Gearing Up for Safety: Motor Carrier

Safety in a Competitive Environment

September 1988

NTIS order #PB89-124796
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Gearing Up for Safety: Motor Carrier Safety

in a Competitive Environment, OTA-SET-382 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, September 1988).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-600549

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form can be found in the back of this report)
Foreword

Trucks carry three-quarters of the dollar value of all commercial goods transported in

the United States, and the speed, convenience, and cost-effectiveness of truck transport

make this ratio unlikely to change quickly. The intercity bus and commercial trucking industries are governed by Federal motor carrier regulations, and the Motor Carrier Act of

1980 eliminated many economic restrictions limiting entry to the industry. Federal safety

regulations remain basically unchanged, however, and were expanded gradually in range

and coverage during the 1980s. Despite this, the number of highway accidents involving

heavy trucks climbed during the first half of the decade, prompting concern among public

and industry officials, alike. As I write this, the southwest horizon beyond my window—

Virginia—is punctuated by a billowing, black cloud from a classic tanker truck accident

and fire.

Although many studies on the impacts of deregulation have been undertaken, questions have lingered about the adequacy of existing Federal safety policies and programs.

The Committee on Public Works and Transportation and the Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation of the Committee on Government Operations, both

of the House of Representatives, asked the Office of Technology Assessment to determine

how well existing safety policies, regulations, and technologies meet the government’s responsibility for ensuring safety in the motor carrier industry. The study was endorsed by the

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

This report contains the results of that analysis. A review of critical intergovernmental

issues for the Department of Transportation and State Governments has been added to

the basic questions about the adequacy of Federal standards and programs. During the course

of the study, it became clear that the report would have to consider how policy is implemented, and consequently, the relationship between the Department of Transportation and

the States, which have become important partners in Federal safety programs. This comprehensive look at motor carrier safety also includes the economic framework of the industry as it affects operations, an analysis of safety data, and a review of research and development needs for safety technologies for both industry and government.

Throughout the study, the advisory panel, review group, workshop participants, and

a host of contributors played key roles in developing the major issues and contributed a

broad and invaluable range of perspectives. OTA thanks them for their substantial commitment of time and energy. Their participation does not necessarily represent endorsement of the contents of the report, for which OTA bears sole responsibility.

. . .

Ill
Gearing Up for Safety:

Motor Carrier Safety in a Competitive Environment

Advisory Panel

Charles Curtis, Panel Chairman

Van Ness, Feldman,

Carla J. Berroyer

Deputy Director for Intergovernmental Affairs

Illinois Department of Transportation

Philip T. Brown

Director, Marketing Resources Division

The Travelers Companies

Joan Claybrook

President

Public Citizen

John C. Dannemiller

President and Chief Operating Officer

Leaseway Transportation Corp.

Robert A. Davis

Chief Project Engineer

747 Division

Boeing Commercial Airplane Co.

R.V. Durham

Director, Safety and Health Department

International Brotherhood of Teamsters

James Johnston

President

Owner-Operators Independent Drivers

Association of America

Clyde Kizer*

Vice President, Technical Services

Maintenance and Operations Division

United Airlines

*Currently with Airline Transport Association.

Sutcliffe, & Curtis

Lillian Liburdi

Director

Management and Budget Department

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Louis M. McNair

Executive Central Air Safety Chairman

Air Line Pilots Association

William A. Maloney

Associate Administrator for Motor Carriers

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission

John Meyer

James W. Harpel Professor

The Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

Richard C. Schwing

Senior Staff Research Engineer

General Motors Research Laboratories

Dean Stanley

Corporate Vice President for Engineering

Navistar International Corp.

Alan Stephen

President

Scenic Airlines

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents.
Gearing Up for Safety:

Motor Carrier Safety in a Competitive

OTA Project Staff

Environment

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA

Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Nancy Carson

Science, Education, and Transportation Program Manager

Edith B. Page, Project Director

Michael Hines, Analyst

Walter Diewald, Senior Analyst

Kevin Dopart, Analyst

Eric Butler, Analyst

Karen Mathiasen, Research Assistant

Melanie Cohen, Research Assistant

Tse-Sung Wu, Research Assistant

Marsha Fenn, Administrative Assistant

Madeline Gross, Secretary

Christopher Clary, Administrative Secretary

Kimberley Gilchrist, Secretary

Contractors

Mark Abkowitz Jerrold Muskin

Vanderbilt University Francine Rudoff

Paul Jovanis

University of Wisconsin Kathryn van Wyk

Mark Lepofsky Porter Wheeler

Vanderbilt University

v
Contents

Page

Chapter l. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 2. The Motor Carrier Industry–A Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Chapter 3. Federal and State Regulatory Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Chapter 4. Motor Carrier Accident Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Chapter 5. Technologies To Improve Motor Carrier Safety . .........................109

Chapter 6. Human Factors in Truck Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...137

Chapter 7. Sources of Information for Evaluating Safety. . . . . ........................157

Page

Appendix A. Human Factors in Truck Safety, . . . . . . . . . . . ..........................179

Appendix B. Workshop Participants, Reviewers, and Contributors . . . . . . . . ............180

vi
.-

“

.

. .

credit: Michael Hines, OTA staff
CONTENTS

Page

Background .*. .,** ..o***. ... ... ... *.*. .*** ... *.. ..** + * * * ~ * * . . . * * * ******.**

Fragmented Governmental Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .* .. .+ .. .. ..+. . . . . . . . .

The Diverse industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Human Factors . .. . .. ..; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .*....*. ....+*.. . . .

5

8

9

10

12

13

13

14

14

15

15

16

16

17

18

20

21

22

22

23

23

26

26

26

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... ... +.......

Fatigue and Hours of Service ..**... ..*....* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Accident Factors . ..,......+....++..+.. . . . .+. .. .......+. . . . .

On-Board Computers. . . . ..*..*. ● .,..**. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Education .......+. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ....+

Vehicle and Roadway Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*....* . . . . .

Speed and Highway Design ..:...

Brakes .. .. .. .. .. ... a s=. . . . . . . .

Equipment Standards . . . . . . . . . . .

Adopting New Technologies . . . . .

Governmental Coordination. . . . . . .

State issues . . . . . . . ... DO. ...+...

Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DOT Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Safety Data Resources . . . . . . . . . . . .

Inspection and Enforcement Data

Market Entry, Exit, and Financial

Carrier Issues . . . . .. $.. ... ... .o.t.

...*,,. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .....**

. . . . . . . .4*.*+.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

...*.,. . . . . . . .

Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● ✎✎☞✎☛✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

● ✎✌✎✎✎✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

. . . . . . . .....+4. ..**.... ● .*. .

Profits.*. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .*....*

Capacity F*...*** ● .**..... ● *** *

Box

Page

I-A. Motor Carrier Safety-Policy Options and DOT Opportunities . . . . . . ....**. ● 6

Figures

Figure

l-1. Total Freight Revenues by Modal Shares, 1978 and 1986. . . . .

102. Truck Tree s.. . . . . .. ..+. ...+. .**,... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

4

7

8

11

12

12

13

14

19

l-3. MCSAP Inspection Rates Compared With Truck Accident Rates + . . . . . . . . . .

l-4. Trailer Sales Since 1980, by Length. ... .~. . . . . . . .. +. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-5. Motor Carrier Industry Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

l-6. Number of ICC Motor Carriers by Revenue Category, 1978-86 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I-7. Net Profit Margin, 1978-87 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .+. .......=

1-8. Relationship of Driver Fatigue to Accidents, by Hour of Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

l-9. injury Severity in Heavy Truck Accidents Relative

to Truck Driver Drinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-10.. Organizations Concerned With Brake Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● . .

Tables

Table Page

1-1. Overview of Federal Regulatory Responsibilities for Motor Carrier Safety . . . . . .

Safety Equipment for New Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

18

24

25

1-2. Estimated Costs of Truck

l-3. Truck Safety Information

IA. Truck Safety Information

Systems(Accident

Systems (Exposure

Data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Data) .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ......+
Chapter 1

Summary

Goods ranging from lettuce to automobile parts

and steel cables are carried by trucks of all sizes and

types from manufacturers to factories, stores, and

homes. Freed by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 from

many Federal rules governing entry, pricing, and

services, the trucking industry has capitalized on its

speed, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness to enhance

its dominant role in commercial goods transport—

and no serious challenger is on the horizon. Today,

trucking accounts for more than three out of every

four dollars spent on domestic freight transportation

(see figure 1-1). Trucking companies have continued

to enlarge their market share by keeping rate increases

small over the past 8 years—well below rises in the

consumer price index. Rates charged to large volume shippers have actually declined in real terms.1 

Carrier costs, however, have increased more than

rates have risen. Companies that have survived the

resulting economic squeeze have done so by streamlining operations and cutting costs to improve productivity. Many were unable to modernize suffi1

I Alex BroW, n & Sons, nc“‘ “Wrap-Up of the October 29 Trucking

Seminar,” unpublished manuscript, December 1987.

Figure 1-1 .—Total Freight Revenues by Modal Shares,

1978 and 1986

1978 1986

NOTE: “All other” includes air, pipeline, water, freight forwarders, and miscellaneous shipper costs

SOURCE” Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on data from Transportation Policy Associates, “Transportation in America,” November

1986, as cited in American Trucking Associations, Inc., “American

Trucking Trends, ” 1987

ciently to compete and succumbed to falling profits

and cash flow problems.

Intercity buses are also part of the motor carrier

industry—a part that has not fared well in recent

years. Former bus travelers purchased automobiles

or were lured by lower air fares available after airline deregulation, shifting to other transport modes

in large numbers; the number of revenue bus passengers declined by about 5 percent in the 1980s.

Bus companies consolidated service, abandoning

routes in lightly populated rural areas, and leaving

some former passengers without readily available

transportation service.

Despite the vital services they provide, large vehicles, both buses and heavy trucks,: are perceived

as menaces on the roads by many members of the

driving public–much to the concern of the industry. Steady increases in highway traffic have exacerbated long-standing heavy vehicle safety problems;

indeed, the number of vehicles now exceeds highway design capacity in many urban areas. Today’s

trucks and buses are larger and heavier than those

of 6 to 8 years ago and travel more miles over the

Nation’s highways–most of which were designed

for automobiles. Highways, such as the Interstate

system, which were constructed with truck use in

mind, were built for a vehicle comprised of a tractor pulling a 96-inch wide, 40- to 45-foot long trailer

—considerably smaller than the combination vehicles now standard. (Figure 1-2 gives examples of some

of the vehicles now common on major arteries.) This

makes handling today’s large trucks safely through

turns, on curves and ramps, passing vehicles, and

stopping within the appropriate distances a challenge, even for skilled, well-trained, and experienced

drivers.

Government officials and safety experts have long

sought ways to achieve a responsible balance between ensuring highway safety and facilitating the

flow of commerce. For example, after economic deregulation in 1980, a major Federal safety program

~Heavy trucks are those ulth gross vehicle weights of 26,(YJ1 pounds

and over-the focus for much of this study because the category includes comhlnation tractor-trailers, vehicles that pose the greatest drlting challenges and the largest safety hazards.

3
4

Figure l-2.—Truck Types

Straight truck

l — 25’ - 40’ — 1

4-axle tractor-semitrailer

5-axle tractor flatbed trailer

—38’ - 48 ’ — 1

Twin trailer or double

3-axle tractor-semitrailer

5-axle tractor-semitrailer

5-axle tractor tank trailer

35’ - 40’ — 1

Rocky Mountain double

(operated only in certain States)

I 45’ - 48’ 28’ — 1

Turnpike double

(operated only in certain States)

(operated

28’ — 1

Triple

only in certain States)

28‘ — 28’ — 1

Lengths shown are typical; shorter or longer lengths are possible depending on carriers’ needs and State laws.

SOURCE: American Trucking Associations, Inc.
5

was enacted—the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance

Program (MCSAP), authorized as part of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) of 1982.

This program has assisted 48 States in building their

safety and enforcement capabilities. Nonetheless, the

number of accidents involving heavy trucks increased a total of 15 percent over the 5 years between 1981 and 1986, the last year for which accurate Federal data are available.3 This increase is

slightly greater than the increase in truck-miles

traveled.

The number of fatalities in heavy truck accidents

has held constant between 4,000 and 5,000 annually over the last 10 years despite the rise in travel,

a credit to safety efforts. However, four out of every

five people killed in accidents involving truck tractor-trailer combinations are occupants of the other

vehicle, usually a car.4

Between 1 and 2 percent of

accidents involving these trucks result in a fatality;

the comparable figure for all other types of motor

vehicles (except motorcycles) is well under 1 percent.

In short, despite the steps taken to improve heavy

vehicle safety, concerns persist.

Accidents usually happen as a result of a sequence

of events, often initiated by a single occurrence complicated by a number of interacting factors. Federal

data from the National Accident Sampling System

(NASS) indicates that the three most common factors associated with heavy vehicle accidents are:

1) speed too fast for conditions; 2) level of training of the driver; and 3) age of the vehicle. These

factors are related to a range of activities that are

affected by government and every segment of the

motor carrier industry.

JOTA ~alculation5, ba5ed on National Accident Sampling SYstem

data and information provided by National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration staff.

‘OTA calcuiacions, based on data from the Fatal Accident Reporting System.

To identify changes to existing Federal policies and

programs that address these and related safety issues, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)

took a comprehensive look at the motor carrier industry and the spectrum of safety programs. Research included a review of the numerous Department of Transportation (DOT) and State regulatory,

enforcement, and safety programs; accident data resources, truck studies, and accident analyses; and

raw accident data. Industry operations and financial performance were assessed, using data from published sources and information provided by both

large and small carriers. As a result of this wideranging effort, OTA concluded that addressing

motor carrier safety issues successfully requires a

comprehensive and strategic approach. Congress’

choices are to formulate and enact such an appreach into law, to institute more aggressive congressional oversight practices, or to leave the

problem in the hands of the executive branch. Action is needed in three key areas:

●

●

●

Box

increased attention to human performance

factors, including training guidelines for

drivers and maintenance personnel, driver

hours of service and fatigue, and management

practices, such as hiring, scheduling, and

drug and alcohol testing;

stepped-up requirements for technologies to

improve safety in over-the-road vehicle operations. These must address vehicle design and

equipment requirements, such as tractortrailer brake compatibility, antilock brakes,

and vehicle visibility enhancements, as well

as highway structure and design; and

concentrated efforts to integrate government

activities across all jurisdictional levels, to increase national uniformity for regulations

and enforcement, and to improve regulatory

compliance for all motor carriers.

1-A provides a summary of major policy options and cost estimates.

BACKGROUND

The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 changed or elim- additional safety measures for motor carriers over

inated Federal economic requirements for many seg- the intervening years to enhance Federal safety overments of the trucking industry, but retained exist- sight for interstate commerce, focusing on enforceing safety regulations. Congress has enacted several ment, and to a lesser degree, the driver and the ve-

7

Figure 1-3.—MCSAP Inspection Rates Compared With Truck Accident

MCSAP inspections, vehicIe and driver violations

1,000

9 0 0

8 0 0

7 0 0

j 600

m

: 5 0 0

L

1-

4 0 0

3 0 0

2 0 0

100

0

— Inspections

---- Vehicle s

placed out of service

placed out of service

.“

,- ,“ ,.”

.

.’-

. .

..’

---

---

---

..- -.

-- --- ---

---- ---

I 1 1 1

1984 8 5 8 6 8 7

‘tear

KEY: MCSAP = Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program.

SOURCE” U.S Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program: Options /ntended to Improve a Generally Successful and Cooperative Federa//Sfate

Partnership Promoting Truck and Bus Safety (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1968), table 3, p. 18.

of service for violations. Even in States where efforts are made to perform completely random inspections, 30 percent of inspected vehicles are being put out of service.5

4 0 0

3 0 0

2 0 0

100

0

Truck accidents,

Rates

by weight of truck

.

. ’

. ’

. ’

— 10,000–25,999 pound s

----- 26,000 pounds and over

1 1 1 1 I 1

1982 83 84 85 86 87

Year

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident

Sampling System data, 1981-86. Data for 1987 are not yet available.

The STAA also authorized operation of trucks

with trailers 102-inches wide and 48-feet long, or

two 28-foot double trailers, on all Interstate highways and certain roads designated as part of the National Truck Network. The act allowed these vehicles to operate as necessary on other roads to gain

“reasonable access” to terminals for pick up and delivery, although States retained responsibility for

Photo credit: Commercia/ Vehicle Safety Alliance

‘Paul Melander, Tennessee Puhllc Service Commission, personal

communication, Mar. 23, 1988.

State inspectors identify safety hazards

before an accident occurs.
8

defining “reasonable access.” Carriers moved quickly

to take advantage of the opportunity to use larger

trailers (see figure 1-4), and longer, wider vehicles

now dominate intercity motor transport. In fact, encouraged by potent industry lobbying, many States

permit 53-foot trailers or even longer combination

vehicles, all of which exceed the limits of existing

highway designs. Operating a heavy vehicle safely

under such circumstances requires an experienced,

well-trained driver, capable of quick and alert performance and accurate judgment and decisionmaking, as well as a well-maintained vehicle.

Several studies have indicated that automobile

drivers cause up to 50 percent of multiple vehicle

truck accidents. Regardless of who is at fault, accident costs are spread widely, and often are paid

as much by the injured, the rescuers, and inconvenienced travelers as by the party that caused the

Photo credit: Ohio State Highway Patrol

Heavy truck accidents delay traffic and have

significant societal costs.

Figure 1=4.—Trailer Sales Since 1980, by Length

7 0

6 0

3 0

2 0

10

0

1980 1982 1984 1986

Yea r

SOURCE: Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, “Van Trailer Report, ” various

years.

accident. Thus, a comprehensive program to improve carrier safety must address issues related to

drivers of both heavy vehicles and automobiles, to

the heavy vehicles themselves, and to road design

and management. While a national program to improve motor carrier safety may well bring somewhat higher direct transportation costs, these

could be balanced by a reduction in the societal

costs of highway accidents, which, it was recently

estimated, will reach $65 billion by 1990.6

%J. S. Congress, House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, The Status of the Nation Highways: Conditions and Performance, Report of the Secretary of Transportation (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1987).

FRAGMENTED GOVERNMENTAL FRAMEWORK

Attempts to address safety issues in a comprehen- the Federal level, the Interstate Commerce Comsive and systematic manner are stymied by the vast mission (ICC), and three DOT agencies oversee

varieties and numbers of governmental bodies that different aspects of trucking through setting standshare responsibilities for truck safety and the far ards and enforcement. Within DOT, the National

flung, disparate nature of the trucking industry. At Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
9

sets and enforces standards and requirements for

the manufacture of new vehicles. The Office of Motor Carriers (OMC) in the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has regulatory and enforcement

responsibility for the drivers, carrier operations, and

the companies operating the vehicles. The Research

and Special Programs Administration regulates containers used in highway transportation of hazardous materials (see table 1-1). A number of other

offices within FHWA set standards for highway design and approve funding programs for State highway construction. These units rarely work closely

on carrier safety issues; in fact NHTSA and OMC

each have separate advisory groups for truck matters. In Congress, a similar number of committees

have jurisdiction over different aspects of motor carrier safety.

At the State level, numerous groups play roles,

with Governors’ offices, State legislatures, and Departments of Transportation, Highways, Police, and

Public Safety, as well as regulatory bodies, such as

Public Utilities Commissions or Public Service Commissions as major actors. Within States, responsibilities are divided differently, and agencies have separate and often incompatible approaches to activities

such as issuing inspection stickers, penalties for overweight trucks, and highway access decisions.

Table 1-1 .—Overview of Federal Regulatory Responsibilities for Motor Carrier Safety

Department of

Transportation

Administrate ion Senior Official Responsibilities

Federal Highway

Administration

(FHWA)

National Highway

Traffic Safety

Associate

Administrator

for Engineering and >

Program Development

Associate

Administrator

for Research, *

Development

and Technology

Associate

Administrator w

for Motor Carriers

Associate

Administrator +

for Policy

Administration

(N HTSA)

Research and

Special Programs >

Administration

Determines how truck access

affects the highway system

Manages research on the adequacy

of highway design to accommodate

trucks

Establishes and enforces operating

regulations for commercial motor

carriers; includes driver and

maintenance requirements

Studies the implications of longer

combination vehicle used on the

Nation’s highway system

Establishes regulations for the

manufacture of new vehicles and

related equipment; investigates

safety-related equipment defects

Establishes and enforces

regulations for containers used in

used in transportation of hazardous

(RSPA) materials

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 19S8.

THE DIVERSE INDUSTRY

The governmental framework seems simple when tors include companies owning from 1 to 500 or

compared to the motor carrier industry, or more more trucks, doing business as private or for-hire

accurately, the industries. The intercity bus indus- carriers, carriers of exempt commodities, ownertry is but one small segment. Heavy truck opera- operators, intermodal-operators, and interstate and
10

intrastate carriers (see figure 1-5). Freedom to enter

the market and compete for available customers has

had far-reaching effects on virtually all of these–

diminishing the-differences between common and

contract carriers and expanding the opportunities

for private carriers. The number of ICC-regulated

carriers (about 33 percent of the Nation’s total number of carriers) more than doubled between 1978

and 1986, with most of the growth in the smallest

ICC revenue category, Class III (carriers with revenue under $1 million annually). The number of large

(Class I and 11) carriers declined slightly over this

time period, however, as carriers declared bankruptcy or changed hands (see figure 1-6).

Although many of the new entries were not new

to trucking, having previously operated as exempt

or private carriers, the services they offered created

considerable excess capacity at the same time as the

1981-82 recession and its aftermath damped factory

production and shipment levels. As a result, rates

tumbled and carrier profit margins fell, even for the

historically most profitable carriers (see figure 1-7).

While accurate data are hard to acquire since companies leaving the industry need not report to ICC,

estimates are that the number of carriers merging

or going out of business climbed steadily from under 200 a year in 1978 and 1979 to over 1,500 in

1986.

Surviving carriers have in common a lean, costconscious management approach focused on ways

to increase market share, often through specialized

service. Carriers of all sizes have been affected by

rate competition and forced to examine alternatives

to utilize capacity and to increase productivity. Companies that have succeeded in meeting specialized

market demands or that have a financial cushion

adequate to support investments in equipment, facilities, and well-qualified drivers (important for

safety) can do well.

Each carrier has chosen methods that are most

cost-effective for its individual operations, and no

single best way of managing for safety emerged from

OTA’s examination. In equipment management, for

example, some firms with good safety records keep

their tractors for 7 or 8 years, undertaking major

engine overhauls at 300,000 miles. Others choose

to replace tractors at 4 years or 500,000 miles, finding maintenance too costly after that. Reflecting

these varying decisions, over the past 8 years, the

median age of heavy trucks in the commercial fleet

rose from 6 years in 1978 to 7 1/2 years in 1985, and

has settled at about 7 years after strong sales in 1987.

Large carriers are standardizing fleets to make maintenance more efficient and enable them to bargain

hard with manufacturers for durability and maintenance-free characteristics in their large fleet purchases. However, companies with notable safety

records do have in common a commitment to safety

and to personnel and scheduling practices that indicate respect for the driver and his or her essential

contribution.

The industry relies for economic success on high

productivity gained by carrying large volumes in millions of single trips, meeting demanding time schedules, and keeping prices competitive. These business

requirements do not make it easy to comply with

complex and varying regulations imposed at “different governmental levels. OTA concludes that the

economic success of a carrier has an identifiable

effect on operations and fleet condition; in fleets

having financial difficulties, vehicles are not as

well maintained and equipment tends to be older.

However, the absence of good data from the period before economic deregulation, the effects on

all business activity of the 1982 recession, and the

many changes in carrier operations that occurred

as the result of other governmental policy decisions, all lead OTA to conclude that no clear link

can be established between changes in economic

regulation and motor carrier safety.

HUMAN FACTORS

Accident data show that over 60 percent of accidents are caused by human error. While a good deal

is known about the factors that degrade driving performance, OTA concludes that Federal program

have not focused adequately on developing effective countermeasures. Inexperienced drivers are

particularly susceptible to accidents, and a large

number of heavy truck drivers involved in accidents
71

l-- TI

---

.->

u)
12

w

Figure l-6.—Number of ICC Motor Carriers

by Revenue Category, 1978-86

3 5

3 0

2 5

2 0

15

— Revenues under $1 million

----- Revenues over $1 million

0 ’

$ , , ,

197879 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

Year

KEY: ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission.

SOURCE: Ronald Roth, American Trucking Associations, Inc., “Trucking: An Overview and Focus on Recent Times, ” unpublished manuscript, September 1987, chart 14.

have poor driving records–including speeding

offenses.

Training

A vital element in preventing accidents is the

driver’s skill and awareness; both can be increased

through appropriate training. Surveys indicate that

many heavy truck drivers have not received any formal driver training prior to going on the road, although many companies will hire only drivers with

verifiable experience. OTA research shows that

many drivers involved in accidents never had any

training or significant retraining, and that level of

driver training is frequently a factor cited on accident reports. OTA concludes that special attention

to training requirements and close scrutiny of the

guidelines for the commercial driver’s license test

as they are developed by DOT are warranted. To

ensure that training issues are adequately addressed, Congress may wish to require national

Figure 1-7.–Net Profit Margin, 1978-87

(all carriers) -

197879 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

Year

SOURCE: Ronald Roth, American Trucking Associations, Inc., “Trucking: An Overview and Focus on Recent Times, ” unpublished manuscript, September 1987, chart 25.

guidelines for driver training and certification for

truck driver training programs. A consensus process for developing and approving the guidelines is

important to ensure widespread acceptability. Participants could include officials from training

schools, Federal and State regulatory and enforcement agencies, labor, carrier management, and vehicle manufacturers. A key issue is on-the-road experience required of prospective drivers, and to

address this issue, DOT might encourage carriers

to develop apprentice programs that follow national guidelines.

Considerable public and private effort will be necessary to make any new standards and programs effective, and the commitment of carrier management

to safety and to implementing new standards will

play pivotal roles. Historically, DOT has not been

an active player in this area. Congress may wish to

encourage DOT to develop a cooperative government, academic, and private research, education,

and outreach program to address management-
13

related issues such as driver hiring, screening, and

training programs and hours-of-service revisions.

Fatigue and Hours of Service

Research indicates that fatigue can play a major

role in accidents, particularly for older drivers and

for drivers on the road for 12 hours or more.7

Moreover, drivers of large trucks have shown significant increases in driving errors and decreases in

driver alertness due to fatigue during driving times

that are well within the current hours-of-service

limit. Greater understanding of the impacts on performance of circadian rhythm (time-of-day) and

fatigue is needed so appropriate regulations and

changes to driver scheduling can be developed.

OTA concludes that aggressive Federal research

programs to address fatigue and sleep issues and

to determine their role in truck accidents are top

priorities. DOT has planned several research

projects on these subjects for the next 2 years; these

projects represent small but important initial steps

and deserve support and funding. However, followup will be essential if the research is to bring

safety benefits.

Many heavy truck operations are not conducive

to allowing adequate rest for medium- and long-haul

drivers. DOT hours-of-service regulations were formulated 50 years ago, and do not take into account

the effects of operating on Interstate highways, new

vehicle technologies, contemporary economic conditions, or advances in understanding of circadian

rhythm, fatigue, and sleep needs. OTA research

points to compelling reasons for DOT to reexamine the hours-of-service regulations, and to develop revised standards based on current knowledge

and the around-the-clock operating environment

necessary today.

Other driver-related factors, such as the effect of

air quality and vibration in the cab environment

on performance and fatigue, need consideration as

well. An effective Federal research program on these

subjects would require joint efforts by NHTSA and

FHWA. Work to address these issues could also in-

‘Patrick Hamelin, “Truck Driver’s Involvement in Traffic Accidents

as Related to Their Shiftworks and Professional Features, ” Symposium

on the Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Traffic Accidents (Ottawa,

Canada: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,

April 1987), vol. 2, pp. J-10?.

elude cooperative government-industry studies to

explore changes in cab and seat design and feasible

scheduling alternatives and training programs. To

ensure that all views are heard, independent drivers

and representatives of large and small carriers should

participate.

Accident Factors

Federal support for research on fatigue could

also provide information to help management and

drivers understand when drivers are most vulnerable to accidents and how scheduling and procedures might be altered to accommodate sleep

needs (see figure 1-8). One practical and achievable outcome of such research would be simple, effective, and inexpensive techniques to screen drivers

with sleep disorders, who are at high risk for fatiguerelated accidents.

Figure 1-8.- Relationship of Driver Fatigue

to Accidents, by Hour of Day

t

-- -Accidents classified

as non fatigue related

!

1

t

— Accidents classified

as fatigue related

o

I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12

a m pm

Hour of day

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; adapted from K.D, Hackman

et al. (eds.), Analysis of Accident Data and Hours of Service of /rrterstate Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers (W@shlngton, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, August 1987)
14

Drivers under the influence of alcohol are far more

likely to have a severe accident (see figure 1-9).

Abundant evidence indicates that truck driver performance is impaired by blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) levels well below 0.10 percent and that

alcohol and drug use increases both the likelihood

and severity of accidents. Congress may wish to ensure that acceptable BAC levels for truck drivers

are set at 0.04 percent, the current level for airline pilots, and to require drug and alcohol screening for all driver applicants, as part of periodic

DOT-required physical examinations, and for

probable cause. Research is under way at the NaFigure l-9.—lnjury Severity in Heavy Truck Accidents

Relative to Truck Driver Drinking

100

9 0

8 0

7 0

6 0

5 0

4 0

3 0

2 0

10

0

0 )

Injury severity

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident

Sampling System data, 1981-85.

tional Transportation Safety Board to document

truck driver activities for 72 hours prior to a fatal

accident to determine drug use and to try to establish impairment levels related to that use. Since a

record of previous violations is characteristic of

many truck drivers involved in serious accidents,

Congress may wish to monitor closely DOT’s future decisions related to violations during part-time

activities or while off duty.

On-Board Computers

On-board computers that record speed, stopping

times, brake applications, etc., are management tools

that many carriers have used successfully to improve

the efficiency of their operations and to hold drivers

accountable for their performance. Several carriers

requested permission from DOT to substitute records from these computers for driver logbooks, and

DOT has ruled that the devices are acceptable. Requiring the devices as a safety measure to improve

compliance with the hours-of-service regulations has

also been suggested.

In companies where on-board computers are used,

fleet managers introduced the devices only after careful dialog with drivers to minimize potential adverse

reactions. Many owner-operators view the devices

as intrusive and cannot find benefits that justify investment in them. OTA concludes that while a

Federal requirement for on-board recording devices may be premature, Congress may wish to require DOT to plan and implement a program leading toward such a rule. Preparation and education

for management, labor, and State enforcement

officers are essential to ensure acceptance of these

tools as safety devices, prevent their abuse, and

assure their usefulness in increasing industry compliance with regulations.

Public Education

Finally, education programs directed at motor carrier and automobile drivers could enhance awareness of safety issues related to sharing the roads.

These programs should focus on the handling and

stability characteristics of trucks, the need to maintain adequate distance between vehicles, the longer

distances required for a heavy vehicle to stop, and

the severe damage that can result from a collision

between cars and trucks. Congress may wish to re-
15

quire NHTSA and FHWA to play mutually sup- population. Information programs could be incorportive roles in developing a model program for porated into the process for obtaining and renewStates to ensure that these messages reach a broad ing driver licenses.

VEHICLE AND ROADWAY TECHNOLOGIES

While highway system design issues and truck vehicle safety technologies are inextricably linked, they

are treated as two separate issues by governments,

by carriers, and by vehicle manufacturing industries.

Moreover, while data point clearly to vehicle technology problems that have identified technical fixes,

only a handful of researchers have devoted similar

attention to highway design issues as they affect

operation of wider and longer heavy trucks. OTA

finds that a systems approach to commercial vehicle highway safety is a priority for Federal action. DOT agencies, including NHTSA and OMC

and highway planning, safety, and design offices

in FHWA must work more closely with

other and with industry to address driver,

cle, and road safety issues systematically.

Speed and Highway Design

each

vehiFederal and State accident databases cite “speed

too fast for conditions” most frequently as a factor

in truck accidents. To determine the appropriate

speed for conditions, the driver must understand

the operating limits of his vehicle and the configuration of the specific section of the roadway on

which he or she is traveling. For example, accident

analyses show that a disproportionate share of fatal

Photo credit: Michael Hines, OTA staff

Heavy trucks travel all types of roads, although most

roads were designed for automobiles.

heavy truck accidents occur on U.S. and State highways, roads usually constructed with lane widths

and median markings appropriate for automobiles.

Light conditions, weather, and traffic congestion are

not major contributors to such accidents. Reconstructing these highways to increase width, passing

lane length, and sight distances, and to provide

sturdy median barriers would be prohibitively expensive. Thus, the driver, as he or she assesses the

appropriate speed and controls the vehicle, is the

primary accident prevention tool.

Industry approaches to limiting and controlling

vehicle speed vary widely. Some companies train

drivers how to operate according to explicit corporate speed policies, and design driver schedules

so that trips can be accomplished within the legal

duty shift. Other large trucking companies install

speed governors set at roughly 57 miles per hour

(mph) on their fleets, finding that the need to balance fuel efficiency, safety, and delivery schedules

is best met by this method. Still other companies

have installed on-board computers to monitor driver

speed. On the other hand, many truck drivers, including some employed by large companies, own radar detectors and consider them essential to accomplishing the on-time deliveries required of them by

shippers or brokers.

Congress may wish to consider legislation to require speed control devices, such as governors or

other devices that measure and record speed only,

as tools to control and monitor speed and aid enforcement. In addition, since the primary reason

for radar detectors is to alert a driver when the

vehicle’s speed is being monitored to see whether

it is exceeding the speeding limit, Congress may

wish to make such devices illegal for all vehicles

across the country. Also, model standards for

penalties for speeding that are high enough to be

a deterrent to violators could be developed.

A reexamination of highway design standards

with an awareness of the size of today’s heavy trucks
16

could lead to relatively low-cost safety improvements—revised signs to assist drivers of heavy vehicles in accurately assessing the appropriate

speed for roadway limits. Also of importance are

revisions to ramp design, intersection, and other

roadway standards. While these are long-term processes and reconstruction of roadways will take longer

still, Federal efforts could be intensified to assist

States in determining appropriate new standards.

Further, in light of the important role of speed

in fatal accidents, Congress may wish to reexamine the decision to permit truck speeds of 65 mph

on rural Interstate highways. Data analysis for this

study leads OTA to conclude that the importance

of keeping trucks at speeds compatible with highway design and roadway conditions outweighs any

small economic advantages that might accompany

faster carrier travel.

Brakes

Defective brakes are the most prevalent vehicle

violation uncovered by roadside safety inspections.

In addition to brake wear and adjustment problems

that affect buses and straight trucks, brake compatibility between tractors and the trailers they pull

poses major difficulties. One result of incompatibility

between tractor and trailer brakes is a high potential for jackknifing. Bobtails (tractors running without a trailer) and combination trucks running empty

pose particular difficulties because of the complicated

relationship between brake systems and truck loads.

OTA concludes that overcoming brake incompatibility between tractors and trailers and other

brake-related problems are priorities for manufacturers and carriers. Furthermore, active participation by NHTSA is necessary to bring early resuits and improved standards for brake system

components. Trailer manufacturers as well as tractor makers must be involved in the rulemaking process to ensure the development and use of compatible and well-balanced braking systems. An all-out

joint effort by OMC, NHTSA, the trucking industry, and tractor and trailer manufacturers to address this issue is urgently needed.

Another essential step in addressing brake problems is completion of current DOT tests on antilock brake systems to verify their effectiveness under

field conditions. Manufacturers are beginning to test

Photo credit: Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance

Brake defects such as this are the most frequent

equipment violations found during

roadside inspections.

tractor-only antilock systems, on the premise that

these are currently the most feasible for the complex and diverse U.S. trucking industry. If the DOT

tests are successful, antilock systems could become mandatory equipment by the early 1990s.

Key components to successful implementation of

the requirement include: 1) lead time for development of standard procedures for mechanics for

maintaining and adjusting the brake system, and

2) education and training programs for operators

and mechanics to disseminate accurate information on checking and adjusting brakes for varying loads. Full tractor-trailer antilock systems remain the eventual safety goal.

Equipment Standards

Handling and stability problems increase the likelihood of rollover, particularly for operations involving tractors and double trailers. Tire condition and
17

performance are also key factors in safe operations.

Additionally, lethal override/underride accidents,

particularly at night, indicate a need for devices to

mitigate the effects of these accidents and to make

trucks more visible at night. OTA concludes that

NHTSA has lagged badly in proposing upgraded

standards in several of these areas. Congress may

wish to require NHTSA to move vigorously on

rulemaking.

The Federal Government could play a more active role in determining standards for safety technologies, either as performance criteria (which state

minimum acceptable capabilities) or as design standards (which detail the equipment that must be

used). 8 Vehicle equipment compatibility issues are

so difficult that a cooperative Federal effort by OMC

(FHWA), NHTSA, and industry is needed for solutions.’ For example, some of the FHWA brake

standards are incompatible with NHTSA requirements. As new equipment becomes standard, mechanics will need training in proper techniques and

tools. Cooperative industry-government efforts will

be especially useful in developing and implementing education and training programs for mechanics to ensure that both new and old systems are

maintained properly.

Manufacturers and researchers have experimented

with and evaluated splash and spray control methods and devices. Tractor manufacturers have been

working on aerodynamically shaped tractors and

side deflectors and dams for trailers; one side-benefit

is increased splash and spray control. OTA coneludes that NHTSA moved prematurely to close

its rulemaking for this problem, and that performance criteria could be developed and phased in for

new equipment, based on available knowledge.

Truck occupants typically do not wear safety belts

that can protect them from ejection or hard contact with the cab interior, which can cause serious

injury or a fatality. OTA concludes that a require”

ment that drivers use three-point seat belts when

operating their vehicles could contribute to driver

survival. The implications of cab design and cab

‘Joe R. Morris, “Safety Implications of Changes in Truck Size and

Weight Limits,” Svmposium on rhe Role of Heavy Freighr Vehicles

in Traffic, op. cit., footnote 7, vol. 3, pp. 4-14.

“Robert Erwn, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “Transcript of Proceedings—OTA Workshop on Technologies Affecting

Truck Safety, ” unpublished transcript, Mar. 10, 198?.

equipment location are important subjects for a continuing Federal program of cab crashworthiness research.

Difficulty in designing retrofit equipment adaptable to older vehicles and the evolutionary nature

of technology focus manufacturers’ R&D efforts

toward new vehicles. 10 New requirements for safety

equipment concern large firms and individual

owner-operators, since refitting and modifying existing fleets or vehicles can have significant costs.

Without regulation, industry will balance the degree of benefit against the effort and cost involved

in retrofitting a vehicle to determine whether to

adopt safety equipment.11 Given these difficulties,

Congress may wish to require DOT to develop implementation programs for regulations that require retrofits with new technologies.

The relative operating safety of single and double combinations has been studied extensively, but

major differences have not been established, nor

could OTA identify significant variation in its own

research. Moreover, after an initial learning and adjustment period for doubles operations, fleet owners

have found the safety record for both types of operations to be very similar. OTA concludes that

different safety problems are inherent in each

design and that appropriate driver training and

experience with each can improve operational

safety.

Finally, the cost of educating drivers to use new

safety equipment is one that will have to be accounted for in some fashion by the marketplace. Although carriers may need to pay drivers and mechanics more for having technological skills, some

of the costs will be offset by reduced accident and

insurance costs.

Adopting New Technologies

Since many safety improvements do not translate

directly into higher productivity, industry acceptance of new technologies is slow. The fragmentation of the industry hampers dissemination of safety

information on new technologies, and legislative and

rulemaking processes required to implement new

IOP.A. Gustafson, Cummins Engine Co., Inc., personal communi

cation, Apr. 28, 1987.

1 IFarrel L. Krall, Navistar International Corp., personal communication, Apr. 29, 1987.
18

technologies are complex and time-consuming. Although the number of participants may be large (see

figure 1-10), government-industry working groups

that focus on setting uniform standards, voluntary

field testing by industry, and the sharing of experimental data can lead more quickly to acceptable new

standards.

OTA concludes that Federal education and information programs are essential if requirements

for new technologies are to be implemented

quickly. Congress may wish to allocate resources

and require DOT to undertake such tasks. For example, widespread misunderstanding by operators

and some maintenance personnel of how truck

brake systems should be installed, adjusted, and

maintained, suggests a need for a nationwide education program. Training programs for maintenance

personnel are a top priority.

Trade associations and publications could well

take the lead in educating carriers, while States could

coordinate such measures with their enforcement

programs and with State trucking associations. The

industry members hardest to reach with such efforts

are the owner-operators, since many do not participate in large industry groups. Establishing video instructional displays at truck stops around the country is one method of informing carriers and drivers

of the risks they take by operating trucks with deficient brakes. Ways to avoid and correct safety problems can also be presented at such displays.

The adoption of safety-related technologies by

trucking firms and owner-operators is not an automatic process. Improved safety equipment that has

clear economic benefit may be quickly utilized by

industry. 12 Many firms that can benefit from a par-

‘:Brian O’Neill, Insurance Institute of Highway Safety, in Office of

Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 109; and Ernie Vaughn,

Owner-Operators Independent Truck Drivers Association, in Office

of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 33.

ticular safety technology (e.g., brake retarders for

firms that operate frequently over mountainous

routes) have already taken steps to adopt it.13

However, the economic benefit of safety equipment

is not always apparent to industry. OTA finds

that in this situation, setting Federal performance

standards for equipment through rulemaking, and

ensuring that the standards apply equally to all

motor carriers, regardless of classification, is appropriate. Rough estimates of the costs of new

safety equipment may be found in table 1-2.

1]William Leasure, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,

in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 170.

Table 1-2.—Estimated Costs of Safety Equipment

for New Vehicles

Cost per vehiclea

Equipment option (1988 dollars)

Tractor:

1. Three-point seat belts . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

2. Anti lock brakes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,100

3. Brake adjustment indicators and

automatic slack adjusters

(front axle) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

4. Brake adjustment indicators and

automatic slack adjusters

(rear axle) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

5. Splash/spray suppression . . . . . . . . . 300

6. Reflectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Tractor total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Trailer:

1. Conspicuity devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Side underride guards . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. Automatic slack adjusters . . . . . . . .

4. Brake adjustment indicator . . . . . . .

5. Antilock brakes (not currently

offered in U. S.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6. Splash/spray suppression . . . . . . . . .

7. Rear underride guard . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Trailer total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2,895b

125

1,000

450

150

1,200

300

100

3,325C

NOTE: The Nation’s registered tractodtrailer fleet included 1.1 million trucktractors and 3.4 million trailers in 19S6.

aAverage or midrange cost based on current Production le@S.

bRepreSentS as percent addition to tractor cost, based on $86,500 aVera9e tractor

cost for 19S7.

CRepreSentS a w percent addition to d~ van trailer cost, based on $11,000 aVera9e

trailer cost (closed-top, dry freight van) for 1987.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 19SS; based on estimates from the

American Trucking Associations, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, and several trailer

manufacturers, August 19S8.

GOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION

Congressional mandates and DOT actions since licensing, represent steps toward greater safety. A

1980, such as requirements for annual vehicle in- comprehensive national truck safety program resections and more stringent standards for driver quires continuing such programs and establishing
Figure 1-10.–Organizations Concerned With Brake Standards

[

:.. I

I

Truck Trailer Brake Research Group

I I

1: Us. ;

Department :/

Vehicle ~

Research .

I Test Center ~

I

Manufacturer s

Associatio n

Engineering ,

; Committee : “

Brak e

Committe e
20

a far more systematic Federal-State approach. OTA

concludes that two issues are top priorities: 1) impproving State enforcement capabilities and regulatory uniformity, and 2) better coordination and

cooperation among agencies within DOT.

State Issues

MCSAP has firmly established the role of States

as an essential adjunct to Federal safety efforts. Continued Federal financial support for State inspection and enforcement activities through MCSAP

is crucial. Because additional trained personnel

are needed across the country, Congress may wish

to increase funding for this useful program. Additional State activities could enhance safety in

a number of areas.

Monitoring industry through terminal audits and

ensuring the safety fitness of all motor carriers are

important components of a systematic safety program. DOT has made some progress in assigning

fitness ratings to the large numbers of unrated motor carriers, mostly small operators, who entered the

trucking industry after deregulation. However, the

safety fitness of the private fleets that provide over

half of commercial truck transport must also be

evaluated, and Federal personnel levels are inadequate for this task. Because State audit programs

are indispensable additions to Federal enforcement

efforts, Congress may wish to require DOT to develop guidelines and handbooks for States and to

encourage more States to train inspectors and begin auditing carriers. Efforts by FHWA to improve

regulatory compliance materials for industry would

be helpful as models for the States as well.

OTA concludes that industry complaints about

inconsistent State inspection and enforcement

procedures and penalties are symptoms of the

need for stronger Federal and State efforts toward

national uniformity. The Commercial Vehicle

Safety Alliance’s (CVSA) goal of establishing uniform inspection and out-of-service criteria provides

an excellent model for States to use in working

together toward consistent nationwide programs.

However, efforts will be ineffective unless State governments make the commitment to have all their

own agencies cooperate toward this goal. Moreover,

intrastate motor carrier operators are subject to uniform safety controls only if Federal regulations have

been adopted and are enforced by the States. Congress may wish to consider requiring all States to

participate in MCSAP and adopt and enforce Federal regulations. To assist in resolving current conflicts in State agency agendas, strong DOT support

for consistent implementation of enforcement programs will be needed once FHWA’s review of State

laws and regulations has been completed and State

safety laws evaluated.

Congress may wish to require DOT to provide

technical assistance and information on safety regulations and enforcement issues for State officials,

law enforcement personnel, and judges. Educational materials could be distributed to States and

motor carriers on: 1) Federal safety requirements,

2) model programs for amending laws, 3) implementing Federal standards, and 4) developing an information clearinghouse. An enforcement handbook

could provide general guidance on the safety regulations and safety factors to consider when setting

penalty amounts for various types of violations. Involving State executive and legislative bodies, bar

associations, and enforcement organizations, such

as State Attornies General and police chiefs, in the

process could help gain acceptance from all agencies of the need for a uniform approach.

DOT has issued a rule, effective in November

1988, eliminating a long-standing regulatory loophole–the Commercial Zone Exemption as it applies to safety regulations in large urban regions.

Congress may wish to ensure that this and other

safety exemptions are eliminated completely and

quickly. State and local enforcement officers will

need capability to monitor and enforce safety requirements for commercial vehicles in urban commercial areas.

The public safety requires that motor carrier safety

regulations are independent of commodity, corporate form, type of operation, or destination of the

cargo—the traditional bases of regulation and often

the bases for exemptions. Trucks operating in intrastate, private, government, and exempt services perform a major share of the Nation’s motor carrier

transportation. While safety regulations have gradually been extended to these carriers, OTA coneludes that a comprehensive heavy vehicle safety

program must extend safety regulations to all

heavy vehicles and operators in all States. The

need for safety does not vary with the type of
27

operation, and no exemptions from safety regulations, including the Commercial Driver’s License,

are warranted.

Access

The motor carrier industry is a focal point for

many conflicting demands. Shippers, especially those

of bulky lightweight products, such as packaged

foods or paper goods, push for larger trailers to carry

more goods—at minimal extra cost. To capture this

business, carriers have purchased new trailers larger

than drivers are accustomed to, and joined shippers

in convincing State legislatures that trailers as long

as 53 feet can operate safely on State roads.

In the Motor Carrier Act of 1984, Congress made

clear that decisions on access to State roads for large

trucks are the province of the States, not the Federal Government. Resolving the conflicts inherent

between industry’s push for larger and longer vehicles and the limitations of the Nation’s road network requires Federal and State officials to work

closely with each other and with shippers and carriers. States have found developing routes and communicating access decisions clearly to industry to

be complex and difficult tasks, requiring hard work,

patience, good will, and good humor from all parties. Where the process has failed, carriers travel on

the routes they deem necessary to reach their destinations, often using narrow rural or urban roadways that are unsuitable for the large vehicles and

violating State law.

OTA concludes that varying State access, inspection, and enforcement policies pose significant problems for industry and can adversely affeet highway safety when drivers detour on back

roads to avoid the delays that often result. Congress may wish to require DOT to play a more active role in facilitating State-industry dialog and resolving these difficult issues. Technology transfer for

innovative solutions and working actively with

appropriate State and industry organizations are two

possible approaches. (For further discussion of technical aspects of the access issue, see chapter 5.)

