The 1992 World Administrative Radio

Conference: Technology and Policy

Implications

May 1993

OTA-TCT-549

NTIS order #PB93-203727
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The 1992 World

Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications, OTATCT-549 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1993).

For Sale by the U.S. government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP Washington, DC20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-041 766-X
Foreword

A

s the 20th century draws to a close, new radio technologies and services

are poised to change the ways we communicate. Radio waves already

make possible a wide range of services considered commonplace—

AM and FM radio broadcasting, television, cellular telephones, remote

garage-door openers, and baby monitors. Advances in radio technology are giving

birth to even more new products and services, including pocket-sized telephones

that may allow people to make and receive calls anywhere in the world, high-definition televisions (HDTV) with superior quality pictures and sound, and static-free

digital radios.

The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC-92) authorized

frequencies for many of these new radiocommunication services, and granted additional frequencies for many existing services, including international broadcasting,

satellite-based mobile communications, and communications in space. The effects of

these changes will be felt well into the 21st century as countries around the world

develop and deploy new communications systems to serve the needs of consumers,

businesses, and governments. For the United States, the decisions made at the conference will critically affect how we develop new radio technologies and applications, how competitive this country will be in radiocommunications equipment and

services, and how effectively the United States can exercise its role as a leader in

world radiocommunication policymaking.

This study of the outcomes and implications of WARC-92 was requested

by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Senate Committee on

Commerce, Science, and Transportation. OTA was asked to evaluate the success of

U.S. proposals at the conference, discuss the implications of the decisions made for

U.S. technology and policy development, and identify options for improving U.S.

participation in future world radiocommunication conferences. This report complements OTA’s assessment of the preparations process for WARC-92, The 1992 World

Administrative Radio Conference: Issues for U.S. International Spectrum Policy.

OTA acknowledges the contributions of the members of the U.S. delegation

to WARC-92, who helped clarify and focus the issues. OTA also appreciates the

assistance of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the

Federal Communications Commission, and the State Department, as well as the

numerous individuals in the private sector who reviewed or contributed to this document. The contents of this report, however, are the sole responsibility of OTA.

Roger Herdman, Director

. . . Ill
Project Staff

DAVID P. WYE

Project Director

Gregg Festa

Research Assistantl

Karolyn St. Clair

Graphics Specialist

ADMINISTRATIVE

Liz Emanuel

Office Administrator

Barbara Bradley

Secretary

CONTRACTORS

Richard G. Gould

George Hagn

Telecommunications Systems

John Andelin

Assistant Director, OTA

Science, Information, and

Natural Resources Division

James W. Curlin

Program Manager

Telecommunication and

Computing

Technologies Program

1 July-September 1992

iv
Reviewers and Contributors

João Carlos Fagundes Albernaz

Director-Adjunto

Ministério Da Infra-Estrutura

Departamento Nacional de

Administração de Freqüências

Dexter A. Anderson

Telecommunications Manager

Voice of America

Jan Witold Baran

Attorney at Law

Wiley, Rein & Fielding

Jeffrey Binckes

COMSAT Mobile Communications

Communications Satellite Corp.

William M. Berman

Vice President and Director

Global Spectrum Management

Motorola Inc.

Robert Briskman

President

Satellite CD Radio

David Castiel

President

Ellipsat Corp.

Lawrence F. Chesto

Director

Telecommunications Systems

Aeronautical Radio, Inc.

Vary Coates

Senior Associate (Project Director)

Office of Technology Assessment

David J. Cohen

Staff Member

National Telecommunications and

Information Administration

William Cook

Director

Electromagnetic Spectrum

Management

U.S. Department of Navy

Raymond Crowell

Director

Industry Government Planning

COMSAT

Steve Crowley

Consulting Engineer

Frederick J. Day, Jr.

Attorney at Law

Keller and Heckman

Daniel S. Ehrman, Jr.

Vice President, Finance & Business

Affairs

Gannett Broadcasting

Ben C. Fisher

Attorney at Law

Fisher, Wayland, Cooper& Leader

Michael Fitch

Senior Advisor

International Communications and

Information Policy

U.S. Department of State

Steven H. Flajser

Vice-President, Space Systems

Loral

Victor E. Foose

Manager, Frequency Engineering

Branch

Federal Aviation Administration

William Gamble

Deputy Associate Administrator

National Telecommunications and

Information Administration

Tomas E. Gergely

Electromagnetic Spectrum Manager

National Science Foundation

John T. Gilsenan

Deputy Director, Spectrum Policy

Bureau of Communications and

Information Policy

U.S. Department of State

Richard G. Gould

President

Telecommunications Systems

Bruce A. Gracie

Head

WARC/CCI Affairs

International Relations Branch

Communications Canada

George H. Hagn

Senior Staff Advisor

Information & Telecommunications

Science Center

SRI International

William Hatch

Department of Commerce

National Telecommunications and

Information Administration

v
Gerald B. Helman

Consultant

Ellipsat Corp.

Olof Lundberg

Director General

Inmarsat

Geoff W. Perry

Telecommunications Consultant

Societe International de

Telecommunications Aeronautiques

Neal D. Huikower (SITA)

Associate Department Head

Bill Luther

International Advisor

Federal Communications Commission Leonard R. Raish

Attorney at Law

Kris Hutchison Fletcher, Heald & Hildreth

Director of Frequency Management

ARINC, Inc.

Robert McIntyre

Chief, International Staff

Private Radio Bureau

Federal Communications Commission

Michael C. Rau

Senior Vice-President

Science and Technology

National Association of Broadcasters

Waiter E. Ireland

Director

Regulatory Affairs Office

U.S. Information Agency

H. Donald Messer

Engineer

Voice of America Edward E. Reinhart

Consultant

Karyl A. Irion

Senior Project Staff

Atlantic Research Corp.

John E. Miller

consultant

Stanford Telecommunications

Alan B. Renshaw

Program Manager

Starsys Global Positioning

Ed Jacobs

Deputy Chief

Land Mobile and Microwave Division

Federal Communications Commission

Gary K. Noreen

Chairman and CEO

Radio Satellite Corporation

Warren Richards

Chairman of ITU-CCIR

U.S. Department of State

Janice Obuchowski

President

Freedom Technologies, Inc.

George Jacobs

Consultant

Paul Rinaldo

Consultant

Bruce Kraselsky

Vice-Chairman

Constellation Communications, Inc.

Randall T. Odeneal

General Partner

Sconnix Broadcasting Co.

Raui R. Rodriguez

Attorney at Law

Leventhal, Senter & Lerman

Walter La Fleur

Director

Engineering & Technical Operations

Voice of America

Larry Olson

Chief, International Branch

Federal Communications Commission

Walda Roseman

Director

Office of International

Communications

Lawrence Palmer Federal Communications Commission

Program Manager

National Telecommunications and

Information Administration

Todd LaPorte

Analyst

Office of Technology Assessment

Charles Rush

Chief Scientist

National Telecommunications and

Alex Latker Information Administration

Engineer

Federal Communications Commission

Alan L. Parker

President

Orbital Communications Corp. Norbert Schroeder

Private Sector Coordinator

National Telecommunications and

Information Administration

Lon C. Levin

Vice-President and Regulatory Counsel

American Mobile Satellite Corporation

Richard Parlow

Associate Administrator

National Telecommunications and

Information Administration
Joseph F. Sedlak

Director of Government Relations

Volunteers in Technical Assistance

Jeffrey L. Sheldon

General Counsel

Utilities Telecommunications Council

Herschel Shosteck

Herschel Shosteck Associates, Ltd.

Jean Smith

Contractor

Office of Technology Assessment

Walter Sonnenfeldt

Executive Director

Walter Sonnenfeldt & Associates

Thomas P. Stanley

Chief Engineer

Federal Communications Commission

Ron Strother

President

Strother Communications

Leslie A. Taylor

President

Leslie Taylor Associates

Robert Taylor

Office of Space Operations

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Thomas S. Tycz

Deputy Chief

Domestic Facilities Division

Federal Communications Commission

Jim Vorhies

National Telecommunications and

Information Administration

Thomas Walsh

International Engineer

Federal Communications Commission

Francis Williams

Chief, Treaty Branch

Office of Engineering and Technology

Federal Communications Commission

Kurt A. Wimmer

Attorney at Law

Covington & Burling

Joan Winston

Senior Analyst

Office of Technology Assessment

vii
1 Summary and Findings, 1

Request for the Study, 2

Introduction, 3

Summary of Findings, 3

WARC-92: The Conference, 9

Themes and Trends From WARC-92 15

Implications for U.S. Policy and Technology

Development, 30

Options for Improving U.S. Policymaking, 39

2 Outcomes and Implications for

U.S. Radio Technology, 51

Factors Complicating Assessment of WARC-92

Outcomes, 51

U.S. Objectives for WARC-92, 54

High-Frequency Broadcasting, 55

Broadcasting Satellite Service-Sound, 64

Terrestrial Mobile Services, 77

Satellite Mobile Services, 86

Other U.S. Allocation Proposals to WARC-92, 128

3 Next Steps and Lessons for the Future, 143

International Issues in WARC-92 Implementation, 144

Domestic Context for WARC-92 Implementation, 149

WARC-92: Lessons for the Future, 157

Conference Management, 166

APPENDIXES

A Structure and Proceedings of WARC-92, 173

B International Observers at WARC-92, 176

C Selected WARC-92 Resolutions and

Recommendations, 177

D Acronyms and Glossary of Terms, 180

E Negotiated Rulemaking: An Alternative to Traditional

Rulemaking, 184

INDEX, 187

contents

ix
and

Findings 1

F

or 50 years, radio technologies and services have played

an important role in the daily lives of people all over the

world. Radio waves carried messages of hope to millions

of people caught behind the Iron Curtain. They allowed

Americans to see and hear Neil Armstrong’s first steps on the

Moon. In more recent years, satellite communications have

allowed us to witness events from around the globe as they

happened—the fall of the Berlin Wall and a lone Chinese student

facing an advancing tank in Tiananmen Square. Radio waves

also make possible services and technologies considered commonplace today—radio and television programs, cellular telephones, and even microwave ovens, remote garage-door openers,

and baby monitors, Advances in radio technology are giving

birth to a wide range of new products and services, including

pocket-sized telephones that may allow people to make and

receive calls anywhere in the world, high-definition television

(HDTV) that will provide superior quality pictures and sound,

and digital radios that will provide static-free listening.

The process of coordinating the radio frequencies used by

different wireless services and systems, and harmonizing radiocommunication policies worldwide is an extremely complex

task. Procedures must be developed that allow radio services to

share sections of the radio frequency spectrum, and international

agreements must be negotiated so that systems and equipment in

different countries can interconnect and not interfere with each

other. The job of harmonizing and regulating telecommunication

and radio services on a worldwide basis falls to the International

Telecommunication Union (ITU), a specialized agency of the

United Nations. In order to allocate radio frequencies for specific

radiocommunication services and to negotiate the rules and

regulations that govern the use of those services internationally,

1
2 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

For 4 weeks in February 1992, delegates from around

the world met in the Palacio de Congresos in

Malaga-Torremolinos, Spain for the 1992 World

Administrative Radio Conference.

ITU-member countries periodically gather in

World Administrative Radio Conference (WARCs).

The latest conference, the 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC-92), took place

in Torremolinos, Spain over the month of February 1992. Among other issues, WARC-92 addressed frequency allocations for a wide range of

existing and emerging radio services and sought

to define the regulations that will govern them.

Despite the growing role wireless services

play, the world of international radiocommunication policymaking is largely removed from public

view. The institutions and procedures that guide

the development and coordination of wireless

services worldwide have long been the province

of engineers-not politicians or diplomats. Today,

however, as the frequencies used for radiocommunication become increasingly congested, the

problems of regulating international uses of the

radio spectrum are becoming progressively more

complex. And as the connections between radiocommunications, international trade and competitiveness, and national security have become

clearer, these problems have begun to draw more

high-level attention from American and foreign

policymakers.

REQUEST FOR THE STUDY

In November 1991 the Office of Technology

Assessment (OTA) released a background paper,

The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Issues for U.S. International Spectrum

Policy. 1 That paper examined the technologies

and issues to be considered at WARC-92, discussed the international and domestic context for

WARC-92 preparations, and analyzed the U.S.

process of conference preparation.

To complete the analysis of WARC-92 begun

in that paper, the House Committee on Energy

and Commerce and the Senate Committee on

Commerce, Science, and Transportation requested

that OTA prepare a follow-on study that would

examine the outcomes of WARC-92 and their

implications for U.S. radiocommunications policy. Noting the importance of international radio

frequency allocations to emerging and established radiocommunication services and domestic

industries, the Committees requested that OTA

assess the relative success of the U.S. proposals to

WARC-92 and analyze the potential impacts that

the conference’s decisions might have on domestic radiocommunication services and policymaking, the international competitiveness of the

United States in new radio services, and the

ability of the United States to achieve its diplomatic and foreign policy goals.

To answer these questions, OTA focused its

analysis in three areas:

1. What decisions were reached at WMC-92?

What implications will these decisions have

on the development of new radio-based

technologies and services in this country?

How will the decisions of WARC-92 affect

1 U.S. Congress, Office of lkchnology Assessmen4 The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Issues for U.S. International

Spectrum Polic~ackground Paper, OTA-BP-TCT-76 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, November 1991). Hereafter

“O’IX, WmC-92,”
Chapter 1--Summary and Findings I 3

2.

3.

U.S. international competitiveness in radiocommunication applications and services

internationally?

How successful were U.S. proposals to

WARC-92? What were the barriers to

greater success? What lessons can be drawn

from the WARC-92 experience?

How does the current structure of radiocommunication policymaking in the United

States contribute to and/or detract from the

ability of the country to influence international radiocommunication policymaking?

What types of organizational or procedural

changes might be needed for the United

States to adapt to changes in the international procedures for setting international

radiocommunication policy?

This report is divided into three parts. Chapter

1 presents an overview of WARC-92, including

an analysis of the themes of the conference and a

discussion of the factors that will affect implementation of the final decisions. The chapter also

presents options for restructuring the U.S. WARC

preparation and radiocommunication policymaking processes to better respond to the challenges

of the 21st century. Chapter 2 presents a detailed

discussion of the allocation and technology issues

that were most important at WARC-92, discusses

the issues involved in domestic and international

implementation of WARC-92 allocations, and

considers the implications for existing and emerging U.S. radio technologies and services. Chapter

3 discusses—in the context of WARC-92 outcomes-the preparation for WARC-92, the management of preparations and conference negotiations,

and changes that may be needed in the domestic

structures and processes for preparing for and

implementing decisions made at future world

radiocommunication conferences.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The following section summarizes the conclusions OTA reached as a result of its research. The

underlying bases for these findings are discussed

in more detail throughout the report.

Overall, United States proposals enjoyed

mixed results at WARC-92. U.S. negotiators

achieved some notable successes, but also suffered some defeats. On many of the most important and controversial issues considered by the

conference, the broad objectives of the United

States were achieved. For example, the United

States was successful in preventing changes in

spectrum allocations that could have harmed

important domestic radiocommunication systems

and services. The United States was also successful in persuading the conference to adopt allocations for many important new and existing

services, including low-Earth orbiting satellite

(LEOS) systems, space research and communications systems, and high-frequency broadcasting

(see box l-A).

However, these

successes were

often tempered united States

by constraints on I proposals

how, when, or I achieved

where the newly- mixed results allocated frequencies could at WARC-92.

be used, It is unclear how serious (and permanent) these limitations will be, and it may not be possible to assess

their impact on new radio services until systems

begin operation. Thus, the ultimate effects of

some WARC-92 decisions are still uncertain, and

evaluations of the implications of these decisions

must remain tentative.

Any evaluation of the outcomes and implications of an international conference will be

colored by the perspective one takes. WARC-92

is no exception. Depending on how the goals and

objectives of the conference are defined, the

results are more or less successful. Taking a

narrow perspective, and merely comparing U.S.

proposals with the results of the conference may

lead to an overly negative assessment of the

outcomes of WARC-92. Many analysts prefer a
4 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

broader analysis that recognizes the difficulty of new radio services. The limited successes of

international negotiations and accepts that not all

U.S. proposals will be adopted at any given

conference. These analysts believe that results are

more accurately judged in the context of longerterm negotiating across several conferences and

many years. From this perspective, the mixed

results of the U.S. proposals at WARC-92 are

seen as only the frost step in achieving U.S.

objectives, and analysts who take this view see

WARC-92 as a success for ‘opening the door’ to

WARC-92 will serve as the foundation for future

proposals as U.S. representatives pursue frequency allocations and regulations favorable to

U.S. radiocommunication interests.

Some analysts, however, prefer an assessment

that views WARCs and their outcomes in isolation from the larger radiocommunication policy

process. From this perspective, to the extent that

U.S. proposals were adopted by WARC-92, the

conference was a ‘‘success’ ‘—whatever occurs
Chapter 1--Summary and Findings I 5

after the conference should be considered sepa- results of WARC-92 and may also obscure the

rately. OTA believes this perspective is too

restrictive and takes the decisions made at WARC92 out of context—the goals and objectives for

U.S. participation in a WARC should advance the

larger radiocommunication goals of the United

States. Such a narrow perspective may also

obscure flaws that might exist in the policy

development and/or preparation process.

Concentrating on the “success” or “failure” of U.S. proposals may oversimplify the

nuances of implementing the frequency allocation decisions made at the conference. Several

factors will affect how WARC-92 decisions are

implemented and what the implications of

those decisions will be. First, WARC-92 does not

mark the end of international spectrum negotiations, nor does it represent the fma1 resolution of

the issues it addressed. It was only one, albeit

important, step in the continuous process of

allocating and regulating frequencies internation-
6 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

ally. Similarly, the agreements reached at WARC92 are not cast in stone-future negotiations and

world radiocommunication conferences may

modify or even reverse some of them. This fact

works both for and against those who take a‘ ‘long

view. ” When decisions are subject to review, it is

easier to downplay negative outcomes as only a

temporary or minor setback that will eventually

Agreements

reached at WARC-92

are not cast in stone----

future conferences

may modify or even

reverse some of

them.

be overcome

through future

negotiations. On

the other hand,

the successes

achieved by U.S.

negotiators are

also subject to

review and/

or modification.

Winnin g favorable power limits

at WARC-92, for example, does not mean that

such limits will not be changed (in ways unfavorable to U.S. interests) based on further studies or

operational experiences.2

Second, many of the details involved in implementing the new allocations and services are yet

to be worked out. The decisions reached in Spain

must now be adopted by each ITU-member

country, and any conflicts in implementing WMC92 allocations and the systems that will use them

will have to be resolved in negotiations between

countries. In those bands of frequencies where

spectrum must be shared, users will have to work

out sharing arrangements to prevent harmful

interference. In addition, many of the technical

details that will affect the future of these services

and technologies are still undecided. WARC-92

called on the International Radio Consultative

Committee (CCIR) to conduct studies on the

technical aspects of many of the allocations

adopted.

Third, WARC-92 assigned long transition times

to many services before new allocations can be

used, making the implications of WARC-92

difficult to foresee. Some WARC-92 allocations

cannot come into effect for 10 or 15 years in order

to give existing users of the bands adequate time

to move to other frequencies. The full force of

some of the decisions made at WARC-79, for

example, are just beginning to be felt. Likewise,

some WARC-92 allocations are not scheduled to

come into effect until 2007, and so it will be many

years before their effects will be evident. In the

meantime, radio technology will continue to

advance, and international and domestic regulations will continue to evolve. Because of this,

evaluating the outcomes of WARC-92 is, in one

sense, premature. Rather, the outcomes of WARC92 must be examined as one step in a longer

process that stretches out for many years before

and after.

Finally, the fact that WARC-92 allocated radio

frequencies for new and existing radio services

does not guarantee that those services-and the

individual systems implemented to provide themwill be technically viable or economically successful. In a broad sense, the final assessment of

WARC-92 will depend on how successful U.S.

systems will be in domestic and world markets.

Consumers and foreign regulators will ultimately

determine the outcomes of WARC-92.

The preparation and negotiation of proposals for WARC-92 and the outcomes and

implications of the conference cannot be divorced from the broader U.S. radiocommunication policy process. From this perspective,

lack of integrated, long-term radiocommunication planning by U.S. spectrum managers

and policy makers hurt U.S. preparations for

WARC-92 and now threatens to undermine

2 Commenters have pointed out that this outcome makes WARC-92 a‘ ‘success. ’ However, since the limits agreed to at the conference may

be changed, this victory may ultimately prove hollow.
Chapter l-Summary and FindingsI 7

the successes achieved at the conference.3

Driven primarily by advances in technology and

a commitment to improving competitiveness, the

perspective of both government and industry has

been too narrowly focused on merely gaining

access to new radio frequencies. As a result of the

rush to prepare positions for WARC-92—and

now to license services—larger policy issues

have been overlooked or neglected, and insufficient consideration is being given to the longterm consequences of implementing new technologies and services. The result has been an often

reactive and short-sighted approach to spectrum

policy--once frequencies are allocated, other

issues can be addressed later. This problem is

exacerbated because radiocommunications policy development and spectrum management in

the United States is divided between the Federal

Communications Commission (FCC) and the

National Telecommunications and Information

Administration (NTIA), with input from the

Department of State on international issues. No

common vision or policy goals currently unite

these agencies, and although new leadership may

bring more foresight to the process, institutional

inertia and personal ambivalence about the prospects of radiocommunication planning among

spectrum managers may frustrate the development of new policy directions. Preparations and

negotiations for future world radiocommunication conferences will be impaired if radiocommu -

nication policymaking continues to be fragmented and unfocused.

Past approaches to international radiocommunication policy development and negotiations may no longer produce the most successful outcomes for the United States at future

conferences. While U.S. technologies and markets still lead the world in many wireless services,

new international competitors will challenge the

United States to develop more cooperative strategies that rely less on U.S. market power and more

on developing consensus and agreement with new

(and old) allies around the world. Several trends

evident during the preparations for and negotiations at WARC-92 are challenging traditional

U.S. approaches to international policymaking.

The rapid development of new radio technologies and applications, the explosion of demand for wireless communication services,

and the consequent increase in congestion of

the radio frequency spectrum have put great

pressures on the structures and processes for

managing radio-based communications both

domestically and internationally. Finding

space on the airwaves for new technologies

and services is becoming increasingly difficult, and many counties, including the

United States, have become more protective

of their existing uses of the spectrum. Balancing the needs of existing and emerging

uses of the radio frequency spectrum will

become one of the most critical technological and political problems facing U.S. telecommunications policymakers.

Economics and politics have begun to play a

greater role in the way spectrum is allocated

both internationally and domestically as

radio services have assumed a greater role in

world communications and commerce. The

economic stakes involved in the decisions of

WARCs are huge, and as a result, decisions

and proposals regarding spectrum use are

often no longer based primarily on technical

criteria. In trying to develop domestic radiocommunication policy and prepare for WARCs,

U.S. spectrum managers must often contend

with politically powerful users, large invest3 The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineer~United States Activities (IEEE-USA) recently noted the over-concentration on

short-term domestic issues to the detriment of long-tam pkmnin g and accommodation of international concerns. See Comments of the Institute

of Electrical and Electronics Engineers before the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Notice of Inquiry in the

matter of Current and Future Requirements for the Use of Radio Frequencies in the United States, Docket No. 920532-2132, released June

1, 1992.
8 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

ments in equipment, and users with long

histories of successful operation and public

service. Internationally, maintaining and promoting the competitiveness of U.S. products

and services in world radiocommunication

markets and protecting vital national (security) communication systems are increasingly important goals of U.S. international

spectrum policy.

In this newly economically-driven context,

government and private sector representatives are especially concerned about the rise

of regional blocks of countries that are

uniting to protect and advance their economic interests in international meetings

such as WARC-92. These coalitions can

wield significant power in forums such as the

ITU, with its one-nation, one-vote process,

and could effectively work against U.S.

interests at future world radiocommunication

conferences. These regional groups also

often have enormous technological, manufacturing, and/or market power that could

pose a serious threat to U.S. competitive

interests in global markets. On the other

hand, these new alignments may present the

United States with an important opportunity

to cultivate support for U.S. positions.

As telecommunications industries have been

deregulated and privatized and as markets

have been liberalized around the world, the

private sector and radiocommunication user

groups have begun to play an increasingly

important role in the development of international spectrum policy. This rise may portend important changes in the role of the ITU

in international spectrum regulation. Negotiations that previously involved only governments will in the future more directly include

a variety of spectrum “special interest

groups”—private sector and extra-governmental organizations that represent important international users of radiocommunications—the world aviation community, for

example. These international groups were

evident at WARC-92 and worked hard behind the scenes to have their concerns

addressed.

The rise of such groups and the increasing

involvement of the private sector in international regulatory affairs pose a substantial

challenge for U.S. policymakers. The problem is that the interests and goals of transnational companies and organizations will not

always match those of the United States.

Even those companies based in the United

States may have trouble supporting U.S.

positions if those positions conflict with

their own international interests or with the

interests of their industry. In the future,

government spectrum managers must be

watchful that U.S. companies participating

in international conferences support U.S.

positions and do not promote their own

special interests to the detriment of specific

U.S. objectives. A strong policy focus must

be maintained if the United States is to be

successful in influencing international radiocommunication policymaking.

Finally, the ITU recently restructured itself

and its processes to better meet the challenges presented by these changes. In this

new environment, the United States is being

forced to reexamine traditional assumptions

about how the spectrum is allocated and how

radiocommunication policy should be set.

Reliance on purely market-based approaches

to spectrum policy are likely to be inadequate to protecting and promoting U.S.

technological competitiveness and policy

leadership in future international policy decisions.

In order to maximize the success of U.S.

proposals at future world radiocommunication conferences, the current structure and

processes of radiocommunication policymaking in the United States will have to change.

Institutional organization, responsibilities, and
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 9

procedures for future world radiocommunication

conferences must be reexamined. Current levels

of funding for WARC preparation and negotiation may be inadequate with future conferences

now slated to occur every 2 years. Planning,

preparation, and negotiation for these biennial

meetings will become continuous activities, replacing the more sporadic efforts for past conferences. Centralizing WARC preparation could

streamline decisionmaking and eliminate the

funding disparities between agencies that characterized WARC-92. Options for improving WARC

preparations-and radiocommunication policy in

general—are discussed at the end of this chapter.

A critical long-term concern for U.S. spectrum

managers and policymakers is balancing important national economic and security interests

against the broader goals of international cooperation, integration, and regulatory accord. In some

cases, legitimate U.S. radiocommunication requirements may not match global needs. However, U.S. policy makers must be wary of advocating positions that too often conflict with world

needs or that run the risk of isolating the United

States from the world radiocommunication community. Many analysts believe that an isolationist

approach could decrease U.S. effectiveness in

international radiocommunication policymaking

in the long term. Thorough evaluations must be

made of the foreign policy implications of U.S.

positions, and international considerations must

be weighed carefully in developing U.S. domestic

and international spectrum policies. U.S. spectrum managers must also develop better guidelines to balance the needs of new and existing

spectrum users, More open and effective procedures are needed to compare and evaluate proposals from competing government agencies and

between the government and the private sector.

Cooperation between U.S. Government and

private sector interests is generally good during WARC preparations and negotiations.

Although each group vigorously pursues its

own interests, and conflicts are hard-fought,

both sides work together to develop U.S.

positions and policies. In large part, this spirit of

cooperation is the result of the extensive network

of personal relationships that have been built over

many years, and the prior experience many in the

private sector gained while working for the

government. The downside of this cooperative

process is that

sometimes it is

unclear who is

in charge of for- Sometimes it is

mulating U.S. in- unclear who is in

ternational spec-

. charge of formulating

trum policy—

the Federal Gov- U.S. ‘international

ernment or the spectrum policy—the

private sector and Government or

its consultants. private sector.

Despite such

problems, however, this network of individuals

could form a foundation for the future development of aggressive and forward-thinkin g U s .

radiocommunication policy, if guided by clear

and creative guidelines and a focused policy

development process.

WARC-92: THE CONFERENCE

WARC-92 began on February 3 and ended

March 3, 1992. More than 1,400 delegates

attended the conference representing 127 of the

ITU’s 166 member countries. 4 The conference

was also attended by observers from 31 international and regional organizations (see appendix

B). Fifty-three official delegates from the United

States participated in the deliberations in Spain,

4 The number of countries has fluctuated rapidly in recent years as countries have consolidated (East/West G~y and North/$outh

Yemen) and as the member states of the former Soviet Union-the Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus, for example-have sought to enter

the ITU as independent members. Delegates from 124 countries attended WARC-92, with 3 (Belize, Latvia, and Liechtenstein) represented

by proxy.
10 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

More than 1,400 delegates representing 127 countries

participated in the deliberations of WARC-92.

representing a wide range of interests from the

Federal Government and the private sector (see

table l-l). Jan Witold Baran, a lawyer from

Washington, DC, served as head of the U.S.

delegation, a position that confers temporary

ambassadorial status. A support staff of 18

additional representatives provided technical and

administrative assistance to the delegation at the

conference, and approximately 30 more U.S.

citizens attended all or part of the conference as

observers and informal advisers. 5 During the

conference, a “home team” of approximately 40

government and private sector representatives

remained in the United States and provided

additional technical and policy guidance to the

delegation in Spain.

The work of WARC-92 was functionally

divided among a variety of committees (see

appendix A for a description of the formal

seven-committee structure of WARC-92). The

most important work, and the majority of formal

negotiations, at WARC-92 was conducted in the

meetings of Committee 4 (the Allocations Committee), and Committee 5 (the Regulatory Committee). These committees distributed their work

to ad hoc and drafting groups in which small

groups of delegates forged agreements on specific

topics and developed regulations for implementing changes. The supreme body of WARC-92 was

the plenary, which was chaired by the Honorable

Jose Barrionuevo Peña of Spain.6 It was at the

plenary sessions that decisions were formally and

finally agreed to-most of the Plenary sessions

took place in the last several days of the conference.

The decisions made at WARC-92 resulted

from a complex mixture of formal committee

meetings and extensive informal discussions

outside of the formal meeting structure. These

informal discussions, during which much of the

real work of the conference--negotiation and

persuasion—took place, were held during coffee

breaks between sessions, at lunches around town,

and at after-hours meetings anywhere there was

space. The agreements reached at the conference

Table 1-1—WARC-92 Delegates’

Department of Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Department of Defenseb

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Federal Communications Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Other Government

National Aeronautics and Space Administration . . . 2

National Science Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Coast Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

U.S. Information Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Federal Aviation Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

a Includes support staff.

b Includes Army, Navy, and Air Force.

NOTE: Some private sector delegates worked as contractors supporting various government agencies.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, based on U.S.

Delegation Report.

5 The United States was the only delegation to send a separate ‘‘support staff. ” In practice these individuals performed duties that closely

resembled those of the formal delegates, although they were not considered delegates by ITU and did not have direct access to working

documents, except through fellow delegates.

6 For conferences held outside Geneva (home base for ITU), the chairman of a WARC is traditionally provided by the country hosting the

conference. Five vie-chairs, including Ambassador Jan Baran, the head of the U.S. delegation were selected by the delegates to assist the chair.

Delegates from the Russian Federation Cote d’Ivoire, China, and Norway served as the other vice-chairs.
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 11

were based on consensus and compromise, although informal polls were sometimes taken to

gauge support and/or opposition to a specific

proposal. Although formal voting on issues is

provided for in the rules of the ITU, it is usually

only used as a last resort, and no formal votes

were taken at WARC-92. This was considered a

minor victory by some members of the U.S.

delegation, since the United States was isolated

on some issues and had only tentative support on

others. Formal voting on these issues could have

been embarrassing for the United States.

As a result of the month-long negotiations,

WARC-92 allocated frequencies to a number of

emerging radiocommunication services and systems, including low-Earth orbiting satellite (LEOS)

systems, 7 broadcasting-satellite services for audio

broadcasting (BSS-Sound), and HDTV. See box

1-A for brief descriptions of these services. The

conference also expanded the frequency allocations for the Mobile-Satellite Service (MSS),

high-frequency (HF) broadcasting, and a variety

of space research and operations services. Box

1-B summarizes the allocations made at WARC92 and figure 1-1 shows a sample page from the

Final Acts of WARC-92. Chapter 2 discusses the

allocations in greater detail.

WARC-92 differed from past WARCs in

several respects. It was the first WARC in more

than 12 years to attempt a broad revision of the

international Table of Frequency Allocations. As

opposed to the WARCs of the 1980s, which

generally concentrated on one service-mobile,

high-frequency broadcasting, or space communication services--WARC-92 addressed a wide

range of allocation issues covering many segments of the radio spectrum. Compounding the

breadth of the conference, the time allotted to

WARC-92 was short, both for preparations-less

than 2 years-and for the conference itself.

New radiocommunication services will permit people

to communicate to and from almost anywhere in the

world.

WARC-92 was limited to only 4 weeks; however,

for previous WARCs, the ITU had allotted

substantially longer time.

Most analysts believe that WARC-92 was

probably the last broad reallocation conference

that will be held. At a special plenipotentiary held

in December 1992, the ITU adopted a new

timetable for future radiocommunication conferences.

8 According to that schedule, WARCs,

renamed ‘‘world radiocommunication conferences,’ would be held every 2 years. Most

observers expect these conferences to be narrower

in focus than WARC-92-concentrating on one

service or area of the spectrum, more like the

WARCs of the 1980s. The format and working

procedures of future conferences were also

changed in order to streamline decisionmaking

and reflect the increasing role of the private sector

in international telecommunications policymaking. The full impact of these changes will not be

felt for several years, however, since some of the

agreed-to changes have not yet been imple7 No types of LEOS systems were considered by WARC-92. “Little” LEOS systems plan to provide data and position-location services

and will operate in the VHF/UHF frequencies. ‘‘Big” LEOS will provide telephone services in addition to dat% and will operate in frequencies

above 1 GHz.

8 See OTA, M!4RC-92, op. cit., footnote 1 for further discussion of the organization and functioning of the ITU.
12 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications
Chapter 1--Summary and Findings I 13
14 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

MOD

Figure l-l-Sample Page From Final Acts of WARC-92

MHz

1613.8 -1626.5

r———

L— ——Allocation to —Serwces

1

Region 1

11

Frequencies — 1613.8 -1626.6

AERONAUTICAL

RADIONAVIGATION

MOBILE-SATELLITE

(Earth-to-space)

Region 2

1613.8 -1626.5

AERONAUTICAL

RADIONAVIGATION

RADiODETERMINATIONSATELLITE

(~a~h-to-space)

Mobk-Satellde

J

‘ ‘C>733A

(space-to-Earth)

MOBILE-SATELLITE

(Earth-to-space)

New & existing

footnotes —

Mobde-Satelllte

L(“ -)

(space-to-Earth)

722727730731 731X

731 Y 732733 733A 722 731X 731 Y 732733

\733B 733E 733F 733C 733D 733E

r SUP 731A

Footnotes

that have

{

SUP 731B

been

removed. SUP 731C

L SUP 731D

Region 3

1613.8 -1626.5

AERONAUTICAL

RADIONAVIGATION

MOBILE-SATELLITE

(Earth-to-space)

Radiodeterminatlon-Satelhte

(Earth-to-space)

733A

Moblle+atelhte

(space-to-Earth)

722727730731 X 731 Y

732733 733B 733E

Indicates a

new footnote

that has

been added

to the table.

L> 0ADD 731Y

The use of the band 1613.8 -1626.5 MHz by the mobile-satelllte

service (space-to-Earth) is subject to the application of the coordination and notification procedures set forth in Resolution COM5/8.

+- ITU

Regions

Allocations

1

1

Primary

serwces are

listed In all

capital letters

1

I

/

Secondary

services are

Irsted m Initial

capdal letters.

Final Acfs of fhe thfd
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 15

mented. In order to evaluate the implications of

these changes for the United States, the Department of State has convened a task force under the

auspices of the U.S. national CCIR/International

Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) committee structure. That group will

also study possible improvements in U.S. structures and procedures that could allow the United

States to participate more effectively in the new

ITU.

THEMES AND TRENDS FROM WARC-92

A number of broad trends complicated the

negotiations leading up to and at WARC-92, and

several important themes were evident at the

conference that will influence the course of future

ITU proceedings and meetings. U.S. spectrum

policymakers and managers must take account of

these trends in order to ensure the success of U.S.

negotiating efforts for future world radiocommunication conferences.

E Spectrum Negotiations Are Becoming

Increasingly Difficult

The overarching message to come out of

WARC-92 is how difficult it has become to

achieve international consensus on spectrum

matters. WARC-92 has been described as one of

the most difficult international radio conferences

in memory. The issues were technically complex

and interrelated. New geopolitical realities had

redefined who the important players were, and

economic concerns drove countries to protect

their existing radio services and users with a

tenacity rarely seen before.

WARC-92 came very near to failing entirely.9

Twenty-four hours before the scheduled end of

the conference, several major allocation issues

remained unresolved-future public land mobile

telecommunications systems (FPLMTS), MSS,

and BSS-Sound—and delegates talked openly

about calling a formal halt to the proceedings. If

that had occurred, it is possible that no decisions

would have been accepted, no new allocations

would have been made, and more than 2 years of

preparation would have been left unfulfilled.

Several factors made WARC-92 difficult. First,

the agenda for the conference changed (and

expanded) substantially over time. originally,

WARC-92 was conceived as a limited conference

that would resolve issues left over from previous

WARCs and address a small number of new

allocations for space and mobile services. After

the initial scope of WARC-92 was set by the 1989

ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, however, it was

expanded considerably at the 1990 ITUAdministrative Council meeting. At that meeting, the United

States added many new items to the agenda,

including frequency allocations for ‘little’ LEOS,

terrestrial supplements to BSS-Sound, and some

new space services. Even after the agenda was

finalized in 1990, however, the range of topics to

be addressed continued to grow. Companies in

the United States unveiled plans in late 1990 for

“big” LEOS systems that would provide telephone service in addition to data communications, and that would require a frequency allocation all their own. Because these systems are a

type of Mobile-Satellite Service, they were considered at WARC-92 as part of the MSS negotiations. The result of this expansion was that issues

became more complex and interrelated, more

viewpoints had to be accommodated, and government and private sector resources were stretched

very thin. Nonetheless, the broader agenda did

force WARC-92 to consider many (new) topics in

which the United States had important interests.

g Ln ITU parlance, ‘‘fail’ seems to have a specific mcaning, although there is disagreement over exactly what it is. Some delegates believe

that if a conference fails, it is adjourned without any final agreements being signed+ven on those issues where decisions had been reached.

Others believe that the conference could sign a partial agreement on items that had been agreed to. No WARC has ever ended this way, but

the threat of “failure’ was used at WARC-92 to push delegates to compmmise.
16 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

9 Technology Issues: Existing Services

or New Uses?

The clearest theme governing the negotiations

at WARC-92 was the battle between existing and

new technologies-how to find room in the

spectrum for new technologies and services while

accommodating the existing users of the spectrum. The spectrum is already completely allocated from 9 kHz up to 275 GHz (300 GHz in the

United States), and many of these frequencies,

especially in the bands below 6 GHz are heavily

used (see box 1-C for a brief description of radio

waves and the

radiospectrum). 10

D

And while policyelegates makers and engistruggled to find need-s in the United

spectrum for new States continue to

technologies while I

propose ways to

make more effiaccommodating cient use of the

existing users of spectrum and

the spectrum. accommodate

more users, congestion continues to increase.ll Thus, new systems

and services trying to gain access to radio frequencies often must contend with entrenched users with

long histories of serving public (and private) needs

and who have large investments in equipment.

In the U.S. preparation process, the battle over

the 1435-1525 MHz band of frequencies illustrates this tension. Proponents of satellitedelivered audio broadcasting wanted to use a

portion of this band to deliver BSS-Sound services. The band, however, is already used by the

Federal Government and aerospace companies to

provide aeronautical telemetry (tracking, data

relay, etc.) services in support of aircraft testing

and missile development.12 Debate over the U.S.

proposal(s) for these frequencies was intense.

At WARC-92, the battle between old and new

was clearly evident. On most issues, countries

sought to protect their existing services, in which

they have often invested millions or billions of

dollars, while simultaneously promoting new

technologies and services with the potential to

provide new or better services where none existed

before or that could advance their competitive

interests. This battle often separated the developed and developing countries. Developing countries, because of sunk investments and a lack of

resources to modernize, often resisted new allocations that could make their existing systems

obsolete. Developed countries, on the other hand,

which are generally better able to implement new

technologies more rapidly, were the major force

pushing allocations for new types of radio services. Although resource problems face both developing and developed countries, large-scale

changes in systems may be more keenly felt in

developing countries, many of which lack the

funds and personnel to make such changes. Such

countries are likely to need financial and technical

help to implement new systems. Recognizing

these problems, WARC-92 adopted Resolution

22, which calls on the ITU’s Telecommunications

Development Bureau (BDT) to provide assistance to countries in need.13

10 o’I.A, wmc-$v, op. cit., footnote 1.

11 Congms, for e=ple, has ~n considering legislation for sevaal years that would take spectrum from the government ~d me it

available to the private sector. The FCC has put great emphasis on sharing spectrum and competition in its recent proceedings, and has attempted

to encourage innovation and Spectrum-efficient applications in its Pioneer’s Preference ruling. NTrA has initiated a study looking at the

long-range spectrum needs of the counrry. Scholars, policymakers, and industry analysts alike are debating the value of auctions for assigning

spec(rum rights. See OTA, WMC-92, op. cit., footnote 1 for further discussion of the technical developments affecting spectrum

congestion.

12 MS ~mpnents ~W w~ted t. me the band for mobile services. For more information on the history of this debate, see O’M, WMC-92,

op. cit., footnote 1.

13 ~temtio~ ~lecomrnunication (hioq Fina/Ac(s of the WorkiAdministrative Radio Conference (WWC-92), Resolution 22. Hereafter,

‘‘ITU, Final Acts.”
As the spectrum becomes more crowded and

congested, convincing existing users in the United

States and abroad to share or give up their

spectrum will become increasingly difficult. American strategists and policymakers must recognize

that convincing incumbents to share spectrum or

move will require sustained efforts in political,

economic, and technical persuasion. As part of

these efforts, the United States may wish to target

programs and funding that would help developing

countries modernize their (radio) communication

services and infrastructures. Such funding, in

combination with direct private sector aid to these

countries, would make U.S. systems and services

more affordable and accessible internationally,

and could promote demand for U.S. technology

and equipment overseas. Such a strategy may also

help counter efforts on the part of other countries,

notably Japan and several European countries, to

build international markets

nications equipment.

M The Rise of Regional

Another important trend

for their telecommuBlocks

evident at WARC-92

was the linking of countries in groups in order to

more forcefully present their positions. WARC92 was the first WARC held under the banner of

the ‘new world order.’ The USSR had dissolved,

and its control over a strong block of Eastern

European countries had almost vanished.14 The

historic North-South divisions that separated the

developing and developed countries for many

years had lessened, replaced on many issues (but

not all) by divisions between blocks of countries,

each united by common regional and economic

concerns. Among these, a unified block of

Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 17

<

.

,4.

<.\,

New satellite technologies will enable people in

remote parts of the world to access many kinds of

information and receive technical assistance tailored

to their specific needs--all at low cost.

European countries, represented by the Conference of European Postal and Telecommunications administrations (CEPT), was the strongest

at WARC-92. The developing countries, as a

group, exhibited little of the unity and cohesiveness they have shown in the past. However,

toward the end of the conference, under the

guidance of Mr. Abderrazak Berrada of Morocco,

many of the developing countries, especially

from Africa and the Middle East, were able to

exercise considerable control over debate on

many important issues.

15 While other regional

blocks did not show the cohesiveness and determination of CEPT, some countries of the Asian

Pacific and Latin America were able to cooperate

on specific issues—indicating their potential

emergence as a force to be reckoned with at future

conferences.

14 me Russia Federation did send a delegation to WARC-92, as did the Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus. The delegates for lheSe new

countries were, by and large, the same individuals that had represented the USSR in the pas~ and they usually acted together in their proposals

and negotiations. By most assessments they were an effective, although limited, force at WARC-92.

15 At past co~ermms, developing ~untries often would setup (or threaten) votes on specfIc issues they knew they had a maJorhY for. h

this way, they could more directly control the outcomes of the conferences. At WARC-92 their impact was much more beni~ if importantno votes were takeq but the number of potential votes commanded by Mr. Berrada was an important force in making the developing countries

voices heard and forcing concessions out of the developed countries.
18 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN POSTAL AND

TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADMINISTRATIONS

to present a more unified front at international

meetings. In forums such as WARC-92, where

The most powerful bloc at WARC-92 was each country has one vote, such a unified group

CEPT, representing 32 European countries.l6 can potentially command a substantial number of

CEPT members are the telecommunications regu- votes, and this power gives an enormous amount

latory authorities from each participating country. of leverage in conference negotiations. At WARCFor the past several years, CEPT has been gaining 92, CEPT was closely coordinated, presenting

the attention of U.S. international spectrum ex- common positions on most of the items the

perts as it has become more coordinated and able conference considered. The tight cohesiveness

16 Atilou@ ~~ is dfIIOSt unanimously regarded as the most powerful single force at WARC-92, curiously, little mention has been made

as to how effective the European bloc was at the conference. While such an evaluation is outside the scope of this report, future studies of the

CEPT organimtion and processes might provide valuable lessons for the United States as it plans for future conferences.
Chapter l-Summary and FindingsI 19

Table l-C-l—Radio Frequency Bands and Uses

NAME Frequency range Examples of services

Very low frequency (VLF)

Low frequency (LF)

Medium frequency (MF)

High frequency (HF)

Very high frequency (VHF)

Ultrahigh frequency (UHF)

Superhigh frequency (SHF)

Extremely high frequency (EHF)

3 to 30 kHz

30 to 300 kHz

300 to 3,000 kHz

3 to 30 MHz

30 to 300 MHz

300 to 3,000 MHz

3 to 30 GHz

Above 30 GHz

Marine navigation

Marine and aeronautical navigation equipment

AM radio broadoast, LORAN maritime navigation, longdistance aeronautical and maritime navigation

Shortwave broadcast, amateur radio, CB radio

Private radio land mobile services such as police, fire, and

taxi dispatch; TV channels (2 through 13); FM broadcasting;

cordless phones; baby monitors

UHFTV channels; cellular phones; common carrier point-topoint microwave transmission used by Iong-distance phone

companies; satellite mobile services

Radar, point-to-point micowave, and satellite communication

Satellite communioations and space research

SOURCE: Harry Mileaf (cd.), Electronics One, revised 2n Ed. (Rochelle Park, NJ: Hayden Book Co., Inc., 1976), p. 1014; and John

J. Keller, “No Vacancies,” The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 9,1990, p. R14.

Individual radiocommunication services use specific bands of frequencies, which are allocated to them at

world administrative radio conferences (WARCs). FM radio broadcasting, for example, uses the 88-108 MHz band

(see figure 1-C-2). In many cases, however, bands of frequencies are shared by different services. In the lower

part of the radio spectrum, for example, frequency bands are often shared by fixed (point-to-point) and mobile

radiocommunication services.

Figure l-C-2—Radio Frequency Spectrum and Selected Services

AM radio

(535-1 705 kHz)

r-” I

VHF TV,

chs. 2-6 Ku-Band

(54-72 MHz VHF TV, (10.7-12.2 GHz

and chs. 7-13 Cellular and

76-88 MHz) (1 74-216 MHz) (825-894 MHz)

L“7”J “?25~??$15GHz )

(88-108 MHz) (512-806 MHz)

< [ —...–. ..+ . ....–...~ ~ I ..-+..-1

300 kHz 3000 kHz 30 MHz 300 MHz 3000 MHz

(3 MHz) (3 GHz)

L——-J >

30 GHz

NOTE: This figure uses a logarithmic scale with dashed lines representing breaks in the scale. Shaded areas in different segments

of the scale are not proportional. For example, AM radio occupies 1,170 kHz of spectrum, while cellular (which appears smaller

visually) actually occupies 69,000 kHz of spectrum.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
20 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

and determined approach of the CEPT countries

made CEPT a strong, almost immovable force on

many issues.17

In analyzing the performance of CEPT at

WARC-92, some observers and delegates tend to

see CEPT as a monolithic group that would not

compromise on any issue. In large part, this view

stems from CEPT’s unwillingness to compromise

on the high visibility MSS (including big LEOS)

issues that were priorities for the United States.

Individual European countries were often unwilling to change their positions so as not to break

down the unity of the CEPI’positions.18 However,

while it is true that CEPT’s lack of flexibility

made it difficult to negotiate with on several

important issues, on other matters CEPT was

reportedly more willing to compromise. In the

debate over BSS-Sound, for example, internal

divisions in CEPT forced a change in its position.

The perceived inflexibility of the CEPT bloc

(and the United States’ own determination) appears to have had at least one positive outcome.

Delegates from both sides agree that such rigidity

undermined the ability of Europe and the United

States to negotiate before and at WARC-92, and

that more flexibility in negotiations might produce better outcomes at future conferences. This

realization may lead to more productive discussions and negotiations between the United States

and Europe prior to the next world radiocommunication conference.

The role of CEPT in future international

spectrum negotiations is somewhat unclear due to

continuing reorganization of its structure and

functions. Prior to 1987, CEPT was composed of

telecommunications regulators, systems operators, and telecommunications services providers.

In that year, the role of CEPT was redefined and

the scope of its power diminished by transferring

standards development activities to the European

Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).

In September 1992, CEPT reorganized again, and

now consists solely of telecommunications regulators, with system operators and services providers forming a separate group.19 Within CEPT, the

focal point of radiocommunication policymaking

is the European Radiocommunications Office

(ERO), which evaluates spectrum use and development, manages spectrum interests, and develops long-term spectrum policy.

As a result of these restructurings, CEPT

activities have become increasingly focused on

regional and international radiocommunications

policymaking-with the goal of promoting greater

harmonization of European policies. This concentration, and the slowly increasing political and

economic unification of Europe, may eventually

strengthen CEPT as an organization and bring it

to the forefront of European radiocommunication

policy development. However, at the end of 1992,

the various European organizations (including

CEPT, ETSI, and the European Community (EC))

had not settled all the jurisdictional and procedural battles over radiocommunication policy. It

is still too early to tell if restructuring will make

the European process more or less effective, and

what impact these efforts will have on European

performance at future world radiocomrmmication

conferences.

Aside from its new focus on radiocommunications policy, regional changes could bolster

Europe’s and CEPT’s position. Driven by economic concerns, for example, the nations of

Europe are becoming increasingly united on trade

and competitiveness issues—a trend that may

17 me ~~vior of CEPT at W~C-92 has been likened to a battleship-large and powdtd, but slow to ~uver.

18 ~ addition t. the CEPT ~oup, the Europ~ community had its own representatives at W~C-92. Some U.S. delegates to W~C-92

believe that this group was present to enforce the solidarity of the European countries at the conference. Several observers, however, note that

such pressures were resisted by CEPT members, especially those not belonging to the EC, and that the relationship between the EC and CEPT

representatives was strained at best.

19 ~~= Evagow ‘‘cEn: Ri3di0 hterference, “ Communications Week International, July 20, 1992, p. 4,
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 21

foreshadow greater cooperation on radiocommunication policy development in order to support

common economic goals. With the dissolution of

the USSR, the newly independent countries of

Eastern Europe have been seeking alliances with

Western Europe, including joining CEPT or the

EC (see figure 1-2). CEPT’s numbers (and hence

the number of potential votes CEPT would

represent) will likely swell in the next several

years. A larger CEPT representing more countries

at future conferences could pose a substantial

challenge to U.S. negotiators and policymakers.

INTER-AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

CONFERENCE (CITEL)

The countries of the Western Hemisphere have

their own forum for coordinating telecommunications policies, CITEL.20 However, in the past,

CITEL has served little more than a discussion

function for its members; it has not been an

effective force for coordinating regional radio- or

telecommunication policies. In preparation for

WARC-92, many of the countries in the Western

Hemisphere, including the United States, made a

concerted effort to build regional cooperation-at

least in part in response to the perceived power of

the CEPT alliance-in order to present a stronger,

more united front at the conference. Two formal

meetings were held in an attempt to work out

common positions, and working groups were set

up to develop common views that could be used

by all CITEL members to form the basis for their

own national proposals.21 Despite recognition of

the importance of such activities and extensive

discussions between countries, no formal common proposals/positions were adopted.

During the conference, CITEL had little more

success in building a stronger presence and

promoting regional views. A schedule of meetings had not been set up in advance of WARC-92

and formal discussions were held only in the last

2 weeks of the conference. Ambassador Baran

hosted a luncheon for CITEL members, but only

a few countries attended. The CEPT countries, on

the other hand, met daily to update members on

late-breaking news and to develop negotiation

strategies and responses. In the end, the CITEL

effort was ineffective because members could not

agree on common views.

The ineffectiveness of CITEL at WARC-92 is

the result of several factors. There is little

historical tradition of cooperation between the

countries in the Western Hemisphere on telecommunication matters. CITEL has been underfunded by the Organization of American States,

its parent organization, for many years. Perhaps

most importantly, the countries that participate in

CITEL are a more heterogeneous grouppolitically, economically, and culturally-than

the countries that belong to CEPT. There are

fewer natural and historical linkages that can be

used to promote cooperation.

However, the failure of CITEL’S efforts at

WARC-92 should not be considered a systemic

failure of CITEL as a coordination mechanism.

Rather, its ineffectiveness illustrates the need for

better regional cooperation, both in conference

preparation and at the conferences, and indicates

that further work must be done if CITEL is to

more forcefully represent the interests of its

members. Most analysts do not believe, however,

that the goal of efforts to improve CITEL should

be to mirror the kind of organization represented

by CEPT--namely, development and strict adherence to common regional proposals by all

members. “Common proposals” carry with them

m CITEL is an ongoing conference convened under the auspices of the @g anization of American States. See OTA, WIRC-92, op. cit.,

footnote 1 for a more in-depth discussion of CITEL, its historical developmen~ and its WMC-92 preparations.

z] ~s approach differs from that of CE~, which actually submitted ‘‘European Common Proposals for the Work Of the Cotierence. ’ ~

contrast, the idea behind CITEL WARC-92 preparations was not for the CITEL countries to actually submit “common proposals’ to which

each country would adhere, but to develop common positions from which each country would develop and submit its own formal, individual

proposals for WMC-92. See International Tklecormmmication Unio~ “European Common Proposals for the Work of the Conference, Parts

I and II, ” Document 20-E, Oct. 7, 1991.
22 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Figure 1-2--Current and Projected European Community Membership

— —

ijz/z /Finland”

Russia

v

&

v Estonia (2000)

Latvia (2000)

y!

1’ Lithuania (2000)

Szech

Liechtenstein 

?iwitzerland

Yovenia

 Republic (2000

 (2000),

(1996)

(1996)c

*W”

<~

w

Mlual Ila

G

Greece ‘ Q

‘---”T

– Bosnia-Herzegovina

— Montenegro

,.,

D European Community ~ European Free Trade Association m EC Associate Countries

(1996), (2000) –Indicate projected dates countries may join the European Community

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 23

the potential loss of national sovereignty and

could lead to the type of inflexibility many

observers attributed to CEPT. Maintaining national flexibility in a framework of regional

cooperation seems to be the consensus goal of

those involved.

Continued improvement in CITEL’s effectiveness will require the cooperative efforts of the

U.S. private sector and the Federal Government,

as well as the other member countries of CITEL.

Representatives from all these groups recognize

the need for better coordination, and individuals

from several CITEL countries approached U.S.

delegation members and observers to talk about

ways to improve future efforts. A long-term

commitment must be made to the CITEL process

if the region is to effectively work together at

future world radiocommunication conferences.

OTHER REGIONAL BLOCKS

In addition to CEPT and CITEL, some delegates reported that the French- and Englishspeaking countries of Africa were more united

than they had been at past conferences. They also

showed a willingness to follow the leadership of

Morocco on several issues, making Africa a

powerful force in later stages of the conference.

As further evidence of the increasing unity of the

African continent, observers point to the development of a regional satellite system-RASCOM.

Some analysts believe that the unifying force of

a common satellite communications system may

lead to a more coherent approach to meeting the

communications needs of the continent, and

could form the basis for future cooperative efforts

among the countries of Africa in telecommunications development and policymaking.

This coalescence could present the United

States with an opportunity to improve relations

with African nations and strengthen its negotiating positions internationally. Africa is part of the

same ITU region (Region 1, see figure 1-3) as

Europe. Improved ties and cooperation with

Africa could provide leverage for U.S.-supported

proposals. Other observers point out, however,

that the African nations are still disorganized—

they have nothing approaching the CEPT or even

CITEL organizations, and are not yet a major

market for telecommunications products or services.

The countries of the Asian Pacific represent

another region of the world that is becoming

increasingly important. While the region does not

have an organization comparable to CEPT, the six

countries of the Association of South East Asian

Nations (ASEAN) have cooperated on trade

issues in the past and have announced the

formation of a free trade area that would include

320 million People.** And while not a member of

ASEAN, Australia has been an active force at past

conferences, including WARC-92. Japan has

been quiet at past conferences, but has economic

power that could come into play in the future.

Although uniting all these countries in a single

trading block is unlikely in the short term, they

represent a huge market for U.S. goods and

services, and could become powerful representatives of regional interests in ITU activities.

Because of these political/economic realignments and differences in the ways countries use

spectrum, the United States has lost many important allies and some of the historical influence it

has wielded in international radiocommunication

policymaking. At past conferences, the United

States had usually been able to count on the

industrialized world and even, to a certain extent,

on the USSR for support. By 1992, however,

many of these historical ties had dissolved, and

new ones were still being developed. As a result,

at different points in the conference, the United

States found itself isolated on several important

issues. The Europeans, for example, opposed the

United States on many items, including some of

the most important issues of the conference22 ASEAN mem~s include: Brunei Darussalam, Lndonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The ASE~ Fr= Trtie ha

(AIWA) is expected to begin Jan. 1, 1993. Paul Blustei~ “Southeas[ Asia Joins the Bloc Party,’ The Washington Post, Nov. 10, 1992, p. B1.

330-071 0 - 93 - 2 QL 3
24 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

/’” b.

.___.!!l!!yy-Ji
future terrestrial mobile services, MSS, and

BSS-Sound. The United States was also not able

to develop significant worldwide support for its

proposals on aeronautical public correspondence

(APC) and HDTV.23 The United States can no

longer rely solely on its market power and

technological preeminence to influence the outcomes of international radiocommunications conferences.

The rise of regional blocks of countries acting

in concert at ITU forums presents the United

States with both threats and opportunities. The

threats stem from the possibility that U.S. proposals and positions could be overpowered in future

WARCs. Conversely, the fluid state of alliances

presents the United States with an important

opportunity to encourage the formation of other

blocks of countries, either on a regional basis or

perhaps based on a particular special interest, that

could support U.S. positions. The United States

would not necessarily have to be an official

member of such alternative alliances for them to

prove useful. The development of alternate,

competing power centers could be used to balance

each other at future conferences. At the same

time, the United States should cultivate alliances,

both with members of the Western Hemisphere

and with individual countries or other regional or

international organizations that share U.S. concerns, in order to promote U.S. interests.

1 The Economics and Politics of WARC-92

Economics and, as a consequence, politics are

playing increasingly pivotal roles in the allocation of spectrum both internationally and domestically. In the past, international spectrum allocation was largely the province of government

engineers, spectrum managers, and representatives from a few large (U. S.) telecommunications

companies. Today, as the world’s telecommunications industries and service providers are inChapter l-Summary and Findings I 25

creasingly turned over to private ownership and

as markets are opened to competition around the

world, the economic stakes associated with spectrum policy are growing. Decisions that were

once based primarily on technical considerations

are now decided on the basis of economics

(investments, revenues, and competitiveness) and

politics as well as technology. As countries (or

blocks of countries) have sought to advance their

economic interests in radiocommunications, spectrum allocations have become a weapon in the

battle for global economic supremacy, and WARCs,

which decide how frequencies are to be divided

between services, have become anew focus in the

intense global

struggle for competitive advantage

in radiocommunication technologies and services. Countries

seek to protect

the interests and

investments of

their existing domestic users, and

Economics and

politics are playing

increasingly pivotal

roles in spectrum

allocation—

internationally and

domestically.

try to gain an advantage for their manufacturers

and service providers in order to promote competitiveness.

Evidence of the increasingly political aspect of

the process is abundant. In the United States,

companies or government agencies fighting for

spectrum often raise the battles to the political

level—pitting Congress against the FCC, and the

Defense Department against the private sector.

Congress, for example, got involved in the FCC’s

spectrum reserve proceeding in order to protect

the interests of the incumbent users of frequencies

the FCC proposed to reallocate. FCC commissioners have noted the political pressures and

rumors surrounding the pioneer’s preference proZ3 III tic Cme of APC, the united St,ites held to its or@ud positio~ protecting the systerm already being used in the United Statti, cm~da,

and Mexico. However, in the case of HDTV, the IJtil~d States went along with a compromise supported by other members of Region 2, the

Western Hemisphere.
26 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

ceedings for LEOS services.24 Motorola wrote

then Vice-President Dan Quayle, seeking help in

preventing the International Maritime Satellite

Organization (Inmarsat) from entering the big

LEOS arena (see chapter 2).

The consequences of this focus on economics

and the consequential politicalization of WARCS

have a number of effects clearly seen at W~C92. First, despite the general belief that global

allocations are the most advantageous-in terms

of market size, consequential lower equipment

costs, and reduction of interference-allocations

were often made on a regional or even countryspecific basis. Many countries, the United States

included, inserted footnotes into the international

Table of Frequency Allocations that prohibit

services from operating in their country or allocate services that will operate only in their

country. 25 Although such footnotes are sometimes necessary to protect important national

services, fictionalization of the allocation table

in this way makes it harder to share spectrum and

coordinate services, and may lead to an increase

in interference between different services operating in the same band in different countries.

Divided allocations may also reduce the potential

market for new services, increase equipment

costs, and may even make some services (technically and/or economically) infeasible. The negative impacts of regionalization should not be

overestimated, however. The large size of some

regional markets may mean that a worldwide

system or service would not convey any further

significant economies of scale or size.

Second, in order to protect existing services,

technical limitations were put on many of the new

allocations. These include sharing requirements,

power limitations, and stringent coordination

procedures. Such limitations could severely limit

the ability of a new service to operate and could

preclude it altogether in some circumstances. At

best, such limitations make the process of developing and introducing a new international radiocommunication service more difficult and subject

to failure if countries cannot agree.

Third, long transition times were attached to

some new services. In many cases, these services

cannot come into operation for 10 or 15 years.

These long transitions are designed to protect

investments in equipment—allowing time for

companies and countries to recover their investments before the systems are replaced. However,

in an era of rapid technological change, when

generations of technology are measured not in

years, but in months, such a practice can also be

used to allow lagging countries to ‘‘catch up’ to

their competitors in the development of new

technologies. In this role, long transition times are

sometimes perceived as protectionist mechanisms of foreign trade policy.

For the future, the role of politics and economics

must be clearly recognized and explicitly included

in preparations and negotiation strategies. As the

traditional role and power of foreign postal,

telegraph, and telephone administrations (PTTs)

erode, the locus of power will likely shift to private

companies and government telecommunication

ministries. The experience of WARC-92 showed

the effectiveness of making direct contacts with

high government officials in other countries. It is

at these higher levels that political and economic

pressures will be understood and acted on. Closer

N Comments of Co@ssioner Ervin S. Duggaq “FCC Tentatively Chooses Non-profit Organization ~Oposing LEO Siitellk sCXVlCf3 to

Aid Developing Country Volunteer Programs to Receive First Pioneer’s Licensing Preference, ’ Telecommwican”ons Reports, Jan. 20, 1992.

Comments of Commissioner James Quello at the August 5, 1992 meeting of the Federal Communications Commission.

25 Footnotes to the inte~tio~’rableof Frequency Allocations, just like the footnote you are r=ding, tierdesctibeor limit tie allocations

Listed in the table. They are designated by number and letter-731X (see figure 1-1, which shows a sample page horn the international lhble

of Frequency Allocations, including how footnotes are presented). Footnotes are used for a variety of purposes, including to specify power

levels, reference relevant resolutions, and allocate additional services. As noted, footnotes are also used by a country (or countries) to preserve

some measure of national sovereignty when they disagree with the allocations that were made internationally. These country footnotes can make

alternative or additional allocations or can limit operations within those countries.
Chapter I-Summary and Findings 127

cooperation with high-ranking foreign government

officials may enhance the ability to achieve

compromises acceptable to all sides.

