United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Military Research and Development,

Committee on National Security, House

of Representatives

March 1996 NAVY MINE

WARFARE

Budget Realignment

Can Help Improve

Countermine

Capabilities

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-104

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-271137 

March 13, 1996

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and

 Development

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your request, this report identifies opportunities for the Navy to realign its

spending priorities to address weaknesses in its ability to conduct effective sea mine

countermeasures. Operation Desert Storm highlighted many of the weaknesses that remain

today. This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy to address those

weaknesses.

This report is an unclassified version of our December 1995 report. In that report, we provided

more detail and additional data to support our findings and recommendations.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members, House

and Senate Committees on Appropriations, Senate Committee on Armed Services, and House

Committee on National Security; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the

Secretaries of Defense and the Navy. Copies will also be made available to other interested

parties upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations and

 Capabilities Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose Operation Desert Storm highlighted major weaknesses in the Navy’s

capability to detect and disarm enemy mines. The Navy possessed only a

very limited capability at that time to conduct mine countermeasures at

various water depths. In addition, two Navy warships, the U.S.S. Princeton

and the U.S.S. Tripoli, both struck Iraqi mines in open waters in the

Persian Gulf. The combined damage to the two ships, which totaled about

$21.6 million, was caused by two mines—one estimated to cost $10,000

and the other about $1,500. The Navy has since made a number of

organizational changes and initiated several research and development

projects to address the weaknesses in its mine countermeasures program.

At the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and

Development, House Committee on National Security, GAO examined the

steps the Navy is taking to ensure a viable, effective naval force that will

be ready to conduct mine countermeasures in two nearly simultaneous

major regional conflicts. Specifically, GAO evaluated the (1) status of the

Navy’s research and development projects, (2) readiness of the Navy’s

on-hand mine countermeasures assets, and (3) match between the Navy’s

planned and on-hand mine countermeasures assets and its mine

countermeasures requirements.

Background The Navy uses ships, helicopters, and explosive ordnance units to detect

and destroy enemy mines from deep water up to the beach. Until the late

1980s, the primary mission of these forces was to detect and destroy

enemy mines laid along U.S. coastlines and in U.S. harbors. Subsequent to

the fall of the Soviet Union and the greatly diminished threat to U.S.

coastlines, the Navy redirected its mine countermeasures program to

detect and destroy enemy mines overseas in support of U.S. naval and

amphibious operations in regional conflicts. Current wartime doctrine

requires mine countermeasures forces to be deployable outside U.S.

coastal waters.

After Operation Desert Storm, the Navy designated the Commander of the

Mine Warfare Command as the operational commander of all naval mine

warfare forces. His responsibilities include ensuring the readiness of the

mine warfare assets, enhancing the integrated training of all mine warfare

forces, conducting training exercises with other fleet units, and

commanding mine warfare forces when deployed to military operations.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Executive Summary

Results in Brief Critical areas in the Navy’s mine countermeasures capabilities remain

unmet, and the Navy is pursuing a number of different projects to address

these areas. However, it has not established clear priorities among all of its

mine warfare programs to sustain the development and procurement of its

most needed systems. Consequently, the Navy has experienced delays in

delivering new systems to provide necessary capabilities. In addition, the

Navy has identified shortfalls of about $99.5 million in the development of

its shallow water projects.

The systems and equipment installed on the Navy’s ocean-going mine

countermeasures ships have experienced reliability problems and parts

shortages for several years. As a result, individual ships are not fully

capable of performing their mine countermeasures missions, although

collectively they may be able to carry out particular missions. To its credit,

the Navy recognizes these shortfalls and has taken positive steps to

improve the reliability and supportability of its ships. However, a number

of the ships’ systems and equipment are still not as reliable as predicted,

and parts shortages persist.

At the same time that the Navy is experiencing delays in delivering critical

capabilities, the Navy is spending about $1.5 billion to acquire 12 coastal

mine hunter ships that were designed specifically to protect U.S. coastal

waters against the Soviet Union but not to travel across the ocean under

their own power. Each of these ships will cost the Navy an average of

$3.6 million per year to operate and maintain. In addition, the Navy has

discussed plans to acquire a new mine countermeasures command,

control, and support ship early in the next century and is spending more

than $118 million to convert the U.S.S. Inchon for this purpose in the

interim. The Navy estimates that annual operation and maintenance costs

for the U.S.S. Inchon will be about $4.5 million. These command, control,

and support activities can be provided from existing ships and on-shore

locations.

Principal Findings

Delays in Research and

Development Projects

Jeopardize the Navy’s

Ability to Conduct Mine

Countermeasures

No single system can provide the Navy with the capability to conduct mine

countermeasures from deep water to the beach. Therefore, the Navy has

been developing numerous systems to address the varying water depths.

However, the Navy does not have a definitive plan that identifies the

additional systems needed in the long term to acquire necessary shallow

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Executive Summary

water capabilities. It has pursued these projects independently of each

other and, consequently, has had to make tradeoffs among them. The Navy

has started and stopped some of these projects repeatedly over different

fiscal years to respond to changing priorities.

Reliability and

Maintainability Problems

Affect Mission Readiness

The Navy now possesses 14 ocean-going mine countermeasures ships and

is experiencing significant logistics challenges to keep them operational.

The ships have been unavailable at times for training because of failures of

critical systems and equipment. The foreign-made engine, in particular, has

a history of problems involving failures of cylinder heads, bearings,

crankshafts, and engine actuators. These shortages have adversely

affected the overall mission capability of the ships and resulted in parts

being diverted from the production line and removed from some ships for

use in other ships.

The Navy established an admirals’ oversight council in November 1994 to

identify corrective actions to address these issues. However, officials

believe it will be several years before all the improvements can be made

because the Navy will incur additional costs to address the corrective

actions and the ships’ schedules will have to be accommodated.

Additional Ships Are

Unnecessary for Meeting

the Navy’s Mine

Countermeasures

Objectives

The Navy began to acquire 12 coastal mine hunter ships in the mid-1980s

to counter the mine threat of the former Soviet Union. Because this threat

to U.S. coastal waters was greatly diminished with the fall of the Soviet

Union, the originally intended mission of the coastal ships no longer

exists. However, instead of removing some of these ships from the Navy’s

inventory, as recommended by the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector

General in May 1995, the Navy is continuing to purchase all 12 ships at a

total cost of about $1.5 billion.

The deployment capability of the coastal ships is limited. These ships are

not designed to travel across the ocean under their own power, and they

can only operate at sea for a maximum of 5 days. Because these ships

were not intended to deploy, the Navy designed them with a very limited

ability to communicate with other fleet units. It will cost the Navy, on

average, $3.6 million per year to operate and maintain each of the coastal

mine hunter ships. The Navy did not cancel orders for any of these ships

or explore options or opportunities for removing them from the Navy’s

inventory. These options include deactivating the ships or transferring

them to other allied navies through the foreign military sales program.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Executive Summary

The Navy also tentatively plans to acquire a new command, control, and

support ship early in the next century, even though the Navy can provide

command, control, and support for mine countermeasures activities from

existing naval ships or on-shore locations. In the interim, the Navy is

spending more than $118 million to convert the U.S.S. Inchon to a

command ship, even though the ship is already 25 years old. The Navy

began the conversion in March 1995 and is anticipating a completion about

March 1996. As of August 1995, the Navy had already committed

$99 million of the conversion funds.

Recommendations To improve the Navy’s readiness to conduct mine countermeasures, GAO

recommends that the Secretary of the Navy develop a long-range plan to

identify the gaps and limitations in the Navy’s mine countermeasures

capabilities; establish priorities among the competing projects and

programs, including those in research and development; and sustain the

development and procurement of the most critical systems. The Secretary

of the Navy should direct particular attention to those systems required to

improve the Navy’s shallow water mine countermeasures capabilities.

GAO also recommends that the Secretary of the Navy improve the readiness

of ocean-going mine countermeasures ships. If the Navy finds that the

funds necessary to sustain critical research and development and improve

the readiness of ocean-going mine countermeasures ships are not

available, the Navy should consider using funds that would otherwise be

used to operate and maintain some of the coastal mine hunter ships.

Agency Comments DOD partially agreed with GAO’s findings and recommendations (see 

app. II). DOD acknowledged that delays in research and development

projects have had an impact on the Navy’s ability to conduct mine

countermeasures and concurred that reliability and support problems

have affected the mission capability of its mine warfare ships. Further, DOD

partially concurred that the coastal mine hunter ships’ role in overseas

locations is limited. However, DOD did not concur with GAO’s finding that

the command, control, and support ship is not essential. DOD agreed with

GAO’s recommendations that the Secretary of the Navy develop a

long-range plan to sustain the development and procurement of the most

critically needed mine warfare systems and improve the readiness of the

Navy’s ocean-going mine countermeasures ships. However, while DOD

acknowledged that cost savings could be achieved if the planned inventory

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Executive Summary

of coastal mine hunter ships were reduced, DOD did not agree that such a

reduction is a viable option.

GAO questions the need to operate additional coastal mine hunter ships

given the funding shortages in the mine warfare budget, which is causing

projects addressing unmet mine countermeasures needs to go unfunded.

Since critical areas in Navy mine countermeasures capabilities remain

unmet, GAO believes these areas should have higher priority than operating

additional coastal mine hunter ships.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

10

Lessons Learned From Operation Desert Storm 10

Mines and Mine Countermeasures Forces 11

Mine Warfare Research and Development Activities 18

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 18

Chapter 2 

Delays in Research

and Development

Projects Limit the

Navy’s Ability to

Conduct Mine

Countermeasures

20

A Long-Range Plan Can Direct Funding to Priority Projects 20

The Navy Still Lacks the Ability to Effectively Counter Mines in

Shallow Water

22

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 23

Chapter 3 

Reliability and

Supportability

Problems Affect

Mission Capability of

Mine Warfare Ships

24

MCM Ships Are Not Fully Capable of Performing Mine

Countermeasures Mission

24

Problems Persist With Reliability and Supportability of MCM

Ships

27

Newer MHC Ships Are Experiencing Similar Reliability and

Supportability Problems

30

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30

Chapter 4 

The Navy Is Procuring

More Ships Than

Current Requirements

Dictate

31

MHC Role in Overseas Locations Is Limited 31

Dedicated MCS Ship Is Not Essential 32

Cost Savings Can Be Achieved by Reducing Inventory of Ships 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Chapter 5 

Conclusions and

Recommendations

35

Recommendations 36

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 36

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Contents

Appendixes Appendix I: Navy Projected Shortfalls in Shallow Water Mine

Countermeasures Projects

38

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 39

Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report 52

Tables Table 3.1: Number of Total and High-Priority Requisitions for

MCM Ships, February 1994 Through January 1995

26

Table 3.2: Most Troublesome Parts Shortages Affecting Mine

Warfare Ships

29

Figures Figure 1.1: An MCM Ship 12

Figure 1.2: An MHC Ship 14

Figure 1.3: The U.S.S. Inchon 15

Figure 1.4: An MH-53E Helicopter With Minesweeping Gear 17

Abbreviations

DET Distributed Explosive Technology

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

MCM mine countermeasures

MCS mine countermeasures command, control, and support

MHC mine hunter, coastal

SABRE Shallow Water Assault Breaching System

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Mine warfare captured the Navy’s attention during Operation Desert Storm

when two Navy warships, the helicopter carrier U.S.S. Tripoli and the

guided missile cruiser U.S.S. Princeton, were heavily damaged by Iraqi

mines in the Persian Gulf in February 1991. The combined damage to these

two ships, which totaled about $21.6 million, was caused by two

mines—one estimated to cost $10,000 and the other about $1,500. Naval

mines are extremely economical weapons and are readily available on the

world’s arms market.

The Navy has identified naval mine countermeasures—the ability to detect

and disable enemy sea mines—as a critical element for establishing

maritime superiority to ensure access to ports, keep sea lanes open, and

support amphibious assaults. During the Cold War, the major factor in

developing mine countermeasures capabilities was the ability to clear

Soviet-laid mines from U.S. harbors to enable U.S. ships to break out of

U.S. ports. With the fall of the Soviet Union, however, the threat of enemy

mining in U.S. coastal waters has greatly diminished. Changing world

conditions have caused U.S. defense planning to shift from a concept of

global conventional war to a concept of regional conflicts and crises.

Lessons Learned

From Operation

Desert Storm

The 1992 Navy Mine Warfare Plan detailed four critical mine warfare

lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm and the actions taken by the

Navy in response to those lessons. The first major lesson was that the

Navy lacked a unified command structure. The mine countermeasures

commander’s staff consisted of 23 individuals assembled from 21 different

commands, resulting in a command staff that was ill-prepared for its task.

Fortunately, the 4 months in theater before actual clearance operations

provided for adequate command staff and mine countermeasures force

training. The Navy has since consolidated operational command of all

mine warfare forces in the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, who

reports administratively and operationally to the Commander in Chief,

U.S. Atlantic Fleet.1

 His responsibilities include ensuring the readiness of

the mine warfare assets, enhancing the integrated training of all mine

warfare forces, conducting training exercises with other fleet units, and

commanding mine warfare forces when deployed to military operations.

The Mine Warfare Command is located at the Naval Air Station, Corpus

Christi, Texas. Mine warfare ships are homeported nearby at Naval

Station, Ingleside, Texas. Plans to move all mine hunting helicopters from

1

During military operations, the Mine Warfare Commander reports to the appropriate area Commander

in Chief.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Alameda, California, and Norfolk, Virginia, to Corpus Christi have not been

finalized.

A second lesson learned from Operation Desert Storm was the need to

improve the readiness of mine warfare forces. Since that time, the Navy

has conducted or participated in about a dozen exercises with U.S. and

foreign naval battle groups. Mine warfare training courses have been

expanded for both enlisted and officer personnel, and career paths for

enlisted minemen have been revised to enhance opportunities for

long-term tours of duty in mine warfare.

Third, the Navy acknowledged the need to identify and acquire the

necessary resources to carry out its mine countermeasures mission. In

1994, the Navy took delivery of the last of 14 mine countermeasures (MCM)

ships and acquired the first 2 of 12 planned mine hunter, coastal (MHC)

ships. In addition, the Navy is converting a helicopter landing ship to a

mine countermeasures command, control, and support (MCS) ship.

Last, the Navy recognized that it has very limited systems to counter mines

in various water depths. Consequently, the Navy has established several

research and development projects to address these limited capabilities.

Mines and Mine

Countermeasures

Forces

Sea mines are explosive devices hidden in the sea that can be detonated

either by direct contact or indirectly at a distance by the acoustic, seismic,

or magnetic signatures of passing ships. The mines can be floating,

moored, bottom-laying, or buried. Sophisticated mines are equipped with

electronic sensors designed to ignore certain types of ships and target

others or count a specific number of ships before arming and detonating.

The various methods for countering mine threats include detection and

avoidance, mine hunting, influence minesweeping, and mechanical

minesweeping. Mine hunting is the process of detecting, locating, and

identifying mines through the use of sonar. Influence minesweeping

activates electronic sensors within the mines using towed magnetic or

acoustic sweep gear to detonate mines at a safe distance. Mechanical

minesweeping involves the physical removal of mines using sweep wire to

drag mines or cutting gear to release and float tethered mines for later

detonation. The Navy’s primary mine countermeasures forces consist of

ships, helicopters, and explosive ordnance disposal units.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Mine Countermeasures

Ships

The Avenger class MCM ship, the larger and more capable of the two

classes of mine countermeasures ships, is a 224-foot ocean-going mine

warfare ship designed to clear mines in both coastal and offshore areas.

(See fig. 1.1.) The hull is constructed of wood and glass-reinforced plastic

to maintain a nonmagnetic character, which is essential to mine clearing

operations.

Figure 1.1: An MCM Ship

Source: Navy.

The MCM is capable of both mine hunting and minesweeping—both

mechanical and influence—and is designed for conducting mine

countermeasures operations worldwide. Major on-board systems include

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 1 

Introduction

the mine hunting sonar, unmanned submersible mine neutralization

vehicle, precise integrated navigation system, and standard

magnetic/acoustic influence minesweeping system. The MCM ships are

designed to travel at a speed of 13.5 knots. However, depending on the

distance, the Navy might use heavy-lift ships to transport MCM ships to a

battle site in a timely manner, which would benefit the MCM ships by

reducing engine wear and tear en route to the battle site.

The MCM ship program, which is managed by the Mine Warfare Ship

Program Office, Naval Sea Systems Command, cost $1.8 billion over a

period of 10 years. The first of 14 MCM ships was commissioned in

September 1987, and the last was commissioned in November 1994. The

MCM ships have a crew of 8 officers and 75 enlisted personnel.

Coastal Ships The Osprey class MHC ship, the smaller of the two classes of mine

countermeasures ships, is 188 feet long and designed specifically to clear

harbors and coastal waters. (See fig. 1.2.) The MHC hull is constructed of

glass-reinforced plastic to provide the necessary low-magnetic character.

The Mine Warfare Ship Program Office also manages the MHC ship

program.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.2: An MHC Ship

Source: Navy.

The role of the MHC has always been more limited than that of the larger

MCM. The MHC class of ships was designed primarily to conduct mine

hunting and mechanical minesweeping within U.S. harbors and coastal

waters. These ships were originally designed to be nondeployable coastal

mine hunters that would have a maximum mission capability length of 

5 days. However, the MHCs can be deployed and operated for longer

periods of time, as long as they are provided with fuel and supplies from a

close support ship. In addition, the Navy has made some ship alterations to

expand the storage capacity of the MHC.

The MHC ship program, which is in the production phase, will cost about

$1.5 billion. The first of 12 MHC ships was commissioned in November 1993

and the second in August 1994. The Navy took delivery of the third MHC in

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 1 

Introduction

April 1995. Construction of the 12th MHC ship began in September 1994,

and delivery is scheduled in fiscal year 1999. The MHC ships have a crew of

6 officers and 46 enlisted personnel.

Mine Countermeasures

Command, Control, and

Support Ship

To provide command and control functions, serve as a platform for

helicopters, and support supply and logistics operations, the Navy Mine

Warfare Command began converting the helicopter landing ship U.S.S.

Inchon to an MCS ship in March 1995. When this conversion is completed in

about March 1996, at a cost of more than $118 million, the U.S.S. Inchon

will be capable of carrying an MCM Group Commander and staff and

supporting long-endurance airborne, surface, and underwater MCM

operations. (See fig. 1.3.) The U.S.S. Inchon, which is 25 years old, has an

expected lifespan of about 10 more years. The Navy has tentative plans to

design and build a new MCS ship early in the next century.

Figure 1.3: The U.S.S. Inchon

Source: Navy.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Helicopter Squadrons The Navy’s airborne mine countermeasures assets consist of 24 MH-53E

Sea Dragon helicopters and their related sweep gear. (See fig. 1.4.) The

Sea Dragon, the largest heavy-lift helicopter in the West, is capable of

towing a variety of minesweeping and mine hunting countermeasures

gear. The airborne forces enhance surface forces by providing rapid

response and deployment capability as well as the ability to sweep wider

areas of the sea in a shorter time. These forces are consolidated in

Squadron HM-14 based in Norfolk, Virginia, and Squadron HM-15 based in

Alameda, California. Each of these squadrons is made up of 12 MH-53E

helicopters. The Mine Warfare Command plans to consolidate its airborne

mine warfare helicopter squadrons at Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi,

Texas. Squadrons report operationally to the Commander, Mine Warfare

Command.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.4: An MH-53E Helicopter With Minesweeping Gear

Explosive Ordnance

Disposal Units

Fifteen explosive ordnance disposal units of eight personnel (one officer

and seven enlisted) each report operationally to the Commander, Mine

Warfare Command. These units are made up of underwater divers and

demolitions experts who are trained and equipped to locate, identify,

explode, disable, recover, and dispose of mines. Once mines have been

located by surface or airborne forces, the units move in and detonate the

mines safely or disable and retrieve them for future study. In addition,

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 1 

Introduction

these units are capable of supporting surface and airborne mine

countermeasures operations.

Mine Warfare

Research and

Development

Activities

The Navy is pursuing a number of different projects to develop new mine

countermeasures capabilities or improve existing capabilities. These

programs are largely developed at the Naval Coastal Systems Station in

Panama City, Florida, and administered out of the Program Executive

Office for Mine Warfare in Arlington, Virginia.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

At the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and

Development, House National Security Committee, we examined the steps

the Navy is taking to ensure a viable, effective naval force that will be

ready to conduct mine countermeasures in two nearly simultaneous major

regional conflicts overseas. Specifically, we evaluated the (1) status of the

Navy’s research and development programs, (2) readiness of the Navy’s

on-hand mine countermeasures assets, and (3) match between the Navy’s

mine countermeasures assets and its mine countermeasures requirements.

To determine the status of the Navy’s mine warfare research and

development projects, we examined the Navy’s operational requirements

documents and met with program managers to gather data on those

systems the Navy is developing to meet its requirements. Further, we

examined past and projected budget data to identify the funding history of

the projects and estimate the delivery dates of the projects to the fleet.

To determine the readiness of ships, we reviewed Status of Resources and

Training System reports, high-priority requisitions, Mine Readiness

Certification Inspections, and other data related to mission capability. We

discussed problem parts and unreliable systems with the Mine Warfare

Command, the Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity, and the Chief of

Supply, and we identified efforts to resolve these problems. We conducted

a detailed analysis of the Mine Warfare Commander’s priority lists of

problem systems and equipment affecting the MCM and MHC ship classes.

To determine whether the Navy has identified the type and quantity of

assets needed to carry out its mine countermeasures mission, we

discussed the need for mine countermeasures ships and support vessels

with the Commander, Mine Warfare Command. We also reviewed and

analyzed reports, testimony, and requirements studies published between

1989 and 1995 by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Center for Naval

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Analyses, Naval Audit Service, and Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector

General.

We visited three MCM ships, the U.S.S. Defender, the U.S.S. Gladiator, and

the U.S.S. Scout, in Ingleside, Texas. We also performed our work at the

Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity, Ingleside, Texas; the Mine

Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas; the Office of the Deputy Chief

of Naval Operations, the Naval Sea Systems Command, the Naval Air

Systems Command, the Program Executive Office for Mine Warfare, the

Office of Naval Research, the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and the Office of

the Director of Naval Reserves, Washington, D.C.; the Office of the

Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet Headquarters, Norfolk, Virginia; the

Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia; and the Naval Coastal

Systems Station, Panama City, Florida.

We performed our review between July 1994 and July 1995 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 2 

Delays in Research and Development

Projects Limit the Navy’s Ability to Conduct

Mine Countermeasures

Critical limitations in the Navy’s ability to conduct mine countermeasures

at various water depths that were identified during Operation Desert

Storm still exist today, and the Navy is pursuing several projects to

address these limitations. However, it has not developed a long-range plan

that identifies a baseline of its systems’ current capabilities and

weaknesses or establishes priorities among its competing projects to

sustain the development and procurement of the most needed systems.

One of the significant limitations demonstrated during Operation Desert

Storm was the Navy’s inability to conduct mine countermeasures in

shallow waters. This capability is one of the Navy’s greatest challenges and

key priorities. The Navy’s current plans to bring additional systems on line

beyond 2001 in support of amphibious assaults are uncertain.

A Long-Range Plan

Can Direct Funding to

Priority Projects

The capability to conduct naval mine countermeasures is a critical element

in ensuring that the Navy can project military power from the sea onto the

world’s beaches in military operations. Operation Desert Storm

demonstrated, and subsequent independent studies conducted by the

Naval Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences (1993) and the

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (1994) have

documented,1

 that no single system can provide the Navy with the

capability to conduct mine countermeasures at all water depths due to the

complexity of mine warfare operations and the various mines that the

Navy may encounter. Therefore, the Navy must develop a set of

complementary systems and tactics to effectively carry out its mine

warfare operations.

The mine warfare community is currently developing about 18 different

projects to enhance its capability to conduct mine countermeasures at all

water depths. These projects include

• enhancing the mine countermeasures ships’ and helicopters’ mine hunting

sonars to provide greater area coverage and improve their capability to

detect and classify enemy mines,

• upgrading the ships’ and helicopters’ minesweeping systems to provide

greater output to destroy mines and improve serviceability,

• upgrading the ships’ mine neutralization system to provide the ships with

an immediate destruction capability of identified mines,

• developing a mine neutralization system for the MH-53E helicopters to be

used with the airborne mine hunting sonar system, and

1

Reports on these studies are classified.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 2 

Delays in Research and Development

Projects Limit the Navy’s Ability to Conduct

Mine Countermeasures

• developing the capability to neutralize mines and obstacles in the surf

zone.

The Navy’s current approach to developing the mine warfare research and

development projects has been inefficient. According to Navy officials,

many of the projects have had to compete for limited financial resources,

and the Navy has had to make tradeoffs among them. The Navy has started

and stopped some projects repeatedly over different fiscal years to

respond to changing priorities, and these repeated starts and stops have

resulted in schedule delays. For example, officials explained that the

airborne mine hunting sonar system (AN/AQS-20) program has

experienced starts and stops that have resulted in a delay in the system’s

initial operating capability. The Navy began to develop this system in the

late 1970s, yet has still not brought this system on line. Officials further

explained that the Navy has had to place different management teams on

this project over the years and that the program has suffered from the lack

of continuity in expertise. Moreover, current procurement plans for this

sonar system will only allow the Navy to fund procurement of two to three

systems per year, despite the fact that mine countermeasures helicopters

deploy in squadrons of four. According to mine countermeasures officials,

the mine warfare community will consequently have to maintain support

simultaneously for two different mine hunting systems until all of the

helicopters are outfitted with the upgraded sonar.

The airborne mine neutralization system program has also experienced

starts and stops since the program began in the mid-1970s. This program

was dormant during Operation Desert Storm. It was restarted in fiscal year

1992 but canceled in fiscal year 1993. Funds were restored in fiscal year

1996.

Sustaining limited financial resources for priority programs will likely

become even more challenging in the future. The independent studies

conducted after Operation Desert Storm by the Naval Studies Board of the

National Academy of Sciences and the Johns Hopkins University Applied

Physics Laboratory concluded that the use of modeling and simulations

could assist the Navy in identifying its mine countermeasures priorities. A

long-range plan addressing the gaps and limitations in the Navy’s mine

warfare capabilities, especially its shallow water capabilities, could help

the Navy maximize its limited financial resources and ensure sustained

funding of its priority systems.

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Chapter 2 

Delays in Research and Development

Projects Limit the Navy’s Ability to Conduct

Mine Countermeasures

The Navy Still Lacks

the Ability to

Effectively Counter

Mines in Shallow

Water

After Operation Desert Storm, the Navy determined that its inability to

clear mines and other obstacles in shallow waters is one of its greatest

challenges. The Navy needs to develop this capability because enemy

forces can easily lay mines and obstacles in shallow waters,2

 since this

area is closest to their shorelines and because surf action causes many

mines to partially or totally bury, making them harder to detect. Without a

shallow water mine countermeasures capability, the only alternative for

amphibious forces would be to avoid an enemy minefield and make an

approach in another area. The risk associated with this maneuver,

however, is that enemy forces might intend for U.S. troops to make an

amphibious landing right into harm’s way.

The Navy cannot operate its mine countermeasures ships in very shallow

water due to the risk of running aground or damaging their hulls. The Navy

would also have difficulty towing its mine sweeping gear because of the

likelihood that the gear would snag on the bottom of the ocean.

The Navy is currently developing six mine countermeasures systems to

clear mines and obstacles in shallow water.3

 Since Operation Desert

Storm, however, the Navy has not added any of these systems to its fleet.

Moreover, the Navy has not made final decisions about additional systems

to conduct mechanical sweeping, hunt for buried mines, or perform

reconnaissance of mines in very shallow water. In addition, the Navy is

only developing the capability to counter light and medium obstacles and

has not decided what it will do to counter heavy obstacles.

The mine warfare program is experiencing budget constraints, and the

Navy has not fully funded its shallow water mine countermeasures

projects, even though it identified this area as a priority. The Navy plans to

spend about $317 million between fiscal years 1991 and 2001 in the

development of its shallow water projects. However, budget documents,

as of February 1995, show that unmet requirements for fiscal years 1997

through 2001 will total about $99.5 million. This figure may be understated

because the Navy still has to make final decisions on some projects.

Appendix I shows the Navy’s shallow water mine countermeasures

projects and the shortfalls associated with each project.

2

Obstacles include barriers such as telephone poles, concrete blocks, steel objects, and barbed wire

fences. They are classified as light, medium, or heavy. Enemy forces can place obstacles on the beach

and in the surf zone.

3

At the end of fiscal year 1995, the Navy canceled its participation in the development of a seventh

system, the Semi-Autonomous Acoustic/Magnetic Vehicle, which is a remote-controlled, high-speed

influence sweep.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
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Delays in Research and Development

Projects Limit the Navy’s Ability to Conduct

Mine Countermeasures

In addition to funding shortfalls, some of these projects are experiencing

technical and developmental delays. The Navy’s Distributed Explosive

Technology (DET) and Shallow Water Assault Breaching System (SABRE)

programs are examples of two of these projects.4

 Initially, the Navy

planned to destroy enemy mines in the surf zone by deploying these

systems from the beach into the water. The Navy has since changed its

strategy and is now planning to deploy these systems from the water onto

the beach off of Landing Craft Air-Cushion vehicles. This change in

strategy has resulted in an initial operating capability delay of about 

2 years. Due to this decision, the Navy had to redesign the rocket

propulsion mechanisms to deliver these systems to the targeted area and

conduct additional testing to examine the impact of launching DET and

SABRE from an unstable platform.

In another example, the Navy does not anticipate making final decisions

about its Explosive Neutralization Advanced Technology Demonstration

program until fiscal year 1998. This program is intended to enhance the

capability of the DET and SABRE programs and increase the safety of Navy

personnel either by using an unmanned glider to deploy the systems or

enhancing the capability of Landing Craft Air-Cushion vehicles to deploy

DET and SABRE from a greater distance.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD agreed that critical limitations in the Navy’s ability to conduct mine

countermeasures that were identified during Operation Desert Storm still

exist today. DOD also agreed with our emphasis on the complexity of mine

countermeasures and the fact that no one system can handle the mine

countermeasures requirement for all types of mines at all water depths.

4

DET is a distributed explosive net delivered by rocket motors. SABRE is an explosive line charge used

with DET to clear mines in the surf zone.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
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Reliability and Supportability Problems

Affect Mission Capability of Mine Warfare

Ships

Reliability problems and parts shortages continue to affect the readiness

and performance capabilities of the Navy’s MCM ships. The Navy has been

working to overcome shortcomings associated with the engines, sonars,

generators, winches, and other critical systems and has made progress in

resolving some of the more serious problems. However, a number of the

ships’ systems and equipment are still not as reliable as predicted, and

parts shortages persist. Mine warfare officials indicated that it would be

several more years before all the necessary improvements could be made

to the MCM ships because of the additional costs to fix the problems and

changes in the ships’ schedules. The MHC ships, some of which are

currently being delivered to the Navy’s fleet, are also experiencing similar

reliability and supportability problems.

MCM Ships Are Not

Fully Capable of

Performing Mine

Countermeasures

Mission

The Mine Warfare Commander is committed to having eight MCM ships

capable of deploying immediately to carry out mine countermeasures

missions in two major regional conflicts occurring nearly simultaneously.

The Navy uses detailed criteria to objectively determine whether each ship

is fully capable of performing the wartime mission for which it is designed.

As of July 1995, no MCM ship was rated fully capable of performing its mine

countermeasures mission. Instead, Navy status reports show that MCM

ships generally possess the resources and have accomplished the training

necessary to undertake major portions of wartime mine countermeasures

missions. The Mine Warfare Commander stated that each MCM ship did not

have to be fully capable of performing all missions. He said that

commanding officers provide a subjective assessment of their ships’ ability

to perform their wartime missions and that the effectiveness rating goal

was 80 percent.

The Commander further commented that some ships’ mission

effectiveness ratings could be increased quickly by cannibalizing missing

parts from other ships. He also said that some ships that were missing

certain systems or equipment could be used for portions of missions that

did not require those systems or equipment that were inoperable.

The Commander acknowledged that achieving acceptable mission

effectiveness rates for the MCM ships has been difficult because the ships’

systems and equipment have broken down more often than expected and

the Navy emphasized production schedules and program costs when

building the ships and failed to order sufficient quantities of spare parts to

support the ships after they became operational. He agreed that the MCM

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Reliability and Supportability Problems

Affect Mission Capability of Mine Warfare

Ships

ships have had serious problems and that they were continuing to have

problems, but he emphasized that progress was being made and that

problems were being fixed. However, reliability problems continue to

cause some MCM systems to experience more downtime than the Navy

average, result in high-priority requisitions for mission-essential parts, and

affect crew training.

Systems and Equipment on

MCM Ships Continue to

Have Above-Average

Downtime

Several of the systems on the MCM ships have experienced periods of

inoperability that exceed the Navy average of 15 days. These reliability

shortfalls have affected the ships’ engines, combat systems, and other

critical systems and equipment for several years. The foreign-made engine,

in particular, has had a history of problems involving the cylinder heads,

bearings, crankshafts, and actuators. Whenever the failure of a ship’s

system or equipment affects the ship’s primary mission and repair is not

possible within 48 hours, a report is prepared and entered into a tracking

system; downtime exceeding 30 days is categorized as being unresolved

for an excessive period of time. Downtime can affect the Navy’s ability to

train its crews and meet readiness goals. Management reports, which track

systems and equipment downtime, indicate that downtime for MCM ships

continues to be significant.

MCM Ships’ High-Priority

Requisitions Show Need

for Mission-Essential Parts

The Navy assigns a high-priority code to a ship’s order for parts to repair

mission-essential systems and equipment if the ship cannot perform some

or all of its missions while waiting for the replacement parts. About

16 percent of all requisitions by Navy ships are considered high priority.

Each of the MCM ships has experienced periods in which it could not

perform some or all of its missions while waiting for replacement parts

ordered with a high-priority designation.

From February 1994 to January 1995, the MCM fleet averaged 

392 high-priority requisitions per month, or 28 per month for each ship. In

some months, over 600 high-priority requisitions for mission-essential

parts were processed. Table 3.1 shows the number of total and

high-priority requisitions processed from February 1994 to January 1995.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
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Reliability and Supportability Problems

Affect Mission Capability of Mine Warfare

Ships

Table 3.1: Number of Total and

High-Priority Requisitions for MCM

Ships, February 1994 Through

January 1995 Month and year

Total

requisitions

High-priority

requisitions

Percent of total

requisitions

High-priority

requisitions

per ship

February 1994 2,053 154 8 11

March 1994 1,736 220 13 16

April 1994 4,720 678 14 48

May 1994 2,203 617 28 44

June 1994 1,671 495 30 35

July 1994 3,847 623 16 45

August 1994 1,574 208 13 15

September 1994 1,691 247 15 18

October 1994 2,052 212 10 15

November 1994 2,435 418 17 30

December 1994 2,380 227 10 16

January 1995 3,279 610 19 44

Total 29,641 4,709 16 337

The Mine Warfare Commander agreed that spare parts shortages,

particularly shortages of those high-priority parts that affect mission

capability, have been a concern since delivery of the first MCM ship and

that the shortages have been made worse because systems and equipment

have not been as reliable as predicted. The Navy has been taking

extraordinary efforts to correct its MCM supply support deficiencies. Over

the past year, the overall percentage of high-priority requisitions for MCM

ships had been reduced to the same percentage as the rest of the Navy

(16 percent).

MCM Ships’ Crews Are Not

Fully Trained

The Mine Warfare Commander acknowledged that reliability shortfalls and

inadequate supply support have had negative effects on crew training. He

said, however, that crew rotation schedules were the primary cause of

some ships not having fully trained crews and that training was sufficient

to meet planned wartime commitments.

At times, failures in critical systems and equipment have prevented ships

from participating in planned training. For example, in September 1994,

we monitored an exercise in the Gulf of Mexico (JTFX-95) from the U.S.S.

Defender and the command center at Corpus Christi. We observed that the

U.S.S. Dexterous and the U.S.S. Champion had engine problems and were

unable to participate in the exercise and that the U.S.S. Warrior could only

perform some missions after a lightning strike knocked out its sonar. The

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
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Reliability and Supportability Problems

Affect Mission Capability of Mine Warfare

Ships

U.S.S. Defender was the only ship to participate fully and received a

satisfactory evaluation for its performance in locating training mines

placed in the Gulf of Mexico. The Mine Warfare Commander said that the

performance of MCM ships in a May 1995 training exercise off the coast of

Denmark (Blue Harrier 95) indicated significant improvement in the

reliability of the ships. Although the postexercise evaluation was still

underway, the Commander said the MCM ships’ reliability and performance

were outstanding.

Problems Persist With

Reliability and

Supportability of

MCM Ships

The Navy has identified causes of reliability and supportability problems,

initiated corrective actions, and resolved some of the problems. Navy

officials commented that the MCM ships are operating longer periods of

time without mission-degrading failures of the systems and equipment.

However, documents show that the Navy is still in the process of

identifying and quantifying the corrective actions needed and that

technological challenges and funding shortages will make it difficult to

address all of the necessary improvements.

The Mine Warfare Command has been concerned about the reliability

shortfalls of its ships’ engines, sonars, generators, winches, and other

critical systems and equipment for several years. In early 1994, the

Command established a priority list of key systems and equipment with

problems and gave special attention to implementing long-term solutions.

The list included 17 problems affecting the entire class of MCM ships. The

Command has had some success with its efforts. For example, improved

engine governor drives were expected to be installed on all MCM ships

during fiscal year 1995, and improved water piping systems will be

installed as each ship undergoes periodic maintenance.

After delivery of the last MCM in November 1994, the Navy began giving

priority attention to the reliability and supportability problems affecting

MCM ships by establishing an admirals’ oversight council. The council is

giving the highest priority to identifying and executing solutions to

reliability shortfalls and ensuring that corrective actions are being

identified and coordinated among responsible officials. Mine Warfare

Command officials cited engine problems, inoperative combat systems,

and inadequate supplies of parts among the key areas that need immediate

attention.

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Reliability and Supportability Problems

Affect Mission Capability of Mine Warfare

Ships

Engine Problems The main propulsion plant on MCM ships, which consists of four

turbo-charged, 600-horsepower diesel engines, has been prone to

catastrophic failures and poor reliability. The problems were so bad that

during 1994 the Navy considered buying replacement engines. However,

the Navy determined that this approach was not cost-effective and decided

to fix the engine problems. Navy documents indicate that several factors

have contributed to the engine problems, including an undersized water

jacket cooler that causes the engine to overheat; fuel, oil, and exhaust

leaks; and a poorly designed drive train. In addition, Navy officials said the

fuel injection pump, thermocouple system, and cylinders were failing at

high rates and needed immediate attention.

The Navy resolved the problem in part by changing the operating profile of

the engines to a cruising speed of 8 knots and replacing engine governor

drives with improved drives. As of July 1995, the Navy had redesigned all

drive train components and developed improved return lines, gaskets,

clamps, and injection pump valves. The Navy plans to install improved

versions on all ships by December 1995. The Navy is also developing a

larger water jacket cooler. Although no formal replacement schedule has

been developed, the Mine Warfare Commander estimates that this problem

will be corrected by 1997.

These actions, although helpful, have not solved all of the engine’s

problems. The Navy is still determining how much funding will be needed

to make the required modifications. The Navy will then have to seek this

funding through future budget requests. For the long term, the admirals’

oversight council directed the Deputy Program Manager for Mine Warfare

Ship Programs to explore the feasibility of purchasing replacement

engines when the current engines are beyond economical repair and

address the problem of obtaining funding for the replacement engines.

Combat Systems Mine Warfare Command officials identified problems with certain key

mine countermeasures combat systems that need priority attention to

determine their causes and funding for proposed solutions. Among these

problems, the officials noted that the Navy has not allocated funds to

upgrade the navigation system on its MCM ships. It is very important that

the ships know precisely where they are so they can communicate to other

ships in the area the exact location of any mines that are found. The Navy

has an upgraded version of its AN/SSN-2(V)4 precise integrated navigation

system. According to the Mine Warfare Commander, funding will be made

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Reliability and Supportability Problems

Affect Mission Capability of Mine Warfare

Ships

available, and the Navy plans to have the system on all MCM ships by

December 1997.

Parts Shortages Navy officials commented that the admirals’ oversight council was giving

priority attention to improving supply support for specific systems and

equipment, and Navy documents show that progress is being made. For

example, the officials said that parts for the foreign-made engine would

soon be bought exclusively from U.S. manufacturers. Nevertheless, parts

shortages are expected to persist for some time in part because the ships

have multiple configurations of systems and equipment. For example, the

AN/SQQ-32 sonar suite has two variants that operate essentially the same

but are two very different systems for maintenance and parts support.

Navy officials said they were trying to determine if funding could be made

available to standardize combat system configurations and address other

key problems.

A Mine Warfare Command supply officer identified the most troublesome

spare parts shortages that were continuing to affect operations. The

officer provided a list of 15 out-of-stock parts that were causing

operational problems and downtime for the engines, minesweeping gear,

air conditioner, sonar system, sewage system, and main control console.

Table 3.2 lists these parts.

Table 3.2: Most Troublesome Parts

Shortages Affecting Mine Warfare

Ships

Part System

Turbocharger Engine

Cooler core Engine lube oil purifier

Belt Engine fuel oil purifier

Upper cable section Minesweeping gear

Middle cable section Minesweeping gear

Acoustic power cable Minesweeping gear

Cable assembly Mine neutralization vehicle

6W5 cable Mine neutralization vehicle

6W9 cable Mine neutralization vehicle

Impeller Air conditioner

Transformer Air conditioner

Circuit card SQQ-30 sonar system

Zinc anodes SQQ-30 sonar system

Plasma display Main control console

Macerator pump Sewage system

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
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Reliability and Supportability Problems

Affect Mission Capability of Mine Warfare

Ships

Newer MHC Ships Are

Experiencing Similar

Reliability and

Supportability

Problems

It is too soon to fully assess the capability rates of the entire class of

newer MHC ships because the Navy had received only three MHCs as of

May 1995. Nevertheless, in early 1994, the Mine Warfare Command

identified five problem areas affecting the entire class of MHC ships. The

admirals’ oversight council has also included the MHC in the scope of its

work.

The MHCs contain many of the same systems found on the MCMs and

therefore will require the same corrective action in certain cases. For

example, early versions of the MHC will have to be backfitted with

improved versions of the variable depth sonar and mine neutralization

system. Later versions will have the improved versions installed during

production. In other cases, problems may be even more acute on the MHC.

For example, Navy documents indicate that communications problems on

MHC ships are more serious than those on MCM ships. MHC ships, originally

designed to hunt mines off the U.S. coast, are equipped only with

high-frequency radios. Since the Navy has decided that MHC ships should

now be deployable overseas, satellite communications will be essential.