Photo credit: Land Line

States determine which roads heavy trucks may travel to reach terminals such as this one

to pick up and deliver goods in urban areas.
22

DOT Programs

OTA finds that the division of responsibility for

different facets of roadway, vehicle, and driver issues among multiple agencies hampers safety

problem solving within DOT. To be able to respond effectively to congressional safety directives,

DOT will need to coordinate its agencies. DOT’s

program to implement the commercial driver’s

license requirement is a commendable exception; it

could serve as a model for efforts to deal with

equipment requirements and highway design issues.

Congress may wish to require DOT to develop a

plan to integrate the technical expertise now

divided between NHTSA and the motor carrier

and highway design sections of FHWA to address

issues such as roadway and vehicle compatibility

guidelines, upgraded safety equipment standards,

national training guidelines for drivers and maintenance personnel, accident reduction and mitigation strategies, and data collection and analysis.

OTA further concludes that DOT agencies need

to coordinate in collecting and analyzing data,

conducting research programs, and developing

regulatory proposals. Although NHTSA and

OMC in FHWA do review some of each other’s research projects, this is the exception rather than the

rule. Establishing special working groups to address

issues of common concern, jointly funding research

activities, and sharing staff expertise are examples

of strategies that could be used.

SAFETY DATA RESOURCES

Accurate, uniform, and representative information that gives sufficient detail for analysis is essential for informed policy decisions on motor carrier

safety issues. Objective data are needed to identify

highway design limitations and problems and to

evaluate the point at which technologies are reliable and cost-effective. However, OTA concludes

that, with few exceptions, existing heavy truck

data and information resources have deficiencies

that limit their value in supporting safety policies

and programs. In general, Federal data collection

suffers from lack of uniformity, some duplication,

inadequate quality control, poor handling, and outdated storage systems. Furthermore, OTA finds

that no effective central DOT analysis capability

exists, and that this deficiency seriously hinders

DOT’s policymaking. Congress may wish to require DOT to establish such a centralized capability and develop a comprehensive program to

gather, review, and analyze relevant data. Although some of the existing data are useful for

analyzing particular truck safety issues, none of the

national accident databases is ideally suited for addressing all truck safety issues (see table 1-3).

NASS, NHTSA’s major data source, includes accident data from 1981 to the present. NASS selects

accidents, based on a statistically based sampling

scheme, permitting the derivation of estimates for

national accident totals and annual trends. Changes

made to NASS for 1988 (see chapter 7) are likely

to make it more difficult to conduct detailed truck

and bus accident causal studies using this database.

State accident reporting systems present several

promising alternatives because they can represent

a census of accidents. However, the lack of uniformity among State data presents problems for extrapolating findings to the national level. The efforts of

NHTSA in establishing the CARDfile, and of

FHWA working with CVSA and the National

Governors’ Association in striving for more uniform

State accident reporting practices are commendable

efforts to address this issue.

A NASS-style approach focused on heavy vehicles could be a cost-effective prerequisite to a truck

and bus accident data system, for it allows a sampling of operations by both geography and road use.

To provide accurate and comprehensive information, each accident investigation could be handled

by field staff that examines the vehicle and the accident site, interviews vehicle occupants, and reviews

medical and driver records. For this option to be

realized, additional funds will be needed both to restore the original approach and to expand the system to meet truck safety concerns, including training of field teams in truck accident investigation.

FHWA currently has a uniform data collection

demonstration project under way in the midwest.

FHWA could work actively with other States to expand accident report forms to accommodate truck
23

detail and to establish uniform reporting thresholds

and forms for data elements. Both of these developments would enhance truck safety information

and furnish a statewide census of accident history.

NHTSA’s advice and expertise would be invaluable, regardless of which agency took the lead.

The cost of either an accident or an exposure data

collection program is a function of the desired precision in the estimates. Close to 300 sampling units

would be required to achieve reasonable confidence

levels for determining accident rates for different

truck types, at a total annual cost of close to $2 million. In addition, the logistical demands of establishing and maintaining cooperative arrangements

with each jurisdiction are formidable. More economical alternatives include continuing and expanding existing data collection instruments, although

their deficiencies are likely to persist. Given the massive scale of trucking activity, and the comparatively

detailed safety information available for air, rail, and

marine transportation, these are important tradeoffs to consider.

OTA finds that uniformity between accident

and exposure data, and accuracy in estimating

truck movements (see tables 1-3 and l-4) are priority needs. Congress may wish to consider extending FHWA’s reporting requirements to inelude an annual report from all motor carriers,

including intrastate operators and those currently

exempt from Federal reporting requirements. Information could include the number of trucks

owned and miles traveled. To keep track of heavy

vehicles, a Federal-State cooperative truck registration database could be developed in conjunction with State vehicle registration requirements.

An FHWA database such as SAFETYNET could

be used if modifications to the system can be made.

Inspection and Enforcement Data

Under MCSAP, a wide range of State inspection

and enforcement data is being amassed that provides useful information for safety analyses. Although the process by which vehicles and companies are targeted for inspection varies between States,

the inspection results are reported in a uniform way.

SAFETYNET, the enforcement database developed

for MCSAP, must mature before its information can

be available in an automated form on a national

scale, but at that time it will be a valuable resource.

Additional DOT technical assistance for State

agencies in developing more uniform data manage--

ment systems and analytical capabilities, especially

in tracking preventable accidents and violation statistics, would be an effective use of limited funding.

States could use this information to target carriers

for audits and inspections. As FHWA and ICC implement new procedures for assessing the safety fitness of commercial vehicle operators, explicit procedures for monitoring ongoing safety performance

will be needed. State personnel and FHWA field inspectors alike could benefit from consistent guidelines for deciding whether to initiate a compliance

education program or an enforcement action.

Market Entry, Exit, and

Financial Performance

Little public data is available on the financial performance of the industry, and ICC has required less

and less reporting over the past 8 to 10 years. OTA

concludes that the ICC reporting system has dwindied to a point where it no longer adequately

monitors carrier market entry, exit, and financial

performance. The current lack of information

presents a significant problem for both safetyrelated and broad policy decisions. Obtaining

sufficient information would require a dramatic

reversal of ICC policy to include Class 111 carrier

registrations, requests for exemptions, and sufficient

detail in the data elements to track some degree of

financial performance. Substantial data will be

needed to restore this system so that it serves a useful purpose for evaluating truck safety. Congress may

wish to require ICC to collect such data or place

responsibility for doing so with DOT as part of a

national motor carrier safety program.
Table 1=3.–Truck Safety Information Systems (Accident Data)

Database Kept by Years Strengths Weaknesses

50-T (part of FHWA, Office of Motor Carriers ●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Good detail on truck accident

characteristics

Exclusive truck focus

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Missing several portions of the truck

opulation

Concern over accuracy and completeness

of reports

elies on carrier participation

Restricted to aggregate accident reporting

Limited in terms of number of

participating States

Missing some truck detail

Small number of heavy truck accidents in

database

Detailed causal analysis sometimes

difficult

1973 to present

MCMIS)

1983 to present

1979 to present

FHWA, Special

Monitoring Study

FHWA, Office of Highway

Information

Involves accident and exposure data

Exclusive truck focus

I

I

NASS NHTSA, National Center for

Statistics and Analysis

Statistical sampling design

Comprehensiveness of accident

investigation

Reasonably good detail on truck

accident characteristics

National estimates of accident

frequency

Census of all fatal accidents

Comprehensiveness of accident

investigation

Comprehensiveness of accident

investigation

Good detail on truck characteristics

Exciusive truck focus

Census of all accident types

(

FARS

NTSB

NHTSA, National Center for

Statistics and Analysis

NTSB

1975 to present Limited details on truck configuration and

operation

Nonfatal accidents not represented

1986 to 1987,

single collection

Limited sample of accidents under

investigation, not representative of truck

crashes generally

State databases Various State regulatory agencies Based solely on police reports at scene

Varying detail on truck accident

characteristics

Lack of uniformity from State to State

CARDfile NHTSA 1982 to present Census from several States

Uniformity in reporting format

Limited truck detail due, in part, to limited

uniform variableiisted

Based solely on police reports at scene

Limited to a few States

Motor carrier industry Individual carriers,

trade associations

Some individual carriers maintain

excelent detail on accidents and

movements

Exclusive truck focus

Individual carrier represents single

observatiion in industry

Access to individual carrier records is not

in the public domain

Trade associations report accident rates

but not details on accident characteristics

Insurance

companies

Individual companies,

IS0

Detailed financial and statistical data

on truck insurance policies and claims

Aggregate reporting of information by

insurers

Primary concern over loss ratio rather

than accident causation

UMTRI UMTRI 1980 to present Combines coverage of FARS with Reliance on information provided by

carrier during post-accident investigation

Restricted to fatal accidents

detail of 50-T

Post-accident investigation to

complete missing information

Exclusive truck focus

KEY: MCMIS = Motor Carrier Management Information System; FHWA = Federal Highway Administration; NASS = National Accident Sampling System; FARS = Fatal Accident Reporting System; CARDfile

= Crash Avoidance Research Datafile; NTSB = National Transportation Safety Board; NHTSA = National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; iSO = Insurance Services Offices, inc; UMTRi - University

of Michigan Transportation Research institute.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988.
Table l-4.—Truck Safety Information Systems (Exposure Data)

Database Kept by Years Strengths . . . ,

TIUS Bureau of the Census Every 5 years, most

recently in 1982

CTS Bureau of the Census

Motor Carrier Census FHWA

File

(part of MCMIS)

HPMS FHWA

Tws FHWA

Since 1983, every 5

years

Most recent 5 years

Annually

Annually

Motor carrier industry Individual carriers,

trade associations

NMTDB Transportation Research and 1977 to present

Marketing (consulting firm)

NTTIS UMTRI 1988 to 1987,

single collection

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Covers all trucks used in the United

States

Sample biased toward heavy trucks -

Exclusive truck focus

Multimodal

Cross-checked against the Census of

Manufacturers

Provides flow data

Comprehensive listing of carriers and

truck fleet operators

Exclusive truck focus

Statistical sampling design

Detail on roadway characteristics

Truck classification and weight data

Exclusive truck focus

Aggregate statistics on tons, ton-miles,

and truck registrations

Detailed flow records from individual

carriers and shippers; can merge with

similar accident records

Exclusive truck focus

Focuses on long-distance truck

movements

Good truck and operator classification

detail

Exclusive truck focus

Good truck and operator classification

detail

Disaggregate and aggregate analysis

possible

Exclusive truck focus

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

weaknesses

No commodity flow data

Only rudimental commodity information

Reflects tractor use, not trailer use

Based on owner response

Shipment data on some products are

missing

Only shipments from point of manufacture

to first destination are reported

Nonuniformity between surveys

Voluntary data submission

Many carriers missing from database

No commodity flow data

Limited truck classification detail

Counting sites are not statistically

representative

Method of data collection varies and is

subject to observer error

Truck data are based principally on LTL

carriers

Individual carrier represents single

observation in industry

Access to individual carrier records is not

in public domain

Purposely excludes short-haul truck

movements, especially in Northeast

Not in public domain

Relatively small number of observations

Single collection

KEY: TIUS = Truck Inventory and Use Survey; CTS = Commodity Transportation Survey; MCMIS = Motor Carrier Management Information System; FHWA = Federal Highway Administration; HPMS = Highway

Performance Monitoring System; TWS = Truck Weight Study; LTL = less-than-truckload; NMTDB = National Motor Truck Data Base; NTTIS = National Truck Trip Information Sutvey; UMTRI = University

of Michigan Transportation Research Institute.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 19s8.
26

CARRIER

Trucking is a tremendously complex industry with

numerous market segments; each is served by a variety of motor carriers, making generalizations difficult. Changes in the economic regulation of the motor carrier industry had sweeping effects on market

entry, operations, costs and pricing, employment

policies and labor relations (including wage levels),

and technology development. The distinctions between various types of regulated motor carriers have

greatly diminished since deregulation, and entry opportunities for private carriers and owner-operators

have increased.

The nature and volume of the business conducted

by various segments of the trucking industry have

also changed. The largest general commodity carriers now tend to specialize in less-than-truckload

(LTL) shipments (under 10,000 pounds). Many large

LTL carriers have failed since deregulation, and few

new ones have entered the market. However, several of the largest nationwide LTL carriers have expanded and prospered, concentrating business in

this segment. These firms compete fiercely for market share.

At the same time, the interstate truckload (TL)

industry has become more diverse and dispersed.

New entrants in the TL segment tend to be small

and nonunion carriers, often from the ranks of

owner-operators, who are a key part of this trucking fleet. However, to compete successfully as individual entrepreneurs, owner-operators must drive

long hours and accept TL backhauls at low rates,

circumstances that create physical, psychological,

and economic hardships.

Factors are at work to tip the balance of TL operations toward larger carriers with more capital to

invest. Successful TL operations currently stress

high-quality service, using high-capacity, specialized

equipment and utilizing their assets and labor productively to serve targeted market niches. Concerned

about the reliabiliy of leased equipment and drivers,

carriers with sufficient resources buy their own

equipment and employ company drivers. Others,

such as automobile carriers, select and train drivers

carefully to handle safely their highly specialized,

complex equipment that is difficult to lease. Productivity is high enough that shippers pick these highISSUES

.

Photo credit: Karen Mathiasen, OTA staff

Automobile carriers train drivers to handle special

equipment and valuable cargo.

service carriers for both service and unit price, and

they become “core” carriers, capturing a large portion of the TL freight from major shippers. Owneroperators face continued business pressure from

these trends.

Profits

Profit margins have fallen even for the most successful carriers, a product of intense price competition caused partly by changes in manufacturing and

partly by continuing overcapacity. Carriers’ expenses

per ton-mile are up 75 percent since 1978, while revenues have increased only 54 percent. General

freight revenues per ton-mile have increased slightly

more than the consumer price index since 1978, but

have not matched price increases in the general

economy, particularly for large shippers and those

in highly competitive city-pair traffic lanes. Carriers

that serve small shippers and those in less competitive markets have fared better.

Capacity

One major reason for the high number of motor

carrier failures over the past 8 years was the overcapacity that existed in the regulated environment.

Despite the failures, however, industry analysts indicate that for several reasons, some overcapacity
27

persists. While the number of heavy trucks registered nationwide has declined slightly, trailers used

now are longer and wider, and double trailers, which

have significantly greater carrying capacity, have become commonplace on the Interstate system. In

addition, industry data show all trucks are being

used more productively; they are driven more miles

annually and spend longer hours traveling each day.

Rate discounting has made low labor costs and

high productivity essential to survival; thus carriers

have found it difficult to increase driver wages and

improve arduous work conditions. Nonetheless, the

need to keep trucks moving has made many carriers focus on ways to make driving a more attractive occupation. Many successful companies have

had to provide extra incentives to attract enough

drivers, since the traditional driver pool has been

shrinking.

Longer vehicles, double trailers, heavier weights,

a shortage of qualified drivers, and a competitive

marketplace, all have important implications for

heavy truck safety. Overcapacity leads to price

discounting and shrunken profit margins, creating

difficult economic trade-offs for decisions about investment in safety-related equipment and safety-conscious hiring and scheduling practices. Competition,

increased operating costs, and low, erratic profit

margins create a need to control costs that can lead

to shortchanging safety-related driver training, truck

maintenance, and equipment improvements. Carriers are, in general, interested in safety, but they

will measure investments in new safety equipment

and technologies against tangible economic rewards.

Cost and safety trade-offs are particularly problematic for owner-operators and small carriers, who

have to generate revenue regularly to stay in business and may have no regular operations base or

maintenance facility. OTA concludes that Federal

safety regulations will affect carriers economically

with varying severity, depending on their financial reserves and stability. Congress will want to

keep this in mind as it weighs policies related to

safety.
Chapter 2

The Motor Carrier

industry-A Profile

Photo credlt: Tse-Sung Wu, OTA staff - – “ - - Photo credit: Land Line

Bobtail tractor Flatbed trailer

“. - - - — . -

‘7

i

{

Photo @v&t: Iomn Math&an, OTA staff

Conventional tt*tO#

Photo credit: Freightliner Corp.

Cab-over-engine tractor

I

Photo cradt: Land Line l%oto cmdlt: Karen Mathiamn, OTA staff

Tanker Automobile carrier
CONTENTS

Page

The Nation’s Truck Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Number of Trucks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Heavy Trucks... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Industry Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

ICC-Regulated Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Intrastate Intercity). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 *

Intrastate (LocaI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Exempt Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Private Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

State Requirements for Truckers . . . . . . . . . 37

Hazardous Cargo.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Other Industry Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . 38

The Nation’s Buses.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Bus Deregulation in 1982. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Safety `Aspects ., .. .. .4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Forces for Economic Change in Trucking . . . 41

Regulatory Shifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

, Motor Carrier Act of 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Surface Transportation Assistance Act

of 1982 . .......+...*** . . * . * *..*..... 41

The Surface Transportation and Uniform

Relocation Act of 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Other Forces for Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Competitive Conditions and

Industry Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

For-Hire Carriers,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

State Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Market Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Market Competition.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Profit Margins and Overcapacity . . . . . . . . . 44

Business Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Heavy Truck Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Trailer Size..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Specialization and Concentration. . . . . . . . . 46

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Safety Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Boxes

B o x Page

2-A. Small Less-Than-Truckload (LTL)

.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., 48

2-B. A Truckload Carrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Figures

Figure Page

2-1.

2-2.

2-3.

2-4.

2-5.

2.6.

2-7.

2.8.

2-9.

2-lo*

2-11.

Table

Truck Types.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Motor Carrier Industry

Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Number of ICC Motor Carriers by

Revenue Category, 1978-86 . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Net Profit Margin, 1978-87 . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Motor Carrier Failures, 1971-87 . . . . . . . 45

Sales of Trucks Weighing Over 33,000

Pounds, 1978-87 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Median Age of Trucks, 1978.86 . . . . . . . 46

Trailer Sales Since 1980, by Length . . . 47

Trailer Sales Since 1980, by Width.... 47

General Freight Trucking Industry

Total Revenue, 1978-87 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

LTL/TL Tonnage, Adjusted

Seasonally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Tables

Page

2-1. Total U.S. Truck and Bus Registrations,

1979-86 .. .. .. .. ... ... .....;. ... ...:. 31

2-2. New Truck Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

2-3. Number of Trucks Owned and Operated

by Commercial Enterprises, Selected

Data for Largest Weight Classes, 1986 . . 34

2-4. Intercity Bus Industry in the United

States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

2-5. Number of ICC-Regulated Motor

Carriers and Freight Forwarders . . . . . . . . 43
Chapter 2

The Motor Carrier industry—A Profile

The motor carrier industry moves goods and materials between shippers and receivers all across the

Nation and carries passengers between large and

small cities. Motor carriers are our most ubiquitous

freight mode, using the extensive U.S. highway network to link markets of all types, sizes, and locations and serving many points that lack rail or air

service. The numbers of motor carriers grew dramatically during the 1980s, with many carriers of

all sizes moving to specialize in different segments

of the market. This wide variety of activities makes

the industry difficult to categorize.

Nonetheless, motor carrier safety concerns and

issues are best viewed in their industry context, so

that policy changes to improve safety recognize and

address the economic and physical characteristics

of the industry. Motor carrier accidents have immediate economic impacts on carriers, drivers, and

shippers of the freight being transported. However,

motor carrier safety is also a prime governmental

THE NATION’S

Number of Trucks

Industry-wide data on the domestic trucking fleet

are available from several sources, although data on

the entire population of trucks, including both interstate and local carriers, suffer from severe shortcomings (see chapter 7). The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) compiles and publishes data

on all motor vehicle registrations by State. Its most

recent statistical report shows a total of 176.2 million motor vehicles of all types, of which 77 percent

and public concern, because carriers share the roads

with automobiles and other personal-use vehicles.

Moreover, the societal costs of traffic accidents are

heavy. The Secretary of Transportation recently

projected that the annual economic cost of highway accidents could be $65 billion in the year

2000. ’

This chapter presents an economic and business

profile of the motor carrier industry, describing the

vehicle fleet, industry characteristics, competitive

conditions, industry trends, and major policy developments. The information focuses on the large,

heavy trucks that are a prime safety concern and

provides a framework for evaluating specific safetyrelated issues.

‘U.S. Congress, House Committee on Public Yt’orks and Transportation, The Status of the Nation High\& a~’s: Concilrions and Performance, Report of the Secretary of Transportation (V’ashlngton, DC: L1.S.

Government Printing Office, 1987). Cost projections are In constant

1985 dollars.

TRUCK FLEET

were automobiles, 0.3 percent were buses, and about

23 percent were trucks.2 The number of commercial and private truck-tractor registrations declined

by over 20 percent between 1979 and 1986. Selected

registration figures are presented in table 2-1 for

1979-1986. Light trucks–pickups, panel trucks, and

delivery vans, generally of 13,000 pounds or less

gross vehicle weight (GVW)—dominate the population of registered trucks, making up 83 percent of

‘Federal Highway Administration, Highway Sratisr~c-ZW?6 (Yi’ashington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1986).

Table 2.1 .—Total U.S. Truck and Bus Registrations, 1979-86a (in millions)

Total State motor Total commercial and

vehicle registration— Total truck private truck-tractor Private and Total commercial

Year all vehicles registrations registrations commercial trailers bus registrations

1986 . . . . . . . . . . . 176.2 40.2 1.1 3.4 0.11

1985 ......, . . . . 171.7 39.0 1.2 3.4 0.11

1984 . . . . . . . . . . . 166.5 38.0 1.1 3.2 0.11

1983 . . . . . . . . . . 163.9 36.5 1.2 3.1 0.11

1982 . . . . . . . . . . . 159.5 35.3 1.2 0.11

1981 . . . . . . . . . . . 158.5 34.5 1.2 3.0 0.10

1980 . . . . . . . . . . . 157.3 33.6 1.4 3.3 0.10

1979 .., . . . . . . . . 153.6 33.3 1.4 3.3 0.10

aData have ~O~e limitations, such as possible double Courrting for multiple registrations and reporting lag times of 16-18 months. Data are compiled by States and

are supplemented by the Federal Highway Administration to reduce double counting.

bpredominantly Ilght trucks (included 36 million pickup trucks in 1~).

SOURCE Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics (Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation, 1979-66),

31
32

the 40.2 million truck fleet. Only 1.1 million trucktractor power units and 3.4 million commercial-type

trailers and semitrailers were counted in 1986.

The Bureau of the Census has conducted surveys

roughly every 5 years of various transportation activities, including a Truck Inventory and Use Survey

(TIUS) as part of the Census of Transportation. ’

The TIUS is currently underway, and while data

from the 1982 TIUS are somewhat outdated, they

are the most recent available.

Heavy Trucks

Most heavy commercial trucks travel close to

100,000 miles per year and dominate commercial

interstate traffic. The small trucks and vans that

comprise the vast majority of truck sales play only

a minor role in interstate commerce. Figure 2-1

presents a selection of heavy truck types in silhouette, and illustrates the diversity of commercial

vehicles in use on our highways. Many heavy commercial trucks employ a tractor-trailer configuration,

as reflected by all but one of the truck types shown,

although numerous straight trucks and dump trucks

are also included in this category.

The definition of a heavy truck varies for regulatory and legislative applications by the various State

and Federal authorities concerned with motor carriers. Most industry observers categorize trucks by

weight rather than by actual size, because heavy

trucks pose special engineering problems (mainly

high axle and wheel loadings that stress the roadway) and safety hazards. Federal statute suggests one

definition, because the Federal Government imposes

a heavy vehicle use tax on vehicles that exceed

26,000 pounds GVW, and most loaded vehicles

operating in interstate commerce exceed that level.

Total truck sales numbered 3.8 million in 1987.

Trucks are categorized by various weight classes, and

the two heaviest are Class 7 (26,001 to 33,000

3U.S, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 7_ruck IrJventory and Use Sur\’ey (Washington, DC: various years).

pounds) and Class 8 (33,001 pounds and over). Two

relatively comprehensive sources provide data on

these trucks. First, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers

Association (MVMA) reports on retail sales of

trucks by weight class—selected MVMA data are

presented in table 2-2. Sales of the heaviest class have

fluctuated substantially over the past few years, reflecting business conditions and regulatory changes.

After a slump in sales of heavy trucks in 1986, sales

rebounded in 1987 and 1988, reflecting fleet renewals

with more fuel efficient, durable vehicles.

A trucking industry profile presents more detailed

data on trucks owned and operated by commercial

enterprises (see table 2-3). Over 1.8 million trucks

of Classes 6 (19,501 to 26,000 pounds), 7, and 8 were

operated by more than 343,000 commercial enterprises in 1986. Just over 1 million Class 7 and 8

trucks are operated by about 180,000 businesses.

Table 2-3 also shows two other descriptive classifications for users of Classes 7 and 8, by type of enterprise and by fleet size. Vehicles used in the “trucking” business are classified as “for hire, ” while trucks

used to transport company-owned goods as part of

an overall commercial enterprise are classified as

“private.” About two-thirds, or over 681,000, of the

heaviest vehicles are classified as private and are

operated by over 81 percent of the companies owning large trucks. The remaining one-third of the

heavy truck fleet is for-hire. Private and for-hire fleets

own roughly equal numbers of tractor-trailer combinations. In general, however, companies whose

primary business is to provide trucking services for

hire operate only about one-third of the largest

trucks.

Over 84 percent of the establishments that operate Class 7 and 8 trucks own fleets of only one to

five large trucks; thus a high proportion of small

enterprises operate the largest trucks. A few large

companies with fleets of 100 or more vehicles own

nearly 40 percent of the Nation’s Class 7 and 8

trucks, yet constitute only 0.4 percent of all trucking companies. These large firms include the major

national for-hire trucking companies, the large private carriers, and the few large specialized carriers.
33

Straight truck

l — 25’ - 40‘ — 1

4-axle tractor-semitrailer

l — 38’ - 48’ — 1

5-axle tractor flatbed trailer

l — 38’ - 48’ I

Figure 2-1 .—Truck Types

Twin trailer or double

l — 28 ‘—l l — 28’ — 1

3-axle tractor-semitrailer

1— 24’ - 28’—[

5-axle tractor-semitrailer

I

4 0

’ - 5 3’ ~

5-axle tractor tank trailer

l — 35’ - 40’— 1

Rocky Mountain double

(operated only in certain States)

I 45’ - 48’ I 1—28’— 1

Turnpike double

(operated only in certain States)

I 45’ - 48’ I I

4 5

’ - 4 8

t

~

Triple

(operated only in certain States)

l — 28’ —1 l — 28’—! 1—28’— 1

Lengths shown are typical; shorter or longer lengths are possible depending on carriers’ needs and State laws.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on American Trucking Associations
34

Table 2-2.—New Truck Sales (by gross vehicie weight, in pounds)

6,000 6,001 - 10,001- 14,001 - 16,001 - 19,501 - 26,001- 33,001

Year and less 10,000 14,000 16,000 19,500 26,000 33,000 and over Total

1978 . . . . . . 1,231,559 1,990,547 74,938 5,989 5,476 178,992 41,151 177,587 3,706,239

1979 . . . . . . 1,014,016 1,594,060 19,163 2,399 4,611 163,304 46,264 192,889 3,036,706

1980 . . . . . . 592,339 794,184 5,661 362 2,946 91,119 58,846 121,826 1,667,283

1981 . . . . . . 629,030 816,373 311 591 2,764 85,000 52,264 114,575 1,700,908

1982 . . . . . . 917,908 803,639 280 58 1,556 47,330 58,498 77,186 1,906,455

1983 . . . . . . 1,370,395 849,498 223 2 1,252 47,648 59,026 85,653 2,413,897

1984 . . . . . . 1,707,301 1,061,974 1,631 4 5,713 60,457 87,396 150,849 3,075,325

1985 . . . . . . 1,988,434 1,057,556 19,463 0 5,345 53,471 98,406 134,230 3,356,905

1986 . . . . . . 2,130,874 997,272 0 0 5,931 45,333 96,998 116,477 3,392,885

1987 . . . . . . 2,475,402 1,052,958 0 366 6,085 46,473 103,188 136,938 3,821,410

SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Facts& Figures (1978-1987).

Table 2-3.—Number of Trucks Owned and Operated by Commercial Enterprises,

Selected Data for Largest Weight Classes, 1986

Commercial Truck Ownership for Largest Weight Classes

Number of Number of

companies trucks

Classes 6, 7,and8a 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343,176 1,806,488

Class 6 0nly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259,691 785,698

Class 7and8: (by company type)

private . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151,326 681,153

for-hire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.651 339.637

Fleet Size for Companies Operating Class 7 and 8 Trucks

Number of Percent of

Fleet size companies companies

1-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151,455 84.2%

6-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,379 8.5%

11-25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,855 4.9%

26-50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,523 1.4%

51-100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,004 0.6%

100 or more . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 761 0.4%

asrandarddesignationsfortru~k ~eightclasses aree~pressedin grossvehicleweight as follows: Class6 is 19,501 to26,000pounds; Class 7is26,001 to33,000pounds;

Class 8is 33,001 pounds and over.

SOURCE: Dun& Bradstreet Marketing Service, Profi/e of the Commercia/ Heavy Truck Markel An /ndustry Update (compiled from Trinc Transportation Consultants

database) (W. Newport Beach, CA: Newport Publications, 1966)

INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS

Trucking is a service activity comprising many varied market segments, with the two broadest categories defined as l) private and 2) for-hire carriers.

Private carriers transport their own freight as an adjunct to their basic business and are not always considered in discussions of the trucking industry. A

local baker using a delivery truck is engaged in private carriage, and so is a national chain, such as

Sears, when it distributes goods in its own trucks.

For-hire carriers are always considered trucking cornpanies and are engaged to haul freight belonging

to another party. For-hire carriers are subject to Federal and State economic regulations, while private

carriers are normally exempt from most of those economic regulations.

Figure 2-2 portrays the traditional division of the

key types of trucking companies by primary market orientation. Changes in trucking laws and regulatory approach have blurred some of the distinctions, but the categories remain basically valid

because most trucking businesses have a market specialty. However, since deregulation, a truck normally

engaged in private carriage maybe operated for hire

under certain circumstances. Similarly, a truck may

carry products exempt from regulation, then later
35 I IL t II 1 L

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36

be leased to a carrier that has interstate

to carry regulated commodities.

ICC-Regulated Carriers

authority

Carriers operating for hire in interstate commerce

generally require Interstate Commerce Commission

(ICC) authority and are subject to Federal economic

regulations related to markets and commodities

served, tariff filing, and financial responsibility. Regulated interstate for-hire carriers may operate as

common carriers or as contract carriers. Common

carriers are expected to provide authorized movements to any shipper requesting service according

to publicly available tariffs (price lists). Contract carriers may provide services to shippers with whom

they have a written contractual agreement, which

normally includes service and volume commitments

and a schedule of charges. With the appropriate ICC

authority, carriers may function both as common

carriers and as contract carriers.

Interstate transport refers to product movements

whose origin and destination are in different States,

whereas intrastate shipments have both origin and

destination within a single State. Interstate movements by for-hire carriers may be carried in all types

of equipment, but long-distance, high-volume shipments generally move in tractor-trailer combinations.

Intrastate (Intercity)

Shipments carried for hire between two points

within a State are not subject to ICC economic regulation. However, the majority of States impose economic regulations governing certification (entry),

tariffs, and other requirements on intrastate motor

carriers. The intensity of regulation varies by State;

two States have never imposed economic regulations

on truckers, and several States, Arizona and Florida

for example, have completely deregulated intrastate

trucking. Carriers may operate both intrastate and

interstate, if properly authorized. Very few data exist

regarding the operating practices and financial

health of intrastate carriers.

Intrastate (Local)

Local movement of goods for hire are usually not

subject to either State or Federal economic regulations if both origin and destination are within the

same locale. Information about local trucking is

limited; much local movement is private in nature,

and no comprehensive data exist about local forhire trucking. ICC has stipulated areas surrounding jurisdictions, termed “commercial zones, ” in

which ICC regulations do not apply, even if the

movement is interstate in nature. The geographic

coverage of these commercial zone exemptions has

been expanded over time, and further revisions are

currently being considered. Until recently, the Department of Transportation (DOT) safety regulations exempted movements within commercial zones

from some safety requirements, although a different definition of commercial zone was used for

safety. After substantial evidence accumulated of a

high number of safety violations among carriers in

commercial zones, Congress began to consider legislation to eliminate these exemptions to safety regulations. DOT issued a rule in May 1988, ending

the exemptions in November 1988.

Exempt Movements

Several significant segments of interstate trucking are exempt from ICC economic regulations—

for example, carriers transporting such commodities as unprocessed agricultural products, livestock,

periodicals, decorative stone, and wood chips. This

group of carriers typically specializes in exempt agricultural produce and seasonally shifts trucking operations from one producing region to the next. They

are not required to conform to the entry or pricing

requirements applied to other interstate for-hire

carriers.

Photo credit: Land Line

Although livestock carriers are exempt from ICC

economic regulations, many must comply with

Federal safety regulations.
37

However, the exemption from economic regulation is dependent on the commodity being hauled,

not the nature of the carrier organization or equipment. These carriers must still comply with DOT

safety regulations and insurance requirements (if interstate carriers) and with various State trucking

laws.

Private Carriers

A large number of manufacturers, distributors,

wholesalers, and retailers operate private (not for

hire) trucking fleets as an adjunct to their regular

business activities. These private fleets are a substitute for, and compete indirectly with, for-hire trucking services. Private fleet operators value their control over service, schedules, and equipment. In the

1980s, some corporate managements began to scrutinize traffic management and private fleet operations more closely as “profit centers. ”

Private fleets vary from large trucking operations

of Fortune 500 firms to small one or two truck fleets

used to transport goods to and from vendors and

customers. These fleets dominate the portion of the

carrier industry using heavy straight trucks. Smaller

trucks in private fleets are apt to serve mixed purposes beyond freight movement. For example, a van

or pickup truck may be used for commuting or to

make sales calls. Very little aggregate data is available on the operating practices or financial conditions of private carriers.

Trucks operating as private carriers are not subject to ICC economic regulation. However, private

carriers are now permitted to offer certain intercorporate and for-hire services with ICC approval. Private carriers are subject to DOT safety regulations

and to various State trucking laws.

State Requirements for Truckers

Every State has its own set of requirements for

truckers engaged in freight movements, whether the

movements are intrastate or interstate in nature.

Historically, Federal policy has left many aspects of

trucking under State jurisdiction. Each State may

impose its own requirements in at least six areas,

and these requirements often overlap and differ from

the requirements of other States and the Federal

Government.

Vehicle Registration

Motor vehicles, including trucks, are generally required to be registered in the State of owner residence. Registration provides for vehicle identification plates (license plates) and ownership verification

(title), and generates a registration fee to the home

State. Commercial trucks crossing State lines encounter a variety of different registration requirements, and cannot assume reciprocity treatment as

is the case for automobiles.

Fuel Taxes

Each State may impose its own fuel tax, and such

taxes represent an important source of State revenue. States generally have sought to devise collection methods that are not dependent on location

of fuel purchase, but reflect fuel used and/or mileage traveled within the State by large commercial

trucks. However, State requirements for the payment of fuel taxes differ substantially.

Other Taxes

A number of States impose taxes on interstate motor carriers in addition to or in place of registration

fees and fuel taxes, commonly called third-structure

taxes. Third-structure taxes are usually truck-mileage

taxes that may also increase with vehicle weight.

These taxes are based on the finding that heavy

trucks create wear and maintenance costs for the

highway system that increase more than proportionately with fuel used. Eleven States imposed thirdstructure taxes in 1987.4

Economic Regulations

Most States place economic requirements on intrastate freight movement; many still require carriers to file for rate increases. Carriers must seek certification to operate under various State laws

governing the public convenience and necessity of

their services. Safety and insurance requirements are

often incorporated in these State regulations.

Size and Weight

States have their own size and weight restrictions

that apply to State and local roads not on the des-

‘American Trucking Associations, Department of State Laws, “State

Taxes,” unpublished manuscript, January 1987.
38

ignated map of the National Truck Network (including the Interstate system and other specified routes).

Indeed, no Federal size and weight statutes existed

prior to the 1956 designation of the limited-access

Interstate system. States often evaluate road conditions and route configurations as suitable for vehicles smaller in size and lighter in weight than those

now allowed by Federal law. This has raised many

issues about the access of large, heavy vehicles to

commercial locations in a State. (See chapters 3 and

5 for further details.)

Hazardous Cargo

Each State has concerns about hazardous cargo

moving within and through the State, and a variety of State laws to regulate these movements. To

qualify for Federal motor carrier safety program

funds, States must adopt Federal hazardous materials regulations or similar ones and apply them to

intrastate transport. Local governments have also

become increasingly active in regulating the movement of hazardous cargo.

Other Industry Characteristics

Equipment Type

Equipment type varies for each form of carriage,

and with market conditions, cost considerations,

and fleet available. The conventional combination

truck in interstate service is a tractor pulling a 45-

to 48-foot dry van trailer or twin 28-foot trailers.

Certain Western States allow triple 28-foot trailers

and a few Western and Northeastern States permit

longer combinations (such as twin 45-foot trailers)

on designated highways, often requiring the carrier

to obtain a special permit. All States allow oversized

vehicles if a special permit is obtained, although most

States will grant overweight permits only for nondivisible loads. Among the many other specialized

trailer types are tank trailers, flatbed trailers, refrigerated trailers, automobile rack trailers, hopper trailers

for grains and ores, pole trailers, and a variety of

special-purpose trailers. Trailers are not normally

dedicated to run in combination with a particular

tractor or driver.

Equipment Ownership

Truck-tractors, trailers, and other carrier equipment may be owned by the carrier or leased from

other sources. Equipment may be leased, with or

without drivers, from truck leasing firms, from a separate for-hire or private carrier, or from an independent owner-operator. Each of these sources may

provide one or more trucks on a permanent lease

for a period of time and/or for a trip-lease for the

duration of the trip. Responsibility for maintenance

services varies considerably from one lease to

another. The variety of ownership and leasing arrangements has grown considerably over recent

years. Enforcement of safety and other requirements

becomes more complex when the truck owner differs

from the company using and/or driver operating

the truck.

Owner-Operators

Owner-operators are independent trucking contractors who offer their services to a variety of customers. These small operators may haul exempt

commodities, work for certificated carriers under

lease arrangements, or transport regulated commodities under their own ICC operating authority.

About 80 percent of all owner-operators own and

drive just one truck5 and often have no fixed place

of business, no maintenance shop, and very limited

capital. The remaining 20 percent of independent

truckers operate small fleets of up to 20 trucks and

hire other drivers, even though they continue to

think of themselves as owner-operators. About 75

percent of all owner-operators are leased to ICCregulated carriers and private carriers, and about

25 percent haul exempt commodities. A 1986 survey of more than 5,300 independent truckers found

that over 78 percent surveyed owned their power

units or tractors, while only 26 percent owned

trailers.G

Prior to regulatory reform in 1980, owneroperators typically did not possess ICC operating

authority, and were not directly regulated by ICC.

Over the past 8 years, many owner-operators have

obtained ICC interstate authority for moving regulated commodities, comprising a major part of the

5James Johnston, Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association of America, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation, Oversight Hearing on the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, September 1985.

6Road King, “Drivers’ Opinion Survey VI,” sponsored by Associates Commercial Corp. and Unocal, unpublished manuscript, June 6,

1986.
39

Photo credit: Tse-Sung Wu, OTA staff

Owner-operators often have their cabs equipped with

sleeping berths that become the driver’s home

away from home.

dramatic increase in the number of ICC-regulated

carriers.

Several studies in the last two decades have attempted to estimate the total number of owneroperators and to assess their financial and operating results. Because data are imprecise, these studies

have produced quite different results and a wide

range of estimates. Most industry observers believe

that a substantial number of independent truckers

have left the industry in recent years as a result of

competitive pressures leading to long and arduous

working hours. Various sources indicate that at least

100,000 owner-operators remain in business.;

Union Representation

The trucking industry has a long history of union

representation. The International Brotherhood of

Teamsters (IBT) is the major union representing the

for-hire segment of the industry, although the unionized labor force has shrunk with the decline of

the general freight, common carrier segment of the

business. Slightly less than half of all truckload carriers and other parts of the trucking industry that

rely on independent owner-operators employ union

drivers. Private carriers, if organized, employ members of other unions as well as IBT members. Since

the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, new entrants have

used predominantly nonunion drivers.

7Marshall Seigel, Independent Truck Owner-Operators Association,

testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation, O\’ersight Hearing on the Motor Carrier Act of 1980,

Sept. 21, 1983.

THE NATION’S BUSES

The bus industry is the passenger-carrying segment

of the motor carrier industry. Buses were not major passenger carriers even in their prime, and were

hit hard by increased automobile ownership and use,

competition from subsidized passenger rail, and deregulation of the airlines in 1978. Competition

among air carriers for intercity travel brought lower

air fares that have proven a major attraction for

price-sensitive passengers on long distance trips.

The bus industry has several clearly defined major segments. One large group provides intercity and

interstate regular passenger route service under ICC

regulation, and several other segments provide other

important passenger services. These include charter operators, who offer group and tour service,

school bus operators (both school district and contract service), and local transit agencies.

The intercity bus industry includes large and small

carriers and a few very large, Class I carriers (see

table 2--4). Industry-wide data are difficult to obtain,

because regulatory changes have reduced bus company reporting requirements. The bus industry has

declined nationwide over the last 10 years—busmiles, passengers-carried, and employee numbers all

trend downward, and total operating revenues have

declined since the early 1980s. For Class I carriers

the decline is more striking, with the number of bus

passengers declining 37.5 percent between 1980 and

1986.

The largest interstate bus companies have suffered

the most severe financial reverses. Greyhound, by

far the biggest bus operator, with 6,800 drivers for

3,500 buses, took over the nearly-bankrupt Trailways operation in late 1987. Both carriers had regularly reported operating losses in recent years; those

losses widened in early 1987, triggering their merger.

Bus Deregulation in 1982

Competition from other travel modes continued

after regulatory reform for interstate buses in 1982

brought needed flexibility for bus operators. Because

bus ridership had declined significantly, major national operators considered the right to withdraw
40

Table 2-4.–lntercity Bus Industry in the United States

(including operations of all carriers reporting to the interstate Commerce Commission and intrastate carders)

1970 1975 1980 1985 1986

Number of companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000 950 1,330 NA NA

Number of buses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,000 20,500 21,400 20,100 19,100

Number of employees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49,500 46,600 49,100 43,300 40,600

Total bus-miles (millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,209 1,120 1,162 997 945

Revenue passengers (millions). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 354 365 353 346

Revenue passenger-miles (millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,300 25,600 27,400 23,800 22,500

Operating revenues, all services ($ millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,165 1,943 1,898 1,838

Operating expenses (millions). . . . . . .. .. ... ... .....O. . . . ....””..” 812 1,098 1,811 1,839 1,781

Net operating revenue, before income taxes ($ millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 68 132 59 57

Class 1 interstate carriers only (over $5 million annual revenue) 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986

Number of companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 84 46 43 29

Number of buses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,158 9,800 8,427 7,240 6,230

Number of employees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34,383 35,140 30,950 24,210 21,090

Total bus-miles (millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 849 771 580 524

Revenue passengers (millions). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 152 132 91 83

Revenue passenger-miles (millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,900 18,200 17,080 12,510 11,117

Operating revenues, all services ($millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 722 955 1,390 1,270 1,168

Operating expenses($ millions). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 639 893 1,311 1,212 1,115

Net operating revenue, before income taxes ($ millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 62 79 58 53

Operating ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 94 94 95 95

SOURCE: American Bus Association and Interstate Commerce Commission data.

Photo credit California Department of Transportation

The intercity bus industry has faced fierce competition for passengers from private automobiles,

Iow cost air travel, and Amtrak.

from markets, not entry, as the key regulatory is- riers to provide low-cost service was also projected

sue. States, in particular had resisted discontinuing as a benefit of regulatory reform.

bus services, and Congress found that: “State regulation of the motor bus industry has, in certain Safety Aspects

circumstances, unreasonably burdened interstate The number of buses operating on the highways commerce. . . .“8

Permitting smaller, regional car- is so much smaller than the number of trucks that

“Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pubhc Law 97-261, SCc. 3. bus accidents do not figure prominently in national
41

accident data. However, because passengers are in- tive, the industry has recommended additional Fedvolved, the safety record of the bus industry is highly eral safety regulations for interstate buses, including

visible, and buses are subject to broad State controls. extension of coverage for Federal safety provisions

Interstate operators encounter numerous complex to private and not-for-hire bus operators. Proposed

and conflicting State requirements and could ben- legislation calls for the establishment of an office of

efit from more uniform treatment at the State level. bus safety in FHWA, and would

At the initiative of the American Bus Associa- uniform Federal requirements on

tion, the major intercity bus industry representa- passengers.

impose relatively

motor carriers of

FORCES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN TRUCKING

Several powerful forces have changed the trucking industry, including regulatory evolution, legislative mandates, and shifts in economic structure.

This section briefly highlights these forces, focusing on developments over the past decade.

Regulatory Shifts

Interstate for-hire trucking is and has been for

years subject to regulation by ICC. In earlier years,

entry, markets served, and rates were subject to

detailed ICC examination and control through a

complex approval/disapproval process, which came

under severe criticism during the 1970s. ICC began

to shift away from many regulatory strictures, especially after Presidents Ford and Carter strongly urged

less regulation and made their Commission appointments accordingly. ICC interpretations became significantly less restrictive in the years just prior to

1980. Operating permits (authority to engage in interstate transportation) became much easier to obtain and collective rate-making practices by interstate motor carriers were reviewed. These ICC

actions were controversial and stimulated congressional hearings and eventual passage of motor carrier legislation in 1980.

Motor Carrier Act of 1980

The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA) represented the first major change in the statutes since

1935 and has profoundly influenced the interstate

motor carrier industry by significantly altering the

ICC regulatory framework. Like most major legislation, the MCA reflected years of hearings, several Administration proposals, and extensive committee deliberations. Congress found, as stated in

the act, that the motor carrier regulatory statutes

were outdated and required revision. The intent of

the act was to reduce unnecessary regulation and

to provide explicit direction to ICC, which had been

deregulating independently.

Key areas of change for the federally regulated segment include reduced requirements for new entrants, fewer restrictions on expansion by existing

firms, and greater pricing freedom. However, interstate motor carriers remain subject to ICC regulation, although in a much relaxed framework.

Surface Transportation Assistance Act

of 1982

The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of

1982 (STAA), omnibus highway and transit authorizing legislation, contained provisions affecting

truckers in two important economic areas, motor

carrier user taxes and truck size and weight. Under

the STAA, fuel taxes were increased sharply to 9

cents per gallon, from the 4-cent level that had been

in effect since 1959. Moreover, the STAA enacted

increases in the heavy vehicle use tax applicable to

vehicles exceeding 26,000 pounds GVW. After

much controversy over the heavy vehicle tax, a

differential of 6 cents per gallon additional tax on

diesel fuel was enacted, and the heavy vehicle use

tax was rolled back. Thus, diesel trucks experienced

a fuel tax increase from 4 to 15 cents per gallon in

mid-1984.

In 1956, Federal law restricted vehicles using the

Interstate system to 73,280 pounds, but Federal legislation passed in 1974 permitted States to raise truck

weights. As a trade-off to industry for higher fuel

taxes, truck size and weight restrictions were
42

amended in 1982 and 1983 to permit larger, heavier trucks to use the Interstate system. The STAA

mandated that States allow trucks with gross weights

up to 80,000 pounds to use the Interstate system,

overriding lower, more restrictive weight limits in

several States. The 1982 act also initiated Federal

length limitations for commercial vehicles; States

now cannot limit semitrailer lengths to less than 48

feet nor second-trailers in combination units to less

than 28 feet. In 1983 Federal legislation prohibited

States from restricting truck width below 102 inches

(up from 96 inches) on the Interstate system.

The 1982 act further limited State laws by providing that no State could deny “reasonable access”

for large trucks to reach terminals and other facilities from the Interstate network. That is, States

must allow large, heavy trucks not only to use the

Interstate but also to get on and off the Interstate

and use State roads.

