RAB/98-25

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Railroad Accident Brief Report

CHI98FR011

COLLISION

CENTRAL KANSAS RAILWAY

GENESEO, KANSAS

JULY 16, 1998

On July 16, 1998, about 6:40 a.m. central daylight time, a Central Kansas Railway

(CKR) Hutchinson North Switcher (HNS) train collided with a parked Hoisington Local

(HL) train near Geneseo, Kansas. The HNS train was traveling about 8 miles per hour

when the collision occurred. The HNS train consisted of 4 locomotive units and 128

freight cars. The HL train consisted of 6 locomotive units and 13 freight cars. At the time

of the collision, the HL train was being refueled from a fuel truck. The weather was clear

and sunny; the temperature was 91° F.

Seven cars on the HNS train derailed; five were destroyed. Six locomotive units

from the HL train were damaged; three derailed and two of those derailed were destroyed.

The fuel truck was overturned and destroyed, and it lost its contents. There were no

injuries or fire. The cost of the derailment was $824,028.

The HNS train departed Hutchinson, Kansas, for Geneseo about 2 a.m. with 97

cars. The engineer operated the train from the lead locomotive unit, and the conductor

accompanied the train in his private vehicle, as prescribed by CKR operating practices.

The train crewmembers had track warrant authority to operate their train from Hutchinson

to Sterling Junction, Kansas. From Sterling Junction through Geneseo, the crewmembers

were required to operate their train under “restricted speed”1

 operating rules. From

Geneseo through the area where the collision took place, the crewmembers were again

required to operate their train by track warrant authority.

The HNS train crewmembers were instructed to deliver their 97-car train to

Geneseo and to pick up 30 freight cars on the pass track, as well as an additional 98

freight cars on the Union Pacific Railroad (UP) siding. The train crewmembers decided to

make the switching movement by coupling the lead locomotive unit to the 30 cars parked

on the pass track, and then shoving them forward and coupling them to the 98 cars parked

on the UP siding (with 97 cars still in tow).

 

1

 When a train is required to move at restricted speed, movement must be made at a speed that allows

stopping within half the range of vision short of: a train, an engine, a railroad car, men or equipment fouling

the track, or a derail or switch lined improperly. The crew must keep a lookout for broken rail and not

exceed 20 mph.
2

After the crewmembers coupled the trains, the engineer stated that he was having

a difficult time moving the 225-car train. The conductor instructed the engineer to

uncouple the 97 cars from the rear of the train, so they could shove the 128-car train onto

the main track and clear of the UP siding.

The engineer notified the conductor that he had uncoupled the cars as instructed.

The conductor then instructed the engineer to shove the 128-car train forward. The

engineer asked the conductor if he had a track warrant for the movement. The conductor

replied that he did. The engineer stated that he started the shoving movement, assuming

that the conductor was protecting the grade crossings and the lead car of the train. During

the shoving movement, the conductor instructed the engineer to increase the train’s speed

because the train was approaching an ascending grade. No further radio communication

was conducted. The engineer had shoved the cars about 3.5 miles when an undesired

emergency brake application occurred. The train had collided with the parked HL train.

Postaccident investigation revealed that the parked HL train had a valid track

warrant to occupy the main track at Geneseo and that the HNS train did not have either

written track warrant authority or verbal authorization to enter the main track there. The

investigation further found that it was common practice for the conductor to contact the

train dispatcher via a CKR cellular telephone and then to communicate the track warrant

authority to the engineer. According to CKR’s Operating Rule 14.8, both the conductor

and the engineer must have a copy of any track warrant issued to their train, and each

crewmember must read and understand the track warrant.

CKR operating rules required the conductor to be positioned at a point from

which he could see the developing situation well enough to provide protection for the

shoving movement. The engineer shoved the 128-car train without knowing where the

conductor was located. Also, the rules required the conductor to maintain radio contact

and to continue to give the engineer movement instructions. The conductor did not

communicate with the engineer after instructing him to increase speed.

OmniTRAX, the parent company of the CKR, required that every train

crewmember be efficiency tested2

 on a monthly basis. Two managers were assigned to

efficiency test about 30 operating train crewmembers each month over a 1,200-mile

territory. The CKR General Director of Operations subsequently changed the frequency

of the testing so that each manager only had to test eight train crewmembers each month.

CKR records indicated that the engineer had not been efficiency tested since he began

work as an engineer on September 29, 1997. The conductor had only been efficiency

tested twice, on November 27, 1996, and January 2, 1997. The conductor had been

employed in the CKR operating department since March 1995.

 

2

 A periodic test and inspection conducted by a railroad to determine the extent of compliance by

operating personnel with its code of operating rules, timetables, and timetable special instructions in

accordance with a written program.
3

PROBABLE CAUSE

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

this accident was that the Hutchinson North Switcher train crewmembers allowed their

train to enter and proceed along the main track without first obtaining track warrant

authority and the Central Kansas Railway management’s lack of operational safety

oversight.

Adopted: December 1, 1998