,783 

Ohio 160 177 228 275 312 377 410 

Texas 645 733 1,001 1,215 1,425 1,681 1,892 

Michigan 102 99 110 139 168 184 250 

New Jersey 140 295 311 341 380 454 486 

Massachusetts 205 194 247 268 328 354 391 

North Carolina 111 126 215 248 302 321 321 

United States 14,405 18,323 21,264 23,885 25,962 28,588 29,532 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, StatisticdAbs!mct of the 

United States, various years. 

The incorporation of new municipal governments as a result of metropolitan growth led to the creation of the first two local government boundary review commissions in 1959 in Minnesota and Alaska. The Alaska commission is 

unique because it was established by the state constitution (Art. X, Sec. 12). 

The Minnesota Municipal Board descnied the local government situation as 

perceived by the state legislature at the time its commission was founded: 

6 

Before the Board was established, the Minnesota Legislature 

was confronted with municipal boundary chaos. The spectacular 

post-World War I1 growth in large urban centers marked a distinct departure from the previous patterns of a predominantly agricultural 

age. In just one decade, in five metropolitan counties, 45 new villages 

were organized: nearly half of them contained under 1,000 people 

when incorporated; seven contained under 200; and one contained 

only 43. By the end of the 1950s, a total of 130 separate municipalities 

had mushroomed in the seven-county nin Cities area. 

This proliferation of uneconomic villages, which often lack 

means to furnish their own police and fire protection or adequate 

sewage disposal facilities, placed additional burdens on counties and 

surrounding areas." 

Changing Populations 

The problems said to be associated with rapid growth were not confined to 

Minnesota or to the immediate post-World War I1 decade. Indeed, from 1960 

to 1990, the population of the United States grew by 34 percent. Tmble 4 shows 

the ten states that grew most rapidly from 1960 to 1990; four of them have local 

government boundary review commissions (see Tmble 4). 

The states with boundary review commissions include some that experienced substantial in-migration from 1960 to 1990 (e.g., California). The percentage of population growth was higher than the national average in eight of 

the BRC states and lower in the other four states (see nble 5). Minnesota, for 

example, grew at 28 percent, slower than the national average (39 percent), 

and Iowa's population increased by less than 1 percent. 

Table 4 

Percentage Change in U.S. Population, 1960-1990 

(Ten Fmtest Growing States) 

State Boundary Commission Percentage Change 

Nevada 

Arizona 

Alaska 

Florida 

Utah 

Colorado 

Texas 

California 

New Hampshire 

Hawaii 

U.S. Average 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

322 % 

18 1 

143 

16 1 

93 

88 

89 

83 

75 

39 

n 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, StatisticdAbstmct of the 

United States, 1991. 

7 

& 
Table 5 

Population and Percentage Change, 1960 and 1990 

(States with Boundaty Review Commissions) 

State Percentage 1960 1990 Change 

Alaska 

California 

Iowa 

Michigan 

Minnesota 

Missouri 

Nevada 

New Mexico 

Oregon 

Utah 

Virginia 

Washington 

United States 

226 

15,717 

2,758 

7,823 

3.414 

4;320 

285 

95 1 

1,769 

89 1 

3,967 

2,853 

179,323 

~ 

550 143 

27,960 78 

2,777 <1 

9,295 19 

4,375 28 

5,117 18 

1,202 322 

1,5 15 59 

2,842 61 

1,723 93 

6,187 56 

4,867 63 

248,710 39 

Source: US. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of tlze 

United States, 1991. 

With the population growth of the post-war period came an increase in the 

percentage of the U.S. population living in urban areas, from 64 percent in 

1950 to 74 percent by 1980. Urbanization was above the national average in 

nine of the 12 BRC states, Michigan showed no change, and California showed 

a 10 percent increase, the same as the national increase (see nble 6). 

Legislative Intent 

Although legislative intent vanes among the states, there is a marked sirnilarity in state code provisions that spell out the problems to be solved by 

boundary review agencies. Some examples follow: 

California: Among the purposes of a local agency formation commission are the discouragement of urban sprawl and the encouragement of the 

orderly formation and development of local governmental agencies based 

on local conditions and circumstances. One of the functions of the local 

agency formation commission is to make studies and furnish information 

that will contribute to the logical and reasonable development of local governments in each county.'* 

Minnesota: The Minnesota Municipal Board is empowered to promote 

and regulate development to provide for the extension of municipal government to areas that are developed or are being developed for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, and governmental purposes or are needed 

for such purposes; to protect the stability of unincorporated areas that are 

used or developed for agricultural, open space, and rural residential purposes 

and are not presently needed for more intensive uses; and to protect the integrity of land use planning in municipalities and unincorporated areas.') 

~~ ~ 

Table 6 

Percentage of Population in Urbanized Areas, 1950 and 1980 

(States with Boundary Review Commissions) 

State 

Percent 

Urban Percentage 

1950 1980 Change 

Percent 

Urban 

Alaska 

California 

Iowa 

Michigan 

Minnesota Missouri 

Nevada 

New Mexico 

Oregon 

Utah 

Virginia 

Washington 

United States 

27 

81 

48 

71 

55 

62 

57 

50 

54 

65 

47 

63 

64 

64 37 

91 10 

59 11 

71 0 

67 12 

68 6 

85 28 

72 22 

68 14 

84 19 

66 19 

74 11 

74 10 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the 

United States, 1982-83, and Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial 

Times to 1970, Part 1, Series A. 

Oregon: The local boundary commissions are to: 

(a) Provide a method for guiding the creation and growth of cities and 

special service districts to prevent illogical extensions of local government boundaries; 

(b) Assure adequate quality and quantity of public services and the financial integrity of each unit of local government; 

(c) Provide an impartial forum for the resolution of local government jurisdictional questions; and 

(d) Provide that boundary determinations are consistent with local comprehensive planning. l4 

V@nia: The intent is to create a procedure whereby the state will help 

ensure that all of its counties, cities, and towns are maintained as viable communities.ls 

Washington: The purpose of the boundary review boards is to guide and 

control growth in metropolitan areas so as to avoid problems arising from rapid 

proliferation of municipalities and haphazard extension of and competition to 

extend local government boundaries.16 

These statements of legislative purpose illustrate a number of policy goals 

relevant to the establishment of most, if not all, boundary review agencies. 

The goals are: 

8 9 
w 

w 

w 

w 

w 

In interviews with BRC staff members and other interested parties, these 

broad goals were raised repeatedly in relation to the current status and problems of boundary review commissions. 

The Current Status of Boundary Review Commissions 

’Ib determine the current status of boundary review commissions, ACIR 

conducted a survey of state municipal leagues, associations of townships, and 

associations of counties. ACIR also interviewed the staffs of the boundary 

commissions. Eleven states, predominantly in the Upper Midwest and the 

West, established boundary agencies between 1959 and 1980.’’ The St. Louis 

County, Missouri, Boundary Review Board was created in 1989. 

BRCs vary with regard to several important characteristics (see Bble 7, 

page 12). Six of the commissions have statewide jurisdiction (Alaska, Iowa, 

Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Virginia); BRCs in the other six states 

have countywide or metropolitan jurisdiction (California, Missouri, Nevada, 

Oregon, Utah, and Washington). Most BRCs have authority to make boundary 

decisions on request, subject to judicial review and popular referendum. The 

Virginia commission acts only in an advisory capacity to the courts, where the 

decisions are made. Each BRC operates under state laws concerning local govEncouraging orderly development and discouraging sprawl; 

Protecting agricultural land and open space; 

Promoting comprehensive land use planning; 

Enhancing the quality and quantity of public services; 

Limiting destructive competition between local governments; and 

Helping ensure the fiscal viability of local governments. 

States with Boundary Review Commissions 

ernment creation, boundary adjustment, consolidation, and dissolution. Most 

commissions review a wide range of boundary adjustments, including annexations, incorporations, consolidations, and detachments. The commissions in 

Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah deal exclusively with annexation. 

Many BRCs can veto boundary change proposals without a vote of the affected citizens, although commission decisions commonly may be appealed to 

the courts. The circumstances for appeals vary from state to state. 

Some BRCs have their own staff, while others rely on part-time staff, usually county employees. Financing also varies, with some commissions using 

state funds and others using local government funds. 

The BRCs in California, Oregon, and Virginia appear to be involved with 

long-range planning issues (including spheres of influence), while the others 

seem more concerned with responding to specific petitions. 

A brief review of the powers and duties of the 12 BRCs follows. The problems and issues facing BRCs are presented in a later section. 

Alaska 

Alaska is the nation’s largest state in terms of land area, but ranks 49th in 

population.’* Roughly 36 percent of the land area and 85 percent of the population lie within the jurisdiction of 15 regional governments called organized 

boroughs. The rest of the land area and population are in the Unorganized 

Borough-which refers to all areas, not necessarily contiguous, that are outside organized boroughs. 

There are substantial differences between the organized boroughs and the 

Unorganized Borough. Service provision is one example. Most urban development and service provision are in the organized boroughs. Organized boroughs 

raise local revenue for education, usually through saleduse taxes and property 

taxes. In the Unorganized Borough, education is funded entirely by the state. 

When territory becomes or is annexed to an organized borough, the law 

requires that it make a local contribution to schools equivalent to a 4 mill property tax or 35 percent of “basic need,” whichever is less.I9 All of the boroughs 

established before 1986 levy property taxes to support education, but none of 

those established since then do so. For example, Northwest Arctic Borough (established in June 1986) levies no taxes, but relies on significant payments in lieu of 

taxes from Cominco’s Red Dog zinc mine to fund local services. Aleutians East 

Borough (October 1987) relies on a 1.5 percent sales/use tax on commercial fishing to fund education and other services.2o Lake and Peninsula Borough (April 

1989) imposes a 2 percent tax on commercial fishing. Denali Borough (December 

1990) levies a 4 percent hotel bed tax and a 5 cents per ton severance tax on coal.21 

Boundary changes have generated controversy because incorporation as an 

organized borough or annexation to an organized borough requires the collection 

of local revenues. Municipal incorporation or annexation also can mean increased 

taxes for residents whether or not the municipality is in an organized borough. 

The Alaska Local Boundary Commission was established by the state constitution in 1959 and is administered through the state Department of Community and Regional Affairs. It is a single statewide board that handles 

incorporation of cities and boroughs, and annexation, detachment, consolidation, merger, and dissolution of cities, boroughs, and unified municipalities.22 

10 11 

/ 
Table 7 

Characteristics of Boundary Review Commissions 

One statewide 

board 

5 appointed 

by Governor 

State 

funded 

$266,000 

4 

One for each 

of 58 counties 

(except 

San 

Francisco) 

Varies Counties 

legally 

required 

to Pay 

expenses 

Most 

are 

staffed 

county 

employees. 

bY 

One statewide 

board 

Total of 5 

Governor 

2 local 

3 bY 

plus 

Statutory 

Citation 

Date 

EstabI is hed 

Additional 

Review 

or Approval 

'Qpe of Boundary 

Changes 

Considered 

or Local MemberState Organization ship 

Alaska A.S. 

44.47.590 

44.47.565- 

1959 Annexation 

Detachment 

Dissolution 

Incorpora tion 

Merger or Consolidation 

~ ~~ 

Referendum or legislative 

review in 

some instances 

Appeal to courts 

Local 

Boundary 

Commission 

Local 

Agency 

Formation 

Commissions 

California 1963 Annexation 

Incorpora tion 

Detachments from cities 

Creation, 

reorganization, 

formation and 

abolition of special 

districts and county 

service areas 

of influence 

Determines spheres 

Referendum, 

local 

government 

Appeal to courts 

if discrimination 

or abuse of 

power alleged 

C.G.S. 

Sections 

56000- 

57550 

Ch. 368 

CL 

N 

Iowa City 

Development 

Board 

1972 

(compliance 

mandatory 

in 1975) 

1968 

(incorporation and 

consolidation) 

Annexation 

Incorporation 

Dissolution 

Consolidation 

Detachment 

Referendum 

Appeal to the 

within 90 days 

courts 

State 

funded 

representatives 

Table 7 (coiit.) 

Characteristics of Boundary Review Commissions 

Date 

Established 

State 

or Local 

Organization 

5pe of Boundary 

Changes 

Considered 

Additional 

Review 

or Approval Agency 

Title 

Statutory 

Citation 

MemberState ship Funding Staff ~ 

Public Act 

No. 191 

(1968) as 

amended 

State 

funded 

over 

$220,000 

Annexation 

Incorporation 

Consolidation 

Appeal to courts 

Referendum if 

area to be 

annexed has 101 

or more persons 

Michigan State 

Boundary 

Commission 

1972 

(Annexation) 

One statewide 

board 

3 statewide 

by Governor 

2 by Probate 

Judge in 

County 

3 appointed 

by Governor 

Minnesota Minnesota 

Municipal 

Board 

M.S.A. 

Ch. 414 

(1988) 

1959 One statewide 

board 

State 

funded 

$247,000 

Annexation 

Incorporation 

Detachment from cities 

Consolidation of 

municipalities 

and towns 

and annexation 

Concurrent detachment 

Appeal to courts. 

Referenda in some 

circumstances 

Missouri St. Louis 

County 

Boundary 

Commission 

RSMo. 

72.403 

Ch. 72 

One countySt. Louis 

County 

10 nominated by 

mayors and 

county 

council and 

selected by 

county 

executive 

County 

council 

appropri- ates funds 

Staffed 

county 

employees 

by 

Annexation 

Incorporation 

Consolidation 

Transfer of governing 

jurisdiction 

1989 Referendum 

1967 0 

(Inactive) 

Nevada Ci iy Appeal to courts 

Annexation 

Commission 

N.R.S. 

268.670 

268.610- 

Vanes Operating 

expenses 

from 

county 

Counties with Annexation 

population 

100,000 or 

more and less 

than 250,000 
Table 7 (cont.) 

Characteristics of Boundary Review Commissions 

Date 

Established 

State 

or Local 

Organization 

lLpe of Boundary 

Changes 

Considered 

Annexation 

Additional 

Renew 

or Approval 

district courts 

Appeal to 

Agency 

Title 

Statutory 

Citation 

Member- State ship Funding Staff 

Staffed 

by state 

1965 3 appointed 

by Governor 

State 

funded 

per diem 

and 

expenses 

N.M.S. 

Annotated 

1978 

Section 

3-7-1 

D.R.S. 

Chp. 

199.512 

199.410- 

New 

Mexico 

Boundary 

Commission 

Local 

Government 

Boundary 

Commis 

sions 

One statewide 

board 

?kro in 

metropolitan 

areas 

Third 

abolished 

1980 

Yew 

Mexico 

lregon 1969 7 or 12 

appointed by 

Governor 

Locally 

funded 

Varies 

by commission 

Annexation 

Incorporation 

Detachment from cities 

Consolidation or merger 

Creation, abolition, or modification of certain 

special districts 

including approval of 

additional functions 

extension of sewer or water services by cities or special districts 

sewer and water firms 

Extraterritorial 

Creation of private 

Transfers of tenitoy 

Depends on method of 

initiation 

Appeal to 

State Court of 

Appeals 

Jtah Boundary r Annexation 

Review 

Zommission 

Utah 

,ode 

4nnotated 

Iitle 10 

Ihp. 2 

Part 4 

1979 County Varies by 

commission 

7 or 5 

Zounty 

xovides 

;pace and 

Financing 

Lippeal to courts 

Table 7 (cont.) 

Characteristics of Boundary Review Commissions 

Date 

Established 

State 

or Local 

Organization 

Membership 

l)pe of Boundary 

Changes 

Considered 

Additional 

Review or Approval 

Agency 

Title 

Statutory 

State Citation Funding Staff 

Virginia Commission 

on 

Local 

Government 

Ch19.1 

Title 15.1 

Code of 

VA 

1980 One statewide 

board 

5 by 

Governor 

State 

$460,000 

7 Incorporation 

Annexation 

Consolidation 

Limited immunization of 

counties from city 

Courts make 

initial decisions 

and hear 

appeals 

in 

FT 89-90 

annexation Ill Mediation I 

Washington Boundary 

Review 

Boards 

W.S. 

Ch. 36.93 

R.C.W. 

1967 Required for 

counties over 

ulation op 

tional in other 

counties 

210,000 pop 

11 for 

counties 

over 

500,OOC and 

5 for 

all others 

County 

funded 

Varies 

county 

bY 

Annexation 

Incorporation 

Dissolution of cities 

and towns 

Consolidation of cities 

and towns 

Creation, consolidation, or abolition of special 

districts 

Extraterritorial exten- sion of sewer or water 

seMce by a city or special district 

Appeal to courts 
The five board members are appointed by the governor for five-year overlapping terms. One member is appointed from each of Alaska’s four judicial 

districts, and one member is appointed at large and serves as chairperson. The 

BRC has a staff of four and is funded by the state at about $266,000. 

The commission typically receives 20 to 25 petitions a year, most of which 

concern annexation to cities. There are few annexations to boroughs, although 

interest is increasing. Some of the most rapidly growing urbanized areas in the 

state are contiguous to organized boroughs. 

California 

California established its Local Agency Formation Commissions (LAFCOs) in 1963, in part as a response to rapid growth and the perception that this 

growth was causing haphazard formation of cities and special districts. Of 

greater concern was that annexation procedures did not seem to require any 

reference to logic, efficiency, or service capabilities. Consequently, municipal “an- nexation wars,” premature conversion of prime agricultural land, and perceived 

illogical annexation patterns were common throughout the state. The Knox-Nis- bet Act of 1963, redrafted as the Cortese-Knox Governmental Reorganization 

Act of 1985, established a LAFCO in each of California’s 58 counties (except San 

Francisco, which is a unified city-county with no unincorporated temtory). 

LAFCOs have broad jurisdiction, including (but not limited to) incorpora- tion, annexation, detachment, and consolidation of cities and special districts. 

In addition, LAFCOs determine spheres of influence, which are the physical 

boundaries and service areas that a local governmental agency ultimately is 

expected to serve. The sphere of influence may, and oftendoes, extend beyond 

the physical boundaries of a municipality or special district. Although local 

governments do not have jurisdiction in areas that are within their sphere of 

influence but outside their current boundaries, LAFCO members consider 

spheres of influence in making boundary adjustment decisions. 

There are two staffing patterns. Some LAFCOs have their own staffs, 

which work exclusively on LAFCO projects and serve at the pleasure of the 

commission. Most of the commissions depend on county employees for staff 

and use space in county offices. Counties are legally required to fund LAFCOs, although the level of funding is somewhat discretionary. 

LAFCO membership vanes from county to county. The minimum number of members is five: typically, two county supervisors selected by the board 

of supervisors, two municipal officials selected by a majority of the mayors in the 

county, and one public member selected by the other four members. Some LAFCOs have added two members representing special districts, and others have increased the number of public members. Some LAFCOs, including those in Los 

Angeles and San Diego, have a representative from the county’s largest city. 

The volume of LAFCO activity vanes greatly. Riverside County, a rapidly 

suburbanizing county east of Los Angeles, reports an average of more than 100 

cases per year. By contrast, Mono County, in east-central California along the 

Nevada border, reports only two or three cases per year. 

Although the types of petitions coming before LAFCOs differ somewhat, 

most appear to involve expansions of special districts. 

The LAFCO process is reported to have contributed to a less controversial settlement of municipal borders in many of the most rapidly growing coun16 

ties. In 50 or so counties, virtually the whole urbanized area has been assigned 

to municipalities’ spheres of influence in an effort to end boundary disputes. 

Iowa 

The Iowa City Development Board was established in 1972. It is a statewide board, charged with maintaining records on boundary adjustments and 

reviewing and acting on municipal boundary changes. It is empowered to review municipal incorporations, annexations, discontinuances (termination of a 

city), consolidations, and severances (deletions of territory from a city). 

The board was established to (1) regulate urban development to ensure 

that it does not undermine the effective provision of municipal services, especially those that are capital intensive and require long-range planning (such as 

water and sewers); (2) make sure that substandard facilities are not installed; 

and (3) restrict encroachment on agricultural land and confine development to 

compact areas around an existing city. 

The City Development Board consists of three members appointed by the 

governor to serve staggered six-year terms. The board is required to appoint 

additional local representatives when it considers a petition. Usually, two local 

representatives are appointed, either from cities, counties, or the territory involved in the proceeding. The board is funded by the state at about $45,000 a 

year and has one staff member. 

The majority of actions coming before the BRC involve annexations, but the 

board also considered two dissolutions in recent years. There is disagreement 

about whether the number of dissolution petitions is likely to increase in coming years. Iowa’s economy has been adversely affected by problems in the agricultural sector, which, combined with an aging population and an outflow of 

young adults, are making it difficult for some cities to maintain financial viability. 

Michigan 

The Michigan State Boundary Commission was established in 1968 as a 

single statewide board to handle petitions for incorporation and consolidation. 

Annexation was added in 1972. The board has three statewide members appointed by the governor to consider all matters and two local representatives 

appointed by the probate judge in the county affected by a specific petition. 

The commission has a staff of three, and its funding is more than $220,000. 

The BRC was created to place boundary adjustment decisions in the 

hands of an impartial board, replacing a process that involved referenda that 

were usually divisive and often generated litigation.23 When the parties agree, 

annexations can proceed without commission action. When there is disagreement, annexations must come before the board. BRC decisions are frequently 

appealed to the courts and may be tied up there for long periods of timesometimes for years. 

The board’s work is dominated by annexation petitions, typically from cities 

seeking to annex land from townships. The board encourages cooperation between cities and townships, but still is involved in lawsuits over annexation petitions. Part of the reason for this is that Michigan townships (particularly those 

with charters) are empowered to provide services similar to those provided by cities. Some charter townships have incorp~rated.~~ Townships and cities frequently 

17 
compete to provide services to the same areas. Where these services involve considerable capital investment (e.g., water and sewer systems), the outcomes of 

competition have long-term fiscal impacts on both parties. Charter townships that 

meet certain criteria are immune from annexation. These criteria include providing fire and police protection, solid waste disposal, and water and sewer services. 

The net effect of this law has been to encourage the conversion of towns to cities. 

