COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Pe tty and Senior Judge Willis Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

MAURICE LAMAR THOROGOOD MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0232-06-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK JANUARY 30, 2007 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH Mark S. Davis, Judge S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Defender (Catherine E. P. Haas, Assistant Appellate Defender; Virginia In digent Defense Commission, on brief), for appellant. Benjamin H. Katz, Assistan t Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Maurice Lamar Thorogood, appellant, was convicte d, in a bench trial, of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of Co de § 18.2-248. On ap peal, appellant does not challenge that he possessed cocaine. Rather, he contends the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to prove his intent to distribute the cocaine. For the reas ons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
ANALYSIS When addressing the sufficie ncy of the evidence, we “‘pres ume the judgment of the trial court to be correct’ and reverse only if the trial court’s decision is ‘pla inly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Kelly v. Commonwealth , 41 Va. App. 250, 25 7, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) ( en banc ) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth , 39 Va. App. 96, 99, 57 0 S.E.2d 875, 876-77

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - (2002)). In practical terms, a review ing court does not “‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial establis hed guilt beyond a reasonable do ubt.’” Stevens v. Commonwealth , 46 Va. App. 234, 249, 616 S. E.2d 754, 761 (2005) ( en banc ) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)) (empha sis in original), aff’d , 272 Va. 481, 634 S.E.2d 305 (2006). We ask only whether “‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essen tial elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Kelly , 41 Va. App. at 25 7, 584 S.E.2d at 447 ). “‘This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw re asonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Kelly , 41 Va. App. at 257-58, 584 S. E.2d at 447 (q uoting Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319). Thus, we do not “substitute our judgment fo r that of the trier of fact” even if our opinion we re to differ. Wactor v. Commonwealth , 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002). “Because direct proof of intent is often impossible, it must be shown by circumstantial evidence.” Servis v. Commonwealth , 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988). “If evidence of intent is wholly circumstantial, ‘all necessary circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and exclude ever y reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’” Dukes v. Commonwealth , 227 Va. 119, 122, 313 S.E.2d 382, 383 (1984) (quoting Inge v. Commonwealth , 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1976)). Circumstantial proof of a defendant’s intent includes the quantity of the drugs discovered, the packaging of the drugs, and th e presence or absence of drug paraphernalia. Expert testimony, us ually that of a police officer familiar with narcotics, is routinely offered to prove the significance of the weight and packaging of drugs regarding whether it is for personal use. Shackleford v. Commonwealth , 32 Va. App. 307, 326-27, 528 S.E.2d 123, 133 (2000) (other citations omitted). In accord with settled standa rds of appellate review, we vi ew the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, th e party prevailing below. Yopp v. Hodges , 43 Va. App. 427, 430, 598 S.E.2d 760, 762 (2004).- 3 - Here, Detective R.M. Holley, who qualified as an expert in the use, packaging and distribution of narcotics, opine d that possession of three large pieces of crack cocaine, weighing “a little over nineteen grams” is inconsistent w ith personal use. Holley pointed out that a heavy user, who ingests approximately a half of a gram a day, woul d consume nineteen grams of cocaine “anywhere from nineteen da ys to thirty-eight days . . . .” Detective Holley continued: I’ve never seen a user with nineteen grams on them mainly for the reason that they don’t want to get ri pped off, they don’t want to get robbed. But this is nineteen hundred dollars worth of crack cocaine on the street and I’ve just never seen a user with this amount on the street . . . . Holley did acknowledge the three large rocks did not appear to be “cut up for major distribution.” Commenting on the fact no mone y was found on appellant, Holley testified if appellant had just purchased the nineteen gram s, he could understand the absence of cash. Nevertheless, a large percentage of dealers do carry currency with them. Holley concluded, “the fact that someone with nineteen grams of cocaine on them with no money is not a determining factor whether I find it inconsiste nt or consistent.” Further, Ho lley considered the fact that no smoking device was found. The foregoing evidence supports the trial cour t’s conclusion that appellant intended to distribute cocaine. See Hunter v. Commonwealth , 213 Va. 569, 570, 193 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1973) (holding that proof that quantity possessed exceeds that norm ally intended for personal use, without more, is sufficient to show intent to distribute).
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we find that the tr ial court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to convict appellant of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed.