Arms Control in Space

May 1984

NTIS order #PB84-198209
Recommended Citation:

Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-BP-ISC-28, May 1984).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 84-601064

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Workshop on Arms Control in Space

January 30-31, 1984

Prof. McGeorge Bundy, Chair

New York University, New York, N.Y.

Mr. David S. Brandwein

System Planning Corp.

Arlington, Va.

The Hon. George E. Brown, Jr.

Member of Congress

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

Dr. Paul Brown

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Livermore, Calif.

Dr. Robert W. Buchheim

Phoenix, Ariz.

Prof. Albert Carnesale

JFK School of Government

Harvard University

Cambridge, Mass.

Dr. Ashton B. Carter

Center for International Studies

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cambridge, Mass.

The Hon. Cooper Evans

Member of Congress

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

Dr. Richard L. Garwin

IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center

Yorktown Heights, N.Y.

Dr. John H. Gibbons

Director

Office of Technology Assessment

U.S. Congress

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Alex Gliksman

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Washington, D.C.

Prof. Donald L. Hafner

Boston College

Chestnut Hill, Mass.

Mr. Lionel S. Johns

Assistant Director

Office of Technology Assessment

U.S. Congress

Washington, D.C.

Dr. Robert H. Kupperman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Georgetown University

Washington, D.C.

Dr. Steven A. Maaranen

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Los Alamos, N.Mex.

Dr. Michael M. May

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Livermore, Calif.

Dr. Keith B. Payne

National Institute for Public Policy

Fairfax, Va.

Mr. John E. Pike

Federation of American Scientists

Washington, D.C.

The Hon. Larry Pressler

Member of Congress

United States Senate

Washington, D.C.

Dr. Victor W. Reis

Science Applications, Inc.

McLean, Va.

Dr. Peter Sharfman

Program Manager

Office of Technology Assessment

U.S. Congress

Washington, D.C.

Walter Slocombe, Esq.

Caplin and Drysdale

Washington, D.C.

Dr. John D. Steinbruner

Director, Foreign Policy Studies

The Brookings Institution

Washington, D.C.

MGen. Henry B. Stelling, Jr., USAF (ret.)

Rockwell International

Anaheim, Calif.

Dr. Sayre Stevens

System Planning Corp.

Arlington, Va.

NOTE: Several participants were originally invited as alternates for others who could not attend the entire workshop.
—

OTA Arms Control in Space Workshop Staff

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA

Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Peter Sharfman, International Security and Commerce Program Manager

Gerald Epstein, Workshop Rapporteur

Bruce Blair

Thomas H. Karas

Administrative Staff

Jannie Coles Dorothy Richroath

Acknowledgments

Jackie Robinson

OTA gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Alex Gliksman of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee staff, and of Paul Kreisberg and Harry Blaney of the Council on

Foreign Relations.
Contents

Page

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Points of General Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Points of Disagreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . .

Topics for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Opening Statement by Senator Larry Pressler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Organizing Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Discussion Focuses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Residual ASAT Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Comparison of U.S. and U.S.S.R. ASAT Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Role in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ASAT Attack Scenarios and Potential for Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Connections Between ASAT and Ballistic Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . .

Prospects for Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“Rules of theRoad”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Present Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Descriptions, Pros, and Cons of Possible Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Focuses and Philosophies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Philosophical Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ASAT Limitation Treaties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ASAT Arms Control Pro Arguments. ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ASAT Arms Control Con Arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ASAT Weapon: Pro Arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“Rules of the Road” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Grandfathering Existing Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. ASAT Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Limitations of ASAT Accords on BMD Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Urgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Soviet Attitudes and Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Past Development and Present Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Speculation on Future Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Diplomatic and Political . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Soviet Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Possible Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Attitudes and Efforts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Dependence on Space Systems.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Anti-Satellite Systems and Negotiations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Present Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ASAT Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Arms Control in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ASAT, BMD, and the 1972 ABM Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Review of 1972 ABM Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Major Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

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4

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v
Contents—Continued

Page

Connections Between ASAT, BMD, and the ABM Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Draft ASAT Treaties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Treaty Wording . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Verification Issues... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Caveats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Levels of Verifiability.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Factors in Verification of ASAT Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Complications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Simplifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Verification Particulars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Direct Interception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

“Space Mines” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Directed Energy Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Spoofing, Jamming, or Otherwise Interfering With the Operation

of Systems Using Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Cooperative Verification Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Appendix A-Survivability of Space Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Appendix B-Compliance With the 1972 ABM Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Appendix C-ABM Treaty and Related Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Summary

In late 1982 and early 1983, the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International

Operations, and Environment of the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings

on space weapons and arms control. To explore

these issues further in a discussion format not

easily achieved in hearings, Sen. Larry Pressler, Chairman of the Subcommittee, asked

OTA to conduct a workshop focusing on antisatellite (ASAT) weapons as one aspect of

space arms control. The workshop, held in

Washington, D. C., on January 30 and 31,

1984, provided an opportunity for technical,

diplomatic, military, and policy-analysis experts to interact, think out loud, and build

upon each other’s ideas.

The workshop was organized into six sessions, although issues involving anti-satellite

weapons and arms control are not easily compartmentalized into distinct subject areas.

Each session was introduced by a 10- or 15-

minute informal oral presentation which set

the stage for further discussion. This workshop proceedings volume is organized along

the same divisions as the sessions, with some

rearrangement.

The first session, an overview, reviewed

technical aspects of anti-satellite systems and

presented a candidate set of topics for discussion in later sessions. The second session covered pros and cons of ASAT arms control. Soviet attitudes and efforts regarding ASATs

were the focus of the third session; U.S. attitudes and developments in ASATs and ASAT

arms control were reviewed in the fourth. The

effect of ASATs on the continued viability of

the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,

and vice versa, were covered in the fifth session. The last session centered on verification

issues.

At Senator Pressler’s request, OTA is publishing the workshop proceedings. OTA’s

agreement with the panelists was that the

workshop report would discuss the viewpoints, ideas, and findings arrived at during

the conference, but that particular statements

or opinions would not be attributed to specific

individuals. Therefore, the transcript has been

paraphrased and rearranged to form this report. The proceedings have been circulated

among the panelists, who were given the opportunity to suggest corrections and clarifications. They have not been reviewed by the

Technology Assessment Board.

The workshop panelists were asked to raise

and clarify issues, not to resolve them. No attempt was made to reach conclusions or develop consenses during the workshop sessions.

However, OTA has noted and listed below several points where the panelists appeared to be

in general agreement. These points are followed by a brief discussion of some of the fundamental bases for disagreement among the

panelists. Following that is a list of some

issues, raised during the course of the workshop, which were felt to merit further research

and analysis.

POINTS OF GENERAL AGREEMENT

No arms control agreement can eliminate all potential, making some de facto residual

anti-satellite capability. However, panelists dif- ASAT capability inevitable. ASAT arms confered in interpreting the significance of this trol supporters stressed that it would be miresidual ASAT capability which would be infea- nor compared to the capability of extensive

sible or impractical to ban. Some systems not ASAT or “space mine” efforts which could be

designed to be ASATs (ICBMs, manned space- undertaken in the absence of an arms control

craft, etc.) nevertheless have some ASAT agreement, while some of the ASAT arms con-
2• Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

trol opponents believed that the residual capability might nevertheless pose a significant

threat to U.S. satellites.

ASAT arms control cannot eliminate the need

to protector supplement vital satellites with a

variety of survivability measures. However, it

can serve to lessen the measures required to

protect space systems. Under any arms control accord, programs to ensure survivability

of critical satellites or programs which supplement or replace their function will remain

vital. The temptation to assume that survivability measures could be relaxed following an

agreement must be resisted. “We could be that

stupid, ” said one panelist, “but we don’t really

have to be.”

The “verifiability” of an ASAT accord can

only be assessed for a specified set of restrictions and measures, and any discussion of the

verifiability of a particular provision ought to

include consideration of the significance of potential violations of that provision. The

panelists did not evaluate in detail, partly because of security classification restrictions, the

verifiability of compliance with the various

kinds of arms control agreements that were

discussed. It was clear that the standards of

verification required for effective ASAT arms

control are highly controversial. Panelists

agreed, however, that bans on testing would

require less extensive verification measures

than bans on possession, and that compliance

with some ASAT arms control provisions

could be verified with high confidence.

Future U.S. and U.S.S.R. activities in space

hold great potential for generating uncertainty

and misunderstanding regarding the countries’

respective intentions. Workshop participants

agreed that the Soviet Union will continue its

vigorous exploitation of space, and that some

Soviet activities will be perceived in the

United States as provocative. Similarly, some

American actions will appear provocative to

the Soviets. Both countries will observe activities which they will not completely understand and which will cause considerable concern. Misunderstandings concerning the intent

of various space actions could be particularly

dangerous during crises or low-level conflicts.

Ambiguities might be lessened or resolved

with some type of “rules of the road” or “behavior in space” agreement. Some panelists

thought that an agreement concerning behavior in space, or towards space objects, might

serve to reduce tensions and uncertainties.

Such an agreement need not be associated

with other measures limiting anti-satellite

weapons systems; indeed, there might be value

even if (thought some panelists) or especially

if (thought others) there were no accompanying ASAT restrictions. Such an agreement

might be modeled after the “rules of the road”

on the high seas, which are embodied in several international agreements that recognize

freedom to operate, lessen the risk of accidental collision, and minimize unnecessary provocation at sea. Possibly the most valuable feature of a “rules of the road in space”

agreement would be the establishment of a

forum like the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standing Consultative Commission, which would help maintain

an ongoing dialog between the United States

and the Soviet Union and would permit discussion of activities whose significance was not

clear. A “rules of the road” agreement should

not be allowed to impede more serious provisions concerning space weapons if such provisions are found to be desirable. The precise

form of a “space behavior” agreement was not

explored in depth at the workshop, and the political and diplomatic procedures and tradeoffs

required to negotiate and implement such an

agreement were not addressed.

If ASAT threats are reduced by an agreement,

there may be fewer reservations about placing

important systems in space, creating in turn

greater incentive for developing ASAT weapons.

If an accord has the effect of relaxing survivability measures at the same time that reliance

on space systems is increasing, then the

growth of targets both valuable and vulnerable might provide strong motivation to attempt covert ASAT development. This possible paradox reinforced panelists’ observations

that an ASAT accord is no substitute for effective measures to reduce space system vulnerability.

Preservation of the functions now performed

in space does not require the survival of all space
Summary ● 3

assets. Military support activities carried out

in space are very important, but they can be

duplicated or distributed among many space

systems. Furthermore, many alternatives to

space-based systems exist or can be developed.

The idea that the United States needs an

ASAT weapon in order to deter enemy ASAT

attack was not strongly supported. Many participants felt that the ability to retaliate

against terrestrial assets served to deter

ASAT attack at least as well as the ability to

respond in kind against enemy satellites. Furthermore, one of the rationales other than deterrence which has been given for the U.S.

ASAT program-to carry out attacks on particularly hostile Soviet satellites-conflicts

with the ASAT’s deterrent role. Nobody at the

workshop felt that A SAT attack scenarios

were well enough understood to predict the

outcome of “tit-for-tat” ASAT retaliatory attacks in general. The likelihood and nature of

subsequent escalation would be highly dependent on which satellites were attacked and

under what circumstances.

The U.S. air-launched ASAT weapon now

undergoing testing is clearly technically superior

to the present generation of Soviet groundlaunched ASATs. The ability to home in from

a wide range of directions, and the flexibility

of being launched from highly mobile aircraft,

will make the U.S. ASAT a considerably more

capable weapon if deployed. The United States

will be able to launch consecutive ASATs

much more rapidly than the Soviets, who are

restricted in how rapidly their ASAT can be

fired by their limited number of launch sites

and by the time required to recycle them.

There are also significant asymmetries in the

target sets which are at risk to the two systems. Many important space functions are carried out by the United States using satellites

in geosynchronous orbit, well out of range of

the Soviet ASAT. Many Soviet satellites with

similar functions use highly elliptical “Molniya” orbits, which could be vulnerable to U.S.

attack at their lower altitudes. However, the

United States would face severe logistical and

operational difficulties in attempting to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, since Soviet satellites are shorter lived than U.S. satellites and are consequently replaced more

frequently, the Soviets may be better prepared

to reconstitute space systems than the United

States would be.

In spite of asymmetries in capability, neither

the existing Soviet ASAT nor the U.S. ASAT

undergoing tests poses a severe military threat

to the other side. The present level of ASAT

technology is significantly limited. Both U.S.

and U.S.S.R. weapons are restricted to targets

in low Earth orbit and cannot reach geosynchronous orbit. Both systems may have to

wait several hours for a target satellite to come

within range of the appropriate F-15 base (for

the U.S. system) or ground launch site (for the

Soviets), although the mobility of the F-15

makes this restriction considerably less severe

for the U.S. ASAT. If either the U.S. or the

U.S.S.R. system were mated to boosters able

to reach geosynchronous orbit, the ascent

would take many hours. In light of these limitations, many treaty proponents would tolerate (although not necessarily prefer) a treaty

which would “grandfather” existing systems.

Perceptions differed as to the relative political implications of the existing U.S.S.R. system versus the U.S. ASAT which is undergoing testing, but nobody felt that the overall

military balance was affected significantly by

either—especially when compared with potential future ASAT developments.

A ban on testing ASAT weapons would greatly increase the difficulty of developing a highconfidence, high-quality, dedicated ASAT system. Panelists thought it would be very difficult to develop and field a highly capable new

system with no detectable tests. Some tests

might go undetected—for example, there are

many perfectly legitimate activities involving

rendezvous in space which could be made to

be partial tests of ASAT interception capability—but many tests would be required to instill confidence in an ASAT system, and some

of these would probably be detected. Banning

the tests would force the violator either to

forgo tests or to test covertly; covert testing,

assuming that it could in fact be carried out

undetected, would certainly be more difficult

34-310 0 - 84 - 2
4 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

and less extensive than the overt testing that

would be possible in the absence of a ban. In

the absence of tests, all agreed that no one

could be highly confident that a new system

would be effective in difficult scenarios

(against many targets in a short time interval and/or effective at geosynchronous altitude). If a system were to be developed without testing, the inability to make refinements

based on tests and the lack of confidence developed through tests would degrade the system’s military significance.

ASAT and ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and technologies are closely related. As effective ASAT weapons are developed and introduced, boost-phase ballistic missile defense

systems will become increasingly problematical since all such systems utilize space-based

early warning systems and possibly other subsystems which would be vulnerable to ASAT

attack. Many, although not all, prospective

midcourse BMD systems would also have vulnerable space-based assets, and even terminal

BMD systems would likely utilize space-based

early-warning sensors. At the same time, even

a poor quality or prototype midcourse or

boost-phase BMD system may have very significant ASAT capability since satellites are

much easier to destroy than missile warheads.

Therefore, development of boost-phase and

mid-course BMD systems will severely constrain ASAT arms control possibilities. Conversely, since ASAT and BMD technologies

are related, treaties limiting ASAT development or testing will limit development and

deployment of boost-phase and midcourse

BMD systems. Of course, the 1972 ABM

Treaty and 1974 protocol thereto already severely constrain testing, development, and

deployment of BMD systems.

POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT

Disagreement over the desirability of an

ASAT treaty hinges on basic philosophical differences over the role of arms control. Although

acknowledged at the workshop, these differences were not discussed or debated significantly during the sessions. They are outlined

below in an attempt to summarize some of the

considerations most relevant to different sides

of the ASAT arms control debate.

One attitude, supporting ASAT arms control, is that we value the safety of our own satellites more than we value the ability to destroy Soviet satellites. We want to protect

those of our own military support functions

which we presently carry out via satellites, and

protecting them is much easier if our satellites

are not threatened by a highly developed, highly capable Soviet ASAT. Preventing the Soviets from deploying an effective ASAT would

be much more helpful than developing our

own.