The BRC has worked to incorporate much of the urbanized areas, thus lessening 

the need for boundary review procedures. 

Referenda are held only for annexations approved by the commission involving 101 or more persons and in which a referendum is requested by petition of voters within the area to be annexed or the city attempting annexation 

or the remainder of the affected township. Historically, annexations approved 

by the commission generally have been defeated by the electorate. Given that 

annexations involving 100 or fewer persons do not go to referendum, some 

cities have attempted to annex land areas that are small enough or sparsely 

populated enough to avoid the referendum requirement. 

State law allows townships and municipalities to establish contracts for 

service delivery and tax sharing. The purpose is to help create “win-win” situa- tions for townships and cities and avoid “win-lose” annexations. Twenty such 

contracts have been established since the law was enacted in 1984, ten of them 

in 1988. This form of interlocal agreement is not without its critics, but it is 

reported to be increasing as local officials become familiar with the law. Ser- vice contracts also appeal to officials of governments with fiscal problems be- cause they allow cities to reduce some expenses without being subjected to 

forced annexation or running the risk of receivership. 

Minnesota 

The first local government boundary review commission established in the 

United States,” the Minnesota Municipal Board (MMB) has broad powers to de- termine incorporation, annexation, and other boundary adjustments. The im- petus for the creation of this single statewide board was the explosive growth in 

the Twin Cities metropolitan area during the 1950s. The legislature regarded 

the situation as chaotic and imprudent and created the board as a remedy. 

The three members of the board are appointed by the governor. The 

board considers all petitions for annexation, incorporation, detachment from 

cities, consolidation, concurrent detachment and annexation, and dissolution. 

In certain instances, board decisions are followed by a referendum. Board de- cisions also can be appealed to the courts. The BRC is currently funded at ap- proximately $247,000 and has a staff of four. 

The board’s primary work involves annexation. In fiscal 1985,113 annexation petitions came before the MMB, 72 of them initiated by a majority of the 

landowners in the area to be annexed. Ninety-six petitions were approved during that fiscal year, some of which were initiated earlier. In fiscal 1986 (the 

most recent year for which data were available), 90 annexation cases came before the board (61 of them through the landowners), and, with carryovers, 95 

petitions were approved. 

Missouri 

The St. Louis County Boundary Commission, the newest BRC, was created 

in 1989 after more than a century of boundary conflicts.26 In 1876, voters in a 

countywide election approved a board of freeholders proposal to separate the 

city and county. Five small incorporated municipalities remained in the county 

in 1876; there are 91 of them today. Then and now, the county government 

provided municipal services to residents of unincorporated areas. A number of 

annexation and merger proposals have been defeated since the separation.” 

The BRC has jurisdiction over a range of boundary adjustments, with authority to evaluate proposals on the basis of present and proposed levels of 

services, taxes, zoning, and compactness. BRC jurisdiction includes every annexation, incorporation, consolidation, or transfer of governing jurisdiction 

proposed in St. Louis County, including annexations initiated by petition of all 

property owners in the area to be annexed. When more than half of the land 

involved in a change is unincorporated, at least 10,000 persons must be affected. The long-range goal of the commission is to incorporate the entire 

county into municipalities that can provide the services their citizens require. 

The county executive chooses ten commissioners for five-year terms from 

lists of nominees submitted by mayors of small, medium, and large cities, and 

county council members. Elected or appointed officials are not eligible for 

membership. The county council funds the BRC. 

Although the commission has no authority to initiate boundary change 

proposals, it can make changes requested by petition and can combine requests. Boundary changes may be proposed by municipalities, citizen petition, 

or the county. Cases approved-those found to be in the best interest of the 

citizens of the municipalities and unincorporated areas involved, adjacent areas, and the county as a whole-are put on the ballot. Such cases are subject to a 

concurrent majority vote. After a successful election, the commission establishes 

a transition committee to implement the annexation. If the commission disapproves the change, the proposal dies. The commission must give its rationale 

for disapproval. 

Soon after the commission began operation, a dispute arose over whether 

its jurisdiction included voluntary annexations. Missouri law provides that annexation takes place without a vote if all property owners in the area agree to 

be annexed and if the proposal is not challenged by citizens of the annexing 

municipality (at least eight must object). Earlier court rulings held that the 

counties had no standing to object to voluntary annexations. During its first 

year of operation, the commission considered 17 proposed boundary changes, 

of which four were withdrawn, six were approved, and seven were disapproved. The criteria for disapproval are set out in the commission’s enabling 

legislation. The most frequently cited reasons for disapproval were detrimental impacts on areas adjacent to the proposed change, problems with the legally 

described boundaries, and the effects of the change on county tax resources. 

The commission developed several recommendations for legislative 

changes to improve its operation. These include: 

(1) Clarification of its jurisdiction with respect to annexations initiated by 

100 percent of property owners affected by the change; 

(2) Adoption of standards and regulations for consistent review of 

boundary change proposals; 

18 19 
(3) Directions on how the county is to provide and finance services in 

unincorporated areas; 

(4) Provision for services to small unincorporated pockets where annexation is not advantageous to any of the adjoining municipalities; 

(5) Independence of the commission; 

(6) Establishment of a time limit for review; 

(7) Institution of public hearings as a required step in the commission re- 

(8) Revision of the distribution of population-based tax revenues to anview process; and 

nexations. 

Nevada 

Nevada established the City Annexation Commission in 1967 to consider 

certain municipal annexations. The commission’s jurisdiction is based on 

county population. In practice, Washoe County (Reno) is the only jurisdiction 

subject to the commission.26 Clark County (Las Vegas) has too large a population,29 and other counties are too sparsely populated for board jurisdiction. 

The commission in Washoe County is inactive (reports indicate that the 

commission has not met in ten years) because most annexations take place 

through procedures that do not involve the BRC. The state law provides that a 

city can annex property without commission action if 100 percent of the prop- erty owners within a contiguous area sign a petition for annexation or if the city 

owns the contiguous area “in fee.” 

New Mexico 

The New Mexico Boundary Commission was established in 1965 as a 

three-member board with statewide jurisdiction. The governor appoints the 

members of the commission. The state funds the commission, paying per diem 

and expenses for members. The state also staffs the board, although staff 

members are not full-time employees of the commission. BRC has jurisdiction 

only over annexations, and its decisions can be appealed to the courts. 

New Mexico has three procedures for annexation of territory to cities. 

They are arbitration, petition, and use of the boundary commission. The BRC 

can be used when either a municipality or a majority of the landowners in an 

area petitions the commission for annexation of the area. 

The commission’s jurisdiction is limited to two questions: (1) Is thearea 

proposed for annexation contiguous to the city? (2) Can the annexing municipality provide the area with municipal services? If the commission determines that these conditions are met, it is required to order the area 

annexed to the municipality. 

The commission is not permitted to determine whether the persons affected want to be annexed, nor can it modify the annexation request. 

In some instances, cities annex property in order to preserve the semi-rural 

character of the area or to provide city services. In other instances, as in Santa 

Fe, annexation is used to control architectural style. 

Oregon 

Oregon established three Local Government Boundary Commissions in 

1969 in the Portland area (Washington, Multnomah, and Clackamas counties), 

I 

the Eugene area (Lane County), and the Salem area (Marion and Polk counties). Only the commissions in the Portland area and Lane County survive. 

These commissions have jurisdiction over municipal annexation, incorporation, detachment, and consolidation or merger, as well as the creation, abolition, or modification of certain special districts. The commissions also have 

jurisdiction over extraterritorial extension of water and sewer services, and the 

creation of private sewer or water companies. 

The boundary commissions have been controversial. The Salem area commission was abolished by the state legislature in 1980. A bill to abolish the 

Lane County commission was introduced in the 1989 legislative session and 

passed the House of Representatives by a wide margin, but it died in a Senate 

committee. Efforts to abolish the commissions are apparently the result of 

public dissatisfaction with specific decisions. In addition, some legislators have 

expressed the view that local boundary adjustments should be made by elected 

officials rather than by appointed bodies. 

The Portland area commission has 12 members appointed by the executive officer of the Portland Metropolitan Service District. The Lane County 

commission has seven members appointed by the governor. The Portland area 

commission has a staff of five full-time equivalent employees. The Lane 

County commission has a full-time equivalent staff of two, provided by the 

Council of Governments. 

The commissions are locally funded. The Portland commission is funded 

at approximately $292,000 and has 120 to 150 cases annually. The Lane County 

Commission is funded at approximately $72,000 and has a smaller annual caseload. Both commissions report annexation petitions as their most common cases. 

Utah 

The Utah Boundary Review Commissions were established in 1979, one 

for each of the 29 counties. The commissions have jurisdiction only over protested boundary changes, chiefly annexations. They have no jurisdiction over 

incorporations. The commissions may review and approve or disapprove, in 

whole or in part, a proposal for a boundary change. The commissions are active 

in about one-third of the counties. 

In counties with two or more municipalities, the commission has seven 

members- two representing the county, two representing municipalities, and 

three representing the general public. In counties with only one municipality, 

the commission has five members-two representing the county, one representing the municipality and two representing the general public. The commissions are funded by the counties and have no staff of their own. 

Virginia 

The Virginia Commission on Local Government (CLG) was established 

in 1980 as a statewide BRC. The commission is the only board to issue advisory 

reports to the courts, in which boundary decisions are made. The commission’s 

opinions often are quite influential. 

The commission reviews and analyzes annexations, incorporations, detachments, consolidations, and dissolutions, and advises the state courts of its findings. 

If possible, the commission resolves disputes through formal mediati~n.~’ 

20 21 
In addition, the commission is required to report its findings to all affected 

local governments. CLG also conducts investigations and analyses at the request of local governments. 

CLG is a statewide board with five members appointed by the governor. 

The commission has a staff of seven and was funded by the state at approximately $460,000 for 1989-1990. 

Virginia’s cities are independent, which means that a jurisdiction cannot 

exist simultaneously within the boundaries of a city and a county. Under these 

circumstances, city incorporations and annexations subtract from the county 

property tax base and may greatly affect county revenues and service responsibilities. This provision of Virginia law led to controversial annexation disputes, 

which, in turn, led to the establishment of the commission. 

In 1986, the Virginia General Assembly established the Commission on 

Local Government Structures and Relationships (the Grayson Commission) 

to study local government reorganization and the state’sannexation and incorporation laws. The commission reported its findings in 1990, but the legislature took no action on the report. One of the Grayson Commission’s major 

recommendations would make CLG the final decisionmaking body in annexation and incorporation issues. A special committee was set up in the General 

Assembly’s House Appropriations Committee to review a proposal for statelocal revenue sharing and financial incentives for regional cooperation, as contained in the Grayson Commission’s report. 

In a related move, the legislature extended a previous three-year moratorium on city-initiated annexations and municipal incorporations until 1993, 

Even without the moratorium, CLG staff members report that local governments tend to plan carefully for annexation proposals because annexation in 

Virginia can be costly and time consuming, and a contested annexation can disrupt relations between local governments. In addition, cities can annex only 

once every ten years, so there are incentives for cities to anticipate capital improvements and the need for vacant land. 

According to staff members, the commission places strong emphasis on 

planning and on environmental issues in making recommendations to the 

courts. Growth concerns, including carrying capacity and land development 

controls, have been important elements of the commission’s recommendations. 