9 The Rise of the Private Sector

INTERNATIONAL AND WARC ISSUES

As the forces of privatization and liberalization

sweep through the world’s telecommunication

and radiocommunication industries, the number

and influence of private sector interests and user

groups are growing. This rise has the potential to

alter the ways in which radiocommunication

policies are determined internationally by bringing telecommunications system operators, manufacturers, and users more directly into the process.

However, the increasing role of the private sector

in international telecommunications regulation

and negotiations may pose a threat to international structures and institutions such as the ITU.

Historically, the ITU has been primarily an

intergovernmental organization, bringing together

the nations of the world in order to harmonize

telecommunication and radiocommunication policies and coordinate international usage. With the

rise of transnational telecommunication fins,

however, and the demise of the governmentcontrolled PTTs, control of the world’s tele- and

radiocommunications networks and policies is

increasingly being influenced by the private

sector.

As a result, the focus of world telecommunication and radiocommunication policymaking could

shift. The structures and processes that were set

up to accommodate intergovernmental negotiations may prove inadequate for private sector

needs. Recognizing this, the ITU is attempting to

open its activities more to the private sector. If its

efforts succeed, it may survive as a new, more

industry-oriented ITU. However, if its processes

and structures begin to be seen by the private

sector as too slow, or too political, or even

irrelevant, some or all of the ITUs functions

could increasingly be bypassed.

The rise of the translational corporation poses

challenges to both domestic and international

WARC preparations and negotiations, although

the extent to which this is a serious problem is still

unclear. Often such companies have branches or

subsidiaries in many countries. In the preparations for world radiocommunication conferences,

it is possible that representatives of these companies will pursue proposals that favor their home

country or their company over best interests of the

country in which

they work. In the

United States,

with its open

(FCC) preparation process, this

is a serious concern. Foreignbased or foreignowned companies

doing business in

the United States

may seek to inThe private

sector’s rising

influence is creating

new threats and

opportunities for

United States

spectrum

policymakers.

fluence U.S. spectrum policy through their U.S.

subsidiaries or partners in ways that favor them or

their countries.26

The multinational character of these companies

is felt at the WARCs as well. In recent years, as

the international trend to privatization and liberalization has advanced, more and more members of

private companies have been serving on other

nations’ WARC delegations. This trend continued at WARC-92, and promises to accelerate in

the future as ITU activities are increasingly

opened to private sector participation. Some

companies, in fact, may actually have representatives on several different delegations27—raising

26 b WARC.92 prepmatiom, questions of foreign ownership and the influence that it might have on U.S. policymaking were I-tied iII

comection with two LEOS firms-Starsys, Inc., which has ties to the French Governmen~ and I-oral, which is 49 percent owned by foreign

companies (see chapter 2).

z? Motorola, for example, had representatives on several delegations, including the U-nited States, Canad% France, md Australia.
28 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

the possibility at least that in international fora

such as ITU conferences and meetings, these

companies may (surreptitiously) choose to pursue

strategies that protect or promote the company’s

best interests, but do not support and may actually

undercut the efforts of the governments on whose

delegations they serve.

DOMESTIC ISSUES

The ramifications of this rise internationally

are far-reaching, but the United States, with its

active private sector and more democratic policy

processes, could be affected more than other

countries. 28 The role of the U.S. private sector in

international telecommunication matters is unique

in a foreign policy setting. Due to the historical

development of the telecommunication industry

in this country (private, not government-owned),

and the high degree of expertise private sector

representatives have developed in international

radiocommunication matters, they play a much

more active and involved role in foreign (telecommunication) policy than companies in other

industries .29

During the preparations for WARC-92 and at

the conference, for example, private sector representatives were very active in the development of

U.S. proposals and in lobbying for U.S. positions

at the conference. Generally, government and

industry delegates believe these efforts were

important in achieving positive outcomes for the

United States. In the case of big and little LEOS,

several delegates credited much of the success of

the U.S. proposals to the work of the LEOS

private sector proponents supported by the government. Ambassador Baran encouraged the wide

participation of the U.S. private sector in order to

demonstrate to foreign delegates that the United

States was serious about its various proposals and

that the proposals enjoyed broad industry backing.

The private sector will also be intimately

involved in implementing the decisions of WARC92. U.S. companies planning to operate in foreign

countries, for example, will have to develop a

knowledge base of the various stakeholders and

regulations in those countries in order to negotiate

for foreign licenses. The knowledge gained in this

process could form an important foundation for

planning and strategy as the United States prepares for future conferences.

The extensive involvement of the U.S. private

sector in international radiocommunication policymaking has benefits and disadvantages. The

primary benefits flow from the expertise industry

representatives have developed. In many cases

this experience was gained from previous service

in the Federal Government. This relation fosters

a closer sense of collegiality among Government

and nongovernment representatives that promotes greater cooperation and better decisionmaking. In this way, the private sector supplements the government’s own expertise, enabling

the best and brightest of American radiocommunication experts to contribute to developing

policies and positions.

The downside of this involvement is that

private sector individuals represent the interests

of their company, and in some cases, these

interests may conflict with the greater interests of

the United States.30 On an individual level it is

Z8 Reco@fig the fipor~ce of this mStruCturingfOrArnaican companies, the State Department organized a private sector ITU Task Force

to develop recommendations on how the United States should approach the special plenipotentiary. The fuml recommendations of this group

were submitted to the State Department in December 1992.

29 h E~ow espwially, he tel~communications service providers have historically been public institutions-P’ITs. In effeCt there were no

private sector service providers, although manufacturers of equipment have been privately owned.

30 ~si5 one remorl co~ict of interest disclosures were required fiorn W U.S. delegates.
.

Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 29

often difficult to balance the two. For official

WARC delegates, this tension can be especially

trying because delegates formally represent the

United States, and they may have to support U.S.

positions that they and their companies do not

endorse and actively argued against in the past.

Several delegates to WARC-92 reported feeling

torn on various issues. In cases such as these, a

danger exists that an individual may work more

for his/her own interests and not support (or

actually undermine) official U.S. positions. Isolated instances have occurred in past conferences,

and infighting between the big LEOS proponents

was evident at WARC-92, but, by and large,

government representatives and delegation leaders report that the private sector delegates were

relatively well-behaved at WARC-92.

More problematic is unofficial private sector

involvement at the conferences. Past practice has

allowed governments to let individuals from both

the government and industry participate in the

work of the conferences as ‘‘observers’ or

‘‘support staff. At WARC-92, such designations

were granted to a large number of people from the

U.S. private sector. Again this practice has both

good and bad effects. The primary advantage is

that more people increases lobbying strength to

support U.S. positions, gauge foreign delegates

reactions, and simply get work done. WARC

observers from both the government and the

private sector credit a strong industry presence

with helping U.S. positions get adopted. However, some delegates to WARC-92 (both U.S. and

foreign) and others who attended WARC-92 have

charged that lobbying was sometimes too aggressive or heavy-handed. Motorola, for example, had

a contingent of representatives in Torremolinos

estimated at over 30 people (all but one of whom

was not part of the official delegation). Too large

a group of “observers’ can easily become

overbearing and make foreign delegates feel

dominated. In some cases, these industry representatives, who are not formal delegates and are

less subject to formal control by the delegation

leadership, can be overzealous-becoming, as

one observer put it, “their own worst enemy. ”

Perhaps more than in the past, setting rules of

conduct early in the process and maintaining tight

control over the number and (to the extent

possible) the actions of unofficial delegates will

be important.

Participation by private sector companies also

leads to questions of equity. Large corporations

can afford to send sizable groups of their employees to international meetings such as a WARC.

Smaller companies, however, have no such option. In many cases, they hire an outside consultant/

lawyer to represent them in the preparation work

and at the conference. Disproportionate representation such as this may give an unfair advantage

to those companies well-heeled enough to participate,

Finally, the direct and critical involvement of

the private sector in sensitive international negotiations raises a number of important questions for

U.S. policymakers. Fundamentally, who’s in

charge? At what point does the U.S. Government

lose control of foreign policy? How much latitude

should private sector delegates have at conferences? Should private companies take such an

aggressive role? In such an environment, companies may feel free to cut “deals” with foreign

countries in order to advance their own interests.

In some cases, such arrangements may help

further the policy objectives of the United States,

but should such actions be condoned? In an era of

translational corporations that owe less and less

allegiance to any national government, there is no

guarantee that private interests will always match

U.S. public policy or foreign policy objectives.

Aside from questions of legality, such actions

could undercut the sovereign power of the U.S.

Government to negotiate international agreements.
30 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY AND

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

The lessons of WARC-92 and the implementation of its outcomes cannot be analyzed in

isolation from the larger context of U.S. radiocommunication policymaking. That context is

characterized by a divided government structure,

a strong and involved private sector, and a

philosophical commitment to market-driven policy development. The proposals that the United

The lessons of

WARC-92 cannot be

analyzed in isolation

from the larger

context of U. S.

radiocommunication

policymaking.

States adopted for

WARC-92, and

the manner in

which the decisions made at the

conference will

be implemented

domestically, are

a product of these

forces.

OTA has previously analyzed

the divided structure of U.S. radiocommunication

policymaking and the problems that it causes in

the WARC preparation process.31 That analysis

led to the conclusion that the fragmentation of

U.S. radiocommunication policymaking, lacking

clear long-term policy guidelines or vision, led to

radiocommunication policies that were often

reactive and lacking focus. And while this structure may have worked adequately for isolated

issues or specifically-defmed topics such as

WARC-92, it works less well for developing

long-term and/or broader radiocommunication

policy initiatives.

Looking beyond WARC-92, although senior

policymakers increasingly recognize the importance of the international dimensions to radiocommunication policy and more effective planning, it is possible that philosophical, structural,

procedural, and institutional inertia may inhibit

creative policy development and prevent the

United States from aggressively moving ahead in

radio technology policy development. Even with

a change in Administrations, which may bring

more focused direction and leadership to U.S.

radiocommunication policy development, structural and procedural problems will continue to

exist, and ideological changes at the top levels of

the government may take some time to falter down

to career spectrum managers. Established institutional cultures and beliefs, and uncertainty over

how much the spectrum can and should be

planned, could make the implementation of any

new vision difficult.

B Refining the Market Approach to

Spectrum Policy

In place of focused forward-looking policy

leadership by the Federal Government, the United

States has relied almost solely on market forces to

guide the development of radiocomrnunication

services and technologies in this country .32 And

while market mechanisms do have advantages in

technology development, there are dangers in

relying too heavily on such an approach. Overreliance on market mechanisms, combined with

the divided nature of U.S. radio spectrum management and a lack of forward-looking action on

the part of Federal policymakers, has led to a drift

in international radiocommunication policy that

could consign the United States to being a

second-rate radiocommunication power.

Historically, the United States has based its

approach to telecommunication development on

a philosophical/ideological model that identifies

“the market” as the best driver of technological

31 o’K& WMC.W, op. cit., footnote 1.

3Z NTIA, op. cit., footnote 3.
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 31

Radio astronomers use large dish-shaped antennas, such as this one in Puerto Rico, to help them explore the

Universe. These antennas must often be several hundred feet in diameter in order to pull in the faintest radio waves

from distant galaxies.

progress.

33 34 According to this approach, market

mechanisms provide maximum flexibility to industry to develop and sell products and services

that meet consumer/user demands. Similarly,

government spectrum managers believe that a

priori pl anning of radiocommunication services

would lead to inefficient use of the spectrum by

committing frequencies to technologies and services that may not succeed in the long-run.

Proponents of a market approach point to U.S.

leadership in many areas of radiocommunication

technology and the highly developed state of U.S.

radiocommunication systems (compared with other

countries) as proof that the market-based approach should be the preferred model for technology development.

PROCESSES OF MARKET-BASED

POLICYMAKING

In practice, the market model affects the

development of radiocommunication policy on at

least two levels. At the broadest level, the market

is called on to determine what technologies and

services should be developed, how much spectrum should be allocated to them, and in what

bands. This approach to policymaking and spectrum allocation suffers from several flaws. First,

the market can only sort effectively and effiSJ For one view of tie difference between market-driven and technology-driven approaches to telecommunications, see Barbara J. F~~

and D. Mike Maxwell, ‘‘Market-Based Public Policy, ’ Telephony, June 15, 1992 p. 80.

34 Not wi~~d~g ~ffo~ bY he FCC in he e~lY 1970s to create spec~ reserves for l~d mobd~ te&mlO@eS. For a brief hktOry Of

these actions, see Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of

New Telecommunications Technologies, 7 FCC Rcd No. 4, Feb. 7, 1992.
32 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

ciently between competing commercial uses, or

uses that can be reduced to dollar figures. It

cannot adequately judge between a commercial

system, for example, and a radiocommunication

service that serves larger social goods or goals,

such as public diplomacy or radio astronomy—

where few or no direct monetary benefits may

accrue. In cases such as these, public policy must

step in to fill the void left by a market approach.

Policymakers must decide how to strike the

balance between the important social functions

filled by radiocommunications-public safety,

defense, diplomacy, and scientific research-and

(new) commercial systems that could potentially

improve U.S. competitiveness in radiocommunications, create jobs, and improve our balance of

trade.

Determining g the “public good’ in this new era

of wireless communication will be increasingly

difficult. Many different players in the government and industry need the radio spectrum to

carry out their missions and provide services to

the public. Domestic policy battles over spectrum

use will intensify as the Nation’s airwaves

become increasingly congested—pitting the private sector against the government, different

domestic radio industries against each other, and

various Federal Government users against each

other. For example, the use of radio frequencies to

provide safety and navigation services to maritime and aeronautical users is a vital public

interest use of the spectrum, but it is not particularly glamorous. The importance of such uses can

sometimes get lost in the enthusiasm for new

consumer technologies. In these battles, the

legitimate interests of the existing users of the

spectrum must be balanced against the potential

benefits to consumers and advantages to international competitiveness that new technologies

could bring. Too often, as policy is determined

now, such evaluations-based on a comprehensive assessment of the benefits and disadvantages

of each competing user—are not made.

Second, what is “the market’ and who defines

it? Presumably the market is perceived user

demand for a product or service. Unfortunately,

this demand is usually measured and reported on

by the very companies that wish to serve it—they

have an obvious motive in making the proposed

service seem as popular and desirable as possible.

As a result, the marketing projections made by

these potential providers may be overestimated.

The widely varying estimates of the market for

satellite-delivered phone services indicate the

subjective nature of this approach. Allowing the

private sector to dictate radiocommunication

policy through its definition of market demand

may skew the policy development process in

ways that benefit companies at the expense of

consumers or the long-term development of a

coherent radiocommunication policy designed to

serve public needs.35

Because of the difficulties in identifying “successful” technologies, opponents of greater Federal Government involvement in technology development (industrial policy) believe that the

government should not be put in the position of

picking specific technology winners” and ‘losers. Rather, they argue that the government

should support any and all radio-based technologies that contribute to an agreed-upon framework

of policy goals for radiocommunications development. Such policy goals and objectives, however, like the concept of universal service in

telephony, cannot be set or achieved by market

forces alone.

Furthermore, some analysts, in fact, argue that

the U.S. approach to telecommunication technol35 some @ysts~emorebl~t: “Thepubfichbeexlk gely shutout of the communications pOliCYprOOXS. Although the Communications

Act of 1934 mandates that all actions implementing it be based on determina tions that they are in ‘the public interest’ the FCC has viewed

the public as nothing more than customers. It has let those who sell services to the public decide what is best for them.” Nolan Bowie, Angeta

J. Campbelt, and Andrew Jay Schwartzmaq ‘‘Telecommunications, ‘‘ in Mark Gree~ (cd.), Changing America: Blueprints for the New

Administration (New Ycrk: Newmarket Press, 1993), pp. 604-615.
Chapter l--Summary and Findings I 33

ogy development is often not market-, but technologydriven. “If you build it they will come” still

seems to be the dominant theme in U.S. telecommunications technology development.

Although the current [industry] language suggests a market model, the actions continue to

focus on a technological one. This confusion has

brought the industry to its present impasse. More

than anything else, this impasse is characterized

by effort after effort to develop ‘‘market-driven”

products, only to have the products repeatedly fail

in market trials.

Why is this happening? The industry has

carefully identified products customers could

use. . . The answer lies in understanding how

paradigms affect actions. . . if their [companies’]

vision is limited by a focus on technology, if their

insight is bounded by a commitment to specific

products, they may see only what technology can

do for customers rather than learning what

customers need technology to do for them.36

The reason for this continued reliance on technology has been attributed to the fact that “all too

often, the people who invent and design new

technologies are not the ones who debate and

think through their social, economic, and policy

implications. 37 In other words, technology is

often developed by engineers who concentrate on

solving technical problems, but give less thought

to how (or even if) the technology systems they

have developed will really be used. Given this

historical focus, letting the market decide, when

the market is defined by the companies trying to

serve it, is not necessarily a sound basis for

determining public policy or the public good.

More specifically, in the development of WARC

proposals, the dictates of an as-yet-unspecified

market demand should not be uncritically accepted or given undue weight in the preparation

process. Noncommercial systems that serve important public (safety) communication needs

must be fairly considered and equally strongly

advocated. Government regulators and analysts

must play this role.

Some analysts have likened the change that

needs to occur in telecommunications policy with

the change in paradigm from an industrial economy to an information economy—with a change

in focus from industry to public interest needs.

Congress has an important role to play in moving

U.S. telecommunication policymaking into the

21st century. Today, legislation is often

.,. designed from art industrial age perspective to

protect industrial age players. They represent

sellouts to special interest groups rather than the

responsible leadership needed in these economically turbulent times.38

More forwardlooking leadership from the The dominant Congress could

push U.S. spec- theme in U.S.

trum managers to telecommunications

consider more technology

carefully the

development still

long-range impacts of their de- seems to be

cisions on all of “if you build it they

American soci- will come. ”

ety, and take a

broader, more comprehensive approach to evaluating the public good.

The second means by which the market controls radiocommunication policy is just as important. Once a market decision has been made

regarding which services are most needed, the

market is then called on to sort out competing

systems, standards, and companies. Unfortunately, the market is fickle, and acts according to

36 B~bara J. Fti and D. M&e wwe]l, “Re-g the TeIecom Field of Dreams,” Telephony, MM. 9, 1992, p. 50.

37 D. L~&&xia, remar~ &fore tie AXMNMI Conference of the Public Radio Program Directors ASSOCMO% Philadelphia% PA, Sept. 17,

1992.

38 Btibm J.F- and D. M.&e Maxwell, op. cit., footnote 36.
34 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

economics-it does not necessarily take into

account important social or political goals.

Finally, the market does not always work. In

the standards-setting arena, there are many examples when market forces have failed, including

AM stereo and digital cellular telephone.39 In

these cases, the failure of the market to quickly

converge on a standard held up the development

and deployment of the most advanced technologies. In an era of rapid technology developments,

~

waiting for the

‘arket ‘0 ‘ e t

R

standards and sort

elying solely out winners and

on the market losers could leave

undermines

effective strategic

the United States

behind its international compeplanning. 1 titers in advanced

I wireless applications. 40 During

the preparations for WARC-92, for example,

private sector stakeholders often complained

about the lack of government leadership and

guidance in developing positions.

EFFECTS OF A MARKET-BASED APPROACH

From a policymaking perspective, U.S. reliance on market forces at both levels has several

undesirable effects. First, there is a philosophical

commitment in this country to the democratic

ideal where proponents and opponents come

together in a neutral forum to debate the merits of

an idea and arrive at a reasoned conclusion or

decision. This is a forum where information flows

freely, and the technical merits of a technology

should decide its fate-win or lose. However, in

reality, the picture is more complicated. In cases

where the economic stakes reach into the billions

of dollars, companies will look for any means to

discredit their competitors and politics often

enters the equation (witness the political overtones to almost every major decision the FCC

makes). If the market were a level playing field,

all rivals could compete evenly. However, in this

debate, all parties are not equal. Larger companies, with more resources and better political

connections and clout, can often gain an ‘unfair’

advantage. As a result, the market is not allowed

to function normally. It becomes hostage to the

various political and legal machinations industries use to either protect themselves (as in the

case of personal communication services) or to

promote themselves (as in the case of LEOS). The

market sometimes has less to do with deciding

outcomes than the political considerations that

have come to the fore with the rise of the

(economic stakes of these) new technologies.

Relying solely on market forces to determine

spectrum policy also undermines effective strategic planning and could decrease the long-term

competitiveness of the United States in new

radiocommunication services. Indicative of the

lack of strategic focus in radiocommunication

policymaking, no effective governmentwide mechanism exists for comparing and evaluating radio

technologies and services as a basis for public

policy decisions. The FCC, through its public

comment processes, does try to make these kinds

of analyses, but it only controls the private sector

w ~eFCC ~s now ken m~&ted t. set a s~tid form stereo. Telecommunications Authorization Act of 1992, fiblic ~w 102-538,

Oct. 27, 1992.

a A ~g~g qumhon from ~e WMC.92 p~p~atio~ process, and one that tiers debate in the stidwds-set@ ~em for new

technologies, is at what point should positions (and standards) be set. By waiting for the market to decide (determine a standard) the United

States could lose any competitive advantage it might have. Waiting also makes it very dfilcuh to push U.S. proposals and policies abroad, when

they have not been set. Such disputes were highly evident in the preparation for the ‘l%e Inter-American ‘Mecomrnunications Conference

(cITEL) WARC-92 preparation meeting held in Washington DC. Would the United States be better served by adopting a decision early and

getting a potentiat jump on the competition? On the other hand, locking in a position too early could jeopardize effective negotiation-if U.S.

representatives did not have the flexibility to modify their stances-just as setting a standard too early can lock in technology that is not the

optimum. For a more complete discussion of the policy issues surrounding standards setting, see U.S. Congress, OffIce of Technology

Assessment, G106u1 Stanahrds: Building lllocks~or theFucure,TCT-512 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offtce, March 1992).
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 35

use of the spectrum. There is no open, effective

way to compare government and nongovernment

spectrum use. WARC-92 was, in large part, a

struggle for spectrum between emerging wireless

technologies and services and established radio

frequency users. For several reasons—lack of

objective sources, lack of FCC staff resources,

pressures imposed by the shortness of WARC-92

preparation time, secrecy of government data,

lack of experience and data on new services—

open evaluations of the public interest benefits

and/or disadvantages of competing radio services

were never made.

The foremost example of this lack of process

was the competition for the coveted frequencies

in the L-band. The Federal Government and

major aircraft manufacturers use the lower portion of this band (1435-1525 MHz) for aircraft

and weapons testing. Because these activities are

classified, however, the FCC claims it was unable

to determine exactly how the government and its

contractors use the band-i. e., what frequencies,

what times of day, what geographic locations.

The government was never forced to fully explain

its use of the band.41 The private sector, because

of the favorable transmission characteristics of

the band, wanted to use this spectrum for mobile

satellite services or digital audio broadcasting

satellite services. While a comparison was apparently made between the existing uses of the band

and the potential revenues, technological gains,

and competitive benefits that could be realized by

reallocating the band for BSS-Sound, it is unknown what factors were used in the comparison

or how they were valued.

Finally, the reliance on private industry to

identify future spectrum needs obscures the

second-order effects of new systems and services.

Assuming frequencies are granted, what real

benefits will the United States realize? Many of

the new systems and services tout their benefits to

American competitiveness. Such claims need to

be examined closely. Will the equipment needed

for these new services be produced in the United

States? Indications are that some will not be.

Little LEOS service providers, for example,

report being disappointed with the response of

U.S. manufacturers to this potentially lucrative

new area. More importantly, for a system to

succeed globally, it will need to attract support

(and funding) from a variety of foreign sources,

both government and private sector—global systems will require global partners to succeed.

Launches may not be on American rockets, and

much of the other equipment for the systems may

not be produced in American factories. The real

benefits to American competitiveness may come

only in enhancing the U.S. reputation as the

world’s premier provider of satellite services, and

laying the foundation for future advances in

global satellite markets.

Overall, relying on the power of the U.S.

radiocommunication market alone would be a

mistake. The emerging markets of Europe and

Asia will challenge U.S. claims to being the

world’s preeminent technology developer and

consumer. Creative and aggres- /

sive policymaking, taking advantage of market forces, is

needed to ensure the competitiveness and

leadership of the

United States in

world radiocomCreative and

aggressive

policymaking is

needed to ensure

United States

competitiveness

in world

radiocommunication

munication markets. Without I markets.

such leadership, the United States will continue to

rely on its private sector to set the direction for

U.S. radiocommunication policy. Industry, however, needs the guidance and partnership of

41 Gove~ent SPc~ m~gem dispute this view. They contend that they made all necessary information available to the FCC for review.

However, what information was actually provided, its accuracy and completeness, is unclear.
36 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

government planners to make the United States a

strong, coherent presence in international radiocommunication policymaking and markets. A

more aggressive policy process is needed to bring

leadership, direction, and coherence to U.S. international radiocommunication policymaking.

9 Improvements in Long-Range Planning

As a result of the historical reliance on market

forces and the lack of Federal Government

leadership in spectrum policy development, longterm planning for future uses of the radio frequency spectrum and coordination of spectrum

policy (including priority-setting) are inadequate.

For example, although U.S. proposals for WARC92 were developed in a timely fashion, it is less

clear how well, if at all, these proposals (and the

~

policy directions

theY imPIY) fit

Long-term radio

frequency spectrum

planning and

coordination of

spectrum policies

are inadequate.

into long-range

policy goals or

even if such longrange goals have

been considered.

Preparing WARC

proposals and

positions is not

equivalent to developing long-term policy (even if WARC negotiating strategies are carried out over long periods

of time), and it is unclear if such an essentially ad

hoc approach can meet long-term needs. A more

regular ITU schedule for future conferences will

increase pressures to develop more coherent U.S.

policymaking initiatives, and force both the

government and the private sector to consider

long-term goals in a more clearly defined and

focused way.42

OTA has argued in the past that a reliance on

market forces and a lack of government and

private sector foresight in planning for future

radiocommunication services will hurt the U.S.

ability to compete internationally .43 OTA continues to believe that between a purely market-based

approach to spectrum management and an overly

centralized approach to planning, there is a

middle ground of creative, aggressive planning

and policymaking that will enable the United

States to compete more effectively in the new

technologies and services that are being developed. 44

However, developing a practical approach to

spectrum planning will be challenging. A number

of analysts in both the government and the private

sector have noted the difficulties in planning

spectrum. First, planning for needs and technologies that do not yet exist is nearly impossible, and

would not necessarily lead to efficient use of” the

spectrum. The tradeoffs between encouraging

efficiency and promoting the development of new

technologies must be carefully weighed as a part

of determining future radiocommunication policy. It may be possible to craft policies and

regulatory efforts that encourage both, but it will

be necessary to carefully balance the needs for

efficiency with the demand for new technologies

and services. Second, even if spectrum is more

concretely planned, this does not guarantee that a

market for the planned service will actually

develop or that the services/systems planned will

become economically viable. The 12-GHz band

of frequencies, for example, has been planned for

several years to provide direct broadcast televi4Z NTIA m men steps in this dh~tion with its proc- on future spectrum requirements, as has the State Department with its task force

on U.S. reactions to changes in ITU. See U.S. Department of Commerce, National lklecommunications and Information A&mm“ “Stratiom

‘‘Current and Future Requirements for the Use of Radio Frequencies in the United States,” Notice of Inquiry, Docket 920532-2132, June 1,

1992.

43 O’IA, WARC.!M, op. cit., footnote 1.

44 A s- concept has been called a “progressive” approach to telecommunications regulation. See Steven R. Rivkin and Jeremy D.

Rosner, “Shortcut to the Information Superhighway: A Progressive Plan to Speed the lklecommunications Revolution” Future Choices,

August 1992.
sion services from satellites. Despite the fact that

such services were frost proposed in the early

1980s, they are only now beginning to be

implemented, and their eventual success is far

from certain.

One of the fundamental reasons for the lack of

a clearly defined vision/framework to guide U.S.

radiocommunication policy development is the

divided responsibility for policymaking in the

United States. The FCC and NTIA have not

worked cooperatively to build such a view or

framework. Recognizing these problems and the

importance of radiocommunications, in recent

years U.S. policymakers at higher levels have

begun to pay greater attention to spectrum policymaking.

The executive branch has taken the lead in

revitalizing spectrum planning. NTIA recently

issued a Notice of Inquiry requesting comments

and information on ‘‘Current and Future Requirements for the Use of Radio Frequencies in the

United States, ”45 In the Notice, NTIA notes

clearly the importance of improved planning of

the spectrum resource:

. . . planning helps ensure that adequate spectrum

will continue to be available for public safety

needs, other non-commercial uses such as

amateur radio and scientific research, and local,

state, and federal government uses, Moreover,

improved planning is essential for the U.S.

government to represent effectively the interests

of all U.S. spectrum users in international spectrum negotiations. Such planning is especially

important to permit the presentation of consistent

policies in such forums as the new series of

biennial World Administrative Radio Conferences recommended by the High Level CommitChapter l-Summary and Findings I 37

tee of the International Telecommunication Union

(m) .

In its comments on NTIA’s proceeding, Motorola

notes further that ‘‘this explosive growth of new

mobile communications services, driven by technological advances and consumer demand, will

lead to a serious shortage of spectrum absent

sound spectrum planning. ”46

Unfortunately, these efforts have not yet been

matched by the FCC. Critics accuse the Commission of doing little more than reacting to technology developments. It responds to applications and

petitions, but has shown a notable lack of

aggressiveness or foresight in helping to advance

the development of radio technologies. Numerous observers have commented that the FCC will

not act until someone forces it to by filing a

petition for change. Despite a historical lack of

planning at the FCC, however, there are signs that

things could be different. The FCC has taken an

aggressive (ironically, some say too aggressive)

approach to developing standards and an implementation schedule for HDTV. The FCC’s Office

of Plans and Policies has written studies on the

future of fiber optics and the broadcasting industry. 47 In early 1992, the FCC proposed the

creation of a ‘‘spectrum reserve in order to

promote the development of new radiocommunication technologies and services.48 Aside from

the political problems encountered by the plan,

the FCC’s efforts at least represent an effort to

spur future development.

In terms of international spectrum planning and

policymaking, the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) and the international

Space Frequency Coordination Group (SFCG)

45 ~, op. cit., fOOmOte g.

46 comen~ of Motoro~, ~c., ~ me ~tter of “c~~t ad fifieReq&m~~ for tie IJw of Radio Frequencies k the United Stitt X,”

op. cit., footnote 34, p. 4.

47 Ro&fl M. pepper, Through the~oking GIa$S: IntegratedBroad& ndNe~orks, Regulato~ Po[icy affdz~ti~tionalc~nge (W&jhhl@On

DC: Federat Communications Comrnissio% November 1988); Florence Setzer and Jonathan Levy, Broadcast Television in a A@tichannel

Marke@ace (Washingto~ DC: Federal Communications Commission, April 1991).

48 F~er~ com~titiom co~ssioq ‘‘R~~elopment of spec~to ~co~agebovationin &e use of New ~]~omm~catiom

Technologies, ” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ET Docket 92-9, 7 FCC Rcd No. 4, Feb. 7, 1992.
38 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

may provide a model of plannin g for future

spectrum needs. The SFCG (see chapter 2) is

composed of space agencies from all over the

world. This group identifies the future needs of

space operations and research, and develops

consensus among member countries, on a continual basis, on how best to meet those needs.

Because of the long lead times to get large-scale

space operations and missions into space, this

Despite the

increasing

importance of

telecommunications

in world and

domestic economies,

no action has been

taken to unify

United States

telecommunications

policy.

group has to think

of their spectrum

requirements in

the long term and

then develop international agreements to get what

they need. In the

United States, for

example, NASA

was a strong

driver pushing

the United States

to become more

involved with and

to support what

turned out to be

WARC-92. As a result of the extensive prenegotiation done in the SFCG prior to WARC-92,

new allocations for space services were relatively

easy to agree to at the conference.

1 The Future: Protecting US.

Technological and Policy Leadership

As the United States moves into the 21st

century and wireless technologies and services

become an increasingly important part of the

overall telecommunications infrastructure of this

country, the timely development of appropriate

radiocommunication policies, both domestic and

international, becomes imperative. Many analysts

have identified the general problems and shortcomings of the presently divided structure of U.S.

telecommunications policymaking.49 As a subset

of overall telecommunications policy, spectrum

planning and management suffers from the same

problems. It is important to note, however, that

despite the increasing importance of telecommunications in world and domestic economies and

the strategic and competitive benefits a strong

telecommunications policy represents, no action

has been taken to unify U.S. telecommunications

policy, although some efforts have been made to

improve long-term spectrum management.

The large number of radiocommunication technologies and services now being developed, and

the corresponding increase in the number and

influence of private sector interests, will place

increased emphasis on government and private

sector cooperation to prepare for future world

radiocommunication conferences, to carry out

cooperatively developed strategies at the conferences, and to implement new domestic radiocommunication rules and regulations. There is a

significant amount of expertise in both the

government and the private sector that must be

tapped in creative ways to bring the benefits of

new technologies and services to American consumers and to promote the competitive interests

of U.S. radiocommunication firms overseas.

Unfortunately, the United States has had no

vision or policy framework that could guide

spectrum development and that would ensure that

the spectrum resource is utilized in the public

interest and for the benefit of the Nation. Overall,

49 For a dixussion of such issues, see Hew Geller, The Federal Structure for Telecommunications policy (WaShhgtOQ m: The Benton

Foundation 1989); U.S. Congress, Office of Twhnology Assessmen4 Critical Connections: Communicatiomfor the Future, OTA-CIT407

(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1990); U.S. Congress, Office of ‘lkchnology Assessment The 1992 WorId

Administrative Radio Conference: Issues for U.S. International Spectrum Policy, OTA-BP-TCT-76 (Washingto~ DC: U.S. Government

Printing OffIce, November 1991); Michael F. Starr and David J. At.kiQ “The Department of Communications: A Plan and Policy fc]r the

Abolition of the Federal Communications Commission, ” Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, vol. 12, No. 2, titer

1989; and U.S. Department of Commerce, National lklecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Spectrum Management Policy:

Agenda for the Future, NTIA Special Publication 91-23 (lVashington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1991).
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 39

the process of developing coordinated domestic

and international radiocommunication policy in

the United States is seriously lacking. Decisions

and policies are often reactive and not based on

long-term considerations. This situation is compounded by the fact that there has not been one

decisionmaking authority that effectively arbitrated policy disputes between Federal agencies

in a timely manner; that made policy-level

decisions among competing agency missions and

requirements.50 The recent change in Administrations may bring more focus and vision to U.S.

spectrum policy, but in any case, it is too soon to

gauge the impact anew perspective could have on

improving U.S. radiocommunication policymaking, or the effectiveness of such an approach in the

face of stubborn institutional and structural barriers.

The trends examined above and the issues and

implications outlined in chapter 2 demonstrate

the need for a comprehensive approach to spectrum management in this country, and the potential consequences to services and competitiveness

if such a policy framework is not adopted. Unless

institutional and structural changes are made, this

lack of policy guidance and planning will, in the

long term, reduce the U.S. leadership role in

international radiocommunication policymaking

and could erode the U.S. competitive position in

radio-based technologies and services.

OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING

U.S. POLICYMAKING

The choices for improving domestic and international U.S. radiocommunications policymaking cover a broad range of approaches and

options. Many of the options discussed include

reorganizing the institutions and processes by

which international spectrum policy is made. Any

successful reorganization, however, must be based

on specific public policy goals that the reorganization is designed to achieve.51 A careful analysis

must also be made of the tradeoffs of reorganization, including

those between efficiency, equity,

and political and

public accountability. 52 Reorganizations based on

well-meaning,

but elusive concepts—such as

improved economy, efficiency,

or public responN0 single

decisionmaking

authority has

effectively arbitrated

policy disputes

between Federal

agencies in a timely

manner.

siveness—are not likely to be successful in the

absence of clearly defined goals.

At the broadest level of policy development,

presidential leadership may be effective for setm me director of tie office of Management and Budget (OMB) is authorized to resolve appeals &tW&n agencies OVm Specifk Fed~al

Government frequency assignments, but this authority does not appear to extend to policy decisions or give OMB the right to decide matters

of policy such as which agency mission(s) should take precedence over others in matters of frequency allocation.

51 ~ a 1977 repo~ t. the Congess, the Congressional Research Semice noted that: ‘‘Reorganization itself cannot be a ‘value. ’ It receives

its normative content by absorption. A reorganization is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending upon the purposes the reorganization is designed to achieve.

Presumably, in the hierarchy of purposes, a reorganimtion should be justified on the grounds that it is facilitating the achievement of a ‘higher

Pwse’ thaII that which is the purpose of the current org anizational stzucture. It is the task of President Carter, as it was of his predecessors

and wiLl be of his successors, to develop a hierarchy of values so that the process of reorg anizationwithbe neither random nor counterproductive,

but will sexve a purpose which is both consistent and visible. Ronald C. Moe, Executive Branch Reorganization: An Overview, prepared by

the Congressional Research Semice for the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, committee print, March 1978, p. CRS-72. The

relationship of goals to institutional organiza tion is also discussed in U.S. Congrvss, Oftlce of Technology Assessment, Critical Connections;

Contmunicationfor the Furure, OTA-CIT-437 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1990).

52 Craig Thomas, “Reorganizing Public Organiz.a tions: Alternatives, Objectives, and Evidence, ’ paper prepared for the Secretary of Energy

Advisory Board, U.S. Department of Energy, August 1992. This paper also notes the necessity of choosing between goals (“values”) “when

deciding whether and how to reorganize a public organization,’ and notes the ‘‘profoundly political” mture of such decisions, p. 51.
40 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

ting the general goals and policy framework that

will guide future radiocommunication policy.

Likewise, Administration initiatives may also be

able to improve specific aspects of the U.S.

radiocommunication policy process—through executive orders, for example. However, forceful

congressional action may also be needed to help

focus attention on the broad problems facing U.S.

spectrum managers and to develop priorities for

resolving those problems. The approaches and

options presented below give Congress a number

of ways to work with the Admini stration in order

to bring about desired improvements or to exercise more prominent leadership if the Administration fails to act quickly and decisively in improving U.S. radiocommunication policy structures

and processes.

Depending on congressional interest and involvement, three basic approaches are available

to reform the international radiocommunication

policy process, within which specific options are

presented. The three approaches represent a

progression from least to most complicated—

from short term solutions that could be implemented in less than a year, through solutions that

could be developed over a 1 to 2 year span, and

finally to more long-term, systemic solutions,

which could take many years to enact. Each

approach has its own benefits and disadvantages

as outlined below. The options presented are not

meant to be exhaustive or exclusive, and many

different combinations of options are possible.

Figure 1-4 summarizes these approaches and

options, and figure 1-5 puts them in the context of

Congressional decisionmaking.

I Approach 1

Improvements in the U.S. policymaking process must be made immediately to allow the

United States to most effectively respond and

adapt to rapid changes in radio technology and the

recent restructuring of the ITU. Over the course of

the next year, Congress could take several steps to

improve the U.S. radiocommunication policy

process in general and the WARC preparation

process specifically. Congressional action, by

targeting funding and focusing attention on key

aspects of the U.S. spectrum policymaking process, would demonstrate commitment to and

leadership of U.S. radiocommunication policy,

and could encourage the development of more

focused policies by the agencies involved. Such

efforts could be made in concert with executive

branch efforts or in place of them if insufficient

interest or attention is forthcoming from the

White House. Implementation of these options

may also serve as a stimulus for further presidential action.

The first general approach would leave the

existing three-part radiocommunication policy structure and procedures intact, and allow

the FCC, NTIA, and State Department, as well

as the individual Federal agencies, to build on

improvements they have already instituted.

The FCC, for example, established the Office of

International Communications (OIC) in January

1990 to coordinate international policies. Driven

by the increasing importance of international

concerns in the FCC’s daily work, and supported

by former Chairman Alfred Sikes, OIC has

evolved into an important center of policy coordination in the FCC. Most of the experienced

international staff, however, still remain scattered

among the FCC’s various bureaus. As noted

above, the State Department has convened a task

force to examine changes in ITU structure and

possible U.S. responses. NTIA is engaged in a

long-term effort to improve its spectrum management procedures vis-a-vis the private sector,53

53 me blucpfit for ~ese activities was first outlined by NTIA in early 1991, and many of the changes they identified hve been put into

place. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration% U.S. Spectrum Management Policy: An

Agendafor the Future, NT’lA Special Publication 91-23 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Off@ February 1991).
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 41

and has begun a broad assessment of the longterm spectrum needs of the United States.54

OPTION 1. Take no action, but closely monitor

the efforts noted above and the overall direction

and development of U.S. international radiocommunication policy.

OPTION 2. Increase funding for existing agencies

and programs and tie it to improvements in the

radiocommunication policymaking process and/

or WARC preparation activities.

Targeted financial support for WARC preparation and spectrum policy planning activities

could encourage more forward-looking policies

and enable more thorough policy planning and

technical preparation for future radiocommunication conferences.

OPTION 3. Mandate the formulation of a longrange spectrum plan.

If Congress believes that the executive branch

is not making sufficient progress toward developing a more comprehensive and focused approach

to international spectrum management, it could

also require long-range and strategic planning on

the part of all Federal agencies. This would force

the executive branch to develop priorities for

radiocommunication policy, and would also contribute to the development of a broader spectrum

policy framework that would guide future policymaking efforts.

As the focal point of this effort, the FCC and

NTIA could be required to cooperate on developing a long-range plan that would address the

Nation’s spectrum needs, with revisions to the

plan submitted at regular intervals. In 1978,

Executive Order 12,046 required that such a plan

be developed, and although NTIA has produced

a series of long-range plans beginning in 1986,

these plans have largely been developed without

the cooperation of the FCC (as required) and even

at times without the participation of the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee(IRAC).5556

In the recent legislation statutorily authorizing

NTIA, such a plan was listed as a function of

NTIA, but was not mandated.57 Making the

development of such a plan a required responsibility of NTIA, subject to congressional review,

could hasten the development of more focused

policy.

This option would build on NTIA’s current

efforts to identify long-range spectrum needs, and

expand this activity to serve as the basis for the

development of a future integrated national spectrum plan. In order to bring the FCC more directly

into the process (and meeting the original language of Executive Order 12,046), legislative

language could be inserted in FCC appropriations

to mandate formal FCC cooperation with the

NTIA effort. The effort could also be further

expanded to include all Federal Government

agencies with radio operations. In some cases,

such efforts may require the commitment of

additional resources, but such increases could be

minimal.

In order to accommodate the concerns of the

private sector, another possible vehicle for improving the development of radiocommunication

policy and new radiocommunication technologies and services is to fund (jointly with industry,

perhaps) a radiocommunication equivalent of

Sematech. In that case, the Federal Government

funds a consortium of computer chipmakers to

promote research and development of chips and

promote U.S. competitiveness in the chip industry. A similar arrangement for radiocommunication could have a variety of missions. It could

serve as a focal point for the development of radio

54 ~, op. cit., fOOmOte 3.

55 Exe~tive order No. 12,046, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code con~essiomd C% ~‘ “strative News, 9685-9692.

S6 ~,op. cit., footnote 53, P. 176.

57 ~bfic ~w 102-538, Oct. 27, 1992$
42 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

I

I

Figure 1-4—Approaches and Options for Improving U.S. Radiocommunications Policy

—

Option 1 I

Monitor exlstlng efforts and the I

overall dlrectlon and develop- 1

ment of U.S. international radlo-

,--- -

communlcatfon policy.

APPROACH 1

Short-Term

J

I

Leave the existing three-part radmcommunicatlon

‘--–:==::;.,

policy structure intact, and allow the FCC, NTIA,

—— — and State Department, as well as the Indwidual

Option 3 Federal agencies to build on Improvements they

Mandate the formulation of a have already instituted.

———. —..———— —

long-range spectrum plan.

r

-

. . —i-. -—.—–—

Option 5 T

I

1

Establish an advisory commsslon

1

to evaluate the mternatlonal

spectrum pol!cymaklng process.

I

I

~— 1—.——–.—–A

1

—

Option 2

Increase funding for exstlng

agencies and programs and tle

d to Improvements In the radlocommunlcatlon policymaking

process and/or WARC preparation actlwhes.

—— 

- 

.—

‘r-:: -- -

Option 4

Mandate improvements In government (NTIA) and FCC collection

of frequency use data, and ensure

that such data, where not vital to

nahonal security, IS made easily

accessible to the publlc,

—

APPROACH 2

Medium-Term

Would retain the current diwsion of responsibility

for domesttc radncommunication policymaking,

but create mechanisms that would facilitate the

coordination of international poltcy.

1

_.~_:z..‘—---––3’=- —, ~ –——— ——— ———“--––.~---–-—. 7— -—

Option 1

Establish a senior Interagency group

to resolve pollcy-level disputes between

agencies and between the Federal

Government and the prwate sector.

Option 2

Create a small Interagency group that

would coordinate and/or develop

mternatlonal radlocommunlcatlon policy.

Option 3

Formally establlsh a separate agency

for developing and coordinating international radlocommunlcatlon policy.

[::::’,1 The third and most radical approach to Improwng

U.S. radiocommumcatlon pohcymaklng

revolves restructuring or reorganizing all or part

of the existing domestic policy structure.

F;;;pii:;”cyE?;rn[g$i$cs$

KEY: CIP = Bureau of International Communications and Information Policy; FCC = Federal Communications Commission; NTIA - National

Telecommunications and Information Administration.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 43

Figure 1-5-Decisions to Improve U.S. Spectrum Policymaking

1 ..— —– J

-.. — J . . 1

I

Approach 1, OptIon 1

-~

r

— — J

v +

What can be done Immediately? 1

and/or

[

What long-term solutlons are available? I

~....— k- --1

APPROACH 1 —— — IJ

I -----Any comblnat]on of OptIons 2-5

.— J

Later: Have these changes been effectwe?

,. — . .— _ ~———–I .

[-YES: END ~ [ NO i————k“

f

~-” APPROACH 2

_& <IF;

Is structural reorganization

‘ - - ~... —. —— necessary?

I

I

[ -1---:, YES “ [NO+ i-.—....__-=

_–.— ] ~------ L. ._–_._.,

1 OptIon 3 ~

I OptIons 1, and/or 2Aor2B

.—— — —. J ~

[

,— —-. . —— J

I

I

Later: Have these changes been effective?

[- --- ‘

1 —1

YES: END

- J

— L ——

1 NO L– ——}

APPROACH 3

Since this approach WIII

take many years to

accomplish, should intenm

Improvements be made?

Q

L.

‘L-. —. - YES L

. - !

O

- -

—. —>

~– ‘. .—

v

—7

--—.“~ v

~–— I

.

1. Options 1,2, or 3.-? or 1. OptIon 4.— .._

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
44 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

technologies, focus private sector input into the

radiocommunication policy process, and provide

a forum for cooperative industry/government

policy development. Such an organization could

also serve as a clearinghouse for future world

radiocommunication conference preparations.

OPTION 4. Mandate improvements in government

and FCC collection of frequency use data, and

ensure that such data, where not vital to national

security, are made easily accessible to the public.58

Additionally, such data should be required to

be shared with relevant policymaking authorities

in order to reach informed decisions about future

WARC proposals and spectrum requirements. In

several cases during the preparation for WARC92, private sector and even some government

interests complained that they could not assess

some uses of particular spectrum bands because

the data either did not exist or were withheld.

OPTION 5. Establish an advisory commission to

evaluate the international spectrum policymaking

process.

Such a commission could be mandated to

identify any problems with the current U.S. policy

structure, recognizing the current state of flux in

the world’s telecommunications community, and

to recommend specific improvements (if needed)

in the structure and/or processes of U.S. international spectrum policymaking. Such a commission could be established in a number of different

ways. Congress, for example, could pass legislation to establish such a committee, with membership to include individuals chosen by the President and assuring adequate representation for

Congress.59 The principle advantage of such a

commission would be to focus more high-level

attention on the processes of radiocommunication

policymaking and encourage greater congressional and Administration (oversight of and)

involvement in goal-setting for U.S. international

spectrum policy. Another recent suggestion calls

on the president to establish a commission to

review overall U.S. communications policy and

make recommendations for updating it.60

The advantages and disadvantages of essentially preserving the status quo mean continued

reliance on market mechanisms to make broad

policy decisions. This approach maintains an

ideological commitment to market-based decisionmaking and ensures that the private sector has

maximum flexibility to quickly respond to both

new consumer demands and advances in technology. However, as noted previously, too much

reliance on market forces reduces the amount and

quality of strategic planning that can be accomplished. In the face of increasingly fierce competition in global radiocommunications systems and

services from both Europe and Japan, such a

policy may inhibit U.S. ability to compete effectively in world markets.

9 Approach 2

Although the options presented above could

contribute to the short-term improvement of the

development of U.S. international spectrum policy, more substantial changes may be required to

ensure that U.S. policies adequately reflect the

technological, economic, and political changes

now taking place in global radiocommunications

policymaking. Over the next year or two, Con58 ~A discuss= OptiOIIS to improve access to frequency data in NTIA, U.S. Spectrum ~a?KIgettM?nt policy, op. cit., foo~ote 53.

59 b 1966, for example, Congress passed the “Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act” which directed the President to

establish a Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources. ‘II@ commission had 15 members, limited to 5 from the Federal

Gov ernmen~ and with Four members of Congress seining as advisors. ‘I%e legislation specifkd the duties of the commission and provided for

funding of its efforts. ‘The committee was part of a broader legislative approach to develop a “comprehensive, long-range, and coordinated

program in marine science. . . .“ Public Law 89-454, June 17, 1966.

@ “Br~~ Awtittig R~ction to Suggestion of Presidential commission On communications,” Telecommunications Reports, Dec. 14,

1992.
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 45

gress may want to consider additional procedural

and/or structural improvements that could improve U.S. WARC preparations and the overall

policy development process. These medium-term

options represent the next step in a broader

evaluation of the efficacy of current U.S. methods

for determining international spectrum policy.

The context and timing of these changes is

crucially important. With world radiocommunication conferences scheduled to take place biennially, the distinctions between general policy

development and WARC preparation will become increasingly blurred and will, in fact, begin

to converge. A single focal point for integrating

these trends would help the United States to

develop and maintain a clear policy direction

throughout all its international radio negotiations

and meetings. NTIA, for example, proposed a

Joint Strategic Planning Council, which would

bring together the FCC and NTIA to coordinate

domestic spectrum management policies,61 An

important factor in forming such a group is to get

high-level support for its activities, and to ensure

the active and effective participation of private

sector interests.

The second approach to improving radiocommunication policy development would retain the current division of responsibility for

domestic radiocommunication policymaking,

but create mechanisms that would facilitate

the coordination and/or development of international policy. Under this general approach,

several options for improving the coordination

and quality of radiocommunication policy exist.

OPTION 1. Establish a senior interagency group

that could resolve policy-level disputes between

agencies and between the Federal Government

and the private sector.

A possible model is the Senior Interagency

Group for telecommunications that was disbanded for budgetary reasons in the mid-1980s.62

This group would have the power to review the

spectrum uses of the various Federal agencies and

prioritize the agencies’ missions and future spectrum requirements. The group would also settle

disputes between industry and the Federal Government regarding conflicting proposals for spectrum use. In order to fairly represent all interests,

private sector membership in this group, as

observers at least, maybe required. Efforts would

have to be made to ensure the widest possible

participation from industry-not just the largest

or most well-established players.

OPTION 2. Create a small interagency group that

would coordinate WARC and/or international

radiocommunication policy.

This group could effectively complement the

Senior Interagency Group noted in Option 1, and

could probably be put together with a minimum

of additional funds, although this would require

further study. This solution was suggested by a

number of delegates and observers, and took

several different forms.

Option 2A. In its least complicated form such

a group would coordinate, but not subsume, the

activities of the FCC, NTIA, and the State

Department in preparation for world radiocommunication conferences. This group would focus

only on WARC preparation.

Option 2B. In order to ensure that WARC

proposals effectively reflect broader U.S. international spectrum goals, the mandate of the group

discussed in Option 2A could be broadened to

include coordination not only of WARC positions

and proposals, but also the coordination of all of

international radiocommunication policy and integrating WARC preparations within an overall

policy framework.

Legislation, for example, could create (reestablish) the Joint Long-Range Planning commit-
46 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

tee, composed of representatives of both the FCC

and NTIA, that would meet on a regular basis, and

produce a report to Congress every year or two

years. This legislation would force the United

States to specifically develop goals and plans for

developing the radio spectrum resource and

radiocommunication systems, and could provide

a vehicle for Congress to participate in the

goal-setting for radiocommunications and to closely

monitor progress toward those goals.

OPTlON 3. Formally establish a separate agency

for developing and coordinating international

radiocommunication policy.

Essentially, the international radiocommunication

functions and staff of the FCC, NTIA and Bureau

of International Communications and Information Policy (CIP) would be merged in one

agency.

63 Domestic functions could be left intact.

Such an agency would combine technical and

policy expertise and, proponents believe, would

effectively unify U.S. international radiocommunications policymaking and streamline both the development of policy and the WARC preparation

process. Such a singular focal point for international radio policy could also improve the conduct of radiocommunications negotiations internationally. For example, foreign spectrum managers would no longer be confused by the

three-part division of responsibility in this country and could no longer take advantage of this

split to further their own positions. However, such

a centralized approach faces opposition by many

analysts and would be difficult to institute both

institutionally and politically.64

The most difficult question regarding the

establishment of such an agency is whereto locate

it in the structure of the U.S. Government. Care

would have to be taken to establish it at a high

enough level to give it the authority to set

priorities and policies, while at the same time

avoiding the ability of one group or groups to

dominate the agency’s work. Clear lines of

responsibility and coordination between this agency

and the FCC, NTIA, and State Department would

have to be established.

Along these lines, some have suggested the

creation of an office similar to the U.S. Trade

Representative (USTR) for international telecommunications (or just radiocommunications) policy. In 1962, Congress created a position in the

White House for a special representative for trade

negotiations, changed as the chief representative

of the United States in all trade agreements

negotiations, and chair of an interagency organization, established by the President, to assist with

the implementation of trade and tariff agreements.65 Paralleling the language describing the

mission of NTIA, the USTR is designated as the

President’s “principal advisor” on international

trade policy. The USTR also coordinates interagency preparation for and participation in multilateral trade talks, and supervises a network of

private sector advisory groups.

The advantage of this option is that it would

raise the level of international telecommunicaSJ For ~~ple, tie agency wo~d combine the FCC’S Office of International Communications, -’s ~lce of International Afffi5, and

the State Department’s CIP.

M me idm of cenh~ing telecomrnunicatiom and radiocommunications policy in the United States has been discussed exten.wvely

elsewhere. For a brief review of the arguments for and against such an approach, see OZ4, W%RC-92.

65 me OffIce SupW@he USTR WaScrat~ by exwutive order in 1%3. For a fuller discussion of the USTR, see Stephen D. Cohen. The

Making of United States International Economic Policy, 3rd Ed. (New York: Praeger, 1988). Cohen reports that the creation of the ofllce was

precipitated by Congressional doubts about ‘the State Department’s ability to drive a hard bargain and bring home the most advantageous trade

agreement. . .“ (p. 66). Similar concerns have been raised about the ability and will of the State Department to negotiate international

telecommunication agreements-some believe that they are more concerned with keeping foreign governments happy than anything else. The

1974 Trade Act elevated the position to cabinet-level status. In 1980, under Reorganization Plan No. 3, the offke was renamed the Office of

the USTR and received a broader mandate that effectively made the offke “the lead agency in all aspects of policy formulation in the trade

and investment sectors. Reorganization Plan No. 3 (as submitted to Congress by the President) says that the USTR ‘shall have primary

responsibility’ for ‘developing and for coordinating the implementation of U.S. international trade policy.’” Ibid, p. 67.
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 47

tions to the political level, enabling/forcing policy decisions to be made about goals, priorities,

and strategies. The status of such an agency

would offer high prestige and political leverage to

formulate policy, and could offer a place for

policymakers to coherently think about international telecommunications policy, rather than

responding to the wishes and whims of private

sector and Federal agency interests.

The main disadvantage to such an agency is the

very real threat that the office could become too

political-a charge often leveled at the USTR.

Rather than aggressively formulating policy and

pursuing long-term negotiation strategies, this

new agency could be “captured’ by U.S. industry or the administration in power. It would be

extremely important to build in openness and

public accountability into the procedures of such

an agency.

9 Approach 3

In the long term, the changes needed in the U.S.

radiocommunication policy development process

may be realized only as part of a more sweeping

reordering of the Nation’s entire telecommunication policymaking structure, Sustained congressional efforts would be required to make these

changes. As noted in chapter 3, each of the

agencies involved in the management (and/or

regulation) of spectrum resources has its own

problems and limitations that constrain its effective participation in the policymaking process.

The FCC is critically short of funds to do its job,

and this has caused it to take a primarily reactive

approach to policymaking. NTIA is hampered by

its sometimes conflicting roles as presidential

telecommunications advisor and Federal Government spectrum manager. And the role of the State

Department needs clarification and perhaps redefinition. See chapter 3 for further elaboration of

these issues and options.

The third and most radical approach to

improving U.S. radiocommunication policymaking involves restructuring or reorganizing all

or part of the existing domestic policy structure. This approach would take many years to

debate, build support for, and enact.

Some analysts believe that as long as the

current structures (FCC, NTIA, and State Department) and divisions in authority (Federal Government vs. private sector and State/local government) continue to exist, there is little chance that

a coherent international radiocommunication policy can be articulated and maintained in the long

term. These analysts believe that policy development for both government and nongovernment

spectrum use must be combined in order to

achieve a focused approach to both policy and

international negotiation.

From this perspective, many observers view

the disbanding of the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) in 1978 as a mistake.66 They

believe that a high-level (White House) focus is

needed once again for U.S. telecommunications

policy. Still others believe that a cabinet-level

position is needed—a Department of Communications. Disagreements over the form of this

restructuring reflect the lack of consensus over

the importance of telecommunications policy and

what the best format for developing that policy is.

While presidential leadership, or at least support, would be necessary for any of these options

to come into being, Congress has an important

role to play in considering the implementation

and implications of these proposals. Long-term

congressional leadership in the development and

articulation of U.S. radiocommunication policy

could be the vehicle through which such changes

are enacted, and the creation of such an agency or

department may help to solidify the congressional

role in the future development of U.S. radio- and

telecommunications policies. Efforts to restructure the process would also demonstrate the

M oTp funcliowj were transferred tO NTIA.
48 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

importance Congress places on the issues of

telecommunication policy in this country.

OPTION 1. Reestablish the Office of Telecommunications Policy in the White House.

This office would be responsible for developing all domestic and international telecommunications (including radio) policy for the executive branch. Similar to the establishment of a

USTR-type position noted above, such an agency

would confer needed high-level attention to the

problems of telecommunications and would offer

a mechanism for more effectively coordinating

long-term policy development and resolving policy level disputes between agencies. The creation

of such an office would entail moving responsibilities for radio- and telecommunications as

outlined in the options below. Changes could be

accomplished through executive order.

OPTION 2. Transfer responsibility for international

telecommunications out of CIP or out of the State

Department entirely.

If Congress decided that CIP was no longer

necessary in a restructured international telecommunication procedure, CIP’s functions could be

transferred to another bureau of the State Department.67 This action would likely require Congressional action since CIP was established by

Congressional mandate.68 This could result in

either effectively burying CIP, and presumably

effectiveness, or conversely, if CIP’s functions

were taken over by a strong division of the State

Department, or if CIP continued to exist within a

strong division of State, the effectiveness of the

office could be enhanced. Alternatively, CIP’s

functions, and the responsibility of the State

Department for international telecommunications

representation, could be transferred to NTIA, a

newly created international radiocommunications

agency, or a new OTP.

OPTION 3. Decouple NTIA’s dual roles as presidential advisor on telecommunications matters

and manager of the Federal Government’s spectrum use.

As argued in chapter 3, the two roles can

conflict and give the appearance of being incompatible in many instances-WARC preparations,

for example. Two choices are possible. First,

transfer IRAC duties and support out of NTIA.

IRAC existed before NTIA, and could be made

into a separate organization with a separate

budget. This would sever the now direct policy

development lines from IRAC to NTIA and give

NTIA more autonomy to make policy decisions in

the public interest and with less influence from

IRAC. Under this option, the question of whether

to leave NTIA as the manager of Federal Government spectrum is problematic. Some could argue

that separating IRAC from NTIA would sufficiently protect the public’s interest by decreasing

the power of IRAC over NTIA policymaking.

However, the ties between the two agencies could

continue to be too close to permit truly independent policy development. IRAC might have to

assume a broader role as the Federal Government

spectrum manager, an option that would seriously

reduce the role and staff of NTIA.

An alternative choice is to leave IRAC in

NTIA, but separate out the role of presidential

telecommunications advisor from NTIA and put

it in the White House. One possible place to vest

this authority is the Office of Science and

Technology Policy or a new OTP. Another

possibility would be to transfer it to a special

telecommunications representative, like USTR,

noted above. This action would leave NTIA free

ST me State Dep~ent recenfly resmcmred its operations, revoking CIP’S bureau status and placing it ~der the Bureau of Wonomic and

Business Affairs. This could affect both CIP’s stature and its ability to carry out its statutory responsibilities.

68 ~ Cmly 1990, for example, Representative 13dward Markey considered proposing legislation tbat would have removed autiotity for

international HDTV negotiations from the State Department and placed it in the Department of Commerce.
Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 49

to concentrate on its responsibilities as Federal

Government spectrum manager.

OPTION 4. Create a separate cabinet-level agency,

a Department of Communications that would

include an international radiocommunications

junction.

This option would abolish the FCC, NTIA and

CIP, and transfer their functions to one integrated

department that would have overall responsibility

for developing and implementing national telecommunications policy, and negotiating at international meetings.

The advantages and disadvantages are similar

to those for Approach 2 above: international

telecommunications policy would gain a more

solid political base from which to settle disputes

and set goals and priorities. However, the department could become another pawn in political

battles, or be captured by industry. There is little

discernible support for this idea among members

of Congress.

The most far-reaching changes would be accomplished through the establishment of a central

telecommunications agency combined with a

major commitment to an industrial policy for the

telecommunications industries. Such a commitment would require the most active and long-term

congressional involvement. This approach could

be accomplished through existing structures or

through a centralized telecommunications agency.

The benefits of such an approach would be to

raise the level of policymaking to a higher level,

and to focus greater attention, and hopefully

resources, on telecommunications policy issues.

The disadvantages include the effects of poor

planning and decisionmaking and a danger of

even greater politicalization of the issues.
—

Outcomes

and Implications

I

for U.S. Radio

Technology 2

ARC-92 considered a host of issues that were

technically complex, interrelated, and contentious.

Many of these issues were left over from previous

WARCs, but the conference also considered frequency allocations for a number of new services and technologies. As a result of the month-long deliberations, conference

delegates reached agreement on a broad range of allocation and

regulatory issues. This chapter examines the outcomes of

WARC-92, the factors that contributed to the success and/or

failure of U.S. proposals, and the implications WARC-92

decisions will have for the development of radio technology in the

United States and the making of future radiocommunication policy.

FACTORS COMPLICATING ASSESSMENT OF

WARC-92 OUTCOMES

Although the United States achieved many of its objectives for

WARC-92, U.S. proposals were generally less successful than

popularly reported, How much less is open to debate. Members

of the delegation leadership point cut that the United States was

very successful in ‘‘opening the door’ to several important new

services, and on many issues of lesser importance, U.S. proposals

were accepted by WARC-92. These officials take a long view of

the process of international spectrum management, and note that

additional gains will be pursued at future conferences. They do

not see the fact that the United States did not get everything

exactly as proposed as a failure, but rather as an expected

outcome and as part of a longer-term U.S. strategy in international spectrum policymaking.

Many factors complicate an evaluation and analysis of the

decisions reached at the conference. Some of these factors are

technical, some procedural, and some interpretive. In addition, as

51
52 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

economic, technical, and political needs change,

policies regarding radiocommunication services

and the effects of those policies can be expected

to change as well. As a result, assessing the future

of specific services is difficult and somewhat

speculative. The discussion below presents the

most likely developments in these technologies

and services based on current knowledge of

technical details, negotiations, and political priorities.

9 Differences in Interpretation

Evaluation of the outcomes of WARC-92, or

any other international conference, is complicated by differences in perspective and interpretation. Different people, depending on their job or

affiliation, have different perspectives, and as a

result, interpretations and evaluations of events

and decisions can vary significantly. Defense

Department evaluations may differ from Federal

Communication Commission (FCC) assessments,

which could be wholly different from an analysis

by someone in the private sector. Even among the

members of the U.S. delegation—who supposedly all have U.S. interests at heart-this divergence of opinions exists.

In describing and analyzing the implications of

any international conference, there is a tendency

for those involved to simplify the issues and put

the best possible light on the outcomes achieved.

Since the close of WARC-92, government and

private sector representatives have endeavored to

accentuate the positive results of the conference

while downplaying negative outcomes. In some

cases, this ‘‘positive spin’ makes issues easier to

understand. In other cases, however, ‘ ‘spin’ ‘ can

cloud the issues, covering possible strategic or

policy errors and making assessments of U.S.

performance more challenging. In the case of

WARC-92, the effects of ‘ ‘ spin‘‘ have been

compounded by the complexity of the decisions

made and the secrecy surrounding several of the

issues—it is difficult to evaluate results when

they are not necessarily final or well-defined.

In addition, it is important to remember that

WARCs are negotiations, and as is the case for

almost any international negotiations, it is unreasonable to expect that one side will get all it

desires. Such was the case for WARC-92. In order

to fairly evaluate the outcomes of the conference,

it is important to understand how specific goals

for the negotiations were developed and what

strategies were used to pursue them. In some

cases, for example, negotiating positions (based

on amounts of spectrum requested) were established that might have been more extreme than

was actually needed. These proposals might not

have been expected to succeed entirely, but were

put forth as bargaining chips in order to provide

negotiating room. In such cases, a narrow analysis

that simply compares proposals with results may

lead to an overly negative judgment about the

outcomes of WARC-92 for the United States.

I Procedural Issues

The problem of assessing WARC-92 outcomes

is exacerbated by the way decisions are reached at

WARCs and the way the international Table of

Frequency Allocations is written. In WARC

negotiations, frequencies are allocated to specific

radio services and become part of the international Table of Frequency Allocations (see figure

1-1). However, footnotes are often added to these

allocations that further define or constrain how,

when, or where individual services can be used

and by which countries. 1

1 Footno[cs to the international T-~blc of Frequency Allocations, just like the footnotes in this report, further describe or limit the allocatmns

listed in the table. They are designated by number and letter-731X (see figure 1-1 in chaptcrl, which shows a sample page from the international

Table of Frequency Allocations, including how footnotes are presented). Footnotes are used for a variety of purposes, including to specify power

levels, reference relevant resolutions, and allocate additional semices. Footnotes are also used by a country (or countries) to prcscrvc some

rncasure of national sovereignty v.’hcn they disagree with the allocations thal were made internationally. These countiy footnotes can make

ahmative or additional allocations or can limit operations within those countries.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 53

Often, adding footnotes to the allocations table

is the only way to reach agreement. A country (or

countries), for example, may decide that it cannot

agree with an allocation that has been agreed to

internationally because of its existing uses. The

dissenting country will attempt to have a footnote

placed in the allocation table noting its use of the

frequencies or making an alternative allocation

that applies only to it. At WARC-92, for example,

the members of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) decided to allocate the

1452-1492 MHz band to the BroadcastingSatellite Service-Sound (BSS-Sound) on a coprimary basis. The United States, however, in order

to protect domestic aeronautical telemetry uses—

aircraft testing and weapons development—

placed a footnote (in the form of an alternative

allocation) that prohibits those frequencies from

being used in the United States for BSS-Sound. In

addition to footnotes, WARCs also adopt resolutions and recommendations that set conditions on

the use of some frequencies that will affect how

allocations can be implemented. Resolutions and

recommendations also identify areas requiring

further technical study by the International Radio

Consultative Committee (CCIR) (see appendix C

for a select list of WARC-92 resolutions and

recommendations).

WARC-92 made many important changes to

the international Table of Frequency Allocations,

but also inserted many footnotes that will constrain the use of those new allocations.2 In fact,

delegates at the conference had a joke about the

number and complexity of the footnotes they had

agreed to: ‘‘what the allocations giveth, the

footnotes taketh away. ” At the close of the

conference, a representative of Canada remarked

that he was glad the conference was over so he

could go home and determine just what he had

agreed to. Olof Lundberg, Director-General of

Inmarsat, echoed this sentiment after the conference ended: “I think all of us who want to be

players in new areas have a challenging time

ahead to find out to what degree this spectrum is

usable . Thus, concentrating only on the allocations that were adopted could lead one to conclude that the results of WARC-92 were more

favorable for the United States than they actually

are. A thorough analysis of the decisions of the

conference requires careful consideration not

only of the allocations, but also of the sometimes

technically complex, sometimes deliberately vague

footnotes that accompany the allocations.

1 Technical Issues

Finally, in analyzing the outcomes and implications of WARC-92, several important technical

caveats must be noted that will affect how and

when WARC-92 decisions will be implemented,

First, many of the technical details that will affect

the future of these services and technologies are

still undecided, and will be negotiated amongst

the stakeholders over the next several years. In

addition, WARC-92 called for the CCIR, which

studies technical matters relating to radio technology, to conduct studies on many of the systems

and services addressed at the conference. These

studies will guide future revisions of the decisions

made at WARC-92.

Second, the decisions and allocations made at

WARC-92 are not cast in stone. Although WARC92 has been described as the last of its kind, it will

not be the last world radiocommunication conference, and future conferences will very likely

change, reverse, or otherwise modify the decisions and allocations made at WARC-92. According to the recent restructuring of the ITU (see

chapter 3), future world radio conferences will

take place every 2 years-each dealing with a

single topic or very limited range of topics. It is

likely (and required in some cases) that these

conferences will modify the allocations and foot2 For mobile services, e.g., more than 30 new footnotes were added that define power ICVCIS and sharing criteria, limit usc to certain

countries, and specify dates for implementation.

3 Quoted in Bob Chapin+ “Inrnarsat: MSS Evolution or Revolution?” Satellite Communications, August 1992, p. 36.
54 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

notes made at WARC-92 based on CCIR studies

and as a result of new technological developments.

In addition, the decisions made at WARC-92

will be subject to continuing interpretation (and

reinterpretation to fit changing national priorities)

over the next two decades. Since many of the

services (and systems) discussed at WARC-92

are still being developed, their operational characteristics are still unknown, Consequently, the

procedures and regulations that govern their use

will likely change over time as experience sharpens understanding.

The implications of WARC-92 are also difficult in some cases to foresee because of the long

transition times involved. The ITU often makes

allocations effective 10 or 15 years in the future

in order to give existing users of the bands

adequate time to move to other frequencies. So,

for example, the full force of some of the

decisions of WARC-79 are just now beginning to

be felt. Likewise, some WARC-92 allocations are

not scheduled to come into effect until 2007—15

years from now. It may take almost that long to

work through the nuances of the WARC-92

footnotes, and in that time, technology will have

continued to advance rapidly. Radio services will

have gone through several generations of improvements, and new applications will have been

developed. Policies, rules and regulations will

continue to evolve in response to technology

developments. For these reasons, evaluating the

outcomes of WARC-92 is, in one sense, premature. Rather, the outcomes of WARC-92 must be

examined as one piece in a longer process that

stretches out for many years before and after.

U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR WARC-92

The general goals for the United States at

WARC-92 were to enhance the competitive

position of the United States in radiocommunication technologies and services, and allow new

radio services and technology systems to be

developed as quickly and flexibly as possible. In

pursuit of these goals, the U.S. delegation had

several objectives for WARC-92:

Support allocations for new services, such as

low-Earth orbiting satellites (LEOS), BSSSound, and general satellite service (GSS),

as well as the expansion of allocations for

existing services, such as the Mobile-Satellite

Service (MSS) and high-frequency broadcasting (HF).

Protect important domestic radio operations

by preventing new services from operating in

the same bands and interfering with the

incumbent services. This was an important

concern for allocations in the L-band (approximately 1.4-1.6 GHz), the 14.5 -14.8 GHz

band, and the frequencies just above 21.4

GHz, among others.

Assure that new and existing allocations are

more flexible and less constrained by regulation-allowing U.S. companies to exploit their

technical strengths in international markets.

Promote development of new radiocommunication technologies, an area in which the

United States is a world leader.

In some cases these objectives conflicted with

each other. During the domestic preparations for

WARC-92, for example, U.S. policymakers were

forced to choose between protecting the important civilian and military uses of the L-band for

aircraft and weapons testing and promoting new

digital broadcasting technologies that had been

proposed by the private sector. In such cases,

intense policy disputes erupted, the undercurrents

of which carried over into the conference.

The sections below discuss the most important

allocation issues debated at WARC-92.4 Each

4 Other matters besides new allocations for radio services were discussed at W~C-92. However, the main focus of the conference was

on allocations, and allocation issues consequently are the focus of this report. For a full discussion of the U.S. positions for WMC-92,

negotiating issues, and fiil results, see U.S. Department of State, United States Delegafi”on Report: World Administrative Radio Conference,

International Telecommunication Union, Malaga-Torremolinos, Spain, 1992, publication 9988, released July 1992.
— —

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 55

section provides a brief background on the service by amateur radio operators, international governand technology, discusses the U.S. proposals and

how well they fared at WARC-92, and examines

the implications for the service now that agreements have been reached.5

HIGH-FREQUENCY BROADCASTING

9 Background

The frequencies from 3 to 30 MHz are referred

to as the high-frequency band or, more commonly, the shortwave band. Because radio waves

in these frequencies can travel long distances

(beyond the horizon), they are extensively used

ment (Voice of America, British Broadcasting

Corporation, and Radio Moscow) and private

(religious) broadcasters, and for national and

international aviation, maritime, and emergency

communications. 6 Many developing countries

use these bands primarily to provide domestic

point-to-point communications.

International broadcasters typically transmit

news and information services and religious

programming as well as music. Many countries,

including the United States, use shortwave broadcasting to champion their political, cultural, and

economic beliefs around the world. In this role,

HF broadcasting is viewed by many nations as an

5 All information onU.S. proposals comes from U.S. Department of State, UnitedStates Proposalsfor the 1992 WorldAdministrative Radio

Conference for Dealing with Frequency Allocations in Certain Parts of the Spectrum, Department of State publication 9903, July 1991.

6 Although more than 1O(3 countries currently use HF frequencies to broadcast information progr amming internationally, large-scale

international broadcasting is limited to perhaps a dozen (mostly industrial) countries, including Australia, Cana&, Chin% Cuba, France,

Ge rmany, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For a brief discussion of the history of international HF

broadcasting, see James Wood, “Growth Explosion in International I-IF Information Broadcasting,” Telecommunications Policy, vol. 15,

February 1991, pp. 22-28.

330–071 0 – 93 - 3 QL 3
56 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

&* ,

The United States uses high-frequency broadcasting towers like these in the Phillipines to transmit radio

programs around the world.

important tool of foreign policy. In the past, for

example, HF broadcasting was instrumental in

delivering propaganda programming during times

of war. This function was important during the

Cold War, but today, the overt propaganda

content of the broadcasts has been toned down

and more emphasis is put on communicating

American values and viewpoints. The United

States currently broadcasts more hours of

international programming than any other country.

For many years, the amount of spectrum

allocated to HF broadcasting has been recognized

by most countries as critically inadequate, especially in the most valuable (and congested) bands

below approximately 10 MHz.7 Part of the reason

for this congestion is simple numbers-there are

more broadcasters than available frequencies.

Planning exercises conducted for the 1987 High

Frequency Broadcasting WARC (HFBC-87), for

example, indicated that more than 50 percent of

all HF broadcasting needs submitted by member

countries could not be adequately met, and

between 25 and 35 percent of these needs could

not be met at all.8 In 1990 the National Telecommunications and Information Administration

(NTIA), concluded that 2 to 4 times more

spectrum (depending on specific frequency bands

and modulation techniques) was needed to meet

7 The bands below 10 MHz are especially coveted by broadcasters and other HF users because they are much more reliable than the

frequencies above 10 MHz. Frequencies above 10 MHz that are used for long distance communication are often affected by sunspot activity,

which varies by the time of day and by season. When this happens, the broadcasters in the upper bands reset their transmitters to the lower

frequencies, causing even more interference and congestion.

8 WMC-92 Lndustry Advisory Committee, “Final Report of Informal Working Group Number l,” report submitted to the Federal

Communications Commission Apr. 24, 1991.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 57

current HF broadcasting requirements. The International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB)

reached similar conclusions in its report to

WARC-92.9

One reason behind the great demand for HF

frequencies is that multiple frequencies are often

needed to deliver programming to a given geographic area over the course of a day. Different

frequencies have distinct transmission characteristics that make them suitable for long-range

transmission during specific hours-different frequencies, for example, are used at night and

during the day. Thus, in order to provide continuous coverage to a specific region or city, frequencies must be changed as the day progresses. For

example, Voice of America (VOA) uses seven

frequencies to deliver programmingg to Beijing,

China. The problems in providing adequate

coverage to an area as large as China or Africa are

enormous and achieving adequate quality and

coverage may require many different frequencies.

The international regulatory system also contributes to the congestion of the HF broadcasting

channels. HF broadcasting is not regulated, for

example, as AM/FM radio is in the United

States—where one station is assigned to one

channel in a specified geographic area. This

assignment process substantially reduces interference between stations. International HF broadcasting, on the other hand, has much less stringent

limits. Although the use of specific frequencies is

supposed to be coordinated internationally, and

the FCC regulates U.S. broadcasters, in other

countries broadcasters often transmit anytime,

anywhere they want-as long as the band is

allocated to HF and they follow the international

Radio Regulations (and sometimes even this is

not adhered to).l0 Some of the most sought-after

frequencies can have as many as 10 stations

operating on them.

9 U.S. Proposals

The United States made several proposals

relating to HF allocations and regulations. First,

based on the need for additional frequencies for

HF broadcasting, and in order to balance the

amount of spectrum available in the ITU’s 3

regions (see figure 1-2), the United States proposed to allocate an additional 1325 kHz in ITU

Region 2, and an additional 1125 kHz in Regions

1 and 3. The following additional HF broadcasting allocations were proposed for Region 2:

5900-5950 kHz 13800-13900 kHZ

7200-7525 kHZ* 15600-15700 kHZ

9350-9500 kHz 17450-17550 kHz

11550-11650 kHz 18900-19300 kHZ

*The United States proposed to add only 125 kHz

in this band for ITU Regions 1 and 3 in order to

align the HF broadcasting bands worldwide

(existing HF broadcasting allocations in these

regions exceeded those in Region 2). This accounts for the difference in total proposed allocations.

All these allocations except the 18900-19300 kHz

would be contiguous with existing HF broadcasting bands.

In addition, the United States proposed that all

new allocations be required to use a transmission

9 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Spectrum Required for HF Broadcasting,

NTIA Report 90-268, October 1990. Internation.al Telecommunication UnioU Document 4 of WUC-92, Malaga-Torremolinos, SpairL

February 1992.

10 The Irltematioti Frequency Registration Board does have to be notified that such operations me hginning, but the~~sno red power

to prevent stations from operating on any frequencies they want.
58 ! The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Figure 2-l—Single Sideband Modulation

In order to transmit information using radio waves, the

reformation to be sent (music or voice) IS impressed

onto a carrier wave. As a result of this process, sidebands are created that actually contain the music

or voice Information of the signal. Radio receivers

extract the music or voice reformation from the carrier

and its sidebands.

‘m

When both upper and lower sidebands are transmitted,

the method IS called double sideband modulation.

b, —— ●

&

.

In smgle-sideband modulation, either one of the

sidebands IS removed from the modulated carrier.

Only the carrier and one sideband are transmitted.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, adapted from

Harry Mileaf, cd., Electronics One (Rochelle Park, NJ: Hayden Book

Company, Inc., 1976),

technique called reduced carrier single-sideband

(SSB) modulation (see figure 2-1).11 SSB reduces

the amount of spectrum each radio signal/station

needs, thereby allowing more users to share the

band. 12 In order to encourage the early use of

SSB, the United States also proposed advancing

the date (agreed to at HFBC-87) when all

broadcasting must be converted to SSB from the

year 2015 to 2007.

Finally, the United States proposed to align the

differing regional HF broadcasting and amateur

radio service allocations around 7 MHz—

creating a worldwide allocation for HF broadcasting at 7200-7525 kHz. A procedure for reaccommodating existing services displaced by these

changes was also proposed.

1 Results

United States HF proposals achieved mixed

results at WARC-92. The conference allocated

only 790 kHz of additional spectrum to HF

broadcasting, of which 200 kHz is located in

frequencies below 10 MHz (the most congested

portion of the HF bands). The remaining 590 kHz

was allocated between 11 and 19 MHz. All the

newly allocated bands are allocated on a worldwide basis (see table 2-l).

Two significant limitations were put on the use

of these new frequencies. First, they cannot come

into operation until April 1, 2007. At that time,

broadcasting will become the exclusive primary

service operating in the bands. Point-to-point and

mobile services, however, will be able to use the

bands after this date, but only within the boundaries of a country and only on a low-power,

noninterference basis. WARC-92 Resolution 21

defines the conditions for the phase-in of the

broadcasting service in these newly allocated

bands.

1 ] Cwendy, most ~temtio~ shortwave broadcmting uses a transmission technique c~led double sidebmd.

12 Conbq t. int~tion, the kcre~e k spec~ ava.ilabili~ would not be 2:1. NTIA estimates gains of about 1.8:1, while the ITU/~

estimates that the efficiency gain would be approximately 1.5:1, meaning that 2 existing double-sideband channels could be converted into 3

new SSB channels.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 59

Table 2-1—WARC-92 High-Frequency Broadcasting Allocations

Frequency Amount Frequency Amount

5900-5950 KHz 50 KHz 11600-11650 KHz 50 KHz

7300-7350 KHz 50 kHz 12050-12100 KHz 50 KHz

9400-9500 KHz 100 KHz 13570-13600 KHz 30 KHz

13800-13870 KHz 70 Khz

15600-15800 kHz 200 KHz

17480-17550 KHz 70 KHz

18900-19020 KHz 120 KHz

200 KHz 590 KHz

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

Second, WARC-92 prohibited use of these

additional bands until a process for planning the

HF broadcasting spectrum has been completed.

This restriction is defined in Resolution 523,

which also calls for a WARC to establish

planning procedures. However, United States HF

broadcasters believe that planning will be meaningless until more spectrum is allocated, The

United States entered a formal reservation in the

Final Acts of WARC-92 to protest the small

amount of spectrum allocated to HF broadcasting

and other limitations put on use of the bands.13

On its other HF proposals, the United States

was more successful. WARC-92 did agree that all

new bands should be required to use SSB

transmission, but did not accept the U.S. proposal

to advance the date for conversion of all HF

broadcasting to SSB from 2015 to 2007. The

conference did, however, adopt Recommendation

519, which recommends that the next WARC

again consider advancing the date for replacing

current double-sideband transmissions with more

spectrum-efficient SSB techniques. WARC-92

did not accept the U.S. proposal for aligning the

world’s HF broadcasting bands around 7 MHz,

but Recommendation 718, proposed by Mexico

and supported by the United States, was adopted

that calls for a future conference to address the

issue. Finally, WARC-92 accepted U.S. proposals for reaccommodation procedures and secondary status for freed and mobile users in the HF

bands. WARC-92 also adopted Recommendation

520 that member governments take steps to shut

down HF broadcasters who are using frequencies

outside the designated HF broadcasting bands.

H Discussion

DOMESTIC ISSUES

In the domestic preparation process for HF

broadcasting, the primary issue was how much

additional spectrum the United States should

propose to be reallocated for HF broadcasting

uses. This debate pitted private broadcasters and

several agencies of the Federal Government (U.S.

Information Agency (USIA)/VOA and Radio

Free Europe/Radio Liberty) against other U.S.

Government users, including the Departments of

Treasury (Coast Guard) and Justice (Federal

Bureau of Investigation).

During the preparations process, the FCC’s

Industry Advisory Committee (IAC) recommended

that 2455 kHz of additional spectrum be allocated

for HF broadcasting. Defense and other government HF users proposed far smaller amounts, and

a compromise of 1325 kHz was tentatively

13$ {In he “Iew of he u~ted states of ~e-ica, ~i~ co~erenw f~]~ to tiead~uate provision for tie ~ needs of the broadcasting

service, particularly below 10 MHz, despite an earnest effort to do so. The IFRB’s Report to the Conference shows that broadcasters’

requirements far outnumber the channels available in the bands between 6 and 11 MHz (where spectrum is urgently needed) and that planning

will not work effectively without additionzd and adequate HF spectrum. Therefore, the United States of America reserves the right to take the

necessary steps to meet the HF needs of its broadcasting service. ’ hternational ‘IMecommunication UnioL *’Declarations,” WmC-92

Document 389-E, Malaga-Torremolinos, Spa@ Mar. 3, 1992, p. 29.
60 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

reached. What happened next is disputed, but

final proposals included only 1325 kHz. USIA

and VOA, joined by private broadcasting interests, complained to NTIA that this amount was

inadequate, and proposed an additional 60 kHz.

Other government agencies, including the Coast

Guard and Federal Bureau of Investigation, opposed this addition, citing the use of the specified

band for drug interdiction activities. NTIA agreed

with these agencies, and rejected VOA appeal—

the final proposal to WARC-92 was for 1325 kHz.

In an attempt to force official U.S. proposals to

include more spectrum for HF broadcasting,

VOA, representing government and industry

broadcasters, took its case to the National Security Council (NSC) in early January 1992.14 NSC

did not act on VOA’s request until after WARC92 had ended, effectively nullifying VOA’s

appeal.

The clash over allocations for HF broadcasting

has become controversial. Different players in the

debate hold conflicting views of what happened

and when: What information was shared? When

were decisions made and who made them? How

carefully were the factors surrounding the issue

considered? Because the debate involved existing

government use of the HF bands, much of the

preparations and debate regarding HF broadcasting allocations were conducted in the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), the

deliberations of which are largely restricted from

public view. 15 The issues surrounding the battle

over additional HF spectrum and its implications

for long-term U.S. radiocommunication policy

development are discussed in chapter 1.

Ultimately, the domestic battles over HF broadcasting proposals most likely had no effect on the

WARC-92 outcome. Even if the United States

had proposed more spectrum, as did the Europeans, it is unlikely that the developing countries

would have agreed to any further allocations. A

few analysts disagree. They believe that if the

United States had been able to develop a proposal

with even more additional spectrum for HF

broadcasting in a timely manner, and had joined

others (the Europeans) in promoting such new

allocations prior to WARC-92, that additional

spectrum could have been obtained. Whether it

was the result of conscious strategy or not, going

into the conference with more modest proposals

now makes the outcome look better than it would

have if the United States had proposed the larger

amount of spectrum VOA and the private broadcasters wanted.

An additional area of domestic disagreement

involves the implementation of SSB technology.

This conflict again involves VOA and private

broadcasters, on the one hand, and other government agencies on the other. Although VOA

supports the conversion to SSB in principal, and

is, in fact, installing SSB-compatible transmitters,

it is concerned about how and when the transition

to SSB can be accomplished. VOA’s position is

that the cost of SSB radio receivers currently

prevents their rapid adoption by VOA’s listeners,

and until adequate numbers of SSB radios are in

use, they will resist ceasing their double-sideband

14 NSC is ~ laq ~e~o~ for resolv~g issues mat could not ~ resolved iD tie re~m WARC preparation processes. It has no specific expertise

in radiocomrnunication matters and no individual who specializes in telecommunication issues.

15 me ~terdepmmt MO Advisory Cohttee @AQ was fo~ed ~ 1922 to coor@te tie Fede~ Government’s use of the spectrum.

It is now located in the Commerce Department and consists of approximately 20 to 25 representatives from those Federal agencies who are

the most active users of radio technologies. IRAC serves in an advisory capacity to NTIA in matters of radiocornmunication policy and spectrum

management. For more information on IIL4C and its role in the WARC-92 preparation process, see U.S. Congress, Office of T@nology

Assessment, The 1992 WorldAdministrative Radio Conference: Issues for U.S. International Spectrum Policy, OTA-TCT-BP-76 (Washington

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1991).
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 61

(DSB) transmissions.l6 Typical shortwave (HF)

radio receivers are relatively inexpensive, but

SSB receivers, which are being manufactured

today (although not in mass market quantities),

cost $175 and up, far beyond the means of most

VOA listeners around the world.17 VOA’s position also may be related to a desire to move

eventually into satellite (BSS-Sound) delivery of

its programming. Rather than forcing its listeners

to endure two format changes in the coming years,

VOA may prefer to move directly into BSSSound delivery of its services, leapfrogging a

technology (SSB) they see as only an interim (and

very expensive) step.l8

These disagreements indicate a larger policy

and institutional battle that is being fought

between private/government broadcasters and

other Federal Government spectrum users in the

arena of international frequency allocation. Defense interests are especially reluctant to reallocate spectrum for HF broadcasting (public and

private) because they control much of the HF

spectrum allocated for government use, and they

do not want to give up any more frequencies than

necessary. As a result, the HF broadcasting

community reports being consistently overwhelmed

in government decisionmaking processes such as

the IRAC preparations for WARC-92. The issue

appears to be one of agency mission. Defense-and

security-related communications appear to have

assumed a higher priority than international

broadcasting, despite a National Security Directive (NSD-51) that affirms the important role of

international broadcasting in foreign policy and

supports its continued mission. Battles of this

type can be expected to continue until guidelines

are developed that allow government policymakers

to weigh competing spectrum claims based on

clearly-defined policy goals.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Unlike many other allocation issues, the debate

at WARC-92 over new HF broadcasting allocations echoed past ITU differences between the

developed and developing countries. For more

than a decade, the United States and many other

industrialized countries have been advocating

increasing HF broadcasting allocations in order to

meet the growing needs of international HF

broadcasters. These past efforts achieved only

limited success.

Historically, developing countries, who use the

HF bands for fixed (point-to-point) domestic

telecommunication services, have opposed expanding the allocations for HF broadcasting.

They fear that such uses would interfere with or

limit their point-to-point HF systems, and that

increased use of these frequencies for broadcasting could make their existing equipment unusablejeopardizing their investments in that equipment.

They want to continue to use HF for domestic

communications and they want to protect their

investments. Many countries are also concerned

about increased foreign broadcasting into their

territories.

At WARC-92, these historic divisions persisted as a large and determined block of develop16 * ~USIA ~oc~ not ~ppo~e ~onvcr~ion t. SSB, ~~ch it sees as offering sp~~ efficiency and possibly generator-fuel savings, provided

its listeners have SSB-compatible receivers. . . USIA has consistently insisted that two related problems, the introduction of SSB-compatible

transmitters and the introduction of SSB-compatible receivers, must be resolved prior to the fha.1 abandonment of DSB in favor of SSB. . .The

high cost of SSB-compatible receivers, especially in the Third World, maybe a significant factor in delaying the conversion from DSB. Until

and unless adequate numbers of SSB-compatible receivers are in the hands of audiences, broadcasters, and more importantly the governments

that in most cases pay their bills, will be unwilling to cease DBS operations. ” Review comments of Walter La Fleur, Director, Office of

Engineering and Technical Operatiom, Voice of America, Iettcr to David P. Wyc, OTA, Nov. 18, 1992, p. A-2.

17 some ~yst5 ~lntaln t~t me Price of SSB rKelvers Wou]d ~omc down substanti~y when fiey were manufactured in tfuc mass market

quantities. Others believe that the price of the reccivcrs would still be prohibitively high.

18 It should be noted that ncw BSS-Sound receivers will also be very expensive when they are first inmoduced.
62 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

ing countries staunchly opposed allocating any

more frequencies to the HF broadcasting service.

The industrialized countries, including the United

States and Europe as well as the Russian Federation and Japan, supported increasing the allocations. The Europeans, in fact, submitted a common proposal for new HF spectrum that exceeded

even the amount proposed by the United States.

Discussions over the allocation proposals at the

conference were intense, and negotiations quickly

became focused on the most valuable and congested frequencies below 10 MHz. After a number of formal and informal meetings and much

discussion “of f-line,” a compromise package

was worked out that included the allocations

noted above.

Although the allocations by WARC-92 fell

short of U.S. objectives, the United States supported the compromise package. U.S. delegates

participating in the HF negotiations felt that

further discussion would be useless, citing extensive opposition to any further allocations. Developing country opposition also blocked other U.S.

proposals. The U.S. proposal for advancing the

conversion date for SSB, for example, met stiff

resistance from the developing countries, and

some developed countries, who were concerned

that they could not afford to refit or replace their

equipment any faster than the original date of

2015.

This case points out the difficulty of balancing

domestic and international factors in developing

proposals. Domestic users need more spectrum,

which led the United States to propose large

additional allocations. Many (primarily developing) countries, however, oppose expansion, meaning that a smaller proposal might have had better

chances for success internationally. U.S. proposals represented an attempt to strike a balance

between these two conflicting forces.

H Issues and Implications

FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS ARE

INADEQUATE

STILL

From the U.S. perspective, despite the allocations made at WARC-92, the amount of spectrum

allocated for HF broadcasting is still inadequate.

This means that the HF broadcasting bands will

continue to be congested and subject to high

levels of interference among stations around the

world. Furthermore, the limitations placed on the

implementation of the new HF broadcasting

frequencies mean that these bands will not be

available for HF broadcasting for at least 15 years.

Given the shortage of spectrum that currently

exists, the decisions made at WARC-92 will not

solve broadcasters’ immediate needs.

Several long-term questions regarding HF

broadcasting remain. How can the United States

best meet its HF broadcasting requirements given

the limitations and restrictions of the WARC-92

allocations? What constraints, if any, will the

inadequacy of allocations put on future U.S. HF

broadcasting activities? Will future international

broadcasting services require more high frequency spectrum or can other technologies be

used to alleviate the shortage?

The options available to the United States are

limited. According to the U.S. reservation in the

Final Acts of WARC-92, the United States will

take all steps to meet the needs of its broadcasters.

In practice, this may mean that U.S. broadcasters

will use the frequencies allocated at WARC;-92

immediately, in spite of the implementation date

of 2007. Despite ITU agreements and resolutions

that prohibit broadcasting in frequencies out of

the specified bands, many countries, including the

United States, have been forced to use bands other

than those allocated to HF broadcasting to meet

their domestic HF broadcasting needs.l9 In the

future the United States may be forced to expand

19 ~~ber 342 of the Radio Re@latio~ permits such operations provided they do not cause interference to the allocated SCmlceS.

International lklecomrnunication Unioq Radio Regulations (Geneva, 1982).
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 63

its use of prohibited frequency bands in order to

meet its broadcasting requirements.

PLANNING

Planning the HF broadcasting spectrum is

closely linked to the amount of spectrum that has

been allocated for HF broadcasting. From the

U.S. perspective, any attempt at planning before

adequate spectrum is allocated would be difficult

and most likely unsuccessful. The United States

will fight attempts to plan the spectrum until it

believes that allocations are adequate and/or until

an adequate planning system is developed.20

Aside from arguments that insufficient spectrum exists for planning, the United States has

historically opposed a priori pl anning of the

spectrum. Government officials believe that such

planning reduces the flexibility to meet as yet

undefined future needs and leads to inefficient

utilization of spectrum resources, U.S. spectrum

policymakers may also fear that because spectrum is in such limited supply, and because the

United States is the world’s largest user of the HF

spectrum, that ITU planning could force U.S. HF

broadcasters to give up frequencies in order to

make room for other countries. Thus, it is unclear

in any case if the United States would ever

support the formal planning of the HF broadcasting bands. From the perspective of developing

countries, like the past battle over geosynchronous orbital slots for satellites, this is a question

of equity and fairness they have been pursuing for

some time, and which continues to be important

to them. The issue of HF planning will continue

to be contentious for many years.

SINGLE-SIDEBAND TRANSMISSION

Single-sideband transmission is not a new

technology. Amateur radio operators, the military, and some marine and aeronautical users have

been using it for many years. Converting these

types of (point-to-point) radiocommunication systems to SSB is easier than for mass market

broadcasting operations because commercial services and the military have greater financial

resources and the ability to more completely

control the transition process—allowing them to

implement transmitters and receivers simultaneously. Broadcasters, on the other hand, directly

control only the transmission of the signal; they

cannot force listeners to buy new radios.21

Although SSB radios are available, they are not

a truly ‘‘mass market” product. Currently, SSB

receivers are available commercially for $175 and

up in the United States. These prices will slow the

widespread introduction of these radios in the

developing nations of the world. If and when mass

market economies are realized, the price of SSB

radios will fall, Whether such radios will be

produced cheaply enough to sell worldwide, and

when, however, are open questions. Developing

a market for such products will be difficult until

more broadcasters (are forced to) start using SSB

transmissions for their programming. The conversion to SSB in the United States will continue to

be a difficult issue. Because of this, broadcasters

will probably continue to insist that sufficient

numbers of SSB-compatible receivers be in the

hands of their listeners before abandoning DSB in

favor of SSB systems.

BSS-SOUND

The congestion in HF broadcasting bands and

the relatively low reliability and quality of some

of the frequencies is pushing international broadcasters to look for alternative means to deliver

programming. An important future possibility in

international broadcasting is the deployment of

20 Despite ~=fom t. &te, he devel~p~ent of ~ computcnz~ p~ing model ~ not been successti. Systems that have been developed

so far have suffered from various technicat flaws that made them unacceptable to ITU members. It is unclear how vigorously further

development efforts are being pursued.

21 Broa&.~terS we faced ~~ a c~cken.egg smfio. Consmers do not &ve SSB radios and do not want to buy them ~td there 1S Sufficient

progr amrning to listen to. Broadcasters will resist broadcasting to listeners who cannot hear them-unless they are forced to. One possible

solution is to develop inexpensive dual-mode radios capable of receiving both SSB and DSB transmissions.
64 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

broadcasting systems that use satellite technology. Such systems would cover larger areas than

terrestrial transmitters, and if such systems are

licensed and operated regionally and/or globally,

they could replace traditional HF broadcasting as

the medium of choice for international broadcasters.

22 The deployment of only a small number of

satellites could beam hundreds of channels of

programming around the world, thereby relieving

some, if not all, of the current congestion of the

HF broadcasting bands. Many HF broadcasters,

including VOA, see the future of international

broadcasting in satellites. Direct broadcasting

from satellites could provide worldwide coverage

for U.S. broadcasters that is more complete,

reliable, and of higher quality than that available

with HF technology.

One important issue that will have to be

addressed at future ITU meetings before BSSSound international broadcasting can go forward

is the legitimacy of cross-border satellite transmissions. Currently, HF broadcasting across national boundaries is internationally recognized as

a legitimate activity, although some countries do

attempt to jam foreign transmissions entering

their territories. There is currently no similar

broad acceptance of international satellite broadcasting activities, and the impossibility of conforming satellite coverage areas strictly to national boundaries could cause serious difficulty in

implementing such systems on a regional or

worldwide basis.23 Some countries, who want to

exercise tight control on the flow of information

into their countries, will seek to impose restrictions. U.S. broadcasters would prefer that future

satellite-based international broadcasting be considered in the same way that HF broadcasting is

today. This would allow them maximum flexibility in reaching listeners around the world.

BROADCASTING SATELLITE

SERVICE-SOUND

I Background

BSS-Sound refers

programming (music,

to the delivery of audio

news, sports) from satellites directly to consumer radios. While no

BSS-Sound services are operating yet, the systems now being developed would use digital

technology to broadcast CD--or near CD-quality

programming to listeners using radio receivers

that would be portable/mobile and low-cost.24 A

key feature of satellite broadcasting is that it

allows programmers to broadcast their signal over

a wide area-the entire United States, for exampleas opposed to the limited range of today’s

conventional terrestrial transmitters. Some developers of BSS-Sound systems plan to augment the

satellites with terrestrial transmitters that would

improve reception in urban areas (between buildings, in tunnels, etc.). Because these systems will

send their signals in a digital format, the term

digital audio broadcasting (DAB) has come into

widespread use (especially in the United States)

to describe this next generation of radio broadcasting, and, in fact, DAB is now commonly used

to describe both satellite and terrestrial digital

broadcasting systems.

Proponents of BSS-Sound see many markets

for the new digital services. They are planning a

variety of programming targeted to groups of

users with different musical tastes, ethnic and

cultural backgrounds, and special interests—

groups that may not be able to support a local

zz pJ~ made MS ~~ent & opposing further allocations for w broadc~ting.

23 ~ fac~ No, ‘2674 of tie ~dio Re@ations stip~tes tit “~1 tm~c~ me~s av~able SW be used to reduce, to the maximum eXtent

practicable, the radiation over the territory of other countries urdess an agreement has been previously reached with such countries.’ ITU, Radio

Regulations, op. cit., footnote 19, p. RR30-2. Whether or not this regulation requires prior consent of countries before satellite broadcasting

can be beamed into them is a topic of debate in U.S. radiocommunication policy circles.

z~ Because existing AMIFM radios use analog technology, they will not be able to receive the new digital BSS-Sound signals. Consumers

will have to buy new (digital) radios in order to listen to the new services.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 65

radio station, but when aggregated across the

country, make a national service possible. This

concept is analogous to the programming philosophy of cable television.

In addition to audio programmingg, the transmission of data services directly to users is also

being explored. Proponents envision broadcasting data services to support educational needs,

paging operations, and navigation and traffic

management systems for the Nation’s cars and

highways. In addition to purely domestic services, international broadcasters see BSS-Sound

technology as an important new way to transmit

radio programming around the world—a service

that would allow them to reach listeners with

higher quality than the HF broadcasting they use

today.

BSS-Sound applications have been studied

internationally for at least 25 years. The members

of the ITU first considered allocating frequencies

for BSS-Sound services at the 1979 WARC. That

conference and subsequent WARCs, however,

were not able to agree on specific allocations, and

as a result, the matter was deferred for consideration by WARC-92.

U.S. Proposal

Because of the contentious nature of the debate

this country over allocations for BSS-Sound,

the U.S. proposal for this service was submitted

to the ITU after the formal package of U.S.

proposals was submitted in July 1991. The United

States proposed that the 2310-2360 MHz band be

allocated for BSS-Sound and complementary

terrestrial broadcasting services on a worldwide

basis.

9 Results

The U.S. proposal was not adopted as a

worldwide allocation. Instead, WARC-92 adopted

three different allocations for BSS-Sound (see

figure 2-2 and table 2-2), making the development

b

-5

-.

Satellite dishes such as these will beam digital quality

radio programming up to satellites that will then

retransmit it across the country.

of a common worldwide BSS-Sound system/

standard unlikely.25 First, WARC-92 allocated 40

MHz of spectrum for BSS-Sound and complementary terrestrial systems at 1452-1492 MHz on

a coprimary worldwide basis. However, 30 countries, including many countries represented by the

Conference of European Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), indicated

through a footnote (722AAA) that BSS-Sound

services will have to operate on a secondary basis

until April 1, 2007. This will likely preclude the

introduction of these services in those countries

until that date. In addition, the United States,

holding to its original proposal, added a footnote

(722B) that allocates the 1452-1525 MHz band

only to the fixed and mobile services-no BSSSound or terrestrial DAB services will be permitted in that band in this country. The United States

was the only country that made such a stipulation,

which was to protect existing aeronautical telemetry users. Second, a number of countries,

including Japan, China, and the Russian Federation, allocated (through footnote 757A) the 2535-

2655 MHz band for BSS-Sound on a coprimary

basis. Finally, the United States, joined only by

India, inserted another footnote (750B) allocating

25 WUC-92 did agree that all BSS-Sound systems would be required to use digital transmission technology.
66 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Figure 2-2—WARC-92 Allocations for Broadcast Satellite Service-Sound

Q

,/’-+

L

_ India accepts all three

allocations.

NOTE: Only Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine are included from the former Soviet Union.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

the 2310-2360 MHz band for BSS-Sound, Thus,

there are three BSS-Sound allocations that could

eventually be used.

WARC-92 also adopted two resolutions pertaining to BSS-Sound. Resolution 528 called for

another conference, preferably before 1998, to

plan BSS-Sound services, develop procedures to

coordinate BSS-Sound with complementary terrestrial (DAB) services, and review criteria for

sharing the spectrum with other services. In the

interim, new BSS-Sound applications may be

implemented, but only in the upper 25 MHz of the

allocations, and only according to existing coordination requirements. Terrestrial DAB services

Table 2-2—Population Distribution of WARC-92

BSS-Sound Allocations

Allocations Population (milllions)

1452-1492 MHz 3,135

No restrictions 2,584

Not until 2007 551

2310-2360 MHz 1,087

2535-2655 MHz 2,719

NOTE: Because India accepted all three allocations, the actual numbers of listeners for each allocation will vary depending on which

allocation(s) India uses.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, based on data

provided by Voice of America.
Chapter 2--Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 67

may also be introduced, but only after coordinating with countries whose existing services might

be affected. This 25 MHz limit should allow some

services to use the spectrum, but the number of

systems that could share the frequencies may be

limited.

Resolution 522 notes that BSS-Sound services

could be provided by either geosynchronous or

non-geosynchronous orbit satellites, and requests

that the CCIR study the sharing criteria for

BSS-Sound systems using different orbits and

between BSS-Sound and other services in order to

develop coordination procedures and avoid harmful interference between systems and services.26

The resolution also requests that the ITU’s

Administrative Council place this matter on the

agenda of a future WARC. This resolution

responds to the development of low-Earth orbiting satellite (LEOS) systems and the many

unknowns regarding systems using this new

technology.

WARC-92 also adopted Resolution 527, which

calls for a future WARC to consider the development of terrestrial DAB in the VHF broadcasting

bands (existing FM radio bands) for Region 1 and

interested countries of Region 3. This is in

response to the plans of several European countries to begin digital sound broadcasting on an

interim basis in those bands. The resolution also

requests the CCIR to begin the relevant technical

studies (including system characteristics, propagation, and sharing criteria) associated with the

introduction of such services.27

9 Discussion

The idea of broadcasting radio programming

directly from satellites is not new, dating back at

least 45 years.28 The introduction of digital

technology, however, and the promise of staticfree radio programming gave new impetus to

BSS-Sound and DAB development efforts in the

1980s. The European Commission took the lead

in developing digital radio technology with its

Eureka 147 DAB project, which was first demonstrated at the 1988 WARC. U.S. efforts to develop

DAB and BSS-Sound technology have lagged

behind European efforts, and U.S.-developed

systems are only now being demonstrated.

DOMESTIC BACKGROUND

The development of DAB systems has taken

two forms in the United States. Originally, a small

number of companies proposed satellite-based

(BSS-Sound) systems that would use frequencies

in the L-band (roughly 1.4-1.6 GHz) to transmit

their programming. Because these types of systems, like Eureka 147, would use frequencies

other than the traditional AM/FM broadcasting

bands, they are often referred to as ‘out-of-band’

systems. The first U.S. company to formally

announce such a system in the United States was

Satellite CD Radio.29 As currently planned, the

Satellite CD system, which was proposed in 1989,

26 ~ tis -e, non-g~syrlchronous orbits refer p rirnarily to elliptical, and not low-Earth orbits. Because LEOS only remain in range of a

receiver for a period of minutes, some analysts doubt whether audio services could be provided by LEOS.

27 ~tematio~ TelWo-@~~tion u~~~ )7i~l ~ts of the world ~~”nis~ative R~io Conference (WmC-92), provisiomd vel_siO~

Malaga-Torrernolinos, Spain+ March 1992, p. 116. Hereafter, ITU, Final Acts.

28 me concept of using satellites tO @~tit pro jpmrning was presented by Arthur C. Clarke in 1945 (Arthur C. Clarke, “Extra-’I5rrestriat

Relays, ” Wireless World, October 1945). The more modem concept of BSS-Sound was considered at previous WARCS in 1979, 1985, and

1988. See OTA, WfiC’-92, op. cit., footnote 15.

29 At abut he sme be, fidio sate~te Coloration (RadioSat) desi~ed a system tit wo~(j bve used the MSAT system p~ed fOr

operation by American Mobile Satellite Corp. (AMSC) and the Department of Defense global positioning system. The system planned to

provide entertainrnent, communications, and navigation semices primarily to car radios on a nationwide basis. Services to be delivered

included: interactive digital audio entertainen~ data broadcasts, including traftlc and weather advisories; navigation inforrnatiorL and

two-way voice and data communications. Because of what RadioSat terms “unlawful’ behavior on the part of AMSC, RSC was never able

to negotiate for frequencies with AMSC and has terminated development of the RadioSat system. RSC has filed suit against AMSC charging

violations of the Communications Act of 1934 and the Sherman Antitrust Act.
68 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

would use two satellites to broadcast up to 30

channels of CD-quality music to subscribers who

would pay a $5 to $10 monthly fee. The system,

which will serve only the United States, is

scheduled to begin operation in 1997. In December 1992, five other companies submitted applications to the FCC to offer satellite radio services—

American Mobile Radio Corp. (a subsidiary of the

American Mobile Satellite Corp.), Primosphere

L. P., Loral Aerospace Holdings, Inc., SkyHighway Radio Corp., and Digital Satellite Broadcasting Corp.30

Because out-of-band DAB solutions would

create a completely new set of radio broadcasting

frequencies, many broadcasters have strongly

opposed the development of such systems, claiming that they would destroy the American tradition of local broadcasting. Primarily, these broadcasters fear the competition that a national radio

service might pose to their local operations. New

national radio programs could conceivably take

away listeners and advertising revenues that

would otherwise go to support local broadcasters.

In addition, broadcasters believe that the more

rapid development of out-of-band DAB might put

them at a technical disadvantage in using digital

technology. To counter these perceived threats,

broadcasters have demanded guaranteed access to

any new spectrum that would be opened for

terrestrial (out-of-band) DAB use.31 Although no

frequencies have been allocated specifically for

terrestrial DAB, the FCC did allocate frequencies

for BSS-Sound (satellite use only) at 2310-2360

MHz. However, the problem of allowing existing

users access to new frequencies will recur if the

United States considers additional allocations for

terrestrial systems (see below).

Largely in response to local broadcasters’

concerns, several companies began developing

DAB technology that would work “in-band”—

using the same frequencies now used by existing

AM/FM radio stations. Such systems would

allow terrestrial broadcasters to upgrade their

facilities to digital quality at less cost than

out-of-band solutions and with minimal disruption to the industry. Today, almost all U.S.

terrestrial DAB development remains focused on

in-band solutions.32

Gannett, CBS, and Group W Broadcasting, for

example, formed a partnership (USA Digital

Radio) to develop an in-band, DAB system

dubbed Project Acorn. This system would send

the digital audio signal over the same channel as

the existing AM/FM analog signal, but at a

reduced power level that would not interfere with

the simultaneously transmitted analog signal (see

figure 2-3). Demonstrations of the system were

scheduled for the end of 1992, with an experimental system planned for mid-1993.33 Another DAB

solution has been proposed by Strother Communications and Lincom Corporation. The Strother/

LinCom solution is also in-band, but broadcasts

the digital signal in “guard bands’’-fiequencies

on either side of existing FM channel that are left

unused in order to guard against interference from

stations on adjacent channels. The system also

sends a digital signal that is much weaker than the

so ~ese applimtiom were tenwtively accepted by the FCC in March 1993, ‘‘FCC Accepts Satellite DARS Application, ” Telcom Highlights

lnfernafiomd, vol. 15, No. 10, Mar. 10, 1993. Later in MarclL I-oral Aerospace withdrew its application as part of an agreement to enter into

a partnership with Satellite CD Radio.

31 On@ly, ~fore~.bmd DAB system were ~~g develop~, L.b~d frequencies w~e considered for both satellite ad teIKW@ DAB.

Broadcasters wanted their access to these frequencies guaranteed so that they could compete in digitat services with any new

competitors-otherwise they feared they would be effectively shut out of and unable to compete with the new technologies and services. This

situation is analogous to the current demands of cellular carriers to be allowed to provide personal communications services.

32 Edmund L. Andrews, “Digitat Radio: Static Is Only Between Owners,” New York Times, May 6, 1992, p. D8.

33 D~elE-,Vice Resident, Finmce and Business Affairs, Gaunet Broadcasting, personal communication, June 2, 1992.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for US. Radio Technology I 69

Figure 2-3—Proposed In-band Digital Audio Broadcasting Systems

I

1 Single AM or FM channel 1

Traditional

AMIFM signal

Freauencv

A

DAB signal sent at reduced power

In-band, on channel

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

analog signals in order to avoid interference.

Other companies developing terrestrial DAB

systems include Mercury Digital, AT&T, the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology and General Instrument.

WARC PREPARATIONS

The development of a proposal for BSS-Sound

was the most difficult in the domestic WARC-92

preparation process. 34 Many interest groups in

both the private sector and the Federal Government took strong positions on the issue, The

majority of the private sector, as indicated by the

FCC in its Report on WARC-92, favored an

allocation for BSS-Sound in the L-band (between

1430 and 1525 MHz), as did many foreign

countries. 35 The U.S. aerospace industry, the

Department of Defense and its aerospace contractors and many local terrestrial broadcasters resisted this proposed allocation. Aerospace industry representatives, both civilian and military,

vehemently oppose any new use of the L-band,

due to its importance for aircraft and weapons

systems testing and the unknowns associated with

Exlstlng FM channels

A ‘r

DAB signals sent In exlstlng “guard bands.”

In-band, adjacent channel

developing a new radiocommunication

system.

service/

During WARC-92 preparations, the U.S. broadcasting industry was tom by bitter internal

disagreements over the future development of

DAB and the U.S. BSS-Sound proposal. Proponents of satellite-delivered DAB favored frequency allocations in the L-band. Initially, the

National Association of Broadcasters (NAB),

which represents local broadcasters, supported

this approach. However, a significant number of

local broadcasters strenuously opposed the allocation of radio frequencies for a new satellite

audio broadcasting service, arguing that many

local broadcasters were already experiencing

financia1 difficulties and that the establishment of

a competing, national service would undermine

the ability of local broadcasters to attract advertising revenues. In January 1992, the NAB dropped

its support for L-band proposals. Eventually, the

opponents of an L-band allocation prevailed, and

a compromise allocation was proposed at 2310-

2360 MHz.

~ See OT’, wMC-92, op. cit., fOOtnOte 15.

35 TMS band is cwendy allmat~ in the United States to mobile (sbared by both Federal Government and nongovernment users, but limited

to aeronautical telemetering and telecoremand of aircraft and missiles), radiolocation (for military use only), and freed semices (allocated on

a secondary basis for government use only). The S-band is not as extensively used for aeronautical telemetry as is the L-band.
70 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

WARC NEGOTIATIONS

At WARC-92, the U.S. proposal has been

described as ‘dead on arrival. ’ There was almost

no international support for this allocation going

into the conference, and despite the best efforts of

U.S. negotiators, only India supported the U.S.

position in the Final Acts of WARC-92. Opposition to the U.S. proposal came from all parts of the

world. Canada, for example, has been developing

terrestrial DAB systems that would use L-band

frequencies, and Mexico has indicated that it will

develop similar systems in the next several years.

The CEPT countries also opposed the U.S.

proposal, initially proposing allocations in the

2570-2620 MHz band, and later supporting allocations in the L-band.36 Other countries, including China, Japan, and the Russian Federation

favored an allocation around 2500 MHz, in order

to protect their existing uses of the L-band.

At the conference, the primary debate was over

where the BSS-Sound allocation should be locatedin the L-band (1.5- 1.6 GHz) or the S-band

(2.0-2.5 GHz). The debate was difficult because

each band has specific advantages and disadvantages.37 Discussion focused on questions of technology (propagation), economics (cost of receivers), but more practically on the politics of

spectrum management—the tension between protecting existing services on the one hand and

promoting new technologies and services on the

other. L-band allocations were opposed by many

countries, including the United States, Japan, and

some European countries, because the bands are

already heavily used for other radio services. In

Japan, the bands are allocated to important mobile

services. In the United States, the band is used for

aircraft and weapons testing. Moving these existing users to other frequencies would cost millions

of dollars.

POST-WARC ACTIVITY

Since WARC-92 ended, BSS-Sound and DAB

regulatory and development efforts in this country have been moving slowly, largely due to the

‘‘wait-and-see’ strategy the FCC and NAB

pursued immediately following the conference.

However, the FCC has taken several actions in the

DAB/BSS-Sound debate. In October 1992, the

FCC proposed to allocate the 2310-2360 MHz

band for BSS-Sound (but only for satellite use) in

this country, a decision that was later formalized.

This action boosted the prospects of Satellite CD

Radio, and, as noted above, prompted other

companies to enter the race for BSS-Sound. The

FCC’s allocation, however, has not dampened the

development of in-band, terrestrial DAB systems.

Ironically, the allocations made by WARC-92,

and the obstinate U.S. position on L-band, have

focused more attention on in-band DAB systems

in the United States. Initially, most of the private

sector favored an allocation in the L-band.38

When that band was not allocated in this country,

attention shifted to in-band solutions, which had

become better defined as the WARC preparations

process went along. Several companies are now

developing in-band DAB systems, including

those noted above.

Regarding satellite DAB, NAB opposed a

Satellite CD Radio request for an expedited FCC

rulemaking to allocate the 2310-2360 MHz band

for BSS-Sound, stating that the world course for

digital radio, satellite and terrestrial, remains

unclear.39 At the same time, NAB encouraged the

development of an in-band system for DAB that

36A tot~ of 18 CEFT coma-k jointly submitted the CEPT proposal.

37 Most BSS.S~und proponents and radio engineers &lieve that me fr~uencies aromd 1.5 (Mz w twhnictdly better suited fOr

satellite-delivered DAB than higher frequencies. Propagation characteristics are better at L-band-at the higher S-band frequencies, signals

am more likely to be scattered or blockal by buildings, trees, etc. Because of this, some analysts believe that S-band may only be suitable for

satellite transmission.

38 See especi~ly Annex B of hdustry Advisory Comdt@, “Final Report: W~C’92,” submitted to the FCC, Apr. 30, 1991.

39 ‘‘NAB Opposes Satellite CD wdio Request for Expedited BSS-Sound Allocation Rulernaking, ’ Telecommunications Reports, June 8,

1992, P. 30.
.

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 71

would improve the quality of both AM and FM

stations. If that effort was to fail, NAB apparently

believes that L-band is more attractive for BSSSound than the S-band allocation the U.S. indicated at WARC-92.

The Electronic Industries Association (EIA)

established a task group in August 1991 to

develop a standard for DAB in this country. The

standard agreed to by EIA will be submitted to the

FCC as a proposed U.S. standard. The group is

composed of specific system proponents, broadcast representatives, and manufacturers. In late

1992, the group solicited proposals for systems to

be tested as part of the recommendation process,

and actual testing of proposed systems is scheduled to begin sometime in 1993.40

Internationally, the United States continues to

be active in the work of the CCIR’S study group

on BSS-Sound issues. In preparation for future

CCIR meetings on BSS-Sound, industry and

private sector representatives formed a working

group in August 1992 to develop U.S. positions.

The main focus of the group will be on future

topics the CCIR should study in preparation for

the future radio conference on DAB called for in

Resolution 528.

A few companies have been authorized to

provide BSS-Sound services in other parts of the

world. The first, WorldSpace Corp. (Afrispace,

Inc.), was granted an experimental license by the

FCC in 1991 to provide radio services in Africa.

After regulatory delays resulting from WARC92, Afrispace now plans to launch its AfriStar-1

satellite in 1995, and has signed up 3 broadcasting

companies that will use 5 of its 36 channels.41

CaribSpace Ltd., a subsidiary of WorldSpace, has

been granted a license from the government of

Trinidad and Tobago to provide similar services

in the Caribbean.42

~ Issues and Implications

The questions involved in assessing the future

of BSS-Sound and DAB far exceed the allocations issues debated at WARC-92. The allocations made at the conference set the stage for the

future development of new digital radio services,

but the allocations are only one part of a much

larger constellation of policy problems related to

the future development of radio technology and

the evolution of the radio broadcasting industry in

this country. The decisions to be made about how

to implement WARC-92 allocations implicitly

shape future, broader policy decisions, and cannot

be considered separately from them.

The case of BSS-Sound/DAB represents a

missed opportunity for the United States. Based

on the reported needs and requirements of the

Defense Department and its (politically) powerful

allies in the aeronautical telemetry industry, and

pressure from the Secretary of Defense, the

United States was forced to take a position

counter to the majority of the world. The problem

is not that the Department of Defense won, ’ but

rather that the (policy) process for determining

needs and evaluating competing needs was largely

hidden from view. What should have happened

was an objective and thorough review of the

existing use of the band compared with the

potential benefits to American industry, leadership, and consumers of participating in a new

worldwide broadcasting system.

The extent to which this was done is unclear.

NTIA officials maintain that proper policy procedures were followed and that L-band allocations

for BSS-Sound were not pursued because support

for the concept and those particular allocations

was weak. However, it is difficult to discern in

this case if there was a formal policymaking

process, and if it was followed. Because of the

sensitive nature of the bands involved and the

40 Steven ~row]ey, Comu]tig en~eer, prsonal Commticatiou J~Y G, 1992.

41 Daniel Marcus, “AfriSpace Satellite Plan Runs Into 2-Year Delay,” Space News, vol. 4, No. 2, Jan. 11-17, 1993.

42 Teleco~unications Reports, ‘‘CaribSpace Gets License for Satellite Radio System From Trinidad and Tobago Government’ vol. 58,

No. 36, Sept. 7, 1992.
72 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

closed nature of the IRAC process, it is impossible to determine how thorough and objective the

evaluation of the competing uses of the band was.

Questions remain about who did the comparing,

what factors they used (and how each was

valued), and what inputs were considered from

both sides.

The stakes in the BSS-Sound debate are too

important to let things develop without further

policy analysis and debate. Mexico, and especially Canada, are planning to move ahead with

(terrestrial) DAB plans in the next several years.

Meanwhile, the United States risks falling behind

in this potentially lucrative opportunity for U.S.

manufacturers and service providers and this

potentially important method for disseminating

U.S. programming and information overseas. The

consequences are clear:

If DAB is established internationally years

prior to introduction in the United States, our

international competitiveness would be put at risk

while the public would be denied access to an

important new service.43

DOMESTIC ISSUES

After a less-than-satisfactory outcome at WARC92, domestic efforts to develop BSS-Sound and

DAB continue. The United States, because of its

existing use of the L-band spectrum and its strong

tradition of local broadcasting, has been forced

into a dual approach to DAB development. This

dual approach is shaped in part by history and in

part by technology, which has become an important driver of the DAB/BSS-Sound debate. Some

companies are concentrating on developing inband systems for terrestrial use while others are

focusing on satellite-delivered out-of-band systems. No system currently being developed effectively integrates existing broadcasting infrastructure with new satellite technology.

This divided approach reflects the two perspectives that drive the BSS-Sound/DAB debate. On

the one hand, many people raised in the traditional broadcasting industry tend to see the issue

as one of new satellite services versus traditional

local broadcasters. This group is most concerned

with developing terrestrially-based DAB solutions that will preserve the existing radio services

and industry structure while bringing technical

innovation to the industry. On the other hand, the

proponents of satellite-delivered DAB have a

slightly different set of concerns than the broadcasters. They are most concerned with bringing

new services to the public and making a range of

broadcasting services available to previously

underserved areas.

The allocations made by WARC-92 and U.S.

response(s) to them confined this duality. This

de facto approach was not the result of any

carefully thought out policy initiative to improve

U.S. radio quality or diversity, but rather an

attempt to avoid hard choices by letting marketplace forces decide a technology “winner.”

Unfortunately, this tactic has slowed the development of DAB technology, and may prevent the

United States from entering this new field early

on—allowing other countries to develop the

expertise, hardware, and software that will make

them the leaders in this new technology/service

area, not the United States. This unofficial

strategy has important long-term consequences

for the future of the broadcasting industry in the

United States, and it is unclear whether U.S.

policymakers recognize, and are willing to confront, the many factors at work. To date, the larger

issues of how these new digital technologies will

impact the future (and structure) of the radio

broadcasting industry in this country have been

ignored by policymakers.

Short-term Issues--The most immediate question facing U.S. policymakers and regulators is

how future digital radio services will be offered.

The FCC has taken the first step toward defining

the future of radio broadcasting in this country by

—

43 Te~~~~y of JO~ R. HO~es, ~ Hags ~fore tie su~o~~ee on ~]eco~~cations md FiKEUNX of the COfittee on her=

and Commerce, House of Representatives, 102d Congress, Nov. 61991, p. 8.
—

Chapter 2--Outcomes and Implications for US. Radio Technology I 73

adopting the allocations the United States pursued at WARC-92. Other issues that remain to be

resolved include how many competing BSSSound systems could the U.S. population support? Will these competing systems share listeners, or will subscribers be locked in to one

provider? Should other ways of providing BSSSound services, such as advertiser-supported,

nonprofit, or public broadcasting, be encouraged,

and how can this be done? Should future terrestrial DAB services use the same band as satellite,

or should they use the existing AM/FM band?

For example, the development of in-band

systems poses several issues for policy makers.

One concern is the distinction between AM and

FM broadcasters. Because of the differences in

spectrum currently allocated to AM and FM

stations (10 kHz vs. 200 kHz, respectively),

developing in-band digital solutions for FM radio

has been much easier than for AM. Because of

this, many industry analysts expect that AM DAB

will not be able to achieve the same quality as FM

DAB.

44 Due to such predictions, some AM

station owners have promised to block any

standard that disadvantages them relative to FM.

On the other hand, FM station owners will resist

any technology that brings AM radio broadcasting up to the quality of FM and hence into more

direct competition.

45 Some observers believe that

such feuding among broadcasters could potentially slow the development of terrestrial DAB

technology, and cause the United States to fall

(further) behind in the development of such

technologies and systems—reducing or removing

any chance the United States may have to be a

world leader in the production of DAB equipment

and the operation of DAB services.

Alternatively, if future terrestrial DAB services are allocated (additional or alternative) spectrum outside the traditional AM/FM bands, future

licensing of such systems would pose the FCC

with a challenge similar to the decision facing it

in the personal communication service (PCS)

licensing proceeding.

46 Should existing broadcasters be allowed into new spectrum to offer

DAB, or should this new spectrum be opened

only to new service providers? This is more than

a technical or economic question, which will

require the FCC, with the input of the Congress,

consumers, and industry to decide.

Long-term Issues-Such issues indicate a

number of longer-term questions for regulators

and policymakers. Should all broadcasters have

an equal shot at DAB technology? How can new

forms of competition in radio services be promoted while acknowledging (but not necessarily

protecting) the role and investments of local

broadcasters? How can the traditional strength of

the U.S. local broadcasting industry be complemented by the new technologies of satellite

delivery? What should the future structure of the

U.S. broadcasting industry look like?

The most difficult long-term issue facing

policymakers is how BSS-Sound and DAB will

affect the (local, terrestrial) broadcast industry.

Satellite broadcasting directly to listeners has the

potential to dramatically reshape the broadcast

industry in this country. Depending on a number

of technical, economic, and political choices that

will be made in the next several years, BSSSound services could complement local programW Edmund L. AIKIKWS, op. cit., footnote 32.

45 me issue is ~oney. over tie ~eMs, ~r~io &5 g~ed populfity over ~&aUse of its higher qtity. AS a result, more people listen

to FM stations, and licenses for FM stations are more valuable. Digital technology, with its immunity to noise and high quality, would wipe

out the differences in quality between AM and FM stations: Bringing all stations into quality parity and bringing down the value of FM licenses

will at the same time raising the value of AM licenses. Broadcasters who have invested hundreds of thousands (or even tens of millions) of

dollars in an FM station will oppose anything that would jeopardize that investment.

46 ~ tit ~a~e, me FCC must decide wheth~ t. ~low ~ellul~ operators to provide KS,-g advantage of their techuicd and marketing

experience, or bar the cellular operators from entering the PCS market in order to foster more competition in the mobile services

industries.
74 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

ming, be limited to serving niche markets, or

emerge as a substantial competitor to local

broadcasters.

In some countries and in some systems, terrestrial and satellite DAB may develop as complementary parts of one broadcasting system. In the

United States, however, it now seems likely that

the two industries will remain separate--the

established broadcast industry controlling terrestrial DAB, and the new startups controlling

satellite services. It is likely that these technologies will continue to develop on separate tracks,

although the relative timelines for the development of each is far from certain. This divided

approach may prevent the United States from

pursuing a comprehensive approach to improving

radio broadcasting quality and diversity, while at

the same time extending its reach and flexibility.

Countries adhering to one (in this case most likely

L-band) allocation for both terrestrial and satellite

programming may have an advantage in building

a more flexible broadcasting system.

As both BSS-Sound and terrestrial DAB systems come into operation, the challenge for the

FCC will be to fashion a radio broadcasting

industry that takes advantage of both satellite and

terrestrial DAB technologies. The question is:

Are the services inherently competitors, or could

they be (structured to be) complementary? NAB

and the local broadcasters tend to see satellite

delivery of audio services as a potential competitive threat.47 However, it may be possible to set

the rules for BSS-Sound such that the services are

complementary, rather than competitive. A possible analogy may be the dual nature of cable

television—local television stations and cable

channels exist alongside “superstations” and

nationwide cable channels that cater to specific

interests. Nationwide services may be able to

supplement existing local services or cater to

nationwide niche audiences that are too small to

support local broadcasting, but when aggregated

can support a broadcasting service. Ethnic or

religious groups may provide audiences for such

programming. Nationwide coverage would also

fill in gaps in coverage of various programming

formats-not every person in America can get the

kinds of radio station he or she wants, and not

every market has 10, 15,20 or more stations with

a variety of formats available. For the more

remote listener who would like to hear classical

music, a satellite-delivered service may be the

only real option.

Industry fears that nationwide satellite audio

programming will destroy the broadcasting industry must be taken seriously. However, a larger

policy question remains: if the radio industry is

doing so poorly—stations closing, revenues

dropping-why save it? The industry should be

prepared to present a good case for preserving its

privileges based not on past history-there can be

little doubt of the historical importance of local

radio stations, but on the prospects for future

performance. Society in the 1990s and beyond is

changing rapidly, and the Nation’s radio listeners

are entitled to a radio system that best meets their

needs. The public interest may need to be

redefined to include not only local, but also

national and international programmingg and services.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

The international issues surrounding the implementation of BSS-Sound and DAB services are

complex, and at present there are more questions

than answers about the future of digital radio

broadcasting services. As a result, the future of

DAB/BSS-Sound and the impacts of the three

BSS-Sound allocations is uncertain. Perhaps

47 ~ey ~ote tit if qj~~v satellite sm~ces we au~ofied and made available before local broadcasters cm implement terrestri~

digital broadcasting systems, this would represent unfair competition. John Abel, for example, stated that some local and satellite services could

exist side-by-side, and local broadcasters could compete “if we have the same opportunity as the satellite broadcaster in providing DAB. ”

lkstimony of John Abel, in Hearings before the Subcommittee on lklecornmunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy and

Commerce, House of Representatives, 102d Congress, Nov. 6, 1991, p. 14.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 75

most importantly, until a future conference can be

held to plan BSS-Sound, only the top 25 MHz of

the allocations can be used to provide BSS-Sound

services .48 This effectively means that the number

of potential service providers in the band will be

very limited, at least until the requested WARC is

held. 49 In addition, the entire world, with the

exception of about a dozen countries, agreed to

the L-band allocation, although in some countries, including most of Europe, the services may

not be able to be offered until 2007.50 Although

the United States is not wholly responsible for

these outcomes, U.S. actions contributed to an

allocation structure that is less than ideal from a

global service perspective. The division of the

world into three different BSS-Sound allocations

could have a number of detrimental effects on the

future of the BSS-Sound industry.

Manufacturing—From a manufacturing standpoint, multiple allocations mean that makers of

portable radios and radios for cars will be forced

to build three different types of receivers. Although the different radios may share some

common parts, the radio receiving equipment will

have to be different. And if different formats and

standards are used for the transmission of DAB,

manufacturing difficulties will become even more

severe. The division of allocations and possibly

standards will lead to production that is not as

efficient since manufacturing efforts will have to

be divided.

For the United States, the impacts of this

division on manufacturing will be limited since

‘‘there is almost no production of VCRs, camcorders, tape players and recorders, radios, phonographs, or CD players in the United States.”51

The impacts on the makers of radios for U.S. cars,

GM-Delco, for example, is also likely to be slight.

It remains to be seen if domestic manufacturers

will produce alternative radios for installation in

vehicles destined for export. Development of a

strong domestic BSS-Sound industry, however,

could enhance and expand this country’s reputation as a leader in the development and operation

of satellite communications systems. The actual

benefits of this new technology for the United

States, however, are less clear, since the technical

details of U.S.-designed and built systems would

have to be modified to work in other parts of the

world.

International Broadcasting—The impacts of

multiple allocations on international broadcasting

are likely to be more severe. Because up to three

sets of frequencies could be used for BSS-Sound

around the world, the development of a global

satellite radio broadcasting service will be difficult. Instead, regional BSS-Sound systems are

likely to become the focus of development efforts,

and coordination between countries using different allocations could be difficult.52 The United

States, for example, is expected to have a hard

time coordinating its aeronautical telemetry servi4B S= Resolution COM4/W, ITU, FiM/kts, op. cit., footnote 27. In the fti numbering of Resolutions and Recommendations, COM4/W

became Resolution 528.

49 me Sa!e]lite ~~dio (SCDR) system, for emp]e, uses 21~ of s~~, but cm o~y ske with one other o~mtiorlal system.

The plan proposed by SCDR would accommodate up to eight satellites (appro ximately 4 competing providers), but would use the whole 50

MHz of the U.S. 2310-2360 MHz allocation. Cutting the available spectrum in half would presumably limit the number of competing providem

to two.

50 N~&rs of ~ou~es ~r ~watiou however, is o~y one ~dication of tie potenti~ impacts of ~we ~locations. When judged (roughly)

by population served by each allocation+ the disparity between allocations lessens signiilcantly (see table 2-2). L-band allocations could serve

up to 3,2 bilLion listeners, the U.S./India allocation up to 1.1 billio% and the other S-band allocation up to 2.7 billion. These numbers are

changeable because India, with over 800 million people, accepted all three allocations. Figures are based on numbers provided to OTA by the

Voice of America.

51 U.S. Dep~ent of Comeme, ~tentio~ Trade ~minis~atio~ us, ~n~~~(~”a~ Ou/[ook ’92 (washingto@ DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, January 1992).

52 However, from a ~dwMe/system pasp~tive, tie impacts of ~s division will ~ limit~ s~ce sate~ite systems are tieady rOUtiely

designed to serve regional areas.
76 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

ces—testing for (military) aircraft and weapons

systems—with Canada and Mexico. These countries plan to use the worldwide allocation to

provide DAB services, although initially only

through terrestrial transmission systems. This

means that Canadian and Mexican L-band systems will have to be coordinated with U.S.

aeronautical telemetry users, and any U.S. system

that is deployed using the S-band allocation will

have to be coordinated with Mexico and Canada.

It is possible that this will put pressure on the

government to simply drop the U.S. position on

L-band and adopt the world allocation.53

In addition, an important issue in the implementation of BSS-Sound systems, especially in

the area of new entertainment and information

services, is the question of cross-border information flows. Because of the nature of satellite

transmission, it is very difficult to limit a satellite’s signal (its footprint) to conform to national

boundaries. Some countries may resist (or jam)

unwanted transmissions from outside their borders. WARC-92 did not address this question,

since the primary focus of the meeting was to

agree on allocations for the service. However, it

is expected that a future conference will take up

the issue.54

For U.S. international broadcasters who see

BSS-Sound as a way to extend their coverage and

give their listeners higher quality, the impacts of

different allocations are unclear. Any international broadcaster that decides to put up its own

satellite system to achieve worldwide coverage

will have to adapt its satellites and its system

design to conform with the varying allocations. It

is also possible that international broadcasters

could lease transponders on regional systems—

this would relieve them of having to engineer

their own system, but would also relinquish their

direct control of their transmissions.

Listeners--Finally, the impacts of different

BSS-Sound allocations on listeners are likely to

be minimal, except for international travelers.

Common allocations and equipment have benefited consumers in the past because they can use

their radios anywhere in the world-current

broadcasting frequencies are global, and AM and

FM are standard modulations schemes. When

BSS-Sound systems come into operation, listeners will have to buy new DAB-compatible radios,

which will be slightly different depending on

where they live.

The cost for DAB/BSS-Sound receivers is

expected to follow the example set by other

consumer electronic technologies-it will likely

start out very high initially, but fall quickly as

demand improves and mass market economies

are achieved. Most analysts expect the cost of

such receivers to be no more than high-end

AM/FM cassette players available today. The

cost for a radio station to upgrade its facilities in

order to offer DAB programming is less clear.

The cost in this case will depend on how

advanced/up-to-date the station’s existing technology is—is there a lot of equipment that must

be changed out, or does the station already have

some of the digital equipment necessary to

53 me fit~ tmes~~ focus of the Canadian and Mexic~ systems may be a blessing for the United States. ‘lkrrestrial systems till bC easier

to coordinate than satellite systems since their limited range means they will affect U.S. telemetry operations only near the borders. EventuaUy,

however, these systems may also be delivered via satellite, at which time coordination and interference problems will become much more

diff3cult. Some observers note that the introduction of satellite DAB semices in Canada and Mexico would seriously degrade aeronautical

telemetry services, perhaps making them unworkable. The long transition time to sateUite-delivered DAB services, however, should provide

adequate time for U.S. telemetry operations to move to higher bands. Another serious concern in the implementation of these systems is their

effect on U.S. radioastronomy activities, which use very sensitive receivers in the frequencies just below those now allocated for BSS-Sound.

54 Resolution 527 ties note of tie problem by noting No. 2674 of tie ~io Re@tions, which states: “k devising the cbaCtel_ktiCS Of

a space station in the broadcasting-satellite service, all technical means available shall be used to reduce, to the maximum extent practicable.

the radiation over the territory of other countries unless an agreement has been previously reach with such countries. ’ ITU, Radio Regulations,

p. 30-2, op. cit., footnote 19.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 77

support DAB operations? Estimates range from

$50,000 to $150,000.55

One important policy consideration, in this

country and internationally, is to lay out a realistic

transition plan that will allow a smooth and

orderly phase-in of terrestrial and satellite DAB

service in whatever band(s) are used. Following

past practice, for example, new DAB radios may

be required to be able to receive regular AM/FM

transmissions.

TERRESTRIAL MOBILE SERVICES

The mobile telecommunications service industry is still in its formative stages—mobile and

mobile-satellite technologies continue to evolve

and new systems are proposed regularly.56 Because of this volatility, it is difficult to predict

what the industry will look like in 5, 10 or 15

years. Different proponents have different perspectives on the future of mobile services, and no

one really knows yet how the pieces will fit

together. The final structure of the mobile services industry will depend largely on market

forces. Consumers will decide which services—

satellite, PCS, cellular, mobile data—will be

successful and which will not.

One of the fastest-growing segments of the

mobile telecommunications industry is terrestriallybased radio systems serving mobile users (in cars,

trucks, ships, aircraft, and on foot). Since its

introduction in 1983, for example, cellular telephone service has amassed more than 9 million

subscribers in the United States, and recent

statistics released by the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association show an annual

growth rate approaching 40 percent.57 Some estimates of the potential revenues from mobile

services run into the tens of billions of dollars

annually. 58

The boom in demand for mobile telecommunications services has given rise to a confusing

array of new technologies and systems. Countries

and businesses around the world have proposed

new mobile applications that will deliver a wide

variety of new (and old) services, including

paging and messaging, telephone, facsimile, data

communications, and even imaging and video. In

the United States, for example, hundreds of

companies have applied at the FCC for radio

frequencies to deliver future PCS.59 In Europe and

Japan, government authorities have given mobile

services high priority in domestic spectrum allocations. As a result of the growing demand for

services and spectrum, WARC-92 was charged

with allocating additional spectrum for new and

emerging mobile services.

1 Future Public Land Mobile

Telecommunications Systems

BACKGROUND

The focus of WARC-92’S attention to mobile

services was on Future Public Land Mobile

Telecommunications Systems (FPLMTS).

5S ~s~ony of John R. Holmes, op. cit., footnote 43, P. 9.

56 In ITT-J parlance, “mobile’ refers only to terrestrially-based mobile systems. ‘‘Mobile-satellite service’ (MSS) refers to mobile services

provided via satellite. MSS is discussed in the next three sections.

57 Breed on s~tistics compil~ in the frost 6 mOnlhS Of 1992. “CITA’s Biannual Sumey Shows Record Industry Growth in First Half of

1992,” Telecommunications Reports, vol. 58, No. 36, Sept. 7, 1992.

58 Smdies est~t~g me potenti~ v~ue of th~e new markets must be viewed with caution as data and its interpretation k highly subjective.

A study conducted by Market Intelligence predicts that worldwide sales of cellular phones, pagers, and accessories witl reach $6.2 billion by

1998. “Study Says World Markets for CeIlular Phones, Pagers Will Reach $6.2 Billion by 1998, ” Telecommunications Reports, VOL 58, No.

37, Sept. 14, 1992. Another study conducted by AIexander Resources, Inc., for example, puts potential revenues at over $10 billion in 1999

for wireless local exchange services alone. Te[ephony, June 29, 1992, (untitled box), p. 11. A study by Datacomm Research Co. projects

potential revenues for cellular data services will reach $1 billion by 2001. “Datacomm Study” Telecommunications Reports, vol. 58, No. 36,

Sept. 7, 1992.

59A pti~ list of tie comp~es tit ~ve app]ied at the FCC to offer such services can be found in OTA, WARC-92, aPPend-ix C, oP. cit.,

footnote 15.
78 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

FPLMTS refers to a concept being developed in

the CCIR primarily by European radiocommunication interests for delivering mobile telecommunications services in the 21st century. Although

clear service definitions and specifications have

not yet been developed, FPLMTS is currently

conceived as a terrestrially-based system (perhaps supplemented with satellite technology)

using large towers located throughout a region to

provide an array of voice, data, and video services

to mobile users. The Europeans view FPLMTS as

the successor to the Global System for Mobile

communications (GSM—formerly Groupe Speciale Mobile)---a pan-European digital cellular

system that is currently being deployed across

Europe.

60 In order to ensure that future mobile

systems would have adequate spectrum, the

Europeans pursued allocations for FPLMTS at

the 1987 Mobile WARC (MOB-87), but the issue

was carried over to WARC-92.

U.S. PROPOSAL

The United States made no specific allocation

proposals for FPLMTS, citing the extensive

existing allocations available for mobile services,

uncertainty over just what FPLMTS is, and the

possibility of making FPLMTS-like services

available through standard-setting and common

(global) interoperability requirements rather than

through a new frequency allocation. In its statement on FPLMTS in the official U.S. WARC-92

proposals, the United States noted the work being

done to develop FPLMTS internationally, but

opposed the allocation of new frequencies for the

system(s).

RESULTS

WARC-92 did not formally allocate any frequencies for FPLMTS, but it did identify 230

MHz that is ‘intended” to be used for FPLMTS—

1885-2025 MHz and 2110-2200 MHz. This

“identification” was made in footnote 746A—

FPLMTS does not appear in the actual allocations

table. Debate over whether frequencies would be

“allocated,” “identified,” or “intended” for

FPLMTS use was intense (see discussion below).

Related to the work on FPLMTS, WARC-92 also

upgraded the mobile service to coprimary status

(in Region 1) in the 1700-2290 MHz band. This

created a primary worldwide allocation for mobile services from 1700 to 2690 MHz.

WARC-92 also adopted Resolution 212, which

notes the ongoing study of FPLMTS characteristics and calls on the CCIR to continue its work in

order to develop “suitable and acceptable technical characteristics for FPLMTS that will facilitate

worldwide use and roaming, and ensure that

FPLMTS can also meet the telecommunication

needs of the developing countries and rural

areas.” 6l The resolution does not specify dates

for implementation nor any relevant operating

parameters. It does, however, identify the frequencies 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz as

the bands where a satellite component of

FPLMTS is expected to be necessary by the year

2010.

DISCUSSION

Domestic Issues-The debate over the future

of mobile telecommunications services in this

country has been as intense as the negotiations in

Spain over FPLMTS. In the United States, there

are many different visions of the future of

terrestrially-based mobile services. Cellular, cable,

and telephone companies are all looking toward

the next generation of mobile telecommunications, and there is a confusing array of ideas about

how these new services will be provided and what

applications they will offer. Proponents and

@ Al~~u@ GCJM& ken @~~ ~~ d~~y~ re~~g to s~~dfition of eq~pmen[, 17 co~ties pki.11 to begin offelir.lg services ill ] 992

and have 4 million users in 1994. The completed network is expected to be operational by the late 1990s and have 20 million subscribers by

the year 2000. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, .JPRSReport, Feb. 20, 1992, p. 17; Apr. 3, 1992, p. 20; and Apr. 28, 1992, p. 11.

61 ~tematio~ Q1eco=~cation u~o~ A&fendum and Corn”gendm to fhe Final kts of the Workj Administrative Radio Confert!nce

(WfiC-92), provisional versiom Malaga-Tbrmmolinos, 1992, p. 17.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 79

analysts talk about micro-cellular systems, CT-2

(2nd generation cordless telephones), and PCS. In

addition to these land-based systems, various

satellite systems are being planned to offer an

array of data and voice services (see the sections

on MSS below).

Much of the debate and development of new

mobile communications services in this country

has focused on PCS, which many consider the

U.S. equivalent of FPLMTS. PCS has emerged as

an umbrella term that encompasses a wide variety

of systems and services, but basically, PCS is a

wireless phone and data service that will allow

users to send and receive phone calls and/or

messages using small lightweight (and eventually

inexpensive) handsets similar to today’s cellular

phones. Current concepts of PCS systems are as

varied as the companies proposing them. Some

analysts foresee PCS installations in limited

geographic areas such as shopping malls, airports,

college campuses, and downtown commercial

centers--essentially complementing current cellular systems. Others predict wider uses, including vehicle as well as pedestrian communication.

These systems would compete with cellular

systems, and have even been considered as an

alternative to traditional wired telephone service.

The FCC has chosen a broad definition for

PCS—referring to it as a “family” of new

communication services-in order to not prejudge the outcomes of the various development

efforts. 62

The FCC has two separate proceedings that

will affect the future of PCS. These proceedings

are now being considered simultaneously. The

frost, a Notice of Inquiry on PCS released in June

1990, has been the subject of many comments and

an en bane hearing in December 1991.63 In July

1992, the FCC adopted a notice of proposed

rulemaking (NPRM) in this proceeding affirming

the need for PCS, proposing allocations for data

and voice services, and asking for additional

comments on licensing, competition, and spectrum requirements. The FCC deferred action on

the frequencies to be allocated to PCS, wanting to

gather further comments in the emerging technologies proceeding (see next paragraph).

The second proceeding focuses on an FCC

proposal to reallocate frequencies in the 2 GHz

band in order to create a “spectrum reserve’ for

emerging technologies. 64 This proceeding was

formally begun in January 1992 and in October

1992 the FCC adopted a Report and Order and

Third NPRM in the proceeding finally proposing

the frequencies to be made available to emerging

technologies and outlining transfer plans for

incumbent users. PCS is expected to be one of the

major users of these bands. All but the lower 35

MHz of this reserve overlaps with the FPLMTS/

mobile allocations made at WARC-92, meaning

that the FCC could implement FPLMTS/PCS in

up to 185 MHz (see figure 2-4). Thus, if a

worldwide FPLMTS-like service does develop,

the United States will be able to use the same

frequencies as the rest of the world. A worldwide

primary allocation is desirable because it would

make it easier to interconnect various national

systems and to develop a worldwide mobile

communication system that would allow individuals to use their portable telephones anywhere in

the world. Instead of countries using different

frequencies for their mobile services, all countries

could use the same broad band of frequencies—

allowing manufacturers to produce handsets that

@ Cements of TIIOmaS StanIey, FCC Chief Engineer, Feb. 23, 1993.

63 Feder~ Comtimtiom co~~siou ‘ ‘~en~ent of the Cofission’s Rules to Estabfish New Personal Communications SeIViWS, ”

Notice of Inquiry, Gen. Docket No. 90314, released June 28, 1990.

64 Feder~ com~mtiom co~sslou ‘‘R~evelopmentof tie Spec- to Enco~age hovationin the Use of New Telecommunications

Technologies, ’ Notice ofProposedRule Muking, ET Docket 92-9, released Feb. 7, 1992. The FCC proposed to reallocate 220 MHz of spectrum

in the 18501990 MHz, 2110-2150 MHz, and 2160-2200 MHz bands. It is important to note the timing of this action-just after the start of

WARC-92.
80 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Existing

allocations

WARC-92

allocations

Existing

allocations

WARC-92

allocations

FCC

proposed

allocations

WARC-92

allocations

Figure 2-4—WARC-92 Frequency Allocations From 1400-2700 MHz

1400 1500 1600 1700 1800

Various mobile satellite -Meterological satellites

33 MHz 34 MHz 16.5 Mtiz 34 Mtiz 35 Mt-iz

1800 1900 2000 2100 2200

( 1 I I IT

I I Private microwave 1

I I I I

Gov’t fixed & mobde Electronic news gathering Private microwave

f Deep Space Research

140 MHz Space R & OIEES

~

.

,;,:MssP; M~S ‘ r

40 MHz 40 MHz 40 MHz 40 Mt-iz

F– ‘— + }+E+

Emerging technologies Emerging technologies

2200 2300 2400 2500 2600 2700

Space R & O/EES +-+ [’Kq+

16.5 Mtiz 20 Mtiz 20 MHz

I

MSS Mobile-Satelllte Service MMDS Multichannel, multipoint

?

Earth-to-space

EES Earth-Exploration Satellite distribution service

I

FPLMTS Future Public Land Mobile Cl Interior MSS shadings indl-

+

Space-to-Earth

Telecommunication System cated paired bands

1

Space R & O Space research and

operations

a Not an allocation

b Secondary allocation

c Not allocated in U.S.

L—.._— 1

NOTE: This chart is not complete. Not all International Telecommunication Union services are shown, and some have been edited for presentation.

Many footnotes will affect the allocations presented. The WARC-92 allocations shown are the allocations as interpreted by the United States, and

are not necessarily applicable to other countries.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, based on a figure

supplied by Motorola.

will work worldwide. Issues regarding standards, technologies has become highly controversial.

protocols, and interoperability between different On one side are the incumbent users of the bands

national systems will have to be negotiated in who want to protect their existing point-to-point

order to achieve a truly worldwide service. operations and who would prefer not to move to

The FCC’s proposal to reallocate frequencies other frequencies. These users include: the railin the 2 GHz band in order to accommodate new road companies and public utilities--operators of
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for US. Radio Technology 181

oil and gas pipelines and electric power transmission lines-which use these frequencies to monitor and control their operations and provide

trouble reports during emergencies; public safety

agencies-police, fire, and ambulance-which

use these frequencies as part of their everyday

missions;b5 and common carrier microwave operators who use the frequencies to relay point-topoint communications traffic, often as a backup to

long-distance fiber optic lines or to interconnect

cellular telephone cells. On the other side are the

potential new users of the spectrum, most notably

the hundreds of companies that have applied to

the FCC to provide new personal communication

services. Because of the favorable transmission

characteristics of these frequencies, they are

ideally suited to delivering these types of new

mobile services.

The debate over the FCC’s spectrum reserve

and its reallocation of the 2 GHz band illustrates

the findings and lessons presented in chapter 1.

Fundamentally, the debate is one of old versus

new—how to balance the legitimate requirements

of the existing users against the desire to promote

the development of innovative technology systems and services. Each side is able to muster

convincing arguments to support its case. The

utilities and railroads point to their extensive use

of the bands and the important functions that

these systems control, especially in times of

emergency when reliable and instantaneous communications are vital to control potentially dangerous situations such as power surges, gas leaks,

and train derailments. Their systems are often

extensive, and have provided reliable communications for many years. Moving to other frequencies, they claim, would create problems because

the other frequencies to which they could move

are often already crowded, the equipment using

those new frequencies is less reliable, and replacing so much equipment would be prohibitively

expensive. 66 Changing to other Communication

media, such as fiber optics or satellite, often is not

possible from an engineering or reliability standpoint, and would cost many millions of dollars.

The proponents of PCS, on the other hand,

promise an array of new communication services

that would serve millions of users, produce

billions of dollars in revenue, and promote the

competitiveness of U.S. companies in international radiocommunication markets. They claim

that the frequencies allocated to the existing

services are not heavily used in all parts of the

country and that they can design and engineer

their systems to share spectrum where necessary.

Because of the huge financial stakes involved

and the potential revenues (and jobs) new services

could generate, the FCC’s proposal quickly

became political. The utilities, feeling that the

FCC had not taken adequate account of their

views, took their case to members of Congress

sympathetic to the concerns of the industry and

the public safety agencies. The issue moved

beyond technical concerns, and the controversy

turned into a political test of wills as much as a

debate over technology.

Throughout the dispute, most of the stakeholders indicated that they would be willing to

compromise. Utilities and others said they would

be willing to share the bands under the right

conditions, or they would change frequencies if a

suitable transition plan was developed. Their

primary concerns were the reliability of the new

systems and the cost of moving to other bands.

The proponents of PCS indicated a willingness to

share the bands and to develop systems that

would not interfere with the existing users. They

agreed, in principle, to finance the cost of moving

the existing users to other bands. Finally, in

October 1992, the FCC adopted a decision that

65 It is fipo~t t. note tit ~ub~c s~e~ uses would not be forced to leave tie b~d as wo~d tie u~ities and private/common carrier

microwave users.

66 Estimates vw from $125,000 to $200,000 per Ctiel. See, e.g., “FCC to Delay Proceeding on Highly Controversial Spectrum

Reallocation Plan,” Washington Telecom Week, vol. 1, No. 1, Apr. 3, 1992.
82 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

outlined a plan, originally proposed by utility

company representatives, for accommodating both

interests.67 The FCC is still collecting and reviewing comments on this issue—no final decision has

been reached.

International and WARC-92 Issues-In the

past decade, the development of terrestrial mobile

communications systems has become a key focus

of European telecommunications policy. The

geography of Europe-the relatively small size of

the countries-lends itself to terrestrial mobile

solutions. Satellite systems, on the other hand,

cover areas that many Europeans believe are too

large for Europe.68 Issues such as cross-border

communications and control of such a network

make satellite solutions politically difficult. Despite the drive toward a unified Europe, nations

still want to keep some control over their domestic radiocommunication policies, and individual

domestic terrestrial mobile systems, even though

connected through the umbrella of GSM, fit these

needs. As a result, FPLMTS was a key issue for

the Europeans at WARC-92. CEPT proposed

FPLMTS allocations at 1900-2025 MHz and

2110-2200 MHz.

The FPLMTS debate at WARC-92 presented

the United States with a dilemma. It wanted to

support the future development of mobile services, and ensure that U.S. PCS services could

flourish in the future, but it also wanted to ensure

that the spectrum could be used as flexibly as

possible, and not be tied to one concept, especially a European concept like FPLMTS. The

U.S. position managed to combine the two. Just

before WARC-92, the FCC adopted a NPRM

proposing frequencies that could be used for

emerging telecommunications services such as

PCS.69 The frequencies identified in that NPRM

overlapped with the frequencies to be considered

for FPLMTS at WARC-92. This action gave the

United States an important source of leverage

internationally-showing U.S. support for the

(international) development of mobile services in

the 2 GHz band, but also allowing it to maintain

its opposition to explicit allocations for a system

that had yet to be defined.

U.S. opposition to formal FPLMTS allocations

was based on several factors. First, a large amount

of spectrum is already allocated to (terrestrial)

mobile services.70 U.S. spectrum managers believe that such allocations are sufficient to meet

future mobile communication needs. Furthermore, U.S. delegates took the position that

FPLMTS services could be provided under the

existing mobile allocations without setting aside

a specific band of frequencies for FPLMTS.7

1 In

addition, in contrast to the terrestrial focus of the

Europeans, U.S. Government and much private

sector interest in new mobile services is largely

concentrated on satellite-based systems. Satellites are seen as a more efficient way to reach

consumers in sparsely populated areas outside the

range of terrestrial cellular systems and as a way

to allow mobile users to easily ‘‘roam” beyond

ST Feder~ communications Comrnissioq ‘ ‘Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New ~lwommunications

Technologies,” First Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 92-437, Oct. 16, 1992,

68 A satellite km of o~y 500 kilometers, approximately what is being described for some LEOS applications, could Potentitiy reach into

several countries in Europe.

@ Feder~ Communications Cornmissio~ Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Op. cit., fOOtUOte w.

70 me ~tematio~ Table of Fr~uen~y ~Watiom con~ a pmmob~e ~location in Region 2 iII the bands 1668.4-1690 MHz ad

17002690 MHz.

71 me fom~ propos~ for FPL~S s~tes ~ pm tit ‘‘tec~~ s~~ds such as modulation p arameters, protocols, and channelization

schemes will be just as important as an altocated band in facilitating any requirements for global roamin g. These standards and protocols may

obviate the need for a common worldwide band for international roaming. We believe that it is premature to desigmte a frequency band until

the CCIR has progressed further in its work. ” U.S. Proposals, op. cit., footnote 5.

72 ~e5cnfly, a ce1]~wcu5tomer who &ave]s ou&ide of his~er loc~ system must often make previous arrangements with the cellular camiers

involved and/or dial complex access codes in order to use the systems.
. .

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 83

their home system.72 Finally, the United States

opposed specific allocations for FPLMTS because of the lack of a clear definition for exactly

what FPLMTS will be. This position is consistent

with the general U.S. commitment to keep radio

service allocations as flexible as possible so as not

to preclude development of innovative new systems and technologies, Allocating spectrum to a

service that is currently so poorly defined, and

whose spectrum needs are still vague, U.S.

spectrum managers believe, would not be an

efficient use of the spectrum, and could conceivably lock the world into this inefficient use for

many years.

One unacknowledged, although likely, reason

for U.S. opposition to FPLMTS is related to trade

and competitiveness. The European countries,

with GSM, are ahead of the United States in the

deployment of advanced digital cellular technologies. American opposition to FPLMTS may

represent an attempt by the government and

industry to slow down European development

efforts in order to allow the United States to

“catch up. ” Although U.S. technology is second

to none, regulatory requirements and the lack of

aggressive policy designed to promote U.S.

mobile applications has held back the development of a nationwide mobile communications

service.

At the beginning of WARC-92, the United

States did not support FPLMTS, but did not

actively oppose it. U.S. negotiators report they

were willing to compromise on FPLMTS in

return for concessions by the Europeans on the

mobile-satellite service (MSS) allocations the

United States wanted for big LEOS and other

MSS services. However, as the conference progressed, neither side was willing to compromise

much, and negotiating stances hardened. It became clear that U.S. opposition to FPLMTS and

European opposition to MSS/LEOS would have

to be resolved together. Each side used its

opposition to the other’s proposal as leverage in

the negotiations. Unfortunately, the obstinacy of

both sides prevented such a deal from being

struck easily.

The final wording of the footnote authorizing

FPLMTS caused much debate. FPLMTS proponents urged the conference to ‘‘designate’ or

“identify” the bands for FPLMTS, but opponents, including the United States, opposed this

wording, believing that it was too strong and too

closely approached an actual allocation of frequencies for FPLMTS. As adopted, the footnote

reads that these bands are ‘‘intended for use. . .by

FPLMTS.’’ 73

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

The difficulty of predicting the future of mobile

services is illustrated by the simple difficulty of

even defining what the terms and acronyms mean.

The United States, for example, would not

support allocations for FPLMTS at WARC-92

because no delegate from Europe could really

explain what FPLMTS is. It is a concept, one that

has only vague meaning now and will continue to

evolve as time passes and needs, technologies,

and institutional relationships become clearer.

Although the United States opposed FPLMTS

allocations at WARC-92, the outcome of the

FPLMTS debate for the United States may, in the

long term, turn out to be a “success.” The

frequencies identified for use by FPLMTS internationally largely match those that have been

proposed by the FCC for similar services in this

country. Using these frequencies will enable the

United States to more easily fit into an international FPLMTS service, thereby opening an

important long-term opportunity for the growing

U.S. mobile communications industry.

International Issues-The development of

terrestrial mobile services in the 21st century is

unclear on many fronts. The new technologies

and systems for mobile communications are just

now being designed and implemented. The European countries have been aggressive in develop7J 1~, Addendum and Corrigendum, op. cit., footnote 61, p. 17.
84 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

ing and implementing policies that promote the

development of new mobile services. As a result,

the rollout of GSM, after a slow start, is picking

up speed. The European Commission has also

issued a directive requiring member countries to

allocate spectrum for Digital European Cordless

Telephone (DECT) service.74

Regulatory Barriers: From a regulatory perspective, several issues will confront FPLMTS

proponents as they develop systems. First, the

ITU has traditionally allocated spectrum only to

categories of radiocommunication services, not to

specific types of systems such as FPLMTS.

Upgrading FPLMTS to a service could be difficult, especially given U.S. opposition. Because

the concept of FPLMTS is not well-defined, it is

unclear what rights and obligations FPLMTS

system operators will have and be subject to. Such

legalistic distinctions, however, are not likely to

stand in the way of FPLMTS development if no

country objects.

Furthermore, the footnote authorizing

FPLMTS states that “[s]uch use [for FPLMTS]

does not preclude the use of these bands by other

services to which these bands are allocated. ”

How this limitation will be interpreted, and what

effect it may have on other services and negotiations among countries remains to be worked out.

Unlike other footnotes designed to protect existing services, it does not explicitly protect existing

services from interference or indicate that

FPLMTS systems will have to accept interference

without recourse (a secondary status). This essentially creates a vague new category of operation

(neither primary nor secondary) applicable only

to FPLMTS.

Finally, the technical details of FPLMTS are

just starting to evolve. Many observers expect

that if and when a unified concept of FPLMTS

does emerge, it will come slowly and initially be

terrestrially-based. Any satellite component of

FPLMTS cannot come into operation until 2010,

and then will be subject to stringent coordination

requirements that were laid out for new mobile

satellite systems in Resolution 46.

The result is that the implementation of

FPLMTS is essentially uncharted territory. Arrangements will have to be worked out as

individual systems come into operation, or, more

likely, further regulations and operating parameters may have to developed at a future world

radiocommunication conference. For example, as

noted in Resolution 211, the CCIR has determined that FPLMTS will not be able to share

spectrum with the Space Services (see section

below). Thus, the potential impact of FPLMTS on

space communications will be very carefully

watched by the world’s space agencies. In addition, some of the frequencies identified for

FPLMTS are also allocated to MSS. Sharing

concerns could seriously constrain or limit the

future development of FPLMTS.

Marketing Uncertainties: The future of

FPLMTS is cloudy from a market perspective as

well. While predictions about the potential of

personal wireless communications systems are

not in short supply, demand may be. There are

already several different types of mobile systems

operating and under development in Europe,

including GSM, CT-2/Telepoint, and personal

communication networks (PCN).75 It remains to

be seen if all these mobile services will be viable.

In the United Kingdom, for example, Telepoint

services-in which users carry portable phones

that can only make calls, not receive them-failed

to attract many subscribers and the industry is

74 me bad de~iwted for DECT~S is 1.880_19~ ~qw~ch overlaps the wmc.gz &@@~ mLMTs bands. Each ECcountry

has implemented the allocation as required. See Kurt Wimmer, “Global Development of Pemonal Communications Services, ”

Communications Luwyer, summer 1992.

75 Job Willimoq “U.K. PCN Rubber Hits tie Road, “ Telephony, vol. 222, No. 14, Apr. 6, 1992, p. 7.

76 ~em is ~~y one ~m~g ~lepo~t Oprator (Hutc~son) ~ me Utited Kingdom. It now has 9,000 base StiitiOIIS h operation ~d

expects to build 3,(MI0 more. Kurt Wimmer, personal communication% Nov. 20, 1992.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 85

struggling to stay alive.76 PCN trials have also

been beset by difficulties, but at least two systems

are expected to begin operations over the next

year. However, the slow start of PCN in the

United Kingdom does not seemed to have caused

other countries to abandon PCN--Germany and

France are both moving ahead with their PCN

plans,

The total size of the market for mobile services

may not support many competing technologies

and systems. GSM operators, for example, often

view PCN as a threat since it represents ‘‘another

purchasing option. ’77 The wide variety of mobile

systems-GSM, PCN, CT-2, microcellular, various satellite systems that are being planned-may

cause consumer confusion similar to that being

experienced in the evolution of technologies for

playing prerecorded music. In that case, a number

of competing formats (cassettes, Digital Audio

Tape, Digital Compact Cassettes, Compact Discs,

Sony’s Minidisc, etc.) maybe causing consumers

to resist merely buying the latest technology. A

similar trend toward confusing and competing

mobile telephone systems may cause consumers

to resist buying until the market shakes out and

one system becomes dominant. The battle between GSM and PCN in Europe could preview

similar conflicts between cellular and PCS in the

United States.

Domestic Issues—In the United States, the

development of future terrestrial mobile services

is similarly unclear. The cellular industry, which

has been a world leader since its inception in

1983, and continues to add subscribers at a rapid

pace, is now struggling to improve and expand its

systems. In contrast to the GSM plans of Europe,

there is no settled plan in this country to provide

one unified cellular system, and technical and

billing problems still exist when cellular users

“roam’ outside their home systems,78 In addition, the cellular industry is in the middle of a

heated battle over the choice of a standard for the

industry that would cover the next generation

digital cellular systems now being designed.79

Such difficulties threaten to slow the development of future mobile services in this country, and

have led some analysts to conclude that the

United States now trails Europe in the deployment of advanced mobile technologies.

Like FPLMTS internationally, the FCC faces a

similar problem defining the future of mobile

communications for the United States. Is the

American conception of PCS similar to the

United Kingdom’s PCN? Or is it more general?

Does it compete with cellular or complement it?

At different points in time, and depending on who

was asked, the answer to any of these questions

could be ‘‘Yes, ’ ‘‘No,’ or ‘Maybe.’ Recognizing the inherent uncertainty and danger in pigeonholing a new technology/service, the FCC has so

far adopted the widest possible definition for

PCS—it is all things to all people.

One of the more difficult questions facing U.S.

regulators and policymakers is the relationship of

U.S. PCS systems to FPLMTS. Should the United

States support FPLMTS? If PCS is developed

before FPLMTS begin operating, should

FPLMTS be made compatible with PCS? How?

77 GSM and PCNS arc quite similar technically, GSM operates in the 900 MHz band, and PCNS (in Europe) “essentially we GSM at 1.8

GHz instead of 900 MHz. ” John Williamson, “GSM Bids for Global Recognition in a Crowded Cellular World,” Telephony, vol. 222, No.

14, Apr. 6, 1992, p. 37.

75 Mccaw CCHulm communications, hc. and southwestern Bell Corp. did announce plans to make cellular service available nationwide

by negotiating with local franchises across the country to ensure common service standards that would altow seamtess transitions between

different service areas. GTE Corp., Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, and Ameritech have also announced a mtionwide cellular plan that would challenge

McCaw’s system. Mary Lu Camevale, ‘‘GTE, Baby Bells Issue Challenge to Cellular One, ” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1992, p. B 1.

79 me battle is between The Division Multiple ACCCSS (TDMA), which waS ‘ ‘Officially’ chosen by the Cellular TWcommunications

Industry Association (CTL4), and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), which, although ICSS developed than TDMA, has caught the

attention of some large cellular providers due to its promised l,argcr capacity gains over TDMA. CTIA is now evaluating both technologies.

For a discussion of the TDMA vs. CDMA debate, sce Global Tclecom Report, ‘‘TDMA Has Been Selected as Standard, but CDMA Is Gaining

Visibility and proponents, ” vol. 8, No., 2, July 27, 1992.
86 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Should the United States continue to oppose

FPLMTS if it appears that it will not be compatible with PCS? What are the implications of the

U.S. building a system (with all necessary standards and protocols) not supported by other nations

of the world? As other countries outside of

Europe adopt GSM as the standard for nextgeneration mobile communications, some analysts fear that the United States may become

surrounded and outnumbered by GSM users. It

may also be possible that-looking beyond GSM—

FPLMTS will “encircle” PCS as well. The risks

and advantages of such an outcome, and the

policies leading to it, should be carefully weighed

while policy can still be adapted to fit the

international context.

The case of mobile communications points out

a serious tension in American telecommunications policy. It must somehow balance the need

for aggressive policy with a philosophical commitment to marketplace solutions. Aggressive

policymaking that sets clear direction could

provide focus to U.S. development efforts and

allow U.S. companies to compete more effectively abroad. Many members of the private

sector called for such leadership during WARC92 preparations, a call that went largely unanswered. The disadvantage to this approach is that

choosing the “wrong” policy direction may

commit U.S. interests to a technology path that

does not endure.

Unfortunately, unlike the Europeans, the United

States has no coherent policy to guide the

development of mobile services, nor even any

general direction that could guide policymaking.

The United States is committed to a policy that

lets the market decide. So far, some would argue,

the development of cellular technology has been

remarkably successful-judging by increasing

numbers of users and revenues. Such success,

however, when judged in an evolving international context, may be short-lived. Many technologies, including PCS, MSS, cellular, and LEOS,

are now fighting for spectrum (see figure 2-4) and

customers, and time may be working against U.S.

interests.

The United States can no longer afford to let the

market decide-the potential for these new services is too important in terms of benefits to the

American consumer, the revenues that could be

generated, and the boost to American competitiveness that a focused approach to mobile

communications could provide. U.S. spectrum

managers and policymakers must make strategic

decisions and hard choices to avoid the kinds of

self-destructive technology battles that have held

back other communications services-AM stereo, and now digital cellular standards. More

aggressive oversight and guidance (leading to

unified action) is needed if the United States is to

effectively move forward in pursuit of world

mobile communication markets. Otherwise, domestic battles may destroy America’s ability to

wage the war abroad.

SATELLITE MOBILE SERVICES

In addition to terrestrially-based mobile communication services, companies around the world

have proposed to use satellites to deliver mobile

services. For communications providers, satellitebased systems offer ubiquitous coverage of large

(hundreds or thousands of miles across) areas, the

remotest of which may be uneconomical for

terrestrial systems to reach. Satellite-based communication systems have also become increasingly attractive to users because advances in

technology have produced smaller, lighter, and

less expensive user equipment and a wider range

of applications, including telephony, remote data

collection, data communication, position determination, etc. At WARC-92, ITU members considered allocations for three types of MS S-each

offering overlapping services, but using different

system configurations and user equipment. The

following three sections discuss: geosynchronous

MSS, LEOS systems planning to offer data

services, and LEOS systems plannin g to offer

telephone services.
. —

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for US. Radio Technology I 87

I Mobile-Satellite Services80

BACKGROUND

Since the mid-1980s, consumer demand for

MSS has grown rapidly. Comsat’s mobile services revenue, for example, rose from 14 percent of

total revenues in 1988 to 20 percent in 1990.81

Proponents of MSS see satellites as an economical and efficient way to deliver telecommunication services to users across wide areas. They

point alternatively to the congestion of many

cellular systems as evidence of the demand for

such services and to the lack of nationwide mobile

services as an advantage of satellite delivery. As

a result, the demand for additional spectrum for

MSS has grown dramatically both domestically

and internationally.

The development of MSS in this country dates

back to the early 1980s. In 1985, the FCC released

a NPRM to allocate frequencies and develop

regulatory and technical policies that would foster

the development of MSS.82 As a result of that

2-year proceeding, the FCC reached two important conclusions: 1) given the limited amount of

spectrum then available, MSS services, including

aeronautical, land, and maritime applications,

could only be efficiently and economically provided by one licensee, and 2) the sole licensee

should be a consortium of the applicants who had

previously applied to provide MSS. As a result of

this decision, the American Mobile Satellite

Corporation (AMSC) was formed and granted the

sole license in the United States to provide MSS

Satellites in geosynchronous orbit 22,300 miles above

Earth are being used to provide a variety of mobile

communication services to aircraft, ships, and

vehicles.

in the 1545-1559 MHz and 1646.5 -1660.5 MHz

bands.83 As currently conceived, AMSC’s MSAT

system will cover all of North America, and will

offer a range of services, including nationwide

mobile telephone service, paging, data communication, and position location services to land,

maritime, and aeronautical users (trucking or

shipping companies, for example). AMSC also

plans to provide communications for civil aviation, including air traffic control and flight

management communications to support safety

services and airline passenger telephone calls. In

1992, AMSC began offering data messaging

services using leased satellite capacity from

Comsat. Customers using this service will even80 Al~ou@ MSS tecfic~y ~cfcr~ t. ~1 ~es of mobile satellite systems, including LEOS, in tis section MSS will refer only to

geosynchronous satellite systems. LEOS systems are discussed separately below.

81 Andrew Lawler, ‘ ‘Political, Economic Changes Draw New Markets, ” Space News, vol. 3, No. 3, Jan. 27-Feb. 2, 1992.

82 For a discussion of~e ~stow of domestic ad inte~tio~ MSS issues, see John Davidson Thomas, ‘ ‘~te~tio~ AsWc@ ‘f ‘e ‘Obile

Satellite Services,” Federal Communications Luw Journal, vol. 43, December 1990.

83 Cuenfly, tie major stockholders of AMSC are Hughes CofQmuficatiO~, kc., McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc., and Mobile

Telecommunications Technologies Corp., which together control approximately 90 percent of AMSC shares. The FCC’s actions in this

proceeding, including the validity of the consortium approach have been challenged repeatedly on legal grounds. Although the court did reverse

and rcmand the order establishing AMSC, the FCC subsequently reasserted the legitimacy of the consortium approach and the awarding of

the sole MSS license to AMSC. Members of the aeronautical community appealed these decisions, but the case was dismissed on procedural

grounds. The court, however, did note its concern over the FCC’s authority to mandate licensee consortiums. “FCC, AMSC Get Victory by

Default. . .,” Telecommunications Reports, vol. 59, No. 5, Feb. 1, 1993.

330-071 0 - 93 - 4 QL 3
88 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

tually be switched over to AMSC’S satellite, United States, who hold investment shares in the

which is expected to launch in late 1994. organization. Comsat is the official U.S. signaThe major global player in MSS is the Interna- tory to Inmarsat and the only authorized seller of

tiona1 Maritime Satellite Organization (Inmar- Inmarsat services. 84 Although it was originally

sat). Inmarsat is an international cooperative established in 1979 to serve the communication

owned by more than 60 countries, including the needs of ships-at-sea, Inmarsat has gradually

ad -sati~elfis not prmitted to provide land or aeronautical mobile serviees in the United States, It does offer some maritime sen’iCeS.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology 189

expanded the scope of its activities to include

international aeronautical communication services (begun in 1989), and land mobile communication services. Today, land mobile users make

up 25 percent of Inmarsat’s customers.85

U.S. PROPOSALS

Winning support for MSS proposals was among

the highest U.S. priorities at WARC-92. Under

the umbrella of MSS, the United States had a

number of interests to protect and promote, and

these gave rise to several different proposals. The

priorities (listed in no particular order) for the

United States in MSS were to:

1.

2.

3.

Convert the specific mobile satellite services (aeronautical, land, and maritime) into

“generic” MSS, while providing adequate

protection and priority for aeronautical and

maritime safety communications;

Obtain new spectrum for MSS; and

Prevent reallocation of the 1435-1525 MHz

band now used for aeronautical telemetry to

MSS or BSS-Sound (see section on BSSSound for discussion).

Generic MSS—In the past, the ITU had

subdivided the various mobile satellite services

into three separate categories-aeronautical, land,

and maritime-each with its own allocations. The

United States first proposed that these separate

allocations be merged into a single “generic”

allocation at the 1987 WARC on mobile services

(MOB-87), That proposal was not accepted by

MOB-87, and the issue was carried over to

WARC-92.

The WARC-92 U.S. proposal for generic MSS

was premised on the belief that ‘‘the current

service specific allocations in the 1.5/1.6 GHz

bands are too restrictive to permit flexible usage

to adapt to dynamic changes in communication

needs. We recognize, however, that special provisions are necessary so that safety services will be

protected from interference, and that these services will be ensured priority access over other

communications in these bands. ’ ’86 The current

division of MSS, U.S. spectrum managers believe, leads to inefficient use of the spectrum

because radio frequencies cannot be transferred

quickly enough for use by the most-demanded

services-leaving some services with too much

spectrum, while others face spectrum shortages

and congestion. In order to eliminate this form of

structural inefficiency, the United States proposed to merge the specific MSS (aeronautical,

land, and maritime) into generic MSS, while

providing special protections and preemptive

access to the safety services. Government spectrum managers believe that such safeguards

would be adequate to protect safety needs of the

aeronautical and maritime communities.

U.S. proposals targeted a total of 61 MHz for

conversion to generic MSS. The United States

proposed to reallocate the Land Mobile-Satellite

(LMSS) and Maritime Mobile-Satellite Service

(MMSS) bands at 1530-1544 MHz (downlink)

and at 1626.5 -1645.5 MHz (uplink) to MSS.87

And in the bands 1545 -1559 MHz (downlink) and

1646.5 -1660.5 MHz (uplink), the United States

proposed to reallocate the Aeronautical MobileSatellite (Route) Service (AMS(R)S) and LMSS

to MSS.88

Additional MSS allocations--In addition to

these changes, the United States sought additional

allocations for MSS. As noted above, the United

States proposed to make 19 MHz of spectrum at

85 Ellen Messmer, “Inmarsat Ready to Challenge Iridiurnj” Network World, Mar. 16, 1992.

86 us. propos~s, op. cit., fOOtnOte 5, P. 4.

87 horder t. b~~~e~owt of sp~~av~able forupl~s ~ddoms, tie United States *CI props~ to allocate the b~d 1525-1530

MHz to the mobile-satellite service (space-to-Earth). See below. This proposal includes priority access for maritime safety communications

as indicated in the proposed footnotes that accompany the frequency proposal.

M ~s props~ provides pfion~ ~cess ~~ re~-~e preemptive capability for the Aeromutical Mobile-Satellite (Route) Semim. ~s

access was proposed in a footnote accompanying the allocation proposat.
90 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

1626.5 -1645.5 MHz (uplinks) generic. The companion (paired) generic MSS downlink band for

these frequencies at 1530-1544 totaled only 14

MHz.

89 Consequently, the United States proposed to add 5 MHz (1525-1530 MHz) to the

newly generic MSS downlink band at 1530-1544

MHz, thus balancing the amount of spectrum

available for both uplinks and downlinks.

The United States also proposed new worldwide allocations of 80 MHz (40 MHz each for

uplinks and downlinks) for MSS. The proposed

allocations were 2110-2130 MHz and 2160-2180

MHz (downlinks), and 2390-2430 MHz

(uplinks). For ITU Regions 1 and 3, the United

States also proposed to allocate (through footnotes) the bands 2500-2535 MHz (downlink) and

2655-2690 MHz (uplink) to MSS. Finally, the

United States proposed an allocation footnote to

add MSS to the 1850-1990 MHz band. This

addition was intended to provide future spectrum

for MSS operations, including LEOS systems.90

RESULTS

United States MSS proposals enjoyed mixed

results at WARC-92. The U.S. proposal to

convert existing aeronautical, maritime, and land

mobile satellite service allocations into a generic

MSS allocation worldwide was generally not

successful—WARC-92 let stand the existing

divisions between the specific services (see figure

2-5). This outcome was not surprising given past

opposition. International support for maintaining

a separate band of frequencies for satellite services serving airline routes was especially strong.

The United States achieved part of its goal,

however, by inserting two footnotes in the crucial

bands indicating that MSS would be allocated on

a primary basis in this country and several

others. 91 Footnote 726C allocates 1530-1544

MHz and 1626.5 -1645.5 MHz on a primary basis,

but only in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,

Malaysia, Mexico, and the United States, and

maritime distress and safety services have priority. The effect of this footnote is to make MSS

primary in all of North America. Footnote 730C

allocates the 1555-1559 MHz and 1656.5 -1660.5

MHz bands to MSS, but only in the United States

and Argentina, and provides priority access to

AMS(R)S.

Regarding new MSS allocations, some of the

U.S. proposals were accepted, some were not.

New spectrum was allocated to MSS in a number

of bands (see box 2-C and figure 2-4), but the new

allocations are modified, and in some cases

severely constrained, by a complex array of

footnotes that specify power levels, coordination

requirements, and implementation dates. Because

of these limitations, the United States entered two

reservations in the Final Acts of WARC-92

complaining g about the “unduly restricted allocations” for MSS and the delay in making some of

the new allocations available. Through these

reservations the United States maintains its rights

to use the bands as it deems necessary in order to

meet the needs of mobile satellite systems in this

country.92

DISCUSSION

Domestic Issues-U.S. proposals were driven

by the increased demand for mobile services in

this country (and the perceived latent demand

worldwide), the large geographic areas involved,

89 Satelli[e Semices we often ~ocat~ in ptid buds. This means tit all communications signals going to the satellite in one bmd will

be transmitted back to Earth in the companion band.

90 me Ufited Sta[es ~so ~~ted t. use ~eseb~ds for fi[~e perso~ comm~ca[ions semice~ development and w~td to reserve the b~d

for possible satellite augmentation of terrestrial PCS systems.

91 Footnote 726C Wwa[es tie b~ds 153(3-1544 ~(do~nk) ad 1626.5 .1645.5 ~(uplink) to ~S on a primary basis h ArgenthM,

Australia, Brazil, Canad% the United States, Malaysia, and Mexico. Foomote 730C allocates the bands 1555-1559 MHz and 1656.5- 1660.5

MHz to MSS, but only in the United States and Argentina. Provisions are made to protect and provide emergency access for maritime (and

other) safety communications.

w Intematio~ Telecommunication Union, WARC-92, Document 389-E, Mm. 3, 1992, P. 29.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 91

Figure 2-5-WARC-92 L-Band Mobile-Satellite

Downllnk allocations

1545

1525 1530 1533 15441

Service Allocations

1555 1559

—. —

MSS

L.———

AMS(R)S MSS

Upllnk allocations

1646.5

1626.51631 .51634.5 1645.5 ‘ 1656.5 1660.5

~ –d–d-.

1 —~+---—-

~ MMSS~ I

(

; t.-..-.–-– —~–.—–1 ,

@ r“

c

–T—–

0— 7

z

v MSS I AMS(R)S

1

I

0 MSS

%

u)’

5

I

!- .— _J_._J

a Secondary

b In Region 1 only

c In Regions 2 & 3 only

KEY: AMS(R)S=Aeronautical Mobile-satellite (Route) Serwce “ ,LMSS=lJmd

Mobile-Satellite Service, MMSS-Maritime Mobile-Satellite Service,

MSS=Mobile-Satellite Service.

SOURCE: Office of Teehnoloyg Assessment, 1993.

and the rapid development of satellite technolo- satellite systems—was an important consideragies. AMSC’s stated need for more spectrum--so tion.

93 In addition, the desire to foster the

that it could compete with other international development of this newly emerging, and poten9S The Limited amount of spectrum allocated to MSS worldwide prior to WARC-92, combined with the number of counties/companies

planning to [aunch MSS systems made sharing the spcetrum essential. As a result of preliminary negotiations with some other countries, AM

and the Federal Government believed that there simply was not sufficient spectrum to support all the competing systems, including AMSC.

Without adequate spectrum, AMSC would have had serious difficulties offering the number and quality of services it had planned.
92 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

tially important and profitable industry, and to

keep America at the forefront of satellite technology and services, quickly made MSS proposals

one of the most important priorities for the United

States and a major focus of U.S. WARC-92

preparations and negotiations.

Although many in the Federal Government,

including NTIA, support the concept of generic

MSS allocations, U.S. proposals for converting

the individual mobile satellite services (aeronautical, maritime, and land) into a generic allocation

for MSS were generally opposed by the individual user communities, both domestically in the

U.S. preparation process and at the WARC itself

(see below).

International and WARC-92 Issues-The

United States has been fighting the battle of

generic MSS since the mid-1980s. Inmarsat has

opposed the idea, and the international aeronautical community, which wants to maintain a

separate band for aeronautical safety communications or at least ensure that safety communications are protected from interference and continue

to have priority access to satellite communication

channels in the event of an emergency, has been

especially critical of the generic concept. They

believe that the rise of commercial MSS will

eventually reduce the amount of spectrum available for aeronautical safety communications and

subject such communications to increasing inter-
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 93

ference. While U.S. spectrum managers maintain equipment) will be compromised if civil aviation

that adequate safeguards can be built into technol- users are forced to share spectrum with commerogy and accomplished through rule changes, cial MSS providers .94 The maritime community is

representatives of the aeronautical community in similarly concerned that future development of

both the United States and in international avia- MSS services in the bands could degrade the

tion organizations, such as the International Civil future worldwide Global Maritime Distress and

Aviation Organization (ICAO), are skeptical that Safety System (GMDSS). To date, the arguments

such protection can be provided through either against generic MSS have been more persuasive

technical or procedural means. They are con- internationally.

cerned that air safety (and existing investments in

94 D~~~~ti~ally, tie battle betw~n AMSC and tie aeronautical comm~~ continues. -c, kc., md other gIOllPs hUVe fild SUitS

challenging AMSC’S license, and they continue to doubt the ability of AMSC to ensure the reliability and preemptive access of aeronautical

satellite communications required by the FCC and international rules. The FCC recently declined to adopt standards for such operations, leaving

it instead to AMSC to design the system itself. Telecommunications Reports, ‘‘FCC Adopts Technical Standards, Licensing Requirements for

Aircraft Earth Stations, ” vol. 58, No. 37, Sept. 14, 1992.
94 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

The negotiations over additional allocations

for MSS were some of the most contentious of

WARC-92. The greatest difficulty in negotiating

new MSS allocations was in overcoming the

resistance of other countries who were trying to

protect their existing services. Many countries

believe that (U. S.) satellite systems will cause

interference to the existing services in the bands—

just as the maritime and aeronautical communities believe that such systems will cause interference to their systems.

This difficulty was compounded by the opposition of the European bloc to any new U.S. MSS

allocations. Even before WARC-92 began, battle

lines had been drawn between the United States,

for whom MSS was a high priority, and Europe/

CEPT, which generally opposed U.S. MSS allocation proposals. At the conference, both sides

refused to compromise, and despite some promising rumors, negotiations remained deadlocked for

3 weeks. Only 3 days before the end of WARC92, no agreement had been reached, and the heads

of delegations for the principal countries involved

tried to negotiate a solution. Finally, in the last

hours of the conference (between 2 AM and 7

AM), a deal was struck in which European

opposition to MSS was dropped in return for U.S.

concessions on FPLMTS.

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

Allocation Issues-WARC-92 outcomes represent a step forward for the U.S. MSS industry,

but successes were limited, and several issues will

likely be revisited. Most significantly, some new

spectrum was allocated for MSS use. However,

while the additional spectrum allocated to MSS is

important, the proponents of these new systems,

both in the United States and abroad, believe that

the frequencies allocated to MSS are still inadequate. Around the world, a number of countries

are developing MSS systems (both regional and

global in scope), each with its own spectrum

needs. These needs, however, greatly exceed the

amount of spectrum currently allocated to MSS.

In addition, some of the new bands allocated to

MSS by WARC-92 cannot be used before 2005-

too late to accommodate all the systems now

being developed.95 The limited amount of additional spectrum that was allocated to MSS at

WARC-92 and the limitations placed on the new

allocations mean that this issue will almost

certainly be revisited at a future world radiocommunication conference. MSS proponents believe

that restrictions could be reduced as the systems

come into operation, and more spectrum may be

allocated as demand for the service increases.

As a result of the difficulty in coming to

agreement on MSS issues, many footnotes were

inserted into the allocations covering MSS. These

footnotes modify the allocations in many ways—

setting specific dates, varying the allocations in

different countries, specifying coordination requirements, etc.—all of which serve to protect

existing services, but which also constrain the

introduction and/or operation of mobile satellite

systems and services. Moreover, because of the

technical detail in the MSS footnotes and the

sometimes vague way in which they were written,

these footnotes are subject to continuing interpretation.

Serious economic concerns underlie the MSS

footnotes-concerns that are not amenable to

technical frees and that will only be solved

through intense negotiation. Years will be needed

to develop, interpret, and negotiate the practical

meaning of some of them. To what extent this will

slow the development of mobile satellite services

is uncertain. The U.S. Government and AMSC

have already begun the process of coordinating

U.S. MSS services worldwide.

The general failure of the U.S. generic proposals could constrain the development of future

global MSS systems in the L-band. The fact that

MSS exists in a generic sense only in North

95 w&te is noted in foo(note 746X. The United States, feeling this date was too far in the fiture, succeeded in hlserting a.IIOther fOOblOte

in the table of allocations (746U) that moves up the date at which MSS services can begin in the United States to Jan. 1, 1996.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 95

America (in 1525-1544 MHz and 1626.5 -1645.5

MHz—footnote 726C) or only in the United

States (in 1555-1559 MHz and 1656.5 -1660.5

MHz—footnote 730C) means that any global

MSS system the United States might put into orbit

must conform to the international allocations

when operating in other countries. It remains to be

seen how serious this restriction will be. AMSC,

for example, plans to serve only North America,

and is constructing its system accordingly-it

will not be affected directly by the regional

allocations in Regions 1 and 3. The United States

will undoubtedly press for generic allocations in

these bands at future conferences in order to allow

more flexible uses of these frequencies by a

variety of satellite services. This position will

likely continue to be opposed by the aeronautical

and maritime communities until such time as the

technical viability of providing them priority

access to MSS frequencies can be proven.

Competition with Terrestrial Services—The

impacts of MSS services on terrestrial mobile

services is unclear. Both of these delivery systems

will provide essentially the same services—

telephone, paging, and data communications. The

most important question facing mobile service

proponents is: is the overall market for mobile

communication services large enough to support

many different technologies and companies? The

market will ultimately decide if MSS becomes a

mass market consumer service or a service

targeted to niches such as trucking companies,

fleet management services, and/or national paging services.

Some analysts have commented on the ability

of future satellite services to provide competition

to cellular telephone operators—and the beneficial effects this competition would have on prices

and service. While such competition could have

beneficial effects, it is not yet clear if MSS

systems will compete directly against cellular

systems or if MSS could provide effective competition to the cellular providers in more than a few

markets or niche applications. The strategy of

some MSS providers (including big LEOS), at

least publicly, is to provide services that “complement” the existing cellular systems by targeting areas not served by cellular systems and/or

individuals who frequently roam between different cellular systems. If these services prove

successful, however, it is likely that the satellite

companies will begin to compete with the cellular

telephone companies for the same customers.

Future of the U.S. MSS Industry---Given the

additional spectrum allocated to MSS at WARC92 and the likelihood that additional spectrum for

MSS will be made available at future WARCs,

the domestic structure of the U.S. MSS industry

and the policies governing it should be immediately reviewed. The questions involved in determining the future of MSS in this country are

complex and will require high-level policy decisions that take account of many important technical, economic, and political factors. This issue

graphically demonstrates the importance of having a framework in place through which to

develop consistent and aggressive policies that

would support the development of mobile (including terrestrial and satellite) services in this

country.

Several domestic MSS issues remain unresolved. Fundamentally, the decision facing the

FCC and the Congress is how much competition

to allow in the MSS industry. AMSC has been

licensed for several years as the sole provider of

MSS (in the bands 1545—1559 MHz and 1646.5-

1660.5 MHz) in the United States, but its role and

very existence continue to be challenged in

court. 96 Furthermore, the additional spectrum allocated to MSS at WARC-92 calls into question the

96 A~C, ad he ~atio~e for ~~~bfis~g a co~ofii~ approach for MSS, ~s be~ c~enged in COurt and survived SO f~. ~ the FCC

and AMSC lose, the U.S. MSS industry (which essentially is AMSC) could be seriously set back. AMSC has been the focal point of U.S.

coordination discussions internationally, and satellites arc already being constructed. If AMSC is invalidated, or if MSS services are opened

for (additional) applications, deployment of MSS in this country could be delayed.
96 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

FCC’s original rationale for granting only one

MSS license-namely that there was only enough

spectrum to support one licensee.

Since its creation, the FCC has carefully

protected and supported AMSC. Some observers

hypothesize that since the FCC created AMSC, it

feels responsible to defend it against all threats—

domestic and foreign. However, although the

FCC’s desire to protect AMSC and promote the

development of a costly and risky new service is

a laudable goal, the conditions that led to that

decision have changed and will continue to

evolve. The rapid development of alternative

MSS technologies (LEOS), for example, and the

FCC’s support of them undermines AMSC’s and

the FCC’s arguments that AMSC must be initially

protected from competition in order to survive.

LEOS systems will provide similar services and

presumably compete head-to-head with AMSC in

many markets and service segments.

Such developments call into question the belief

that the protection of AMSC as a regulated

monopoly is in the best interests of the citizens of

the United States. On one hand, government and

AMSC officials believe that the regulation and

protection of AMSC are necessary to ensure that

the system/company can survive and begin offering services. If AMSC was not protected and

ultimately failed, there would be no mobile

satellite service in this country, and the United

States would suffer a serious setback in the

international negotiations now going on to work

out spectrum sharing arrangements among the

proposed MSS systems. In addition, if AMSC

were to fail, and no company or system could

quickly take its place, Inmarsat could step in to

provide services--on a monopoly basis with

monopoly prices.

On the other hand, entry of Inmarsat into U.S.

markets could be beneficial to American consumers if a “level playing field” for competition

could be created and maintained. As noted above,

Inmarsat has been aggressively expanding its role

and customer base for the last several years, and

has targeted land mobile telecommunications as

an area for future growth. International paging

using Inmarsat satellites is expected to begin in

1994, and the organization has announced plans

to provide telephone and other services in competition with the U.S. LEOS providers (see below).

When the FCC allocates additional spectrum to

MSS in conformance with WARC-92 decisions,

Inmarsat could potentially provide services in

competition with AMSC—if it were allowed into

U.S. markets. However, if a worldwide system

such as Inmarsat was permitted to operate in the

United States, it would reduce the amount of

spectrum available for U.S. domestic systems—

perhaps making their services difficult or impossible to deliver.

A true commitment to competition and its

presumed benefits-lower prices and better quality-require that the possibility of opening the

U.S. market to other MSS providers—both domestic and foreign—be examined. If AMSC is to

continue to operate under protected monopoly

status, the reasons for such an important policy

decision must be carefully and openly examined

in the light of evolving domestic and international

considerations. It may be possible, given the

availability of new spectrum, to open up MSS in

the United States to even greater competition.

With the procompetitive atmosphere that now

exists at the FCC, in Congress, and in the

executive branch, such a monopoly approach

seems out of place. This debate points out the

intricate and complex interconnections between

(developing goals for) radiocommunication policy, WARCS, and trade policy.

I Little LEOS

BACKGROUND

One of the greatest booms in the use of wireless

technologies has come in the demand for data

communication and simple messaging applications. The growth in paging services and the more

recent explosive growth in portable data communications-for service technicians in the field, for

example-indicates a large, and as yet, unex-
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 97

ploited market for wireless data communication

services.97 In order to meet this perceived demand, several U.S. companies have proposed to

use networks of low-Earth orbiting satellites to

deliver two-way data, messaging, and position

determination services worldwide. Because these

systems will operate in frequencies below 1 GHz

(in the VHF/UHF bands), and because they will

use very small satellites, they are often referred to

as “little LEOS,” in order to distinguish them

from similar networks of LEOS that plan to

operate in frequencies above 1 GHz and deliver

voice services as well as data (see section on ‘‘big

LEOS” below).

Current designs for the little LEOS systems

envision networks of up to 24 satellites flying in

orbits only several hundred miles above the

Earth. 98 Depending on complexity, these satellites are expected to cost from $6 to $10 million

each. On the ground, satellite dishes called

network gateways located throughout the world

will relay messages and data to the satellites that

will then retransmit the information down to

individual users who will receive it on small

handheld terminals (see figure 2-6). Users will be

able to send short messages back through the

satellites to the gateways for delivery to other

mobile users or through the public telephone

network to family and friends or their company.

Trucking companies, for example, could use the

systems to locate cargoes or trucks, and to

communicate with employees.

Little LEOS systems plan to offer a variety of

communications services. The most basic service

initially might be domestic one-way paging. The

most advanced applications will allow users to

send and receive messages on small, portable

hand-held units that resemble large calculators

I

is

Small satellites such as this one, which is less than 4

feet tall, will bring data communications services to

people around the world.

with an antenna attached. These handsets will be

able to receive and transmit messages of up to 200

characters, determine the users’ location to within

97 see, for exmp]e, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and reformation~“ “strationj Telecom 2000.”

Charting the Cour.refer u New Century, NTIA Special Publication 88-21 (Washirtgtoq DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1988).

A number of radio-based data communication networks are already operating in this country, including ARDIS (Motorola/I13M) and Ram

Mobile Data (Ram/BellSouth), and the FCC has proposed allocating 20 MHz of spectrum for wireless data communication as part of its

proceeding on PCS, op cit., footnote 63. Severat companies bave also announced plans to market data services that would use existing cellular

telephone systems.

98 Geosynchronous-orbiting satellites, by contmst, are located 22,300 miles above tie Efi.
98 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Figure 2-6-Generic Little LEOS System

.,.

..

. .

..

. .

,, ,’

4

<—_----=- “

.’

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

100 meters or less, and are expected to be

relatively inexpensive (depending on features,

current estimates range from $50 to $400). User

terminals could also be installed in cars, trucks,

and boats or even be integrated with a vehicle’s

radio system. An advantage offered by the little

LEOS systems over terrestrially-based data services is their ability to supply location information

to users and for other service providers. Lost

hikers or boaters and stranded motorists, for

example, could use the systems to send distress

signals giving their exact location. Police could

use such systems to find stolen cars. Finally, such

systems can provide environmental or industrial

monitoring by allowing stationary units to transmit weather or leak detection data to a central

location.99 The kinds of features a user wants will

determine the type and cost of equipment needed.

U.S. PROPOSALS

As a result of discussion in the FCC’s Industry

Advisory Committee and between industry and

government interests, the United States proposed

allocations for MSS to be used by little LEOS

systems in three bands. The bands proposed were:

137-138 MHz (downlink), 148-149.9 MHz

(Uplirlk), and 400.15-401 MHz (downlink).

RESULTS

By most accounts, the United States did well

with its little LEOS proposals. The frequencies

the United States wanted were allocated, but

some only on a secondary basis. Additional

frequencies the United States did not propose

were adopted for LEOS use, and interim coordination procedures for little LEOS operations were

agreed to.

w Such ~~e~ could ~so be ~~way: tie sensors mtdd be polled for an immediate read%.~~- ‘‘FCC Stms pager ~ces”

Washington Technology, vol. 7, No. 1, Apr. 9, 1992, p. 30.
——

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 99

WARC-92 allocated 137-138 MHz for little

LEOS downlinks. However, in order to protect

existing services, the band was broken up into

subbands, some of which are primary while others

are secondary (see figure 2-7). This spectrum will

be shared on a coprimary basis with space

operations and research services and meteorological satellite operations, and with fixed and

mobile services (both secondary).

The 400.15-401 MHz band was also allocated

for LEOS downlinks. This band will be shared

with the meteorological aids and satellite services

and space research services on a coprimary basis

and space operations on a secondary basis. LEOS

services may operate freely in these two bands as

long as they stay below a certain level of power

(so as not to interfere with existing services).

However, if the signal from the satellite exceeds

that “trigger” level (it is too powerful when it

reaches the ground), the little LEOS service

provider must coordinate the system with existing

users (see discussion of Resolution 46 below).

The band 148-149.9 MHz was allocated for

LEOS uplinks on a coprimary basis with fixed

and mobile services. However, in order to protect

existing services, WARC-92 put limitations on

LEO operations in this band that are stricter than

for the downlinks. First, conference delegates

agreed that ‘‘the mobile-satellite service [including LEOS services] shall not constrain the development and use of fixed, mobile and space

operation services in the band 148- 149.9 MHz."100

Second, the power levels of the mobile user

terminals cannot exceed a specified level (in

countries which have not allowed the service),

which is very low—lower than limits on the other

bands. And unlike the power levels specified in

the 137-138 and 400.15-401 MHz bands, the

limits in this band are absolute. If a country has

not permitted the system to operate within its

borders, the power 1evels in the offended country

may not exceed these limits under any circumstance.

Hand-held terminals will enable consumers and

business users to send and receive short messages

around the world and determine their location

anywhere on Earth to within 100 meters.

More importantly, many countries (including

most of Europe, many African nations, Canada,

Russia, and others, but not including the United

States) have effectively made these LEO uplink

frequencies secondary (see box 2-A for a discussion of the differences between primary and

secondary status for radio services) in their

countries by inserting a footnote into the international Table of Allocations stating that:

[s]tations of the mobile-satellite service in the

band 148-149.9 MHz shall not cause harmful

interference to, or claim protection from stations

lm 1~, A&e~um ati Corrigendum, op. cit., footnote 61, p. 1.
100 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Figure 2-7—WARC-92 Little LEOS Frequency Allocations

137 MHz 138 MHz 400.15 MHz 401 MHz

$

Coprimary

Secondary Coprimary Secondary Coprimary

. 1 - 1. -. -. 1- I : 1

137.025 137.175 137.825

Down link frequencies

148 MHz

Coprimaryb

I

Uplink frequencies

a Downlinks are Subjwt to coordination according to Resolution 46 if they eXCeed Certain pOWer levels.

b s~onda~ in more than 70 countries. See footnote 6082.

c user terminals have pwer limits to avoid interference across national boundaries.

d Use of the 149.9-150.05 MHz band is limited to land systems, and remains secmndary until January 1, 1997.

NOTE: The coordination procedures outlined in Resolution 46 apply to LEOS systems operating in any of these bands.

150.05 MHz

149.9 MHzdl

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

of the fixed or mobile services in the following

countries [more than 70 out of the ITU’s 166

countries are listed]. . . .l0l

Coordination between LEOS uplinks and the domestic services in these countries will be required.

In addition to the proposals made by the United

States, WARC-92 allocated additional frequencies for little LEOS operations. The band 149.9-

150.5 MHz, which is limited to land mobile use,

will be shared on a co-primary basis with

radionavigation-satellite services. Any LEOS service in this band may not constrain the radionavigation services, and will be on a secondary basis

until Jan. 1, 1997. In response to proposals made

by the Russian Federation, a secondary allocation

was adopted for MSS in the bands 312-315 MHz

(uplink) and 387-390 MHz (downlink), which can

be used for non-geostationary systems. Any little

LEOS system will have to share these bands with

freed and mobile services, and cannot cause

interference to existing services.

Finally, WARC-92 adopted Resolution 46,

which outlines interim procedures for introducing

and coordinating LEOS systems with existing

services. Each of the bands allocated for use by

little LEOS is subject to the procedures and

limitations contained in Resolution 46, which

will remain in effect until permanent procedures

and regulations are adopted at a future world radio

conference. As noted above, in the 137-138 MHz

and 400.15-401 MHz bands, coordination is

required only in cases where the signal power of

a satellite received at the Earth exceeds a certain

level. 102

DISCUSSION

Domestic Background—Prior to WARC-92,

four companies applied to the FCC to build little

10I I’I’U, Addend~ ad Corn”gendum, footnote 608Z, op. cit., footnote 61, p. 1.

]02 me titis. 125 ~Wo ~~ lfiitmy ~c~gedby a fu~eco~erence ifitproveseither too restrictive for LE@ or does notofferenough

protection to existing services. Since none of the LEOS systems are operational yet, determiningg exact power requirements and sharing criteria

is extremely diftlcult. As systems are implemented, and levels of interference can be measured and analyzed, these requirements and criteria

may change. Special note is also taken to protect radio astronomy services in nearby bands.
— — .

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio ‘Technology I 101

LEOS systems: Leosat, Inc.; Orbcomm, a subsid- (Collecte et Localisation par Satellite); and Voliary of Orbital Sciences Corp.; Starsys, jointly unteers in Technical Assistance (VITA), Inc. (see

owned by ST Systems and North American CLS box 2-D).103 These companies were active in

103 ~OSat~S ~ppllmtion Wm dismissed by me Fcc on procedural grounds. Leosat appealed the dismissal, but wm denied in J~~ 1993.
102 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

promoting U.S. proposals for little LEOS both

before and at WARC-92.

The rivalry between these companies before

the conference was intense, particularly between

Starsys and Orbcomm and between Leosat and

the others. Each challenged the other’s technical

plans and system configuration. Orbcomm also

raised serious questions about possible foreign

(government) ownership of Starsys, a factor that

would make Starsys ineligible for a U.S. license

under section 310 of the Communications Act of

1934.104 Starsys, while acknowledging French

interests in the company, maintains that U.S.

concerns control the board of directors, thus

making the company eligible for a license. The

FCC has so far declined to rule on Orbcomm’s

accusations, and is proceeding with its actions.105

Although the issue has not been resolved, the

FCC has already awarded Starsys an experimental license. This may be in violation of the

Communications Act, which makes no distinction between experimental and operational licenses. Observers point out that by awarding the

experimental license, the FCC may have created

a precedent that will be hard to reverse.

WARC Negotiations—WARC delegates credit

much of the success of the little LEOS proposals

to the work done prior to the conference by U.S.

representatives traveling to other counties to

explain the LEOS concept, how it works, and

what the benefits could be. In many cases, this

work was undertaken by individual representatives of the little LEOS proponents on behalf of

their own or their clients’ systems. Little LEOS

proponents worked hard to educate individual

countries on the specifics of little LEOS systems,

seeking to allay those countries’ concerns that

these services would interfere with their existing

uses of the band. At least some of this preconference work was done outside the framework of the

official bilateral or multilateral talks the U.S.

Government held with many countries.

Some observers have noted that U.S. Government representatives initially did not discuss little

LEOS in meetings with foreign countries. Several

possible reasons for this relative lack of interest

on the part of the government have been noted.

First, little LEOS were not one of the highest

priority items for the United States. A second

rationale that has been advanced is that some

government interests were not happy with the

bands that had been chosen for little LEOS and

would have been happier if the bands were not

allocated at all. An additional explanation is that

the government representatives who participated

in these initial preconference meetings did not

have the expertise to discuss little LEOS topics in

detail. These theories are reinforced by the fact

that few industry people were involved in early

negotiations. l06

Just before WARC-92 convened, Ambassador

Jan Baran brought together the little LEOS

proponents to address the heated rivalry among

the proponents during the preparation process in

the United States. These meetings laid the groundwork for successful cooperation among the little

LEOS applicants at WARC-92. At the conference, private sector representatives played an

important role in building support for U.S.

proposals and relaying status reports to government spokesmen and delegation leaders. Communication between these two groups was reportedly

very good, and paid substantial benefits in rebuffing attempts by the Russian Federation and

French delegations, among others, to limit little

LEOS allocations.

At WARC-92 some, especially European, countries, were extremely protective of existing serv10447 uS-CA., ~wti~n 310.

Ios Fede~ Communions Co&sSioq Tentative Decision in the Matter of Request for Pioneer’s Preference in Proceeding to Allocate

Spectrum for Ftiedand Mobile Satellite Services for L.ow-Earth Orbit Satellites, FCC 92-21, released Feb. 11, 1992, p, 5.

1~ It should & noted that li~le LEC)S applicants did participate in many of the multilateral meetings thiit were held ptior to WARC-92,

including various CCIR meetings and the CITEL W~C-92 preparation meetings.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 103

Table 2-3—Chronology of Little LEOS Actions

September 1988. . . . . . . . . . . . Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) files application for experimental LEOS

system.

February-October 1990. . . . . . Orbcomm, Starsys, VITA, and Leosat file applications to construct LEOS systems.

October 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FCC releases Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on establishment of little LEOS service

and allocation of frequencies.

January 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . FCC awards pioneer’s preference to VITA.

March 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . WARC 92 adopts allocations for little LEOS systems.

April 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FCC issues experimental licenses to Orbcomm and Starsys.1

FCC asks for comments on establishing an advisory committee for Iittle LEOS.

Leosat application dismissed.

May 18, 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Orbcomm, Starsys, and VITA file joint comments proposing new little LEOS rules.

July 23, 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . FCC establishes an advisory committee for little LEOS (official title: “Below 1 GHz

Negotiated Rulemaking Committee”).

August 10, 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . First meeting of little LEOS advisory committee.

September 16, 1992. . . . . . . . Last meeting of little LEOS advisory committee.

January 1993. ., . . . . . . . . . . . FCC allocates frequencies to little LEOS, and proposes technical rules to govern little

LEOS systems.

1 VITA has held an experimental license since 1989.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

ices, and wanted to constrain little LEOS operations as much as possible. This opposition accounts for the adoption of footnote 608Z, which

limits little LEOS to secondary status in many

countries in the 148- 149.9 MHz band. Although

not ideal, this allocation was apparently acceptable to the three U.S. proponents. U.S. representatives were successful in reaching out to many

developing countries and convincing them to

support the U.S. proposals.

Post- WARC Activity—Domestic Actions: Once

allocations were made by WARC-92, efforts to

launch little LEOS systems moved back to the

United States and into high gear. The FCC took

an aggressive approach toward implementing the

little LEOS systems (see table 2-3); issuing

experimental licenses to Orbcomm and Starsys,

granting a pioneer’s preference to VITA, and

establishing an advisory committee to help it

establish the rules and regulations that will

govern little LEOS systems (see appendix E). The

FCC’s proceeding on the frequencies to be used

by little LEOS concluded in January 1993, when

the FCC adopted the allocations proposed at

WARC-92 as the domestic allocations for little

LEOS services, At the same time, the FCC

proposed rules, based on the results of its

negotiated rulemaking process, to govern little

LEOS services.

After WARC-92 ended, the little LEOS companies, partners at WARC-92, once again became

rivals. As before, some of the most contentious

issues surrounding the implementation of little

LEOS services are those that involve technical

challenges and protests the companies have

leveled against each other. It should be noted,

however, that the companies (Orbcomm, Starsys,

and VITA) were able to put aside their differences

long enough to work out proposed service rules

and sharing arrangements to submit to the FCC.

International Interest: On the international

front, interest in little LEOS has been strongest

among the developing countries, who see satellite

communication as an important way to reach

areas with inadequate or no communication

services. As of early 1993, at least three other

countries were actively developing little LEO

systems, France’s Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES-the French equivalent of NASA)

has already launched the frost satellite in a
104 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

proposed little LEOS system called Taos. Although currently not funded, the concept for the

full system calls for six satellites to be operational

in 5 years serving up to 1.5 million users

worldwide. 107 In Mexico, LeoSat Panamericana

has begun experiments and plans to begin offering services in 1995.108 Smolsat—a consortium

of space companies based in the Russian

Federation—has already launched the first six

LEOS (two of which are for commercial use) of

a proposed 36-satellite system known as “Gonets. "

109Beginning in 1995, the system plans to

provide high-speed data services including electronic mail and fax transmission serving transportation and other industries. The Gonets system

plans to add intersatellite links in 1997, enabling

voice services to be provided globally, at a total

cost of $300 million. Although this system will

not compete with U.S. little LEOS providers for

the same spectrum, it could compete with U.S.

system (s) to provide the same types of services

around the world.ll0

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

WARC-92 significantly boosted the prospects

for little LEOS technologies and services. However, several obstacles remain, and difficult issues

must be resolved before little LEOS services

become available throughout the world. Services

are expected to be implemented frost in the United

States and then spread to other countries. Current

plans call for U.S. services to begin sometime in

1994.

Sharing Concerns--The most important issue

facing little LEOS proponents involves interference and sharing. Sharing concerns have several

dimensions. First, the new little LEOS systems

must share with the existing users of the frequencies, both domestically and internationally. This

is likely to be the largest problem standing in the

way of the implementation of little LEOS services. The frequencies in which the little LEOS

will operate are already used by some countries,

including the United States, for space operations

and research and meteorological services (in

137-138 MHz and 400.15-401 MHz), and various

point-to-point and mobile applications (in 148-

149.9). 111 In order to protect existing services,

WARC-92 limited little LEOS to secondary

status in parts of the 137-138 MHz band (see

figure 2-7), limited power levels, and, as noted

above, more than 70 countries downgraded little

LEOS to secondary status in their countries in the

148- 149.9 MHz (uplink) band. The latter declaration could cause serious difficulties for potential

little LEOS service providers if foreign governments are unwilling or unable to coordinate the

LEOS uplinks with their own uses.

Domestically, U.S. Government agencies want

to protect their existing services from harmful

interference by little LEOS. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),

for example, operates weather satellites in the

107$ ‘French Hope to ~~ch Glob~ Data-ordy Mobile Commllrlkatiom System, ” Space Commerce Week, vol. 9, No. 40, Oct. 19, 1992.

Im Plans for LeoSat Panarnericana’s system call for 24 satellites serving Latin America. It will offer the same types of data messaging and

paging services as the U.S. LEOS companies. Manuel Villalvazo, “UoSat Panarnericana: Latin American Communications on the Move, ”

Satellite Communications, November 1992.

IW t ‘Russi~ Firms Launch Initial Satellites of LEO System, ” Satellite News, July 27, 1992, p. 5.

110 me Russia system will Use 312-315 MHZ for its downhnks and 387-390 MHz for uplinks. Both bands are allocated to MSS on a

secondary basis, and must share with existing fixed and mobile services. Because these bands are used for Defense Department

communications, the system will not be allowed to operate in the United States.

111 Radio ~~onomy ~teru~ are ~so p~c~~ly concerned about possible ~terference from li~le MOS tito their space observhg

instruments. Although these instruments operate in slightly higher frequencies (150.05-153 MHz and 406.1-410 MHz), use of radio fkquencies

is not precise and often can spill over into adjacent channels. Radio astronomers fear that little LEOS operations will spill over into their

frequencies and disrupt their receiving equipment, which is very sensitive. This prompted W~C-92 to adopt language in footnote 599A that

instructs countries to “take all practicable steps to protect the radio astronomy service in the 150.05-153 MHz [and 406.1-410 MHz] band from

harmful interference. . . .“
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 105

137-138 band. Discussions have already begun to

coordinate the use of these frequencies. The

148-149.9 MHz band is currently allocated domestically only for government (military) use.

The Air Force, for example, plans to extend its

meteorological satellite system in the 400 MHz

band.

International sharing may also be difficult due

to the existing uses of the bands and the degree of

opposition to the U.S. proposals, especially in the

137-138 MHz and 148-149.9 MHz bands. Canada, for example, although it supported other U.S.

little LEOS proposals, joined footnote 608 Z---

making little LEOS secondary in Canada. This

action was taken in order to protect its extensive

paging operations in the 148-149.9 MHz band.

Because these systems have to penetrate buildings to ensure complete coverage, they are also

very high power, and since they are often

concentrated near the U.S. border, coordination

between Canada and the United States will be

necessary. These uses must be taken into account

by little LEOS proponents as they design their

systems and by the FCC as it implements rules

governing little LEOS services.

The secondary status of LEOS operations in

some bands is an important concern for potential

little LEOS providers, both at home and abroad,

While the effects of these limitations are not

known, since the services are not yet operational,

they are potentially serious. Secondary status

makes sharing with existing users more complicated, and coordination issues become more

difficult, although probably not insurmountable.

Little LEOS providers maintain that they can

operate within these limitations, but the real

possibility exists that the primary services in the

bands, especially the fixed and mobile services in

the 148-149.9 MHz band could overwhelm them.

As long as this secondary status exists, little

LEOS services will remain threatened, potentially dampening investment in these systems and

retarding development. Despite such difficulties,

each company is moving ahead with its negotiations for foreign licenses.112

The second major sharing concern facing the

competing little LEOS providers is that they must

share the newly allocated spectrum among themselves. Although the spectrum allocated to little

LEOS is limited, the FCC has stated its intention

to allow as many providers as possible to use the

bands, and is committed to having at least three

competing providers. Indications are that this

sharing can be accomplished among the existing

applicants, However, it is less clear how potential

future providers will be accommodated in the

bands. It is possible that future applicants-both

domestic and foreign—may have a difficult time

using spectrum that has already been divided up

between the three U.S. companies. This is an

important concern in foreign countries considering launching their own systems. The EC’s

Communications Directorate has requested talks

with the United States to discuss its concerns that

the U.S. systems not become de facto standards/

monopolies in the little LEOS bands (see section

on big LEOS below). The FCC’s negotiated

rulemaking proceeding did not resolve these

questions, but they are expected to be addressed

by the FCC in its upcoming NPRM on the little

LEOS service rules and licensing procedures. A

final resolution of this issue may have to wait

until systems are operating and real usage and

interference levels can be measured.

International Licensing—The question of

international licensing of little LEOS systems is

crucial. Little LEOS providers will have to gain

approval from every country in which they plan to

operate. 113The problem is that satellite footprints

(the areas within which transmissions can be

received) do not respect national boundaries—

transmissions spill over borders, and systems

112 or~omm, for ~xmple, ~epo~S t~t it hm ageements wifi 11 cow~ies and is in negotiation wi~ 11 more to establish its service.

113 Bo~ ~pll~ facilities (gateways) ~d user tem~~s ~] ~ve to ~ lice~edc me way hislicenshg is accomplished will depend on ~ch

country’s regulations (and politics), and will have to be negotiated on a country-by-country basis.
106 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

cannot just be turned off at the border. In the worst

case, if a country opposes the system, and refuses

to license a LEOS system, the little LEOS

services would technically be prohibited from

operating in that country. For a concept that is

premised on worldwide coverage, a patchwork of

‘‘safe’ nations in which the system can operate

would be complex to engineer, and could undermine the economic viability of the system.

Operating a LEOS system in an area such as

Europe, for example, which has a number of very

small countries, may make provision of service to

some countries, but not others, (technically) very

difficult. 114 Only one dissent from a country in a

strategic geographic location could effectively

preclude service for a number of countries.

Foreign countries will have several concerns

over the licensing of little LEOS systems, and

negotiations will be complex. Political, technical,

and economic issues will all be in play, and the

ability of the little LEOS providers to convince

foreign countries to license such services will

depend on several factors. First, all countries will

want to protect their existing systems and applications that will be sharing the band with the new

little LEOS systems. The little LEOS providers

must convince these countries that their proposed

systems either will not cause interference to

existing services or can be engineered to share the

spectrum with them.

Secondly, the contractual obligations of the

licensing country and the service provider will

have to be delineated. European nations especially are concerned that little LEOS systems may

siphon use (and hence revenues) away from the

public telephone network—an important source

of revenues they want to protect. Many issues will

be considered: Who will build and pay for any

required infrastructure in the country, such as a

satellite gateway facility? How will revenues

generated by these new services be distributed

between the companies and the countries in which

they operate? If a system is offering services in a

country, that country could demand a portion of

the revenues generated in return for licensing the

system. If a country maintains a gateway to the

system, revenue sharing would be easier to

monitor than if a country is served by a gateway

in a neighboring country. Such negotiations will

have to be conducted on a country-by-country

basis, a process that will be time-consuming and

legally complex.

Finally, on a purely political level, the manner

in which the FCC rules governing such services

are written (and enforced), the ways the systems

actually operate, and the dictates of the Communications Act of 1934 may have an impact on

which countries support and license them. If other

countries that may intend on launching their own

little LEOS systems perceive that FCC rules are

written and the initial U.S. little LEOS applicants

will operate in such a way that inhibits other

(foreign) systems from sharing the spectrum with

them, those countries may refuse to license the

U.S. systems. A potentially more significant

problem has to do with section 310 of the

Communications Act of 1934.115 Under that act,

licensing of companies owned or controlled by

foreign nationals or governments is severely

restricted. Other governments may be reluctant to

grant U.S. companies licenses to operate in their

country when foreign companies are not allowed

to obtain licenses in the United States.ll6

Markets--The potential market for little LEOStype services is large. However, several long-term

questions remain that could limit the marketing

appeal (and the revenue-producing ability) of

little LEOS services. First, because of the limita114 fiOvld@~~Wtesi@ leve~ fionemm~while sti~respcfig thepowerlfitations in those neighboring countries who have chosen

not to license the service may require painstaking engineering design and coordination.

11S 47 u.S.C,A, section 310.

116 ~sprovisionapplies o~y t. theprovisionofcommoncarrier, broadcasting, and some aeronautical services. ~partto avoid ~sproblem,

Starsys has indicated that it will apply to the FCC to be licensed on a non-common carrier basis.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 107

tions on little LEOS operations due to footnote

608Z, little LEOS services are not likely to

become available in those 70+ countries in the

near future. The effect of this footnote may

eliminate Europe as a potential market. The

question then becomes: can little LEOS survive

on the markets that are left? The U.S. little LEOS

applicants believe that they can. The size of the

remaining markets, however, will determine that

success or failure and as yet, the real demand for

LEOS-type services is not well-known.

From a U.S. competitiveness perspective, footnote 608Z may actually be positive. Because the

footnote made LEOS a secondary service in

Europe it also effectively excludes European

companies from launching competitive systems.

With only a secondary allocation, it is extremely

unlikely that any European companies would

build (or find support to build) such a system.

Even if a system were built, it would likely take

many years of negotiations, and some countries

might have to renounce footnote 608Z. By the

time this occurred, one or more U.S. systems

would already be operating and would have a

substantial jump on the market and an installed

base of customers and equipment.

The most serious marketing problem for the

little LEOS will likely be competition from other

mobile data service providers. In the United

States, terrestrially-based data communication

systems, such as Ram Mobile Data, Ardis, and

CoveragePlus, as well as private systems, are

already providing mobile data services in most

large urban markets. In addition, Qualcomm’s

OmniTracs system is already serving the Nation’s

trucking companies with nationwide position

location and data messaging services.117 The

installed base of customers and equipment could

make it difficult for little LEOS to attract sufficient customers to be profitable.

In addition to these established companies,

little LEOS systems may also face competition

from the proposed big LEOS systems, which plan

to offer data services in addition to their primary

voice service. While little LEOS services could

be less expensive than similar services provided

by big LEOS, it is possible that big LEOS will be

able to match service prices since the cost of

providing data services (in addition to their core

voice service) will likely be nominal. Many

consumers may want (and be willing to pay for)

voice services instead of data-only services. On

the other hand, little LEOS services may undermine the big LEOS (data and messaging) services, due to their lower costs and earlier implementation.

The current rush to put little LEOS services

into operation represents a desire on the part of the

applicants to get such systems into operation as

soon as possible in order to capture the unmet

needs of today’s consumers and businesses. If a

large enough market can be captured initially,

before big LEOS come into operation, little

LEOS systems could become and remain profitable. However, if their services do not achieve

adequate levels of market penetration quickly,

and if their costs are too high, little LEOS

survivability in the face of competition from big

LEOS maybe questionable.

As a result of such pressures, little LEOS

systems may be reduced to serving primarily rural

areas or niche markets with special communication needs. Services, for example, could eventually be limited to business applications, such as

vehicle location and traffic management services,

fleet management services for freight companies,

and data communication services for service

personnel or emergency relief agencies.

Technology and Cost Considerations-As

with all low-Earth systems, little LEOS satellites

will have to be constantly replaced as older

satellites reach the end of their lifetimes (approximately 5 to 7 years).

118 This means that for as long

as the system operates, new satellites will have to

117 “wi~ LEO ~~ation (@m Door to Mobile Data, AVL Competition?” LundMobile Radio News, vol. 47, No. 4, Jan. 22, 1993.

118 NASA hm ~~o ~~~~ tie possibili~ tit exist~g space debris may pose a threat to LEOS syst~.
108 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Figure 2-8-Low-Earth Orbit Satellite System receive poor coverage and the time when

could actually contact a satellite would

This generic low-Earth orbiting satellite system demonstrates

how such systems can achieve near-worldwide coverage. The

actual systems have orbits that differ in altitude, number of

satellites in orbit, number of orbital planes, and shape of the

orbit.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

be designed, built, and launched on a continuing

basis. Some have likened this to an assembly line

for satellites. As a result of this long-term

commitment, several issues need to be recognized. First, the cost of constructing and launching the initial network of satellites is only part of

the total cost of the system. Because satellites will

have to be constantly replaced, revenues must

also cover the ongoing costs of design, construction, and launching. These costs must be borne as

long as the system is in operation. Given the

marketing questions raised above, this could be a

challenge. Second, although little LEOS systems

do not necessarily need a full network of satellites

to operate, access to services using less than the

optimum number of satellites would be degraded.

The system could operate, but some areas might

a user

be reduced. If a string of launch failures occurs, any

LEOS system will be in jeopardy.

1 Big LEOS119

BACKGROUND

In addition to the data and positioning services

being developed by the little LEOS companies,

another class of LEOS systems has been proposed

that would provide telephone service almost

anywhere in the world. These LEOS systems,

which will operate in frequencies above 1 GHz,

have been dubbed “big LEOS.” Like the little

LEOS, big LEOS systems will use a network of

many satellites-from 12 to 66 depending on the

type of orbit—to provide service around the globe

(see figure 2-8). These satellites will be larger and

more complex than little LEOS satellites, and, as

a result of their added capabilities, will also be

more expensive ($10 to $20 million). On the

ground, control centers will administer the system

and manage the satellites, and a number of

gateway stations located in different countries

will be connected to the public telephone network—

allowing users to receive calls from and make

calls to anyone with a (regular wired) telephone

(see figure 2-9). One advantage of big LEOS over

conventional geosynchronous satellite systems

for phone service is that, because the low-Earth

satellites are much closer to the Earth (generally

less than 1,000 miles compared with more than

22,300 miles), they avoid the annoying delay in

conversations caused by the long trip the signals

have to make between the Earth and the geosynchronous satellite and back.

Big LEOS systems promise to provide voice

and data communications where none exist now

(in remote mountains, for example), or in coun119 khnicmy, the systems discussed in this section are not all /ow-Earth orbiting systems. TRW’s Odyssey system, fOr e-pie, pl~s to

use medium-Earth orbits, and Ellipsat plans elliptical orbits. As a result official government termi.nologyuses the term “non-geosynchronous’

when referring to these systems. Because these systems have been colloquially referred to as ‘‘big LEOS” for several yam, OTA will continue

to use the term in this section to refer to all proponents for these types of systems.
. 

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology 1109

Figure 2-9-Generic Big LEOS System

——1

NOTE: Intersatellite links will be used only by Motorola’s Iridium

system.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

tries in which the communications infrastructure

is not well-developed. These satellite systems

would allow such countries to connect their

citizens with each other and to the outside world,

while avoiding the high (often prohibitive) cost of

building a wireline communications infrastructure. Other potential markets for big LEOS

services include international tourists and business travelers, emergency relief organizations,

government agencies, and various international

associations,

U.S. PROPOSALS

The big LEOS concept was first formally

proposed after the topics for WARC-92 were

finalized (see table 2-4). As a result, big LEOS

were not specifically included in the WARC-92

agenda. However, prior to the conference, U.S.

representatives were able to convince other ITU

members that LEOS systems are only a different

way of providing MSS, and should be considered

as part of the MSS negotiations.

In anticipation of their inclusion in the WARC92 debate, allocations for big LEOs were considDual-mode portable telephones, such as this prototype

from Iridium, will first attempt to connect to a local

cellular system. If no system can be accessed, the

telephone will then use the satellite system to complete

the call.

ered in the various U.S. domestic preparations

processes, and in its final Report on WARC-92

proposals, the FCC! identified bands that it

recommended for LEOS use. The FCC proposed:

Upgrading MSS to primary status in 1610-

1626.5 MHz (Uplink) and 2483.5-2500 MHz

(downlink);

Allocating through a footnote the 1613.8-

1626.5 MHz band to MSS downlinks on a
110 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Table 2-4-Chronology of Big LEOS Actions

November 1990. . . . . . . . . . . .

December 1990. . . . . . . . . . . .

May 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

June 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

July 1991-February 1992.. . .

February 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . .

August 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

January-March 1993. . . . . . . .

Summer 1993... . . . . . . . . . . .

Ellipsat Corp. files application to contruct Ellipso I.

Motorola inc. files application to construct Iridium.

TRW, inc. files application to construct Odyessy.

. Constellation Communications, Inc. files application to contruct Aries.

● Loral Qualcomm Satellite Services., Inc. files application to construct Globalstar.

. Ellipsat Corp. files application to construct Ellipso Il.

Applicants file for Pioneer’s Preference.

WARC-92 adopts allocations for MSS (big LEOS).

. FCC declines to grant Pioneer’s Preference to any particular applicant.

. FCC grants experimental licenses to Motorola, Inc., Constellation Communications, Inc., and Ellipsat Corp.

. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposes allocations for big LEOS services.

. FCC releases public notice on negotiated rulemaking for big LEOS.

Big LEOS Advisory Committee deliberations.

Planned launch of experimental systems.

■

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

secondary basis in order to permit bidirectional use of the band; 120 and

Allocating through a footnote the 1850-1990

MHz band to MSS on a primary basis.121

In the initial U.S. proposals to the ITU, these

recommendations were included as part of the

MSS proposals, and although LEOS are not

specifically mentioned, the proposals did note the

use of MSS allocations for LEOS services, and

U.S. intentions to use the bands for LEOS

operations were made clear to foreign delegates

prior to the conference.

RESULTS

U.S. allocation proposals were relatively successful, but a number of footnotes limit the power

the systems can use and prohibit big LEOS

systems from causing interference to (some) other

users of the band-effectively reducing big LEOS

operations to secondary status in relation to those

other users. Stringent coordination requirements

were also adopted. These conditions were acceptable to U.S. big LEOS proponents, but they may

be revisited in the future if they prove too

restrictive. In summary, WARC-92 decided to:

Upgrade MSS (including, but not limited to

LEOS) to coprimary status at 1610-1626.5

MHz (uplink) and 2483.5-2500 MHz

(downlink), subject to the coordination procedures specified in Resolution 46 (see

below). 122 In order to protect the services

currently using the band, WARC-92 set

limits (according to footnote 731X) on the

power the mobile telephones can use. This

footnote also prohibits MSS operations from

interfering with aeronautical navigation and

freed services, including the Russian GLONASS satellite navigation system (see box

2-E). Users of big LEOS mobile telephones

cannot interfere with or claim protection

from these existing services. This provision

effectively makes MSS/big LEOS services

secondary to these other services, even

IXI ~~ ~ropo~~ responds ~w~y to the pl~ Of Iridium to use the hd fOr two-way comm~~tion.

121 In order to prewme flexibility, no direction (I@IIIC or downlink) WM spdkd for htid.

122 user~d~e~ ~~~gup t. a sateflite c~ot exc~d sp~~lc power levels tit vw &cording to whether Or not the fr~uencies Wfil

be shared with the Russian satellite mvigation system, GLONASS. For signals being transmitted down from LEO satellites, WARC-92 set

a ‘‘trigger” level—if the power of the signal exceeds that level, LEOS systems would have to coordinate with existing users. If the signal’s

power remains under the limit however, no coordination is required.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for US. Radio Technology I 111

—

(Continued on nexf page)

though MSS services technically have a band to be used for bidirectional communiprimary allocation. cation between the users and the satellites.

■ Adopt a secondary allocation for MSS H Elevate the Radio Astronomy Service to

downlinks at 1613 .8-1626.5 MHz, subject to primary status in the 1610.6-1613.8 MHz

the conditions of Resolution 46.123 This band.124 In addition to this upgraded status,

allocation allows the 1613.8 -1626.5 MHz WARC-92 also modified footnote 733E to

123 poW~~ lfil~~ ~PPIY tO ~~ I (j 138.1626.5 ~s~ond~ ~location, but LEO systems WI tive (O coordfi[e regardless of power level.

124 In ~ls b~d, aero~utl~al radionavigatio~ radiodetermination-satellite, MSS, ~d radioas~onomy W Skep-stahlS.
112 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

prevent harmful interference to radio astron- WARC-92 also adopted Resolution 46 to

omy services from MSS and radiodeter- establish interim procedures for announcing and

mination-satellite services. coordinating new non-geostationary satellite sysThe U.S. proposal for the 1850-1990 MHz terns. Because these systems are still being

band was not accepted. However other additional developed, their technical parameters are not

spectrum was allocated to MSS which could be final, and the methods for sharing spectrum

used for LEOS services (see section on the between new LEOS services and existing (terresMobile-Satellite Service, above). trial and space) services have not yet been
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 113

developed. These interim procedures were adopted

to allow the ITU adequate time to study the

problems and develop appropriate sharing criteria. In the meantime, LEOS systems can be

deployed, allowing engineers to gain practical

experience and knowledge about what service

rules and interference criteria will be required to

enable systems to share the spectrum. Permanent

regulations governing sharing will be adopted by

a future conference called for in the resolution.

DISCUSSION

Domestic Background—Ellipsat Corp. and

Motorola, Inc. first formally proposed LEOS

systems providing voice communications in late

1990--too late to be included in the formal

agenda of WARC-92 (see table 2-4). Shortly

thereafter, three additional applicants--Loral Cellular Systems Corp., Constellation Communications, Inc., and TRW, Inc.— applied to the FCC

to construct other big LEOS systems (see box 2-F

for a description of the big LEOS applicants and

table 2-5 for a comparison of their systems).125

Despite their lack of formal standing on the

WARC-92 agenda, big LEOS quickly became

one of the focal points of U.S. proposals and

preconference negotiations. U.S. companies have

historically been very strong competitors in

satellite communications, and the emergence of

the big LEOS concept before the conference

presented the United States with an important

opportunity to extend its lead in satellite technology and services and shore up its role in mobile

technology, which many observers believe is

slipping given European progress in implementing GSM.

Two basic concepts were originally proposed

for big LEOS systems (see figure 2-10). In the

simpler of the two, proposed by all the firms

except Motorola, the LEOS would function

primarily as relays in the sky. A user would place

a call through the LEO satellite, which would then

transmit it to the nearest Earth gateway station for

connection through the long distance and local

lines of the public telephone system. No switching between satellites would be required.

Motorola’s Iridium system, by contrast, is

much more complex. It was first designed as a

satellite-only system in which a caller would send

his/her call to the satellite, which would then pass

it from satellite to satellite until it reached the

satellite closest to the intended recipient of the

call. That satellite would then transmit the call to

the intended person’s portable phone, or relay the

call through the public telephone network via a

network gateway station.126 Because of the intersatellite linking and switching that Iridium requires, the system requires sophisticated satellites

and software to control it.

In response to concerns by U.S. telephone and

cellular providers and criticism from foreign

telephone companies that satellite-only phones

would bypass foreign telephone systems and

deprive them of valuable telephone revenues, all

the big LEOS proponents began developing

“dual-mode” handsets-mobile telephones that

will be capable of using either cellular or satellite

systems.

127 The phone will frost attempt to connect to a local cellular system. If the user is not in

an area with cellular service, or is out of range of

the nearest system (or if the terrestrial system is

busy), the phone will then connect to the satellite

network. Dual-mode handsets will resemble today’s

portable cellular telephones, and are expected to

cost from $500 to $3,000.

IM AMSC aISO applied to theFcc forperrnission to construct a system using the same bands, and isparticipatingin the negotiated tiemtig

regarding big LEOS systems.

124 s~ce its ong~ in~oductio~ Motorola h~ refined ~s concept in response to criticism that such a system would bypass eXiSting

telephone systems, an unacceptable outcome to many foreign (and U. S.) governments and telephone companies. See the discussion of

“dual-mode” phones below.

127 Foreig telephone comp~es ~ve some leverage over U.S. comp~es ~ause hey me often own~ by or closely ~iCd With their

governments-who control frequency allocations the U.S. companies need to operate.
114 The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications
Table 2-5—Big LEOS (Low-Earth Orbiting Satellite Systems)

System Holding company Technology partners cost

Odyssey TRW, Inc. N/A $1.3 billion

Iridium Iridium. Inc., subsidiary of Motorola McDonnell Douglas (launch vehicle); $3.37 billion

Satellite Communications. Inc., General Electric Co. (ground stations):

subsidiary of Motorola. Inc. Motorola, Inc. (electronics)

Raytheon (antennas)

Lockheed (satellites)

Ellipso Ellipsat Corporation, subsidiary of Fairchild Space & Defense Corp. (satellites and $410 million

Mobile Communications Holdings. Inc. ground stations)

Israel Aircraft Industries

Aries Constellation Communications. Inc. Defense Systems. Inc. (satellites): $294 million

MicroSat Launch Systems, Inc. (launch vehicle):

Pacific Communications Sciences, Inc. (system &

software)

Globalstar Loral Qualcomm Satellite Services, Inc., Loral Aerospace Corp. (space segment): $748 million

subsidiary of Loral Aerospace Corp. & Qualcomm, Inc. (ground segment)

Qualcomm, Inc. (joint venture)

Technology and Service Characteristics of Big LEOS

System No. of Geographic Modulation Handset cost Service Market Operational

satellites coverage cost estimates date

Odyssey 12 North America CDMA $1,000 N/A N/A Mid-1 996

Iridium 66 Global TDMA/FDMA $2,000-3,000 $3.00 p/rein 6 million 1998

Ellipso 24 U.S. & Territories CDMA $300 (add-on)a

$0.60 p/rein 18 million Mid-1994

$1,000 (new unit)

Aries 48 Global TDMA/CDMA/FDMA $1,500 N/A 2.9 million 1996

Global star 24 (first generation) U.S. (first generation) CDMA $700 (dual-mode) $0.30 p/rein 3,4 million 1997

48 (second Global (second $600 (single-mode)

generation) generation)

aAdd-on to existing cellular handset.

KEY: CDMA= code division multiple access, FDMA=frequency division multiple access, TDMA=time division multiple access

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, based on information provided in system applications to the FCC,
116 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Figure 2-10-Satellite-Linked Mobile Phones:

Two Approaches

Motorola’s Original Iridium Plan

A fleet of sophisticated satellites in low-Earth orbit pick up

mobile phone calls from anywhere on Earth and could relay

them from satellite to satellite, bypassing Iong-distance

companies. Motorola has had difficulty developing a

satellite with all the technical capabilities needed that could

be launched at a practical cost.

s

Competing Satellite Plans

The satellites’ only role is to link mobile phones to regional

ground stations. Calls are switched and routed between

ground stations over Iong-distance phone lines. Far fewer

satellites are needed, especially if unpopulated areas

and oceans are not covered, and the satellites can be much

simpler in design.

&

2

,,

,,

!.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, based on Motorola, Loral, from The New York Times, Aug. 26, 1992, p. D5.

In addition to the differences in basic concept,

the Iridium system, which has been the focus-—

fairly or unfairly-of most of the press attention

to LEOS, differs in several respects from the other

big LEOS systems. First, it plans to use many

more satellites. The original Iridium concept

called for 77 satellites, but in August 1992, that

number was reduced to 66 as a result of improvements in satellite design. Second, Iridium plans to

use time division multiple access (TDMA), a

transmission technique that Motorola began developing for future digital cellular telephone

systems, while the other four applicants plan to

use code division multiple access (CDMA).

Third, the original concept for Iridium envisioned

a system that would not use the local telephone

system or existing cellular networks. Rather, it

would have bypassed terrestrial systems completely unless the number being called was a

regular wired telephone (see figure 2-10). As

noted, Motorola retreated from this bypassoriented design in the face of harsh criticism from

foreign governments and telephone companies,

and is now developing a dual-mode mobile

telephone. Finally, Iridium requires extremely

sophisticated satellites that can route calls much

like the switching centers used for public telephone service-making them substantially larger

and costlier than the satellites of the other

applicants. Because of the complexity and cost of

the system, Iridium’s usage charges are expected

to be much higher per minute than its competitors

($3.00/minute as opposed to approximately $0.50,

minute). Motorola points out, however, that users

of the other big LEOS systems will have to pay

long distance telephone rates in addition to the

charge for using the satellite service, making the

total cost of a phone call comparable.

In addition to the companies profiled in box

2-F, several other firms are planning or would like

to use the big LEOS spectrum. AMSC, for

example, has applied at the FCC to use the

frequencies to support its geostationary system.

Inmarsat has announced plans for Project 21, a

global satellite telecommunications service that

would provide mobile services to users at sea, in

the air, and on land. Project21 has not been given

final approval, but Inmarsat is conducting technical and marketing studies, and has already begun

working with equipment manufacturers to de-
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 117

velop specifications for its handheld phones.128

Inmarsat predicts the market for satellite phones

will reach 2 million by the end of the century, but

also believes that in order to be successful, these

(types of) services must serve domestic users—

international travelers are not a large enough

market to justify the systems. A final decision of

whether to proceed is expected in July 1993, and

tentative plans call for the system to begin

offering services by 1998. In anticipation of

moving ahead with the project, Inmarsat has filed

to use the frequencies allocated at WARC-92 for

MSS.

129

Finally, Celsat, Inc. proposed to build and

operate a ‘‘Hybrid Personal Communications

Network” called Celstar that would operate in

either L- or S-band.130 Celstar would combine

terrestrial and space technologies into a “super’

cellular system that would use two geostationary

satellites and many ground stations to supply

voice, data, compressed video, and position

determination services to as many as 750,000

users at a cost of $0.25/minute (for telephone

service). Costs for satellite construction and

launch are estimated at $660 million, while

lightweight user handsets will cost $500.131 Plans

call for the terrestrial portion of the system to

begin operating by 1993, with the satellites

coming into operation in 1996. Celsat’s petition

to use the L-band frequencies for its system was

denied by the FCC in August 1992.

In order to speed the development of service

rules and technical parameters for big LEOS

The U.S. Global Positioning System uses a network of

satellites that allows users (in aircraft, on ships, or in

vehicles) to determine their location almost anywhere

on Earth.

systems and services, the FCC in August 1992

asked for comments regarding the formation of an

advisory committee to develop draft proposals for

FCC consideration.132 This process was first used

to help the FCC develop the rules arid specifications guiding the development and operation of

little LEOS systems (see appendix E). The big

LEOS committee began its work in January 1993,

and finished in April 1993. The final report of the

committee will be submitted to the FCC for

consideration as it writes a formal NPRM, which

is expected to be released in May 1993. After the

]2s Llkc tie phones proposed by the U.S. big LEOS applicants, -sat’s‘dSets ~ nmarsat-P terminals) wiIl be duaI-mode. They are

expected to cost around $1500.

1x) me ~pec~ic ~quencles Me: 1616- 1626.5 M H Z, 2483.5 -25(N MWZ} and 198@20~0 MHz, ~ of which could be ‘Seal by ‘ti

geosynchronous and LEO satellite systems. See also, Ellen Messmer, “INMARSAT Ready to Challenge Iridium+” Network World, Mar. 16,

1992, p. 21; “INMARSAT Files for Frequencies Following W-C, Telcom Highlights International, March 25, 1992, p. 17.

IW Celsat ~sfiled ~ ~ppllcation at tie FCC for reallocation of ~ese fr~uencies, but no apphcation for atltiofi~ to c0t3StlUct tie SyStem

has yet been filed. See Celsat, Inc., In the Matter of Amendment of Part 25 of the Commission’s Rules for an Allocation of Frequencies und

Other Rules for a New Nationwide Hybrid SpacelGround Cellular Network for Person allMobile Communications Services: Petition for

Rulemaking, before the Federal Communications Cornmissio% RM No. 7927.

131 Renee Saunders, ‘‘Celsat Joins Mobile Satellite Contenders, ” Space News, Feb. 17-23, 1992, p. 4.

132 Federal Communications Commission, “FCC Asks for Comments Regarding the Establishment of an Advisory Committee to Negotiate

Proposed Regulations, ’ CC Docket No. 92-166, released Aug. 7, 1992.
118 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

NPRM process is completed, the FCC hopes that

the process of licensing providers of big LEOS

service can be completed quickly.

As of April 1993, the big LEOS companies

were in the process of completing design plans,

building strategic and manufacturing partnerships, trying to convince foreign governments of

the value of big LEOS, and searching out

potential technology partners.

WARC-92 Negotiations-Big LEOS was one

of the most difficult and complex issues debated

at WARC-92. In broad terms, the debate pitted the

United States and its allies against the Europeans

and their supporters. U.S. support for the big

LEOS concept was very strong and obtaining

frequency allocations for these new systems was

the highest U.S. priority at WARC-92. Many

countries supported the U.S. position, especially

developing countries who had become convinced

of the potential benefits such systems could

provide.

Before WARC-92 opened, U.S. and CEPT

positions on MSS and big LEOS hardened, and

preconference negotiations were unproductive.

At the conference, negotiations continued to be

difficult. 133 Both sides tried to find ways to

tradeoff support for each others’ systems, but

such compromise was hard to achieve. A deal was

struck only in the last hours of the conference.

Complicating the U.S. negotiating position on

big LEOS was the support the United States had

given to the Global Navigation Satellite System

(GNSS) concept. GNSS is an international satellite system concept now being developed to

provide global navigation services to aircraft, and

that is designed to replace a confusing patchwork

of different terrestrially-based systems around the

world. The United States, along with ICAO and

the former USSR, has been actively involved in

the development of this concept since the rnid1980s. Proponents expect that GNSS will use two

satellite systems, the U.S. Global Positioning

System (GPS) and the Russian GLONASS system (see box 2-E) to provide precise position

determination and other navigation information

to aircraft flying anywhere in the world.l34 The

system is expected to increase safety, e.g., preventing disasters such as the downing of a Korean

airliner over Russian airspace in 1983, and

efficiency, by allowing planes to be spaced closer

together on routes and allowing them to fly the

most fuel/time efficient routes.

U.S. support for GNSS/GLONASS dates back

to 1987. At the 1987 Mobile Services WARC, the

U.S. opposed an L-band allocation for Aeronautical Public Correspondence (APC—see below)

because it thought such use would interfere with

the U.S. GPS and thereby threaten the operation

of GNSS. At WARC-92, however, the United

States not only supported, but proposed, frequency allocations for big LEOS that would use

some of the same frequencies as GLONASS. This

policy switch seriously underrnined U.S. support

of the GNSS system in international eyes, and led

many frustrated domestic and international aviation officials to question why the United States

133 Ec ~&=~~.S, fO~ ~~ple, ~fieV~g tit tie CEPT co~~es ~d given up too much on little LEos, pushed @to hk a bd position

on big LEOS allocations.

134 ~50 ~~di5cussed i5 a potenti~ EU~p~ sateflite aeromutic~ Mvigation syst~. Emope~ offIciids have reportedly show some

reluctance to use either the U.S. DoD-controlled GPS system or the Russian (Ministry of Defense’s) GLONASS system. “International Air

Traffic Control May Go From Radar to GPS,’ Telcom Highlights International, vol. 14, No. 23, June 3, 1992. p. 17.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 119

was willing to jeopardize years of work on

GNSS. 135 Big LEOS proponents, on the other

hand, believe that it is possible for both services

to share the band, and that the U.S. positions were

not mutually exclusive.

Some analysts and delegates believe that U.S.

support for commercial big LEOS systems over

GLONASS/GNSS at WARC-92 not only damaged U.S. integrity internationally-making it

harder to “sell’ U.S. positions at future conferencesbut may also have set a bad precedent for future

conferences. ITU members may try to reallocate

frequencies used by the U.S. GPS system.

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

LEOS promise universal communications anywhere in the world, Brochures touting these

services and the popular press extol the benefits

to the world community and the technical marvels

they represent. Such systems are also expected to

generate huge revenues for services providers and

equipment makers-estimates easily reach into

the billions of dollars per year. At present, U.S.

companies lead the world in the development of

LEOS technology. However, a number of hurdles

remain to be overcome before these services can

be made available to the citizens of the United

States and the world.

International Allocations and Licensing—

Inter-nationally, the biggest potential problem

facing the providers of big LEOS services is that

they must obtain licenses in every country in

which they plan to operate. Although international allocations for MSS/big LEOS were agreed

to at WARC-92, those allocations must now be

adopted by individual ITU member countries

before the new systems can begin operations.

Furthermore, there is no guarantee--even if the

international allocations are adopted—that foreign countries will license all or even any of the

U.S. companies that have proposed big LEOS

services.

The possible implications of U.S. big LEOS

proposals began to draw the attention of foreign

telecommunications regulators and policymakers

even before the end of WARC-92. European

Community officials fear that the U.S. licensing

process “ultimately will become a worldwide

mandate, ’ 136 and that U.S.-operated systems will

dominate this emerging market-precluding the

introduction of (non-U. S.) competing systems.137

At the conference, the EC Commission delivered

a letter to Ambassador Baran, head of the U.S.

delegation, requesting talks on the subject after

WARC-92 ended. Informal talks were held in late

summer of 1992, but no formal agreements were

reached and no actions were taken as a result of

the meeting. Among the issues discussed: licensing procedures in the United States and Europe,

shared use of spectrum by existing and future

systems, and domestic procedures for interconnecting satellite networks with the domestic

135 b the domestic p~paration process, U.S. aviation interests opposed MSS/big LEOS allocations that they believed would tieaten

GLONASS/GNSS. They were not successful in having their views accepted, but they received assurances about protecting GLONASS in the

FCC’s final Report. The Report stated: “the Commission has been unable to determine the extent of IGLONASS] operations above 1610 MHz.

Therefore, we have not been able to assess the potential for interference to GLONASS in the 1610-1626.5 MHz range. However, if it is

determined that GLONASS is operating extensively above 1610 MHz, the U.S. Delegation will have the flexibility to modify the U.S. proposal

to protect GLONASS. ”

The real meaning of those assurances in practice, however, became clouded at WARC-92. It became clear that GLONASS will operate above

1610 MHz, and the delegation did negotiate some protections for the system relating to allowable power levels, However, such protection was

inadequate in the view of the domestic aviation community, who continue to feel that the United States was not truly committed to protecting

GLONASS at the expense of the commercial big LEOS systems. See Federal Communications Commission “An Lnquiry Relating to

Preparation for the International Telecommunication Union World Administrative Radio Conference for DeaIing With Frequency Allocations

in Certain Parts of the Spectrum,” Report, Gen Docket 89-554,6 FCC Rcd 3900 (1991), p. 15.

1~ Daniel Marcus, “EC Fears Prompt Satellite Talks,” Space News, vol. 3, No. 20, May 25-31, 1992, p. 1.

137 me llcemlng of big LEOS is ~que in tie ~s(oq of ~tematioM1 tel~omm~catio~ b~ause, although licenses will be granted by the

FCC (a U.S. regulatory agency), the services these systems will offer will be global in scope-seemingly putting the FCC in the position of

granting de~acro international licenses.
120 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

telephone system in each country. Despite these

talks, the Europeans generally remain cool to

American big LEOS systems. 138 Consequently,

the big LEOS providers are engaged in extensive

efforts to persuade foreign spectrum managers

that their systems pose no threat to established

services. Ultimately, the survival of big LEOS

systems will depend on how successfully they can

lobby foreign governments.

If some countries decide not to allocate the

spectrum agreed to at WARC-92, or not to license

big LEOS systems—in order to protect existing

systems, for example--it could seriously jeopardize the viability of the systems. Big LEOS

companies could be faced with a patchwork

service in which some countries would have

service and others would not. The customer base

and coverage of the system would be reduced, and

the operator of the system would have to find

some way to actually turn the system off over

offended countries. While it is technically feasible to do this, software solutions will be extremely complex and expensive. In addition,

differing amounts of spectrum are allocated in

different countries, and adequate frequencies

might not exist in some cases for multiple

systems. Such scenarios may make operating a

true global system technically unrealistic.

Frequency Coordination and Sharing—

Spectrum sharing and coordination in the big

LEOS frequencies is expected to be even more

difficult than the problems faced by little LEOS.

Because of the limited amount of spectrum

allocated to LEOS at WARC-92 and the bandwidth requirements of the systems themselves,

only a limited number of such systems can be

accommodated worldwide, a fact recognized by

the delegates to WARC-92 in Resolution 70.139

This recognition also led the conference to adopt

Resolution 46, which defines interim coordination procedures for LEOS and calls for future

study by the CCIR.

Domestic Coordination: Frequency sharing

and coordination problems faced by big LEOS

services split along two dimensions. First, the five

big LEOS proponents must find ways to share the

allocated spectrum amongst themselves. Given

the relatively small amount of spectrum allocated,

and the relatively large (compared with little

LEOS) bandwidth requirements of voice services,

this could prove to be a substantial challenge.

Complicating this problem, the big LEOS companies have proposed different transmission modulation schemes. Iridium, as noted above, plans to

use TDMA, which Motorola is also developing

for digital terrestrial cellular services. The other

four applicants have proposed to use CDMA to

provide their services. Because these two forms of

modulation are different, they cannot use the

same frequencies. The negotiated rulemaking

proceeding at the FCC attempted to work out a

compromise on this issue, but discussions were

not successful. Ultimately, the FCC will have to

decide how best to accommodate the needs of all

the applicants. Unless one side or the other

relents, it must find some way to allow both

CDMA and TDMA transmissions to be used.

A number of commenters have pointed out that

the ability of the four CDMA systems to share

amongst themselves may also be limited. Limitations on power and hence capacity, according to

one commenter, are ‘‘certain only to increase the

effective cost per circuit for each system, increase

the ultimate price to the end user, and possibly

jeopardize the viability of one or more of the

competing applicants. ’ ’140 Perhaps for this reason, some analysts have suggested that a consortium, like AMSC, may be one alternative to

providing big LEOS services.

In addition, any future big LEOS system will

have to share the bands with the services already

138 “Satel Conseil Examin es WARC Results, Especially LEOS, ’ Mobile Satellite Reports, vol. 6, No. 21, Oct. 12, 1992.

139 ITT-J, Fi~/ Acrs, op cit. foomote 27, p. 117.

]40 Cel=t, op. cit., fOOt.nOte 130, P.‘
Chapter 2--Outcomes and Implications for US. Radio Technology I 121

using the frequencies. Observers have pointed out

that sharing with existing services may be possible or more easy to negotiate if the other services

are willing to compromise and work with the U.S.

big LEOS providers. If such cooperation is not

forthcoming, and if their consent to share the

bands is not obtained, many believe that, as

currently designed, big LEOS will not be able to

share spectrum in the short term.141 Over the next

several years, as technology is developed to work

around such constraints, big LEOS could come

into operation, but they would be years late and

equipment would likely be much more expensive

than originally planned. Either one of these

possibilities could conceivably derail these systems.

For example, the bidirectional use of the

1613.8 -1626.5 MHz frequency band by Iridium

may cause serious sharing problems. As noted

above, the downlinks that Motorola plans to use

for Iridium were granted only secondary allocations at WARC-92. The CCIR has tentatively

recommended that systems using these frequencies should not cause interference to systems

operating on a primary basis. ‘‘The recommendation would prevent Iridium-which will have a

secondary downlink at 1613.8-1626.5—from interfering with other primary and secondary users

in the band. 142 This fact, combined with the high

power levels characterizing Iridium’s TDMA

system, ‘‘virtually precludes the possibility of

Iridium sharing spectrum with any other satellite

system—U.S, or foreign. ’’143 The CCLR called

for additional studies to examine the problems.

GLONASS: The most difficult international

frequency coordination problem will be with the

Russian GLONASS system.

144 Although both

types of proposed big LEOS systems may interfere with GLONASS, Iridium appears to present

more severe and difficult sharing problems because of the concentrated signal power of Iridium’s TDMA modulation scheme. Motorola has

said that it cannot share with GLONASS and will

seek to operate in frequencies not used by the

system. ‘‘MSS industry observers saw the limits

imposed on the big LEO allocations as favoring

the four applicants who proposed to operate in

separate uplink and downlink bands, while raising potential problems for the Iridium system. 145 The four CDMA companies believe that

they can share with GLONASS, but there is

concern that with all four systems functioning,

interference might become a problem. Theoretically, the CDMA systems could use the entire

1610-1626.5 MHz band, while Iridium, which

plans to use TDMA bidirectionally can only use

that portion of the band not used by GLONASS. l46

One specific potential problem is the operation

of the user terminals in the uplink allocation at

1610- 1626.5 MHz. Interference from these portable telephones could be just as serious as interference from the satellites, and could make coordination of big LEOS systems difficult since the

primary status of the existing services gives them

advantages in negotiations. GLONASS receivers,

for example, which are to be mounted on the top

of the aircraft, are very sensitive. Although the

141 me baSiS of MS &fief iS we ~x~emely res~ctive ~wer levels (power flUX de~ity (pm) limits) that have been pla~d on LEOS

operations. While current proponents claim that they can share the spectnmL other analysts believe that more sophisticated and expensive

equipment-now just being designed-wdl be necessary.

142 L $CCIR Sees ~oblems Wi& Bi-&ectiO~ @~tiOn of Mdiq” Sate//ite News, VO1. 16, No. 5, Feb. 1, 1993, p. 4.

143 ~ld.

144 BWause tie U.S. GpS system ~~es frequencies ~ a lower fr~uency b~d (1565.1585 ~), it till not h affected by the big LEOS

systems.

145 ( ‘u.S. ‘Big, LitUe LEOS” Get Allocations at W~C. . .,” Te[ecorrununications Reports, Mar. 9, 1992, p. 14.

Iti ~t frequencies GLONASS Ml ~c~y & ~s@ when f~ly operatio~ is still not cl-. Shofly &fore WlmC-92, the RussiarIs filed

plans at the ITU to use frequencies up to 1620 MHz, thus leaving Motorola with only 6.5 MHz in which to operate. It is unclear iflridium could

operate (witb adequate quality and capacity) with this limited amount of spectrum.
122 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

receivers would be partially shielded from interference from mobile telephones by the body of the

plane, when the aircraft is turning and banking

(especially during landing and takeoff), the GLONASS receiver could be exposed to interference

from nearby user terminals.147 In order to limit

interference from the handsets and protect the

existing services in the band, WARC-92 (footnote 731X) put restrictions on the transmission

power from user terminals. Design and implementation of big LEOS systems under these

constraints will be technically challenging, but

should be possible.

Implementation of big LEOS systems will face

two critical issues vis-a-vis GLONASS. First,

some arrangement must be worked out with

GLONASS officials to insure that U.S. big LEOS

will be able to operate effectively across the entire

frequency band allocated at WARC-92. Motorola

officials have said that they cannot share with

GLONASS or GLONASS-M (an expanded version of GLONASS). This prompted the United

States to oppose attempts to implement GLONASSM. Alternatively, the frequency allocations and

assignments made by the FCC will have to work

around the GLONASS system, Second, the United

States would have to oppose more stringent

power limits than those defined in footnote 73 1X.

Because no LEOS systems are operating, it is

difficult to judge the real effects of any potential

interference they may cause to existing systems.

In practice, it is possible that the limits on big

LEOS power set out by WARC-92 are not strict

enough—the U.S. delegation was successful in

negotiating limits that were at least workable in

the interim. In that case, the members of the ITU

may decide to make the limits more stringent.

However, if the power limits are made much

stricter, big LEOS proponents believe that their

systems may not be able to operate.

Continued U.S. Government support of the big

LEOS concept puts it in a difficult position

regarding the use of the L-band frequencies, The

United States now supports two systems/users

competing for the same frequencies: GLONASS,

which is viewed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as an integral part of the future

global navigation system, and big LEOS. At least

two related consequences of the U.S. actions at

WARC-92 must be considered. First, what, if any,

backlash could be taken against the U.S. GPS

system at future international meetings? Second,

from a broader perspective, what effect will big

LEOS systems really have on GLONASS, and

was promoting big LEOS a sufficient reason to

risk the future of the GNSS system?

This issue highlights the policymaking gap that

exists in U.S. international radiocommunications

policymaking. In this case, powerful commercial

interests with little more than a conceptual plan

and initial technical designs were able to undermine an established, U.S. Government (FAA)-

sanctioned, civil aviation initiative that is already

partially finalized globally and is already operating. No public proceeding assessing the advantages of one versus the other was held, and no

accountability for the policy shift has been

assigned. The mechanism by which this decision/

shift was made is invisible, and the reasons so far

undocumented. 148

Radio Astronomy: Another potentially difficult

sharing problem will have to be worked out

between the big LEOS providers and the world’s

radio astronomers. Radio astronomy is now

allocated on a primary basis in the 1610.6- 1613.8

MHz band, and is protected from interference by

two newly modified footnotes (733E and 734).

Footnote 733E specifically protects radio astronomy operations from interference from MSS

(including LEOS) systems. Since radio astronomy

147 k ~tewmfig &ta on ~tetierence and sharing, therefore. it is important that these problems be taken irMO account ~d that COmputti

models do not assume an aircraft flying level.

14S Wtioughsuch ~oficQ policydecisio~ ~eno~ywork~outfidiscussio~wi~tit? hlteldepaItmeIltm&) AdViSOWCOInmittM

and between NTIA and the FCC, it is not clear to what extent NTIA was aware of the implications of FAA’s support of the GLONASS system.
Chapter 2--0utcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 123

uses extremely sensitive receivers and requires

precise measurements, almost any interference

caused to radio astronomy services could be

serious. Big LEOS proponents believe that the

position determination capabilities of their systems will be sufficient to protect radio astronomy

applications. 149 The radio astronomy community

generally does not share that confidence.

The real issue in this case, however, maybe the

political support enjoyed by each side. Radio

astronomers do not have the economic clout of

private sector industries, and hence their political

leverage is limited. In cases where interference is

a problem, it is possible that the complaints of

radio astronomers will be accorded less importance than the concerns of commercial ventures.

Market Considerations-Aside from the technical and regulatory questions plaguing the development of big LEOS, a more fundamental problem has not been adequately addressed. What is

the market for these types of services? Will big

LEOS services be profitable in the long term? A

number of assumptions underlie predictions about

big LEOS services that have not been adequately

analyzed. These assumptions need to be examined in order to assess the market potential for big

LEOS services and the viability of such services

in the long term.

The question of potential market size for

satellite telephony must be put into context—

users do not care how their service iS delivered,

whether by satellite (LEOS or geosynchronous),

cellular, or emerging personal communication

services. Thus, the critical questions are: What is

the market for mobile services? What other

technologies will compete? What portion of the

overall market can LEOS services realistically

expect to capture? Inmarsat, for one, estimates the

worldwide market for satellite mobile phones will

reach 2 million by the year 2000.150 Early

estimates put the dollar value of mobile satellite

services (including both large and small LEOS) at

$1 billion by 1995 rising to $9 billion by 2000.151

However, cutting through the hype of promotional brochures and presentations on big LEOS

services to realistically assess expectations is

difficult. And while initial projections made by

the companies in their original applications would

lead one to believe big LEOS will be serving

millions of users in a few years, a number of

doubts remain, and most analysts question the

market analyses done so far. An examin ation of

the marketing projections filed with the companies’ initial applications reveal a wide range of

market estimates for essentially the same service.

In an ironic twist, the big LEOS proponents

themselves may have limited their potential

revenues by promoting a dual-mode approach. In

systems with dual-mode designs, the user’s portable phone will first search the airwaves for a local

cellular service, and if no such service is found,

the system would then automatically switch to the

satellite system. The problem is that if the phone

finds the local system, as it will most of the time

in the United States, Europe, and many other

developed (and some developing) nations, the

satellite system will not be used, and no revenues

will be generated.

A dual-mode approach (using U.S. handsets)

could also draw the ire of foreign cellular carriers

who may operate on different frequencies than the

United States. When the dual-mode phone attempts to connect to a cellular system in a foreign

country, it may not be capable of operating on the

l@ Stice mdio astronomy facilities are usually loeatai in remote parts of the world, fiteIf~enCefiOm usert~ s is expected to be minimal.

Some proponents have suggested that since radio astronomy receivers are located at well-known positions, the big LEOS systems could use

the position determination capability built into their systems to actually turn off user terminals that get too close to such facilities. Signals from

the satellites, however, represent a much more serious problem as they cannot avoid a particular area.

150 ~fI nmarsat Satellite Telephone Venture Launched, ” Telcom Highlights International, vol. 14, No. 43, Oct. 28, 1992.

151 Dam here was reported in ‘‘Mobile Satellite Communications Market to Pass $1 Billion in 1995, ’ Telcom Highlights Infernationu/, Feb.

6, 1991. Study was conducted by International Resource Development, Inc., and based on the expectation that services would start in 1994 or

earlier,
124 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

local frequencies, and would switch to the satellite system, bypassing the local cellular carrier.

Many types of dual-mode phones may have to be

produced to work in various countries-defeating

one of the purposes of ubiquitous worldwide

coverage.

A similar problem that may decrease the

potential markets for the dual-mode satellite

services is the potentially divided nature of the

future installed base of cellular users. Depending

on which service consumers use, they may be

served by either a CDMA or TDMA cellular

system. This prior use may constrain which

satellite system a user can subscribe to--TDMA

users would have to use Iridium (and only

Iridium) while CDMA users could choose between the other four (if they all survive), but could

not use Iridium. In order to promote maximum

flexibility, users might have to use a tri-mode

phone, which is not (yet) being developed.

Thus, the big LEOS service providers could be

limited to marketing essentially to areas without

cellular service. Current populations may not be

able to support deployment and continuing operation of a $1 to $4 billion LEOS system. Basing

expensive systems on speculative projections

seems optimistic at best, and an invitation to

financial disaster at worst. Compounding the

problem is that there is not one, but potentially six

companies vying to offer these services. Clearly

not all are viable or will survive.

International Markets; A significant part of the

justification for big LEOS services is their ability

to serve the communication needs of countries

with underdeveloped terrestrial communications

systems. This marketing pitch was used to great

advantage at WARC-92 to build support among

the developing countries. However, some observers question whether such benefits will actually

flow to those countries.152 These countries (and

their citizens) do not have substantial financial

resources and the big LEOS equipment and

services are expected to be very expensive

initially. Motorola’s Iridium phone, for example,

is expected to cost $3,000 when introduced,

falling to about $1,500 when mass produced. In

the United States, the average consumer is

relatively affluent, with an average per capita

income (1988 dollars) of $16,444.153 For much of

the rest of the world, however, consumers are not

so well off. The per capita income in the Central

African Republic, for example, is approximately

$376, meaning that the average consumer would

have to work 4 years to buy a phone. Even if

national governments buy the phones, who will

pay for the services? At $3.00/minute it would

take 17 hours of labor just to make a 1 minute

phone call! 154 In any case, these numbers are not

well quantified, and require more analysis before

foreign market potential can be realistically

estimated. 155

Basing projected subscribership and/or revenues on international travelers is also risky. Such

travelers are likely to stay in major cities where

they will have access to local wired infrastructure

as well as local cellular providers (assuming they

have a dual-mode phone capable of working in

the country in which they are traveling)-further

shrinking the potential market for satellite services. If they cannot use the local cellular provider,

they would use the satellite system. However,

local or national cellular providers in foreign

~~z Some more c@cal analysE befieve that in fact, the big LEOS providers have little interest in serving developing counties because tiey

realize that profits will be slim at best. Instead, these analysts believe, the applicants will concentrate their development and marketing activities

in the most industrialized countries. If anything, they believe, users in developed countries will end up subsidizing users in developing countries.

From this perspective, advertising the benefits for developing countries is little more than good public relations and a way to win international

support.

153 per ~apl~ &o~e fiWes provided by: ~k S, Hoffman (~.), The Wor/dA/~~c a~Book OfFucfS: 1992 (hiew York: phms Books,

1991).

j~ Assumin g that the average consumer in the Central African Republic works 40 hours a week 52 weeks a year.

155 Some obsewe~ pr~lct tit rwoveMg any significant revenues fmm tie developing countries may take M long as 10 yMLS.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 125

z r—‘- -:.1 ‘ .

- 

:- ‘-- ‘

--- ‘---— 

~ I ~- -

‘“-’ ‘—” ‘–—

Analog Earth

ce I I u la r satel Ii te

Pcs Di~ita I

—

—

JJ- ..LL ~————.. .—

countries will strongly object to this form of

bypass, unless a revenue sharing plan is in place.

Finally, counting Europe and Japan as potential

markets is risky for two reasons. First, both are

already deploying terrestrial systems that would

directly compete with big LEOS services. Second, licensing big LEOS services in Europe could

be extremely difficult, as demonstrated by CEPT

opposition to U.S. proposals at WARC-92, European countries have serious doubts about allowing mobile satellite services to share with their

existing terrestrial (mobile) services, and will

likely take steps to protect and promote their

systems at the expense of, especially U. S.,

competing satellite-based systems.

Envisioning such global systems without European connections is even more difficult. Such

systems may not be able to survive without access

to European markets. Motorola, for example, has

said that ‘‘we do not see Iridium without European participation,” and, consequently, is busy

trying to convince European governments that

Iridium poses no threat to their existing or

planned systems, including FPLMTS.156 Thus,

talks between EC and U.S. radiocommunication

officials are crucial to the success of U.S. big

LEOS systems.

Domestic Markets: Leaving aside international

markets, even marketing big LEOS services in the

United States could be difficult. As noted above,

mobile phone users will not care how their service

is provided—by satellite, cellular, or PCS—and

the mobile phone market may not be big enough

to support many competing technologies and

companies. Cellular telephony, for example, has

a big head start in coverage and in signing up

customers. Cellular telephone service is available

to over 80 percent of the U.S. population, and

covers approximately 60 percent of the country

(excluding Alaska).157 If big LEOS companies

plan to draw customers away from cellular

companies they may have a difficult time unless

they can show that their service is of better

quality, cheaper, or different than cellular. In the

meantime, the cellular industry will move ahead

with its own improvements. Coverage will improve as more rural cellular systems are built,

roaming between cellular areas will become

easier, and capacity and quality will improve as

digital cellular systems are implemented.158

Inmarsat: The prospect of Inmarsat entering

the market for mobile satellite services presents

its own set of problems for U.S. regulators and

policymakers. Originally, Iridium announced that

it would like to sell satellite capacity to, partner

with, or complement Inmarsat. Inmarsat, however, seems clearly focused on providing its own

156 Comenw of Mike Pellon, quoted in Andrea.s Evagora, ‘‘CEPT: Radio Interference,’ Communications WeekInternational, July 20,1992,

p. 4.

157 miot Hamilton, &onomiSt, &onomic Management Consultants, Inc., personal communication, July N, 1992.

158 M~-aw Cellulti, for exmple, is in tie process of building a nation~de cell~ network ~ough agreements with ]OGd Celhlh OperatOrS

throughout the country.
126 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

system in competition with Iridium.159 This poses

.

a Policy dilemma for the U.S. Government:

should it support Motorola and its $3+ billion

system, or should it side with Inmarsat, in which

the United States holds a major interest through

its signatory, Comsat?

This increasingly bitter battle has reached the

highest levels of the U.S. Government, Motorola

points out, and others agree, that Inmarsat, which

is a consortium primarily funded by governmentowned and/or controlled ‘signatories, ’ could use

its influence and current position as a supplier of

mobile services worldwide, to politically block

out new, private sector competitors.160 Others

believe that the potential entry of Inmarsat into

the MSS business has stifled, and will continue to

depress, investment in private satellite systems,

as investors wait to see what Inmarsat will do.

Even if U.S. systems do begin offering services

before Inmarsat, they believe, Inmarsat may be

able to arrange incentives such as tax breaks that

would give it an unfair global advantage. This

could ultimately result in a (worldwide) monopoly for Inmarsat and high prices and poor quality

for consumers.l6l This is one reason some observers believe it is important to support AMSC—to

provide competition to Inmarsat.

Currently, the FCC is pushing ahead with big

LEOS licensing in order to help U.S. systems

become operational quickly, an important consideration from a marketing perspective. Timely

licensing of U.S. systems could provide them

with an important competitive advantage to offset

the global (political) support that Inmarsat could

muster. This approach could also allow the

United States to avoid having to support one side

over the other. U.S. systems could come into

operation first, and then the United States could

support the entry of Inmarsat into the business as

an enhancement to competition.

Technology Issues-In addition to the questions raised over frequency coordination and

sharing, questions have been raised over some of

the technical details of the individual systems.l62

This section will not analyze the technical feasibility of each system in detail since each proponent continues to refine their technical plans and

make improvements in their original system

design. Instead, it identities broad concerns about

the technical details of the systems-issues that

must be addressed by all proponents to develop a

viable system.

One of the most serious concerns facing big

LEOS operators is the limits WARC-92 placed on

the power these systems can use. Because the systems are not yet operational, questions have been

raised about the power requirements and whether

the satellites will be able to deliver the power needed to effectively provide the proposed services.

Related to the question of power, one of the

more difficult technical problems involves the

ability of the systems to penetrate buildings.l63

159 pa~&Mcr)ou@ I nmarsat director of strategic planning, said that ‘they will be fighting for the same customers.’ Quoted in ‘Special

Report— Satellite Competition Heating up in Europe, Asia, ’ Satellite News, vol. 15, No, 11, MN. 16, 1992, p. 7.

la See, for example, a report prepared for Iridiw Inc. by Nathan Assmiates, kc., “Inmarsat’s Project 21 and U.S. Policy,” June 5, 1992.

161 Ibid.

162 Mime Coqoratiou for e~ple, completed an initial analysis of the technical feasibility of the various LEOS systems based on tick

original applications at the FCC. The report notes numerous instances in which proponents’ claims-about satellite coverage areas, weigh~ and

system communications capabilities cannot be verilled. However, the report also concludes that none of these technical issues seemed

“insurmountable.” Mitre does not expect any of the big LEOS systems to be operating before 2000. W.J. Ciesl@ L.M. Gaffney, and N.D.

Hulkower, et al, ‘‘An Evacuation of Selected Mobile Sateltite Communications Systems and Their Environment, ’ The Mitre Corp., Bedford,

MA, Aprd 1992.

163 ~~ou@ en~eers ~edivid~ on ~s problem, an~~rof is~es ~trq~e ~erresearchremain to be resolved. One issue involved

is where the testing should actually be conducted. Circular orbital paths converge as they approach the North and South Poles. This means that

the satellites in those orbits will be closer together, meaning that a satellite is more likely to be closer to the user and more able to give a good

signal. If testing is conducted in these areas, as opposed to around the equator, results will likely be too positive. Relying on tests conducted

only in the United States or Europe will lead to false assumptions about service availability and quality in other parts of the world.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 127

Unlike cellular telephony, which is terrestriallybased and has radio waves that travel along the

ground, satellites, which will be flying high above

the ground, may not have suitable angles for

penetration into buildings. Because of the frequencies involved, a clear line-of-sight may be

needed to the satellite, requiring users to either go

outside or stand at a window. The problem is

compounded by the nature of LEOS themselves;

they are not stationary with respect to the

Earth-the line-of-sight will change as the satellite passes through its orbit. Furthermore, as the

satellites travel in their orbits toward the equator,

they will spread out; i.e., some areas will be

further from the satellite than those directly

beneath its orbital path.l64 See figure 2-8, for

example. In those far away cases, direct line-ofsight to the satellite may be a necessity for any

communication. More testing is needed.

Yet another issue, although not strictly technical, is that of replacement satellites. The 5-year

lifespan of the LEO satellites is relatively short

compared with the 15-year lifespan of most

geosynchronous satellites, That means that replacement satellites will have to be built and

launched continuously as long as the system

operates. The often-overlooked ongoing nature of

these enterprises raises two major concerns. First,

the costs of the systems as addressed in their

applications are merely the initial costs of bringing the system into operation. The companies

operating these systems will also incur substantial

recurring costs of maintaining the system—

building and launching new satellites.

Second, the ability of the system to operate

continuously will depend on a continuing supply

of new satellites. If, for any reason, the satellites

cannot be built, cannot be launched, or fail in

orbit, the system’s reliability and integrity will be

jeopardized. Some analysts have suggested that to

meet such launch requirements, a very high

launch reliability will be necessary, a level that is

presently above current averages. Given the

nature of some of the (emergency) services

expected to be provided by these systems, such a

level of risk will require careful monitoring by

government agencies to ensure continued system

reliability and quality.

Iridium, because of its complexity, poses

several unique technical questions. Some analysts

cite a number of technical factors that lead them

to believe that Iridium probably will not be viable

in the near term. For example, Iridium’s plans call

for satellites to communicate not only with users

and gateways on the ground, but to transfer calls

between satellites. This additional feature increases the complexity and weight of the system,

and introduces unique technical challenges for

Motorola that do not concern the other proponents. First, the satellites are much more complex

and difficult (and costly) to build-they will be

essentially switching centers in the sky.l65 Second, the software to control the complex switching (intersatellite links) envisioned in Iridium is

a major development challenge.

All the applicants for big LEOS systems will be

retuning and improving their system and satellite

designs until formal rules are adopted and licenses granted by the FCC. With the recent

changes in its system design, Motorola officials

hope to refocus attention on the promise of the

system rather than its past troubles. Changes in

the system do not necessarily indicate fundamental weaknesses in the technology as much as

continual improvements in the system design.

As a result of the above concerns, investment

financing for big LEOS companies has been very

hard to generate.

166 The worldwide economic

downturn, combined with the regulatory, technical, and market uncertainties associated with the

164 BWau~e of its ~lllptical orbit, Ellipsat has a dfiferent set of conce~ about tie positioning Of itS SatelhteS.

165 me Sate111te5 of ~e o~er system fiction essenti~ly ~ a “~nt Pipe’ ‘--merely ~laying si@stiat are sent from tie ~o~d. They wdl

encompass few, if any, switching functions.

166< ‘On he Trail of hves[ors: LEOS Face Financial World’s Skeptics, Satellite News, vol. 15, No. 37, Sept. 14, 1992.
128 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

systems has reportedly made them a ‘‘hard sell”

to the world’s financial community. Time will

eventually bring an economic recovery, and time

could be used to improve the systems and

services, but time is also the enemy of emerging

systems. Existing (cellular) systems are expanding their coverage and improving their services at

a rapid rate, and other new mobile technologies

are also waiting in the regulatory wings.

OTHER U.S. ALLOCATION PROPOSALS

TO WARC-92

I Broadcasting-Satellite Service-HDTV

BACKGROUND

High-definition television refers to the next

generation of television service that will have

high resolution (nearly twice that of conventional

television), better color, a wider screen, and

compact disc-quality digital sound. It has been

under intensive development in the United States,

Japan, and Europe for several years.

167 Orig i

nally, HDTV developers planned to use an analog

transmission format similar to that used by

today’s television sets. However, the superior

picture and sound quality of HDTV would require

much more bandwidth (and spectrum) to transmit

the HDTV signal. Because these analog HDTV

signals were expected to occupy so much spectrum, they would not fit into the channels that had

previously been defined and planned for satellite

television broadcasting in the 11.7-12.75 GHz

band. As a result, new international allocations

for satellite-delivered HDTV were believed to be

necessary. The 1988 WARC on the Use of the

Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the Planning of

Space Services Utilizing It (ORB-88) attempted

to allocate frequencies for these new wide-band

television services, but no agreement was reached

and the debate was carried over to WARC-92.

A desire to promote the development of one

worldwide HDTV standard was one of the

original forces pushing a worldwide allocation for

BSS-HDTV. As countries developed different

systems, however, and made choices about how

HDTV would be delivered, standards began to

diverge. Thus, at WARC-92 the rationale for a

worldwide allocation, while still powerful, had

lost some of its urgency.

U.S. PROPOSAL

The U.S. proposal for BSS-HDTV had two

main components. First, the United States proposed that the existing allocations and associated

plans for satellite television broadcasting around

12 GHz could serve as the basis for worldwide

HDTV allocations.l68 This proposal was based on

the expectation, discussed below, that developments in digital compression would allow HDTV

signals to fit into the existing allocation plans.

However, in order to accommodate future growth

of the service and specific HDTV station assignments that could not be made according to those

16? HDTV WaS ori@nally Conceivedmore than 20 Years ago, but only recently have advances inrnicroelectronics ~d digital Si@prOCeSshg

brought the technology close to commercial applications, For discussion of the historical, technical, and economic implications of HDTV, see

U.S. Congress, Office of lkchnology Assessment, The Big Picture: HDTV and High-Resolution Systems, O’IA-BP-CIT-64 (Washingto~ DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1990).

16s ~ tie ewly 1980S, a sepmate (from HDTV) trend was developing that would directly affect the U.S. WmC-92 proposal. Witi adv~ces

in satellite technology and the shrinking of consum er electronics, entrepreneurs began to develop satellite systems they hoped would bring many

channels of television progr amrning directly into consumers homes via small (18 inches) receiving dishes. These services were dubbed

DBS-direct broadcast satellite. In order to accommodate these new satellite services, the countries in Region 2 (essentially the Western

Hemisphere) agreed in 1983 to allocate frequencies (12.2 -12.7 GHz) and developed a plan to implement DBS services. These allocations W=

formally adopted by the ITU at the 1985 WARC on the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing

It (ORB-85), Genev% 1985. This conference also allocated spectrum to satellite broadcasting services in 11,7 -12.5 GHz in Region 1 md

12.2-12.5 GHz in Region 3. Thus, no common worldwide allocation was achieved. Although no DBS systems are yet operating in this country

(Europe hm operating DBS systems), several companies continue to pursue the idea of delivering television programming by satellite (see

below).
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology

plans, the United States also proposed to allocate

the 24.65-25.25 GHz band for use by HDTV

satellite broadcasting.

RESULTS

The U.S. proposals did not generate adequate

support, and the United States eventually changed

its position in order to support a common Region

2 allocation. In fact, WARC-92 delegates were

unable to agree to a single worldwide allocation.

Instead, the conference adopted two separate

allocations, one (17.3 -17.8 GHz) for Region 2,

including the United States, and another (21.4-

22.0 GHz) for the rest of the world. These

allocations cannot come into effect until April 1,

2007. In addition to the allocations for BSSHDTV, allocations were made for frequencies to

support BSS-HDTV systems. 169 WARC-92 also

adopted Resolution 524, which calls for a future

conference to consider modernizing the existing

satellite broadcasting plans (originally set out in

1977) for Regions 1 and 3 in order to better

accommodate digital HDTV technology.

DISCUSSION

HDTV was not one of the highest-priority

concerns for the United States at WARC-92. In

fact, the U.S. proposal for using the 12 GHz bands

for HDTV was less a proposal than a position—it

required no new allocations or regulatory changes.’ 70

Several factors underlie the U.S. position. First,

there is little tradition of satellite delivery of

television programming in the United States.

Despite the 3 million backyard satellite dishes

owned by American consumers, direct broadcast129

ing by satellite (DBS) has not yet taken hold in

this country. There are currently no DBS services

in the United States, and the first is not expected

to be operational until late 1993. Europe and

Japan, by contrast, have operated DBS services in

their countries for several years, and see HDTV as

a natural extension to those systems. Japan, in

addition, has been operating a satellite HDTV

channel on a limited basis for several years. In the

United States, by contrast, the primary focus for

HDTV delivery has been on terrestrial broadcasting solutions—in large part a response to the

historical importance and power of American

broadcasters.171 In addition, the U.S. position was

based on the belief in this country that advances

in digital signal processing would allow HDTV

signals to be transmitted in the narrow channels

that had previously been defined in the 12 GHz

plans, thereby eliminating the need for extensive

new allocations. This belief, in turn, was based on

the continuing development of digital HDTV

systems in the United States.172 U.S. engineers

expect these systems, which take advantage of

advanced compression techniques, to be able to

transmit full HDTV-quality programming in the

24 MHz television channels that are now used for

conventional television broadcasting.

Engineers in other countries and the CCIR

report on the technical bases for WARC-92 were

less optimistic about the prospects of digital

compression and of fitting all HDTV channels

into existing plans, and the United States had a

difficult time convincing other countries that such

technologies could actually produce the high

level of quality they believe HDTV viewers will

169 ~ese f ‘f~der N’ Operatiom were allocated frequencies at 18.1 -18.4 GHz (footnote 870A), 24.75-25.25 GHz (the orig~ U.S.

proposal for BSS-HDTV, footnote 882Z), and 27.5-30.0 GHz (footnote 882 W).

170 Tacit rew~tion ~d accep~ce were @ven t. use of tie exisfig p~ in Resolution 524, h which JVARC-92 delegates cded for a

reworking of existing plans in Regions 1 and 3 to better utilize modern HDTV technology.

171 ~sis ~oversfipMiUtion. ~edelivewof DTV si@s t. thehomecom~erhas &enanintense s~ggle&Weenlocal broadcasters,

cable companies, and DBS service proponents. Each is actively testing HDTV transmission systems, and the FCC is expected to define a

standard for HDTV sometime in 1994.

172 ~g~lly, M of the propos~s for U.S. system were analog. The Conversion to digital kg~ with the ~o~~ment bY ‘en=d

Instruments that they would develop an alldigitat HDTV system. All the other remaining proponents quickly followed suit, with the exception

of Japan’s Muse systerni which eventually withdrew its system from consideration.
130 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

demand. 173 As a result, the primary focus of the

HDTV debate at WARC-92 centered on where to

put the additional bands that countries perceived

would be needed for HDTV service.

There were initially three proposals for new

HDTV frequencies. The United States, supported

initially by Japan, proposed to allocate the

24,65-25.25 GHz band to BSS-HDTV. Many of

the countries in Region 2 supported an allocation

at 17.3 -17.8 GHz, and CEPT, supported by

Australia and the Russian Federation, proposed

an allocation at 21.4 -22.0 GHz.

Each of the various proposals had specific

advantages and drawbacks. The U.S. proposal

was unsuccessful largely because other countries

believed that the extremely high frequencies

proposed by the United States would take more

power to deliver and consequently systems would

cost more to build and operate.

174 Despite U.S.

technical papers showing that the costs of these

systems would not be substantially higher than

those that would operate in the other proposed

bands, by the third week of the conference, the

U.S. position had garnered little support internationally, and U.S. delegation leaders decided to

pursue an alliance with other Region 2 countries,

who advocated BSS-HDTV allocations in the

17.3 -17.8 GHz band. The 17.3 -17.8 GHz proposal suffered primarily from its impacts on

existing services and on plans to use the band in

support of other services in Regions 1 and 3. The

21.4-22.0 GHz proposal, by contrast, enjoyed

substantial international support-CEPT was able

to line up as many as 55 countries to support its

proposal-but was unacceptable to the United

States because those frequencies are used in this

country for microwave telephone links. U.S. and

other delegates from Region 2 were successful in

preventing the 21.4-22.0 GHz band from being

allocated to BSS-HDTV in the region. If that had

happened, many U.S. microwave communication

users would have been forced to relocate to other

bands, costing the industry a great deal of money

and causing disruptions in domestic point-topoint communications.

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

WARC-92 established relatively long lead

times (the year 2007) before BSS-HDTV could be

implemented in order to allow existing users of

the band adequate time to shift their operations to

other bands, but perhaps more importantly to

allow the technology to more fully develop. A

long lead time will allow standards to be developed for HDTV transmission around the world,

and will allow engineers and spectrum managers

to become more familiar with the operational

characteristics of satellite HDTV systems only

now being designed. Long lead times are not

expected to constrain new HDTV services, since

existing BSS bands will likely be used at frost, and

it will be some time before demand for HDTV

will require the additional spectrum.

Satellite-delivered HDTV services in the United

States are expected, at least initially, to be

provided using the frequencies outlined in the

existing 12 GHz plans for DBS. As a result, the

future of satellite HDTV is closely tied to the

relative success or failure of current DBS efforts.

If the systems now being planned to deliver

(standard analog) television programmin g directly to home consumers from satellites do not

come to fruition, or if the services fail to attract a

sufficient number of subscribers, future plans to

deliver HDTV programming by satellite may be

reevaluated.

173 ~temtio~ ~l~m~cation Ufion, ~te~tio~ ~dio co~~~tive Committee, CCIR Report: Technical and Operational Bases

for the World Administrative Radio Conference 1992 (W~C-92), March 1991, p. 7-1.

174 ~tereS@ly, Some of the E~ope~ ~~tries reporte~y ~dori@y w~ted to propse these .$~efrequencies, However, @Us~ Of

a compromise agreed to in the CEP’L they decided to support allocations in the 21.4-22.0 GHz band instead. So, despite sympathy for the U.S.

positiom CEPT unity prevailed on this issue.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for US. Radio Technology I 131

On the other hand, if DBS services “take off,”

the delivery of HDTV by satellite becomes much

more likely. Hughes Communications’ DBS system, DirecTv, for example, is moving ahead with

its plans to deliver television direct to homes.175

The system is expected to begin delivery by early

1994, and will use two satellites to carry up to 150

channels of programming on 32 transponders.176

Its first satellite is scheduled to launch in December 1993, and co-owner United States Satellite

Broadcasting (Hubbard Broadcasting) has already purchased 5 of the satellite’s 16 transponders, with 5 more dedicated to cable programming

for rural areas. The remaining 6 transponders will

be used by Hughes for DirecTv entertainment

programming. 177 Depending on the success of

these services, other providers may decide to

enter the DBS/HDTV arena.178 If DBS and initial

HDTV services are successful, it is likely that the

additional frequencies allocated by WARC-92 for

BSS-HDTV will be used to accommodate (new)

providers that cannot be accommodated in the

lower bands.179

However, even if DBS does not succeed and

direct-to-home HDTV satellite services never

come into operation, viewers may still have the

opportunity to get such services. Satellites will

continue to carry video traffic for the major

broadcast and cable networks, and consumers

who wish to purchase their own ‘‘backyard

dishes” (and any descramblers needed) will be

able to receive HDTV services just as they receive

television service today.

It is too soon to tell how successful DBS and

any future HDTV services will be. Some analysts

are still skeptical that DBS services (HDTV or

not) will be able to compete against the existing

cable television industry. The DBS industry has

been trying to get off the ground (figuratively and

literally) for more than a decade now, and DBS

efforts in the early and mid- 1980s ended in

failure. The success of DBS and, in the longer

term, satellite-delivered HDTV, will depend in

part on the strength of competition from other

video delivery systems in this country--cable,

local broadcasters, multichannel multipoint distribution service (often known as “wireless

cable”), and perhaps new fiber-to-the-home systems supplied by the telephone companies. With

so many choices available to consumers, DBS

and HDTV systems may have difficulty gaining

enough customers to be viable.

In some cases, these technologies/systems are

already gearing up to provide HDTV services.

Cable systems, for example, have been aggressively laying fiber optic cables in order to increase

their capacities—an increase that could be used to

carry HDTV programming. Satellites will, however, have some advantages in the transition from

regular television to HDTV. Compared with local

broadcasters, there will be far fewer equipment

changes in one or two satellites compared with

hundreds of local broadcasting stations.

The regional, as opposed to global, allocations

agreed to by WARC-92 are not expected to

convey any relative advantages or disadvantages

175 Hughes recently signed a $250 million-d~ with the National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative (NRTC), fo~ed in 1986 by ~al

telephone and electric companies, who will retait the DireeTv progr amming and sell/lease the receiving equipment. The target market is the

12 million households served by NRTC members.

176 ‘‘IS DkecTv Coming Alive at Last?’ Te[com Highlights International, May 6, 1992.

’77 Debra Polsky, ‘‘Hughes DirecTv Deal to Bring Satellite Service to Rural Areas, Space News, vol. 3, No. 16, April 27-May 3, 1992, p,

4.

178 ~cre Me n. 1icem~g Iestfictiom mat would prevent DBS provide~ from offering HDTV programming.

179 It could tie Until 2007 for ~ls size de-d to bc built, so tie lead tie a~eed to at WARC-92 may not be w that limiting.
132 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

in terms of global competitiveness.l80 In fact, the

regional allocations of WARC-92 may serve to

confirm and reinforce the trend toward divergent

HDTV standards already being developed around

the world. Originally, international spectrum

managers hoped that the establishment of a single

worldwide spectrum allocation for HDTV would

facilitate the global deployment of HDTV and

promote the development of one international

standard for the production and transmission of

HDTV programming. The establishment of a

single standard, in turn, would have reduced the

potential for interference between systems, and

would mean that only one type of HDTV equipment would have to be manufactured, and no

complicated conversion would be needed to show

HDTV programming in different parts of the

world.181 However, technological developments

in various countries and different choices on how

to deliver HDTV programming to consumers

have made it almost a certainty that standards will

again be divided, making the establishment of a

single BSS-HDTV frequency band less important.

1 Terrestrial Aeronautical Public

Correspondence

BACKGROUND

Aeronautical public correspondence (APC)

services allow airline passengers to place telephone calls while in flight (phone calls cannot yet

be received by passengers). The systems use

transmitters in aircraft to communicate with

receiving stations at various locations on the

ground. These ground stations then relay the

telephone calls through the public telephone

network to their final destination.

APC services were frost proposed on a global

basis at the 1987 Mobile WARC (MOB-87). That

WARC allocated frequencies in the 1.5-1.6 GHz

band for APC experiments. However, in the

United States and many other countries, these

frequencies are heavily used for other services

and could not be used for APC. As a result, the

United States decided to operate APC services in

the 849-851 MHz and 894-896 MHz bands. A

number of companies in the United States currently provide such services, and several other

countries, including Canada and Mexico, use

these frequencies as well. The North American

system is fully operational, and hundreds of

aircraft have been equipped with equipment using

these frequencies.

U.S. PROPOSAL

The United States proposed that the 849-851

MHz (ground-to-air) and 894-896 (air-to-ground)

MHz bands be allocated for APC use on a

worldwide basis. This proposal was based on the

extensive use of these frequencies for APC in

North America.

RESULTS

The U.S. proposal was not adopted, but the

United States was successful in protecting its

existing APC system. A primary worldwide

allocation was made to APC at 1670-1675 MHz

for transmissions from ground stations and in

1800-1805 MHz for transmissions from aircraft to

the ground. The United States, along with Canada

and Mexico, inserted footnote 700A specifying

that they would continue to provide APC in the

849-851 MHz and 894-896 MHz bands.

180 L&ewl~e, ~yc~~petitive~dv~~~~ hat wo~d normally convey to he comp~y orco~~ tit develops a smdard f~s~ haS tdSO &n

lost. The world has already been effectively divided into three standards areas by policy decisions in the United States, Japan, and Europe, that

each would have their own standard. Thus, the markets have already been predefine to a targe extent, and the competitive race now has shifted

to individual companies within regions, or in the case of the United States, a country.

181 Television progr arnming is currently produced and transmitted in one of three incompatible formats: NationaI lklevision Standards

Committee (NTSC), Phase Alternation Line (PAL), and Systeme Electronique Couleur avec Memoire (SECAM), each of which are used by

different groups of countries. The U.S. standard is NTSC.
Chapter 2--Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 133

DISCUSSION

The APC debate again pitted the United States

against the CEPT countries, which proposed that

the 1670-1675 MHz and 1800-1805 MHz bands

be allocated for APC service worldwide. The

choices facing WARC-92 delegates on this issue

were clear-support either the United States or

Europe. No other bands were seriously considered. Although there was important support for

the U.S. position in Region 2—the Western

Hemisphere--other countries around the world

did not back the United States, and the U.S.

proposal was ultimately rejected. The CEPT

countries were again able to muster strong internal and external support, and were uncompromising. Their strong position made the U.S. proposal

difficult for other countries to accept.

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

As a result of the two sets of frequencies

allocated by WARC-92, aircraft may have to

carry two different kinds of equipment to provide

APC services in different parts of the world.

Alternatively, aircraft may have to be outfitted

with new transceivers that operate in both bands

and that presumably would be more expensive.

This issue could be revisited at a future world

radiocommunication conference if a dual system

proves technically unworkable or economically

undesirable.

In the long term, terrestrial APC systems may

be augmented or even superseded by satellite

technology. For example, Comsat, GTE Airfone,

and Northwest Airlines have successfully demonstrated a satellite-based communications system

for both cockpit and cabin telecommunications

services. 182 The system, linked through Inmarsat

satellites and Comsat’s Earth stations, will provide global telephone and other communications

services when aircraft are out of range of GTE’s

terrestrial network.

For the United States, the WARC-92 APC

allocation could undermine the U.S. advantage in

terrestrially-based airline communication systems. The United States is currently the world

leader in developing APC services and providing

communications services for airline passengers.

Japan has focused its efforts on delivering such

services via (Inmarsat) satellite. Until now, Europe has been unable to match the systems

operating in North America because common

frequencies to carry such services did not exist.183

The WARC-92 decision essentially levels the

APC playing field-erasing the previous U.S.

advantage and starting development of and competition for such systems and services back at

square one. The decision clearly benefits European APC interests by allowing them to “catch

up” to American developers.

The longer-term implications of the decision

are unclear. U.S. manufacturers of APC equipment will either be shut out of world markets

altogether, or will have to retune production lines

to manufacture radios compatible with the new

world frequencies. This could mean producing to

two different frequencies and sets of standards.lw

U.S. equipment makers will have to work hard to

maintain their technical and market lead in APC

in the face of divided markets and production

inefficiencies.

I Fixed-Satellite Service at 14.5-14.8 GHz

BACKGROUND

Fixed-satellite service (FSS) refers to communications systems that use satellites to link

182 ‘‘CCJIMSAT, GTE &fOne and Nofiw@ Airlines Successfully Test satellite ComKUuniatiODS, ” TelcomHighlights International, April

29, 1992, p. 17.

183 ‘ ‘The Executive OffIce Arrives on Airliners, ’ Telcom Highlights International, vol. 14, No. 20L21, May 20, 1992, p. 23.

184 A ~~ ~~r=omendationprowse~ ~tonly hose phones tit~mplywi~Eq~~~~omm~catio~Smtidshl,?dhlk@’rsI)

standards be allowed to operate in Europe. Evagora, op. cit., footnote 156.
134 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Figure 2-1 l-Data Relay Satellite System

—

Data relay

satellite

*

~~•

P

\

Newer satellites

requlrlng high rate

$

data transmission

use 14/1 5 GHz

space research

\

allocations

Low dat;

rate satellite s

use 2 GHz

Data to Earth and

\

space researc h

satelhte controls use allocations

14/1 5 GHz space

research allocahons

// ..7+

LEO satellite

I

Emergency satelllte

control uses 2 GHz

~. space research allocations

Y’

Earth

White Sands ground termmal

—.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1993.

stationary (fixed) satellite antennas on Earth.185

The FSS is used around the world to provide

long-distance communications links for telephone conversations, data files, and video programming. Currently, international use of the

14.5 -14.8 MHz band is limited to transmission of

video programming for BSS, and is used extensively by Intelsat. In the United States, however,

these frequencies are allocated solely for government use, and are used primarily to support

Department of Defense operations. NASA also

uses the band (on a secondary basis) to support its

Tracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS),

which relay data from remote sensing satellites to

Earth (see figure 2-11). WARC-92 considered

reallocating these frequencies in order to correct

shortages in the amount of spectrum available for

FSS uplinks relative to downlinks. The shortage

was 500 MHz in Region 2 and 250 MHz in

Regions 1 and 3.

U.S. PROPOSAL

Because of existing uses in the band 14.5 -14.8

GHz, the United States strongly opposed reallocating these frequencies for FSS. The United

States said it would not agree to any licensing of

freed-satellite operations in the band, nor to

protect such operations from interference from

other users. As a result, the United States proposed that the allocation at 14.5 -14,8 GHz remain

unchanged.

RESULTS

The United States was successful in preventing

WARC-92 from reallocating the band. Instead,

the conference allocated 250 MHz to FSS uplinks

at 13.75 -14.0 GHz. The allocation is coprimary

with radiolocation services, and standard frequency and time signal-satellite and space research services are secondary. Two footnotes

were added to the allocation. Footnote 855A

specifies power levels and antenna sizes for Earth

stations, and footnote 855B lays out a phase-in

schedule for making FSS primary in the band. In

addition, WARC-92 adopted Resolution 112,

which calls on the CCIR to conduct sharing

studies between FSS and the existing services in

the band, and evaluate the impact of the FSS on

these other services.

DISCUSSION

The U.S. Government had put an absolute

block on these frequencies in order to protect

Department of Defense systems supporting national security interests. Intelsat, with the backing

of many developing countries, strongly supported

the reallocation, while some European countries

sided with the United States in opposition.

185 ~ese Sateui(e antennas are the large dishes famik to most people.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for US. Radio Technology I 135

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

The FSS allocation at 13.75-14.00 GHz has

mixed implications for the United States. On the

positive side, government operations at 14.5 -14.8

GHz were successfully protected. On the other

hand, the United States must now share 250 (out

of 600) MHz of spectrum that had been devoted

to active sensors, such as radar altimeters. The

impacts of this sharing on the existing services in

the band, especially the space services, are not

known, and will be studied as noted above. Some

protections are given to the existing services in

the footnotes adopted by WARC-92. The United

States may revisit this issue at a future conference

in order to allocate additional frequencies for

sensor applications or further protect existing

services.

I Space Services

SPACE RESEARCH AND OPERATIONS SERVICES

BELOW 2 GHz

Background —The need for communications

to support space activities by the nations of the

world has grown significantly in recent years.

Radio frequencies are used in space to communicate with manned spacecraft, to command and

control satellites, to relay data from remote

sensing satellites to Earth, and to communicate

with astronauts working outside their spacecraft.

The United States, for example, uses these

frequencies during shuttle missions, for support

of the Hubble Space Telescope, and may need

them for future operations of Space Station

Freedom.

The frequencies allocated to these communications and support services, like frequencies in

many other bands, have grown increasingly

congested over the years.186 The 2 GHz bands,

which were used for both the Apollo and Soyuz

space missions, are becoming especially prone to

interference because of their favorable transmission characteristics and high reliability. In 1979,

there were just over 70 assignments for space uses

of these frequencies. By 1992, this number had

risen to over 300 assignments around the world. 187

The most recent and dramatic example of the

congestion now plaguing space communications

was demonstrated during the rescue of the Intelsat

VI satellite by U.S. shuttle astronauts—

interference was evident in conversations between the astronauts and their colleagues in the

shuttle and on the ground.

U.S. Proposals-The United States had several proposals for Space Research and Space

Operations Services in the 400-420 MHz and 2

GHz bands. In the band 400.15-401 MHz, the

United States proposed that a footnote be added

to the Space Research Service specifically allow

space-to-space communication between manned

vehicles in space-in support of docking maneuvers, for example. In the band 410-420 MHz, the

United States proposed to add a coprimary

allocation for the Space Research Service to allow

communications in support of extra-vehicular

activities (EVA)—work performed by astronauts

while they are outside their spacecraft. These

activities include such things as maintenance on

both the shuttle and Space Station Freedom and

future satellite rescues.

The United States proposed to upgrade allocations to the space services to primary status in

various frequencies between 2025 and 2290

MHz. Previously, these bands had only been

allocated to the space services through footnotes

(747, 748, 750), and were subject to difficult

coordination requirements under Article 14 of the

international Radio Regulations. The proposed

186 w~c_fj~_gg, for ~=ple, ~ot~ fi Reco~en&tion 716 fie incr~sing use of ~ese bands by tie space research ~d space operation

services, leading to increased coordination difficulties. Recommendation 716 further notes that this congestion may slow the development of

such services. Both W= C-ORB-88 and WUC MOB-87 requested that a conference be convened to address these issues.

187 Ro&fl Taylor, spe~~ -gement speci~l~t, National Aeronautics ad Space Adminis@atioL persoti communicatio~ July 10,

1992.
136 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy implications

upgraded allocations (which would eliminate

Article 14 coordination requirements) included188:

2025-2110 MHz to space research, space

operation, and Earth exploration-satellite

(uplink and space-to-space) services;

2110-2120 MHz to space research service

(uplink for deep space activities-defined as

distances greater than 2 million kilometers

from the Earth); and

2200-2290 MHz to space research, space

operation, and Earth exploration-satellite

(downlinks and space-to-space) services.

Results-U.S. proposals were generally successful. In the band 400.15-401 MHz, the requested footnote was added to the primary space

research allocation enabling these frequencies to

be used for space-to-space communications. These

frequencies will be shared among a number of

services, including downlinks for little LEOS

services. Spectrum was also allocated to the

Space Research Service at 410-420 MHz, but on

a secondary basis. It is likely that the United

States will seek to have this allocation upgraded

at a future conference, once interference and

sharing concerns with terrestrial users are resolved.

In the 2 GHz bands, all U.S. proposals were

accepted by the conference. However, a footnote

was added to the bands 2025-2110 MHz and

2200-2290 MHz to protect communications between geostationary and non-geostationary satellites. WARC-92 also adopted Resolution 211,

which calls for additional study of sharing between the space services and mobile services (see

below) and Resolution 710, which calls for a

future conference to consider upgrading the status

of the Meteorological-Satellite and Earth ExplorationSatellite Services (401-403 MHz) to coprimary

status.

Discussion and Implications-In years past,

some ITU members had opposed the upgrading of

the space services, primarily because of the

possible interference they could cause to existing

freed and mobile systems. Observers note several

reasons for the change at WARC-92. First, the

space services had been operating in these bands

under their footnote allocations for many years.

Experience had shown that sharing with the freed

and mobile services could be accomplished, at

least for some mobile services (see below).

Second, the various space agencies of the world

had been working on these issues before the

agenda for WARC-92 was even set, and had

already reached a tacit agreement in the Space

Frequency Coordination Group (SFCG), composed of space agencies from around the world.

That agreement was translated back to member

governments and was used to build support for

U.S. space proposals at WARC-92. As a result, a

high degree of coordination and cooperation

existed between SFCG members prior to WARC92, making the negotiations for space services

allocations at the conference relatively easy.

Interestingly, CEPT was an important element of

this process, since Germany, France, and the

European Space Agency are all members of the

SFCG.189 The successful negotiation and resolution of the space issues serves as a counterpoint to

the difficulties the United States had with the

CEPT bloc in other areas, and indicates that the

United States and Europe may be able to work

together in the future.

Sharing between mobile services and the newly

upgraded space services will be a subject of

continuing study and experience. Sharing difficulties may limit the number and/or kinds of

mobile services that can operate in the bands.

Proponents of the mobile services point out that

sharing has been demonstrated over time. However, this sharing has generally only been with

168 WI ~ese Wocations wollld be on a coprimaxy basis and would share with terrestrial freed and mobile WVkes.

IS9 ~of Novem& 1992, he membem of the SF(2G included: Argentin~ Aust.dh, Austi, Bel@W Brazil, c~~, c~~ EufoP~

Space Agency, France, Germany, Indi4 Italy, Japq Netherlands, Russia, SpaiLL Swedeq United Kingdon and the United States.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 137

“low-density mobile systems, ” such as electronic newsgathering (ENG) services. Resolution

211 notes that the introduction of conventional

landmobile systems, such as cellular/PCS/FPLMTStype services, would cause “unacceptable interference to the space services,” and calls for the

CCIR to continue its studies of protection for the

space services from mobile services.l90 It also

suggests that future limits on mobile systems may

be needed to permit the services to continue to

share the bands. This would clearly constrain the

types of mobile services that could use the band,

Until the CCIR finishes its studies, the resolution

recommends that only “low-density mobile systems,” be permitted-no conventional land mobile services such as cellular phone service or

PCS/FPLMTS.191 Resolution 211 also calls for a

future conference to define the conditions for

sharing between mobile and space services.

U.S. space service proponents won what they

perceive to be an important battle against the

increasing number of mobile services in the 1-3

GHz band. With their new status, and the new

limits proposed in Resolution 211, the space

services seem well-positioned to continue and

expand their use of these 2 GHz bands. The limits

proposed on mobile services, on the other hand,

should not greatly affect future U.S. interests

since the FCC’s emerging technologies proceeding does not include these bands. The impacts are

likely to be greater in Europe, with their increasing push for terrestrial mobile systems (although

this will not affect FPLMTS, since it is not

identified for use in 2025-2110 MHz or 2200-

2290 MHz). The new allocations may also help to

solidify the status ENG operators, of which the

United States has many, since they apparently can

share with the space services, and future competition from other mobile systems will be limited.

SPACE SERVICES ABOVE 20 GHz

Background—As the bands around 2 GHz

become increasingly crowded, space operations

and services have had to look for additional

spectrum at higher frequencies. Congestion in the

2 GHz bands is exacerbated by the everincreasing bandwidth requirements of NASA’s

space operations, especially data collection from

remote sensing satellites. For example, although

NASA currently uses the 14 GHz bands for data

relays, it is already considering higher bands

(around 23/26 GHz) to serve future generations of

satellites.

U.S. Proposals and Results--The United

States had a number of proposals regarding

various satellite-related and space services above

20 GHz. These are summarized below.

Inter-Satellite Links: The United States proposed to allocate the 21.7-22 GHz band to support

links between satellites of the various mobile

satellite services. These frequencies, for example,

could be used to provide communications between satellites as envisioned in Motorola’s

Iridium system. The United States also proposed

a primary allocation in the 25.25-27.50 GHz band

for wideband space-to-space links to support

space research and Earth exploration-satellite

applications. These links would be used to

transmit data, including high-resolution video,

from low orbiting spacecraft such as the United

States space shuttle or Space Station Freedom to

geostationary data relay satellites, including the

U.S. TDRS.192 The existing intersatellite service

allocation would be used for TDRS-to-user links

in the 22.55-23.55 GHz band based on the

availability of bandwidth and the feasibility of

I$Q IT(J, FiM/ Acts, Resolution COM4L2, op. cit., footnote 27, p. 81.

191 KS ad ~L~S, however, are not ~rrently proposed for use in these bands.

192 Fou ~RS systems me now being develop~.by me United S@tes, tie E~ope~ Space Agency, Jap~ and tie co~onwealt.h Of

Independent States. The United States system is the only one operational at this time, serving approximately 100 satellites.
138 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

sharing, See figure 2-11.193 In addition, these

wideband space-to-space links could be used to

provide communications between Space Station

Freedom and a variety of space vehicles flying

near it.194

The U.S. proposal for 21.7 -22.0 GHz was not

accepted. However, an equivalent amount of

spectrum (300 MHz) was allocated at 24.45-

24.75 GHz for intersatellite service. For the

wideband satellite links at 22.55-23.00, the BSS

allocation was deleted to make more room for

future intersatellite links. The U.S. proposal for a

primary allocation at 25.25-27.50 GHz was accepted.

Space Research Service Requirements: To

support domestic and international space research

efforts, the United States proposed two new

allocations. The first proposal was for coprimary

allocations at 37-38 GHz (downlink) that would

support space research activities such as Very

Long Baseline Interferometry (VLBI) by satellite,195 which requires wide bandwidths to send

data. In addition, the 37-37.5 GHz (downlink)

would also be used in conjunction with 39.5 -40.5

GHz (uplink) to provide communications with a

planned station on the Moon and the mission to

Mars in the 21st century. Because of the intense

use of data communication these efforts will

require, wideband radio links will be needed.

There are no frequency bands allocated in the

Radio Regulations that could be used for wide

bandwidth links between the Earth and the Moon

and between the Earth and Mars. Use of the same

band for both sets of links is desirable because it

would permit use of common equipment, ..196

The United States also proposed a worldwide

upgrade for the Space Research Service (for deep

space research-such as the Voyager and Viking

interplanetary missions) to coprimary status at

31.8 -32.3 GHz (downlink) and 34.2-34.7 (uplink)

to support increasing space activities in these

bands. Currently, these bands are allocated to the

Space Research Service worldwide, but only on a

secondary basis, and not for deep space research.

The United States, however, and 10 other countries had different allocations.197 This disparity

created a situation that the United States believed

threatens future deep space research missions at

a time when the trend toward international

cooperative missions for deep space exploration

creates the need for increasing unity and

cooperation.

There is a serious potential for interference to

national and international deep space missions

because the current allocations allow uplinks and

downlinks for space research conducted by Earth

orbiters to use the same bands as deep space links.

These links are not compatible because of the

widely different transmission [power] and received signal strengths, 198

The U.S. proposal for space research (VLBI)

and communication downlinks (for a lunar colony) at 37-38 GHz was accepted, but WARC-92

allocated only half the proposed amount for the

uplink frequencies--4O-4O.5 GHz. Although this

creates an imbalance in the frequencies available

193 CWent~RS ~te~tes use ls.4_lQ.OG& forsenfig the&@ fmm tie DRS sate~te to tieground station at white S~ds, New Mexico.

These space research frequencies, however, are only secondary (to radiolocation services). The next generation of sateUites, however, will use

government frequencies in the 20.2 -21.2 GHz band.

lx pofio~ of tiese frequencies may also be used to co remand and control remote robots working on the space stationj and retrieving remote

scientific modules that would be in orbit near the space station.

195 ~1refers t. mewwements ~de us~g SateUites tit emble scientis~ @ ~~k geodetic movemen~ on E@.h md provide information

on the changes caused by earthquakes.

lx U.S. Dep~ent of State, u.S. Proposals, op. Cit., fOOt.130te 5.

197 See foo~otes 8$)() and 891 of the ITU, Rudio Regulations, op. cit., fOOtOOte 19.

1% u.S. Dep~ent of State, U.S. Proposa/s, Op. Cit., fOO@Ote 5.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 139

for uplinks and downlinks, the needs outlined

above should be satisfied.

The U.S. proposal for deep space downlinks at

31.8 -32.3 GHz was accepted, but an existing

footnote (893) designed to protect the navigation

systems in the band could limit some uses.

Sharing and interference criteria will have to be

worked out on a case-by-case basis. The U.S.

proposal for deep space uplinks at 34.2 -34.7 GHz

was accepted. Additional allocations were made

to the space research service (downlinks) on a

secondary basis in the band 74-84 GHz.

General-Satellite Service: The United States

proposed a new service, the General-Satellite

Service (GSS) that would have operated at

19.7 -20,2 GHz (downlinks) and 29.5 -30.0 GHz

(uplinks), and would have replaced current primary fixed-satellite and secondary mobilesatellite service allocations in those frequency

bands. This proposal was based on efforts now

underway in the United States to develop and

implement communications satellites integrating

a wide variety of capabilities on a single, flexibleuse satellite. These include fixed, mobile, and

point-to-multipoint applications. The U.S. (Government and industry) position is that such

flexibility is needed in order to better match future

satellite capacity with future satellite communication needs.

The concept of a General-Satellite Service was

not adopted by WARC-92. The United States did

win a minor victory by having MSS upgraded to

coprimary status in 19.7 -20.1 GHz, but only in

Region 2 (see figure 2-12). MSS was also made

coprimary worldwide at 20.1 -20.2 GHz. Similarly, MSS was upgraded to primary status in

29.5 -29.9 in Region 2 and worldwide only at

29.9-20.0. However, a number of footnotes will

affect the use of these bands. First, existing

footnote 873 allocates these same bands to the

terrestrial fixed and mobile services on a primary

basis for large sections of Africa, the Middle East

and Asia. Five new footnotes describe various

limitations and conditions that MSS networks

must meet to operate in the bands, including

Figure 2-12—U.S. Proposal for

General-Satellite Service

Down links

19.7 -20.2

Worldwide

Previous

!.

Fixed-Satellite

allocations Mobile-Satelllte

Worldwide

t 1

Us .

proposal I

General-Satellite I

L— I

I WARC-92a Region 1 Region 2 Region 3

outcome Fixed-Satellite Fixed-Satellite Fixed-Satellite

19.7 -20.1 Mobile-Satellite Mobile-satellite Mobile Satellite

20,1 -20.2 L

Fixed-Satellite Mobile-Satellite I

Uplinks

19.7 -20.2

Worldwide

m 1

Previous Fixed-Satellite

allocations Mob@ Satellite I —.—.-~

v

Worldwide

pro~a-____ General-Satellite

.J

v

WARC-92a

’

b Region 1 Region 2 Region 3

outcome Fixed-Satellite Fixed-Satellite Fixed-Satellite

29.5 -29.9 Mobile-Satellite Mobile-Satellite Mobile-Satellite

29.9 -30.0 !--- —–

Fixed-satellite Mobile-Satellite I

a A number of footnotes further define the uses of these bands.

b This band is also allocated to the Earth Exploration-satellite Service

on a secondary basis.

NOTE: Radio services in all capital letters are allocated on a primary

basis. All others are secondary.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

coordination requirements relating to the countries in footnote 873. WARC-92 also adopted

Recommendation 719 that calls for studies to be

conducted on the technical and sharing characteristics of ‘multiservice’ satellite networks.
140 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

In line with the decisions of WARC-92, the

FCC has adopted an NPRM to upgrade MSS to

coprimary status in the 19.7 -20.2 GHz and

29.5 -30.0 GHz bands. The notice responds to a

July 1990 proposal by Norris Satellite Communications to establish a general satellite service to

provide fixed, broadcast, mobile, and personal

communications services in the Ka-band. While

the upgrade to MSS will enable Norris to operate

many services, broadcast services are still not

allowed. The FCC hopes that broadcasting experiments in the 20/30 GHz range as part of NASA’s

Advanced Communications Technology Satellite

(ACTS—scheduled for a 1993 launch) will answer sharing and interference questions regarding

shared use of the band by broadcasting and other

satellite services. Depending on the success or

failure of the ACTS experiments and Norris’

efforts, the United States may pursue a GSS

definition and allocation at future world radiocommunication conferences.

Earth Exploration-Satellite; Earth ExplorationSatellite Services (EESS) are being increasingly

used by the United States to obtain higher quality

data about the Earth and regions of the atmosphere that are not available through the use of

other frequencies. To avoid the potential of future

interference to these activities, the United States

proposed a primary allocation for EESS (passive)

allocations at 60.7 -60.8 GHz and 156-158 GHz.199

However, because of domestic coordination and

preparation problems, the 60 GHz proposal was

withdrawn.

The 156-158 GHz proposal was accepted.

Other EESS allocations made at WARC-92

include secondary allocations at 25.5-27 GHz

(downlink-to be shared with the intersatellite

links noted above), 28.5 -30.0 GHz (uplinklimited to data transfer), and 37.5 -40.5 GHz

(downlink-shared with a variety of services).200 A

number of footnotes, however, which relate to the

operation of the FSS in the 28.5 -30.0 GHz band

will affect EESS operations, and may constrain

future development of EESS services in that

band.201 Sharing and coordination arrangements

will have to be developed for all these allocations.

Radiolocation-Satellite Service: The United

States proposed to define a new space service, the

Radiolocation-Satellite Service, and to provide a

primary allocation for this service in the band

24.55-24.65 GHz. This new definition and allocation will provide for satellite-based location

services to a variety of users.

The U.S. definition was adopted, but the

proposed allocation was made in a slightly higher

band-24.65-24.75 GHz, and only for Region 2.

Discussion—The U.S. proposals for space

services were the most successful proposals the

United States made at WARC-92. Much of the

success of these proposals has been attributed to

the work done prior to WARC-92 in the SFCG.

As noted, this group provides a forum within

which the space agencies of the world can discuss

their spectrum needs and identify future spectrum

requirements. This mechanism makes it much

easier to precoordinate frequency allocations for

space services and applications at international

conferences such as WARC-92. The group also

provides a mechanism for space agencies to build

support for their proposals and generate crosssupport among different nations.

199 The use of ~ese bands for this type of data collection is “ptiSive,’ meaning that radio waves being reeeived by the satellite are merely

measured and recorded for analysis. “Active” data collection on the other hand, is accomplished by a satellite sending out signals (such as

radar) to a particular target (layers of the atmosphere, the Earth itself) and analyzing the signal when it returns.

~ A p- ~Wation was alSO made to EESS at 040.5 G*.

201 some of~ese foo~otes were props~ by tie United S@tes to provide up~power ~nbol systems titwill & re@redto enhance FSS

performance. Currently, the 27.5-29.5 GHz band is allocated to the FSS for uplink use only. A downlink signal is required to provide adequate

information to control system perfo rmance. To aceommo&te a dowrdink transmission to support these power control systems, the United States

proposed to add a footnote to permit the use of downlink beacon operations within the 27.5 -29.5 GHz band. This proposal was accepted, but

was further refined and divided into footnotes 882A and 882B.
Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 141

The problems with GSS were slightly different

and more political in nature. The Europeans saw

no need for the new service, maintaining that

existing allocations provide adequate flexibility.

202 This view is similar to the European views

on and opposition to the generic MSS allocation

proposed by the United States. This recurring

split may indicate either a deeper philosophical

opposition to more generic, vague service allocations, or it may simply indicate a fear of,

generic-type services on the part of the Europeans.

203

Depending on the actual reason for this opposition, two factors may influence the success of

future U.S. GSS (and generic MSS) proposals.

First, the European preference for more stratified

allocations may come from a stronger belief in

planning and/or that more specific allocations are

easier to use. The United States, on the other

hand, generally has rejected a priori spectrum

planning, preferring to let market forces dictate

spectrum uses. Second, and perhaps more likely,

economic advantage may be the driving force

behind European opposition. It appears the United

States has a slight technological lead in MSS and

advanced space applications, and the Europeans

may believe that GSS systems will give the

United States a greater advantage in building

systems and providing services in these new, and

as yet undefined, allocations.204

Implications—The space communications allocations made at WARC-92 represent some of

the United States’ more clear-cut successes at

WARC-92. The United States got most of the

allocations it wanted in this area (with the

exception of GSS), and seems well-positioned to

move ahead with plans for future space missions

and activities.

The implications for future GSS-type services

are less clear. Proponents maintain that the

allocations made will allow services very similar

to what a GSS would have allowed-permitting

de facto GSS systems to operate. This belief is

probably overoptimistic. The various footnotes

and political opposition associated with the socalled GSS bands will make establishment of a

GSS-type service complex. The successful development of such systems by the United States or

others will depend on how much the political

opposition fades and the manner in which sharing

arrangements are resolved. Systems will develop

as negotiations allow.

202 Repofie~y,~awcmen[t.Supwfisomeme of multiuse satellite concept was worked Out behvmn rePresen@ves of ~eufited ‘tates

and CEPT. EC observers, however, apparently feeling that Europe had been too willing to compromise on other issues, decreed that no

compromise on GSS would be acceptable. Consequently, the Heads of the European Delegations opposed the U.S. proposal.

203 It is ~tems(~g t. note, howevm, tit he E~ope~sdidsuppofi~L~s,a Concept tit is as poorly defined as GSS or generic mobile.

204 on tie o~er ~d, when tie Europeans have tie perceived adv~~ge, as hey do ~ ten~~~ mobile systems, for eMmple, tie tables

turn--the vagueness and flexibility (of FPLMTS) become acceptable to them but not to the United States.
Next

Steps and

Lessons

for

the Future 3

w

ARC-92 set the stage for the development of radiocommunication technologies and services for the next

decade or more. Future world radiocommunication

conferences will build on the agreements of WMC92 in an attempt to bring high-quality communication services to

people all around the world. In order to ensure the most effective

participation of the United States at these future conferences,

U.S. spectrum managers and policymakers must understand the

context within which international decisions will be made, and

the U.S. agencies primarily responsible for conference preparations and negotiations must adapt their cultures and structures to

this new environment. The first test of the government’s and the

private sector’s understanding of this new context will come in

the implementation of WARC-92 decisions and their preparations for the next world radiocommunication conference to be

held in the fall of 1993.

