In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-3345

TOY COLLINS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN RED CROSS,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 08-cv-50160—Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 28, 2012—DECIDED MARCH 8, 2013

Before KANNE, WOOD, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Toy Collins worked for the American Red Cross. The Red Cross later fired her after an

investigation concluded that Collins committed multiple acts of employee misconduct. Collins sued under

Title VII, claiming that she was really fired because of

illegal retaliation and discrimination. The district court

found that Collins did not present enough evidence to

support her claims and granted summary judgment for

the Red Cross. We agree with the district court and affirm.
2 No. 11-3345

I. BACKGROUND

Toy Collins first started working with the American

Red Cross in 1998 as a paid volunteer with AmeriCorps,

a federal community service organization. After her

AmeriCorps stint ended in 2000, the Red Cross hired

Collins as a full-time employee in its Rockford, Illinois

office.

Collins is African-American. In the summer of 2006,

Collins called the Red Cross’s 24-hour confidential

hotline to complain about discrimination: she alleged

that her co-workers put tacks on her chair, damaged her

property, demanded private information, stole her

files, required her to pay business costs from her own

pocket, and otherwise harassed and sabotaged her. On

August 31, 2006, she filed a racial discrimination

charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The EEOC gave her a “right-to-sue”

letter on February 26, 2007, but Collins did not sue at

that time.

In June 2007, several of Collins’s co-workers complained that Collins (1) told others that the Red Cross

was out to get minorities; (2) said she could not work

with homosexuals; (3) instructed an employee to falsify

records; (4) coerced a subordinate into teaching a class

for free; and (5) gave out blank certifications for

Red Cross courses. The Red Cross assigned Janet Stice,

a human resources officer from a different office, to

investigate the complaints. Stice interviewed eight witnesses between June 26, 2007, and June 28, 2007. Stice

also interviewed Collins, who denied the allegations
No. 11-3345 3

against her. Ultimately, Stice found all of the allegations against Collins were “[s]ubstantiated.” (R. 77-20 at

8.) Stice compiled her findings in a written report and

recommended that Collins be terminated. (Id. at 2-8.)

Based on the report, the Red Cross terminated Collins

on July 16, 2007. Collins sued under Title VII, alleging

that the Red Cross retaliated against her for filing the

2006 EEOC complaint and discriminated against her because of her race. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the Red Cross, and Collins now

appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper where “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). We review the district court’s entry of summary

judgment de novo and view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Arizanovska v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 682 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2012). That

said, we will not draw inferences “that are supported

by only speculation or conjecture.” Harper v. C.R. England,

Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue

of material fact exists only where there is enough

evidence that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Here, Collins raises

two Title VII claims: one for retaliation, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-3(a), and another for discrimination, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a). The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Red Cross on both claims, and we

will address each in turn.
4 No. 11-3345

A. Retaliation

Title VII forbids retaliating against an employee

“because he has opposed any practice made . . .

unlawful . . . by this subchapter, or because he has made a

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner

in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this

subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Here, Collins attempts

to prove her retaliation claim under the “direct method”

of proof. To do so, she must show that (1) she engaged

in protected activity under Title VII; (2) she suffered

an adverse employment action; and, (3) there is a

causal link between her protected activity and the

adverse action. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 859

(7th Cir. 2012). The Red Cross rightly concedes that

filing an EEOC complaint was a protected activity and

that Collins’s termination was an adverse employment

action. See Arizanovska, 682 F.3d at 703-04. Thus, the

only question is whether there was a causal link

between the two.

To answer this question, Collins directs us to Janet

Stice’s report recommending that the Red Cross

terminate Collins. The “Disposition” section of the report

included a list of allegations that Stice found to be

“[s]ubstantiated.” (See R. 77-20 at 8.) One of those conclusions was that Collins “has told others that [the Red Cross]

is out to get minorities.” (Id.) According to Collins though,

none of Stice’s interviews actually substantiated this claim.

Thus, Collins concludes, the report must have been referring to Collins’s EEOC complaint, and a reasonable jury

could find in her favor.
No. 11-3345 5

We disagree. Stice’s report begins with a list of allegations, one of which was that Collins “told others that

[the Red Cross] is out to get minorities.” (Id. at 2.) From

there, the report contains several pages of brief summaries of interviews with Collins’s co-workers. Following

that are several pages of what appear to be rough transcriptions of Stice’s interview with Collins. Finally, the

last page of the report concludes that the initial allegations are “[s]ubstantiated” and recommends that Collins

be terminated.