The Surface Transportation and

Uniform Relocation Act of 1987

This 1987 legislation provided funding for Federalaid projects over the next 5 years and extended user

taxes at current levels. No major provisions affecting motor carriers or changing their treatment were

incorporated.

Other Forces for Change

Legislative and regulatory actions are an important force affecting the trucking industry, yet they

are but one component of the business environment.

Other economic aspects of trucking operations are

briefly outlined below.

● Energy Costs. Fuel prices shot upward in the

late 1970s, but have declined and stabilized in

recent years. Diesel fuel used by most combination trucks more than doubled in price between 1978 and 1981, and in 1986 remained

●

●

●

●

about 73 percent higher than 1978 including

the higher Federal and State taxes.9

Inventory Policies. Many companies have

adopted “just-in-time” inventory policies,

spurred on by high interest rates and a need

to reduce carrying costs, putting a premium on

service quality and reliability. Pressure for ontime deliveries has increased, and for-hire trucking companies have responded by stressing service, including reliable deliveries.

Import Growth. Imports of manufacturer and

consumer goods have grown phenomenally,

while domestic production levels have been disappointing. This changes the market orientation for trucking services and equipment. Container traffic has grown rapidly, originating at

ports and major rail hubs.

Insurance Crisis. The cost of insurance for motor carriers rose rapidly in the mid-1980s and

availability of insurance coverage became a

problem. Insurance costs are a small percentage of total operating costs, but that percentage almost doubled between 1984 and 1986, to

reach 3.6 percent.10

Highway Conditions. Traffic growth over the

past decade outpaced highway improvements.

In fact, completion of the Interstate system,

originally planned for 1969, has just now become a possibility with the funding provided

by the 1987 act. As a result of inflation and

funding constraints in the late- 1970s and early1980s, highway pavement conditions deteriorated and volume/capacity ratios increased.

Poor pavement and heavy congestion pose special problems for the operation of large

trucks. 11 Increased Federal aid in the mid1980s brought some improvements.

‘American Trucking Associations, American Trucking Trends, 1987

(Alexandria, VA: 1987), P. 44.

“’Ibid., p. 28.

1 IFedera] Highway Administration, Sfafus of rhe Nations H~ghway~

(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, various years),

COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS AND INDUSTRY TRENDS

Regulatory reform and economic shifts led to dra- and 1982. Statutory changes in user tax levels and

matic changes in the motor carrier industry; these in allowable vehicle size and weight have also led

changes were magnified by the recession in late-1981 to important industry shifts.
43

For-Hire Carriers

The total number of for-hire carriers rose from

67,038 in 1978 to 89,677 in 1987, a 34 percent increase.’: The primary focus of the MCA was regulator y reform for inter-state for-hire carriers, the

group subject to Federal regulation. Easier entry was

in fact accomplished, and the number of ICC-regulated carriers increased markedly in the late- 1970s,

then steeply in the 1980s, more than doubling to

almost 37,000 in 1986 (see table 2-5).

The growth has been primarily among Class III

carriers, small carriers reporting revenues less than

$1 million annually. The number of Class III carriers rose from 12,900 in 1978 to 33,903 in 1986 (see

figure 2-3). These numbers are dramatic, even if adjusted for company withdrawals and growth out of

Class III. Meanwhile, over the same period the number of Class I and II carriers declined slightly.

State Requirements.

State requirements for interstate motor carriers

are gradually becoming more uniform and less burdensome. Congress encouraged this process through

provisions of Section 19 of the MCA, which required a study of State regulations and the prospects

for uniformity.13 With support from DOT, the National Governors’ Association undertook a multiIJDun & Bradstrcxx Marketing Service, Profile of rhe Commercial

Hea\r\ Truck ,Uarker: An lndusrry Update, compiled from Trinc Transportation Consultants database (W. Newpcn-t Beach, CA: Newport PubIlcations, 1986).

1‘L1.S. Department of Transportation and the Interstate Commerce

Cc,mmission, “Llnlform State Regulations,” Section 19, Report to Congress, n.d.

Figure 2.3.—Number of ICC Motor Carriers

by Revenue Category, 1978-86

— Revenues under $1 million

----- Revenues over $1 million

* , , ,

1978 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

Year

KEY: ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission.

SOURCE: Ronald Roth, American Trucking Associations, “Trucking: An Overview

and Focus on Recent Times, ” unpublished manuscript, September

1987, chart 14.

year information gathering and consensus-building

project that has resulted in a set of recommendations for more uniform State requirements.14 

l’4Nat10na] Governors’ Association, V’orking Group on Stare M~-

tor Carrier Procedures, Consensus Agenda (Ames, IA: Iowa Department of Transportation, 1986). Policy endorsing the recommendations

(conrlnued on next page)

Table 2-5.—Number of ICC. Regulated Motor Carriers and Freight Forwarders

Revenue classification

Freight

Year Class I Class II Class Ill Other a

forwarders Total

1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 1,266 35,505 711b

38,438

1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

—

947 1,387 33,903 71 lb — 36,948

1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,013 1,489 30,337 444 265 33,548

1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,088 1,554 27,370 469 261 30,742

1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,139 1,631 24,411 336 231 27,748

1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,144 2,139 22,059 380 241 25,963

1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,031 2,293 18,563 383 244 22,514

1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 2,164 14,610 324 193 18,238

1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 2,754 13,337 — 184 17,267

aclass I and class II carriers relieved of reporting requirements.

blncludes freight forwarders.

SOURCE: Thomas J. Donahue, American Trucking Associations, testimony before the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Mar, 16, 1986.

87-004 0 - 88 - 2
44

Market Share15

Domestic freight volumes and the importance of

trucking may be measured in several ways. Total

U.S. domestic intercity freight tonnage was relatively

unchanged over the period 1980-86. However, trucks

increased their share from 36.5 percent in 1980 to

40.1 percent in 1986, after some declines in the late1970s when railroads successfully captured growth

in heavy freight such as coal. Domestic intercity tonmiles reflect both weight and distance moved; in

1986 intercity ton-miles exceeded 1980 levels for the

first time since sharp declines in 1981 and 1982.

Trucking increased its share of intercity ton-miles

from 22.3 percent in 1980 to 25.3 percent in 1986.

Trucks have traditionally carried high-value

freight over shorter distances than rail and earned

higher than average freight tariffs per ton-mile. In

contrast, railroads carry large amounts of low-rated

heavy bulk commodities such as sand, gravel, and

coal. Thus, trucking revenues comprise 76 percent

of all intercity freight revenues, a percentage that

has gradually increased since 1980. While deregulation of both railroads and trucking occurred in

1980, motor carriers have continued to increase market share, although at a slower rate. Many motor

carriers now use their fleets very productively and

at low unit costs. Moreover, truck service characteristics are well-suited to the growing use of light

density, high value components and the decline in

traditional heavy manufacturing. Intermodal traffic is growing, and trucks play an indispensible role

in it. Goods move by rail over high-density routes

in double-stack containers from U.S. ports to inland intermodal transfer terminals, where distribution is completed by truck.

Market Competition

The amount of actual and potential competition

in individual markets has grown to a much greater

extent than indicated by the number of certificated

carriers. The authority conferred by ICC to trans-

(conrinued fi-om previous page)

was adopted by the Governors on Feb. 26, 1986. The Working Group

relied in part on the comparative information in Harrison Boyd &

Associates, “Organizational Frameworks for Interstate Motor Carrier

Regulation,” prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, unpublished manuscript, April 1987.

15A1] domestic freight totals are from Transportation PolicY Associates, Transportation iii America (Washington, DC: 1986).

port interstate freight is now much broader and has

fewer restrictions limiting points served, commodities carried, or routes used. It has become commonplace for ICC to grant motor carrier authority to

serve all points in the United States for general commodities, whether or not the carrier has applied for

the broad authority.

Profit Margins and Overcapacity

The motor carrier industry has continued to gain

market share over the past 10 years, but profits have

been elusive for many firms in the face of an increasingly competitive transportation marketplace. Regulatory reforms eased entry and permitted better capacity utilization for some carriers, while the 1981-82

recession damped factory production and shipment

levels.

However, the issue of capacity is complex. The

number of tractor-trailers on the road dropped over

1 percent, and the number of single-unit trucks declined 8 percent’ between 1980 and 1986. At the

same time truck tonnage increased almost 11

percent.

Truck-miles traveled increased nearly 30 percent

per vehicle, and trailer capacity increased as wider

and longer vehicles were allowed. Thus, each truck

is dispatched more frequently, spends more time

traveling, and carries more. Moreover, carriers seeking backhauls offer very low rates rather than return empty, so that capacity is frequently readily

available at low cost. The amount of freight carried

in each average truckload has remained constant

(13.6 tons in 1980, declining to 13.3 in 1986). These

facts all imply that despite the drop in the number

of trucks, substantial unutilized trailer capacity has

remained available.l6

The result has been higher operating ratios (ratio of operating expenses to revenues) on average,

including sharp rises in operating ratios from 1978

through 1982, followed by modest, uneven improvements in the mid-1980s. Profit margins measuring

net income as a percent of sales show deterioration

from 1978 through 1982, followed by irregular recovery since that time until 1987 when rate cutting

was severe (see figure 2-4).

16 Rona1d D. Roth, American Trucking Associations, “Overcapacity

, ” unpublished manuscript, July 1987.
45

Figure 2-4.–Net Profit Margin, 1978=87

(all carriers)

( ,

197879 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

Year

SOURCE: Ronald Roth, American Trucking Associations, “Trucking: An Overview

and Focus on Recent Times, ” unpublished manuscript, September

1987, chart 14.

Business Failures

The intensely competitive atmosphere and continuing overcapacity in for-hire trucking is reflected

in the large number of motor carrier failures. Failures

for all for-hire trucking companies, including local

and household, have risen dramatically from under 200 annually in 1978 and 1979 to over 1,500

in 1986. The pattern of failures between 1971 and

1987 is shown in figure 2-5. The failure rate remained

high in the mid-1980s even during periods of sustained economic growth, and the number of failures

showed its first decline in recent years during 1987.

Even so about 150 of every 10,000 trucking companies failed in 1987, exceeding the rate of 115 failures

for every 10,000 companies for all businesses. ”

Both large and small trucking companies have failed.

ITRonald D, Roth, American Trucking Associations, personal communication, July 22, 1988.

Figure 2.5.— Motor Carrier Failures, 1971-87

750

500

250

0 0 0

750

500

2 5 0

0

I I 1 I I I I I 1 I ( I 1 ( 1 I 1 1

1971 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87

Year

SOURCE: Thomas J. Donahue, American Trucking Associations, testimony before the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, “Mar.

16, 1988.

Heavy Truck Sales

Annual sales of heavy trucks have been relatively

stagnant as shown in figure 2-6. Sales of Class 8

trucks, with gross weight capability of over 33,000

pounds, remain below the 1979 level and showed

declines even in the relatively prosperous years of

1985 and 1986. Such flat sales contrast sharply with

record sales levels for small trucks, pickups, and

vans, which have lifted the overall truck sales market. The sales trends suggest that the increased market share and expanded number of carriers have not

required growth in the number of trucking units.

The median age for all trucks has increased slightly

from about 6 years in 1978-1979 to 7.7 years in 1986

(see figure 2-7). Fleet purchases lowered this figure

slightly in 1987.

Trailer Size

The changes in size and weight restrictions in 1982

and 1983 allowed carriers to expand capacity and
46

Figure 2-6.—Sales of Trucks Weighing Over

33,000 Pounds, 1978-87

00

5 0

0

, , , 1 , 1 1 , * I

1978 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

Year

SOURCE: Thomas J. Donahue, American Trucking Associations, testimony before the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Mar.

16, 1968.

increase labor productivity—larger trailers and heavier cargo loads, where possible. Trailer producers

and purchasers responded very rapidly to reconfigure the Nation’s fleet of trailers. Figure 2-8 shows

that 95 percent of all trailers produced in 1980 (based

on samples of production shipments) were between

40 and 45 feet in length, while almost none were

longer. By 1984, over 58 percent of new trailers

produced were longer than 45 feet, mostly 48 feet.

As of 1986, over 56 percent were over 45 feet, while

29 percent were exactly 28 feet in length, reflecting

the increased use of tandem (double) trailers on the

Interstate system.

Increases in trailer width have been even more

dramatic. Almost all trailers produced in 1980 and

1982 were exactly 96-inches wide, as shown in figure 2-9. In 1984, less than a year after wider trucks

were permitted on the Interstate system, over 70 percent of the trailers produced were 102-inches wide

or more, most exactly 102 inches. In 1986, 76 percent were 102 inches or more. The trucks encounFigure 2-7.–Median Age of Trucks, 1978-86

9.0

8.5

8.0

5.5

I

0.0 1 t I , , I , 1 1

1978 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

Year

SOURCE: Thomas J. Donahue, American Trucking Associations, testimony before the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Mar.

16, 1988.

tered on our highways are indeed larger than those

of just a few years ago.

Specialization and Concentration

ICC regularly reports operating results for the 100

largest regulated motor carriers; as a group, their

performance has been weak, reflecting financial pressures of recent years. Data for 1981, a good year relative to the recession that followed, show that tonnage fell almost 4 percent, while net operating

income declined by over 26 percent. In 1982, revenue tons hauled fell by 11 percent, operating revenues fell by 4 percent, and net operating income fell

by 62 percent. Of the 100 carriers reporting, 81

showed declines in tonnage and net operating income, and the largest carriers showed a perilous aggregate operating ratio (operating expenses divided

by operating revenues) of 98.7.

Since the recessionary period of the early 1980s,

motor carrier traffic and finances have improved,
47

Figure 2-8.—Trailer Sales Since 1980, by Length Figure 2-9.–Trailer Sales Since 1980, by Width

100

90

80

70

I

40

30

20

10

0

1980 1982 1984 1986

Year

1980 1982 1984 1986

Year

L I

Longer than 4 5 ’

. . . . . :.,

SOURCE: Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, Van Trai/er Size Report, various years.

SOURCE: Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, Van Trai/er Size Reporf, various years.

but not by much, In 1986, the 100 largest carriers

hauled less tonnage than in 1981 but realized slightly

higher net income. In 1987, tonnage increased to

181 million revenue tons, roughly the 1981 level,

but profit margins were squeezed. Net income was

down 48 percent, and the operating ratio reached

96.6 percent.18

dustry revenues from about 13.5 percent in 1978 to

about 16 percent in the mid-1980s. 20 The three

largest carriers (excluding United Parcel Service,

which dwarfs them all) are all nationwide LTL

specialists: Consolidated Freightways, Roadway Express, and Yellow Freight. This Big Three is gradually capturing more traffic, showing more revenue

growth, and reporting lower operating ratios relative to other large carriers on average. During the

12 months ending September 30, 1987, for example, the Big Three increased their total revenues by

5.4 percent while revenue for others in the largest

100 carriers increased an average of 3.1 percent. z

’

However, size alone is not a determining factor for

profits, and well-managed small LTL carriers can

also do well (see box 2-A).

Less-Than-Truckload Carriers

A small number of the very largest trucking companies have expanded their scope and scale of operations since 1978. The ten largest carriers, by revenue, are predominantly less-than-truckload (LTL)l9

carriers, and they have increased their share of in-

“lncersca[e Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, “Large

Class I Motor Carriers of Propertv, Selected Earnings Data,” unpuhIlshed data, n.d.

1‘Less-than-truckload carriers transport cargo that mav come from

several shippers in units that may weigh anywhere from roughly 250

pounds up to as much as 12,000 pounds.

‘PForrune, “Blessings by the Truckload,” Nov. 11, 1985, p. 138.

‘

] Interstate Commerce Commission, op. cit., footnote 18.
48

Established General Freight Carriers

The general freight trucking sector as a whole has

been caught between rising costs and competitive

pressures on rates. The Regular Common Carrier

Conference (RCCC), an association with approximately 400 members, includes most of the large,

established interstate common carriers. RCCC

members transport general freight and earn about

80 percent of their revenues hauling LTL. According to RCCC data, more than half (53 percent) of

the full service general freight carriers went out of

business between 1978 and 1986.

However, truckload (TL)22 and LTL revenues for

the RCCC group differ dramatically (see figure 2-

10). Revenue on LTL traffic has increased slightly,

while TL revenue has decreased sharply. Tonnage

carried by RCCC carriers has dropped, but again

with sharp differences between categories. From

1978-86, LTL tons fell 31 percent, while TL tons

plummeted 63 percent.

‘~Truckload carriers transport goods for a single shipper in full loads

weighing from about 12,000 pounds to the legal maximum for their

vehicle.

This established carrier group has seen its traffic

erode significantly. Figure 2-11 shows that LTL-TL

tonnage movements for a regularly-surveyed segment of RCCC carriers did not rebound when industrial production expanded in the mid-1980s. Presumably much of the business was captured by other

carriers. Net income for 1986 was at the highest level

in 10 years, but was barely above the 1978 level and

has fluctuated dramatically over the period. Net income for the first 6 months of 1987 was down 61

percent compared to a year earlier.

Truckload Carriers

TL operators easily obtained operating authority

in the less regulated environment of the early 1980s

and grew impressively, with owner-operators providing a large portion of capacity. TL operations are

simpler than LTL and do not require intermediate

handling and shipment consolidation en route to

make up a trailer load. Many TL carriers have minimal communications, management, sales forces,

and terminal facilities. Carrier facilities are likely to

be few in number, sparsely staffed, and removed
49

Figure 2-10.–General Freight Trucking Industry

Total Revenue, 1978-87

KEY: LTL = less-than-truckload; TL = truckload.

SOURCE’ Regular Common Carrier Conference, testimony of James C. Haskins

before the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Mar.

16, 1988.

from shipment origins and destinations. However,

a new operating strategy is evolving in the TL

market—the high-service carrier serving targeted

market niches. These TL firms provide high-capacity

or special equipment and utilize their assets and labor very productively (see box 2-B). To compete successfully, many owner-operators must drive long

hours and accept backhauls at low rates, circumstances creating physical, psychological, and economic hardships.

Several factors are at work to tip the balance of

TL operations toward larger carriers with more capital to invest. Concerned about the reliability of

Figure 2.11 .—LTL/TL Tonnage,

Adjusted Seasonally

. . . ..

. .

.“ “.

.“

. . . .

. - 0

y

\

-.-.

.

.. 4

. .

“. . . . . .

“.. . . .

. .

industrial production ““o.

-- -” LTL tonnage “.

...........TL tonnage “. “.. . . . .“ ”..

“.. .

1 1 I I I I I I I I I I

76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

Year

KEY: LTL = less-than-truckload; TL = truckload.

SOURCE: Regular Common Carrier Conference, “Quarterly Survey of General

Freight Carrier Operating Results, 4th Quarter, ” 1988.

leased equipment and drivers, carriers with sufficient

resources buy their own equipment and employ

company drivers. Many carriers, such as automobile haulers, operate highly specialized, complex

equipment that is difficult to lease. Productivity is

high enough that shippers pick high-service carriers

for both service and unit price. Such carriers become a “core” carrier, taking a large portion of the

freight from major shippers. Observers predict an

acceleration of the core carrier concept.23

‘

} William M. Legg and John M. LarkIn, “High-Ser\,ice Truckload

Carriers Prospering,” Industr y Week, Apr. 4, 1988, Special Supplement;

and Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., “Wrap-up of the October 29 Trucking

Seminar,” unpublished manuscript, December 1987.

CONCLUSIONS

Trucking is a tremendously complex industry that alizations are tenuous at best. A highly competitive

defies easy classification. Numerous market segments market environment in the trucking industry conare served by a variety of motor carriers, and gener- fronts carriers of all sizes with constant financial pres-
50

sure and forces difficult choices between offering rate

discounts to attract business and maintaining rates

to generate revenue.

Changes in economic regulation affected market

entry, operations, costs and pricing, employment

policies and labor relations (including wage levels),

and technology development. The distinctions between various types of regulated motor carriers

greatly diminished after deregulation, and entry opportunities for private carriers and owner-operators

improved.

The nature and volume of the business conducted

by various segments of the trucking industry has

changed, becoming less predictable. Large general

commodity carriers tend to specialize in LTL shipments. While many large LTL carriers have failed,

a few of the largest nationwide LTL carriers have

expanded and prospered. Few newly formed carriers

have entered the LTL business; existing LTL carriers have competed fiercely for each other’s markets. Small carriers and owner-operators have captured a larger portion of the TL market, in part

because of lowered entry barriers and more pricing

freedom. New entrants tend to be small and nonunion, often coming from the ranks of owner-operators, a key part of this fleet. The interstate portion

of the TL industry has become more diverse and

more dispersed.

Profit margins have fallen, even for the most successful carriers, under pressure from intense price

competition that is partly a result of changes in manufacturing and partly of continuing overcapacity.

Expenses per ton-mile are up 75 percent since 1978,

while general freight revenues per ton-mile have increased only 54 percent. Freight rates have also fallen

behind price increases in the general economy, particularly for large shippers and those in highly competitive city-pair traffic lanes. Carriers that serve

small shippers and those in less competitive markets have fared better.

Other factors have also changed the framework

in which carriers compete.

● Unregulated commercial zones have been

greatly expanded, opening larger areas to local

carriers.
,“ .- ,

Chapter 3

Federal and State

Regulatory Programs

Photo credit: California Department of Transportation
CONTENTS

Page

Federal Safety Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......55

The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. ... ... .....55

Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... ... .....5?

1986 Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .......57

Multiple Federal Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,+.... 58

Department of Transportation: Federal Highway Administration . . . . . . . . . .......58

Department of Transportation: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ..61

Equipment Regulations.. . . ., + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..61

Department of Transportation: Research and Special Programs Administration ...61.-

Interstate Commerce Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....+...

National Transportation Safety Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Motor Carriers Exempt From Federal Safety Regulations . . . . . . . . . .

State Programs . . . . . . . ● ......* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Improving State Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....**. . . . .

The Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Regulatory Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Highway Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Data Collection and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Inspection and Audit Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Buses . . . . . . .*.*... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commercial Vehicle Safety AIliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Personnel and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ............+.. . . . . .

Enforcement Issues . . . . . . . .*.*.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....+*.. . . . .

Conclusions and Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendixes

Appendix

3-A. Chronology of Federal Legislation Relating to the Motor Carrier

(1935-87) . . . . . .

3-B. The Historical

Box

3-A. Selected State

. . . . ..*...* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Boxes

Audit Programs.. . . . . . . . . . . .

3-B. A Sample of State Training Programs . . . . . .

Figures

Figure

3-1. Legal Trailer Length, by State . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-2. Motor Carrier Inspections and Out-of-Service

Tables

Table

,...,. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .61

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

,...,,. . . . . . . 75

● . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Page

Industry

. . . . . . . . . . . . 80

. . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . 70

. . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . 56

. . . . . . . *..+* 71

3-1.

3-2.

3-3.

3-4.

3-5.

3-6.

Overview of Federal Regulatory Responsibilities for Motor Carrier Safety . . . . . .

Summary of DOT Motor Carrier Safety Regulations in Title 49 0f the Code of

Federal Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..+. . . . . . . . . . . . . ● . . . . . . . ,.,..... . . .

Federal Highway Administration Inspections and Audits, Fiscal Years 1980-87.

Regulatory Exemptions to Title 49 0f the Code of Federal Regulations . . . . . . . .

Agencies Administering Motor Carrier Requirements in Selected States . . . . . . .

Reasonable Access Provisions . . . . . . . +..;....+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

60

60

63

64

67
51

Shippers now frequently utilize fewer carriers

with comprehensive operating territories to take

advantage of cumulative discounts and service

commitments in return for guaranteed freight

volumes.

Truckload carriers establish defined traffic lanes

with certain shippers (e. g., between two plants

of the same shipper) and capture a steady, balanced volume of business under contract.

The traditional driver pool has been shrinking,

and carriers have had to provide incentives to attract drivers. Rate discounting, however, has made

low labor costs and high productivity essential to

survival, so carriers find it difficult to increase driver

wages and improve arduous work conditions.

Safety Implications

Trucks have become significantly bigger and heavier since deregulation, primarily in response to Federal legislation requiring States to allow longer, wider

trailers and heavier gross weights. For similar reasons, double trailers are rapidly becoming commonplace on the Interstate System. These changes in

truck equipment have not been matched by upgraded roadway design and capacity, and as automobile traffic has increased, urban peak-hour congestion has become severe in many jurisdictions. Such

road and traffic conditions increase the likelihood

of an accident.

Price discounting and low profit margins create

difficult economic trade-offs for investments in

safety-related equipment and maintenance. These

trade-offs are particularly problematic for owneroperators and small carriers, who have to generate

revenue regularly to stay in business and may have

no regular maintenance facility.

Carriers are, in general, interested in safety, but

will measure investments in new safety equipment

and technologies against tangible economic rewards.

Competition, increased costs, and low, erratic profit

margins create a need to control costs that may lead

to shortchanging truck maintenance and equipment

improvements. OTA concludes that Federal safety

regulations will affect carriers economically with

varying severity, depending on their financial reserves and stability.

Requirements to operate trucks safely should not

depend on commodity, corporate form, or destination of the cargo, the traditional basis of ICC regulation. Safety regulations have gradually been extended to trucks operating in intrastate, private, and

exempt services, and these perform a large share of

the Nation’s highway transportation. OTA coneludes that the need for safety does not vary with

the type of operation, and that no exemptions

from safety regulations are warranted.
Chapter 3

Federal and State Regulatory Programs

Highway safety, particularly for motor carriers, has

long been a Federal and congressional concern. Multiple regulatory programs, administered by different

agencies within the Department of Transportation

(DOT) set minimum standards for vehicle equipment, driver qualifications, and commercial motor

carrier operations, and for the highways on which

the vehicles operate. The Federal Government also

provides funds to State and local jurisdictions for

construction and maintenance of highways, bridges,

and tunnels, and for State highway safety programs.

Although Federal economic control of the trucking industry has dwindled significantly since deregulation in 1980, some years ago Congress began a

series of legislative steps toward a comprehensive

Federal motor carrier safety program. Systematic

efforts to improve highway safety are limited by

interjurisdictional issues and conflicts at many governmental levels, however. Moreover, numerous

Federal agencies and congressional committees share

responsibilit y for creating and enforcing safety legislation, creating further complications. Because the

efforts of these groups are difficult to coordinate,

and no single group has ultimate responsibility, addressing truck safety in a systematic, integrated way

has to date proven an unachievable task.

In addition, many States impose substantial economic and safety requirements on intrastate carriers.

Yet, while Federal grants for State programs have

greatly enhanced State inspection and enforcement

capabilities, the scope of these programs varies significantly. Despite this extensive Federal and State

regulatory and enforcement framework, heavy vehicle transportion has grown annually, and safety

issues persist.

This chapter describes the Federal laws and regulatory programs governing motor carrier operations

and the efforts of the Federal Government and the

States to improve safety. Policy options are identified in the final section. A chronology of motor carrier legislation (appendix 3-A), and a brief history

of motor carrier regulations (appendix 3-B) appear

at the end of this chapter.

FEDERAL SAFETY LEGISLATION

Commercial motor vehicles are defined by law as

those: 1) weighing 10,001 pounds or more, 2) designed to transport more than 15 passengers, including the driver, or 3) used to carry hazardous materials in quantities requiring vehicle placarding.

(Lightweight vehicles are those weighing 10,000

pounds or less.) Although economic regulation by

the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) of the

motor carrier industry was substantially reduced in

1980, the regulatory changes did not encompass Federal safety regulations. Laws enacted since 1980 have

strengthened and expanded coverage by Federal

safety standards, and Congress has promoted greater

national uniformity by establishing consistent size

and weight laws, and by encouraging States to adopt

Federal regulations.

The Surface Transportation

Assistance Act of 1982

The primary goal of the Surface Transportation

Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA) was to fund improvements to the Nation’s highways, bridges, and

mass transit facilities by raising and restructuring

existing highway taxes. 1 As a concession to the

commercial motor carrier industry, the statute also

called for uniform weight, length, and width limitations on trucks and buses using major, federally

finded highways. Overriding existing State laws, the

STAA prohibited States from setting a maximum

gross vehicle weight limit under 80,000 pounds for

‘Publlc LauT 97-+24, 96 Stat. 2097 (Jan. 6, 1983).

55
56

vehicles operating on any portion of the Interstate

system. Additionally, the act prohibited States from

denying trucks reasonable access between these

highways and facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and

rest; and to points of loading and unloading (for

household goods carriers). In 1984, the STAA was

amended to allow Governors to seek exemptions for

Interstate highway segments in their States that

could not safely accommodate longer trucks.2

‘Tandem Truck Safety Act of 1984, Public Law 98-554, 98 Stat.

2829. The act also modified the reasonable access provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act to include 28-feet by 102-inch singletrailer units; this amendment was made to codify existing industry practice, as 28-foot trailers are replacing the standard 48-foot trailers for

pickup and delivery service.

In addition, States were prohibited from barring

trucks with twin trailers from Interstate highways

or certain Federal-Aid Primary routes designated by

DOT. 3 States also were required to permit truck

semitrailers of 48 feet in length for one trailing unit

and 28 feet each for two trailing units on these roads.

Maximum length limits were not set, however, and

legal trailer lengths vary significantly among the

States (see figure 3-l), with many States permitting

trailers even longer than 48 feet. States were also

required to establish and enforce a vehicle width

limit of 102 inches for Interstate highways or any

other Federal-aid highway designated by DOT, pro-

~See 23 CFR 658, app. A.

Figure 3-l.— Legal Trailer Length, by State

u 48-foot trailer s

; 50-foot trailers

HI

NOTE: Semitrailers in Wisconsin, Indiana, and California must conform to a State specified king-pin-to-rearmost axle distance to operate without a permit.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988, based on the 53 federal Register 19 (Jan. 19, 1988).
57

vialed that the traffic lanes were designed to be at

least 12-feet wide. Procedures allowing a State

Governor to notify DOT of highway segments not

capable of accommodating 102-inch-wide vehicles

and to request an exemption, identical to those relating to truck length, were established by Congress

in 1984.4

The safety issues associated with longer, wider

trucks are extremely controversial. Some segments

of the trucking industry argue that longer trucks are

needed to improve productivity. Other industry

groups and many States and safety advocates believe that such vehicles pose a safety hazard even

when operating over designated highways and access routes. Chapters 4 and 5 contain more detailed

assessments of the performance and operation of

longer combination vehicles on the existing highways. A discussion of State access requirements is

presented later in this chapter.

The STAA also authorized funds for State inspection and enforcement programs through a Federal

grant program—the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance

Program (MCSAP)—to improve State capabilities

to inspect heavy vehicles and enforce motor carrier

safety regulations. Under this program, some DOT

control over intrastate carriers was initiated—to

qualify for MCSAP funds, States were required to

adopt the Federal motor carrier safety regulations

or compatible State requirements. MCSAP has become an important part of overall truck safety efforts in recent years, promoting uniform regulations,

enforcement activities, and Federal-State coordination. The program is detailed later in this chapter.

Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984

Concerned about inconsistent State laws and regulations and about the adequacy of existing Federal

regulations, Congress passed the Motor Carrier

Safety Act of 1984.5 Specifically, the act directed

DOT to promulgate revised Federal regulations

establishing minimum standards to ensure that:

. commercial motor vehicles were safely maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated;

● the responsibilities imposed upon operators of

commercial motor vehicles did not impair their

ability to operate such vehicles safely;

+Tandem Truck Safety Act of 1984, op. cit., footnote 2

‘Public Law 98-554, 98 Stat. 2832 (Oct. 30, 1984).

●

●

the physical condition of operators of commercial motor vehicles was adequate for them to

operate such vehicles safely; and

the operation of commercial motor vehicles did

not have deleterious effects on the condition

of such operators.

Before issuing revised regulations, DOT was required

to consider costs and benefits as well as State laws

and regulations to minimize Federal preemption.

Furthermore, Congress requested a 5-year review

of State motor carrier laws to identify those differing substantially from Federal requirements. Additional provisions of the 1984 act called for annual

commercial motor vehicle inspections, the establishment of Federal inspection standards, a comprehensive study on the safety characteristics of heavy

trucks, and an investigation and study of crash protection for truck occupants.

1986 Commercial Motor Vehicle

Safety Act

The adequacy of requirements for drivers of commercial motor vehicles has been a primary concern

of safety-conscious officials. A key element of the

1986 act is that truck drivers are prohibited from

holding more than one State license, a provision

that became effective on July 1, 1987.6 The act also

directed DOT to establish minimum written and

road tests for drivers by July 15, 1988. Motor vehicles covered by the act are those weighing 26,001

pounds or more; however, the Secretary of Transportation is authorized to lower the threshold to

10,001 pounds. Motor vehicles used to carry hazardous materials or designed to transport more than

15 passengers, including the driver, are also included.

Under the provisions of the act, a driver must be

road-tested in a vehicle representative of the type

he or she will operate, and minimum passing scores

for written tests must be established. Furthermore,

drivers taking these tests must have a working

knowledge of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR) and vehicle safety systems. DOT

must also establish a blood-alcohol concentration

‘Drivers are also required to notifi employers if they have been disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle, and employers

and States must be notified of all traffic violations, except parking infractions. (49 CFR 383.)
58

(BAC) standard by October 1988, and is currently

considering a BAC level of 0.04 percent. p

To support an effective single-license system, DOT

must establish a Commercial Driver’s License Information System by January 1, 1989.8 Data in the

system, including the information required on

licenses and driver compliance records, will be available to DOT, States, employers, and employees.

States are not required to have fully operational

programs until 1993. Grants will be made available

to develop testing and licensing programs, to test

operators of commercial motor vehicles, and to participate in the national information clearinghouse.g

However, a State that fails to comply with the requirements of this act will lose 5 percent of its

Federal-aid highway funds in 1994 and 10 percent

of its funds in subsequent years.

‘To support this rulemaking effort, the Department of Transportation requested a study by the National Academy of Sciences to assess

the differences between 0.10 and 0.04 blood-alcohol concentration levels.

For further details, see ch. 6.

‘The Department of Transportation has the option of operating this

system in-house or using another system employed by one or more

States.

‘Between 1987 and 1991, $5 million of the Motor Carrier Safety

Assistance Program funds has been earmarked for basic grants. Supplemental grants, using $3 million of the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration highway safety funds, will be made available to States eligible for

basic grants. An additional $5 million, also from the Motor Carrier

Safety Assistance Program will be used to support information clearinghouse programs.

MULTIPLE FEDERAL ROLES

As the trucking industry has expanded over the

past 50 years, Congress has gradually allocated safety

responsibility for motor carriers to a variety of agencies. Authority for safety-related issues such as highway design, equipment regulation, hazardous materials transportation, driver qualifications, and

enforcement was divided among different Federal

agencies, making a systematic approach to safety an

elusive goal. Attempts to improve motor carrier

safety after deregulation have been further hampered

by historical carrier exemptions from regulations and

the lack of reliable data on the number of operators and trucks doing business. Currently, three

DOT agencies–the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (NHTSA), and the Research and

Special Programs Administration (RSPA)–share —

responsibility for ensuring motor carrier safety

table 3-1).

‘Department of Transportation:

Federal Highway Administration

(see

Within FHWA, the Office of Motor Carriers (formerly the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety) issues

and enforces the FMCSR.10 These regulations,

IOUnder a reorganization plan announced in October 1986, the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety was replaced by the Office of Motor

Carriers.

summarized in table 3-2, govern the operations of

commercial motor carriers and truck drivers. FHWA

is responsible for setting minimum levels of financial responsibility for commercial motor carriers (49

CFR 387) and administering MCSAP. Data systems

maintained by FHWA contain enforcement and accident statistics (see chapter 7).

In addition, interstate commercial motor carriers—

public and private—must be assigned one of three

safety fitness ratings by FHWA to acquire ICC approval. However, carriers may operate with temporary ICC approval while awaiting an FHWA fitness rating. At the end of a terminal inspection,

known as a safety review, FHWA rates carriers satisfactory, unsatisfactory, or conditional. DOT has

dropped the insufficient information rating it used

to give when it lacked the information on which

to base a rating.11 The factors in determining

safety ratings include any violations discovered during safety management audits and driver equipment

compliance reviews in the previous 5 years, the operator’s record of improvement over that period, the

I lprior t. 1983, an insufficient rating was automatically elevated to

a satisfactory rating after 1 year from the date it was assigned, if the

rating was not, in that time, changed to unsatisfactory or conditional.

Until recently, carriers assigned an insufficient information rating retained such a rating until the Department of Transportation received

definitive positive or negative information on which to change a rating. See 48 Federal Register 22565 (May 19, 1983).
59

Table 3-1 .—Overview of Federal Regulatory Responsibilities for Motor Carrier Safety

Department of

Transportation

Administration Senior Official Responsibilities

Federal Highway

Administration

(FHWA)

National Highway

Associate

Administrator >

for Engineering and

Program Development

Associate

Administrator P

for Research,

Development

and Technology

Associate

Administrator

for Motor Carriers >

Associate

Administrator P

for Policy

Traffic Safety >

Administration

(NHTSA)

Research and

Special Programs >

Administration

(RSPA)

SOURCE’ Office of Technology Assessment, 1988

Determines how truck access

affects the highway system

Manages research on the adequacy

of highway design to accommodate

trucks

Establishes and enforces operating

regulations for commercial motor

carriers; includes driver and

maintenance requirements

Studies the implications of longer

combination vehicle used on the

Nation’s highway system

Establishes regulations for the

manufacture of new vehicles and

related equipment; investigates

safety-related equipment defects

Establishes and enforces

regulations for containers used in

transportation of hazardous

materials

operator’s accident record, and violations of Staterelated laws or regulations.l2

FHWA plans to assign safety fitness ratings to the

185,000 unrated carriers within the next 3 to 5

years, 13 and recently, FHWA hired 150 new field

safety investigators to conduct safety reviews and

provide technical assistance to carriers. As of July

1988, ratings of 58,270 motor carriers (see table 3-3)

had been completed. FHWA rated 8 percent of the

carriers unsatisfactory, 40 percent conditional, and

52 percent satisfactory.

To reduce the risks associated with preventable

accidents, FHWA plans to work with individual

‘:49 CFR 385.3. These factors were formally codified in 1982 in response to industry criticisms pointing to the lack of objectivity in the

factors, the lack of notice to carriers of their safety ratings, and the

lack of an appeals procedu~e. See 47 Federal Register 26135 (June 17,

1982).

] ‘Gerald J. Davis, chief, Federal Programs Di\ision, Office of Motor Carriers, Federal Highway Admlnlstration, personal communication, Mar. 25, 1987.

companies that have poor safety records and will

meet with industry associations to discuss the use

of countermeasures. This type of program was successful in FHWA’s northwest region, and a small

national effort has been started.

Each of the nine FHWA regional offices has an

Office of Motor Carrier Safety. These regional offices

investigate accidents and provide technical support

and direction to safety investigators who conduct

audits of motor carriers and vehicle inspections. Under MCSAP, however, States have assumed lead

responsibility for roadside inspections, and most

State MCSAP agencies have focused initially on developing and implementing vehicle and driver inspection programs. FHWA has greatly reduced its

roadside inspection activities while increasing carrier terminal audits (see table 3-3).

FHWA has also been responsible for developing

a highway access policy for large trucks, and issued

a rulemaking in 1982 permitting the trucks author-
60

Table 3-2.—Summary of DOT Motor Carrier Safety Regulations in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations

Part 325: Compliance With Interstate Motor Carrier Noise Emission Standards.—Establishes procedures for inspection, surveillance, and measurement of motor vehicles to determine compliance with noise emission standards.

Part 350: Commercial Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program.— Establishes guidelines for the development and implementation of State programs for the enforcement of Federal motor carrier safety regulations. Conditions, objectives, and funding

of the program are also detailed.

Part 383: Commercial Driver’s License Standards; Requirements and Penalties.— Requires that drivers have a single commercial motor vehicle driver’s license, and that drivers provide employers with information about previous employment and

previous violations and suspensions. Also prohibits an employer from allowing a person with a suspended license to

operate a commercial motor vehicle and sets penalties for violations.

Part 385: Safety Ratings.—Prescribes procedures for issuing motor carriers ratings of satisfactory, unsatisfactory, or conditional. Also lists the factors to be considered in determining a safety rating and sets procedures for notification and review.

Part 386: Rules of Practice for Motor Carrier Safety and Hazardous Materials Proceedings. —Authorizes the Associate Administrator for Motor Carriers of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to determine whether a motor carrier or person

subject to the jurisdiction of FHWA has failed to comply with motor carrier safety regulations. Also authorizes the Associate Administrator to compel compliance, issue a civil penalty, or both.

Part 387: Minimum Levels of Financial Responsibility for Motor Carriers.— Establishes minimum level of financial responsibility required by motor carriers and mandates that motor carriers must have proof of insurance and authorization from the

Interstate Commerce Commission in order to operate.

Part 388: Cooperative Agreements With States. —Authorizes any State to enforce FHWA safety regulations, and establishes

terms of eligibility, cancellation, exchange of information, and requests for assistance.

Part 389: Rulemaking Procedures— Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.— Establishes rulemaking procedures that apply

to the issuance, amendment, and revocation of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.

Part 380: Federal Motor Carrier Regulations, General.- Establishes definitions and applicability of regulations. (For list of exemptions, see table 3-5.)

Part 391: Qualifications of Drivers.—Establishes minimum qualifications for motor carrier drivers (i.e., to qualify to drive a commercial motor vehicle, part 391 states that a person must be at least 21 years old, have a currently valid commercial motor

vehicle operator’s permit, have prepared and furnished the motor carrier that employs him with a list of violations, have

successfully completed and been issued a certificate of driver’s road test or an equivalent). In addition, part 391 establishes minimum duties of motor carriers with respect to the qualifications of their drivers.

Part 392: Driving of Motor Vehicles.— Establishes driving practices in cases of railway grade crossings, drawbridges, and hazardous driving conditions. Also sets regulations for use of lighted lamps and reflectors, accidents and license revocation, emergency signals, fueling precautions, and specifies prohibited practices.

Part 393: Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation.— Establishes requirements for motor carriers including lighting devices, reflectors and electrical equipment, brakes, glazing and window construction, fuel systems, coupling devices and towing methods, miscellaneous parts and accessories, emergency equipment, and protection against shifting

or falling cargo.

Part 394: Notification and Reporting of Accidents.—Defines reportable accidents and establishes duties of motor carriers to

make reports and keep records of accidents that occur during their operations.

Part 395: Hours of Service of Drivers.— Establishes hours-of-service regulations for drivers, restricting driving periods of more

than 10 hours after 8 consecutive hours off duty, for any period after having been on duty for 15 hours after 8 consecutive

hours off duty, or more than 60 hours in any consecutive 7 days. Regulations are also set for recording driver duty status.

Part 396: Inspection, Repair, and Maintenance.—Establishes requirements for the inspections, repair, and maintenance of commercial motor vehicles.

Part 397: Transportation of Hazardous Materials; Driving and Parking Rules.— Establishes requirements of transportation of

hazardous materials including special parking, route, tire, and smoking regulations.

Part 398: Transportation of Migrant Workers.— Establishes regulations governing the transportation of migrant workers for more

than 75 miles when crossing the boundary of another State, a U.S. territory, or another country.

Part 399: Employee Safety and Health Standards.—Establishes step, handhold, and deck requirements that apply to drivers

of trucks and truck-tractors, having a high profile cab-over-engine configuration for entrance, egress, and back of cab

access, manufactured on or after September 1, 1982.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, based on Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

Table 3-3.–Federal Highway Administration Inspections and Audits, Fiscal Years 1980-87

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

Number of Federal safety

specialists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 162 177 180 178 166 155 241

Number of driver/vehicle

inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31,875 40,872 35,825 26,015 22,590 16,046 10,027 910

Number of motor carrier

audits/reviews. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,093 9,640 12,095 11,666 13,037 10,492 6,637 23,714a

aThiS substantial InCrease reflects a transition at the Federal Highway Administration from safety audits to less in-depth Safety reVieWS,

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, based on Federal Highway Administration information, 1988.
61

ized by the STAA unlimited access on the Interstate system. (For further information, see the section on “Highway Access” later in this chapter.) The

Association of State Highway and Transportation

Officials has also influenced decisions related to

highwa y access because it sets the standards for the

construction and reconstruction of national highways. These standards have been determined primarily by the size and maneuverability of passenger cars, and in the case of many parts of the

Interstate system, by a tractor pulling a 40- or 45-

foot trailer. Because the standards were set and highways constructed before the size and operating characteristics of the longer trailers authorized by the

STAA were known, standards are currently being

revised (for further information, see chapter 5).

Department of Transportation:

National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration

NHTSA develops and enforces safety standards

for newly manufactured vehicles and equipment, addressing such items as brakes, lights, tires, and seat

belts. To support standard development, the agency

collects accident data and sponsors research. However, these activities have not led to major new truck

safety equipment standards in recent years. (For further details, see chapter 5.) NHTSA enforcement

programs focus on vehicle and equipment testing

and inspections to ensure compliance with existing

standards. The agency also conducts investigations

of safety-related defects14 and issues criteria for inspections of motor vehicles that are used by State

highway programs. ’5

Equipment Regulations

Responsibility for developing highway safety

standards for use by State agencies is shared by

NHTSA and FHWA:

● NHTSA administers the State standards for

motor vehicle inspections, registration, driver

education, traffic laws, traffic records, police

“Regulatlons for enforcement of the National Highway Traffic

Safetv Administration standards and defects investigations are contained in 49 CFR 554.

‘jSubpart B of 49 CFR 570 specifies the criteria for vehicles with

gross \’chicle weight ratings of more than 10,000 pounds.

●

traffic service, debris cleanup, and accident investigations and reporting.

FHWA set standards for highway design, construction, and maintenance, traffic engineering,

and identification and surveillance of accident

locations through a number of agency divisions.

These groups do not regularly coordinate with

NHTSA or the Office of Motor Carriers.

FHWA also has primary responsibility for the

highway transportation of hazardous materials

and enforcement activities for the highway

mode.

Although FHWA and NHTSA regulations cover

comparable areas, the rulemaking efforts of these

agencies are distinct from each other. Moreover, historically poor interagency coordination within DOT

has led to inconsistent regulations for newly manufactured vehicles and for operating standards for

commercial motor carriers. Congressional action was

required to resolve conflicting NHTSA and FHWA

regulations for front brakes, for example; several inconsistencies in other brake requirements persist.

Recently, FHWA published a proposed rule that

would require vehicle inspections at least once a

year, as mandated by the Motor Carrier Safety Act

of 1984.16 Under the new rules, commercial vehicle operators are responsible for having all vehicles

inspected, according to explicit standards, by individuals meeting specified FHWA qualifications. Inspectors would be required to complete vehicle inspection reports and operators to retain such reports

for 1 year. Special markings on trucks and trailers

would indicate the month and year of the last inspection. Operators registered in a State with an inspection program that meets the objectives of the

FHWA program would be permitted to comply with

State requirements in lieu of Federal regulations.

Department of Transportation:

Research and Special Programs

Administration

Regulations governing the transportation of more

than 30,000 hazardous materials are issued by the

Office of Hazardous Materials Transportation within

1C52 Federal Register 5913 (Feb. 26, 1987). In an earlier notice, the

Federal Highway Administration requested comments on this issue.

See 50 Federal Register 1245 (Jan. 10, 1985).
62

RSPA in DOT. RSPA regulations prescribe requirements for packaging to ensure effective containment

during transport, and communication of the hazards

posed by these materials through special shipping

papers, markings, labels, and vehicle placards.17

RSPA’s authority encompasses requirements for

the design and performance of packages used to ship

low-level radioactive materials and highway routing of all radioactive materials. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is responsible for containers used

to transport high-level radioactive materials.l8

Interstate Commerce Commission

ICC regulates the motor carrier industry by granting operating authority to common and contract

carriers, collecting economic operating data from the

larger motor carrier companies, and monitoring

rates. Although deregulation substantially eased the

entry requirements for interstate for-hire motor carriers, operating authority must still be obtained from

ICC by common and contract carriers and private

carriers seeking for-hire authority.19 Carriers exempt from ICC regulation include those engaged

in private carriage, including intercorporate hauling, and in the transportation of specified agricultural commodities.20

Furthermore, purely intrastate motor carriage and

transportation within ICC-designated commercial

zones are not subject to ICC regulation.21 A com1; Hazardous materials regulated by the Research and Special Programs Administration are listed in 49 CFR 171. Regulations for containers are specified in 49 CFR 173, 178, and 179. Specific modal requirements are contained in Parts li’4 (rail), 175 (air), 176 (nonbulk

water transport), and 177 (highway). Regulations for bulk water shipments, developed by the U.S. Coast Guard, are specified in 46 CFR.