The commission has evolved into a research organization and technical 

advisor to local governments and to the state on interlocal issues, including 

revenue sharing, joint powers agreements, and service delivery, as well as on 

boundary adjustments. 

City-county mergers have incorporated virtually the entire Tidelands 

area, ending a politically divisive period of boundary disputes there. Countywide provision of urban services also seems to have stabilized boundary disputes in the metropolitan Richmond and Washington, DC, areas. 

Washington 

Boundary Review Boards (BRBs) were established in Washington in 1967. 

BRBs are required in counties with populations over 210,000 and are optional 

in other counties. Membership varies: BRBs in counties with more than 

500,000 people have 11 members; others have 5 members. Representatives 

from cities, counties, and special districts plus independent gubernatorial appointees serve four-year terms. Cities, counties, and special districts choose 

their own representatives. The boards are funded by the counties, and the 

number of staff varies by county. 

BRBs have broad powers over municipal annexation, incorporation, consolidation, and dissolution. They also review the creation, abolition, or consolidation of special districts and the extraterritorial extension of water or sewer 

services by cities and special districts. The commissions act as dispute resolution bodies, operate on a case-by-case basis, and focus on trying to rationalize 

growth and local government boundaries. The jurisdiction of a BRB must be 

invoked, most commonly by an affected government, before it can review a 

proposal. In only limited instances may a BRB invoke its own jurisdiction. 

The objectives of BRBs are (1) preserving neighborhoods and communities, (2) recognizing physical boundaries, (3) creating and preserving logical 

service areas, (4) preventing irregular boundaries, (5) discouraging the incorporation of too many small cities, (6) dissolving inactive special districts, (7) 

adjusting impractical boundaries, (8) approving incorporation or annexation of 

urbanized areas, (9) protecting agricultural land, and (10) guiding the extension of municipal services to assure that the financial burden is approximately 

equal to the value of services received. 

The state law establishing BRBs presumes that local government competition for unincorporated territory has a disorganizing effect on land use. For 

this reason, the commissions are charged with limiting and guiding competition 

among municipalities and special districts with regard to unincorporated land. 

Although BRBs are not land use planning bodies, some of them encourage cities 

to develop mutually consistent comprehensive plans. The legislature enacted a 

new growth management process with similar goals during its 1990 session. 

The King County BRB staff reported that commission decisions are more 

controversial now than in past years. A bill in the 1989 state legislature proposed eliminating the boards. Although it was supported by cities, the bill was 

defeated. BRB staff in counties with smaller populations report less controversy. It appears that most annexation proposals are approved, but those that 

are not can generate considerable controversy in local areas. 

Issues Facing Boundary Review Commissions 

Boundary review commissions face a variety of issues, problems, and challenges. This section of the report summarizes the most common issues identified by ACIR. They are grouped under the following three questions: 

H Why have BRCs? 

H 

H 

What functions should BRCs perform? 

How should BRCs be structured? 

Why Have BRCs? 

Local government boundary issues are contentious in many cases; however, ACIR found that the existence of boundary commissions does not necessarily change that fact. In some cases, it does appear that BRCs have reduced 

contentious boundary disputes, although it was not possible to determine 

22 23 
whether the lessened tension was the result of amicable problem solving by 

BRCs or of the reluctance of citizens to raise boundary issues in the face of 

likely objections from a BRC. 

Some of the BRCs themselves have become controversial. In Oregon, one 

commission was put out of business by the legislature as a result of political 

controversy and another survived a recent legislative challenge. In addition, 

some BRC decisions are challenged in court or at the polls. These challenges 

have been especially prevalent in Michigan. Those who have lost a particular 

decision can become severe critics and active political opponents of the boards. 

In the state of Washington, the legislature limited the BRCs’ powers. 

Originally, BRCs were empowered to consider any proposal they thought 

needed review. The law was amended to permit BRC review only on request of 

a local government or certain landowners. 

In many states and urban areas, existing townships or counties provide the 

additional services required by metropolitan growth, thereby reducing boundary disputes. In the eight northeastern states, which are completely incorporated, there is little possibility of boundary changes. 

The argument against the BRC approach is the “vote with your feet” concept. This argument stresses the value of having a variety of local jurisdictions, 

each of which offers a different package of public services for citizens to 

choose. When such competition exists, citizens are able to maximize their satisfaction with local government by living in the jurisdiction that provides the 

service package and tax rates most closely matched to their preferences. 

BRCs, it is argued, may interfere with the creation and maintenance of a multiplicity of local governments and the desire of citizens to create still more 

units of their own choosing. In particular, the BRCs may tend to value larger 

scale governments with their assumed economies of scale more highly than 

small governments with greater political accountability and choice of services. 

Those who take this view assume that BRCs generally would oppose new incorporations and favor annexations or consolidations. They see the “market” 

approach to citizen-initiated incorporation under general state law being more 

likely to create additional local government choices. 

However, BRC analyses may not necessarily cany a ‘%bigger is better” bias. 

The diseconomies of large-scale governments as well as small-scale governments 

are generally recognized. Legislative direction to BRCs, as well as the analytical 

criteria they have developed, could guard against bias in either direction. The 

strongest political value in the local government system, in fact, is against consolidating existing units. This preference is enforced by procedures established by 

state laws that all but rule out consolidation under most circumstances. 

The fact that most BRC work involvesannexation, combined with the fact 

that many local jurisdictions in metropolitan areas share boundaries with other incorporated governments, like a jigsaw puzzle, keeps most BRC activity 

incremental. In general, BRCs respond to individual proposals for boundary 

changes rather than initiating studies of broader strategies for governmental 

boundary reform. This situation is simultaneously a disappointment to those 

who hope for a “rationalization” of local government patterns and a comfort to 

those who believe that an electoral-legal marketplace of boundary decisions is 

preferable to a centrally planned pattern. 

The establishment of boundary review commissions raises some questions 

about citizen self-determination. When the legislature creates a boundary 

commission, the role of citizens changes. They can no longer, in many cases, 

petition the legislature to establish a new unit of government or expand one to 

meet their needs. Although individuals have the right to appear before a 

boundary commission, they may have little influence. Commission-approved 

boundary adjustments typically are submitted to the voters, making the electorate part of the process in these cases. When boundary commissions deny a 

proposal, however, the decision does not go before the voters. Thus, boundary 

commissions can prevent incorporations, even when the electorate favors 

them. Such cases generate the most controversy, and citizens may be further 

removed from the determination process. 

Despite the controversies generated by many boundary decisions, in most 

BRC states, city, county, and township association representatives opposed 

abolishing the commissions. Several of these respondents pointed out that in 

the absence of a BRC boundary proposals might become even more political 

and/or more litigious. The ability of BRCs to conduct studies and analyses that 

assist citizens and public officials in making decisions about boundaries was 

cited as a useful function not provided by other units of government, as were 

BRCs’ mediation and dispute resolution roles. 

What Functions Should BRCs Perform? 

The question of BRC functions has been answered differently in different 

states. Most BRCs spend most of their time processing annexation cases. This 

reality is a long way from the broad charges given to several of the BRCs in 

their charters. 

Assisting Urban Growth Management. Boundary changes alone cannot 

solve the problems that arise from rapid urban growth. Yet, most boundary 

review commissions are expected to assist in solving those problems. Only recently have a few states embarked on major growth management programs, 

and the work of the BRCs is potentially relevant to these efforts. Even though 

BRCs are neither land use regulating agencies nor public works agencies, 

some of them are required to consider comprehensive land use plans when 

making their decisions, and proposals that contravene established plans can be 

rejected on that basis. In most cases, however, ACIR found little connection 

between the BRCs and state and local growth management agencies. In California, Oregon, and Washington, where a significant amount of growth management activity is taking place, a link between these two types of agencies 

might be productive. Studies of service areas and spheres of influence could 

make a significant contribution to practical action plans. 

ACIR found substantial frustration among BRC advocates about the commissions’ inability to deliver fully on their broad legislative mandates. The 

frustration is intensified by the fact that most of the BRCs are reactive, that is, 

they can only consider proposals brought to them. Some of the commissions 

can order changes in proposals and others can initiate proposals, although they 

seldom do so. 

Some BRC staff members feel that they must approve boundary changes 

having unwise implications for land use because the proposal meets other cri24 25 
teria for an adjustment. In California, some complaints that the BRCs have 

“lost control” of development were based on the fact that special taxing districts are not within their jurisdiction. These districts can be established independentlyby developers and then turned over to the new residents, who must 

pay off the bonds. This activity has been spurred in recent years as a means of 

getting around the Proposition 13 limits on the local property tax. 

Easing Competition for Territory and Tax Base. More modest goals for 

BRCs would center on the tasks of easing the competition among governments for temtory and tax bases. ACIR found that annexation proposals make 

up the bulk of the BRCs’ work, with petitions for consolidation of special districts being next most prevalent. Petitions for new incorporations are infrequent. Thus, most BRC decisions influence the revenues and service 

production of existing local governments rather than respond to citizen requests for new local jurisdictions. Under these circumstances, BRCs must resolve interjurisdictional disputes. 

Dispute resolution processes short of the courts or the electorate have begun to develop in some BRCs. Of course, not all boundary cases create dis- putes, and some states have provided short cuts that allow uncontested 

boundary changes go into effect without formal BRC action. Nevertheless, 

many boundary decisions can have long-range consequences for the revenues 

and expenditures of all the local governments involved, and they are very seri- ously contested. In such cases, some BRCs have become directly involved in 

establishing mutual agreements among contending local governments. 

In California, the LAFCOs determine spheres of influence for municipal- ities, which are formal agreements designating the ultimate physical bound- aries of the municipality and which local government will provide services to 

an unincorporated area. The agreements have the potential to mitigate disputes among municipalities, especially once the sphere of influence has been 

adopted. At the same time, these agreements make it possible for local gov- ernments to plan to meet their eventual service obligations. 

In Oregon, spheres of influence are designated in state and local comprehensive plans, and the BRC is required to ensure that all boundaries are consistent with such plans. Therefore, the designated spheres of influence are a 

factor in BRC decisions. BRCs also rule on extraterritorial extensions of services, thereby having an impact on the configuration of service production arrangements for the future. 

In Washington, boundary agencies do not establish spheres of influence, 

but they are required to make decisions based on the future service needs of an 

area and the impact of a boundary change on governing arrangements within a 

county. This suggests that BRCs often end up considering the ultimate boundaries of municipalities and the areas they will serve. 

Other BRC states do not provide for formal municipal spheres of influence, but the need for agreement among local governments remains strong. 

For example, when two cities want to annex the same territory, the BRC must 

determine which city has the greater capacity to deliver services to the area. 

This leads the BRC into a dispute resolution role. 

In Virginia, the BRC is required to act as a mediator under certain conditions. The service contracting provisions in Michigan run in the same direction. Although most of the other BRC states do not officially assign the 

commissions a dispute resolution role, it is becoming a major function of several boundary agencies. 

