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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 107th Congress

2nd Session

S. PRT.

2002

107–61

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

AND HOMELAND SECURITY:

THE ROLE OF OTA

R E P O R T

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF

HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, Chairman

FOR THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

UNITED STATES SENATE

APRIL 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation

ii

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota

RON WYDEN, Oregon

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

BARBARA BOXER, California

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona

TED STEVENS, Alaska

CONRAD BURNS, Montana

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

GORDON SMITH, Oregon

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director

MOSES BOYD, Democratic Chief Counsel

JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel

iii

C O N T E N T S

Page

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ......................................................................................... v

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL ............................................................................................. vii

PREFACE .................................................................................................................... 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... 2

Findings ............................................................................................................. 2

Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 2

Recommendation ............................................................................................... 2

Rationale ........................................................................................................... 3

Terrorist Technology Threats ................................................................... 3

Precluding or Deterring Terrorist Acts ................................................... 3

Detecting Terrorist Acts When They Occur ............................................ 4

Coping with the Consequences of Terrorist Acts .................................... 4

Technological Choice ................................................................................. 5

Technology Assessment ............................................................................ 6

OTA’s Structure and Pattern of Operations ........................................... 7

OTA: 1993–1995 ........................................................................................ 8

Current Situation ...................................................................................... 8

Technology Assessment in the War on Terrorism and Homeland Security:

The Role of OTA ............................................................................................ 10

Terrorist Technology Threats ................................................................... 10

Precluding or Deterring Terrorist Acts ................................................... 12

Detecting Terrorist Acts When They Occur ............................................ 15

Coping with the Consequences of Terrorist Attacks .............................. 17

Technological Choice ................................................................................. 20

Technology Assessment ............................................................................ 23

OTA’s Unique Role and History ............................................................... 24

OTA’s Structure and Pattern of Operations ........................................... 26

OTA’s Credibility, Objectivity, and Relevance ........................................ 28

The Relative Roles of OTA, CRS, and GAO ............................................ 29

OTA After Gibbons: 1993–1995 ................................................................ 30

Findings ..................................................................................................... 32

Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 33

Recommendations ............................................................................................. 34

Notes .................................................................................................................. 36

(v)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,

Washington, DC, April 11, 2002.

DEAR COLLEAGUE: Technology is crucial to our conduct of the

War on Terrorism and to the success of our homeland security programs. The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

is deeply engaged in evaluating policies and programs involving the

role of technology in enhancing homeland security in the areas of

communications, airlines and airports, seaports, railroads, trucking, transportation of hazardous materials, manufacturing facilities, and science and technology in general. In conducting these

evaluations, the Committee is concerned not only with the effectiveness and costs of the technologies, but also with their impact

on U.S. industries and consumers, and the privacy rights of individual citizens.

To aid the Committee in its consideration of these matters, I

have requested that a study conducted by Mr. Ellis R. Mottur, as

a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, be made available to the Committee. Mr. Mottur

earlier served as the first Assistant Director of the Congressional

Office of Technology Assessment and more recently as Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Deputy Assistant Secretary for

Transportation and Technology Industries.

This document contains the report prepared by Mr. Mottur, entitled: ‘‘Technology Assessment in the War on Terrorism and Homeland Security: The Role of OTA.’’ Although the report has not been

considered or endorsed by the Committee or any of its members,

I believe it will be of interest to the Congress and many persons

in the scientific, technical, academic, and professional communities,

as well as the general public. To insure its general availability, I

have directed that this document be published as a Committee

print.

Sincerely,

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, Chairman.

(vii)

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR

SCHOLARS,

Washington, D.C., March 22, 2002.

HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, Chairman,

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,

U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your kind letter

expressing interest in my study at the Woodrow Wilson Center. In

response to your request, I am pleased to provide the Commerce

Committee with my report entitled: ‘‘Technology Assessment in the

War on Terrorism and Homeland Security: The Role of OTA.’’

The report focuses on the utilization of technologies in achieving

homeland security, demonstrates the need for technology assessment to evaluate those technologies, traces the history of OTA, and

concludes with a recommended course of action. I hope the report

proves useful to the Committee.

With best personal wishes.

Sincerely,

ELLIS R. MOTTUR,

Public Policy Scholar.

Enclosure

(1)

PREFACE

In the months since September 11, it has become abundantly

clear that America’s unparalleled superiority in technology is critical to achieving success in the War on Terrorism and ensuring

homeland security. Accordingly, the choices the United States

makes with respect to the implementation of particular technologies will continue to be of paramount importance to the course

of that struggle for years to come.

Those choices are exceedingly complex, involving assessments of

effectiveness, costs, benefits, and impacts on the economy, environment, society, and human values, as well as comparisons with alternative technologies. Technology assessment is the methodology

for making such choices.

As one of the founders of the congressional Office of Technology

Assessment (OTA), and its first Assistant Director, I was well acquainted with that methodology and its application within the congressional context. Accordingly, in order to contribute to the national response to this unprecedented challenge, I joined the Woodrow Wilson Center as a Public Policy Scholar to conduct a study

on technologies in the War on Terrorism and homeland security,

with a focus on the potential role of OTA. The initial result is this

report, which I hope proves useful in helping empower Congress to

fulfill its legislative, appropriation, and oversight responsibilities in

this overarching conflict.

I want to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and especially

to Michael Van Dusen, Samuel F. Wells, Jr., Kent H. Hughes, and

Robert S. Litwak for making this project possible, to all of the

Scholars at the Center for their stimulating intellectual discussions, to my intern, Jonathan Radke, for his valuable assistance,

and above all to Lee H. Hamilton whose far-sighted, inspired leadership of the Center makes it as great a pleasure as it is a privilege

to be a part of it.

Of course, the statements, views, and recommendations expressed in this report are solely the responsibility of the author

and are not in any way intended to reflect those of the Woodrow

Wilson Center, its management, staff, or other scholars.

2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FINDINGS

• Technology is critical to U.S. success in the War on Terrorism

and ensuring homeland security.

• A wide variety of sophisticated technologies may be involved in

those efforts.

• Choosing among possible technologies and patterns of implementation is a complex process, oftentimes involving unintended consequences.

• Technology Assessment is the methodology for making such

choices.

• The leading exemplar of technology assessment was the congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), founded in

1972.

• For almost a quarter of a century, OTA provided Congress

with valuable analyses of policy options on important issues involving technology.

• During that period OTA achieved a world-wide reputation for

excellence, as a non-partisan, objective, and credible conductor

of technology assessments.

• When OTA’s funding was discontinued in 1995, there was no

dissatisfaction with its performance; indeed OTA received accolades for its excellent work.

• Elimination of its funding was a cost-cutting measure at a time

of fiscal stringency and a symbol for Executive Branch agencies

to emulate.

• Congress now needs its own source of non-partisan, objective

technology assessment in order to fulfill its legislative, appropriation, and oversight responsibilities in the War on Terrorism and ensuring homeland security.

• While OTA’s funding was discontinued, its enabling statute remains in effect, including its authorization of ‘‘such sums as

may be necessary.’’

CONCLUSION

To fulfill its constitutional responsibilities in pursuing the War

on Terrorism and ensuring homeland security, Congress urgently

needs to reactivate OTA.

RECOMMENDATION

In the first supplemental appropriation bill considered in this

session, Congress should include $1 million for OTA to canvass and

consult with congressional committees, and plan a series of technology assessments designed to meet the priority needs of those

committees with respect to the War on Terrorism and homeland

security.

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RATIONALE

In the War on Terrorism, America’s principal advantage is its

unparalleled technological superiority—measured not only in highly sophisticated hardware and software—but also in the competence and character of its citizens in controlling that technology.

This is true not only in dealing with the war, but just as importantly, in ensuring homeland security.

Terrorist Technology Threats

Each terrorist threat or act can be characterized by the specific

technology utilized, by its means of delivery, and by its intended

target. The diversity of technologies involved is enormous. There

are 36 deadly biological agents, including 13 viruses, 7 bacteria, 3

micro-organisms with traits common to both bacteria and viruses,

1 fungus, and 12 biological toxins. Cyber-terrorists can hack into

information systems, deny service to others by overwhelming sites

with bogus requests, and spread computer viruses or worms.

Chemical agents encompass nerve gases, cyanides, phosgene, and

vesicants. Explosives run the gamut from nuclear fission, fusion, or

dirty nuclear bombs through plastic explosives, nitrogen-based varieties, to pipe bombs, or simple hand grenades.

Similarly there are a great variety of means whereby terrorists

can deliver their agents of destruction or disruption, including

mail, modems, missiles, aircraft, ships, trains, trucks, autos, on

foot, or by remote detonation. And their targets are equally varied,

including: transportation and telecommunications systems; air,

water and food supplies; energy sources and distribution channels;

financial and computer networks; factories; key buildings; population groups; and prominent individuals.

But surpassing the extensive array of technologies, transmissions, and targets available to terrorists is the wide range of

countervailing technologies we can deploy to deal with their threats

or attacks. These fall into 3 categories, those aimed at: (1) precluding or deterring the terrorist act; (2) detecting it when it occurs; and (3) coping with its consequences.

Precluding or Deterring Terrorist Acts

The overarching campaign in this category consists of the current

and projected military actions, along with the coordinated diplomatic, intelligence, public safety, and financial efforts to thwart

terrorism wherever it lurks. On the homeland security front, there

are a wide variety of technological systems under consideration. A

number of these involve the enhanced coordination of more sophisticated, computerized information systems to track and apprehend

terrorists before the deed is done. Most of the other technological

systems directed at preventing terrorist acts are aimed at either or

both of 2 goals: (a) to maintain boundaries which only authorized

individuals can traverse; and (b) to ascertain whether the identities

of specific individuals or entities meet the authorization criteria.

The role of technology in maintaining boundaries lies essentially in

electronic barriers, surveillance sensors, video cameras, alarms,

and communications systems.

Identification technologies to confirm authorization to traverse

boundaries include those aimed at screening things and those deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:06 May 07, 2002 Jkt 078705 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78705.TXT SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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signed to verify persons’ identities. Since conventional x-ray screening of baggage is not very effective for moderately sophisticated explosive devices, a number of more advanced systems are being investigated, such as pulsed fast-neutron transmission spectroscopy.

An example of a technology for screening things that may be carried by persons is a holographic imaging system that can see objects hidden under clothing. A host of new technologies are being

studied for verifying individuals’ identities, including sophisticated

biometric identification techniques, such as facial pattern recognition and iris or retina scanning systems.

Detecting Terrorist Acts When They Occur

If the terrorist act involves an explosion or shooting, witnesses

are immediately aware that something terrible has transpired; but

if the act involves cyber-terrorism or chemical or biological agents,

there may be a considerable time lag before the act is discovered.

If cyber-terrorists disrupt major electric power or communications

systems, the act would be readily recognized; but when cyber-terrorists introduce computer worms or viruses into information systems, crucial time may elapse before the deed is discovered. Detection of chemical or biological agents is even more challenging. An

example of a detection technology under development is a portable

isotopic neutron spectroscopy chemical assay system that can identify nerve gases or explosives. Detection of biological agents is most

difficult since the effect on the exposed individuals may not become

apparent for a considerable period—by which time it may be too

late to counteract the agent. An example of a technology being considered for detecting 8 different biohazards (including anthrax

spores) is Polymerase Chain Reaction of PCR which uses specific

enzymes to amplify tiny quantities of DNA to match them with

DNA samples of the biological agent.

Coping with the Consequences of Terrorist Acts

After a terrorist act has been detected, it is imperative that its

nature and extent be rapidly comprehended so that appropriate

countermeasures can be undertaken. But it is sometimes difficult

quickly to ascertain the character of chemical agents utilized in an

attack; and biological weapons are especially troublesome in confounding rapid comprehension of what has transpired, as was evidenced in last fall’s anthrax attacks. To facilitate more rapid comprehension, there’s a need for a greatly improved communications

network. This is underscored by the fact that the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) were not aware of May 2001 Canadian studies

that confirmed the threat of spreading anthrax through the mail,

even though 6 other U.S. agencies were cognizant of the studies.

CDC did not learn of the studies until early November when the

anthrax outbreak was almost over. Examples of technologies for

coping with chemical attacks are the Antidote-Treatment-NerveGas-Agent Auto-injector, a pen-like device to administer both types

of anti-nerve-gas antidotes, and Sandia National Laboratory’s development of a nontoxic, non-corrosive foam to neutralize chemical

agents. Examples with respect to biological agents include an advanced, hand-held nucleic acid-analyzer to identify biological

agents in the field within a matter of minutes and the use of irraVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:06 May 07, 2002 Jkt 078705 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78705.TXT SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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diation of mail to destroy bacteria or spores. The administration’s

budget includes $6 billion for combating bioterrorism, including a

substantial amount for research and development of such technologies.

Technological Choice

Choosing among the vast array of technological options for homeland security is a complex process. Sometimes there are inadequate

data; other times the underlying science is not fully understood.

But even when the scientific basis and data are available, there remains the so-called ‘Law of Unintended Consequences,’ which refers to the fact that many technologies engender ancillary, unexpected consequences that are difficult to foresee and sometimes detrimental in their impacts.

The most obvious example from the past is the use of the internal combustion engine for vehicles. While this innovation served as

one of the prime movers of 20th century economic expansion, its

long-term effects on the environment have been deleterious because

of air pollution and the possibility of global warming. Another example is the use of chlorofluorocarbons for refrigeration and air

conditioning. Along with the very beneficial effects of this innovation has come the diminution of the ozone layer, which serves to

block the sun’s rays and prevent skin cancer.

The point of these past examples is not that we should have refrained from utilizing the internal combustion engine for vehicles

or Freon for cooling, both of which have bestowed substantial benefits on our standard of living. But if we had anticipated their ancillary, adverse consequences earlier, we might have been able to

structure their implementation in such a way as to mitigate those

unintended consequences and to design research and development

programs aimed at alternative or supplemental means of achieving

the same ends.

Technologies considered for homeland security have already exhibited some unintended consequences. The irradiation of mail

damages computer chips, film, food, pharmaceuticals, contact lens,

etc. Moreover, the process appears to have caused illness in some

mail handlers because the irradiation heats the plastic warp used

to protect the mail, thereby releasing noxious fumes. A potential

problem arises with retinal scanning for identification purposes because of possible adverse health effects from the infrared light used

to scan the retina and the threat of infection because of contact

with the equipment. With respect to on-flight security, it appears

that Tasers, a kind of stun gun, might interfere with the plane’s

operational instruments. A broader case of unintended consequences involves the impact on personal privacy from the more

intrusive use of surveillance cameras and the integration of data

bases containing background information on individuals. Similarly

the wider use of antibiotics, like Cipro, could trigger greater resistance as bacteria adapt to them. The planned computerized, surveillance system of foreign students has also engendered considerable

opposition from the colleges and universities that fear the loss of

their tuition—another unintended consequence.

The lesson from all this is that technologies often have unintended, ancillary consequences which—to the extent feasible—

6

should be anticipated and taken into account in selecting among alternative technological solutions and structuring their implementation. The point is not that any particular technology is inherently

good or bad, but rather that its relative benefits and detriments depend partially on its ancillary consequences, as well as on the uses

to which it is put and the way in which it is implemented.

Technology Assessment

The analysis, comparison, and selection of technologies is a complex process, involving the following components:

• determining the technical capabilities of the technology;

• evaluating its effectiveness in achieving its primary objectives;

• ascertaining its costs;

• delineating the benefits it confers;

• anticipating its ancillary consequences, both positive and negative;

• discerning its probable impact on the economy, environment,

society, and individual values;

• comparing the technology with alternatives in terms of all the

foregoing factors; and

• delineating the advantages and disadvantages—the pros

and cons—for the various policy options confronting decision

makers.

Technology assessment is the methodology for conducting such

analyses. Incorporating elements of operations research, systems

analysis, cost-benefit studies, game theory, linear programming,

simulation studies, and alternative-futures scenarios—along with

pragmatic public policy considerations—technology assessment

emerged as a distinct field of academic research in the mid-1960s.

After 5 years of extensive hearings before the House Science and

Astronautics Committee, and subsequent consideration by the Senate Rules Committee, the Technology Assessment Act of 1972 was

signed into law on October 13, 1972, thereby establishing OTA as

only the third support agency of Congress in the history of the Republic. (The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was not created

until 1974.)

During the legislative consideration of creating OTA, a great deal

of attention was focused on why Congress needed a new agency,

rather than relying on CRS and GAO. It was the overwhelming

judgment of the academic, scientific, technical, and public policy

communities that neither CRS nor GAO was capable of carrying

out the technology assessments required by Congress, a view in

which the Director of CRS, the Librarian of Congress, and the

Comptroller General all concurred.

OTA went through its formative stages, guided by its Founding

Director, former Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario. OTA later

achieved maturity under the leadership of Director John Gibbons,

who served about 15 years from 1979 to 1993. He built the credibility of the Office within Congress and throughout the nation’s

academic, scientific, technical, and professional communities. InVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:06 May 07, 2002 Jkt 078705 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78705.TXT SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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deed, OTA was recognized worldwide as the top institution of its

kind, with many countries creating their own comparable organizations, modeled on OTA, including Austria, Denmark, the European

Union, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. While OTA products had a pervasive impact on congressional

activities during the Gibbons Era, and the Office received many accolades and awards, its impact was best summed up by an article

in the Federal Times, which stated: ‘‘[I]n a town where unimpeachable sources are oh-so-hard to come by, OTA has managed to secure a position near the top of the list.’’ 1

OTA’s Structure and Pattern of Operations

OTA consists of a congressional Technology Assessment Board

(TAB), a Director and his staff, and an Advisory Council. TAB consists of 6 Senators and 6 House members, evenly split between the

2 parties. The 10 public members of the Advisory Council are appointed by TAB and are joined on the Council by 2 ex officio members, the Comptroller General and the Director of CRS. TAB appoints the Director, who then appoints the office staff. The TAB

Chairmanship rotates between Senate and House in different congresses. Traditionally the Chairman comes from the majority party

in his House and the Vice Chairman from the opposite party in the

other House. Assessments are undertaken at the request of congressional committees, not in response to individual members as is

the case with CRS and GAO.

For each assessment undertaken, OTA convenes an advisory

panel made up of experts, stakeholders, and citizens relevant to the

particular assessment. These advisory panels play a key role in the

design of the assessment, in the analysis of the data that has been

assembled, and in reviewing the final report, which is also examined by a number of other outside reviewers who bring special expertise and points of view to the assessment. Over time OTA came

to draw upon a pool of about 1,000 panelists and outside reviewers.

The overall assessment process embodies a series of checks and

balances that confer credibility, objectivity, and relevance on the

final report. Some of the most important checks and balances are

the:

• even balance between House and Senate and the 2 parties on

TAB;

• tradition of the Chair and Vice Chair from opposite parties;

• need for TAB approval to initiate assessments and release

reports;

• Advisory Council’s salutary influence on OTA’s standards of

excellence;

• advisory panel’s role in design, analysis, and review of assessment;

• role of stakeholders and additional outside reviewers;

• preparation of Review Memorandum which describes reactions

of panelists and reviewers to each portion of report and shows

how final version takes account of those comments; and

8

• the pattern of continuing, informal communication between

OTA and committee staff before, during, and as follow-up to

the assessment.

With this understanding of the OTA process, it becomes clear

why neither CRS nor GAO could effectively carry it out. Neither

one operates under the close control of a congressional board; neither one responds only to requests from committees; and neither

one has the statutory authority or institutional capability to integrate the expertise and views of 1,000 outside advisers into assessments.

Examples of some OTA reports particularly relevant to the War

on Terrorism and homeland security include:

• The Border War on Drugs

• Electronic Surveillance in a Digital Age

• High Level Radioactive Waste Site Characterization

• Impacts of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria

• New Developments in Biotechnology

• Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing

• Taggants in Explosives

• Technology Transfer to China

• Technology and Counter Terrorism • Transportation of Hazardous Materials • Virtual Reality and Technologies for Combat Simulation

• Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

OTA: 1993–1995

After about 15 years of outstanding service, Gibbons resigned as

OTA Director in early 1993 to join the new administration. He was

succeeded by Dr. Roger C. Herdman who had been serving as Assistant OTA Director with responsibility for Health and Life

Sciences.

In 1995, however, there was a sea change in control of Congress.

The new leadership was intent on eliminating a number of cabinet

departments and on reducing the costs of government, including

within the Legislative Branch. The likeliest target for reduction

within Congress was one of the support agencies, CBO, CRS, GAO,

and OTA. Of these, OTA was the smallest and most vulnerable. Accordingly, in order to save money, the House Appropriations Committee recommended elimination of all funding for OTA. This was

strenuously opposed by many members—including all TAB members in the House—but the leadership prevailed. In the Senate the

committee proposed a small amount for OTA, but only enough to

enable it to close down its operations in an orderly manner. Again

there was a strong effort to provide adequate funding, led by all

Senators who have served on TAB. But again the majority voted

it down and OTA ceased operations at the end of FY 1995.

Current Situation

As noted in the Findings, while OTA’s funding was discontinued,

its enabling statute remains in effect, including its authorization of

‘‘such sums as may be necessary.’’ Moreover, since the Senate is a

continuing body and the act does not limit the tenure of its members, the Senators who were Board members in 1995—Senators

9

Grassley, Hatch, Hollings, and Kennedy—are still Board members.

Since the House is not a continuing body, it could be argued that

the current House members who were on TAB in 1995—Representatives Dingell, Houghton, McDermott, and Oxley—would not still

be members. But in any case, the act stipulates that: ‘‘Vacancies

in the membership of the Board shall not affect the power of the

remaining members to execute the functions of the Board.’’ In

short, OTA has an ongoing authorization for appropriations, and

TAB is empowered to submit a recommendation to the Appropriations Committees for such an appropriation.

To underscore the urgent necessity for reactivating OTA, one example of OTA’s potential impact on the War on Terrorism and

homeland security should suffice. The anthrax attacks last fall engendered considerable confusion and consternation among public

health authorities, public safety officials, and policy makers

throughout federal, state, and local government. There was great

uncertainty on many matters, including the number of spores necessary to trigger inhalation anthrax in humans; but it was widely

believed that 8,000–10,000 spores would be needed to cause inhalation or pulmonary anthrax. If OTA had been operational at the

time, it could have brought a highly relevant 1993 OTA report to

the attention of the public health authorities. The report entitled

Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction stated: ‘‘1,000 spores or less can produce fatal pulmonary anthrax in some

members of an exposed population.’’ 2 If this information had been

readily available, it’s conceivable that it even could have saved a

life or—at the very least—afforded much better guidance to the

public health authorities in designing their response to the crisis.

It is clear that Congress urgently needs to reactivate OTA, and that to do so, all that is required is inclusion of $1 million in the

next supplemental appropriation. Considering that this $1 million

would reactivate an Office that could aid Congress in evaluating

the $38 billion the President has recently requested for homeland

security, the $1 million amount does not seem unreasonable.

* * * * *

10

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

AND HOMELAND SECURITY: THE ROLE OF OTA

In the War on Terrorism, America’s principal advantage is its

unparalleled technological superiority—measured not only in highly sophisticated hardware and software—but also in the competence and character of its citizens in controlling that technology.

The military action in Afghanistan was a striking demonstration of

those assets.

Eight thousand mile bombing runs from the continental United

States, tactical aircraft sorties from carriers in the Persian Gulf or

Arabian Sea, targeting by satellites and Predator drone planes,

real-time information displays, GPS-guided smart bombs—along

with night vision and special forces providing laser guidance on the

ground—enabled precision bombing that could penetrate cave entrances horizontally and explode underground with greater devastation than hundreds of dumb bombs in World War II or Vietnam.

In short, the awesome enhancement of our military capabilities

through technology is apparent to all who tune in to CNN. But perhaps not as overtly obvious, yet promising to be as powerful and

pervasive is the potential impact of technology on homeland security. This potential impact flows both from the technology utilized

by the terrorists and from the technology we need to employ to deal

with their threats.

Terrorist Technology Threats

Each terrorist threat or act can be characterized by the specific

technology utilized, by its means of delivery, and by its intended

target. Thus the catastrophe of September 11 utilized jet fuel as an

explosive, delivered by means of fully-fueled, Boeing-757 and -767

aircraft, and directed at the World Trade Center towers. The subsequent anthrax events utilized highly refined, aerosolizable anthrax

powder, delivered through envelopes in the mail, and aimed at Senate and media personnel. The ongoing bombings in Israel utilize

plastic explosives, delivered by suicidal individuals on foot or in vehicles, and targeted at groups of innocent bystanders.

