Opinion filed Februar y 1 8, 2010



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

___________ 

### No. 1 1- 08 -0 02 95 -CR

____ ____ __ FE LIX JON ATH AN CE RV AN TES, Ap pellant

V.
STA TE OF TEX AS , A ppellee

On App eal from the 142nd District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR 34759

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N The jury convicted appellant, Felix J onathan Cervantes, of the offe nse of thef t from a pe rson. See T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN
. § 31.03(e) (4)( B) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009)

. The jury also found “tr

ue” on two prior state jail f

elony convictions that wer e alleg ed for enhanc ement purposes a n d assessed punishment at confineme nt in the I nstitut ional Division of the Texas Depar tment of Criminal J ustice f o r a te r m o f th ir ty

- tw o mo n th s
. A p p e ll a n t c h a ll e n g e s h is conviction i n f o u r p o in ts o f e r r o r
. We

a ff ir m.2 Ba c k gr ou nd Fa c ts Appellant wa s char g ed by indictment with unlawfully acquir ing and exercising control over Eliz abeth Pauley ’s purse and its contents without her consent a nd with the intent to deprive he r of the prope rty . Pauley

testified that on the af

ternoon of Ma

y , 18, 2008, J ose Erne sto Santos st ole her purse f rom her in the pa

rking lot of PetSm ar t i n M idland. The State c alled Santos as a w itness at appellant’ s trial. Santos testified that appellant drove him to the PetSmart par king lot in appe llant’s

car and that appe llant subsequentl y transporte d him away

from the pa

rking lot after the theft

occur red. A dditionally , Pauley and two witnesses to the the ft, J ennife r Ly nn and John L in t o n, identif ie d a p p e ll a n t a s th e dr iv e r o f th e g r e e n D o d g e I n tr e p id w it h te mp o r a r

y li c e n s e p late s that tr a ns po rt e d Sa

nto s to a nd

fr om t he Pe tSma

rt pa rk inglot

. Offic ers with the Midland Police De partment made an attempt to locate the ca r desc ribed by Pauley and the witnesse s soon after the theft o cc u rred. Serg eant Alf redo G rimaldo locate d the vehicle pa

rked in f ront of a g as pump at a Seve n-Eleve n convenie nce store . He attempted to watch the ve hic le wh ile he a wa ite d a c on fi rm a tio n o f t

he ve hic le inv olv e d in the the ft , but the oc c up a nts of the ve hic le sp ed awa

y wh e n th e y

saw h im. Se rg e a nt G ri ma ldo a tte mpt e d to fo llo w t he ve hic le in his patrol car , but he was una ble to keep up a s they

drove throug h a re s i d en t i al neighborhood. Pol ic e of fi c e rs su bs e qu e ntl y loc a te d the ve hic le a sh or t ti me la te r. Th e y

fo llo we d th e ve hic le un til it stopped at a residenc e on Pasadena Street. Appellant wa s driving the car at the time, and Santos was sitting on the p as s en ger s ide. A subseque nt chec k reve aled that both the ve hicle and the residenc e on Pasade na belong ed to appe llant’s mother. Sufficiency of the E

videnc e Appellant cha lleng es the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence in his first point. To de te rm ine if

the e vid e nc e is l e g a lly

su ff ic ie nt, we mus t r e vie w a ll o f t he e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t favor able t o the ver dict and dete rmine whe ther a ny rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential ele ments of the cr ime bey ond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1 97 9) ; Ho op e r v . S

tat e , 2 14 S.W. 3d

9, 13 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); J ac k so n v . S tat e , 17 S.W .3d 664, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). To deter mine if the evidenc e is factua lly sufficie nt, the appellate court revie ws all of the e vidence in a neutra l light. W a t s o n v
. Sta te , 20 4 S. W.3 d 4 04 , 4 14 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ) ( ov e rr

uli ngin p a rt Zun iga v . S

tat e , 1 44 S.W. 3d

47 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 )) ; Johnson v.3

Sta te , 2 3 S. W.3 d 1 , 1 0- 11 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Cai n v . S tat e , 9 5 8 S. W. 2 d 4 0 4 , 4 0 7

