Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative

Technologies

June 1992

OTA-BP-O-95

NTIS order #PB92-202180
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies-Background Paper, OTA-BP-O-95 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1992).

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of’ Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16 -037951-2
Foreword

The United States has pledged to destroy its entire stockpile of chemical weapons by the

end of this decade. The U.S. Army has begun this process by building and testing a

demonstration facility to disassemble and incinerate these weapons on Johnston Island, a

small island in the mid-Pacific Ocean. After tests prove the concept, the Army plans to build

similar facilities for the other chemical weapons now stored at each of eight sites in the

continental United States.

Local community groups are opposed to the Army’s current program at a number of these

sites. The incineration of hazardous materials of all kinds has engendered concerns about

public health impacts. Several organizations have suggested that technologies other than

incineration may be safer and more appropriate for this program. Because of these factors,

Senator Wendell H. Ford asked the Office of Technology Assessment to evaluate the status

and availability of alternative technologies for destruction of chemical weapons in the U.S.

stockpile as an adjunct to OTA’s larger assessment of weapons dismantlement.

This background paper briefly describes the Army’s chemical weapons destruction

program, discusses the factors that could affect a decision to develop alternatives, discusses

the alternatives, and illustrates the difficulty of gaining public acceptance of complex

technical systems.

OTA appreciates the assistance and support this effort received from workshop

participants, reviewers, and other participants. They provided valuable information that was

critical to the completion of this study, and enabled OTA to develop a much more complete

and accurate analysis. OTA, however, remains solely responsible for the contents of this

report.

~zf AdL&L4-

JOHN H. GIBBONS

- Directo r

,,, Ill
Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Workshop Participants

Edgar Berkey

National Environmental Technology

Applications Corp.

Gene Dyer

Bechtel Corp. (Retired) and

Member of the National Research

Council Committee on Review

and Evaluation of the

Army chemical Stockpile

Disposal Program

Larry Eitel

Consultant Chemical Engineer

Richard Eriksson

California Department of Toxic

Substances Control, Alternative

Technologies Division

Walter Kovalick

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Technology Assessment

Jack Swearengen

Sandia National Laboratories

Robert Whelen

U.S. Army Chemical

Demilitarization Program

Reviewers

Col. Eric Azuma

Office of the Assistant

Secretary of the Army

Charles Baronian

U.S. Army Chemical

Demilitarization Program

James Bartel

Sandia National Laboratories

Hayden Burgess

Citizen of Waianae, HI

Ned Coale

U.S. Army Chemical

Demilitarization Program

Jeanette Crow

Alabama Conservancy

Workshop Participants and Reviewers

William Davison

Director

General Atomics

Angela Dooley

Citizen of Pine Bluff, AR

Kevin J. Flamm

U.S. Army Chemical

Demilitarization Program

Bracelen Flood

Concerned Citizens of

Madison County, Kentucky

Terry Galloway

Synthetic Technologies Inc.

Sebia Hawkins

Greenpeace Pacific Campaign

Thomas Hess

Office of the Assistant

Secretary of the Army

Peter Hille

Common Ground

Cathy Hinds

National Toxics Campaign Fund

Valerie Hudson

Kentucky Department for

Environmental Protection

Col. William R. Humbaugh

Ordinance Corps

Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot

Mark Kagan

The Committee for National

security

Cindy King

Utah Chapter, Sierra Club

Jim Knipp

Citizen of Milan, TN

Linda Koplovitz

Concerned Citizens for

Maryland’s Environment

Toni Lampkin

Citizens for Environmental Quality

John Longwell

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

William McKenna

Department of Army Headquarter

Us. Army Armament, Munitions

and Chemical Command

Michael Modell

Modell Development Corp.

Carl Peterson

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

Al Picardi

Consultant

Robert Sabia

Burns and Roe Industrial

Services Co.

Donald L. Siebenaler

National Academy of Sciences

Board on Army Science and

Technology

Lenny Siegel

Pacific Studies Center

National Toxics Campaign Fund

Jeremy Sprung

Sandia National Laboratories

Ross Vincent

Sierra Club

Thomas J. Wilbanks

Oak Ridge National Laboratories

Craig Williams

Kentucky Environmental Foundation

David Wood

National Toxics Campaign

Rainer Zangerl

Citizen of Rockville, IN

NOTE:

iv

OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the workshop participants and

reviewers. The workshop participants and reviewers do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this

background paper. OTA assumes full responsibility for the background paper and the accuracy of its contents.
OTA Project Staff—Disposal of Chemical Weapons:

Alternative Technologies

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA

Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Robert Niblock, Oceans and Environment Program Manager

Peter Johnson, Project Director

Mark Brown, Senior Analyst

Jan Linsenmeyer, Research Assistant

Administrative Staff

Kathleen Beil, Office Administrator

Sally Van Aller, Administrative Secretary

Contractor

Florence Poillon, Editor

v
Contents

Page

Chapter l. Alternative Destruction Technologies-History and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY AND FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Opposition to the Army’s Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Approaches to Developing Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Timing Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Risks of Developing Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Alternative Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

International Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

CHAPTER 1 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Chapter 2. The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

THE U.S. ARMY’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Geography and Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

History of Chemical Weapons Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

On-Site Destruction vs. Relocation of the CW Stockpile for Off-Site Destruction . . . . . . . . . 17

Condition of the CW Stockpile-Potential of Increased Risk From CW Deterioration . . . . . 17

DISPOSAL OF THE ARMY’S CW STOCKPILE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

The Army’s Demonstration Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE CURRENT CW DISPOSAL PROGRAM . . . . . 18

Local and National Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Projected Program Schedule—Revised Deadlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Cost Estimates--Cost Overruns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR THE ARMY’S BASELINE PROJECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

CHAPTER PREFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Chapter 3. Current Technology and Alternatives ● ....0.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...0..00. ● 0 . . 25

CURRENT TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

The Army’s CW Disassembly and Incineration Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

EXAMPLES OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Chemical Neutralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Supercritical Water Oxidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Steam Gasification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Plasma Arc Pyrolysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Improved Interim Continued Storage-The CW Demilitarization Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Alternatives Involving Transportation and Relocation of the CW Stockpile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

CHAPTER PREFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Appendix A. Selected Chemical Weapon Destruction Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Appendix B. U.S. Army Risk Assessment for Off-Site Transportation of

Chemical Weapons ..0..0.. . . . . . . . . . ● 0.0..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .000...0. . . . . . . . . . ● . . 36

Appendix C. Summary of the Chemical Weapons Workshop .000.... ● *....*.* . . . . . . . . . 39

Boxes

Box Page

l-A. Federal Laws Addressing Chemical Weapons Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

l-B. State Authority Over the Siting, Construction, and Operation of

Incinerators for Chemical Weapons Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
l-C. Condition of the M55 Rockets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

l-D. Programs for the Promotion of Alternative Technologies for

Hazardous Waste Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2-A. Properties of chemical Weapons Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2-B. Some Regulatory Hurdles for CW Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Figures

Figure Page

1-1. M55 Rocket, Filled With Agent GB or VX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-1. U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-2. Structures of Chemical Weapons Nerve (Organophosphorus) and

Blister (Mustard) Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tables

Table

1-1.

2-1.

2-2.

2-3.

Revised Programmatic Chemical Disposal Schedule

Characteristics of Chemical Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Physical Characteristics of Chemical Munitions . . . . .

7

13

15

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

U.S. Chemical Weapons Disposal Program Implementation Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

vii
Chapter 1

Alternative Destruction Technologies—History and Summary

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Army currently has custody of chemical

weapons (CW) containing nerve and blister (vesicant) agentsl located at eight sites in the continental

United States and at Johnston Island, a small island

in the Pacific Ocean. The Army’s current disposal

program calls for munition disassembly followed by

incineration, on-site, at all of the present locations of

the CW stockpiles. This approach has met with

opposition by some communities and States that

have CW stockpiles and by several national and

international environmental groups. At the State

level, this opposition may succeed in preventing or

seriously delaying construction of the Army’s

planned CW disposal facilities at certain locations.

The Army itself has expressed concern about

potential regulatory obstacles to completing its CW

disposal program. Additional program delays have

also been experienced because the Army’s Johnston

Island demonstration program, required by Congress prior to construction of CW disposal facilities

in the continental United States, has not yet been

successfully completed.

Because of the legal, social, and technical obstacles faced by the Army, the Office of Technology

Assessment (OTA) was asked to examine alternatives to on-site incineration for the destruction of

these weapons. This report does not attempt to assess

in any detail the technical aspects of the Army’s

current CW destruction program.2 It reviews the

status and availability of alternative technologies

and discusses the factors that could lead to the

consideration of such alternatives.

The need for an effective U.S. CW stockpile

destruction program has been driven by several

factors. The Army has had its own requirements for

a disposal method for surplus and obsolete chemical

weapons for as long as these materials have been part

of its arsenal. In 1982, Under Secretary of the Army

J.R. Ambrose stated in a letter to the chairman of the

National Research Council (NRC) Board on Army

Science and Technology that:

[T]he United States faces a formidable problem in

disposing of its current obsolete chemical munitions

and agent stockpile. About 90 percent of the

inventory of chemical agent and nearly as much of

the munitions inventory has little or no military

value and will require disposal regardless of future

decisions regarding the binary weapons program (l).

A related and ongoing concern expressed both by

the Army and the NRC is the potentially increasing

risk from the existing U.S. CW stockpile as it

deteriorates with age.

Congress has directed the Army to develop and

implement a CW destruction program (see box l-A).

The Department of Defense Appropriation Act of

1986 (Public Law 99-145) directed the Secretary of

Defense to destroy the current U.S. CW stockpile in

a safe and effective manner. This directive was

originally tied to the Army’s acquisition of newer

binary chemical weapons, although the development

of such weapons is no longer planned and few were

actually ever built (2, 3). A plan provided by the

Secretary of the Army to Congress in 1986 became

the basis of a Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement (PEIS). As the Army’s program development encountered unanticipated technical and political hurdles, Congress flexibly responded by amending completion timetables. Initially, the Army was

required to destroy its CW stockpile by 1994. In

1988, Congress extended the completion date to

1997. Also in 1988 the Army compared alternatives

of relocation of weapons to one or more central

disposal sites to that of on-site disposal at each of the

eight locations. The Army chose on-site disposal

because it believed that any accident on an existing

Army base would be easier to mitigate than an

accident at some unknown point along a transportation route. Recently, the Army has submitted a

revised completion date of 2000 to Congress that

maintains the plan to build on-site disposal systems

at each of eight sites (see table l-l) (4, 5, 6).

1 See box 2-A for a more complete description of chemical weapons agents and their effects.

2 It aISo does not discuss c~ofrac~e, an experimental munitions disassembly technique that freezes and crushes CWS. Cryofracture is pm of tie

current development program and is considered by the Armytobeonlya‘‘front end’ process that must be coupled to incineratio~ and does not therefore

constitute an incineration alternative.

– l –

324-649 0 - 92 - 2
2 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Box I-A—Federal Laws Addressing Chemical Weapons Disposal

A number of laws have been passed over the years that specifically address chemical weapons disposal.

The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986 (Pubic Law 99-145) mandated the destruction of the

U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions. It directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop

a comprehensive plan for destruction of the stockpile, which would be carried out by an Army management

organization. The law established a destruction deadline of September 30, 1994, and provided a separate DOD

account to fund all activities. The law further required that the Army plan should provide for maximum protection

for the environment and human health and that the facilities constructed would only be used for destruction of

chemical weapons and munitions. Public Law 99-145 clearly stated that once the stockpile elimination was

complete, all facilities would be dismantled and removed.

Amendments and revisions have since been made to the law governing the stockpile destruction requirements

and the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180), Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to issue the final Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement on the chemical stockpile destruction program by January 1,1988. The law further

required that funds designated for the program could not be obligated until the Secretary of Defense provides

Congress, in writing, proof that the overall concept plan for the Chemical Demilitarization Program includes:

1. An evaluation of alternate technologies for disposal of the existing stockpile, and

2. Full-scale operational verification tests of the selected chemical weapons disposal technology or

technologies.

In addition, Public Law 100-180 required the Secretary of Defense to submit an alternative concept plan for

the chemical stockpile demilitarization program to both Committees on Armed Services of the Congress. This

alternative concept plan was to be completed by March 15, 1988. The law also required the Secretary of Defense

to establish an ongoing program for surveillance and maintenance of the stockpile and assess its overall condition.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989, (Public Law 100-456) made additional

changes that affected the Army’s program to destroy the chemical weapons stockpile. This law extended the

stockpile elimination deadline to April 30, 1997. It also required the Army to complete Operational Verification

Testing (OVT) of its demonstration facility at Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) before

proceeding with construction of similar full-scale facilities for the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile

located in the continental United States. However, this provision did not prohibit construction activities at the

Chemical Agent Munition Disposal System in Tooele, Utah.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510) also addressed the

Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program. This Iaw pays particular attention to issues involving the safety status

and the integrity of the stockpile. In the law, Congress requires the Secretary of Defense to develop a Chemical

Weapons Stockpile Safety Contingency Plan. This plan would detail the steps that DOD would follow if the

chemical weapons stockpile began an accelerated rate of deterioration or any other question of its integrity arose

before full-scale disposal capability was developed. This plan, which is to set forth a planning schedule, funding

requirements, equipment needs, and time frame for emergency plan implementation, was to be submitted to

Congress 180 days after the law was passed.

Currently, legislation involving the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program addresses the delays in the

program and proposed deadlines. Both the House and Senate bills for National Defense Authorization for Fiscal

Year 1992 and 1993 (S. 1507 and H.R. 2100) propose extending the stockpile elimination deadline to July 1999.

Other laws that helped shape the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program include Public Laws 91-672

and 92-532.

The Foreign Military Sales Act Amendment (Public Law 91-672), passed in 1971, prohibited the transportation

of chemical weapons from the Island of Okinawa to the United States. It further directed the U.S. Department of

Defense to destroy these chemical weapons outside the United States. (In 1971, the U.S. Army moved chemical

weapons from Okinawa to storage facilities at Johnston Island.)

The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries ACt of 1972 (Public Law 92-532) prohibited ocean dumping

of chemical weapons.
Chapter 1-Alternative Destruction Technologies-History and Summary ● 3

Table l-l—Revised Programmatic Chemical Disposal Schedule

Start

facility Start Start End

Location construction prove-out operations operations

Johnston Island. . . . . . . . . . . .

Training Facility. . . . . . . . . . . .

Tooele Army Depot. . . . . . . . .

Anniston Depot. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Umatilla Depot. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pine Bluff Arsenal. . . . . . . . . . .

Lexington-Blue Grass. . . . . . .

Pueblo Depot . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newport Ammo Plant.... . . . .

Aberdeen Proving Ground. . .

November 1985

June 1989

September 1989

June 1993

January 1994

January 1994

May 1994

May 1994

January 1995

January 1995

August 1988

N/A

August 1993

April 1996

November 1996

September 1996

March 1997

March 1997

June 1997

June 1997

July 1990

October 1991

February 1995

October 1997

May 1998

March 1998

September 1998

September 1998

June 1998

June 1998

October 1995

December 1999

April 2000

November 2000

December 2000

November 2000

February 2000

May 2000

April 1999

June 1999

NOTE: This schedule does not take into account delays from major system failures or litigation and is dependent on funding

support.

SOURCE: S. Livingstone, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and Environment), testimony before the

House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, Apr. 1, 1992, Second Session, 102d Congress.

Bilateral treaties that were negotiated with the

former Soviet Union (now the Commonwealth of

Independent States, C. I. S.) contained deadlines for

CW destruction by each signatory. One of these

agreements that had been under final negotiation

between the United States and the Soviet Union

mandated staged destruction over time of the CW

stockpile of both countries to 5,000 metric tons of

agent by 2002. Even though this agreement has not

been put into force, many believe it is in the best

interest of the United States to honor its intent if not

its timetables. However, both the United States and

the C.I.S. are having difficulties in achieving these

timetables for several reasons. The C.I.S. currently

has no active CW disposal program, and past efforts

to develop a disposal facility in the Soviet Union

were derailed by local citizen opposition (7). At

present, Russia has no project ready for the destruction of an estimated 40,000 tons of chemical

weapons agents stored there (8). The agreements

that have been negotiated appear to allow flexibility

in accommodating technical and other problems that

affect CW destruction program timetables. It is

becoming clear that the flexibility is needed even

given the significant pressures to move ahead

expeditiously.

SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

Although the Army has done a credible job

developing the technical aspects of its current

program, major political and social obstacles remain. Analyses other than OTA’s of the Army’s

current program indicate that there are also some

remaining technical and cost obstacles (9, 10, 11, 12,

13, 14). At present, the Army has no backup plan

should its current program be unsuccessful.

Opposition to the Army’s Program

Local and national opposition may be able to

prevent or seriously delay construction of the

Army’s planned CW disposal facilities. For example, the State of Kentucky has passed legislation

establishing more stringent measures for the Army

to obtain the permits required under the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (see box

l-B). Other States could follow this lead. Also, the

Army has not completed a congressionally mandated demonstration of its technology at Johnston

Island. It is not clear that this demonstration as

presently planned will adequately address concerns

raised by groups who oppose the Army’s CW

program.

The Army itself has been concerned about the

difficulties affecting the completion of its current

CW disposal program (4). In 1984, after reviewing

the Army’s experience with CW neutralization and

incineration, the National Research Council (NRC)

endorsed the Army’s decision to use incineration

(l).

