United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

April 1996 MILITARY

READINESS

A Clear Policy Is

Needed to Guide

Management of

Frequently Deployed

Units

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-105

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-271135 

April 8, 1996

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Robert K. Dornan

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

This report addresses your concerns that the time military personnel are

spending away from home on deployments—commonly called personnel

tempo (PERSTEMPO)—has increased and is stressing portions of the military

community and adversely affecting readiness.1

 You asked that we review

(1) U.S. forces’ frequency of deployments in recent years; (2) the effect of

increased PERSTEMPO on the readiness of U.S. forces; and (3) Department

of Defense (DOD) actions to mitigate the impact of high PERSTEMPO,

including efforts to create systems for measuring PERSTEMPO.

Background The end of the Cold War and the evolution of a new security environment

have resulted in new operating realities for the U.S. military. Amid

significant reductions in the overall size of U.S. forces, defense budgets,

and overseas presence, the U.S. military must continue to deploy its forces

for traditional combat training and simultaneously manage increased

demands to deploy forces for peace operations and other activities. U.S.

military forces have participated in peace operations for many years. For

example, the United States has committed military personnel to the

Multinational Force and Observers since 1982 to ensure that Israel and

Egypt abide by the provisions of the Sinai Peace Treaty. However, in

recent years, U.S. participation in peace operations has grown. In 1992

alone, the United States began deployments eventually totaling 26,000

personnel to Somalia, 3,000 to Bosnia, and 14,000 to Southwest Asia. The

ongoing deployment to Bosnia is expected to involve over 20,000 troops.

1

For the purposes of this report, a deployment is defined as any period of time longer than 24 hours

that a military unit spends away from home for peace operations; humanitarian assistance or disaster

relief; counterdrug operations; joint or service-unique training; or other activity. Peace operations

range from low-intensity peacekeeping operations, such as military observer duty, to high-intensity

peace-enforcement operations.

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Congress and others have expressed concern about the overall impact of

peace operations on unit and personnel readiness. Deployments for some

operations can impair unit and personnel combat training and equipment

readiness and divert funds from planned operations and maintenance

activities. In other cases, however, deployments can enhance the combat

capabilities of units. For example, such deployments provide excellent

experience in the tasks essential to wartime proficiency for light infantry,

supply, or other support units.

Results in Brief DOD cannot precisely measure the increase in deployments because, until

1994, only the Navy had systems to track PERSTEMPO. Historically, the Navy

and the Marine Corps have deployed at about twice the rate of the other

services, and their rates of deployment have increased only slightly.

However, deployments of Air Force and Army personnel have increased

significantly in recent years. These increases have affected most heavily a

small number of critical units with unique specialties such as special

forces units, electronic warfare squadrons, Patriot air defense units, and

military police. DOD estimates that the percentage of personnel deployed

between 1987 and 1995 increased from about 2 percent to about 6 percent

for the Air Force and from about 5 percent to 9 percent for the Army.

Our analysis of a group of high-deploying units over a 4-year period

showed that most had elements that were deployed for more than one-half

of each year. Peace operations were the driving force behind the

increases, accompanied by smaller increases in joint activities.2 DOD

officials believe that deployments could be reduced by eliminating

redundant military training and combining or canceling some exercises.

Some training has already been reduced.

Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reports indicate a stable

level of overall unit readiness during the 1990s.3

 According to this

measure, less than one-third of the high-deploying units we reviewed

dropped below planned readiness levels due to deployments, and this

impact was often short-lived. However, SORTS does not capture all the

factors that DOD considers critical to a comprehensive readiness analysis,

such as operating tempo and personnel morale. In contrast to SORTS data,

2

Joint activities include joint training among the U.S. services and between U.S. services and other

nations’ services as well as the show of U.S. force to promote regional stability, support required by

treaties with other nations, and other multinational activities.

3

This system measures the extent to which each unit possesses the required resources and is trained to

undertake its wartime missions.

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our visits to high-deploying units and discussions with officials in major

commands revealed pronounced concerns about personnel problems such

as divorces, missed family events and holidays, and lowered retention.

Also, although DOD compiles a large number of statistics on personnel

readiness, many of the statistics are not useful for depicting conditions in

the high-deploying units because they are not collected consistently across

the services or are compiled only at major command levels. Therefore, it is

not possible to compare general conditions in high-deploying units with

those in other units. Data we could obtain on drug testing results and

reports of spouse/child abuse showed that rates in both areas were

generally lower in the high-deploying units than in others.

