FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KELLY SAMSON; SALLY SAMSON; 

CHARLES KUHN; SARAH KUHN; JOHN

L. SUTHERLAND; CAROLE D.

SUTHERLAND; THOMAS E. MORGAN,

III; BETH BRYSON MORGAN;

THOMAS E MORGAN CHILDREN’S

TRUST; BLAKELY ROCK HOLDINGS

LLC; A. GARY AMES; BARBARA J. No. 10-35352

AMES; A GARY AND BARBARA J. D.C. No.

AMES LIVING TRUST; MARK D.  3:05-cv-05197-RJB

LAROCHE; TRINA LAROCHE; BLAKELY

PROPERTIES LLC; SAMSON FAMILY OPINION

LAND COMPANY, LLC; BLAKELY

HARBOR PROPERTIES LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Robert J. Bryan, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 8, 2012—Seattle, Washington

Filed June 15, 2012

6939
Before: Richard A. Paez and Mary H. Murguia,

Circuit Judges, and James S. Gwin, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Paez

*The Honorable James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. 

6940 SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND
COUNSEL

Averil Rothrock and Aaron Matthew Laing — Schwabe Williamson & Wyatt, PC, Seattle, Washington; and Dennis Reynolds — Law Office of Dennis D. Reynolds, Bainbridge

Island, Washington, for the plaintiffs-appellants. 

Michael Charles Walter, Amanda Gabrielle Butler, and Randal Wayne Ebberson — Keating Bucklin & McCormack Inc.

P.S., Seattle, Washington; and Rod P. Kaseguma, Rosemary

A. Larson, and William A Linton — Inslee, Best, Doezie &

Ryder, P.S., Bellevue, Washington, for the defendantappellee.

Daniel A. Himebaugh — Pacific Legal Foundation, Bellevue,

Washington, for amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

“Full indeed is earth of woes, and full the sea,” remarked

Hesiod,1 and reviewing the long odyssey of Kelly and Sally

Samson, we are inclined to agree. The pair own waterfront

property in picturesque Blakely Harbor in the City of Bainbridge Island. They devoutly wished to build a pier or a dock

on their property during a time when local authorities had

imposed a moratorium on such projects. The Samsons and

some of their fellow landowners waged a long campaign

against the moratorium in the state courts, and ultimately won

a judgment declaring that the moratorium violated the state

constitution. That victory was a hollow one, however, because

the state courts upheld permanent changes to Bainbridge’s

1Hesiod, Works and Days, in 2 The Library of Original Sources 28 (Oliver J. Thatcher ed., 1901). 

6942 SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND
shoreline land-use laws that permanently deferred the Samsons’ dreams. 

The Samsons come now to the federal courts, seeking damages for the thirty-one months during which they were barred

from improving their shoreline property by the moratorium on

new projects. They assert that the moratorium violated their

substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and seek damages against the city under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. We conclude that the moratorium ordinances were validly enacted, nonarbitrary, and manifestly

related to the city’s legitimate municipal interests. Accordingly, we hold that the City of Bainbridge Island did not violate the Samsons’ constitutional rights, and we affirm.

Background

Kelly and Sally Samson2 own waterfront residential property in Blakely Harbor, a bay on the southeast side of Bainbridge Island, in Puget Sound. In Washington, shoreline

property like the Samsons’ is subject to a regulatory scheme

that consists of three parts: (1) the Shoreline Management Act

of 1971, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 90.58.10-930, a state statute

that provides a basic framework for shoreline management;

(2) the Washington Department of Ecology’s regulations

implementing the Act, see generally Wash. Admin. Code tit.

173; and (3) Shoreline Master Programs, which are comprehensive use plans adopted by local jurisdictions and approved

by the Department of Ecology, see Wash. Rev. Code

§ 90.58.030(3)(c). 

The City of Bainbridge Island (“Bainbridge”) adopted a

2Following the practice of the district court and the litigants, we use

“the Samsons” as a metonym for the eighteen natural persons and corporate entities that constitute the Plaintiffs-Appellants in this appeal. All

eighteen appellants own residential waterfront property in Blakely Harbor

and were affected by the moratorium. 

SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND 6943
Shoreline Master Program in 1996. In 2000, the Washington

Department of Ecology revised its statewide shoreline regulations. State law in effect at the time required Bainbridge to

update its Shoreline Master Program to comply with the new

regulations within two years of their passage. See Wash. Rev.

Code § 90.58.080 (West 2000) (“Local governments shall

develop or amend, within twenty-four months after the adoption of guidelines as provided in RCW 90.58.060, a master

program for regulation of uses of the shorelines of the state

consistent with the required elements of the guidelines

adopted by the department.”).3 Bainbridge thus began a comprehensive review of its 1996 Shoreline Master Program.

At the prompting of local residents and community associations, Bainbridge considered proposed restrictions on overwater shoreline development, such as private docks and piers.

Critics of shoreline development particularly focused on

Blakely Harbor. Blakely Harbor is the least developed and

most rural of Bainbridge’s various harbors, and many residents were keen to preserve its pristine character. Bainbridge’s own Harbor Management Plan, adopted by the City

Council in 1999, praised Blakely Harbor for its “relatively

undeveloped” character, and stated that preventing the proliferation of manmade over-water structures was a “specific

goal[ ]” for the city.4

3The state legislature amended the Shoreline Master Program requirements in 2003. The amendments eliminated the requirement that cities

update their Shoreline Master Programs within two years of a change to

state guidelines, and substituted a county-by-county update schedule. See

An Act Relating to shoreline management; and amending RCW

90.58.060, 90.58.080, and 90.58.250, ch. 262, 2003 Wash. Laws 1424-25.

According to the new schedule, cities in Kitsap County—where Bainbridge Island is located—were required to update their Shoreline Master

Programs by December 1, 2011. See Wash. Rev. Code

§ 90.58.080(2)(a)(iii) (West 2004). 

4Blakely Harbor remains “the last harbor within Central Puget Sound

that remains largely undeveloped with docks.” See City of Bainbridge

Island, 2006 Blakely Harbor Dock Shoreline Amendment Fact Sheet 1

(Aug. 2006), available at http://www.ci.bainbridge-isl.wa.us/documents/

Blakely_Dock_Fact_Sheet_Aug2006.pdf. 

6944 SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND
On August 8, 2001, the City Council adopted Ordinance

No. 2001-32. The ordinance imposed a moratorium on

“shoreline substantial development applications for construction of new docks and piers . . . in Blakely Harbor.”

5

 The ordinance was passed on an emergency basis and without a public

hearing, though a public hearing was held after adoption. The

ordinance included prefatory language taking note of the paucity of docks and piers in Blakely Harbor and observing that

none had been constructed in the previous thirty years. The

ordinance also expressed the City Council’s view that the

moratorium was “necessary for the protection of the public

health, safety, property, or peace.”

Two weeks later, the City Council passed Ordinance No.

2001-34, which expanded the scope of the moratorium to

apply to permit applications for a broader range of development projects anywhere on the island. The amendment clarified, however, that the moratorium did not apply to permit

applications for projects involving preexisting structures, such

as maintenance, repair, and restoration projects. The expanded

ordinance listed a variety of new justifications for the moratorium. These included the threat that shoreline structures posed

to critical shoreline habitat, the need to preserve what little

undeveloped shoreline remained on the heavily developed

island, and the importance of holding construction activity in

abeyance while the city completed the revisions to its Shoreline Master Program. 

Six weeks later, the City Council adopted Ordinance No.

2001-45, which narrowed the moratorium so that it applied

only to applications for “new overwater structures (piers,

5Washington law requires that all shoreline development in Washington

be consistent with the policy of the Shoreline Management Act and any

local shoreline master program. Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.140(1). To

effectuate this requirement, state law provides that any “substantial development” on state shorelines first requires a substantial development permit. Id. § 90.58.140(2). The Bainbridge moratorium functioned to prevent

residents from filing applications for such permits. 

SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND 6945
docks and floats) and new shoreline armoring (bulkheads and

revetments) where none has previously existed.” With Ordinance No. 2001-45, the City Council issued findings of fact

that it developed from public testimony and other evidence

presented at public hearings held after the passage of Ordinance No. 2001-34. The City Council found, inter alia, that

shoreline structures such as piers, docks, and bulkheads had

the “potential to cause significant impact to critical shoreline

habitat” and to adversely affect juvenile salmon populations.