However, possibly in reaction to political opposition to its program, the Army recently requested the
4 ● Disposal of Chemical weapons: Alternative Technologies

Box l-B—State Authority Over the Siting, Construction, and

Operation of Incinerators for Chemical Weapons Destruction

The Commonwealth of Kentucky has been delegated authority under the Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act (RCRA) and the Clean Air Act to issue within the state construction and operation permits for hazardous waste

management facilities such as a CW incinerator. State authority affects all phases of the construction and operation

of an incineration facility. Statutes passed under this authority by the Kentucky State legislature have placed

additional specific requirements for hazardous waste incinerators intended for use with chemical weapons (the

Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 224, 224.865) (l). These revisions have not only included CW agents as

chemicals to be regulated, but also required that an equivalent treatment/destruction technology be fully

demonstrated prior to permitting the proposed CW incinerators.

These revised statutes require submission of:

monitoring data from a comparable facility [that] reflects the absence of emissions from stack or fugitive sources

including but not limited to the products of combustion and incomplete combustion which alone or in combination

present any risk of acute or chronic human health effect or adverse environmental effect [Kentucky Revised Statute

224.865].

One interpretation of this requirement according to Kentucky State officials as suggested by the Center for

Disease Control (CDC) is that it would require a 30-year epidemiological study on a similar site, along with

complete monitoring data (l). In addition to State control over new incinerators, local county courts in Kentucky

may also have authority to veto the siting of a CW destruction facility.

During the 1992 Session of the Kentucky General Assembly, House Bill 465 was passed and signed by the

Governor on April 1, 1992. This legislation, effective July 15, 1992, specifically requires that before a permit can

be issued to construct a CW destruction facility information must be provided showing that:

no alternative method of treatment or disposal, including, but not limited to, neutralization and transportation to a less

populated disposal site, exists. . .or is likely to exist or could be developed. . that creates less risk of release or harm

to the public or the environment. . .

The legislation also sites State authority under Section 6929 of Title 42 of U.S. Code to:

impose reasonable restrictions directly relating to public health and safety with respect to the management of

hazardous wastes beyond the minimum standards established under federal law. [Moreover] [T]here exist

NRC Committee on Review and Evaluation of the need to address the relevant social and political

Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program to issues involved as well. This is likely to require the

reevaluate the status of incineration. An additional active participation of all interested parties, includNRC committee has also been formed, the Commit- ing the Army, regulators, contractors, community

tee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Tech- organizations, and environmental groups.

nologies (Alternatives Committee), to examine alternatives for CW disposal. The first meeting of the Such a collaborative effort could begin by develAlternatives Committee was held in March 1992. oping criteria for an acceptable program that address

Many believe that this new NRC committee effort is the key technical and social obstacles. Features that

important not only because of technical benefits but are important to some groups include:

because it could reflect the Army’s willingness to

●

integrate community and environmental concerns in

its decisions.

Approaches to Developing Technologies ●

The nature of the political problems faced by the

Army’s CW destruction program suggests that

completing its present program or developing a

successful alternative one involves more than tech- ●

nology development. Any successful program will

Use of a destruction technology that does not

have smokestacks, which are associated with

uncontrolled environmental emissions;

Selection of a technology with features specifically appropriate for the CW stockpile and that

could not become the basis of continued

operation for hazardous waste disposal at the

facilities sites;

Development of portable CW destruction systems that could be used directly in a munition
Chapter 1-Alternative Destruction Technologies-History and Summary ● 5

substantial gaps in informati‘on concerning the acute and chronic health effects and environmental consequences of

exposure to [chemical weapons agents] and [their] degradation products.. .[which] justify the imposition of standards

correlative to the uncertainties and severity of risks potentially posed by the treatment or disposal of the compounds.

The legislation specifies that before anyone may construct or operate a facility for treatment, storage, or

disposal of CW agents, he or she must demonstrate that:

The proposed treatment or destruction technology has been fully proven in an operational facility of scale,

configuration and throughput comparable to the proposed facility [to ensure] destruction [efficiency] of 99.9999

percent. . .as achievable during the design life of the facility under all operating conditions including during the

occurrence of malfunctions, upsets, or unplanned shutdowns.

The legislation also requires monitoring data from an operation facility showing the “absence of emissions”

that “present any risk of acute or chronic human health effects... .“ Plans are also required for a State and local

emergency response.

Representatives from other States legislatures that have CW depots within their States have made inquiries of

the Kentucky state authorities about the nature of this strategy. According to a General Accounting Office (GAO)

study, other States where the Army has proposed constructing CW destruction facilities, such as Indiana have

shown an interest in how the Kentucky State legislature has dealt with the Army’s program (2). The State of Utah

has enacted legislation affecting the permitting of CW destruction facilities (2). Utah has required that the disposal

facility built at Tooele, Utah will operate at 50 percent capacity for 6 months for each and every individual chemical

agent to be destroyed (2). State environmental officials will then evaluate test data for the individual agents (2).

According to the GAO report, in 1988, the Army’s estimates for construction State dates assumed that State-issued

environmental permits for each of the proposed sites could be obtained in 15 months. On the basis of its experience

with Utah, the Army now anticipates that it will take 24 months, and it is not clear how realistic even this revised

estimate will be (2).

References

1. Hudson, V., Deputy Commissioner for Special Projects, Kentucky Department for Environmental

Protection, Frankfort Office Park Frankfort, KY. Telephone Conversation December 12, 1991.

2. U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule Slippages are

Likely to Continue, GAO/NSIAD-92-18 (Washington, DC: November 1991).

storage facility to avoid risks associated with

transporting and handling CWs away from their

present storage locations;

. Development of individual programs with features specific to individual sites; and

. Development of safe and effective community

emergency response programs.

Timing Questions

It is difficult to predict the time that may be

While there are pressures to destroy the CW

stockpile quickly, there is no technical basis to set

absolute deadlines for completion of the CW destruction program. The condition of the existing CW

stockpile is probably the most serious consideration

but few data and no rigorous, comprehensive analysis of the risks posed by deterioration of the weapons

exist. The Army’s monitoring program has yet to

identify trends of increasing deterioration. There are

also domestic and international political pressures to

expedite the weapons destruction program. Howrequired to develop an alternative program given the ever, many believe that congressional mandates and

available information about alternative technologies. It is clear that the alternatives identified by

OTA are all in early stages of development—

perhaps several years behind the Army program’s

current development stage. It is also evident, however, that political or legal delays could prevent

implementation of current technology at some or

several of the weapons storage sites for a number of

years.

the status of bilateral treaties and agreements are

sufficiently flexible to consider the development of

alternative programs.

As stated above, the least flexible deadline maybe

the increasing risk associated with deterioration of

the CW stockpile. With the exception of the M55

rockets located at five of the eight continental U.S.

sites, the best available information about the
6 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

condition of the CW stockpile, including that from

ongoing surveys, suggests there are few problems

with agent leakage from bombs, artillery projectiles,

mines, or bulk storage tanks (1, 15, 16). In 1984 the

NRC indicated that although there were insufficient

data to project the near-or long-term storage life of

CW agent containers, available information suggested that the overall leak frequency had not

substantially increased during the lifetime of the CW

stockpile (l). However, the report also concluded

that the M55 rocket is the primary basis for a

maximum credible accident at each of the depots due

to the possible harm that could be inflicted on both

workers and civilian populations. In a 1985 study by

the Army on the condition of the M55 rockets, the

occurrence of a catastrophic event from a deteriorating stockpile in the near future was considered

highly unlikely (17). Nevertheless, the continued

storage of M55 rockets and other types of munitions

at Army depots represents a continued, finite risk to

communities located near these depots. To better

quantify this risk, existing monitoring programs on

the status of the U.S. CW stockpile could be

expanded to provide additional information about

the rate of deterioration of the M55’s. In addition,

further analyses of the risks from continued storage

as well as possible risk reduction measures could be

very useful in decisions about time available to

pursue alternative programs (see box l-C).

The timing issue is critical in alternative technology development planning. One approach to an

alternative program could be to try and find midterm corrections for the Army’s current system, e.g.,

replacing one or more of the incinerators themselves

with some other method of destruction but keeping

the rest of the system. Another would be to start over

with an entirely new system. The impact on the

Army’s current program clearly will be quite different with these two approaches. A sense of time

constraints will also dictate where a new program

can begin. For examples, if lots of time is available,

then a new program could afford to begin in the

laboratory; if less time is available, then a new

program would probably be forced to consider only

existing bench-scale technologies or technologies

already tested in related areas.

How much time may be available to develop

alternatives is not known nor is there an accurate

estimate of time required for various approaches.

Technical and regulatory hurdles faced by the

current program may delay it well beyond its

planned completion date. In any case, a clear

analysis of time constraints is critical and it should

include costs of delay, the risks of delaying, the

degree of uncertainty and other factors.

Risks of Developing Alternatives

Even though it may be desirable to sponsor an

alternative technology development program, it is

important to understand the risks of such an effort.

The prospects for success of an alternative program

are not assured. There could always be a number of

technical or political problems and delays associated

with any development program. Failure of a technology or approach in a full-scale test is always

possible. After even the best efforts to develop new

technologies, it is possible that the results could be

no better or even worse than those from the current

system.

Therefore, if an alternative development program

was supported it would not necessarily follow that

the current program should be stopped. It may be

possible to combine the best features of both

programs in the future, or it may be that current

technologies will be superior to any alternatives in

the end.

Alternative Technologies

To be applicable to the current CW stockpile, a

technology must be able to effectively destroy or

decontaminate the chemical agents, the drained and

empty munitions and containers, the associated

explosives and propellants, and the munition packaging material (dunnage). The Army’s current system incorporates all of these waste streams. Some

alternatives that have been proposed, however, may

be expected to be useful in destroying only the

chemical agent itself. Others could possibly be

applicable to other waste streams (e.g., explosives

and propellants). In any case, any complete system

would need to integrate the capability to handle all

waste streams as well as to handle, disassemble, and

drain the various types of containers or weapons

involved.

OTA reviewed available data on alternative technologies. Of those that have been proposed by others

for CW destruction, OTA selected four that are

briefly discussed in this report (chemical neutralization, super critical water oxidation, steam gasification, and plasma arc pyrolysis). These four were

selected only for the purpose of illustrating the
Chapter I-Alternative Destruction Technologies-History and Summary . 7

Box 1-Condition of the M55 Rockets

The M55 rockets (see figure l-l) are considered the most dangerous items in the current stockpile for a variety

of reasons (1, 2). Since the M55 rocket is a fully assembled munition containing either agent VX or GB, along with

fuses, burster charges, and propellants-in a configuration that cannot be separated easily-it is the most potentially

hazardous item in the CW stockpile (3, 4). The M55 rockets are also the source of the greatest number of leaking

munitions. Not surprisingly, M55s are the primary basis for a maximum credible accident at each of the depots where

they are located due to the possible harm that could be inflicted on workers and civilian populations (1).

Approximately 478,000 M55 rackets are located at five of the eight continental U.S. sites and at Johnston Atoll (3,

4). In part because of these problems, the 1984 National Research Council report recommended that disposal of the

M55 rockets be expedited.

Historical records of the M55 rockets are largely lost, destroyed, misfiled, or nonexistent (3, 4). The rockets were

developed in the 1950s. The GB-filled rockets were manufactured at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado, between

1%1 and 1965, and the VX rockets were manufactured at Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Indiana, in 1964 and

1%5. The M55 was shown to be erratic and undependable, and the Army declared it obsolete in 1981 (3, 4).

In the risk analysis for different transportation options at the eight U.S. CW storage sites (which assumed that

incineration would be the destruction method; described more fully in appendix B), a large portion of the risk often

was due to the presence of specific munitions(5). For example, the M55 rockets are stored at the Anniston (Alabama),

Lexington-Blue Grass (Kentucky), Pine Bluff (Arkansas), Tooele (Utah), and Umatilla (Oregon) Army depots (6).

At Anniston, with the option of continued CW storage and with the adoption of appropriate safety procedures, more

than 40 percent of the remaining risk was associated with the M55 rockets (5). (The balance of the remaining risk

is distributed among the other types of munitions.)

For on-site disposal with adoption of appropriate safety procedures at the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot,

rockets are responsible for essentially all of the risk At Pine Bluff, for on-site destruction with adoption of appropriate

safety procedures, more than 95 percent of the risk is due to the M55 rockets. At the Tooele site, most of the risk is

associated with bulk containers of agent GB in warehouses, although handling projectiles, rockets, and mines with

VX is also a contributing factor. At the Pueblo facility, which lacks M55 rockets, the on-site destruction alternative

with adoption of appropriate safety procedures has most of the risk associated with the projectile munitions.

The M55 rocket contains a chemical agent (either VX or GB), in an aluminum warhead a rocket motor with

a solid propellant; a burster loaded with an explosive to explode the warhead on impact and disseminate the agent;

an igniter to ignite the rocket motor; and a fuse designed to arm after rocket launch and to detonate the burster on

striking the ground (3, 4). Leaks or other degradation of any of these systems over time could lead to an increased

risk of accident. In 1985 the U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) conducted a study on the

condition of the M55 stockpile in which 393 rockets were selected randomly from the total stockpile of 478,000 (3,

4). These rockets were disassembled and the individual components assessed to estimate the amount of

Figure 1-1—M55 Rocket, Filled With Agent GB or VX

Fin

19

Fu Ignitercable

Chemical agent

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Army, “Independent Evaluation/Assessment of Rocket, 115mm: Chemical Agent (GB or VX), M55,” U.S. Army

Material Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, October 1985.

(Continued on next page)
8 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Box 1-C-Condition of the M55 Rockets-Continued

degradation they had undergone after 20 to 25 years of storage. These estimates were presented as a means to

estimate the continued storability of the rockets and were not considered accurate predictions.

Both external and internal leaks of chemical agents in the M55 rockets were found. The rocket propellant

contains a stabilizer that was present at 1.6 to 2.2 percent by weight. If the stabilizer content, which is depleted during

normal conditions, falls below 0.2 percent then auto ignition of the propellant could occur. The stabilizer has

probably been diminishing ever since the weapons were manufactured, but because the 1985 assessment was the

first evaluation since production, it was impossible to quantify stabilizer degradation over time. A worst-case

estimate of remaining storage life, obtained by projecting stabilizer loss for the lot showing the greatest decrease

since production (stored at Johnston Island), indicated that this lot would reach the “first decision point (increased

surveillance)” after 25 years, in 2010. Overall, the propellant was estimated to show a minimal loss of stabilizer,

which indicates an extensive remaining safe storage life. Other potential hazards identified in this project included

interaction between internally leaking GB agent and the burster agent to produce a highly sensitive organometallic

compound, although, “unless the reactions are highly efficient, sufficient amounts of the metal organic compounds

[to cause an explosion] are not expected.” Metal springs that keep the fuse in an unarmedposition may be corroded

by internally leaking GB, causing the fuse to become armed and able to function during a handling accident.

However, the study concluded that, overall, the occurrence of a catastrophic event with the M55 rocket in the near

future is highly unlikely (3, 4).

Overall, the rocket stockpile was estimated to be in good condition by the Army’s 1985 study. The Army has

established a continued monitoring program to monitor degradation and rapidly identify new leakers (6). Although

M55 rockets containing agent GB were first found to be leaking in 1966 (3, 4), there has been no trend toward an

increased rate of leakers detected (7). At the Kentucky Blue Grass facility, as is routine at all U.S. CW storage

facilities, air in igloos containing M55 rockets and other CW munitions is monitored for chemical agent prior to

entry. The M55 rockets are stacked on wooden pallets with 15 rockets per pallet. A positive igloo detection of CW

agent requires that the individual leaking rocket be located. Individual rockets, sealed in their fiberglass firing tubes,

are also routinely tested for leaks. Leaking rockets are transferred to steel tubes that are bolted together and sealed

at the middle with a flange and rubber “O” ring. However, only 897 individual rockets are monitored per quarter,

out of a total of 69,500 at the Kentucky base (1.3 percent per quarter). Very few munitions other than the rackets

have leaked at this facility (7). Although it is difficult to support conclusions made from data taken from the limited

sample sizes used in these studies, the Army has found no trends in the frequency of leak detection in M55 rockets

over time.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

References

Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Risk Analysis Supporting the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program

(CSDP),” prepared for the Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army,

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, December 1987.

National Research Council, Disposal of Chemical Munitions and Agents (Washington, DC: National

Academy Press, 1984).

McKenna, W., U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, Defense Ammunition

Directorate, Air, Sea and Toxic Chemical Munitions, Rock Island, IL, personal communication, Dec. 2,

1991.

U.S. Department of the Army, “Independent Evaluation/Assessment of Rocket, l15mm: Chemical Agent

(GB or VX), M55,” U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD,

October 1985.

Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Risk Analysis Supporting the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program

(CSDP),” prepared for the Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army,

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, December 1987.

U.S. Department of the Army, ‘‘Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3, Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, MD, 1988.

Briefing to Office of Technology Assessment staff at the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot. Lexington.

KY, Dec. 10, 1991.

-.
Chapter 1-Alternative Destruction Technologies-History and Summary ● 9

state-of-the-art of alternatives we were able to

examine and of showing the level of information that

exists about alternatives. If a program to develop

alternatives was pursued, these four may or may not

be among those selected for further tests.

Present work with alternative technologies is

focused on treatment of hazardous wastes other than

chemical weapons. None of these techniques is

available at present as a working alternative to the

Army’s current disassembly-incineration program.

Moreover, it is not possible, on the basis of

information currently available, to predict which

alternative technique, if any, would be the best

candidate for development into an acceptable and

successful CW disposal technology. If the Army’s

present program does not succeed, there could well

be advantages in supporting the development of

more than a single CW destruction technology both

to encourage competition and to ensure that at least

one of them will be successful. There may also be

advantages to certain technologies that are unique to

specific sites.