Hazard communication requirements are in 49 CFR 172.

‘:Nuclear Regulatory Commission authority is derived from the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011. Issues related to the transportation of radioactive materials and hazardous substances were addressed in a 1986 OTA assessment, the Transportation of Hazardous

Materials.

‘

q

Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over motor carriers

is specified in 49 U.S.C. 10521.

‘

pCarriers exempt from the Interstate Commerce Commission’s reg

-

ulations are specified in 49 U.S.C. 10522-10524 and 10526. However,

companies that intend to conduct intercorporate hauling must notify

the Interstate Commerce Commission as required by 49 CFR 1167.

1149 U.S. C. 10525 and 10526(b). Intrastate transportation that is

regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission includes two situations where: 1 ) the normal route of a carrier between two points in

the same State includes a highway ourside the State, or 2) transportation between two points in the same State that precede or follow interstate movement are considered interstate in nature because they pass

the “essential character of commerce” test. Daniel Sweeney et al., Transportation Deregulation: What’s Deregulated and What isn’t (Washington, DC: NASSTRAC, 1986), pp. 109-110.

mercial zone is composed of a base municipality, all

its contiguous municipalities, and all other municipalities and unincorporated areas within U.S.

boundaries that are within specified distances of the

base jurisdiction.22 In April 1987, ICC issued a

proposal to increase the size of commercial zones

substantially and extend economic exemptions.

National Transportation Safety Board

The National Transportation Safety Board

(NTSB), an independent agency reporting directly

to Congress, has issued a number of special studies

related to the qualifications of commercial motor

vehicle drivers as well as numerous accident investigation reports containing extensive recommendations for amendments to FHWA regulations and industry practices. NTSB is currently focusing on the

effects of drugs and alcohol on driver performance

and commercial vehicle safety.

Motor Carriers Exempt From Federal

Safety Regulations

While the FMCSR apply to common, contract,

and private motor carriers of property, they do not

cover several other categories of carriers (see table

3-4). Private motor carriers of passengers, such as

school buses, are exempt from Federal regulations,

while for-hire motor carriers of passengers, like Trailways and charter bus services, are not. Because Federal safety statutes have historically applied only to

interstate transportation, many operations conducted solely within the boundaries of a State need

not comply with the FMCSR.

In addition, vehicles and drivers used wholly

within a municipality or a DOT-designated commercial zone, even if State lines are crossed, were

for years exempt from Federal safety regulations unless they were transporting large quantities of hazardous materials.23 In response to pressure from

safety advocates, including Congress and industry

organizations, FHWA finally issued a rulemaking

that requires vehicles and drivers used in such local operations to comply with Federal safety regulations by November 15, 1988.

‘

: For example, the distance for municipalities with populations under 2,500 is 3 miles, while the distance for municipalities with populations over 1 million is 20 miles. See 49 CFR 1048.101.

‘]49 CFR 390.16. This exemption did not apply to operations in

Hawaii.
63

Table 3-4.—Regulatory Exemptions to Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations

Parts

(for summary of parts, see table 3-2)

Vehicle/driver type 391’ 392 393 394 395 396 397

Vehicles owned, operated, and regulated by Federal,

State, or local governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X x x x x x x

Private carrier of passengers (i.e., school buses) . . . . . . . . X x x x x x x

Intracity operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X x x x x

Lightweight mail trucksc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X

. . . . . . . . . .

x x x x x

Farm custom operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

Certain farm vehicle driverse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Farm-to-market operationsf 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Apiarian industriesg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:11: ::::: I;:::

Drivers traveling beyond a commercial zone, transporting

cargo other than explosives or other

dangerous articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X

KEY: X = exemption from requirement.

aDri ver~ in the following ~ategorie~ am exempt from portions of part 391: drivers regularly employed before Jan, 1, 1971; intermittent or occasional drivers; drivers

furnished by other motor carriers; drivers of articulated farm vehicles; intrastate drivers of vehicles tranSPOrfin9 combustible liquid; and drivers operating in the State

of Hawaii. The Department of Transportation has ended this exemption effective Nov. 15, 1988.

bThi~ exemption applies t. vehicles or drivers wholly within a municipality or commercial zone, unless transporting hazardous MateridS that rr3qUire a placard and

weigh 2,500 pounds or more in the case of one dangerous article, or 5,000 pounds or more in the case of more than one dangerous article. The exemption does not

apply to drivers in the State of Hawaii. The Department of Transportation has ended this exemption effective Nov. 15, 1986.

cThis exemption applies t. motor carriers used exclusively to tranpo~ mail under contract with the I.J.S. Postal Service that have a gross vehicle weight Of 10,000 pounds

or less.

dThis exemption applies t. drivers who operate motor vehicles controlled and Operated by a person engaged in custom-harvesting, if the vehicle is used tO trWISpOr’f

farm machinery or supplles to or from a farm for custom-harvesting operations, or used to transpofl custom-hatvested crops to storage or market.

eThis exemption applies t. farm vehicle drivers, except those driving ‘rticul’ted motor vehicles with gross vehicle weights, inCIUrJlrlg 10Sds, of more than 10,000 pounds,

fThis exemption applies t. drivers of vehicles controlled and operated by ‘ farmer who, as a private carrier, iS using the vehicle to transport agricultural products frOnl

his farm, or to transport farm machinery, farm supplies, or both to his farm. Drivers transporting hazardous materials that require a placard are not exempt.

gThis exemption applies to drivers operating motor vehicles controlled and operated by a beekeeper engaged in the seasonal transportation of bees.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, based on 49 CFR 390.33.

STATE PROGRAMS

State economic and safety regulatory programs

governing the operations of motor carriers are extensive. States require motor carriers to register their

vehicles, obtain operating authority and insurance,

pay a variety of taxes, adhere to truck weight and

size limitations, and comply with safety regulations,

including special routing or scheduling restrictions.

In most States, multiple agencies are responsible for

administering these programs. For instance, departments of finance or revenue assess taxes, departments of motor vehicles or transportation register

vehicles, and a public utilities commission or

commerce department may grant operating authority. Safety regulations, including those for the transportation of hazardous materials, maybe issued and

enforced by departments of transportation, public

safety, health, or environment, or by the State police (see table 3-5 for a sample of State agency authority).

Improving State Capabilities

Beginning in the late- 1960s, FHWA entered into

cooperative agreements with States to bolster roadside inspection activities. However, no Federal financial support was provided, limiting the effectiveness of most State programs. Ten years later, FHWA

funded demonstration programs in Alaska, Idaho,

Michigan, and Utah to improve safety inspections

and to monitor truck size and weight. These States

were encouraged to adopt the FMCSR, and State

inspectors were trained to enforce them. The data

collected underscored the importance of effective

State enforcement as an accident prevention tool.

For example, in the year Utah increased its inspections by 330 percent, a 43-percent reduction in accidents involving commercial motor vehicles occurred.

Similarly, Idaho experienced 37 percent fewer commercial accidents in the year that it increased its inspections by 268 percent and its weighings by 218

percent.24

Many State motor carrier safety programs have

altered significantly since 1980. At that time, reducNU . . s Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Adminstration, Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, “Interim Report, Commercial

Motor Carrier Safetv Inspection and Weighing Demonstration Program, ” unpublished manuscript, August 1981.
64

Table 3=5.—Agencies Administering Motor Carrier Requirements in Selected States

State motor carrier requirements Arizona New York Virginia Iowa Minnesota

Registration and taxes

Vehicle registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MVD DMV DMV MVD DPS

Fuel use tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MVD TAX DMV MVD DOR

Fuel sales tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — TAX DMV

Out-of-State fuel tax.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

—

TAX MVD —

Fuel surtax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — scc a 

–

Gross receipts tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

—

TAXb — — —

Weight/distance tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MVD TAX — — —

Economic regulation

initial ICC regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — DOT S c c MVD DOT

Supplemental ICC registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — MVD DOT

Identification stamp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — DOT S c c MVD DOT

Other regulations

Certificate of insurance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MVD DMV SCC MVD DOT

Safety issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MVD DMV SP MVD DOT

Hazardous materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DHS DEC DOH TRA DOT

Size and weight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MVD DMV DH&T MVD DOT

KEY:DEC = Department of Environmental Control DPS = Department of Public Safety

DH&T = Department of Highways and Transportation ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission

DHS = Department of Health Services MVD = Motor Vehicle Division

DMV = Department of Motor Vehicles SCC = State Corporation Commission

DOH = Department of Health SP = State Police

DOR = Department of Revenue TAX = Department of Taxation and Finance

DOT = Department of Transportation TRA = Transportation Regulatory Authority

avirginia considers this a second structure tax.

bNew York also imposes a Franchise Tax.

SOURCE: Office ofTechnology Assessment, adapted from National Governors’ Association Working Group on State MotorCarriers Issues, ”Current Effortstolmprove

the Administration of State Motor Carrier Requirements, Report No.7:’ November 19S5, pp. 11-17.

tions in Federal inspection activities, major changes

in the motor carrier industry, and concerns about

truck-related accidents, all pointed to the need for

stronger State enforcement. With Federal support,

State inspection and enforcement programs expanded, and a higher percentage of trucks and

drivers are placed out of service for violations.

However, until the STAA was passed in 1982, requiring States accepting Federal funding for enforcement to adopt Federal regulations, no formal means

of coordinating Federal and State regulations existed. With the participation of State-based organizations, such as the National Governors’ Association, some progress has been made in coordinating

State economic and safety regulatory policies and

activities. Nonetheless, varied and changing State

regulations still affect interstate carriers.

The Motor Carrier Safety Assistance

Program

Based on the success of these demonstration programs, State commercial motor vehicle safety programs have been federally supported by MCSAP

since 1984.25 The primary goal of MCSAP is to increase and improve State capabilities to enforce uniform motor carrier safety and hazardous materials

regulations for both interstate and intrastate motor carriers and drivers through safety inspections

of commercial motor vehicles in terminals and along

roadsides. Data collection and analysis is a secondary goal, and States may use grant funds to develop

an accurate database on regulatory compliance. Currently, all States except Alaska, New Mexico, South

Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming participate in

MCSAP. 26 Because recent legislation intended to

phase in the FMCSR in Texas was challenged by

industry, Texas is not qualified to receive funds from

MCSAP, at least for the present.

Two types of State grants–development and

implementation—are available under MCSAP. 27

Development grants, available for a maximum of

‘The Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program was authorized under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Public Law

97-424.

% addition, participating U.S. territories include American Samoa,

Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

~TRequirements for State participation in the Motor Carrier Safety

Assistance Program are contained in 49 CFR 350.
65

3 years, may be used by States to establish or substantially modify an enforcement program. Development activities include program planning, initiating legislative or regulatory action, formulating a

budget, designating the State agency responsible for

administering MCSAP, and preparing a State Enforcement Plan (SEP). FHWA guidelines require that

an SEP cover the following:

●

●

●

●

●

●

current status of commercial motor carrier operations, including traffic volume, seasonal patterns, and accident statistics;

current enforcement efforts, including the role

of State agencies, the personnel involved, the

facilities and equipment utilized, and the number of inspections and audits conducted;

evaluation of the current motor carrier safety

program and the identification of problem

areas;

objectives and goals of the State program, such

as hiring and training additional staff, increasing the number of inspections and audits, and

revising legislation;

description of how resources will be used to accomplish objectives; and

method for evaluating program effectiveness.28

Development grants were awarded to 21 States and

territories during fiscal year 1985. By 1987, however,

most States had progressed to the implementation

phase of MCSAP.

Implementation grants provide funding for States

ready to initiate enforcement programs or enhance

established ones. Activities may include recruiting

and training of personnel, acquiring and maintaining equipment, conducting new or expanded inspections, and establishing an “out-of-service” and

compliance enforcement system. To qualify for an

implementation grant, a State must:

. agree to adopt and enforce the FMCSR (49

CFR 390-399), including highway-related portions of the Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR 171-173 and 177-178) or compatible State rules, regulations, standards, and

orders applicable to motor carrier safety;

. submit an SEP and designate a lead agency for

administering the plan;

“49 CFR 350.13, app. A, and U.S. Department of Transportation,

Federal Highway Adminstration, “Suggested Standard Implementation

Grant Application,” unpublished manuscript, April 1986.

●

●

●

●

agree to devote adequate resources to administration of the program and enforcement of rules,

regulations, standards, and orders;

have established statutory authority to enforce

Federal or compatible State regulations, regulate private and for-hire carriers, and provide

for right-of-entry into vehicles and facilities;

agree to adopt uniform reporting requirements

and submit reports as requested by FHWA; and

require registrants of commercial motor vehicles to declare knowledge of applicable Federal

or compatible State regulations.

MCSAP is financed by the Highway Trust Fund

and State appropriations. Federal grants of 80 percent must be matched by 20 percent from States.29 

Initially, incremental funding for MCSAP was authorized over a 5-year period: $10 million was authorized for fiscal year 1984, and $10 million was

to be added each year, up to a maximum of $50 million by fiscal year 1988. However, grants awarded

in 1985 and 1986 were significantly lower than authorized funding levels—less than $15 million in 1985

and approximately $17 million in 1986. For fiscal

year 1987, the Secretary of Transportation requested

that the $50 million maximum funding level for

MCSAP be authorized to meet the needs of expanding State programs; State grant requests for 1987

exceeded $44 million. Due to budget cuts for fiscal

year 1988, State grant requests were just under $42

million.

While a primary objective of MCSAP is to encourage States to adopt uniform regulations and implement consistent inspection and enforcement policies and procedures, significant differences among

State programs persist. Among the factors affecting the scope and effectiveness of State programs are:

●

●

the degree to which State legislation allows compliance with MCSAP, including the authority

to regulate for-hire and private carriers;

the adoption of Federal regulations or compatible State rules;

~9Funds available to any State for proposed program dmelopment

may not exceed $50,000 per year. Implementation grant funds are distributed to the States according to an allocation formula based on the

following factors in equal proportion: road mileage (all highways),

\’chicle-miles traveled (all vehicles), number of commercial vehicles over

10,000 pounds, ~pulation, and special fuel consumption (net reciprocity

adjustment). See 49 CFR 350.21.
66

●

●

●

●

the extent to which accident and inspection

data are collected, analyzed, and used to support regulatory and enforcement policies;

the extent to which States conduct safety audits at carrier facilities, in addition to roadside

inspections;

the number of inspectors employed, the ability of State agencies to compensate employees

for overtime, and the availability and quality

of inspector training programs; and

the ability of enforcement officers to issue citations for violations and the issuance of penalties sufficiently high to be a deterrent to noncompliance.30

Regulatory Consistency

States participating in MCSAP often must pass

enabling legislation authorizing the adoption and

enforcement of Federal motor carrier safety and hazardous materials regulations or compatible State regulations. In addition, State regulations must apply

to both private and for-hire carriers, and State enforcement personnel must have authority to conduct inspections of both intrastate and interstate

motor carriers. Yet, despite these Federal requirements, laws in a number of States continue to limit

the scope and applicability of motor carrier safety

programs. FHWA has under way a review to determine the status of motor carrier safety legislation

in each State—a task that FHWA officials estimate

will take more than a year.

In addition, some States restrict the activities of

law enforcement personnel. Kentucky prohibits audits of motor carrier operations, and Mississippi inspectors received authorization to inspect carriers

other than for-hire carriers of property or persons

as recently as July 1, 1988. Enforcement officials in

Maryland are limited by State legislation prohibiting adoption of hours-of-service regulations for intrastate drivers working within a 100-mile radius.31 

State hazardous materials transportation laws also

vary, with some States exempting specific commodi-

‘°For further information, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Moror Carrier Safery Assistance Program (MCSAP): Options intended To Improve a Generally

SuccessfiIl and Cooperative Federal/State Partnership Promoting Truck

and Bus Safety (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

June 1988).

‘

] Ron LIpps, Maryland State Department of Transportation, Safety

Division, personal communication, Oct. 8, 1987.

ties, while others apply hazardous materials regulations only to quantities that require placards under

Federal law.J2

To address the issue of regulatory consistency,

Congress requested a 5-year review of State commercial motor carrier safety laws and regulations.33 

A panel convened by the Secretary of Transportation is determining whether State laws and regulations are more or less stringent than Federal requirements. State laws and regulations that are found

to be less stringent than their Federal counterparts

will be preempted and may not remain in effect after October 30, 1989. A State law or regulation that

is more stringent will not be preempted unless there

is no safety benefit associated with it, the law is

not compatible with Federal regulations, or enforcement of it causes an undue burden on interstate

commerce.

Highway Access

Highway access policies differ markedly from State

to State. FHWA was instructed to develop rules and

guidelines for a National Truck Network for the

larger trucks authorized under the STAA.

FHWA’s rulemaking authorized trucks that met

the uniform size and weight limits to travel on all

Interstate highways and designated State primary

highways and to have reasonable access off these

highways to terminals and to facilities for food, fuel,

repairs, and rest.34 Because States resisted Federal

limitations on their authority to restrict movements

of these trucks, States were allowed to interpret the

terms “reasonable access” and “terminal.”35 This

permitted significantly varying State interpretations

(see table 3-6), leading inevitably to industry appeals

for uniform Federal standards. Carriers protest limits

on access to shippers and terminals, and drivers

claim that inadequate signage and complex route

listings hamper their ability to travel legally.

‘

: Placards are symbols placed on the ends and sides of motor \ehicles indicating the hazards of the cargo. Shipments of some hazardous

materials, such as etiologic agents and consumer commodities, do not

require placards. In addition, shipments of less than 1,000 pounds of

certain types of hazardous materials do not have to be placarded. See

49 CFR 172.504.

‘]The Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984, Public Law 98-554 (Oct.

30, 1984), 49 U.S.C. 2501 et seq.

3423 CFR 658.

1~Porter K. Wheeler, “State Regulatory Programs for Motor Carriers,” OTA contractor report, !vlay 1987.
67

Table 3-6.—Reasonable Access Provisions

Access policy

State 1/2 m i Ie 1 mile 3 miles 5 miles 10 miles Unlimited Comments

Alabama. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . From identified designated

interchanges.

Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Width restrictions.

Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Unless otherwise posted.

California . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Terminal access beyond 1/2

mile by signed routes from

identified access points.

Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Unless otherwise posted.

Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Special driver license needed

for twins.

Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . By permit only.

District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . By permit only.

Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . From identified interchanges:

rural—1 mile (2 Iane) and 3

mile (4 lane); urban—1 mile

on crossroads with 12-foot

Ianes; carriers must petition

terminals outside above

limits,

Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . From identified interchanges:

60-foot limit.

Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Length restrictions.

Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . State highways and local

roads to facilities.

Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

lowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . All U.S. and State routes. 5

miles from National Truck

Network; all streets served

by designated routes and

3-10 miles outside cities,

depending on population.

Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

All U.S. and State routes.

2 miles in rural areas; 1/2 mile

in urban areas.

Shortest possible route to

terminals.

By permit only.

Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Michigan . . . . . .

Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To facilities or for route

continuance.

Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nevada, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New Hampshire.,..,.. . . . . . .

New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

All U.S. and State routes.

By permit only for twins.

By permit only for twins.

20 miles from Interstate,

designated roads

Permit required beyond 1,500

feet.

New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

All U.S. and State routes.

Reasonable access (up to the

discretion of enforcement

officers).

(table continued on next page)
68

Table 3-6.—Reasonable Access Provisions—continued

Access policy

State 1/2 mile 1 mile 3 miles 5 miles 10 miles Unlimited Comments

Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unlimited on all but local

roads—width only; twins,

tractor-semitrailers not

restricted.

Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 miles.

Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Doubles restricted to 1 urban

mile; 1 mile on 2-lane roads

and 3 miles on 4-lane roads

in rural areas; others by

permit only.

South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Twins to terminals allowed.

South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Access limited to loading

docks, terminals, and

maintenance facilities,

Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Shortest reasonable route.

Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Unless otherwise posted.

Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1/ 2 rnile on designated

interchanges; further

distance by permit only.

Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perrnit required beyond1/2

mile.

Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Within 2 miles of designated

route.

Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

SOURCE: Officeof Technology Assessment, based on Commercia/ Carrier JournaL April 19SS, pp. SO-81.

Several States, especially in the East, have relatively restrictive access provisions. In Pennsylvania

for example, access to roads off the designated network is limited to 0.2 miles, except on specific routes

listed in an 84-page manual.36 Massachusetts has

designated only a portion of its State highways

as part of the National Truck Network, and has

adopted a $50 permit requirement for carriers who

want access to most other roads.37 Connecticut requires all drivers of twin trailers to be tested and

licensed in-State.38 Many carriers support legislation to amend the STAA, establishing a uniform

‘J. Terry Tume~ “Statementofthe Interstate Carriers Conference

on the Matter ofReasonable Access to the Designated Highway System,” testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Apr.

21, 1988, app. A.

~Duane W. Acklie, president, Crete Carrier Corp., testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Apr. 21, 1988, p. 4.

‘~homas R. Stedman, vice president, National Private Trucking

Association, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Apr. 21, 1988, p. 9.

definition of “terminal” and “reasonable access” and

permitting STAA trucks to travel on most roads

and highways, unless a State convincingly demonstrates that a road cannot safely accommodate large

trucks.

The Tandem Truck Safety Act of 1984 authorized universal access by double 28-foot trailers, aiding companies that operate doubles by granting unlimited access for pick up or delivery purposes once

the twin trailers were uncoupled. Large carriers have

taken advantage of this access provision, building

terminals close to Interstate highways where each

28-foot trailer can be attached to a separate tractor, or the contents of the trailers transferred to

smaller vehicles. Many small companies, however,

claim they do not have the funds or type of operation necessary to develop this kind of network.39

l~Richard D+ Henderson, executive vice president, private Truck

Council of America, Inc., letter to Senator Exon, U.S. Congress, May

12, 1988.
69

Data Collection and Analysis

Establishing databases that track motor carrier

compliance with safety regulations is an important

component of many State programs. Data are used

to target carriers for inspections and audits and to

support legislative or regulatory actions.

Although MCSAP funds maybe used to develop

information systems, the extent to which various

States collect and analyze data varies, and many

States cite inadequate data as a major implementation problem for MCSAP. Enforcement efforts are

hampered by incomplete records of carrier, vehicle,

and driver violations. In addition, poor accident

data prevent State authorities from identifying carriers with high preventable accident rates and

from conducting regulatory compliance education

programs.

The ability of a State to obtain a complete compliance profile of an interstate motor carrier or

driver, by accessing Federal and State databases, is

a key element of a current demonstration program.

SAFETYNET, a Federal-State automated network,

will eventually link FHWA’s motor carrier safety

database, containing information on more than

200,000 interstate carriers and 25,000 hazardous materials shippers, with State data systems. FHWA’s

database, described in more detail in chapter 7, includes information on driver and vehicle violations,

basic demographic and profile data on interstate carriers and shippers, data from accident reports filed

by carriers, and Federal enforcement actions.40 Approximately 35 States currently retrieve information

from the central database in Washington, DC. Of

these, 22 States also transmit data to the central

computer. 41

Four States–Colorado, Michigan, North Carolina, and Oregon—were selected to participate in

a SAFETYNET demonstration program. During

the initial phase, users of SAFETYNET will be able

to: input driver and vehicle inspection data; update

and query inspection data and carrier census data;

query safety management audit summary data, accident report summary data, and inspection work-

~%ee J.A. Reyes Associates, Inc., “SAFETYNET: The Motor Carrier Safety Information Network, ” prepared for U.S. Department of

Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, November 1984.

‘lAngell A. Sebastian, Federal Highway Administration, personal

communication, Aug. 4, 1988.

load data; and generate system reports.42 Eventually, all States are expected to participate in

SAFETYNET; however, full implementation may

take as long as 10 years.

Inspection and Audit Programs

States conduct two basic types of inspections—

roadside checks of vehicles and drivers and safety

management audits. During a roadside check, an

inspector examines a vehicle for mechanical problems and inspects documents, such as a driver’s

hours-of-service record and license, as well as shipping papers or route plans, if applicable. An audit,

which is conducted at a carrier’s terminal or other

business office, involves a review of records on vehicle use and maintenance, driver files and logbooks,

and accident and violation reports and records.

Management policies and procedures may also be

assessed, and any vehicles in the terminal at the time

of an audit may be inspected as well.

In most States, the development of safety audit

programs has lagged behind establishment of roadside inspection programs. Obtaining authority to

conduct audits from State legislatures and providing adequate training for State inspectors have

proven to be major obstacles. Because uniform

standards and procedures for audits have not been

established, State audit programs differ in the criteria used for targeting carriers, the analysis of data

obtained from a carrier’s files, and the extent to

‘~J.A. Reyes Associates, Inc., op. cit., footnote 40.

Photo credit: Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance

Roadside inspections are a critical part

of the MCSAP program.
70

which compliance education and monitoring efforts

are undertaken. Examples of well-developed State

audit programs are provided in box 3-A. In addition, at least 17 States are assisting FHWA in rating carriers by conducting less in-depth safety and

compliance reviews.43

Many States initially concentrate on roadside inspections, and States that have added enforcement

personnel and increased inspections are placing

higher percentages of vehicles and drivers out of

service (see figure 3-2). For example, in Maine, when

five new roadside inspectors were hired with

MCSAP funds, 60 to 70 percent of the commercial

motor vehicles inspected were placed out of service. 44 Similarly, in 1986, inspection teams in New

York State failed 58 percent of approximately 3,200

trucks checked during roadside inspections on the

Long Island Expressway and on highways near Albany and Buffalo.45 In Connecticut, 13 Federal

inspectors were hired in 1986 to assist 1 I State officials in conducting roadside inspections. Subsequently, 5,000 motor carriers were placed out of service in fiscal year 1987, an increase of 1,500 over the

previous fiscal year.46

Strategies for selecting vehicles to inspect vary

among the States. Some conduct random roadside

inspections, while others, such as Maryland, have

begun to target trucks that appear to be in poor condition. Under Maryland’s system, the percentage of

vehicles placed out of service rose from 32 percent

in 1985 to 63 percent in 1986, and the driver outof-service rate increased from 3.7 to 8.3 percent during the same period.47 In July 1986, Idaho implemented its inspection saturation program, which

concentrates on one area of the State for 3 to 4 days.

Officers are dispatched throughout surrounding

areas, hindering driver attempts to avoid vehicle inspections.48

~lRobert L Bleakley, Federal Highway Administration, Personal

communication, Oct. 10, 1987.

~4Maine Times, “Losing Control: Deregulation May Have Made It

Too Easy to Get Into the Trucking Business,” May 8, 1987, p. 2.

“Robert Hanley, “60% of Trucks Fail New York Area Inspections,”

IVeu’ York Times, Oct. 8, 1986, p. B1.

~~wil}lam Shaefer, coordinator, Motor Carrier Safety Assistance

Program, Connecticut Department of Transportation, personal communication, July 22, 1987.

~:OTA research, 1987.

‘8L.J. Nickerson, Idaho State Police Department, personal communication, July 21, 1987.

Many State inspection programs have strengthened emphasis on the driver, since enforcement officials believe that increased driver surveillance will

reduce the number of operator-related accidents.
77

Figure 3-2.— Motor Carrier Inspections and

Out-of-Service Violations, 1984.87

1,000 r

500 –

I

400

300

200

100

0

-1

L

inspection

drivers

of service

vehic I es

of service

s

1984 1985 1986 1987

Yea r

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program: Options Intended

to Improve a Generally Successful and Cooperative Federal/State Partnership Promoting Truck and Bus Safety (Washington, DC: US. Govern.

ment Printing Office, 1988), Table 3, p 18

Currently, human error accounts for over 60 percent of all commercial motor vehicle accidents (see

chapters 4 and 6 for further information). Special

efforts aimed at drivers have been instituted in a

number of States. Nevada’s “Driver Check” program

has resulted in a 3.7-percent decline in accidents

caused by driver error. Using a hardwired remote

terminal connected to the State’s mainframe computer, enforcement personnel at fixed locations can

check local, regional, and interstate drivers. During these license checks, enforcement personnel can

identify cases of suspension, revocation, outstanding warrants, and multiple licenses.49 Tennessee

has a special drug and alcohol enforcement program.

Inspectors are taught to recognize probable cause

for drugs and are equipped with manuals and a field

test kit that help them identify paraphernalia and

illegal drugs.50

“Federal Highway Administration, “Innovatl\e MCSAP Programs,”

unpublished manuscript, July 25, 1987, p. 9.

“’Ibid.

Photo credit: Rhode Island State Police

Once a truck is placed out of service, appropriate

repairs must be made before it can be driven again.

Buses

State officials also have the authority to inspect

for-hire, interstate, and intrastate buses. (Private carriage of passengers is exempt from the Federal safety —

regulations. ) Although all but 11 MCSAP States inspect buses, only a few devote a significant portion

of their resources to bus inspection programs; more —

often, States conduct annual, terminal audits for

buses registered in State. In Minnesota, for example, the State legislature mandates that all school

buses must pass a terminal inspection each year.51

,

States that do conduct bus inspections usually inspect unloaded buses only. Inspectors focus on areas

where a number of buses can be inspected at once,

such as sports complexes, casinos, and amusement

parks. This strategy is considered most efficient because passengers are not inconvenienced and companies usually have the time and resources to get

a replacement if a bus is placed out of service. Michigan, for example, routinely inspects buses at

Detroit’s sports facilities; bus drivers are usually

cooperative—as well as unaware of safety defects on

their vehicles.52

Under MCSAP, New Jersey has developed a bus

inspection team that targets both loaded and unloaded buses, many of them en route to Atlantic

City. Of the 8,900 roadside inspections conducted

between April 1987 and April 1988, 718 buses were

‘

l Larry Klukow, Minnesota State Police, personal communlcat[on,

May 27, 1988.

‘

: William Murphy, Department of h40tor Carriers, Michigan State

Police, personal communication, Apr. 26, 1988.
72

Photo credit: California Department of Transportation Photo credit: California Department of Transportation

Some States have special roadside inspection programs for buses. Brake and steering system

deficiencies are frequent safety violations.

placed out of service. Officials have reported that

since the roadside inspection program began, fewer

buses have out-of-service violations.53 

In California, the vast majority of buses receive

annual, terminal inspections. However, State officials have also inspected loaded buses since they discovered that the “gamblers specials, ” offering tours

to Reno or Las Vegas, Nevada, were often operating illegally and unsafely. Bus companies that advertised 24-hour turnaround operations appeared

to be particularly hazardous, and officials discovered that drivers often violated hours-of-service regulations by staying with the tour the entire time.

Several highly publicized bus accidents in California were attributed to driver fatigue. To bring these

operations under control, State officials created a

task force to develop a State roadside inspection program in 1981. Brakes, tires, and defective steering

systems as well as driver violations are common

safety problems.54

Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance

To promote interstate cooperation and a more efficient motor carrier safety inspection system, agencies in 46 States and 10 Canadian provinces have

agreed to adopt uniform truck inspection standards

~’Sebastian Messina, chief of Motor Carrier Inspection and Investigation, Office of Regulatory Affairs, New Jersey Department of Transportation, personal communication, Apr. 27, 1988.

“Charles S. Allen, commander, Department of the California Highway Patrol, Motor Carrier Section, personal communication, May 2,

1988.

as members of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA). Formed in 1980 under the leadership

of California, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington,

CVSA is independent of the Federal Government,

although FHWA now coordinates closely with

CVSA in a major outreach effort.

CVSA is organized into four regions, each with

its own elected officials who concentrate on local

or regional issues. Special CVSA national committees address issues related to data collection, drivers,

vehicles, research, training, and hazardous materials.

Industry associations and companies are encouraged

to express their concerns and to become nonvoting associate members of CVSA.

CVSA States and provinces use common inspection standards and out-of-service criteria developed

in cooperation with DOT. In addition, members affix and recognize common inspection decals on

trucks; the decals are valid for 3 months and indicate the quarter in which the last inspection took

place. Vehicles that pass a CVSA North American

Standard Inspection can usually pass through member States and provinces without further inspection,

unless a readily visible defect is detected or a decal

expires.

One reason CVSA was formed was to reduce delays caused by duplicative inspections of interstate

vehicles; however, many factors undermine the effectiveness of the strategy to provide uniformity. Because only certain State agencies belong to the

CVSA, other State agencies with power of enforce-
73

Photo credit’ New York State Department of Transportation Photo credit: New York State Department of Transportation

After examining a tanker for safety violations, an inspector applies a Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance decal, good

for three months. The decal is proof to inspectors in “other

and need not

ment or inspection sometimes refuse to recognize

or issue the decals. In addition, inspectors will not

give decals to trucks that pass inspections other than

the North American Standard. Standards for issuing the inspection stickers have been inconsistent

among the member agencies, though CVSA officials are working to resolve this through better communication.

Drivers complain that their trucks are subjected

to additional inspections, sometimes as frequently

as three times a month, causing costly and unnecessary delays. Independent drivers and owner-operators are particularly affected because their vehicles

are not readily identifiable as belonging to a large

fleet whose maintenance practices are known and

respected by inspectors.55 CVSA acknowledges

startup problems and claims that the majority of

complaints have been from drivers in the States that

have recently joined CVSA and where personnel

need experience with inspection procedures.55

Personnel and Training

State inspection forces vary in size and capability.

A majority of States train some members of the

highway patrol to be certified MCSAP inspectors.

Civilians in a number of States are also empowered

to enforce safety regulations and are trained to

work with the officers. More ambitious States at55Rita Bontz, president, Independent Truck Drivers Association,

personal communication, Apr. 24, 1988.

‘Russ Fiste, Commercial Vehicle Safety Alllance, personal communication, May 25, 1988.

CVSA member States that the truck has passed inspection

be rechecked.

tempt to instruct most or all members of the highway patrol to recognize fundamental safety violations, usually brakes out of adjustment and hoursof-service violations. For the most part, however,

instruction in truck safety is not provided at State

police academies, and a limited number of enforcement personnel are responsible for conducting roadside inspections.

Unless a State has developed its own program,

training is provided either by Federal officials or by

instructors from the Training Safety Institute (TSI)

in Oklahoma City. FHWA has divided MCSAP

States into nine regions. The Federal employees in

each region train inspectors in their States in cooperation with trainers from TSI. Usually two instructors train an average of 30 participants in 4 to

5 days. All State participants are taught to inspect

vehicles and cargo and to check driver qualifications. 57 States that have developed notable training programs are highlighted in box 3-B.

Instruction provided for FHWA staff is more intensive than the courses offered to State participants,

although by October 1988, training courses for State

officials will cover the same material taught to Federal officials. FHWA trainees attend 5-week classes

at TSI and learn to conduct safety reviews instead

of inspections. Between June 1986 and June 1987,

the Federal staff of safety specialists doubled when

150 Federal officials graduated from TSI.

‘

; Robert L. Bleakley, Federal Hlghvav Administration, personal

communication, Nov. 11, 1987.
74

Since Federal support for training began in 1984, hazardous materials training, and Federal officials

well over 4,000 State inspectors have been who usually train State inspectors have redirected

trained. 58 Few regions, however, have the re- their efforts toward these employees.

sources to meet all training needs. For example, recently trained Federal investigators need additional Training officers are also unable to meet the de5aWilliam Nalley, Federal Highway Administration, personal com- mand for refresher courses in some regions. Almunication, Nov. 3, 1987. though many inspectors receive on-the-job recur-
75

rent training, changing procedures and regulations

necessitate refresher courses. Regional officials

stressed that, in particular, they lack the capability

to provide additional hazardous materials courses.

Recognizing that uniform training is an essential

basis for consistent commercial vehicle inspections,

CVSA, FHWA, and TSI have combined efforts to

standardize training courses. In June 1986, a DOT/

State training committee was formed to recommend

ways to standardize hazardous materials and vehicle inspection training. Members agreed that both

course content and instructors should be certified,

training should be accomplished at a local level,

refresher training should be conducted annually,

and a train-the-trainer program should be created.

Many of these recommendations, such as the trainthe-trainer program, are being implemented, although budget and time constraints hamper efforts.

In some States, instructors have been told to condense their training and teach the same course in

only a few hours. Nevertheless, TSI trainers expect

that the number of certified commercial vehicle inspectors should increase significantly as a result of

the program.59 

Recognizing the need for more trained State personnel, CVSA, FHWA, and TSI are cooperating

to create a new training package with several levels

of training. FHWA contracted with Michigan to

complete the package by May 1, 1988; CVSA supervised the project; and members of TSI are incorporating hazardous materials training and will

keep material up-to-date. The package includes four

courses:

● Full Inspection .—This duplicates the North

American Standard Inspection course currently

taught,

● Walk Around Vehicle Inspection.—This course

is geared towards highway patrol officers who

have many additional responsibilites. Michigan

is currently reviewing the results of a pilot study

conducted last spring, when 125 of their patrol

officers were given a day and half of training

in motor carrier safety. Although lack of time

limited their ability to enforce safety regulations,

most participants felt they benefited from the

course.

‘qFrank Tupper, Training Safetv Institute, personal communication,

No\. 2, 1987.

●

●

The

Driver Inspection.—This driver-only course was

developed partly in response to the commercial driver’s license law and partly because so

much evidence indicates that the majority of

motor carrier accidents are the fault of the

driver.

Special Road Inspection.—This is a course for

special inspections that focus on either a type

of truck (i.e., cargo tanks) or one aspect of trucks

(i.e., brakes).60

course package has been submitted to DOT for

review and assimilation into MCSAP procedures.

Current FHWA plans call for States to dedicate 75

percent of enforcement time to the full inspection

course, and 25 percent to the others,

The new training package and the train-thetrainer program are also intended to increase each

State’s role in roadside inspections. State officials

are now encouraged to attend the MCSAP management course at TSI, a course previously limited

to Federal employees. Although regional Federal instructors will continue to train State inspectors, the

train-the-trainer courses and the MCSAP management course allow for more State control over roadside inspections; Federal officials will focus on au--

dits and safety reviews.

Enforcement Issues

State officials agree that placing a vehicle out of

service is the enforcement measure most likely to

deter drivers and carriers from violating safety regulations. Most officials have also been responsive

to the efforts of CVSA and FHWA to create uniform inspection standards and have adopted the

Federal out-of-service criteria.61 However, State

officials acknowledge that personnel limits hamper

effective enforcement, and admit that modified inspection procedures and inspection stickers may be

necessary to permit more motor carrier inspections

and ease the burden on industry posed by multiple

inspections.

~Commercia] Vehicle Safety Alliance, “Bylaws and Memorandum

of Understanding, ” unpublished manuscript, October 1986. These inspection levels were adopted at the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance annual meeting at Bar Harbor, ME, Oct. 24, 1986.

“Taken from an Informal telephone survey of 45 States conducted

by the Office of Technology Assessment in October 1987. Unless otherwise noted, information gi~’en in this section is derit,ed from this sur~,e},.
76

Carriers claim, and OTA research confirms that

uniform inspections are still the exception rather

than the rule—enforcement measures vary among

and within States, creating many uncertainties for

carriers. For example, enforcement strategies for vehicles that violate safety regulations but do not meet

the out-of-service criteria vary. In some States, a fine

is issued for each violation. In others, the driver is

given an inspection form that must be completed

by the carrier, usually within 15 to 30 days, and

returned to the enforcement agency when repairs

have been made. The most stringent States do both.

A driver stopped for any inspection, however, loses

precious time needed for load delivery within his

deadline, regardless of whether violations are found

or penalties imposed.

Classifications of safety violations also vary. In

many States, the enforcement officer will cite an offender for either a criminal or civil offense, depending on the severity of the violation. Fines and penalties for similar violations often differ, not only from

State-to-State, but by jurisdictions, as well. To increase uniformity of penalties, several States now

classify motor carrier safety violations as civil penalties with set fines consistent within a State unless

contested by the offender. However, enforcement

officials in a number of States claim that offenders

who protest tickets are too often rewarded for their

efforts. They argue that judges and magistrates are

not only inconsistent in their deliberations, but

often uninformed about the gravity of safety violations and lenient with violators. For example, in

Maryland, drivers with out-of-service violations

theoretically can receive $1,000 fines, but fines are

often significantly reduced at the judicial level. Moreover, Maryland law prohibits State patrol officers

from fining trucks more than $30 for routine violations, and some drivers and carriers consider this

just a cost of doing business in Maryland. Other

States also find that low fines are not effective deterrents to safety violations.

In particular, officials report, judges do not appear to understand the safety implications of weight

limit violations, viewing them as minor offenses. In

Maine, for example, some judges consistently dismiss charges for overweight vehicles, despite a State

statute that sets penalties for these offenses. In some

counties in Kansas, officers have stopped citing

drivers for excessive cargo because judges invariably refuse to fine them.

State officials complain that lack of change at the

legislative level hinders improvements in the judicial system. In Ohio, fines have not increased since

1923. 62 Safety officials also complain that legislators place little priority on safety and are reluctant

to limit judicial authority by establishing statutes

for safety violations. Enforcement efforts are further

undermined by lack of communication between judicial and enforcement officials, between members

of the trucking industry and enforcement agencies,

and between enforcement agencies in the same

State. In some States where the Public Utilities Comb; David Leland and staff, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,

“Ohio Transportation Regulation: Back to the Future,” unpublished

manuscript, 1987, p. 28.

Photo credit: Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance

Penalties for safety violations may vary widely by

jurisdiction or, in some States, by officer discretion.

Photo credit: Rhode Is/and State Police

Temporary scales are used to check compliance with

truck weight limits at some roadside inspection sites.
77

mission has been designated the lead agency, its employees do not work closely with officers from the

highway patrol and are unfamiliar with the enforcement efforts of the State police.

A number of State enforcement agencies have begun educating legal officials themselves. In West Virginia, for example, a State supervisor meets with local legal officials to explain which violations should

be considered most serious before inspections are

conducted at a new site. The Department of Safety

in Missouri sponsors annual seminars on truck safety

for judges in the St. Louis area, and is considering

expanding this program to other regions of the State.

In Idaho and Ohio, a legal attorney has been hired

to assist State prosecutors and judges in cases of violations of motor carrier safety regulations. At a recent conference in Tucson, Arizona, truck safety

specialists were given their first opportunity to address State judges. In Rhode Island, the arresting

officer must be present at the hearing to explain the

circumstances and potential hazards of a safety violation to the judicial authority.

Some officials feel that education should be aimed

at the drivers, especially in States where Federal

safety regulations have been most recently adopted.

Delaware sponsored two seminars for members of

the industry this year, hoping not only to educate

truckers, but also to improve the relationship between enforcement officers and drivers. In New

Hampshire, the Department of Safety organizes informal coffee breaks at truck stops to try to increase

driver understanding of the Federal regulations and

what to expect at roadside inspections. California

has a well-established public information campaign

that includes presentations to trucking companies

as well as efforts to establish a better rapport between truck drivers and members of the California

Highway Patrol.

Difficulty identifying carriers and drivers with multiple violations is yet another impediment to effective enforcement. Although most States keep records of driver and vehicle violations, few have the

capability to identify repeat offenders. In smaller

States, name recognition is used to pinpoint carriers

with safety records. Rhode Island has begun fining

carriers instead of drivers for economic violations

to target carriers cited for multiple violations,63 and

can now identify carriers that repeatedly incur or

neglect to pay fines. This policy developed when officials decided that responsibility for vehicle maintenance rested with the carrier instead of the driver.

One goal is to encourage drivers to alert enforcement officials voluntarily when forced to drive trucks

that violate equipment regulations.

Arizona adopted civil penalties in 1986 to target

repeat offenders. Multiple or hazardous materials

violations are automatically subject to higher fines.

If a motor carrier is guilty of repeated violations after being informed of noncompliance, the carrier’s

operating license is suspended.

California’s new computerized Management Information System of Terminal Evaluation Records

contains carrier fleet information, hazardous materials spills, license history, citation information, accident involvement, and terminal ratings. This system identifies carriers and drivers with particularly

poor safety records, and after its first year of operation, officials discovered that some carriers had

received between 600 and 800 citations.64 When

SAFETYNET becomes operational, this type of information will be accessible nationwide,

In Maryland a special enforcement team, the Bus

and Truck Patrol, has been created to increase bus

and truck compliance with safety regulations.65

This seven-person team is dispatched to one area

for 1 to 6 months. Plainclothes officers, who are certified MCSAP inspectors using unmarked cars, try

to reduce the number of moving violations, such

as speeding and tailgating; they can place trucks out

of service, if necessary,

‘~William A. Maloney, associate administrator of Motor Carrlcrs,

Rhode Island Division of Public Urilitles and Carriers, personal communication, Aug. 4, 1987.

‘Phyllis Myers, California Highway Patrol, personal communication, Nov. 11, 1987.

“Millard M. Bell, supervisor, Special Trat%c Enforcement, Maryland

State Police, personal communication, Oct. 8, 1987.
78

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS

A comprehensive national truck safety program

requires continuing emphasis on programs developed over the last 5 years and a more systematic

Federal-State approach. OTA concludes that the

top priorities are: 1) improving State enforcement

capabilities, 2) increasing State regulatory uniformity, and 3) better coordination and cooperation among agencies within DOT at the Federal

level. Congressional mandates and DOT actions

since 1980, such as requirements for vehicle inspections and national standards for driver licensing,

can make major contributions to highway safety if

uniformly applied.

MCSAP has firmly established the role of States

as an essential adjunct to Federal highway safety efforts. OTA concludes that continued Federal financial support at current levels for State inspection and enforcement activities through MCSAP

is crucial. Additional trained personnel are

needed across the country. Monitoring industry,

through State terminal audits and ensuring the

safety fitness of all motor carriers, is an important

component of a systematic safety program. Because

State audit programs are such valuable additions to

Federal enforcement efforts, FHWA could be required to develop guidelines and handbooks for

States to encourage more States to train inspectors

and begin auditing carriers. Efforts undertaken by

FHWA to improve regulatory compliance materials for industry would be helpful for the States as

well.

OTA concludes that industry complaints about

inconsistent State inspection and enforcement

procedures and penalties are symptoms of the

need for stronger Federal-State cooperation for

national uniformity. CVSA’s goal of establishing

uniform inspection and out-of-service criteria provides an excellent model for States to use in working together toward consistent nationwide programs.

However, any efforts will be ineffective unless States

make the commitment to have their executive agencies cooperate toward this goal. To help resolve conflicts in State agency agendas, strong DOT support

for consistent enforcement programs will be needed,

once FHWA’s review and evaluation of State laws

and regulations has been completed. Cooperative

efforts with State officials and bar associations are

key. State executive agencies, legislative bodies, and

law enforcement organizations may accept the need

for uniformity more readily if they are involved and

informed at an early stage. Congress may wish to

consider requiring DOT to provide technical assistance and technology transfer for additional

educational materials for State officials, law enforcement personnel, and judges. An enforcement

handbook providing general guidance on the safety

regulations and safety factors to consider when setting penalty amounts for various types of violations

could be helpful.

In the Motor Carrier Act of 1984, Congress made

clear that decisions on access to State roads for large

trucks are the province of the States. However,

States have found developing routes and communicating access decisions clearly to industry to be

complex and difficult tasks, requiring hard work,

patience, good will, and good humor from all parties. Where this process has failed, carriers travel on

the routes they deem necessary to reach their destinations, often traveling small rural or urban roads

in violation of State law and endangering themselves

and other motorists.

OTA concludes that varying State access, inspection, and enforcement policies pose significant problems for industry. A national truck

safety program should apply equivalent safety requirements to all heavy trucks. This implies that

no exemptions to the commercial driver’s license

are warranted. Congress may wish to encourage

States to develop more uniform safety requirements. Congress may also wish to consider eliminating all exemptions from Federal truck safety

regulations and encouraging DOT to play a more

active and assertive role in facilitating State/industry dialog and resolving difficult access issues.

Technology transfer of innovative approaches and

working actively with appropriate State and industry organizations are two possible approaches. For

further discussion of the technical aspects of the access issue, see chapter 5.

Finally OTA finds that the division of responsibility for different aspects of roadway, vehicle,

and driver issues among multiple agencies hampers safety problem solving at DOT. The extent
79

to which DOT will be able to respond effectively

to congressional safety directives depends on better cooperation and more systematic coordination

among Federal agencies. For example, better accident data analysis at NHTSA could provide information to the Office of Motor Carriers for driver

training guidelines or hours-of-service rules. Information about vehicle characteristics and design

standards could be exchanged by NHTSA and

FHWA to guide program development.