’Em base disputes consistently produce conflict between local governments seeking boundary changes and those that stand to lose tax base if 

changes are approved. This is true because local governments rely heavily on 

property taxes, and the effect is accentuated when the territory includes commercial or industrial properties that frequently generate more property tax 

revenues than they consume in services. In some cases, sales tax revenues also 

are an issue. BRC staffs indicate that tax base disputes are among the most 

common. In fact, the dispute resolution role of most BRCs appears to be dominated by the need to find solutions to conflicts over tax base and the fiscal implications of boundary changes. 

Sometimes, boundary change proposals can have major impacts on the affected governments, especially those standing to lose tax base. For example, 

the 1984 incorporation of Mammoth Lakes, California, had such a severe fml 

impact on Mono County that 30 percent of the county workforce was laid 

Boundary adjustments raise other questions regarding revenues and ex- penditures. For example, a county may find it difficult to maintain a public hospital if tax revenues decline as a result of a loss of tax base due to municipal 

annexation, A county’s ability to pay off bonds also may be affected by boundary changes. For these reasons, boundary commissions can be instrumental in 

achieving fiscal agreements between local governments. In some instances, 

commissions deny boundary changes because of their fiscal implications for 

other units governments. (’The fiscal implications of boundary changes are often one of the factors that state legislatures direct BRCs to consider.) In other 

instances, the BRC plays a role in helping local governments reach an agreement prior to a boundary change. 

California’s Proposition 13 has affected the work of the LAFCOs because 

property tax revenues can be divided between cities and overlying counties. 

LAFCOs typically require cities and counties to agree on how property taxes 

will be divided before the commission will consider a boundary proposal. 

There have been instances in which counties refused to agree to the division of 

property tax revenue unless sales tax revenue was also divided (some state sales 

tax revenue goes to the local government in which it is generated). LAFCOs have 

approved such arrangements to minimize the negative fiscal impact on counties. 

Negotiating Service Agreements. It is beginning to be recognized that 

boundary changes are not always necessary to resolve issues brought to a BRC. 

The Michigan provision that allows townships and municipalities to establish 

contracts for service delivery and tax sharing is an example. Services may be 

provided-decided on and paid for-by one unit of government and produced 

and delivered by an~ther.’~ The sizes of these jurisdictions may be very different, but each may take advantage of the other’s strong points. A jurisdiction 

that is too small to produce desired services efficiently (because it is too small 

to capture available economies of scale) can contract with a larger unit. Contracting also may reduce the costs of services for the larger unit by utilizing 

excess capacity. The same per-unit costs could be achieved, theoretically, by 

26 27 
merging the two units of government. but the smaller unit would lose its identity and its ability to chose its own levels of service. Thus, by contracting, small 

units of government frequently maybe able to operate at no greater costs than 

larger governments. When this is true, one reason for consolidating small local governments loses its validity. In such cases, contracting can substitute for 

boundary changes and preserve the traditional units of local government without creating great controversy. 

There can be drawbacks to contracting, however. First, the administrative/ 

legislative overhead costs for each government are not usually reduced by the 

contract, thereby resulting in some continued cost duplication. Second, the 

governing boards’ authority over service decisions is somewhat reduced. 

Third, for the average citizen, accountability for service decisions may become 

somewhat amorphous. 

State laws establishing BRCs generally make no distinction between the 

provision and production of public services.33 As a result, BRCs often make 

their decisions without considering these distinctions and their implications 

for the boundaries of local governments. Thus, opportunities for citizen 

self-determination in the choice of services to be provided-and the taxes required to pay for these services-may be needlessly sacrificed to efficiency arguments based on economies of scale. 

Nevertheless, different services have different scales of efficient provision and production. Different boundaries may be appropriate for different 

provision units. Thus, as one observer phrased it a few years ago, there is a 

need for small and large units of government t~gether.’~ 

A single set of criteria that biases boundary commissions in favor of larger 

units of government for all purposes and fewer units overall may work against 

citizen satisfaction with many types of services, just as the lack of large provision units may deprive citizens of other service options. 

Protecting the Public Interest and Promoting Fiscal Equity. The citizens 

directly involved in a boundary adjustment are not the only ones affected by 

change. Aboundaty change could, for example, result in increasing service demands on a county, thus necessitating a countywide tax increase. The tax increase would have an impact on county residents who live quite far from the 

territory directly involved in the boundary adjustment. This suggests that 

boundary agencies also have a role as representatives of a larger “public” interest. 

Boundary agencies often must consider the impact of a proposed change 

on citizens and landowners outside the territory directly affected (e.g., citizens 

of unincorporated areas and other municipalities in the county). This makes 

the BRC the representative of the interests of the entire county or region and 

of citizens who may not be aware of the impact of distant boundary changes on 

their taxes and services. 

It is not always easy, however, to determine what the “public” interest is. 

Those who receive tangible benefits from annexation or incorporation would 

likely vote “yes” on the issue, saddling future residents with potential long-run 

burdens or inequities. One of the roles of California’s LAFCOs, for example, 

is to examine the long-run implications of formation/incorporation proposals, 

such as: Do the boundaries make sense? Is the proposal financially feasible? Is 

there an adverse effect on adjacent communities? Are the range and level of 

services sufficient to meet present and future needs? Is the larger community 

represented within the proposal? Properly applied, these tests do not inhibit 

free public expression; instead, they can promote a reasoned citizen review of 

available service 

How Should BRC Membership be Structured? 

Cities, counties, and special districts within the jurisdiction of a BRC frequently have representation on its governing board. This does not mean that 

local government officials directly control BRC decisions. Indeed, in some 

states, cities, counties, and special districts must be represented on the commission, but officeholders and public employees are prohibited from serving. 

Most commonly, appointments are made by the governor, with relatively 

few restrictions. Even so, the importance of boundaries to local governments 

leads them to become involved in the appointment process. In some instances, 

they formally nominate members. In other cases, they informally communicate with the governor’s office, and sometimes there are understandings that 

local jurisdictions will be represented on the BRC. 

This raises a question of the extent to which the composition of a BRC 

influences its decisions. Certainly, members are likely to draw on their backgrounds in making decisions. In addition, different types of local government 

members may have very different views about boundary adjustments. 

Given that many, if not most, BRC decisions involve existing local governments and can have major long-term consequences, there is reason to believe 

that it is appropriate for these governments to be represented on the board. 

Nevertheless, heavy or exclusive representation from existing governments 

would seem to favor the status quo and make it more difficult for interests advocating the creation of new governments to get a fair hearing. 

Effects of Boundary Review Commissions on Annexation 

One question that this report cannot answer definitively is whether BRCs 

are effective. ACIR found no substantive or systematic evidence to indicate 

that BRCs effectively assist urban growth management, ease competition for 

temtory and tax base, protect the public interest and promote fiscal equity, or 

negotiate service agreements. Nor was there any evidence that BRCs do not 

effectively serve these functions. 

The effectiveness of BRCs is difficult to measure. In an article on the factors that affect annexation rates, Gaines Liner points out that several scholars 

have touched on the effectiveness issue in their studies of anne~ation.~~ John 

Bollens, David Bromley and Joel Smith, Ira Kaufman and Leo Schnore, Vivian Klaff and Glenn Fuguitt, and others have highlighted the significance of 

annexation as the predominant form of municipal growth.37 These attempts at 

gauging the impact of state laws on annexation have yielded mixed results. In 

1949, Bollens concluded that restrictive laws could slow annexation rates.” 

Ranking state laws by perceived restrictions on annexations, Thomas Dye concluded that the laws seemed to have few constraining effects on cities.39 Using 

a different ranking, Raymond Wheeler concluded that laws could restrict an28 29 
nexation activity.40 Of course, each ranking depended on the author’s perception of the restrictiveness of the law. 

Instead of ranking laws by the degree of restrictiveness, several other studies 

relied on Frank Sengstock‘s typology of laws, which classifies annexation activity by whether it is determined judicially; legislatively; popularly; by municipalities; or by quasi-legislative, administrative, or third-party Building 

on this typology, Susan MacManus and Robert Thomas studied 243 U.S. cities 

and found no relationship between laws and annexation In a study of 

annexation in southern states, Patricia Dusenbury concluded that state law 

was the most important variable affecting annexation rates.43 

Thomas Galloway and John Landis obtained mixed results when they 

tested the predictive power of the Sengstock typology using states as the unit 

of analy~is.4~ The results varied with how they measured annexation. Comparing metropolitan and nonmetropolitan cities and using the percentage of cities 

reporting annexation as the dependent variable, states with judicially determined annexation exhibited the highest levels of activity. With the frequency 

of annexations by reporting municipality as the dependent variable, they found 

the greatest metropolitan annexation in states employing third-party or quasilegislative bodies. With the size of the annexed parcel as the dependent variable, states with judicially determined annexation showed the greatest activity. 

In comparison to other states, states with municipally determined annexation 

had the highest level of activity when annexation was measured as thepercentage of cities reporting annexation. 

When Galloway and Landis measured annexation as the average number 

of annexations per reporting city, states relying on quasi-legislative or administrative bodies displayed the highest annexation levels for metropolitan cities, 

and states with popularly determined annexation showed the highest levels for 

nonmetropolitan cities. When annexation was measured as the average size of 

the land area annexed, states with judicial determination exhibited the highest 

levels of annexation in both types of cities. 

Gaines Liner analyzed the predictive power of the Sengstock typology of 

annexation laws usingdata on cities instead of aggregate state His study 

showed that state laws do influence annexation rates. In terms of land area 

annexed, he concluded that the role of annexation tends to be greater when 

cities are able to annex unilaterally than when they are required to annex under restraining laws. In contrast to the Landis and Galloway finding that cities 

in states with municipal determination laws do not exhibit higher annexation 

activity, Liner’s study showed higher annexation rates when cities are permitted to act undaterally than when laws subject the final decision to a vote of 

the people or to a third party. 

In terms of population annexed, Liner’s findings showed weak indications 

of greater annexation under laws that allow a quasi-legislative or administrative body to rule on the final annexation decision than under other types of 

laws, including those allowing cities to act unilaterally. By the Sengstock typology definition, boundary review commissions should be included in this category. Thus, annexation of more population may occur where there is a 

boundary review commission than where cities can act unilaterally or where 

they must go through the judicial process. A final caveat-annexation laws 

may be more closely associated with annexation of land than of population.46 

ACIR attempted to discern whether boundary review commissions were 

effective devices for stemming annexation rates by examining annexation data 

provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census from the 1950s until 1990. However, because reporting standards changed frequently during these years, the 

data did not yield a consistent time series suitable for analysis. 

Using available census data, Thble 8 ranks states by population annexed in 

1987. The data show at least some annexation activity in all BRC states, but no 

discernible pattern. Bble 9 ranks states by the number of annexation actions 

between 1980 and 1987. Again, no discernible pattern is evident. One cannot 

establish that BRC states generally have more or less annexation activity. 

When ranked by the number of annexation actions per 10,000 population 

between 1980 and 1987, as shown in Thble 10, there is no discernible pattern. 

There is, however, a cluster of six BRC states in the third quintile of activity. 

Two BRC states had so little annexation activity that it was disguised in the 

table due to rounding. When the number of square miles and the population 

added are taken into account inThble 11, a pattern among BRC states still cannot be distinguished. 