These current examples illustrate the diversity of technologies,

means of delivery, and targets that terrorists may employ. The full

range of possibilities is extremely wide. Thus biological agents

could include—besides anthrax—small pox, plague, viral encephalitis, yellow fever, and Marburg virus. Examples of other agents

that could be introduced through the food supply are botulism, salmonella, E. coli, and cholera. In fact, ‘‘the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention lists 36 classes of . . . potential weapons . . .

[including] 13 viruses, 7 bacteria, 3 rickettsiae (micro-organisms

that have traits common to both bacteria and viruses), 1 fungus

and 12 biological toxins.’’ 3

Cyber-terrorists utilize the internet, software, and their extensive computer skills to hack into purportedly inaccessible information systems, to deny service to others by overwhelming sites with

bogus requests, and to spread deleterious computer viruses or

worms. In contrast with weapons of mass destruction, ‘‘cyber

threats are considered weapons of mass disruption . . . Computer

security experts . . . have begun seeing evidence of increasingly

potent attacks by hackers . . . denial of service attacks [are] beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:06 May 07, 2002 Jkt 078705 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78705.TXT SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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coming more common and more disruptive . . . Attackers have also

employed ‘worms’ . . . aimed at routers, which direct traffic

throughout the internet . . . No computer on the internet is immune from denial of service attacks.’’ 4

Chemical agents encompass: nerve agents like sarin, tabun,

soman, and VX gas; cyanides; phosgene; and vesicants such as sulfur mustard gas. Explosives run the gamut from nuclear fission or

fusion bombs to dirty nuclear bombs (which disperse radioactive

materials without a chain reaction) to highly energetic plastic explosives to nitrogen-based (nitramine) varieties like nitroglycerine

to pipe bombs or simple hand grenades. Arson can be committed

merely with a container of gasoline and some matches. And of

course, determined terrorists can rely on simple weapons like automatic rifles, hand guns or—as we saw on September 11—even

small box cutters.

While not as diverse as the wide range of technologies terrorists

may employ, there are a number of means through which they can

deliver their agents of destruction or disruption, including: mail;

computer modems; missiles; aircraft (from crop dusters to Boeing

767s); ships (from huge tankers to small harbor craft); trains;

trucks; automobiles; bicycles; on foot; by a hand hurling a grenade;

or by remote detonation, which itself can be accomplished by a variety of methods.

For example, in the ‘‘early 1970s, IRA [bombs in the UK consisted of] . . . nails wrapped around a lump of plastic explosive

and detonated simply by lighting a fuse. . . . [Their] time bombs

. . . were . . . dynamite and commercial detonators . . . attached

to ordinary battery-powered alarm clocks.’’ Later on to avert danger to their agents, they began detonating remotely ‘‘by using the

radio controls for model aircraft. The British Ministry of Defense

(MoD) thwarted this means of attack through electronic countermeasures and jamming techniques.’’ The IRA then developed a ‘‘network of sophisticated electronic switches [to] bypass the . . .

countermeasures . . . [T]he MoD scientists . . . [then devised] a

new system of electronic scanners able to detect radio emissions

. . . before the bomber can actually transmit the detonation signal.’’ But the IRA subsequently developed ‘‘a photo-flash ‘slave’ unit

that can be triggered from a distance of up to 800 meters by a flash

of light.’’ 5 So the various technologies for detonating and thwarting

detonation continue to contend with each other.

The targets terrorists may attack are equally varied, ranging

from: telecommunication systems; computer networks; water systems; 6 food supplies; energy sources and distribution systems (nuclear or coal power plants, hydroelectric dams, natural gas pipelines, oil refineries, etc.); transportation systems (roads, rail, subways, bridges, tunnels, seaports); financial institutions and networks; factories; key buildings; and concentrated populations or

even prominent individuals.

The vulnerability of the nation’s electric power system, for example, was underscored at a recent conference of industry executives,

at which it was revealed that: ‘‘The computers that control the electric power system around the nation have been probed from the

Middle East, and terrorists may have inspected the physical equipment . . . Government experts identified nuclear power plants as

12

perhaps the most attractive targets, but said dams, gas pipelines

and oil refineries were not far behind.’’ 7

Surpassing the extensive array of technologies, transmissions,

and targets available to terrorists is the wide range of countervailing technologies we can deploy to deal with their threats or attacks. These countervailing technologies fall into three categories,

those aimed at: (1) precluding or deterring the terrorist act; (2) detecting it when it occurs; and (3) coping with its consequences. It

is instructive to examine illustrative examples of technologies in

each of these categories.

Precluding or Deterring Terrorist Acts

The best example in this category, of course, is the current effort

to root out and extirpate the Al Qaeda network, cells of which are

reputed to be festering in about 60 countries throughout the world.

Accomplishing this goal would surely go a long way toward precluding many terrorist attacks. But as President Bush reiterated in

his January 2002 State of the Union speech, the War on Terrorism

extends far beyond the Al Qaeda network or the former Taliban

government, as is evidenced by the recent incursion of American

special forces into the Philippines and planned deployments into

Yemen and the Republic of Georgia. Furthermore, underscoring his

oft-stated warning that nations that harbor terrorists are equally

culpable, he specifically cited Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as ‘‘seeking weapons of mass destruction,’’ castigating them as constituting

‘‘an axis of evil.’’ 8 Proceeding in parallel with the military actions

in Afghanistan and the Philippines and the President’s public exhortations, are the coordinated diplomatic, intelligence, public safety, and financial efforts to thwart terrorism wherever it lurks. Undoubtedly this concerted campaign has already impeded previously

plotted terrorist events.

But as President Bush also noted in his State of the Union address: ‘‘Thousands of dangerous killers . . . are now spread

throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without

warning.’’ 9 To intercept and prevent any of their attempted terrorist acts from implementation, homeland security measures may

encompass a wide variety of technological systems. Many of these

technologies involve ‘‘the use of powerful computers . . . [which]

can spot linkages among [innumerable] individual pieces of information . . . Germany pioneered the use of computers in this field

. . . Two apparently unrelated individuals could be shown to be extremely likely to belong to the same terrorist group by showing an

overlap in the information about them which was too complete to

be coincidental . . . The FBI has now refined and expanded upon

the capacities pioneered by the German police . . . [by developing

a computer system] designed to draw investigative inferences from

the organized examination of all the data that the Justice Department and its component agencies are collecting.’’ 10

Most of the other technological systems directed at preventing

terrorist acts are aimed at one or both of two goals: (a) to maintain

some kind of boundaries which only authorized individuals or entities can traverse; and (b) to ascertain whether the identities of specific individuals or entities meet the authorization criteria.

13

The boundaries can be as wide as the U.S. seacoasts and northern and southern border or as narrow as the walls of a particular

facility, building, or secure room within a building. They can be the

perimeters of nuclear, electrical, or telecommunications facilities or

the confines of a particular airfield, airplane, seaport, ship, train

station, train, bridge, or tunnel. They can be secured through appropriate configurations of powerful walls, fences, doors, electronic

barriers, surveillance sensors, video cameras, communication systems, alarms, guards, and guard dogs. Current examples range

from the projected increase of customs agents and immigration officials to be stationed at the Mexican and Canadian borders and various airports and seaports to the National Guard troops at nuclear

power facilities to the reinforced cockpit doors on aircraft.

With respect to border crossings, a number of technologies are

being explored. The Director of Homeland Security, Governor Tom

Ridge said: ‘‘experimental high-tech ‘fast lanes’ for frequent travelers, and inspecting cargo trucks and electronically sealing them

at locations away from the border would . . . move the border into

the 21st century . . . [although] scanners to read the 5 million

‘laser’ identification cards issued to people who frequently cross the

border [still need to be installed] . . . The new laser IDs include

biometric features, such as fingerprints . . . The other new technology under discussion includes more mobile x-ray units, which

resemble a drive-through car wash. A vehicle crossing the border

would drive through the apparatus and an inspector could, for instance, detect false compartments used to smuggle people or check

sealed cargo.’’ 11

The role of technology in maintaining boundaries lies essentially

in electronic barriers, surveillance sensors, video cameras, communication systems, and alarms. Some examples will serve to illustrate the range of technologies involved. Thus alarm systems are

generally based on hard-wire lines, microwave, radio frequency, or

cellular transmission technologies.12 When available, fiber optics

may replace copper hard-wire lines, since fiber optics provides

longer distance transmission and freedom from electromagnetic or

radio frequency interference.13 Because of the heightened emphasis

on anti-terrorism activities since September 11th, many efforts are

underway to develop more sophisticated surveillance systems. A

good example is the software that has been developed by NetTalon

Security Systems, Inc. of Fredericksburg, Virginia. This software

enables real-time, simultaneous transmission to and from an aircraft and the ground for a host of video, sound, and sensor information (e.g., motion or vapor detection, changes in pressure or temperature, etc). As a result, the ground station could instantaneously trigger response mechanisms like aiming a Taser stun gun

or releasing pepper spray at a precise target.14

Identification technologies to confirm authorization to traverse

boundaries fall into two classes: those aimed at screening things

and those designed to verify persons’ identities. In both cases there

are a multitude of technologies entering into practice, under consideration, or still in research and development. Illustrative of these

is the wide range of devices under consideration for baggage

screening at airports. Conventional x-ray screening of baggage is

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vices.15 Other technologies that have been studied for this purpose

include: thermal neutron activation (TNA); automated neutronsource accelerator; elastic neutron scattering; pulsed fast-neutron

transmission spectroscopy (PFNTS); photon activation; nuclear resonant absorption (NRA); fast-neutron associated particle (FNAP);

dual energy x-ray systems; backscatter x-ray; coherent x-ray scattering; and dual energy x-ray computed tomography (CT).16

Numerous other technologies are being developed for screening

things that may be carried by persons. For example, the Pacific

Northwest National Laboratory (pNNL) in Washington State has

developed a hand-held ‘‘device that uses ultrasonic waves to see inside of sealed containers, a holographic imaging system that can

see objects hidden under clothing, and a polymer that detects nerve

agents.’’ 17 The Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) is ‘‘developing . . .

electromagnetic devices for screening bottles and other containers

. . . [for] detecting liquid explosives.’’ Other devices, known as

trace detectors, have been manufactured for ‘‘detect[ing] the residue or vapor from explosives on the exterior of carry-on bags and

on electronic items, such as computers or radios,’’ or even on shoes.

Other trace detectors under development screen items handled by

persons to detect residue or vapor from explosives on the persons’ hands. Also in development are walk-through screening portals

that can: ‘‘detect particles and vapor from explosives on passengers’ clothing or in the air surrounding their bodies.’’ 18

There is also a wide array of technologies being considered for

verifying individuals’ identities and authorization to traverse

boundaries. Some of these are as simple as the use of wireless devices with software developed by Aether Systems, Inc. of Maryland

whereby airport security personnel can instantaneously check electronic records to identify passengers, airport employees, and vehicles.19 Others include the more extensive use of photo IDs and

smart cards (with embedded computer chips), encryption for electronic communications, and increasingly sophisticated biometric

identification techniques. One biometric system utilizes passive and

active imaging technologies, which ‘‘can see through clothes and

produce an image of the human body underneath . . . In passive

screening, the natural radiation emitted by the human body is detected and analyzed . . . Active imaging entails irradiating the

body with x-rays or millimeter waves and analyzing the radiation

scattered from the body . . . [M]etallic weapons or explosive materials . . . will appear different from [the body].’’ 20

Generally, biometrics refers to a set of technologies that utilize

human characteristics or behavioral traits to identify particular individuals. These include: fingerprinting, finger patterns, palm

prints, hand geometry, hand topography, hand and wrist vein patterns, facial pattern recognition, voice recognition, signature or

handwriting analysis, key stroke dynamics, and iris or retina scanning. An example that employs facial pattern recognition is the

FaceIT technology manufactured by a New Jersey company,

Visionics. This system generates ID codes ‘‘based on 80 unique aspects of [individuals] facial structures, like the width of the nose

and the location of the temples. FaceIT can instantly compare an

image of any individual’s face with a database of the faces of suspected terrorists.’’ 21 Iris scanning systems are based on the fact

15

that not only are everyone’s irises—even those of identical twins—

different, but also that each individual’s two irises are different

from each other. Software has been developed that enables scanning and database comparison of irises to take place within a few

seconds.22

Detecting Terrorist Acts When They Occur

When efforts to prevent or deter terrorism fail and a terrorist act

occurs, it is not always immediately obvious what has happened.