Congress may wish to require DOT to develop

a plan to integrate the technical expertise now

divided between NHTSA and the motor carrier

and highway design sections of FHWA to address

issues such as roadway and vehicle compatibility

guidelines, upgraded safety equipment standards,

national guidelines for training for maintenance

personnel and drivers, and accident reduction and

mitigation strategies. The approach that DOT has

taken to developing the commercial driver’s license

program is commendable; it could serve as a model

for efforts to deal with equipment requirements and

highway design issues.

OTA further concludes that DOT agencies need

to cooperate and coordinate in collecting and

analyzing data, conducting research programs,

and developing regulatory proposals. Establishing

special work groups to address issues of common

concern, jointly funding research activities, and

sharing staff expertise are examples of strategies that

could bring benefits at little or no extra cost.

Additional DOT technical assistance for State

agencies in developing more uniform data management systems and analytical capabilities, especially

in tracking preventable accidents and violation statistics, would be an effective use of limited funding.

States could use this information to target carriers

for audits and inspections. As FHWA and ICC implement new procedures for assessing the safety fitness of commercial vehicle operators, explicit procedures for monitoring ongoing safety performance

will be needed. State personnel and FHWA field inspectors alike could benefit from consistent guidelines for deciding whether to initiate a compliance

education program or an enforcement action. Improved educational materials on Federal safety requirements that could be distributed to States and

motor carriers on model programs for amending

laws, implementing Federal standards, and developing an information clearinghouse would also be

extremely useful.
80

APPENDIX 3-A: CHRONOLOGY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION

RELATING TO THE MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY (1935-87)

1935—Motor Carrier Act. Formally regulated the motor carrier industry by authorizing the Interstate

Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate common, contract, and private carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. Granted ICC authority to establish requirements for employee

qualifications and hours of service, and safety

standards for operation and equipment.

1944—Federal-Aid Highway Act. ’ Authorized the designation of a 40,000-mile system of highways, now

known as the Interstate Highway System.

1948—Reed Bulwinkle Act. Granted Rate Bureaus immunity from antitrust laws, promoting joint service arrangements between competing carriers.

Information about rates and classifications, published by Rate Bureaus, were also used by carriers

and shippers to negotiate individual rates.

1956—Highway Trust Fund. Established a fund comprised of proceeds from Federal motor vehicle fuel

taxes and various excise taxes to finance construction of all Federal-aid highways.

1966–Highway Safety Act. Directed the Secretary of

Commerce to issue standards for driver education and licensing; vehicle registration, operations, and inspections; accident investigations and

reporting; and traffic control, highway design,

and maintenance. Required States to establish

highway safety programs in accordance with these

Federal standards and match Federal funds received. Directed the Department of Commerce

to expand highway safety research and development activities.

1966–National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

Mandated the development of minimum manufacturing standards for motor vehicles. Required

a new agency, the National Traffic Safety Agency,

to issue safety standards for passenger automobiles, trucks, buses, and motorcycles; to conduct

research, testing, development, and training necessary to reduce traffic accidents and related

deaths and injuries; and to expand the National

Driver Register to identify individuals whose motor vehicle operating licenses had been denied,

terminated, or temporarily withdrawn. Prohibited

ICC from adopting or continuing safety standards for motor vehicles under its jurisdiction that

differed from the standards established under this

act.

‘Federal-Ald Highway Acts 1954, 1956, 1958, 1!%0, 1%2, 1964, 1966, 1974,

1981, and 1982 are not cietallecl In this appendix; the acts primarily authorized

funds for highway construction.

1966—Department of Transportation Act. Transferred

safety responsibilities of ICC and the Department

of Commerce to the Department of Transportation (DOT). Internal agencies created included

the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA),

the National Highway Safety Bureau, and the National Traffic Safety Bureau.

1968–Federal-Aid Highway Act. Required DOT to

establish national bridge inspection standards and

a program designed to train employees to carry

out bridge inspections.

1970—Federal-Aid Highway Act. Created an internal

DOT agency, the National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA), to carry out

highway safety programs; research and development relating to highway safety, traffic construction and maintenance, traffic control devices,

identification and surveillance of accident locations, and highway-related aspects of pedestrian

safety. Authorized the creation of a special bridge

replacement program.

1973–Federal-Aid Highway Act. Authorized funding

for highway safety construction programs to reduce roadway hazards such as rail-highway crossings and improve highway engineering standards.

Authorized the establishment of a pavementmarking demonstration project to provide greater

vehicle and pedestrian safety. Directed DOT to

carry out research on drug use and driver behavior and to investigate the use of mass media

for informing and educating the public of ways

and means for reducing the number and severity

of highway accidents.

1975–Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. Authorized DOT to set regulations applicable to all

modes of transportation.

1976—Federal-Aid Highway Act. Authorized funding

for bridge reconstruction and development, and

for eliminating hazards of railway crossings. Authorized DOT to provide incentive grants to

States that had significantly reduced traffic fatalities and to penalize States with weak safety

programs.

1978—Surface Transportation Assistance Act. Authorized funds for highway construction. Directed

DOT to inventory penalties for weight violations

in each State, and required each State to report

weight violation penalties annually to DOT. Authorized the establishment of a bridge replacement and rehabilitation program. Appropriated

funds to NHTSA and FHWA for safety programs
81

and to carry out highway safety research and development.

1980–Motor Carrier Act. Directed ICC to relax standards for entry into the industry. Established that

common and contract carriers needed to show

only that they were fit, willing, and able. Expanded the private carrier exemption to allow intercorporate hauling between a parent company

and its subsidiaries. Required owner-operators to

meet the fitness test only if they haul specified

processed food and other commodities and the

owner is in the truck during the trip.

1982—Bus Regulatory Reform Act. Duplicated the motor carrier act of 1980 for the bus industry by

relaxing standards for entry.

1982–Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA).

Authorized and financed higher levels of Federal

expenditures by raising and restructuring highway taxes. Established uniform truck weight,

length, and width limitations for the Nation’s

highways. Established a new Federal grant program, the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program, to improve State capabilities to conduct inspections of vehicles and enforce motor carrier

safety regulations.

1984—Motor Carrier Safety Act. Directed DOT to

promulgate revised Federal regulations, establish

fitness standards for commercial motor carriers,

and undertake a 5-year review of State motor carrier laws to identify those that are more or less

stringent than Federal requirements.

1984—Tandem Truck Safety Act. Allowed State Governors to seek exemptions for Interstate highway

segments that could not safely accommodate

trucks; modified reasonable access provision of

the STAA to include 28-foot by 102-inch trailer

units.

1986–Commercial Motor Carrier Safety Act. Established a new driver’s licensing program that prohibits operators of commercial motor vehicles

from holding more than one State license and requires drivers to pass a written examination and

a road test in a vehicle that is representative of

the type that will be operated.

1987—Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation

Assistance Act. Authorized funds for the construction of highways and for mass transportation programs. Directed DOT to establish a national bridge inspection program. Appropriated

funds to NHTSA for purposes of research and

development in highway safety.

APPENDIX 3-B: THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

Although Federal regulation of motor carriers did not

begin until 1935, many States enacted legislation in the

1920s governing various aspects of truck and bus transportation, including economic operations, highway protection, and safety. ] Led by Texas, a number of States

established regulatory programs for both common and

contract carriers. Requirements for contract carriers, generally less extensive than those for common carriers, were

imposed to protect the operations of common carriers.2 

Interstate carriers were not generally subject to State economic regulations; however, several Supreme Court decisions upheld the application of State safety and highway requirements to interstate carriers.3 

‘~y 1932, all States except Delaware had attempted to regulate the transportation of passengers, and 29 States had laws controlling the carriage of property

bv motor vehicles. Ph]hp D. Lmklln, Econorn]cs of Transportation (Homewood,

IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1972), pp. 673-674.

“The Texas law required contract carriers to obtain permits, while common

carriers were Issued certificates of publlc convemence and necessity. In addition,

mimmum rates for contract carriers, which could not be lower than railroad

rates, were prescrlhed. It should also be noted that earlier attempts bv State<

to regulate contract carriers were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court, because thev were not found to he huslnesses prowdlng services w[th a publlc interest. lbld., p. 675.

‘State control otter Interstate carrleri was ln~alldated by a 1925 Supreme

Court decmon that ruled that States could not forbid, Ilmlt, or prohlblt competition In Interstate commerce. See Buck v. Kuvkendall, 267 U.S. 307 ( 192 5),

The absence of Federal control over interstate carriers

encouraged intense competition within the motor carrier industry. Finally, with the support of the railroads

and the large, established trucking companies, Federal

legislation governing commercial motor carriers was

passed in 1935.4 The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to

regulate motor carriers engaged in interstate or foreign

commerce. The authority extended to intrastate operators handling shipments moving in interstate and foreign commerce.5 Three major categories of motor carriers were addressed by the act:

●

●

●

Common carriers–for-hire carriers holding themselves out to serve the public;

Contract carriers–for-hire carriers operating under

special contracts, usually for shipments over a specified period of time; and

Private carriers—carriers transporting goods for their

own use or uses incidental to their businesses.

‘Public Law No. 255, 49 Stat. 543 (1935).

‘While the orlglnal act permitted such Intrastate operators to transport persons or property wlthln the State under State authonzatlon, a 1962 amendment

to the act eliminated the abd[ty of Intrastate carriers to engage In Interstate

commerce. Locklln, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 676.
82

In addition, requirements for transportation brokers were

included.6

The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 also authorized ICC

to establish requirements for driver qualifications and

hours of service, and safety standards for operations and

equipment. The first set of regulations, issued by ICC

in 1940, applied to all common, contract, and private

carriers.

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 authorized the

Interstate Highway System–eventually to total over

42,000 miles–to connect metropolitan areas, serve the

national defense, and link U.S. highways with major

routes in Canada and Mexico. In 1956, Congress established the Highway Trust Fund, composed of proceeds

from Federal motor vehicle fuel taxes and various other

excise taxes, to finance construction of all Federal-aid

highways, including the Interstate Highway System.

Highway funds could be withheld from States that allowed trucks on the Interstate system with more than

18,000 pounds on a single axle, 32,000 pounds on a tandem axle, and 73,280 pounds gross vehicle weight

(GVW). (In 1975, the maximum GVW limit was raised

to 80,000 pounds.) However, under a grandfather clause,

States could retain limits allowing wider or heavier vehicles that were in effect as of July 1, 1956. Moreover,

each State was permitted to set different size and weight

standards for other highways within its jurisdiction,

As the Nation’s dependence on motor vehicles for personal and commercial uses grew, so did the number of

serious accidents and fatalities. In 1965 alone, 49,000 persons were killed in highway accidents, 1.5 million suffered

disabling injuries, and the economic costs associated with

these accidents came to an estimated $8.5 billion.; To

address these problems, Congress took a series of steps

to improve highwa y safety.

The Highway Safety Act of 1966 directed the Secretary of Commerce to issue standards for driver education and licensing; vehicle registration, operations, and

inspections; accident investigations and reporting; traffic control; and highway design and maintenance.”

States were required to establish highway safety programs

in accordance with these Federal standards and to match

Federal funds received. States that did not implement

safety programs were subject to a 10-percent reduction

in their Federal highway funds. By 1970, all 50 States,

“Brokers were required to obtain Interstate Commerce Commission Ilcenses

and bonds or other security. In addltlon, the Commission was authorized to

specify accounting and recordkeeplng requirements.

“Senate Pubhc Works Committee Report 1302 to accompany S. 3052, Hlghwav Safety Act of 1966 (June 23, 1966).

‘Publ]c Law 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (Sept. 9, 1966).

the District of Columbia, and 4 territories had established

highwa y safety programs.’

Concerned about the automobile industry’s emphasis

on style and performance instead of safety and collision

protection, Congress also passed the National Traffic and

Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966,’” Under this act, a

new agency within the Department of Commerce—the

National Traffic Safety Agency–was empowered to issue safety standards for passenger automobiles, trucks,

buses, and motorcycles; conduct research, testing, development, and training necessary to reduce traffic accidents

and related deaths and injuries; and expand the National

Driver Register to identify individuals whose motor vehicle operating licenses had been denied, terminated, or

temporarily withdrawn. ” Although State motor vehicle

equipment standards had to be identical to the Federal

regulations, stricter standards could be imposed for those

vehicles procured by States or the Federal Government.

Shortly after safety statutes were enacted in 1966, Congress authorized the establishment of a Federal transportation agency—the Department of Transportation

(DOT). ” While the ICC retained economic regulatory

authority over motor carriers, its safety responsibilities

and those assigned to the Department of Commerce were

transferred to DOT. Within DOT, the Federal Highway

Administration was created to administer the regulatory

programs related to employee qualifications and hours

of service as well as to highway transportation operations

and equipment safety. Separate agencies—the National

Highway Safety Bureau and the National Traffic Safety

Board–were formed to implement the provisions of the

new safety laws. In addition, the National Transportation Safety Board was established to: 1) determine and

report on the cause or probable cause of transportation

accidents, 2) conduct special studies on transportation

safety and accident prevention, and 3) make regulatory

recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation.13 

%surance Institute for Highway Safety, .Starus Report, vol. 21, No. 11, Sept.

9, 1986.

‘“Public Law 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (Sept. 9, 1966).

“The National Driver Register, originally estabhshed In 1960 by the Department of Commerce, was a voluntary driver record exchange program. Although

all States participated in the program, the program provided only summar y

reports of Ilcense suspensions or revocations related to drunk driwng or fatal

accidents. The 1966 amendments allowed States to file reports on license denials

and withdraws for any reason, except for wlthdrawls of less than 6 months based

on an accumulation of minor violations. Senate Commerce Committee Report

i301 to accompany S, 3005, Nationa[ Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of

1966, June 23, 1966.

“U.S. Department of Transportation Act, Publlc Law 89.670, 49 U.S.C.

1651.

‘h 1974, the National TransWrtation Safet y Board became an Independent

agenc y and Its role was expanded.
Chapter 4

Motor Carrier

. . . . —..-... . -— —.. .

Accident Analysis

*

..—.— ““””---t ~—-—-------- -

‘ “‘-i - . . . . .

Photo credit: Ohio State Police
CONTENTS

Page

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Accident Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Driver Performance. . . . . . . . ...+..... . . . . . . 88

Driver Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Previous Driving History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Drugs and Alcohol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Age and Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Fatigue . . . . . . . . . . . +. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Vehicle Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Braking System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Tires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..**.... . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Rollovers and Vehicle Handling and

Stability. .. ... .. ........+ . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Override/Underride .. .. . . . . . ........+ . . 94

Truck Configuration and Utilization.. . . . . 95

Truck Occupant Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Safety of Nonregulated Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Economic Factors . .......................100

Enforcement ● **.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Roadway Environment . ..................101

Road Type .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ..;. . . . . . . . ..101

Lighting Conditions . ...................102

Weather Conditions . ...................103

Sharing the Road .. ....................104

Conclusions and Policy Options . ..........104

Figures

Figure Page

4-1. Truck Accidents by Category of

Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

4-2. Vehicles Involved in Fatal Accidents . . 85

4-3. Fatalities in Combination Truck

Crashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

44. Motor Carrer Accident Causal and

Prevention Factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

4-5. Driver-Related Factors as Cited in

Heavy Truck Accident Reports . . . . . . . 89

4-6. Injury Severity in Heavy Truck

Accidents Relative to Truck

Driver Drinking. . . .. . . . .. ......+. . . . 90

4-7. Relationship of Driver Fatigue to

Accidents, by Hour of Day . . . . . . . . . . . 91

4$. Jackknifes Related to Attempted

Accident Avoidance Maneuvers . . . . . . . 93

4-9.

4-10.

4-11.

4-12.

4-13.

4-14.

4-15.

4-16.

4-17.

4-18.

4-19.

Table

Tractors Involved in Fatal Accidents,

by Type of Collision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Accidents and Override/Underride in

Reduced Lighting Conditions,

by Truck Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Truck Driver Seat Belt Use, by Injury

Severity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Vehicle Age by Regulatory Status . . . . . 99

Truck Inspection and Truck Accident

Rates for California State Highways,

1976-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Percentage of Trucks That Speed, by

Carrier Classification . ...............100

Fatal Truck Accidents by Road

Classification . ......................102

Fatal Truck Accidents by Median

Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............102

Fatal Truck Accidents by Posted Speed

Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........103

Combination Truck Accidents, by

Time of Day . . . . . . . . . . . . ............103

Fatal Truck Accidents by Weather

Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . ...104

Tables

Figure

4-1. Car Occupant Deaths Compared to ‘“-

Truck Occupant Deaths in Fatal

Crashes of Large Trucks and Cars . . . . . 86

4-2. Accident Causes Assigned in State of

Washington Truck Crashes in 1984..... 89

4-3. Single-Trailer Involvement Rate . . . . . . . . 95

4-4. Distribution of Combination-Unit Truck

Mileage and Fatal Accident Involvement

by Body Type, in Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

4-5. Vehicle Involvement Rates in Fatal and

Nonfatal Accidents in 1984. . . . . . . . . . . . 97

4-6. Occupational Fatalities in 1984. . . . . . . . . 98

4-7. BMCS Roadside Inspection of All

Carriers . . . . . . . . .....................100

4-8. Single-Trailer Accident Involvement

Rates by Highway Functional Class.. ...101

4-9. The Effect of Lighting Conditions on

Rear-End Collisions . .................103
Chapter 4

Motor Carrier Accident Analysis

Accidents for heavy trucks (those with a gross vehicle weight rating of over 26,000 pounds) have increased over the last few years, reaching an estimated

total of 278,322 accidents nationwide in 1986. (See

figure 4-1.) Accidents for all trucks over 10,000

pounds increased at a slightly lower rate. Bus accidents are such a relatively small part of total accidents that accurate comparisons are difficult. Total truck-miles traveled also have risen during the

1980s, but somewhat less than the rise in heavy

truck accidents.1 

Of all heavy vehicles, tractor-trailer combinations

provide the most difficult driving challenges, and

‘OTA mtlmatcs from the National Accident Sampling System database; also hlatlonal Highway Traffic Safety Administration calculations.

California (Mlcials reported a similar rise o~er this period. See California Hlghwav Patrol and State of California Public Utilities Commission, Joint Leglslat]ve Report on Truck Safet~’, AB-2678, Final Report

(San Francisco, CA: No\ember 1987), p. 19.

Figure 4-1 .—Truck Accidents by Category of Truck

500

400

300

200

100

0

— 10,000 to 25,999 pound s

--- 26,000 pounds and over

~.-.--- -

- -

--- - , ---------

, 0 ’

, # ~

.

I I 1 I 1 1

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986

Yea r

SOURCE’ Office of Technology Assessment, 19@8, based on National Acc!dent

Sampllng System data

the severity of the accidents in which they are involved reflects their special nature. Roughly 1 to 2

percent of these accidents result in a fatality2—

about double the percentage for automobiles (see

figure 4-2). The comparable figure for all other types

of motor vehicles (except motorcycles) is well under 1 percent. In the past decade, the average annual death toll from tractor-trailer accidents has

ranged between 4,000 and 5,000 fatalities (see figure 4-3), increasing slightly since 1982. About 80 percent of the fatalities in these accidents were pedestrians or occupants of other vehicles, a proportion

that has increased gradually over time (see figure

4-2). When single-vehicle truck accidents are eliminated, this proportion is even greater (see table 4-

1). Head-on collisions are particularly severe. They

‘Based on the National Accident Sampling System (1981-85) cst]-

mates. Multiple-vehicle accidents comprise 66 percent of all hea\w truck

accidents and 72 percent of all hea~’~’ truck accidents in~’olt’lng a fatality’.

Figure 4-2.—Vehicles Involved in Fatal Accidents

8

m Combination trucks

7- ■ m Passenger cars

197677 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

Yea r

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988, based on Fatal Accident

Reporting System data

85
86

Figure 4-3.— Fatalities in Combination Truck Crashes

Total fatalities

,;;;;:::::;; Fatalities of truck

u

..::,..:,:,: .,:, occupants only

197677 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

Year

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on Fatal Accident

Reporting System data.

constitute only 3.3 percent of heavy truck accidents

yet account for 29 percent of all fatal accidents involving those trucks.3 

This chapter contains results from OTA’s analysis of motor carrier accident data and a review of

previous studies of three key accident causal factors:

driver performance, vehicle factors, and the roadway environment. Areas needing further research

are outlined, and policy options are identified that

address accident causes as part of a national motor

carrier safety strategy.

‘Based on National Accident Sampling System (1981-85) and Federal Accident Reporting System (1983) data. For further discussion of

the strengths and weaknesses of these databases, see ch. 7.

Table 4-1.—Car Occupant Deaths Compared to

Truck Occupant Deaths in Fatal Crashes of

Large Trucks and Cars

Ratio of car occupant fatalities

Year to truck occupant fatalities

1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1979 ......, . . . . . . . . . .

1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26:1

28:1

29:1

31:1

34:1

28:1

34:1

35:1

SOURCE: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Big Trucks, 1985, p. 8.

METHODOLOGY

Thorough accident analysis requires accurately

identifying the type of heavy vehicle involved, the

roadway conditions, and, to the extent possible, the

characteristics of the driver. However, determining

all events leading to an accident is difficult because

of the quality of available databases.4 Police and

insurance claim reports, the most common sources

of information, are limited in detail, because the

report forms ask for only certain information and

investigating officers often do not adequately understand accident causation. The accident cause reported on the form is usually only the last event

in a chain that includes interactions between the

driver, vehicle, and highway environment as well

as weather and location.

4one of the ear]iest systematic studies of the interactions in accidents examined five major factors: human, environmental, vehicular,

loss-limiting, and legal and regulatory. A.D. Little, Inc., The Srare of

the Art of Tr&ic Safety (Boston, MA: June 1966).

Exploring accident information beyond the detail in accident reports is of critical importance.

When reporting accidents, police often must attribute responsibility to one of the parties, and if the

accident cause is not clear, the mishap may simply

be ascribed to driver error. Thus, the heavy vehicle driver may be blamed more frequently than warranted. 5 For example, in California, accident

reports associate driver error with over 90 percent

of truck-at-fault accidents. b In contrast, European

data indicate multiple causes involving driver error

5Kenneth Perchonok, “Driver and Vehicle Characteristics as Related to the Precipitation of Accidents,” U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Report

No. DOT-HS-802 355, May 1977; and P.P, Jovanis, “A Perspective on

Motor Carrier Safety Issues in the 1980’s,” presented at the Conference on Truck Safety, Northwestern University, June 198’7.

‘California Highway Patrol, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 10.
87

and defects in road design and the vehicle in a

majority of cases.7 OTA research indicates that

while human error is the primary cause of about

65 percent of accidents, other factors also contribute to most accidents.

Combining accident and exposure data can clarify the relative importance of vehicle, driver, and

environmental factors. Where appropriate, OTA

used the Truck Inventory and Use Survey, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) monitoring

program, and other survey instruments to estimate

exposure. The quality and limitations of this information are discussed in chapter 7.

In those cases where exposure data are limited,

OTA made inferences about the industry based

solely on accident data rather than on both accident and exposure data. In each case, the sources

‘J. Fructus, “Highlights on Heavy Vehicle Safety in Europe,” .Symposium on the Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Traffic Accidents

(Ottawa, Canada: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, April 1987), VO1. 1, P. l-~1.

of the information are made explicit. Improved data

collection methods, such as those proposed in chapter 7, would facilitate more detailed and specific

analyses.

Accident Causes

Accidents usually result from a chain of events,

often initiated by a single occurrence, and complicated by a number of interacting factors (see figure

4-4). The potential for an accident is partially a function of the characteristics of the driver, including

experience, training, age, attitude, physical condition (fatigue, intoxication, other debilitations), and

psychological state. Other factors include the condition of the vehicle, highway design, and roadway

characteristics; regulatory oversight, such as licensing

and traffic enforcement; and the type of management supervision exercised by the carrier.

Still other factors contribute to the disproportionate number of fatalities associated with heavy truck

accidents. Because of the size and weight of these

trucks relative to cars, truck occupants have more

Figure 4-4.— Motor Carrier Accident Causal

and Prevention Factors

; State and local agency actions Motor carriers Manufacturers

ulot~ons \ Vehicle n. -,-- 1

Accident causal factors a

. .

Accidents

SOURCE” Office of Technology Assessment, 1988,
88

protection in an accident than car occupants. The

mismatch of size and mass between heavy trucks and

cars and the special difficulties inherent in controlling a tractor-trailer on a highway designed for

smaller vehicles are other major contributing factors to severe accident consequences. According to

OTA’s review of accident reports, the three factors

most frequently associated with heavy vehicle accidents are: 1) speed too fast for conditions, 2) training of the driver, and 3) age of the vehicle.

Speed Too Fast for Conditions

The phrase “speed too fast for conditions” on accident report forms masks a variety of interlocking

roadway and vehicle-related factors that affect driver

performance in ways the driver may not understand

and probably is unable to accommodate in any case.

Vehicles operating at higher speeds operate closer

to the limits of friction and rollover thresholds, and

drivers have very little time to carry out emergency

maneuvers at high speeds. (See chapter 5 for further discussion of the driver’s role in this important

area. ) Often a posted speed is appropriate for cars

and does not adequately consider the inherent incompatibility that exists in many instances between

highway design and the large trucks now common.

Certain interchange ramps on major highways are

examples. Variations in speed among different vehicles increase the likelihood of an accident by providing more conflict situations, such as passing maneuvers and braking.8 

‘D. Solomon, Accidents on Main Rural Highways Related to Speedj

Dri;’er, and Vehicle (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce,

Bureau of Public Roads, July 1964).

Judging the speed suitable for road conditions is

a complex task with a high potential for miscalculation, especially for drivers of heavy vehicles. A

detailed investigation of the role of human factors

in truck accidents in Finland points to failure in controlling the vehicle, in estimating the traffic situation, and in perception as the principal causes when

human error is cited as the primary factor. Driver

attitude and the physical or mental state of the

driver emerge as key accident characteristics when

human error is given as a secondary cause.’

‘1.U. Stocker, “Statistical Analysis of HFV Accidents,” Symposium

on rhe Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Traffic Accidents, op. cit.,

footnote 7, vol. 1, p. 2-26.

DRIVER PERFORMANCE

Speed figures prominently among driver-related

factors in accidents. Where details are given on truck

accident report forms (45 percent of the time in the

National Accident Sampling System (NASS) from

the years 1981-85), the most frequently cited include

driving too fast for conditions, poor lane changes,

and following too closely. (See figure 4-5.) An analysis of heavy truck at-fault collision reports in Oregon indicates that the principal causes cited are improper maneuvers, speed too fast for conditions, and

driver fatigue and inattention. ’O Motor Carrier

Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) records show

that several States have found excessive speed to

be the most frequent human factor involved in accident causation. For example, Maryland, Massa1(’Oregon Public Utility Commissioner, 1984 Truck Znspecrions and

Truck Accidents in Oregon (Salem, OR: July 1985).
89

0 10 20 30

Percent of accidents

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident

Sampling System data, 1981-85.

chusetts, Washington, and Oregon cite speeding as

the most common accident causation factor.11

The frequencies of types of driver error for truck

drivers in truck accidents in Washington State are

shown in table 4-2. Areas of poor performance by

the truck driver include inattention, exceeding reasonable speed, following too closely, and improper

turning maneuvers.

Driver Training

Analysis of NASS data for the years 1981-85 indicates that training received by drivers of heavy

vehicles involved in accidents is an important factor. Although data are limited, it appears that the

