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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

ROBERT GENE WELLS,

 Plaintiff, 

v. CASE NO.: 5:21-cv19-TKW-MJF

TOMMY FORD, in his official capacity as

SHERIFF of BAY COUNTY, and RICK ANGLIN,

In his supervisor capacity

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

PURSUANT TO RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Defendants, Tommy Ford, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Bay

County, Florida, and Rick Anglin, in his supervisory capacity, pursuant to 

Rule 11(b) and (c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves this 

Court for an order imposing sanctions, including, but not limited to, attorneys’ 

fees against Plaintiff, Robert Gene Wells, and his counsel and state:

 1. On or about February 19, 2021, Robert Wells (hereinafter 

“Plaintiff”), filed a Complaint (ECF 13) alleging the following against Sheriff

Tommy Ford (hereinafter, “Sheriff”) and Rick Anglin (hereinafter, “Anglin”): 

Count I: Deliberate Indifference Failure to Protect – Fourteenth 

Amendment (SHERIFF) 

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Count II: Deliberate Indifference Failure to Protect – Fourteenth 

Amendment (ANGLIN)

Count III: Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs – Fourteenth 

Amendment (SHERIFF)

Count IV: Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs – Fourteenth 

Amendment (ANGLIN)

1

Count V: Common Law Negligent Training (SHERIFF) 

Count VI: Common Law Negligence (SHERIFF) 

Count VII: Violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(SHERIFF) 

2. Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated while he was at the 

Bay County Jail (hereinafter, “BCJ”), on or about June 13, 2018, when 

housed in the protective custody dorm and he was victimized by two other 

inmates. 

3. In Counts I and II, Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff, through his 

employees and/or agents, and Anglin, in his supervisory capacity, had a duty 

to protect him from other inmates and detainees, especially in light of his 

mental and physical conditions, and failed to do so, instead placing him in a 

protective custody dorm with Tavis Bell and Diontez McCoy, having 

1 Count IV was dismissed by Order of the Court. [ECF No. 22]

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knowledge of their violent crimes, where Bell and McCoy then victimized

Plaintiff. 

4. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff was deliberately 

indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs by housing him in protective custody 

rather than in the medical unit or the behavioral observation unit. 

5. In Counts V and VI, Plaintiff alleges Sheriff breached his duty of 

care by failing to properly classify Plaintiff, and Sheriff breached its duty of 

care by negligently implementing or operating its training program with 

regard to employees/agents involved in detainee supervision. 

6. In Count VII, Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff failed to provide 

reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff’s mental and physical disabilities 

during the course of incarceration and discriminated against Plaintiff by way 

of failing to properly classify him and place him in a mental health or medical 

pod. 

7. The depositions taken in this case establish that the allegations 

and causes of action asserted against Sheriff and Anglin, contained in 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, are frivolous and lack any legal, factual, or evidentiary 

basis to assert a claim against Sheriff and Anglin. Specifically, the following 

are undisputed and supported by record evidence: 

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A) The record evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff was placed in 

the protective custody dorm, or C-1, which is a dorm designed to protect 

individuals from the general population. There is not just one criterion used 

to determine when an inmate is placed in protective custody. [Burkett, P. 16, 

L:18-23]. Individuals who are accused or convicted of child sex offenses are 

typically placed in protective custody as well those accused of a high-profile 

crime involving gang members. [Anglin, P. 7-8, L:15-25, 1-2 & 103-104, L:23-

25, 1-25]. Individuals are also placed in protective custody due to being infirm 

and needing the assistance of a walker or wheelchair. [Anglin, P: 22-8-24] 

B) McCoy and Bell were both properly housed in C-1 protective 

custody due to the nature of their charges. [Anglin, P. 7-8, L:15-25, 1-2 & 

103-104, L:23-25, 1-25]. There is no record evidence that Bell nor McCoy 

specifically targeted Plaintiff, nor had they previously made any threats that 

they would harm Plaintiff. Record evidence demonstrates that C-1 was a unit 

with very few problems. [Anglin P. 22, L:18-24]. 

C) Plaintiff was also properly housed in C-1 protective custody due 

to his need for additional assistance. [Anglin P. 20, L:13-25].

Memorandum of Law

The intention of Rule 11 sanctions is to “reduce frivolous claims, 

defenses, or motions, and to deter costly meritless maneuvers.” Massengale 

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v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Donaldson v. Clark, 

819 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc)). Rule 11 requires a party to 

abandon a claim if, after a reasonable opportunity of investigation or 

discovery, such claim is no longer tenable. Turner v. Sunguard Business 

Systems, Inc., 91 F.3d 1418, 2422 (11th Cir. 1996) (that contention of a 

complaint was not frivolous at the time filed does not prevent the trial court 

from imposing Rule 11 sanctions for continuing to advocate untenable 

claims). If a party continues to prosecute untenable claims a court may 

impose appropriate sanctions against the attorneys and parties for violation 

of Rule 11. Battles v. City of Ft. Meyers, 127 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 1997)

(Rule 11 allows sanctions when an attorney insists upon a position after it is 

no longer tenable).

To survive a motion for summary judgment on a deliberate indifference 

failure to protect claim, “a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence of (1) a 

substantial risk of harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that 

risk; and (3) causation.” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th 

Cir. 2013). “Merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does 

not justify liability under section 1983... The known risk of injury must be a 

strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before a guard’s failure to act 

can constitute deliberate indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 

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1537 (11th Cir. 1990). Additionally, a prison official must both be aware of 

facts from which the inference can be drawn that a substantial risk of harm 

exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (1994). 