The President, Congress, and DOD have taken a variety of actions to study

and address the increase in PERSTEMPO, and DOD is considering additional

recommendations. However, DOD has not issued regulations that could

provide the guidance and discipline needed for long-term management of

PERSTEMPO. There is no DOD-wide definition of a deployment, and each

service defines it differently. DOD has not directed the services to have

goals or policies to limit PERSTEMPO, and the services—with the exception

of the Navy—have no clear regulations on this issue. Even though all

services have systems to measure deployment activity, there is little

consistency in terms of whether unit or individual data are collected and

the statistics each provides. DOD officials believe that the high PERSTEMPO

operating environment is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. As a

result, key units will likely continue to be stressed unless DOD and the

services agree on a basic framework for managing PERSTEMPO.

Increases in Peace

Operations and Joint

Activities Focused on

a Small Group of

Unique Units

All services have experienced increased deployments since the late 1980s,

with the Air Force and the Army absorbing the largest percentage of

changes. However, a small group of units in each service with unique skills

in high demand absorbed most of the impact. Peace operations were the

major reason for the increases, with smaller increases for joint activities.

All Services Experience

Increases

DOD cannot precisely measure the increase in deployments because, until

1994, only the Navy had systems to track PERSTEMPO. The Defense

Manpower Data Center attempted to reflect the level of PERSTEMPO by

matching personnel and pay records with readiness information

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identifying units in a deployed status.4 As shown in figure 1, between 1987

and 1995 the percentage of personnel deployed, as measured by the

Center’s data, increased for all services.

Figure 1: Estimated Percent of

Services Deployed (1987-95)

Air Force Army Marine Corps Navy

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Estimated percent deployed

12/87-6/90 9/91-3/95

Note: Data from July 1990 through August 1991 was excluded to eliminate effects of the Gulf War.

Marine Corps data for September 1991 through March 1992 was excluded due to inaccurate

reporting of family separation allowances.

The change was particularly striking in the Air Force and the Army. As

figure 1 shows, between the late 1980s and early 1995, Air Force personnel

deployed increased, on average, from about 2 percent of the force to over

6 percent. During the same period, the Army increased the percent of its

force deployed from an average of 5 percent to about 8.5 percent. One

reason for the increase is that DOD’s recent drawdown has reduced not

only the overall number of personnel in these services but also their

overseas presence. Traditionally, personnel in these services operated

4

This analysis assumed that all members of a unit were deployed if a certain percentage of its

personnel were receiving family separation allowances, which are paid to servicemembers away from

their families for over 30 days, or imminent danger pay.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
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from bases in the United States or from locations in Europe and

elsewhere, where their families were also located, with relatively few

deployments. Now, fewer personnel are being asked to respond to more

deployments, travel farther in doing so, and leave their families while

deployed.

The Navy and the Marines experienced much smaller percentage

increases, but they were already deploying about two to three times more

than the other services. In the late 1980s, about 11 percent of the Navy’s

force was deployed at any given time. By early 1995 this figure had

increased to about 14 percent. Over the same period, the Marine Corps

increased the average of its force deployed from about 12 percent to

13 percent. The Navy and the Marine Corps have always had relatively

high deployment rates. Personnel in these services have traditionally

operated on cyclical deployment schedules on board ships or at forward

presence locations across the globe, unaccompanied by their families.

Because of their forward-deployed mode of operations, the Navy and the

Marines were generally able to respond to increased demands with forces

already deployed.

Units in Short Supply

Heavily Tasked

Increased deployments have fallen most heavily to a few types of units

with unique skills in high demand, such as special forces, electronic

warfare squadrons, Patriot air defense units, and military police. Many of

these critical units are in short supply in the active force, with much of the

capability residing in the reserve component. For example, about

75 percent of the military’s psychological operations capability resides in

the reserve component. We recently reported that the extended or

repeated participation of such units in peace operations could impede

their ability to respond to major regional contingencies because of the

difficulty in quickly disengaging and redeploying them.5 DOD officials told

us that the services should periodically examine force structure to ensure

that frequently used capabilities are not contained primarily in the

reserves.

DOD is examining the need to increase the number of some high-deploying

units. According to the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the European

Command, the unified command responsible for operations in Bosnia, the

forces needed to fulfill the National Security Strategy—that is, to be

prepared to respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional

5

Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts

(GAO/NSIAD-95-51, Mar. 8, 1995).

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
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contingencies—and those needed for peace operations like Bosnia are not

necessarily the same.6

 The major regional contingency scenario requires

traditional combat forces, while peace operations and other non-war

activities draw heavily upon the types of unique units that are few in

number (those units discussed above). The CINC believed that the

PERSTEMPO issue is driven by this dichotomy and that current forces should

be reevaluated and realigned to address this problem. The European

Commander also believed that better coordination of contingency

planning among CINCs could reduce the tasking of high PERSTEMPO units.

Such planning is currently focused within each unified command’s sphere

of operations and may not adequately account for changes in one theater

that can increase PERSTEMPO in others.

Our analysis of high-deploying units shows that most had at least one

element, such as a company or detachment, deployed for over one-half of

each year from fiscal year 1992 through June 1995. For example, Air Force

electronic warfare squadrons had at least one element deployed an

average of 313 days each year. Marine support, ground combat, and

aviation units and Army support units had one or more elements deployed,

on average, at least 210 days annually during the period. Some individuals

were deployed for even longer periods. Even when units return to their

home station, individuals may have to spend time away from their homes

on other duty. For example, some sailors must provide ship security every

fourth night on board ship.

The amount of time deployed between 1992 and 1995 was stable or

increasing for most types of units we analyzed. For example, the Army

military police units averaged about 160 days on deployment in 1992, but

this figure had increased to an average of 172 days in 1995 (projected from

third quarter figures). The Navy was the only service whose pace of

deployments appeared to be abating. For example, deployments of the five

nuclear submarines in our sample dropped from an average of 210 days in

1992 to a projected average of 173 days in 1995. According to officials at

the submarine units we visited, the number of submarines had not yet

been reduced by the drawdown, so the full complement of ships has been

available to deal with the demand. However, officials were concerned that

once the number of submarines is reduced, which is expected in the next

several years, they would encounter the same difficulties as the other

6

Each of the nine unified commands is responsible for supporting and achieving U.S. interests in its

area of responsibility. For example, the European Command is responsible for most of Europe and

parts of the Middle East, and the Special Operations, Transportation, and Space Commands are

responsible for specific functional areas. The regional commands are responsible for planning and

conducting peace and other operations in their respective areas of responsibility and for determining

requirements and conducting joint training.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
B-271135 

services. According to Navy officials, Navy PERSTEMPO has recently been

dropping to pre-Gulf War levels.

Peace Operations and Joint

Activities Drive Increase in

Deployments

In the high-deploying units we studied, most of the increased deployments

were for peace operations, particularly those of Air Force and Army units.

However, after declining between 1992 and 1993, joint activities between

the United States and other nations’ forces also increased during 1994-95.

Figure 2 illustrates the Air Force and the Army’s steep growth in

deployments for peace operations. Navy and Marine officials also noted

significant increases in peace operations, but both services generally met

increased requirements using units already on scheduled deployments. We

were unable to develop detailed statistics on the amount of time these

services spent for peace operations because detailed records were not

available to isolate time spent on one activity versus another during

scheduled deployments.

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Figure 2: Peace Operations for

High-Deploying Army and Air Force

Units (fiscal years 1992-95)

1992 1993 1994 1995

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

Year

Average percent of time deployed 

Army Air Force

Note: Figures for 1995 are through the third quarter.

Despite the increases in peace operations, the high-deploying units

continued to spend most of their time deployed for training, scheduled

forward deployments, or other traditional missions. We found no major

reductions in the amount of time deployed for training. Throughout

1992-95, each service stayed within about 12 percentage points of its yearly

averages for training deployments.7

 However, as shown in figure 3, after

declining between 1992 and 1993, joint activities began to increase

somewhat in 1994 for the Air Force, the Army, and the Marine Corps. We

were unable to separate joint activities from the Navy Atlantic Fleet data

on overall training.

7

Navy statistics are based on Atlantic Fleet ships only. Detailed breakdowns of Pacific Fleet ships were

not available.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
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Figure 3: Joint Activity in

High-Deploying Units (fiscal years

1992-95)

1992 1993 1994 1995

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Year

Average percent of time deployed 

Air Force Army Marine Corps

Note: Figures for 1995 are through the third quarter.

According to many of the CINCs, in addition to the increased deployments

for peace operations, there have been large increases in joint activities

since the end of the Gulf War. In some commands such activities have

more than doubled. These deployments involve myriad actions, such as

training exercises between U.S. services and those of other countries,

computer simulation exercises, intergovernmental and multinational

requirements such as the show of U.S. force to promote regional stability,

and support required by treaties with other nations. For example,

Partnership for Peace is a new type of exercise that emerged after the Gulf

War. This initiative seeks to intensify military and political cooperation

throughout Europe and includes participation of North Atlantic Treaty

Organization countries and countries from eastern Europe and the former

Soviet Union. According to DOD officials, no system tracks all of these

activities, and no standardized terminology distinguishes them.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
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Consequently, individual contributions to the increases are difficult to

analyze precisely.

Increased deployments are rooted in the changing national military

strategy. According to DOD officials, the increased focus on regional

security and stability has been accompanied by increased deployments for

peace operations. Many of these operations involve an increasingly

complex integration of diverse land, sea, and air assets from U.S. and other

nations’ military services, making joint training increasingly important and

spurring increased deployments for joint activities. However, the need for

deployments for training in each service’s individual mission also

continues unabated.

DOD officials acknowledged that better balance and management of these

competing demands is needed, and DOD has begun to address this need.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program annually

administers about 200 activities, over two-thirds of which have been

focused on objectives other than joint training.8

 Program officials told us

that many joint training exercises involve small groups of servicemembers,

and they are attempting to reduce them by combining or canceling some

exercises. Moreover, program officials said they are continuing to develop

joint mission essential task lists to help integrate joint and service training

tasks, which could lead to less redundant training.

At the request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs are

also examining exercise plans to prevent redundant training by

consolidating, synchronizing, reducing participation in, or canceling

exercises. Many of the CINCs and Joint Staff personnel told us that the

scope and duration of joint exercises, particularly those involving

ineffective large-scale exercises, are already being reduced and many

exercises are involving fewer people. One CINC reduced the number of

scheduled exercises in his area from 112 in fiscal year 1995 to 85 in fiscal

year 1996 by combining smaller, single-service exercises into larger, joint

training exercises.

According to DOD officials, many other deployments are generated by

intergovernmental and other demands outside the Chairman’s program.

These officials are developing definitions for all the various types of

activities to provide a better basis for analyzing such demands. Officials

from the U.S. Atlantic Command, which is responsible for training,

8

See our report entitled Military Capabilities: Stronger Joint Staff Role Needed to Enhance Joint

Military Training (GAO/NSIAD-95-109, July 6, 1995).

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
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packaging, and deploying forces in response to requirements identified by

other CINCs, told us that DOD should have a policy regarding the use of DOD

assets and personnel to fulfill tasks generated by other government

agencies, such as the Department of State. DOD assistance is currently

based on guidance and criteria provided by the Office of the President and

the Secretary of Defense, and in response to requirements in support of

the national security strategy or decisions by the President or other

officials in the National Command Authorities. Atlantic Command officials

also believe that DOD needs to establish a policy to improve discipline in

the long-term scheduling of exercises.

More judicious management of deployments may also require cultural

adjustments in the services. Commanders from the unit level through

major commands acknowledged that turning down deployment requests

was very difficult because they believed that doing so would reflect

negatively on the unit and/or on them. The Army Special Forces

Commander, for example, recently acknowledged that the command

“never met a deployment opportunity that we didn’t like” and challenged

the command to curb its traditional appetite for deployments. In fact, a

number of officials were concerned that commanders in all the services

were competing for deployments to underscore the value of their units

during the current drawdown.

DOD Unable to

Measure the Full

Impact of

Deployments on

Readiness

DOD systems are inadequate to assess the full impact of high PERSTEMPO on

readiness. Although unit readiness reports indicated a stable level of

readiness during the 1990s, the high-deploying units we visited voiced

pronounced concern that some personnel have been stressed to their

saturation point, with attendant concerns about difficulties in family life

and lowered retention rates. The SORTS reports do not capture all the

factors that DOD considers critical to a comprehensive readiness analysis,

and indicators of personnel readiness—such as retention rates—are

generally not available in the form needed to analyze stress on individual

units.