Market forces alone cannot be expected to lead the

development of alternative CW destruction technologies. The U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons is

small compared to industrial chemical waste. If an

alternative is to be developed, government will have

to be depended on for at least some of the support.

There are existing programs at the Federal and State

level and in private industry and universities that are

designed to promote alternative technologies for

hazardous waste disposal. These might serve as

models for development of alternative technologies

for chemical weapons disposal, although none has

been given this mission (see box l-D).

In developing alternative programs, a clearly

defined process and definition for judging them will

be required. Even though difficult, failure to establish applicable criteria for assessing alternative

programs will make it impossible to gauge their

success or to make necessary corrections.

For example, the limited scope of the Army’s

current technology demonstration project at

Johnston Island was criticized in a 1991 NRC Letter

Box l-D—Programs for the Promotion of Alternative

Technologies for Hazardous Waste Destruction

Existing programs designed to promote alternative technologies for hazardous waste disposal may serve as

models for the development and promotion of alternative technologies for chemical weapons disposal. State and

Federal Government, private industry, and universities have developed programs that attempt to address the

technical, legal, and social obstacles involved with the development and introduction of new technologies for the

disposal of hazardous waste. For example, a workshop at the annual meeting sponsored by the National Solid

Wastes Management Association is titled, “Dealing With an Angry Public: Siting Strategies To Gain Public

Acceptance.” Topics include how to define realistic, measurable public acceptance goals; analysis of key audiences;

identification and mobilization of grass-roots support; and implementation of cost-effective strategies and

monitoring their success while building public acceptance (l).

The Technology Innovation Office (TIO) in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response has the mission of identifying and publicizing more efficient, cost-effective

solutions from developers and technology users that address hazardous waste disposal problems faced by the

Federal Government and private sector. The TIO mission includes promoting the use of innovative treatment

technologies by government and industry on contaminated waste sites, soils, and groundwater by providing

technology and market information to targeted audiences of Federal agencies, States, consulting engineering firms,

technology developers, and the investment community (2). TIO also attempts to facilitate the cooperative

development, evaluation, and implementation of innovative treatment alternatives at Federal facility sites (3). They

have compiled a list of resources for alternative technology development including regional ERA offices that deal

with permitting and performance standards; Federal and State assistance programs; Federal, State, nonprofit, and

private test and evaluation facilities; and university affiliated hazardous waste research centers (4). EPA’s Office

of Research and Development (ORD) also plays a role in alternative technology development by helping vendors

develop and test, at both pilot and full scale, technologies that may be applicable to U.S. waste site remediation,

through such programs as the Superfund Innovative Technology Evaluation (SITE) program (5). The SITE includes

a demonstration program that funds developers through a cost-sharing process in which developers pay for the

(Continued on next page)

324-649 0 - 92 - 3
10 ● Disposal of Chemical weapons: Alternative Technologies

Box l-D—Programs for the Promotion of Alternative

Technologies for Hazardous Waste Destruction-Continued

mobilization and operation of technology demonstrations and EPA pays for the planning, sampling, analysis,

quality assurance, and report preparation. SITE’s Emerging Technologies Program, with currently more than 30

participants, funds up to $300,000 over 2 years for bench or pilot technology development.

The National Environmental Technology Applications Corporation (NETAC), has a similar mission of

accelerating, on a national basis, the commercialization of environmental technologies under development by the

public and private sectors (6, 7). This not-for-profit corporation was established through a cooperative agreement

between EPA and the University of Pittsburgh Trust, specifically for the purpose of developing innovative

commercial environmental technologies. This program reaches across all of the EPA programs described above,

in addition to the private sector. NETAC offers a variety of services to the environmental technology developer,

supplier, end user, and government official. Services include business planning, market and financial analysis, entry

strategy, technology evaluation, laboratory services, and regulatory analysis.

References

1. National Solid Wastes Management Association, “Waste Expo ‘92,” New Orleans, LA, May 5-8, 1992.

2. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Technology

Innovation Office, Mission Statement, Washington, DC.

3. Powell, D.M., and Kovalick Jr., W.W., “Innovative Treatment Technologies: A New Forum for

Cooperation,” paper submitted to “Federal Environmental Restoration 1992,” U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Technology Innovation Office,

January 1992.

4. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Technology

Innovation Office, “Innovative Hazardous Waste Treatment Technologies: A Developer’s Guide To

Support Services,’ EPA 540/2-91/012, Washington, DC, June 1991.

5. Kovalick, Jr., W.W., “Innovative Site Remediation Technologies: Barriers and Opportunities,” paper

presented at the “Symposium on Global Environment and the Construction Industry,” Massachusetts

Institute of bchnology, Cambridge, MA, Oct. 21, 1991.

6. Letter from Sharon L. Ross, Business Analyst, NETAC, University of Pittsburgh Applied Research Center,

Pittsburgh, PA, Apr. 28, 1992.

7. Berkey, Edgar, President, National Environmental Technology Applications Corp. (NETAC), Pittsburgh,

PA, Written comments received Apr. 15, 1992.

Review. The NRC pointed out that the Army was continental sites are covered by the Clean Air Act

missing the opportunity to provide crucial assessments of the technology and program that would

support the construction of future sites by generating

higher levels of public confidence. The NRC also

stated that the success of any demonstration project

should be gauged by the degree to which it facilitates

public understanding and acceptance by providing

well-documented answers to reasonable, and probably inevitable, questions from concerned citizens as

well as regulators. For example, a failure of the

current demonstration is that it does not require

measurement of products of incomplete combustion

(PICs), especially dioxins and dibenzofurans (13).

The Clean Air Act does not apply to the Johnston

Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS)

facility and therefore the Army is not collecting data

to demonstrate compliance with this act, but the

and the relevant States will need this type of

information.

International Implications

A successful U.S. CW disposal program will have

broad international implications. The United States

and the C.I.S. are setting the stage for worldwide

CW disposal. A United Nations special commission

is currently investigating possible methods for the

destruction of the Iraqi CW stockpile. As many as 18

countries in addition to the United States and the

C.I.S. may now possess chemical weapons. With

increasing international pressure to eliminate chemical weapons, the need for an appropriate and

acceptable CW program also increases. This pressure also makes it difficult to discuss delays of any
Chapter 1-Alternative Destruction Technologies-History and Summary . 11

type. If any alternative technology development

program is supported, it will be necessary to bring all

of these considerations into the decision. This OTA

background paper provides only some of the information about the potential benefits and risks that

alternative technologies could offer. It is not clear at

this point whether benefits exceed the risks, but

directed development work on alternatives could

help answer some of the key technical questions.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

CHAPTER 1 REFERENCES

National Research Council, Disposal of Chemical

Munitions and Agents (Washington, DC: National

Academy Press, 1984).

Whelen, R. P., Engineering and Technology Division,

briefing at the Office of the Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen, MD, Oct. 29,

1991.

U.S. Congress, Library of Congress, Congressional

Research Service, “Chemical Weapons: U.S. Arms

Control Negotiations and Destruction,” prepared by

Steven R. Bowman, Washington, DC, updated Sept.

25, 1991 and Feb. 13, 1992.

Baronian, C., Deputy Program Manager and Technical Director, briefing at the Office of the Program

Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen,

MD, Oct. 29, 1991.

Busbee, W.L., briefing at the National Research

Council Committee on Review and Evaluation of the

Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, Washington, DC, Jan. 21, 1992.

Livingstone, S., Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Installations, Logistics and Environment), testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, Apr. 1, 1992,

Second Session, 102d Congress.

Ember, L., “Chemical Weapons Disposal: Daunting

Challenges Still Ahead,’ Chemical and Engineering

News, 68(33):9-19, Aug. 13, 1990.

Chemical and Engineering News, “Russia Not Able

To Destroy Chemical Arms,” Chemical and Engineering News 70(3):17, Jan. 20, 1992.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Stockpile

Destruction Delayed at the Army’s Prototype Disposal Facility, GAO/NSIAD-90-222 (Washington,

DC: July 1990).

U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Obstacles to the Army’s Plan To Destroy Obsolete U.S.

Stockpile, GAO/NSIAD-90-155 (Washington, DC:

May 1990).

U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Stockpile

Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule Slippages

Are Likely To Continue, GAO/NSMD-92-18 (Washington, DC: November 1991).

Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Evaluation of the GB

Rocket Campaign: Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent

Disposal System Operational Verification Testing,”

prepared for the Office of the Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, MD, June 1991.

National Research Council, Committee on Review

and Evaluation of the Army Chemical Stockpile

Disposal Program, “Review of the Mitre Report:

Evaluation of the GB Rocket Campaign: Johnston

Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System Operational

Verification Testing, Dated May 1991,’ letter report,

Washington, DC.

Hudson, V., Deputy Commissioner for Special Projects, Kentucky Department for Environmental Protection, Frankfort Office Park, Frankfort, KY, personal communication, Dec. 12, 1991; letter review,

Apr. 15, 1992.

Briefing of Office of Technology staff at the LexingtonBlue Grass Army Depot, Lexington, KY, Dec. 10,

1991.

McKenna, W., U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and

Chemical Command, Defense Ammunition Directorate, Air, Sea and Toxic Chemical Munitions, Rock

Island, IL, personal communication, Dec. 2, 1991.

U.S. Department of the Army, “Independent Evaluation/

Assessment of Rocket, l15mm: Chemical Agent

(GB or VX), M55,” U.S. Army Material Systems

Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD,

October 1985.
Chapter 2

The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program

THE U.S. ARMY’S CHEMICAL Percentage

Site Iocation of total

WEAPONS STOCKPILE Tooele Army Depot, UT,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.3

Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.0

Geography and Distribution Umatilla Depot, OR... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.6

Pueblo Depot, CO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.9

Anniston Army Depot, AL.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1

The chemical weapons (CW) stockpile is located Johnston Island, South Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6

on Army bases at eight continental U.S. sites (see Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0

figure 2-1) and at Johnston Island in the Pacific Newport Army Ammunition Plant, IN...... . . . 3.9

Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, KY. . . . . . 1.6

Ocean (717 nautical miles southwest of Hawaii). It

is distributed as follows (by percentage of chemical The stockpile includes chemical agents stored in

agent): bulk containers without explosives and propellants,

as well as rockets, land mines, mortars, cartridges,

Figure 2-1—U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile Distribution

I Newport Army I

Pine Bluff

/

Ammunition Plant I

VX - TC

(3.9%)

GB, VX, H, HD, HT = Chemical agents.

TC = Ton container

R = Rockets

M = Mines

ST= Spray tanks

B = Bombs

C = Cartridges

P = Projectiles

Umatilla Depot

HD - TC

GB -P, R, B

VX - P, R, M, ST

(1 1.6%)

Tooele Army

Depot LexingtonH - P Blue Grass Army

HD -C, P, TC

HT -C, P

GB -C, P, R, B, TC GB - P, R, TC

(42.3%) VX -P, R

(1 .6%)

Pueblo Depot

HD -C, P

HT - C

(9.9%)

Arsenal

HD -C, TC

HT - TC

GB - R

VX - R, M

(12.0%)

Anniston Army

Depot

HD -C, P, TC

HT - C

GB -C, P, R

VX -P, R, M

(7.1%)

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3, Office of

the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1988.

–13–
14 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Table 2-l-Characteristics of Chemical Agents

Vapor Liquid

pressure density

Common Chemical torr g/cm3 Freezing Mode of

Agent name CAS No.a Chemical name formula (at 25° C) {at 25o C) point (°C) Color action

Nerve

GA Tabun 77-81-6

GB Sarin 107-44-8

VX 50782-69-9

Vesicant

H, HD Mustard 505-60-2

HT Mustard

L Lewisite 541-25-3

Ethyl-N, N-dimethyl C6H11N2O2P

phosphoramidocyanidate

Isopropyl methyl C4HIOFO2P

phosphonofluoridate

o-ethyl-S-(2- C1lH26N O2PS

diisopropylaminoethyl)

methyl phosphonothioIate

Bis(2-chlomethyl)sulfide C4H8Cl2S

60% HD and 40% TC

Dichloro(2- C4H2AsCl3

chlorovinyl)arsine .

0.07

2.9

0,0007

0.08b (H)

0.11 (HD)

0.104

0.58

1.073 -50

1.089 -56

1.008 <-51

1.27 8-12 (H)

14 (HD)

1.27 1

1.89 - l 8

d

Colorless to Nervous system

brown poison

Clear to straw Nervous system

to amber poison

Clear to straw Nervous system

poison

Amber to Blistering of

dark brown exposed tissue

Amber to dark Blistering of

brown exposed tissue

Amber to dark Blistering of

brown to black exposed tissue

a Chemi=l Abstracts Service number.

b Varies with purity of sample.

c Agent T is Bis[2(2aloroethyl.thio) ethyllester; it is CAS No. 63918-89-8.

d Vafies * O.1O C, depending on purity and isomers prWWIt.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,” VOIS. 1,2,3, Office of

the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1988.

and artillery projectiles composed of both chemical chemical agents are ‘‘unitary’ in that they are

agent and various explosive-propellant components. directly toxic to humans, as opposed to “binary”

The total amount of chemical agents contained in

agents, which are relatively nontoxic until they are

the stockpile has been estimated to be 25,000 tons (1,

mixed together. Although the exact amount of

binary weapons in the U.S. stockpile is classified, it

2), although the exact amount is classified. The has been described by the House Committee on

chemical weapons contain organophosphorus nerve Appropriations as “negligible” (3).

agents (GA, GB, and VX) or vesicant compounds

(mustard and Lewisite) (table 2-l). (See box 2-A on Most (61 percent) CW agents are not contained in

the toxic properties of these compounds.) These munitions but stored in steel l-ton bulk containers

Box 2-A—Properties of Chemical Weapons Agents

Chemical weapons agents stored at the eight continental U.S. Army sites include both organophosphorus ester

nerve agents and mustard blister (vesicant) agents.

Mustards. The sulfur mustards in the U.S. Army stockpile are blister (vesicant) agents H, HD, HT, and Lewisite

(table 2-l). Agent H typically contains about 30 percent related impurities (l), but in some cases may contain only

18 percent of the nominal material. The impurity of some of these materials makes monitoring and confirming their

destruction by certain proposed technologies, such as chemical neutralization, more difficult (2). HD) and HT are

purified by washing or distillation. Lewisite is a more volatile organic arsenic-based vesicant compound (1).

Human exposure to vesicants leads to blistering of exposed tissue and can cause severe skin blisters, injury

to the eyes, and damage to the respiratory tract from inhalation of vapors (l). Epidemiological data indicate that

agent His a human carcinogenic, and T (in HT) and Lewisite are probably carcinogens (3,4, 5).

Nerve Agents. The three nerve agents in the U.S. Army CW Stockpile are GA (Tabun), GB (Sarin), and VX

(figure 2-2). They are normally liquids at room temperature but are highly toxic both as liquids or following

vaporization (see table 2-l). Structurally related organophosphorus ester compounds having less acute human

toxicity are used as insecticides. These compounds are potent inhibitors of acetylcholinesterase (AChE), an enzyme
Chapter 2-The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program ● 15

that normally breaks down the neurotransmitter acetylcholine. With AChE inhibited, acetylcholine builds up to

abnormal levels, causing a continuous, uncontrolled stimulation of nerves that use this neurotransmitter. Among

other characteristic poisoning symptoms from AChE inhibition are convulsions, with death in mammals caused by

respiratory failure. Death from these nerve agents can occur within 10 minutes of exposure (l). None of the nerve

agents is apparently carcinogenic, mutagenic, or teratogenic. In one review, nerve degeneration was considered an

unlikely outcome from either acute or chronic exposure to these nerve agents (5).

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

References

U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3, Office of the Program Manager for chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, MD, 1988.

Whelen, R.P., Engineering and Technology Division, briefing at the Office of the Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen, MD, Oct. 29, 1991.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Toxicology Program, Fourth Annual Report on

Carcinogens, NTP 85-002, Washington, DC, 1985.

International Agency for Research on Cancer, Monograph 9, pp. 181-192, Geneva, Switzerland, 1975.

Journal of the American Medical Association, “Recommendations for Protecting Human Health Against

Potential Adverse Effects of Long-term Exposure to Low Doses of Chemical Warfare Agents,” Jourrnal

of the American Medical Association, 259(10):1453, 1459, Mar. 11, 1988.