majority of all heavy truck drivers have not received

extensive or appropriate training.

~~~OcO~ Ca~rler Safety Assistance Program, Annual Reporr (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1986).

Table 4.2.—Accident Causes Assigned in

State of Washington Truck Crashes in 1984

Number of times Percent of

Causal factora

assigned accidents

Driver errors:

Inattention. . . . . . . . . . . . 1,128 22

Failure to yield right-ofway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513 10

Exceeding reasonable

speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 670 13

Alcohol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 1

Disregard stop

sign/signal . . . . . . . . . . 58

Following too closely . . 277 5

Exceeding stated

speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 1

Over center line . . . . . . . 120 2

Improper passing . . . . . . 71 1

Improper turn . . . . . . . . . 271 5

Apparently asleep . . . . . 62

Drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 l b

Failed to signal . . . . . . . 22 —

Disregard warning

sign/signal . . . . . . . . . . 25 —

Improper parking

location . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 —

Improper signal . . . . . . . 10 —

No lights/failed

to dim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 —

Deficient equipment 343 7

Other violations 606 12

No violation 1,674 33

Total accidents. . . . . . 5,051

aThe num~r of causal factors does not equal the number of total accidents

because several causal factors are assigned in some accidents

bLess than 1 percent.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988, based on data from the

Washington Utilities and Transpoflation Commission, and the National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

In an investigation of 35 accidents involving double trailers, the National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB) reported that the most common

training given to drivers consisted of instructions

on how to connect the combination units. No driver

in the sample had received appropriate, specialized

instruction on handling characteristics unique to

twin-trailer operations.12 OTA research indicates

that training provided through schools and carriers

varies tremendously in quality and duration. Some

carriers prefer to hire drivers with over-the-road ex-

‘zNational Tranqwtation Safety Board, unpublished remarks based

on research for the NTSB Heavy Truck Study, presented at the National Motor Carrier Safety Y4’orkshop, Washington, DC, Mar. 11,

1987.
90

perience, rather than hiring inexperienced drivers

regardless of training. For further discussion of this

important issue, see chapter 6.

Previous Driving History

Heavy vehicle drivers involved in accidents often

have received citations for previous safety violations,

particularl y for speeding and other moving violations, and have been involved in previous accidents.

Over 40 percent of truck drivers involved in accidents had at least one prior speeding conviction in

the previous 3 years. OTA’s comparison of NASS

(1981-85) and the Federal Accident Reporting System (FARS) (1983) data revealed little difference in

the previous violation and accident records of truck

drivers involved in nonfatal and fatal accidents.

Drugs and Alcohol

Truck accident reports often show a low percentage of convictions for driving while intoxicated

among truck drivers. Because of the importance of

good driver performance for safety and the lack of

data on drugs as contributors to accidents, NTSB

is conducting a study of fatal truck accidents to determine the extent of driver impairment by alcohol

and drugs. The study is expected to be completed

in 1989.

Heavy vehicle drivers themselves perceive driver

drug and alcohol abuse to be relatively frequent. In

a 1986 survey sponsored by the Regular Common

Carrier Conference of 1,319 long-haul, tractor-trailer

truck drivers in Florida,13 drivers were asked their

perception of drug and alcohol use. The average respondent estimated that 36 percent of fellow drivers

sometimes drive under the influence of drugs, and

18 percent of drivers sometimes drive under the influence of alcohol.

OTA analysis of NASS data indicated that alcohol involvement and accident severity are strongly

related. Figure 4-6 shows the severity of injuries as

a function of drinking by heavy vehicle drivers. The

relationship between drinking and accident severity suggests that alcohol alone is a major factor in

fatal accidents.

1]R. Beilock, 1986 Motor Carrier Stiety Survey (Alexandria, VA:

Regular Common Carrier Conference, 1987).

Figure 4-6.—injury Severity in Heavy Truck Accidents

Relative to Truck Driver Drinking

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Injury

m

Drinking involved

severity

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident

Sampling System data, 1981-85,

Age and Experience

Young and inexperienced truck drivers exhibit the

highest risk of accidents,14 with those under 25

years of age six times more likely than other heavy

1qI.J. Jones and H.S. Stein, Effects of Driver Hours of Service on

Tractor-Trailer Crash Involvement (Washington, DC: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, September 1987) p. 11; M.J. Sanders, Canyon Research Group, Inc., “A Nationwide Survey of Truck and Bus

Drivers,” unpublished manuscript, March 1977; and P. Green et al.,

University of Michigan, “Accidents and the Nighttime Conspicuity

of Trucks,” unpublished manuscript, January 1980.
91

truck drivers to be involved in an accident.15 Drivers with less than 1 year of experience constitute

1 percent of the carrier work force, yet account for

3 percent of the accidents.l6

Fatigue

Fatigue reduces a driver’s sensorial and motor capacities. Research has shown that truck drivers are

susceptible to both sudden fatigue, due to temporary

irregularities of the sleep cycle, and accumulated fatigue, due to long working hours.

Significant increases in driver errors and decreases

in alertness have been noted as early as the fourth

hour of shift driving time and generally increase

throughout the trip, except for a slight recovery near

the end of a trip.17 The lowest levels of alertness

occur for most drivers between 2:00 a.m. and 7:00

a.m. Moreover, the adverse effects of prolonged driving are probably more pronounced for drivers aged

45 or older than for young drivers. 18 Drivers on irregular schedules experience more fatigue than

drivers on regular schedules, and the effects occur

earlier. 19 A recent study using a case-control design

to establish comparable samples for 300 truck

crashes indicated that the relative risk of crash involvement for truck drivers driving more than 8

hours is almost twice that for drivers driving fewer

hours. 20 Moreover, drivers using a sleeper cab for

rest periods experience greater fatigue than relay

drivers.21

‘;K.D. Hackman et al. (eds.), Ana)ysis of Accicienr Data and Hburs

of Service of Interstate Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers (Washington, DC: U.S. Bpartment of Transportation, Ftderal Highway Administration, August 1978).

“Jovanis, op. cit., footnote 5.

‘TWilliam Harris et al., Human Factors Research, Inc., A Study of

the Relationships Among Fatigue, Hours of Service, and Safery of Operations of Truck and Bus Drivers (Washington, DC: U.S. D.e~~rtment

of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, November 1972).

1‘Ibid.

‘“Robert T. Mackie and James C. Miller, Human Factors Research,

Inc., Effects of Hours of Service, Regularity of Schedules and Cargo

Loading on Truck andl?us Driver Fatigue (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, October 1978).

‘pJones and Stein, op. cit., footnote 14.

‘

) Mackie and Miller, op. cit., footnote 19; and Robin P. Hertz,

“Sleeper Berth Use as a Risk Factor for Tractor-Trailer Driver Fatality, ” presented to American Association for Automotive Medicine, New

Orleans, LA, September 1987.

Accident data involving interstate commercial

motor vehicle drivers show fatigue-classified accidents as proportionally higher during the hours between 11:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m., suggesting an impact due to circadian rhythm (see figure 4-7).22

NTSB also notes fatigue or hours-of-service violation as a factor in over 30 percent of its accident

investigations. 23 Long hours of driver duty time,

some as long as 26-31 consecutive hours prior to accidents, have been documented, often a result of

carrier dispatch, delivery, or other requirements.

Road and vehicle visibility are major contributing

factors to accidents when a driver is fatigued, as is

speed too fast for conditions.

A study of truck drivers in France found that fatigue is a major problem for drivers on the road for

several days in a row. These drivers worked as fre2~Hackman et al., op. cit., feotnote 15.

~~National Transportation Safety Board, op. cit., footnote 12, p. 2.

Figure 4-7.—Relationship of Driver Fatigue

to Accidents, by Hour of Day

t I

I

-- -Accidents classified

as non fatigue related

— Accidents classified

as fatigue related

I 1 I 1 I I I I I I i I I I I I I I I I i I

3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12

a m pm

Hour of day

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, adapted from K.D. Hackman et al,

(eds.), Analysis of Accident Data and Hours of Service of /rrterstate

Cornrnercia/ Motor Ve/rlc/e Drivers (Washington, DC: U.S. Department

of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, August 1978),

87-004 0 - 88 - 3
92

quently as other drivers during the day, yet remained on duty, driving and performing other tasks

after normal business hours. This pattern led to both

sudden fatigue and accumulated fatigue.24 The

study used a survey of truck driving patterns to

~qPatrick Hamelin, “Truck Driver’s Involvement in Traffic Accidents

as Related to Their Shiftworks and Professional Features, ” Symposium

on the Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Traffic Accidents, op. cit.,

footnote 7, vol. 2, p. 3-107.

measure exposure; periods of high accident risk were

determined by comparing accidents with exposure.

Data indicate that accident involvement rates generally increase throughout the day, reaching peaks

at mealtimes, at the end of the afternoon, into the

evening, and late at night. A risk peak in the first

hour of any shift has been reported by other heavy

truck safety research.25

“jovanis, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 8,

VEHICLE FACTORS

Vehicle design and performance affect truck

safety, just as maintenance and operating practices

do. Design and performance issues involve brake

system capabilities, handling and stability, vehicle

crashworthiness, and truck occupant protection.

Maintenance practices include preventive maintenance as well as replacement of inoperable or worn

parts. Vehicle operating practices include cargo loading, cargo tiedown, overall weight, and weight distribution.

The role of vehicle factors in an accident may be

more subtle than that of the driver. While vehicle

factors may not precipitate a crash, they can reduce

the vehicle’s performance capabilities below the

threshold where safety can be maintained when traffic or roadway conditions require an emergency maneuver. These factors thus play a significant role in

highway environments, such as heavy traffic, steep

grades, curves, or narrow roadways, where peak vehicle performance is needed.

The subtleties of the role of the vehicle in accidents are emphasized in Oregon accident records

for heavy trucks. Vehicle defects were cited as the

accident cause in only 6.7 percent of all cases.26

However, when truck at-fault accidents were disaggregate, over 20 percent were linked to mechanical defects, highlighting the potential for vehicle factors in preventing accidents as well as for mitigating

severity.

Problems associated with vehicle equipment show

up in MCSAP inspection reports. Although the

number of out-of-service citations resulting from vehicle inspections varies among States, a significant

‘hOregon Public Utility Commissioner, op. cit., footnote 10.

number of trucks (ranging from 30 to 60 percent)

are placed out of service for equipment violations

immediately. 27

Braking Systems

Defective brakes were the most common equipment violation cited in the MCSAP reports, followed by poor lighting and tire condition. Brake system failures were the single largest group of causes

cited for large truck accidents associated with mechanical defects, constituting 31 percent of the —

total.28

The nature of brake problems has been documented in greater detail by the Oregon Public Utility

Commission, 29 which found that over 60 percent

of all violations related to brakes being out of adjustment; another 14 percent related to problems

with the brake lining. Therefore, roughly three of

every four brake-related citations identified problems that normal brake maintenance could easily

detect and correct. NTSB’s investigations reveal that

in many cases the truck driver had responsibility

for proper brake adjustment, but the carrier had not

required or furnished appropriate training.3 0

~;The process of selecting vehicles for inspection varies among

States. Out-of-service citations are likely to be high (greater than 50

percent) when the selection process is nonrandom, based on inspecting vehicles that outwardly appear to have problems. Random selection yields out-of-service citation rates closer to 30 percent. Paul

Melander, Tennessee Public Service Commission, personal communication, Mar. 23, 1988.

‘~Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, 1976-1978 Analysis ofhfotor Carrier Accidents Involving Vehicfe Defects of Mmhanical Failure (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, November 1979).

‘~oregon Public Utility Commissioner, op. cit., footnote 10.

~~)National Transportation Safety Board, opi cit., footnote 12, P. 3.
93

Poor brake adjustment and maintenance coupled

with sudden braking or other avoidance maneuvers

can increase the possibility of jackknifing,31 a significant problem as shown in figure 4-8. Jackknifing potential is exacerbated by wet road conditions 32 and is especially prevalent among lightly

loaded or empty vehicles.33 A comparison of accident-involved articulated vehicles from the NASS

(1981-85) and FARS (1983) databases does not, however, show jackknifing to be overrepresented in fatal accidents.

“Jackknifing 1s also discussed in ch. 5.

‘~H.S. Stein and 1.]. Jones, Crash involvement ofbrge Trucks by

Configurat~on: A Case Conrrol Srudy (Washington, DC: Insurance

Institute for Hlghwav Safetv, January 1987).

“C. Winkler et al., Parametr~c Analysls of Heat’y Duty Truck Dvnam~c Stablliry, Report No. DOT-HS%06-411 (Vrashington, DC: U.S.

Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, h4arch 1983).

Braking and

steering

Steering

Other

I I I

o 10 20 30 40

Percent of Jackknifesa

These numbers do not add to 100 since some

jackknifes are attributed to multiple maneuvers.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident

Sampling System data, 1981-85

Tires

Data from Oregon indicate that in 1984, 9.9 percent of truck at-fault collisions were attributed to

mechanical causes, although for single-vehicle truck

crashes 21 percent were attributed to mechanical

causes and 24 percent of these to tires. Other data

indicate tires to be the second leading cause of

crashes in which mechanical defects were primary

contributing factors. ~4

Tires have not been examined as extensively as

other factors as a cause of accidents. Tire specialists

indicate that a single tire blowout—even on the

steering axle—should not result in total loss of control by the driver, unless other circumstances or

equipment problems exist. Looseness in the steering system, striking a curb, or panic braking may,

in combination with a blowout, cause the driver to

lose control. Because specifying an accident cause

is complicated, and the tire blowout is easily remembered and identified,35 it is difficult to determine

whether a blowout preceded a crash or occurred as

a result of it.

Rollovers and Vehicle Handl

and Stability

Rollovers often occur on curved roads, :

ing

and vehicle factors include handling characteristics and sta-

‘~ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Big Trucks (V’ashington,

DC: 1985).

‘Christopher G. Shapeley, “A Comparison of Car and Truck

Safet ~,” presented at the American Societv of Ci\’il Engineers Symposium on Accommodation of Trucks on the Highv’av: Safety in Design, Nashville, TN, May 11, 1988.

Photo credit: Michael Hines, OTA staff

Vehicle handling skills are challenged when drivers

transport especially wide loads.
94

bility as well as load shifting, deficient brakes, and

deficient tires. (For information on roadway contributory factors see chapter 5.) Driver-related factors include inattention, falling asleep, loss-of-control/skidding, speeding, and avoidance maneuvers.

Operational factors, such as unbalanced cargo loads

and trailer loads with high centers of gravity, also

affect vehicle stability.

Poor handling and vehicle instability often lead

to vehicle rollovers, which, in turn, strongly correlate with accident severity. Rollovers are more likely

to be associated with accidents involving a driver

fatality relative to all heavy truck accidents (see figure 4-9). OTA’s NASS (1981-85) and FARS (1983)

analyses also show that rollovers occur in 7.6 percent of all heavy truck accidents, but are a characFigure 4-9.—Tractors Involved in Fatal Accidents,

Rollover

onIy

a) Frontal

and

rollover

Other

by Type of Collision

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Percent

a

Percentage of all tractor accidents.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessmentj 19SS; based on Motor Vehicle

Manufacturers Association data, 1987.

teristic of 16.5 percent of truck accidents involving

a fatality. Other studies substantiate the relationship between rollover and fatal accidents36 and

show that the risk of injury is higher in rollover accidents involving a single vehicle relative to multiplevehicle accidents.37

Rollovers are a particularly acute problem for

double-trailer combinations. Although the sample

of doubles accidents in the NASS database is quite

small, the incidence of rollovers in doubles accidents

is very high. Studies show that doubles are three

to four times more likely to overturn than singles

in noncollision accidents 38 and that rollover

occurred in close to 70 percent of twin-trailer accidents. The most common occurrence was rollover

of the rear trailer.39

Override/Underride

When accidents occur between large trucks and

cars, the mismatch between truck and car bumper

heights causes trucks to override smaller vehicles or

smaller vehicles to underride trucks. Override/

underride accidents occur more frequently at night,

when darkness reduces visibility for all drivers. Figure 4-10 shows that the override/underride prob-

~hNational Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Truck Qcupanr

Projection, Prepred in response to the Motor Carrier Safety Act of

1984 (Washington, DC: December 1986).

‘;Stein and Jones, op. cit., footnote 32, p. 13.

‘*Oliver Carsten, “U.S. Accident Experience of Single and Double

Trailer Combinations,” Symposium on the Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Trafi”c Accidents, op. cit., footnote 7, vol. 1, p. 2-80, table 5.

‘qNational Transportation Safetv Board, op. cit., footnote 12, p. 1.

Photo credit: Land Line

Flatbed trailers are particularly difficult to see, creating

the potential for severe underride accidents.
95

Figure 4-10.—Accidents and Override/Underride in

Reduced Lighting Conditions, by Truck Type

Platform

Dropframe

Livestock

carrier

al Dumptruck

Q%

x Closed

u top van

Refrigerator

Tank

Garbage

Tractor

(no trailer

1 1

All accidents

/

Override underride

accidents

I I

o 1,000 2,000 3,000

Number of accidents

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident

Sampling System data, 1981-85.

lem is greater for dump trucks, closed-top vans, or

flatbed or platform trailers; platform trailers present

the most problems.40

A comparison between fatal and nonfatal car-intotruck accidents shows that fatalities occur more frequently in underride accidents, including many from

contact with the side of the truck. Trucks and

trailers with devices to prevent underride were more

likely to be involved in nonfatal accidents,41 highlighting the value of such protection.

Truck Configuration and Utilization

Accident rates and types vary for straight and

combination trucks, for single- and double-trailer

“’Motor Vehicle Manufacturer’s Association, Proceedings of the A’atjona] Truck Safety Symposium (M’ashington, DC: June 1987), PP. 85-

86; Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Moror Truck Research

(N’ashington, DC: November 1985).

41 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Motor Truck R==h J

op. cit., footnote 40, pp. 7, 9.

operations, and for loaded and empty trucks. The

operating characteristics and contributing factors—

the number of powered axles, cab configuration,

type of trailer, type of cargo, trip length, time of day,

road type, and driver age and experience-differ for

every accident. Each factor needs to be considered

independently and interactively in any comprehensive analysis.42 In fact, for single-trailer operation

alone, involvement rates differed significantly by

trailer type and location, as shown in table 4-3.

Table 4-4 shows fatal accident involvement percentages (truck driver and other vehicle driver) by

truck body type for combination trucks. These data

underscore the overinvolvement of tank trucks and

the relative severity of dump truck collisions for the

other vehicle driver.

The relative safety of single- and double-trailer

combination trucks is highly controversial, and several studies have examined their relative risks. Each

study differs in methodology and sources of data,

making a comprehensive and coherent assessment

difficult. For example, studies of truck accidents on

turnpikes permit consistent accident and exposure

information because the intercity operations of doubles are adequately represented. However, the restriction to turnpike operation eliminates consideration of the entire trip from origin to destination.

National studies do not allow control for geographic

location and roadway type. Thus, study results have

varied due primarily to: 1) differences in exposure

survey methods and uncertainties in the resulting

estimates of exposure, 2) unreliable and missing ac-

‘:T. Chirachavala and J. O’Day, A Comparison of Accident Characteristics and Rates for Combination Vehicles ~~ith One or Two

Trailers, Report No. UM-HSRI-81-41 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of

Michigan, August 1981).

Table 4-3.—Single-Trailer Involvement Rate

(per 100 million vehicle-miles)

Trailer type Local Intercity

Van . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168.0 75.9

Flatbed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69.9 106.8

Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142.2 78.1

Auto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241.6 73.6

Dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46.1 33.1

SOURCE: T. Chirachavala and J. O’Day, A CornparlsorI of AccMent Characteristics and Rates for Combination Vehicles With One or Two Trailers,

Report No. UM-HSRI-81-41 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, August

1981),
Table 4-4.—Distribution of Combination-Unit Truck Mileage and

Fatal Accident Involvements by Body Type, in Texas

Percent of Percent of “other vehicle”

combination-unit driver fatalities occurring

Percent of truck driver in collisions with

Body type miles traveled fatalities combination-unit trucks

Van . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.5 28.1 24.5

Platform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.2 25.2 27.8

Tank a 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.0 33.0 20.8

Dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 3.0 11.1

Pole/log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 0.7 1.9

Livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 6.7 8.0

All others. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 3.3 5.9

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0b100.0 100.0

alncludes dry bulk, liquid, and gas.

bsum does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

SOURCES: Truck Inventory and Use Survey/Texas 1982 and Texas State Accident Data (1981-1983); National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration

cident data, 3) differences in the definition of an accident and/or large truck, 4) differences in vehicle

classification survey methods, 5) differences in driving environment, and 6) inherent stochastic variation associated with small samples.43 Despite these

variations, a summary of study results to date

follows.

Using accident and exposure data during 1966-

70 on the Indiana Toll Road, one study concluded

that doubles had a significantly lower involvement

rate than did singles.44 However, doubles had

more injuries or fatalities per accident than singles.

No effort was made to separate these data by rural

or urban location.

In 1977, an FHWA study analyzed the accident

experience of seven large motor carriers for a 7-year

period and found no significant differences between

accident and severity rates of singles and doubles.45

The carriers surveyed were among the largest common and private carriers in the country; no attempt

was made to control for different operating environments.

A followup study conducted by FHWA in 1978,

using data from California, found that the only sig-

‘JG.A. Sparks and J. B[elka, “Large Truck Accidcnr Experience in

Western Canada: A Case Study of Two Large Fleets,” .svmposiumon

rhe Role of Heatrv Freight Vehicles in Traffic Accidents, op. cit., footnote 7.

‘+R.E. Scott and ]. O’Day, Srarisrical Anal\’sis of Truck Accident

lnvo)~’ernenr, Final Report (Ann Arbor, MI: Highway Safety Research

Institute, December 1971).

~5Federal Highltay Administration, Safety c~mp~ris~fl ofD~ub~t’s

Versus Tractor Semi-Tra~ler Operatmn (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1977).

nificant difference in doubles and singles involvement rates on a vehicle-mile basis, was a higher fatality rate for doubles. 46 However, when a

cargo-based exposure measure (ton-miles) is used,

the higher tonnage capability of doubles results in

a higher accident rate and injury rate for singles.

Although there were problems with the accuracy

of the exposure estimates in this study, the findings

illustrate some of the differences in the way this topic

is viewed.

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety used

a case-control study design to account for differences

in operating characteristics between singles and doubles. 47 The study concluded that doubles are two

to three times more likely to be involved in accidents than other large trucks on the same type of

roadway. This approach preselected locations where

accidents have already occurred, perhaps for reasons unrelated to vehicle configuration. The study’s

findings have generated substantial controversy.

Other controlled studies have been conducted for

a less-than-truckload carrier by Northwestern

University. % Using over 160 traffic links connecting terminal pairs served by both singles and doubles in 1983 and 1984, the studies found no statistically conclusive evidence of differences between the

*H McGee ~ al., Comparison of California Accident Rates for Single and Double Tractor-Trailer Combination Trucks, Report No.

FHWA-RD-78-94 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, March 1978).

~:steln and Jones, op. cit., footnote 32.

“Jovanis, op. cit., footnote 5.
97

accident rates of singles and doubles. A similar study

conducted for OTA corroborated these findings;

moreover, after an initial driver learning period, the

doubles safety record improved sufficiently to exceed that of the singles.49

An extensive Transportation Research Board

study of the relative safety of single- versus doubletrailer trucks concluded that doubles have slightly

more accident involvements per mile traveled than

singles operated under identical conditions at highway speeds. 50 This and other studies indicate that

considerable differences exist in single- and doubletrailer accident involvement rates by road type, emphasizing the importance of the operating environment as well as the configuration of the truck.51 

Accident rates for articulated trucks exceed those

for straight trucks by factors of three to four, depending on location and road conditions.52 The

consequences of articulated truck accidents are more

serious as well. While single-unit trucks have nonfatal accident rates comparable to nonfatal accident

rates for combination trucks (see table 4-5), their

rate of involvement in fatal accidents is considerably lower.53;

Whether the tractor is operating as a bobtail (not

pulling a trailer) or attached to a semitrailer also affects accident rates. Bobtails are 14 times more likely

+ ‘P.P. Jovanls and I. Zabaneh, ‘

{ Anaiysis of Carrier-Based Safetv

Data,” OTA contractor rept>rK, February 1W!8.

“’Transportation Research Board, Tt{ln Trailer Trucks, TRB Special Report 211 (Washington, DC: National Research Council, 1986).

“Car\tcn, op. cit., footn(xe 18.

‘

: Stein and ]onei, op. cit., footnote 32, p. 9.

“Natmnal Hlgh\\al Traffic Safetv Administration, op. cit., footnote

36.

Table 4-5.—Vehicle Involvement Rates in Fatal

and Nonfatal Accidents in 1984

Combination- Single-unit

unit trucks trucks

Vehicles in fatal accidents . . . 4,232 956

Vehicle involvements in fatal

accidents (per 100 million

vehicle-miles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 1.8

vehicle involvements in

nonfatal accidents (per 100

million vehicle-miles) . . . . . . 279.0 299.0

SOURCES” National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Fatal Accident

Reporting System, National Accident Sampling Systems, Federal

Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, Truck Inventory and Use

Survey

to be involved in a fatal accident, and their injury

involvement rate is 19 times greater than for the

tractor-semitrailer configuration.5q In addition,

empty tractor-semitrailer trucks are more likely to

be involved in crashes than fully loaded trucks.’i

This is probably due to the difficulty in maintaining control when braking empty or partially loaded

tractor-trailers. (See chapter 5, figure 5-3.)

Truck Occupant Protection

Less than 1 percent of all medium and heavy truck

occupants involved in accidents are killed, and only

10 percent are injured.56 Nevertheless, truck driving is considered a relatively dangerous occupation.

Table 4-6 shows fatality rates for selected occupations, indicating that truck driving and mining are

the most dangerous industrial occupations.

A truck driver wearing a seat belt is much less

likely to be injured or suffer severe injury in an accident, primarily because he is less likely to be

thrown out of the cab by the impact. The majority

of truck drivers (76 percent) involved in accidents

were not wearing seat belts, as shown in figure 4-

11.7 FARS (1984) data indicate that total or partial ejection was involved in 38 percent of

combination-unit truck occupant fatalities. Truck

occupants were also ejected after an accident more

frequently than were passenger car occupants (25

percent). 58

Entrapment, cab crush, and contact with interior

surfaces have serious consequences for truck occupants who remain in the cab during an accident.

A study of truck occupants in rural accidents identified ejection and steering-assembly contact as the

leading sources of injury, followed by contact with

54K, Campbell and O. Carsten, Fleet Accident E\’aluarlon of

FMVSS 121, Report No. DT-HS-806-261 (Vrashlngton, DC: L1. S. Department of Transportation, National Highwa} Traffic Safetv Administration, August 1981).

55Stein and Jones, op. cit., footnote 32, p. 11.

~Naticlna] Highway Traffic safety Administration, op. ~lt., footnote

36.

‘;This contrasts somewhat with the safety belt use rate for truck

drivers not involved in accidents. A nonobtrusive sur\c} of safety belt

usc among combination-unit truck drivers revealed that over 93 percent were not using their belts. P. Alhson and R. Tarklr, “Heavy Truck

Occupant Restraint Use, ” prepared for the National Highu’ay Traffic

Safetv Adm]nlstratlon, September 1982.

‘+~’atlonal Hlgh\\ay Traffic Safet~ Admlnlstratlon, op. cit., footm}te

36, p. 14.
98

Table 4-6.-Occupational Fatalities in 1984

Industry group Workers (x 103

) Deaths a Deaths/10 8 workers

All industries . . . . . . . . . . . . 104,300 11,500 11

Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,000 1,200 5

Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . 19,900 1,100 6

Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28,900 1,900 4

Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,900 1,400 9

Transportation and public

utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,500 1,500 27

Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,700 2,200 39

Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,400 1,600 46

Truck drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,876b 1,087C 58

Mining, quarrying . . . . . . . . 1,000 600 60

aNatlOnal safety council, Accident F8cts 7*.

bus, Depa~ment of Labor, Employment arrd ~arfl~flgs, ~anuarY f~.

cFederal Accident Reporting SySt&m, IW.

SOURCE: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

the windshield and the door area.59 A study of injury patterns of fatally injured truck drivers con59H. Robinson et al., Trucks in Rural Injury Accidents, NHTSA Report No. HS-800-232 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, July 1969,

Figure 4=11 .—Truck Driver Seat Belt Use,

by Injury Severity

No injury

Possible

injury

L

Non -

incapacitating

~

injury

Incapacitating

injury

Fatality

❑ No belt used

o 20 40 60 80 100

Percent of injuries

Lap bel t

used

❑ Lap/shoulder Unknow n

belt used restraint

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident

Sampling System data, 1981-85.

eluded that severe abdominal injuries in combination with head and/or chest injuries were more likely

among combination-unit truck drivers than among

drivers of other truck types.60 The nature of these

injuries suggests the steering wheel is particularly

dangerous. The steering wheel was also identified

as the most prominent source of injury in an analysis of 124 accidents involving Volvo trucks in

Sweden. 61

Some information is available on the relative

safety of cab-over-engine units (COE) and conventional cabs. For example, the risk of injury to a COE

driver is 15 percent higher, and the risk of injury

to the nontruck driver slightly lower, when a COE

is involved.62 FARS data show that COEs have a

greater involvement in accidents in which a fatality occurs as well as in accidents involving a truckdriver fatality.

The initial stimulus for the COE design was Federal length restrictions that are no longer in effect.

Many drivers claim COEs have poorer ride quality

and increased vibration that cause discomfort and

fatigue.

b~~. Karlson et al., “Fatally Injured Truck Drivers,” Proceedings of

the 21st Conference of the American Association of Automotive Medicine (Arlington Heights, IL: American Association of Automotive Medicine, September 1977).

blA. Anderson et al. “Injuries in Trucks and the Effectiveness of

Seat Belts,” Proceedings of the 24th Conference of the American Association ofAutornotive Medicine (Arlington Heights, IL: American Association of Automotive Medicine, October 1980).

‘zMotor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, op. cit., footnote 41,

p. 11.
99

SAFETY OF NON REGULATED CARRIERS

A substantial safety concern has been the lack of

Federal regulatory oversight of carriers operating exclusivel y in commercial zones and in other federally exempt categories. Analysis of NASS (1981-85)

data indicates that nearly two out of every five accidents involve a heavy truck belonging to a carrier that is not Interstate Commerce Commission

(ICC)-regulated. Oregon officials report that in 1984

the highest at-fault accident rate belonged to ICCexempt, interstate carriers.63

Figure 4-12 shows the age distribution of heavy

trucks involved in accidents. Differences in the quality of various truck operations are also apparent

“’Oregon Public L’tillty Commissioner, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 39.

Figure 4-12.—Vehicle Age by Regulatory Status

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

1

i

-i

Age, in years

(6.8)” aEstimated average age, in years.

KEY DOT = Department of Transportation; ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident

Sampling System data, 1981-85

when examining Federal roadside inspection data.

Table 4-7 shows that ICC-exempt carriers have

somewhat higher violation rates than other carriers

and slightly more serious safety problems. Systematic interpretation is impossible because of numerous changes in recent years in coverage by ICC regulations and in the application of Federal safety

regulations to previously exempt carriers.

Roadside inspections can serve as effective accident prevention measures. A 10-year California

State study found a clear inverse relationship between the number of roadside inspections and the

number of truck at-fault accidents.64 (See figure 4-

13.) Although other factors undoubtedly influenced

operations over the study period, the apparent correlation between increased enforcement activities and

on-the-road safety improvement is hard to ignore.

“Callfornia Highway Patrol, Crirical Zrem Znspecrion Fac-r Sheet

(Sacramento, CA: 1986).

Figure 4-13.—Truck Inspection and Truck Accident

Rates for California State Highways, 1976-85

95

90

85

80

75

70

65

60

55

50

●

●

0

# ‘t — Inspection s

0 ,

0

# I ~ . - ---- Accident s

t

I I I I I 1 I I I (

1976 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

Year

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; adapted from California Highway Patrol/State of California Public Utilities Commission, Joint Legislative Report on Truck Safety (San Francisco, CA: November 1987), p. 37
100

Table 4-7.—BMCS Roadside Inspection of All Carriers (in percent)

ICC-authorized Private ICC-exempt other

1983

Without violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 25 28

With violations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 75 72

Out-of-service violations. . . . . . . . . . . 28 25 32

1984

Without violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 21 20

With violations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 79 80

Out-of-service violations. . . . . . . . . . . 31 29 36

KEY: BMCS = Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety.

ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission

SOURCE: Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, BMCS Annual Roadside Inspection IW.3 and 1984 (Washington, DC: September 1985).

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The U.S. trucking industry represents a diverse

mix of carriers, drivers, and truck owners operating with a broad range of safety practices and levels

of management control. Some limited evidence links

the amount of motor carrier investment in safetyrelated activities to the firm’s overall financial condition. One examination of for-hire, general freight

carriers found that the average carrier that eventually goes bankrupt spends less on safety and maintenance, has older equipment, and depends more

on owner-operators.65 However, the basis for this

finding was not a comparison of accident rates to

carrier profitability, but rather a comparison of expenditures related to safety performance to a

weighted combination of financial ratios. Moreover,

studies of this kind are hampered by the scarcity

of industry financial data maintained by ICC, particularly for new entrants. Furthermore, ICC is eliminating requirements for detailed financial reports

from those carriers who must still submit records.

The question of whether driver speeding is related

to the method of compensation extended to drivers

has been hotly debated. Undeniably, drivers paid

by the job have an economic incentive to speed to

produce more revenue-generating trips within a

given time period. However, numerous other factors affect a driver’s desire to speed. Figure 4-14

shows the relationship between carrier classification

and speeding violations among truck drivers involved in accidents. Although speeding is prevalent

across all segments of the carrier industry, excessive

“5G. Chow, “Deregulation, Financial Condition and Safety in the

General Freight Trucking Industry,” presented at the Northwestern

University Conference on Economic Deregulation and Safety, Evanston, IL, June 1987.

speeding is more frequently found among ICCexempt and for-hire carriers according to accident

data. Leased drivers have the highest incidence of

previous speeding violations and previous license

suspensions and revocations. Furthermore, the

Figure 4.14.—Percentage of Trucks That Speed,

by Carrier Classification

Private

Non -

commercial

o 10 20 30 40

Percent

aMar@t share in percent.

KEY: ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 198B; based on National Accident

Sampling System data, 1981-85.
101

NASS (1981-85) data show that leased drivers and

drivers operating for ICC-exempt carriers are disproportionately involved in drunk driving accidents.

The validity of these figures is difficult to establish

because of the relatively small sample size and because NASS data do not have well-defined driver

or carrier classification categories.66 Furthermore, it

The National Accident Sampling System driver classifications are

is difficult to delineate the class of driver on a specific trip because the same driver could be leased

or not leased in different driver classifications and

may drive in many different types of operations during the year.

somewhat confusing, since the classification categories do not appear

to be mutually exclusive (e.g., an owner-operator could be trip leased

in some instances).

ENFORCEMENT

State terminal audits conducted as part of the

MCSAP program raise important carrier management safety issues. In Arizona, for instance, the three

most common carrier violations are: 1) failure to

maintain driver qualification files, 2) hours-of-service

violations, and 3) failure to maintain inspection, repair, and maintenance records. Officials familiar

with Oregon’s audit results concluded that carriers

do not comply with the requirements because of a

lack of knowledge or understanding of the regulations as applied to their operations. Moreover, even

when the regulations are understood, the cost of

noncompliance is so low that it is not an effective

deterrent. These findings point to the need for a better education and enforcement program.

In Michigan, a direct link has been established

between driver qualifications, hours of service, and

vehicle operations and commercial vehicle accidents.

Making compliance with driver qualification procedures a direct responsibility of carriers has proven

to be an effective accident prevention tool.67

‘

; Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program quarterly and annual

reports.

ROADWAY ENVIRONMENT

Roadway environment factors are often listed incidentally on many accident reports. Road design/

geometry, weather, lighting conditions, traffic conflict opportunity, and operating speeds can all create conditions that are unforgiving of errors, making an accident more likely.

Road Type

The functional class of the roadway has a profound impact on heavy truck involvement rates for

both fatal and nonfatal accidents68 (see table 4-8).

A similar relationship between rural/urban and Interstate/other roadway fatality rates appears in a corroborating study, although the magnitudes differ

somewhat.69

Figure 4-15 depicts frequencies of heavy truck accidents and fatal heavy truck accidents by road clas-

“U. S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, “Monitoring Operations of Larger Dimension Vehicles Report,”

unpublished manuscript, Jan. 14, 1987.

~qCarsten, op. cit., footnote 38, table 5.

sification. Of particular significance is the proportion of heavy truck, fatal accidents (relative to all

large truck accidents) that occur on U.S. and State

highways, particularly rural, non-Interstates. Some

characteristics of these roads create the potential for

severe accidents.

Table 4-8.—Single-Trailer Accident Involvement Rates

by Highway Functional Class

Involvement rates

(per 100 mvm)

Nonfatal

Functional class Fatal injury

Rural Interstate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.87 25.53

Rural-other principal artery. . . . . . 3.80 31.43

Rural minor arterial . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.49 41.65

Rural major collector. . . . . . . . . . . 13.67 50.12

Urban Interstate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.23 52.73

Urban-other principal artery . . . . . 9.52 103.41

Urban local . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.79 55.59

KEY: mvm = million vehicle-miles,

SOURCE: Federal Highway Administration, “Monitoring Operations of Larger

Dimension Vehicles Report, ” Jan. 14, 1987.
102

Figure 4-15.— — Fatal Truck Accidents

State

highway

U s .

highway

Interstate

Country

roa d

Other

by Road Classification

o 10 20 30 40

Percent

apercent of all truck accidents.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on Nationai Accident

Sampling System data, 1981-85 and Fatal Accident Reporting System

data, 1983.

For instance, fatalities are far more likely in accidents occurring on roads that are not physically

divided and thus provide greater opportunity for

head-on collisions (see figure 4-16). Roads with

higher posted speed limits are significantly more

likely to be the site of fatal truck accidents (see figure 4-17).

Slightly less than half the heavy truck accidents

(49 percent) occur at intersections, and 80 percent

of heavy truck accidents occur on roadway alignments classified as “straight” according to NASS

(1981-85) data. Of all heavy truck fatality accidents,

only 34 percent occur at intersections and 81 percent occur on straight aligned roads. Finally, 71 percent of nonfatal heavy truck accidents occur on level

ground, 28 percent occur at grade, and only 1 percent at crests or in sags. Fatal heavy truck accidents

have a similar pattern, except for a slightly higher

proportion of fatal accidents at hill crests.

Figure 4-16.— Fatai Truck Accidents

by Median Controi

(32.2)

One -

1

way (13.4 7

o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Percent

apercent of ail truck accidents.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident

Sampiing System data, 1981-85 and Fatal Accident Reporting System

data. 1983.

Lighting Conditions

The impact of lighting conditions on heavy truck

accident rates is still imperfectly understood. Several studies find that the risk to truck safety is 1.5

to 2.0 times greater at night than in the daytime.70

Table 4-9 indicates this is apparently true for rearend accidents. Other studies report a higher truck

accident rate in darkness during the summer, but

a comparable accident rate for daylight and darkness during the winter season, or find no significant

impact of lighting conditions.71 However, there is

‘cMotor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Proceedings of the National Truck Safety Symposium, op. cit., footnote 40.

71L. Strandberg, “On the Braking Safety of Articulated Heavy

Freight Vehicles,” Symposium on the Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles

in Traffic Accidents, op. cit., footnote 7, vol. 2, p. 3-28; P.P. Jovanis

and J. Delleur, “Exposure-Based Analysis of Motor Vehicle Accidents,”

Transportation Researrh Record, No. 910 (Washington, DC: Trans.

portation Research Board, 1983), pp. 1-7; and Stein and Jones, op. cit.,

footnote 32, p. 12.
103

Figure 4-17.— Fatal Truck Accidents

by Posted Speed Limits

70

60

50

: 3 0

20

a

10

0

55 m ph 50 mph 45 mph 40 mph

Posted speed limit

apercen t of all truck accidents. (These numbers do not add Up to 100 because

not all posted speed limits are included.)

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident

Sampling System data, 1981-85 and Fatal Accident Reporting System

data, 1983.

Table 4-9.—The Effect of Lighting Conditions

on Rear. End Collisions

Lighting condition

Accident twe Daylight Not daylight

Rear end . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.30/o 72.70/o

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49.1% 50.9 ”/0

SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Manufacturer’s Association, Proceedings of the National

Truck Safety SyrrtposiurrJ (Washington, DC: June 1987), pp. 85-89.

a correlation between lighting conditions and fatalities; 50 percent of fatal accidents involving heavy

trucks occur at night, in contrast to 27 percent of

all heavy truck accidents (see figure 4-18). An official for the largest bus company indicated that nighttime accidents involving a bus running into a flatbed trailer truck were a major concern.72

‘

: Ro&rt Forman, vice president for safety, Greyhound Bus Co., personal communication, February 1988.

Figure 4-18.—Combination Truck Accidents,

by Time of Day

— Total accidents

--- Fatal accidents

t I 1 t I I 1 I

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration analysis of Texas data, 1981-83.

Weather Conditions

Most heavy truck accidents (80 percent) occur in

clear weather conditions (see figure 4-19). However,

one study concluded that snowy weather is an important predictor of high accident rates for trucks,

whereas rainy days have lower truck accident rates

than do clear days.73 Conspicuous by their absence

as accident factors are splash, spray, or wind from

passing trucks, likely due to difficulty in measuring

this problem from accident reports. Moreover, research literature does not contain detailed discussion on this subject, although individual carriers,

the American Trucking Associations, and others

have recognized it as a significant problem. Additional study is needed to determine whether other

characteristics, such as wet road conditions described

in accident reports, are acting as a surrogate for

splash and spray problems.

7]Jovanis and Delleur, op. cit., footnote 71.
104

Figure 4-19.—Fatal Truck Accidents by

Weather Condition

Clear Rain Snow

Weather condition

apercent of all accidents. (These numbers do not add Up to 100 because not a~l

posted speed limits are included.)

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident

Sampling System data, 1981-85 and Fatal Accident Reporting System

data, 1983.

Sharing the Road

In a majority (77 percent) of multiple-vehicle accidents involving trucks, the truck is the striking

unit.74 A subset of the accidents where the truck is

the striking unit may be attributable to passenger

car maneuvers into a truck’s path. Annual studies

carried out over the past 10 years by the California

Highway Patrol of heavy truck collisions place trucks

at fault 43 to 53 percent of the time.75 

“0TA calculations from the National Accident Sampling System

(1981-85) data.

‘

5National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, op. cit., footnote

36, p. 157.

An American Automobile Association-sponsored

study of multiple-vehicle accidents involving heavy

trucks in Michigan notes that the nontruck driver

was considered at fault in 69 percent of fatal accidents and 49 percent of serious injury accidents requiring hospitalization.76 These results suggest that,

in addition to developing policies directed at improving the skills of truck drivers, educating the driving public about truck operations and safety requirements is a priority.

‘dAmerican Automobile Association, Cars and ~ruclcs: Sharing rhe

Road Safely (Washington, DC: December 1986).

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS

Drivers, vehicles, road design characteristics, and

ambient environmental conditions form a system

in which motor carriers operate. Accident analysis

highlights the interrelated nature of highway transportation. The accident studies referenced in this

chapter underscore the complexity of this operating system and illustrate the difficulty of isolating

single causal factors. Moreover, the precise role that
105

each accident causal factor plays in heavy vehicle

accidents is difficult to determine from current accident reports. OTA finds that better understand”

ing by State enforcement officers of accident causation and accident investigation methods is

needed. Congress may wish to request the Department of Transportation to add accident investigation to the training provided under MCSAP.

OTA analysis of Federal and State data shows

that the three most common factors associated

with heavy vehicle accidents are speed too fast for

conditions, the training of the driver, and age and

condition of the vehicle. The appropriate speed for

conditions is a function of a variety of factors—

highway and vehicle design, and environmental and

human factors–that must be evaluated by the

driver. Any one of them can create unsafe driving

conditions. When heavy vehicles operate at speeds

higher than appropriate for the road design, the vehicles are closer to their limits of braking and rollover performance capabilities. The time available

to the driver to carry out emergency maneuvers is

greatly reduced. Other factors, such as insufficient

training, fatigue, road design inadequate for trucks,

vehicle overloads, and poor visibility can all interact to limit safe speed, In view of the major role speed

plays in fatal truck accidents and the many characteristics of heavy vehicles that make them more difficult and time consuming to stop safely, Congress

may wish to reexamine the decision to permit

truck speeds of 65 mph at the discretion of States

and to explore other methods of controlling excessive speeds for heavy vehicles.

The heavy vehicle driver operates a complex piece

of heavy equipment on roads designed for and occupied by smaller, more responsive vehicles. The

driver is frequently the key factor in determining

whether or not an accident occurs. However, truck

drivers are often ill-prepared or inadequately trained

for their jobs. Accident results indicate that better

driver training could help reduce both the number

and severity of accidents.

Congress may wish to consider requiring 1) that

national guidelines for truck driver training be developed and validated; 2) that States must require

evidence of training in a school or carrier program

meeting the guidelines for the commercial vehicle driver’s license; and 3) that the special handling characteristics of different vehicle configurations be a part of the guidelines. A key

component of such a program is broad representation on the group developing the guidelines, including Federal and State regulatory and enforcement

officers, scientists and researchers who study human

fatigue factors, and representatives of training

schools, carrier management, labor, and vehicle

manufacturers.

A large number of heavy truck drivers involved

in accidents have poor driving records, including

speeding offenses and other unsafe maneuvers that

are major causes of accidents. Young, inexperienced

drivers are particularly at risk of an accident. There

is a strong correlation between truck drivers under

the influence of alcohol and increased accident likelihood and severity, Inspection and accident records

show that carriers exempt from Federal safety regulations have more violations both for the condition of the vehicle and the qualifications of the

driver.

Fatigue can play a major role in accidents, particularly early in a shift and after extended shift

length. Older drivers are more affected by fatigue

than younger drivers. Drivers of large trucks have

shown significant increases in driving errors and decreases in driver alertness due to fatigue well within

the current hours-of-service limit. Policy options addressing these driver-related factors may be found

in chapter 6.

Vehicle design and operating characteristics have

a significant impact on safety. Brake systems are

most in need of attention, with brake maintenance

a principal concern. Tire condition and performance are also key factors in safely handling a heavy

truck. Override/underride accidents occur more

often under conditions of reduced visibility, and

trucks with underride protection are involved in

fewer fatal accidents. Bobtails and combination

trucks running empty pose higher accident risks, because of the complicated relationship between brake

systems and truck loads. Poor handling and vehicle stability increase the likelihood of rollover, particularl y for doubles operations. Policy options to

address these issues directly are presented in chapter 5.

Studies of the relative safety of single and double

combinations are not conclusive about differences
106

in operating safety. OTA finds that different safety

problems are inherent in each design, and that

driver training and experience with doubles and

any other heavy vehicle with special handling

characteristics can improve their safe operation.

Truck occupants typically do not protect themselves by wearing seat belts. As a result, ejection and

contact with the cab interior often occur, leading

to serious injury or fatality. Congress may wish to

consider a requirement for heavy trucks to have

substantial safety restraints and for drivers to use

them.

Furthermore, OTA concludes that stepped-up

research is needed to improve cab design and

safety. A public/private cooperative approach

could provide a cost-effective way to integrate public health expertise and manufacturing product development.

Although roadway environment is recognized as

a key part of the safety equation, U.S. and State

highways are significantly overinvolved in fatal

heavy truck accidents. Clear median markings and

sturdy barriers are key factors in safety, and Congress may wish to encourage DOT action on developing standards for such median devices on

State and rural highways heavily used by trucks.

Finally, the need for cars and trucks to share the

roads safely makes education a top priority for DOT

and State governments alike. The driving public

must be made more fully aware of the handling characteristics of heavy trucks and the potentially lifethreatening consequences of a multiple-vehicle

crash.
Chapter 5

Technologies To Improve

Motor Carrier Safety

. . .- — . . . - “. - -.— --- .-. . . -. .
CONTENTS

Page

The Motor Carrier Operating Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............109

Highway Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................110

Road Geometry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................110

Requirements of Longer Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . ................................112

Vehicle Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................114

Truck Brake Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................114

Truck Steering and Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................123

Truck Tires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................124

Trucks and Other Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................126

Override and Underside. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............126

Splash and Spray Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............127

Truck Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................128

Motor Carrier Driver Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...129

Truck Cab Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................129

Post-Crash Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................130

Cab Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....................130

On-Board Recording Devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............130

Conclusions and Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............131

Boxes

Box Page

5-A. Brake Retarders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................119

5-B. Rulemaking History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................122

Figures

Figure Page

5-1. Typical Low-Speed Inward Off-Tracking Problem at an Intersection . ........112

5-2. Longer Combination Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....113

5-3. Types of Brakes for Medium and Heavy Trucks. . .........................116

5-4. Cam Brake Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............117

5-5. Stable Stopping Distances of Heavy Air Braked Vehicles From 60 mph on

Dry Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .....117

5-6. Braking Power Necessary To Maintain 55 mph v. Percent Grade.... . .......119

5-7. Tractor-Trailer Brake System Schematic Diagram . . . . . . . . . . ................120

5-8. Stopping Distance of Fully Loaded Truck at Two Brake Adjustment Levels ..122

5-9. Hitching Mechanisms for Twin-Trailer Trucks . ...........................125

5-10. Typical Car/Truck Front Bumper Height Differential . . . . . . . . ..............126

5-ll. Organizations Involved in Brake Matters . . . . . . . . . . . ......................133
Chapter 5

Technologies To Improve

Motor Carrier Safety

Accident analyses and equipment research demonstrate that appropriate road design and vehicle

technologies can help prevent highway accidents

and reduce fatalities and injuries. Moreover, recent

research shows that some aspects of highway design

make driving today’s heavy vehicles safely very difficult. Although new technologies cannot eliminate

the effects of poor road conditions or unsafe driving, they can reduce the likelihood that a roadway

mishap will result in a catastrophe.

This chapter examines the relationship between

the vehicle, the driver, and the roadway environment, and describes the impact of highway design

characteristics, vehicle equipment, and safety technologies on vehicle performance. As motor carriers

of passengers, intercity buses operate under many

of the same rules and regulations as the trucking

industry. Certain aspects of truck safety are directly

applicable to bus safety. Critical items such as

brakes, tires, and lights are important for the safety

of bus passengers and the motoring public and must

be monitored by bus operators. Thus, although bus

safety issues are not addressed separately in this

chapter, many technology issues are applicable to

that industry as well.

THE MOTOR CARRIER OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Today’s highway environment is substantially

different than that of 10 years ago. The increase in

automobile ownership, dispersed patterns of work

and residence, and the speed and convenience of

truck transportation have increased the use of the

Nation’s roads, Traffic on many highways in and

around major metropolitan areas is already at or

above design capacity, and road congestion is a fact

of daily life for millions of Americans. The volume

of automobile traffic, combined with large numbers

of heavy trucks, has made accidents more likely simply by increasing the opportunities for accidents and

exposing drivers to stressful driving conditions.

The impact of heavy traffic volume on safety is

compounded by the fact that in recent years, passenger cars have become smaller and lighter while

commercial trucks and some buses have become

longer, heavier, and wider.1 Combination trucks

with 48-foot single trailers or twin 28-foot trailers

are permitted on Interstate highways in all States

under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act

of 1982 (STAA). Segments of the motor carrier industry have mounted intense efforts to expand the

network of roads and access points available to these

IPatrl~la F. N’aller, “Hca\}’ Truck Safct~ ]n a Changing Hlghwa}

Transpc~rtatl(>n En\[r(Jnmcnt, ” prcwntccl at the annual meeting of the

American Sc]~[ety of Mechanical Englncers, Phocn]x, AZ, Ncn, 16-

17, 19s2, pp. 4243.

vehicles. However, large portions of the Nation’s

highway system, particularly State roads, were designed primarily for automobiles, not for vehicles

with the size and operating characteristics of heavy

trucks. Moreover, the geometric design policy by

which virtually all highway design is guided in the

United States provides for only a slim margin of

safety for large trucks.2

The STAA also created the National Truck Network, which includes the Interstate system and designated Federal-Aid Primary routes. The States must

allow the heavy vehicles reasonable access between

the National Truck Network and terminals and facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest. The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), which establishes

design guidelines for highways, “. . . has not adopted

a design vehicle that reflects the STAA semitrailer

combination.”3 Thus, only portions of the Interstate system and the National Truck Network were

designed and constructed to accommodate the larger

STAA vehicles.

‘Rohert Er\in et al., lmpxr of.$pec]fic Ce(]metric Features on Truck

c ~pcr~rlt>n, and Sak’tl at Interchanges (N’ashington, DC: Federal Hghwa~ Adrninlstratlon, August 1985), p, 1.

‘Federal Hlghwav Admlnl~tra[lon, GuIdc fbr .ilonitor-ing and Enhamlng .%fir} on the ,Yar]c)nal Tru,k ,Net\{ork (Xi’ashlngton, DC: LI.S.

Department of Transpot-tatlon, Oct[]hm 19S6).

109
110

HIGHWAY DESIGN

Highway designs are”. . . developed after considering such factors as traffic volumes, vehicle mix,

accident history, turning maneuvers and frequency,

economics, and speed.”4

In principle, the design of

a highway facility is determined by “. . . the largest

design vehicle likely to use that facility with considerable frequency or a design vehicle with special

characteristics that must be taken into account.”5

Highway features affect at least four major safety

factors including:

●

●

●

●

the ability of a driver to maintain vehicle control and identify hazards;

the number and type of opportunities for conflicts between vehicles;

the consequences of an out-of-control vehicle

leaving the travel lane; and

the behavior and attentiveness of the driver,

particularly the choice of travel speed.

However, the contributions of even the best highway design to safe vehicle operation can be counterbalanced by variables such as weather, lighting,

and traffic.6 This section examines the interaction

between road design geometry and heavy trucks,

highlighting potential low-cost countermeasures to

dangerous roadway situations.

Road Geometry

AASHTO design standards guide the construction and reconstruction of highways across the

country. In most cases, these guidelines were formulated for the passenger car, the dominant vehicle on the road.7 Stopping sight distances on hillcrests, for example, were based on the locked-wheel

performance of passenger car tires, and the passing

sight distance standards for passing lanes were based

‘Ibid., p. 16.

‘American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, A Policy on Geometric Design o~l-fighways and Streets (Washington, DC: 1984), pp. 19-20.

Transportation Research Board, Designing Safer Roads: Practices

for Resurfacing, Restoration, and Rehabilitation, Special Report (Washington, DC: National Research Council, 1987), P. 77.

‘Robert Ervin et. al., “Truck Control Problems Posed by the Design

of Highway Ramps,” Vehicle High way Infrastructure: Safety Compatibiiiry, P-194 (Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc.,

February 1987), P. 29.

on car acceleration capabilities.8 AASHTO standards for the Interstate highway system can accommodate STAA trucks. However, States are free to

choose the design vehicle for highways within their

borders, and in fact, used standards for smaller vehicles for many of the segments of the Nation’s road

network that are heavily used by trucks.9 Thus,

despite design efforts aimed at minimizing safety hazards, certain features of the highway system are contributing causes for accidents involving heavy vehicles.

Highway standards are evolutionary, and change

occurs very slowly. Moreover, the relationship between safety and highway design features is still

poorly understood, because statistical correlations

have not been determined.10 Even after new standards are developed, existing roads may not adequately accommodate heavy trucks. Recently released AASHTO highway design standards do not

provide fully for the largest trucks authorized by the

STAA, for example, since 102-inch semitrailers require wider lane widths than the new standards provide on curves. *l In addition, automobiles need

longer passing sight distances and more time to overtake longer tractor-trailer combinations. To make

matters even more confusing, the current design

manual offers 14 different design vehicles from which

States may choose. 12

Seven areas of AASHTO’s “Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets” pose concerns

for truck operations, including:13

. sight distance and no-passing zones,

● grades and climbing lanes,

● intersection design and operation!

~p,s. Fancher, “sight Distance Problems Related to Large Trucks,”

Symposium on Geometric Design for Large Trucks, Transportation

Research Record 1052 (Washington, DC: Transportation Research

Board, National Research Council, 1986), pp. 29-30.

Transportation Research Board, Twin Trailer Trucks: Effects on

Highways and Highway Safety, Special Report 211 (Washington, DC:

National Research Council, 1986), p. 179.

“~ransportation Research Board, op. cit., footnote 6.

I ITransportation Research Board, op. cit., footnote 9, P. 180.

‘~Larry King, Office of Engineering, Geometric and Roadside Design Branch, Federal Highway Administration, personal communication, May 10, 1988.

‘]J.W. Hall, “Introduction,” Symposium on Geometric Design for

Large Trucks, op. cit., footnote 8, p. 1.
111

. interchange and ramp design,

● roadside design and traffic barriers,

● traffic control device usage, and

● safety.

For example, one basic AASHTO design vehicle–

tractor and an approximately 40-foot trailer—was

intended to serve as the model for designing rural,

two-lane intersections. However, this vehicle was

subsequently widely used for designing intersections

in urban areas across the country. Tractors with 48-

foot or longer trailers making turns in such intersections override all available clearance space between travel lane edge and road edge.14 

Intersections are potentially dangerous in other

ways as well. In a turn, the wheels on the rear axle

of a vehicle follow a track inside the path of the

wheels on the front axle—a phenomenon called offtracking. Tractor-trailers making turns begin to offtrack inwardly at slow speeds and trailers often encroach on intersecting traffic lanes, striking other

vehicles (see figure 5-1). Low-speed off-tracking can

be reduced or eliminated by mechanisms that steer

the wheels of each axle, an expensive alternative generally reserved for specialized equipment. Current

intersection designs do not satisfactorily accommodate the effects of low-speed off-tracking, especially

:~Robert Er~,ln, ~ctlng director, University of Michigan Transpor”

tatlon Research Institute, persona] communication, Jan. 13, 1988.

Photo credit: Michael Hines, OTA staff

Large trucks can be hazardous to other vehicles at

intersections because the trailers cannot

make sharp turns.

for the 48-foot semitrailers that are now basic

equipment. 15

Highway interchange ramps, even those on many

Interstate highways, are especially hazardous locations for trucks.16 AASHTO geometric design

standards for ramps are based almost exclusively on

passenger car dimensions.17 While negotiating

curves at high speeds, commercial vehicles exhibit

outward off-tracking-each outside wheel of an axle

travels a path outside the path of the preceding outside wheel. The outside wheels on a trailer may strike

a curb or other object close to the roadway, damaging the curb or object or, worse, causing rollover.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reports that high-speed off-tracking is common, an important safety issue as the population of multiple-trailer combination vehicles

increases. 18 No studies have been conducted regarding combination vehicle configuration and accidents due to off-tracking.

Particular ramp design parameters make it all too

easy for a truck driver to lose control of his vehicle. A truck entering a curving highway entrance

or exit ramp at high speed must slow down rapidly

on a curving roadway, placing a truck at immediate risk for a jackknife or rollover accident.19 Compound curves, where the degree of curvature varies

throughout the curve, present particularly difficult

challenges .20 Drivers often do not understand the

dynamic characteristics of the vehicle and the interaction with the changing highway geometry.

They thus do not adequately adjust their speed for

the situation and are consequently moving too fast

I’John W. Hutchinson et al., “Highway Factors in Truck Wrecks,”

Proceedings, Symposium on Accommodation of Trucks on the Highway: Safery in Design (Nashville, TN: American Society of Ci\’il Engineers, May 11, 1988).

1bSnehamay Khasnabis, “Operational and Safety Problems of Trucks

in No-Passing Zones on Two-Lane Rural Highway s,” S}rmposium on

Geometric Design for Large Trucks, op. cit., footnote 8, p. 38; and

Federal Highway Administration, Longer Comhinqrion l~ehicle Opcrarions in Western States (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, October 1986), p. III-7.

ITErvin et al., op. cit., footnote 7, p. 29.

INNational Highway Traffic Safety Admlnistratlon, ~eat}’ Truck

Safety Srudy, prepared in response to the Motor Carrier Safetv Act

of 1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, January 1987), p. 132.

!“Ervln et al., op. cit., footnote 2, p. 118.

~JJustin True, Federal Highway Administration, personal communication, Oct. 21, 1987.
112

Figure 5-1 .—Typical Low-Speed inward Off-Tracking Problem at an lntersection

Path of front

right tire of

r tracto r

■

■

Truck

width Path of rear

left tire of tractor

■ wmwmmmmmmmmmmmmmm ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

Stationary automobile

in path of off-tracking trailer

Path of rear

left tire of trailer ●

■

●

■

■

■

●

■

■

■

■

■

\

Position

at start

of

turn

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

❑ Off-tracking of trailer

Off-tracking at intersections presents dangers to other drivers because of the wide path covered by the turning tractor-trailer.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment modification of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and Federal Highway Administration diagrams.

for each succeeding section of the curve. Speed advisory signs compound the problem by giving speeds

appropriate for cars not trucks.

Requirements of Longer Vehicles

Drivers of longer combination vehicles (LCVs)–

Rocky Mountain Doubles, turnpike doubles, and

triples (see figure 5-2)—also confront major driving

challenges due to highway design. LCV dimensions

"

. . . greatly exceed the dimensions of vehicles that

even Interstate highways were designed to accommodate.”21 Problems include off-tracking at intersections, difficulty staying within travel lanes on

tight curves, and the increased distance that other

vehicles must travel to pass an LCV on two-lane

roads.22 In metropolitan areas, LCVs’ greater overall trailer length and inherent handling characteristics further complicate safe operations. Urban freeways also have more crowded travel lanes, reducing

distances between vehicles and increasing the need

2iFederal Highway Administration, op. cit., footnote 16, P. ‘-8.

‘~Ibid., p. III-8.
113

Figure 5-2.—Longer Combination Vehicles

Rocky Mountain double

(operated only in certain States)

I 45’ - 48’ I I —28 ’ — 1

Turnpike double

(operated only uncertain States)

I 45’-48 ’ I I

45’-48 ’

I

Triple

(operated only uncertain States)

l —28’ —I l — 28’ —1 l —28’ — 1

Lengths shown are typical; shorter or Ionger lengths are possible depending

on carriers’ needs and State laws.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on American Trucking Association, Inc

for rapid steering movements. 23 Abrupt turning

movements by the driver, such as changing lanes

to reach an exit or to avoid slow traffic ahead, create special dangers from rearward amplification and

swaying of the rear trailer.

States that permit LCVs provide for these large

vehicles in several ways to keep them off highways

that cannot accommodate them. The most common

method is to construct large truck parking or exchange lots at intervals on turnpikes and Interstate

highways. Carriers that use turnpike doubles or triples use these lots as assembly and break up points

for the LCVs. Tractors haul single trailers from origins off the Interstate to the lot where the trailers

are hitched in tandem to a single tractor for the long

haul to a destination lot. There the trailers are broken apart and either hitched to another tandem for

“Ibid., p. 111-7.

a further leg or attached to an individual tractor

and hauled to the final destination.

A segment of the trucking industry is pushing for

increased productivity through expanded use of

LCVs. However, safety problems and pavement deterioration at the edge of the roadway caused by

off-tracking are likely to result if large numbers of

LCVs use inadequate road segments for increased

off-highway access.24 Although research is currently underway to identify major shortcomings in

road design, immediate, wholesale reconstruction

of the road network is not feasible. Since many

longer trucks are here to stay, some form of interim

safety countermeasures are prudent public investments.

Countermeasures include selective improvements

at high-risk locations, determined by traffic volume

‘

q

Ibid., p. 111-16.
114

and accident analysis and aimed at reducing accident frequency and severity. Highway safety can be

improved during reconstruction by correcting deficiencies in:25

•

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

lane and shoulder widths,

roadsides and sideslopes,

bridge entrance widths,

road horizontal alignments,

sight distances,

intersections,

pavement edge drops,

pavement surface conditions,

posted speeds for ramps and curves, and

sign design, height, and location.

Warning signs that communicate timely and specific safe speed information for trucks on highway

entrance or exit ramps are relatively inexpensive

countermeasures. Outer curb removal on interchange ramp curves can reduce trailer rollovers.

Other safety efforts, such as runaway truck escape

ramps, grade-climbing lanes, and better pavement

markings can also reduce hazards inherent in truck

operations. These vary in cost and scope and illustrate actions that State and local governments can

undertake.

Some State highway departments have begun to

address the special problems of large, heavy trucks

in mixed traffic. The California Department of

Transportation adapted a computer model to com-

~fTransportation Research Board, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. 105-106.

pare data representing the geometry of State roads

against the operating parameters of large trucks. The

model identified portions of the State road network

where STAA trucks would have difficulty negotiating the existing road geometry safely. California

chose to use special signs to designate the highways

where STAA trucks could travel.26 The trucking

industry found the designated network overly restrictive; efforts to effect a compromise are under

way.

Other jurisdictions are considering constructing

exclusive truck-use lanes on congested highways in

urban areas. The State of Texas has undertaken a

feasibility study for such lanes focused on the I-35

corridor between Dallas and San Antonio. The

study showed that present volumes on 90 percent

of the corridor did not warrant exclusive truck-use

lanes. The researchers used a computer program to

evaluate the study corridor and obtain information

on volume-to-capacity ratios and effective median

width. Congested segments of the corridor near urban areas contained insufficient roadway median

space for truck lanes. However, one of the six design options, elevated truck lanes, was suitable for

some segments of the corridor.27

“John Van Berkel, chief, Truck Operations Branch, California Department of Transportation, personal communication, Nov. 12, 1987.

~;Dan R. Middleton et al., “Moving Analysis Program to Evaluate

Geometric and Operational Feasibilities of Exclusive Truck Facilities,”

Geomerric Design and Operational Effects, Transportation Research

Record 1122 (Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 1987),

pp. 132 and 141.

VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES

Accident data analyses suggest that improvements

in several areas of equipment design and maintenance could enhance heavy vehicle safety. The braking system is foremost among these safety technologies, and brake systems are especially problematic

for tractor-trailer combinations. Such issues as handling and steering, occupant protection, visibility

and lighting, and splash and spray control also are

important for buses and combination and straight

trucks. Current technologies are discussed in the following sections. The truck of the future is likely to

incorporate advanced electronics, such as monitors

for vehicle operation, vehicle controls, drivetrain

controls, information displays, electrical systems,

comfort and convenience features, and driver performance aids.28 However, until these technologies

are proven and cost-effective, they will not be readily

adopted by the industry.

Truck Brake Systems

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) inspection data show that the most frequent violation

on trucks pulled out of service is poorly maintained

or misadjusted brakes. Moreover, OTA found wide-

‘NAuromotive News, “Heavy-Duty Electrucks,” Nov. 24, 1986, p.

D14,
115

spread misunderstanding particularly among owneroperators, about the proper installation and maintenance of brakes. Three basic air brake foundation

brake designs are currently fitted to heavy trucks

(see figure 5-3): cam brakes, wedge brakes, and disc

brakes, Over 90 percent of heavy-duty, air braked

vehicles use an S-cam drum brake, which is operated via a push rod from a diaphragm air chamber

(see figure 5-4). The wedge drum brake has built-in

automatic adjusters.

The disc brake provides improved resistance to

fade, comes equipped with automatic slack adjusters,

and operates more effectively at high temperatures

than drum brakes.29 Disc brakes on trucks presently cost more ($250-$500 per axle) than drum

brakes and account for less than 3 percent of the

truck brake market.30 Early problems with truck

disc brakes included premature pad wear and rotor

failure due to cracking, conditions resulting from

design problems and incompatibilities between disc

and drum systems. 31 Although many operators of

fleets comprised of straight trucks are long-time disc

brake users, compatibility problems need to be resolved before disc brakes can be widely used on

tractor-trailers. Correct driving practices are also a

key issue.

Brake System Performance

Brake performance is generally evaluated in two

dimensions–stopping distance and stability. The

ability of truck braking systems to perform according to these criteria has been tested by NHTSA

using driver-modulated stops (driver applies brakes

to just below wheel lockup and modifies the pressure until the vehicle comes to a complete stop). As

figure 5-5 shows, all trucks, regardless of configuration and load, take longer to stop from a speed of

60 miles per hour (mph) than passenger cars and

buses. Loaded tractor-trailers perform relatively well,

better than empty vehicles, particularly bobtail tractors, since brake systems are typically optimized for

loaded conditions. Very short wheelbase bobtail

~“Chris Shapeley, “A Comparison of Car and Truck Safety,”

Proceedings, SymPsium on Accommodation of Trucks on the Highway: Safety in Design, op. cit., footnote I 5.

W Fleet Owner, “Fleets Hold Back From the Next Brake,” July 1983.

~lIan Jones, “Truck Air Brakes—Current Standards and Performance, ” presented at the 28th Annual Conference of the American Association for Automotive Medicine, Denver, CO, October 1984, p. 12.

tractors require as much as 500 feet to stop, almost

three times more than a passenger car.

Truck brakes must be sized to handle vehicle

loaded weights that can be up to three times greater

than vehicle empty weights. For large combination

vehicles, the relationship between a trailer’s brakes

and those of the tractor are critical; incompatible

systems create unbalanced braking and excessive

32 wear.

Tractors and trailers are manufactured separately

by different companies in separate industry segments. Broad ranges of performance exist for tractors, trailers, and other components, and some of

the ranges may be incompatible with other parts

of the vehicle system.33 Current NHTSA requirements for air brake systems (tractor-trailers have air

brakes on each axle) require brake actuation in 0.45

seconds for tractors and 0.30 seconds for trailers.34

However, many safety experts and industry representatives believe that tractor-trailers should have

more evenly matched or synchronized brake actuation times and antilock systems to help maintain

stability and control.

The effectiveness of truck brakes is determined by

many elements within the braking system. They include brake system capacity, brake force distribution, application timing, limiting valves, linings, and

maintenance and adjustment.

Brake System Capacity

Truck brakes rely on friction and brake lining material to provide sufficient torque to slow and stop

a vehicle weighing as much as 80,000 pounds within

a reasonable distance. Repeated or continuous brake

use (such as on long or steep hills) generates high

temperatures that cause the brake linings to lose effectiveness either from fading or disintegration.35

Thus, on a 60 percent grade, an 80,000-pound

tractor-trailer requires 167 times more braking

power than a 3,000-pound passenger car, even

3~Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Big Trucks (Washington,

DC: 1985), p. 12.

~~National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, op. cit., footnote

18, p. 57.

“49 CFR 571.121.

~iNational Highway Traflc Safety Administration, op. cit., footnote

18, p. 59.
116

Figure 5.3.—Types of Brakes for Medium and Heavy Trucks

‘edge brake

brake

SOURCE: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and G. DeClalre, Vice President of Research and Engineering, Rockwell

International Corp.
117

Figure 5.4.—Cam Brake Assembly

Brake

SOURCE, Off Ice of Technology Assessment modification of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration diagram

Figure 5-5.—Stable Stopping Distances of Heavy

Air Braked Vehicles From 60 mph on Dry Road

4 Car s

Buses

o 100 200 300 400 500

Stopping distance, in feet

❑, Range fo . . . r

:’” typical vehicles

though the tractor-trailer weighs only 27 times

more. (See figure 5-6.)36

To achieve better fuel efficiency, truck manufacturers have worked to reduce vehicle rolling resistance and improve aerodynamics. However, this

puts greater stress on truck braking systems. Current truck brakes do not have sufficient heat capacity for all braking requirements, and brake

thermal loads may increase in the future. Brake

retarders could be useful in lessening thermal

loads on brakes, especially in hilly and mountainous terrain. (See box 5-A.)

Brake Force Distribution

Ideally, distribution of braking energy among the

truck’s axles matches the load placed on it. However, in normal truck operations, load size and

weight distribution vary by shipment, and nothing

in current brake systems modulates brake force distribution in reaction to changes in loading. In general, if the braking forces on the tractor and trailer

are poorly matched to the way the load being carried

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration data, 1987 ‘hlbld., p. 61.
118

Photo credit: Tse-Sung Wu, OTA staff

A driver demonstrates how to connect brakes when attaching a trailer to a cab.

is distributed, the brake components can overheat

leading to fading, disintegration, or even fire in very

extreme cases. Until new brake technologies become

standard equipment on new vehicles, achieving

brake force distribution and balance compatible with

each of the ways in which trucks can be loaded and

operated will be difficult.3i

One method of redistributing brake force as loading changes is a load proportioning valve. The simplest load proportioning device is one that senses

whether there is a connection between a tractor and

trailer. If the tractor is operated without a trailer,

braking effort is shifted to the steering axle from the

drive axle. The proportioning valves can reduce the

stopping distance for a bobtail tractor moving at 60

mph from 500 feet to about 300 feet. Domestic manufacturers offer this relatively simple and inexpen-

‘

; Ibid., p. 91.

sive ($50) device38 as standard equipment on some

models and as optional equipment. The device cannot discriminate between a loaded and an empty

trailer and benefits only a bobtail tractor.

More sophisticated load proportioning devices are

widely used on heavy vehicles in Europe, in part

because European Community regulations for truck

brakes cannot be met without such a system. These

devices continuously monitor the load on each axle

b y measuring the deflection of the suspension

system.

Brake Application and Release Timing

Brake application and release times need to be as

quick as practical. Although long release times do

not affect stopping distance, they do make it difficult to release the vehicle’s brakes quickly in the

‘81bid., p. 91.
119

Figure 5-6.—Braking Power Necessary

To Maintain 55 mph v. Percent Grade

/

/

/

.“

.“

/ ,’ :“”

/ ●

1 A 1 A 1 1 1 1

80,000

pounds

— Truc k

3,000

pounds

.“””” Car

1 234567 8

Percent grade

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration data, 1987,

event that the driver overbrakes and locks the

wheels. The longer the trailer wheels remain locked,

the more likely that trailer swing or jackknife can

occur.

Current Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard

(FMVSS) regulations specify that tractor brakes may

take no longer than 0.45 seconds to actuate once

the pedal is pushed, but give no minimum time.

Consequently, tractor manufacturers have designed

their brake systems for the worst case—the longest

wheelbase tractor with the slowest actuation times.39

However, the actuation times may be much less than

the maximum, and the tractor brakes may actuate

so quickly that the trailer cannot respond effectively.

Trailer manufacturers have been unable to design

an air brake system that will actuate at the same

time as that of the tractor. (See figure 5-7.) Requiring a minimum actuation time as well as a maximum could ensure that tractor brakes do not actuate too quickly—prior to the trailer brakes—putting

the combination out of balance. One industry group

‘

vLarry Strawhorn, American Trucking Associations, ~rsonal communication, hfar. 4, 1987.

holds that a minimum brake actuation time for tractors should be set at 0.30 seconds,4o and trailer

brakes should also actuate and release within a certain time.

NHTSA has addressed several of these problems

through a notice of proposed rulemaking41 The

goal is a more effective timing balance without an

increase in complexity of the system. The notice proposes changing the existing brake application and

release timing requirements for trucks, tractors, and

trailers, and establishing new timing requirements

for the control-line coupling between lead and trailing units.

“’American Trucking Associations, Comments on NHTSA Docket

No. 85-0~, Notice 1, 50 Federal Register 20113 (Dec. 30, 1985).

‘

] Docket No. 85-07, Notice 1, Air Brake Systems, 50 Federal Reg-

~ster 20113 (May 14, 1985).
120

Brake

Chambers

supply circuit r] Rear axle circuit r] Front axle circuit Spring brake and

trailer supply circuit

Antilock Brakes least one domestic manufacturer is already installing a European antilock system on U.S. vehicles.

Antilock brakes can prevent the wheels from locking and reduce the potential for directional instabilities that often lead to jackknifing and overturning. An antilock system consists of devices attached

to each truck axle that sense when a wheel begins

to lock and momentarily release the brakes. As early

as 19’77, a NHTSA study comparing trucks fitted

with antilock systems with those without, found that

jackknifing accidents were reduced by 29 percent.

Second-generation antilock systems are now being

developed using recent advances in microprocessor

technology. Although no widespread domestic production of antilock systems exists at this time, at

Antilock technology has progressed sufficiently so

that many safety advocates are calling for a regulation requiring antilock brakes on all new equipment.

Brake and tractor manufacturers have developed

tractor-only, tandem-axle systems that they believe

will be compatible with U.S. industry operations.

However, the lesson of FMVSS 121 (see box 5-B)

is that the reliability of antilock system technology

must be proven before antilock brakes can be mandated. In cooperation with antilock suppliers, truck

manufacturers, and motor carriers, NHTSA is testing equipment with antilock systems to acquire performance, reliability, maintainability, and cost data.
121

Trailer System

Automatic Limiting Valves

An automatic brake pressure limiting valve (ALV)

is used by some operators to reduce brake application pressure to the front axles of combination-unit

trucks under all but panic stops. Steering wheel pull

during braking is related to poor front brake adjustment and maintenance. Brake experts and manufacturers contend that ALVs may cover up front

brake maintenance problems, degrade stopping capability when the vehicle is operating empty or on

slippery roadways, and burden other brakes on

downhill grades. Proponents among carriers hold

that limiting valves on standard front brakes keep

the front axle from locking or the vehicle from pulling to one side during a sudden brake application

under emergency stopping conditions.42

Brake Maintenance and Adjustment

Appropriate brake adjustment is essential for adequate braking for current systems. NHTSA tests

conducted on brakes at different adjustment levels

show that stopping distance increases as brake adjustment deteriorates (see figure 5-8). Adjustment

of S-cam drum brakes is especially critical because

4~Larrv Strawhorn, American Trucking Associations, quoted in Paul

Richards, “Point/Counterpoint: Front Brake Limiting Valves, ” Cornmcrcial Carrier Journal, December 1987, p. 59.
122

drivers cannot sense brake adjustment when brake

systems depends on compressed air for actuation.

Steering axle brakes are often poorly maintained–

only half of trucks randomly inspected had operative front-wheel brakes. Those that were in operaFigure 5-8.–Stopping Distance of Fully Loaded

Truck at Two Brake Adjustment Leveis

+34%

cool

brakes

Hot

brakes

Fully adjusted

At recommended

readjustment

point

I +76%

0 10020030040050060070 0

Stopping distance, in feet

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1986; based on National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration data, 1987.

tive had missing parts or were so out of adjustment

that the brakes did not function, and, in some cases,

drivers had detached the front-wheel brakes.43

Most truck brakes must be adjusted manually, and

this requires regular maintenance. However, automatic slack adjusters can take up the slack created

by normal wear of the brake shoes. Although early

models had problems with overadjustment, causing

the brake to overheat and wear excessively, these

problems have been overcome.44 Approximately 20

percent of heavy vehicles are presently using automatic slack adjusters at a cost of $100-$150 per

axle,45 and three tractor manufacturers have announced plans to make these standard equipment

within the next year.

Even poorly performing automatic adjusters, when

properly installed, are improvements over manual

brake adjustment. Their potential safety benefits underscore the need to establish a performance test

~~studie~ by Cunagin (1986), Kirkpatrick (1986), and Smith (1986)

as cited in National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, op. cit.,

footnote 18, p. 72,

“Jones, op. cit., footnote 31, p. 13.

‘

5 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, op. cit., footnote

18, p. 74.
123

and acceptable performance limits for brake adjustment systems. Such systems could be enhanced by

diagnostic devices to indicate when routine brake

adjustment maintenance is needed.

Brake Linings

Brake linings are essential components in providing sufficient braking force. Although Federal regulations specify minimum performance requirements

for brakes on newly manufactured trucks, no standards exist for brake linings or replacement linings.

In practice, heavy truck operators often do not or

cannot obtain linings that match the performance

of those that came as original equipment on the vehicle, This is due in part to the difficulty in identifying linings—lining codes are hard to read and

interpret, and the code is destroyed as the lining

wears out. Moreover brake linings vary widely from

manufacturer to manufacturer, from formulation to

formulation supplied by a single manufacturer, and

even within a given formulation from batch to

batch.”

Although equipment as fundamental as brake linings needs quality control and reliability, no immediate solution is available. The Society of Automotive Engineers is currently developing an improved

method of rating brake linings, but the time to develop a rating scheme is lengthy, and the precision

of the scheme is hard to predict.

Truck Steering and Handling

Heavy truck sizes and physical properties give

them distinctly different and unique handling characteristics. Merging and turning actions, steering

around corners, and lane changes present problems

not found in car driving that increase the potential

for truck accidents. Considerable research has been

conducted on steering and handling as well as vehicle design and stability. The engineering details,

as summarized below, have been well documented

recently by NHTSA.47

Rollover

A rollover is a major risk in truck driving, especially for tractor-trailers. Truck rollovers occur because as a vehicle moves through a turn, centrifu-

“Ibld, p. ??.

‘

; Ibid., pp. 96154.

gal force acts to roll the vehicle outward from the

turn, causing the vehicle’s inside tires to lift from

the ground. If the imbalance is too great, the vehicle rolls over. The ratio of the track width to the

height of the truck’s center of gravity is the basic

determinant of the vehicle’s stability, although in

maneuvers such as lane changes, the dynamics of

the vehicle are also important. For example, rollovers can also be caused by rearward amplification

through the trailer, caused by inherent properties

of the vehicle design. The most effective ways to reduce rollovers would be to lower the center of gravity

and to use wider vehicles. Wider (102-inch) vehicles reduce loading heights and permit wider track

and suspension spreads. It has been estimated that

if both tractor and trailer were 102 inches wide, the

incidence of rollovers might be reduced up to 35 percent for combination-unit trucks operating with

medium-density freight.48

Rearward Amplification

Rearward amplification is manifested as rear trailer

side-to-side oscillation. It can be caused by slight

steering actions, by changes in road surface, or by

wind disturbances. A driver’s steering maneuver at

the front of the vehicle increases in intensity at the

rear of the vehicle or combination. Although the

oscillations may not be large enough to cause loss

of control, they sometimes result in trailing units

encroaching on other traffic lanes and endangering other motorists, or moving off the pavement and

striking a curb or roadside obstacle.

Rearward amplification greatly magnifies the effects of a steering action on the rear trailer of doubles units and LCVs. Furthermore, the driver of a

multiple-trailer combination has difficulty avoiding

a rollover caused by steering actions, because he cannot feel what the rear trailer is doing and because

of the delays between steering inputs and responses

at the end of the combination “train.”49 A driver’s

first indication of incipient rollover due to lateral

oscillation of a trailer is observation of trailer motion via the rearview mirror,50 although warning

technologies have been developed.51 Thus, truck-

{

“Ibid., p. 109.

4qIbid., p. 102.

5rRoundtable discussion, Proceedings, S\mposium on Accommoda.

tion of Trucks on rite Highway: Safety in Design, op. cit., footnote 15.

jlEdward Domenico, Truck Systems, Inc., personal communication,

June 1, 1988.
124

ing industry pressure to improve productivity and

efficiency by using longer and multiple-trailer combination vehicles, makes rearward amplification and

stability of rear trailers an issue of considerable

concern.

Research has shown that rearward amplification

is strongly related to the type of trailer-to-trailer

hitching mechanism. The most common mechanism

is currently the A-train, a dolly that is connected

to the towing unit by a single pintle hitch (see figure 5-9). Although the A-train provides easy maneuverability at low speed, it is less stable at highway speed than a conventional tractor-semitrailer

and has comparatively poor rearward amplification

performance.

Technical solutions to rearward amplification are

under consideration, although current alternatives

all have trade-offs in cost, weight, maintenance, and

operational difficulties compared with the A-dolly.

The most basic innovation to the hitching mechanism has been the introduction of the B-train (see

figure 5-9), which greatly reduces rearward amplification. In this design, the pintle hook articulation

joint is eliminated and the vertical support and fifth

wheel functions of the dolly are incorporated into

the rear of the leading trailer. A number of practical problems limit the B-train’s use to doubles where

the trailers are always used together, are not interchangeable, and do not need to be unloaded from

the rear.52 Some Canadian provinces now give Btrain users a 1,000-pound payload advantage.53 A

popular variation, the C-train, is composed of a

tractor-semitrailer towing one or more full trailers

made of a B-dolly and semitrailer.

Off-Tracking

Off-tracking occurs when the wheels on the rear

axle of a vehicle do not follow the same track as

the wheels on the front axle. (See the section on

“Road Geometry” earlier in this chapter for a more

detailed discussion). Off-tracking complicates heavy

truck handling and steering for the driver during

turning movements and on curved portions of

roadways.

‘

: National Hlghwav Traffic Safetv Admimstraticm, op. cit., footnote

18, p. 130.

‘~Ian Jones, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, personal communication, Apr. 19, 1988.

Faulty tires and brakes are frequently cited as safety

violations during inspections.

Truck Tires

Tire performance affects the stability and control

of trucks. Ultimately, tires transmit all the driving

and braking torque, and develop the cornering and

directional stability essential to the performance of

highway vehicles. “Tire manufacturing technology

has advanced considerably in the past 10 to 15 years,

so that fewer than 5 percent of tire failures are believed to be due to manufacturing or material

failures. Accident reconstructions suggest that a tire

failure in an accident is more likely to occur than

an accident caused by a tire failure.54 Although

metal objects, debris in the roadway, and poor tire

maintenance (principally underinflation) are major

causes of tire failure, little is known about tire failures

that cause accidents.55

Radial tires have become the standard of the industry although bias-ply tires are used as well. Lifecycle cost analyses have determined that radial tires

have longer tread wear, more durable casings, yield

greater fuel economy due to lower rolling resistance,

and provide better handling. These advantages far

outweigh the higher initial costs.5

6

‘+David Williams, Smithers Scientific Services, personal communication, May’ 17, 1988.

~jPeggy Fisher, president, Roadway Tire Co., personal communication, May 17, 1988. ~~homas Fo~ and Joseph Zekoski, “Impact of Truck Tire Selection

on Contact Pressures,” presented at the Paving and Transportation

Conference, Symposium on Pavement Rutting, University of New Mexico, Jan. 4, 1988.
125

Figure 5-9.-Hitching Mechanisms for Twin-Trailer Trucks

hitch

B-Train hitch

C-Train hitch

SOURCE: Roads and Transportation Assoclatlon of Canada, “Canadian Vehicle Weights and Dimensions Study,” Technical Steering Committee Report, 1987
126

Retread tires are used throughout the industry,

although no studies have been completed of the extent of their use or their impact on safety. The retread industry has made considerable advances in

product reliability in recent years, due to demands

from both the trucking and airline industries, and

confidence in the product is high.57 Trucking firms

with successful maintenance programs have found

retreading to be safe and cost-effective, and some

even find it advantageous to do their own retreading. 58 

An industry trend is visible toward use of low profile tires for line-haul trucking.59 These have a

5; Fisher, op. cit., footnote 55.

‘

sGerald F. Stanley, “The Master of Maintenance,” Commercial

Carrier Journal, May 1988, pp. 73-78.

‘9Ford and Zekoski, op. cit., footnote 56, p. 10.

TRUCKS AND

Collisions between heavy trucks and smaller vehicles, primarily cars, inevitably result in more serious consequences to the occupants of the smaller

vehicle. A truck can weigh as much as 40 times more

than a car, has a much stiffer structure, and stands

higher above the ground. Trucks are designed to

carry heavy payloads and have large, stiff frames that

do not generally deform much in a frontal collision

and therefore absorb little of the kinetic energy generated in a crash. Thus, when cars and trucks collide, practically all of the damage occurs to the

car. 62

Override and Underride

In a car/truck collision, if the truck’s bumper or

body structure is too high to engage the car’s

bumper, the car’s primary energy absorption capability is not utilized (see figure 5-10). Either the car

strikes the truck and slides underneath it (underside), or the truck strikes the car and climbs over

it (override). h]

Rear-end collisions in which passenger vehicles

underride the rear ends of trucks or trailers are very

‘JNaticmal Highway Traffic Safety Administration, op. cit., footnote

18, p. 138.

‘

; Ibid., p. 145.

shorter side wall than standard tires, permitting

lower trailer floors and greater trailer capacity. Coupled with improved wheel systems, low-profile tires

can reduce truck weight, maintenance costs, and

recapping costs.60

Using a single, wider tire to replace a pair of standard tires to reduce both capital and operating costs

is also being considered by industry. Safety concerns

include the fact that single tires on trucks running

empty have less lateral grip, and the tires can bounce

sideways. Moreover, heavily loaded single tires do

not spread the loaded weight in the same manner

as dual tires and may cause additional damage to

the road pavement and the roadbed.61

‘Overdrive, “As the Wheel Turns,” September 1987, pp. 14-18.

‘lAsa Sharp, Goodyear Tire Co., personal communication, May 6,

1988.

OTHER TRAFFIC

Figure 5-10.—Typical Car/Truck Front Bumper

Height Differential

SOURCE: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

likely to cause fatalities. A study of fatal accidents

in Texas and Michigan found that underride occurs

in more than 90 percent of car/truck rear-end collisions. 64 NHTSA estimates that truck underride

accidents account for approximately 300 occupant

fatalities per year, or 1- percent of all fatalities.65

A Federal standard requiring an underride guard

on trucks and trailers in excess of 10,000 pounds

was originally proposed by NHTSA in 1969. NHTSA

subsequentl y amended its proposal by requiring

‘Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, op. cit., fcotnote 32, p. 7.

“Jeffrey Miller, deputy administrator, National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies,

March 1986, p. 73.
127

Photo credit: Land Line

Sturdy rear underride guards can prevent a car from

sliding under the truck—a frequent cause of fatalities

in such accidents.

trucks and trailers to meet a modified strength test

with whatever components were in position to contact the test block.66 However, NHTSA has never

issued a final standard. Underride guards for the

rear ends of trucks are required by FHWA under

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation 393.86, although many safety experts believe the standards

specify guards that are not strong or low enough.

In the absence of an adequate Federal standard, the

Michigan legislature established a standard similar

to the modified NHTSA proposal and required rear

underride guards for 53-foot trailers in 1986. 67

NHTSA officials recently stated that alternatives,

such as visibility enhancements for the sides and

rear ends of trucks, are being tested. 68 These in -

clude additional lighting and reflective materials that

would help drivers avoid collisions altogether.

The proposed test block was a rectangle 4-inches high and 12-

inches wide, and its height was uniformly set with the lower edge 16

inches from the ground. Each truck or trailer had to meet the strength

test at all points out to the outermost test points on the vehicle. These

changes were made in response to industry concerns about economic

and operational difficulties posed by a requirement for a maximum road

clearance of 18 inches. 35 Federal Register 12956 (Aug. 14, 1970).

~~Ro&rt Ervin, IJniversity of Michigan, in U.S. Congress, Office of

Technology Assessment, “Transcript of Proceedings–~A Workshop

on Technologies Affecting Truck Safety,” unpublished transcript, Mar.

10, 1987, p. 210.

~Mi]ler Op ~it. . , footnote 65; and Diane Steed, administrator, National Hi~hway Traffic Safety Administration, testimony before the

House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies, March 1986, p. 73.

Researchers in Germany have sought to design

truck front-end protection to reduce override impact. The most effective design was found to be an

energy-absorbing bumper mounted low; it absorbed

energy, and disengaged and deflected the car after

initial impact.

6 9

Independent tests conducted in

Britain showed that a device with certain force and

deflection characteristics fitted to the front of trucks,

could substantially reduce override and injuries and

fatalities. 70

Splash and Spray Protection

Splash and spray created by a heavy truck on a

wet pavement restricts the view for both car and

truck drivers. Section 404 of the STAA directed

DOT to establish minimum standards for the performance and installation of splash and spray suppression devices for use on truck tractors, semitrailers, and trailers to improve visibilit y on we t

71 The Statute required the development roadways,

of these standards within a year. In 1984, Congress

extended the industry compliance deadlines in the

1982 act, because standards had not yet been issued

by FHWA and NHTSA.

7 2

In 1985, NHTSA published a notice of proposed

rulemaking requesting comments on minimum

standards and installation requirements for spray

suppressant flaps and side skirts. 73 The proposa l

“M. Danner and K. Langwieder, Association of German Automotive Insurers, Department of Automotive Engineering, “Results of an

Analysis of Truck Accidents and Possibilities of Reducing Their Consequences Discussed on the Basis of Car-to-Truck Crash Tests,” Paper

No. 811027, unpublished manuscript, 1984.

‘OS. Penoyre and B. Riley, Transport and Road Research Laboratory, “Desirable Structural Features for the Design of Front and Rear

Underrun Bumpers for Heavy Goods Vehicles,” Report No. C168/84,

unpublished manuscript, 1984.

~lsection 414 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982,

Public Law 97-424, 49 U.S.C. 2314. In 1970, the National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration issued a notice of proposed rulemaking

that would have required spray protectors on most heavy trucks; these

devices consisted of fenders, modified side skirts, and mudflaps. However, subsequent tests indicated that use of this equipment caused a

dangerous level of brake heat buildup, The National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration withdrew the proposal in 1973. See 35 Federal

Register 14091 (Sept. 4, 1970) and 38 Federal Register 28840 (Oct. 17,

1973).

‘

: Section 223 of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984, Public Law

98-554, 98 Stat. 2847. New trucks were to have been required to comply with splash and spray suppressant standards within 1 year after

they are promulgated. Existing trucks were to be retrofitted within 4

years after the standards were issued.

‘]50 Federal Regisrer 14631 (Apr. 12, 1985). Spray suppressant flaps

hang down behind tires and are designed to reduce the amount of spray.

Side skirts are flat surfaces that hang down from the side of a vehicle

(continued on next page)
128

suggested that flaps capable of varying levels of spray

reduction would be required.

74 FHWA also pub -

lished a proposed rule, consistent with NHTSA requirements, requiring the installation of flaps and

side skirts on truck tractors and certain semitrailers

manufactured on or after 1 year from the effective

date of a final rule. Older vehicles would be retrofitted within 4 years. 7 5

The motor carrier industry

reacted negatively to the proposed rulemakings, and

in late spring 1988, NHTSA formally dropped all

proposed requirements for spray reducing materials on heavy trucks.

While recent research generally shows that these

devices decrease the density of the spray cloud, test

results vary according to the type of vehicle used

and other environmental conditions. ’b For example, drop-frame trailers, such as those used by United

Parcel Service (UPS) and some household goods

moving companies, do not have much distance between trailer and road surface, and the wheel well

creates a compact area where the water is contained.

77 Nevertheless, UPS is using effective splash

and spray retarding equipment on tractor-trailer

combinations. The cost per unit is in excess of $200

($30 for tractor hardware, $25 for the dolly, $120

for side skirt mounting, $5 per flap, and $40 to install the splash suppressant bristles on the side of

the trailer). UPS believes that it provides a safer environment for motorists and improves the public’s perception of the trucker.

However, maintenance problems are associated

with some splash and spra y guards. Rubber flaps

tend to break off. 1ce builds up on the flap face and

eventually falls onto the roadway in chunks, creating a different safety hazard. On some vehicle configurations, such as tankers, dump trucks, and loggers, plastic bristles do not stay on the flaps of the

truck for very long. Perhaps the most pressing ap-

(continued from previous page)

and prevent water coming off the top wheel wells, tires, and vehicles

bottom from forming into spray clouds,

“The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration also stated

that when flaps capable of achieving a 75-percent reduction in spray

became available (anticipated within 4 years), new vehicles would be

required to have the improved flaps.

’550 Federal Register 14630 (Apr. 12, 1985).

‘“Miller, op. cit. footnote 65; and Neil Thomas, Office of Motor

Carriers, Standards Development Division, personal communication,

Mar. 25, 1987.

‘;Thomas Hardeman, United Parcel Serwce, In Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., foomote 67, p. 161.

plication is for splash and spray controls on longer

combination vehicles and triple-trailer combinations, where water is thrown out by additional axles

and wheels. Oregon has a regulation that requires

all triples to install splash and spray equipment.

Tests of aerodynamically-shaped tractors and trailers

show that properl y designed side deflectors and dams

on tractors and skirts on trailers can substantiall y

reduce splash and spray. 78 

Open-graded asphalt used in road construction

can also decrease splash and spray, give good traction in wet weather, and reduce road noise dramatically. The effective lifetime of this material is around

5 years, yet the cost of laying down the pavement

is relatively modest.

Truck Visibility

Automobile drivers have a difficult time at night

correctly perceiving the shape, road position, location, and speed of poorly illuminated trailers. This

problem makes rear and/or side underride accidents

even more likely. A NHTSA test using relatively

inexpensive reflective markings for the rear ends of

trailers showed that the markings significantly reduced rear and side collisions at night. It is estimated

that $50 to $100 worth of reflective tape (purchase

and installation per traiIer) could produce a 15-

percent accident reduction. w

‘BFarrel Krall, Navistar International Corp., personal communication, Aug. 5, 1988.

‘

qWilliam J. Burger et al., Improved Commercial Vehicle Conspicuity and Si~alling Systems: Task 3, Field Test Evaluation of Ve-

(continued on next page)

Photo credit: Freight/iner Corp.

Aerodynamic side deflectors and dams are attached

to this cab to increase fuel efficiency and

reduce splash and spray.
129

industry has taken its own initiatives in this area

as part of corporate marketing. For example, FritoLay places a reflective company logo on the rear

door of each trailer. However, this can present a

separate hazard if other drivers mistake a vehicle

for a fixed facility on the side of a roadway. A performance standard that improves luminosity without restricting corporate graphics is likel y to gain

industry acceptance.

Poor ly illuminated trailers can also increase risk

of side underride collisions. For example, a trailer

being maneuvered into position at a loading dock

of an older urban plant or warehouse may briefl y

block the travel lanes of a busy city street. Without

special measures to increase its visibility at night,

the trailer may not be reflected soon enough for the

car driver to react. Flatbed trailers pose special problems because their lack of exterior surfaces does not

provide sufficient area for extensive safety-lighting

fixtures.

(continued from previous page)

hlcle Reflecrmm”zarlon Effec~i;eness (Nrashlngton, DC: National Hlghw.ay Traffic Safet}’ Administration, September 1985), p. 111-8 per errata

sheet.

MOTOR CARRIER

Although much of the attention to truck safety

has focused on the impact of truck safety on other

vehicle occupants, the safety of a truck driver is also

of concern. Ejection is one of the leading causes of

fatalities and injuries among tractor-trailer occcupants, and all available data indicate drivers sustain proportionatel y more serious injuries if they are

thrown from the vehicle.

8 4 The simplest way to

prevent ejections is through use of safety belts, and

a driver that remains seated has a chance to regain

control of the vehicle after an accident. Nevertheless, reluctance to use a safety belt remains a major

problem among truck drivers: Efforts have been under way since 1980 to encourage more drivers to

wear safety belts, and industry groups have assisted

motor carriers with programs to convince cab occupants to wear safety belts. Current designs, however, are based upon passenger car standards and

‘National Hghway Traffic Safety Aclminlstration, Truck Occupant

Protection, prepared in response to the Motor Carrier Safety Act of

1984 (V’ashlngton, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, December 1986).

Color also plays a role in truck visibility at night.

It can assist another vehicle driver in determining

the speed of an approaching truck. The color green

is used in Japan on trucks weighing over 17,600

pounds. A series of green vehicle marker lights signal the speed of a truck; one light indicates the truck

engine is running; two lights mean the truck is going more than 25 mph; and three lights indicate the

truck speed to be 38 mph or greater. w Colors also

cause bias in depth perception, an important factor for drivers of vehicles moving at different speeds

at night. For example, the color red is seen before

the color blue on a distant object,

81 and the arrangement of lights can also provide cues about an

object’s proximity and its relative speed. 82 More -

over, one’s reaction to lights and colors is somewhat

dependent on knowing what one is looking at. 8 3

“Jim Winsor, “Japanese Trucking: Tougher Equipment Safet}r

Regs,” F/eaty Dury Trucking, December 1987, p. 16.

‘[Louis Siverstern, research section chief, Systems and Research

Center, Honeywell, Inc., personal communication, Apr. 27, 1988.

‘~Rudolf Mortimer, professor, Department of Health and Safety

Studies, University of fllinois, L1rbana, personal communication, Aur.

27, 1988.

“’Ibid.

DRIVER SAFETY

are not necessarily appropriately designed

installation.

85

Truck Cab Structure

for truck

Strengthening the structure of truck cabs could

make them more crush resistant and better able to

protect occupants. However, many serious injuries

sustained by truck occupants who remain inside the

vehicle during accidents result from contact with

interior components, primarily the steering wheel.

Research on cab interiors has focused on materials, fire resistance, noise absorption, and projectile

reduction.

Since the majority of crash-involved truck drivers

move in more than one direction during the crash

sequence, contacts with the steering wheel, windshield, instrument panel, and surfaces of doors and

‘

iRobert E. Heglund, assistant VICC president and manager, Transportation Ser\’ices Loss Prm’ention Department, Liberty Mutual Insurance Group, personal communication, Mar. 22, 1988.
130

door headers are common sources of injury .86 At

least one European truck manufacturer uses a steering wheel that is both smaller and more flexible than

those typically installed in U.S. trucks. Limited case

study evidence has shown that this design causes

fewer and less severe driver injuries in crashes. 8 7

Research in this area has lagged in the United States.

Post-Crash Fires

In most cases, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint

the exact source of truck fires, especially when more

than one vehicle is involved in the crash. Fuel from

the truck is apparently a primary factor. Improvements to address this issue focus on the concept of

“cab fireworthiness. ” Suggestions have been made

to incorporate on-board automatic fire suppression

equipment; “kill switches” for electrical systems to

eliminate ignition sources; use of flame-resistant,

nontoxic materials in the cab; and methods and devices to protect cab occupants during a cab-engulfing

fire for a limited time period. At least one truck manufacturer currently locates the batteries under the

cab, to try to reduce the likelihood of fire after a

collision.

Cab Environment

The immediate working environment for the truck

driver is the truck cab. Equipment manufacturers

and the trucking industry have examined seats,

safety belts, controls, access, and noise to determine

the best design for actual driver’s use. 88 A properly

designed truck cab can “. . . increase the productivity of drivers of heavy trucks by reducing driver

fatigue, improving driver satisfaction and morale,

and reducing the number of accidents.” 8 9

The ambient environment within the truck cab

also has an effect on the driver. Tests have shown

that contamination from diesel vehicle carbon

monoxide is not a problem, but that nitrous oxide

levels can be higher than recommended by the Na-

~Natlonal Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Op. cit., footnote

84,. p. 76.

“Ibid., p. 78.

‘8Mark Sanders, “U.S. Truck Driver Anthropometric and Truck

Work Space Data Survey,” prepared for the Society of Automotive

Engineers, January 1983.

‘~hage Berggren, “Equipment Productivity: At What Price?” unpublished remarks to the American Trucking Associations Foundation Meeting, Ocean Reef, FL, Apr. 29, 1988.

Photo credit: Michael Hines, OTA staff

Heat, noise, and vibration in the truck cab contribute

to a stressful working environment for drivers.

tional Institute for Occupational Safety an d

Health .

9 0

Ride quality in heavy trucks is sometimes very

poor. This complex issue is a product of variations

in the truck design including wheel base, axle location, frame stiffness, and suspension type as well as

vehicle load and road surface condition. The large

engine in close proximity to the cab adds vibration,

noise, and heat. Heat and humidity have an adverse

effect on driver physiology and performance, noise

levels are often high enough to have adverse effects,

and vibrations are at a level that creates fatigue.91

These pose formidable challenges for researchers and

manufacturers.

On-Board Recording Devices

On-board devices that record engine revolutions

per minute, vehicle speed, oil temperature and pressure, cooling system temperature, and so forth are

currently available for approximately $1,500 to

$2,500. Although the information collected permits

the examination of distance traveled, driving time,

breaks, daily rest periods, and speed limit compliance, carriers usually purchase these systems to manage fuel efficiency. Safety advocates have proposed

‘Federal Highway Administration, Toxic Gases in ~eavy ~u(Y

Diesel Truck Cabs, Report No. FHWA-RD-77-139 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Department of Transponation, October 1977).

“lNational Highway Traffic Safety Administration, A Study of Hear,

Noise, and Vibration in Relation to Driver Performance and Physiological Status, Report No. HS-801313 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, December 1974).
131

using on-board recording devices to improve compliance with hours-of-service rules and speed limits.

One firm reports that an on-board device pays

for itself in 6 months through cost savings in fuel,

maintenance, and driver time (reduced paperwork

requirements). 92 It also helps streamline the preparation of reports that must be kept on file by the

company for oversight agencies,93 providing an

economic incentive for installing the device. The system also includes an alarm that is activated if a driver

operates at speeds greater than 55 mph for more

than 1 minute, a capability that made the company

decide installation of speed governors was unnecessary. Management made major efforts to gain

acceptance from drivers before installing the devices,

giving seminars to help drivers understand how and

why the organization was going to use the recorders.

After initial resistance, drivers understood that the

recorders could be advantageous, proving, for example, that a late delivery stemmed from following

the rules. 94

Another large transport company reported that

since it installed on-board recording devices, fuel

mileage has improved by 12 percent, tire mileage

has increased to 270,000 miles, brake lining life has

increased, and insurance rates have dropped. To

gain acceptance among drivers, the company initiated an incentive plan based on the driver’s performance evaluation. From information gathered by the

recording device, each driver receives a grade based

on a cumulative average of all major functions on

the trip, such as maximum speed, engine revolu9: Phillip Brown, The Travelers Companies, in Office of Technology

Assessment, op. cit., footnote 67, p. 183.

~~The Department of Transportation has accepted recording device

output in lieu of logbooks for some carriers.

‘Phillip Brown, The Travelers Companies, in Office of Technology

Assessment, op. cit., footnote 67, p. 186.

tions, and idle time. The incentive plan pays drivers

an extra 2 cents a mile if they receive a performance grade of 10, and 1 cent per mile for a grade

of 9. Some drivers now prefer trucks equipped with

the devices so that they can earn extra compensation. 95

An insurance case was recently settled on the basis

that the tape from an on-board recording device

showed that a truck driver had geared down in anticipation of an automobile driver’s cutting in front

of him to enter a ramp. The device showed that the

truck driver did, in fact, gear down, but could not

do so fast enough to prevent the accident. The automobile driver lost the case.96

While several European countries currently require on-board recording devices in their heavy

trucks, installation of these devices on trucks in the

United States remains voluntary, although their use

is increasing.97 Companies using on-board recorders

as standard fleet equipment are doing so for multiple management-related reasons, not primarily to

improve the fleet safety record.98 Although some

devices may not be tamper proof, FHWA has determined that tampering with on-board computers

is not a serious problem.99

“5Prit’ate Line, “A Driver Incentive Plan, With an On-Board Computer, Rewards Proper Vehicle Operation, ” October 1986, p. 15.

~Phlllip BroW,n, The Travelers Companies, in Office of Technology

Assessment, op. cit., footnote 67, pp. 236-237.

‘

; Freightliner estimates that about 5 percent of their new trucks are

equipped with electronic recorders at the customer’s request (Otto Carroll, Freightliner, personal communication, Aug. 3, 1988). Rockwell

estimates that on-board electronic recording systems are currently being used on about I percent of the heavy trucks in operation. G.J. Flannery, Rockwell International, personal communication, Feb. 25, 1987.

‘%’ictor Jennings, Ryder Truck Rental, in Office of Technology},

Assessment, op. cit., footnote 67, pp. 185-186.

‘Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Highway Administratmn,

Mar. 13, 1988.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS

Highway system design issues and heavy vehicle truck sizes and heavier weights

safety technologies interact as parts of a system. Yet, faster than changes to highway

have occurred far

design standards.

too frequently, components of the system are treated OTA finds that Congress may wish to require

as isolated and separate by government agencies and DOT to develop a systematic Federal approach to

the respective industries. While some technical im- motor carrier safety. A first step is better coordi”

provements for heavy vehicles are under develop- nation on heavy vehicle and highway safety issues

ment, major safety issues remain unaddressed. among DOT agencies, including NHTSA and

Changes to government policies allowing larger FHWA’S Office of Motor Carriers (OMC), high.
132

way planning, safety, and design offices. Key components include accumulation of objective data to

identify highway design problems and aggressive

testing programs to determine the point at which

equipment technologies and accident countermeasures are reliable and cost-effective. Also important

are consistent Federal regulations, long-overdue at

DOT–NHTSA and OMC brake standards still differ in some respects.

Furthermore, OTA finds that resolving conflicts, such as industry’s push for still longer vehicles and the limitations of the Nation’s road network, will require far better communication and

cooperation by Federal and State governments

and industry. State decisions on permissible vehicle sizes and weights are often not consistent with

the ability of the highway system to accommodate

the vehicles. Working groups that can focus on setting research agendas and model standards, developing interim countermeasures, voluntary field testing by industry, and the sharing of experimental

data can contribute. No governmental mechanism

exists currently that adequately deals with such difficult issues, and active participation by Federal and

State officials is essential to a systems approach.

While the stability and braking characteristics of

heavy trucks have been well studied by NHTSA,

cab occupant protection and reducing the effects of

car/truck collisions are two areas that need additional research. Congress may wish to encourage

NHTSA to step up work on these important safety

technology issues with the goal of determining

and implementing appropriate standards.

The Federal Government has a role to play in determining whether safety technologies should be

specified as performance criteria (which state minimum acceptable capabilities) or as mandated design

standards (which specify in detail the equipment that

must be used). ’m

Vehicle equipment compatibility issues are extremely difficult for industry to resolve without active Federal participation. OTA concludes that

Federal agencies such as OMC, NHTSA, and in1m]oe R. Morris, “Safety Implications of Changes in Truck Size and

Weight Limits,” Proceedings of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Symposium on the Role of Heavy Freight Vehicles in Trafi”c (Ottawa, Canada: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Apr. 27-30, 1987), vol. 3, pp. 4-14.

dustry must jointly seek solutions to compatibility issues.101 While truck manufacturers and users

agree that upgraded Federal brake standards are

needed, they also stress that industry should work

with NHTSA and FHWA to test new technologies

and to develop appropriate regulations.

OTA finds that issuing standards for antilock

brakes will be warranted within the next 3 to 5

years. The NHTSA test program for antilock

brakes on tractors now underway is an essential

step. Antilock systems for tractors and trailers is

the ultimate goal. If manufacturers of both tractors

and trailers are involved in the rulemaking process, the development and acceptance of compatible

and well-balanced braking systems will be accelerated.102 The Tractor Trailer Brake Research Group,

an industry group (see figure 5-11), has been working very slowly toward resolving longstanding brake

and compatibility issues. Active participation by

NHTSA and OMC could speed the process. OTA

concludes that the Federal Government could

play an active role in brake lining performance

tests and identification methodology, with the

goal of issuing performance criteria and compati~

bility standards for both original and replacement

linings, Other longer-range brake research activities also warrant Federal support. Examples of basic

research include “braking by wire” and improving

tire/braking force capability.

Critical needs exist for maintaining existing technologies even while new innovations are under

consideration—initiatives for improving brake maintenance, for example. Widespread misunderstanding of truck brake systems and brake maintenance

and adjustment suggests a need for a comprehensive education program for owners and operators

of all fleets and mechanics. A training requirement

for mechanics could be an important step.

Manufacturers indicate that enough is known

about vehicle visibility and splash and spray for

preliminary equipment standards and performance criteria to be developed. NHTSA may have

overlooked some possible splash and spray control

options. Congress may wish to request NHTSA to

address these issues with renewed vigor and issue

regulations in the near future.

IOIOffice of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 67.

1“~Ibid., pp. 32-43.
I

Standard s

Council

Ad Hoc Technical ~

Advisory Panel- l:

Braking and Handling j

Brake :

Committee i

KEY: NHTSA = National Highway Transportotion Safety Administration;

FHWA = Federal Highway Administration; OMC = Office of Motor Carriers

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, based on information from American Trucking Associations, 1987.
134

The adoption of safety-related technologies by trucking firms and owner-operators is not an automatic

process. The technologies must mitigate a perceived

or apparent problem and provide a reasonably shortterm return on investment. Because they do not

have economies of scale available to large firms,

owner-operators have difficulty realizing economic

payback for safety-related equipment. Improved

safety equipment that has clear economic benefit

will eventually be accepted by industry,103 as evidenced by purchases of technologies such as automatic