The consequences of ineffective U.S. participation in international telecommunications negotiations and rulemaking could be

significant. The rules and regulations set at international fora, r

r

and U.S. responses to them, will substantially influence the

development of new communications services and how well U.S.

companies can compete in radiocommunication services and -

equipment worldwide. Economic, technical, and political factors

must be integrated into a focused, long-term strategy for meeting l== ,..

~ \

U.S. radiocommunication needs. The lessons of WARC-92 can .1

contribute to the realization of such a policy and strategy ,- ~ ‘y

framework, and will enhance the effectiveness of future U.S. ~

delegations and improve chances for U.S. “success” at future ~

world radiocommunication conferences. /AK A

143
144 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IN

WARC-92 IMPLEMENTATION

WARC-92 represented neither

nor the end of work for spectrum

entrepreneurs worldwide. Rather,

the beginning

managers and

it marked the

end of one phase and the beginning of another.

With WARC-92 agreements finalized, member

countries of the International Telecommunication

Union (ITU) must now decide individually how

to implement the allocations agreed to at WARC92+1

1 Foreign Allocations and Licensing

Like the United States, most countries usually

accept the bulk of the international allocations

and incorporate them into their domestic frequency tables. However, also like the United

States, individual countries will exercise their

right to adapt or ignore allocations they believe

are not in their best interests or that will interfere

with their existing uses of the spectrum. Because

radiocommunication systems must be licensed in

each country in which they plan to operate, a

single country’s refusal to license a service (or

allocate spectrum for it) could jeopardize systems

that are regional or global in nature, such as some

broadcasting and mobile satellite services. At the

least, one country’s refusal (out of several countries in a given geographic area) to allocate a

service or license a particular system will pose

substantial engineering challenges. Service to

neighboring countries, who have accepted the

allocation and licensed the service provider,

could be adversely affected.

Given the opposition expressed at WARC-92

toward some services, international acceptance of

some proposed systems and services is still in

doubt. At the conference, many countries, including the United States, indicated through footnotes

to the allocation table that some services (using

specific frequencies) would not be permitted to

operate within their borders, or could not operate

until after a specified date. The United States, for

example, prohibited Broadcasting-Satellite ServiceSound (BSS-Sound) services from using L-band

allocations in this country. Since Canada and

Mexico have indicated that they will both use

these frequencies, and since those uses will likely

interfere with U.S. telemetry operations, coordination will be necessary in North America.

I Sharing and Coordination

The development of sharing and coordination

arrangements among new systems and between

incumbent and new users of the spectrum will

challenge U.S. Government and private sector

negotiators. Other countries will try to protect

their existing services and gain advantages in

service, price, or technical sharing arrangements.

As noted in chapter 1, footnotes to the international Table of Frequency Allocations in some

cases limit how, when, and where a service can be

offered. For example, 75 countries joined together in a footnote that limits the operation of

low-Earth orbiting satellites (LEOS) in the 148-

149.9 MHz band to secondary status (see chapter

2). This could constrain or preclude operation of

LEOS services in those countries. In addition,

limits on power, such as those imposed on LEOS

systems operating above 1 GHz (big LEOS), may

also make coordination of new services difficult.

Because the systems are not yet operational, the

power requirements and characteristics of these

new services are not yet known, and the limits

agreed to at WARC-92 may not be practical.

Negotiating the technical details that will allow

different services to share frequencies will be

contentious, as shown by the debate in the United

States over the provision of big and little LEOS

services (see chapter 2).

1 The agreements reached at WARC-92 will enter into force on Oct. 12, 1993, unless otherwise noted in the text of the Final Acts of

WARC-92.
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future 1145

I Trends Affecting International

Implementation

In addition to the themes discussed in chapter

1, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)

has previously identified several broader trends

that are shaping the evolution of world radiocommunication technology, services, and policy.2

These include: rapid technological advances,

globalization of systems and services, increasing

regionalism, privatization and deregulation, and

shifting geopolitical power centers and alliances.

Each of these trends will affect how WARC-92

decisions are implemented.

RADIO TECHNOLOGY IS ADVANCING RAPIDLY

The rapid development of new radio technologies and services have serious consequences for

the implementation of WARC-92 allocations and

regulatory decisions. First, the rapid changes and

advances in technology make setting rules and

standards for radiocommunications systems increasingly difficult. The decisions made at WUC92 were necessarily made on the basis of today’s

technology, but some of these decisions will not

come into full force for 10 to 15 years. During that

time, the technical bases for the decisions or the

technical parameters agreed to at WARC-92 are

certain to change and become outmoded.

In an era where the product cycles for electronics are measured in months, not years, a rapid and

flexible approach to standards-setting and manufacturing is vital to domestic and international

economies, As rules and regulations continue to

be negotiated both domestically and internationally, it will be important to not lock in technology

solutions and systems that may be quickly superseded. Enough flexibility in the rules must be

assured so that technology can continue to grow.

A flexible approach will be extremely beneficial

to U.S. companies-enabling them to take advantage of their radiocommunication expertise and

research and development (R&D) strengths to

quickly bring new technologies and services to

market throughout the world. The United States

explicitly recognized the benefits of such an

approach in its proposals for generic MobileSatellite Service (MSS) and General-Satellite

Service (GSS).

GLOBALIZATION OF RADIOCOMMUNICATION

As the world becomes increasingly reliant on

information services to sustain economic growth

and productivity, the importance of global telecommunication systems increases. Companies

seek to be more closely connected with customers, suppliers, and partners around the world.

Individuals increasingly depend on and expect

reliable communications wherever they are. Telecommunication systems serving these needs must

be global in scope. The LEOS systems now being

developed by the United States and other countries are designed to meet such needs.

The trend toward globalism was not wellserved by WARC-92. At the conference, countries and groups of countries doggedly fought to

have their own positions advanced and their own

services protected, despite the almost universal

recognition that global allocations would better

promote the development of new services and

reap higher economic benefits for all.3 Compromise on many of the issues facing WARC-92

delegates was notoriously difficult, and countries

2 U.S. Congress, Office of Technolgy Assessment The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Issues for U.S. International

Spectrum Policy, OTA-BP-TCI’-76 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1991), hereafter, 4 ‘OTA, WMC-92.’ The

government of Canada cited many of the same factors as the driving forces behind its recent reassessment of Canadian spectrum policy. See

CanadA Depmment of Communication, A Spectrum Policy Framework for Canada, Cat. No. Co 22-120/1992 (Minister of Supply and

Services, September 1992).

3 The benefits of a single worldwide allocation for any new service, leading to a single standard would provide economies of scale for

manufacturers, allowing equipment prices to be lower, It is possible that the txnefits of this situation may unevenly benefit the countries of

the world—all countries and consumers would benefit from lower prices, but the other benefits (increased revenues and profits) to

manufacturers would accrue only to those developed countries actually making the equipment.
146 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

did not hesitate to insert country-specific footnotes that either exempted them from specific

decisions or made unilateral decisions to promote

their own national interests.

In large part, the blows to worldwide allocations were spurred by the increasing importance

of regional ties in world affairs. In Europe, for

example, the convergence of economic interests

and the emergence of a unified approach to

economic policy has made the European countries

much more active in promoting their economic

self-interest, especially in telecommunications. In

order to protect their existing radiocommunication

services and advance European technology worldwide, the Europeans have taken a strong stance

promoting uniquely European proposals and requirements. They are no longer quite so willing to

follow the American lead in technology, preferring instead to stake out their own g-round.

Similar alliances, formal or more informal,

exist in many other regions of the world as well,

including southeast Asia, and, to a lesser extent,

Latin America and Africa. As a result, instead of

global allocations, WARC-92 adopted differing

regional allocations for many important services

including BSS-Sound and high-definition television, MSS, and aeronautical public correspondence. Such divisions may make future negotiations more difficult, and global allocations harder

to achieve.

PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION

Reflecting the new connection of economics

and telecommunications, perhaps the most important trend influencing the future of world

radiocommunications is the increasing privatization of telecommunication services coupled with

the increasing liberalization of markets and deregulation of telecommunication and radiocommunication industries. In the past, and to

some extent, the present, one of the largest

impediments to expanding the U.S. telecommunications presence abroad has been the monopolies

and monopoly relations maintained by the government-controlled post, telegraph, and telephone

administration (PTTs) around the world. As the

sole supplier of telecommunications services and

buyer of telecommunications hardware, these

government institutions wielded tremendous economic and political power-power that was often

used in concert with other foreign government

policies to exclude U.S. companies from freely

competing in many countries.

In recent years, however, in response to intense

global competition in telecommunication equipment and services and user complaints about high

costs and poor service, many countries have

attempted to replace their traditional government

telecommunication monopolies with more aggressive privately-owned companies and liberalized rules on provision of services and equipment.

These trends represent a tremendous opportunity

for U.S. companies to expand their markets and

sales overseas. Combined with the increasing

globalization of telecommunication services noted

above, U.S. companies now have an opportunity

to compete in countries they previously were

excluded from.

The effects of liberalization and privatization

also have led to a number of new players in world

radiocommunications, and U.S. companies seeking to deploy their new WARC-approved services

will face a different world than only a few years

ago. Instead of one government ministry to deal

with, U.S. companies may now be faced with a

government ministry, a private national telecommunications company, and a plethora of competitors. Both potential support and opposition will

be more diffuse, forcing American interests to be

quicker to recognize potential allies and more

agile in forming alliances with foreign national

companies or even other foreign competitors-a

trend already evident in the bidding for some

foreign telephone system contracts. The implications of this trend are discussed in more detail

below.
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 147

THE FUTURE OF THE ITU AND

SPECTRUM POLICYMAKING

Another important factor affecting the implementation of WARC-92 agreements will be

changes in the structure and functioning of the

ITU. In June 1991, the Administrative Council of

the ITU endorsed the recommendations of a High

Level Committee (HLC) that had been established to examine the procedures and institutional

structure of the ITU and recommend changes that

would allow the organization to more effectively

carry out its responsibilities.4 As a result of the

HLC deliberations, the Council called for a

special Additional Plenipotentiary Conference

(APP) to be held in December 1992 that would

consider the recommendations outlined by the

HLC. The Council also established a “Drafting

Group’ of experts from various ITU member

governments to develop revisions to the ITU’s

Constitution and Convention based on the HLC

recommendations.5 This Drafting Group, which

the United States participated in, finished drafting

the revised text in March 1992, and the APP took

place as scheduled over the last weeks of 1992.

The United States generally supported the changes

recommended by the HLC, since it participated

actively in the work of the HLC and the formulation of the recommendations contained in the

final report.

In order to prepare for the APP, the State

Department’s Bureau of International Communications and Information Policy (CIP) formed a

task force in December 1991 to develop U.S.

positions and propose changes and/or modifications to the HLC recommendations. The meetings

of this task force were held under the auspices of

the national International Radio Consultative

Committee (CCIR)/International Telegraph and

Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) committees, the activities of which are also coordinated by the State Department. More than 60

representatives of the private sector and of the

various Federal agencies involved in international spectrum matters participated in the work

of this group. The task force submitted its final

report in early December 1992, but has recently

been reconvened to address how the United States

should respond to the changes made at the APP.6

The APP adopted changes in three broad areas

that will significantly influence the conduct of

future ITU activities and world radiocommunication conferences.7 First, ITU members adopted a

new institutional structure that is intended to

streamline decisionmaking and that gives greater

emphasis to development efforts (see figure 3-l).

Second, the APP laid the groundwork for expanding the role of the private sector in ITU activities,

although many of the specifics of their participation in the new ITU remain to be worked out.

Finally, the APP adopted a 2-year schedule for

future WARCS, which have now been renamed

‘ ‘world radiocommunication conferences.

These new conferences will combine the traditional functions of WARCS for frequency allocation and revisions to the international radio

regulations, with the functions of the CCIR’s

Plenary Assembly, which will form a separate

part of the conference.

The most important, and potentially disruptive,

of these changes is the conversion to a regular

2-year cycle of conferences. Because of the

overlap in planning and preparation cycles, the

2-year schedule means that ITU members will be

d For further discussion of the HLC, see OTA, W~C-92, op. cit., footnote 2.

5 The proposed changes are being made to the ITU Constitution and Convention as approved by the 1989 Nice (France) Plenipotentiary

Conference. However, this Constitution/Convention has not yet entered into force and ITU is still technically guided by the Nairobi Convention

of 1982.

6 See ‘ ‘Final Report of the CCI’IT and CCIR Joint Task Force, ’ submitted to Ambassador Bradley P. Holmes, U.S. Coordinator and

Director, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Communications and Information Policy, Dec. 4, 1992.

7 For tie comp]ete text of tie APP decisions, see International Telecommunication UniorL Final Acts of the Additional plenipotentiary

Conference (Geneva, Dec. 22, 1992).
148 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Figure 3-l—New Structure of the International Telecommunication Union

Recommended by the High Level Committee

I

Conferences

Development

Sector

‘-—r r

Study

Groups

Plenipotentiary

Conference

InITU

Council

“T

r

Conferences

–J

~1

Business

Advisory

Committee –,

rJStandardlzatlon

Sector

rStudy

Groups

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

c

World Radlocommunlcatlon

Conferences

Secretary

General

preparing for conferences constantly. In fact, each

country will be preparing proposals for a conference at the same time that it is beginning planning

for the following conference.

This change has important implications for

how the United States prepares for future conferences. First, the 2-year schedule presents an

opportunity for the United States to rationalize its

budget and personnel approaches to world radiocommunication conference preparation. For those

, I

Strategic

Policy and

Plannlng Unit

Radiocommunlca!lon

Sector

Study

Groups

7

Radio

Regulations

Board

—-T— ’

J

Radiocommunicatlon Study

Group Advisory

Committee

Federal agencies and private companies involved

in the planning and preparation for these conferences, a 2-year cycle will put an enormous burden

on both personnel and funding resources.8 In the

past, few, if any, resources were devoted exclusively to WARC preparations on an ongoing

basis. In most cases, staff assigned to work on

WARC preparations had other responsibilities

that shared time and attention with WARC. Such

an arrangement, while not necessarily ideal, was

s It should also be noted that few companies will have interests in each and every W.4RC that is held. Depending on the agenda for each

conference, private sector interests will change, as will the relative participation of the various Federal Government agencies.
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 149

justifiable based on the sporadic nature of the

WARCS, their varying agendas, and tight budgets. In the future, however, conference preparation and planning will require full-time attention

on the part of all involved, but especially the

Federal Communications Commission (FCC),

National Telecommunication and Information

Administration (NTIA), and the State Department. Adequate staff must be assigned to work on

these issues, and enough finding must be secured

to assure that these staff can do their jobs. In

particular, enough money must be budgeted for

travel and international bilateral/multilateral negotiations that lay the crucial groundwork for

negotiating success.

The scheduling of regular conferences may

also provide benefits in the U.S. radiocommunication policy process. Because of the continuous

nature of the preparations, this schedule may

force the United States to look forward more

purposefully and identify longer-term requirements for domestic radio technologies and services. This, in turn, may also force the United

States to develop more explicit strategies for

pursuing these new goals, and could result in the

development of a broader framework for identifying needs, prioritizing goals, and conducting

negotiations—providing much-needed focus to

the overall U.S. spectrum planning and management process.

It is too soon to assess the full range of impacts

of ITU restructuring. The immediate changes in

the structure of ITU will be dramatic, but the

longer-term impacts on the mission, and the

effectiveness of ITU in the face of new technologies, new players, and an increasingly privatized

world are likely to be more subtle. As a result,

U.S. policy toward ITU and its various organs and

conferences is entering a period in which U.S.

policymakers must be especially sensitive to the

changes in the international telecommunication

and radiocommunication arenas. Government policymakers and private sector representatives must

continue to look ahead and share information with

each other in order to best promote the competitive interests of the United States.

DOMESTIC CONTEXT FOR

WARC-92 IMPLEMENTATION

The decisions made at WARC-92 will be

implemented in a domestic context that is complex and contentious. Radiocommunication policymaking is a world of dealing, bargaining and

negotiating, and as in any politically charged

forum, deals can fall apart and on occasion are

sabotaged. The domestic battles now being

fought over WARC-92 spectrum allocations and

service rules are characteristic of strategies often

used ‘‘inside the Beltway’ ‘—maligning the character of the competition, disputing every claim,

relying on assumptions and half-truths, manipulating the media and Congress.

United States preparations for WARC-92 were

concentrated in the FCC, NTIA and the State

Department. The functions, processes, and issues

involved in this 3-way division of responsibility

have been previously discussed.9 This section

will examine the roles these agencies play in the

implementation of the decisions made at WARC92 and the larger role they play in developing U.S.

radiocommunication policy.

E Federal Government Agency Roles

In the United States, responsibility for implementing the decisions of WARC-92 will be

divided between the FCC and NTIA (see figure

3-2). The FCC is implementing decisions that

affect the private sector and nonfederal use of the

spectrum, while NTIA is implementing the decisions that affect Federal Government use of radio

frequencies. Together, the two agencies must

work out the necessary arrangements in those

areas of the spectrum where Federal Government

and private sector users must share radio frequencies. The State Department provides input to the

9 OTA, WMC-92, op. cit., footnote 2.
150 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Figure 3-2-Steps in the Federal Government’s Preparation for, and

Implementation of, WARC-92 Agreements

I

I

L-> rFederal

Communlcatlons +-

Commlsslon

L—‘rL

, rAd HOC 206 r

CCIR

National (U. S.)

Study Groups

J L—

‘-r~ ‘-—$–

r

Interdepartment

Radio

Advisory

Committee

‘-rC

CCIR

International

Study Groups

—

&

r

National

Telecommunlcatlons ‘

and Information

Admlnlstratlon—

I

CCIR JIWP

Report

~+ I U.S. proposals submitted to the International I

L

Telecommunlcahons Union by the State Department

‘------T--

.

WA RC-92 negotiations <—--- ”

—

)~

r

Federal

Communications

Commlsslon

->rVarious 4

Rulemaklngs

L—— —A

Final Acts of WA RC-92

r - -

T

I

+

c

National

Telecommunlcatlons

and Information

Admlnlstration

r

1

Ad HOC 206

1

Addltlonal

CCIR

Studies and

Recommendatmns1

NOTE: CCIR - International Radio Consultative Committee; JIWP = Joint Interim Worldng Party.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future ! 151

FCC and NTIA in matters with important international repercussions. In almost every case, the

battle over access to the newly allocated frequencies is fierce, and U.S. spectrum managers face

many difficult choices in reconciling new interests with existing users and in choosing between

competing systems promising similar services.

In the past, the FCC and NTIA had longer times

to work out the details of implementation. The

decisions of WARC-92, however, are being

implemented more quickly for a number of

reasons. First, as noted below, the FCC had a

number of proceedings dealing with WARC-92

already in progress. Folding the agreements

reached at WARC-92 into these proceedings can

be done quickly. Second, the private sector is

pushing for rapid action on these proposals,

fearing that foreign and domestic competitors

may enter the race now that allocations have been

established. They also want to begin offering

services and start revenue flowing as quickly as

possible. l0 The result is that many highly visible

issues, such as personal communications service

(PCS), big and little LEOS, and BSS-Sound are

already being considered by the FCC.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Implementation Issues

The FCC is the focus of much of the work now

being done in the United States to implement the

decisions made at WARC-92. In the past, the FCC

usually initiated a single comprehensive proceeding to implement WARC decisions. In the case of

WARC-92, however, the FCC already had several

ongoing proceedings (begun prior to WARC-92)

dealing with specific items that also appeared on

the WARC-92 agenda.11 Because of the important economic and competitive issues involved in

several of these items, especially LEOS, the FCC

is acting quickly to resolve those issues first, and

holding less contentious issues for later action.

These existing proceedings will provide the basic

framework for FCC implementation of the W~C92 agreements. Observers expect that the remainder of the allocations and implementation issues,

including HF broadcasting, HDTV, and aeronautical public correspondence, will be dealt within

one comprehensive proceeding. It will take several years for the FCC to adapt the WARC-92

decisions and allocations to fit national needs.

This incremental approach has both benefits

and drawbacks. By considering a number of

issues separately, the process may become fragmented at a time when a cohesive approach is

needed. In many cases the frequencies to be

considered in different proceedings overlap, but

the services vying for the same bands might not

be compatible. Many services, for example, are

currently competing for frequencies in the 2 GHz

band, including the existing users of the band

(utilities, public safety agencies, and telephone

companies), PCS, new space communication

services (the responsibility of NTIA) and MSS.12

It is not clear how these different proceedings will

relate to each other. On the other hand, government officials point out that by separating the

issues in this way, no one issue can hold up the

consideration of the others. With the complex

variety of issues decided by WARC-92, and the

contentious nature of some of the issues, separating the items may be a better solution.

Challenges for the Future

The FCC, however, faces a number of problems that could hinder its ability to quickly and

effectively implement WARC-92 decisions and

10 Fears of Comytition me often just~led. Inrna.rsa6 for example, immediately after WARC-92 concluded, aUnOUUCti its titention to use

some of the new frequencies for future LEOS aftd/or geosynchronous satellite services.

11 ~e~e prW~~gs include props~ for emerging technologies, Personal commtimtiorIs services, littte MOS, big ~OS, and

BSS-Sound.

12 smc~lc~ly, theb~ds kvolv~ Me lg5(J-’20lcl MHz, 21 1(L2140MHz, and 2160-2200 W, which all overlap to varyi% degr~s between

the FCC’s Emerging Technologies proposal (for PCS), MSS allocations made at WARC-92, and the bands made available for Future Public

Land Mobile Telecommunication Systems at WARC-92. See figure 2-4 in chapter 2.

330-071 0 - 93 - 6 QL 3
152 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

that could undermine its long-term ability to

effectively regulate the Nation’s airwaves. First

and foremost, the FCC has been put in the

position of trying to do too much with too few

resources. Funding at the FCC continues to suffer

from past battles that took place between the

agency and the Congress as a result of differences

involving philosophy, approach, and specific

FCC actions. As a result of chronically low

funding levels, the FCC has weathered a siege of

hiring freezes and staff shortages. Delays in

beginning the negotiated rulemaking that will set

regulations for the delivery of big LEOS services,

for example, were attributed to staff shortages at

the FCC. Had the agency’s responsibilities remained static, these staff shortages might have

been more easily dealt with, but they came at a

time when the regulatory burden on the FCC was

increasing. New radio technologies and services

are being rapidly introduced, and the passage of

the Cable Television Consumer Protection and

Competition Act of 1992 has put even more

pressure on the FCC’s resources. 13

As a result, the FCC’s ability to effectively

fulfill its mandate is hampered. By and large, the

FCC can handle the day-to-day activities of

regulating the Nation’s telecommunications issues, albeit sometimes very slowly. However,

lack of staff and funding constrain the Commission’s ability to look forward and aggressively

plan for the next generation of telecommunication

services. “The handful of engineers and other

technical specialists on [the FCC’s] staff lack the

resources to become deeply involved in technological planning and evaluation. Technology

issues are taken over by parties battling for

advantages in the marketplace, and the FCC just

barely manages to referee these disputes.”14

brig-term planning is almost nonexistent in

many areas, and in radiocommunications especially, the FCC has failed to develop a long-term

strategy for managing the boom in wireless

communications services. In short, the FCC has

become primarily a reactive agency, with little

ability to look forward.15

The second major constraint on FCC action is

the litigious nature of American society. Almost

every decision the FCC renders is challenged in

court and often appealed numerous times. It is a

sad fact that FCC decisions are often written with

the expectation that they will end up in litigation. l6 While acknowledging the importance of

overturning improper decisions, the consequences

of this are to siphon staff time and resources away

from aggressive (new) policymaking to defend

past actions. Court battles also delay the introduction of new services for the American consumer,

and cause uncertainty for equipment manufacturers and service providers alike. In an attempt to

head off potential lawsuits in the implementation

of WARC-92 decisions regarding big and little

LEOS, the FCC used negotiated rulemakings that

brought together all interested parties to work out

acceptable compromises that could be written

into FCC rules and regulations (see appendix E).

This approach shows promise in some cases (like

little LEOS), but its success in resolving more

complicated and controversial issues has yet to be

proven.

Options for Improving the FCC’s Performance

In light of current Federal budget realities,

Congress has several options to improve the

functioning of the FCC. First, require structural

13 fibfic hw 102-385, Oct. 5, 1992.

14 W. Page Montgomery, ‘‘1992 at the FCC: The Year of the Paradox,’ Business Communications Review, vol. 22, No. 3, March 1992, pp.

32-33.

15 KC stfi often exp~ heir lack of anticipatory action by claiming that there is nothing they can do until someone or some company

formally petitions the FCC for action.

lb R~enfly, tie FCC hm attempted to find alternatives to it procedures that would reduCe the CkCeS fOr litigation ~d Str-e the

regulatory process. See box 2-B.
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 153

and/or procedural changes that would concentrate

more resources on international radiocommunication issues. For example, more focused and

coherent international radiocommunication policymaking might be promoted through the creation of a formal or informal internal policy

development group. 17 Given cur-rent staffing shortages and increasing responsibilities, this option

may be of limited effectiveness without additional funds. Increases in the number and types of

radiocommunication services and the FCC’s new

role in regulating cable television will continue to

press FCC staff and resources.

Second, increase funding for the FCC. This

money could either be targeted for international

radiocommunications or come in the form of an

across-the-board increase in the FCC’s appropriation. Additional funding would allow the FCC to

hire more engineering and legal staff to better

handle an already large workload. More staff

would also make it possible to redeploy staff

resources to concentrate on international mattersthose with international experience would be able

to focus their attention on international matters.

Increased funding would also allow FCC staff to

participate more effectively in bilateral and multilateral meetings held in foreign countries-a

crucial consideration when preparing for an

international meeting such as a WARC.

Such increases could be provided for by

changing the way the FCC is funded. Proposals

have been advanced in the past that would allow

the FCC to fund its operations, at least partially,

through fees that it would charge radio licensees,

or from the money to be raised by spectrum

auctions. The added revenues produced in this

manner could contribute a significant amount of

money to the FCC’s operations.l8 A combination

of appropriated funds and fee-based funds could

improve the FCC’s performance, while keeping

present funding levels and congressional oversight intact.

However, simply “throwing” money at the

FCC will not solve its problems. Rather it would

be a first step in a long-term campaign to boost the

agency’s efficiency and policymaking abilities.

Just as crucial is the attention given to the

importance of international issues at high levels,

a more coherent focus for international radio

policymaking, and a more forward-thinking and

aggressive approach to policy. Successful policymaking at the FCC will result from a combination of changes/improvements in structure, funding, and philosophy. Setting specific goals for

future policy development and reorganization of

the FCC, perhaps through legislation, and closely

monitoring progress toward those goals will be

necessary to achieve better policymaking results.

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND

INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION

Implementation Issues

NTIA, like the FCC, is now developing procedures for implementing the decisions made at

WARC-92, especially as they affect government

radiocommunication services such as space research and operations. NTIA will coordinate its

efforts closely with the FCC because many of the

frequency bands allocated at WARC-92 are used

by both private sector and government systems.

NTIA's efforts, however, are not as visible as the

FCC’s, because most of the high-profile systems

and services are those to be provided by the

private sector, and hence are regulated by the

FCC.

NTIA’s efforts to implement WARC-92 agreements will be influenced by two separate, but

i T AS OTA noted k tie pas~ FCC hte~tio~ staff are spread throughout various bureaus and divisions. B@ing M t.heSe exP@ togetia

in one formal office would be almost impossible, given internal FCC pohtics. For this reaso~ a formal group could be convened that allowed

staff to retain their current positions.

18 For emple, tie con~essio~ Budget oftlce estimates that spectrum auctioning of licenses for consumer land-mobile cO~tiCatiOn

services could generate between $1.3 and $5.7 billion over 3 years. U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Auctioning Radio Specrrum

Licenses, March 1992.
154 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

hopefully complementary, activities. The primary

focus for NTIA’s activities will be the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC),

which has retained Ad Hoc 206, its forum for

WARC-92 preparations, and changed its terms of

reference to include implementation of WARC92 allocations and decisions.l9 In this process

NTIA will coordinate its implementation and

spectrum management activities with the FCC

through both informal staff contacts and the

formal participation of the FCC as a liaison to

IRAC. In addition to the specific implementation

issues to be worked out in Ad Hoc 206, NTIA has

also launched a Notice of Inquiry dealing with

future U.S. spectrum requirements, including the

implications of WARC-92.20 Presumably, the

work of IRAC will inform this proceeding and

vice versa. The outcome of this inquiry will be a

report on national spectrum requirements and

technology trends affecting long-range planning

for new radio services.

Challenges for the Future

The dual role played by NTIA in the domestic

radiocommunication policy Process creates a

significant problem in developing domestic and

international radiocommunication policy. On one

hand, NTIA is the executive branch advisor to the

president on telecommunications policy. In this

capacity, it should weigh all sides of the issues

and present reasoned recommendations to the

president. However, NTIA is also charged with

the responsibility of managing the Federal Government’s use of the spectrum. In this mission, it

promotes the interests of the Federal Government

spectrum users-a mission that often conflicts

with its other mandate of providing rounded

advice on telecommunications policy. In the past

NTIA has seemingly put more weight on the

government side of the equation. However, with

the increased activism of the agency in the last

several years, it has become more sensitive to the

needs of the private sector and criticism that it is

too “closed” to private sector input and cooperation. Steps have been taken to open NTIA

activities to the public as much as possible.21

In addition to balancing its role as presidential

advisor for all telecommunications issues against

its advocacy for government spectrum users,

NTIA must also confront the difficult task of

balancing different agency needs and missions in

the management of the Federal Government’s use

of the spectrum. As exemplified by the dispute

over new allocations for HF broadcasting and the

debate over use of the L-band, this task can often

be highly contentious and political.

Options for Improving NTIA’s Performance

While NTIA is trying to improve its performance relative to the private sector, its conflicting

policy responsibilities have not been resolved

and, indeed, cannot be resolved by the agency

itself. Action must be taken by the Congress and

the Administration to determine just what NTIA’s

role and responsibilities should be and take the

necessary actions to implement that decision—

whether it be in the form of legislation, a new

executive order, or as part of a more comprehensive effort to revamp all U.S. radiocommunication policy.22 The specific options for resolving

these problems are discussed in more detail in

chapter 1.

19 M Hoc XM fi now c~ed @ an offIcial fromNI’IA’sOfIice of Spectrum Management. For a discussion of the XOle of IFUC and Ad

Hoc 206 in the preparation of U.S. proposals, see 0~ W~C-92, op. cit., footnote 2.

m U.S. Dep~~t of commerce, National ~lecommunications and ~O_tiOn~‘ “ tration, ‘‘Current and Future Requirements for

the Use of Radio Frequencies in the United States,” Docket No. 920532-2132, June 1, 1992.

21 o~ wfic-92, op. cit., foo~ote 2.

22 ~ ~to~ 1992, Cowess p~sed le@+tion that gives NTIA statutory authority (Public Law 102-538). This action effectively coddied

Executive Order 12,046, which had been the basis for NTIA’s authority since 1978. Unfortunately, this legislation cxmfii the duality in

~’s mandate noted above.
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 155

STATE DEPARTMENT

Implementation Issues

The State Department is not directly involved

in the implementation of WARC decisions in the

United States. It does, however, provide input and

coordination to the FCC and NTIA on international matters. In most cases, this involvement is

through State Department coordination of and

participation in bilateral and multilateral discussions with other countries about implementation

of specific radiocommunication systems. The

State Department also coordinates U.S. participation in the work of the CCIR and CCITT, the

sections of the ITU that study telecommunications services and make technical recommendations on standards and system characteristics. The

CCIR, especially, will play an important role in

the implementation of WARC-92 decisions as a

result of the conference’s call for technical studies

in many areas, including LEOS, future mobile

services, space services, and BSS-Sound. The

State Department is also active in coordinating

U.S. activities with other international telecommunications organizations such as The Inter-American

Telecommunications Conference (CITEL) and

the European Community (EC).

Challenges for the Future

The State Department plays an uneasy role in

the U.S. radiocommunication policy process. It is

the official representative of the United States in

all formal international telecommunications meetings, such as WARCS. It also plays an important

role in selecting the head of the delegation and

providing most of the administrative support

during the conference.

However, the role of the State Department is

constrained in several ways. The State Department plays no direct role in developing or

implementing domestic radiocommunication policy (e.g., WARC decisions), and has no authority

over the radiocommunication policies of other

executive branch departments. The State Department’s almost nonexistent role in the development and implementation of domestic telecommunication policy limits its effectiveness in

international radiocommunication policymaking

and negotiations. Although State Department

spokespeople are technically experienced and

politically knowledgeable, many foreign delegates know they have no power over domestic

implementation of international decisions. This

may inspire them to deal directly with domestic

regulators (FCC and NTIA) in order to streamline

negotiations.

The Bureau of International Communications

and Information Policy (CIP), which is the focal

point for telecommunications within the State

Department, has a relatively small staff of telecommunication professionals, and no formal

engineering staff to support them. Established in

1982, CIP is also a relatively new addition to the

State Department structure and, as a result, does

not enjoy the prestige, status, or power of other

bureaus in the Department.23

This relatively low position reportedly caused

problems at WARC-92. There was initially little

cooperation from other parts of the State Department in the preconference phase of negotiations,

and members of the delegation leadership were

frustrated trying to get things done through the

Department. In part to solve this problem, Gerald

Helman, a former ambassador and the U.S.

representative on the ITU’s High Level Committee, was brought onto the delegation to provide a

better liaison with State Department officials.

These initial difficulties between the State

Department and the U.S. WARC-92 delegation

leadership also point out a more fundamental

concern that must be addressed-the lack of

23 AS noted in chpter 1, the Snte Department is now considering a restructuring that would place CIP under the Bureau of monomic ~d

Business Affairs. This change may affect CIP’S ability to carry out its coordination functions for international policy, and further reduce its

stature in the State Department.
156 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

high-level attention to telecommunications policy in the State Department, and a lack of

appreciation of the importance of telecommunications for international trade and competitiveness. It is clear from the pre-conference phase of

WARC-92 preparations that the State Department

can play an important role in promoting U.S.

radiocommunication policy around the world.

During that period, but only after much prodding,

U.S. embassy staffs supported U.S. pre-conference

efforts by meeting with high-ranking telecommunication officials in ITU-member countries and

explaining and promoting U.S. positions. Such

international support will be crucial before future

conferences in light of the restructuring of traditional alliances and the rise of regional blocks

around the world. Despite the relative success of

such efforts, however, there is currently little

evidence to suggest that higher levels (above CIP)

of the Department understand or appreciate this

potential role.

Opt ions for Improving the

State Department’s Performance

Although many are critical of the historical role

the State Department has played in past WARCS,

and doubt its continued usefulness, other analysts

believe that CIP and the State Department have an

important role to play in negotiating international

radiocommunication policy. As telecommunication becomes a more global industry, telecommunications policymaking will assume a more

international character. As regional and worldwide communications systems develop and as

geopolitical relations continue to evolve, the

foreign policy aspects of U.S. international radiocommunications policymaking will become more

important. The State Department, as the U.S.

Government expert on foreign affairs, can play an

important role not only in promoting U.S. interests abroad, but in formulating positions that have

the best chances of acceptance in international

fora—helping U.S. companies enter and successfully compete in new and existing markets. The

State Department already has the basic framework in place-through its embassies-to make

an effective impact on international telecommunications policy. Neither the FCC nor NTIA has

this advantage. Those who believe that continued

State Department involvement in the international telecommunications policy process would

be beneficial have argued that restructuring and

strengthening CIP would solve its past problems.

Strengthening CIP may require revising its

mission and restructuring its staff. A clearer role

in developing international telecommunication

policy may be needed. CIP must make a serious

case for itself within the State Department in

order to show its relevance to the conduct of

foreign policy. Most importantly, an overhaul of

CIP would require a commitment from senior

State Department leaders to integrate telecommunications issues with foreign policy considerations. Remodeling CIP would probably also

require increased funding for travel and staff. The

addition of a small engineering staff may help

integrate ClP’s role in international policy with

its counterparts at the FCC and NTIA.

An alternative is to strip the State Department

of its authority in telecommunications entirely,

and move its fictions to another agency--either

an existing one or a new agency for radio and

telecommunication development. The specific

options for restructuring are discussed in chapter

1. Given the uncertainties of the new ITU process,

it is imperative that Congress decide what role the

State Department should have in international

telecommunications policymaking and representation. If action is not taken, CIP will continue to

struggle in its present form. Congress can influence international telecommunications policy

through CIP, but that leverage could be more

effective.

One potential roadblock to the State Department increasing its role in the area of telecommunications is the division of responsibility between

the State Department and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). The EC letter to Ambassador

Baran (see the section on LEOS in chapter 2)

requesting a meeting on LEOS licensing and
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 157

coordination raised two important public policy

questions that have not yet been adequately

addressed. The first issue is a fundamental

question of what agency in the United States

should be in charge of, or participate in, telecommunications meetings and negotiations that involve trade. Historically, the USTR has handled

all negotiation between the United States and the

EC. In this case (LEOS), the USTR did participate

in the meetings, but not substantively. In the

future, however, as trade and telecommunications

issues become increasingly blurred, such an easy

resolution may be hard to come by, and friction

could develop between the State Department,

NTIA, and the USTR. In order to avoid future turf

wars, rights and responsibilities should be clearly

outlined.

A parallel issue raised by the EC request is who

does the United States deal with in Europe on

telecommunications matters—the EC’s telecommunications committee or European Radio Communication Office (ERO)? The divisions and

uncertainties in the European telecommunications structure present an opportunity for the

United States. And while the United States

obviously has no direct input into how the various

roles and responsibilities ultimately are divided,

a careful study should be made and steps taken to

ensure the best interests of the United States.

WARC-92: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

I Conference Preparations

PRIORITY-SETTING AND GOVERNMENT

POLICY LEADERSHIP

Because of the limited, and increasingly congested, nature of the radio frequency spectrum,

setting priorities for its use is critical to ensuring

the effective and efficient development of radio

technologies and services in the long-term. Policies must be developed, with appropriate input

from the private sector, that promote the development of new technologies and that also protect

vital public safety and defense interests. WARC

proposals and positions, because they help set the

international context for all radiocommunication

development and use, are thus critically important

in this regard. Unfortunately, both before and

after WARC-92, the government has been consistently criticized, by both members of the

private sector and the government itself, for its

lack of leadership in developing U.S. proposals

and positions for the conference.

Two primary factors contributed to this lack of

leadership. First, as noted in chapter one, the U.S.

approach to spectrum policymaking and WARC

preparation is based primarily on a democratic,

market-driven model that tends to be reactive

rather than forward-looking. And while this

approach allowed the United States to produce

decisions (WARC proposals) on time, it is less

clear that those decisions were (and are) in the

best long-term interests of the country. The

apparent success in setting WARC-92 proposals

quickly obscures the fact that long-range strategic

planning on the same issues is almost nonexistent.

One incident in particular from WARC-92

illustrates the impacts that a lack of focused

leadership and inadequate priority-setting can

have. During the preparations for the conference,

a conflict developed over the U.S. position with

regard to the use of the L-band. Here, two clear

policy issues clashed—support for big LEOS

versus support for the future Global Navigation

Satellite System (see chapter 2). The United

States found itself in the politically difficult

position of supporting two different uses for the

same frequency band--one a private sector use

backed by powerful companies promising billions of dollars in revenue and the other an

international system for improving air safety and

navigation that was already partially planned and

coordinated. No policy determination was made

to support one use/system or the other. Rather, the

U.S. delegation tried to finesse its position to

support both proposals, despite evidence that the

systems could not share the same frequencies.

The conflict will continue as the United States

and other nations try to reconcile the decisions of

the conference regarding these two services.
158 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

The second factor underlying the lack of

focused government leadership is the divided

structure of the radiocommunication policy process. Each of the agencies involved in the WARC

preparation process has its own priorities. The

FCC is concerned with promoting the interests of

the domestic radiocommunication industry and

U.S. radio service users. NTIA’s primary concern

is to protect the Federal Government users of the

spectrum, while also promoting the competitiveness of U.S. companies overseas. The State

Department, based on its mandate for advancing

foreign policy, is most concerned with negotiating the best deal once positions are set. Unfortunately, these three perspectives and the differing

missions of the various Federal agencies can often

give rise to divergent policy directions and

conflicts over the ‘best’ policy alternative. More

to the point, there is currently no effective

mechanism that stands above the agencies that

can mediate such policy-oriented disputes when

they arise.

But the deeper problems created by a divided

policy structure and lack of leadership may be

more subtle and far more serious. As noted in

chapter two, during the consideration of additional allocations for HF broadcasting, a conflict

developed between private broadcasters and U.S.

Information Agency (USIA)/Voice of America

(VOA), who wanted additional allocations and

other government agencies, who opposed further

allocations for broadcasting in the band, noting its

extensive use for drug interdiction activities. In

many respects this situation mirrored preparations prior to WARC-79. In both cases, VOA lost

its case in the traditional preparation process of

IRAC, and appealed the decision to the National

Security Council (NSC). Before WARC-79, NSC

accepted VOA’s position. In 1992, however, NSC

did not rule on VOA’s request until after the

conference had ended, effectively nullifying the

appeal. 24

The issue of whether VOA was justified in its

request is not the crucial issue. The more fundamental questions involve the policymaking and

appeals processes-are they fair and adequate,

are they adhered to, and, ultimately, do the

decisions made reflect the best interests of the

American public? Because of the different interpretations of events leading up to WARC-92 and

because much of the negotiations over HF broadcasting spectrum took place in the closed proceedings of IRAC, it is difficult to determine what

really happened, and when. It is clear that a policy

process is in place, but what is less clear is how

closely and fairly formal procedures were followed, and how much each side took advantage of

the process. Some government and private sector

representatives from the HF broadcasting community believe that they did not get a fair hearing

of their requirements in the U.S. preparatory

activities, leading some to claim that a policy

“deal’ was struck between the FCC, NTIA, and

other government users. They similarly feel that

the appeals process was not handled in an

aboveboard manner by those involved. They

point to this instance as part of a more general

problem in the way the IRAC/Ad Hoc 206

process works-a process they view as biased

against broadcasting interests specifically and

against smaller, less powerful agencies in general.

NTIA rejects this view. Agency officials maintain that there is no bias in the IRAC policymaking process, and that in the case of HF broadcasting, proper appeal procedures were followed.25

They point out that VOA was actively involved in

~ NSC subsqumdy rejected the VOA POshion.

U ~cmes where a di~~ment exists, the nod pr~~urc is for the issue to be passed to progressively h.i@Er Ievck fOr reSOhtiOn. muS

the debate (in the IRAC preparation process) over additional frequencies for HF broadcasting moved horn Working Oroup A of Ad Hoe 206

to the full membership of Ad Hoc 206, to the full IRAC, to NTIA, where a policy decision was made, and ftiy to the National Security

Council. While this process is well-understood, it is also possible that both sides can use the process to their own advantage. There is evidence

that both sides manipulated parts of the process in order to advance their negotiating strategies.
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 159

the IRAC process, and that the FCC, which

participates in the proceedings of the IRAC

through a liaison, did support VOA’s and private

broadcasters’ position. As a result of the preparation and appeals process, NTIA decided that the

existing uses of the band were more important

than VOA’s planned uses, and consequently

made a policy decision not to support VOA’s

requests.

Complicating the analysis of this situation is

the secrecy that tends to shroud the deliberations

of IRAC and its preparations of Federal Govem26 

ment positions. Because many of the government’s uses of radio frequencies support classified activities, IRAC meetings have historically

been closed to the public. This contributes to an

impression that hidden agendas are being pursued

and protected under the veil of ‘‘national security. ’ ‘ This perception is reinforced by a belief

that government users may not always fully

document their use of the spectrum to the

public.27 FCC staff, who represent “the public,’

do attend IRAC meetings, but it is unclear how

forcefully they articulate private sector interests

in such meetings or how much information they

can pass on to private sector representatives.

Some commenters have noted that the FCC

liaison is an effective force within IRAC, well

able to represent the interests of the private sector.

Other private sector commenters, however, are

not convinced that the FCC always represents

them as forcefully as it could.

Since IRAC meetings are mostly closed to the

public, such claims and beliefs are difficult to

evaluate. In the case of HF broadcasting, there is

no way to discern at what level the decision was

actually made, who made it, what policy dimensions were considered, and how carefully private

sector concerns were addressed. There is no way

to check what information was provided by the

existing users of the band, and there was no open

discussion at the policy level of which agency

mission was most important in this case-the

public diplomacy mission of the VOA and others,

or the use of the frequencies to support drug

interdiction efforts. However, it should not be

assumed that because VOA did not have all its

requests granted that the process is biased. On the

other hand, the fact that VOA did get some of

what it wanted does not prove the fairness of the

process either.

On a more general level, secrecy leads to an

impression that government frequency use information is not being shared. Some believe that it

may not even exist. Again, because of the closed

nature of the proceedings, an objective analysis of

such claims is difficult. The agencies participating in IRAC negotiations maintain that they do

share information, and that inadequate frequency

data is also a problem with the FCC. Executive

branch officials also point out that at certain

points, internal debate at the FCC is just as closed

from public view as is the IRAC process—at

some point, (public) inputs must be closed off and

a decision made. While this is true, the workings

of IRAC are generally more difficult to analyze--

it is still unclear what inputs are made and how

they are considered. Decisionmaking may need to

be closed off, but accountability must also be built

into the system to the extent possible. A way must

also be found to insure the accuracy and completeness of both government and private sector

frequency data, and to provide adequate access to

it for those with legitimate needs. Basing policy

M NTLA~ ~en steps t. o~n tie IRAC process so that its activities are more accessible to the public. This includes a public presentation

period at the beginning of each IRAC meeting. For further discussion of NTIA’s plans, see U.S. Department of Commerce, National

Telecommunications and Information Admru‘ ‘stratio% U.S. Spectrum Management Policy: Agenda for the Future, NTIA Special Publication

91-23 (Washington DC: US. Government Printing OffIce, February 1991).

27 ne extent to which gov ernment spectrum users must disclose and describe such use is unclear. NTIA official.s maintain that they require

users to support their proposals. What constitutes adequate support in this context is not defined. Especially in cases affecting national security

uses of the spectrum even NTIA officials may not Imow exactly where where, or how extensively a given frequency or band of frequencies

is used.

330-071 0 - 93 - 7 QL 3
160 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

decisions on flimsy or anecdotal data is no way to

formulate good public policy.

In general, critics of the IRAC process complain that few high-level, open policy determinations were made that could have guided the

WARC-92 preparation process, and solved major

disputes like HF broadcasting. Instead of being

guided by policy goals and accepted priorities, the

overall approach to WARC-92 preparations was

topic-oriented and ostensibly consensus-driven,

both within the Federal Government’s IRAC

proceedings and in the FCC’s Industry Advisory

Committee. Unfortunately, this approach does

not necessarily ensure that the best proposals are

put forward, only those that are supported by the

strongest (politically and/or financially) proponents and the best lawyers and consultants. This

may lead to cases in which the “little guy” gets

trampled-their concerns expressed but discounted.

In such cases, consensus can become in practice

little more than a rubber stamp for the wishes of

the most powerful.

The HF broadcasting case also highlights the

tension between NTIA’s mission as Federal

Government spectrum manager and its role as

presidential advisor on telecommunications-it

must walk a fine line between what the Federal

agencies (as represented in IRAC) want, and what

is good for the country as a whole. Policies and

decisions involving Federal Government spectrum use, based on the consensus of the Federal

users involved, may not reflect the larger public

interest. In such cases, it is possible that the

spectrum manager mission supersedes its advisory role, and private sector interests may lose out

to Federal Government interests. The outcome of

the HF debate provides little evidence either way.

HF broadcasting interests did get additional

allocations, but they did not get as much as they

wanted. From this broadest perspective, regardless of how the decision was made, claims of bias

toward Federal agencies are not supported; neither are claims that private sector interests were

well-represented and fairly considered.

The overarching question becomes: Who is

making U.S. Government communication policy? Based on what principles and concerns? In

lieu of guiding policy directives from above, it

appears that Federal policy is often developed out

of the consensus-based process of IRAC. This, in

and of itself, is not necessarily improper, but with

such a heavy concentration of defense-related

interests serving on that committee and a lack of

clear policy guidance, it is unclear if the workings

of IRAC represent a ‘‘level playing field’ on

which all agencies can get a fair hearing of their

needs and in which the best interests of the public

are served.28 It is also not clear that IRAC has the

authority or is at the appropriate (high-enough)

level to deal with fundamental questions of

policy-especially since IRAC is chartered in

only an advisory capacity to NTIA, which is

formally charged with developing policy and

managing the radio spectrum. 29 The appeals

process for IRAC decisions is well-defined, if

time-consuming. It should be noted, however,

that an effective appeals process does not compensate for or justify a poor policy-development

process.

28 As of Feb~ 1992, tie membership of IRAC consisted of: the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, HAth ~d Hum

Services, Interior, Justice, State, Treasury, Veterans Affairs, Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, National Aeronautics and Space Achmm“ “Stratiom

Navy, Nationat Science FoundatiorL U.S. Information Agency, U.S. Postat Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, General Services

Administration, Federat Aviation Administration, and a liaison from the Federal Communications Commission. The Defense Information

Systems Agency, National Communications Systerq and National Security Agency participate only as observers. IRAC is chaired by unofficial

from NTLA’s OffIce of Spectrum Management.

29 ~~s noted ~s temion i~e~: ~ ~Sfi~e tie RCc~m is the Deputy Associate Adrmrus “ ‘ trator of [the Offke of Spectrum

Management] and most of the subcommittee chairmen are also NTIA employees, it may appear to some that NTIA decisions are actually made

by IRAC or vice versa. The advisory role of KRAC and the decisionmaking role of NTIA should be cltiled and the abitity of the IRAC to

develop independent policy proposals emphasized. ” NTIA, op. cit., foomote 26, p. 22.
Chapter 3--Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 161

PREPARATION OF OFFICIAL PROPOSALS AND

NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

Despite some problems, initial U.S. preparations for WARC-92 went well. The official

proposals were developed on time (with some

exceptions) and were among the first to be

submitted to ITU. However, once that process

was completed, the development of negotiating

positions and strategies (based on the formal

proposals that were submitted to ITU for WARC92) became difficult. Several factors combined to

make this happen. First, the multitude of private

sector and government views were very difficult

to blend. A broad range of interests, a large

number of participants, and the lack of government leadership noted above are cited by most

observers as contributing factors.

Second, an almost universal complaint heard

from both private sector and government delegates and analysts was that the official U.S.

delegation was chosen and officially named much

too late in the preparation process. This complaint

has been made a number of times in the past.

Critics argue that the delegation must be picked

and announced well in advance of the conference

if the United States is to develop effective

positions and if the members of the delegation are

to learn to cooperate. Although an informal core

of industry and government representatives had

been preparing for WARC-92 well before the

conference, uncertainty about the makeup of the

delegation and the government’s efforts to preserve the secrecy of U.S. positions, made the

drafting and elaboration of fallback positions and

negotiating strategies difficult.

These problems led some observers, foreign

delegates, and U.S. delegates to complain that

developing formal and final U.S. negotiating

positions took too long. The result was a lack of

firm positions and strategies that made early

preconference diplomacy very awkward. The

unsettled form of U.S. positions had the further

effect that, in many international bilateral and

multilateral meetings (such as the CITEL meeting

held in Washington, DC in May of 1991), the

United States could not forcefully push (renegotiate) its views because they were not set. Some

delegates believe that having more time to “sell”

the U.S. positions, for example BSS-Sound and

HF, would have produced better results at the

WARC.

While more time to lobby for U.S. positions

could have helped promote U.S. interests, the

U.S. process could not have worked much faster.

The timeline for WARC-92 was set by the ITU at

its June 1990 Administrative Council meeting,

and the United States was one of the first

countries in the world to submit its proposals,

which were some of the most detailed and

comprehensive presented to the conference.

Another complaint about how proposal and

position development was handled involves information on other countries’ proposals and

positions. Critics complain that foreign positions

were not adequately considered in the preparation

process.

30 Preconference meetings between countries were a good source of information, but critics

charge that such information was not integrated

into the preparation of U.S. positions and strategies. One example these critics cite is the U.S.

proposal for BSS-Sound/digital audio broadcasting. In this case, existing domestic use of the

L-band outweighed international opinion; going

into the conference, worldwide support for the

U.S. S-band proposal was almost nonexistent,

while strong support existed for L-band and other

S-band allocations. The result of the U.S. prepara30 See Cements of tie I~ti~[e of Electrical and Electronics Engineers before the NationaJ ‘fkIecormmmications wd ~omtiOn

Administration+ Notice of Inquiry in the matter of Current and Future Requirements for the Use of Radio Frequencies in the United States,

Docket No. 920532-2132, released June 1, 1992.
162 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

tion process, however, left the United States with

little flexibility at WARC-92.31

While this may be true, such charges may also

be a matter of perception. In any case they point

out the tension in balancing domestic needs and

requirements with international concerns. In some

cases, the United States will have an overriding

interest in protecting its existing services, like

aeronautical telemetry, just as other countries do.

Attributing this decision to a lack of flexibility or

sensitivity to international concerns is not necessarily accurate.

Since good preparation is the key to a successful conference, an examination should be made of

ways to allow U.S. representatives to negotiate

more effectively before the conference, while still

promoting the democratic ideals of participation

that characterize the U.S. process. Some analysts

note that the root of U.S. inflexibility lies in the

nature of its preparation process. This process,

which is the result of long, and often contentious

debate, results in positions that are often very

rigid—there is no time or will to review the issues

again. This can force U.S. delegates to negotiate

from difficult and inflexible positions—a situation that closely resembles the Conference of

European Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) negotiating style, according to some U.S. delegates. These analysts

suggest that starting from a position that is not

quite so set and specific may have benefits in

allowing delegates more room to negotiate. Starting with more flexibility could lead to better

outcomes in the long run.

An inevitable tension arises between making

decisions that allow U.S. interests to advocate

U.S. proposals and closing off debate too early.

With adequate time and resources, the U.S.

process works well. In cases such as WARC-92,

where deadlines were short, the process works

less well. In entering an era in which conferences

will occur every 2 years, it becomes more

important to reach decisions in a timely fashion.

Ways must be found to speed the process while at

the same time allowing all voices to be heard.

1 Preconference Negotiating

EXTENSIVE PRECONFERENCE NEGOTIATION

IS CRUCIAL

One clear lesson from WARC-92 is the importance of extensive and open (as much as possible)

talks with other countries prior to the opening of

the conference. Such talks, either informally

between staff, or in more formal bi- or multilateral

meetings give countries an opportunity to present

their positions and gauge support and/or opposition to them, get information on other countries

proposals, and begin to find areas of common

ground on which to cooperate or areas of disagreement that will require negotiation and supportbuilding. Such contacts are a crucial forerunner to

the conference itself, and represent an important

opportunity to refine positions and gather intelligence for future negotiations. Although the United

States did conduct meetings prior to WARC-92 in

an attempt to inform other countries of our

positions and concerns and gauge potential support or opposition, many delegates feel that more

extensive prenegotiation would have been beneficial.

Delegates and observers had several complaints about the way in which preconference

meetings were handled. Some observers have

complained that in some cases, the key spokespeople for the United States did not participate in the

bilateral talks that were held with many countries.

Government and private sector analysts have

noted that such participation by experts is crucial

in the early stages of WARC prenegotiation

because it informs other countries what the U.S.

positions are and provides crucial early feedback

that should allow U.S. negotiators to further

range, making it impossible for them to support the U.S. position. Each side’s position was made inflexible by existing uses. In the last clays

of the conference, however, some European countries did break ranks and support the L-band allocation proposals.
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 163

refine and develop positions and strategies that

have a better chance of success at the conference

itself. Such meetings also provide an opportunity

for private sector representatives to explain (sell)

their systems in great detail, including an explanation of how such new systems would be

implemented, how they might affect existing

radio services, and what benefits would come

from using the new systems and services.

Several factors contributed to this problem.

First is the fact that the official delegation was

named so late in the preparation process. The

individuals who would later become spokesmen

for the United States had not even been officially

named to the delegation, In a few cases, the

people who did make these trips were not the most

knowledgeable about the subjects to be discussed

and were not the ones who later represented the

United States at WARC-92. Another reason for

this is a matter of time: U.S. experts and

government spokespeople were needed in the

United States to help develop policies and positions, but at the same time, they were also needed

to participate in bi- and multilateral discussions

abroad.

Finally, a lack of travel funds hindered the

participation of some key individuals at early

meetings. The FCC, for example, which should

have been represented on any meetings with

foreign representatives, was able to send only one

or two representatives because of limited travel

funds and other work commitments, and these

were often not the FCC staffers who were expert

on the topics, who were involved in the preparation of proposals and (fallback) positions, and

who became delegates to WARC-92. These

choices deprived the United States of building or

strengthening relationships with foreign delegates and prevented in-depth (more technical)

discussions on some topics prior to the conference.

Another complaint heard about the conduct of

preconference negotiations is that at least two

potentially important trips (one a trilateral meeting with the United Kingdom and Russia in

Moscow and another a tour of a number of

countries in Africa) were canceled at the last

minute. Explanations as to why the trips were

canceled have been vague, although turmoil in the

former USSR has been blamed for the cancellation of the Moscow trip. Meetings were rescheduled with some of these countries.

Some delegates have also complained about

the distribution of the bilateral meetings held

before the conference. There was apparently a

heavy concentration of meetings with CEPT

representatives, but less contact with other potentially important countries. In retrospect, Ambassador Baran has stated that, given CEPT’s reluctance to compromise, he thinks time would have

been better spent working with other countries.

The expansion of work with the CITEL countries

may provide a useful forum in this regard.

In addition to the bilateral and multilateral

meetings scheduled as part of WARC preparations, CCIR activities provide an important forum

for explaining U.S. views and systems. U.S.

(government and private sector) representatives

were active in the work of CCIR study groups.

These study groups, which meet periodically over

a number of years, consider specific allocation/

regulation topics, and develop (technical) recommendations on WARC agenda items. These

recommendations provide crucial input to the

work of the conference, and often carry great

weight in the deliberations. The work of CCIR in

preparation for WARC-92 culminated in a Joint

Interim Working Party meeting in March 1991.

The product of this meeting was a voluminous

report that contained all the technical recommendations to WARC-92 concerning frequency

requirements and suitable allocations for the

various services under consideration, frequency

sharing and interference criteria, and other technical recommendations.32

32 For a more ~.dep~ dismssion of role of the CCIR and its study groups in WARC preparations, see O’IX, WMC-9Z, op. cit., foomote

2.
164 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Several observers have noted the important, if

underrated, opportunity such meetings offer for

developing support for U.S. proposals. Because

the United States is one of the world’s leaders in

developing radiocommunications technology, and

because membership in the study groups is more

open to private sector input and more limited (in

numbers) than that of the WARCs, U.S. companies play a leading role in the technical studies

undertaken in CCIR. Thus, the United States

(through the papers it develops for the study

group topics) can have a significant impact on the

recommendations developed by CCIR and hence

on the work of the WARC itself. Some observers

believe that more extensive and effective work in

the CCIR fora before the WARCs leads to more

successful outcomes for the United States at the

conferences. In addition, the activities of the

study groups not only offer important opportunities for building support for U.S. proposals, but

also expose U.S. representatives to other countries’ ideas-allowing the United States to take

better account of them in our formal proposals.

Given these benefits, the activities of CCIR

should continue to be an important focus of

pre-WARC negotiations.

THE NEED FOR NEW ALLIES

The increasing power of Europe as represented

by the CEPT coalition has important implications

for future preconference negotiation strategies.

U.S. experts in international spectrum policy

recognize that Europe will be the single most

powerful force in the ITU for some time. Prior to

WARC-92, meetings that were held between the

United States and CEPT were not very productive. Each side attributed this to the other’s lack

of willingness to compromise. Preconference

negotiations suffered because of this, and, as a

result, WARC-92 deliberations were made more

difficult because few issues could be resolved

before the conference.

In order for the United States to most effectively address the new power of the European

countries, many analysts believe that more regular meetings with the Europeans will be necessary

for U.S. spectrum managers to monitor European

views and directions, and to gauge their future

positions and assess their response to U.S. proposals. This approach will allow U.S. representatives to gather intelligence on European goals and

to more easily cooperate with them on issues of

mutual interest. The important advantage of early

talks and greater cooperation (than was evident

prior to WARC-92) with CEPT is that conference

negotiations could be easier, and the United

States would gain a strong ally that could help in

defeating proposals from other blocks of countries. The new ITU conference schedule will also

force more regular meetings between the United

States and Europe as they prepare for conferences

every 2 years, providing increased opportunities

for cooperation.

Although the power of CEPT was clearly

evident at WARC-92, it did not ensure success on

all issues. Many countries were put off by the lack

of flexibility on the part of the Europeans (and the

United States) and their unwillingness to compromise or negotiate on some issues. Reportedly,

even some European delegates were unhappy

about the lack of flexibility CEPT showed.

Delegates from both the United States and CEPT.

countries recognize that such a lack of willingness

to compromise made the work of WARC-92

much more difficult. This recognition provides an

important opening for the United States to work

with CEPT to resolve disputes before both sides

become too committed to them and incapable or

unwilling to compromise.

As a complementary approach, in order to

counter the power of CEPT countries, Western

Hemisphere countries are seeking to build the

strength and unity of CITEL. CITEL has long

been an underused resource in harmonizing

Western Hemisphere telecommunications views,

but before WARC-92 serious efforts were made
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 165

to bring North and South American interests

together. 33 CITEL countries did meet several

times as a group at WARC-92, but no substantive

agreements or common views could be developed, in large part because of infighting between

member countries (including the United States)

for control of the agenda of the group and the

outcomes on various issues.

Despite its relative ineffectiveness at WARC92, CITEL remains an important potential source

of support for the United States in the future.

Historically, it has been held back by a lack of

status, a lack of recognition of its importance by

CITEL member governments, and a consequent

lack of adequate funding to produce meaningful

results. Gradually, these factors are changing.

There is a growing recognition of the importance

and promise of CITEL among both U.S. and

foreign government officials. If the promise is to

become reality, however, this recognition must be

backed up by renewed efforts to compromise and

increased funding.

It is unlikely that CITEL will become another

CEPT--a collection of countries with common

positions that cannot be changed easily. The

telecommunication interests, economies, and political structures of CITEL member countries are

too diverse to promote that level of collaboration.

Rather, CITEL members see it as a way to

improve coordination and cooperation between

themselves, and exploit common interests where

possible.

The United States will also have to engage in

more extensive preconference negotiations and

meetings outside the developed countries. Building on the alliances developed before and during

WARC-92, a new program of extensive outreach

to the developing countries of Asia, and especially Africa, could pay important benefits at

future ITU conferences.

RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS HAMPERED

NEGOTIATIONS

One of the most serious limitation on preconference negotiations was lack of resources. Many

delegates have noted that the meetings held prior

to WARC-92 were hampered because key government spokespeople often could not make the

trips. Lack of adequate travel funds was the

primary factor limiting more active participation

of government representatives. As a result, there

were a few occasions on which some matters

could not be discussed because they were too

technical for those U.S. representatives present.

The seriousness of this limitation is open to

question.

The State Department, through its Office of

Internationa1 Conferences, controls (some of) the

funds that pay for U.S. participation in all

international conferences, including WARC-92.

Funds from this office are used to pay for the

administrative costs of U.S. attendance at the

conference (computers, office rental, supplies,

etc.), and to pay for the head and the vice-chairs

of the delegation, along with two or three support

staff. Beyond those individuals, the question of

who the State Department will pay for is always

hotly contested. The Office of International Conferences has limited funds, and each Federal

agency—including CIP--vies for additional staff.

The agencies must cover remaining staff costs out

of their own travel budgets.

While State Department funding is used to pay

the administrative expenses of the conferences,

travel funds for preconference meetings usually

come out of individual agency budgets. For

agencies such as the FCC, which has operated on

a chronically tight budget for many years, this

meant that its representation on bilateral talks was

often limited to one or two people or none.