Figure 2-2-Structures of Chemical Weapons Nerve (Organophosphorus) and Blister (Mustard) Agents

o

cl-b

\ II Cl CH2CH2S CH2 CH2 Cl

N —P —C N

CH 3 /

I H,HD (Mustard)

‘ \ CH2CH3

GA (Tabun)

CH3 o

I II

cl-lo— P —

F

I I

C(CH3)3 C H3

GB (Sarin)

o

/

CH(CH3)2

C H3C H20

— P — S C H2C H2N

I \

I

cl-k

VX

‘ CH(CH3)2

,

C W

, /s, ,

C H 2

, ,

C H 2

, /S, /CH2 ,

cl CH2 CH2 o CH2 CH2 cl

T

c’\ /

H

H

/

c – c

\ /c ’

‘ \

Lewisite c1

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3,

Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1988.
16 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Table 2-2—Physical Characteristics of Chemical Munitions

Munitions typea — Physical data — — Agent — Explosive/energetic components

Length

(in)

78.0

78.0

Weight

(lb)b

57

56

Weight

(lb) b

10.7

10.0

10.5

11.7

11.7

11.7

6.5

6.0

3.0

1.6

14.5

5.8

6.0

108

220

347

1,356

Diameter

115 mm

115 mm

13.5 in

155 mm

155 mm

155 mm

155 mm

155 mm

105 mm

105 mm

8 in

4.2 in

4.2 in

11 in

16 in

14 in

22.5 in

30.1 in

30.1 in

30.1 in

30.1 in

Rocket Type

GB

Vx

Burster

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yesd

Yesd

Yesd

Yesd

Yesd

Yesd

Yesd

Yesd

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Propellant

Yes

Yes

Fuze

Yes

Yes

M55

M55

Land mine

M23 5.0 23 VX No Yesc

155-mm projectile

M104

M11O

M11O

M121, M121A1 , M122

M121A1

26.8

26.8

26.8

26.7

26.7

95

99

99

100

100

HD

H

HD

GB

VX

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

105-mm projectile

M60

M360

Yesc

Yesc

21.0

16.0

32

32

HD

GB

Yese

Yes”

8-in projectile

M426 35.1 199 GB or VX No No

4.2-in mortar

M2, M2A1

M2, M2A1

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

21.0

21.0

25

25

HT

HD

500-lb bomb

MK-94-O 60 441 GB No No

750-lb bomb

MC-1 50 725 GB No No

M4teye bomb

MC-1 86 525 GB No No

Spray tank

TMU-28/B 185

81.5

81.5

81.5

81.5

1.935 VX No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Ton container 3,100 H, HD, HT, or L 1,700

N / A

f

GA N / A

f

2,900 GB 1,500

3,000 Vx 1,600

a Military &signation numbers are shown below the munitions tyw.

b For~nvers]on of the U.S. military standard sizes to metric units, 1 in -2.54 cm and 1 lb= 0.454 kg.

c Land mines and fuzes are stored together but are fIOt SSSWlbbd.

d Not all proj=tiles have been put into explosive configurations.

e The 10l&mm pj~tileis~nfigur~ both ~th and without ~rsters, fuzes, and artridge CaSeS COflhhlhlg pmpehlt.

f [nforrnation is not available.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatk Environmental Impact Statement,” VOIS. 1,2,3, Office of

the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 19SS.

(4). However, most of the individual items to be tions in concrete coffins for ocean dumping (5, 6).

destroyed in the stockpile are the various munitions During the decades of experience with CW disposal,

described in table 2-2. although Army personnel have been exposed to CW

agents, no casualties have resulted (7).

History of Chemical Weapons Disposal In 1969 at the request of the U.S. Department of

Defense (DOD), the National Research Council

(NRC) reviewed the issue of CW disposal and

recommended chemical neutralization via alkaline

hydrolysis for the nerve agent GB and incineration

for the mustard agents H and HD (6). After research

and development work by the Army in the 1970s on

these technologies, the Army concluded that incinerThe Army has an ongoing need for disposal of

surplus and obsolete chemical weapons. Attempts to

manage the problems of CW disposal have a long

history involving a variety of destruction techniques. Prior to 1969, the Army disposed of chemical weapons by open-pit burning, evaporative “atmospheric dilution,’ burial, and placement of muni-
Chapter 2—The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program ● 17

ation was the preferred method for the destruction of

all classes of chemical weapons.

The Army indicated that the decision to abandon

chemical neutralization in favor of incineration

(officially in 1982) resulted from problems encountered with the chemical neutralization process (6).

The Army’s early chemical neutralization program

actually applied only to destruction of the chemical

agent itself. Incineration was used to decontaminate

metal parts centaining residual chemical agent that

came from disassembled CW munitions and storage

containers. Since incineration was introduced as a

necessary component of all early CW disposal

schemes, the fact that it became the basis of the

Army’s CW disposal program was probably inevitable. The 1987 report by the Army about its experience with CW destruction refers to the “widespread

acceptance of incineration as an effective, safe, and

environmentally sound method of disposal of hazardous materials’ (6). Now, 5 years later, the

suggestion of widespread acceptance of incineration

seems insupportable in light of the strong and

effective opposition to most applications of incineration for waste disposal.

In 1984 the incineration decision was supported

by another NRC review. The NRC based its

endorsement on a review of existing data supplied

almost entirely by Army research. In 1988 the Army

published a Final Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement (PEIS) designating on-site disposal consisting of disassembly followed by incineration as the preferred method of CW destruction (4).

On-Site Destruction vs. Relocation of the

CW Stockpile for Off-Site Destruction

In the 1988 PEIS for its on-site CW disassembly

and incineration program, the Army compared

several alternatives, including partial or complete

relocation of the CW stockpile to regional or

national sites for destruction. The comparative risk

of the entire CW disposal program associated with

on-site versus regional disposal was evaluated as not

statistically distinguishable according to an analysis

contracted by the Army (7). The Army argued that

this apparent risk equivalence was misleading because the analysis failed to consider the location in

terms of corresponding mitigation of possible accidents. That is, an accident on an existing Army base

would be easier to mitigate than an accident

occurring at some unknown point along a transportation corridor. A qualitative consideration of this

difference led to the conclusion that any option

involving CW transportation off-site was more risky

(7). The current Army program specifies that chemical weapons will remain on-site, at the eight

continental U.S. bases and Johnston Island where

they are now located, for destruction by disassembly

and incineration.

Condition of the CW Stockpile—

Potential of Increased Risk From

CW Deterioration

In 1992, chemical weapons containing unitary

agents stored in the continental United States will be

from 24 to 47 years old (8). Low-level leaks of

agents have been detected in some of the munitions,

although the risk from such leaks has been suggested

to be low. The M55 rockets (box l-C) filled with GB

agent are the greatest source of leaks. All other types

of munitions and storage containers in the CW

stockpile have substantially fewer leakages and are

in stable condition (4, 5, 9, 10). The relative

instability of the M55 rocket is probably due to its

unique construction, which includes a thin aluminum warhead filled with GB chemical agent (7, 10,

11). The other agent-filled munitions are constructed

of much heavier gauge aluminum plate or steel that

is more resistant to corrosion and leakage. Most of

the leaking M55 rockets, first discovered in 1966,

come from one manufacturing source of GB agent,

and there appears to be a correlation between acid

content and frequency of leakage through the

aluminum walls (7, 10, 11, 12).

Primarily because of leakage problems, the M55

rockets constitute a major portion of the total risk of

CW handling and storage at the five continental U.S.

sites where they are located (12). The CW monitoring program directs Army personnel to conduct

ongoing surveillance of the stockpile. The Army has

established a continuous monitoring program to

rapidly identify new leaking munitions (4). As

leaking munitions are discovered, they are sealed in

protective steel tubes (“overpacks”) to contain

further leakage. Although M55 rockets containing

agent GB were first found to be leaking in 1966(11,

12), there has been no trend toward an increased rate

of leakers detected (9).

In a partial answer to questions about the urgency

of CW disposal, the NRC committee in its 1984

report stated that data are insufficient to project the

324-649 0 - 92 - 4
18 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

near- or long-term storage life of CW agent containers. However, in the face of this uncertainty,

available information indicates that the frequency of

leaks for most munitions at all eight U.S. sites,

except for the M55 rockets, did not increase

substantially in the years prior to (5) or after 1984 at

at least the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot in

Kentucky (9). A 1985 study by the Army specifically on the condition of the M55 rockets concluded

that the occurrence of a catastrophic event in the near

future is “highly unlikely” (11, 12). However, in

view of the critical importance of this issue, this

study could be updated.

DISPOSAL OF THE ARMY’S

CW STOCKPILE

The Army’s Demonstration Projects

The Army’s current program requires a series of

pilot demonstration CW disposal facilities. Some of

these demonstrations have been required by Congress. The Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal

System (CAMDS) (Tooele, Utah) was initiated by

the Army to test and evaluate equipment and

processes to be used in CW disposal facilities.

Although CAMDS is authorized to dispose of

chemical weapons, its primary purpose is data

collection and test evaluation of the process equipment (13).

The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal

System (JACADS) is currently undergoing operational verification and testing for the destruction of

M55 rockets. The Army anticipates that JACADS

will eventually demonstrate the destruction of all

types of CW munitions and storage containers. This

system is actually not one but four separate incinerator systems, each designed to handle a distinct

component from the CW disassembly waste stream.

Public Law 100-456 (the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1989) requires the Army to

complete operational verification of its technology

at JACADS before proceeding with equipment tests

at Tooele, Utah, and other U.S. sites (14). Based in

part on the CAMDS experience, this “new generation’ of CW incinerators is intended to demonstrate

compliance with current Toxic Substances Control

Act (TSCA) and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) standards. TSCA compliance is

required because the tube containers for M55 rockets

contain small amounts of polychlorinated biphenyls

(PCBs). RCRA compliance is similar for any new

incinerator and involves demonstrating acceptable

emission rates of metals in ash, particulate loading,

hydrogen chloride and hydrogen fluoride stack

emissions, etc. (See box 2-B on regulatory hurdles

for CW incineration facilities.) Results from this

technology demonstration design facility are intended for use as a basis for the design and

construction of the eight proposed continental U.S.

on-site incinerators, although construction at Tooele,

Utah has already begun.

Four evaluations of the JACADS operation by the

Mitre Corp. have been planned for completion by

1993. The frost report was released in June 1991 (14).

A final evaluation directed to Congress, followed by

congressional certification of JACADS, is anticipated in February 1993 (15).

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY

THE CURRENT CW DISPOSAL

PROGRAM

Local and National Opposition

Several national and local organizations are

opposed to the Army’s present CW disposal program. Citizens at the Lexington-Blue Grass Army

Depot (Kentucky) have mounted the most effective

resistance. The opposition to the Army’s CW

destruction program in Kentucky may be able to

block or seriously delay its completion. (See box 1-B

for a description of Kentucky State authority for

regulating hazardous waste facilities.)

Currently, less opposition exists at other continental U.S. sites (16). However, other States might

follow Kentucky’s lead. The Utah State legislature

has implemented some restrictive requirements for

CW disposal facilities proposed for the Tooele site.

Specifically, it has required a series of additional and

time-consuming test burns. Citizen groups that

oppose the Armys current CW destruction plan also

exist in every one of the eight states with CW

stockpiles.

Although the public was not informed of the

Army’s plans to build a CW destruction facility at

the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot until January

1984, citizen concerns about the CW storage had

been developing for decades. Although the Army

moved chemical weapons into the Lexington-Blue

Grass Army Depot during the 1950s, local residents

were not informed of this fact until 10 years later.
Chapter 2—The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program . 19

Box 2-B—Some Regulatory Hurdles for CW Destruction

The Army must secure environmental permits for its CW incineration facilities in the same manner as civilian

projects. The Army’s Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) demonstration facility, located

on Johnston Island, however, is exempt from obtaining certain environmental permits that will be required for CW

destruction facilities planned for the continental United States. Although Executive Order 12088 provides for

waivers of these laws in cases of national emergency, the Army has not yet requested such a waiver for the storage

and handling of chemical weapons. A range of Federal, State, and local permits required prior to the start of

construction include:

1. A review by the Department of Health and Human Services of public health and safety issues and the

environmental impact of the Army’s CW destruction program (l).

2. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permits for construction and for operation of incinerator

facilities. Full-scale incinerator operations cannot begin until trial burns are satisfactorily completed,

following construction approval, in accordance with final RCRA permitting requirement. The U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has delegated RCRA authority to all of the eight States in which

incinerators are planned.

3. Toxic Substances Control Act approval before operation of incinerators with M55 rockets, because of the

presence of PCBs in rocket-firing tubes.

4. Air emissions source permits under the Clean Air Act and State or local air quality regulations. Clean air

permits must be obtained from each relevant State authority.

5. Other environmentally oriented regulations including the Endangered Species Act (Public Law 93-205),

Floodplain Management Executive Order 11988, and Protection of Wetlands Executive Order 11990.

6. For transportation off-site, approval from the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Environmental

Protection Agency, and other relevant Federal and State authorities.

Reference

1. U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical stockpile DisposalProgram Fina.1 Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3, Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, MD, 1988.

This led to the impression that the Army had Army Depot should be moved to another site for

“sneaked’ chemical weapons into the area without

any regard for the safety of citizens who lived nearby

(17). Although the amount of chemical weapons

stored at the Kentucky depot is proportionally small

(1.6 percent of the total U.S. stockpile), local

residents are aware that Kentucky’s share includes a

higher proportion of the most dangerous types,

especially the M55 rockets (69,500 rockets out of a

total of 478,000, or 14.5 percent in the total M55

rocket stockpile) (9, 11, 12).

At present, organized opposition to the Army’s

CW incineration program in Kentucky comes from

members of the State legislature; civic leaders;

academics; and key political, citizen, and national

groups that together comprise a highly organized

and potentially very effective opposition (17). In

1988 (when the Army’s PEIS was published), the

Governor of the State of Kentucky stated that the

chemical weapons at the Lexington-Blue Grass

destruction (18).

Based on conversations with representatives from

three Kentucky citizen groups (the Kentucky Environmental Foundation, Concerned Citizens of Madison County, and Common Ground), opposition is

based on several issues, and there is no consensus on

which concerns are most important. Issues of public

concern include the possible health risks associated

with effluents from incineration, as well as the

possibility that the planned CW destruction facilities

will be used to incinerate other types of waste once

the weapons disposal program is complete. The

latter concern is founded partially on reports that

specifically direct the Army to consider using the

incinerator facilities, after the completion of CW

destruction, for the disposal of hazardous waste

generated by DOD; Federal, State, or local governments; and private industry (3, 5, 19). A general

concern is that the Army may have not adequately

addressed unique aspects of the Kentucky Blue
20 ● Disposal Of chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Grass facility, such as its proximity to major

population centers.1 Another often repeated issue is

the perceived risk to citizens in communities surrounding CW stockpiles during munitions transport

from storage igloos to the central on-site incinerator

facility.

As a result of this last concern, Kentucky citizen

groups continue to express a strong preference for

the option of removing the chemical weapons from

Kentucky to some other site for storage or destruction using a transport container that would prevent

leakage in case of an accident. They refer to the 1987

Mitre report concluding that there is no significant

difference in risk between on-site incineration and

moving the stockpile to a less populated area (1,12).

They also cite the Army’s successful movement of

CWs stored in Germany to Johnston Island in the

summer of 1990 (17, 20). Many of the communities

that surround the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot

have indicated a reluctance to have chemical weapons transported through their own communities.

Similarly, the Army’s counter argument is that the

Mitre risk assessment failed to consider the geographic location and the potential for adequate

response to accidents occurring on-site versus those

occurring during transportation off-site (7).

Projected Program Schedule—

Revised Deadlines

The Army’s current proposed schedule for its CW

destruction program is shown in table 2-3. This

schedule has been revised more than once since the

1988 PEIS, and unforeseen events may prompt

further revisions. The schedule shown in this table

was presented to Congress on April 1, 1992 (21).

Cost Estimates-Cost Overruns

The Amy’s cost estimates for the CW destruction

program have been continually revised upward. In

1985 the Army’s life-cycle cost estimate for completion of destruction of the CW stockpile at the eight

continental U.S. storage sites and Johnston Island

was $1.7 billion. In 1988 the Army revised the total

program cost to $3.4 billion (19). Recent reports

indicate that the Army is revising its cost estimates

for CW destruction upward to $6.5 billion (3, 17) or

as high as $7.9 billion (21). The largest portion of the

cost is for existing and projected operating expenses

(while the incineration facilities are operational).

Facility construction is a small fraction of the total

cost (17).

INTERNATIONAL

IMPLICATIONS OF A

SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM

The United States and former Soviet Union

signed a bilateral agreement in June 1990 to destroy

their CW stockpiles, although acceptable verification and destruction technologies were not resolved

(3, 22). The agreement timetable specified that

destruction should begin by December 1992; that 50

percent stockpile would be destroyed by December

1999, followed by all but 5,000 metric tons destroyed by May 2002. Although the agreement was

not ratified by either country, some of its provisions

were adopted. Both nations have declared an end to

CW production and in May 1991 president Bush

forswore U.S. use of chemical weapons and pledged

to destroy all U.S. chemical weapons within 10 years

of the Geneva global chemical weapons convention

(CWC) negotiations (a multilateral effort now in its

24th year) coming into effect. This renunciation was

very positively received by the participants of the

convention and was widely seen as a significant

impetus for the CWC negotiations (3). If ratification

of the bilateral agreement continues to be delayed,

then the CWC may be concluded and allowed to

supersede the U.S./Soviet bilateral agreement on

CW destruction (3).

Negotiations over the bilateral agreement were

prolonged primarily by the Soviet Union’s inability

to develop a workable plan for the destruction of its

chemical weapons. U.S. officials now believe that

the agreement deadlines will have to be extended

because of the lack of CW destruction facilities in

the independent republics. The agreement allowed

for postponement of deadlines should either side

encounter delays in the construction of facilities.