The City Council also adopted the estimates of city planners

that in the time it would take to revise the Shoreline Master

Program, Bainbridge would receive “at least 14 shoreline substantial development permit applications and 29 shoreline

substantial development exemption applications” if no moratorium were in effect. 

In November of 2001, a group of residents sued Bainbridge

in Kitsap County Superior Court, seeking a declaration that

the “rolling” moratorium was illegal and void (the “Biggers

litigation”). See Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 169

P.3d 14, 17-19 (Wash. 2007). While the litigation was pending, Bainbridge officials reviewed an environmental assessment and prepared a draft updated Shoreline Master Program.

Id.

Almost a year later, on August 14, 2002, the City Council

adopted Ordinance No. 2002-29, which extended the term of

the moratorium to March 1, 2003. The ordinance, which was

enacted after a public hearing, provided that the moratorium

would last until early 2003. Days before the moratorium

expired, the City Council adopted Ordinance No. 2003-13 on

an emergency basis, which extended it to September 1, 2003.

Before the second deadline expired, the state superior court

issued a decision in the Biggers litigation. The court invalidated the moratorium, holding that the city “overstepped its

constitutional limits” by failing to exempt structures under

6946 SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND
$2,500 and by trenching on the authority of the state Department of Ecology.

Bainbridge appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals.

Bainbridge moved to stay the superior court’s judgment pursuant to Washington Rule of Appellate Procedure 8.1(b). The

Court of Appeals granted the stay.6 City officials announced

in a press release that they would continue to refuse to accept

building permit applications for over-water structures during

the pendency of the appeal, despite the superior court’s judgment. On August 27, 2003—two weeks after the state trial

court invalidated the moratorium ordinances—the City Council adopted Ordinance No. 2003-34, which extended the moratorium for Blakely Harbor until March 1, 2004. 

Shortly thereafter, the City Council amended the Shoreline

Master Program to permanently ban new dock construction in

Blakely Harbor. These permanent restrictions were identical

to the restrictions in the moratorium, so the amendments to

the Shoreline Master Program had the effect of terminating

the moratorium. The Washington Department of Ecology

approved the permanent modifications to Bainbridge’s Shoreline Master Program in early 2004.

After the city amended the Shoreline Master Program, the

Biggers litigation reached the Washington Supreme Court. A

divided court affirmed the superior court’s judgment that the

rolling moratorium violated the state constitution. See Biggers, 169 P.3d at 17. In a separate case two years later, however, the Washington Court of Appeals upheld Bainbridge’s

permanent amendments to its Shoreline Master Program prohibiting construction of new single-use private docks in

Blakely Harbor. See Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island, 202

P.3d 334 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). The Washington Supreme

6Rule 8.1(b) provides that a stay of a trial court judgment issues as a

matter of right if the judgment “affect[s] real, personal or intellectual property.” 

SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND 6947
Court denied review. Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island,

218 P.3d 921 (Wash. 2009). Bainbridge’s revised Shoreline

Master Program thus remains in effect, and continues to protect Blakely Harbor’s primeval character.

While the Biggers litigation was pending, the Samsons and

eight other property owners filed multiple new actions in Kitsap County Superior Court, alleging a variety of state-law

claims as well as federal constitutional claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Bainbridge removed the cases to the United

States District Court for the Western District of Washington,

which consolidated the actions. The Samsons and Bainbridge

filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the federal

claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor

of Bainbridge, holding that the Samsons had not raised a genuine issue of fact on their equal protection, substantive due

process, and procedural due process claims. The Samsons

now appeal the adverse summary judgment on their substantive and procedural due process claims only. 

The district court had jurisdiction over the Samsons’ claims

under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Discussion

I. Substantive due process claim.

A government entity may be held liable under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 if an “action that is alleged to be unconstitutional

implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that

body’s officers.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

690 (1978). The Samsons allege that Bainbridge violated their

substantive due process rights when it enforced the development moratorium, which was enacted and repeatedly extended

by city ordinances. The district court granted summary judgment for Bainbridge on this substantive due process claim.

6948 SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND
We review de novo the grant of summary judgment. See

Sharrock v. United States, 673 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir.