Agencies with larger budgets, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, had

33 Several m&ting5 wercheld byCInL inpreparation forw!MC-92. The goal of these meetings was to generate common vlewS titC~L

members could use as a guide in developing their own country’s WARC-92 proposals, Although this goal was not achieved, the meetings were

extrcmely valuable achwving the broader objective of increasing the cooperation and unity of the countries of the Western Hemisphere. See

OTA, W~C-92, op. cit., footnote 2.
166 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

fewer difficulties. The State Department also has

funds to send U.S. Government representatives to

meetings of CCIR at which bilateral meetings

could also be conducted. This way of “piggybacking” one meeting on another allowed the

United States to send issue experts from agencies

that could not afford the costs themselves.

The funding for future world radiocommunication conferences must be rationalized. The sporadic nature of past conferences made them very

difficult to budget for—travel budgets varied

wildly from year to year. The regular schedule of

conferences planned for the future will make

setting travel budgets easier. However, the funds

to support the continuous series of bilateral

preparation meetings and the funds for the conferences themselves must match this ambitious new

schedule.

BUILDING BROADER SUPPORT

FOR U.S. PROPOSALS

In addition to the targeted prenegotiation that

takes place before WARCs, a number of delegates

and observers have identified the importance of

long-running U.S. efforts that have helped build

support for the United States. The best example of

such efforts is the United States Telecommunication Training Institute (USTTI), which provides

technical training to spectrum managers and

technicians from developing countries. A number

of WARC-92 delegates from other countries were

graduates from this program. Although it is not

possible to assess the direct impacts of this

program and U.S. training of foreign nationals

generally on the support for U.S. proposals, many

delegates believe that the exposure to U.S. ideas

and technology that these students receive is

important in building a broad base of support for

future U.S. radiocommunication policies.

CONFERENCE MANAGEMENT

9 Head of Delegation

The head of delegation’s job is to have U.S.

proposals adopted at WARC-92. Because of the

generally late selection of heads of delegation,

Ambassador Baran played almost no role in the

development of U.S. proposals. As is the normal

process, proposals were developed in concert by

the FCC (for private sector issues) and NTIA (for

Federal Government issues). His primary function, therefore, was as a negotiator--conducting

preliminary/exploratory negotiations with foreign countries before the conference, and working

during the conference to resolve the most difficult

issues that could not be resolved in lower-level

working groups. The Ambassador was also responsible for the day-to-day and strategic management of the delegation at the conference itself.

RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS EXPERT?

One of the criticisms heard during the preparation for WARC-92 was that Ambassador Baran

was not a radiocommunications expert, nor even

particularly knowledgeable about international

telecommunications. Some believe that the head

of delegation should be well-versed in radiocommunications, which would eliminate the need for

time-cons uming education (essentially on-thejob training) of an ambassador prior to the

conference. Others believe, however, that the

most important skills for a head of delegation

involve leadership, international experience, negotiation skills, and an understanding of politics.

They point out that an intelligent individual can

learn the issues and surround him/herself with

experts to filter and explain technical details that

arise. Ambassador Baran fell into this latter

category and, by most accounts, did a good job in

familiarizing himself with the issues.

These divergent views are not irreconcilable.

WARC-92 was an extremely wide-ranging conference. It addressed many technologies, services,

and issues, a number of which were leftover from

previous conferences. A single individual would

have difficulty mastering all the topics that were

discussed at WARC-92 in such a short period of
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 167

time. 34 Past WARCs, with the exception of the

general WARCs such as WARC-79, concentrated

on narrower topics such as mobile services or HF

broadcasting or satellite communications. In such

cases, it may be possible for an individual to

understand the range of issues addressed by the

conference. Because future world radiocommunication conferences are expected to be more

limited in scope, it may be possible to find a head

of delegation who is well-versed in international

negotiation and knowledgeable of the issues.

TERM OF APPOINTMENT

One problem identified by observers critical of

U.S. WARC preparations in the past is that the

U.S. head of delegation, who receives temporary

ambassador status (but does not get paid by the

government), is chosen too late in the preparation

process. The reason for this is that there is a

6-month limit on the terms of temporary ambassadors. Before WARC-92, Ambassador Baran was

selected, and began working in late 1990, although he was not formally sworn in until August

1991.

The length of a head of delegation’s term

complicates the management of preconference

meetings and preliminary negotiations. Although

Ambassador Baran began (unofficially) working

on WARC-92 issues roughly 1 year before the

conference, some preparation activities and meetings had been scheduled and were taking place

before he started. The result was that U.S.

representatives were participating in many meetings around the world covering a number of

topics—a confusing array that sometimes conflicted with directions the Ambassador was trying

to take. Individuals sometimes had to be ‘grounded”

in order to have the preparations work at home be

rationalized with the need for meetings abroad.

To solve such problems, some have suggested

that the ambassadorship should be a fixed-term

appointment-perhaps 4 or 6 years. Consequently,

the position of head of delegation is most often

mentioned in connection with a permanent agency

to coordinate U.S. planning and preparations for

international radiocommunications conferences

(see chapter 1). Among WARC-92 delegates and

observers, opinion is split over whether the

United States should have a permanent head of

delegation, and, if so, what requirements and

responsibilities should go with the post. Such a

position could, if properly conceived and set up

provide a valuable focus for future WARC

preparations. A permanent head of delegation

could bring consistency to delegation management and the preconference negotiations that

form an important part of WARC outcomes. A

longer appointment could also provide continuity

to U.S. conference activities-preparation, negotiations, and implementation-and would allow

an individual to build experience that is not lost

when the conference ends. On a broader scale, a

longer freed-term appointment could provide

continuity to U.S. negotiating efforts before,

during, and after WARCs—building trust and

relationships among foreign heads.

Among those who oppose establishing a conference preparation agency and/or a more permanent head of delegation, many believe that the

current system works the way it is—’ ‘if it ain’t

broke, don’t fix it. ” Many observers believe that

a permanent (or fixed-term) head of delegation is

not needed since continuity is provided in the

members of the delegation itself. Other analysts

warn that appointing a more permanent head of

delegation could be difficult politically because

such a move could create a power center in

addition (opposition) to the FCC/NTIA/State

Department troika. The officials in charge of

conference preparation at these agencies could

see the creation of such a post as a threat to their

power. The creation of such a position would also

further diffuse the policymaking procedures that

are in place. Some fear the dislocations that would

~ Several obse~ers ~ve pointed out that some i.ndividtis on both the U.S. and foreign delegations were well-versed k mosc if not tall,

of the important issues discussed at WARC-92-experience gained over many years of participation in ITU aetivitieis.
168 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

result from changing the existing power structures and balances, and believe that changing the

relations of NTIA, the FCC, and the State

Department will result in less effective preparation. Such dislocations, however, would likely be

short-term, and would dissipate after a settling-in

period.

If a freed-term appointment is adopted, an

examination must be made of what role the head

of delegation is expected to play—what rights

and responsibilities will the individual have? In

making this analysis, a number of factors will

have to be considered. What type of background

should the head of delegation have? As noted,

many have argued that the head should be

someone with radiocommunication experience.

Others argue that diplomacy and international

negotiating skills are more important at the top

level. If a freed-term appointment is not made, it

may be easier for a diplomat to learn the

technology and issues and tap the experience and

expertise of good (technical) advisors. On the

other hand, an individual well-versed in radiocommunication policy would know the issues

better. If a longer-term appointment is made, the

question becomes somewhat moot; over the

course of the term, the appointee could better

learn all aspects of the job.

Should the position be full- or part-time?

Conferences separated by many years may only

have required a part-time position in the early

stages of preparation. With ITU considering

holding world radiocommunication conferences

every 2 years, a full-time position may be more

appropriate.

Should the position be filled by a private sector

or government representative? Since the position

would likely be a presidential appointee, either is

possible. Some private sector observers believe

that the only way the private sector can be fairly

represented is with a private sector head of

delegation. A head of delegation chosen from the

government, they argue further, would be too

enmeshed in the institutional battles of the

agencies involved. Government interests, of

course, would rather see one of their own in the

position. It may also be difficult to convince

private sector individuals to serve 4 years and

then leave (if the post is nonsucceeding).

A related question is whether or not the head of

delegation necessarily needs to be an ambassador.

At WARC-92, some heads of other delegations

were ambassadors, some were not. Some maintain that naming an ambassador for WARCS is

overkill, that the connotations of the term take it

out of the more technical realm of the WARC and

contribute to the political nature of the negotiations. Others believe that the rank of ambassador

conveys an important level of status that is useful

in negotiations and that it underscores the U.S.

appreciation of and commitment to the WARC

process.

H Divisions of Responsibility

The division of responsibility for domestic

spectrum policy and the problems it creates have

been previously discussed.35 The problems of a

divided structure were also evident at WARC-92.

Foreign delegates reportedly had a difficult time

deciphering the U.S. delegation and were confused by who was in charge of U.S. policy on

specific topics. Several factors contributed to the

complexity of the U.S. delegation. First, the

delegation itself was large. There were multiple

layers of leadership, including the head of delegation, six vice-chairs, the official U.S. spokesperson for each major committee, a spokesperson for

each subcommittee and working group, official

delegates, the support staff, and the observers. In

addition, delegates were assigned as liaisons to

specific countries or observer groups on major

issues. This structure was overlaid by the distinctions between FCC, NTIA, State Department, and

private sector representatives. To some foreign

delegates the U.S. Government delegates may

35 o~, WMC.92, op. cit., foo~ote 2.
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 169

have seemed indistinguishable, but the more

savvy delegates know that responsibility for

implementing WARC-92 decisions will be divided between the FCC and NTIA, and they

would prefer to negotiate with those who are

likely to be involved in actual implementation.

One simple solution that has been suggested is to

publish a list of U.S. delegates and spokespeople

for the various issues, and distribute it to foreign

delegates at the beginning of future conferences.

In addition to contributing to foreign confusion, the divided nature of the delegation also led

to questions among U.S. delegates about who was

in charge-institutionally and personally. Reflecting the overall lack of focus at home, no one

agency took the lead at the WARC. And while

Ambassador Baran was in overall charge of the

management of the delegation at the conference,

he did not lead negotiations on most of the

issues. 36

The hierarchical structure and large size of the

delegation also caused some communication

problems in the delegation itself. Although the

delegation leadership held daily meetings to

discuss strategy, and full delegation meetings

were held every other day, many delegates

thought that communication between the delegation leadership and the delegates was poor—that

information was passed up to delegation leaders,

but information from the leadership was not

passed down. Several members of the delegation

complained that there were too many layers of

management, and that they were never sure what

the leadership was doing.

9 Execution of Negotiating Strategies

There is some question over how flexible the

United States was at WARC-92 and how flexible

the United States should be in WARCs generally.

As with the evaluation of outcomes, perceptions

of ‘‘flexibility’ are highly variable and depend

on the individuals and issues involved. Critics

complain that before and during WARC-92

negotiations in Spain, the United States took a

very hard line on many issues and refused to

really negotiate. This is reflected in comments

that the United States did not really try to

accommodate foreign positions in its proposals or

preconference negotiations and spent more time

on selling U.S. positions rather than negotiating

a solution.

Members of the delegation leadership maintain

that the United States was flexible on all but a few

issues. The truth lies somewhere in between. As

is usually the case in international negotiations,

the United States was more willing--more flexibleto negotiate on some issues than on others.

Different issues had different degrees of flexibility attached to them based on the outcomes of the

initial preparations process and the way that

(fallback) positions were written.

Several U.S. and foreign delegates have noted

that a lack of flexibility in some U.S. positions

often left the United States isolated on important

allocation issues. To foreign observers, the U.S.

delegation and its leadership often appeared to be

held hostage to previously established positions

and decisions. In order to (substantially) deviate

from formally established U.S. positions and

strategies, the U.S. delegation was required to

constantly communicate with the home team for

instructions and approvals. This added time to the

negotiation process and frustrated some foreign

delegates, who saw the United States as effectively unable to participate in on-the-spot decisionmaking that occurs throughout the conference, especially in the closing days.

Some analysts and observers, from both the

United States and foreign countries, have noted

that the United States was just as inflexible on

some issues as U.S. representatives charge CEPT

was. The reasons for this perception vary. Some

36 ~tereSt@ly, @baSSadOr B~~ ~~de Sfilla Cements abut the European block. CEP’I’, although presenting a coherent block at

WARC-92, did have internal divisions and negotiating through theru was quite difficult. There was uncertainty as to who controlled individual

nation’s positio~the delegates of the country itself, or CEPT leaders. Usually, CEPT positions won out.
170 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

attribute it to the slow preparation of positions

and the late formal naming of the U.S. delegation

and head of delegation. They point out that even

late in 1991, the U.S. delegation had not been

named and U.S. positions were still closely

held—making preliminary negotiations between

the United States and other countries extremely

difficult, and by some accounts, not very productive. U.S. negotiators, however, rightly point out

that certain U.S. positions had been set as a result

of difficult domestic processes that concluded

such inflexible positions were necessary and

justified in order to protect and promote U.S.

interests. They further note that a certain amount

of secrecy is necessary to successful negotiations.

Whatever the case may be, this inflexibility

certainly contributed to the difficulty of negotiations at WARC-92.

Lack of flexibility maybe most directly related

to our open, democratic form of policy development. Proposals and positions are so hard-fought

in the preparations process that it can be very

difficult to modify positions rapidly enough to

effectively negotiate at international conferences

such as WARC-92. Too many interests have to be

considered and consulted to allow reaction times

as quick as some delegates would have liked.

Other delegations reportedly had more flexibility

to make decisions without such consultations.

Changes may be required in the instructions given

to the delegation that would allow U.S. negotiators greater latitude in future negotiations.

Another reason given for the lack of flexibility

on the part of U.S. negotiators is that hard-line

positions were part of the U.S. negotiating

strategy. According to some accounts, the inflexibility of the U.S. delegation was not a problem,

rather it was a deliberately conceived part of a

strategic framework designed to achieve the

greatest possible success for U.S. proposals.

Staking out positions early and refusing to

compromise may in fact have forced some

countries to move further toward U.S. positions

than they would have under a scenario of mutual

cooperation, but the opposite may also be true.

Some countries, especially CEPT countries, may

have become less willing to negotiate in the face

of U.S. determination.

One solution to these problems is to invest the

delegation with greater power and flexibility to

negotiate, and to make the head of delegation

ultimately responsible for the outcomes. This

model is closer to that of several countries,

including the United Kingdom. Such a solution,

of course, has its advantages and disadvantages.

The advantages are that the ability of the delegation to negotiate quickly is improved and that

lines of authority and responsibility are clear. In

the context of a new era of world radiocommunication conferences, change and flexibility will

become more important. It may also be possible

that with more narrowly focused conferences, the

issues will be simpler to manage and the necessity

of consulting extensively with the home team

reduced. Giving the delegation more power alarms

some analysts, however, who fear that such power

could be abused. Changes in positions or negotiating strategies, for example, could be made

without consulting all the affected parties or by

ignoring the positions of some interests (see

below). While such abuses will always be possible, the benefits of added flexibility and speed in

negotiations may make the risk(s) worthwhile.

Because it is not possible to compare the

advantages and disadvantages of each approach

under real-world conditions in this case, it is

difficult to judge whether or not inflexibility was

the most appropriate or effective strategy for the

United States to pursue. Did U.S. inflexibility

hurt us in negotiations or in any way work to the

detriment of the United States vis-a-vis the final

outcomes? Could outcomes have been improved?

Or were such strong stances necessary to achieve

the goals and needs identified in the domestic

preparation process? It is easy to believe on a

theoretical level that greater flexibility would

have better served U.S. interests in the negotiations both before and at the conference. The

reality, however, may be that such a hard-line

approach was best, and, obviously, U.S. negotia-
Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 171

tors perceived it to be so (although others strongly

disagree). Unfortunately, there is no way to

objectively assess what could have happened if

things had been different. The more relevant point

is whether or not such absolute positions were

necessary and how such positions were determined. The domestic preparation process again

appears as a crucial element in the success or

failure of U.S. proposals to WARC-92. It is these

processes, and the structures and ideology underlying them, that must be carefully examined. In

cases where the United States feels it must stake

out an inflexible, and often isolated, position, it

becomes critically important to carefully assess

the reasons, benefits, and disadvantages of such

an approach. As noted throughout this report, it is

unclear to what extent such evaluations were

made.

The larger policy/management question that

arises is who has ultimate control of the delegation’s actions. Prior to arriving at WARCs, the

U.S. head of delegation is given a set of instructions drafted by the State Department in consultation with the FCC and NTIA that serve as the

blueprint for how negotiations should be conducted. These instructions set out objectives and

goals and list priorities and outcomes the United

States could not accept under any conditions.

Such a document, however, cannot possibly

foresee all the twists and turns negotiations take.

As a result, the delegation leadership must have

some degree of flexibility to make decisions

on-site. Substantial deviations from accepted

U.S. positions are traditionally cleared through

consultations with the U.S. home team. The issue

is how much discretionary negotiating power the

delegation should have vis-a-vis the home team

and the agencies. The uneasy balance of power

between the delegation and the home team blurs

the lines of authority and obscures responsibility—

confusing both foreign and U.S. delegates. Who

is ultimately responsible for the conduct and

outcomes of negotiations, the head of delegation,

the home team expert on specific topics, or the

broader collection of home team representatives?

One example from WARC-92 illustrates the

problem. In discussions over MSS, as noted

previously, a major U.S. concern was preserving

the 1435-1525 MHz band for aeronautical telemetry uses. At WARC-92, however, conference

delegates decided to allocate portions of this band

to BSS-Sound (1452-1492 MHz) and MSS (1492-

1525 MHz—for Region 2 only). The United

States was forced to insert a footnote (722B) to

protect aeronautical telemetry interests. The

strength of the wording of the footnote, however,

was the subject of hot debate between private

sector interests, who wanted to leave open the

possibility of future (MSS) uses of the band, and

Defense Department/NTIA interests, who believed that strong language was needed to keep

unwanted services out. Following the original

U.S. position, the delegation drafted language

that was very strict, and sent it to the U.S. home

team for comment and approval. The home team

concluded that the language was too uncompromising and sent draft language back to the delegation

that NTIA/Defense Department believed was not

strong enough. In the end, the delegation stuck to

the original U.S. position, and the harsher version

of the footnote became the official footnote.

Opinions differ as to what the real effect of this

wording will be.

In this case, the original delegation instructions

for the issue were followed to the letter, a decision

made by the delegation itself in spite of new

instructions from the home team. Several questions arise: Does the delegation or the head of

delegation have the authority to ignore the home

team’s instructions? Who made the policy decision that the footnote should be so harsh? Was

adequate consideration given to private sector

concerns? Is the private sector at a disadvantage

once WARCs start in terms of influencing subsequent policy decisions?
Appendix A: Structure

and Proceedings

of WARC-921

T

he supreme body of WARC-92 was the

plenary, in which all countries participated.

The plenary was chaired by the Honorable

Jose Barrionuevo Peña, member of the Spanish Parliment.2 WARC-92 delegates selected five

vice-chairs to assist him, including Ambassador Jan

Baran, the head of the U.S. delegation.3 Agreements

were Finalized at the plenary sessions, most of which

took place in the last several days of the conference.

B Structure of the Conference

The work of WARC-92 was functionally divided

among seven committees, With the exception of

Committee 1, each of the committees had a single chair

and vice-chair.

Committee 1: The Steering Committee was composed of the chair and vice-chair of the conference and the chair and vice-chair of the other

committees listed below. It coordinated the

meetings and other activities of WARC-92.

Committee 2: The Credentials Committee was

charged with verifying the diplomatic credentials

of the delegations present at WARC-92.

Committee 3: The Budget Control Committee had

two purposes, overseeing conference expenditures and identifying the financial implications

of WARC-92 decisions.

Committee 4: The Frequency Allocations Committee was the focus of much of the work at

WARC-92. All of the decisions on how to

allocate the spectrum were made during the

deliberations of this committee and its subcommittees. Committee 4 divided its work into three

subcommittees: working groups A, B, and C.

Working Group 4A considered allocation issues

in the frequencies below 137 MHz, specifically

high-frequency broadcasting. Working Group

4B considered allocations for services between

137 MHz and 3 GHz. Among the topics included

in 4B discussion were most of the ‘‘hot’

issues—mobile satellite services, including big

and little low-Earth orbiting satellites (LEOS),

Future Public Land Mobile Telecommunication

Systems (FPLMTS), Broadcasting-Satellite Service-Sound (BSS-Sound), and some of the space

services. Working Group 4C considered allocations above 3 GHz, including space services,

high-definition television (HDTV), and general

satellite service. In addition to these working

groups, Committee 4 also assigned specific tasks

1 The following section is based on International Wlecommunication Uniou “Inauguration of WARC-92, ” Telecommunication Journal,

vol. 59, No. 3, 1992, and U.S. Department of State, United .Ytates Delegan’on Report,’ 1992 WorldAdministrative Radio Conference, publication

9938, July 1992, Annex F.

z When ITU conferences are not held in Geneva, the headquarters of ITU, the chairman of a WARC is traditionally provided by the country

hosting the ecmference.

J The other vice-chairs were from the Russian Federation, Cote d’Ivoire, China, and Norway.

173
174 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

to a number of other smaller groups, some of

which are described below.

Committee 5: The Regulatory Committee was the

other most important committee at WARC-92. It

considered the regulatory changes and procedures resulting from the decisions made in

Committee 4, and debated definitions for new

services. The committee also split its work into

working groups—5A, 5B, and 5C- and a number

of subworking groups to address specific regulatory issues.

Committee 6: The Editorial Committee “aligned”

the texts developed in the Allocations and

Regulatory Committees-ensuring that the texts

contained the same meanings in the official

languages of the International Telecommunication

Union (ITU)--French, English, and Spanish.

This was an important committee because countries could try to “align” the texts to their best

advantage-sometimes trying to make changes

that altered the substance of the agreements,

especially if they had earlier “lost” on an issue

in committees 4 and 5.

A Technical Working Group to the Plenary was also

established in order to consider complex technical

issues that required in-depth analysis or study and that

could not be resolved in the work of Committees 4

and/or 5. In addition to providing technical advice to

the conference, the Working Group to the Plenary also

had its own set of issues to consider, including making

recommendations for future conferences to address

meteorological and Earth-exploration satellite services, new space services in bands above 20 GHz, and

meteorological aids services in bands below 1 GHz.

With so many different groups covering so many

different topics, overlapping meetings were unavoidable.

In many cases, the deliberations of Committees 4 and

5 went on simultaneously. For the United States, with

71 delegates and support staff, covering all important

meetings was not all that difficult. For smaller nations,

however, who sent only one or two delegates to the

conference, attendance at all relevant meetings was

impossible. These countries tended to split their time

between the various working, ad hoc, and drafting

groups of Committees 4 and 5.

# Negotiation and Decisionmaking

The work of the conference was hierarchically

structured. In Committee 4, allocations issues were

divided among the appropriate working groups (listed

above). Once these groups started their discussions,

some issues were decided relatively easily and early in

the conference. Other issues, however, were more

difficult. The most contentious issues, includingMobileSatellite Service (MSS), Broadcasting-Satellite ServiceSound (BSS-Sound), and FPLMTS, were handed

down to smaller working groups, which usually

consisted only of the major parties involved in the

debate. Often the membership in these subgroups was

balanced to ensure fair geographic representation

among the ITU’s three regions.

The process of formalizing agreements followed

this hierarchy in reverse order. Each small drafting or

ad hoc group would come to an agreement and then

report its findings to its parent group or committee. In

cases where agreement was not possible, the topic was

“bumped up” to the parent committee for discussion

and resolution. In this way, issues worked their way

back up the conference structure. After final texts had

been agreed to in Committees 4 and 5, these documents

were sent to Committee 6 to be aligned. From

Committee 6, draft agreements finally reached the

plenary level, where the drafts were read through

several times for final agreement, each time refining

wording further and resolving any remaining issues or

questions.

By the end of the conference, most issues had been

resolved in the committees or their subcommittees.

However several issues—MSS, including big LEOS,

BSS-Sound and FPLMTS-had not been resolved.

They were brought to the floor of the full Committee

4 and eventually to the plenary for final resolution,

I Ad Hoc and Drafting Groups

In addition to the above committees, ad hoc groups

and drafting groups were established as needed throughout the conference. Some of the more notable groups

are listed below.
Appendix A-Structure and Proceedings of WARC-92 I 175

COMMITTEE 4

Ad Hoc Group 1—To harmonize allocation options for the general-satellite service.

Ad Hoc Group 3-To identify from options

resulting from the work of Drafting Group 1 to

Working Group 4C a single allocation option to put

forward to Committee 4 that meets the requirements of

the proposing administrations and addresses the concerns of affected administrations, taking into account

the Report of the Chairman of Working Group 4C to

the Chairman of Committee 4 (Dec. 207) with respect

to the general-satellite service.

Drafting Group 4B1-Space research and operation service 1 GHz, mobile and mobile-satellite service

below 1 GHz.

Drafting Group 4B2--Consolidation of all proposals for the mobile-satellite service between 1 and 3

GHz.

Drafting Group 4B3-Consolidation of all proposals for the broadcasting-satellite service (sound).

Drafting Group 4B4---Consolidation of all proposals on regional and worldwide mobile communications

including FPLMTS.

Ad Hoc Group 4B5--To harmonize proposals for

the space operations, space research, and Earth exploration-satellite services in the bands 2025-2110 MHz

and 2200-2290 MHz.

Drafting Group to Ad Hoc 4B5

To harmonize the texts of Resolutions concerning

the space research, space operation and Earth explorationsatellite services at 2 GHz.

Drafting Group 4B6--Aeronautical public correspondence.

AD Hoc Group 4B7—Consideration of the mobilesatellite service in the upper and lower L-bands.

Ad Hoc Group to 4B-Consideration of new

mobile satellite service allocations above 1 GHz and

below 3 GHz.

Ad Hoc to Subworking Group 4C2-To consider

the issue of feeder links for the broadcasting-satellite

service for wide-band HDTV.

Drafting Group 4C1—To consider all proposals

for allocations to the space research, Earth explorationsatellite and inter-satellite services above 25.25 GHz.

Ad Hoc Group 4C2-Consideration of proposals

for an allocation to the fixed-satellite service in the

band 14.5 -14.8 GHz.

Drafting Group-Ad Hoc 4C2

Consideration of conditions under which the fixedsatellite service could operate coprimary with the

radiolocation service.

Ad Hoc Group 4C3-To consider proposals for

allocations to the general-satellite service.

Drafting Group-To integrate proposals from five

administrations to establish frequency bands for use by

space-to-Earth 30 GHz Beacon in the fixed-satellite

service for purposes of uplink power control.

COMMITTEE 5

Ad Hoc 3 to Committee 5-To monitor progress of

work in the working group to the plenary and decisions

of Committee 4 and to incorporate such changes in

consolidated texts of changes to Articles 27,28 and 29.

Drafting Group 5B-Consideration of possible

ways of eliminating the differences of interpretation

among the English, French and Spanish texts.

Drafting Group 5C3--Redraft of text from the

draft resolution relating to terrestrial digital broadcasting.

TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP OF THE PLENARY

Drafting Group l—To consider new resolutions or

recommendations regarding primary allocations for

meteorological-satellite and Earth exploration-satellite

services in the 401-403 MHz band.

Drafting Group 4-To consider proposals concerning modification to Resolution 703.

Drafting Group 5-To consider technical issues

relating to proposals concerning modification of the

definition of ‘geostationary-satellite orbit.”

Ad Hoc 6-To examine the necessary technical

parameters required to protect service allocations

made by Committee 4, particularly with respect to

Articles 27,28,29.
Appendix B:

International Observers

at WARC-921

Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU)

Asia-Pacific Telecommunity (APT)

Arab Satellite Communications Organization (ARAB SAT)

Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU)

Asociacion Internacional de Radiodifusion (AIR)

Caribbean Telecommunications Union (CTU)

Comite International Radio Maritime (CIRM)

Commission of the European Communities (CE)

Conference of European Postal and Telecommunications Administration (CEPT)

Cooperation in Space-Search and Rescue Satellite (COSPAS-SARSAT)

European Broadcasting Union (UER/EBU)

European Meteorological Satellite Systems (EUMETSAT)

European Space Agency (ESA)

European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT)

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

International Air Transport Association (IATA)

International Amateur Radio Union (IARU)

International chamber of Shipping (ICS)

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT)

International Organization of Space Communications (INTERSPUTNIK)

International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT)

International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF)

Inter-Union Commission on Frequency Allocations for Radio Astronomy and Space Science (IUCAF)

Organization Meterologica Mundial [World Meteorological Organization-WMO] (OMM)

Pan African Telecommunications Union (PATU)

Societe Internationale de Telecommunications Aeronautique (SITA)

United Nations (UN)

Union des Radio-Televisions Nationales Africaines [African National Radio-Television Union] (URTNA)

1 Based on U.S. Department of State, United States Delegation Report: 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference, publication 9988, July

1992, Annex E.

176
Appendix C: Selected

WARC-92 Resolutions

and Recommendations

Resolution/Recommendation Numberl Topic

Resolution 112 (COM 4/1) Coordination and technical sharing parameters for the FixedSatellite Service at 13.75-14 Hz.

Resolution 211 (COM 4/2) Use of the bands 2025-2110 MHz and 2200-2290 MHz by the

Mobile Service.

Resolution 711 (COM 4/3) Convening a WARC to reallocate frequencies supporting space

missions from the 2 GHz band to frequencies above 20 GHz.

Resolution 212 (COM 4/4) Implementation of Future Public Land Mobile Telecommunication

Systems (FPLMTS); invites International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) and International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) to study and develop administrative plans.

Resolution 113 (COM 4/6) Invites a CCIR study on adjustments to the Fixed Service as a

consequence of changes to the frequency allocations within the

range 1-3 GHz.

Resolution 114 (COM 4/7) Convening a WARC to address space issues not dealt with at

WARC-92, particularly Earth Exploration-Satellite Service used for

monitoring environmental data.

Resolution 523 (COM 4/8) Convening of a WARC for the planning of the High-Frequency

Broadcasting Service; also, the additional bands are not to be used

until a planning process has been completed.

Resolution 518 (COM 4/W) Convening of a WARC not later than 1998 to plan the BroadcastingSatellite Service-Sound (BSS-Sound) and development of procedures

for the coordinated use of the complementary terrestrial service.

Resolution 213 (COM 4/X) Invites the CCIR to conduct sharing studies concerning the use of the

bands 1492-1525 MHz and 1675-1710 MHz in Region 2 by the

Mobile-Satellite Service.

1 In this appendix, both the provisional and final numbers of the resolutions and recommendations are noted. The numbers listed in parentheses

arc the provisional designation adopted and used at WARC-92.

177
178 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Resolution/Recommendation Numberl Topic

Resolution 411 (COM 5/1) Implementation of the new provisions applicable in the frequency

bands allocated exclusively to the Aeronautical-Mobile (Off Route)

Service between 3025 kHz and 18030 kHz.

Resolution 412 (COM 5/2) Procedures for transfer of frequency assignments of aeronautical

stations operating in the frequency bands allocated exclusively to the

Aeronautical-Mobile (Off Route) Service between 3025 kHz and

18030 kHz.

Resolution 524 (COM 5/3)

Resolution 338 (COM 5/4)

Resolution 525 (COM 5/5)

Resolution 526 (COM 5/6)

Resolution 21 (COM 5/7)

Resolution 46 (COM 5/8)

Resolution 22 (COM 5/9)

Resolution 527 (COM 5/10)

Resolution 70 (COM 5/1 1)

Resolution 710 (GT-PLEN/1)

Resolution 522 (GT-PLEN/2)

Resolution 94 (GT-PLEN/3)

Convening of a WARC to review and improve the region 1 and 3

Broadcasting-Satellite Service (BSS) plans in frequency range

11.7 -12.5 GHz (Region 1) and 11.7 -12.2 GHz (Region 2).

Provisional application of article 56 to ensure harmonization with

the International convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)

as revised in 1988.

Introduction of BSS high-definition television (HDTV) systems in

the band 21.4-22.0 GHz in Regions 1 and 3.

Procedures to ensure flexibility in the Broadcasting-Satellite ServiceHDTV and associated feeder links.

Implementation of changes in frequency allocations between 5900

kHz and 19020 kHz.

Interim procedures for the coordination and notification of frequency assignments of non-geostationary satellite networks, in

certain space services, and other services allocated in the band.

Asks future world development conference to develop priorities so

that the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) can provide

support to developing countries in implementing the decisions of

WARC-92.

Convening of a WARC to address VHF terrestrial digital audio

broadcasting (DAB) for Region 1 and interested Region 3 countries.

Invites ITU to carry out technical, legal and operational studies

leading to standards governing operation of low-Earth orbiting

satellite (LEOS) systems.

Examination of the meteorological-satellite and Earth explorationsatellite allocations in the bands 401402 MHz and 402-403 MHz

with the intent of raising the allocation status to primary.

Further CCIR study concerning BSS-Sound with the view to

developing regulatory provisions for sharing with other services in

the same frequency band.

Reviews of resolutions and recommendations of previous WARCs

to continue.
Appendix C-Selected WARC-92 Resolutions and Recommendations I 179

Resolution/Recommendation NumberlTopic

Resolution 93 (GT-PLEN/4)

Resolution 410 (GT-PLEN/AH-1)

Recommendation 519 (COM 4/A)

Recommendation 520 (COM 4/B)

Recommendation 718 (COM 4/C)

Recommendation 719 (COM 4/D)

Recommendation 621 (GT-PLEN/A)

Recommendation 717 (GT-PLEN/B)

Review of certain resolutions and recommendations of WARC-79,

1983 WARC for the Mobile Services, 1987 WARC on high

frequency broadcasting (HFBC), 1987 WARC for the Mobile

Services, and the 1988 WARC on the Use of the GeostationarySatellite Orbit and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing It.

Development of an arrangement for the allotment of frequencies for

the Aeronautical-Mobile (Off Route) Service in exclusive bands

between 3025 kHz and 18030 kHz.

Recommends that a future WARC advance the date for implementation of single-sideband emissions in the high-frequency (HF)

broadcasting bands.

Elimination of HF broadcasting on frequencies outside the HF bands

allocated to broadcasting service.

Asks ITU to hold a future WARC to consider the possibility of

aligning amateur and broadcast allocations around 7 MHz so as to

provide a worldwide allocation.

Asks CCIR to carry out studies on the technical characteristics and

sharing criteria of multiservice satellite networks using geostationary orbit.

Asks CCIR to study characteristics and requirements of wind

profiler radars with a view to allocating appropriate frequency bands

around 50,400, and 1000 MHz; also invites Administrative Council

to include question of appropriate frequency allocations for operational use of wind profiler radars.

Recommends that the CCIR study sharing criteria in frequency

bands shared by the Mobile-Satellite Service with the Fixed, Mobile

and other radio services.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, United States Delegation Report; 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference, publication 9988, July

1992.
Appendix D:

Acronyms and

Glossary of Terms

Ad Hoc 206: A subcommittee of the IRAC that was

established to coordinate Federal agencies’ preparations for WARC-92. Ad Hoc 206 was reconvened

in order to consider how to implement WARC-92

decisions.

Allocation: The designation of a band of frequencies

to a specific radio service or services. Allocations

are made internationally at World Administrative

Radio Conferences and are incorporated into the

international Table of Frequency Allocations. International allocations are usually, but not always,

incorporated into domestic frequency tables.

Analog: In analog radiocommunication, information

is transmitted by modulating a continuously varying electronic signal, such as a radio carrier wave.

Voice and video messages originate in analog form

since sound and light are wavelike functions. In

order to send these analog signals over digital

media, such as fiber optics or digital radio, they

must be converted into a digital format.

APC: Aeronautical public correspondence. APC refers

to radiocommunication services that allow airline

passengers to place telephone calls while in flight.

Also known as air-to-ground (ATG) communication.

Assignment: The granting by a government of the

right to use a specific frequency (or group of

frequencies) to a specific user or station. Each

television station, for example, is assigned a small

group of frequencies that correspond to a specific

channel number.

Bandwidth: The total range of frequencies required to

transmit a radio signal without undue distortion is

its bandwidth. It is measured in hertz. The bandwidth of a radio signal is determined by the amount

of information in the signal being sent. More

complex signals contain more information, and

hence require wider bandwidths. An AM radio

signal, for example takes 10 kHz, while an FM

signal requires 200 kHz, and a television signal

takes up 6 MHz. The bandwidth required by a

television channel is 600 times greater than that of

an AM radio channel.

BSS: Broadcasting-Satellite Service. An ITT-J-defined

service that refers to the delivery of information or

programming from satellites directly to user receivers. The BSS includes new systems planned to

deliver high-definition television services (BSSHDTV) and audio services (BSS-Sound).

CCIR: International Radio Consultative Committee.

An organ of the ITU that studies and makes

recommendations on the technical standards for

radiocommunication.

CCITT: International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee. An organ of the ITU that

studies and makes recommendations on the technical and operational standards for international

wireline communications. CCITT also addresses

international tariff issues.

CDMA: Code division multiple access. CDMA is a

recently developed radiocommunication format that

uses digital technology and spread spectrum transmission to send information. Each radio signal is

assigned its own unique code and is then spread

over a range of frequencies for transmission. At the

receiving end the receiver reconstructs the original

signal by following the code.

180
—

Appendix D–Acronyms and Glossary of Terms I 181

CEPT: Conference of European Postal and Telecommunications Administrations. Established in 1959,

CEPT consists of 33 European telecommunications

administrations. It acts to coordinate and reconcile

regional telecommunications policy.

CIP: Bureau of International Communications and

Information Policy. Bureau of the State Department

that represents the United States in international

telecommunications negotiations and conferences.

CIP’s bureau status was recently revoked and the

bureau placed under the Bureau of Economic and

Business Affairs.

CITEL: The Inter-American Telecommunications

Conference. A specialized conference of the Organization of American States (OAS) that deals with

both radio and wireline communications. CITEL is

a permanent, ongoing series of conferences that has

35 members from North and South America and the

Caribbean.

CT2: Cordless telephone 2. Personal communications

system that allows users to make calls, but not

receive them. CT2 systems have been demonstrated

in Europe, but only one system has been demonstrated in the United States.

DAB: Digital audio broadcasting. DAB refers to the

transmission of audio broadcasts in digital form as

opposed to today’s (AM or FM) analog form. DAB

promises compact disc quality sound over the air.

Many formats are being developed, and transmission is possible via terrestrial transmitters, satellites, or hybrid systems.

DBS: Direct broadcast satellite. Medium- to highpower satellites that are designed to transmit

programming directly to small satellite receiver

dishes at users’ homes. No DBS systems are

operating in the United States, although several

systems are planned.

Digital: In digital communication, the continuously

varying signals of images and voice are converted

to discrete numbers represented in binary form by

O’s and 1‘s. These binary digits, orbits, can then be

sent as a series of “on’’ /’’off’ pulses or can be

modulated onto a carrier wave by varying the phase,

frequency, or amplitude according to whether the

signal is a 1 or a O.

Downlink: In satellite communications, the signal that

travels from the satellite down to the receivers on

Earth. The direction the downlink signal travels is

also called space-to Earth. See uplink.

FCC: Federal Communications Commission. An independent Federal agency that regulates private and

all nonfederal government use of the radio frequency spectrum. The FCC is also responsible for

regulating most other forms of communication,

including broadcast and cable television, and some

telephone services.

Fixed Service: An ITU-defined radiocommunication

service between specified, fixed points. Also known

colloquially as point-to-point communication.

FPLMTS: Future public land mobile telecommunication systems. FPLMTS is a concept now being

developed in the CCIR for future mobile services,

including PCS.

GSM: Global System for Mobile communications,

formerly, Groupe Special Mobile. A digital mobile

communications standard now being deployed

across Europe that is intended to replace existing

analog cellular telephone services. GSM will allow

systems in different countries to interoperate, permitting consumers to use their cellular phones

anywhere in Europe.

HDTV: High-definiton television. Refers to future

generations of television that will have higher

picture resolution, a wider aspect ratio, and digital

quality sound.

Hertz (Hz): Cycles per second. Radio frequencies are

described in multiples of hertz:

kHz, kilohertz: thousand cycles per second;

MHz, megahertz: million cycles per second;

GHz, gigahertz: billion cycles per second.

HF: High frequency. Refers to radio frequencies in the

range 3-30 MHz. These frequencies are used by

international broadcasting services including Voice

of America, religious broadcasters, and fixed services such as the point-to-point communication

systems used by developing countries.

HFBC: High Frequency Broadcasting Conference.

Specialized world radio conferences were held in

1984 and 1987.

HLC: High Level Committee. The HLC was established by the Administrative Council of the ITU, in

response to instructions from the Nice Plenipotentiary, in November 1989 in order to review the

structure and functions of the ITU. The study

included organization, finance, staff, and coordina-
182 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

tion. The group finished its work in June 1991, and

its recommendations were considered at the Special

Plenipotentiary Conference in December 1992.

IAC: Industry Advisory Committee. The FCC set up

the IAC to coordinate and focus private sector input

for the WARC-92 preparation process. It consisted

of 35 representatives from the private sector and

was cochaired by FCC Commissioner Sherrie

Marshall. It issued its final report in April 1991.

IFRB: International Frequency Registration Board.

The organ of the ITU responsible for maintaining

the list of radio frequencies used worldwide. It also

conducts technical and planning studies for the

ITU. According to changes agreed to at the ITU’s

December 1992 Special Plenipotentiary, the IFRB

will be replaced by a 9-member part-time board.

IRAC: Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee.

Established in 1922 and now located in the Department of Commerce, the IRAC consists of approximately 20 to 25 representatives from the various

Federal Government agencies involved in or using

radio frequencies. The IRAC advises NTIA on

matters relating to Federal Government use of the

radio frequency spectrum.

ITU: International Telecommunication Union. The

ITU is a specialized agency of the United Nations

responsible for international regulation of telecommunications services of all kinds, including telegraph, telephone, and radio.

LEOS: Low-Earth orbiting satellite. LEO satellites are

smaller and cheaper to design, build, and launch

than traditional geosynchronous satellites. Networks of these small satellites are being planned

that will provide data (“little” LEOS) and voice

(“big” LEOS) services to portable receivers all

over the world.

Modulation: The process of encoding information

onto a radio wave by varying one of its basic

characteristics-amplitude, frequency, or phasein relation to an input signal such as speech, music,

or television. The input signal, which contains the

information to be transmitted, is called the modulating or baseband signal. The radio wave that carries

the information is called the carrier wave, The radio

wave that results from the combination of these two

waves is called a modulated carrier. Two of the

most common types of modulation are amplitude

modulation (AM) and frequency modulation (FM).

Mobile Service: An ITU-defined service in which

communication services are provided to mobile

users through terrestrially-based systems (large

towers). Cellular telephone systems provide mobile

services. PCS and FPLMTS would also be classified under the mobile service. See Mobile-Satellite

Service.

MSS: Mobile-Satellite Service. MSS is an ITUdefined service in which satellites are used to

deliver communications services (voice or data

usually, one- or two-way) to mobile users such as

cars, trucks, ships, and planes. It is a generic term

that encompasses several types of mobile services

delivered by satellite, including Maritime MSS

(MMSS), Aeronautical MSS (AMSS), and Land

MSS (LMSS).

NTIA: National Telecommunications and Information

Administration. The agency in the Department of

Commerce that oversees all Federal Government

use of the radio frequency spectrum. NTIA also

serves as the President’s adviser on all telecommunication matters,

OIA: Office of International Affairs. The office in

NTIA responsible for international aspects of telecommunications, including preparation and participation in international communications negotiations and conferences.

OIC: Office of International Communications. Established by the FCC in January 1990 to coordinate

and serve as the focal point for international

activities in the FCC.

OSM: Office of Spectrum Management. The office of

NTIA responsible for day-to-day management of

Federal Government spectrum use. Also provides

technical assistance to OIA in preparation for

international negotiations and conferences.

PCS: Personal communication network/service. Although the term is not yet clear, PCS seems to be

emerging as an umbrella term that refers to any of

the many mobile services (voice and data) designed

to serve individuals wherever they are (walking,

driving, flying).

Primary status: Radio services with primary status

have full rights to use any or all of the radio

frequencies that have been allocated to them, unless

modified by a footnote to the international Table of

Frequency Allocations. Such a footnote can specify

countries in which a service may not operate or can
Appendix D–Acronyms and Glossary of Terms I 183

specify technical constraints such as maximum

levels of power allowed. When two primary services share the same frequencies, they must coordinate their use to ensure that interference is minimized. See secondary status.

PTT: Post, telegraph, and telephone administration.

PTTs are the government agencies that have been

the sole providers of telecommunication services in

many foreign countries for years. Today, their

power and monopolies are declining in the face of

liberalization and privatization.

Radio astronomy: The study of the stars and planets

using radio waves. Radio waves allow scientists to

determine the composition of planets and their

atmospheres. Because radio waves received from

space are very weak, radio astronomy receivers

must be extremely sensitive.

RDSS: Radiodetermination-Satellite Service. RDSS is

an ITU-designated service in which satellites provide location information to ships, planes, vehicles,

and even individuals such as hikers.

Secondary status: Secondary radio services are not

allowed to cause interference to primary services

and cannot claim any protection from interference

from primary services. They must accept interference from a primary service if it occurs. See primary

status.

Spectrum: The spectrum of an individual radio signal

is the range of frequencies it uses, The width of the

spectrum is also called the bandwidth of the signal.

More broadly, the radio frequency spectrum consists of all the radio frequencies that are used for

radiocommunications.

SSB: Single sideband. A method of transmitting radio

signals in which only one sideband is transmitted

and, often, the carrier is transmitted at reduced

power.

Uplink: In satellite communications, the signal that

travels from an Earth transmitting station up to the

satellite. The direction the uplink signal travels is

also known as Earth-to-space. See downlink.

WARC: World Administrative Radio Conference.

WARCS are the primary forum for distributing the

frequencies of the spectrum to the various radiocommunication services, They can address all radio

services (a general WARC) or only specific portions of the spectrum (specialized WARC). The

Final Acts of a WARC have international treaty

status and must be signed by member governments.

The allocations decided on at a WARC usually are

incorporated into domestic tables of allocations.

WARCs have now been renamed by the ITU, and

will be called world radiocommunication conferences in the future.
Appendix E:

Negotiated Rulemaking:

An Alternative

to Traditional Rulemaking

I Background

For several years, the FCC has been searching for a

better way to develop new service rules and license

new service providers. This search is, in part, the result

of the rash of litigation that often surrounds FCC

decisions, and the FCC’s desire to avoid lengthy court

battles in order to speed the introduction of (new)

services to the public. Several options have been

discussed and tried including lotteries, spectrum auctioning, a consortium, and now negotiated rulemaking.

This is the first time such an approach has been tried

by the FCC, and observers and proponents of other

new services are watching the process closely. If the

process succeeds for little LEOS, the FCC expects to

use it as a model in other proceedings-with potentially widespread effects on the traditional approach to

rulemaking at the FCC.1

In order to speed the development of the rules and

regulations governing the new little LEOS systems, the

FCC established an Advisory Committee under the

Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)2 and the

Negotiated Rulemaking Act3 to assist in the development of the technical and service rules and regulations

that will govern the provision of mobile (and fixed)

services provided by LEOS systems operating in

frequencies below 1 GHz. Pursuant to the requirements of the FACA, the FCC issued a public notice of

its intention to form an advisory committee on little

LEOS in April 1992, 4 Numerous parties responded to

the notice, including Orbcomm, Starsys, Volunteers in

Technical Assistance (VITA), who submitted jointlyfiled comments that outlined their proposals for

technical and service rules.5 These comments were

intended to form the basis for the FCC Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on little LEOS service

rules, thereby eliminating the need for the Advisory

Committee altogether. The FCC did not accept this

approach, and proceeded to form the Advisory Committee, It met for the first time on August 10, 1992, at

which time the charter of the group and a work plan

were discussed.

D Participants

In addition to the companies that have filed applications to provide little LEOS services-VITA, Starsys,

Orbcomm, and Leosat6

-representatives from several

1 The FCC, in fac~ has begun a negotiated rulemaking for LEOS systems operating above 1 GHz. Federal Communications Comrnissio~

“MSS Above 1 GHz Negotiated Rulemaking Committee,” Public Notice, DA 92-1691, released Dec. 15, 1992.

2

5 USC App. 2 (Dec. 21, 1982).

3 Negotiated Rulernaking Act of 1990 (NRA), Public Law 101-648, Nov. 28, 1990.

d Federal Communications Commission ‘‘FCC Asks for Comments Regarding the Establishment of an Advisory Committee to Negotiate

Proposed Regulations, ” Public NotIce, DA 92-443, released Apr. 16, 1992.

5 See Jointly Filed Comments of ORBCOm STARSYS, and WTA, ‘‘In the Matter of Establishment of an Advisory Committee to

Negotiate Proposed Regulations for Imw-Earth Orbit Satellite Services Operating Below I GHz,” CC Docket No. 92-76, May 18, 1992, and

Jointly Filed Supplemental Comments of Orbcomm, St.arsys, and VITA in above proceeding, Aug 7, 1992.

b hosat’s application was dismissed by the FCC on procedural grounds, bosat filed for a reconsideration of this dismissal, but that appeal

was denied. It was allowed to sit on the Advisory Committee despite objections by Orbeomm.

184
—

Appendix E–Negotiated Rulemaking: An Alternative to Traditional Rulemaking I 185

government agencies and the aeronautical community

participated in the work of the committee.7 Government representatives were primarily interested in

ensuring that their existing use of the frequencies in

and adjacent to the bands to be used by little LEOS

would be adequately protected. The Air Force, for

example, is planning an addition to its meteorological

satellite system that could be subject to interference

from the new LEOS systems.

B Charter and Work Program

The official charter of the Advisory Committee

states that the task of the Committee was to “gather

and discuss information necessary to form recommendations to the FCC for the regulation, licensing and

coordination of little LEO satellite services. This

information will be used by the FCC in conjunction

with its separate proceeding on the frequency allocations for little LEOS9

, and will form the basis for an

NPRM that will outline technical and service rules for

new little LEOS services. In order to accomplish this

work in a timely manner, an informal working group

was formed to look at the specific issues outlined in the

work plan for the committee. An editorial working

group was formed to develop the language for the

Committee’s final report to the FCC.

The FCC’s general goal, as outlined in the work

program for the committee, was to find ways to

facilitate sharing-not only among the three proposed

systems, but also between them and existing (terrestrial and space) systems using the proposed (and

adjacent) frequencies, between U.S. and international

users of the frequencies, and between present and

future users of the bands, including future additional

LEOS systems.

In the course of its deliberations, the committee

addressed the following issues, among others:

How to license multiple operators;

The impacts of the footnotes adopted at

WARC-92 on little LEOS services;

Sharing considerations, as noted above;

Which modulation (code division multiple

access, time division multiple access, or

frequency division multiple access) method

should be employed;

The need for separate rules for nonprofit

providers such as VITA;

Coordination mechanisms with other services, including services sharing the same

bands and services using adjacent bands that

could be subject to interference from little

LEOS operations.

The committee finished its work as scheduled and

submitted its final report to the FCC on September 18,

1992.

DISCUSSION

The work of the committee was contentious for

several reasons. First, the frequencies in question are

to be used by both the Federal Government and the

private sector, and some of these frequencies were

being opened up for the first time to the private sector.

In the United States, the 148-149.9 MHz band, for

example, was previously reserved for military fixed

and mobile communications.

Second, the international ramifications of the decisions made in the committee and the FCC were

significant, The United States will be the first country

to operate commercial LEOS systems in these bands,

and other countries are apprehensive that what is

decided in the United States will become the &facto

7 The full membership of the committee consisted of: ARINC, Inc., Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Department of

the Navy, Federal Aviation Administratio~ National Aeronautics and Space Mministratiom National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration Leosat, Orbcornrq Starsys, and VITA. The FCC supplied the facilitator and the designated Federal representative for the group.

8 Federal Communications Commissio~ ‘ ‘Charter for the Below 1 GHz LEO Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, ’ Document LEOAC- 13,

Aug. 10, 1992, p. 1.

9 Federal Communications Commission, “Amendment of Section 2.106 of the Commission’s Rules to Allocate Spectrum to the

Fixed-Satellite Service and the Mobile-Satellite Service for Low-Earth Orbit Satellites,” ET Docket No. 91-280, FCC 91-305, released Oct.

18, 1991.
186 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

rules for little LEOS operation all over the world.l0 The

FCC was keenly aware of these concerns.

Third, the timeline for the process was ambitious.

The FCC wanted to move the process along quickly in

order to let the prospective companies get their

services up and running as soon as possible--a

strategy that would allow U.S. companies to bring their

services into operation ahead of any foreign competition. 11 This short timeline was also instituted so that a

negotiated rulemaking on big LEOS could begin as

soon as possible--conducting two negotiated rulemakings simultaneously was not possible due to

limitations on FCC staff time. As a result, the

committee was given only 37 days to do its work.

Meetings were held every week, supplemented by

work conducted in the informal working group and the

editorial group.

Finally, in an attempt to speed the process,12 and

some have argued, circumvent potential dissent, the

three main little LEOS system proponents met informally and devised a set of rules and sharing arrangements that they submitted to the FCC with the hope of

having them adopted by the FCC. 13 The FCC chose not

to adopt them whole, but to include them as inputs to

the work of the Advisory Committee. Leosat, a little

LEOS proponent whose application was dismissed by

the FCC, was not part of those informal meetings and

accused the others of trying to stifle competition.

I Results

The final report represented, as much as possible, a

consensus of views reached in the course of the

month-long deliberations of the committee and its

informal working groups. However, disagreements on

several matters were not resolved. To accommodate

additional views on these matters, the report includes

separate statements from several of the participants.

The committee submitted its final report to the chief of

the FCC’s Common Carrier Bureau for consideration

in the FCC preparation of its formal NPRM on little

LEOS service rules. The NPRM was adopted in

January 1993.

One issue that remains unclear is how future LEOS

systems will be accommodated. The FCC has maintained a commitment to promoting competition in little

LEOS services, and has said that it would like to see at

least three competitors and maybe more offering such

services. A crucial question not determined in the

negotiated rulemaking process was how many entrants

can be accommodated. The private sector participants

in the process, of course, would like to limit entry by

potential future competitors and have said that trying

to accommodate unspecified future needs would be

impossible.

Another unresolved issue, and the subject of heated

debate during the course of the committee’s work

centered on the question of which modulation scheme

is best suited for little LEOS applications. Orbcomm

and VITA have indicated that they will use a frequency

division multiple access system, while Starsys and

Leosat have proposed code division multiple access

systems.

10 Sm, for ~~ple, tie comments of Michel Carpentier, Director General (telecommunications) for the European CO~U@ commission:

‘‘It is a matter of some importance to the commission to ensure that the initial LEO systems are introduced in such a manner as not to prejudice

competitio~ and in particular, to ensure that future systems can operate within the constraints of the existing allocation. ” Quoted in “U.S.

Accepts EC Commission Request for Informal Talks. . .“ Telecommunications Reports, July 27, 1992, p. 15,

11 smol~~ a Russian LEOS syste~ is already pmdy OperatiOM1.

12 Sptig Up he process helps the LEOS providers in at least two ways. Firsti the delay costs them money. The quicker tiese sYstems w

be licensed and begin operations, the faster they can begin making money and producing revenue. In the meantime, all the companies still have

costs (salaries) that must be paid. Second, a quicker start keeps actual and potential investors interested-the longer to returns on investment

the less these systems are likely to attract new investors and the more discontented existing investors become. They are less likely to keep putting

money in for salaries when the potential returns keep slipping in time. This is an important consideration in an era where private capital for

expensive and somewhat risky ventures is tight.

13 S= Jotidy Filed Comments of Orbco- StarSyS, and VITA, ‘‘In the Matter of Establishment of an Advisoxy COmIUittee tO Negotiate

Proposed Regulations for Imw-Earth Orbit Satellite Services Operating Below 1 GHz,” op. cit., footnote 5, and Jointly Filed Supplemental

Comments of Orbcomm, Staxsys, and VITA in same proceeding, Aug. 7, 1992.
Index

Ad HOC 206, 154, 158

Administrative Council (of the ITU), 15, 147, 161

Advanced communications technology satellite (ACTS),

140

Aeronautical-mobile satellite service (AMSS), 89-90

Aeronautical public correspondence (APC), 5,25, 119,

132-134, 146

Aeronautical telemetry, 16,53,65,69,71,75-76, 144

AfriSpace, 71

Allocations table. See international Table of Frequency Allocations

American Mobile Radio Corporation, 68

American Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC), 87-

88,92,95,96-97, 116

Ardis, 107

Aries, 114

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 23

Baran, Ambassador Jan, 10,21,28,103,120,156, 163,

166, 167, 169

BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), 55

Berrada, Abderrazak, 17

Broadcasting-Satellite Service-high-definition television (BSS-HDTV), 5, 11, 25, 128-132, 146

Broadcasting-Satellite Service-Sound (BSS-Sound),

4, 11, 15, 16,53, 63-64,64-76, 144, 146, 161

Bureau of Communications and Information Policy

(CIP), 46, 48, 147, 155-157. See also Department of State

Bureau of Telecommunications Development (of the

ITU), 16

Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 152

Canada

and APC, 133

and BSS-Sound, 70, 76, 144

paging operations in, 105

CaribSpace, 71

CCIR. See International Radio Consultative Committee

CCITT See International Telegraph and Telephone

Consultative Committee

CDMA (code division multiple access), 116,121,122,

124

Cellular telephone, 77,85, 125, 137

digital standard for, 34, 85-86

Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association,

77

Celsat, 117

Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), 103

CIP. See Bureau of Communications and Information

Policy

ClTEL. See Inter-American Telecommunications Conference

Coast Guard, 59,60

Communications Act of 1934, 101, 107

Comsat, 87, 88, 133

Conference of European Postal and Telecommunications administrations (CEPT), 17, 18-21, 125,

133, 137, 162

and aeronautical public correspondence, 133

and Broadcasting-Satellite Service-Sound, 65, 70

and future public land mobile telecommunications

systems, 82

and high-definition television, 130

and low-Earth orbiting satellite systems, 118, 125

and Mobile-Satellite Service, 94

187
188 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

and Space Services, 136

in W~C-92 negotiations, 18-20, 163-164

restructuring of, 20-21

Constellation Communications, Inc., 113, 114

CoveragePlus, 107

CT2 (cordless telephone 2), 78-79, 84

Department of Communications, 47,49

Department of Defense, 69,71, 134, 135, 171

Department of State, 7,40-49, 147, 149, 155-157, 165

Digital audio broadcasting (DAB), 64,66-76

Digital European cordless telephone (DECT), 84

Digital Satellite Broadcasting Corp., 68

Direct broadcast satellite (DBS), 36-37, 129-130

DirecTv, 131

Double sideband (DSB) transmission, 60-61

Dual-mode mobile telephones, 113, 116, 123-124

Earth-Exploration Satellite Service, 140-141

Electronic Industries Association (HA), 71

Ellipsat, 113, 114

European Community (EC), 20, 84, 106, 119-120,

125, 155, 156-157

European Radiocommunications Office (ERO), 20,

157

European Telecommunications Standards Institute

(ETSI), 20

Extra-vehicular activities (EVA), 136

Federal Aviation Administration, 122

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 59,60

Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 7, 37,

4049, 149-153, 165

Fixed Satellite Service (INS), 134-135

Fixed Service, 61

Footnotes, 14,26, 144

Future Public Land Mobile Telecommunications Systems (FPLM1’S), 15,77-86, 125, 137

General-Satellite Service (GSS), 139-140, 141

Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS),

93

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), 118-119,

123, 157

Global Positioning System (GPS), 118-119

Global system for mobile communications (GSM),

84-86,78,82

Globalstar, 114

GLONASS, 111, 112-113, 118-119, 121-122

Gonets, 104

GTE Airfone, 133

Head of delegation, 166-168

Helrnan, Gerald, 155

HDTV. See Broadcasting-Satellite Service-highdeftition television

HFBC-87, 56,58

High-frequency (I-IF) broadcasting, 11, 55-64, 154,

158-159

High Ixwel Committee, 37, 147

Hubble telescope, 135

Hughes Communications, 131

Industry Advisory Committee, 59,99, 160

Inmarsat (International Maritime Satellite Organization), 26, 88-89, 96-97, 116, 124-126, 133

Intelsat (International Telecommunications Satellite

Consortium), 134, 135

Inter-American Telecommunications Conference

(CITEL), 21-23, 155,163-165

Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC),

41,48,60,61,72, 154, 158-160

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 93,

118

International Frequency Registration Board (IF’RB),

57

International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR),

6, 15,53, 147, 155, 163-164

International Table of Frequency Allocations, 11, 26,

52-53, 144

International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 1, 8,

11,27, 146-149

International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative

Committee (CCITI’), 15, 147, 155

Iridium, 113-116, 120-121, 124, 128, 138

Joint Imng-Range Planning Committee, 4546

Joint Strategic Planning Council, 45

L-band, 35,54,67,69, 144, 154, 157, 161

Land Mobile-Satellite Service (LMSS), 89-90

Leosat, 101

Leosat Panamericana, 104

Lincom Corp., 68

I.mral Aerospace Holdings, 68

Imral Cellular Systems, 111-112
Index I 189

Low-Earth orbiting satellites (LEOS), 3,4, 11,26,156

big, 15, 108-128, 144

little, 15,97-108, 144, 157

See also Mobile-Satellite Service

Lundberg, Olof, 53

Maritime Mobile-Satellite Service (MMSS), 89-90

Mexico,

and APC, 133

and BSS-Sound, 70, 76, 144

MOB-87, 89, 119, 133

Mobile-Satellite Service (MSS), 4, 11, 15,25,86-128,

146, 151, 171

See also low-Earth orbiting satellites

Mobile Service, 4, 77-86

Motorola, 26,29,37, 113, 116, 120, 124, 126, 128

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),

37-38.134, 137, 165-166

National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), 69,70

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

105

National Security Council, 60, 158

National Security Directive 51,61

National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), 7,37,40-49, 149, 153-154,

171

and Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee,

4849, 158-160

Negotiated rulemaking, 152

for big LEOS, 117-118, 121, 152

for little LEOS, 103, 106

Norris Satellite Communications, 139

Northwest Airlines, 133

Odyssey, 114

Office of International Communications (OIC), 40

Office of Science and Twhnology Policy (OSTP), 48

Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP), 47,48

OmniTracs, 107

ORB-88, 128

Orbcomm, Inc., 101-103

Organization of American States, 21

Pena, Jose Barrionuevo, 10

Personal communication networks (PCN), 84, 85

Personal communication services (PCS), 4, 73, 77,

78-86, 125, 137, 151

FCC proceedings on, 79-82

Plenipotentiary Conferences of ITU, 15

Special Plenipotentiary of 1992, 11, 147

Primosphere, L. P., 68

Private sector, 27-29

domestic policymaking and, 28-29,32-33, 34-35

role in international negotiations, 27-28

Project Acorn, 68

Project 21, 116-117

Qualcomm, 107

Quayle, Dan, 26

Radio astronomy, 101, 105, 111, 122-123

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 59

Radio Moscow, 55

Radio Regulations, 57, 136

Radiocommunication policymaking

implications of WARC-92 for, 30-39

long-range planning and, 36-38

market forces and, 30-36

options for improving, 39-49

structural problems, 158

Resolution 46 (COM5/8), 111, 120

S-band, 70, 161

Satellite CD Radio, 67-68, 70

Senior Interagency Group, 45

Shortwave, 55

Single sideband (SSB) transmission, 58-59,63

Sky-Highway Radio Corp., 68

Smolsat, 104

Space Frequency Coordination Group (SFCG), 37-38,

137, 141

Space Services, 5, 105, 135-139, 151

Space shuttle, 135, 138

Space Station Freedom, 135, 138

Starsys, Inc., 101-103

Strother Communications, 68

Taos satellite system, 104

Task Force on ITU restructuring, 15,40, 147

TDMA (time division multiple access), 116, 121, 122,

124

Tracking and data relay satellites (TDRS), 134, 138

TRW> Inc., 113, 114
190 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

USA Digital Radio, 68

U.S. Air Force, 105

U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 59, 158

U.S. Trade Representative, 46-47, 156-157

United States Satellite Broadcasting, 131

United States Telecommunication Training Institute

(usT-rI), 166

Voice of America (VOA), 55,57,59-61, 158-159

Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA), 101-103

W~C-92

background, 2,9-15

factors affecting implementation, 144-157

implications for policy, 30-39

structure, 10-11

themes and trends from, 15-29

U.S. delegation, 9-10, 168-169

U.S. negotiating strategies, 169-171

WorldSpace, 71

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