1 The Kentucky Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, which stores chemical weapons and is the proposed site of the Army’s chemicrd weapons

destruction facility, is 1/2 mile from an elementary school, in an area with approximately 55,000 inhabitants. Several schools are within a 5-mile radius

of the depot (1, 17). A related problem is the apparently poor credibility of the Army in the eyes of many of the citizens in the affected area. For example,

late in 1991 an incident in which a small amount of leaked mustard agent was detected by the Army inside one of the munitions storage igloos at the

Lexington-Blue Grass depot was revealed to the general public indirectly via a “leak” to a local school newspaper. Public reaction to this apparently

minor incident was one of outrage and expressed the general feeling that the Army was neither sincere in its efforts to protect the public nor credible

in keeping the public informed of potential hazards.
JACADS

CDTF

TEAD

ANAD

UMDA

PBA

PUDA

LBAD

NAAP

APQ

1

Table 2-3-U.S. Chemical Weapons Disposal Program Implementation Schedule

CY 89 , CY 90 CY 91 CY 92 CY 93 , CY 94 , CY 95 CY96 CY 97 CY98 CY 99 CY OO CY 01

I I I

SYST 7/90 OVT 3/93 OPNS 2/96

(36) CLO

6/89 CONST/SYST 10-91 OPNS 12199

(28) (99) CLO

9/89 CONST 8-93 SYST 2-95 OPNS 4/00

(47) (18) (63) CLO

7

$

9 D E S4&2 R E P 6/93 CONST 4&W SYST ‘ ~

97 OPN S

1 1/00

(14) (34) (18) (38) CLO

6/$9 1 /

9 3REPv 1/94 11/96 5/98 1 2/00 DES CONST OPNS

(12) (34) (32) CLO

8/89 DES 1/93 REP 1/94 CONST 9/96 SYST 3/98 OPNS 1 1/00

(12) (32) (18) (33) CLO

10$30 DES 5

/ 9

3 REP 5/94 CONST 3/97 SYST 9/89 OPNS 5/00

(12) (34) (18) CLO

10/90 DES 5

’ 8

3 REP 5& CONST 3&

7 SYST ‘ &g OPNS ‘ $0

(12) (34) (18) CLO

? ?

1 1

y RE P

1

~

g 5 CONST

6/98

6-97SYST VO

(12) (29) (12) (11)CLO

1/92 1/94 1/95 6/97SYST

6/98

REP CONST v OPNS6/99

(12) v

(29) (12) (11) CLO

JACADS = Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal Facility

CDTF = Chemical Demilitarization

TEAD = Tooele Army Depot

ANAD = Anniston Army Depot

UMDA = Umatilla Depot Activity

PBA = Pine Bluff Arsenal

LBAD = Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot

NAAP = Newport Army Ammunition Plant

APQ = Aberdeen Proving Ground

DES = Design

SYST = Systemization

CONST = Construction

OPNS = Operations

CLO = ClOSUre

OVT = Operational Verification Testing

RFP = Issue and Evaluate Request for Propose

V. start activity first of month

T = complete activity end of month

SOURCE: Livingstone, S., Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and Environment), testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, April 1,

1992, Second Session, 102nd Congress.
22 . Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

According to the June 1990 bilateral agreement,

destruction technologies were to be shared. However, it appears that Soviet CW destruction capabilities are currently nonexistent. The entire CW stockpile is located in Russia (23), which may be

requesting U.S. assistance in building CW destruction facilities. The political disarray caused by the

breakup of the Soviet Union into independent

republics has made this more difficult.

The U.S. CW destruction program has also been

delayed, as described earlier in this paper. Recently,

on the recommendation of the House Committee on

Appropriations, the FY 1992 DOD appropriations

bill as passed by the House prohibited obligation of

$151.9 million in procurement funds for the CW

destruction facilities planned at Anniston, Umatilla,

and Pine Bluff until the following events occurred:

Operational testing at Johnston Island is certified

complete and a report submitted to Congress; the

Johnston Island plant design has been verified; and

appropriate environmental permits for the three new

facilities have been secured. The restriction for

obligation of procurement funds for Anniston is tied

to the start of the third phase of Operational

Verification Testing of JACADS (OVT 3) (24).

In developing their current disposal programs, the

United States and Russia are setting the stage for

general and worldwide weapons disposal. The

control and prevention of the proliferation of chemical weapons is a problem paralleling that of nuclear

weapons: They have in common similar problems of

the verification of manufacture or destruction, and

the potential for illegal use. A United Nations

special commission is currently investigating possible methods for the destruction of Iraq’s CW

stockpile. Iraq has acknowledged having a variety of

chemical weapons containing nerve and blister

agents that will be destroyed under this program

(25). As many as 18 countries in addition to the

United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States (C. I. S.) may possess chemical weapons. In

testimony before the House Committee on Armed

Services in 1991, Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks,

Chief of Naval Intelligence, estimated that the

following 14 non-NATO or non-Warsaw Pact countries probably have chemical weapons: Burma

(Myanmar), China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel,

Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria,

Taiwan, and Vietnam (3). Indonesia, Saudi Arabia,

South Africa, and Thailand were also identified as

possibly having chemical weapons. As international

proliferation of chemical weapons expands, the need

for an appropriate and acceptable CW disposal

program becomes increasingly critical.

The C.I.S. is facing problems surprisingly similar

to those of the U.S. Army in establishing a CW

destruction program. In 1990 the Soviets unveiled

their only CW destruction plant near Chapayevsk in

the Ural Mountains, 500 miles southeast of Moscow

(1, 20). In contrast to the U.S. Army’s program, this

facility was designed to use chemical neutralization

rather than incineration as the primary means for

CW destruction. However, local citizens opposed to

the facility for ecological and environmental reasons, and possibly as a reaction to the Chernobyl

nuclear accident in 1986, were successful in opposing the facility and it was eventually shut down (l).

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR

THE ARMY’S BASELINE

PROJECT

The current Army program for CW destruction

specifies destruction by disassembly and incineration on-site at the eight continental U.S. Army

bases and at Johnston Island where they are now

located. The Army is required by law to prove the

successful demonstration of the Johnston Island

chemical Agent Disposal System. Results from this

prototype design are intended to be used as a basis

for design and construction of the eight proposed

continental U.S. facilities. This “new-generation”

CW incinerator is designed to show that the technology can meet current TSCA and RCRA standards.

The Clean Air Act does not apply to the JACADS

facility and therefore the Army is not collecting data

to demonstrate compliance with this act. Since all

eight continental sites will have to host Clean Air

Act standards, operation and tests of the JACADS

facility will not provide all the data needed.

The first of four planned evaluations by the Mitre

Corp., “Evaluation of the GB Rocket Campaign:

Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System

Operational Verification Testing,” was released in

June 1991 (14). In September 1991, the NRC

released a “Letter Report” review of this first

evaluation. In the review, the NRC was optimistic

about the eventual success of the JACADS demonstration project and recommended that operational

testing be continued. It also made several relevant

criticisms that suggested certain shortcomings in the

JACADS evaluation strategy:
Chapter 2—The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program ● 23

Additional performance measurements, which

could be made at JACADS, would support future

sites by providing higher levels of confidence in the

technology. . .[The current program] does not require measurement. . .of PICS. . especially dioxins

and furans. . . There is a larger issue than the

accuracy of. . .measurements. It is important that the

total environmental impact of JACADS be characterized. . . . These data would facilitate permitting

and public understanding by providing well documented answers to reasonable, and probably inevitable, questions from concerned citizens as well as

regulators.

Although the Army has not had time to respond,

these and other criticisms of the JACADS project

suggest a series of possible scenarios that may result

based strictly on the outcome of the demonstration

project.

In one scenario, the Army’s demonstration program at Johnston Island could be successfully

concluded and the construction of facilities at the

continental sites could continue as planned. It would

probably be useful to provide local groups and

involved States with data from JACADS operations

to show safety standards can be met. If citizen

groups become convinced that the Army’s technology will safely destroy the weapons at each site, and

the technology functions as proposed, then the

program could proceed without opposition.

In another scenario, the Army’s JACADS facility

could successfully demonstrate that the technology

will perform as expected but the organized opposition would remain unconvinced.

In this case, facilities in individual States might be

effectively halted by blocking the issuance of

required State permits. In a final scenario, the

JACADS incineration technology demonstration

project might prove unsuccessful and eventually be

abandoned. This, in turn, would probably mean an

end to construction at any U.S. site.

The second and third scenarios could result in the

need for a CW disposal alternative to incineration,

depending on whether opposition was primarily to

on-site disposal or to the specific destruction technology. In this event the weapons stockpile would

probably be stored and maintained at current sites

while an alternative technology and CW destruction

program is developed.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12,

13,

CHAPTER 2 REFERENCES

Ember, L., “Chemical Weapons Disposal: Daunting

Challenges Still Ahead,” Chemical and Engineering

News, 68(33):9-19, Aug. 13, 1990.

Picardi, A., International Environmental Assessment

Group, Alexandria, VA, “Alternative Technologies

for the Detoxification of Chemical Weapons: An

Information Document,” prepared for Greenpeace

lnternational, Washington, DC, May 1991.

U.S. Congress, Library of Congress, Congressional

Research Service, “Chemical Weapons: U.S. Arms

Control Negotiations and Destruction,” prepared by

Steven R. Bowman, Washington, DC, updated Sept.

25, 1991 and Feb. 13, 1992.

U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile

Disposal Program Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3, Office of the

Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1988.

National Research Council, Disposal of Chemical

Munitions and Agents (Washington, DC: National

Academy Press, 1984).

U.S. Department of the Army, ‘Chemical Agent and

Munition Disposal: Summary of the U.S. Army’s

Experience,” Office of the Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving

Ground, MD, September 1987.

Azuma, E., Office of the Assistant Secretary of the

Army, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, briefing at

the Office of Technology Assessment, Washington,

DC, Oct. 18, 1991.

U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Stockpile

Destruction Delayed at the Army’s Prototype Disposal Facility, GAO/NSIAD-90-222 (Washington,

DC: July 1990).

Briefing of Office of Technology staff at theLexingtonBlue Grass Army Depot, Lexington, KY, Dec. 10,

1991.

McKenna, W., U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and

Chemical Command, Defense Ammunition Directorate, Air, Sea and Toxic Chemical Munitions, Rock

Island, IL, personal communication, Dec. 2, 1991.

U.S. Department of the Army, “Independent Evaluation/

Assessment of Rocket, 115mm: Chemical Agent

(GB or VX), M55,” U.S. Army Material Systems

Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD,

October 1985.

Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Risk Analysis Supporting the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP),”

prepared for the Office of the Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, MD, December 1987.

FIamm, K. J., briefing at the Office of the Program

Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen,

MD, October 29, 1991.
24 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Evaluation of the GB

Rocket Campaign: Johnston Atoll chemical Agent

Disposal System Operational Verification Testing,”

prepared for the Office of the Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, MD, June 1991.

Wojciechowski, P., briefing at the Office of the

Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,

Aberdeen, MD, Oct. 29, 1991.

Baronian, C., Deputy Program Manager and Technical Director, briefing at the Office of the Program

Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen,

MD, Oct. 29, 1991.

Stuart, D., U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, personal communication, Nov. 4, 1991.

Wilkinson, W. G., Governor of the Commonwealth of

Kentucky, in a letter dated February 3, 1988 to

Brigadere General D.A. Nydam, Program Executive

Officer, Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Obstacles to the Army’s Plan To Destroy Obsolete U.S.

Stockpile, GAO/NSIAD-90-155 (Washington, DC:

May 1990).

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

Morrison, D., “No Easy out,” National Journal,

23(19):1100-1104, May 11, 1991.

Livingstone, S., Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Installations, Logistics and Environment), testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, Apr. 1, 1992,

Second Session, 102d Congress.

U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Stockpile

Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule Slippages

Are Likely To Continue, GAO/NSL4D-92-18 (Washington, DC: November 1991).

“Russia Not Able To Destroy Chemical Arms,”

Chemical and Engineering News 70(3):17, Jan. 20,

1992.

Ned Coale, Department of the Army, Office of the

Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,

personal communication, Apr. 22, 1992.

U.S. Congress, Library of Congress, Congressional

Research Service, “Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Issues for Congress,” prepared by Steven R.

Bowman, Washington, DC, June 20, 1991.
Chapter 3

Current Technology and Alternatives

CURRENT TECHNOLOGY

The Army’s CW Disassembly and

Incineration Technology

The Army’s current chemical weapons (CW)

disposal program involves robotic, machine disassembly of the chemical weapon as appropriate for

each specific munition. The various waste materials

from disassembly are incinerated separately. These

include the chemical agent, explosives and propellants, empty munitions and nonexplosive (storage)

containers, and shipping and packing materials

(dunnage). Preliminary separation produces individual waste streams that are relatively homogeneous,

which makes it feasible to optimize conditions for

the incineration of each.

To handle the various waste streams produced by

disassembly, four different furnace systems are

required:

●

●

●

●

Incinerator for the liquid chemical agent and

process liquid waste;

Rotary kiln furnace for the destruction of

explosives and propellants, with an accompanying heated discharge conveyer to remove

leftover materials;

Metal parts furnace to decontaminate by incineration the empty bulk containers, shells, and

bombs; and

Dunnage incinerator for the combustion of

waste packaging.

The resulting gases and other products of incineration are treated with a variety of modern pollution

abatement equipment, including a quench tower,

venturi scrubber, scrubber tower, demister, and for

the dunnage furnace, a baghouse for removal of

particulate. Brine produced by the scrubbers is

evaporated, and the resulting salts are packed in

drums for eventual landfill. The final products that

will require disposal such as landfill are scrap metal,

drums of salt, and ash (l).

The time required to dispose of the stockpiles at

the eight continental U.S. sites after the incinerators

begin to work was estimated in the 1988 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) to be

from 11 months (at Lexington-Blue Grass Army

Depot, Kentucky) to 41 months (at Tooele, Utah).

This was recently revised in the Army’s March 1991

Program Implementation Schedule (Rev. 3) to 11

months (at Newport, Indiana) and 63 months (at

Tooele) (see table 2-3).

EXAMPLES OF ALTERNATIVE

TECHNIQUES

A number of techniques have been suggested for

disposal of chemical weapons. To be applicable to

the current CW stockpile, a technology must be able

to effectively destroy or decontaminate the chemical

agents, the drained and empty munitions and containers, the associated explosives and propellants,

and the munition packaging material (dunnage). The

dunnage is largely conventional packing material

such as wooden pallets and crates. However, the

possibility that the dunnage may be contaminated

with CW agents requires that it be treated as if it

were contaminated.

In 1991 the international environmental organization Greenpeace published a review of nonincineration alternatives for CW destruction, “Alternative

Technologies for the Detoxification of Chemical

Weapons: An Information Document” (5). This

review was very broad in scope and included many

reports of the destruction of a CW agent or related

compounds. Virtually none of these alternative

techniques with the exception of chemical neutralization has been demonstrated for use with actual CW

agents on the scale required for the current disposal

program. The Greenpeace review avoids specifically

endorsing any single technique and concentrates on

those methods that would be most applicable to the

destruction of liquid CW agents. Many of the

technologies proposed would handle only the chemical agent and the other waste materials would need

some other treatment or disposal method.

Many of the CW destruction alternative techniques or technologies discussed in the Greenpeace

report or proposed by others are not new and were

proposed for CW destruction in the early 1980 or

before. In response to a 1982 request to industry for

proposals on techniques for CW destruction, the

Army received suggestions for agent destruction

from eight private companies. These included:

–25–
26 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

conversion to nontoxic useful chemical products;

chemical destruction (neutralization); molten metal,

plasmas, pyrolysis; molten salt incineration; acid

roasting; cement kiln; large kiln; use of a rotary

hearth furnace; supercritical fluid (oxidation); and

thermal tower destruction (2). Although these and

other techniques might be developed into technologies appropriate for CW destruction, none appears at

present to be in a position to serve as an immediate

alternative to incineration. Moreover, in the absence

of more specific information about alternative technologies for CW disposal, it is impossible to predict

which technique could be developed into an acceptable CW disposal technology. The Army rejected

these alternatives primarily because it believed they

would require much more time to develop or prove

capable.

The following is a brief review of four techniques

selected only because they have been specifically

suggested by various interested groups or technology developers as appropriate for CW destruction:

chemical neutralization, supercritical water oxidation, steam gasification, and plasma arc pyrolysis.

Many other techniques have been suggested that are

not reviewed here. There is no technical basis upon

which to select (or reject) these or any other specific

technology. Application of the last three techniques

to dioxin-contaminated soil has recently been reviewed (3). It is quite possible that if a successful

alternative technology is developed for CW destruction, it will be none of these. The proponents of these

alternatives believe that they offer advantages because air emissions may be more readily controlled

and minimized and because of possible improved

safety during on-site handling and transportation.

More details of these techniques are provided in

appendix A.

Chemical Neutralization

The alternative technology for CW destruction

having the greatest amount of available information

is chemical neutralization. The U.S. Army had

extensive experience with this process for the

destruction of CW agents. Chemical neutralization

via alkaline hydrolysis was successfully used to

destroy a substantial proportion of at least some

classes of CW agents in the current stockpile.

Hydrolysis is the reaction of water with a chemical,

such as the CW agent, using an acid or base catalyst,

to produce compounds of greatly reduced toxicity.

In principle, alkaline hydrolysis could be a means to

chemica.lly neutralize the agents GB, VX, and

mustards. Problems encountered by the Army with

alkaline hydrolysis of all types of CW agents may be

surmountable today in view of new techniques (see

appendix A) that were not considered at the time of

the Army’s research in this area and of the increased

pressure to exploit existing nonincineration techniques in CW destruction. Neutralization technology was, however, rejected by the Army as unsuitable for the current CW destruction program. (Appendix A gives a further description of the Army’s work

with and decision to abandon neutralization.)

Most experience with large-scale chemical neutralization of chemical weapons has been with the

agent GB. This agent was successfully neutralized

on a large scale by the use of aqueous sodium

hydroxide. Approximately 8.4 million pounds of GB

(17 percent of the total weight of all agents to be

destroyed in the current program), taken from

various munitions and storage tanks, were neutralized at Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Tooele, Utah,

between 1974 and 1982. From 1979 to 1981, 13,951

M55 rockets containing GB (approximately 3 percent of today’s stockpile and 20 percent of the M55

rocket stockpile at the Lexington-Blue Grass Army

Depot) were destroyed by this combined chemical

neutralization/incineration process (4).

The drained empty munition and ton (bulk storage) containers left over from this process were

treated in a furnace where the explosives were

incinerated and the metal parts thermally decontaminated. In general, chemical neutralization applied

only to the drained chemical agent itself, and

disposal of the remaining waste relied on incineration. Another variation in some of the work

performed involved decontamination of drained

cluster bomblets and ton containers with a caustic

wash to neutralize any residual agent. However, the

caustic wash treatment was also followed by incineration.