2012). In this case, there are no disputes about the material

facts; the only question is the legal one of whether the district

court correctly ruled that Bainbridge did not violate the Samsons’ constitutional rights.7

See Trantina v. United States, 512

F.3d 567, 570 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). 

[1] “The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from

‘depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law.’ U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. At the

threshold, a claim under § 1983 for an unconstitutional deprivation of property must show (1) a deprivation (2) of property

(3) under color of state law.” Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran,

287 F.3d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 2002) (alteration in original).

“[P]roperty interests derive not from the Constitution but from

‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that

secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement

to those benefits.’ ” Gallo v. U.S. Dist. Court, 349 F.3d 1169,

1178 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v.

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). “[F]ederal constitutional

law,” however, “determines whether that interest rises to the

level of a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due

Process Clause.” Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,

436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).

7The only disputed question of fact is whether any of the Appellants in

this case applied for a shoreline development permit during the time the

moratorium was in effect. Bainbridge claims that none did, and the city

implies—though it does not argue outright—that, by consequence, the

Samsons lack standing to bring this suit. The Samsons aver, however, that

during the moratorium period, they attempted to submit a prepared dock

application to the proper authorities at City Hall, but were rebuffed by city

employees. Because the Samsons were injured by the city’s refusal to consider their permit application, and so have standing to bring their constitutional claims, we need not decide whether any Appellant would have

standing if the Samsons had not attempted to file a permit application. 

SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND 6949
The parties dispute whether the Samsons have a property

interest sufficient to support their § 1983 claims. Bainbridge

argues that the property right the Samsons assert is merely the

“abstract need or desire to construct private, single-use docks

on Blakely Harbor.” Appellee’s Opening Br. 30. The Samsons, on the other hand, insist that their property interest is

grounded firmly in Washington’s “vested rights doctrine,” an

unusual legal rule that gives Washington residents who apply

for building permits a vested right to have their application

processed according to the zoning and building ordinances

prevailing at the time of the application. See West Main

Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 720 P.2d 782, 785 (Wash. 1986).

We need not determine whether the Samsons had a cognizable property interest, whether emanating from the vested

rights doctrine or from some more fundamental source.

Because even assuming that the Samsons did have such a

property interest, we conclude that Bainbridge did not violate

the Samsons’ substantive due process rights. 

[2] As the Samsons concede, the moratorium did not

impinge on their fundamental rights. See Jackson Water

Works, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 793 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th

Cir. 1986) (noting that government action that “affects only

economic” interests does not implicate fundamental rights).

“The Supreme Court has ‘long eschewed . . . heightened

[means-ends] scrutiny when addressing substantive due process challenges to government regulation’ that does not

impinge on fundamental rights.” Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d

1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2008) (alterations in original) (quoting

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005)).

Hence, to establish a substantive due process violation, the

Samsons must show that Bainbridge’s ordinances establishing

and extending the moratorium were “clearly arbitrary and

unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public

health, safety, morals or general welfare.” Kawaoka v. City of

Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The ordinances are “presumed

6950 SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND
valid, and this presumption is overcome only by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). The Samsons have not met this “exceedingly

high burden.” Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1088 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The Samsons do not seriously dispute that Bainbridge had

legitimate interests in protecting wildlife and preserving the

development status quo as it prepared to update the Shoreline

Master Program. Instead, they argue that Bainbridge’s conduct was arbitrary and unreasonable because: (1) the city used

a rolling development moratorium in lieu of existing alternative regulatory mechanisms; (2) the city continued to extend

the moratorium without making progress toward comprehensively updating its Shoreline Master Program; (3) the city

extended the moratorium even after the Kitsap County Superior Court declared the enacting ordinances invalid under the

state constitution; and (4) the Washington Supreme Court

held that the rolling moratorium violated the state constitution

in the Biggers litigation. 

[3] None of these rises to the level of “egregious official

conduct.” Id. (“When executive action like a discrete permitting decision is at issue, only egregious official conduct can

be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense: it must

amount to an abuse of power lacking any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted). First, the choice of a moratorium as the favored policy mechanism for regulating development was nonarbitrary. As the Supreme Court has

recognized in its regulatory takings cases, “moratoria, or

‘interim development controls’ as they are often called, are an

essential tool of successful development.” Tahoe-Sierra Pres.

Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,

338 (2002). Bainbridge’s own findings of fact reflect why this

is so: when regulatory changes are pending, cities typically

receive an increased volume of applications from landowners

SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND 6951
seeking to be subject to the existing regime.8

 In light of the

city’s intention in 2001 to revise its Shoreline Master Program, the policy choice of a development moratorium seems

not just nonarbitrary, but positively sensible.

The Samsons’ second argument is that Bainbridge’s excuse

that it needed time to revise the Shoreline Master Program

was pretextual. They point out that Bainbridge did not modify

the Shoreline Master Program until after the superior court

declared the moratorium unlawful, and further observe that

Bainbridge abandoned the planned comprehensive update of

the Shoreline Master Program in favor of a standalone amendment applicable only to Blakely Harbor. Bainbridge replies

that it continued to work on the comprehensive Shoreline

Master Program update throughout the moratorium period.

[4] We are not persuaded that the process of revising the

Shoreline Master Plan was a ruse designed to justify the arbitrary deprivation of the property rights of Blakely Harbor residents. The Samsons have no concrete evidence that the city

was dilatory in updating the Shoreline Master Program, or

was using the updating process as a pretext for some more

malicious objective. Further, the law at the time required the

city to update the Shoreline Master Program, see Wash. Rev.

Code § 90.58.080 (West 2000), and the Bainbridge City

Council did ultimately adopt permanent amendments. And the

8This problem is surely exacerbated by Washington’s vested rights doctrine, which creates an additional incentive to vest a permit application

before regulatory changes take effect. The Samsons make great hay of the

fact that the city’s “admitted objective” in passing the moratorium was to

prevent the Samsons from vesting their development rights. But that is

precisely the point: a moratorium was the only mechanism that allowed

Bainbridge to revise its Shoreline Master Program without triggering a

vesting stampede by landowners concerned about new restrictions—one

that could have obviated any regulatory changes before they took effect.

Cf. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 339 (“To the extent that communities are

forced to abandon using moratoria, landowners will have incentives to

develop their property quickly before a comprehensive plan can be

enacted, thereby fostering inefficient and ill-conceived growth.”). 

6952 SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND
fact that the prohibitions on development in Blakely Harbor

were ultimately the only changes the city made to the Shoreline Master Program is hardly proof that Bainbridge was

merely going through the motions of a comprehensive update.

Development regulations in Blakely Harbor may well have

been the central issue in the comprehensive update process.

Third, the Samsons argue that Bainbridge acted egregiously

and arbitrarily when it voted to extend the moratorium several

weeks after the state superior court had declared it invalid.

The Samsons compare Bainbridge’s actions to those of the

Billings, Montana city council in Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d

1300 (9th Cir. 1988). In Bateson, the city council voted not

to issue a building permit even though the applicant had satisfied all the requirements for the permit. Id. at 1302. It did so

in spite of the city attorney’s warning that the decision would

almost certainly be overturned in court and would expose the

city to substantial civil liability. Id. We held that the city

council’s vote was an “arbitrary administration of the local

regulations, which single[d] out one individual to be treated

discriminatorily” and constituted a deprivation of substantive

due process. Id. at 1303.

Bainbridge’s promulgation of the development moratorium

was nothing like the city council’s denial of a building permit

in Bateson. The city council’s action in Bateson was an idiosyncratic decision about an individual permit-seeker; the

council ignored the city attorney’s advice and denied a permit

to which the applicant was legally entitled. Here, by contrast,

Bainbridge’s attorneys were convinced that the moratorium

was legal under state law and that the superior court had erred

in striking it down. More to the point, Bainbridge sought and

obtained a stay of the superior court’s judgment. It had good

reason to pursue a stay: lifting the moratorium during the pendency of the appeal would have sparked a wave of ad hoc

development before the state court of appeals had the opportunity to review the superior court’s judgment. 

SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND 6953
[5] The Bainbridge City Council obtained a stay of the

adverse judgment, continued to enforce the moratorium, and

pursued an appeal. These actions were nothing like the “arbitrary administration of the local regulations” that we decried

in Bateson. Id.

Finally, the Samsons argue that the Washington Supreme

Court’s judgment that the moratorium violated the state constitution suffices to establish that Bainbridge is liable under

§ 1983. It is axiomatic, however, that not every violation of

state law amounts to an infringement of constitutional rights.