If the terrorist act involves an explosion or shooting, witnesses are

immediately aware that something terrible has transpired; but if

the act involves cyber-terrorism or biological or chemical agents,

there may be a considerable time lag before the act is discovered.

Our increasingly interdependent, technologically complex society is

highly vulnerable to the disruptive effects of cyber-terrorism. If

such acts were to penetrate and disrupt the FAA flight control system, or power grids, or major communication systems, they would

undoubtedly be readily recognized. It also would be obvious if the

method of disruption consisted of, ‘‘flooding [an information] system

with false requests for service [so that it was] impossible to respond to legitimate requests’’—as happened with Yahoo in the year

2000.23 But if the hackers or cyber-terrorists cleverly introduce

computer worms or viruses into information systems—as is occurring with increasing frequency 24—prompt detection of the act

poses a constant challenge to the ingenuity of our software designers and the vigilance of our system operators.

Detecting the introduction of chemical or biological agents is perhaps even more challenging. One of the most widely reported acts

of chemical terrorism occurred on March 20, 1995, when ‘‘the nerve

gas sarin was released in commuter trains on three different Tokyo

subway lines by a terrorist cult group. Sarin was concealed in

lunch boxes and soft-drink containers and . . . released as terrorists punctured the containers with umbrellas before leaving the

trains. Over 5,500 were injured,’’ 11 of whom died. Since there was

no detection capability within the train system and since sarin is

colorless and odorless, detection occurred only after sick patients

flooded the area hospitals.25

To provide rapid detection for such events in the future, U.S. scientists from Argonne, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore national

laboratories ‘‘have been developing and experimenting with chemical sensors in two downtown [Washington] Metro stations . . .

[They have] studied how air moves through the subway and how

trains, heat and humidity affect air flow . . . how chemicals spread

. . . [and how they] can be released through air exhaust systems

into the streets above . . . They can detect the presence of a harmful chemical, such as sarin gas, [but] cannot yet detect biological

agents, such as anthrax.’’ 26 Other detection technologies under development at the national laboratories include: ‘‘a cyanide microsensor, [a] portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy chemical assay

system that can identify nerve agents, compressed gases, or explosives inside artillery shells or bombs [and] . . . a ‘laboratory on a

chip’ that can identify . . . all . . . known chemical warfare agents

in under 30 seconds.’’ 27

16

Detection of biological agents is generally more difficult because

the effect of the biological agent on the exposed individuals frequently does not become obvious until quite some time has elapsed;

and oftentimes it is then too late to counteract the harmful agent.

So it’s imperative that effective detection technologies are developed and made widely available throughout the U.S. public health

system.

Biological agents can be delivered through the air, the water, the

food supply, or—as we recently witnessed—through the mail system. Since detecting biological agents in the mail poses extremely

daunting problems, high security targets—like the Congress and

key government agencies—are beginning to irradiate all such mail

in an effort to kill any biological organisms that may be present.

The U.S. Postal Service recently announced its exploration of an

even more sophisticated technology that could ‘‘detect eight biohazards, including anthrax spores.’’ Termed PCR (for polymerase chain

reaction)—although sometimes referred to as ‘molecular photocopying’—the technology would take air samples every half-hour

from mail passing through high-speed postal sorters and test the

samples for the specific signatures of particular bacteria like anthrax. ‘‘PCR is a general term for a process that uses specific enzymes to amplify tiny quantities of DNA and make a DNA

match.’’ 28

With respect to food, the current system for detecting contaminants is similar to searching for a needle in a haystack. The paucity of resources that have been devoted to this effort is thinly

spread among the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Defense, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Environmental

Protection Agency. Inspections are infrequent and some items— e.g., fish that goes from the boat directly to a wholesaler or retailer—are not inspected at all. Moreover, ‘‘the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention catches [sic] only a small percentage of

food-borne outbreaks because state reporting is voluntary and inconsistent.’’ In 1984 when ‘‘members of a religious commune in Oregon contaminated 10 salad bars with salmonella [sickening] 151

people . . . it took a year to link the outbreak to the commune.’’ 29

With respect to biological agents in general, ‘‘because the time

lag between exposure to a pathogen and the onset of symptoms

may be days or weeks, effective response to a covert terrorist action

will be critically dependent upon (a) the ability of individual clinicians, perhaps widely scattered around a large metropolitan area,

to identify and accurately diagnose an uncommon disease and (b)

a surveillance system for collecting reports of such cases that is actively monitored to catch disease outbreaks as they arise.’’ 30

One such surveillance system is the Pittsburgh ‘‘Real Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance System [which] tracks patients by

zip code, looking for spikes that often signal an upcoming wave of

illness. For example, a jump in fever and respiratory illness in one

neighborhood could tip off medical detectives that an anthrax outbreak has occurred.’’ 31

Unfortunately, the nation’s public health system is woefully unprepared to deal effectively with bioterrorism. ‘‘Vast numbers of the

nation’s private doctors are uninformed about how to recognize,

treat and report casualties of a biological attack.’’ 32 ‘‘Half of all

17

U.S. states [lack] even a single ‘disease detective’ to investigate

outbreaks . . . Ten percent of the nation’s 120 largest city and

county health departments [do] not have e-mail.’’ 33 While ‘‘some serological, immunological, and nucleic acid assays are available for

identifying . . . biological agents, . . . [since] laboratories do not

perform these assays regularly . . . it therefore seems unlikely

that many labs will be immediately prepared to conduct the specific

analytical test needed . . . even when the attending physician is

astute enough to ask for the appropriate test.’’ 34 To begin to remedy these deficiencies in the nation’s public health system, the

President’s recent budget calls for an increase in overall funding for combating bioterrorism to $5.9 billion, including ‘‘$1.2 billion to

improve the ability of state and local health systems to respond to

bioterrorism attacks.’’ 35

Coping with the Consequences of Terrorist Attacks

After a terrorist act has been detected, it is imperative that its

nature and extent be rapidly comprehended so that appropriate

countermeasures can be undertaken. Even with a simple explosive

or shooting attack, one has to determine the number of fatalities

and the nature and extent of the injuries. In the case of arson, one

has to know the extent and nature of the fire to know where to deploy the firefighters and what type of extinguishers to employ. It

is sometimes difficult quickly to ascertain the character of chemical

agents utilized in an attack. But when dealing with a ‘dirty’ radiological device or a nuclear bomb, the process of comprehension becomes even more complex. While acts of cyber-terrorism can usually be traced to their sources, the challenge comes in doing so fast

enough to minimize the damage they have caused. And biological

weapons are especially troublesome in confounding rapid comprehension of what has transpired.

The recent anthrax attack illustrates the nation’s lack of necessary knowledge and effective organization to deal with biological

terrorism. First, there was widespread confusion within the public

health system as to the nature of the anthrax involved and, indeed,

the amount of anthrax needed to cause inhalation anthrax in humans. Moreover, while the mails were used to transmit the anthrax spores to Senator Daschle’s office in October 2001, as of this

writing in March 2002, there is still no resolution as to how anthrax was transmitted to the women who died in New York and

Connecticut. Equally baffling is the case of the postal inspector who

spent 45 days in a Baltimore hospital after inspecting a mail-sorting machine at the Brentwood facility in which the Daschle letter

was processed. Although he evinced most of the symptoms of inhalation anthrax, there was no evidence of anthrax bacteria in his

blood.36

Clearly there are three paramount preconditions that must be

met in order to promote the more rapid comprehension of the nature and extent of terrorist acts: Firstly, we need much more research and development, especially regarding all aspects of bioterrorism. Secondly, we need much more extensive and effective educational programs for the front-line responders to terrorism (police,

firefighters, emergency rescue teams, hazmat squads, etc.), as well

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lyze the situation and prescribe treatment. And thirdly, we need a

vastly expanded and enhanced communication network integrating

the intelligence community with state and local government officials, front-line responders, police and other public safety officers,

and public health diagnosticians and practitioners.

The need for a greatly improved communication network is underscored by the fact that the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)

were not aware of significant Canadian studies conducted in May

2001, ‘‘which showed . . . that a real anthrax threat letter was a

far more dangerous weapon than anyone had believed . . . [Although] bioterrorism and civil defense experts in a half-dozen

[U.S.] agencies had the information . . . CDC epidemiologists . . .

didn’t learn of the Canadian studies until early November. By then,

the anthrax outbreak was almost over.’’ 37

Depending on the determination of the nature and extent of the

terrorist act, there are a number of ways we can attempt to cope

with its consequences. When cyber-terrorism has occurred, it is up

to the experience, ingenuity, and software available to the cybersecurity experts to structure the best approach to blocking further

damage and restoring the system under attack to its normal functioning. When the terrorist employs small arms fire or simple explosives, the treatment for non-fatal victims is straightforward, requiring the standard medical technologies for dealing with accident

injuries. In addition, newly developed technologies can ameliorate

the situation. For example, there is the jackhammer developed at

Brookhaven National Laboratory ‘‘for rescue teams working in collapsed, unstable buildings. The jackhammer . . . creates fewer

shocks and vibrations than a conventional device, reducing the risk

of further collapse . . . [And Sandia National Laboratory is developing] the robot family, a group of intelligent, mobile machines

that can swarm over a site . . . looking for victims . . . The robots

. . . have demonstrated independent ‘swarm intelligence’ in carrying out their tasks.’’ 38

In cases when the terrorist has perpetrated arson, technology can

be of great assistance in enhancing the effectiveness of the response. For example, the NetTalon system cited earlier with regard

to internal aircraft surveillance could also be utilized in fighting

fires. That system would enable the firefighters speeding to the

scene to have real time pictures on their laptop screens of precisely

where in the building the fire was located, its intensity, speed of

spreading, associated vapors, and whether it required water or specialized foams.39

A rudimentary response to a chemical gas attack, of course, is to

don a gas mask before the gas takes effect. ‘‘Although sarin [nerve]

gas can seep through the skin, breathing it in delivers a lethal dose

about 400 times faster—so the mask could give you enough time

to escape from a noxious cloud.’’ However, the mask has to be in

good working order, and the fit has to be airtight for it to function

effectively.40 A good example of a technology for responding to

chemical attack, is the Antidote-Treatment-Nerve-Gas-Agent Autoinjector developed by Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc. of Columbia, Maryland. This pen-like device enables soldiers to self-administer precise doses of both types of required anti-nerve-gas antidotes (atropine and praladoxime chloride).41 Another excellent exVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:06 May 07, 2002 Jkt 078705 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78705.TXT SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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ample is Sandia National Laboratory’s ‘‘development of a nontoxic,

noncorrosive foam that neutralizes both chemical agents and biologic species such as anthrax . . . The foam . . . was used extensively to clean up anthrax-contaminated areas on Capitol Hill.’’ 42

With respect to biological agents, Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory has developed a prototype of an advanced, hand-held

nucleic-acid-analyzer, only slightly larger than a scientific calculator, that would enable emergency workers to identify biowarfare

agents in the field in a matter of minutes.43 For use after a dangerous substance has been detected, the same national laboratory

has developed a gel ‘‘to kill biological agents and neutralize chemicals without harming people.’’ 44 Another approach, still in the research phase, is the attempt to find an antitoxin that would neutralize the toxins produced by the anthrax bacteria. A group at

Harvard Medical School led by Dr. R. John Collier has developed

two methods of neutralizing the anthrax toxins: one by combining

with the toxin molecules and inactivating them; the other by adhering to the toxin molecules and blocking them from entering the

host cells. Both methods have been tested on rats who have survived with no symptoms. Still another approach, in an early research stage, ‘‘involves a new type of antibiotic against anthrax

bacteria . . . discovered by Dr. Lucy Shapiro of Stanford University

and Dr. Stephen J. Benkovic of Penn State. In early laboratory

tests, this antibiotic worked not only against anthrax bacteria, but

also against brucellosis and tularemia, both of which are ‘‘potential

germ warfare weapons.’’ 45

An entirely different approach for counteracting biological agents

is irradiation. But, of course, this cannot be used on infected individuals, but only on things that are carrying the bacteria or the

spores that will produce the bacteria. Following the delivery of anthrax-laden letters to Capitol Hill in October, all mail for the White

House and Congress and much of the mail for federal agencies is

irradiated. All mail for Washington, D.C. is first machine sorted for

zip codes. All mail with government-zip-code destinations is then

sorted by hand. Mail for the White House, Congress, and much of

the mail for other federal government entities is then ‘‘wrapped in

plastic, packed in boxes, and taken by tractor-trailer to irradiation

centers in Bridgeport, New Jersey or Lima, Ohio.’’ At those centers

the boxes of mail move on a conveyor belt past a ‘gun’ that subjects

them to a high dose of ionizing radiation. Afterwards they are

trucked back to Maryland where ‘‘they are opened and allowed to

breathe for up to 48 hours to dispel gases created by irradiation.’’

They are then ready for final sorting and delivery.46

Regardless of which technology is used to respond to the effects

of the terrorist act, critical to the success of any countermeasures

are the resources, training, and organization that are brought to

bear on the situation. For example, in dealing with a chemical attack: ‘‘the removal of solid or liquid chemical agent from exposed

individuals is the first step in preventing severe injury or death

. . . Very few [hazmat] teams are staffed, equipped, or trained for

mass decontamination . . . [F]ew hospitals have formal decontamination facilities; even fewer have dedicated outdoor facilities or

an easy way of expanding their decontamination operations in an

event involving mass casualties.’’ 47 The administration’s budget

20

submission for FY 2003 makes a start toward remedying these deficiencies. The $38 billion for Homeland Security includes nearly $6

billion for combating bioterrorism, encompassing a range of programs: research and development for vaccines, diagnostic tests, decontamination methods, and related technologies; expansion of the

National Pharmaceutical Stockpile; development of rapid response

networks; and training and technical assistance to states and local

governments to strengthen their public health systems.48

Technological Choice

It is clear from the preceding discussion that the menu of technological options available for homeland security is vast. However,

choosing among alternative strategies and technologies is not a

simple, straightforward matter; on the contrary, it is highly complex and fraught with difficulties. Sometimes there are inadequate

data on which to base a sound decision; other times the underlying

science on which the technology is founded is not fully known—as

was the case with understanding the transmission of inhalation anthrax from anthrax spores.

Even when the scientific basis and data are available, however,

a significant difficulty remains: the so-called ‘Law of Unintended

Consequences.’ This refers to the historical fact that many technologies have engendered ancillary, unexpected consequences that

are frequently difficult to foresee and sometimes somewhat detrimental in their impacts. In order to gain some perspective on this

issue, it is useful to examine some examples from the past and

some apparent instances that have already emerged in the application of technology to the War on Terrorism.

The most obvious example from the past is the use of the internal combustion engine to power automobiles and other vehicles.

There is no question that this innovation served as one of the

prime movers of 20th century economic expansion. Moreover, it not

only facilitated much more rapid transportation of people and

goods, but also its initial impact on the environment was salutary;

for it led to the elimination of foul-smelling horse manure from

roads and city streets. Yet we now know that its long-term effect

on the environment has been deleterious because of its substantial

contribution to air pollution and the possibility of global warming.

Furthermore, the use of motorized vehicles has had the unfortunate ancillary consequence of tens of thousands of traffic fatalities

and injuries in the United States annually.

Another past example of the ‘Law of Unintended Consequences’

was the use of chlorofluorocarbons for refrigeration and air conditioning. This was an immensely important innovation that facilitated the comfortable use of many otherwise unsuitable facilities in

the heat of summer and the longer-term distribution and preservation of food products, thereby transforming the role of homemakers

who no longer had to shop for food each day. In referring to Freon,

a trade name for these chemicals, the 1973 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica stated: ‘‘The importance of the Freons lies in the

fact that they are so stable that they are entirely harmless.’’ 49 As

we now know, however, it is the very stability of these chemicals

that enables them to rise up above the atmosphere and serve to deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:06 May 07, 2002 Jkt 078705 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78705.TXT SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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plete the ozone layer, thereby interfering with its blocking of sun

rays that can cause skin cancer.

The point of these past examples is not that we should have refrained from utilizing the internal combustion engine or making

use of refrigeration and air conditioning; both innovations have bestowed substantial benefits on our standard of living. But if we had

anticipated their ancillary, adverse consequences earlier, we might

have been able to structure their implementation in such a way as

to mitigate those unintended consequences and to design research

and development programs aimed at alternative or supplemental

means of achieving the same ends.

As noted above, some apparent instances of the ‘Law of Unintended Consequences’ have already emerged in the application of

technology to the War on Terrorism. Most notable among them is

the use of irradiation to sanitize mail from anthrax spores and

other pernicious contaminants. This ‘‘process tends to destroy computer chips and to damage . . . delicate items including food,

[photos], pharmaceuticals, clothing, contact lens—and even the

paper mail itself.’’ 50

Also the fact that the process entails wrapping the mail in plastic

prior to irradiation has apparently caused varying forms of distress

among some mail handlers. This may be due to the interaction of

the electrons [in the irradiation] and the plastic wrap, thereby producing ozone and carbon monoxide.51 In any case, the mail room

in the U.S. Department of Commerce had to be temporarily shut

down because a number of the mail room employees complained of

nausea and respiratory distress.52 Similarly ‘‘seventy-three employees of the U.S. Senate have reported health problems including

headaches, eye irritation and skin rash after handling irradiated

mail, and the government has issued a cautionary advisory to

180,000 federal workers in the District.53 In addition, ‘‘87 . . .

workers at the Gaithersburg [Maryland mail] facility . . . are experiencing nosebleeds, runny noses, runny eyes, extreme headaches,

nausea.’’ 54

Again these unanticipated consequences do not imply that sensitive mail should not be irradiated. Indeed, as a result of such concerns, ‘‘engineers lowered radiation dosages by about 40% after

concluding that that was sufficient to kill anthrax spores and other

biological contaminants.’’ 55 Also mail is now being ‘‘removed from

the boxes and plastic and allowed to air . . . for as long as 48

hours before re-entering the usual mail delivery system.’’ 56 The

point is that the earlier one can anticipate the ancillary consequences, the better one can implement the technology in a manner designed to obviate or mitigate its adverse effects.

An example of a potential problem with an identification technology occurs in the field of biometrics. ‘‘Retinal scan . . . is perhaps the most secure biometric option. Users, however, fear health

effects from the infrared light used to read the retina, as well as

possible infections from contact with the equipment . . . [Moreover,] a person’s retinal patterns change after he or she experiences

a heart attack. Unions have fought the installation of retinal scan

equipment on the theory that the scan could be used by companies

to spot sick employees and terminate them.’’ 57 Iris scans may not

be as reliable as retina scans, in terms of false acceptance or false

22

rejection rates, but since they do not involve physical contact, they

may prove more desirable in some instances.58 This example illustrates the importance of including examination of ancillary consequences in consideration of alternative technologies.

Technologies for coping with terrorists who are onboard an aircraft in flight also pose a number of problems that need to be assessed, according to a draft report of the National Institute of Justice, a research resource of the Justice Department. The draft report stated that: ‘‘Tasers—a type of stun gun . . . could interfere

with the plane’s operational instruments . . . ‘In the preliminary

tests . . . an electrical discharge less-than-lethal device fired at

cockpit instruments adversely affected a number of systems . . .

[Furthermore,] in the confined space of a cockpit, crew members

are likely to be incapacitated’ . . . by other non-lethal weapons

such as pepper spray or tear gas . . . [The draft report also raised

serious questions on a number of other technologies, including,]

. . . the Laser Dazzler, a light that temporarily blinds an attacker,

. . . anesthetics or calmative chemicals that could incapacitate all

passengers when released into the air, a ‘slippery foam’ on the

cabin floors that could make an attacker slip, and some kinds of

ear-piercing acoustic weapon.’’ 59

A broader problem of unintended consequences that permeates a

number of the technologies that may be used in the War on Terrorism is their impact on the privacy of individuals. This impact

can be readily perceived in the proliferation of video cameras and

human scanning equipment for purposes of security. As indicated

earlier, one biometric system utilizes imaging technologies that can

penetrate clothing and produce an image of the body beneath

them.60 The increasing use of closed circuit TV (CCTV) for security

surveillance portends a pervasive impact on personal privacy. The

proliferation of CCTV in the UK over the past decade may be a

prognosticator of what lies ahead for the United States. In the

early 1990s, after terrorist bombs exploded in the ‘City of London,’ the government installed a network of CCTV cameras around that

area and over the decade encouraged local governments to do the

same in their areas. ‘‘By 1998, 440 city centers were wired [with

CCTV] . . . There are now [estimated to be] 2.5 million surveillance cameras in Britain.’’ 61 ‘‘In Britain in the late 1990s it is unlikely that any urban dweller, in their [sic] role as shopper, worker,

commuter, resident or school pupil can avoid being . . . monitored

by camera surveillance systems.’’ 62

A further instance of the potential invasion of privacy arises from

the intended expansion and integration of data bases containing

background information on individuals for use in security at airports, seaports, border crossings, etc. The more extensive and integrated such data bases are, the more susceptible they become to

misuse of the information. A third example of the potential infringement of privacy comes from the pervasive expansion of the

internet, with its manifold possibilities for mischief. As these technologies continue their diffusion, it is essential that every effort

be made to ensure as much protection of individual privacy as

possible.

Another potentially adverse consequence from anti-terrorist technology is the much wider use of microwave and other forms of radiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:06 May 07, 2002 Jkt 078705 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78705.TXT SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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ation to which persons may be exposed. While there is no conclusive evidence at this time as to such adverse impact, it is important

that such technologies be designed, perfected, and operated so as

to minimize the possibility of any such effects. The more widespread use of specific antibiotics, such as Cipro, also poses potential

unintended consequences. This is evidenced by a recent study

which ‘‘found that a powerful strain of salmonella developed a resistance to the antibiotic Cipro in less than two years.’’ 63

A different kind of unintended consequence has emerged from

the current effort to establish a comprehensive computer network

to track foreign students in the U.S. ‘‘Officials concede they do not

know . . . where [or whether] the 547,000 people holding student

visas are attending school . . . [H]igher education institutions . . .

raised a raft of objections [to the planned system] . . . The issue

is particularly pressing for community and technical colleges,

which rely heavily on foreign students because they pay higher tuition . . . [C]olleges have also objected to a plan . . . that would

prevent foreign students from receiving diplomas until they confirm

that they have either returned home or have extended their

visas.’’ 64 It is clear that this planned computerized, surveillance

system of foreign students would pose major unintended consequences for the academic institutions involved.

Perhaps the ultimate, tragic example of the ‘Law of Unintended

Consequences’ is the fact that without the Internet, cell phones,

and modern telecommunications systems, the Al Queda network

could never have evolved into the pervasive, pernicious web of evil

it has become. So in that warped sense, the terrible tragedy of September 11 was—at least in some small part—an unintended consequence of the proliferation of those technologies.

The lesson from all this is that technologies often have unintended, ancillary effects which—to the extent feasible—should be

anticipated and taken into account in selecting among alternative

technological solutions and structuring their implementation. The

point is not that any particular technology is inherently good or

bad, but rather that its relative benefits and detriments depend

partially on its ancillary consequences, as well as on the uses to

which it is put and the way in which it is implemented.

Technology Assessment

The analysis, comparison, and selection of technologies to be implemented is a complex, difficult process. Discerning unintended

consequences is not the only hurdle that must be overcome. The

process involves the following components:

• determining the technical capabilities of the technology;

• evaluating its effectiveness in achieving its primary objectives;

• ascertaining its costs;

• delineating the benefits it confers;

• anticipating its ancillary consequences and estimating their

positive and negative effects;

• discerning its probable impact on the economy, environment,

society, and individual values;

24

• comparing the technology with alternatives in terms of all the

foregoing factors; and

• delineating the advantages and disadvantages—the pros

and cons—for the various policy options confronting decision

makers.

Technology assessment is the methodology for conducting such

analyses. Focused on the future, ‘‘it is the institutionalization of a

methodology for previewing potential effects of technological developments so that the information generated may increase our ability

to forestall the detrimental effects and encourage the beneficial effects of our inventions.’’ 65 Incorporating elements of operations research, systems analysis, cost-benefit studies, game theory, linear

programming, simulation studies, and alternative-futures scenarios—along with pragmatic public policy considerations—technology assessment emerged as a distinct field of academic research

in the mid-1960s.

Prompted by information on this field from the academic and scientific communities, along with congressional concern with comprehending the technological aspects of public policy issues, Representative Emilio Q. Daddario began a public dialogue in March 1967,

when he ‘‘introduced a bill proposing the creation of a ‘Technology

Assessment Board’ . . . to provide Congress with an ‘early warning

signal’ of the potential good and bad consequences of technological

programs.’’ As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, Congressman Daddario followed up by launching several

years of seminars, studies, and hearings with substantial input

from reports by the Legislative Reference Service [now the Congressional Research Service] and by each of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Public Administration.66

Based on these extensive deliberations, a revised bill was introduced in the House in 1971, and followed by a companion bill in

the Senate. With further amendments, the bill passed the House

in February 1972; and, with some additional revisions, the bill to

create an Office of Technology Assessment passed the Senate in

September 1972. After consideration by a conference committee

and final passage in both Houses, the Technology Assessment Act

of 1972 was signed into law by President Nixon on October 13,

1972,67 thereby establishing OTA as only the third support agency

of the Congress in the history of the Republic. (The first, the Legislative Reference Service, which later became the Congressional Research Service, was created in 1914; the second, the General Accounting Office (GAO) came in 1921; and the fourth, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), was not created until 1974.)

OTA’s Unique Role and History

Under the enabling statute, OTA consists of a Technology Assessment Board (TAB) and a Director. TAB consists of 6 Senators

and 6 House members, evenly split between the two parties (to ensure non-partisanship), along with the Director as an ex officio nonvoting member. The Senate members are appointed by the President pro-tempore of the Senate; the House members by the Speaker of the House; and the Director is appointed by the Board. The

25

Director appoints the office staff. In addition, there is a Technology

Assessment Advisory Council (TAAC), whose 10 public members

are appointed by the Board and which includes 2 ex officio members, the Comptroller General and the Director of the Congressional Research Service.68

During the 5 years of extensive consideration before this measure

was enacted into law, a great deal of attention was focused on the

question of why a new Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was

needed, rather than relying on the existing congressional support

agencies of the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The overwhelming judgment of the

academic, scientific, technical, and public policy communities was

that neither GAO nor CRS was capable of doing the job of technology assessment required by the Congress. Indeed, ‘‘both the

Comptroller General and the Director of the Congressional Research Service (and also the Librarian of Congress) support[ed] the

establishment of an OTA.’’ 69

In the first appropriations hearings on OTA, Representative John

Davis, the ranking House Democrat on the newly created Technology Assessment Board (TAB) stated: ‘‘[OTA] would perform a

function far greater than could be performed by [CRS] . . . inasmuch as much of the information that would be desirable to have

on the part of the committees of both the House and of the Senate

would . . . require the generating of information rather than simply the retrieval of information.’’ And the ranking House Republican on TAB, Representative Charles Mosher said: ‘‘GAO . . . investigations have been after the fact. The type of investigation they

do is in retrospect . . . OTA . . . investigations are before the fact.

They are . . . an early warning system for the Congress and I

think that is a very important distinction . . . [Also] assessments

. . . are assigned to OTA . . . by a request from congressional committees . . . The [Congressional] Research Service is responsive to

any request of a Congressman and, therefore, gets a plethora of

every variety, some very unimportant.’’ 70 The issue of whether

OTA’s functions could be adequately performed by either CRS or

GAO was re-examined in 1976 by the Commission on the Operation of the Senate, which published the conclusion that: ‘‘The functions OTA can perform represent important needs of the Senate,

needs that cannot be met through the committee structure or by

other support agencies.’’ 71

In any case, this point of view had prevailed when, a little over

a year after enactment of its enabling statute, OTA received its

first appropriation in November 1973, appointed its first staff in

December, and commenced operations in early 1974, with then

former Congressman Daddario as its first Director. Recognizing the

challenge of creating a new institution within Congress, he gradually built his in-house staff, developed an extensive network of consultants and advisory panelists, and focused on establishing good

working relationships with the various congressional committees.

He structured OTA’s initial assessments into seven program areas:

energy, food, health, materials, national R&D policies and priorities, technology and international trade, and transportation.

After guiding OTA through its formative first four years, he resigned in 1977, and was succeeded in 1978 by the former governor

26

of Delaware, Russell Peterson. Unlike Daddario, Peterson did not

manage to develop good relationships with the TAB Members who

had appointed him. ‘‘Several members of the board felt that . . .

[his] priorities . . . strayed too far from what Congress considered

to be the most important legislative concerns . . . One [TAB Member] complained that Peterson was trying to create a ‘sort of Brookings Institution in the Congress’ . . . another accused the OTA of

a ‘disturbing pattern of ignoring congressional oversight and service’.’’ 72 In any event, Peterson resigned in 1979 after serving only

one year as Director.

OTA achieved maturity with its next Director, Dr. John Gibbons

who served close to 15 years, from 1979 to 1993. He developed very

good relationships with TAB Members and congressional committees and, through astute management of OTA, built the Office’s

credibility within the Congress and throughout the nation’s academic, scientific, technical, and professional communities. Indeed,

OTA ‘‘gradually became recognized worldwide as the top institution

of its kind . . . Austria, Denmark, the European Community,

France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden

have copied or adapted the OTA style. Similar organizations are

being discussed or formed in Hungary, Japan, Mexico, the People’s

Republic of China, Russia, Switzerland, and Taiwan.’’ 73

From 1974 through 1995, ‘‘OTA published nearly 750 full assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and

workshop proceedings. The quality of those products is attested to

by the facts that from 1992 to 1994, twelve assessments won the

National Association for Government Communicators’ prestigious

Blue Pencil Award . . . [and during] the same 3 years, 12 additional reports were named among the 60 Notable Government Documents selected annually by the American Library Association’s

Government Documents Roundtable—representing the best Federal, State, and local government documents from around the world

. . . OTA’s reports were often bestsellers at the Government Printing Office and the National Technical Information Service . . . [For

example,] GPO sold 48,000 OTA reports in [one year] alone.’’ 74

The authoritative credibility achieved by OTA over the years is

perhaps best articulated in a 1988 article entitled ‘‘Influential Office Guides Congress into Space Age,’’ in which the author asserts: ‘‘Without OTA’s nod, leading scientific theories stand little chance

of winning status as conventional wisdom on Capitol Hill . . . The

Office is credited with having matured into the scientific heavyweight whose assessments can mean life or death for technical

problems in the appropriations process . . . At least one thing is

clear: in a town where unimpeachable sources are oh-so-hard to

come by, OTA has managed to secure a position near the top of the

list.’’ 75

OTA’s Structure and Pattern of Operations

OTA achieved this status as a consequence of the prescience embodied in its enabling statute and the implementing pattern of operations that subsequently evolved. Although the bill that originally passed the House called for the majority party to hold a majority of seats on TAB, the Senate bill stipulated a board evenly divided between the two parties, and the Senate version was acceptVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:06 May 07, 2002 Jkt 078705 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78705.TXT SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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ed in conference.76 This assurance of TAB’s non-partisanship—

highly unusual at a time when both Houses of Congress had been

controlled by the Democrats for a generation—was absolutely essential for enabling OTA to realize both the reality and public perception of objectivity and credibility.

Along with a governing board, evenly split between House and

Senate and between Democrats and Republicans, the Act called for

the creation of an advisory council, including: ‘‘ten members from

the public . . . eminent in one or more fields of the physical, biological, or social sciences or engineering or experienced in the administration of technological activities, or . . . qualified on the

basis of contributions made to educational or public activities.’’ 77

Thus the Act provided TAB and the Director with the perspective

of an eminent group of outside advisers. Since the assessments to

be undertaken by OTA, however, spanned a multitude of scientific

and technical disciplines and specialities, OTA also built a network

of advisory panels and consultants who were versed in the specific

issues involved in particular assessment projects. Over the years as

the OTA in-house staff grew to number nearly 150, this outside

network of advisers grew to about 1,000 individuals throughout the

nation.

The professional staff consisted of about half scientists and engineers and about half social scientists, lawyers, and health care professionals. From 1979 on, the OTA staff was organized in three divisions, each headed by an Assistant Director of OTA. These were

the divisions of: (a) Energy, Materials, and International Security;

(b) Science, Information, and Natural Resources; and (c) Health

and Life Sciences. Each division in turn was organized in three

programs, headed by a Program Director. The programs in division

(a) were: Energy and Materials; Industry, Technology, and Employment; and International Security and Commerce. The programs in

division (b) were: Communications and Information Technologies;

Oceans and Environment; and Science, Education, and Transportation. And the programs in division (c) were: Biological Applications; Food and Renewable Resources; and Health.

Each program in turn usually had several projects underway at

any one time, each of which was headed by a project director. Some

relevant examples of specific OTA assessments include:

• The Border War on Drugs

• Electronic Surveillance in a Digital Age

• High Level Radioactive Waste Site Characterization

• Impacts of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria

• New Developments in Biotechnology

• Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing

• Taggants in Explosives

• Technology Transfer to China

• Technology and Counter Terrorism

• Transportation of Hazardous Materials • Virtual Reality and Technologies for Combat Simulation • Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

As noted above, in addition to the in-house staff and the congressional board and advisory council, OTA made extensive use of a national network of about 1,000 advisory panelists and consultants

28

who addressed specific assessment projects. Thus for each fullfledged assessment an advisory panel of about 12–20 individuals

was appointed which included scientific and technical experts in

the particular subject under consideration, as well as participants

from industry, labor, academia, the professions, state and local government, and the public at large. And before an assessment report

was finalized, it was critiqued by a wider array of experts and

stakeholders throughout the nation.78

‘‘The steps in the assessment process may be summarized as follows: (1) OTA staff engage in informal communication with congressional committee staff. (2) This leads to formal committee request letters to OTA, a proposal from the staff to TAB, and TAB

approval to initiate an assessment. (3) An advisory panel is appointed which critiques the staff’s preliminary assessment design

at the panel’s first meeting. (4) Months later, at the second panel

meeting, OTA discusses its analysis of the data it has obtained and

the way it is likely to be handled in the assessment report. (5)

Some months later OTA presents a draft of its final report to the

advisory panel and subsequently to additional outside reviewers.

(6) About eighteen months after the start of the project, OTA presents a final report to TAB for approval to release it to the requesting committees and the public at large. (7) OTA then presents its

results to the requesting committees, in the form of briefings and

testimony at hearings, as well as in a written document, and disseminates its findings to appropriate Executive Branch agencies,

other interested parties, and the general public.’’ 79

OTA’s Credibility, Objectivity, and Relevance

While this process may appear lengthy and laborious, it embodies an elaborate panoply of checks and balances that confer

credibility, objectivity, and relevance on the final assessment report. These checks and balances are inherent in OTA’s statute and

pattern of operations. Some of the most important ones are:

• the even balance between House and Senate and the two parties on TAB;

• the tradition of choosing the Vice Chair from the opposite

party to the Chair;

• the need for TAB approval both to initiate an assessment and

subsequently to release the final report;

• the Technology Assessment Advisory Council’s salutary influence on OTA’s standards of excellence;

• each advisory panel’s role in the design of the assessment, the

analysis of the data, and the content of the final report;

• the role of the stakeholders and additional expert consultants

in reviewing the draft report;

• the presentation of a Review Memorandum from the Project

Director to the OTA Director, which ‘‘describes the reactions of

the panel and outside reviewers to each portion of the report

and shows how the final version takes account of those comments;’’ 80 and

29

• the pattern of continuing, informal communication between

OTA and committee staff before, during, and as follow-up to

the assessment.

The relevance of OTA’s assessments is ensured by the close control the congressional board exercises over the initiation and final

approval of OTA products, as well as by the continuing communication between OTA and congressional committee staff. While OTA

reports have received widespread acclaim throughout the academic,

scientific, technical, and professional communities, their primary

purpose is not to edify scholars, but rather to serve congressional

needs for the analysis of policy options involving technology. Because of the continuing oversight of TAB and interaction with congressional committees, adherence to this purpose is preserved.

OTA’s objectivity is ensured through a number of the checks and

balances, the most fundamental one of which is that the Board is

evenly split between the two parties and has traditionally included

a range of conservatives, moderates, and liberals among its members. Moreover, the pattern of choosing the Chair and Vice Chair

of TAB from opposite parties adds to OTA’s non-partisanship, and

hence its objectivity. This characteristic is further enhanced by the

roles played by the advisory council, the specialized advisory panels, and the many outside reviewers involved in each assessment.

They comprise not only a very wide range of technical experts, but

stakeholders as well—representatives of industry, labor, public interest groups, and the public at large.

This diversity of expertise and points of view ensures that the

OTA staff is aware of virtually all relevant issues and interests involved in the particular assessment. The fact that the final Review

Memorandum has to show specifically how each concern has been

taken into account accords a high degree of objectivity to the final

OTA report. Attesting to that objectivity is the fact that in debates

on congressional proposals, OTA reports were oftentimes cited by

both the proponents and opponents of the particular proposal.

OTA’s credibility consequently comes from the entire assessment

process and the enviable reputation OTA achieved during the Gibbons directorship.

The Relative Roles of OTA, CRS, and GAO

Having this understanding of the OTA process, it becomes clear

that Congress made the right decision in establishing OTA in 1972,

rather than attempting to rely on CRS and GAO for providing the

necessary analysis of policy options involving complex technological

issues. Congress needs technology assessment that is timely, targeted to the specific legislative priorities of congressional committees, and presented in a format that clarifies the consequences—

both pro and con—of the various policy options related to the technologies under consideration.

Neither CRS nor GAO has the capability to design and conduct

such assessments. Both CRS and GAO must respond to the requests of individual members of Congress; whereas OTA responds

only to requests from congressional committees. Accordingly, OTA

assessments are inherently oriented toward the priority needs of

congressional committees, thereby rendering them relevant to the

committees’ legislative agendas. This legislative relevance is furVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:06 May 07, 2002 Jkt 078705 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78705.TXT SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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ther ensured by the requirement for TAB approvals both to initiate

assessments and release final reports, as well as its continuing

oversight of OTA activities throughout the process. While CRS research and GAO investigations certainly provide valuable information to individual members of the Senate and the House, they cannot possibly attain the same degree of conformance to committees’ legislative requirements.

Furthermore, as former Representative Davis noted, CRS essentially retrieves existent information, while OTA generates new information. And as former Representative Mosher stated: GAO does

retrospective investigations; whereas OTA assessments are future

oriented and serve as ‘‘an early warning system for the Congress

. . . a very important distinction.’’ 81

Finally, neither CRS nor GAO has the statutory authority or institutional capability to make as extensive use of outside advisers

drawn from all segments of the scientific, technical, professional,

and public interest communities as OTA has. As indicated earlier,

these advisers have played an integral, essential role in ensuring

that OTA reports take account of virtually all relevant expertise

and points of view. Without that involvement, OTA’s products could

not have been able to achieve so high a level of objectivity and

credibility as they did. Neither CRS nor GAO is equipped to make

that kind of use of 1,000 consultants.

When one considers that OTA is controlled by a congressional

board—similar to a joint committee—and has maintained continuing communication with congressional committees, along with

the pattern whereby the office has drawn upon its pool of about

1,000 outside advisers, the essence of OTA’s unique role becomes

clear. In effect, OTA has served as a critical translation link between the widespread technical knowledge of the academic, scientific, and professional experts and the policy-oriented queries and

concerns of congressional committees. OTA effects this translation

in a thorough, in-depth fashion that focuses on future-oriented policy options for Congress. In brief, OTA is the interface between

Congress and the nation’s science and technology community. For

all of the reasons that have been cited, neither CRS nor GAO can

fulfill that function.

OTA After Gibbons: 1993–1995

After 15 years of high achievement as OTA Director, Gibbons resigned in early 1993 to join the new administration as Science and

Technology Adviser to the President and Director of the White

House Office of Science and Technology Policy. He was succeeded

by Dr. Roger C. Herdman who had been serving as an OTA assistant director, with responsibility for the Health and Life Sciences

Division. In his new role, Dr. Herdman carried on in the tradition

of excellence established by his predecessor.

However, in 1995 there was a sea change in control of Congress.

The new leadership was intent on eliminating a number of cabinet

departments—Energy, Education, and Commerce—and also on reducing the costs of government, including within the Legislative

Branch. The likeliest target for reduction within the Congress was

one of the support agencies, CBO, CRS, GAO, and OTA. Of these,

OTA was the smallest and most vulnerable.

31

Accordingly, in order to save money—the FY 1995 appropriation

for OTA had been $22 million—the House Appropriations Committee on June 15, 1995 recommended elimination of funding for

OTA. On June 22 following a failed effort by Representative Vic

Fazio (D-CA) to restore OTA funding, the House passed the FY

1996 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill with no funding for

OTA. The House also eliminated the Joint Committee on Printing,

reduced the Joint Economic Committee budget by 25 percent, cut

House committee budgets overall by a total of $40 million, and the

GAO budget by $57 million. So the elimination of OTA’s appropriation occurred within a context of extreme cost-cutting measures

across the board. 82

On July 18 the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out

its bill, including $3.6 million for OTA—but solely for the purpose

of closing down the office. Senator Ernest F. Hollings, who had

served on the OTA board for 23 years, had led an unsuccessful

fight in committee to restore full funding. Again on the Senate floor

on July 20, he offered an amendment to the committee bill to provide OTA with $15 million. Although his amendment was supported by then Minority Leader Daschle, Appropriations Committee ranking Democrat, Senator Byrd, as well as all other senators who had served on the OTA Board—Senators Grassley,

Hatch, Kennedy, and Stevens—it still went down to defeat.

‘‘While lauding the past successes of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), [opponents of the amendment] stated that Senators . . . should support efforts to conserve taxpayers’ funds and

streamline the bureaucracy surrounding Congress.’’ 83 Senator Hollings retorted: ‘‘What you’re doing is eliminating the most economical approach to this technological need.’’ 84 Senator Kennedy said:

‘‘The Office of Technology Assessment . . . continues to serve an

indispensable role . . . it should not be abolished.’’ Senator Grassley noted: ‘‘OTA is our source of objective counsel when it comes

to science and technology and its interaction with public policy decision making . . . [I]f we do not have an unbiased source of information, then we have to rely on organizations with a stake in keeping alive programs that benefit their interests.’’ Senator Hatch

added: ‘‘OTA . . . is the one arm of Congress that does give us . . .

unbiased, scientific and technical expertise that we could not otherwise get where most everybody has confidence in what they do.’’

And Senator Stevens stated: ‘‘[W]e are about ready to do away with

the one entity in the Congress that tries to . . . deliver to Members

of Congress credible, timely reports on the development of technology. I believe . . . that we are changing the course of history in

this Congress, but this is not one of the hallmarks of that change.

This entity (OTA) ought to be out in the forefront of that change,

and it will not be unless it is properly funded and maintained.’’ 85

In the conference committee, Representative Fazio made another

unsuccessful attempt to restore funding for OTA. In that debate

Representative Ray Thornton (D-AK) made a rhetorical connection

between the elimination of OTA’s funds and the inclusion in the

bill of funds to renovate the congressional Botanic Garden. He said:

‘‘The arguments that there are alternatives to OTA apply equally

to [the Botanic Garden, which] could be privatized. There are floVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:06 May 07, 2002 Jkt 078705 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78705.TXT SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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rists all over the country. If we’re going to cancel the garden of the

mind—OTA—then we can’t afford to keep a [Botanic] garden.’’ 86

The House adopted the conference report on September 6, and

the Senate followed suit on September 22, with a proponent of the

bill stating: ‘‘This bill sets the standard. If we in Congress can cut

our own budget, every federal agency should be able to do the

same.’’ The President vetoed the bill on October 3, because Congress submitted it to him prior to passing appropriations measures

for various Executive Branch departments and agencies. After reintroducing the identical bill, the House passed it again on October

31, and the Senate on November 2. This time the bill was sent to

the President, coupled with the appropriation for the Treasury Department and the White House, and he signed it into law on November 17.87 OTA had already ceased regular operations on September 29, the last work day of FY 1995. A skeleton staff was retained for a few months at the start of FY 1996, in order to archive

OTA’s records, arrange for internet access to its reports at various

university sites, close out its personnel and financial commitments,

dispose of its computers, furniture, and other equipment, and prepare its Annual Report to Congress for FY 1995. 88

* * * * *

Findings

The findings that emerge from the foregoing discussion are as

follows:

• Technology is critical to U.S. success in the War on Terrorism

and ensuring homeland security.

• A wide variety of sophisticated technologies may be involved in

those efforts.

• Choosing among possible technologies and patterns of implementation is a complex process, oftentimes involving unintended consequences.

• Technology assessment is the methodology for making such

choices.

• The leading exemplar of technology assessment was the congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).

• For almost a quarter of a century, OTA provided Congress

with valuable analyses of policy options on important issues involving technology.

• During that period OTA achieved a world-wide reputation for

excellence, as a non-partisan, objective, and credible conductor

of technology assessments.

• There was no dissatisfaction with its performance; indeed OTA

received accolades for its excellent work while its funding was

being eliminated.

• Elimination of its funding was a cost-cutting measure at a time

of fiscal stringency and a symbol for Executive Branch agencies

to emulate.

33

• Congress now needs its own source of non-partisan, objective

technology assessment in order to fulfill its legislative, appropriation, and oversight responsibilities in the War on Terrorism and ensuring homeland security.

CONCLUSION

Fortunately, in 1995 when OTA’s funding was discontinued, its

enabling statute remained in effect; no action was taken to rescind

it. So the law establishing OTA is still on the books. OTA still technically exists. For practical purposes, what does this mean?

To determine its import, it’s necessary to examine the provisions

of the enabling statute, the Technology Assessment Act of 1972.

Section 3(b) of the act states that OTA ‘‘shall consist of a Technology Assessment Board . . . and a Director.’’ Discontinuing

OTA’s funding vacated the positions of the director and the staff,

but the Board still technically exists. Moreover, since the Senate is

a continuing body and the act does not limit the tenure of its members, the Senators who were Board members in 1995—Senators

Grassley, Hatch, Hollings, and Kennedy—are still Board members.

Since the House is not a continuing body, it could be argued that

the current House members who were on TAB in 1995—Representatives Dingell, Houghton, McDermott, and Oxley—would not still

be members. However, the facts that TAB is an independent board,

rather than a congressional joint committee and that the OTA statute does not impose any time limit on board appointments provide

a basis for arguing that they still are members of TAB. In any case,

section 4(b) of the act stipulates that: ‘‘Vacancies in the membership of the Board shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the Board.’’ In addition, the appropriations section of the act, section 12(a) states that: ‘‘To enable the

Office to carry out its powers and duties, there is hereby authorized

to be appropriated to the Office [following its first 2 fiscal years of

existence] . . . ‘‘thereafter such sums as may be necessary.’’ 89

In short, OTA has an ongoing authorization to receive appropriations, and the Technology Assessment Board (TAB) is empowered

to submit a recommendation to the Appropriations Committee for

such an appropriation. Given these facts and the finding that Congress needs its own source of technology assessment to fulfill its

role in the War on Terrorism and ensuring homeland security, it

is the conclusion of this author that OTA should be reactivated.

But to underscore the urgent necessity for reactivating OTA, it

is instructive to consider one final example of OTA’s potential impact on the War on Terrorism and homeland security. As is well

known, the anthrax attacks last fall engendered considerable confusion and consternation among public health authorities, public

safety officials, and policy makers throughout federal, state, and

local government. There was great uncertainty as to the source and

extent of the attacks, the potency and persistence of the anthrax

spores, the manner of transmission, and—not least—the number of

spores necessary to trigger inhalation anthrax in human beings. In

the course of reacting to the attacks, it was widely reported that

it was believed that 8,000–10,000 spores would have to be inhaled

for a person to contract inhalation or pulmonary anthrax. This beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:06 May 07, 2002 Jkt 078705 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78705.TXT SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
34

lief undoubtedly played a role in shaping the public health response to the attacks.

It’s unfortunate that OTA was not operational at that time. If it

had been, OTA staff could have ensured that a 1993 OTA report

was promptly brought to the attention of the public health authorities. The report entitled Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass

Destruction contained the following finding: ‘‘1,000 spores or less

can produce fatal pulmonary anthrax in some members of an exposed population.’’ 90 If this information had been readily available,

it’s conceivable that it even could have saved a life or—at the very

least—afforded much better guidance to the public health authorities in designing their response to the crisis.

* * * * *

RECOMMENDATIONS

The War on Terrorism and the striving for homeland security are

urgent national necessities. However, the reactivation of OTA is

equally urgent, if Congress is to be empowered to partner with the

President in pursuit of those objectives—in its role as a co-equal

branch of government.

The sooner Congress can reactivate OTA, the sooner it can effectively deal with those issues. Once OTA receives an appropriation,

it still will take some months to build its staff and network of outside advisers, and to work with the congressional committees to delineate an assessment agenda that meets their priority needs. At

this time of national challenge, waiting until the start of the next

fiscal year, October 1, 2002, is too long a period to remain without

this resource. Accordingly, an appropriation for OTA should be included in the next supplemental appropriations bill to come before

the Congress.

A key question then becomes: How much should be provided for

OTA in this bill? In the current situation of fiscal stringency, one

should allocate only enough to reactivate the office effectively. This

in turn hinges on what the office would be doing for the balance

of this fiscal year.