The existing empirical research, therefore, does not permit confident conclusions about whether boundary review commissions do or do not reduce the 

amount or increase the quality of municipal annexation activity. 

Conclusion 

All states must provide for the establishment and modification of local 

government boundaries. Different approaches to handling proposed boundary changes, including the establishment, consolidation, annexation, and dissolution of local governments, have been developed by different states. 

Twelve states have chosen boundary review commissions. Some BRCs have 

statewide jurisdiction; others serve only one or a few areas within a state. Most 

states have opted for other approaches to boundary changes. In at least eight 

states, all territory is incorporated into local governments, with stable boundaries precluding most possibilities for further change. 

BRCs: One Method of Boundary Adjustment 

Eight of the 12 boundary review commissions were established between 1959 

and 1969. Iowa established its commission in 1972, Utah in 1979, Vrrginia in 1980, 

and St. Louis County, Missouri, in 1989. City and county representatives contacted by ACIR in states with BRCs generally supported their commissions. 

BRC Ben@& Boundary review commissions can be helpful in states that 

have political problems with annexation and incorporation of municipalities and 

special districts in metropolitan areas and in rural areas with declining population 

and economies. BRCs can provide assistance in solving contentious matters, but 

most commissions are not sufficiently empowered to manage growth and boundaly changes in the manner envisioned in their enabling legislation. 

PotentialDrawbacks. BRCs may not be appropriate in all states. Few states 

have established such commissions; even fewer have reasonably active com30 31 
missions. As a group, BRC states do not display manifestly better patterns of 

urban development or fewer contentious boundary disputes. 

There is little evidence that BRCs are able to fulfill all of the expectations 

set for them when they were created. ACIR found no thorough evaluations of 

the effectiveness of these bodies, despite 30 years of experience with them. 

Although it is argued that at least eight states have too little boundary change 

activity to warrant using BRCs, other states with a great deal of such activity 

have not chosen to follow the BRC approach. 

Boundary review commissions have the potential to limit citizen choice 

with respect to local government organization. Citizens may be reluctant to 

turn over to a nonelected boundary review commission some of their present 

rights to vote on boundary changes. 

Defining BRCs Roles. Some states with BRCs provide alternatives to their 

use, or they exclude certain types of boundary decisions from their jurisdiction. 

Options for states with boundary review commissions include a reassessment of the BRCs to see if they are fulfilling their legislative mandates and if 

they are the optimum mechanism for handling boundary adjustments and proposals for local government formation. An alternative would be to consider an 

advisory model in which a boundary agency serves as a source of third-party 

information and mediation, and in which the composition of the agency does 

not advantage or disadvantage any existing local jurisdiction. 

BRCs Are Not All Alike 

There is considerable diversity among BRCs. Some operate statewide; 

others operate only within individual counties or metropolitan areas. While 

some have authority to decide a variety of boundary issues, three are limited 

exclusively to considering annexations. Most have authority to decide these 

boundary issues, subject to judicial appeal or popular vote, but one has only an 

advisory role. Some BRCs have broad goals that go to the heart of urban 

growth and development issues, while others have narrower goals. Some are 

busy and influential; others are underutilized or inactive. 

BRCs Face Varying Degrees of Controversy 

Resolving local government boundary issues often is contentious, even in 

BRC states. Boundary review commissions inevitably are drawn into controversies as they attempt to adjudicate and mediate proposals by landowners, 

competing governments, taxpayers, and other parties seeking advantages for 

themselves-sometimes at the expense of others. Two states have had especially 

contentious experiences with their commissions: Oregon, where one of the three 

metropolitan BRCs was abolished and another one nearly was abolished; and 

Michigan, where a high percentage of BRC decisions are appealed to the courts. 

Basic philosophical differences about whether BRCs should limit the 

number of governments or favor large governments over small ones also 

create stress. Sometimes, these issues become so politically and emotionally 

charged that they end up in court, or they emerge as legislative challenges to 

the established mission or the very existence of the BRC. For the most part, 

however, BRCs have survived these challenges by performing analytical and 

mediating services not available from other sources. 

Shifting Functions of Boundary Review Commissions 

The traditional mission of boundary review commissions often included 

slowing the growth in the number of new municipalities and special districts 

as3well as seeking to systematize annexations. Today, BRC work has shifted 

heavily toward annexation and its attendant interjurisdictional conflicts. 

Hence, an emphasis on citizen-initiated creation of new governments has given way to political competition among existing units. This shift calls for a different type of analysis and assistance than originally envisioned for BRCs. 

A variety of new techniques is emerging for resolving intergovernmental 

disputes and negotiating intergovernmental agreements for service delivery 

and tax sharing. These techniques can help ease the burdens of BRCs having 

to choose between competing local governments, and they can help avoid unnecessary or inefficient annexations and consolidations. Often, a negotiated 

settlement of differences can be more satisfactory than the “winner take all” 

outcome of a court case or a referendum. Likewise, the option of contracting 

for services often can accommodate needs for economy and efficiency without 

creating the controversy of a boundary change. 

The relatively recent distinction between local government provision and 

production of services affords communities new opportunities for considering 

interlocal agreements and contracting as alternatives to boundary changes. 

Nevertheless, new municipalities, special districts, subordinate taxing areas, 

and regional entities may have their place in providing or producing needed 

public services in response to citizen preferences and should be given impartial 

consideration on their political as well as economic merits. 

Although boundaly review commissions can provide assistance in solving 

contentious matters, most of them are not empowered to manage growth and 

boundary changes themselves. States might consider strengthening the role of the 

BRC in working with other growth management and service delivery agencies. 

Given such a role, a BRC might pursue opportunities more effectively for 

improving the economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the local governments within its area of jurisdiction. A BRC can protect the public 

interest from unbridled competition for territory and tax base that can work 

against the interests of taxpayers outside the territory that changes hands. A 

positive program of BRC analysis showing the outcomes of a wide range of alternative boundary changes and intergovernmental cooperation options is 

preferable to an overly cautious role that lets decisions be made without a 

thorough exploration of probable outcomes or to an overly aggressive role that 

imposes bureaucratic mandates on citizens and their locally elected officials. 

Difficulty of Achieving Broader Objectives 

Setting the boundaries of local governments is not a panacea. Boundaries 

do not fund programs, deliver services, construct or maintain facilities, or regulate land use. Much more is needed for effective government. The objectives 

of boundary review commissions are often described in their enabling acts in 

terms of controlling urban growth and ensuring the financial well-being of local governments, but other governments can hold many of the keys to success. 

This point is made explicit in the BRC legislation in California, Washington, 

and Oregon, but not in the other states. 

32 33 
Frustration runs in high in some BRC states, where there is no strong link 

between BRCs and other institutions. Boundary agencies have difficulty making the necessary linkages because of the other issues they face. State legislation could fill this gap by requiring the boundaly commissions, as well as other 

appropriate agencies, to cooperate as they do in Oregon and Washington. Boundary review commissions could work closely with state and lml growth management agencies and coordinate their decisions as closely as possible with the official 

comprehensive land use, development, and environmental protection plans. 

However, effective implementation of broad growth management goals 

appears to be too much to expect of boundary commissions. Many of them 

must attempt to mediate highly controversial contests for territory and tax 

bases. Furthermore, land use and comprehensive development plans often are 

not reliable policy tools. They change too frequently, or they simply fail to be 

implemented. The boundary commissions may remain frustrated in striving to 

meet broader goals because they are perceived to be too closely associated 

with narrower controversies. An alternative might be to limit the goals of the 

BRC to a narrower set of objectives. 

The Influence of State law on BRC Agendas 

State “rules of the game” are the primary driving force in local government formation and boundary change (the federal government plays a role 

through the Voting Rights Act and its amendments). Hence, state law affects 

the specific issues dealt with by BRCs. 

State laws create incentives and disincentives for various types of citizen 

and local government behavior. For example, if certain kinds of services can be 

obtained only in a municipality, citizens have incentives to create new municipalities or seek annexation. In instances when the issue is how best to deliver 

serviccs, there might be incentives to form intergovernmental cooperation 

agreements. Similarly, state laws governing local taxation can stimulate or 

mitigate interjurisdictional competition and afford incentives or disincentives 

to create new units of local government. Few BRCs are powerful enough to 

resist the forces arising from those incentives. 

State laws also can generate bias in boundary review commissions. Some 

commissions are set up to deter the creation and continued existence of new 

(and particularly small) local governments. With current understandings of 

the distinction between the provision and production of local services, and recognizing that local governments are, for many purposes, fundamentally provision units rather than production units, local citizens (as voters, consumers, 

and taxpayers) may be in the best position to determine the appropriate number and mix of local governments to serve their communities. 

If the aim of boundary review commissions is to minimize the number of 

new units of local government and to ensure that existing governments are 

large and prosperous enough to carry out their responsibilities reliably, the 

BRCs should maintain a steady course. While there can be few objections to 

reaching negotiated settlements, especially of highly contentious issues often 

associated with local boundary changes, a switch in emphasis toward easing 

restrictions on the creation of small, independent local governments may encourage wider disparities in taxing and servicing capacities. Easing such restrictions also may multiply the difficulties in reaching agreements about the 

provision of areawide or large-scale services that small units cannot provide. 

If the aim of boundary commissions is to remove biases against the establishment of additional units of government, states might choose to reassess the 

assumptions underlying the establishment of their BRCs. States also could require these agencies to consider the provision-production distinction and contracting opportunities as they decide boundary issues. In addition, states could 

promote cooperation by specifying BRC responsibilities for resolving intergovernmental disputes through the negotiation of interlocal agreements for 

service delivery or tax sharing. 

Another option might be for states to reassess their rules of local government formation, boundary adjustment, and dissolution-as well as other legislation, such as local tax law-to understand how the incentives and 

disincentives created by state law affect the organization of local governments 

throughout the state. 

In summary, one cannot say conclusively that boundary review commissions are effective. State interest in creating BRCs dropped off after 1969, and 

the missions of many existing BRCs changed as well. Thus, it would seem advisable for states with BRCs and for states considering the establishment of a 

BRC to evaluate carefully the objectives that can and should be achieved by 

such an agency. 

34 35 
Notes 

1 See also Charles L. Cotrell, ed., “Assessing the Effects of the US. Voting Rights Act,” 

Publius: The Journal of Federalism 16 (Fall 1986): entire issue. 

* U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), 77ze Challengeof 

Local Government Reorganization: Substate Regionalism and the Federal System, Vol. 3 

(Washington, DC, 1974); and State and Local Roles in the Federal System (1982). 

Daniel R. Mandelker et. al., State and Local Government in a Fedeml System, 3rd Edition (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1990), pp. 82-84. 

See Vincent L. Marando and Mavis Mann Reeves, “State Responsiveness and Local 

Government Reorganization,” Social Science Quartedy 69 (December 1988): 

ACIR, State and Local Roles in the Federal System, p. 241. 

California’s special districts with regional responsibilities (e.g., wholesale water service, resource conservation, etc.)usually overlie cities. But special districts that provide 

local services (e.g., parks, fire protection, street lighting, etc.) frequently are detached 

from an area upon city expansion. Therein lies the basis for significant intergovernmental conflict. Proposals that involve a change in multiple boundaries are “reorganizations.” The goal of LAFCOs is to simplify the pattern of service delivery by allowing 

a single, multipurpose agency to serve an area rather than several single-purpose districts. Letter to ACIR from James M. Roddy, Executive Officer, San Bernardino 

LAFCO, May 25, 1990. 

Gregory H. Singleton, “The Genesis of Suburbia: A Complex of Historical Trends,” in 

Louis H. Masotti and Jeffrey K. Hadden, The Urbanization of the Suburbs, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, Vol. 7 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 29-50. 

Howard I? Chudacoff, The Evolution of American Urban Society (Englewood Cliffs, 

New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1975), pp. 182-183. See also Ernest S. Griffith,A History of 

American City Government: The Progressive Ears and TheirAfiennath 1900-1920 (New 

York Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 286-301. 

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Organization, 

1957 Census of Governments, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC, 1958), p. 14. 

“U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 

United States, 1985 (Washington, DC, 1985) pp. 12-13. ’’ Minnesota Municipal Board, Minnesota Municipal Board (September 1986), unpublished, p. 1. ’’ West’s Annotated California Codes, Government Code, Chapter 6.6, Section 54774. 

‘3Minne~~ta Statutes Annotated (1988), Chapter 414. 

140regon Revised Statutes, Chapter 199, Section 410. 

15Code of Virginia, Chapter 19.1, Section 15.1 945.1. 

l6 West’s Revised Code of Washington Annotated 1989, Title 36, Chapter 93.010. 

17ACIR, State and Local Roles in the Federal System, p. 375-381. 

”Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1988, p. 19. 

l9“Basic need” is defined by a formula based on student population and needs, such as 

vocational or special education. Alaska Stat. 14.17.025. 

”Letter to ACIR from Dan Bockhorst, Local Government Specialist, Department of 

Community and Regional Affairs, State of Alaska, July 3, 1990. 

21Comments to ACIR staff by Dan Bockhorst, Local Government Specialist, Department of Community and Regional Affairs, State of Alaska, December 1991. 

”A merger occurs when one or more governmental units are brought under the juris- diction of an existing governmental unit. A consolidation occurs when two or more 

governmental units combine to form a new governmental entity. 

23Shelby Charter Township v. State Boundary Commission, 425 Mich 50 (May 1986). 

996-1004. 

24S~me of the cities surrounding Detroit and on the southern border of Grand Rapids 

have nearly square boundaries because they are incorporated townships. The square 

boundary was set in the original land survey. 

25The Alaska Local Boundary Commission was established by the state constitution in 

1959, but did not immediately begin operations. 

26The St. Louis County BRC was created after the ACIR survey. This section is based on 

James M. Brasfield, “Incremental Reform in a Fragmented Metropolitan Communi- ty: The Case of St. Louis,” paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Midwest Po- litical Science Association, April 1990. 

”See ACIR, Metropolitan Organization: The St. Louis Case (Washington, DC, 1988). 

=Clark County had a 1986 preliminary estimated population of 569,500. Washoe 

County had a 1986 preliminary estimated population of 224,600. Government Organi- zation, 1987 Census of Governments, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC, 1988), p. 60. 

=The commission only has jurisdiction in counties with populations of between 100,000 

and 250,000. 

30R~ger Richman, Orion E White, Jr., and Michaux H. Wilkinson, Intergovernmental 

Mediation Negotiations in Local Government Disputes (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 

Press, 1986). 

311nteMew with Glen Thompson, Mono County Administrator, January 26, 1990. 

32See ACIR, The Organization of Local Public Economies (Washington, DC, 1987). 

33See ibid. 

34 Howard W. Hallman, Small and Latge Together: Goveming the Metropolis (Beverly 

Hills: Sage Publications, 1977). 

35Letter to ACIR from James M. Roddy, Executive Officer, San Bernardino LAFCO, 

May 25, 1990. 

36 Gaines H. Liner, ‘Annexation Rates and Institutional Constraints,” Growth and 

Change 21 (1990): 80-94. 

37John C. Bollens, “Annexation of Fringe Areas,” Public Management 30 (April 1949): 

98-102; David G. Bromley and Joel Smith, “The Historical Significance ofAnnexation 

as a Social Process,” Land Economics 49 (1973): 294-309; Ira R. Kaufman and Leo E 

Schnore, Municipal Annexations and Suburbanization, 1960-1970 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Center for Demography and Human Ecology, 1975); and Vivian Z. 

Klaff and Glenn V. Fuguitt, “Annexation as a Factor in the Growth of US. Cities, 

1950-1960 and 1960-1970,” Dernogmphy 15 (1978): 1-12. 

38 Bollens. 

39Thomas R. Dye, “Urban Political Integration: Conditions Associated with Annexation in American Cities,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 8 (1964): 430-446. 

40Raym~nd H. Wheeler, ‘Annexation Law and Annexation Success,” Land Economics 

41 (1965): 354-360. 

41 Frank D. Sengstock, Anneration: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area Problem (Ann 

Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1960). 

42Susan A. MacManus and Robert D. Thomas, “Expanding the Tau Base: Does Annex- ation Make a Difference?” The Urban Interest 1 (1979): 15-28. 

43Patricia J. Dusenbury, Suburbsin the City: Municipal Boundary Changesin the Soictlzern 

States (Research Triangle Park, North Carolina: Southern Growth Policies Board, 

1980). 

44Thom~ D.Galloway and John D. Landis, “How Cities Expand: Does State Law 

Make a Difference?” Growth and Change 17 (1986): 25-45. 

45 Liner. 

461bid., p. 92. 

36 37 
38 

39 
Table A-1 

Number of Counties in the United States, by State, 1957-1987 

State 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 

Alabama 

Alaska 

Arizona 

Arkansas 

California 

Colorado 

Connecticut 

Delaware 

Florida 

Georgia 

Hawaii 

Idaho 

Illinois 

Indiana 

Iowa 

Kansas 

Kentucky 

Louisiana 

Maine 

Maryland 

Massachusetts 

Michigan 

Minnesota 

Mississippi 

Missouri 

Montana 

Nebraska 

Nevada 

New Hampshire 

New Jersey 

New Mexico 

New York 

North Carolina 

North Dakota 

Ohio 

Oklahoma 

Oregon 

Pennsylvania 

Rhode Island 

South Carolina 

South Dakota 

Tennessee 

-Exas 

Utah 

Vermont 

Virginia 

Washington 

West Virginia 

Wisconsin 

Wyoming 

67 

NIA 

14 

75 

57 

62 

NIA 

3 

67 

159 

NIA 

44 

102 

92 

99 

105 

120 

62 

16 

23 

12 

83 

87 

82 

114 

56 

93 

17 

10 

21 

32 

57 

100 

53 

88 

77 

36 

66 

NIA 

46 

64 

95 

254 

29 

14 

98 

39 

55 

71 

23 

67 

NIA 

14 

75 

57 

62 

NIA 

3 

67 

159 

3 

44 

102 

92 

99 

105 

120 

62 

16 

23 

12 

83 

87 

82 

114 

56 

93 

17 

10 

21 

32 

57 

100 

53 

88 

77 

36 

66 

NIA 

46 

64 

95 

254 

29 

14 

98 

39 

55 

72 

23 

67 

9 

14 

75 

57 

62 

N /A 

3 

67 

159 

3 

44 

102 

92 

99 

105 

120 

62 

16 

23 

12 

83 

87 

82 

114 

56 

93 

17 

10 

21 

32 

57 

100 

53 

88 

77 

36 

66 

NIA 

46 

64 

94 

254 

29 

14 

96 

39 

55 

72 

23 

67 

8 

14 

75 

57 

62 

NIA 

3 

66 

158 

3 

44 

102 

91 

99 

105 

120 

62 

16 

23 

12 

83 

87 

82 

114 

56 

93 

16 

10 

21 

32 

57 

100 

53 

88 

77 

36 

66 

NIA 

46 

64 

94 

254 

29 

14 

96 

39 

55 

72 

23 

67 

8 

14 

75 

57 

62 

NIA 

3 

66 

158 

3 

44 

102 

91 

99 

105 

119 

62 

16 

23 

12 

83 

87 

82 

114 

56 

93 

16 

10 

21 

32 

57 

100 

53 

88 

77 

36 

66 

NIA 

46 

64 

94 

254 

29 

14 

95 

39 

55 

72 

23 

67 

8 

14 

75 

57 

62 

NIA 

3 

66 

58 

3 

44 

02 

91 

99 

05 

119 

62 

16 

23 

12 

83 

87 

82 

114 

54 

93 

16 

10 

21 

33 

51 

100 

53 

88 

77 

36 

66 

NIA 

46 

64 

94 

254 

29 

14 

95 

39 

55 

72 

23 

67 

9 

15 

75 

57 

62 

N/A 

3 

66 

158 

3 

44 

102 

91 

99 

105 

119 

61 

16 

23 

12 

83 

87 

82 

114 

54 

93 

16 

10 

21 

33 

57 

100 

53 

88 

77 

36 

66 

NIA 

46 

64 

94 

254 

29 

14 

95 

39 

55 

72 

23 

NIA-not applicable 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Govenimnt Oigunuarion, Census 

of Governments, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC, every 5 years). 

Table A-2 

Number of Municipalities* in the United States, by State, 1957-1987 

State 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 

Alabama 

Alaska 

Arizona 

Arkansas 

California 

Colorado 

Connecticut 

Delaware 

District of Columbia 

Florida 

Georgia 

Hawaii 

Idaho 

Illinois 

Indiana 

Iowa 

Kansas 

Kentucky 

Louisiana 

Maine 

Maryland 

Massachusetts 

Michigan 

Minnesota 

Mississippi 

Missouri 

Montana 

Nebraska 

Nevada 

New Hampshire 

New Jersey' 

New Mexico 

New York 

North Carolina 

North Dakota 

Ohio 

Oklahoma 

Oregon 

Pennsylvania 

Rhcde Island 

South Carolina 

South Dakota 

Tennessee 

Texas 

Utah 

Vermont 

Virginia 

Washington 

West Virginia 

Wisconsin 

Wyoming 

318 

52 

374 

331 

246 

33 

49 

1 

310 

508 

199 

1,181 

544 

942 

610 

323 

237 

42 

149 

39 

498 

826 

262 

803 

123 

5 34 

17 

12 

333 

77 

611 

412 

356 

915 

506 

213 

991 

7 

235 

306 

255 

793 

210 

68 

228 

252 

219 

547 

86 

- 

- 

349 

40 

61 

417 

373 

253 

34 

51 

1 

366 

561 

1 

200 

1,251 

546 

944 

618 

365 

258 

21 

152 

39 

509 

845 

266 

892 

124 

537 

17 

13 

334 

80 

612 

449 

356 

932 

533 

222 

1,003 

a 

255 

307 

280 

866 

212 

68 

236 

26 3 

224 

563 

90 

359 

51 

62 

423 

400 

25 1 

34 

52 

1 

383 

512 

1 

194 

1,256 

550 

945 

623 

359 

270 

21 

151 

39 

522 

850 

26 8 

856 

125 

5 38 

17 

13 

335 

88 

616 

4 37 

357 

933 

522 

222 

1,005 

8 

259 

306 

297 

883 

213 

65 

229 

267 

225 

568 

87 

396 

112 

65 

454 

407 

258 

34 

52 

1 

390 

530 

1 

197 

1,267 

546 

95 1 

626 

378 

287 

22 

151 

39 

5 32 

854 

270 

894 

126 

537 

17 

13 

335 

89 

618 

454 

358 

936 

547 

231 

1,012 

8 

262 

308 

316 

981 

214 

61 

231 

266 

226 

570 

87 

419 

142 

70 

467 

413 

262 

33 

55 

1 

389 

530 

1 

199 

1,274 

563 

955 

625 

405 

300 

24 

151 

39 

531 

855 

283 

916 

126 

5 34 

17 

13 

335 

93 

618 

472 

36 1 

935 

567 

239 

1,015 

8 

264 

311 

3 26 

1,066 

216 

57 

229 

26 5 

227 

576 

90 

434 

142 

76 

472 

428 

267 

33 

56 

1 

39 1 

533 

1 

198 

1,280 

564 

955 

627 

425 

30 1 

22 

152 

39 

532 

855 

292 

926 

126 

535 

17 

13 

323 

96 

615 

484 

365 

94 1 

581 

24 1 

1,019 

8 

26 5 

312 

335 

1,121 

224 

57 

229 

26 5 

231 

580 

91 

436 

149 

81 

483 

442 

266 

31 

57 

1 

390 

5 32 

1 

198 

1,279 

567 

955 

627 

4 37 

301 

22 

155 

39 

534 

855 

29 3 

930 

128 

5 34 

18 

13 

370 

98 

618 

495 

366 

940 

591 

240 

1,022 

8 

269 

309 

334 

1,156 

225 

55 

229 

266 

230 

580 

95 

'Includes all active government units officially designated as cities, boroughs (except Alaska), 

towns (except the New England states, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin) and villages. 

New Jersey townships are incorporated municipalities. Using this criterion, the numbers would 

be 566,567, 567, 567,567, 568, and 567. 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Government Organization, Census 

of Governments, Vol.1 (Washington, DC, every 5 years). 

40 41 
Table A-3 

Number of Special Districts in the United States, by State, 1957-1987 

Table A4 

Number of Townships in the United States, by State, 1957-1987 

State 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 State 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 

Alabama 

Alaska 

Arizona 

Arkansas 

California 

Colorado 

Connecticut 

Delaware 

District of Columbia 

Florida 

Georgia 

Hawaii 

Idaho 

Illinois 

Indiana 

Iowa 

Kansas 

Kentucky 

Louisiana 

Maine 

Maryland 

Massachusetts 

Michigan 

Minnesota 

Mississippi 

Missouri 

Montana 

Nebraska 

Nevada 

New Hampshire 

New Jersey 

New Mexico 

New York 

North Carolina 

North Dakota 

Ohio 

Oklahoma 

Pennsylvania 

Rhode Island 

South Carolina 

South Dakota 

’knnessee 

lhS 

Utah 

Vermont 

Virginia 

Washington 

West Virginia 

Wisconsin 

Wyoming 

Oregon 

119 

50 

254 

1,650 

421 

187 

64 

1 

227 

255 

431 

1,800 

313 

199 

808 

157 

217 

107 

155 

205 

102 

92 

248 

827 

174 

610 

58 

80 

140 

112 

924 

111 

168 

160 

105 

550 

34 

51 

112 

69 

195 

645 

118 

72 

40 

745 

32 

78 

133 

- 

- 

202 

52 

299 

1,962 

566 

204 

63 

1 

264 

30 1 

16 

469 

2,126 

560 

26 3 

880 

179 

24 1 

125 

176 

194 

99 

115 

266 

742 

192 

752 

85 

85 

295 

102 

970 

126 

246 

177 

124 

727 

1,398 

56 

142 

80 

268 

733 

142 

72 

46 

867 

55 

68 

144 

- 

25 1 

76 

352 

2,168 

748 

221 

65 

1 

310 

338 

15 

513 

2,313 

619 

280 

1,037 

273 

334 

127 

187 

247 

110 

148 

272 

734 

209 

952 

95 

89 

311 

97 

965 

215 

431 

228 

214 

800 

1,624 

67 

148 

106 

386 

1,001 

163 

72 

48 

937 

120 

62 

185 

- 286 

90 

366 

2,223 

812 

231 

78 

2 

315 

366 

15 

543 

2,407 

832 

305 

1,136 

446 

419 

126 

229 

268 

139 

211 

282 

820 

258 

1,081 

134 

94 

34 1 

99 

954 

248 

56 1 

275 

402 

826 

1,777 

73 

182 

136 

457 

1,215 

176 

74 

58 

1,021 

172 

121 

203 

- 336 

106 

424 

2,227 

950 

236 

127 

1 

36 1 

387 

15 

612 

2,745 

885 

334 

1,219 

478 

30 

178 

252 

328 

168 

26 3 

304 

1,007 

311 

1,192 

132 

103 

380 

100 

964 

302 

587 

312 

406 

797 

2,035 

78 

182 

148 

471 

1,425 

207 

67 

65 

1,060 

258 

190 

217 

- 390 

6 

130 

505 

2,506 

1,030 

281 

139 

1 

417 

390 

14 

659 

2,602 

897 

36 1 

1,370 

517 

39 

195 

264 

354 

184 

356 

315 

1,195 

450 

1,157 

134 

113 

454 

101 

923 

321 

692 

377 

916 

825 

2,050 

80 

242 

199 

469 

1,681 

21 1 

83 

83 

1,130 

292 

26 3 

225 

421 

14 

253 

505 

2,734 

1,085 

28 1 

202 

1 

414 

410 

14 

705 

2,783 

8 36 

372 

1,387 

569 

24 

203 

223 

39 1 

250 

374 

307 

1,217 

5 14 

1,119 

146 

120 

486 

112 

978 

321 

703 

410 

498 

876 

1,805 

83 

300 

212 

462 

1,892 

236 

95 

106 

1,177 

290 

366 

250 

Connecticut 

Illinois 

Indiana 

Kansas 

Maine 

Massachusetts 

Michigan 

Minnesota 

Missouri 

Nebraska 

New Hampshire 

New Jersey’ 

New York 

North Dakota 

Ohio 

Pennsylvania2 

Rhode Island 

South Carolina 

South Dakota 

Vermont 

Washington 

Wisconsin 

Because New Jersey state law does not distinguish between townships and incorporated munici- palities, some argue that the number of townships in New Jersey should be 0. See ’bble A-2. 

2The Bureau of the Census treats townships in New Jersey and Pennsylvania as “townships” be- cause they have no relation to concentrations of population. 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Government Orguniration, Census 

of Governments, Vol.1 (Washington, DC, every 5 years). 

152 

1,433 

1,009 

1,550 

471 

312 

1,262 

1,828 

328 

478 

222 

233 

932 

1,392 

1,335 

1,564 

32 

2 

1,080 

238 

69 

1,276 

152 

1,433 

1,009 

1,546 

470 

31 2 

1,259 

1,822 

329 

478 

221 

233 

932 

1,387 

1,328 

1,555 

31 

1,072 

238 

66 

1.271 

- 

149 

1,432 

1,009 

1,543 

469 

312 

1,25 3 

1,81,7 

343 

486 

222 

232 

931 

1,378 

1,324 

1,554 

31 

1,050 

238 

63 

1.269 

- 

149 

1,432 

1,008 

1,51,7 

472 

312 

1,248 

1,798 

34 3 

476 

224 

232 

931 

1,368 

1,320 

1,552 

31 

1,034 

237 

39 

1,268 

- 

149 

1,4 36 

1,008 

1,449 

475 

312 

1,245 

1,792 

326 

471 

221 

232 

9 30 

1,360 

1,31,9 

1,549 

31 

1,010 

237 

1,270 

- 

- 

149 

1,434 

1,008 

1,367 

475 

312 

1,245 

1,795 

325 

470 

221 

245 

928 

1,360 

1,31,8 

1,549 

31 

996 

237 

1,269 

- 

- 

149 

1,434 

1,008 

1,360 

471 

312 

1,242 

1,798 

325 

454 

221 

247 

929 

1,355 

1,318 

1,548 

31 

984 

237 

1,268 

- 

- 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Government Organirarion, Census 

of Governments, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC, every 5 years). 

42 43 
~~~~~d

I Methodology 

In addition to a nationwide mail survey, this study is based on in-depth interviews with staffs of boundary commissions in each of the states having such 

agencies, interviews with representatives of associations of municipalities and 

counties in those states, and written materials from the boundary agencies. Interviews were conducted with 21 boundary commission staff members. The interviews generally were from 30 to 90 minutes long. 

In the states that have several county or regional commissions, staff members from more than one commission were interviewed. Where there was only 

a single statewide board, one interview was conducted. Following is the number of interviews with BRC staff in each state: Alaska, one; California, eight; 

Iowa, one; Michigan, one; Minnesota, one; Nevada, two; New Mexico, one; 

Oregon, two; Utah, one; Virginia, one; and Washington, four. 

In addition, 14 in-depth interviews were conducted with members of city 

and county associations in the states with boundary commissions. This research report isbased on these interviews plus the mail survey and written materials obtained from boundary agencies. 

44 45 
Appendix C I Questionnaire 

Boundary Review Commissions 

Questions for Municipal leagues and County Associations 

1. How much, if any, contact has your organization had with the boundary 

review commission(s) in your state? 

2. What do you think are the principal benefits for (citiedcounties) of having 

this (these) commission(s)? 

3. What issues with regard to boundary review commissions have been most 

salient for your organization or its members? Can you give any examples? 

4. Do you feel the boundary commission(s) in your state generally protect 

the interests of your members? 

Yes 1 

No 3 

It Depends 2 

4a. Why do you say that? 

5. Are there any examples of instances in which the commission did protect 

the interests of one of your members? 

6. Are there any examples of instances in which the commission did NOT 

protep the interests of one of your members? 

7. What problems or controversies, if any, has your organization or its members had with the boundary commission(s)? 

8. Are there examples of these problems or controversies? 

9. Has there been any legislation proposed or passed in recent years to 

change the powers of the boundary review commission(s) in your state? 

Yes 1 

No 2 

9a. (Zfyes) What years and what did the legislation provide? 

9b. Did your organization play a role in initiating, amending, passing, or 

defeating this legislation? 

46 47 
Initiating 1 Defeating 4 

Amending 2 No Role 5 

Passing 3 

9c. (Ifplayed a role) Would you describe the role your organization 

9d. (Ifappropriate) What is the current status of this legislation? 

10. (Ifappropriate) If legislation were to be proposed to abolish boundary commissions in your state, do you think your organization would favor or oppose it? 

played? 

Favor 1 

Not Sure 2 

Oppose 3 

1Oa. Why do you say that? 

11 In general, do you think residents of IocaI communities know enough to 

make good decisions about incorporations or other boundary changes? 

Yes 1 

No 3 

It Depends 2 

lla. Why do you say that? 

your state? 

12. Overall, what is your evaluation of the boundary review commission(s) in 

Favorable 1 

It DependsMot Sure 2 

Favorable 3 

12a. Why do you say that? 

48