While a ban on all Soviet ASATs would be

ideal, the principal U.S. interest is to prevent

the Soviets from developing a highly capable

system: one which works reliably, threatens

satellites in geosynchronous orbit, operates

with no warning, and/or attacks many targets

at once. Several approaches, including banning

ASAT testing, banning the development of

new ASAT systems, orbarming all dedicated

ASAT systems, could inhibit such a Soviet development. Banning only tests or new developments would be more easily verified than

barming all dedicated ASATS; however, a total

ban might nevertheless be a more effective appreach to preventing development of a highly

capable Soviet system. Although no agreement can eliminate all ASAT capability, supporters of ASAT arms control felt that an

agreement could be devised which would make

Soviet development of such a highly capable

ASAT system very difficult, and that such an

agreement could be adequately verified. The

criterion for supporting an agreement would

be improvement in the security of our space

systems as compared to not having an

agreement.
Summary ● 5

A contrasting approach considers military

competition between the United States and

U.S.S.R. to be inevitable, with arms control

in many cases not being an effective or appropriate alternative to that competition. Accordingly, the relevant measure of national security would be relative advantage or

disadvantage of the United States with respect to the U.S.S.R. Those holding this view

consider it essential to deny the enemy the use

of space during a conflict when such use provides a military advantage. In the case of

ASAT arms control, even if U.S. satellites

were to be safer with an ASAT limitation or

test ban than without one (which would almost

certainly be the case), a treaty might not be

appropriate if it would benefit the Soviet

Union more than it would the United States.

Such asymmetrical advantage might arise

under an ASAT accord for two reasons: First,

a treaty would divert the military competition

away from an arena (ASAT competition)

where the United States would otherwise have

been able to exploit its superior ability to develop highly sophisticated technologies. Second, the Soviets might cheat. Because of the

asymmetric nature of Soviet and American societies, it is argued, the Soviet Union is much

more likely than the United States to cheat

on an agreement. For the same reason, Soviet attempts to cheat are more likely to be successful. Whether or not the kinds of violations

which might go undetected would in themselves pose major threats to U.S. security, any

covert violation would work to our military

disadvantage and would have undesirable political and psychological consequences as well.

There is disagreement regarding how much

significance can be attributed to residual or covert ASAT capability. The panelists agreed that

a considerable testing program is required in

order to have high confidence in an ASAT system. However, there are differences of opinion

regarding how significant an incompletely or

covertly tested system might be. A covert system might not engender high confidence, it

might not be as reliable as a dedicated, overtly

tested system, and it might be discovered, but

it might nevertheless still be developed. There

is disagreement not only about how remote

this possibility is, but also about how this

possibility affects the relative advantages of

a treaty versus the risks.

ASAT arms control is also complicated by

more general considerations regarding the military use of space. On the one hand, emplacing weapons in space or using weapons against

targets in space can be seen as breaking a de

facto political taboo which would be difficult

to restore. Furthermore, introducing weapons

into space might make the world a more dangerous place; this is now almost universally

believed to be the case concerning introduction

of multiple independently targetable reentry

vehicles (MIRVs). On the other hand, any

space arms control might be viewed as a political and psychological barrier inhibiting the

much wider exploration and exploitation of

space as a theater of military operation. A primary example of the wider possibilities of

space is ballistic missile defense—while many

would not be willing to limit ASAT weapons

at the price of impeding investigations into the

possibilities of BMD, others see those restrictions on BMD which would be included in an

ASAT accord as reinforcing the ABM treaty

in support of its original and continuing goals.

TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Among the more general subject areas sug- tainty and ambiguity in space might be desirgested to the workshop for further research were able. Although possible models were proposed,

possibilities for “rules of the road” agreements potential agreements were not discussed in dein space. As noted above, many participants tail. What sort of mechanisms (be they unilatbelieved that some measures to reduce uncer- eral actions, treaties, or informal working ar-
6 ● Arms Control in Space: workshop Proceedings

rangements) could be established to permit

mutual U.S. and U.S.S.R. use of space with

a minimum of suspicion?

Are there ways of characterizing ASATs such

that we can define and ban the most threatening or destabilizing types? Certain activities in

space are clearly more threatening than others,

just as certain activities are more visible than

others. Is there a way that a “rules of the

road” agreement could focus on the more dangerous rather than the more visible? What are

the implications for verification and for

stability?

No treaty of any kind can be perfectly verified.

Several questions arise in handling ASAT treaty

provisions which must therefore be verifiable

only partially, or with less than 100 percent confidence. One problem involves how general or

specific treaty provisions must be made.

Treaty language intended to prevent some

particularly threatening activity (e.g., testing

ASAT interceptors at geosynchronous orbit)

might be phrased in general terms (e.g., forbidding all ASAT tests) which would include

less threatening activities that might be less

verifiable (e.g., testing ASATs in low earth orbit where they might be masked as non-ASATrelated operations). What are the implications

of having varying levels of confidence in verifying compliance with treaty provisions? Are

activities which are not explicitly proscribed

under a treaty necessarily condoned?

Another verification issue requiring further

work involves cooperative verification procedures. Although existing rules regarding freedom of navigation and innocent passage on the

high seas permit forces of one country to approach those of another, approaching a foreign

satellite closely enough to examine it in space

might nevertheless not be taken kindly in the

absence of prior approval. If nuclear weapons

are to be kept out of space with high confidence, then cooperative inspection procedures

(either in space or on the ground) will likely

be required. Can such procedures be arranged?
Opening Statement by Senator Larry Pressler

In the quarter-century since the launch of

the first man-made satellites, the world has

witnessed a quantum leap in the development

of space-based and space-related technology.

These developments have largely served

peaceful purposes. We have learned to use satellite data in crop forecasting; space systems

are today’s key link for communications between nations; and by operating in space we

may be able to solve our energy crisis and

learn more about the universe in which we live.

The military has also played a major role in

space. To date, military space programs have

enhanced global security and provided a principal method for arms control verification. No

one can dispute that the military should sustain these efforts.

But as technology has improved our ability

to operate in space, attention has turned towards using space as a new medium of warfare. We are no longer simply speaking of

using space systems for reconnaissance, military communications, early warning and crisis

management, but we are on the threshold of

transforming space into the new field of battle.

Some would argue that this threshold has

already been crossed. Indeed, for over 15 years

the Soviet Union has operated an anti-satellite

weapon. That weapon continues to be tested

and its use against American satellites would

seriously harm U.S. security.

In response to this deployment, the United

States has developed and started to test a

counter-ASAT. This American system will be

come operational in the latter half of this

decade.

The ASAT problem is, however, only the forward edge of a potentially ominous trend in

the military uses of space. The United States,

and no doubt the Soviet Union, is starting a

process that may lead to the deployment of

beam-powered weapons capable of attacking

a large number and a wide variety of targets

in or flying through space, including ballistic

missiles.

While I support the goals of removing the

threat posed by nuclear weapons, it is far from

clear that the move into space-based ballistic

missile defenses will remove this threat. We

must proceed with caution and engage in careful deliberation before beginning such an initiative. These futuristic weapons are certain

to cost hundreds of billions of dollars. They

may be ineffective and could complicate the

task of providing for an effective national defense posture, while underminingg strategic stability.

Given the potential costs and risks, I believe

that the Congress must carefully consider

both the strategic options and their arms control implications. For this reason, the Senate

Foreign Relations Arms Control Subcommittee has held a series of hearings on the issue

of arms control in space. Let me note that we

began our deliberations long before ASAT and

so-called “Star Wars” weapons received the

serious attention given to them today. In consequence of these hearings, the Foreign Relations Committee favorably reported out S.J.

Res. 129 which calls for a return to the negotiating table on ASATs, a moratorium of limited duration on ASAT space flight tests, and

the inclusion of future space weapons technologies in these talks.

The hearings in the Arms Control Subcommittee provided Senators with a great deal of

information in analyzing the implications of

a space arms race and the arms control alternatives. But we continue to face many uncertainties and many questions remain unanswered. These issues must be quickly

addressed if arms control is to be relevant to

the problem. In addition, the Congress will

soon have to decide whether to fund a multibillion dollar research program on directed

energy weapons. This workshop should allow

us to continue the learning process begun in

the Foreign Relations Committee.

I am, therefore, pleased that the Office of

Technology Assessment has agreed to conduct

7
8 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

this workshop. Special thanks go to OTA Dir- As I said, the Congress has a great deal to

ector Jack Gibbons and to workshop director learn about space weapons and arms control.

Peter Sharfman for organizing this meeting. I am certain that this workshop will have an

In addition, I want to thank this highly dis- important role in our examination of these

tinguished group of participants for coming issues.

to Washington to share their wisdom with us,

particularly our workshop Chairman, McGeorge Bundy.
Overview

This workshop focused on anti-satellite

weapons as an arena for arms control. Early

in the first session, however, a panelist pointed

out that such a focus in many ways creates

an artificial distinction. Space holds a special

“emotional allure. ” Much of the public debate

concerning the militarization of space may result as much from that allure as from an informed judgement of the contribution of space

activities to the military balance of power.

“Nuclear weapons and nuclear war remain

the most important focus for arms control, ”

a panelist pointed out. “ASAT arms control

could reinforce nuclear arms control, but it

could also divert attention from that central,

overriding threat. ” At the same time, however, he and the remainder of the panel recognized that the appeal of space for military support operations is indeed high, and that the

“allure of space” cannot be neglected in any

discussion of ASAT arms control.

ORGANIZING DISCUSSIO N

Three ways of organizing discussion about

ASATs were presented in the opening session.

The first is to enumerate the various mechanisms of destroying satellites. There are essentially three distinct types: 1) direct interceptors, such as the current U.S. and Soviet

ASAT weapons which home in on and then

destroy target satellites; 2) “space mines, ”

satellites which are stationed in orbit and later

detonated to destroy nearby satellites; and

3) directed-energy weapons, which destroy satellites by delivering particle or radiation

beams from a distance.

Other techniques such as concealment,

spoofing, jamming, capturing control, and attacking ground stations, can disrupt the operation of a satellite. The difference between interfering with a satellite and permanently

disabling it is significant, especially with respect to what is possible or desirable to regulate in a treaty. This distinction was made several times during the workshop.

A second method of organizing ASAT issues is to focus on the functions of potential

target satellites and on the implications of subjecting these satellites to attack. So far, there

are five primary roles for military support satellites-communications, surveillance and

warning, navigation, meteorology, and geodetic survey. Different measures may be required

to preserve each of these different functions

in the presence of an ASAT threat.

A third organizational scheme is to enumerate anti-satellite attack scenarios and consider their effects on military capabilities and

their prospects for escalation. Journal articles

and press reports have discussed “just about

every possible circumstance” involving antisatellite activity, from tampering in peacetime

to global nuclear war. Studying various possible scenarios has the advantage that, while

ASAT technology can and will change, the scenarios for A SAT conflict may be more

constant.

DISCUSSION FOCUSES

According to one panelist, the intersections stances-show the relevance of ASAT weapor confluences of these three approaches— ons and tactics to arms control. He singled out

ASAT technologies, tempting or particularly in the first workshop session several points

threatening targets, and plausible circum- about which further discussion could be fo9
10 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

cused. These issues, along with some items

identified later in the workshop, are briefly

described below and include:

RESIDUAL ASA T

CAPABILIT Y

Many systems can destroy satellites besides

those built or designed for that purpose. For

example, ICBMs can be reprogramed to attack satellites rather than terrestrial targets,

giving both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. a de facto

nuclear ASAT capability. The nuclear-armed

Galosh anti-ballistic missile (ABM) interceptors, deployed by the Soviet Union around

Moscow under the terms of the 1972 ABM

Treaty, can easily destroy satellites passing

overhead at altitudes lower than about 1,000

km. However, several panelists pointed out

that the use of nuclear warheads against satellites is not plausible in situations short of

nuclear war.

There is also nonnuclear residual capability.

Rendezvous and docking procedures used in

manned spaceflight could be applied to ASAT

interception. With sufficient radar support, it

is conceivable that Galosh interceptors having conventional warheads might be effective

against satellites.

Since the above systems would remain even

if all dedicated ASAT systems were banned,

panelists agreed that residual ASAT capability will exist under any arms control regime.

The more that space utilization and space technology develop, the greater the residual ASAT

threat will become. Therefore, panelists

strongly emphasized that no arms control

agreement can replace the need to make the

functions that we carry out in space survivable (see app. A). Functional survivability includes protection against non-ASAT threats,

such as attacks on ground stations, and it does

not require survival of all space assets. Space

systems can be duplicated, and non-spacebased alternatives for many support functions

now done in space can be developed. Panelists

noted that survivability would be easier to ensure if dedicated ASAT systems, especially

highly threatening future ones, were controlled.

Determining the level and effectiveness of

residual ASAT capability is important to

weighing the desirability of any treaty. An ineffective ASAT which had no more capability

than the residual capability of non-ASAT systems would not significantly increase the

threat these non-ASAT systems potentially

pose to satellites. There is, then, some minimum level of capability that an ASAT weapon

would have to exceed before its existence

would be significant. It would make little

sense for an ASAT treaty to require a level

of verification holding ASAT capability far

below this minimum. However, exactly where

this minimum level is located is a highly debatable point. Panelists who felt that the residual capability of non-ASAT systems was

quite significant questioned the value of negotiating any limit to dedicated ASATs at all.

The level of residual ASAT capability was discussed further in the verification session of the

workshop.

COMPARISON OF U.S. AND

U.S.S.R. ASAT WEAPONS

Although this topic is unavoidable in any

discussion of ASATs, several panelists warned

against overemphasizing the two countries’ respective capabilities in isolation, without simultaneously considering their respective target sets and possible scenarios.

Both U.S. and U.S.S.R. weapons are designed to intercept target satellites using a

three-step procedure. First, ground-based sensors identify the target satellite and determine

its orbit. Next, the interceptor is launched and

guided towards the intercept point, and finally, the interceptor’s homing sensors are activated and it closes in on the target satellite.

However, while the U.S. air-launched ASAT

climbs directly towards its target satellite in

ten or twenty minutes, the Soviet groundlaunched ASAT must roughly match orbits

with its target, a process which has taken up

to several hours in tests.
Overview ● 1 1

The range of the booster and the homing

process determine which target orbits an

ASAT weapon can threaten. The U.S. Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) ASAT weapon

now undergoing testing destroys its target by

direct impact and can home in on its target

from a wide range of directions. It needs only

to get to the same place at the same time as

its target, and does not need to match orbits

with that target. The present generation of SOviet ASATs, on the other hand, is co-orbital-it

needs to be in the same place at the same time

traveling roughly in the same direction at the

same speed as its target. So far, all Soviet

ASAT tests have been conducted against targets in orbits with inclination angles near 65

degrees.

Workshop panelists felt it “beyond doubt”

that the U.S. air-launched approach is “clearly

superior” to the Soviet ground-launched technique. Besides the limitation of having to

share its target’s orbit, the Soviet ASAT is

restricted by the small number of launch sites

that can handle its modified SS-9 booster. As

many as twelve hours might be required, while

the Earth turns under the target orbit, to

bring the target within range of a launch site.

The Soviets are further limited by the recycle

time of each launch pad, and they cannot

launch many ASATs in rapid succession.

U.S. air-launched ASAT interceptors can be

launched much more rapidly, and from a much

wider geographic area, than the Soviet groundlaunched ASAT. The advantages of the U.S.

ASAT’s airplane-launched approach, and its

direct homing interception, more than compensate for its altitude limit, which has not been

released by the Air Force but was estimated

by a panelist to be considerably lower than

that of the Soviet ASAT. Although present

U.S. plans call for ASAT-equipped F-15 squadrons having the associated logistical support

to be based only at two sites within the continental United States, the planes and the associated support structure could be based in

other areas to give even wider geographic coverage and more immediate response.

Another important asymmetry between

near-term U.S. and U.S.S.R. ASAT capabilities is the target sets which each weapon will

face. Many critical functions which the United

States performs in space are carried out by

satellites in geosynchronous orbit, far out of

range of the Soviet ASAT. Similar functions

for the U.S.S.R. are in many cases carried out

by satellites in highly elliptical “Molniya” orbits, which could be vulnerable to U.S. attack

at their lower altitudes. Present plans for deploying ASAT-equipped squadrons within the

continental United States would not permit

such attacks, but suitably equipped planes

might be able to attack these Soviet satellites

if they, and the appropriate logistical support,

were based in the Southern Hemisphere. Even

assuming appropriate bases could be obtained,

in-flight refueling would be required.

Countering the potential advantages of the

United States system is that it is still undergo

ing preliminary testing, whereas the Soviet

ASAT has been tested, in a restricted manner,

about twenty times over the last 16 years. The

U.S. Department of Defense considers the

Soviet ASAT to be operational. A panelist

warned against comparing something that is

“technologically possible that one side doesn’t

have” against an opposing system which “perhaps looks a little bit like a turkey” but in fact

does have some capability. At any rate, no one

doubted that the U.S. system could be made

operational within a few years at most.

MILITARY ROLE IN SPACE

Much of the concern about ASATs and

ASAT arms control deals with the role of satellites in military activities and the corresponding threat to military capability posed by

ASAT weapons. Space systems are used extensively for military support, but satellites

do not now fill a crucial, indispensable, and irreplaceable role. Many functions now carried

out in space can be performed by other means.