The Navy has funding available in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to correct the

deficiencies with off-the-shelf communications equipment. However,

technicians are concerned that the MHC ships may not have room for

antennas or additional radio equipment and are exploring the possibility of

replacing the radios with small circuit cards to perform this function.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD agreed with our finding that reliability and supportability problems

have affected the mission capability of its mine warfare ships. According

to DOD, the Navy has initiated various actions that have significantly

improved systems reliability. DOD also commented that the Navy is

incorporating improvements into the newer ships as they are built to

improve their reliability and supportability and has adopted a revised

maintenance philosophy that is enhancing operational availability.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 4 

The Navy Is Procuring More Ships Than

Current Requirements Dictate

The Navy is continuing its MHC procurement program at a total cost of

about $1.5 billion, even though the original mission of the MHCs has largely

diminished with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Further, the

Navy is continuing this procurement program at the same time that it has

other unmet critical needs, including the need to develop its shallow water

mine countermeasures programs. As of September 1995, 3 of 12 planned

MHC ships had been delivered to the Navy. The remaining nine ships are

currently under construction and are expected to be completed by fiscal

year 1999. Moreover, the MHC ship, which the Navy is currently planning to

operate as a naval reserve asset, has fewer capabilities than the larger MCM

ships that already exist in the Navy’s fleet.

In addition, the Navy has plans to acquire a new MCS ship early in the next

century. In the interim, the Navy is spending more than $118 million to

modify an existing amphibious warfare ship to provide mine warfare

assets with command, control, and support. The conversion is expected to

be completed about March 1996. Although it is essential to provide the

necessary command, control, and support during military operations, it is

not necessary to have a ship dedicated solely for this effort because other

ships or shore-based facilities could provide the function.

The Navy’s current estimate to operate and maintain each MHC is

$3.6 million per year. Further, Navy officials estimate that it will cost the

Navy $4.5 million annually to operate and maintain the MCS ship. The

savings that would be achieved by removing some of these ships from the

Navy’s inventory could assist the Navy in achieving its other unmet critical

mine countermeasures requirements.

MHC Role in Overseas

Locations Is Limited

The MHC ship was initially intended to protect U.S. coastlines from Soviet

mines and was not developed with an overseas mission in mind. By design,

this ship class was not intended to transit across the ocean under its own

power or operate on station for long periods of time, thereby reducing its

ability to be a viable asset in overseas operations. In addition to its limited

capabilities, the Navy is planning to make the MHC ship a reserve asset,

which will further limit its role as an overseas asset.

MHC Ship Has Limited

Warfare Capabilities

The MHC ship, which is smaller and has more limited capabilities than the

Navy’s larger MCM ships, was designed to protect U.S. coastlines. The MHC

ships were not intended to transit the ocean under their own power and

would have to be transported by heavy-lift ships to be used in overseas

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The Navy Is Procuring More Ships Than

Current Requirements Dictate

contingencies. Currently, these ships can only operate at sea for a

maximum of 5 days and depend on shore-based facilities for resupply. In

addition, the MHC ships are limited in their missions. These ships were

originally designed to conduct mine hunting operations only, although the

Navy has plans to add a mechanical sweep, which will provide the MHC

ships with the capability to physically remove moored mines.

Navy Plans for the MHC

Ship Will Further Limit Its

Use

Mine countermeasures assets have generally been assigned to the Naval

Reserve Force. The Navy plans to continue this practice by placing 11 of

the 12 MHC ships in the Naval Reserve Force, which will further limit their

role in future overseas operations. Generally, about 15 to 20 percent of the

crew, or 8 of 52 personnel assigned to the ship, will be reservists. For the

ships to serve as platforms to provide training to reservists, the ships need

to be located near the reserve population serving on those ships.

Therefore, it would be impractical to position these ships in overseas

locations.

Dedicated MCS Ship

Is Not Essential

Mine countermeasures crises during the mid-1980s and early 1990s

demonstrated the need to provide mine warfare assets with command,

control, and support. The Navy’s 1992 and 1994-95 mine warfare plans

state that airborne and surface mine countermeasures assets require a

dedicated ship for maintenance and logistics support during overseas

deployments. The Navy believes that a platform is also necessary for the

mine countermeasures group’s commander and staff to enhance

communication with the battle group and theater commanders. However,

command, control, and support can be provided from other Navy ships or

from shore-based locations.

Officials at the Mine Warfare Command informed us that the Navy plans to

acquire one new MCS ship early in the next century. This plan, however, is

tentative because no formal acquisition program is in place and no budget

has been submitted for this effort. In addition, the Navy would have to

shift the use of assets and rely on shore-based facilities or other naval

platforms for command, control, and support during two nearly

concurrent major regional conflicts because one MCS ship would not be

able to support both simultaneously.

The Navy is in the process of modifying the U.S.S. Inchon, an existing

amphibious warfare ship, as an interim measure to provide command,

control, and support to air and surface mine countermeasures forces. The

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The Navy Is Procuring More Ships Than

Current Requirements Dictate

Navy does not plan to have the U.S.S. Inchon and the new MCS ship in the

fleet at the same time. The U.S.S. Inchon, which is already 25 years old,

will only have an increased life span of about 10 years once it is converted.

The Navy expects that the conversion will be completed about March 1996

at a cost of more than $118 million. As of August 1995, the Navy had

already committed $99 million of the conversion dollars.

Cost Savings Can Be

Achieved by Reducing

Inventory of Ships

The Navy estimates that operating and maintaining each MHC ship will cost

$3.6 million annually. This figure includes the cost for personnel, unit

operations, fuel, direct maintenance, and other indirect costs. The Navy

could achieve significant savings by removing some of the ships from its

inventory and address its other critical needs by applying these savings to

those programs. However, the Navy is not currently exploring other

options for the MHC ships.

In May 1995, the DOD Inspector General reported1

 that the Navy could

deactivate 5 of the 12 planned MHC ships and put to better use $69.2 million

that would be required to operate and maintain the ships during fiscal

years 1996 through 2001.2

 In addition, the Inspector General identified an

additional $11 million, or $2.2 million per ship, that the Navy would

unnecessarily spend to upgrade equipment on the five MHC ships between

fiscal years 1996 and 2001. These upgrades include improving

communications systems and installing reliability improvements on the

propulsion systems.

The Navy could also declare the ships to be excess capacity and explore

the possibility of transferring the excess MHC ships to allied countries

through the foreign military sales program. Although we did not assess the

world market for mine countermeasures ships, we did note during the

course of this evaluation that a number of countries around the world

possess mine countermeasures fleets.

Navy officials further estimate that it will cost $4.5 million annually to

operate and maintain the U.S.S. Inchon. As with the case of the MHC ships,

savings could also be achieved if the Navy were to decide to remove this

platform from its fleet. However, because the Navy would still have to

provide command, control, and support services from other Navy ships or

1

This report is classified.

2

The $69.2 million is based on the Navy’s estimate to operate and maintain five MHC ships per year less

any costs to deactivate the ships.

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shore locations and incur costs in doing so, it is more difficult to estimate

the savings to be achieved.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD partially agreed with our finding that the MHC’s short on-station time

and reserve status would limit its role in overseas locations. DOD

responded that a contract modification was in place that would increase

the at-sea operational time. However, DOD also responded that the bulk of

the MHC class ships are going to ultimately be assigned to the reserve

forces.

DOD did not agree with our finding that a dedicated MCS ship is not

essential, stating that the Navy has long held the tenet that a ship that

provides effective command and control needs to be deployed with the

operating forces. We acknowledged in this report that command, control,

and support are essential during military operations. However, we also

reported that these functions could be provided from other Navy ships or

shore-based locations. Therefore, we do not believe the need for an MCS

ship is as great as other more pressing needs, such as the need to develop

the capability to conduct shallow water mine countermeasures.

DOD agreed with our finding that cost savings could be achieved by

reducing the inventory of mine warfare ships, but did not agree that

reducing the inventory of ships is a viable option. As discussed above, we

and others believe that reducing the inventory of ships is a viable option.

DOD noted that the actual annual savings associated with not operating

additional MHC ships, projected at $3.6 million each, would not be

completely realized due to decommissioning and deactivation costs. As

previously noted, the DOD Inspector General included deactivation costs in

estimated cost savings and projected a 5-year, $69.2 million cost savings

after deducting deactivation costs.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 5 

Conclusions and Recommendations

The experience of Operation Desert Storm revealed significant

weaknesses in the Navy’s ability to conduct effective sea mine

countermeasures, and the damage sustained by two Navy warships during

that operation clearly demonstrated the impact that enemy sea mines and

obstacles can play in military operations. The Navy has since undertaken a

number of projects to improve its mine countermeasures capabilities.

However, critical limitations and delays in the delivery of new capabilities

remain.

The Navy is pursuing a number of different projects to enhance current

capabilities and develop new ones; however, it has not undertaken a total

systems approach to identify a baseline of capabilities, develop

alternatives, and establish priorities among those alternatives. Many of

these projects have historically experienced starts and stops and are

continuing to experience delays in delivery. Although the Navy has

identified the ability to conduct mine countermeasures in shallow water

depths as a key priority, it still has only very limited capabilities in this

area. Many of the shallow water mine countermeasures projects are

underfunded.

The Navy has finished procuring 14 MCM ships. However, the ships are

experiencing significant reliability problems and parts shortages, which

affect their readiness and performance capabilities. The Navy has been

working to overcome these shortcomings and has made progress in

resolving some of the more serious problems. However, mine warfare

officials have stated that it would be several more years before all the

necessary improvements could be made due in part to limited available

funding.

At the same time, the Navy is continuing to procure 12 MHC ships, despite

the fact that the original mission of the MHC has greatly diminished. The

Navy estimates that it will cost $3.6 million per year to operate and

maintain each of these ships. The Navy is also converting an amphibious

ship to serve as an MCS ship. It will cost the Navy approximately

$4.5 million per year to operate and maintain this ship. One of the lessons

learned from Operation Desert Storm highlighted the importance of

providing mine countermeasures assets with the necessary support.

However, the functions that this ship will provide could be provided from

other ships or on-shore locations.

The Navy cannot afford to support all of its mine countermeasures

projects within its mine warfare budget without continuing to experience

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Chapter 5 

Conclusions and Recommendations

future delays in delivering new capabilities. However, opportunities exist

to realign the Navy’s mine warfare budget to direct funding toward its

most critical needs. If the Navy were to deactivate five MHC ships, the Navy

would save about $18 million annually. These savings, if applied to the

Navy’s shallow water program, would greatly reduce the $99.5 million in

budget shortfalls that the Navy has identified in that program. If the Navy

were to deactivate the MCS ship as well, the Navy could achieve additional

savings, although these savings are more difficult to estimate.

Recommendations To improve the Navy’s readiness to conduct mine countermeasures, we

recommend that the Secretary of the Navy develop a long-range plan to

identify the gaps and limitations in the Navy’s mine countermeasures

capabilities; establish priorities among the competing projects and

programs, including those in research and development; and sustain the

development and procurement of the most critical systems. The Secretary

of the Navy should direct particular attention to those systems required to

improve the Navy’s shallow water mine countermeasures capabilities.

We also recommend that the Secretary of the Navy improve the readiness

of ocean-going mine countermeasures ships. If the Navy finds that the

funds necessary to sustain critical research and development and improve

the readiness of ocean-going mine countermeasures ships are not

available, the Navy should consider using funds that otherwise would be

used to operate and maintain some of the MHC ships.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD agreed with our recommendations that the Secretary of the Navy

develop a long-range plan to sustain the development and procurement of

the most critically needed mine warfare systems and improve the

readiness of the ocean-going MCM ships. However, DOD did not agree that

the last five MHC ships should not be operated and added that the

possibility of using cost savings from deactivating these ships to support

other aspects of the Navy’s mine warfare program is not an option.

We question the need to operate additional MHC ships given the funding

shortage in the mine warfare budget, which is causing projects addressing

unmet mine countermeasures needs to go unfunded. Since critical areas in

Navy mine countermeasures capabilities remain unmet, we believe these

areas should have higher priority than operating additional MHC ships.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix I 

Navy Projected Shortfalls in Shallow Water

Mine Countermeasures Projects

Dollars in millions

Project name and description

Research and

development

funding profile,

fiscal years

1991-2001

Navy projected

shortfalls, fiscal

years 1997-2001

Obstacle Breaching—systems intended

to counter light to heavy obstacles in the

surf zone and on the beach. $19.6 0

Breach Lane Navigation—a sector light

placed on the beach to guide assault

crafts through cleared lanes. 3.7 0

Semi-Autonomous Acoustic/Magnetic

Vehicle—a remote-controlled,

high-speed, influence sweep. 8.1a 0

Shallow Water Assault Breaching System

(SABRE)—an explosive line charge to

clear mines in the surf zone. 33.5 10.5

Distributed Explosive Technology

(DET)—a distributed explosive net

delivered by rocket motors and used with

the SABRE. 51.2 18.9

Explosive Neutralization Advanced

Technology Demonstration (ENATD)—a

system to provide greater standoff

distance and improve accuracy of

deployment of the DET/SABRE. 109.7b 52.6

Advanced Lightweight Influence Sweep

(ALISS)—a towed influence sweep for

very shallow water. 89.0c 17.5

aThis project was canceled at the end of fiscal year 1995. The Navy believes this system

duplicates the Landing Craft Air-Cushion vehicle and is testing the feasibility of using that system

to conduct sweeping operations.

bThe Office of Naval Research will provide the funding for this program for fiscal year 1993

through mid-fiscal year 1998. Funding provided by this office represents $74.6 million of the total.

Due to budgetary cuts, this program will be delayed about 6 months in transitioning into the

research and development acquisition phase. The Navy’s Mine Warfare Program Office will

assume responsibility for the continuation of research and development in mid-fiscal year 1998.

cThe Office of Naval Research will provide the funding for this program for fiscal years 1993

through 1997. Funding provided by this office represents $50.3 million of the total. Budgetary cuts

have resulted in some refocusing of program development. The Navy’s Mine Warfare Program

Office will assume responsibility for the continuation of research and development to acquisition

beginning in fiscal year 1998.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now pp. 3-4 and 22-25.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4 and 26-32.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4 and 33-34.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5 and 34-35.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4 and 35-36.

Now on pp. 5 and 38.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5 and 38.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Sharon A. Cekala

Joan B. Hawkins

David E. Moser

Janine M. Cantin

Christina L. Quattrociocchi

Karen S. Blum

Dallas Field Office Roger L. Tomlinson

Hugh F. Reynolds

Rebecca L. Pierce

(703124) Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-96-104 Navy Mine Warfare
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