alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Centenary International
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2006,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Hector A. Patron Costas, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

(1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


/s/ Hector A. Patron Costas
--------------------------------
Hector A. Patron Costas
Chief Financial Officer
May 15, 2006

      A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or
      other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
      signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
      written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
      the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
      staff upon request. The foregoing certifications are accompanying the
      Company's Form 10-QSB solely pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title
      18, United States Code) and are not being filed as part of the Form 10-QSB
      or as a separate disclosure document.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000759641
<NAME> AEI REAL ESTATE FUND 85-A LTD PARTNERSHIP
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                         157,232
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               157,232
<PP&E>                                       5,126,348
<DEPRECIATION>                               (948,050)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,335,530
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          100,978
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,234,552
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,335,530
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               270,144
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  111,671
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                158,473
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            158,473
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   158,473
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    22.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    22.14
        

</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES JOSEPH KNOCHEL, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

and 

EMILY NOELLE MIHAYLO, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

AMY FACKRELL; JOHN C. MORRIS; 

UNKOWN PARTY, named as Medical 

Director - West Yavapai Guidance Clinic; 

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE 

OF ARIZONA, 

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 20-17326 

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-08086-GMS-JZB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 14, 2021**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 20 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 20-17326

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

James Joseph Knochel appeals pro se from the district court’s order 

designating him a vexatious litigant and imposing pre-filing restrictions against 

him. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Knochel contends that the district court should have held an evidentiary 

hearing before imposing the order, and that recent developments in state court 

undermine the basis for the order. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see Molski v. 

Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007), we conclude there 

was none. The district court followed the appropriate procedure in imposing the 

order: It gave Knochel notice and an opportunity to oppose the order, compiled an 

adequate record for appellate review, made substantive findings regarding the 

harassing nature of Knochel’s litigation history, and narrowly tailored the 

prohibition to future filings in which Knochel may seek to act on behalf of, as next 

friend of, or that in any way relate to, Emily Mihaylo. See Ringgold-Lockhart v. 

Cnty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014). The alleged 

developments in state court do not undermine the basis for the order, and the 

authorities Knochel cites do not support his claim that the district court erred by 

failing to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding those developments.

AFFIRMED.
DISMISS and Opinion Filed August 25, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00978-CV 

CLARA HELMBRIGHT, Appellant 

V. 

SAM SAYED AND MAGED IBRAHIM, Appellees 

On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 429-01065-2018 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Myers, Pedersen, III, and Garcia 

Opinion by Justice Garcia 

Before the Court is appellant’s agreed motion to dismiss this appeal with 

prejudice. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

42.1(a)(1). 

210978F.P05 

 

/Dennise Garcia/ 

DENNISE GARCIA 

JUSTICE 
 –2– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

CLARA HELMBRIGHT, Appellant 

No. 05-21-00978-CV V. 

SAM SAYED AND MAGED 

IBRAHIM, Appellees 

 On Appeal from the 429th Judicial 

District Court, Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 429-01065-

2018. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. 

Justices Myers and Pedersen, III 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is 

DISMISSED with prejudice. 

 It is ORDERED that each party bear his or her own costs of this appeal. 

Judgment entered August 25, 2022.
----

|   | (1) | The      Report, containing the financial statements, fully complies with the      requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of      1934, as amended; and |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of      MMPI. |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                      | MerueloMaddux      Properties, Inc. |                                                   |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
|                      |                                |                                                   |   |
| Date:      March 28, 2008 | By:                                 | /s/ Richard      Meruelo                          |   |
|                      |                                | Richard      Meruelo                                   |   |
|                      |                                | Chief      Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board |   |
|                      |                                |                                                   |   |

----
§ 718.202 Determining the land constituting a farm. ( a ) In determining the constitution of a farm, consideration shall be given to provisions such as ownership and operation. For purposes of this part, the following rules shall be applicable to determining what land is to be included in a farm.
( b ) A minor shall be considered to be the same owner or operator as the parent, court-appointed guardian, or other person responsible for the minor child, unless the parent or guardian has no interest in the minor's farm or production from the farm, and the minor: ( 1 ) Is a producer on a farm;
( 2 ) Maintains a separate household from the parent or guardian;
( 3 ) Personally carries out the farming activities; and
( 4 ) Maintains a separate accounting for the farming operation.
( c ) A minor shall not be considered to be the same owner or operator as the parent or court-appointed guardian if the minor's interest in the farming operation results from being the beneficiary of an irrevocable trust and ownership of the property is vested in the trust or the minor.
( d ) A life estate tenant shall be considered to be the owner of the property for their life.
( e ) A trust shall be considered to be an owner with the beneficiary of the trust; except a trust can be considered a separate owner or operator from the beneficiary, if the trust: ( 1 ) Has a separate and distinct interest in the land or crop involved;
( 2 ) Exercises separate responsibility for the separate and distinct interest; and
( 3 ) Maintains funds and accounts separate from that of any other individual or entity for the interest.
( f ) The county committee shall require specific proof of ownership.
( g ) Land owned by different persons of an immediate family living in the same household and operated as a single farming unit shall be considered as being under the same ownership in determining a farm.
( h ) All land operated as a single unit and owned and operated by a parent corporation and subsidiary corporations of which the parent corporation owns more than 50 percent of the value of the outstanding stock, or where the parent is owned and operated by subsidiary corporations, shall be constituted as one farm.
52.252-6 Authorized Deviations in Clauses.

As prescribed in 52.107(f), insert the following clause in solicitations and contracts that include any

FAR or supplemental clause with an authorized deviation. Whenever any FAR or supplemental

clause is used with an authorized deviation, the contracting officer shall identify it by the same

number, title, and date assigned to the clause when it is used without deviation, include regulation

name for any supplemental clause, except that the contracting officer shall insert "(DEVIATION)"

after the date of the clause.

Authorized Deviations in Clauses (Nov 2020)

(a) The use in this solicitation or contract of any Federal Acquisition Regulation (48 CFR Chapter 1)

clause with an authorized deviation is indicated by the addition of "(DEVIATION)" after the date of

the clause.

(b) The use in this solicitation or contract of any _____ [insert regulation name] (48 CFR _____) clause

with an authorized deviation is indicated by the addition of "(DEVIATION)" after the name of the

regulation.

(End of clause)

Parent topic: 52.252 [Reserved]
#### HELLER v. GOLDBERG.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department.

June 18, 1914.)

Trial (§ 315*)—Breach of Contract—Insufficient Damages—Compromise Verdict.

Where plaintiff was employed for 6 months at a weekly salary of $80, and was discharged during the fourth week without cause, and where at the trial 12 more weeks of the contract period had elapsed, but defendant introduced no evidence that plaintiff had or could have secured other employment, plaintiff was entitled to a verdict of at least $960, or nothing, and a verdict of $200 did not represent the judgment of the jury, but a compromise, and judgment thereon will be reversed.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 740-742; Dec. Dig. § 315.*]

Appeal from City Court of New York, Trial Term.

Action by Helen Heller against Jacob Goldberg. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed, and new trial ordered.

Argued June term, 1914, before SEABURY, BIJUR, and PAGE, JJ.

Joseph S. Rosalsky, of New York City (Jacob I. Berman, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Max D. Steuer, of New York City, for respondent.

*

For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

PAGE, J.

It was conceded that plaintiff had been employed for 6 months at a weekly salary of $80. She was discharged during, the fourth week of her employment, as she claims, without cause, and sued for damages.

