In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 20-1498 

(Filed: 29 December 2021)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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TODD SCHAEFFER, *

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Plaintiff, *

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v. *

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THE UNITED STATES, *

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Defendant. *

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ORDER

HOLTE, Judge.

On 26 October 2020, pro se plaintiff Todd Schaeffer filed a complaint alleging the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) interfered with his conditional privatesector job offer and requested the Court either remand to the agency for reconsideration or 

provide him relief in the form of lost earnings. See Compl., ECF No. 1. On 17 August 2021, the 

Court dismissed pro se plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for failure to pay the Court’s 

required filing fees or submit a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, and for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the Court of Federal 

Claims (“RCFC”). See Op. & Order, ECF No. 24. In its Opinion, the Court held plaintiff failed 

to comply with the Court’s Order, ECF No. 15, and dismissed the case pursuant to RCFC 41(b). 

Id. at 8. Alternatively, the Court held even if plaintiff paid the filing fees or submitted a 

complete motion to proceed in forma pauperis as ordered, plaintiff is a private-sector job 

applicant, not a government employee, so he has no valid claim against the federal government. 

Id. at 6. Further, the Court found FEMA’s denial of plaintiff’s public trust clearance application 

does not put plaintiff in privity of contract with the government, even if plaintiff’s private-sector 

job offer was contingent on receiving FEMA’s approval. Id. at 7. Last, the Court held plaintiff’s 

claims sound in tort which is firmly outside the jurisdiction of the Court. Id. at 8. Consequently, 

the Court held it would not have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims under the Tucker Act. Id.; 

see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2018). On 23 August 2021, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a 

motion for reconsideration pursuant to RCFC 59. See Relief from Op. & Order, ECF No. 28.

RCFC 59(a)(1) provides the Court may grant a motion for reconsideration: “(A) for any 

reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court; [or] 

(B) for any reason for which a rehearing has heretofore been granted in a suit in equity in federal 

court.” “Motions for reconsideration must be supported ‘by a showing of extraordinary 
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circumstances which justify relief.’” Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 

2004) (quoting Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 298, 300 (1999), aff’d, 250 

F.3d 762 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam)). “Under [RCFC] 59(a)(1), a court, in its discretion, ‘may 

grant a motion for reconsideration when there has been an intervening change in the controlling 

law, newly discovered evidence, or a need to correct clear factual or legal error or prevent 

manifest injustice.’” Biery v. United States, 818 F.3d 704, 711 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Young 

v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 671, 674 (2010)). A motion for reconsideration “should not be 

entertained upon ‘the sole ground that one side or the other is dissatisfied with the conclusions 

reached by the court, otherwise the losing party would generally, if not always, try his case a 

second time, and litigation would be unnecessarily prolonged.’” Seldovia Native Ass’n v. United 

States, 36 Fed. Cl. 593, 594 (1996) (quoting Roche v. District of Columbia, 18 Ct. Cl. 289, 290 

(1883)). “It is not sufficient for plaintiffs to reassert the same arguments they made in earlier 

proceedings, nor can plaintiffs raise new arguments that could have been made earlier.” Lee v. 

United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 243, 252 (2017), aff’d, 895 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing 

Freeman v. United States, No. 01-39L, 2016 WL 943859 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 1, 2016), aff’d, 875 F.3d 

623 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Deciding whether reconsideration is appropriate “lies largely within the 

discretion of the [trial] court.” Yuba Nat. Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. 

Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff does not argue there has been a change in the controlling law; in fact, he does 

not cite a single case or statute. See Relief from Op. & Order. Plaintiff also does not argue 

newly discovered evidence justifies reconsideration, nor does he present any. Id. Therefore, the 

Court must determine whether there is “a need to correct clear factual or legal error or prevent 

manifest injustice.” Id. In his motion, plaintiff attempts to relitigate issues by presenting legal 

arguments similar to those the Court found insufficient to establish jurisdiction in its 17 August

2021 Opinion. See Dairyland Power Co-op v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 102, 104 (2012) 

(“Reconsideration is not to be construed as an opportunity to relitigate issues already decided.”). 

Plaintiff also argues this action “was filed to obtain an answer concerning withheld information 

during the application for public trust process” and the Court’s “[j]urisdiction is governed by 

concurrent policies.” Relief from Op. & Order at 5. Plaintiff states “[p]ayment of fees . . . [are] 

not required where the movant asserts good faith efforts to obtain disclosure or discovery without 

court action sharing the inconsistency of principles.” Id. Lastly, “plaintiff requests the [C]ourt 

rule on the provision for special damages, affirm the claim is jurisdiction of the FEMA contract, 

consider ordering the defendant to specify information related to liability for tortious 

interference, and/or use other rules to identify another process or organization to refer the 

issues.” Id. at 5–6 (footnote omitted).