A paradox arises in that, to the extent that

ASAT arms control masks the intrinsic vulnerability of satellites, alternatives to space

systems may not seem necessary and satellites

will be increasingly relied upon. If space utilization grows, so will the incentive to build
12 . Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

ASAT weapons. The solution is for arms control, if pursued, to supplement satellite survivability and redundancy programs and not

to replace them. This point was repeated

throughout the workshop: ASAT arms control

cannot be a substitute for protecting and duplicating satellite functions.

ASAT ATTACK SCENARIOS

AND POTENTIAL FOR

ESCALATION

Does ASAT attack have a unique potential

for triggering wider conflict? Does it imply

that future conflict might be restricted to

space? These points stimulated considerable

discussion, but the panel doubted both.

Since military satellites are used principally

for support activities, they don’t functionally

differ from terrestrial support systems. “Is the

sinking of a U.S. intelligence ship not as likely

and as inflammatory in a crisis as interception

of a U.S. spy satellite?” questioned one panelist. Another panelist pointed out that “war

in space cannot at all be separated from war

on Earth. ” In any conflict, each side has certain objectives, and they are on the ground.

“You don’t shoot satellites just for the fun of

it. ”

Other participants pointed out, though, that

an ASAT attack might be less provocative

than a terrestrial attack since people would

not be directly threatened. “Maybe you destroy the ‘allure of space’, ” said a panelist,

“but you don’t kill anybody.” One panel member stressed that one cannot dismiss isolated

ASAT scenarios to consider ASAT attack

only in the context of a wider conflict. “I am

skeptical about that because the United States

has worked as hard as it possibly can to make

itself extraordinarily vulnerable” to a low-level

ASAT attack. “We have nothing in the pipeline to replace anything that’s in space.”

One panelist stated that the most worrisome

ASAT scenarios involve low-level conflicts. In

desperate cases, even a party not having a dedicated ASAT weapon might be tempted to attack an opposing satellite with whatever

means could be arranged on the spur of the

moment. In a low-level crisis which had not

yet escalated to such a stage, however, existence or lack of a dedicated ASAT able to intercept with high confidence a threatening satellite might make the difference between

attacking and not attacking. Carrying out

such an attack “would be a tremendous temptation if it were easy to do so and could be done

quickly and precisely and with very low collateral damage,” even with the attendant risk

of escalation.

Another panelist disagreed, maintaining

that having fewer or poorer weapons does not

necessarily lower the probability of their use.

If a power feels that conditions warrant an attack on a satellite, it will be as likely to carry

out that attack if it has one weapon as if it has

100. A decision of that magnitude will be a response to many internal and external pressures. “It isn’t going to happen by itself, ” and

if it is deemed to be necessary it may as likely

happen with an improvised system as with a

dedicated one.

An ASAT attack scenario which has been

widely discussed involves attacks on the satellite-borne sensors that provide the U.S. early

warning of a Soviet first strike. One participant minimized the importance or plausibility

of such an attack scenario. A Soviet attack on

warning sensors to prevent a preemptive or

“launch-under-attack” U.S. strike might instead trigger that strike. So, if it were not to

reveal an imminent Soviet nuclear attack, any

Soviet ASAT attack would have to be nearly

simultaneous with the launch of the ICBMs

that it was intended to mask. Since any directintercept ASAT would take several hours to

climb to the U.S. early warning sensors at geosynchronous altitude (no existing ASAT is

presently capable of getting that far), only yetto-be-developed directed-energy weapons or

pre-emplaced space mines would present a significant threat in this scenario.

At any rate, the United States does not rely

solely on early-warning satellites for notification of impending attack. Ground-based radars provide a backup, and for submarine-
Overview • 13

launched missiles they give negligibly less

warning time than space-based sensors.

Ground-based radars can also be supplemented by ship-borne, air-borne, and rocketborne sensors.

CONNECTIONS BETWEE N

ASAT AND BALLISTI C

MISSILE DEFENS E

There are quite significant strategic and

technological links between anti-satellite

weapons and ballistic missile defense (BMD)

systems. ASAT issues are central to BMD,

and while consideration of BMD is less crucial

to analysis of ASAT per se, the two subjects

have significant overlap.

One connection is that any effective BMD

(except for local, low-altitude site-defense systems) is an even more effective anti-satellite

weapon. Even a poor BMD can have significant ASAT capability since satellites are much

easier to destroy than missile reentry vehicles

(RVs). A system used for ASAT would face

at most a few dozen targets, and therefore

could take much more time to attack a satellite than a system used for BMD could allocate

to each of the up to 1,000 ICBMs or thousands

of warheads in a massive attack. Satellites are

intrinsically more vulnerable to damage than

are RVs, and in a great many ASAT scenarios,

attacks on satellites would take place in a

much less hostile environment than the nuclear war in which a BMD would have to operate.

Furthermore, an orbiting satellite’s trajectory

is completely predictable, except for limited

maneuvers, making a satellite in effect a fixed

target.

A second link between ASAT and BMD is

that BMD systems (again with the possible

exception of local site-defense systems) have

space-based elements which would be vulnerable to ASAT attack. Even if a BMD system

did not use weapons based in space, it would

likely have space-based sensors and communications links; any BMD system intended to

attack ICBMs during their boost phase necessarily would require space-based sensors to

detect missile launch. If BMD weapons systems were put in orbit, they would be ideal

targets for each other. They would be large,

expensive, and hard to miss. All indications

at present are that space-based weapons would

be much cheaper to destroy than to replace

“probably by a factor of 10. Right now it looks

like a factor of 1,000. ” On the other hand, they

might be capable of self-defense once they became operational.

As ASAT technology is perfected, it will become increasingly unrealistic to deploy “anything that’s space-based and expensive.” Conversely, if BMD technology is significantly

developed, it will severely constrain the possibilities for ASAT arms control, but it might

also elevate strongly the incentive for ASAT

arms control.

PROSPECTS FOR

VERIFICATIO N

The issue of verifying compliance with an

ASAT accord occupied much of the later workshop sessions. Panelists agreed that a total

ban on anything having any ASAT capability

would be both infeasible and unrealistic considering that residual ASAT capability

(ICBMs, manned spacecraft, etc.) will invariably remain even if all dedicated ASAT systems are banned. There was also considerable

agreement, though, that the extensive testing

program necessary to develop and acquire confidence in an advanced ASAT weapon would

almost certainly be detectable, and that a ban

on such testing would require less extensive

verification measures than a ban on possession. These issues are discussed further elsewhere in this report (p. 39 ff.).

“RULES OF THE ROAD”

Another important point developed in later

sessions was the concept of “Rules of the

Road” or “Utilization of Space” agreements.

Whether or not some agreement limiting

ASAT weapons or testing is desired or implemented, panelists saw a use for an agreement

between the United States and U.S.S.R. which

would allow each party to continue its use of
14 . Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

space without unnecessarily threatening the be helpful. The form of such an agreement was

other. The United States and U.S.S.R. are not discussed in detail; some additional diseach likely to conduct space activities which cussion is reviewed in later sections of this

will appear provocative to the other, and some report.

arrangements for reducing uncertainty might

PRESENT TECHNOLOG Y

The panel agreed that present ASAT technology (both Soviet and U. S.) is limited in significant ways, and that developing systems

free of these limitations would require testing

programs which would almost certainly be observable. Both existing systems (the Soviet

system and the U.S. system undergoing tests)

are only capable of reaching low earth orbit

(on the order of 1,000 km)–neither can reach

important satellites located at geosynchronous orbit (36,000 km). Both systems have inherent time delays, in waiting for targets to

come within range of the launch site and in

reaching their targets once launched. (The U.S.

system, however, is significantly less constrained in these respects.) Both systems leave

intact the adversary’s ability to launch

ASATs. There was general agreement that

present ASAT weapons are much less threatening, and much less destabilizing, than what

could be deployed in a new generation of

ASATs, including ones which could attack

many targets promptly and which could reach

geosynchronous orbit.

As an example, one panelist posed the case

of both the United States and U.S.S.R. having constellations of space-based beam weapons. As mentioned previously, such systems

would likely be targeted at each other. Whichever side attacked first would not only retain

its own ASAT (or BMD) capability but would

eliminate its opponents. This extreme incentive to attack first would be highly destabilizing.

Another participant took issue with this

scenario, stating that the systems would likely

operate so that such an attack by one side

would result inmost of both constellations being destroyed. For instance, one party detecting an attack could detonate space mines trailing its opponent’s systems. All panelists

agreed, however, that the present systems are

not as threatening as future ones could be.
Descriptions, Pros, and Cons

of

FOCUSES AND

Before the United States undertakes to negotiate a treaty, it must determine that a

treaty would be desirable. Could there be a

treaty which would be in our interest, recognizing that Soviet interests do not coincide with

our own? We then need to ask whether such

a treaty might also be in the Soviet interest.

If not, it is pointless to continue. It is not sufficient to find a single set of actors on each side

that would be in favor of a treaty. In order to

be acceptable, a treaty must be desirable to

a large number of players on each side.

Early in the workshop, a panelist questioned

whether anti-satellite weapons were indeed an

appropriate focus for arms control. He pointed

out that the technology and concepts are still

being developed. Furthermore, given that

some residual ASAT capability will always exist, one can’t deny a country the ability to destroy satellites. Although an ASAT arms control accord might include some desirable

features, the panelist felt that those goals

might better be pursued in association with

other arms control ventures.

Another panelist stated that an ASAT

agreement would greatly increase the security

of our satellites by limiting the development

of new ASATs that could be considerably

more sophisticated than the present systems.

Such an agreement would make the task of

protecting our satellites much easier. We must

compare the residual ASAT capability under

a treaty with the threat to our satellites in an

all-out ASAT competition, he pointed out.

One panelist felt that we should be seeking

a stable stopping point to the ASAT competition, or at least some intermediate points that

would slow down the race, reduce tensions,

and lend themselves to further negotiation. In

particular, some concern was expressed about

Possible Agreements

PHILOSOPHIE S

the U.S. ASAT being deployed without sufficient consideration of its long-term or possibly

irreversible implications. An interim accord

would provide some time.

Many participants supported the idea of

finding ways to prevent “provocative and inflammatory” activities in space. Panelists realized that both the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to utilize space in

ways which might have great potential for

creating uncertainty and misunderstandings.

This possibility could be mitigated by an arms

control agreement. “Survivability is not the

only goal” of a space arms control agreement,

suggested a panelist, “and in my mind not

even the main goal. ” He explained that the

case for arms control really rests on the Soviets’ desire to come to some working agreement

with us so we both can develop space capabilities “without coming to clashes or crises or

problems. ” This panelist supported a “rules

of the road” agreement which would “provide

some limit on activities which are going to

pose major puzzles” to both the United States

and the U.S.S.R. This form of agreement

might or might not include an ASAT ban.

We and the Soviets tend to legislate the

norms of international conduct by our actions

and our agreements, noted a participant. In

this manner, we have, for example, in effect

declared that “offensive nuclear weapons are

okay to have, ” but that “they’re not okay to

use directly in a threatening manner in crises. ”

Regarding anti-satellite activity, we have so

far “pretty much legislated that it’s okay to

live and let live in space. ”

“An ASAT treaty,” he continued, “ought

to reinforce that healthy kind of approach to

space. ”

15
16 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCE S

A point which was readily recognized at the

workshop, but was not discussed or debated

in depth, was that disagreement about the value of an ASAT accord stems from deeper philosophical differences about arms control in

general.

Putting it a little simplistically, treaty proponents feel that our national security will be

better with an ASAT treaty than without one,

and that such a treaty can be verified well

enough to ensure our security. Treaty opponents, on the other hand, focus on possible

asymmetries in the relative costs and benefits

of a treaty to the United States and to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, they feel, would

benefit more from United States compliance

than the United States would benefit from Soviet adherence with possible cheating. They

feel that arms control is appropriate only if it

would be advantageous to the U.S. in spite of

this inherent asymmetry.

Is the criterion for negotiation that we end

up better with a treaty than without one? Or,

is it rather that our position with respect to

the Soviets be better with a treaty than without one? Similarly, there are differences in

overall attitudes concerning space and space

arms control. Some view deployment of spacebased or space-directed weapons as the breaking of a de facto political taboo, which would

not only make the world more dangerous but

would also be difficult to reverse. Alternative

ly, any space arms control treaty could be seen

as a political and psychological barrier to the

wider exploration and exploitation of space as

a theater of military operation.

ASAT LIMITATION TREATIE S

In discussing possible forms of ASAT arms

control, the panel categorized five types of

ASAT arms control agreements:

1. Bans on all testing, use, and possession

of all ASAT capability.

2. Bans on all testing, use, and possession

of dedicated ASATs.

3. Bans on use and testing, but not possession, of dedicated ASATs.

4. Bans on development or use of new types

of ASATs; no restrictions on existing

ASAT systems.

5. Bans on use of ASATs; no restrictions on

possession or testing.

Panelists readily agreed that the first type

of agreement is unattainable. Some non-ASAT

systems have some capability to serve as

ASATs, so residual capability would remain

even if dedicated ASAT systems were banned.

Recognizing this fact, the second type of

agreement would deal only with dedicated,

and presumably more threatening, ASAT

systems.

Most of the workshop discussion about

ASAT limitations involved a testing ban

which might or might not include existing systems and which might or might not prohibit

ASAT possession. Testing of a dedicated

ASAT weapon would be more visible, and less

ambiguous, than its possession. To avoid some

of the difficulties of a more extensive ban, a

treaty could permit possession of ASATs but

ban use and testing. Without testing, the significance of possible ASAT possession might

decrease with time. In the view of some, new

systems could not be relied upon, and confidence in existing systems would slowly

degrade.

The fourth type of agreement, conceding the

existence and operation of existing systems,

would still restrict the deployment of new and

more threatening ASATs. It would also suppress the question of residual ASAT capability, since if both sides had a dedicated system

it is unlikely that either would use “balingWire” systems. Considering the disparity between the U.S. and the Soviet ASATs, though,
Descriptions, Pros, and Cons of Possible Agreements ● 1 7

several panelists felt that the Soviets might

not be willing to concede to the United States

the right to test and deploy the air-launched

MHV ASAT without reserving the right to develop a system at least as effective.

The fifth type of agreement in the above list

would prohibit the use of ASAT weapons and

might also delineate acceptable behavior by

codifying some set of “rules of the road. ” Such

measures attracted much interest among the

panelists as supplements to, as well as alternatives to, ASAT limitations. Proposed agreements of this sort are not as well defined as

prohibitions of ASAT testing or possession,

for which draft treaties have been prepared by

various parties.

ASAT ARMS CONTROL:

PRO ARGUMENT S

ASAT treaty proponents see an ASAT arms

race as not serving our best interests. “The

burden is always on arms control to explain

how the world is going to be better with the

treaty than without, ” remarked a panelist,

“and the burden is never on the person who

just wants to keep blundering ahead to explain

how the world is going to be safer that way.

Treaty proponents see continued ASAT competition as unwise, and believe that a treaty

would be worthwhile even if it served only to

constrain future developments. Observing

that the ASAT problem will not disappear

completely, with or without a treaty, one panelist noted that “in the absence of restrictions,

the problem is going to get a great deal

worse.

Offense Dominance.—An ASAT race is not

desirable because, for the foreseeable future,

the offense will always win. Satellites are expensive, and they are inherently vulnerable because of their known trajectories, their limited

numbers, and their fragility. Significant cost

and performance tradeoffs are required to protect satellites against attack. Therefore, U.S.

satellites are likely to be much cheaper to destroy than to replace. This balance will not be

changed by deployment of a U.S. ASAT weapon, even if it is superior to the Soviet ASAT.

Assuming that we need our own satellites

much more than we need to attack Soviet satellites, treaty proponents believe that we

should attempt to negotiate a mutual limitation on ASATs.

Defense and Possible Future Developments.–Arms control proponents particularly

saw great value in ending the ASAT competition as soon as possible. Current technologies

are relatively primitive compared to future

possibilities, which could be very threatening.

It is easier to protect satellites against the current threat than against subsequent generations of ASATs. The later that action is taken,

the more systems will be deployed, the more

complicated the technology will become, and

the more difficult compliance with any treaty

will be to verify. Adequately verifiable testing

bans are possible, proponents feel, and they

would severely limit the development of truly

threatening anti-satellite weapons. The ASAT

competition has not progressed so far that

stopping now would be irrelevant.