Read as a whole, we think it clear that Stice’s report

was not referring to Collins’s EEOC complaint when it

concluded that Collins “told others that [the Red Cross] is

out to get minorities.” (Id. at 8.) The report does not ever

mention Collins’s nearly year-old EEOC complaint.

What it does mention, however, is a series of complaints

and allegations about Collins stirring up tensions

between her co-workers. According to one interview

summary in the report, Collins called one co-worker “a

racist” and another co-worker “a lesbian.” (Id. at 3.) A

third co-worker said that Collins “is very paranoid

about other people” and “thinks that people have conspiracies out to get her.” (Id. at 4.) The transcript of

the interview with Collins also provides guidance; it

indicates that Stice asked Collins “Did you tell Adrianna,

we have to stick together because they are all racist?”;

and “[D]id you say that Kathy was a racist?” (Id. at 5-6.)

Given this context, we think it clear that the report

was concerned with Collins sowing racial tension in

the office, not with her EEOC complaint.
6 No. 11-3345

Collins responds that the report did not do a particularly good job of supporting this conclusion. And

Collins is not wrong. For instance, the report indicates

that Stice asked if Collins told “Adrianna” that “we have

to stick together because they are all racist?” (Id. at 5.)

Stice’s summary of her interview with “Adriana,” however, does not specifically mention this allegation. (Id. at

3.) Doubtless, then, Stice could have documented her

findings more clearly. Nevertheless, at least something in

the report suggests that it was concerned with

Collins sowing racial tension in the office. Indeed, several

parts of the report do. But nothing in the report suggests

that it was concerned with Collins’s EEOC complaint.

And we see no reason why a reasonable jury would

reject a proposition supported by some, albeit imperfect,

evidence in favor of a proposition supported by no evidence at all.

Thus, we do not think that a reasonable jury could

find that the report’s conclusions referred to Collins’s

EEOC complaint. Of course, that does not mean that the

report’s conclusions were correct. Collins denies making

the statements that the report attributes to her, and

we must assume, at this stage, that Collins is telling the

truth. Stice’s report was sloppy, and perhaps it was

also mistaken or even unfair. But Title VII does not

forbid sloppy, mistaken, or unfair terminations; it

forbids discriminatory or retaliatory terminations. See

Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101,

1106 (7th Cir. 2012). Collins has provided evidence showing, at most, that the report’s conclusions were wrong. But

she has not provided anything—apart from mere specula-
No. 11-3345 7

The reader may wonder about Collins’s alleged comments 1

that Stice’s report found to be “[s]ubstantiated.” (R. 77-20 at 8.)

For example, according to the report, Collins “told others that

[the Red Cross] is out to get minorities” and told one of her coworkers that another co-worker was a racist. (Id. at 3, 8.) Did the

Red Cross retaliate against Collins for making these statements?

And, if so, would that give rise to a Title VII claim? Interesting

questions all, but we need not address them. Collins denies

making the statements that Stice’s report attributes to her.

(See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 11, 14.) And, needless to say, Collins

cannot win a suit based on factual events that she insists

never happened.

tion—that the report’s conclusions were wrong because of

Collins’s EEOC complaint. As a result, the Red Cross was

entitled to summary judgment.1

B. Discrimination

Collins also claims that the Red Cross racially discriminated against her. Title VII makes it illegal for an employer

“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,

or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1). Generally speaking, there are two ways

of proving such a claim: the “direct” method of proof

and the “indirect” method of proof. See Naficy v. Ill. Dep’t

of Human Servs., 697 F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 2012). But cf.

Coleman, 667 F.3d at 863 (Wood, J., concurring) (arguing

that the direct/indirect distinction is unnecessarily com-
8 No. 11-3345

plicated and that “the time has come to collapse all

these tests into one”). Under the direct method, a

plaintiff must provide either direct or circumstantial

evidence that the employer had a discriminatory motivation. Naficy, 697 F.3d at 509. And under the indirect

method, a plaintiff must satisfy the well-worn requirements of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973). See Naficy, 697 F.3d at 509.

Collins employs both methods here, and we will start

by addressing the indirect method. Under the indirect

method, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case

by providing evidence “that (1) she is a member of the

protected class; (2) she met her employer’s legitimate

job expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees

outside of the protected class were treated more favorably.” Id. at 511. If she does so, then the burden shifts to

the employer “to introduce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.” Id. If the

employer meets that burden of production, then the

burden shifts back to the plaintiff to provide evidence

that the employer’s reason was pretextual. Id. at 511-12.

“Normally a court should first determine if a plaintiff

has established a prima facie case before subjecting the

employer to the pretext inquiry.” Hague v. Thompson

Distrib. Co., 436 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2006). But where,

as here, “an employer has cited performance issues as

the justification for its adverse action, the performance

element of the prima facie case cannot be separated

from” the pretext inquiry. Duncan v. Fleetwood Motor
No. 11-3345 9

Homes of Ind., Inc., 518 F.3d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 2008) (per

curiam). Thus, we may appropriately begin with pretext.

See Senske v. Sybase, Inc., 588 F.3d 501, 507 (7th Cir. 2009).

“Pretext means a lie, specifically a phony reason for

some action.” Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175

(7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,

the question before us “is not whether the employer’s

stated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the

employer honestly believed the reasons it has offered to

explain the discharge.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 852. “It is not

the court’s concern that an employer may be wrong

about its employee’s performance, or may be too hard on

its employee. Rather, the only question is whether the

employer’s proffered reason was pretextual, meaning

that it was a lie.” Id.

Here, the Red Cross claims that Collins’s misconduct, as

described in Stice’s report, was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her. Specifically, Stice

concluded that Collins had (1) told others that the Red

Cross was out to get minorities; (2) said she could not

work with homosexuals; (3) instructed an employee to

falsify records; (4) coerced a subordinate into teaching a

class for free; and (5) gave out blank certifications for

Red Cross courses. (R. 77-20 at 8.) Based on these

findings, Stice recommended that the Red Cross terminate Collins. (Id.)

Collins argues that Stice’s findings were pretextual. In

support, she provides only one piece of evidence: the

fact that she “denied all of the allegations generated

during” the Red Cross’s investigation. (Appellant’s Br. at
10 No. 11-3345

14.) But, as discussed, a plaintiff must show that her

employer is lying, not merely that her employer is

wrong. See Coleman, 667 F.3d at 852. 

As a result, arguing “about the accuracy of the employer’s assessment” is a “distraction” in the pretext

context; the fact that a statement is inaccurate does not

mean that it is a deliberate lie. Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,

302 F.3d 735, 744 (7th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, merely

denying the employer’s allegations, as Collins does here,

is not enough to survive summary judgment under

the indirect method.

That leaves the direct method. Under this method,

Collins must provide either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence that the Red Cross terminated her

because of racial animus. See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1105.

Direct evidence of discrimination would require something akin to an admission from the Red Cross that it

terminated Collins because of her race. See Raymond v.

Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 610 (7th Cir. 2006). Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, would require

Collins to “construct a convincing mosaic” that “allows

a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the

decisionmaker.” Brown, 700 F.3d at 1105 (internal quotation marks omitted). Collins identifies only one

piece of such evidence here: the “apparently false claim

that she had told unnamed ‘others’ that [the Red Cross]

was ‘out to get’ minorities.” (Appellant’s Br. at 14.) “This

baseless allegation,” she continues, “strongly suggests

racial animus as a motive for the termination.” (Id.)

We do not see how. True, the report used the word

“minorities,” but never in reference to Collins’s status as
No. 11-3345 11

a minority. And even assuming, as we must at this stage,

that the report’s allegation was “baseless,” it does not

follow that it was racially motivated. Evidence that

an employer came to the wrong conclusion might

suggest discrimination if the conclusion were incredible

on its face or if it were accompanied by other circumstantial evidence. See Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC,

489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007) (plaintiff “must identify

such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or

contradictions . . . that a reasonable person could find

them unworthy of credence and hence infer” that the

employer was lying). But none of the evidence in this

case fits that bill; Stice’s conclusions are not facially

incredible, and nothing in the record suggests—directly

or indirectly—that Stice or the decisionmakers at the

Red Cross held any racial animus. And so we are left, at

most, with evidence that the Red Cross was wrong. That

is not enough to survive summary judgment on a discrimination claim. See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1106 (“Perhaps

their supervisors’ criticisms were unfair—clearly the

plaintiffs feel that they were—but there is no evidence

that they were unfair because they were motivated by race,

as Title VII forbids.”); Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty.

Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 603 (7th Cir. 2011) (“although [plaintiff] disagreed with his negative evaluations, that does not mean that the evaluations were the

result of unlawful discrimination”); cf. Malacara v. City

of Madison, 224 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2000) (“An

employer may hire or refuse to hire an employee for a

good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous

facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not
12 No. 11-3345

for discriminatory reason.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the American Red Cross.

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