UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

__________________________________________ ) G. KEYS PC/L OGI S NP, et al., ) )

Pla int if fs , ) ) v. ) Ci vi l A cti on No. 08 -14 13 (P L F) ) MAI SHA POPE, ) ) De fe nd ant. ) __________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON In th e ir c omp la int

pla int if fs a lle g e va

ri ou s c omm on

law c la ims ari sin g fr om t he ir consultancy

on a home r enovation proje ct for the defe ndant. The matter is now bef ore the Court on defe ndant’s motion to dism iss or, in the alternative, to transfe r the c ase to the Super ior Court of the District of Columbia. Afte r a c are ful revie w of the c omplaint and the par ties’ pape rs, the C o urtc o n c l u d e s th ati td o e s n o th av e s u b j e c tm a t t e r

j ur i s d i c t i o no v e r

p l a i n t i f f s ’ c l a i m s . It there fore will transfer

the ca se to the Superior Court. P l ai n t i ff G. Ke y s P C / L OG I S NP i s a c o n s u l t i n g co mp an y an d p l ai n t i ff Gr egg Key s is the sole owner of G. Key s PC/ L OGI S NP and a consultant for the company . See Complaint ¶¶ 2, 3. Both ar e alleg edly Missouri residents. See id. De fenda nt Maisha Pope, a District of Columbia resident, alleg edly enter ed into a contr act with plaintiffs to over see
renovation work on her home . See id. ¶¶ 8- 11. Plaintiffs alleg e that af ter four teen months of work de fenda

nt suspended the pr oject and ha lted further pay ments. See id. ¶ 25. Plaintiffs filed
su it i n th is C ourt

fo r b re a c h o f c on tr a c t, u

nju st e nr ic hme nt, and

tr e sp a ss t o c hatte ls.2 Def endant moves to dismiss the complaint or to transfe r the c ase to the Super ior Court on two gr ounds: (1) the pa rties ar e not in fac t diverse, a nd (2) ther e is a proc eeding pe nd ingbe fo re the Di str ic t of Col umb ia

De pa rtme nt o f R e g ulator

y Af fa ir s r e g ard ingthe same alleg ed contr act. Reg ardle ss of whethe r these a rguments justify

dismiss al, the Court has dis c e rn e d a

se pa rate de fe c t in

pla int if fs ’ c omp la int , th e fa ilure to a lle g e the amou nt i n controve rsy

nece ssary

to give a fe dera l court jurisdiction in a diversity action. This fa iling
re qu ir e s th e Court sua sponte to transfe r the c ase to the Super ior Court.

Fe dera l courts ar e cour

ts of limit ed jurisdiction, possessing only the power confe rre d by

the Constitut ion and by

statutes enac ted by

Congr ess. See Kokkone n v. Guar dian L ife Ins. Co. of America , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); L oug hlin v. United States, 393 F.3d 155, 17 0 ( D. C. C ir . 2 00 4) . Afe de ra l c ourt do e s n ot p re sume that a

c a us e of a c tio n li e s w ith in i ts limit ed jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Gua rdian L ife Ins. Co. of America , 511 U.S. at 377; Bush v. Butler , 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (D.D .C. 2007). All plaintiffs bear the burde n of establishingthat the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. See Price v. Colleg e Park H onda, Civil Action No. 05-0624, 2006 WL1102818 at *6 (D.D .C. Mar. 31, 2006) ( citing Rosenbor o v. Kim, 994 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).

Whe n it pe rc e ive s th at su

bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n is in q ue sti on , th e Court

sh ou ld addre ss the issue su a s

po nte . See Prunte v. Unive rsal Musical Gr oup, 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2007) ( citing D oe by Fe in v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (n oti ngthat, b e c a

us e su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n “ g oe s to the fo un datio n o f t he c ourt ’s po we r t o
re so lve a c a se , [] th e c ourt

is o bli g e d to a dd

re ss i t su a s

po nte ”)) . “Subject-matter jurisdiction
c ann ot b e fo rf

e ite d o r w a ive d a

nd sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d w he n f a ir ly in d ou bt. ” As hc ro ft

v. I qb a l,I tap p ea rs th atp l ai n t i ff s ’ c o un s el i n t er

p re t ed1 1 D. C
. C o d e § 9 2 1 (a )( 2 ) a s p l ac i n g a 1 cap of $50,000 on the amount in controve rsy for c ivil cases over

which the Super ior Court had jurisdiction, and there by

somehow cr eate d an indepe ndent basis for jur isdiction in t he United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Read in its entirety , howeve r, Section 921 limit ed Superior Court jurisdiction with an amount in controve rsy cap of $50,000 only for the first t hirty months after the effectivedate of the Court Reorganization Act . See 11 D.C. Code § 921(a) (6) ( “Immediately following the expiration of the thirty -month period beg inning on suc h eff ective da te, the cour

t has jurisdiction ( re

ga rd le ss o f th e am ou nt i n c on tro v e rsy ) o f a ny c ivi l a c tio n o r a

ny oth e r m atte r, at la

w o r i n e qu ity , b ro ug ht i n th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia .” ) ( e mph a sis 3 129 S. Ct . 1937, 1945 (2009). When conside ringthe issue of subjec t matter jurisdiction, the Court mus t a c c e pt a ll o f t

he c omp la int ’s we ll- ple a de d f a c tua l a lle g a tio ns a s tr

ue and dr aw a ll
rea sonable infe renc es fr om those alleg ations in the plaintiffs’ favor. See G ov’t of Rwanda v. Rwanda WorkingGroup, 150 F . Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2001).

The c omplaint in thi s case alleg es that the Court’s jurisdiction is established by 11 D.C. Code § 921, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332. S ection 1331, g overningfede ral question jurisdiction, is i rre levant bec ause none of the c laims in thi s case raise a fede ral que stion. See B ush v. Butler , 521 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (“ A fe dera l district court does not have fede ral question jurisdiction over state lawtorts. ”). N or does 11 D.C. Code § 921 pr ovide a ba sis for j ur i s d i c t i o ni nth i s C o urt— i tr e l at e s o n l y t o th e j ur i s d i c t i o no f th e S u p e r i o r C o urt . M o r e l i k e l y, plaintiffs intended to asse rt fede ral jurisdiction based sole ly on diversity

of citizenship under 28 U. S.C. § 1 33 2. Se e Com pla int ¶ 1 (“ Th e matte r i n c on tr ov e rs y e xce e ds , e xclu siv e of

int e re sts and costs, the sum spec ified by 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”). Th e div e rs ity

statut e , 2 8 U .S. C. § 13 32 , p ro vid e s f or fe de ra l juri sd ic tio n o ve r c ivi l actions betwe en citizens of diffe rent states, but only wher e the amount in controversy , exclusive
o f i n t er es tan d

co s t s , ex ce ed s $ 7 5 , 0 0 0
. S ee 2 8 U. S
. C
. § 1 3 3 2 (a ). P l ai n t i ff s d o n o tal l ege damag es in an amount that meets this jurisdi ctional bar
. Plaintiffs seek dama g es that total 1added) . The District of Columbia Court Reorg anization Act of 1970, bec ame law on J uly 29, 1970, see Pub. L . No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, and this thirty -month period ther efor e has longsince expired. 4 $52,764.08, “plus interests, costs, and a ttorney ’s fe es, any

and all additional dama g es that may be incurre d betwee n the date of filing of the Complaint and trial, plus prejudg ment interest, punitive damag es, and suc h other re lief that this Court deems just and proper .” Complaint at 11. Pla int if fs a lso de mand

re tur n o f t he pe rs on a l pr op e rt

y wh ic h is the su

bje c t of Count I I I(t

re sp a ss to c hatte ls) — n ame ly , a

la dd e r, a Sho pV a c ma c hin e wi th atta c hme nts , a nd an uno pe ne d, fu ll pr op ane tank . Se e id. ¶ 4 2. Th e se a dd iti on a l a lle g a tio ns do no t r a ise the amou nt i n c on tr ov e rs y from $52,764.08 to an a

mount above the $75,000 jurisdictional bar
. First, while the la dder, the ShopVac mac hine, and the pr opane ta nk cer tainly have
so me va lue (a lth ou g h p la int if fs do no t a lle g e a

pr e c ise amou

nt) , th e do lla

r v a lue of the se
c omm on pie c e s o f c on str

uc tio n e qu ipm e nt c ou ld n ot r e a so na bly make up the a

pp ro ximate ly $2 2, 00 0 d if

fe re nc e be tw e e n p la int if

fs ’ a lle g e d d ama g e s a

nd the amou nt i n c on tr ov e rs y require ment. Second, plaintiffs have not alleg ed what, if any , “additional dama g es” mig ht occur be tw e e n th e date on

wh ic h th e c omp la int

wa s f ile d, le ss t

ha n a y e ar a g o, and

tr ia l. T he Court

wi ll not rely on the possibilit y

of such spe culative damag es in deter mining whe ther plaintiffs have met their burde n to establish jurisdiction. S ee B rea kman v. AOL , L L C, 545 F. Supp. 2d 96, 107 (D.D.C. 2008). Third, cour ts in thi s district have de termined that attorney s’ fe es g ener ally are not inc lud e d in

an a na ly sis of the amou nt i n c on tr ov e rs y , unle ss p ro vid e d f or by statut e or c on tr a c t. See B rea kman v. AOL , L L C, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 107; Wex ler v. United A ir L ines, 496 F. Supp. 2d 150, 154 (D.D.C. 2007); Gr iffin v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., Civil Action No. 06-2246, 20075

U. S. D ist . L EX I S 40 04 1 at *8 (D .D .C. June 4, 20 07 ); B ra nd v. Go v’ t E mpl e s. Ins . Co ., Civ il Action No. 04-1133, 2005 U .S. Dist. L EXI S 44787 at *16-18 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2005) ; Srour v. Ba rnes, 670 F . Supp. 18, 22 (D.D.C. 1987). Plaintiffs have not identifie d any statutory or contra ctual basis for

attorney s’ fe es in this case, a nd the Court does not perc eive a ny basis for such in the alleg ations of the complaint.

Finally , plaintiffs mention a re quest for punitive damag es as pa rt of their de sired dama g e awa

rd . “ Pun iti ve dama g e s ma y g e ne ra lly be inc lud e d w he n c a lc ulatin g the amou nt i n controve rsy

under 28 U .S.C. § 1332(a).” Wexler v. United Air L ines, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 154 (citingNwac hukwu v. Kar l, 223 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66 (D.D.C. 2002)) . “When the existence of fede ral jurisdiction depe nds on a cla im for punitive damag es, the c ourt should ‘scrutinize the punitive damag e cla im to ensure that it has at lea st a colora ble basis in law and f

act. . . . L ibera l pleadingrules ar e not a lice nse for plaintiffs to shoehorn e ssentially local ac tions int o fede ral court throug h extravag ant or invalid punitive damag e cla ims.’” Hunter v. District of Columbia, 384 F. Supp. 2d 257, 261 (D.D .C. 2005) (quoting Kaha l v. J .W. W ilson & Assocs., Inc., 673 F.2d 547, 548 ( D.C. Cir. 1982)).

Plaintiffs alleg e ca

uses of a ction both in tort and in contrac t. Punit ive damag es ty pi cal ly are n otavai lab le f

or a b reach of co nt ract . S ee Fir ema n’s Fun d I ns . C o. v. CT I A, 4 80 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12-13 (D.D.C. 2007). “ Puniti ve dama g es may be aw arde d in a tort ac tion if the de fe nd ant’ s to rt iou s b e havio r i s a c c omp anie d b y ‘f ra ud , il l w ill , r e c kle ssn e ss, wa nto nn e ss, op pr e ssi ve ne ss, wi lf

ul d isr e g ard

of the pla int if

f' s r ig ht, or

oth e r c ir c ums tanc e s te nd ingto ag g ravate the injury .’” H unter v. District of Columbia, 384 F . Supp. 2d at 261 (quoting B utera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 657 (D .C. Cir. 2001)). Nowhe re in plaintiffs’ complaint do6

they alleg e fr aud, ill will, recklessne ss, or any of the other

ag g ravating f

actor s nece ssary

to make
an aw ard of

punitive damag es appr opriate. In fac t, the only alleg ation related to punitive d am age s i nth e c o mp l ai n ti s th e i n cl u s i o no f a nun qu an t i fi edre qu es ti nth e c at ch al l d am age de mand . T his va g ue a lle g atio n d oe s n ot g ive pla int if fs ’ c la ims fo r p un iti ve da ma g e s a “ c olo ra ble basis in law,” Hunte r v. District of Columbia, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 261, a nd is insufficient to meet plaintiffs’ burde n to establish jurisdiction.

For the fore g oing r easons, the Court c oncludes that plaintiffs have not met the amount in controver sy

require ment for diver sity jurisdiction and that it therefor e may not exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ cla ims. I t will transfer the case to the Superior Court of the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia . A n O rd e r a c c omp anyingthi s Me mor and um O pin ion

wi ll i ssu e thi s sa

me d ay. /s/____________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: June 19, 2009