See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700 (1976). “Unless there

is a breach of constitutional rights, . . . § 1983 does not provide redress in federal court for violations of state law.”

Schlette v. Burdick, 633 F.2d 920, 922 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980); see

also Couf v. DeBlaker, 652 F.2d 585, 590 n.11 (5th Cir. 1981)

(“The plaintiffs seem to urge that the defendants’ violation of

Florida [zoning] law provides a predicate for § 1983 recovery.

The state court litigation established such a violation, but not

every infraction of state law constitutes interference with a

constitutionally protected interest.”). 

[6] The Biggers litigation presented only state-law issues.

See Biggers, 169 P.3d at 17. The state supreme court concluded that the moratorium “disregards article XVII, section

1 of the Washington Constitution”; it neither considered nor

decided federal claims. Id. (Indeed, the state-law claims at

issue in Biggers are not even analagous to the due process

claims we consider here.) The case is therefore wholly inapposite to our analysis.9

9For this reason, we do not express a view on whether any of the positions expressed by the three opinions in Biggers represents the views of

a five-justice majority of the Washington Supreme Court. The parties, and

one amicus, argue at length about what, if any, precedential holding can

be extracted from Biggers. Because it is of no moment to this appeal, we

reserve that question for the Washington courts. 

6954 SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND
[7] We conclude that the Samsons have failed to plead or

present sufficient evidence to allow their substantive due process claim to proceed to trial. None of the conduct they

describe was arbitrary in the constitutional sense. At a minimum, it is “at least fairly debatable” that Bainbridge furthered

its legitimate interest in orderly, environmentally protective

shoreline development by instating a moratorium on new

over-water projects. See Halverson v. Skagit Cnty., 42 F.3d

1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. Procedural due process claim.

The district court also granted summary judgment to Bainbridge on the Samsons’ procedural due process claim.

Because the Bainbridge City Council used validly enacted

ordinances to impose and extend the moratorium, we affirm.

[8] “Ordinarily, due process of law requires an opportunity

for ‘some kind of hearing’ prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest.” Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 19 (citing

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). “However,

‘[w]hen the action complained of is legislative in nature, due

process is satisfied when the legislative body performs its

responsibilities in the normal manner prescribed by law.’ ”

Halverson, 42 F.3d at 1260 (alterations in original) (quoting

Sierra Lake Reserve v. City of Rocklin, 938 F.2d 951, 957 (9th

Cir. 1991)). 

[9] The City Council’s enactment of the various moratorium ordinances were lawful legislative acts, because the ordinances applied generally to all owners of shoreline property

on Bainbridge Island (or later in Blakely Harbor).10 See id. at

10Even the first moratorium ordinance, which was adopted on an emergency basis prior to a public hearing, was a legislative act. See Kuzinich

v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding

that the enactment on an emergency basis of a zoning scheme of general

applicability was a legislative act). 

SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND 6955
1261 (explaining that “governmental decisions which affect

large areas and are not directed at one or a few individuals”

are legislative in nature). Nothing in the record suggests that

the City Council adopted the various ordinances in an unlawful manner, and the Samsons do not assert that Bainbridge

failed to provide adequate notice of or forums for public hearings.

[10] Procedural due process entitles citizens to a legislative

body that “performs its responsibilities in the normal manner

prescribed by law.” Id. at 1260 (internal quotation mark omitted). The Bainbridge City Council hewed to its ordinary protocols when it passed the moratorium ordinances. The

Samsons’ rights were thus “protected in the only way that

they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate

or remote, over those who make the rule.” Bi-Metallic Inv.

Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).

Conclusion

It is surely vexing to the Samsons that they and their coplaintiffs successfully challenged the moratorium in state

court, but received no damages for their efforts. And it must

be more vexing still that they won the battle, but lost the war:

the state courts struck down the temporary moratorium, but

upheld the permanent ban on shoreline development. But the

federal courts do not exist to satisfy litigants who are unhappy

with what they received in state court. Nor do they exist to

second-guess the manner in which city officials promote the

public welfare. Because the Samsons have suffered no violation of their constitutional rights to substantive and procedural

due process, the district court’s order granting Bainbridge’s

motion for summary judgment is 

AFFIRMED.

6956 SAMSON v. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND