NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0230n.06
Case No. 23

- 1753
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

RONALD LECH , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. GINA GETTEL; W. MARK FONDREN; JOHN DOES 1

– 3 , Defendants

- Appellees

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
OPINION

B efore : CLAY, THAPAR, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges. THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Ronald Lech claims state officials waited too long to disclose exculpatory evidence. B ecause the Constitution did n’t require an earlier disclosure , w e affirm the dismissal of his claim

. I.
A Michigan police officer pulled Ronald Lech over and asked whether he’d been drinking. Lech said no but failed a field sobriety test. O fficers t ook Lech to the police department, where they administered a breathalyzer tes t. The breathalyzer

— a DataMaster DMT

—

registered Lech’s
blood

- alcohol concentration a s higher than the legal limit. As a result, Michigan charged Lech with driving while intoxicated. While Lech’s charges were pending, the Michigan State Police Department discovered that Intoximeters

— the private contractor who maintained its DataMaster DMTs

— hadn’t been doingNo. 23

- 1753 , Lech v. Gettel

- 2

-

its job correctly . Specifically, Intoximeters failed to perform “ timely 120

- day certifications,” incorrectly recorded “important elements during instrument checks,” and shar ed passwords with jail staff. R. 1, Pg. ID 7

– 8. As a result , in January 2020, the D epartment removed its DMTs from service and recalibrate d them. The D epartment acknowledged Intoximeters’ oversights could have caused inaccurate test results. So , in August 2021

— a week before Lech’s trial was set to begin

— the state dismissed his charges. Lech then sued several defendants, including two Department officials

— Gina Gettel, who oversaw the Intoximeter s contract, and Mark Fondren, who ensured the DMTs were up to standard. Among other claims , Lech argued Gettel and Fondren violated the Due Process Clause by failing to disclose sooner that his breathalyz er results could be inaccurate. See Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)

. The district court stayed Lech’s proceedings until we decided an appeal filed by Kelly Miller. Like Lech, Miller flunked a Michigan DMT test and was charged with driving while intoxicated

. Miller v. Gettel , Nos. 22

- 1034/1046, 2023 WL 2945340, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 2023). After Miller pled guilty , the state dismissed Miller’s conviction, citing the Intoximeter s issues. Id. Miller then su ed Gettel and Fondren, raising the same claim s as Lech

. See i d. at *7. Indeed, Lech copied Miller’s complaint verbatim.
In Miller’s appeal , we held Gettel and Fondren were entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claim

. Id. That’s because n o binding precedent established that Miller had a right to be informed about the Intoximeters issues before pleading guilty

. Id. (citing Robertson v. Lucas , 753 F.3d 606, 621

– 22 (6th Cir. 2014)). Based on our decision in Miller , the district court dismissed Lech’s complaint

. Lech now appeals the dismissal of his due process claim

.No. 23

- 1753 , Lech v. Gettel

- 3

- II. Lech raises the same claim, against the same defendants, on materially identical facts as in Miller

. J ust as in Miller , Gettel and Fondren ar e entitled to qualified immunity : Lech can’t show
that they violated due process by failing to disclose the Intoximeters issues sooner

— let alone that the violation was clearly established

. The Due Process Clause requires prosecutors to disclose material, exculpatory evidence to defendant s . Brady , 373 U.S. at 87. We’ve extended this obligation to police officers, requiring them to turn such evidence over to the prosecutor

. Moldowan v. City of Warren , 578 F.3d 351,
37 8

– 7 9 (6th Cir. 2009). But i n general, only a “ c omplete failure ” to disclose exculpatory evidence at trial offends due process

. United States v. Word , 806 F.2d 658, 665 (6th Cir. 1986). That makes sense: the reason the evidence must be disclosed at all is to prevent “an unfair tri al.” Brady , 373
U.S. at 87

– 88; United States v. Ruiz , 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002) ( calling Brady a “trial

- related right[]”). So i f the evidence is disclosed before trial

— or if there’s no trial at all

— there’s no due

process violation. United States v. Presser , 844 F.2d 1275, 1284 (6th Cir. 1988) ; see also Word , 806 F.2d at 665 (noting even “tardy” disclosures occurring “during trial” are acceptable if the delay isn’t prejudicial)

. Here, Michigan disclosed Intoximeters’ oversights a week before trial was scheduled to begin . An d Lech’s charges were then dismissed , so he was never tried. Thus, t here wasn’t a Brady violation , let alone a clearly established one

. Snow v. Nelson , 634 F. App’x 151, 155

– 56 (6th Cir. 2015). Lech resists this conclusion b y trying to distinguish M iller : Unlike Lech, Miller pled guilty to her charges

. But if anything, that distinction cuts against Lech. As we noted in Miller , some circuits require prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence before a defendant pleads guilty

.No. 23

- 1753 , Lech v. Gettel

- 4

-

Miller , 2023 WL 2945340, at *7 & n.5 (citing cases). B ecause no binding precedent imposed this requirement, we held that Gettel and Fondren were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. (citing Robertson , 753 F.3d at 621

– 22). By contrast, Lech can’t point to any circuit authority

— binding
or not

— requiring disclosure before the state dismissed his case

. See Snow , 634 F. App’x at 155

– 56. Next, Lech faults the district cou rt for failing to consider whether the delay in disclosure prejudiced him. He argues that i f Gettel and Fondren had disclosed the DMT issues to his prosecutor earlier, he would’ve rid himself of the stigma and cost of defending charges sooner

. But t hat “ misperceives the harm Brady claims are designed to redress.” Id. at 156. Again , Brady prevents “an unfair trial.” 373 U.S. at 87. So , t o show prejudice, Lech would need to establish a reasonable probability that, but for the delay, “the jury would have reached a different result

. ” United States v. Crayton , 357 F.3d 560, 569 (6th Cir. 2004). Because Lech wasn’t even tried, he can’t do so

. Finally, Lech argues the district court should’ve waited until summary judgment to dismiss his case. But L ech’s claims fail as a matter of law, so discovery wouldn’t change anything

. Moreover, because qualified immunity protects officers from liability and defending suit , we resolve it “at the earliest possible stage. ” Bell v. City of Southfield , 37 F.4th 36 2, 364 (6th Cir. 2022). W e’ve already held that Gettel and Fondren are entitled to qualified immunity in a materially identical case . S o th e earliest possible stage is now. We affirm.