We are now at a stage in which only our lowaltitude satellites might be vulnerable, and we

face the quite possible future alternative of

having our entire in-orbit force structure subject to prompt destruction. Directed-energy

ASAT weapons, for example, will very likely

be deployed if there is no ASAT accord. Such

weapons, having long ranges and near-instantaneous reaction times, would be destabilizing—especially if based in space. If such systems were developed by either or both sides,

they would be tempting targets, and each side

would have great incentive to attack first in

order to disarm its opponent. In the absence

of an ASAT accord, we are also likely to see

the advent of space mines, which could be comparatively inexpensive. If space mines were

widely deployed, most or all of our important

satellites would be subject to almost instantaneous destruction.

Existing Unreliability. -Future ASATs will

likely be much more reliable than the present

systems, which has significant implications for

stability. Neither the existing Soviet ASAT

nor the U.S. ASAT under development can

presently be considered highly reliable. The
18 . Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

U.S. weapon has never been tested against a

target in space. According to published reports, the Soviet weapon has not functioned

properly in a significant percentage of its

tests. Some panelists did note, however, that

without knowing the nature of and responses

to these failures, we can not necessarily infer

a reduced confidence or lower reliability of the

Soviet ASAT.

Highly reliable ASATs, if they existed,

might increase the risk that low-level crises

would escalate. As discussed in the overview,

confidence in the ability to attack a threatening satellite easily, quickly, and precisely may

increase the likelihood of doing so. In a tense

situation, posited one panelist, the United

States or the U.S.S.R. might initiate ASAT

conflict by reasoning “we’re not going to kill

anybody; we’re not going to threaten anybody’s strategic warning system, but nobody’s going to take pictures of us for a few

weeks now. ” Both the temptation and the danger of an ASAT attack against a reconnaissance satellite in a crisis would be “extraordinarily high.”

Economic Pressure.—A panelist noted that

ASAT limitations could forestall utilization of

ASAT competition by the Soviets as a relatively low-cost means of applying pressure to

the United States. Perceiving a full-scale military buildup by the United States, but constrained by the performance of their own economy, the Soviet political leadership may seek

ways to pressure the United States without

having to engage in an across-the-board response. Inmost cases, the development, or improvement, of an ASAT system is much

cheaper than protecting against ASATs by

duplicating or supplementing space assets.

Mutual Benefit to Treaty.–ASAT arms control advocates noted that ASAT arms control

negotiations are not a “zero-sum” game. Both

the United States and the Soviets would benefit from an ASAT accord. Soviet interest in

negotiations does not mean that we must a priori oppose them. “Certainly you can’t expect

the Soviet Union to sign any agreement which

works to their net disadvantage, ” explained

a panelist, “but most people regard the elimination of nuclear war, or even the significant

delay, decade by decade, of all-out nuclear war,

as being to the advantage of the Soviet Union

as well as the United States. ”

Private Sector Concerns.—One argument

which has been made in favor of ASAT arms

control found no support at the workshop. In

the past, it had been argued that without an

ASAT accord, private industry would be reluctant to invest in space systems which are inherently vulnerable to ASAT attack. Panelists

pointed out that the Soviet’s current capability to destroy anything in the United States

or at sea has not affected the private sector.

They noted, as an example, that the Soviet

ability to shoot down airliners “which has been

demonstrated” has not affected airline investment decisions.

A concern of private industry which was

backed up at the workshop is the problem of

space debris from ASAT weapons test. Studies mentioned at the workshop indicate that

a significant source of debris in low-altitude

orbit is Soviet ASAT testing and ASAT-related activity. ASAT tests at or near geosynchronous orbit would be of considerable concern to communications satellite companies.

ASAT ARMS CONTROL:

CON ARGUMENT S

Much opposition to ASAT treaty efforts

stems not from the desire to have ASAT weapons but rather from the viewpoint that arms

control is not an effective or appropriate

means of addressing the ASAT question.

Residual ASAT.–ASAT treaty opponents

raised the problem of residual ASAT capability—means for destroying satellites which

would be infeasible or unrealistic to eliminate

by any form of agreement. They also noted

that methods for interfering with the operation of systems using satellites, short of destroying them (jamming, spoofing, or attacking ground stations or support facilities),

might be difficult to address in an ASAT arms

control accord.
Descriptions, Pros, and Cons of Possible Agreements ● 1 9

Asymmetric Societies.—The asymmetrical

nature of the Soviet and the U.S. societies, according to arms control opponents, implies

that there will be asymmetric advantage from

any symmetric treaty. The Soviets are much

more likely than the United States to cheat

on an agreement, and if they do cheat they are

much more likely to get away with it. Furthermore, there seem to be differences between the

United States and the Soviet Union in interpretation of “borderline” activities-”I think

we have learned over the last twenty years

that the way the Soviet Union keeps a treaty

is not exactly the way two-thirds of the Senate had in mind, ” summed up one participant.

Verification.— Treaty opponents are very

concerned about the verifiability of compliance

with an ASAT accord. No treaty, of course,

is perfectly verifiable, but different people

assess differently the likelihood (or significance) of activities which may escape detection. Inventories of ASAT interceptors on the

ground or the contents of satellites in space

may be difficult to monitor. Compliance with

bans on ASAT interceptor testing maybe difficult to verify since there are many legitimate

activities requiring rendezvous in space which

could be made to be partial tests of ASAT interception capability. Furthermore, even a

small amount of Soviet cheating in an ASAT

arms control agreement could be significant

since U.S. satellites are long-lived, valuable,

and limited in number. We would be more sensitive to loss of a few satellites than the

Soviets, whose satellites have shorter lifetimes

and are consequently replaced more frequently.

Limits on U.S. Strengths.–More general objections to ASAT arms control result from the

constraints it would put on the ability of the

United States to exploit its technological expertise. By permitting the Soviets to “make

up lost time” in developing advanced ASAT

technology, said a panelist, ASAT arms control would “allow the Soviets a major competitive advantage. ”

Both the United States and the Soviet

Union have too great an interest in the military use of space to agree to an ASAT treaty

that would deny the ability to engage in conflict there, he explained. “If there is conflict,

there is going to be conflict in and from space.

It inevitable because of what we’ve been doing for about the last twenty years” by putting very valuable systems in space and using

them to the extent that we do.

Ballistic Missile Defense. Another very significant source of opposition to ASAT arms

control is the desire to investigate advanced

ballistic missile defense technologies. Some of

the concepts most attractive to BMD supporters involve “boost-phase” defenses which attack missiles as they climb out of the atmosphere. However, since effective boost-phase

weapons would likely also be effective against

satellites, they would almost certainly have to

be restricted under an ASAT accord which

limited the most threatening ASAT technologies. Systems capable of doing boost-phase

BMD would be inconsistent with the existing

1972 ABM treaty, but supporters of BMD research may not wish to contend with a restrictive ASAT accord as well. An opinion expressed at the workshop was that “the ABM

treaty is bad enough to have as a complicating

factor in any type of transition towards strategic defense without adding a layer of porous

ASAT agreement. ”

Difficulty.-A more pragmatic reason for oPposing ASAT arms control is that the process of negotiating such a treaty with the involved executive agencies, with the Soviets,

and with the Congress is “incredibly painful”

and not worth undertaking in the absence of

an overwhelming conviction that it would be

in the national interest.

ASAT WEAPON: PR O

ARGUMENT S

Those opposing an ASAT treaty believe

that ASAT arms control is not in the national interest. They may also believe that having

an ASAT weapon is in the national interest.

Anti-ASAT treaty arguments and pro-ASAT

weapon arguments, although related, are

distinct.

34 -310 0 - 84 - 3
20 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

Three justifications for developing anti-satellite weapons were reviewed at the workshop.

Of the three, one was mentioned but not discussed in detail, and another was not supported by ASAT proponents on the panel.

Attack Hostile Satellites.-The primary reason for developing an American ASAT weapon is to deny the use of space to an adversary

during conflict. The particular example cited

by administration officials and by workshop

participants is the threat posed by Soviet

ocean reconnaissance satellites which are said

to be able to locate U.S. Navy ships on the

high seas. Those holding this view do not wish

to allow the Soviets freedom to conduct reconnaissance activities from space which threaten

American forces. They also expect that the Soviets will utilize other space assets for improving the effectiveness of their military forces

(“ force-multiplication”) and want to be able to

deny the Soviets these capabilities as well.

An American ASAT weapon could be stabilizing, it was argued, if used against Soviet

reconnaissance satellites which would otherwise be available for retargeting Soviet missiles. In a “shoot-look-shoot” scenario, Soviet

reconnaissance satellites would be used to locate U.S. military targets that had survived

a first strike. This data would be used to retarget a Soviet reserve force to destroy those

remaining targets. The Soviets likely know

that they would probably need “more than one

echelon of strategic attack” to carry out an

effective strike against the United States

homeland, argued a panelist. Denying them

this “shoot-look-shoot” capability would make

it harder to conduct an effective first strike,

lessening its probability and therefore increasing stability.

Support Negotiations.—A second reason

mentioned at the workshop for developing a

U.S. ASAT weapon would be use as a “bargaining chip” to induce the Soviets to negotiate an ASAT treaty. Whether or not this viewpoint may motivate development of some

weapons systems, it does not properly belong

in a tabulation of “pro-weapon” arguments.

If one seeks to negotiate a ban on ASAT weapons, for example, then one presumably has already determined that having an ASAT weapon is not necessary.

Deterrence. —The third reason given for having an ASAT weapon is to deter ASAT attack.

This rationale was not supported at the workshop. Arms control supporters and opponents

both felt that the ability to retaliate against

terrestrial targets served to deter ASAT attack at least as well as the ability to retaliate

against satellites. Satellites can be protected

against ASAT attack in a number of ways,

and having the capability to respond in kind

was not thought to be singularly effective in

protecting satellites.

A panelist also pointed out that the deterrent role of an ASAT is in opposition with, not

in support of, the role of eliminating hostile

satellites. If an ASAT capability is required

in order to support objectives (such as preventing detection of naval surface units by Soviet

satellites) which are unrelated to retaliation,

then the deterrent value of an ASAT must be

balanced against its potential use in initiating

space conflict to attack hostile satellites.

“RULES OF THE ROAD”

Many panelists, including supporters of elude rules on space-related ground activities.

ASAT limitations as well as those question- While the nature of such an agreement was left

ing the effectiveness or utility of ASAT bans, vague, and the negotiation process which

agreed that some sort of international agree- might conclude in such an agreement was not

ment concerning “rules of the road in space” analyzed, several motivations and possible excould be beneficial. These rules could also in- amples for such an agreement were raised.
Rules of the road would try to alleviate situations which either side would consider particularly dangerous. For example, they might

inhibit effective placement of space mines by

establishing a minimum separation between

satellites. As both sides continue their operations in space, such rules may become increasingly valuable.

One of the functions of a regime of rules in

space would be to reduce instances where

seemingly dangerous activities are observed

without the means of finding out exactly what

is going on. Certain activities which might be

provocative could be prohibited, or they might

be required to be accompanied by an explanation, perhaps in advance, which had some basis for being believable. The most important

function of such an agreement, suggested one

panelist, might be the establishment of a forum where questionable activities could be discussed. That the forum would help maintain

an ongoing dialogue between the United

States and the U.S.S.R. would be healthy in

and of itself. Alternatively, said another panelist, it would be nice to know that if the

Soviets do something that we find very threatening, they did it on purpose. “We might still

find ourselves getting dangerously close to a

war, but at least we would know better where

we stood.” A panelist also pointed out that

besides defining acceptable conduct, “rules of

the road” might also give some basis for responding to certain violations.

A precedent for “rules of the road” is the

ban in the 1972 ABM Treaty prohibiting interference with the national technical means

used by each side to verify compliance with

that treaty. This measure is a “function ban”:

it does not refer to satellites or space in particular, but rather prohibits interfering with

the function of verification. Such a function

ban might be extended by building upon the

example of the 1971 “Agreement on Measures

to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear

War, ” which requires the United States and

the U.S.S.R. to notify each other “in the event

of signs of interference with [early warning

systems] or with related communications facilities, if such occurrences could create a risk

Descriptions, Pros, and Cons of Possible Agreements Ž 21

of outbreak of nuclear war. ” This clause could

be strengthened to prohibit interference with

the function of early warning in general without reference to satellites or ASATs. A very

important motivation for rules of the road

would be the recognition, such as that implicit

in the 1971 Measures Agreement, that accidents will happen.

An additional model could be the international regime existing on the high seas, in

which certain particularly hostile and dangerous activities have been banned. Similar bans

could be applied to space activities. However,

since the “rules of the road” on the high seas

as they currently exist do not keep ships out

of lethal range of each other, similar rules

would not be sufficient to ban space mines.

New measures would be required if it were desired to eliminate the threat of space mines by

keeping satellites apart by more than a lethal

distance.

“Rules of the road will not prevent ASAT

attacks, ” pointed out one panelist. “Perhaps

they can’t even be verified very well. . . . Nevertheless, an agreement along those lines

might be worth having precisely because it

would reduce ambiguous acts” and minimize

the chances of escalation or misunderstanding

in a crisis. Panelists agreed that “rules of the

road” would not require an ASAT ban; some

of those supporting an ASAT accord felt that

it would be strengthened by rules of the road;

those opposed to an ASAT agreement saw

merit in rules of the road as an alternative.

All panelists agreed that the Soviets are increasing their utilization of space, including

their development of ASAT capability. That

fact, taken with their willingness to negotiate

space arms control with the United States, can

be seen as indicating that they would like to

jointly draw up some general rules of behavior.

“If that’s the signal, that’s a very interesting

signal, ” interpreted a panelist. “It makes it

that much more useful to look for ASAT treaties that simply have the merit of putting

some kind of terms of agreement on record,

if nothing more. ”
22 . Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

GENERAL DISCUSSIO N

There was no agreement on how much the

ASAT threat would be reduced by a treaty,

or on the significance and likelihood of residual or covert ASAT activity. An important

point is the extent to which residual, possibly

covert, ASAT systems would place our spacecraft at risk under a treaty regime. “Is it going to be closer to one-eighth of the original

threat or is it going to be closer to seveneighths?” asked one participant.

GRANDFATHERIN G

EXISTING SYSTEM S

The discussion of possible ASAT limitations, their advantages, and their disadvantages touched on a number of issues. One of

these was the question of “grandfathering” existing ASAT systems: Should the Soviets be

permitted to keep their system? Should the

United States be permitted to continue developing its own? One panelist felt strongly

that the objective of a treaty is to prevent the

development of technologies and capabilities

which are much more threatening than those

existing now. Such a treaty would block the

“sustained, organizational effort” required to

implement such advances in ASAT technology. Existing systems, which are not nearly as

threatening as future ones could be, might be

grandfathered in such a treaty. Alternatively,

further testing and development of existing

systems could be banned, especially at higher

orbits.

One panelist felt that the Soviets would not

accept an agreement which would permit existing systems because of the asymmetries in

capability between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

ASATs. The U.S. F-15 system, a far more capable weapon, will be able to destroy Soviet

satellites much more rapidly than they could

be replaced and would be sufficient to deny the

Soviets access to low earth orbit for a considerable period of time. Given the Soviets’ present technique for attaining higher orbits by

using lower altitude parking orbits, the U.S.

ASAT could effectively deny the Soviets the

ability to reconstitute higher orbit systems as

well.

Another panelist was skeptical about negotiating away the Soviet ASAT because of the

measures that would be required to give the

United States assurance that it had been dismantled. The Soviets have “only in a sort of

Aesopian way” admitted that the present SS-9

based ASAT exists at all, he said, “which is

not a hopeful way to start out on the negotiation” concerning the “extraordinary measures” required to ensure that the system had

been dismantled. However, if the Soviet

ASAT is neither eliminated nor balanced with

a symmetrical U.S. capability, then the political viability of any ASAT accord in this country would be “very, very low. ”

U.S. ASAT REQUIREMEN T

Another issue stimulating considerable discussion was the need for a U.S. ASAT weapon.

There was widespread disagreement about the

requirement for an American ASAT to deny

the Soviets the ability to target the U.S. fleet

with their ocean reconnaissance satellites.

There were no panelists with Navy backgrounds (“we’ve been sinking the Navy without its representation, ” noted a participant),

but at any rate there was little support for the

position that the Radar Ocean Reconnaissance

Satellite (RORSAT) is an extremely threatening system. The capability to destroy Soviet

reconnaissance satellites is neither necessary

nor sufficient to protect the U.S. fleet, it was

pointed out. The United States has many ways

to deny the Soviets intelligence from these

satellites-RORSATs are vulnerable to a variety of electronic countermeasures. Studies

made more than 10 years ago laid out a “long

laundry list of things that could be done other

than blowing it up,” such as decoying and

jamming.

Furthermore, there are many ways the Soviets can locate American ships without the

use of RORSATs. “For instance, they can ask
Descriptions, Pros, and Cons of Possible Agreements ● 2 3 — .

their own ships, which accompany our aircraft

carriers, pointed out a panelist. “If they

didn’t have radar ocean reconnaissance satellites, they would have other things. ”

Also disputed was the argument that a U.S.

ASAT would be stabilizing since it would deny

the Soviets the ability to execute a “shootlook-shoot” attack. That rationale is an example of the “impractical war conduct scenarios”

which one can set up and then show to be impossible if only some particular weapon is

built, a panelist said. “That is not a valid reason to oppose ASAT treaties. ”

Finally, the argument that a U.S. ASAT

weapon is needed to induce the Soviets to negotiate was also challenged. “It is not supported by historical experience, ” said a panelist. “In 1978 and ’79, the negotiations [with

the Soviets on anti-satellite weapons] were

very active and were moving along nicely, and

we didn’t even have a paper program-much

less a system. ” He pointed out that the Soviets “accepted it on faith” that the United

States was quite capable, technologically and

industrially, of putting together a system if

it wanted to. “If both parties feel they can’t

negotiate except from a position of strength,

the conclusion is there will be no negotiations. ”

LIMITATIONS OF ASA T

ACCORDS ON BMD

DEVELOPMEN T

According to some panelists, the effects of

an ASAT accord on the future development

of ballistic missile defense are some of the

most important anti-treaty arguments. “They

involve important issues of judgement. ” While

it was in effect, an ASAT accord would prevent development and deployment of spacebased ballistic missile defense, said an accord

supporter. However, any such treaty could

have provision for periodic review. Treaties

can be mutually eliminated or unilaterally

abrogated; they contain “all kinds of possibilities for not constraining ourselves for the

indefinite future. ” However, another panelist

countered that treaties “tend to become sacrosanct. ” Any attempt to withdraw from an

ASAT accord would become a “major political football” which might obscure strategic

considerations.

URGENC Y

One of the most important points raised by

treaty supporters was that, if an agreement

is to be reached at all, there is great value in

reaching it sooner rather than later. A treaty

may be much harder to negotiate, and be much

less effective, if it is delayed. In particular,

many treaty proponents thought it would be

“extremely damaging” to complete tests of

the U.S. air-launched ASAT because the Soviets will react to that development. If, following future American tests, the Soviets believe

the U.S. system to operate reliably, they may

not be willing to concede the United States’

right to keep that system without demanding

that they themselves be permitted to match

or exceed that system’s capabilities. “Quit

while you’re behind, ” urged a panelist, “or

while you’re nominally behind. ” In another

panelist’s words, “negotiating from strength

is a sinusoidal function and you have to pick

your timing right. . . . We should be negotiating now because we are behind by just the

right amount. ”

In arguing for an agreement as soon as possible, one panelist noted that the negotiations

need not take a long time. “You do not have

to negotiate the ultimate ASAT agreement,

and the best agreement to negotiate first is

the broadest one. ” Another panelist countered

that while an agreement need not take a long

time, it probably will take a long time for reasons which are more political than technical.

“If you don’t want an agreement and you

don’t go to the table, it is likely to take a very

long time” to negotiate and conclude a treaty.
Soviet Attitudes and Efforts

MILITAR Y

PAST DEVELOPMENT AND

PRESENT STATU S

The Soviets have attached a great deal of

significance to space activities. Their programs, controlled by the military, area source

of great national pride and have tremendous

momentum. They have pursued all of the military support activities in space that the

United States has undertaken, often for reasons not clear to American observers. The

U.S.S.R. has also exploited options that the

United States has forgone.

Development of the current Soviet co-orbital

ASAT began in the 1960’s for reasons which

“really kind of remain something of a mystery” and quite possibly were not thought

through in depth. It is not presently a very

capable weapon. “I don’t think that the orbital

intercept system is of great military significance, ” said a panelist, echoing views which

were widely shared at the workshop. “Indeed,

it hard to imagine exactly what threat it does

pose.” However, the Soviets have been taking the system very seriously. They have

maintained it, tested it, and improved it over

the years. They have not made major advances or introduced significant variants of

the co-orbital ASAT, but instead have been

systematically making incremental modifications. A panelist warned against drawing too

many conclusions about the lack of major upgrades in the Soviet ASAT. The United States

had maintained nuclear-armed ASAT interceptors on islands in the Pacific Ocean for 12

years without upgrades. We chose to develop

an entirely new system—the air-launched direct homing interceptor-because that type of

system had clear advantages. “There is no

reason to suppose that the Russians might not

have made a similar decision. ”

One must be careful in comparing the Soviet and the American space efforts. Many

qualifications are required in order to determine true Soviet capabilities or level of effort.

When comparing launch rates, for example,

EFFORT S

one must recognize that Soviet satellites are

much shorter lived than American ones. Although the Soviets had 98 launches (military

plus civilian) in 1983 compared to 22 for the

United States, during that time the United

States had about twice as many active satellites in orbit as the Soviets.

To some extent, the Soviet approach of having more but shorter-lived satellites reflects

the Soviets’ poorer technology; nevertheless,

it does give them some significant strengths.

They have replacement satellites and launchers and will be able to reconstitute space systems quickly in case of ASAT attack.

“The Soviets would fare better than we

would in an environment in which satellites

had an ‘enemy-induced lifetime’ of two

weeks, ” said a panelist. “They would hardly

notice it whereas it would hurt us a lot. ” However, he noted that if the United States

deploys its ASAT, it will be able to destroy

Soviet satellites within a few hours of launch.

The Soviet ability to replace satellites every

few weeks would not be very useful.

At present, the United States is seen by

many observers as being more dependent on

space systems than the Soviet Union. However, as the Soviets increase their use of space

support systems, any asymmetry between Soviet and American reliance on space will

lessen. Indeed, one panelist felt that the

Soviets are now “fully as hooked on the use

of those systems as we are, ” and that they are

clearly using space systems in connection with

their Afghan and other military ventures.

SPECULATION O N

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT S

Future Soviet space activities are certain to

increase and will appear provocative to many

observers in the United States no matter what

the “real” explanations may be. The Soviets

will be undertaking “all sorts of operations at

a level substantially higher than we’re going

25
26 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

to be involved in.” The Soviets are reportedly

doing research and development into directed

energy weapons, and at least one participant

gave “considerable credence” to the notion

that the Soviets might launch a space laser

later in this decade. Such a device, rather than

an incremental refinement of their co-orbital

interceptor, would be required to deal with the

American target set which has many satellites

in very high orbits.

Another panelist cautioned that there has

been, at times, considerable misrepresentation

of the Soviet space program. “They may be

working on lasers, ” he said, and “they certainly work on space. ” However, there has

been “no significant, no credible report” of Soviet space-based lasers. “They could put a laser into space, just as we could, ” he continued,

but it would be “militarily insignificant. ”

One participant questioned the relevance of

speculating about Soviet motivations and

developments, and of comparing the Soviet

and American systems. “Useful as [that process] might be if better answers were available, ” he felt, it turns out “not to be a particularly illuminating way to go” in the present

circumstances. “Maybe it’s a diversion that

really isn’t very helpful at all. ”

DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICA L

SOVIET PERCEPTION S

The Soviets currently say they see the U.S.

strategic buildup as representing a desire to

achieve and maintain a first-strike capability.

Looking for means of countering this acrossthe-board buildup, the Soviets could see development of their ASAT weapons system as being an effective way to put very significant

pressure on the United States with very little investment.

A panelist, attempting to view the American

strategic rearmament program from the

Soviets’ “rather paranoid perspective,” noted

that the MX, the Trident D-5, and the Pershing II missiles are seen as being the “workhorses” of this presumed preemptive attack.

Enduring command and control systems and

ASAT weapons would fulfill vital support

roles. If the United States were to pursue

ballistic missile defense, it would be perceived,

from this viewpoint, as enhancing a first strike

posture by threatening to blunt Soviet retaliation.

American arms control overtures are also

seen by the Soviets as supporting a U.S. firststrike capability, explained the panelist. Our

proposals, which would have the effect of reducing Soviet force levels while not constraining the types of weapons programs we are

undertaking, would just make it easier for us

to undertake a first-strike attack.

POSSIBLE POLIC Y

The Soviets have stated their interest in

resuming ASAT negotiations with the United

States. They have been getting diplomatic

credit for taking the initiative in promoting

space arms control. The Soviets in 1981 and

again in 1983 brought draft ASAT treaties

before the United Nations. A major factor

which seemed to have been a damper on U. S.-

U.S.S.R. progress in the 1978 and 1979 ASAT

negotiations had been the People’s Republic

of China’s nonaccession to the Outer Space

Treaty of 1967. After the OTA workshop had

concluded, one of the participants informed

OTA that the PRC had indeed acceded to the

Outer Space Treaty as of December 1983–an

event “of great importance. ”

Panelists noted that the Soviets have several incentives to negotiate an ASAT treaty

with the United States. One is the argument

“so frequently employed in American arms

control negotiations: ‘sure, we can make that

proposal because, even though it might not be

a good thing if it were accepted, we can count

upon the Americans to not accept it simply

because we propose it.’ “ Alternatively, and
Soviet Attitudes and Efforts ● 2 7

contrary to their seeking to engage in an

ASAT race to pressure the United States, the

Soviets have an interest in limiting ASAT

technology because that is an area where the

United States might be able to excel. The

Soviets are concerned that “we’re going to

push them into a technological race in areas

where we have some advantage. ”

The Soviets have changed their public position since 1981. At that time, they would have

permitted existing ASAT systems to remain

under a treaty. Now, they claim that the U.S.

weapon is too much more capable than their

own to permit such an arrangement, and they

will likely seek to ban it or else demand the

right to respond with at least as capable a system of their own. A panelist noted that, should

the Soviets seek to mirror the U.S. ASAT by

deploying an air-launched equivalent, their

BACKFIRE bomber would be a “splendid machine” for that purpose. It is large, fast,

maneuverable, and can climb to high altitudes;

BACKFIRES and their crews and logistical

support exist in quantity.

The 1983 Soviet draft ASAT treaty modified or removed many of the features of the

1981 draft which had been considered objectionable from the American point of view. In

particular, it did not include explicit objection

to the U.S. space shuttle. The Soviets do not

find the space shuttle to be an object of “fear

and loathing, ” said a panelist. He dismissed

the idea that, using the space shuttle, the

United States might “swallow one of their

satellites and bring it back to Los Angeles or

somewhere and dissect it. ” “ I would strongly

suggest that we not try that, ” he continued.

“The first time we try it, we will have three

shuttles instead of four. ”

However, Soviet attitudes concerning the

shuttle might very well be modified by use of

the shuttle for anti-satellite experiments or

tests. Aviation Week and Space Technology

articles cited at the workshop report that antisatellite related activity is scheduled for future

shuttle missions. Although the Soviets have

indicated an understanding of the importance

placed by the United States on protecting

shuttle activities, including those involving

military support, it was felt at the workshop

that their tolerance would not extend to active ASAT experiments. One panelist felt that,

in reaction to U.S. ASAT activity (shuttlerelated or otherwise), the Soviets may go so

far as to challenge such long-established

precepts as right of overflight of Soviet territory by military-support space systems.

Other panelists made the observation that

it would be “very surprising” if the Soviets,

in concluding an ASAT treaty, would be prepared to give up the capability to attack

elements of a strategic weapons system based

in space. This would apply in particular to

space-based elements of a strategic defensive

system.

A panelist noted that by vigorously pursuing space activities and at the same time seeking space arms control negotiations with the

United States, the Soviets could be indicating

that they would like to draw up some rules of

behavior which would permit them to expand

their space activities in a way that is “reasonably safe and reasonably in concordance with

what we want to do. ” Lack of significant progress on their co-orbital ASAT should not be

taken as indicative of a desire for arms control. “I don’t think that it’s useful or that it’s

likely to succeed to rest the case for arms control on evidences of Soviet restraint. . . . They

will restrain themselves when they see a political purpose to it, and the arms control

agreement or other agreements provide the

political purpose for it. ” Without disagreeing,

another panelist cautioned against attributing

to the Soviets the same policy or operational

doctrine concerning ASATs as the United

States holds. “We have a notion of what we

think ASAT development or ASAT arms control would do within the context of American

security policy . . . [but] it is not obvious to me

that they are going to make those judgments

in the same way we do. ”
U.S. Attitudes and Efforts

BACKGROUN D

DEPENDENCE O N

SPACE SYSTEMS

The United States has placed high importance on the utilization of space for military

support operations. It has developed advanced

space technology which is deployed in valuable, sophisticated, and long-lived satellites.

Space systems are particularly attractive to

the United States in view of its policy of being able to project power worldwide. The high

capability and high cost of American satellites, however, tend to make them attractive

targets for ASAT attack. We have not expended much effort in the past making these

assets redundant or survivable, increasing the

motivation for the Soviets to develop an

ASAT.

At the same time, the U.S. has recognized

the vulnerability of space assets and has not

relied on them as extensively as it otherwise

might have. For example, the space-based

Global Positioning System, when fully operational, will permit increased accuracy of U.S.

strategic missiles, but guidance of U.S.

ICBMs and SLBMs will not rely solely upon

that system. Space systems play a very important role in military support which should

not be underestimated, but critical, indispensable systems are designed with minimum

dependence on satellites. If space links are involved, they are part of a redundant set of

alternatives. As a result, there has not been

a strong incentive to develop ASAT weapons.

Possibly more significant than our partial

dependence on satellites, thought some

panelists, is our moving towards total

dependence on the space shuttle as a launch

vehicle. “If the Soviets have an interest in impeding or disabling all or some parts of our

space program, the way to go to the jugular

is to go to the shuttle, ” remarked a panelist.

“The Air Force’s claims that there is need for

retention of conventional launch capability are

absolutely correct. ”

ANTI-SATELLIT E

SYSTEMS AND NEGOTIATION S

In the 1960’s, the United States maintained

an operational system of nuclear-armed ASAT

interceptors at Johnston Island and Kwajalein

atoll in the Pacific Ocean. These were decommissioned by 1975 for several reasons, including: 1) the threat of orbiting nuclear weapons, which the ASATs were intended to

counter, never materialized; 2) nuclear ASAT

detonations in space would damage friendly

satellites and terrestrial systems by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generation; and 3)

the existence of the nuclear-armed ASAT system formed a disincentive to spending additional money on a more sophisticated and

more usable ASAT weapon. In 1978 and 1979,

the United States held three rounds of bilateral negotiations with the U.S.S.R. concerning A SAT weapons. The talks were never

resumed following the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan.

PRESENT POLICY

Although administration representatives from the perspective of outside, interested,

were invited to participate in the workshop, and knowledgeable observers, and at times

none did so. As a result, the panelists at- cited administration testimony before the Sentempted to represent administration positions ate Foreign Relations Committee.

29
30 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

ASAT ARMS CONTRO L

Present Reagan Administration policy is to

complete development and deployment of the

F-l5-launched, direct-ascent ASAT interceptor and to defer ASAT negotiations which

have been sought by the Soviet Union. Three

reasons have been given to Congress for building a U.S. ASAT weapon: 1) The existence of

the Soviet ASAT requires that the United

States develop an equivalent capability in order to deter Soviet ASAT attack, 2) the United

States requires an ASAT in order to compel

the Soviet Union to enter ASAT weapon negotiations in good faith, and 3) the United States

requires the capability to deny the Soviets use

of space assets which support attacks against

U.S. forces.

Inadequate verification has been the primary stated reason for the United States not

responding positively to Soviet requests to

resume ASAT negotiations. Difficulty in verifying the destruction or ensuring the absence

of dedicated ASAT systems, and the inevitable existence of potential residual ASAT capability (Galosh ABM interceptors, Soyuz rendezvous procedures, etc.) have been cited as

being impediments to treaty verification. Potential residual or covert Soviet ASAT capability has been felt to preclude an effective

ASAT treaty. Pursuit of the Strategic Defense

Initiative, which would likely be impeded by

effective ASAT arms control, may have been

a factor in the opposition to ASAT negotiations but had not been brought up in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations as of early 1984 (the most recent testimony offered before that Committee had

been in May 1983).

ASAT arms control was not seen by the

panelists as being high on the incoming

Reagan administration’s list of priorities. Its

most important military objective was to build

up strategic forces, and ensuring the survivability of military support satellites was made

a very high priority. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Intermediate Nuclear Forces

negotiations may have been a priority, but

ASAT negotiations certainly were not. The

possibility of future ASAT talks had not been

foreclosed, but it was felt that they could be

considered at some future time if they were

seen to be in the national interest. For the time

being, the Air Force was to continue development of the air-launched ASAT weapon.

A workshop participant noted that it

seemed as if there had been no net assessment,

at least in the first three years of this administration, of the overall advantages and disadvantages of an ASAT treaty. ASAT was not

a priority issue, so there was no motivation

for overcoming bureaucratic impediments

against “getting the focused attention either

of persons who don’t wish to agree or of the

person who can tell them to. ” The lack of such

a comprehensive policy, if it indeed is missing,

is likely due to the lack of ongoing ASAT

negotiations. During the 1978-79 ASAT negotiations, there was incentive to formulate an

administration-wide policy. “Negotiating with

the Soviets was really driving the whole process” at that time, observed a panelist.

ARMS CONTRO L

IN GENERA L

The Reagan administration reevaluated previous administrations’ attitudes towards arms

control. It was felt by members of the incoming administration that many previous arms

control agreements had not been in the best

interests of the United States. Negotiations

which had led to treaties had had the effect

of codifying and preserving the status quo.

Since the new administration felt that the

United States was in an unsatisfactory military balance with respect to the Soviet Union,

taking into account rates of buildup as well

as levels of deployed forces, this imbalance

would have to be redressed before there was

much hope of successful arms control. “The

burden of proof,” explained a panelist attempting to interpret administration attitudes, “would be on those who argued that

an arms control negotiation about anything

was more likely to succeed if begun in 1981

than if begun in 1982 or 1983 or 1984 or 1986

or 1987. ”
U.S. Attitudes and Efforts ● 3 1

Panelists also perceived an assumption

within the administration that it would be a

mistake to modify military programs to meet

arms control objectives — either to make arms

control successful or to rely upon successful

conclusion of an agreement. “If a program

makes sense in the absence of arms control, ”

voiced a panelist attempting to represent this

attitude, “then that program makes sense, and

one should not think about the alternatives of

either ‘go ahead with this program’ or ‘go

ahead with an arms control treaty ’.”

Administration policies seemed to some panelists to be consistent with an attitude, held

implicitly by administration policymakers,

that the U.S./U.S.S.R. relationship will be one

of military competition for the indefinite

future. “It is beyond the ability of policy

makers to opt out of that competition, ” as

restated by a panelist. However, “the policymakers may have some choices about where

that competition takes place. ” It would

therefore make sense for the United States to

steer the military competition into an arena

where the United States might excel—developing and deploying sophisticated technology,

such as space technology-and away from

competitions which just involve spending

money, such as putting tanks into Central

Europe. Along these lines, there are those who

argue that space is where the United States

can “outflank” the Soviets and sustain some

kind of superiority, and that consequently an

ASAT treaty might be one of the less attractive arms control possibilities.
ASAT, BMD, and the 1972 ABM Treaty

ASAT systems and anti-ballistic missile systems are closely related, as are ASAT and

ABM arms control. The development of

ASATs can affect the continued viability of

the existing ABM arms control regime; conversely, development of strategic defensive

systems can affect possibilities for ASAT

arms control. This section reviews the 1972

ABM treaty (“I have a rule. . . never to be

flabbergasted at the same thing more than

three times, ” explained a panelist, “but I am

always somewhat surprised at how people forget what it is that the treaty says and what

it does not say”). This section also discusses

some of the relationships between ASAT and

ABM, regarding both weapons systems and

arms control measures.

REVIEW OF 1972 ABM TREATY

PURPOS E

The Treaty Between the United States of

America and the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic

Missile Systems, which entered into force on

October 3, 1972, states its overall purpose in

Article I:

1) Each party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt

other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2) Each party undertakes not to deploy

ABM systems for a defense of the territory

of its country and not to provide a base for

such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except

as provided for in Article 111 of this Treaty.

This explicit declaration of purpose is an important aspect of the treaty. As time, technology, and circumstances change, it is possible

to refer again to the declared purpose in order to develop specific new understandings

which are required to modernize the treaty.

DEFINITION S

An anti-ballistic missile system is defined,

for the purposes of the treaty, as “a system

to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their

elements in flight trajectory. ” This phrase is

followed by the words “currently consisting

of” and then a list of three items: ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM

radars. The treaty is not restricted to those

systems. It says what the current systems are,

but it is intended to cover all ABM systems.

Note that the definition refers to strategic

weapons. Systems to counter tactical missiles

are not covered at all-” a loophole that we designed carefully, and which they are pushing

through, ” according to a panelist (see app. B).

Note also that the treaty defines an ABM as

a system to counter strategic weapons. It does

not say “system designed to counter, as the

Soviets would have liked, nor does it read

“system capable of countering, ” which was

the United States’ preferred wording. The

United States was concerned that, by upgrading surface-to-air missiles (SAM S), the

U.S.S.R. would be able to deploy a considerable ABM capability. The Soviet Union, on the

other hand, was concerned that it would be

forced to classify some 10,000 SAMs as ABM

interceptors. The analogy of upgrading ASAT

weapons to give them ABM capability is similarly relevant and similarly covered by the

treaty.

This definition is essentially a capability

test. All systems which are ABM-capable,

whether or not they were designed for that

purpose, are either considered ABM systems

under the treaty or else are in violation of Article VI(a), which prohibits giving ABM capability to non-ABM systems. This article was

“really aimed at SAM systems, ” explained a

panelist, “but the same thing applies to ASAT

systems. ” If an ASAT weapon is given the

ability to counter strategic ballistic missiles,

33
34 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

then “it’s a violation or else it’s got to count

as an ABM system, one way or the other. ”

MAJOR PROVISION S

The ABM treaty prohibits all ABM deployments which are not explicitly permitted. Article III bans all deployments other than two

sites (amended by a 1974 protocol to one) on

each side, each having restricted numbers of

interceptors, launchers, and radars. These prohibitions, interpreted a panelist, are clear:

“Can you deploy lasers? No. Can you deploy

particle beams? No. Can you deploy squizzle

dumps or freebie dobbles? No.”

Article IV permits testing, at designated

test sites, of certain systems not deployable

under Article III. However, systems permitted at test sites or deployments are

severely constrained by Article V, in which

“each party undertakes not to develop, test,

or deploy ABM systems or components which

are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or

mobile land-based. ” Only fixed, land-based

systems can be tested, and only specified

fixed, land-based systems can be deployed.

“Development,” as referred to in this provision, was defined in a statement to Congress

by the chief U.S. negotiator of the ABM

treaty: “It is understood by both sides that

the prohibition on development applies to

activities involved after a component moves

from the laboratory development testing stage

to the field testing stage, wherever performed.” Interpreted by a workshop panelist,

“if I see one outside the laboratory—a prototype, a bread-board model—if I see one, it’s

a violation. I don’t have to see it tested. ” The

second part of Article V prohibits a launcher

from being able to fire more than one interceptor or be reloaded rapidly.

Upgrades are prohibited in Article VI(a), as

discussed above. No non-ABM systems shall

be given ABM capability or be tested in an

ABM mode. The second part (b) of Article VI

restricts ABM battle management radars by

requiring early warning radars to be on the

periphery of the country and oriented outwards. Agreed Statement F, approved by U.S.

and U.S.S.R. delegation heads at the same

time that the treaty was signed, excludes

radars used “for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification” from the location

and orientation restrictions in Article VI(b).

Article XII prohibits interference with verification of the treaty, both by banning interference with the national technical means

used for verification and by prohibiting “deliberate concealment measures” which would

impede verification by national technical

means. Article XIII establishes the Standing

Consultative Commission to handle questions

relating to treaty compliance, to consider

possible amendments, and to consider proposals for further limiting strategic arms.

Agreed Statement D of the ABM treaty discusses components based on “other physical

principles” and capable of substituting for interceptors, launchers, or radars. Capability,

again, is crucial. If a new device can substitute

for a launcher, interceptor, or radar, its deployment is prohibited. If it is instead only an adjunct or supplement, it would be permitted.

This article specifies that “specific limitations” on such new systems and their components would be “subject to discussion” in the

Standing Consultative Commission, and that

such discussion might lead to amendment of

the treaty. Only if the treaty were amended

to permit these new components would their

deployment be allowed; otherwise, they are

prohibited.
ASAT, BMD, and the 1972 ABM Treaty ● 35

CONNECTIONS BETWEEN ASAT, BMD,

AND THE ABM TREATY

As mentioned above, developing an ASAT

system which had BMD capability, or upgrading one to give it BMD capability, would be

a violation of the ABM treaty. The test of

violation is capability-can the ASAT destroy

missiles? There is an absolute prohibition on

anything not fixed on land at an ABM site or

a designated test site which is able to destroy

“strategic ballistic missiles or their elements

in flight trajectory. ”

National technical means of verification are

protected from interference in Article XII.

Reconnaissance satellites are not explicitly

mentioned in the treaty text, but they are

listed as an example of national technical

means in the transmittal letter from the

Secretary of State to the President which accompanied the treaty and were also mentioned

in the transmittal letter to Congress. ASAT

attacks against reconnaissance satellites used

to monitor compliance with the ABM treaty

are, therefore, banned by that treaty.

Another relevant connection between ASAT

systems and the ABM treaty involves the

radars required for ASAT battle management

(in the absence of an ASAT treaty) or ASAT

treaty verification (if such a treaty is concluded). These space-track radars will physically be very hard to distinguish from earlywarning radars and ABM battle management

radars which are covered by the ABM treaty,

and any ASAT treaty may need specifically

to address space-track radars to ensure that

the prohibitions against ABM battle management radars are not circumvented. However,

according to a panelist, the signal emitted by

a radar “would be quite different if it were fundamentally a space track system than if it

were an ABM, ” making somewhat easier the

task of distinguishing between the two (see

app. B).

TECHNOLOGIE S

There is great overlap between BMD and

ASAT technologies. In general, even a poor

or prototype anti-ballistic missile could be an

excellent ASAT. Looking at BMD systems designed to attack a ballistic missile at different

stages in its flight trajectory, we have three

categories of BMD systems:

1. Boost-phase BMD.–BMD systems de2.

signed to attack missiles as they are

climbing out of the atmosphere under

powered flight have great ASAT potential. Therefore, any treaty effectively

limiting systems having ASAT capability would almost certainly have to restrict boost-phase BMD. Of course, the

ABM treaty already in effect prohibits

boost-phase BMD: in order to respond

quickly enough to attack missiles in their

boost phase, a boost-phase BMD system

will either require space-basing of weapons components or else it will need to

launch “pop-up” components immediate

ly upon detection of missile launch by

space-based sensors. It may well also require directed-energy weapons which produce beams propagating at or near the

speed of light. “Both of those are prohibited by the ABM treaty, ” reminded

a panelist. “It’s not as if there’s some little, subtle question as to whether a spacebased BMD system would be permitted

or not. It’s not. You can’t develop it, you

can’t test it, you can’t deploy it, and it’s

caught in about eight different places in

the treaty. It is not close. ”

Midcourse BMD.–The trajectory of a

missile reentry vehicle while outside the

atmosphere is similar to a satellite orbit:

the peak altitude is on the order of 1,000

km and the velocity is slightly suborbi-
36 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

3.

tal. There is therefore great overlap

between midcourse BMD systems and

ASAT systems. The Soviet Galosh ABM

system was not designed as an ASAT

but does have ASAT capability for satellites in orbits similar to ICBM trajectories; the U.S. miniature homing vehicle ASAT weapon evolved from a design

originally intended for midcourse BMD.

Since the ABM Treaty strictly limits

locations of permitted ABM systems,

there are significant constraints, in terms

of number and location, on ABM systems which could be used as ASATs. Including the interceptors at test ranges,

each side would have only about 115 interceptors and they would be located between 45 and 60 degrees latitude. ABM

systems permitted under the treaty are

therefore “important for some kinds of

satellites in certain kinds of orbits, in certain places,” but they are “probably not

a very significant threat” to satellites in

general. In addition to the constraints in

the ABM treaty, midcourse BMD (like

boost-phase BMD) would probably be inhibited by an effective ASAT treaty.

Terminal BMD.–BMD systems which

attack missile warheads after the warheads have re-entered the Earth’s atmosphere have the least overlap with ASAT

technology. They are also not very useful

systems for defending large areas, as opposed to selected hardened targets.

While research into terminal BMD systems is proposed as part of the Reagan

administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative, they are not the systems primarily responsible for the renewed interest

in ballistic missile defense pursuant to

the President’s March 23, 1983 “Star

Wars” speech.

ROLE S

Since ASAT and BMD technologies are so

closely related, the outcome of any ASAT

limitation or testing ban will almost certainly

impede midcourse and boost-phase BMD development. Conversely, technology development ostensibly for an advanced ASAT system might provide a loophole for undertaking

BMD research which would be in violation of

the ABM treaty.

At the same time, the development of highquality ASATs which will probably occur in

the absence of an ASAT agreement would put

the space-based elements of any BMD system

(sensors if not weapons) at risk. Unconstrained

ASATs would threaten sensors even for ABM

systems which are within the scope of the present ABM treaty.

PERCEPTION S

As noted above, aggressive ASAT development will aid development of advanced BMD

systems since technologies investigated for

ASAT maybe useful in either role. ASAT development may therefore be perceived as supporting a BMD program. To the extent that

development of BMD is seen as being threatening, ASAT development may likewise be

perceived to be a threatening act.

In a political context, a participant suggested that some of the hostile implications

of pursuing BMD research might be ameliorated by simultaneously pursuing some sort

of space behavior or “rules of the road”

agreement.

DRAFT ASAT TREATIE S

The 1983 Soviet draft ASAT treaty includes

a subtlety of language which may or may not

have been intended. The phrase “space object”

is a negotiator’s “term-of-art” originating with

the Outer Space Treaty negotiations. It stands

for anything in space except for ballistic missile reentry vehicles, which were purposely and

carefully exempted from the jurisdiction of

that treaty. Although the Soviet draft mentions space objects in the introduction, an

operative article prohibits testing and deploying “space-based weapons for the destruction

of objects on the Earth, in the atmosphere, or

in outer space” (emphasis added). It does not

say “space objects,“ implying that attacks on

reentry vehicles would not be excluded from
ASAT, BMD, and the 1972 ABM Treaty ● 37

the ban. One participant, noting that the

“Soviets are not dummies when it comes to

treaty language,” thought that quite possibly

they intended to use language that was

“opaque as to their views” which would “invite us to reveal our views of some of these

substantive matters through the route of fiddling around with these language details. ”

The draft ASAT treaty proposed by the

Union of Concerned Scientists, on the other

hand, prohibits attacks on “space objects”

and therefore does not address the problem of

attacks on reentry vehicles. That exemption

was made because the ABM problem had been

explicitly addressed in the 1972 ABM treaty.

“There is a tendency in drafting treaties to

make the treaty stand by itself, ” commented

a panelist. “That should be resisted. Every

treaty exists in the milieu of other

agreements.

At least one participant disputed the value

of preparing drafts outside of an ongoing process of negotiation: “I do not like the idea of

people putting out draft treaties on ASAT

matters. ” They are invariably “incomplete”

since the text alone does not include any of the

history that accompanies a true negotiation

process and since the authors are not necessarily official representatives of their governments. The “prejudicial effects” of extant

drafts “could probably be dismissed in a couple of weeks, ” but that time could be put to

better use should negotiations be resumed.

TREATY WORDIN G

The language of the ABM treaty was left

“fuzzy” in places, and definitions were not

made overly precise, in order to leave a “noman’s-land” surrounding prohibited areas.

The hope was that debate would ensue as to

whether the “no-man’s-land” had been entered

before there were any questions of treaty violation. This “noble experiment, ” however, did

not provide the desired results. “It turns out

the Soviets are creatively legalistic, ” interpreted one panelist. “They don’t worry about

the fuzzy areas. In their view, action in a fuzzy

area is permitted because it not prohibited.

However, the suggestion that the Soviets do

not uphold the spirit of a treaty was debated

by another panelist. “I don’t like to talk about

the ‘spirit of agreement’ because there ain’t

no such thing. ” However, this panelist noted

that there is significant value in having an

operative article in a treaty which states the

treaty’s general purposes. When circumstances change, forcing development of new

understandings in order to maintain the

treaty, one can look back on that declaration

of intent to make an easy transition. “Here is

the agreed purpose that’s built into the treaty.

Here are the new circumstances that bear on

that purpose, and here are the new specific

understandings that are needed to modernize”

the treaty.
Verification Issues

CAVEAT S

Verification issues are inherently difficult to

discuss in an open meeting. However, a panelist pointed out that verification is much more

than a detailed catalog of technical intelligence

capabilities. Another panelist agreed, noting

that the intelligence agencies say that their job

is not verification, but monitoring. They make

that distinction very clearly, he explained:

“verification” is a political, legal, diplomatic,

and military process, of which “monitoring”

is only a part.

tions. First, verification is concerned with

determining whether or not specified treaty

provisions are being complied with and is

therefore inherently dependent on the wording

of those provisions. Second, any discussion of

verification ought to include consideration of

the overall military or security purposes which

the treaty is to serve. The level and confidence

with which compliance with a provision need

be verified must depend on the significance

and implications of violating that provision.

Workshop panelists started the session devoted to verification by making two observaGOAL S

Therefore, any discussion of verification 3. to relax tensions between the supertechnology and procedure must implicitly or powers by establishing a regime of acceptexplicitly be preceded by discussion of philos- able behavior in space;

ophy—what is it that the treaty is to accom- 4. to obtain political or diplomatic goodwill;

plish? Five not necessarily mutually exclusive and

goals of a space arms control or space behavior 5. to avert or constrain an arms race in

agreement were identified at the workshop: space.

1.

2.

to reduce the vulnerability of existing Some aspects of a treaty maybe much more

space assets to dedicated or residual relevant for achieving the principal purposes

ASAT threats by constraining those of the agreement than others, and therefore

threats; it may be more important to verify some porto prevent future development of a high- —

confidence, high-quality ASAT by the

opposing party;

LEVELS OF VERIFIABILIT Y

Some provisions in a treaty may serve to

ban activities which are not very threatening

in themselves but are prohibited in order to

ensure that other, more threatening activities

are not undertaken. In these cases, the activities which are of less concern might not need

to be detected with as high a level of confidence as long as there were higher confidence

that the more threatening activities were not

taking place. As an example, consider a ban

against testing ASAT interceptors at geosynchronous orbit, which would be a more threatening act than testing them in low Earth orbit. It might be easier to ban these high

altitude tests if tests in low earth orbit were

also prohibited. Even if some low-altitude

tests were conducted covertly by masking

them as legitimate rendezvous operations, the

39
40 • Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

.- —

low-altitude ban might prevent overt, explicit

low-altitude ASAT tests which might be more

easily adapted to higher orbits than a covert

capability would be.

Limitations which might not be highly verifiable, taken alone, might nevertheless be

useful in an agreement as long as one understands the limited contributions such bans

might make to security. Subversion of even

a leaky ban would require a totally covert program, which would certainly be more difficult

than an overt one and which mayor may not

be possible. Furthermore, technical encroachment of a treaty proscription by a single component is not the same as development of a

militarily significant system. “Soyuz can ram

satellites, ” admitted a participant, “but you

have to have one hell of a lot of Soyuzes

floating around to make a terribly militarily

effective ASAT system. ”

The problem of levels of verification has

arisen in previous arms control issues. “In the

late 1970’s, there was some agreement among

a large fraction of the community,” said a panelist, “that although cruise missile verification

could not be absolute, verification could be

good enough considering that they did not

pose a first strike threat. ” Another panelist

noted that we do not necessarily have to respond to weaknesses in our verification capabilities by either contorting arms provisions

to avoid the weaknesses or by avoiding arms

control altogether. There are defensive means

other than arms control, such as hardening

and survivability measures or changes in operational procedures, which can offset the military advantage that might accrue to a party

attempting to cheat on an agreement.

FACTORS IN VERIFICATION OF

ASAT ARMS CONTROL

COMPLICATION S

Discussion of ASAT arms control brought

forth several factors which tend to complicate

the verification of compliance with such an

agreement, and several other factors which

ease that task. One of the complications is the

enormous volume of space where illicit activities might be conducted. Verification of compliance with a SALT or START arms control

agreement involves inspection of number of

areas within the Soviet Union or its immediate airspace. This area, although vast, is

relatively well determined and is amenable to

close inspection by space-based photographic

reconnaissance satellites. The region where

space activities might be conducted starts at

altitudes of about 100 km and can range well

past geosynchronous orbit at 36,000 km. Also

increasing the difficulty of verifying compliance with an ASAT treaty is the large number and growing variety of Soviet space

launches. Soviet launches have increased at a

rate of about 2 percent per year, averaged over

the last 15 years. Although this launch rate

may very well decrease in the future as the

Soviets develop longer lived satellites, each additional type of satellite requires a body of experience in order to classify its function and

permit discrimination between unusual activity and routine behavior.

Third, the functional characteristics distinguishing ASAT weapons or space mines

from other satellites may not be readily observable. All national technical means have imperfect discrimination, and the physical differences between permitted and prohibited

satellites may be small. As panelists had previously pointed out, much Soviet space activity is not likely to be completely understood

by the United States no matter what the

“true” Soviet intent might be.

A fourth complication is the inevitable presence of some residual ASAT capability in systems which may be undesirable or infeasible

to ban. ICBMs, SLBMs, ABM interceptors,

maneuvering spacecraft, and possibly air-
Verification Issues ● 4 1

based or ground-based lasers may fall into this

category. These systems may pose problems

in determining whether they are being operated in an ASAT mode; normal operation (of

rendezvous between spacecraft, for example)

may be difficult to distinguish from certain

types of ASAT activities. This question of residual ASAT capability is one of the most

crucial factors in the debate concerning the

desirability of an ASAT accord, and just how

much ASAT activity could go undetected is

a critical question. As the number of systems

possibly having some ASAT capability proliferates, the monitoring task of determining

how these systems are being used will become

even more difficult.

A fifth, somewhat ironic, point made during this discussion was that at present, the

principal motivation for the United States to

develop the sort of space monitoring capability which would be useful in verifying an

ASAT accord is to provide targeting information for the U.S. ASAT weapon. Panelists did

note, however, that it is likely that any monitoring capability needed to verify a treaty

would be desirable in any case. Intelligence collection requirements would persist even in, or

especially in, the absence of a treaty. However,

the lack of an ASAT weapon system might reduce the bureaucratic enthusiasm or political

backing for an extensive space monitoring

system.

SIMPLIFICATION S

Mitigating these complications are several

offsetting factors which assist our capability

or monitoring space arms control. First,

although space is large, it is transparent and

accessible to monitoring, and weaknesses in

round-based monitoring systems can be mitigated by putting those systems into space.

Soviet satellites will be observable by U.S. national technical means. Confusion as to the

true nature of a Soviet spacecraft maybe mitigated by an agreement which will serve to reduce ambiguity of space operations. Furthermore, all ASAT-related activities start on the

ground. Relevant ground sites, including

launch facilities, can be observed by an extensive array of U.S. monitoring facilities; all

launches of significant size from Soviet territory can now be detected. After all, although

the Soviets have never publicly announced

their existing ASAT tests, these tests have

been detected and analyzed by the United

States.

Second, if the Soviet Union attempts to conduct covert ASAT testing or development, it

will need to monitor its own activity if it intends to obtain any data concerning how well

its system performs. The Soviet requirement

to recover data from or observe its activity in

some way may also provide the United States

with an opportunity to detect or intercept the

transmission. The Soviet need to hide covert

testing from the United States may narrow

down the regions where the United States

need concentrate its own verification effort.

Finally, the claim has been made that unattainably stringent levels of verification are

needed for an ASAT treaty because U.S.

targets are few and valuable and therefore

vulnerable to even a small amount of cheating.

This reasoning was thought by many participants to be not so much an argument against

an ASAT treaty as it was a compelling reason for the United States to increase the survivability of its space systems. Rather than

precluding arms control, the situation of having few but valuable satellites calls for having alternatives to them. “If the United States

is truly and genuinely that dependent upon a

few satellites, I’d just like to know what the

hell DOD plans on doing about it, because in

the absence of any ASAT arms control, the

problems are only worse. ”
42 . Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

VERIFICATIO N

The verification discussion was explicitly

not intended to be an exhaustive analysis.

Security considerations, in particular, prevented many highly relevant points from being studied in detail. However, like the other

workshop sessions, the session on verification

did serve to foster discussion on a range of

topics.

One participant pointed out that ASAT

treaties would ban, first of all, the act of destroying satellites, and that this aspect of any

ASAT treaty is readily verifiable. Less clear

was how detectable the capability to destroy

a satellite or its ability to function would be.

Satellite failure can easily be detected.

Although there was concern that the Soviets

might be able to develop a system which could

cause one or two U.S. satellites to fail in a

manner mimicking an equipment malfunction,

panelists noted that satellites presently have

a lot of on-board “state-of-health” monitoring.

These sensors can be augmented to determine

whether a failure is due to an internal flaw or

whether it has been externally induced. Satellites can have sensors to measure incident

laser light, rises in temperature, or sudden accelerations, for example. A satellite’s location

or behavior might also indicate a cause for its

failure, either hostile or benign. Therefore, the

Soviets would not have high confidence that

covert interference would remain undetected.

Central to the ASAT arms control debate

is the level of residual or covert ASAT capability which could remain, or be developed

covertly, after a treaty had been ratified. A

panelist noted that capabilities associated

with known ASAT launch sites and research

and development facilities would be detectable. The detectability of other possible residual or covert activity was more controversial.

One possible “worst-case” evaluation of

ASAT capability which might be covertly developed or maintained under a test ban was

attempted at the workshop. Again, no detailed

assessment of the likelihood of these developments, or of the particular means the United

States could employ to search for them, was

PARTICULAR S

undertaken. There was, however, a general

feeling that nothing arose in that evaluation

which would clearly permit covert development of a high-confidence, high-quality ASAT

weapon under such a test ban, although some

panelists did express strong reservations

about the detectability of nuclear space mines

and ground or air-based lasers. ASAT capability is categorized below by technology.

DIRECT INTERCEPTIO N

1) Fully capable, dedicated, tested systems.—

Neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R.

now has such a system. Developing one would

require an extensive testing program. If such

a proposed system were to be similar to the

existing Soviet ASAT, its launches would be

visible; orbiting vehicles would be noticed,

especially maneuvering ones. If such a direct

intercept system were to be similar to the U.S.

miniature homing vehicle, its ascent could be

seen, its telemetry could be detected, and its

target could be seen. Suspicious rendezvous

operations in space could be inquired about

Tests against points in space would eliminate

any observation of the target, but there would

be concomitant loss of confidence in the

results of the test.

2) Existing Soviet ASAT.–Tests of the ex

isting Soviet ASAT can be monitored. We

possibly would not be assured that all ASAT

interceptors had been destroyed pursuant to

a ban, but we could with high reliability know

if one had been tested. There will certainly not

be high confidence that an ASAT intercept

would work reliably mated to a booster it has

never been tested with. Even with no major

design change, the confidence in and signifi

cance of any untested system is bound to

degrade with time.

3) Residual “baling-wire” direct intercep

ASAT.—One can never rule out the existence

of some covert, improvised ASAT capability

of this sort, but one can deny high confidence

in such a system by preventing tests.
Verification Issues ● 4 3

4) Nuclear-armed ICBM or ABM missiles used

as ASATs.—Testing nuclear warheads in space

is risky, in terms of collateral damage to

friendly systems; prohibited, under the limited

test ban treaty; and easily detectable. (Testing

warheads underground could be done with

high confidence.) Nuclear ASAT capability

cannot reasonably be prohibited since ICBMs

and possibly ABMs will exist with or without

an ASAT treaty. Workshop panelists felt that

such systems did not present a significant

ASAT threat except during nuclear war, in

which case damage to satellites would be likely

whether or not it had been intended. “The

Soviets are bad, but they’re not lunatics, ” said

one panelist, “and I can just see no credibility

whatsoever in the notion that they’d fling a

nuclear weapon up into the heavens and crack

it off. It would cost them a lot. ”

5) Non-nuclear ICBM or ABM used as

ASATs.–With appropriate radar support, it

is possible that the Soviet Galosh ABM could

perform ASAT attacks with a non-nuclear

charge. Galosh deployment and testing are

permitted under the ABM treaty, but the location of the launchers and the consequent range

of orbits at risk are limited by the ABM treaty

and protocol. Testing of an ICBM or ABM in

an ASAT profile would be prohibited under an

ASAT test ban, would be differentiable from

ABM tests, and would likely be detected.

“SPACE MINES ”

In general, any satellite very close to

another country’s satellite is a priori suspicious. Any mine or weapon which would be effective from further away is a complex system

which requires maneuvering or pointing and

would therefore require testing. These tests

would be detectable. Concerning close approach, however, panelists noted that under

the regime presently existing on the high seas,

opposing forces do have the right to make

close approaches. Banning close approaches

in space would require codification of principles not incorporated in present law. Such

an agreement would be highly verifiable, and

could be made even more so by putting potential target satellites in orbits “out in the middle of nowhere” where there would be no innocent reason for other satellites to be anywhere

nearby at all.

1) Non-nuclear space mines.—These would

have to get very close (on the order of 1 km)

to their targets. There would be no innocent

reason to have a satellite that close to another

country’s satellite, and such approaches could

be easily detected.

2) Nuclear space mines.—The Outer Space

Treaty of 1967 prohibits orbiting of “nuclear

weapons, or any other kinds of weapons of

mass destruction. ” Nuclear space mines are

therefore presently prohibited. There are also

significant inhibitions (collateral damage,

breaking the nuclear threshold) against their

use for ASAT (see “Nuclear-armed ICBM or

ABM missiles” section above). At present, nuclear space mines can easily be built, tested

underground, and deployed. However, actual

emplacement of mines within a nuclear kill radius (100 to 200 km) of their targets, or of

mines able to be maneuvered within that

range, would likely be identified from tracking data. Inspector satellites that could detect

nuclear weapons in space satellites were

briefly discussed. However, they may not be

technically feasible, and negotiating an agreement regulating their use might pose problems

(see “Cooperative Verification Measures” section below).

3) Projectile-emitting. -Satellites carrying interceptors which could travel 100 kilometers

or so to their targets could similarly be identified from tracking data; furthermore, projectile-emitting satellites would likely require

extensive testing of their target acquisition

and homing systems, and these tests would

likely be detected.

DIRECTED ENERG Y

WEAPON S

1) Space-based directed energy.–Space-based

directed energy weapons might best be considered space mines with kill radii of hundreds

to thousands of kilometers since they are ef-
44 . Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

fectively instantaneously acting. Space-based,

non-nuclear-pumped lasers would be quite

large and may emit hydrogen fluoride or other

gases. Their operation and testing would be

observable. Nuclear-pumped directed energy

weapons, like non-directed nuclear weapons,

could not be tested covertly in space, and placing them into orbit is contrary to existing

treaties. On-board nuclear weapons might be

searched for (see discussion of inspection in

“Cooperative Verification Measures” below).

2) Air-based, ground-based, or pop-up directed

energy.—All such systems would require

testing. Possible targets could in principle be

monitored to see if they are being illuminated

by strong lasers, are giving off gases, are being unexpectedly accelerated, or are emitting

unusual signals. Air and ground-based systems may be detectable by national technical

means; furthermore, they are increasingly less

effective as the target altitude increases, since

intensity drops off as the square of the distance between the weapon and the target. It

is far easier to blind an optical sensor than to

damage a satellite, requiring probably one

millionth of the energy. Lasers capable of

blinding sensors are easily available, so the capability of blinding sensors cannot be banned.

However, the act of blinding a satellite would

be readily detected: after all, “imaging satelites are only so particularly vulnerable when

they are looking at you. ”

SPOOFING, JAMMING, OR

OTHERWISE INTERFERING

WITH THE OPERATION OF

SYSTEMS USING SATELLITES

These categories would likely not be covered

under an ASAT testing ban, since ensuring

the absence of such capability would not be

verifiable. Furthermore, the United States is

not likely to negotiate away the capability to

interfere with hostile satellites in these ways:

“We would like to do that, we’re very good at

doing that, and we intend to do that in case

of conflict. ”

COOPERATIVE VERIFICATION MEASURE S

Some of the verification techniques discussed at the workshop would require, or

would at least greatly benefit from, cooperative verification procedures between the

United States and the U.S.S.R. Just one example would be verifying the absence of orbiting nuclear weapons, although such

measures might be useful in many other cases

as well.

If the capability for detecting nuclear weapons in orbit were felt to be required (note that

the 1967 Outer Space Treaty forbidding them

was ratified, and remains in force, in the

absence of such explicit procedures), some sort

of co-operative program would need to be

established. One method mentioned at the

workshop might involve a form of “on-orbit”

inspection. In that example, all satellites

would be required to withstand some level of

neutron irradiation. On demand, suspect satellites would be subject to such irradiation

from an orbiting inspector satellite. Emission

of delayed neutrons from the target would reveal the presence of fissionable material. Alternatively, non-intrusive examination for fissionable material might be done on the launch

pad.

There are several difficulties with inspection

in orbit. In the case mentioned above, for example, it might be possible to conceal a nuclear

warhead by shielding it appropriately. A more

general problem with any “on-orbit” inspection is that the inspector satellite, requiring

the capability to acquire, track, and rendezvous with a target satellite, would have and

would regularly test all the attributes of an

ASAT interceptor except for detonation of a

warhead. Another problem with actively probing inspections in particular, noted a panelist, is that “if it’s carrying an accelerator, one
Verification Issues • 45

might want to think about it’’ —such an in- proach velocity, or capability of inspector satspector might indeed have A SAT potential in ellites could be established.

its own right. Perhaps limits on the size, ap-
Appendixes
Appendix A

Survivability of Space Capability

All panelists agreed that survivable space capability is important to the United States with or

without an ASAT treaty. An irreducible residual

ASAT threat will remain under any treaty, making survivability measures essential. Without a

treaty, of course, satellites will face dedicated

ASAT systems in addition to residual capability,

making survivability requirements that much

more difficult.

“Survivable space capability” includes measures

both to protect and to supplement satellites. U.S.

satellites have been hardened against nuclear effects and are spaced so that not more than one at

a time should be vulnerable to any one nuclear explosion. Protection includes hardening against radiation, hardening against system-generated electromagnetic pulse (high voltages induced within

components by radiation from nuclear explosions),

and hardening against other nuclear effects. There

are additional protective measures which can and

should be applied to satellites to guard against

non-nuclear threats. Satellites can be made to

evade direct-intercept ASATs or space mines by

maneuvering or by interfering with (jamming or

confusing) the ASAT’s homing sensors. In the

absence of an ASAT ban, satellites could conceivably also be given active defenses.

Another way to protect satellites is to proliferate

them. Various functions can be distributed on a

wide variety of satellites, and duplicate satellites

can be orbited. These spares can be left silent until needed and they can be decoyed, making their

detection and destruction more difficult. One of

the most important motivations for distributing

capability is to buy time-it will take much 1onger

to destroy many satellites with shared functions

than it will take to destroy any single satellite. Proliferated systems should be simpler and more basic

than the full-fledged, highly sophisticated equipment now used in military satellites. Non-space

assets such as ground stations would have to be

proliferated as well, with the proviso again that

the proliferated stations not be as complex as the

main ground station.

Satellites can also be replaced by other systems.

Today, satellites are used in support of strategic

forces but they are not essential. Ground-based

radars can be used for early warning. Nuclear

detonation detection, besides being proliferated

onto many small satellites, can be done for our own

warheads by placing transmitters on them, if

needed. Tactical theater support now done with

satellites can be replaced with a variety of systems

—remotely piloted aircraft, sounding rockets,

balloons, and low-cost replacement satellites

launched on cheap boosters or ICBMs or SLBMs.

There are many alternatives to space for functions

which are now carried out in space.

49
Appendix B

Compliance With the 1972 ABM Treaty

The Reagan Administration’s recent public allegations of Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements have drawn much attention. One

of these allegations concerned construction of a radar in Siberia which was said to be almost certainly in violation of the 1972 ABM treaty. This

radar was discussed at one point in the workshop,

and portions of that discussion are described in

this appendix.

THE SOVIET RADAR

NEAR KRASNOYARS K

According to Articles III and IV of the ABM

treaty, ABM radars may be located only at agreed

ABM sites or test ranges. Article VI notes that

early warning radars may not be constructed except on the periphery of the country and looking

outward. Agreed Statement F states that phasedarray (electronically steered) radars greater than

a specified size may not be deployed except as permitted by Articles III, IV, and VI. It goes on to

exempt radars used “for the purposes of tracking

objects in outer space or for use as national technical means. ”

The Soviets are constructing a phased-array radar of greater than the specified size near

Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia. The location is not

near the periphery of the country and it is not

oriented outwards. If it is indeed an early warning or ABM battle management radar, the Soviets

are in violation of the ABM treaty. The Soviets

claim that the radar is allowable under the exemption in Statement F. Since it is geographically

poorly sited to be effective for intelligence (national technical means) purposes, it would have to

be a space track radar to be permitted under the

treaty.

The administration has charged that this radar

“almost certainly” violates the ABM treaty.

Others find the issue somewhat less clear. The radar “sort of looks like a duck, and it walks a little

bit like a duck, but it doesn’t look quite like all the

other ducks, ” in the words of one panelist. “The

Soviets say, ‘Oh, don’t worry. It’s not a duck.

Notice there are some differences between it and

other ducks, and when you hear it later, you’ll find

out it barks. It doesn’t quack. ’ “

According to a panelist, the signal from a space

track radar (a “dog”) would be quite different from

that of a radar used for ABM battle management

(a “duck”). Therefore, the question will presumably be resolved when the radar becomes operational. However, some panelists were not willing

to wait that long to find out, and they thought that

the administration’s announcement was proper.

“You can’t expect me to look at something that

looks like a duck and walks like a duck and tell me

it’s a dog and I’m supposed to take it on faith. . . .

You’ve got to provide more help than that. ” They

felt that the Soviets were obligated to be more

forthcoming about the radar than they had been

within diplomatic channels, and that the public announcement served notice that the United States

feels the issue has not adequately been resolved.

Other panelists felt that existing channels were the

appropriate forum and that the public announcement did not serve any constructive purpose.

Some panelists were generally skeptical as to

whether the radar is in fact in violation of the

ABM treaty. The utility of having such a flagrantly illegal early-warning radar, if it is one, was

not felt to be sufficient incentive for the Soviets

to unilaterally abrogate the ABM treaty. Others,

including some who had access to intelligence

data, had little doubt that the radar is indeed optimized for the ABM role. The alternative to being an illegal ABM radar is for the radar to be for

tracking satellites, indicating a buildup of the

Soviet space monitoring capability and being at

least suggestive of an extension of their ASAT

program.

BREAKOUT FROM AN D

LOOPHOLES I N

THE ABM TREAT Y

The ABM treaty is under a great deal of pressure. In the United States, no ongoing research,

development, or deployment contradicts treaty

provisions. However, deployment of ballistic missile defense beyond the permitted single site would

violate the ABM treaty, as would development,

testing, or deployment of any ABM systems or

components other than fixed, land-based ones. A

panelist estimated that at the time of President

Reagan’s March 23, 1983 “Star Wars” speech,

U.S. research into ground-based BMD components

was about three years away from the point at

which continuation could have run up against the

ABM treaty. In light of the March 23 speech and

51
52 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

ensuing developments, this estimate may be

lengthened to about a decade because more futuristic BMD technologies, which are highly immature, presumably will be emphasized at the expense of the older, more developed systems which

were closer to deployment.

The Soviets, according to articles in Aviation

Week and Space Technology referred to by workshop participants, are building defenses against

tactical ballistic missiles. Since the ABM treaty

prohibits defenses only against strategic missiles, anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM)

systems are not covered and are therefore permitted. Anti-tactical ballistic missiles were not

included in the ABM treaty at United States

insistence in order to protect SAM-D, a surface-to-air missile then under development

which was intended to have some capability

against short-range tactical ballistic missiles

as well as against aircraft. However, according

to a panelist, as SAM-D developed (changing

its name to ‘Patriot’), “it lost not only its capability against missiles, but it lost much of

its anti-aircraft capability” as well. At the

same time, “the Soviets have essentially designed and deployed the ‘SAM-D-ski’, which

looks a lot like what we were trying to protect. ”

ATBM systems, and their impact on the

continuing viability of the ABM treaty, were

a source of considerable concern to many

panelists. A panelist felt that “if things are

deployed under the rubric of anti-tactical

ballistic missiles, they can or will have an impact on the penetrability of our SLBMs and

the French deterrent system and the British

deterrent system, and the whole ball of wax

can unravel. ” The U.S. deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe could stimulate a

particularly troubling Soviet ATBM deployment. ‘The United States has no excuse for

deploying anti-tactical ballistic missiles in its

homeland,” pointed out a participant, “but the

Soviet Union does-and we’re giving them a

better one. We are now deploying an offensive

system that says, ‘Hey, you know those

ATBMs? Come on, bring them out, there’s a

legitimate use for them now. ’ “

Panelists did note that, even if the Soviets

should deploy extensive ATBM systems, it

need not change the strategic balance. “We

know how to deal with them, ” said one. “It

requires penetration aids. We know how to do

that. ” These aids are not presently deployed

in the strategic inventory, which “we ought

to do something about, ” but the United States

is not in imminent danger of being effectively

disarmed.

Another cause for concern is the continued

miniaturization of components. Those who

worry about possible scenarios in which the

Soviet Union builds and stockpiles components in preparation for rapid breakout from

the ABM treaty are worrying more now because small radars can have enough capability to fulfill some ABM roles. Even so, small

radars cannot do so in the absence of large

phased-array battle management radars. Since

ABM battle management radars and space

track radars share at least some characteristics, panelists felt that a radar clause might

be required in an ASAT agreement to prevent

circumvention of the ABM treaty restrictions

on radars.
Appendix C

ABM Treaty and Related Documents

1982 EDITION

ARMS CONTROL

TEXTS AND HISTORIES

OF NEGOTIATIONS

UNITED STATES I

A N D

DISARMAMENT

AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C., 2045 I

53
54 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

Treaty Between the United States of America and the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of

Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972

Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972

Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972

Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972

Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972

Entered into force October 3, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating

consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a

substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a

decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as

well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive

arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further

negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the

nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms,

nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt

other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of

its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM

systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this

Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic

ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and

deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;
App. C—ABM Treaty and Related Documents • 55

. —

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching

ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of

a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those

which are:

(a) operational;

(b) under construction;

(c) undergoing testing;

(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or

(e) mothballed.

Article Ill

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty

kilometers and centered on the Party’s national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more

than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor

missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar

complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more

than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and

fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more

than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor

missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in

potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date

of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo

launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than

the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM

radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article Ill shall not apply to ABM systems or their

components used for development or testing, and located within current or

additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen

ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or

components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to

modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, not to develop, test,

or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of

ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and

their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:
56 . Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles,

ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or

their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile

attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented

outward.

Article Vll

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM

systems or their components may be carried out.

Article Vlll

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas

specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this

Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest

possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to

transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or

their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would

conflict with this Treaty.

Article Xl

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic

offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this

Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a

manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of

verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this is Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which

impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of

this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction,

assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the

Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the

framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and

related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
App. C—ABM Treaty and Related Documents ● 5 7

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers

necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical

means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on

the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM

systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability

of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the

provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting

strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate,

Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures,

composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall

enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of

this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter,

the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw

from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of

this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to

the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall

Include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having

jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional

procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter Into force on the day of the exchange

of Instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United

Nations.

DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian

languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET

OF AMERICA SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

President of the United

States of America

Genera/ Secretary of the Central

Committee of the CPSU

RICHARD NIXON L. 1. BREZHNEV
58 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the

United States of America and the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic

Missiles

1. Agreedi Statement

The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the

Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added);

AGREED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON

THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which maybe deployed in

accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article Ill of the Treaty, those non-phased- array

ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system

deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in

watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array

ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article Ill of the Treaty is considered for

purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

[c]

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered

on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing

ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred

kilometers.

[D]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their

components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the

event ABM systems based on other physical principles and Including components

capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars

are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components

would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in

accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.
App. C—ABM Treaty and Related Documents Ž 59

— — .

[E]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to

develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM

interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.

[F]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product

of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three

million, except as provided for in Articles Ill, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for the

purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of

verification.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US

and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blue prints

specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components

Iimited by the Treaty.

2. Common Understandings

Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during

the negotiations:

A. Location of ICBM Defenses

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:

Article Ill of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment

area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following

statement: “The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment

area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment

area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less

than thirteen hundred kilometers. ” In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its

ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of

the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area. (See Agreed Statement [C].)

B. ABM Test Ranges

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972:

Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that “the limitations provided for in Article III

shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing,

and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. ” We believe it would be

useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is

our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM

components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at

White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test

range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars

of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes maybe located outside of

ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to “additionally agreed test
60 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

ranges” to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges

without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional

ABM test ranges,

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common

understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM

radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the

reference in Article IV to “additionally agreed” test ranges was sufficiently clear, and

that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.

C. Mobile ABM Systems

On January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not

to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components.

On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment

of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM

launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked

for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S.

side’s interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common

understanding on this matter,

D. Standing Consultative Commission

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:

The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial

implementation of the ABM Treaty’s Article XIII on the Standing Consultative

Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on

offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement, agreement establishing the SCC will

be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the

following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation

desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT

Delegations; when SALT IS not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired

consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.

Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the

U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

E. Standstill

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:

In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is

prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the

obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the

date of signature of these two documents.

In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:

‘See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between

the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed Sept.

30, 1971,
App. C—ABM Treaty and Related Documents ● 61

—— — .—. —.— — — . —

The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning

observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to

make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and

acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after

they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the

absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with

ratification or approval.

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

3. Unilateral Statements

The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations

by the United States Delegation:

A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement:

The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to

achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms,

following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain

measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S.

Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to

constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our

respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that

the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an

agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, Both

sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of

more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more

complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years,

U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a

basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a

situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to

prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government

attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms.

The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional

consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the

U.S. position.

B. Tested in ABM Mode

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article II of the Joint Text Draft uses the term “tested in an ABM mode,” in defining

ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such

testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this

phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are

intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty,

and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify

the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by

setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while

prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent

testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for
62 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of “tested in an ABM mode, ” we

note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be “tested in an ABM

mode” if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to

launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a

target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic

missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM

interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an

altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are

deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the

kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes

measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM

radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or

instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria.

C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement

to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not

set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting

Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far

more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect

and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM

potential. Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase in the defenses of such

radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement.
App. C—ABM Treaty and Related Documents ● 6 3

Protocol to the Treaty Between the, United States

America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

of

on

Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974

Ratification advised by U.S. Senate November 10, 1975

Ratified by U.S. President March 19, 1976

Instruments of ratification exchanged May 24, 1976

Proclaimed by U.S. President July 6, 1976

Entered into force May 24, 1976

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of

America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on May 29, 1972,

Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of America

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile

Systems signed on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further measures for the Iimitation

of strategic arms would contribute to strengthening International peace and security,

Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems

will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on a permanent

agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of strategic offensive arms,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall be Iimited at any one time to a single area out of the two provided

in Article I I I of the Treaty for deployment of anti-ballistic missiIe (ABM) systems or their

components and accordingly shall not exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or

its components in the second of the two ABM system deployment areas permitted by

Article Ill of the Treaty, except as an exchange of one permitted area for the other in

accordance with Article II of this Protocol.

2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: the United States of

America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the area centered on its

capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not

deploy an ABM system or its components in the deployment area of Intercontinental

ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers as permitted by Article ill(b) of the Treaty.

Article II

1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system and the

components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed and to deploy an

ABM system or its components in the alternative area permitted by Article Ill of the

Treaty, provided that prior to Initiation of construction, notification is given in accord
64 ● Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings

with the procedure agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission, during the

year beginning October 3, 1977 and ending October 2, 1978, or during any year which

commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years for periodic review of

the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only

once.

2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to

dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of

ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area

centered on its capital, as permitted by Article Ill(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union

would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the

area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area

containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article Ill(b) of the Treaty.

3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systems or their components

and the notification thereof shall be carried out in accordance with Article Vlll of the

ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Article Ill

The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in force and shall be

complied with by the Parties except to the extent modified by this Protocol. In

particular, the deployment of an ABM system or its components within the area

selected shall remain limited by the levels and other requirements established by the

Treaty.

Article IV

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional

procedures of each Party. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of

instruments of ratification and shall thereafter be considered an integral part of the

Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on July 3,1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages,

both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. L BREZHNEV

Genera/ Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

o