Although the agent VX, which is structurally

similar to GB, can also be chemically neutralized, by

hydrolysis with aqueous sodium hydroxide, the

Army only demonstrated this on a small scale.

Mustard agent has also been shown by the Army to

be hydrolyzed under alkaline conditions on a small

scale, although only very slowly at ambient temperature. The effectiveness of alkaline hydrolysis of

mustards at elevated temperature was not reported

(4).
Chapter 3-Current Technology and Alternatives ● 27

Supercritical Water Oxidation

Supercritical water oxidation (SCWO) has been

suggested as a plausible alternative for destruction

of the agents contained in chemical weapons (2, 5).

Supercritical water refers to water that has been

heated and pressurized to a transition point between

gas and liquid phases, and thus has some of the

properties of both. Organic materials in solution

with supercritical water can be oxidized by oxygen

introduced from air. This technology is currently

under development by U.S. companies (General

Atomics, Modell Corp., and Modar) and by at least

three major universities, for the destruction of a

variety of hazardous wastes including dioxincont aminated soil (3, 6, 7). Although these companies have prototype devices, none has demonstrated

its use with an actual CW agent. Current prototypes

would be most appropriate for the destruction of

only the liquid chemical agent. However, many

nontrivial technical details remain to be worked out

before SCWO will be suitable for use even with CW

agents alone; no actual CW agents have even been

tested with SCWO destruction technology (6) (see

appendix A for more details). Their design would

not be suitable for decontamin ation of drained

munitions and containers, or for destruction of the

explosives and propellants loaded into burster tubes,

etc., associated with CW munitions. SCWO is being

developed commercially as a general technology for

the destruction of many different organic hazardous

materials, and the destruction of CW agents is

conceived by its developers as, at most, a minor

application of its use.

SCWO in principle may have certain advantages

over incineration for the oxidation of organic waste.

It is similar to incineration in that it involves

oxidation of organic compounds to carbon dioxide

and inorganic acids or salts. However, SCWO

operates at much lower temperatures than incineration. Further, it does not require a large airflow.

SCWO carries out oxidation at lower temperature,

and the reaction medium (water) can be contained

until tested to be safe. Potential products of incomplete combustion (PICs) are entrained in solution

rather than emitted in stack gases. The apparently

superior control of emissions is an attractive feature

of SCWO technology. The effluents from SCWO, in

contrast to the exhaust stack gases from incineration,

may be collected, analyzed, and even recycled to

achieve more complete destruction.

Steam Gasification

Steam gasification (or reformation) has been

proposed for the destruction of chemical weapons by

Greenpeace and by Kentucky citizen groups. Steam

gasification would treat organic materials such as

chemical agents (as well as propellants and explosives) with high temperature steam to produce

simple organic molecules. One vendor is developing

and marketing a portable device using hightemperature steam gasification for the destruction of

gaseous, liquid, and solid organic-containing wastes

(8). The machine is designed to handle bulk objects

such as 55-gallon drums fried with waste, and

therefore may be suitable for handling certain

munitions and bulk CW containers. However, the

device has not been tested with actual CW agents or

actual CW munitions.

In contrast to conventional incineration, steam

gasification does not use an airflow, so the gas

produced by the process is minimized. The same

vendor is currently working on CW disposal problems for the DOE, such as solvent contaminated soil,

that do not involve chemical weapons. It proposes

the use of one or more of its mobile devices

operating directly in or next to a CW storage igloo.

With proper modification, the igloo might serve as

a secondary confinement container. The vendor

claims that this system could avoid the risks

associated with transporting chemical weapons out

of the igloo, a major concern to some citizen groups

that live around such facilities.

Plasma Arc Pyrolysis

Plasma arc pyrolysis, currently in the development stage, has also been proposed for destruction of

chemical weapons by Kentucky citizen groups. In

this process, chemical substances are dissociated

into their atomic elements in a thermal plasma field

created by passing an electric current through a

low-pressure airstreamo The entire system is transportable on a tractor-trailer bed. The most significant

limitation of plasma arc pyrolysis treatment is that

only liquids can be treated. Contaminated soil and

viscous materials cannot be processed by the system

(3). Therefore, plasma arc pyrolysis technology in its

current form would not be suitable for the treatment

of contaminated, drained munitions or of the containers, explosives, propellants, and dunnage associated with chemical weapons.
28 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Improved Interim Continued Storage—

The CW Demilitarization Alternative

In view of the current uncertainty about when any

technology will be available for destruction of the

CW stockpile, an interim alternative that would

involve the transfer of chemical agents from munitions to superior-quality, long-term storage tanks has

been proposed (9, 10). It is not clear if the approach

of interim storage would conflict with either bilateral or multilateral treaties on CW disposal. The

advantage of interim storage would be to secure the

CW agents in the existing stockpile, particularly

those in the M55 rockets, while developing some

alternative destruction technology. Although not

analyzed in this report, in principle the separation of

chemical agents from explosives and propellants

could enhance the safety of storage. This would still

require a mechanical weapons disassembly process

for removal of the chemical agents, as well as

subsequent decontamination and disposal of the

drained munitions and corresponding explosives

and propellants.

Although it is likely that solving these problems

may be no less difficult than disposal of the CW

agent itself, an analysis of separating the chemical

agents from the M55 rockets has been carried out for

the Army (11). That study presented a conceptual

engineering design, cost estimate, and risk assessment for draining and storing in bulk containers the

chemical agents from the explosive and propellant

portions of the M55 rockets. The remaining rocket

components were to be chemically decontaminated

and stored for latter disposal. The report did not

address the issues of the storage and ultimate

destruction of the separated rocket components, the

chemical decontamination solutions or the CW

agents. Moreover, the report indicated that the rocket

separation concept was in an extremely early stage

of development and should be viewed as preliminary

in nature. As with any new unproven technology that

might be applicable to CW destruction, pilot-plant

testing and verification of the process would be

required before it could be implemented (11). A

possible interim solution for the leaking M55

rockets would be to place all of the rockets now in

storage into the protective steel “overpack” containers that the Army already uses only for leaking

rockets (see box l-C).

Alternatives Involving Transportation and

Relocation of the CW Stockpile

In the 1988 PEIS, the Army considered and

rejected the alternative of partial or complete relocation of the U.S. CW stockpile to either regional or

national sites for disassembly and incineration

because the overall risk was calculated to be higher.

However, CW relocation may in principle be considered with whatever destruction technology is selected. In 1987 the Mitre Corp. prepared a risk

assessment for the Army that compared various

transportation alternatives (12). Further details of

this report are given in Appendix B.

Since the condition of the U.S. CW stockpile has

not received rigorous analysis, many conclusions

about the relative safety of various transportation

options will remain questionable regardless of the

specific destruction technology used. The only

options considered in the Mitre report were continued storage (the ‘‘no-action” alternative) versus

on-site destruction, and partial or complete relocation, for destruction via disassembly-incineration.

The Mitre risk comparisons considered only relative

risks to the general population and excluded risks to

workers at the CW destruction facilities.

The risks associated with different options will be

borne by different populations. Thus, the risk of

continued storage will be borne mostly by the

population surrounding the storage site, whereas the

risks associated with transport will be borne largely

by populations along the transportation corridor and

at the final destination (12). The fact that the risks for

various alternatives might generate controversy

among the different populations involved was not

considered in the Mitre risk assessment.

According to the Mitre report, the continued

storage option had significantly greater expected

fatalities than all other alternatives when considering the combined risks at all eight U.S. sites. Using

appropriate safety procedures, on-site incineration

was estimated to be significantly less risky than any

other alternative considered. Combining the total

risk at all eight U.S. sites, the continued storage

alternative-even with appropriate safety procedureshad the greatest expected fatalities associated with

it, whereas on-site destruction involves the least risk.

Regional, national, or partial relocation and disposal

alternatives, respectively, have increasingly greater

expected fatalities than on-site destruction (12). The
Chapter 3-Current Technology and Alternatives ● 29

on-site disposal alternative also had the lowest

probability of causing one or more fatalities, and

partial relocation the highest. For the on-site disposal alternative, transportation activities accounted

for 44 percent of the expected fatalities and plant

operations for 48 percent. In this situation, the M55

rockets in the CW stockpile accounted for 50 percent

and bulk containers 42 percent of the expected

fatalities.

The general conclusions reached about the relative risks of transportation alternatives for the

combined eight sites often differed significantly

from the conclusions reached by site-specific analyses. For example, the risk from continued storage

with appropriate safety procedures was much lower

at the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot than at the

seven other U.S. sites. Although the risk of continued storage was clearly greater than that of on-site

disposal at the Aberdeen (Maryland), Newport

(Indiana), Pueblo (Colorado), Tooele (Utah), and

Umatilla (Oregon) sites, this was not the case with

Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot (Kentucky) and

Pine Bluff (Arkansas) facilities.

Transportation of chemical weapons from their

current sites to regional or national locations for

destruction may be challenged by the States through

which they would have to be moved. The Army 1988

PEIS stated that rail is the preferred mode for the

transportation alternative (13). It described a regional relocation plan using rail shipment to relocate

all continental U.S. chemical weapons to the Tooele

(Utah) and Anniston (Alabama) sites. This plan

requires CW transport from 730 to 1,800 miles,

through 5 to 11 States. A national relocation plan

described by the Army in its 1988 PEIS calls for rail

shipment of all chemical weapons within the continental United States to the Tooele site. This plan

requires CW transport from 730 to 2,670 miles,

through as many as 20 States. A partial relocation

plan was also considered that calls for moving the

chemical stockpiles from the Lexington-Blue Grass

Army Depot and Aberdeen sites to Tooele for

destruction. This plan specified approximately 2,100

to 2,700 air flights over 1,500 to 2,060 miles.

1

CHAPTER 3 REFERENCES

Whelen, R. P., Engineering and Technology Division,

briefing at the Office of the Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen, MD, Oct. 29,

1991.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8,

9.

10.

11.

12,

13.

Baronian, C., Deputy Program Manager and Technical Director, briefing at the Office of the Program

Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen,

MD, Oct. 29, 1991.

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Dioxin Treatment Technologies- Background Paper,

OTA-BP-O-93 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, November 1991).

U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Agent and

Munition Disposal; Summary of the U.S. Army’s

Experience,” Office of the Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving

Ground, MD, September 1987.

Picardi, A., International Environmental Assessment

Group, Alexandria, VA, “Alternative Technologies

for the Detoxification of Chemical Weapons: An

Information Document,” prepared for Greenpeace

International, Washington, DC, May 1991.

Davison, W., Director, Advanced Processing Systems, General Atomics, San Diego, CA, personal

communication, Nov. 19, 1991.

Modell, M., Modell Development Corp., Framingham, MA, personal communication, Nov. 14, 1991.

Galloway, T., Synthetic Technologies Inc.,

Richmond, CA, and Sprung, J. L., Sandia National

Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, personal communication, Dec. 20, 1991.

Hawkins, S., Greenpeace Pacific Campaign, Washington, DC, personal communication, Oct. 22, 1991.

Hille, P. J., Common Ground, Berea, KY, letter

review of the OTA draft on alternatives for chemical

weapons disposal, Apr. 15, 1992.

Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, MA, "M55 Rocket

Separation Study,” prepared for the Office of the

Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,

U.S. Army, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, November 1985.

Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Risk Analysis Supporting the chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP),”

prepared for the Office of the Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, MD, December 1987.

U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile

Disposal Program Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, ’ vols. 1,2,3, Office of the

Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1988.
Appendix A

Selected Chemical Weapon Destruction Techniques

CHEMICAL NEUTRALIZATION:

THE ARMY’S EXPERIENCE

In a 1969 report, the National Research Council (NRC)

recommended chemical neutralization for the destruction

of the chemical weapons (CW) agent GB and incineration

for mustard agents H and HD. After research and

development work on chemical neutralization at the

Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS)

(Tooele, Utah) and Rocky Mountain Arsenal (Denver,

Colorado) in the 1970s, the Army concluded that incineration was the best method for the destruction of all

chemical weapons. The NRC Committee on Chemical

Weapons Disposal has recently been asked by the Army

to reevaluate incineration and alternatives for CW disposal.

Chemical Neutralization of Nerve Agents

Most of the Army’s experience with large-scale chemical neutralization of chemical weapons was with the

organophosphorus ester agent GB. This agent was successfully neutralized using aqueous sodium hydroxide on

a scale compatible with destruction of the current U.S.

CW stockpile. Approximately 8.4 million pounds of

GB-taken from underground storage tanks, GB ton

containers, M139 bomblets (Honest John Warhead), M34

cluster bombs, M55 rockets, and 155/105-mm projectiles,

were neutralized at Rocky Mountain Arsenal from 1974

to 1976 and at CAMDS between 1979 and 1982. By

weight, this represents 17 percent of the 25,000 tons of

agent to be destroyed in the current program.

GB is stable at neutral pH but is hydrolyzed rapidly at

alkaline pH. The half-life of GB at 300 C in aqueous

solution is 146 hours at pH 7 (neutral conditions) but

decreases to 0.4 hour at pH 9 (alkaline conditions) (l).

Presumably at higher pH and temperature, the hydrolysis

rate would be even more rapid. The suggestion has been

made that the addition of a catalyst could speed up this

hydrolysis reaction even more (2).

As part of the Army’s program, after GB neutralization

was determined to be complete, the resulting brine was

evaporated by spray drying and the salts were packed into

drums for disposal. There were some problems with the

spray-drying process, including the possibility that GB

might re-form under certain conditions. This re-formation

could be successfully avoided by adjusting the pH and

brine flow rate, and by reducing the operating temperature

(l).

Difficulties were also encountered in confirming that

the brine was agent-free. Particularly at the CAMDS

facility, minute quantities of agent were detected in the

brine. At Rocky Mountain Arsenal the neutralization

brine was considered agent-free if a 5 percent excess

sodium hydroxide level was achieved. At CAMDS a more

strict criterion was used of less than 20 parts per billion

(ppb) agent (the Army’s soldier drinking water standard).

Difficulties in certifying this level of destruction at

CAMDS may have come from occlusion of GB in rust or

other particulate, formation of GB during analysis, or

false positives resulting from some unidentified interference in the complex neutralization mixture (l). Agent

emissions at the facility during brine spraying at Rocky

Mountain Arsenal often exceeded the action level (0.0003

milligram per cubic meter (mg/m3)) and occasionally the

shutdown level (0.003 mg/m3). These levels were promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services

(DHHS) and the Army’s Surgeon General. However,

perimeter monitors showed that the emission standard for

the general population was not exceeded (l).

After being drained of GB, the empty munition bodies

were moved to a deactivation furnace where explosives

and propellants were incinerated and metal parts thermally decontaminated, i.e., incinerated. Empty ton containers were similarly incinerated in separate furnaces.

Thus, “chemical neutralization” actually applied only to

the drained agent and treatment of the remaining waste

depended on incineration. However, disposal of the M34

cluster bomblets and ton containers used a caustic

(aqueous sodium hydroxide) wash to treat the drained

container by neutralizing any residual agent. For some

reason—possibly a lack of confidence in the efficacy of

this process-the caustic wash treatment was also followed by thermal decontamination (incineration).

From 1979 to 1981,13,951 M55 rockets containing GB

(2.9 percent of the current M55 rocket stockpile) were

destroyed by this combined chemical neutralization/

incineration process (l). The Army also reported problems with re-formation of GB during the brine drying

process, although it is not clear why the corrective actions

described above were not applied to solve the problem in

this instance. The reaction was also reported to take longer

than expected. Adding excess sodium hydroxide to

accelerate the reaction created a larger amount of salt for

disposal. Given the intrinsically rapid hydrolysis rate of

GB under alkaline conditions (corresponding to a short

half life), the apparent slow reaction encountered in this

situation may have been due to problems associated with

the large scale of the demonstration such as complete and

thorough mixing of the organic material with the aqueous

sodium hydroxide.

–31-
32 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Although the agent VX, which is structurally similar to

GB, can also be chemically neutralized, this was never

demonstrated by the Army on a large scale. Acid

chlorinolysis (chlorination in an aqueous acidic medium

followed by caustic neutralization) rather than alkaline

hydrolysis was suggested by the Army as the best method

for chemical destruction of VX (l). However, VX was

shown to be neutralized on a small scale by hydrolysis

with sodium hydroxide. The problems encountered with

the neutralization of GB led the Army to abandon plans

to test the large-scale neutralization of VX. The Army

indicated that a poor water volubility, mixing problems,

and the presence of a “bis” impurity (with unspecified

susceptibility to alkaline hydrolysis) made alkaline hydrolysis of VX difficult (l). As with GB, neutralization

was apparently intended only for the liquid chemical

agent. Incineration was to be used for destruction of the

explosives and propellant components, and for thermal

decontamination of munition cavities and metal parts. In

addition, lack of a reliable low-level monitoring capability for VX in the neutralization brine at the time of the

Army’s research program led it to conclude that DHHS

would never approve chemical hydrolysis (l).

Chemical Neutralization of Mustard Agents

Mustard agent has also been shown in the Army’s

research to be hydrolyzed under alkaline conditions on a

small scale, although only slowly at ambient temperature.

The corresponding reaction rates with alkaline hydrolysis

at elevated temperature were not reported. The products

of mustard hydrolysis with sodium hydroxide were not

identified and their toxicities were not assessed. Alkaline

hydrolysis of mustard agents on a pilot-plant scale was

reported, using the base monomethanolamine instead of

sodium hydroxide, to produce a homogeneous nontoxic

organic waste. Calcium hypochlorite slurry or aqueous

bleach (sodium hypochlorite) was used to oxidize rather

than hydrolyze mustard agents, but there was “uncertainty about the completeness of the reaction” (l).

Summary of the Army’s Neutralization

Process Experience

In the Army’s summary of its experience with chemical

neutralization, the following reasons were given for

abandoning the process in favor of incineration (l):

1.

2.

The perceived complexity of neutralization compared to incineration. Caustic reactants used for

chemical neutralization had to be handled safely in

bulk quantities. However, many industrial largescale processes routinely use such caustic agents,

e.g., the manufacture of soap, The major safety issue

in handling chemical weapons will always be the

agents themselves.

The sensitivity of neutralization to a number of

variables that could slow the reaction and possibly

3.

4.

5.

lead to re-formation of the agent. In some situations, the rate of neutralization in large-scale tests of

chemical agents was much slower than had been

predicted. Very large amounts of impurities in

certain grades of mustard agent also made neutralization difficult to monitor adequately. However, it

is not clear that the problems encountered with

‘‘industrial scale-up” of chemical neutralization are

insurmountable, and the scale of a chemical neutralization program is similar to or smaller than that of

industrial large-scale processes.

The quantity and nature of the waste produced by

neutralization are more problematic than those

produced by incineration. Calculations by the Army

indicated that 1 pound of GB will produce 1.5

pounds of salt, compared to a salt yield of 1.4

pounds from incineration. In practice, the excess

caustic added to speed up the reaction led to 2.6

pounds at Rocky Mountain and 3 to 6 pounds at

CAMDS of salt per pound of agent hydrolyzed. The

Army speculated that the sometimes heterogeneous

form of some agents (partially gelled, mixed with

solid particles such as rust) may have contributed to

the variation in results obtained with chemical

neutralization. These types of technical problems

encountered in the transformation of industrial

processes from bench-scale demonstrations may not

be insurmountable given sufficient motivation to

reach a solution. Also, it has been argued that

producing larger amounts of salts from neutralization may be relatively more acceptable than some of

the perceived problems of incineration, such as the

formation of dioxins.

The capital and operating costs of chemical neutralization were estimated to be higher than those of

incineration (1). This cost comparison might have

to be considerably revised now in light of the

unanticipated cost increases in the Army’s incineration program, which are due in part to technical

problems encountered by the Army after 1987 (3).

The analytical problems encountered in certifying

that the waste materials of chemical neutralization

were agent-free. This must be compared to the

analytical problems faced in demonstrating that

incineration products of incomplete combustion

(PICs) are dioxin or agent-free, etc.

After reviewing the Army’s experience with chemical

neutralization and incineration of chemical weapons, the

NRC in 1984 supported the Army’s decision to abandon

chemical neutralization in favor of incineration. In light of

the current political opposition to incineration, and after

considerably more experience with this technology, it is

not clear that the same endorsement would be made today.

In principle, with appropriate conditions, alkaline hydrolysis could be a means to chemically neutralize the

CW agents GB, VX, and mustards. Problems encountered
Appendix A-Selected Chemical Weapon Destruction Techniques ● 33

with alkaline hydrolysis of all types of CW agents might

today appear to be surmountable in view of new

techniques as well as increased pressure to exploit

existing techniques for use with CW destruction. The

NRC’s Committee on Review and Evaluation of the

Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and Committee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies, were recently requested by the Army to

reevaluate incineration and alternatives for CW disposal.

SUPERCRITICAL WATER

OXIDATION

Supercritical water refers to water that has been heated

and pressurized to a transition point between gas and

liquid phases, and thus has some of the properties of both.

In the supercritical phase the solvent properties of water

change, and organic materials becomes soluble, whereas

inorganic salts become insoluble and tend to precipitate

(4). Organic materials in solution with supercritical water

can be oxidized by oxygen introduced from air. This is a

broad-spectrum oxidation procedure for organic compounds, and at elevated temperature (4000 C), even

refractory compounds such as coal are oxidized (5).

Supercritical water oxidation (SCWO) is similar to

incineration in that it involves oxidation of organic

compounds to carbon dioxide and inorganic acids or salts.

However, SCWO operates at much lower temperatures

than incineration. SCWO is under commercial development as a general technology for the destruction of many

different organic hazardous materials, and the destruction

of CW agents would at most constitute only a small

portion of its use.

SCWO may have certain advantages over incineration

for the oxidation of organic waste. Compared to incineration, SCWO has no requirement for a large airflow.

SCWO carries out oxidation at lower temperature, and the

reaction medium (water) can be contained until it is tested

to be safe. A major selling point of this technology is that

potential PICs are entrained in solution rather than

emitted in stack gases. The apparently superior control of

emissions is an attractive feature of SCWO technology.

The effluents from SCWO, in contrast to exhaust stack

gases from incineration, may be collected, analyzed, and

even recycled to achieve more complete destruction.

In discussions with Modell Corp. and General Atomics,

two companies that are involved in the development of

SCWO for CW agent destruction, it was apparent that

currently there are both advantages and limitations with

this technology. Modell has completed the initial phase of

a research program on the use of SCWO for the treatment

of CW agents (5). It has successfully demonstrated for the

Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA)

the destruction of “simulants” (analogs) of GB, VX, and

HB on a bench scale. Modell achieved “destruction and

removal efficiencies” (DREs) of 99.99999 percent and

has proposed, but not begun, a demonstration of the

technology for DARPA with actual agents. Although

Modell has not yet worked with actual CW agents, it has

demonstrated the oxidation of some explosive materials

such as the effluent from TNT manufacture (’red water’).

The formation and environmental release of dioxin, a

concern in the incineration of organic materials, may not

be significant for SCWO. Modell has demonstrated that

the dioxin congener (TCDD) was oxidized to below

detectable levels when introduced at 500 parts per million

(ppm). The Modell technology has also been demonstrated to work for the destruction of dioxin in pulp mill

waste streams. Wood, when suitably pulverized and

converted to a flowable form, can also be treated.

Gaseous effluents from SCWO are carbon dioxide and

oxygen with traces of carbon monoxide (10 to 15 ppm

with optimized operation). In Modell’s process, these

effluent gases are expanded and cooled; the carbon

dioxide is solidified and removed, and the oxygen is

recycled through the system. This process might be

considered a “closed” system in comparison with

incineration. Oxidation of organic materials containing

hetero atoms such as fluorine, chlorine, sulfur, or

phosphorus produces the corresponding hydrofluoric,

hydrochloric, sulfuric, and phosphoric mineral acids in

solution. These can be neutralized, precipitated from the

SCWO reactor water solution, and removed from the

SCWO reaction vessel.

Although Modell believes that its SCWO technology

could be developed for the Army’s CW destruction

program, it has been unable to interest the Army in this

work. From Modell’s perspective, the Army’s commitment to incineration technology has led it to dismiss

viable alternatives such as SCWO. On the other hand, the

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has apparently expressed an interest in using the technology to treat

radioactive mixed waste. In general, Modell considers

that the greatest commercial opportunities and market for

this technology are not in CW destruction but in other

areas of organic waste disposal. The Modell Corp. is

currently operating a bench-scale SCWO facility with a

capacity of 30 gallons per day and hopes soon to construct

an SCWO facility in Germany with a capacity of 5 to 10

tons a day. Modell estimates a cost of $200 per ton for

sludge disposal.

General Atomics’ (GA) engineers who are involved

with SCWO development are considerably more cautious

about the future uses of this technology for hazardous

waste and CW agent disposal (6). Although a wide range

of organic compounds have been shown by GA to be

oxidized by SCWO technology on a bench scale, it has

never been demonstrated with actual CW agents. GA is

currently under contract to DARPA and the Office of
34 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Naval Research to perform the necessary research and

build a prototype SCWO system that would be capable of

processing relatively small amounts of chemical agents,

propellants, and other U.S. Department of Defense

wastes. SCWO as it is presently conceived is not designed

to handle solid CW agent disposal waste forms such as

drained munitions or dunnage. The research program,

which will be conducted with support from the University

of Texas, the IIT Research Institute (Chicago, Illinois),

and EcoWaste Technologies (Austin, Texas), will initially focus on two areas of importance-corrosion and

solids handling. Corrosion with SCWO is a significant

issue especially because of the mineral acids formed from

the oxidation of compounds containing fluorine, chlorine,

sulfur, and phosphorus hetero atoms. The handling of

solids, such as the salts formed and precipitated during

SCWO, will require careful attention because such

inorganic salts can become sticky under SCWO conditions and could foul the walls of the reactor.

The DARPA contract calls for a 15-month research

phase to address these and other issues and to develop

data, initially on simulants and then on actual CW agents.

Concurrently, a 3+-year pilot-plant development effort is

planned to lead to the construction and testing of a

prototype SCWO unit with a capacity of 1,000 to 1,500

gallons per day. Full demonstration of the practical

application of this technology to CW agent destruction is

therefore estimated by GA to be more than 3 years away.

In discussing the likely success of this application of

SCWO, GA tended to be cautious and to emphasize the

need for the data that will be developed during the

research phase of this work

GA considers the recent bilateral, as well as current and

future multilateral, agreements on CW destruction and

nonproliferation to be an ideal opportunity for SCWO

technology. For example, the United Nations has announced its intention to destroy the Iraqi CW stockpile,

which is considerably smaller than that of the United

States. Use of mobile SCWO-based machines for destruction of this type of small stockpile could be an ideal

application. Unfortunately, the technology may not be

developed in time to be applicable to this particular

situation.

STEAM GASIFICATION

TECHNOLOGY

A process known as steam gasification (re-forming)

treats organic materials with steam at 1,000 to 1,300 ‘C

under reducing conditions to produce carbon monoxide,

carbon dioxide, and hydrogen (7). The steam/organic

materials stream is recirculated through the high temperature reactor to control destruction efficiency. The carbon

monoxide and hydrogen can be reacted over a suitable

catalyst to form either methanol or carbon dioxide and

water. Since steam gasification is a reducing process

rather than an oxidation process such as incineration PICS

will not be formed. This reaction is a temperaturecontrolled equilibrium process so, in principle, any level

of destruction may be achieved by selecting an appropriate temperature.

The current developer is interested in testing its steam

gasification system for CW destruction. It has demonstrated the device with CW simulants but not with actual

CW agents. The machine is designed to handle bulk

objects, including 55-gallon drums filled with waste, and

may therefore be suitable for handling properly prepared

munitions and CW containers. Drummed wastes are

gasified in the drums, one drum at a time, by placing each

drum in a chamber operated at 300 to 700 ‘C. In its current

form, halogens are removed from organic materials by

pretreatment with alkali, and the remaining dehalogenated organic material is destroyed by steam gasification.

Sulfur- and phosphorus-containing materials are converted to salts of their reduced forms hydrogen sulfide and

phosphine. In contrast to conventional incineration, steam

gasification does not use an airflow so the gas flow output

to the environment is minimized.

The developer is offering a “premarket” machine for

customer evaluation. The machine is approximately 5 by

6 by 7 feet and costs about $700,000 when supplied with

a drum feeder and flash vaporizer. The company is

already working on chemical waste disposal problems for

DOE, such as destruction of chlorinated solvents and

organic wastes from weapons dismantlement, that do not

involve chemical weapons. It has proposed a system that

would use one or more mobile steam gasification devices

directly in a CW storage igloo or on a truck positioned

next to the igloo. In this concept, a modified version of the

Army’s current M55 rocket shearing system could be

coupled to the drum feeder. Passage of hot steam around

and through the sheared, drained munition would decontaminate the empty shell. This configuration would have

the advantage of avoiding the risk associated with

transporting CWs from the igloo to a larger stationary

destruction device.

The developer is currently negotiating a contract to

destroy napalm bombs located at Camp Pendleton,

California, by use of steam gasification. These napalm

bombs consist of a 15-foot-long aluminum container

filled with napalm and an explosive. The company plans

to modify its device to contain an entire bomb during the

steam gasification destruction process.

PLASMA ARC TECHNOLOGY

A newly developed Plasma Arc Technology System

can process nearly 10 pounds per minute of solid waste or

55 gallons per hour of liquid waste (4). The developer is

currently testing plasma arc pyrolysis (PAP) technology,
Appendix A-Selected Chemical Weapon Destruction Techniques ● 35

although it has not specifically tested the system with CW

agents. After waste has been atomized in the plasma

pyrolysis chamber the resulting elements are cooled in a

second portion of the chamber and recombine to form

hydrogen, carbon monoxide, and hydrochloric acid. Such

plasmas can reach temperatures of 5,000 to 15,0000 C.

The resulting gases are passed through a wet caustic

scrubber for removal of particulate and hydrochloric

acid. The remaining gases are combusted with air. The

entire system fits on a 45-foot-long transportable tractortrailer bed.

The most significant limitation of PAP treatment is that

only liquids can be treated. Contaminated soil and viscous

materials cannot be processed by the system (4). Thus

PAP technology in its current form would not be suitable

for the treatment of contaminated drained munitions,

containers, explosives, or propellants, and the dunnage

associated with chemical weapons.

Appendix A References

1. U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Agent and

Munition Disposal; Summary of the U.S. Army’s

Experience,” Office of the Program Manager for

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving

Ground, MD, September 1987.

Picardi, A., International Environmental Assessment

Group, Alexandria, VA, “Alternative Technologies

for the Detoxification of Chemical Weapons: An

Information Document,” prepared for Greenpeace

International, Washington, DC, May 1991.

U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Stockpile

Destruction Delayed at the Army’s Prototype Disposal

Facility, GAO/NSIAD-90-222 (Washington, DC: July

1990).

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Dioxin Treatment Technologies-Background Paper,

OTA-BP-O-93 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, November 1991).

Modell, M., Modell Development Corp., Framingham, MA, personal communication, Nov. 14, 1991.

Davison, W., Director, Advanced Processing Systems,

General Atomics, San Diego, CA, personal communication, Nov. 19, 1991.

Galloway, T., Synthetic Technologies Inc.,

Richmond, CA, and Sprung, J. L., Sandia National

Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, personal communication, Dec. 20, 1991.
Appendix B

U.S. Army Risk Assessment for Off-Site Transportation

of Chemical Weapons

In 1987a risk assessment on transportation alternatives

was conducted by the Mitre Corp. to support the Army’s

1988 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

(PEIS) (1, 2). It was intended to give a consistent and

quantitative comparison of the risks of accidental chemical agent exposure to the public during on-site disposal

versus various regional or national transportation and

disposal alternatives. The analysis assumed that disassembly and incineration would be used with any of the

transportation alternatives considered, so that the alternatives consisted only of variations on the logistics of

chemical weapons (CW) transportation and the location

of disposal facilities. However, many of the conclusions

about transportation alternatives, and details about specific storage sites, were independent of the method of CW

destruction. The analysis is unique in that it systematically examined and compared risks associated with

certain CW transportation options, some of which are still

being seriously discussed. Therefore a review of this

document is relevant to a consideration of new alternatives.

In the Mitre analysis, risk was specifically defined as

risk to the public (individuals outside the boundaries of

the military installation) at the proposed disposal sites or

along potential transportation corridors. Risks to persons

involved in operating and maintaining the facilities were

not considered. Only accidents that could result in agent

release at potentially lethal concentrations were considered. Risks from chronic effects of long-term, low-level

exposure to CW agents, or to materials released during

CW incineration, were not included. This present review

focuses on the assumptions and conclusions of Mitre’s

risk assessment and not with the risk assessment methodology.

Five alternatives were evaluated in the Mitre report and

in the 1988 PEIS:

1.

2.

On-site disposal. Chemical weapons would be

destroyed at their current locations. Risk was

assumed to come from handling, on-site transport,

and plant operations.

Regional disposal. Chemical weapons stored in the

eastern United States would be shipped by rail to

Anniston Army Depot (Alabama), while those in

the western United States would be shipped to

Tooele Army Depot (Utah). Risk was assumed to

come from the same activities as on-site disposal,

with additional risks from handling and off-site

transport.

3.

4.

5.

National disposal. All chemical weapons in the

continental United States would be shipped by rail

to Tooele Army Depot. Risk was assumed to come

from the same activities as on-site disposal, with

additional risks from handling and off-site transport.

Partial relocation. On-site CW disposal would be

used at most sites, but the stockpile from Aberdeen

Proving Ground (Maryland) and Lexington-Blue

Grass Army Depot (Kentucky) would be relocated

by air transport to Tooele.

‘‘No-action’ alternative. Chemical weapons would

be stored at their current locations for-at least 25

years. Risk was assumed to come from relatively

rare catastrophic events such as tornadoes or

airplane crashes. Although the probability of such

accidents is low, the consequences would be great,

and the risk extends over a relatively longer time.

Risk would also come from normal monitoring and

handling operations of the CW stockpile, including

the processing of leaking munitions.

Risk was measured exclusively in terms of acute effects

as the following:

●

●

●

e

●

●

●

●

Maximum individual risk;

Maximum lethal plume distance, or minimum distance of an individual from a given site or transportation corridor with no risk of lethal exposure;

Maximum total time at risk for an individual;

Probability of one or more fatalities;

Maximum number of fatalities;

Expected fatalities;

Total person-years at risk and

Expected plume area (used in the study as a surrogate

for overall ecological impact).

Comparative risk assessments based on the above

criteria were done both on the entire CW disposal

program, along with site-specific assessments for the

eight individual sites.