A failure to protect claim can be based on 1) the inmate being a target of a 

specific threat or 2) dangerous conditions at the jail. Est. of Owens v. GEO 

Grp., Inc. 660 F. App’x 763, 769 (11th Cir. 2016). There is no record evidence 

that Plaintiff was a target of a specific threat, nor that there were dangerous 

conditions at the jail.

To establish a deliberate indifference claim as to medical needs, a 

plaintiff must sufficiently allege “both an objectively serious medical need and 

that a Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need.” Burnette v. 

Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008). To meet the first prong, the 

plaintiff must demonstrate an “objectively serious medical need”—i.e., “one 

that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that 

is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for 

a doctor's attention,” and, in either instance, “one that, if left unattended, 

poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 

1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (alteration adopted) (quotations omitted). Deliberate 

indifference occurs, then, where a prison official both knows of the medical 

need and either delays care unnecessarily or does not provide care at all. 

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See Id. at 1246. To survive a motion to dismiss, a cause of action for 

deliberate indifference must adequately plead the existence of three 

components: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard 

of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than gross negligence. Hoffer v. 

Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing

Harper v. Lawrence Cty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2020))2; Taylor v. 

Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that defendant must 

have subjective awareness of an “objectively serious need” and that his 

response must constitute “an objectively insufficient response to that need.”); 

See also Hammond v. Theakston, 2020 WL 6437772 (11th Cir., November 

3, 2020). There is no record evidence of medical treatment being denied, 

rather this is a claim where Plaintiff is alleging failure to protect, thus, this 

claim cannot be sustained.3 

“In order to state a Title II claim, a plaintiff generally must prove (1) that 

he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was either excluded 

from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, 

2 In Hoffer, footnote 2, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that a panel of the Court “recently 

suggested that the more than mere negligence standard in McElligott is more consistent 

with Farmer v. Brennan than the more than gross negligence standard in Townsend.” 

(internal quotations and citation omitted). However, the Court noted that the “competing 

articulations – ‘gross’ vs. ‘mere’ negligence – may well represent a distinction without a 

difference...” based on an interpretation by the Supreme Court.

3 See Court’s ruling on Anglin’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 22]

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programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public 

entity; and (3) that the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination was by 

reason of the plaintiff’s disability.” Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 

1083 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132). Additionally, as Plaintiff is 

seeking compensatory damages, he must prove that Sheriff engaged in 

intentional discrimination, with a showing of ‘deliberate indifference.’ 

Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1134 (11th Cir. 2019). Title 

II of the ADA has been held to apply to a disabled prisoner where he is denied 

participation in an activity or program provided in a state prison due to his 

disability. Bricoll, 480 F.3d at 1081, citing Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr. v.

Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 21 (1998). Additionally, the Department of Justice has 

promulgated regulations implementing Title II’s prohibition against 

discrimination, stating that “[a] public entity shall make reasonable 

modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are 

necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public 

entity can demonstrate that making the modification would fundamentally 

alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” Id. The reasonable 

accommodation requirement does not apply under Title II, rather just the 

reasonable modification requirement, such that a jail or prison must make 

reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the 

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modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, 

or activity. Lewis v. Cain, 3:15-CV-318, 2021 WL 1219988, at *43 (M.D. La. 

Mar. 31, 2021), reconsideration denied, CV 15-318-SDD-RLB, 2021 WL 

5287856 (M.D. La. Oct. 8, 2021). There is no record evidence to support 

Plaintiff was denied any reasonable modifications due to any disability, 

rather, he was placed in C-1, protective custody, as a reasonable 

modification due to his physical and mental limitations. 

Conclusion

Plaintiff has no factual or legal basis for continuing to prosecute his 

claims against Sheriff. Both Plaintiff and his counsel are on notice and the 

record clearly establishes the flaws in Plaintiff’s claims. 

WHEREFORE, Defendant Sheriff and Anglin request this Court to 

enter an order granting this motion and imposing sanctions, pursuant to Rule 

11(c), including reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses, against Plaintiff 

Wells and his counsel.

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 DATED this 26th day of April 2021. 

 WARNER LAW FIRM, P. A.

 /s/ Jennifer A.J. Hawkins

 JENNIFER A.J. HAWKINS 

 Florida Bar No. 0017694

TIMOTHY M. WARNER

 Florida Bar No. 0642363

 501 W. 11th St. Suite A

Panama City, FL 32401

Phone No. (850) 784-7772

 pleadings@warnerlaw.us 

 Attorney for Defendants,

 Sheriff Tommy Ford and

 Rick Anglin

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7.1(B)

The undersigned hereby certifies that she complied with the attorneyconference requirement of Local Rule 7.1(B), regarding the filing of this 

Motion by serving this Motion on Plaintiff’, by serving a copy of this Motion 

on Plaintiff’s counsel via email on April 26, 2022, as required by the 21-day 

safe-harbor period of Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P. Counsel for Plaintiff has not 

responded or taken any action within that 21-day safe-harbor time; therefore, 

undersigned counsel presumes that Plaintiff opposes this Motion. 

 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE TO INITIATE SAFE HARBOR PERIOD

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was served on 

Plaintiff’s counsel on April 26, 2022, via CM/ECF but not filed with the Court 

on that date, as required by the provisions of Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(F), I hereby certify that the foregoing motion 

and memorandum is 1,821 words in length. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 

served on this 26th day of April, 2022, via email to all counsel of record. 

/s/ Jennifer A.J. Hawkins

JENNIFER A.J. HAWKINS

Florida Bar No. 0017694

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