SORTS Reports Indicate

Readiness Is Stable

We and the Defense Science Board recently reported that readiness of the

overall force has remained generally stable during the 1990s, despite the

high level of deployments.9

 However, these reports raise concerns that the

high rate of deployments was reducing readiness in a small number of

9

Military Readiness: Data and Trends for January 1990 to March 1995 (GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR, Mar. 4,

1996) and Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness, June 1994.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
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units. Our analysis of SORTS reports for a sample of high-deploying units

yielded similar results. During the past 5 years, deployments—particularly

unscheduled ones—were a primary cause of a reduction in readiness

below planned levels in 22 of the 78 units (28 percent) analyzed, as seen in

table 1.10

Table 1: High-Deploying Units

Experiencing Readiness Reductions

From Deployments

(Mar. 1990-Mar. 1995) 

Service Total units

Units with reduced

readiness Percent of total

Army 33 12 36

Navy 13 0 0

Air Force 14 7 50

Marine Corps 18 3 17

Total 78 22 28

Source: GAO analysis of DOD readiness reports and discussions with unit

and service officials.

Most of the affected units were in the Army and the Air Force. In the Air

Force, about one-half the units analyzed experienced reduced readiness

during the 5-year period analyzed. About one-third of the Army units

experienced reductions. Many of the declines were of short duration and

were caused by shortages of personnel; increased consumption of spare

parts, which resulted in shortages; and reduced training opportunities

associated with the high pace of deployments.

Service officials pointed out that factors other than deployments can have

as much, or more, influence on reported readiness levels. For example,

Army and Marine Corps officials noted that shortages of

noncommissioned officers in certain job skills were affecting many units.

Concerns About Readiness

Not Reflected in Available

Reports

During our visits to 29 of the high-deploying units, there was pronounced

concern about the impact of high PERSTEMPO on servicemembers and

families in all the services except the Navy. Unit officials and personnel

told us that while many were experiencing personal and career hardships

as a result of the high rate of deployments, they expected to be deployed

for some period of the year and most were coping with the stress. Officials

said, however, that some had almost reached their saturation point and

10Readiness was considered reduced when a unit’s C-level ratings dropped below those planned by the

services. SORTS reports assess the status of unit personnel, equipment, and training in terms of five

overall C-levels. C-1, for example, indicates that the unit possesses the resources and training to

undertake its full wartime mission.

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that further increases could create significant retention, substance abuse,

and family problems.

Unit personnel described a variety of stresses on individuals and families,

such as difficulties in financial management for many young

servicemembers and missing the birth of children and their birthdays as

well as Christmas and other holidays. Many spoke of retention problems

and high divorce rates in high-deploying units. On an Air Force

quality-of-life survey conducted in May 1995, more than one-third of Air

Force officers and enlisted personnel who responded noted

deployment-related impacts on their personal lives and finances. A similar

proportion reported career hardships such as difficulty in obtaining

professional military education. Army air defense unit officials concluded

from a unit-conducted survey that soldiers and spouses were unhappy

with frequent deployments. Conducted at the end of a deployment to

Southwest Asia, this survey indicated that about 27 percent of the married

personnel believed their marriages could be in serious jeopardy if the unit

deployed again in the year following its return. About 40 percent of the

respondents indicated that they had decided to “get out of the Army”

during the deployment.

Members of one Air Force electronic warfare squadron we visited were so

stressed by deployments that one wrote to Members of Congress and the

Chief of Staff of the Air Force asking for relief due to his concerns about

the safety of the squadron. Three of its seven aircraft had been deployed to

Bosnia nearly continuously since July 1993. With nearly half its aircraft

still in Bosnia, the squadron was unexpectedly tasked to send two more

aircraft to Haiti for 2 weeks in September 1994 and three to Saudi Arabia

in mid-October 1994. At the same time, the squadron was asked to

complete a planned move to a new base. Efforts were made to bring back

individuals to accompany their families during the move, but spouses were

upset when some servicemembers were redeployed within 48 hours of

arrival at the new base. These deployments harmed morale and degraded

the unit training program and overall readiness. An Air Force investigation

of the incident concluded that the squadron would need 8 to 12 months to

regain its prior level of training proficiency. Although a portion of the

squadron’s aircraft continued to be used for missions, the Chief of Staff

directed a portion of the squadron’s aircraft to be protected from

deployments until the unit had recovered. According to Air Force officials,

the squadron had largely recovered by November 1995.

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These concerns, however, generally were not reflected in the personnel

readiness statistics that we reviewed. To supplement SORTS data, DOD and

the services developed a large number of statistics on personnel readiness,

such as retention, spouse and child abuse, drug abuse, divorces, and

court-martials. However, many statistics are not collected consistently

across the services or are aggregated at major command and/or

servicewide levels only, preventing comparisons of conditions in

individual units with others.11 We also found little agreement among the

services as to which indicators are the best measures of personnel

readiness.