After a few essential staff members have been appointed, their

primary function would be to canvass and consult with congressional committees in both the House and Senate in order to ascertain their priority needs for technology assessments with respect to

the War on Terrorism and homeland security. The task would then

be to plan a series of assessments designed to meet those priority

needs. Concurrently with these activities, the office would be identifying potential outside advisers on whom OTA could rely, and

under the guidance of the Technology Assessment Board, preparing

a detailed budget submission for the following fiscal year that

would provide OTA with the resources to proceed with a number

of high priority assessments. It is believed that a supplemental appropriation of $1 million

would be sufficient for OTA to carry out these initial activities effectively. Considering that this $1 million would reactivate an Office that could aid Congress in evaluating the $38 billion the President has recently requested for homeland security, the $1 million

amount does not seem unreasonable.

35

Recommendation: In the first supplemental appropriation bill considered in this session, Congress should include $1 million for

OTA to canvass and consult with congressional committees, and

plan a series of technology assessments designed to meet the priority needs of those committees with respect to the War on Terrorism and homeland security.

* * * * *

36

NOTES

1. Sean Ford, ‘‘Small Influential Office Guides Congress Into Space Age,’’ Federal

Times, 13 June 1988, 18.

2. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying

Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 1993, 78.

3. William J. Broad, Stephen Engelberg, and James Glanz, ‘‘A Nation Challenged:

The Threats; Assessing Risks, Chemical, Biological, Even Nuclear,’’ New York

Times, 1 Nov. 2001, AI.

4. John Schwartz, ‘‘A Nation Challenged: The Computer Networks; Cyberspace

Seen as Potential Battleground,’’ New York Times, 23 Nov. 2001, B5.

5. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)

180–181.

6. It should be noted that water systems are vulnerable not only to chemical or

biological contamination, but also to cyber-terrorism: ‘‘. . . essentially every component of the water supply system is highly automated. This includes electronic control of water pumping and storing, water treatment operations, and water transmission . . . [G]reat damage could be done if the control of these systems were lost

for a period of time due to cyber attack.’’ U.S. Congress, House Committee on

Science. ‘‘Safety of Our Nation’s Water,’’ testimony by Richard G. Luthy, Professor

of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Stanford University and Chair, Water

Science and Technology Board, National Research Council, 107th Cong., 1st sess.,

14 Nov. 2001.

7. Matthew L. Wald, ‘‘Electric Power System Is Called ‘Vulnerable,’ and Vigilance

Is Sought,’’ New York Times, 28 Feb. 2002, A11.

8. President George W. Bush, ‘‘State of the Union,’’ U.S. Capitol, Washington,

D.C., 29 Jan. 2002.

9. Ibid.

10. Phillip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Common Sense Strategy for

a Democratic Society (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998) 134–136.

11. Mary Jordan, ‘‘Ridge Calls Security at Border ‘Outdated’,’’ Washington Post, 6 March 2002, A11.

12. Robert Montgomery, ‘‘A Look at Cellular’s Alarming Technology,’’ Mastering

Security (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1996) 12.

13. Robert De Lia, ‘‘Seeing Into the World of Fiber Optics for Security,’’ Mastering

Security (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1996) 17.

14. Donald R. Jones, Jr., Executive Vice President, NetTalon Security Systems,

Inc., Personal Interview, 6 Dec. 2001.

15. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science. ‘‘Aviation Security: Technology’s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities,’’ testimony by Keith O. Fultz, Assistant Comptroller General, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, General Accounting Office, 19 Sept. 1996, 7–12.

16. National Research Council, Detection of Explosives for Commercial Aviation

Security, Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993),

7–12.

17. Jim Dawson, ‘‘National Labs Focus on Tools Against Terrorism in Wake of

Airliner and Anthrax Attacks,’’ Physics Today, Jan. 2002, 19–22.

18. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science. ‘‘Aviation Security,’’ 8–9.

19. Cynthia L. Webb, ‘‘A Handy Security Solution: Aether Software Gets Tryout

on Handhelds at Boston Airport,’’ Washington Post, 16 Jan. 2002, E5.

20. National Research Council, Airline Passenger Security Screening: New Technologies and Implementation Issues, Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996) 3.

21. Jeffrey Rosen, ‘‘A Watchful State,’’ New York Times, 7 Oct. 2001, 6–38.

22. Donald R. Richards, ‘‘ID Technology Faces the Future,’’ Mastering Security

(Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1996) 78.

23. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science, ‘‘Cyber Security: Beyond the Maginot Line,’’ testimony by Wm. A. Wulf, President, National Academy of Engineering

and AT&T Professor of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Virginia,

107th Cong., 1st sess., 10 Oct. 2001.

24. Robert O’Harrow Jr., ‘‘Key U.S. Computer Systems Called Vulnerable to Attack; Defense, FAA Among Agencies Lacking Security, Experts Say,’’ Washington

Post, 27 Sept. 2001, A6.

25. Sada Yoshi Ohbu, et al., ‘‘Sarin Poisoning on Tokyo Subway,’’ Southern Medical Journal, 3 June 1997, 1.

26. Lyndsey Layton, ‘‘Drill Tests Response to Attack In Metro; Exercise Gauges

Chemical Threats,’’ Washington Post, 5 Dec. 2001, B8.

27. Dawson, ‘‘National Labs Focus,’’ 19–20.

37

28. Ellen Nakashima, ‘‘USPS Sees New Way to Spot Biohazards,’’ Washington

Post, 9 Mar. 2002, A13.

29. Marian Burros, ‘‘Eating Well; A Vulnerable Food Supply, A Call for More Safety,’’ New York Times, 31 Oct. 2001, Fl.

30. National Research Council, Improving Civilian Medical Response to Chemical

or Biological Terrorist Incidents, Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: National

Academy Press, 1998) 3.

31. Ceci Connolly, ‘‘Bush Promotes Plans To Fight Bioterrorism,’’ Washington

Post, 6 Feb. 2002, A3+.

32. Avram Goldstein, ‘‘Anti-Terror Campaign Turns to Doctors; Physicians Scramble to Learn About Bio-Weapons; Some Urge Mandated Training,’’ Washington Post, 14 Oct. 2001, A12.

33. Joby Warrick and Steve Fainaru, ‘‘Bioterrorism Preparations Lacking at Lowest Levels; Despite Warnings and Funds, Local Defenses Come Up Short,’’ Washington Post, 22 Oct. 2001, A7.

34. National Research Council, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and

Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response, Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999) 5–6.

35. Eric Pianin and Bill Miller, ‘‘Security Permeates Budget: Many Agencies Would Share $37.7 Billion in New Funds,’’ Washington Post, 5 Feb. 2002, A7.

36. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ‘‘A Nation Challenged: The Disease; Ill Postal Worker

Has Symptoms That Stop Short of Anthrax,’’ New York Times, 11 Jan. 2002, A11.

37. David Brown, ‘‘Agency With Most Need Didn’t Get Anthrax Data,’’ Washington

Post, 11 Feb. 2002, A3.

38. Dawson, ‘‘National Labs Focus,’’ 21.

39. Jones, Personal Interview.

40. George Musser, ‘‘Better Killing Through Chemistry: Buying Chemical Weapons Material Through the Mail is Quick and Easy,’’ Scientific American, Dec. 2001,

20–21.

41. Terence Chea, ‘‘Firm’s Anti-Nerve Gas Device Approved,’’ Washington Post, 30

Jan. 2002, E5.

42. Dawson, ‘‘National Labs Focus,’’ 20.

43. Ibid. 21.

44. John Mesenbrink, ‘‘Fighting the War on Bioterrorism,’’ Security Magazine, 4

Jan. 2002, 3.

45. Gina Kolata, ‘‘Treatments; On Many Fronts, Experts Plan for the Unthinkable: Biowarfare,’’ New York Times, 23 Oct. 2001, F4.

46. Steve Twomey, ‘‘A Recipe for Safe Mail,’’ Washington Post, 30 Jan. 2002, Al+.

47. National Research Council, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, 8.

48. Pianin, ‘‘Security Permeates Budget.’’ 49. ‘‘Freon,’’ Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 9, 1973 ed., 924.

50. John Schwartz, ‘‘The Irradiation of Mail Can Also Zap the Contents,’’ New

York Times, 11 Feb. 2002, C2.

51. Twomey, ‘‘A Recipe For Safe Mail.’’

52. Andrew DeMillo and Allan Lengel, ‘‘Fumes From Mail Sicken 11 at Commerce,’’ Washington Post, 11 Jan. 2002, B9.

53. Spencer S. Hsu, ‘‘73 Senate Workers Report Illness,’’ Washington Post, 7 Feb.

2002, B1+.

54. Spencer S. Hsu, ‘‘Workers Handling Government Mail Report Illness,’’ Washington Post, 9 Feb. 2002, A6.

55. Hsu, ‘‘73 Senate Workers Report Illness.’’

56. Schwartz, ‘‘The Irradiation of Mail.’’

57. Sherry L. Harowitz, ‘‘More Than Meets the Eye,’’ Mastering Security (Dubuque: Kendal1/Hunt, 1996) 73.

58. Richards, ‘‘ID Technology Faces the Future,’’ 79.

59. Sara Kehaulani Goo, ‘‘Nonlethal Weapons Pose Own Risks in Air, Report

Says,’’ Washington Post, 6 March 2002, A11.

60. National Research Council, Airline Passenger Security Screening, 3.

61. Rosen, ‘‘A Watchful State.’’

62. Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong, The Maximum Surveillance Society: The

Rise of the CCTV (New York: Berg, 1999) 42.

63. AP, ‘‘Resistance Builds to Cipro, Study Says,’’ New York Times, 7 Feb. 2002,

A18.

64. Kate Zernike and Christopher Drew, ‘‘Efforts to Track Foreign Students Are

Said to Lag,’’ New York Times, 28 Jan. 2002, Al +.

65. U.S. Congress, Senate, Office of Technology Assessment for the Congress, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Computer Services of the Committee on Rules and

Administration, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 2 March 1972, 72.

38

66. Vary T. Coates, Technology and Public Policy: The Process of Technology Assessment in the Federal Government (Washington, D.C., Program of Policy Studies

in Science and Technology, The George Washington University) July 1972, I:14–36.

67. U.S. Congress, House, Office of Technology Assessment: Background and Status, Report to the Committee on Science and Astronautics, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.,

Aug. 1973, 14–17.

68. ‘‘Technology Assessment Act of 1972,’’ Public Law 92–484 (2 U.S.C 471–481).

69. U.S. Congress, Senate, Technology Assessment for the Congress, Staff Study

of the Subcommittee on Computer Services of the Committee on Rules and Administration, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1 Nov. 1972, 41.

70. U.S. Congress, Senate, Office of Technology Assessment, Excerpt of Hearings

Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Fiscal Years 1973 and

1974, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 9 May & 20 June 1973, 11–14.

71. U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Support Agencies, Prepared for the Commission on the Operation of the Senate, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 55.

72. David Dickson, The New Politics of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1998) 242.

73. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Annual Report to Congress,

Fiscal Year 1995, 6.

74. Ibid. 7–8.

75. Ford, ‘‘Small Influential Office Guides Congress Into Space Age,’’ 18.

76. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Office of Technology Assessment: Background and Status, Aug. 1973, 13–17.

77. ‘‘Technology Assessment Act,’’ sec. 7(a).

78. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, What OTA Is—What QTA

Does—How OTA Works, 1989, 8.

79. Mottur, Alfred E., Institutional Innovation in the Congress: The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), ‘‘Sentinels of the Republic Scholar’’ Honors Thesis, Williams College, Williamstown, MA, 1989, 37.

80. Ibid. 108.

81. U.S. Congress, Senate, Office of Technology Assessment, Excerpt of Hearings,

1973, 11–14.

82. CQ Almanac, ‘‘Congress Cuts Legislative Funds,’’ 1995, 11–61.

83. U.S. Congress, Senate Democratic Policy Committee, Senate Voting Record,

No. 316, ‘‘Legislative Branch Appropriations, 1996, OTA,’’ July 20, 1995.

84. CQ Almanac, 11–64

85. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Annual Report, 36–38.

86. CQ Almanac, 11—64–65.

87. Ibid. 11–65.

88. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Annual Report, 40.

89. ‘‘Technology Assessment Act,’’ sec. 3(b), sec. 4(b), and sec. 12(a).

90. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass

Destruction, 78.

Æ