Events identified by the risk assessment process that

might potentially lead to accidents involving release of

and exposure to CW agents could often be mitigated or

reduced through design and procedural changes. Risks

were analyzed for the unmitigated case and again after

appropriate mitigation. Mitigation strategies included:

using foam or other materials for rapid spill cleanup,

battery-powered lifting devices, blunt bumpers on lift

truck tines, improved mobile fire control systems, seismic

actuated gas cutoff valves in the munition demilitarization

–36-
Appendix B-U.S. Army Risk Assessment for Off-Site Transportation of Chemical Weapons ● 37

buildings, metal shields at the explosive containment

entry and seismically actuated warehouse circuit breakers, changing the munition unpacking area to prevent

mines and rockets from being inadvertently conveyed to

the dunnage furnace, freezing mustard ton containers for

transportation, and restricting airspace at all sites and

eliminating military helicopter flights. The following

discussion of the Mitre report emphasizes the conclusions

about risk assessments with all appropriate mitigation

steps in effect.

Uncertainty in these risk assessments was assumed to

come from uncertainty in the estimated probability that an

accident would take place, not uncertainty about the

consequence of an accident or about estimates of population density, atmospheric conditions, and dose response.

PROGRAMMATIC RISK

COMPARISONS (RISK

COMBINING ALL SITES)

With mitigation, on-site disposal had the lowest

probability of causing one or more fatalities, whereas

regional relocation, continued storage, national relocation, and partial relocation with disposal alternatives

had 5, 7, 10, and 11 times greater probability of one or

more fatalities, respectively. Regional disposal, partial

relocation, and national disposal alternatives had, respectively, 10-, 26-, and 30-fold greater expected fatalities

than on-site disposal. Even with mitigation, the continued

storage alternative had the greatest number of expected

fatalities and on-site destruction the least. This resulted

largely because the estimated risk from continued storage

occurred over a relatively long period (25 years) and came

from rare catastrophic events that would have relatively

large consequences. With mitigation, on-site disposal had

the lowest probability of causing one or more fatalities

and partial relocation had the highest. Mitigation did not

change the number of maximum possible fatalities. As in

the unmitigated case, continued storage had significantly

greater expected fatalities than all other alternatives. With

mitigation, on-site disposal was significantly less risky

than any other alternative considered.

For the continued storage with mitigation programmatic

alternative, 99 percent of the expected fatalities were

associated with CW storage, and the risk associated with

handling and stockpile movement for maintenance and

surveillance accounted for the remaining 1 percent.

Accidents with bulk containers accounted for 99 percent

of the expected fatalities. For the programmatic on-site

disposal alternative with mitigation, on-site transportation activities accounted for 44 percent of expected

fatalities, and plant operations for 48 percent. The M55

rockets in the CW stockpile accounted for 50 percent and

bulk containers 42 percent of expected fatalities.

For the partial relocation alternative without mitigation

(which calls for air transport of the CW stockpile from the

Aberdeen (Maryland) and Lexington-Blue Grass (Kentucky) facilities to Tooele (Utah) using C141 airplanes),

accidents involving rockets contributed 77 percent and

in-flight air accidents along the transportation corridor

accounted for 46 percent of the total risk Accidents with

the highest consequence were considered to occur during

aircraft takeoff involving rockets and projectiles containing GB. Mitigation reduced the probability of one or

more fatalities approximately threefold, although expected fatalities were not significantly decreased. Mitigation had the largest effect on reducing risk from plant

operations.

SITE-SPECIFIC RISK

COMPARISONS

The conclusions reached about programmatic risks for

the combined eight sites described above were often

different from the conclusions reached by site-specific

risk analysis. For example, the risk from continued

storage with mitigation was much lower at LexingtonBlue Grass Army Depot than at the seven other U.S. sites.

Although the risk associated with continued storage with

mitigation clearly was greater than on-site disposal with

mitigation at the sites in Aberdeen, Maryland; Newport,

Indiana; Pueblo, Colorado; Tooele, Utah; and Umatilla,

Oregon, this was not the case with Lexington-Blue Grass

and Pine Bluff (Arkansas) facilities.

Major differences were reported in the distribution of

risk among populations at the eight continental U.S. sites,

in terms of expected fatalities. For the continued storage

option with mitigation, the total program risk is mostly

from potential accidents involving the CW stockpiles at

the Newport Army, Aberdeen Proving Ground, and

Umatilla depots. The risk of continued storage with

mitigation at the other five sites contributes little to the

overall programmatic risk. For on-site disposal with

mitigation, 75 percent of the total program risk is borne

approximately equally by the Army depots in Pueblo,

Colorado, and Newport, Indiana.

For the regional disposal alternative with mitigation, 75

percent of the total program risk is borne by populations

along transportation corridors. For the national disposal

site alternative with mitigation, 98 percent of the total risk

is borne by the population along the transportation

corridor. An intuitive understanding of these relative risks

may explain why transportation alternatives are more

popular with people living near existing stockpile sites.

The total program risk from on-site versus regional

disposal was not statistically distinguishable (3). Other

factors entered into the Army’s decision to select on-site,

rather than regional, disposal. The Army argued that the

results showing a lack of significant difference in risk
38 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

associated with these two programmatic alternatives did

not consider the location and mitigation of possible

accidents. A qualitative consideration of this risk factor 2.

led to the conclusion that any option that involves

transportation of chemical weapons off-site is more risky

(3).

Appendix B References

1. U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile

Disposal Program Final Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3, Office of the Program

3.

Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, MD, 1988.

Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Risk Analysis Supporting

the Chemical Stockpile Disposal program (CSDP),”

prepared for the Office of the Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, MD, December 1987.

Azuma, E., Office of the Assistant Secretary of the

Army, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, briefing at the

Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, DC,

Oct. 18, 1991.
Appendix C

Summary of the Chemical Weapons Workshop

To investigate the feasibility of developing alternative

technologies and approaches to chemical weapons (CW)

destruction, OTA conducted a l-day workshop on February 24, 1992. The workshop explored approaches to

implementing such a development program if that policy

was adopted. The participants were selected from private

and public institutions with background and experience in

research, development, and demonstration of innovative

technologies in the fields of both waste treatment and

chemical processing. The agenda was set to first give

some history of the current program, to discuss the key

obstacles to implementing the technology now under test,

and then to discuss ideas for the creation of an alternative,

and possibly concurrent, plan.

It was noted that public acceptance problems are

seriously affecting the U.S. Government’s ability to

efficiently and effectively establish incineration facilities

at the eight sites and successfully destroy the stockpile of

obsolete weapons as directed by treaties and domestic

laws. Until these problems are overcome, it is likely that

delays will continue and added costs will mount. Some

believe that the public acceptance problem, in particular,

will prevent incineration facilities from being built and

operated in the foreseeable future at some, if not most, of

the depot locations.

OTA staff had concluded and the workshop participants agreed, that none of the alternatives to the current

Army program, that have been proposed by various

individuals or groups, could be expected to be available

soon for destruction of the weapons stockpile. Rather,

each is in some early stage of development where it must

undergo substantial integration with a larger system and

testing or field demonstrations before it could be considered acceptable. Further, the process for supporting the

development and testing of alternative technologies and

systems is limited. While some firms and individuals have

proposed alternative technologies that are promising,

none have been tested with actual chemical agent and

most only address a part of the total weapons destruction

system (usually the treatment of the agent itself) and thus

must be considered as only part of the total solution.

Because any alternative technology would need to be

further developed and tested, the workshop participants

discussed how a development program should be structured, how certain promising technologies might be

selected for further development, what criteria would be

selected for judging the acceptability of new technologies,

what other factors need to be considered, and what time

and resources would be required. The following is a

summary of the points made during these discussions.

An important conclusion of the workshop was that,

even though a technology (namely, incineration) may be

viewed by the government as the “technically best” or

“most available” (or even, as in this case, the “only

available’ ‘), it may nonetheless be necessary to develop

alternative technologies for possible use at some of the

sites because some of the communities will not accept the

chosen solution. Even though current deadlines established by law and government policy may, in principle,

not allow enough time to develop alternatives, much more

time is likely to be available when public opposition

delays the implementation of the current technical approach. However, workshop participants noted, it’s important that the government doesn’t make the same

mistakes in developing alternative technologies as it did

in picking the current one. That is, it mustn’t be done in

a process closed to the stakeholders and interested parties.

Thus the process of developing a possible alternative

technology will be as important as the pure technical

solution itself. The process must involve the public early

and continuously and must provide for meaningful public

input to the decisions that are made.

Congressional concerns about the current program and

its chances for success were discussed by workshop

participants. Four committees in Congress have authority

over the Army’s Chemical Demilitarization program:

Senate and House Committees on Appropriations (Subcommittee on Defense), and the Senate and House

Committees on Armed Services. These committees do not

all agree about the proper direction of this program, but its

cost is becoming an increasingly important issue to all.

Some feel that the eight sites where incinerators are

planned are somewhat politically isolated-’ ‘them against

the world. ’

Implementation of an alternative technology development

program may require a new, neutral institution other than

the Army to administer it. Some participants believed that

a location should be designated, probably by Congress,

where new, competing technologies could be tried. An

example might be to use a portion of the Johnston Atoll

chemical Agent Disposal System facilities at Johnston

Island, although the possibility of site contamination with

agent would have to be evaluated. This facility is already

designed to handle the CW munitions and agents.

National Research Council (NRC) activity was also

discussed at the workshop. The NRC has a Committee on

Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies, under

the Board on Army Science and Technology, chaired by

John Longwell (MIT) and Gene Dyer (Bechtel). The

committee plans to review all proposals for alternative

technologies and to identify the most promising ap-

–39–
40 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

preaches. It will ask the scientific and commercial

community to come forward and present their ideas. The

committee will characterize the alternatives, enumerating

their strengths, weaknesses, potential advantages and

disadvantages, and needed research. It is possible that

these NRC committee activities will become beginning

steps of new national alternatives for CW destruction

program, even though this is not the intention now. The

NRC expects to develop a data bank to which others will

have access. The OTA workshop participants suggested

that the NRC also deal with the key issues of public

participation in its work. However, its position as a purely

scientific body may make this difficult.

The NRC committee considers that an alternative

technology must have application to one or more of the

four process streams currently used to destroy agent and

munitions. Considering the sites, and the nature of the

chemical stockpile located therein, it’s possible that one

or more alternatives (in combination) could apply.

Whatever the case, a total working system is required in

the end, and the system eventually developed must be the

result of a series of reevaluations and corrections.

Workshop participants agreed that only after integration

and conceptual system design is done will it be possible

to compare the merits of alternatives to the current system.

It is very difficult, as well, to compare technologies that

are in early stages of development. Usually more design,

testing, and evaluation work is needed before valid

comparisons are made and NRC does not have the

resources to do this.

During discussions of public participation and alternative technology criteria, workshop participants agreed

that different solutions may be appropriate for different

sites or different weapons. The Army and concerned

citizens would need to work together on establishing

site-specific solutions if that approach was followed. Such

public participation is crucial to acceptance of a solution:

merely an explanation of risk to the public is generally

ineffective. Participants all stated that the development of

a new technology is more than just a technical problem,

and the nontechnical community must be involved in a

successful program.

A common nontechnical community position is that the

technical community does not have the right to impose

any risks on the affected public. The problem is that the

U.S. public is unwilling to accept any risk that they did not

consent to. The criteria for a new technology are only

partially technical, and also involve managerial, legal, and

other nontechnical aspects that all must be addressed for

a successful program. A critical point is that the developers of the new technology need a very clear concept of the

needs and concerns of the people who will be affected by

the new technology. Workshop participants felt the

current Army program lacks this concept.

Workshop discussions led to the conclusion that

without local involvement most projects involving ‘waste

disposal” are likely to be vehemently opposed. However,

this may or may not change with community involvement. In addition, the agenda of national groups may be

different than that of local groups and probably should be

handled differently. With regard to the Army’s CW

destruction program, most believed that alternatives

should be developed—the only question is how. The

Nation’s ability to carry this out will reflect on its ability

to function as a technical society in the next century.

Workshop participants also discussed the role of

contractors. Contractors are a key interested party that

should be involved in planning the development of new

technologies. Contractors also have their own agendas

and preferences. The contractor community also needs to

know, and factor in, the political realities, i.e., general

unpopularity of incinerators. Although the CW disposal

program will require oversight from government agencies, the design and implementation will probably come

from private industry. The Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) is developing a computer database on

available vendors and technology for alternative technology development in a number of waste treatment areas.

Most believe that we need some model on how to

commercialize a technology in order to move ahead in this

field.

Some workshop discussion focused on the fact that

good ideas from small companies often have a difficult

time penetrating the Federal procurement system. These

companies will need assistance to do this effectively. The

small developers of new technologies typically have

annual revenues of a few million dollars and are not

capable of financing major development and testing.

Small companies are often willing to try new solutions for

relatively very small amounts of money. However, small

companies often lack a necessary understanding of the

whole system. A second concern of small companies is

their need to protect ownership of new, innovative ideas

that they consider proprietary.

A suggested model by some workshop participants was

to offer a national prize for the best solution to this

problem. This would not necessarily be to invent a totally

new process but rather to work out the technical details of

currently available techniques. It could have the effect of

turning loose competent engineers to work on the

problem. Possibly it could be a joint project with

unemployed Soviet scientists. A disadvantage to this idea

is that small companies may not be able to participate as

well as large ones.

The university consortia concept was another suggestion discussed as a mechanism to develop alternatives.

EPA has developed such consortia with five universities

receiving $5 million over 5 years. EPA feels that the
Appendix C-Summary of the Chemical Weapons Workshop ● 41

universities are bringing new ideas to the stage of

bench-scale testing in about 3 years.

Workshop discussion of regulatory issues affecting the

implementation of a new technology concluded that these

issues should be anticipated at the earliest stage, rather

than waiting until the last minute to worry about them.

Many development programs do not include regulatory

issues until they are ready for field trials, and then projects

are surprised by the delays they encountered. Some

regulations are developed purely as a means to thwart an

unpopular technology. It would be worthwhile to learn

from the Army’s experience about the regulatory issues it

has had to deal with in its current program. In the end,

regulatory issues can make or break a technology.

A key criterion for the development of new technologies is meeting appropriate standards. This will apply to

levels in air, liquids, and solids. Different alternative

technologies will require different disposal criteria. For

example, certain processes may provide less decontamination for CW containers and it will be necessary to

understand how to integrate regulatory standards early in

the development process.

Substantial workshop discussion focused on time

constraints for the Army’s Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program. The time issue is critical in alternative

technology development planning. One approach to an

alternative program could be to try and find mid-term

corrections for the Army’s current system, e.g., replacing

some or all of the incinerators with some other method but

keeping everything else. Another would be to start over

with an entirely new system. The impact on the Army’s

current program clearly will be quite different with these

two approaches. A sense of time constraints will also

dictate where a new program can begin. For example, if

lots of time is available then a new program could afford

to begin in the laboratory; if less time is available then a

new program would probably be forced to consider only

existing bench-scale technologies or technologies already

tested in related areas. In addition, it maybe premature to

try and be definitive in estimating the time required for

successful completion of the Army’s current program.

Technical and regulatory hurdles faced by the program

may delay it more than what has been estimated.

Replacing incineration with some other CW agent treatment technology at this point could be considered by

some a ‘‘mid-term’ modification.

Most workshop participants agreed that a clear analysis

of time constraints is required. This should include an

analysis of the costs of delay, the risks of delaying, the

degree of uncertainty and other factors, and how to

evaluate them.

Workshop discussions explored examples of analogous alternative technology programs. After the Valdez

oil spill in Alaska, bioremediation companies saw the

situation as a golden opportunity. One workshop participant explained the recent experience of the National

Environmental Technology Applications Corp. (NETAC,

see box l-D), which served as an evaluator for EPA and

also put together a national committee that established

technical and nontechnical criteria to evaluate hundreds of

suggestions. This process narrowed the field to two

alternatives that were eventually tested in the field. The

tests involved importation of bacteria not indigenous to

Alaska, despite the concerns of Alaska citizens. This was

accomplished by incorporating public participation in the

decisionmaking process and explaining the relevant

technology to the public. A key to the success of this

program was to initially develop a set of seven key criteria

with public involvement for the evaluation of suggested

technologies.

Another example given by a workshop participant was

the alternative fuels development program, e.g., oil shale

conversion. This is an example of a new technology that

started from scratch. The Synthetic Fuels Demonstration

program eventually produced six major demonstration

projects, but the program eventually failed for financial

reasons when the price of oil went down. Shale oil would

have been competitive only if oil prices continued to go

up, which they didn’t. The lesson of this example is that

a powerful national interest can significantly accelerate a

program.

Discussions also included some history of incineration

in the United States. Incineration was initially perceived

as a panacea for waste treatment. As instrumentation got

better and real experience was gained, unanticipated

problems with incineration were discovered. A similar

progression may be occurring today with bioremediation,

which initially looked as a promising, benign method for

handling waste. Today, people are beginning to ask about

potential hazards from intermediates and byproducts of

bioremediation processes.

Even though most believed that it is desirable and even

essential to sponsor an alternative technology development program, workshop participants felt it important to

understand the risks of such an effort. The prospects for

success of an alternative program are not assured. There

could always be a number of technical problems and

delays associated with any development program. Failure

of a technology or approach in a full-scale test is always

possible. After even the best efforts to develop new

technologies, it is possible that the results could be no

better or even worse than the current system.

Therefore, if an alternative development program was

supported it would not necessarily follow that the current

program should be stopped. It may be possible to combine

the best features of both programs in the future or it may

be that current technologies will be superior to any

alternatives in the end.
42 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Workshop participants agreed that it is not clear struction. An important issue, therefore, is a continuing

whether future degradation of the weapons in the stock- program to evaluate stockpile condition and predict any

pile poses a significant threat and, thus, how this would future problems.

affect decisions about time available for initiating de-