On plaintiff’s first argument, the Court established in its 17 August 2021 Opinion it lacks 

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims pertaining to the agency’s decision on plaintiff’s public trust 

application. Op. & Order at 6; see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988) (holding federal 

courts lack jurisdiction to review the merits of security clearance decisions); see also Dorfmont 

v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The decision to grant or revoke a security 

clearance is committed to the discretion of the President by law. The district court therefore 

cannot review the merits of the department’s decision to revoke [plaintiff’s] security clearance.”

(citing Dept. of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988)) (internal citations omitted)). Plaintiff 

asserts this Court’s jurisdiction may be invoked through “concurrent policies” but fails to name 
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any such policies. Relief from Op. & Order at 5. Thus, it was not clear error to hold the Court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. 

Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[Plaintiff] bears the burden of establishing subject 

matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” (citations omitted)).

As for plaintiff’s assertion that payment of fees is not required, the Court refers plaintiff 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1926(b) (2018): “The court may require advance payment of fees by rule.” The 

current Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees for the U.S. Court of Federal Claims sets forth a 

civil action filing fee of $350 plus an administrative fee of $52. Id. If plaintiff is unable to pay 

such fees, the Court refers plaintiff to the 2 April 2021 Order, ECF No. 15, directing him to file a 

complete application to proceed in forma pauperis by 30 April 2021, or alternatively pay the 

required fees. Bryant v. United States, 618 F. App’x 683, 686 (2015) (“If a party fails to pay the 

requisite filing fee, despite adequate notice and ample opportunity to do so, the [Court of Federal 

Claims] acts within its discretion when it dismisses the action, just as it did in this case.” (citing 

Brown v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 795, 798 (2009))). To date, plaintiff has failed to take either 

of these actions, despite filing other documents during this time. It was therefore not clear error 

to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failing to comply with a Court order. See RCFC 41(b) (“If 

the plaintiff fails to . . . comply with . . . a court order, the court may dismiss on its own motion 

or the defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.”); Bryant, 618 F. App’x

at 686.

Regarding plaintiff’s requests for the Court to rule on special damages, find jurisdiction 

under his FEMA contract, consider government tort liability further, “or use other rules to 

identify another process or organization to refer the issues,” the Court is unable to perform any 

such actions. Relief from Op. & Order at 5–6. First, for the reasons already established in the 

Court’s 17 August 2021 Opinion, the Court lacks jurisdiction over each of plaintiff’s claims; 

thus, the Court cannot award special damages for claims it is powerless to hear. See Op. & 

Order. Second, regarding the alleged FEMA contract, the Court has already established 

“[p]laintiff’s failure to allege sufficient facts supporting the existence of a contract in turn fails to 

establish privity of contract with the government and therefore fails to establish subject matter 

jurisdiction.” Id. at 7 (citations omitted). Third, regarding government tort liability, “[t]his 

Court lacks jurisdiction over any claims against the government sounding in tort.” Id. at 8 (citing 

Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993) (“[T]ort cases are outside the jurisdiction 

of the Court of Federal Claims.”)). Fourth, regarding plaintiff’s request for the Court to use its 

own rules as an end run around his jurisdictional deficiencies, no Court of Federal Claims rule or 

process can overcome the jurisdictional bar presented by the Tucker Act, which plaintiff fails to 

meet. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). Plaintiff’s requests do not present the extraordinary circumstances 

required to justify relief. Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1235 (“Motions for reconsideration must be 

supported ‘by a showing of extraordinary circumstances which justify relief.’” (citation 

omitted)).

Plaintiff has not met the heightened standard for the Court to grant a motion for 

reconsideration. See id.; Biery, 818 F.3d at 711. Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s 
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motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 28.1 Also, plaintiff has not remedied his failure to comply 

with the Court’s 2 April 2021 Order, ECF No. 15, by submitting a complete motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis or paying the Court’s filing fees. Even if plaintiff presented sufficient grounds 

for reconsideration, his motion would nevertheless be denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Ryan T. Holte

RYAN T. HOLTE 

Judge 

1 On 10 September 2021, plaintiff attempted to file a response to the Court’s Order, ECF No. 27, issued earlier the 

same day, which unsealed plaintiff’s filings, rejected four deficient filings, and filed by leave plaintiff’s motion for 

reconsideration. On 13 December 2021, plaintiff further attempted to file a document requesting relief from the 

Court’s Order, ECF No. 29, issued earlier the same day, which rejected a different deficient document. There are no 

provisions in the RCFC for filing a response to a Court Order unless directed or for requesting relief from an order 

rejecting a deficient document. Accordingly, the Court REJECTS plaintiff’s 10 September 2021 and 13 December 

2021 deficient filings.