- 08 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); Cle wis v . S tat e , 922 S.W .2d 12 6 , 1 2 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Then, the revie wing court de termines whe ther the e vidence supporting the verdic t is so we ak that the ve rdict is clear ly wrongand manife stly

unjust or whether

the ver di ct is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the conflicting evidenc e. W atson , 2 04 S.W. 3d

a t 41 4- 15 ; Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 1 0

- 1 1

. T h e f

i n d e r o f f a c t i s t h e s o l e j u d g e o f t h e w e i g h t a n d c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s ’ t e s t i m o n y. T EX
. C ODE C R IM
. P R OC
. ANN
. art. 36.13 (V ernon 2005) , art. 38.04 (V ernon 1979)

. Appellant attacks the suffic iency of the e vidence on two g rounds. He f irst challeng es the evidenc e that identifies him as t he driver of the car that transported Santos to and f rom the PetSmart parkinglot. He additionally challeng es t he evidence that establishes his culpability for the the ft. He

c on te nd s th a t th e State fa ile d to pr ov e that he wa s a pa rt y to the the ft of

fe ns e c omm itt e d b y

Santo s. I n addition to Santos’s t es t i m o n y , the victim and two witnesses of the theft identified

a p p e l l a n ta s t h e dr i v e r

o f t h e v e h i c l e
. W i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e a c c u r a c y o f t h e i r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t e s t i m o n y, we de fer to the jury ’s de t er mination of the witnesses’ c redibility

. Jack son , 443 U.S. at 326. Fur thermore , the evidence establishes that appellant’ s mother owne d the ca r and that he was dr iving the ca r at the time he and Santos wer e appr ehende d by the police. Un de r the law of

pa rt ie s, a pe rs on may be c ha rg e d a s a pa rt y to t he of fe ns e if the of fe ns e is committed by

his own conduct or by

the conduc t of another

for whom he is criminally responsible. T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN
. § 7. 01 (a ) (V e rn on 20 03 ). A p e rs on is c ri min a lly

re sp on sib le fo r a

n o ff e ns e committe d by

another if he intentionally

promotes or a ssists t he commission of the off ense by soliciting, enc ourag ing, dir ecting , aiding , or atte mp ting to aid the othe r per son to commit t he off ense. T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN
. § 7.02(a) (2) (Ve rnon 2003). The evidenc e supports a convic tion under the law of pa

rties when the person wa s phy sically prese nt at th e co mmissi on of the off ense a nd

encour ag ed the c ommissi on of the off ense by words or othe r ag ree ment. Se e Ra ns om v . S tat e , 920 S.W .2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). To dete rmine whe ther the de fenda nt was a pa

rty , we may examine the events oc curr ing be fore , during , and after the c ommissi on of the off ense a nd rely on the

a c tio ns of the de fe nd a nt, wh ic h sh ow a n un de rs tand ing a nd c omm on de sig n to do the pr oh ibi te d a c t. Id

.4

We p ri mari ly

fo c us on Santo s’ s tes tim on y to de te rm ine a pp e lla nt’ s cul pa bil ity fo r t he the ft

. Santos initially testified that he and appellant did not have any previous discussions ab o u t S antos stealing a purse in the PetSmart parking lot. Sant o s conti nued to deny that appellant ha d any involvement when the pr osecutor c onfronted him with a state ment that Santos made at the time of

arr est implicating a

ppellant. Howe ver, Santos subseque ntly chang ed his testimony by testify ing that appellant “ knew wha

t we we re g oing to do. . . . He knew I g ot off to steal the la dy ’s purse.” Appellant attac ks Santos’s testimony on two g rounds. He f

irst contends that Santos’s damag ing te stimony

cannot be believed be cause Santos also testified that appellant did not have any involvement in the theft. We disag ree
. We pr esume that the jury resolved the conflicts in Santos’s testimony in favor of

the prosec ution, and we defe r to that deter mination in reviewing the suffic iency of the e vidence

. Jack

son , 443 U.S. at 326. Ap pe lla nt a dd iti on a lly

a sse rt s th a t Santo s’ s te sti mony a s a n a c c omp lic e wa s n ot s uf

fi c ie ntl y
corr oborate d. T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN
. § 31.03(c) (2) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009) sets out the corr oboration requirem en t s for a

n acc omplice’s testimony in a theft c ase. Se e Le e v . S tat e , 29 S.W .3d 570, 576 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 0, no pe t.) . Se c tio n 3 1. 03 (c )( 2) pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: [T] he testimony

of an a ccomplice shall be corroborated by proof that tends to connec t the actor to the crime, but the a ctor’s know ledg e or intent may be esta blished by

the uncorr oborate d testimony of the a ccomplice

. Thus, S ec t i on 31.03(c) (2) is similar to the g ener al ac complice witness r ule set out in T EX
. C ODE C R IM
. P R OC
. ANN . art. 38.14 (V ernon 2005) wi t h o n e ex ception: an a ccomplice ’s testimony in a theft ca se re g ardingthe def endant’ s knowledg e or intent does not nee d to be cor roborated. See Lee , 29 S.W .3d at 576. This exception is ap p l i ca b l e to S antos’s testimony reg ardingappellant’ s knowledg e of Santos’s intent to steal the pur se. Even w ithout thi s ex ce p t i o n , there is nonacc omplice testimony

that corr oborate s Santos’s testimony that appellant assisted in the c ommissi on of the c rime. Pauley

testified that the drive r of the ve hicle lea ned over and opene d the door for Santos as he ra

n awa y from Pauley

and that the dr iver then dr ove aw ay at a hig h rate of spee d. Moreove r, there is a

mple evidenc e that corr oborate s the rema ining portions of S an t o s ’s testimony . I n conducting a suf fi ci en cy revie w under

the ac complice witness r ule, the re viewing court must eliminate the ac complice testim ony from consideration and then ex amine the remaining5

portions of the re cord to asce rtain i f t here is any evidenc e that tends to connec t the accused w ith the commission o f t h e cr ime. So lom on v . S tat e , 49 S.W .3d 356, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); He rn an de z v . S tat e , 939 S.W .2d 173, 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Appellant’s owner ship of the ca r, his presenc e ins ide t he car at the t ime that the police a pprehe nded the c ar a

nd its occupants, and the evidenc e identifying him as the driver at the time of the theft c orrobor ate Santos’s testimony

. Viewing the evidenc e in the light most favora ble to the ver dict, we c onclude that a ny rational trier of fac t could have found the essential elements of theft fr om a per son with respec t to appellant bey ond a re asonable doubt. Viewing all of the evidenc e in a neutra l lig ht, the evidenc e supporting the conviction is not so weak to rende r the verdic t clear ly wrongand manife stly

unjust. Further

more, the conf licting e vidence does not outwe igh the evidenc e supporting the conviction to the deg ree that would cause the ver dict to be ag ainst t h e gre at we i g ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. Appellant’s f

irst point is overr

uled. I n h is thir d p oi nt , app ell ant c on te nd s th a t hi s d ue pr oc e ss r ig hts we re vio la te d b e c a us e his conviction was ba sed upon a la ck of e vidence . Our de termination that appellant’ s conviction was supported by

leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence with r eg ard to the first point is dispositi ve of this contention. Appellant’s third point is overruled. Prior Inconsistent Statement Appellant asse rts in his second point that the trial court did not require the State to follow the proper proce dure in a dmitti ng Santos’s prior inconsistent statement for impea chment purpose s. He also cont en d s t h at t he trial c ourt err ed in deter mining that the pr obative value of the prior in c o n s is te n ts t a t e m e n tw a s n o ts u b s t a n t i a l l y

o u t w e i g h e d

b y t h e d a n g e r

o f u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e
. We revie w a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidenc e under an abuse of discre tion standard. Op re an v . S

tat e , 201 S.W. 3d

72 4, 72 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); Bu rd e n v . S tat e , 55 S.W .3d 608, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). An appe llate cour t will not reverse a trial c ourt’s ruling unless that ruling falls outside the z one of rea sonable disagr eeme nt. Zul ian i v . S tat e , 9 7 S. W.3 d 5 89 , 5 95 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ); Burden , 55 S.W .3d at 615. On dir e c t e xami natio n b y

the pr os e c uto r, Santo s in iti a lly te sti fi e d th a t he a nd a pp e lla nt d id not have a

ny previous discussions about stealing a purse from a c ustomer in the P etSmart parking lot. I n response to Santos’s answer , the prosec utor asked him if he re called te lling De tective Sheldon John so n at th e tim e of

a rr e st that he a nd

a pp e lla nt d isc us se d stea lin g a

purs e a s th e y

dr ov e to6

PetSmart. Santos testi fied that he did not rem em b er m ak ing this statement to De tective Johnson. The prose cutor a dditionally asked S an t os if he re called te lling De tective Johnson that appellant

o rd er ed h i m t o g ive the purse to appellant af ter it was stolen. Santos testified that he did not

reme mber makingthis statement to Detec tive J ohnson. The prose cutor subseque ntly asked that the trial court a llow the State to play the audio of Santos’s statement t o Detec tive J ohnson outside of the pr e se nc e of the jur

y in o rd e r t o r e fr e shSanto s’ s r e c oll e c tio n o f t he state me nt. Af

te r p lay ingthe a

ud io of the stateme nt to Santos, the prosec utor then questioned Santos outside of the pr esenc e of the jury about the state m en t

. S antos testified that the comments that he made to De tective Johnson imp lic a tin g a

pp e lla nt i n th e the ft

we re inc or

re c t. At the conc lusion of the hearing outside of the pre sence of the jury , appellant objec ted to the admission of Santos’s sta t em en t t o Detective J ohnson on the g rounds that it would constitute an imp ro pe r u se of a pr ior

inc on sis te nt s ta te me nt a

nd that th e pr ob a tiv e va lue of the state me nt w ou ld be substantially

outweig hed by the dang er of unfair pr ejudice. T he trial c ourt overr uled appe llant’s objections to the statement. Howe ver, the trial court r uled t hat t he stateme nt would only be admitted for impea chment purposes and that it would g ive a limit ing instruction to this eff ect at the time the statement wa s offe red. The prose cutor re sumed his direct e x amination of Santos in the jury ’s presence . He a sked Santo s a bo ut the va

ri ou s c omm e nts that he ma de to De te c tiv e John so n imp licati ng appel lant. Specifica lly , the prosec utor asked Santos if he reca lled making the following comments to Detec tive J o h nson: (1) “A nd did y ou tell Detec tive J ohnson that [appellant] told y ou to just find som ebody and take her purse” ; ( 2) “And y ou said, Ibelieve, on the statement, that [appellant] encoura g ed y ou to steal her pur se”; a

nd (3) “ And I

believe you said ea

rlier that [appellant] threw the pur se aw ay .” Santo s te sti fi e d th a t he re c a lle d ma kin g the se c omm e nts a ft e r list e nin g to the a ud io of the state me nt. Santos further te stified that he lied to Dete ctive Johnson in telling him that appe llant was involved in the theft. Appe llant subsequently chang ed his trial t es t i m o ny during cross-e x amination by appella n t’ s tr ia l c o u n s e l b y

s tati n g th a t h is c o mm e n ts to D e te c ti v e Jo h n s o n im p li c a ti n g a

p p e lla nt

wer e cor rec t and that his previous testimony to the contra

ry was fa lse. The c redibility

of a w itness may

be attac ked b y any

party , including the party calling the witness. T EX
. R. E V ID . 607. T EX
. R. E V ID . 613(a) permits a party to impea ch a witness with a prior inconsistent statement. To be a dmissibl e under Rule 613(a) , a prior statement must be inconsistent7

with the one g iven at trial. Lop e z v . S tat e , 86 S.W .3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The prope r predic ate f

or impeachme nt by a prior inconsistent statement require s that the witness first be aske d if he made the contra dictory statement at a

cer tain place and tim e an d t o a certain pe rson. I f the witness denies making the contra dictory statement, it can the n be prove d by the prior inconsistent statement. Mc Ga ry

v . S tat e , 7 50 S.W .2d 782, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Ex trinsic evidenc e of an inc o n s is te n t s tate me n t is n o t a d mi s s ib le if th e w it n e s s u n e q u iv o c a ll y a d mi ts h a v in g ma de the statement. Cla rk

v . S tat e , 881 S.W .2d 682, 695 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). We co nc lud e that the tr ia l court did no t per mit the pr e dic a te re qu ir e me nts of Rul e 61 3( a ) t o be violated be cause extrinsi c evide nce of Santos’s statement to D etec tive J ohnson was not offer ed be fo re the jur

y . A t th e pr os e c uto r’ s r e qu e st, e xtri ns ic e vid e nc e of the state me nt w a s p ro vid e d to Santos to refre sh his recollec tion outside of the jury ’s prese nce. When pr ocee dings be fore the jury resumed, the prosec utor’s questions to Santos followed the format contemplated by Rule 613(a) by prese nting him with the contra dicto ry statements that he ha d previously made a nd g iving him an opportunity

to admit or deny

making the statements. F urthermor e, the tria l c ourt took the extra step of ins tr uc tin g the jur

y that it c ou ld o nly

c on sider the p ri or

state me nts fo r i mpe a c hme nt p ur po se s. Se e Mi ra nd

a v . S tat e , 813 S.W .2d 724, 735 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1991, pe t. ref’ d) (A w itness’s pr ior inc onsi st ent st a te me nt i s a dmi ssi ble on ly fo r p ur po se s o f i mpe a c hme nt u

nle ss i t f a lls wi thi n a hea rsay exception.). Evidence admissible as impeac hment under Rule 613( a) may be excluded under

T EX
. R. E V ID . 403 if its p robative va lue is substantially outweig hed by

its prejudicial ef

fec t. See W ine ga rn e r v . S

tat e , 235 S.W .3d 787, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “The r ule g ives the trial cour

t

c on sid e ra ble la tit ud e to a sse ss the c ourt

ro om dy namic s, to jud g e the ton e a nd te no r o f t he wi tne ss’ [s] testimony and its impact upon the j ury , and to conduct the nece ssary balanc ing.” W

inegarner , 235 S.W .3d at 791. A tri al co u rt ’s d u t y , when pr esente d with the issue of the a dmissibi lity of a pr ior inconsistent statement is to balance the probative value, or leg itimate impeachment pur pose of the statement, ag ainst the dang er of unfair prejudice to the opposing pa rty in the form of the potential misuse of the statement by the trier of fa ct for substantive pur poses. Miranda , 813 S.W .2d at 735. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appe llant’s ob je c tio n und e r R

ule 40 3. As a n a c c omp lic e , Sa nto s’ s v e rs ion

of th e e ve nts wa s c ri tic a l to appellant’ s prosec ution. The probative va lue of impea ching Santos’s potentially untrue testimony8

wa s n ot s ub sta

nti a lly ou tw e ig he d b y

the po te nti a l mi su se by

the jur y of his pr e vio us state me nt t o De te c tiv e John so n. F ur

the rm or e , a par

ty may no t im

pe a c h it s o wn

wi tne ss i f t

he pr ima ry purp os e is me rely to g et the witness’s prior statement befor e the jury

. Hu gh es v . S tat e , 4 S. W. 3 d

1 , 4 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1999). I n this reg ard, a party is not permitted to use a “stra w-man p l o y ” t o g et imp e a c hment evi dence be fo re the jur y a s su bs tanti ve e vid e nc e by

c a lli nga wi tne ss i t kn ow s w ill testify inconsistently

with a previous statement he or she has g iven. Miranda , 813 S.W .2d at 735. The trial c ourt expressly deter mined that there was no e vidence that the Stat e an ticipated that Santos’s trial testimony

would be inconsistent with his statements to Detec tive J ohnson or t hat the State called Santos a s a witness in bad fa ith. As noted by the cour t in Hughes , surprise on the pa rt of t he party calling the wit ness i s a fa ctor to be c onsidered in a Rule 403 analy sis. Hughes , 4 S.W .3d at 5. Appellant’ s second point is overr uled. Jury Argum ent Inh i s f o u rt h p o i n t , a

p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t th e S t a t e m a d e i mp e r m i s s i b l e j u r

y ar g u m e n t s
. In one inst a n c e , th e p r o s e c u to r s tate d : “ M r
. Sa n to s is th e o n e th a t to o k th e p u r s e
. A n d I b e li e v e the evidenc e shows, [appellant] par ticipated in his doing that.” I n another instance, the pr o s ec u tor stated: “And I ’ll submit to y ou that the – y ou don’t have to convict [ appellant] on the testimony of M r
. Sa n to s , th a t yo uh a v e g o t t

h e o th e r e v id e n c e , w h ic h is mo r e th a n s u f f ic ie n t t o c o n v ic t h im .” Appellant conte nds that th es e s t at em ents invaded the jury ’s exclusive role in deter mining the

cre dibilit y

of the w i t n es s es
. However, a ppellant did not object to either of the cha lleng ed jury arguments. A defe ndant who fa ils to obj ect to a jur y argument forf

eits his right to complain a bout the ar g ument on appea l. Coc k re ll v. Sta te , 933 S.W .2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). There fore , appellant’ s complaints are waived. Se e id . at 89. Appellant’ s fourth point is overruled. This Court’s Ruling The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

T E R RY M c C A LL

JUSTI CE Fe bruar y 18, 2010 Do not publish. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , a n d

S t r a n g e , J.