At the time of the trial, 12 more weeks of the contract period had elapsed. Defendant introduced no evidence of any kind indicating that plaintiff had or could have secured other employment. Plaintiff was therefore entitled to a verdict of at least $960 or nothing. The learned judge below had, without objection, charged that the opportunity for other employment was a matter of defense, and not a part of plaintiff’s case. It is quite evident, as a matter of simple mathematics, that the verdict represents, not the judgment of the jury, but a compromise.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event. All concur.
Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Case No.: 4:01cr47 – SPM 

WILLIE JAMES FRANCIS,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

C0RRECTED1

 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS

This cause comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion to proceed in

forma pauperis (doc. 258) to appeal of the order denying his 3582(c) motion to

reduce his sentence under Amendment 750 (see docs. 242 and 248). The

standard for appealing in forma pauperis requires that the appeal be taken in

good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Good faith in this context is measured by an

objective standard. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). 

Defendant’s appeal is not taken in objective good faith because Defendant was

subject to a statutory mandatory minimum sentence and his sentencing range is

not reduced by Amendment 750. Accordingly, it is

1

 This order has been corrected in the “ORDERED AND ADJUDGED”

section to show the correct document number for the motion to proceed in forma

pauperis. The previous order identified the document as (doc. 248), but the

correct identification is (doc. 258).
Page 2 of 2

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma

pauperis (doc. 258) is denied.

DONE AND ORDERED this 8th day of March, 2012.

s/ Stephan P. Mickle 

Stephan P. Mickle

Senior United States District Judge

Case No.: 4:01cr47 – SPM
§ 765.405 Payment of costs associated with transfers. The transferor and transferee are responsible for paying transfer costs such as real estate taxes, title examination, attorney's fees, surveys, and title insurance. When the transferor is unable to pay its portion of the transfer costs, the transferee, with Agency approval, may pay these costs provided: ( a ) Any cash equity due the transferor is applied first to payment of costs and the transferor does not receive any cash payment above these costs;
( b ) The transferee's payoff of any junior liens does not exceed $5,000;
( c ) Fees are customary and reasonable;
( d ) The transferee can verify that personal funds are available to pay transferor and transferee fees; and
( e ) Any equity due the transferor is held in escrow by an Agency designated closing agent and is disbursed at closing.
# Ciiy of :/ac£son

Mr. Scott Faulk Essential Air Service Division Department ofTransportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE Washington, D.C. 20590 Dear Mr. Faulk: JERRY GIST MAYOR December 22, 2014

t··.,J

On behalfofthe city ofJackson, please accept this letter supporting the decision ofthe Jackson-Madison County Airport Authority in their choice ofthe proposal submitted by Air Choice One to provide Essential Air Service to Jackson, Tennessee. Business leaders, plant managers and the public citizens have helped determine which ofthe two proposals would best serve the needs ofthe community. The Jackson/Nashville/Memphis service connection has unfortunately been underutilized. The presence ofthe Essential'Air Service Program serves as an advantage point to attract new industry and strengthen economic development in this region. I support air service that will engage an acceptable and consistent level of travelers. Ifyou have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact either myself or Tammy Buchanan (tbuchanan@cit;y;?fjackson.net).

I ;.• '

JG/blm

# :,··r:Q~ Jerry Gist Mayor . 

## '

.

.**~·.** .; .**~**
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 4:01CR45-SPM/AK

GREGORY EUBANKS,

Defendant.

___________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause is before the Court on Defendant’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. 104. Defendant pled guilty to distributing cocaine

and possession of a firearm by a prior convicted felon and was sentenced on September 16,

2002, to 211 months imprisonment. Doc. 76. Defendant appealed his sentence, which was

affirmed. See Doc. 103. 

On this occasion, Defendant maintains that he has been subjected to an unconstitutionally

enhanced sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines in contravention of Blakely v. Washington. 

Doc. 104.

Following its decision in Blakely, which involved the constitutionality of state sentencing

guidelines, the United States Supreme Court determined that Blakely applies to the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines as well. United States v. Booker, ____ U.S. ____, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159

L.Ed. 2d 442 (2004). However, the Eleventh Circuit has just determined that Booker is not

Case 4:01-cr-00045-MW-CAS Document 105 Filed 03/25/05 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

Case No: 4:01cr45-spm/ak

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, as “Booker’s constitutional rule falls

squarely under the category of new rules of criminal procedure that do not apply retroactively to

§ 2255 cases on collateral review.” Varela v. United States, 2005 WL 367095, at *4 (11th Cir.

Feb. 17, 2005).

In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

That Defendant’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255, Doc. 104, be DENIED.

IN CHAMBERS at Gainesville, Florida, this 25th day of March, 2005.

s/ A. KORNBLUM 

ALLAN KORNBLUM

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

A party may file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations

within 15 days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. A party may

respond to another party’s objections within 10 days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure

to file specific objections limits the scope of review of proposed factual findings and recommendations.

Case 4:01-cr-00045-MW-CAS Document 105 Filed 03/25/05 Page 2 of 2
MINUTES

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

HON. MARK E. FULLER, PRESIDING AT DOTHAN, AL

DATE COMMENCED: 10/2/06 AT: 9:55 a.m. 

DATE COMPLETED: 10/3/06 AT: 11:40 p.m.

Wayne Black §

§

vs. § CV. NO. 1:03CV734-MEF

§

Lamar Glover, et al. §

______________________________________________________________________________

PLAINTIFF APPEARANCES: DEFENDANT

Wayne Black, Pro Se Gary C. Sherrer

______________________________________________________________________________

COURT OFFICIALS PRESENT:

Barbara Wells, Law Clerk

Kelli Gregg, Courtroom Clerk

Jimmy Dickens, Court Reporter

______________________________________________________________________________

 JURORS

Janet Evelyn Sullivan Amy T. Walker

Terri J. Dykes Janice Elaine Ethridge

Stephanie Renee Adams Charlotte Dale Wright

Terry Warren Weeks Randall Malcome Meeks

______________________________________________________________________________

COURTROOM PROCEEDINGS:

( X) Jury Selection and Trial

10:35 a.m. - Court convenes.

Opening remarks by Court.

Court gives oath and swears entire jury panel in.

Voir dire begins.

Plaintiff Challenges for Cause jurors #55, 61 and 75 which the Court

GRANTS.

Defense counsel Challenges for Cause juror #10 which the Court DENIES

and juror #39 which the Court GRANTS.

Jury selection held.

Jury panel is given the oath and sworn in with the Court and seated in jury 

Case 1:03-cv-00734-MEF-SRW Document 46 Filed 10/02/2006 Page 1 of 2
box.

Court gives instructions to the jury.

Opening statements begin. Plaintiff takes 4 minutes and Defendant takes 7

minutes.

5:00 p.m. - Court is in recess.

DAY TWO

10/3/06

9:05 a.m. - Court convenes.

Plaintiff calls his first witness Lamar Glover to testify.

Defendant begins cross-examination of witness Glover.

Plaintiff calls his next witness Commander Bowers to testify.

Defense counsel begins cross-examination of witness Bowers.

Plaintiff begins re-direct examination of witness Bowers.

Defense counsel begins re-cross examination of witness Bowers.

Plaintiff calls his next witness Officer Roberts to testify.

Defense counsel begins cross-examination of witness Roberts.

Plaintiff begins re-direct examination of witness Roberts.

Plaintiff calls his next witness Officer Turner to testify.

Defense counsel begins cross-examination of witness Turner.

Plaintiff begins re-direct examination of witness Turner.

10:40 a.m. - Court is in recess.

11:15 a.m. - Court reconvenes.

Plaintiff calls his next witness Dr. Banner to testify.

Defense counsel begins cross-examination of Dr. Banner.

Plaintiff begins re-direct examination of witness Banner.

Plaintiff rests at this time.

Defense counsel files a Motion for Directed Verdict on Behalf of

Defendants at the Close of Plaintiff’s case.

Oral argument is heard on motion.

Court GRANTS defendants Motion for Directed Verdict.

Court brings jury back in and excuses them from this trial.

Court will enter a written order in this case.

11:40 a.m. - Court is in recess.

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