We did, however, obtain data comparing retention in our Navy sample of

units with those Navy-wide. Personnel retention rates in the sampled units

were 6 to 15 percentage points lower than overall Navy levels between

1991 and June 1995. These results are consistent with Center for Naval

Analyses reports conducted in 1992 and 1994, which found that more time

at sea reduces retention rates for enlisted personnel.12 The Navy was the

only service that maintained this data at the unit level. The other services

aggregated their retention data at major commands and above.

The Defense Manpower Data Center prepared a special analysis

comparing reports of (1) positive drug tests and (2) spouse and child

abuse in our sample of units with servicewide rates between 1991 and

1994. In general, rates in both areas were lower in the high-deploying units

than in the services as a whole. DOD is developing a central registry for all

reports of child and spouse abuse with standardized data elements for

collection of case information. The central registry is expected to be fully

implemented in 1996.

DOD Is Taking Action,

but Requirements for

Managing

PERSTEMPO Are

Unclear

The President, Congress, and DOD have recognized the problems generated

by increases in PERSTEMPO and have taken steps to address them. In

addition, DOD is considering a number of recommendations intended to

mitigate PERSTEMPO problems. However, DOD policy on PERSTEMPO is unclear

in many areas.

11Our report Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Develop a More Comprehensive Measurement System

(GAO/NSIAD-95-29, Oct. 27, 1994) raises similar concerns.

12Implications of Changes in Time Spent at Sea (CAB 94-19, Mar. 1994); Personnel Tempo of

Operations and Navy Enlisted Retention (CRM 91-150, Feb. 1992).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
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Actions Underway to

Manage High PERSTEMPO

In May and July 1994, the President signed a new Presidential Decision

Directive and national security strategy that included policies designed to

make U.S. involvement in peace operations more selective. For example,

one policy sets forth specific standards of review to help determine when

the United States should participate or support peace operations,

including whether the role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an

identified end point. It also states that the primary mission of the U.S.

armed forces remains to be prepared to fight and win two nearly

simultaneous regional contingencies.

Legislation has also been introduced in Congress to address the impact of

high PERSTEMPO. For example, in the National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 1996, Congress recognizes that excessively high PERSTEMPO

for military personnel degrades unit readiness and morale and can

adversely affect unit retention. The act encourages DOD to continue

improving techniques for defining and managing PERSTEMPO with a view

toward establishing and achieving reasonable PERSTEMPO standards for all

military personnel.

DOD and the services have also taken actions to better manage high

PERSTEMPO. In addition to the actions taken to reduce deployments by

better integrating joint and service training requirements, the Joint Staff

has drafted the global military force policy. This policy is designed to help

guide decisions to use units few in number but high in demand for peace

operations and other types of deployments. The policy will outline the

impact that successively higher levels of deployment have on unit

maintenance, training, and other readiness areas. DOD officials hope to

finalize the policy during the spring of 1996. DOD is also developing a new

Joint Personnel Asset Visibility System, which uses electromagnetic

identification cards to track personnel assigned to Joint Task Force

operations. In addition, PERSTEMPO is discussed at the Joint Monthly

Readiness Review, which provides a venue for input from both the

services and the CINCs on readiness assessments.

DOD and the services are using the reserves to relieve active duty units and

lower PERSTEMPO. For example, the Air Force used reserves to relieve

highly stressed squadrons in Europe, and the Marine Corps used reserve

rifle companies to relieve active duty Marines in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

According to DOD officials, the success of this approach is dependent on

(1) better identification of and planning for requirements, (2) flexibility in

the training and use of reservists, and (3) programming the funding to

meet needs.

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The services continuously monitor retention levels of individuals and job

specialties, and the Army and the Air Force already have or plan to offer

bonuses and increase the number of personnel in some high-deploying

units, such as air defense artillery or airborne warning and control system

units. The Air Force has sought relief from the taskings for airborne

warning and control system units to catch up on lost training

opportunities. It has also instituted its Palace Tenure System, which helps

ensure that support taskings are balanced across their entire force. The

Navy has adopted a revised training strategy tailored to the new

requirements and expects to reduce the days deployed for training up to

10 percent for ships underway. The Navy has also reorganized the fleets

and established a permanent Western Hemisphere Group to more

efficiently fulfill Caribbean, counternarcotics, and South American

commitments.

PERSTEMPO

Requirements Are Unclear,

and Service Systems Are

Inconsistent

It is difficult for DOD to determine the actual time that either military

personnel or their units are deployed. This information is important to

planning and managing contingency operations. Although all services now

have systems to measure PERSTEMPO, each service has different

(1) definitions of what constitutes a deployment, (2) policies or guidance

for the length of time units or personnel should be deployed, and

(3) systems for tracking deployments (see table 2).

Table 2: Service Deployment

Measurement Systems Measurement Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps

Definition of

deployment:

7 days or more 56 days or more 1 day or more 10 days or more

away from

home station

Policy or

regulation limiting

deployments:

No policy, but

goal of no

single

deployment

over 179 days

Yes, policy

limits

deployments to

180 days/6

months

No policy, but

maximum

desired level of

120 days per

year

No policy, but

goal of no

single

deployment

over 6 months

System tracking

capabilities

Unit and

individual

Unit only Major weapon

systems and

individual

Unit only

As noted on table 2, the Army defines a deployment as a movement during

which a unit spends 7 days (3 days for Special Forces) or more away from

its home station. However, deployments to combat training centers, which

generally last about 3 weeks, are not counted. In contrast, the Marine

Corps defines a deployment as any movement from the home station for

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
B-271135 

10 days or more, including a deployment for training at its combat training

center.

DOD is currently considering several recommendations made by its

PERSTEMPO Working Group and a Defense Science Board task force.13 For

example, these reports recommend that (1) a Joint Staff readiness and

training oversight panel oversee joint exercises and service inspection

activities to help reduce deployment demands and (2) the CINCs establish

plans for the rotation of units and personnel involved in operations that

exceed 6 months. DOD and European Command officials said that they do

not plan to rotate the combat units in Bosnia after 6 months. Rather, they

will stay as long as needed, up to 364 days. However, they will receive a

rest and relaxation break after 179 days. According to these officials,

rotating units in and out of Bosnia is costly and could cause operating

inefficiencies.

The Defense Science Board report also recommends that DOD issue a

single formula for counting deployed time among the services: 1 day away

equals 1 day deployed. In this regard, the report of the Working Group

recommended that the services continue to refine their PERSTEMPO systems

but, at a minimum, permit a computation of averages for length of

deployment, time between deployments, percent of time deployed, and

percent of inventory deployed—at the unit or individual skill level.

One key issue in the decision of whether and how much to standardize

PERSTEMPO systems is the need for flexibility to accommodate the unique

nature of each service’s missions and deployment practices. In this regard,

officials in the U.S. Special Operations Command told us that they have

developed their own PERSTEMPO system because of concerns that the

various service systems do not reflect the unique demands placed on

Special Forces personnel. U.S. Atlantic Command officials believed that all

services should be required to track PERSTEMPO by unit to help them make

better decisions concerning unit deployments. Similarly, European

Command officials called for DOD to direct a single method to identify

which units are tasked, including an objective goal for PERSTEMPO

management.

The Working Group’s June 1995 report noted that the services had a

number of concerns in this regard, including concerns that

13Report of the PERSTEMPO Working Group, June 1995; Report of the Defense Science Board Task

Force on Quality of Life, October 1995.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
B-271135 

• such systems and thresholds could erode traditional service roles and

usurp service responsibilities,

• such thresholds may lead to unmanageable restrictions on unit and

individual deployability, and

• such systems may require an unnecessary and expensive level of detail.

The PERSTEMPO Working Group is finalizing its second study and is due to

report in the near future. The report will address whether current

deployment measurement systems are appropriate and provide overall

conclusions on the status of PERSTEMPO today as well as recommendations

for further courses of action.

Recommendations To provide the oversight and guidance needed for long-term management

of PERSTEMPO, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense

• identify key indicators that provide the best measures of deployments’

impact on personnel readiness and adjust existing databases to allow

research comparing these indicators in high PERSTEMPO units, skill groups,

or weapon systems to other such groups and

• issue DOD regulations that guide service management of PERSTEMPO by

(1) establishing a DOD-wide definition of deployment; (2) stating whether

each service should have a goal, policy, or regulation stipulating the

maximum amount of time units and/or personnel may be deployed; and

(3) defining the minimum data on PERSTEMPO each service must collect and

maintain.

Agency Comments In a meeting to discuss the Department’s comments on a draft of this

report, DOD officials said they generally agreed with our findings and

recommendations. In written comments on the draft report (see app. II),

DOD said that it has taken, and will continue to take, numerous initiatives

to manage PERSTEMPO. Also, DOD said that it will be considering

recommendations made in the PERSTEMPO Working Group’s report that is

due to be published in the near future.

Scope and

Methodology

To assess the frequency of deployments and their impact on readiness, we

focused our analyses on about 80 high-deploying active duty units in the

four services and the Special Operations Command (see app.I). At our

request, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force provided us with a list of

68 combat and support units that were the highest deployers in the 5 types

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
B-271135 

of units most frequently deployed. The Marine Corps did not have the

historical data to identify units with particularly high deployment rates.

Instead, we used a group of 18 Corps-identified units representing a

cross-section of Marine units. We obtained deployment histories for 83 of

these units and complete SORTS readiness histories for 78 of the units. For

these units, we analyzed available readiness-related statistics and

conducted case study visits to 29 judgmentally selected units. The case

study units were selected to provide broad coverage of the types of units

in each service as well as geographical diversity.

To determine the frequency of deployments in recent years, we relied

primarily on an analysis performed by the Defense Manpower Data Center,

based on a special database approximating the frequency of deployments

by measuring family separation and imminent danger pay. We did not

verify the Center’s data. We supplemented this data with deployment

histories collected directly from the high-deploying units and information

from a recently created Joint Staff database. We also discussed the status

of efforts to measure PERSTEMPO with each service and the Joint Staff.

We assessed the impact of high PERSTEMPO on readiness through a

two-tiered process. We assessed readiness of the overall force at the unit

level by using our recently completed analysis of force readiness. We also

compared SORTS ratings for the high-deploying units from 1991 to 1995 with

profiles of targeted ratings. We then compared ratings below expected

levels with unit explanations of degradations in readiness, supplementing

this analysis with discussions at the major command level. To assess the

impact of deployments on individual readiness, we reviewed available

literature and held discussions with individual service and unit officials.

Because there was no agreement regarding the best indicators of the

impact of deployments on individuals and because of data limitations, our

work in this area was limited to data on spouse and child abuse and

positive drug tests from the Defense Manpower Data Center and Navy data

on retention.

To review DOD actions to mitigate the impact of high PERSTEMPO, we

reviewed DOD reports and held discussions with DOD, service, and unit

officials.

We conducted our review from May 1995 to January 1996 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
B-271135 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, Senate and House

Committees on Appropriations, Senate Committee on Armed Services, and

House Committee on National Security, and to the Secretaries of Defense,

the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Copies will also be made available

to others upon request.

The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. If you or

your staff have questions about this report, please call me on

(202) 512-5140.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Types of Units

Included in Our

Sample of

High-Deploying Units

24

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

25

Appendix III 

Major Contributors to

This Report

26

Tables Table 1: High-Deploying Units Experiencing Readiness

Reductions From Deployments

12

Table 2: Service Deployment Measurement Systems 16

Figures Figure 1: Estimated Percent of Services Deployed 4

Figure 2: Peace Operations for High-Deploying Army and Air

Force Units

8

Figure 3: Joint Activity in High-Deploying Units 9

Abbreviations

CINC Commander in Chief

DOD Department of Defense

PERSTEMPO personnel tempo

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
Appendix I 

Types of Units Included in Our Sample of

High-Deploying Units

Army Special Forces/Rangers

General support (quartermaster, field services,

 and general supply)

Air defense artillery/Patriot batteries

Military police

Mechanized infantry

Navy Tank landing ships

Perry-class frigates

Ticonderoga-class cruisers

Spruance-class destroyers

Burke-class destroyers

Nuclear-powered fast attack submarines

Air Force Special operations squadrons

Airborne warning and control system squadrons

Electronic jamming squadrons

Reconnaissance squadrons

Marine Corps Fighter attack squadrons

Harrier attack squadrons

Electronic warfare squadrons

Light attack helicopter squadrons

Infantry battalions

Communications battalions

General support (maintenance and engineering)

 and battalions/squadrons

Light armored reconnaissance battalions

Aviation command and control group

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Sharon A. Cekala

Charles J. Bonanno, Jr.

Jose M. Pena, III

Atlanta Field Office John W. Nelson

John H. Pendleton

Gerald L. Winterlin

(703096) Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-105 Military Readiness
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