slack adjusters. 104 OTA finds that when economic

advantages of equipment that has proven safety

value are not apparent, setting minimum Federal

standards for equipment that apply equally to all

motor carriers, regardless of classification, is

appropriate.

Since many equipment safety issues do not translate directly into improved productivity, industry

acceptance of new technologies is slow under any

circumstances. The fragmentation of the industry

hampers dissemination of safety information on new

technologies. OTA finds that a thorough education

and information program for new technology requirements could benefit purchasers and users.

Congress may wish to allocate resources for such

tasks. Video instructional displays at truck stops

around the country could inform drivers of the risks

they take by operating trucks with deficient brakes,

tires, or lights. These displays could also present information on ways to avoid and correct other safety

problems. States could coordinate these activities

with their enforcement programs.

1

0] Ibid.

‘

{wWilliam Leasure, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 67, p. 170.

Retrofitting trucks with newly mandated safety

equipment can have significant costs. Difficulty in

designing retrofit equipment adaptable to all older

vehicles and the evolutionary nature of technology

focus manufacturers’ R&D efforts toward new vehicles.105 Congress may wish to consider requiring

DOT to develop implementation programs for

new and retrofit technologies, and to set deadlines

for programs.

Finally, the cost of educating drivers to use new

safety equipment is one that will have to be accounted for in the marketplace. Although carriers

may need to pay drivers and mechanics more for

having additional technical skills, the higher costs

to shippers and ultimately the public can be more

than offset by reduced accident costs.

On-board recording devices are cost-effective management tools and can motivate drivers to be more

efficient. Their use for driver oversight has also been

successful if management followup is appropriate.

However, management experience to date shows

that careful dialog with drivers to minimize potential adverse reactions is important when introducing the devices. OTA finds that an immediate

mandatory requirement for on-board recording

devices may be premature. Education for management, labor, and enforcement officers is essential

to promote acceptance of these tools as safety devices and prevent abuse. Congress may wish to

consider requiring DOT to plan and implement

a program to accomplish these goals.

1C5P.A. Gustafson, Cummins Engine Co., Inc., personal communication, Apr. 28, 1987.
Chapter

Human Factors in Truck Safety

6

.

*

.

*89 m@/?: K&&n Mathheen, OTA staff

Trainees watch an instructor demonstrate how to back up a truck.
CONTENTS

The Driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Driver Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Alcohol and Drug Use Among Drivers .

Drug Testing . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... .......+.

Management Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Driver Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Training Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Training Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sharing the Road With the Driving Public

Hours of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fatigue and Sleep Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Technologies to ‘Address Human Performance Issues. . ..........................152

On-Board

Conclusions

Box

6-A.United

Figure

62.

6-2

6-3.

Recording Devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........153

and Policy Options . . . . . . . ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Box

Page

Study of Successful Safety Management . ......144

Information Processing sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Incident History of Heavy Truck Drivers Involved in Accidents

Truck Accident Risk Compared With Duration of Truck Work

Tables

Table

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

..139

Shim:::::::..ls l

Page

6-1. Drinking-Related Accidents by Driver Classification . .......................140

6-2. Drinking-Related Accidents by Carrier Classification . . . . . . ..................140

6-3. Current and Proposed Hours-of-Service Regulations . .......................150
Chapter 6

Human Factors in Truck Safety

Heavy vehicle drivers must continuously process

and react to a variety of information, and even

momentary lapses in concentration can cause an accident. The behavior of other drivers, the vehicle,

roadwa y design, and the traffic environment all can

distract the driver, as can other factors such as carrier management attitudes and policies or economic

and scheduling pressures. Human error is cited as

the cause of over 60 percent of motor carrier accidents.

Although the Federal Government has focused

on some aspects of vehicle and highway design, it

has given inadequate attention to the interacting

and subtle human factors that affect motor carrier

safety. This chapter describes driver performance

and explores the relationship between human factors and truck safety, describing industry safety programs and identifying Federal policy options.

THE DRIVER

The typical human information processing sequence includes receiving information, recognizing

and evaluating it, reaching a decision, and taking

action—all within a very short time period. (See figure 6-1. ) An alert driver can process information

in less than 2 seconds when confronted with an unexpected hazard in the roadway.1 However, fatigue

or other impairment affects both the speed of the

driver’s mental processes and the accuracy of his

judgment. 2 The continual changes in the roadway

environment and the special skills required in stopping and maneuvering heavy trucks suggest that a

competent heavy truck driver should be well trained,

experienced, and alert.

Driver Screening

Driving a heavy vehicle demands greater skills

than operating a passenger car, both in normal driving situations and in responding to potential hazards. 3 Heavy trucks are less easily maneuvered

than automobiles, requiring greater distances for

passing, stopping, turning, and accelerating, and

forcing drivers to anticipate and avoid potential traf-

‘P. D. Olsen et al., Parameters Affecting Stopping Sight Distance,

NCHRP Report No. 270 (Washington, DC: Transportation Research

Board, 1984).

‘M. Allnutt “Human Factors: Basic Principles,” Pilot Error, The H u -

man Fac-rors, R. Hurst and L. Hurst (eds. ) (London, England: Granada

Publishing, 1983).

‘Transportation Research Board, Zero Alcohol and Ocher Options:

L.lm~rs for Truck and Bus Drlt’ers, Special Report 216 (Washington,

DC: National Research Council, 1987).

fic conflicts. Thus, a safety conscious carrier manager will take seriously the task of identifying and

hiring drivers with appropriate skills, attitudes, and

training.

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for carrier hiring procedures are broad

enough to permit wide variations in company practices. All driver applicants must complete a written

application and must take a road test and a written test. However DOT gives no clear guidelines for

what constitutes “passing” either test. In fact, DOT

does not require that the knowledge test be passed,

only that the applicant be told the correct answer

for the items missed. (For further details on requirements, see chapter 3.) In practice, even these regulations are ignored by some carriers or interpreted

with considerable latitude. Commercial Driver’s

License Program4 tests will determine whether a

prospective driver has the minimal level of skills to

operate a heavy truck. However, the carrier management’s evaluation of a driver’s background and skills

will remain the dominant hiring standard.

Many carriers devote careful attention to driver

hiring, requiring reference checks, referrals, drug

screening, and interviews, over and above the back-

‘Commercial \ehicle operator licensing was changed dramatically by

passage of the 1986 Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act, but the

gradual phasing in of the program will delay the full impact of the legislation. The Commercial Driver’s License Program of the Department

of Transportation established fit’e key dates as milestones for identifying and removing unqualified drivers from the road. For further information on the program, see ch. 3.

137
138

I

_-

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a)

— ------ -

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139

ground checks and pre-employment physical examinations that DOT requires. Thorough prehiring

evaluation can pay major dividends for management. One company uses a carefully developed test

to help determine which applicants have the coordination, physical capability, and mental attitude to

handle a tractor-trailer combination. The company

has found a very strong correlation between the

driving skill level exhibited during the evaluation

and driver performance after hirings Moreover,

when a driver eventually does have an accident, the

cause is frequently a driving behavior characteristic that the test had identified as needing improvement. Such a diagnostic tool can provide a carrier

with invaluable information to use in both initial

driver training and retraining.6

Automotive safety research shows that those who

indicate on a screening test that they are risk-takers

are likely to be relatively aggressive in their driving

behavior, less mindful of cautions about safety, and

more likely to drive longer hours without rest. On

the other hand, risk averse drivers, though not necessarily more skilled, are likely to give other highway users a way out in dangerous road situations

and to show prudence in their driving decisions. i

However, not all carriers understand the benefits

of careful screening—a DOT study of carriers rated

unsatisfactory in the Pacific Northwest found that

35 percent of the firms had unsatisfactory driver

qualification procedures.8

Although driving a truck requires different skills

than driving a car, one study that examined the relationship between a truck driver’s driving records in

his personal vehicle and in his truck found a strong

similarity between the records. OTA analysis of the

National Accident Sampling System data also shows

that heavy truck drivers involved in accidents have

received citations for previous safety violations,

particularly for speeding (see figure 6-2). However,

the prior record in the truck is a better predictor

than either the record in the private vehicle or the

‘John Dannemiller, Leaseway Transportation Corp., in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “Transcript of Proceedings—

OTA Workshop on Human Factors and Truck Safety,” unpublished

transcript, May 19, 1987, p. 43.

‘Fred E. VanccAa\l, Michigan State University, personal communication, May 18, 1988.

‘Richard Schwing, General Motors Research Laboratories, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5.

‘Robert Bleakley, Federal Highway Administration, in Office of

Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 65.

Figure 6-2.-Incident History of Heavy Truck

Drivers Involed in Accidents

50 ~

40

30

20

10

0

Prior incidents u

KEY: DWI = Driving while intoxicated.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988; based on National Accident

Sampling System data.

total record including both private and commercial

driving.9

Management interest in more stringent screening

procedures may be thwarted by demographic and

economic pressures. The Department of Labor reports that the truck driving work force is expected

to increase 17.2 percent by 1995, placing truck driving among the 37 fastest growing occupations out

of 500 studied. 10 At the same time, industry

analysts forecast that finding qualified truck drivers

will become more difficult over the next decade, with

a 30-percent reduction in the available driver pool

expected by 1992. This reduction will be due to

retirements, drug screening, tighter Federal driver

requirements and licensing standards, a shrinking

national labor force, and the perception that truck

driving is a high-stress job requiring excessive time

‘Shirley B. Geissin~r et al., The Relationship Between a Truck

Driver!s Performance in a Personal Vehicle and in a Large Truck

(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Highway Safety Research Center, June 1986).

IPNationa] Transportation Safety Board, Training, Licensing and

Qualification Standards for Drivers of Heavy Trucks, Report No.

NTSB/SS-86/02 (Washington, DC: Apr. 17, 1986), p. 5.

87-004 0 - 88 - 4
140

away from home.11 Truck driver wages rose just

over 20 percent between 1979 and 1987, as compared to a rise of almost 50 percent for all occupations. 12

To meet its needs, industry may have to resort

to nontraditional labor sources, such as women and

minorities, and increase wages. Recent proposals to

allow 18- to 20-year-oIds to operate commercial vehicles and heavy trucks as on-the-job trainees are

a result of the shrinking driver pool. These proposals

raise safety concerns, since accident statistics point

directly at young drivers as a high-risk group.

Thus, although the importance of the selection

process in screening out unqualified drivers is well

recognized by many carriers, the need for personnel may cause the numbers of problem drivers behind the wheel to grow. Steps may be required to

bolster application of uniform and stringent driver

selection practices throughout the industry.

Alcohol and Drug Use Among Drivers

Although currently being revised, Federal Motor

Carrier Safety Regulations now prohibit possessing,

being under the influence of, or using an intoxicating beverage or drug while on duty, or consuming

an intoxicating beverage within 4 hours of going on

duty. Furthermore, a person is not qualified to drive

if he or she has a current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism or drug dependency. These rules were based

on the knowledge that driving performance is directly affected by intoxication or the influence of

drugs. While the reaction to the ingestion of drugs

and alcohol varies depending on the individual,13

studies show that, for the majority, human performance is degraded by blood-alcohol concentration

(BAC) levels of 0.05 or even lower. Epidemiological studies also indicate that the risk of being involved, as well as at-fault, in a motor vehicle accident begins increasing at low BAC levels.14 This is

in contrast to a legal standard for intoxication in

‘

]

Jim Windsor, “Serious Accidents: Manpower Shortages vs. Driver

Quality,” Heavy Duty Trucking, July 1987, p. 18.

1~Joanne F. Casey, American Trucking Associations, Statistical

Analysis Department, “An Assessment of the Truck Driver Shortage,”

unpublished manuscript, Aug. 10, 1987, p. 7.

111. c. Drew et al., Eff&z of SmaIl hses of Alcohol on a Skill Resembling Driving (London, England: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office,

1959).

I+Transportation R=earch Board, op. cit., footnote j! PO q“”

highway driving currently set at 0.10 BAC in most

States. 15

Many of these research findings are based on automobile driving performance, and heavy vehicle

drivers operate more complicated equipment on

roadways often designed for smaller vehicles. Previous studies suggest that although more skilled persons are better able to compensate for the effects

of alcohol than those less skilled, even skilled drivers

show a decreased ability to handle complex tasks

at low BAC levels.16 Data analysis clearly correlates drinking with truck accident severity (see figure

4-6 in chapter 4). Recognizing the dangers of alcohol consumption and driving, one large petroleum

refining company that sells fuel to truck stop operators has written provisions into its service contracts

forbidding the sale of alcohol at those stops.17i Alcohol use is a problem that cuts across driver classifications as shown in tables 6-1 and 6-2.

lflf the Secretary of Transportation does not issue a regulation by

October 1988, the blood-alcohol concentration for commercial vehicle drivers will automatically drop to 0.04, consistent with present regulations for aviation crews and railroad engineers,

lcTransportation Research Board, op. ck., footnote 3, P. 57.

‘TGisela Vallandigham, vice president of membership, National

Association of Truck Stop Operators, personal communication, Mar.

15, 1988.

Table 6-1.—Drinking-Related Accidents

by Driver Classification

Number of drivers

Drinking Drinking

involved not involved

Noncommercial . . . . . . . . . . 856 90,234

Full time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,555 579,260

Part time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 27,100

Owner-operator . . . . . . . . . . 518 66,996

Leased. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546 11,832

Other ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 2,319

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment analysis of National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85.

Table 6-2.—Drinking-Related Accidents

by Carrier Classification

Number of drivers

Drinking Drinking

involved not involved

Noncommercial . . . . . . . . . . 856 90,234

For-hire/common . . . . . . . . . 856 179,662

For-hire/contract . . . . . . . . . 1,258 194,806

Private . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,932 242,130

ICC Exempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,142 51,770

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 20,163

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment analysis of National Accident Sampling System data, 1981-85.
141

Evaluations of other drug-related impairment

levels are far more primitive. Reliable evidence about

the effects of drugs on drivers is sketchy, and most

States do not test for drugs other than alcohol. Further research on the subject is needed for marijuana

and other controlled substances before adequate impairment guidelines can be established. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) hopes

to establish some guidelines for impairment levels

as part of its current drug and alcohol study; the

study is currently scheduled for completion in

1989.18

Drug Testing

Many carriers require pre-employment drug and

alcohol testing. When one company started a drugalcohol testing program 2 years ago, 15 percent of

the applicants tested positive in the first year.19 A

year later, only 8 percent of applicants tested positive; this company had sent a signal to prospective

drivers that they need not apply if they have a drug

or alcohol problem. Such individuals may seek employment from other carriers with different screening policies; indeed, one company in the Midwest

reported that 47 percent of the applicants it screened

had positive drug screens. Another carrier that conducted drug screening of current employees and job

applicants found that 17 percent of the tests were

positive. 20

Where management fails to take assertive action,

the drug problem among employees can become entrenched. For example, one motor carrier safety director found evidence of marijuana use while making spot checks of his company’s tractors. A

subsequent investigation led to the discharge of 50

percent of the drivers at the terminal involved. In

another instance, a laboratory that performs drug

screening for several major carriers found that even

for repeat examinations, 13 to 18 percent of the tests

were positive. In some cases, this occurred despite

the fact that employees were given 30 to 60 days

advance notice of the tests.21 OTA staff found that

‘KPat Loach, project director, National Transportation Safety Board,

personal communication, Mar. 18, 1988.

“Ken Thom~on, Yellow Freight System, Inc., in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 147.

~“Richard Landis, Associate Administrator for Motor Carriers, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation, Feb. 18, 1986.

‘

l Ibid., p. 28.

drugs are readily available at truck stops, some of

which are well-known among drivers for drug activity, and CB radios are used openly for advertising

or soliciting drugs.22

Appropriate formal procedures for periodic drug

and alcohol testing of employees have been the subject of much debate. Many motor carriers conduct

testing on a calendar basis for all employees; others

test a sample of employees.23 The International

Brotherhood of Teamsters’ master freight agreement

guidelines for physical examinations and for testing urine for marijuana and other classes of drugs

generally follow standards set by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Members can

be tested during their regular DOT physical examinations and when probable suspicion or cause can

be established.24 Although the Teamsters represent

many drivers working for large trucking concerns,

the majority of drivers are not subject to this agreement. When an independent driver contracts with

a larger carrier, however, he must abide by that company’s policy. It has been estimated that carriers

large enough to mount their own alcohol and drug

abuse programs are responsible for less than onethird of the heavy trucks using the highways.25

In a survey of 1,762 truck drivers conducted recently in Florida, 33 percent of the drivers reported

being previously tested for alcohol, and 38 percent

reported being previously tested for drugs by the

company they were presently driving for or to which

they were leased. Owner-operators reported the

lowest frequency of testing, 29 percent for alcohol

and 31 percent tested for drugs, respectively. Drivers

employed by for-hire carriers reported the largest

percentage of prior testing. Attesting to concern

about substance abuse among drivers, 73 percent

of those surveyed stated that they support mandatory random alcohol and drug testing by employers. 26

The reliability of the testing methods is of special

concern for drug tests. The most accurate tests,

‘LAn OTA analyst made several trips with o~.er-the-road drivers in

conjunction with this project.

~ ‘Thomas Donohue, President and CEO, American Trucking Associations, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Feb. 18, 1986.

‘

i

Transportation Research Board, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 132.

‘~Ibid., p. 132.

‘ARegular Common Carrier Conference, “Highway Common Carrier News Release,” NOIT. 16, 1987.
142

which are also the most expensive ($30-$125), can

produce 2 to 3 false positives per 100 tests. Because

of the likelihood of false readings, laboratory experts

urge a followup test. While many cost-conscious employers are not willing to pay for additional tests,

others share information with the applicant and will

re-evaluate the applicant if he or she takes a second test at personal expense.27

Some companies are sensitive to the counseling

needs of drug and alcohol abusers. One carrier’s employees are given a drug test as part of their annual

physical examination; they are notified of their

scheduled appointment 30 days in advance. The

company feels a responsibility to assist the driver

in obtaining treatment if the employee informs management prior to the physical of a drug or alcohol

problem.28

More stringent methods for detection of alcohol

use by truck drivers while on the road have also been

‘iGreg Borzo, “Motor Carriers Institute Re-Employment Drug

Tests,” Trafi”c World, June 15, 1987, p. 12.

‘BKen Thompson, Yellow Freight System, Inc., in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 147-148.

discussed as enforcement measures. A recent study

conducted by the Transportation Research Board

(TRB) concluded that the technical ability to detect and measure BAC levels of less than 0.05 is

available with current screening and testing devices.

However, the legal authority of public enforcement

officers to enforce a law based on a low BAC standard with breath-screening devices has not been

definitively established. If the ability to do so survives legal scrutiny, the TRB report indicates costeffective enforcement could be carried out by screening drivers at truck weigh stations and as part of

vehicle safety inspections. Blood tests could be mandatory after injury-producing accidents. TRB estimates that vigorous enforcement of this kind would

save between 80 to 140 lives annually at a minimum

BAC level of 0.10, 110 to 190 lives at a 0.04 BAC

threshold, and 130 to 250 lives at a limit of 0.00

BAC. The total public and private costs for enforcement at each level is estimated at $30 million, $40

million, and $50 million, respectively .29

~~ransportation Research Board, op. cit., footnote 3, p. Z.

MANAGEMENT APPROACH

Driver attitude is a major influence on truck safety

and that attitude is affected by company management philosophy and the work environment. A carrier that actively promotes safety and rewards good

practices establishes safety as a major driver responsibility. This approach often requires extra effort to

develop staff leadership and provide safety incentives; however, under such management, drivers are

more likely to view themselves as professionals,

accountable for the safe operation of their vehicles.

Incentive programs may include cash bonuses,

award programs, group recognition, and distribution of patches, pins, wallet cards, rings, and even

stock for different levels of achievement.

One firm has adopted a formal corporate approach to safety that focuses on: 1) driver selection,

2) driver training, 3) driver conditioning, and 4)

driver management.

31 Communication is an im-

‘OJohn J. Killilee, Consolidated Freightways, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 152.

“Dannemiller, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 42-46.

,,

,, “,

,’

.! ,’ I

‘, ,.~

Photo credit: Karen Mathlasen, OTA staff

Management emphasis on safety can focus drivers

on its importance.

portant safety ingredient at another firm. For instance, group discussions between management and

drivers encourage driver feedback and provide management with constructive information about operations. Good rapport between labor and manage-
143

ment brings better agreement about organizational

goals and how to achieve them.

One management consulting company has developed a program to establish a positive corporate attitude toward safety through management strategies,

technical training, and operations. The program addresses vehicle inspection, driver selection, drug

screening, driver health, hazardous materials hauling, city and over-the-road driving, hours of service, accident reporting, worker’s safety, and security.32 Another company that produces industryrelated instructional material is developing a series

of video-training programs on trucking. Safety programs will cover driver fatigue, road vision, driving

a bobtail with an empty trailer, and professionalism.

Technical training programs will include brake systems, motors, truck specifications, and gauges and

switches. Numerous other trucking associations

and commercial firms also publish training materials. No widely accepted standards exist for evaluating any of these programs.

Companies that have mounted carefully structured and intensive safety efforts have found major cost benefits in the quality of customer service,

productivity improvements, and accident avoidance

leading to lower insurance costs.34 United Parcel

Service (UPS), one of the most successful carriers

in the country, is such a company, and its accident

rate is one-tenth the national average. Box 6-A describes UPS operations and safety management techniques.

Creating an environment that does not compromise safety requires management to balance regulatory requirements, such as hours-of-service rules,

and customer service needs—just-in-time deliveries,

for example. Intense competition for freight and

market share provides a powerful incentive to increase productivity, utilize capacity, and push drivers

to the limit of their ability to stay alert at the wheel.

Some companies inform customers directly that

‘:Jay Deragon, president, Megasafe, personal communication, Oct.

12, 1987.

‘

] Bernadette Williamson, senior producer, The Kalamazoo Writing

and Video Co., Merv Orr’s Transportation Training Corp., personal

communication, Feb. 25, 1988.

‘qRobert D. Pcnve[l, vice president, Finance, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc.,

personal comunlcatlon, Jan. 26, 1988.

trade-offs exist between costs and quality of service, and that safe, reliable service is worth slightly

higher rates.

3 5

However, drivers complain that shippers, brokers,

and dispatchers often push hard for unrealistic delivery schedules that violate regulations. While an

oversupply of carriers in the mid-1980s enabled shippers to shop around for carriers willing to take a

load on any terms, this is less true today. Nonetheless, drivers resent being held responsible for violations of weight laws or hours-of-service regulations.

The American Trucking Associations, inc. (ATA)

advocate placing responsibility directly on shippers

for demanding that truckers drive longer or faster

than is legal to deliver goods. 36 Others claim that

the need to use brokers places additional constraints

on both shippers and carriers.

37 The State o f

Rhode Island has acknowledged that drivers are

often subject to strong pressure from carrier management and imposes fines and citations for motor

carrier owners whenever their drivers are cited. 38 

One expert finds that drivers feel less pressured to

take loads exceeding weight limits in States where

this change in policy has occurred. 3 9

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)

has two small, new programs that address similar

issues. The Commercial Accident Prevention and

Evaluation Program was started in 198? to identify

carriers with high at-fault accident rates and develop

countermeasures to reduce risks. The Educational

and Technical Assistance Program is a nationwide

safety information program aimed at carriers,

drivers, and industry associations. Mass mailings of

literature identify highway locations with high accident rates and detail accident avoidance techniques.

40

J5Dannemiller, op. Cit ” ~ footnote 5, p. 46; and ibid.

3bDonohue, op. cit., footnote 23, p. 50.

‘TJames Johnston, Owner-Operators Independent Dri\ers Association of America, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 240241.

‘

8 William Maloney, associate administrator for motor carriers,

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, personal communication,

Feb. 2, 1987.

‘gPatricia Wailer, University of North Carolina, Highwa\ Research

Center, personal communication, May 19, 1987.

“’Rolwrt Bleakley, Federal Highway Admirmtration, personal communication, July 6, 1988.

145

DRIVER

OTA accident data analysis shows that level of

driver training is the second most frequently cited

factor for motor carrier accidents. Although reliable statistics do not exist, industry experts estimate

that the majority of drivers have not had adequate

formal training. Research indicates that experienced

drivers often acquire bad driving habits that could

be corrected through remedial or inservice training.

A number of carriers have recognized the importance of thorough training and have developed their

own programs, described later in this section.

At present, no Federal requirement exists for

drivers of heavy trucks to receive formal training,

nor does a single State impose a training requirement for all drivers of heavy trucks. 41 Federal regulations for the Commercial Driver’s License establish qualifications on the basis of whether a person

can safely operate the vehicle and secure the load

to be carried, skills that can be acquired through

either training or experience. Many motor carriers

do not impose specific training requirements, but

require applicants to have a minimum of 2 years of

on-the-road experience. 42 This poses difficulties for

graduates of accredited training programs, since the

only way to meet this demand is to drive for a firm

that has no such requirement.

Formal truck driver education is available through

proprietar y truck driver training schools, nonprofit

public education institutions, and in-house motor

carrier training programs. The number of proprietary training programs is estimated at around 200,

with fewer than 10 being in-house programs. Tuition ranges from $350 to $5,000. Course length,

qualifications of the instructors, student/teacher ratios, and, most importantly, time spent on the road

driving vary widely among programs. 43 A survey of

truckers in Florida indicated that 23 percent of the

1,800 respondents reported receiving formal driver

training school instruction prior to becoming a

professional driver; the average time as a truck driver

was 15 years. 44

4 I ~~at,c)nal Tran~poHatlon safety Board, op. Cit., f[ntnote 1 ~, P 7

‘“Phil M’IIIIs, “No\lce Finds Emplo}mcnt Catch-22,” True-ker.~ L’.SA,

\ol. +, No. ~~, ]u]y ~ 1, 1987, p. ~~.

“National Transpm-tatlon Safet} bard, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 9.

‘qRegular Common Carrier Conference, op. cit., footnote 26, p. 1.

TRAINING

Training Standards

Truck driver training schools are subject to oversight from various licensing and accrediting bodies.

Some States, such as Maryland, Pennsylvania, and

Indiana, require driver training schools to b e

licensed, although different agencies are assigned this

oversight responsibility. While these authorities

often establish a minimum number of course hours,

requirements for course content usually are not

specified.

45 Some schools have been accredited by

the National Association of Trade and Technical

Schools or the National Home Study Council. The

vast majority of programs, however, have not been

accredited by either organization.

DOT issued proposed minimum standards for

training tractor-trailer drivers in 1984, in an effort

to establish guidelines for truck driver training. The

standards call for a minimum 320-hour course lasting 8 weeks, if taken on a full-time basis. Course

content included basic truck operation, safe operating practices, advanced operating practices, vehicle

maintenance, and nonvehicle activities. The standards also covered instructor qualifications, school

facilities, graduation requirements, and student

placement. No final action was ever taken on the

proposed standards, although the Office of Motor

Carriers (formerly the Bureau of Motor Carrier

Safety) published a ready-made curriculum, Mode l

Curriculum for Training Tractor-Trailer Drivers, in

‘jNational Transportation Safetv Board, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 11.

Photo credit: Tse-Sung Wu, OTA staff

A driver receives on-the-road instruction.
146

1984. Included in the 2,500-page document are instructions for the school administrator, instructor,

and student. These standards cannot be used for

evaluating existing schools until their validity has

been tested with actual schools and students, and

DOT has not taken steps to do this.

The Professional Truck Driver Institute of America (PTDIA) was formed by industry in 1986 to certify acceptable training schools. PTDIA has adopted

a curriculum based on the Federal model and started

certifying driver training programs in mid-1988.

PTDIA is funded entirely by industry and has both

carrier and public enforcement representatives on

its Board of Directors. The organization emphasizes

the critical importance of the number of hours of

hands-on, behind-the-wheel driving time a student

receives. % While PTDIA’s activities have been supported by many in the industry, the Commission

of Accredited Truck Driving Schools maintains that

driving schools should be free to structure their curricula to meet their educational objectives.47

Training Programs

Although relatively few in number, carriers’ inhouse training activities can be very effective (see

box 6-A on UPS, for an example). 1n 1980, a large

general commodities motor carrier implemented a

training program to instruct all new drivers in the

safe handling of the vehicle and cargo and has reported a 14-percent decrease in line-haul accident

frequency despite a 38-percent increase in line-haul

mileage .

48 In another case, a trucking firm’s commitment to training led to the provision of a curriculum, equipment, instructors, and course evaluations as aids to outside training schools. 49 Thi s

firm’s screening test for prospective drivers has been

carefully crafted to identify driving patterns and

habits that have the potential to cause accidents.

The insurance industry has also developed training programs to promote safe driving behavior. One

insurance company offers a 5-day seminar, open to

driver trainers, safety personnel, maintenance supervisors, and to the management of fleet policyholders. It includes both classroom and behind-thewheel experience. The examination of several fleets’

safety records before and after personnel received

training showed consistent reductions in accident

frequency and loss rate per vehicle.5o

An alternative approach is developing a truck

driver apprenticeship program so that new drivers

will receive qualified supervision and develop safe

driving habits. In the Netherlands, for instance, prospective new drivers undergo a 2-year apprenticeship.51 There is currently no organized apprenticeship program for heavy truck drivers in the United

States, although the issue has been raised in the past

and is again being discussed.

Recurrent training of employees is important not

only to keep experienced drivers up-to-date, but to

identify bad habits that may have developed over

time. For example, research in Europe has shown

how little perception even experienced drivers have

of their actual speed when they are in a monotonous or repetitive driving situation.52 On U.S.

highways, difficulties with speed perception are acute

when a driver leaves the Interstate system and moves

onto two-lane roads, where speed limits, access, median control, and signs are quite different.53

Keeping drivers physically fit, through physical

conditioning, weight control, and aerobic capacity

can reduce fatigue and stress. One carrier is installing a physical conditioning program nationwide for

its line-haul drivers to assist them in developing

physical and mental stamina to cope with long-haul

driving. 54

MThoma~ M+ Strah, “Truck Driver Training: A Matter of Standards,” Transport Topics, Jan. 18, 1988, p. 16.

‘

i

James J. McAlpin, vice president, Administrative Services, USA

Training Academy, personal communication, Feb. 4, 1988.

+8 Strah, op. cit., fOOtIIOte 46! p“ 8“

‘QDannemiller, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 43-44.

jOSouthern Motor Cargo Magazine, “The Driver is the DecisionMaker,” May 1984.

5] National Transportation Safety Board, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 21.

5~David Lowe, The ~achograph (Solihull, England: Fleet Planning

Limited, 1982), p. 213.

5]James Johnston, Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association of America, in Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 116-117.

5.1 Dannemiller, OP. Cit” )

footnote 5, p. 45.
147

SHARING THE ROAD WITH THE DRIVING PUBLIC

Heavy vehicle operators often claim that most

automobile drivers are unaware of the limitations

and space requirements of heavy trucks. The longer,

wider trucks now permitted are difficult to see

around and require longer distances to pass than

current highway designs allow. Heavy truck drivers

operating in congested areas try to leave enough distance between their own and other vehicles for a

complete stop. However, automobile drivers often

cut sharply in front of trucks, making it difficult to

avoid an accident—for which the truck driver may

be cited,

Education programs for automobile drivers could

help make them aware of safety issues related to

sharing the road with trucks. States such as TenHOURS OF

The hours-of-service rules in effect today are essentially the same as those promulgated in 1937

and 1938 by the Interstate Commerce Commission

(lCC).

56 The regulations prohibit carriers from requiring or permitting any driver to drive more than

10 hours at a time after being on duty more than

15 hours. Drivers must have 8 consecutive hours

off-du ty before driving again. In addition, drivers

are prohibited from driving after 60 hours of onduty time in any 7--day period, or 70 on-duty hours

in any period of 8 consecutive days. 57 Drivers are

required to keep records of their driving in a logbook that must be available for inspection by enforcement officers at all times. “

Complex and difficult to enforce, the hours-ofservice rule is subject to problems ranging from falsification and abuse of logbooks by drivers to loose

interpretations of “on duty” and “off duty” by management. The 15-hour on-duty period can be accounted for during the course of a driver’s overall

duty day in any number of ways. For example, the

56Trucking is not subject t. the Fair Labor Standards Act. Carriers

do not have to pay time-and-a-half for a greater than 40-hour work

u~eek. This creates an incentive for a carrier to hire the fewest drivers

possible and to have them work the longest hours possible in order

to maximize profits.

5~United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Professional Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Carrier Safet}~,

Petitioners’ Brief, No. 81-2283, Mar. 8, 1982.

nessee are considering reorganizing their driver

licensing programs to include material and questions

on truck safety. An information videotape for automobile drivers on sharing the road with trucks

is another possibility;55 it could be shown to people waiting to obtain driver licenses.

Education programs to inform small carriers about

better road safety have also been developed. Available through the National Safety Council and ATA,

these materials describe how a carrier as small as

a 10-person trucking company can implement an

effective safety program.

~5Paul Melander, Tennessee Public Service Commission, personal

communication, May 19, 1987.

SERVICE

driver’s employers may “relieve” him of duty—

responsibility for the vehicle—for meals and rest

breaks. Tiring and strenuous activities, such as loading and unloading performed by the driver, are not

considered part of driving time, although they are

considered duty time and usually contribute to fatigue. Furthermore, 8 hours of off-duty time often

does not afford drivers adequate time to travel to

and from their jobs, eat, bathe, and attend to life’s

other requirements, as well as to get adequate undisturbed sleep. Finally, the illegal practice of requiring a driver to wait at a terminal in an “off-duty”

status for a work assignment contributes to fatigue

prior to the start of a driving tour.55 These factors

help explain why many drivers keep double logbooks

(one for enforcement officers and one for themselves)

or make false entries.

Many drivers are compensated on the basis of how

many miles they drive during a pay period. A longhaul driver faces a choice between violating hoursof-service rules and maintaining his income if bad

weather, highway conditions, or shipper-related delays prevent him from driving an acceptable number of miles. Drivers risk accidents and deny themselves adequate sleep by accepting loads that require

many consecutive hours of driving to reach a final

561bid., p. 9 .
148

.

Photo credit: Michael Hines, OTA staff

Federal regulations require drivers to record their hours of service.

destination on time. Nonetheless, drivers sometimes

boast of their long-distance driving accomplishments

and stoically shrug-off unrealistic shipper deadlines.59

ICC, and subsequently DOT, have recognized

that the hours-of-service rules are subject to abuse.

In 1972, the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS)

in DOT initiated a comprehensive study of the relationship between dangerous levels of fatigue among

truck drivers and the current hours-of-service regulations. 60 The report compiled and analyzed scientific and medical data reflecting driver perform- —

ance and physiological responses collected during

195 truck and bus runs. A total of 1,550 hours of

continuous data was obtained and analyzed on

62,000 miles of highway truck travel in all parts of

the country, and in all weather and traffic conditions. The study concluded:

5

’An OTA staff member heard one operator in Pennsylvania at 8:00

a.m. admit to having to be in Burbank, California at 11:00 a.m. just

2 days later.

‘In 1985, the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety was reorganized and

renamed the Office of Motor Carriers.

. . . driver performance deteriorates, driver alertness . . , diminishes, rest breaks become less effective, and accident probability increases, all within

the current 10-hour daily limitation on driving time.

It [the regulation] is further at odds with a good deal

of anecdotal evidence from the drivers to the effect

that they do suffer from considerable fatigue but are

Photo credit: Land Line

On duty activities such as loading and unloading, in

addition to driving, contribute to driver fatigue.
149

unwilling to admit it because of the feared economic

consequences. 61

This study focused on scheduled relay operations

of large common carriers whose drivers were able

to plan their rest,62 and no formal regulatory action was taken. BMCS acknowledged that further

research was needed to provide data for revising

hours-of-service rules, especially on drivers whose

assignments were irregular in frequency, duration,

and starting times, and who often could not predict when they would be driving.

The second phase of BMCS’s fatigue study, issued

in 1978, found that relay drivers operating irregular schedules suffered greater fatigue, physiological

stress, and performance degradation than drivers

working similar hours on a regular schedule. Fatigue

effects were evident after about 8 hours of relay truck

driving on a regular schedule and considerably

earlier when the schedule was irregular. Cargo loading increased the severity of fatigue associated with

irregular working schedules.63 The reported findings were considered conservative, since the drivers

in the study were allowed 8 hours of sleep each day.

‘

] William Harris et al., Human Factors Research, Inc., A Study of

the Relationships AmoW Fargue, Hours of Service, and Safety of Operations of Truck and Bus Drit’ers, Report No. BMCS-RD-7 1-2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway

Administration, Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, November 1972), p. xi.

b~Robert A. Kaye, Director of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety,

memo to Arthur L. Fox, II, Esq., Aug. 21, 1973.

“]Robert R. Mackle and James C. Miller, Human Factors Research,

Inc., Effects of Hours of Service, Regularity of Schedules, and Cargo

Loading on Truck and Bus Driver Fatigue, Report No. DOT HS-803

799 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, National

Highwa y Traffic Safety Administration, October 1978).

A separate, concurrent study of accident data

found that the length of driving time by itself was

not related to frequency or severity of truck accidents. However, the combination of driving and

nondriving time could be related to driver fatigue

and play a role in accident occurrence.64 Following

the results of these studies, BMCS subsequently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and conducted public hearings in several cities around the

country. By the end of 1978, BMCS had accumulated what it considered to be sufficient information to justify amending the hours-of-service regulations. 65 Table 6-3 provides a summary of hoursof-service regulation options that BMCS considered.

In 1981, however, the agency terminated the rulemaking action and closed the docket, citing the

absence of a direct relationship between the hoursof-service rules and accidents. Also, in 1981 BMCS

commissioned an economic study of the cost of modifying the hours-of-service rules to conform with

Office of Management and Budget and DOT policy

requirements. The projected costs of each of the government’s three major options were considered to be

significantly greater than the projected benefits.66 

‘Safety Management Institute, Analysis of Accident Data and

Hours of Service oflnterstate Commercial Motor Vehicle Dri\’ers, prepared for the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (Washington, DC: Aug.

11, 1978).

‘

i< United States Court of Appeals, op. cit., footnote 57, p. 18.

‘iBooz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., Assessment of rhe Impacts of Proposed Hours of Service Revisions, prepared for the Bureau of Motor

Carrier Safety (Washington, DC: June 24, 1981).

FATIGUE AND SLEEP NEEDS

Medically-related sleep disorders and occupationally-induced sleep disturbances seriously impair driving ability. Scientific literature makes clear that

human performance is best at moderate levels of

arousal. At low levels, the brain loses the capacity

to make quick and informed decisions; at high levels,

actions may be frequent, but ill-directed.67 Fatigue

and sleepiness are associated with low levels of

arousal. Normal fatigue can be exacerbated by three

categories of stress factors: 1) physical environment

such as temperature and vibration; 2) physiological factors such as poor or inadequate sleep, drugs

and alcohol, or irregular eating habits; and 3) psychological factors such as anger, fear, and frustration.68 A distinction is sometimes made for drivers

between single-trip fatigue, where an opportunity

for recovery may exist; cumulative fatigue, in which

recovery time between trips is not adequate; and

chronic fatigue, which usually requires medical assistance. The behavorial symptoms of all three types

“;Allnutt, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 13. “Ibid., p. 15.
Table 6-3.—Current and Proposed Hours-of-Service Regulations

Section Current regulations Option I Option II Option Ill

Meal period

Driving relief period

Intermittent off duty

Duty tour limit

Sleeper berth

Driving time 10 hours

On-duty time 15 hours

Cumulative on-duty time 70 hours in 8-day period

60 hours in 7-day period

Off-duty periods 8 hours

10 hours at home terminal

24 consecutive hours after

driving during 6 days

None required

None required

Not prohibited

No specific limit

2 periods totaling 8 hours,

neither less than 2 hours

Time-of-day restrictions None

8 hours

12 hours

70 hours in 8-day period

8 hours at foreign terminal

12 hours at home terminal

24 consecutive hours per

7-day period, or 48

consecutive hours per

14-day period

30 minutes after 7 or more

hours on duty (logged as

on duty)

30 minutes after 4 hours

(logged as on duty), may

include meal period

Prohibited

15 consecutive hours

2 periods totaling 8 hours,

neither less than 2 hours

None

12 hours

12 hours

8 hours at foreign terminal

30 minutes after 7 or more

hours on duty (logged as

on duty)

30 minutes after 4 hours

(logged as on duty), may

include meal period

Not prohibited

12 consecutive hours

Any 8 consecutive hours of

duty may include sleeper

berth time and off duty

combined if consecutive

None

10 hours

15 hours

70 hours in 8-day period

60 hours in 7-day period

8 hours

None required

None required

Not prohibited

No specific limit

2 periods totaling 8 hours,

neither less than 2 hours

Driving between midnight

and 6 a.m. prohibited

SOURCE: Office of Motor Carriers, 1988.
151

of fatigue are similar, however.69 Sound, adequate

sleep is the best way to relieve fatigue, which is an

independent variable affecting behavior and performance.

Off-duty time, as specified in the regulations, often

does not translate into sleep or rest time, as it was

intended to do, partly because of the way the body

functions biologically. Sleep researchers have shown

that the body typically functions according to a circadian, or 24-hour, cycle that includes regular, defined periods of rest. Thus, when a driver starts his

off-duty time, he may not be biologically ready to

rest. As an example, a driver who begins a driving

day at 6:00 a.m. must stop to rest at 4:00 p.m.,

according to the regulations. However, unless this

is his accustomed time for sleep, his circadian cycle

is not ready for him to begin prolonged rest. The

driver is likely to take a nap eventually, but can begin driving again at midnight, just when the body’s

normal circadian cycle prepares him for sleep.70 As

a result, his alertness level and ability to operate a

vehicle will be severely impaired.

The type of rest can affect driver performance as

well. One recent study of truck drivers found that

sleep disruption associated with sleeper berth use

causes fatigue and deterioration of truck driver performance. In fact, the accumulation of 8 hours rest

split between two sleeper berth shifts increased the

risk of death by a factor of three for truck drivers

b’!bld., p. 18.

‘dDavid Dinges, University of Pennsyl\’ania, in Office of Technolo gy Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 73, 75, 127.

Drivers who sleep in sleeper berths do not receive

adequate rest, according to recent research.

involved in accidents, according to the research resuits.~

’ Moreover, research in Europe shows that

accident involvement rates for truck drivers increase

dramatically as work shift duration exceeds 8 hours

(see figure 6-3).7

’

Research also shows that no amount of mental

or physical conditioning can prepare people to operate at normal levels if deprived of sleep. Reaction

times double or triple, and the brain lapses into sleep

for fractions of seconds at a time, especially during

monotonous circumstances, such as driving. Such

factors may explain the disproportionate share of

‘iRobin P. Hertz, “Sleeper Berth Use as a Risk Factor for TractorTrailer Driver Fatality,” paper presented to the American AsscKiatlon

for Automotive Medicine, New Orleans, LA, ScPtemlwr 1987, pp. 9-10.

‘zPatrick Hamelin, “Truck Driver Involvement In Traffic Accdents

as Related to their Shiftworks and Professional Features, ” S}’mlxxslum

on the Role oflfeavy Freight Veh]cles in Traffic Acc~&nts, iwl, 2 (Ottawa, Canada: Organisation for Economic CooDeratlon and De\clopment, April 198~), pp. 3-107.

Figure 6.3.—Truck Accident Risk Compared

With Duration of Truck Work Shift

2

1.9

1.8

1.7

1.6

1.5

1.4

1.3

1.2

1.1

1.0

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6 u

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

1 I 1 1 1 1

<=4 <= 6 < = 8 <=1 o <=1 2 > 1 2

Work shift duration, in hours

aA ~i~k rate greater than 1.0 means that on average, more accidents occur at those

times in a given work shift than would be expected on the basis of the number

of truck trips.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, adapted from Patrick Hamelin,

‘(Truck Driver’s Involvement in Traffic Accidents as Related to Their

Shiftworks and Professional Features,” Symposium on the Ro/e of

Heavy Freight Ve/ric/es in Traffic Accidents (Ottawa, Canada: Organl.

sation for Economic Cooperation and Development, April 1987), vol.

2, pp 3.107.
152

accidents that occur 1 or 2 hours into a driving

shift,73 and the high level of fatal accidents in the

early morning hours between 5:00 and 7:00 a.m.

According to sleep researchers, these are times when

a person is particularly vulnerable to an accidentcausing situation due to lowered alertness. Experts

have found that an additional period of decreased

alertness also occurs in the mid-afternoon.74 Drugs

and alcohol also affect a sleepy person much more

strongly. 75

Overweight, middle-aged males, a description fitting many truck drivers, are primary targets for a

sleep disorder known as sleep apnea. A person suffering from sleep apnea rarely knows he or she suffers

from the disorder, which is characterized by abnormal breathing at night and results in excessive daytime sleeping.76 While some companies can sched-

‘iHertz, op. cit., footnote 71, p. 76. ;~Technolog}, Re\,ic\\, “Mathematics of Sleep,” February-March

1987, p. 13.

“;David Dinges, University of Pennsylvania, testimony before the

Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, May 14, 1987.

‘“Da\id Dinges, University of Pennsylvania, personal communication, May 19, 1985.

TECHNOLOGIES TO ADDRESS

Carriers utilize numerous technologies to address

management concerns about driver performance.

For example, driving at high speed and the frequency and severity of accidents are strongly correlated (see chapter 4). Many carriers have chosen

to install road-speed governors to limit the speed

at which their tractors operate. These devices prevent the engine from generating more than the specified revolutions per minute, thus controlling the top

speed of the vehicle. If maintained in good working order, governors can keep speed close to the legal limit and improve fuel economy as well.

Some States, such as Virginia, have outlawed the

use of radar detectors in efforts to curtail speeding.

Since the sole function of a radar detector is to recognize when radar is measuring the vehicle’s speed,

the prevalence of these devices in trucks indicates

the potential for abusing speed limits. One recent

study found that radar detectors encourage speeding, with the vehicles traveling fastest being most

likely to be equipped with the devices. Moreover,

ule drivers so that their on-duty and rest hours occur

at regular 24-hour intervals, others find it difficult.

However, driver and management awareness of the

reality of the effects of sleep deprivation and the vulnerability to accidents is a first step toward addressing the problem. Management sensitivity to the fact

that some drivers may be less alert during driving

tours due to a sleep disorder is also important.

The development of portable performance devices

that detect, in a quick, reliable, and noninvasive

manner, whether a person is reacting adequately to

the road is a realistic long-term goal.77 Such alertness devices, however, can create an environment

of false security—an operator awakened by such a

device may conclude that he can continue driving

since he is awake. Alternatively, the driver could

feel tired but decide to continue” driving because he

assumed that the alertness device would awaken him

if he did fall asleep. The driver remains ultimately

responsible for driving safely, for not substituting

these devices for sleep, and for adhering to hoursof-service regulations.

HUMAN PERFORMANCE ISSUES

of all vehicles on the road, tractor-trailers are the

most likely to be equipped with radar detectors.78

In another survey, 69 percent of owner-operators

responding acknowledged that their vehicles were

equipped with radar detectors.79 Further study of

driver behavior in radar detector-equipped vehicles

is underway at the Texas Transportation Institute,

although results are not yet available.80 A separate

survey of truckers in Florida found that 79 percent

use radar detectors.81

The use of detectable radar by enforcement officers

countered by the use of radar detectors and radar

jamming devices by drivers reflect the conflicts between a highly competitive market and enforcing

safety standards. While some segments of the car7U11HS Status Report, “Radar Detectors Spur Speeding,” vol. 22, No.

3, Mar. 14, 1987.

“Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Axociation of America,

“Survey,” unpublished manuscript, Mar. 23, 1988.

‘Dave Seiler, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, personal communication, Apr. 11, 1988.

‘

] Regular Common Carrier Conference, op. cit., footnote 26, p. 2
153

rier industry oppose legal sanctions against the devices, a joint petition to DOT was filed in spring

1988 by the American Automobile Association,

ATA, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety,

and the National Safety Council, asking that they

be prohibited.

On-Board Recording Devices

Safety advocates have proposed using on-board

recording devices to monitor compliance with hoursof-service rules. Units are currently available that

can track distance traveled, driving time, breaks,

daily rest periods, and speed limit compliance in

addition to equipment-related information. These

devices are discussed at length in chapter 5.

Photo credit: Rockwell International Corp

Computers that store driving records and hours-ofservice information can be an efficient

alternative to paperwork.

Photo credit: Rockwell /nternational Corp.

This on-board computer automatically records and

stores the driver’s hours of service.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS

Improving human performance in an industry

that must meet demanding time schedules to prosper is a difficult task. However, since human error

is the largest single cause of motor carrier accidents,

OTA concludes that an aggressive Federal pro.

gram to address human factors issues is a top

priority.

Legislation passed in 1986 requiring a Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) is a major step in establishing uniform truck driver licensing standards and

practices. OTA concludes that for public safety,

no exemptions to the requirement for a CDL are

warranted. Exemptions of any kind would weaken the effectiveness of the legislation. Congress

will wish to monitor closely DOT’s decisions as the

CDL program is implemented. For example, abundant evidence exists that truck driver performance

is impaired by BAC levels below 0.10 percent and

that alcohol use increases both the likelihood and

severity of accidents. Congress may wish to ensure

that DOT sets acceptable BAC levels for truck

drivers at 0.04 percent (or lower), corresponding

to the levels for airline crews and railroad

engineers.

Further, OTA concludes that drug abuse by

truck drivers is a significant safety factor that

deserves substantial study to prepare for regulation. The results of the current NTSB study will

provide valuable information on levels of drug use

and their contribution to driver impairment. How--

ever, more study will be necessary to determine the

appropriate regulatory standards. A requirement for

drug and alcohol screening for driver applicants, as

part of periodic DOT-required physical examina-
154

tions, and for probable suspicion or cause, deserves

consideration. Furthermore, a DOT pilot demonstration program with one or more States for random drug testing could provide valuable information on the role of such testing in accident reduction

and the acceptability of such a program on a national basis. Congress may wish to encourage DOT

to act on these options. Since a record of previous

violations is characteristic of many truck drivers involved in serious accidents, Congress may wish to

monitor DOT’s decisions about violations committed during part-time employment or off-duty driving.

The contribution that careful, appropriate training can make to accident reduction has been amply documented by industry. OTA concludes that

training is an area neglected by DOT and that national guidelines for driver training are needed.

(See chapter 4 for policy options that address this

issue.)

Considerable public and private effort will be required to make any new safety standards effective.

Carrier management commitment to safety and to

implementing new standards play pivotal roles. A

cooperative government-private sector research and

education program is one way to address management issues such as driver hiring, screening, training programs, and scheduling revisions to help accommodate circadian rhythm.

The hours-of-service regulations, do not adequately account for the effects of operating on the

Interstate highway system, new vehicle technologies,

and advances in understanding of fatigue and sleep

needs. OTA finds compelling reasons for DOT to

reexamine the hours-of-service rules and, if warranted, to develop revised standards based on current research results and today’s around-the-clock

operating environment. A carefully phased program to address the issue is essential. Cooperative

government-industry studies including independent

drivers, private carriers, and large and small for-hire

carriers to explore feasible scheduling, training, and

education programs are important initial steps.

Congress may wish to encourage more DOT research on this issue, to provide funds for the research, and to meet specified deadlines for revised

standards.

OTA concludes that Federal programs are

needed to help management and drivers understand when drivers are most vulnerable to acci~

dents and how alterations to scheduling and other

procedures could reduce driver vulnerability.

Moreover, a research program to develop simple,

effective, and inexpensive techniques to screen

drivers who may have a sleep disorder could help

identify the high-risk driver.

OTA finds that the use of radar detectors by motor carrier and automobile drivers alike promotes

speeding and thus increases the likelihood of an

accident. Because high speeds are closely tied to

accident severity, Congress may wish to consider

taking decisive steps at the Federal level to prohibit these devices.

Finally, education programs directed at motor carrier and automobile drivers could enhance awareness of safety issues related to sharing the roads.

These programs should focus on the handling and

stability characteristics of trucks, the need to maintain adequate distance between vehicles, the longer

distances required for a heavy truck to stop, and

the severe damage that can result from a collision

between cars and trucks. Congress may wish to require the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and FHWA to play mutually supportive

roles in developing a model program for States to

ensure that these messages reach a broad popula~

tion by being incorporated into the driver license

and renewal process.
Chapter 7 - 

.

Sources of Information

for Evaluating Safety
CONTENTS

Page

Federal Accident Information Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . t . .............157

Federal Highway Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + . . . . +. . . . . . . . . . . ........157

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration . ............................160

National Transportation Safety Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161

State Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................162

Industry Sources . . . . . . . . ........+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...+..... . ......163

Other Relevant Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............163

The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute . . . . . . . . . ........163

Exposure Data.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Truck Inventory and Use Survey . . . . . . . . . .

Commodity Transportation Survey . . . . . . . .

Motor Carrier Census Fife............+. . .

Highway Performance Monitoring System . .

Truck Weight Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Industry Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

National Motor Truck Data Base. . . . . . . . . .

National Truck Trip Information Survey . . .

Inspection and Enforcement Data..

Federal Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

State Programs.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Market and Financial Data. . . . . . . .

Interstate Commerce Commission

Dun& Bradstreet . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Insurance Industry . . . . . . . . .

Conclusions and Policy Options . . .

Accident Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Exposure Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Inspectionand Enforcement Data

Market Entry, Exit, and Financial

Box

?-A. HotShot Trucks . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure

?-I. Motor Carrier Accident Report

Data 

Box

● ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Figures

Page

Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . .. .. .+. . . . . . . . .158

7-2. A Sample of State Accident Report Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ......164

Table

7-I. Truck Safety Information

7-2. Truck Safety Information

7-3. Truck Safety Information

7-4. Truck Safety Information

Financial Performance)..

Tables

Page

Resources (Accident Data).............+. ... ......166

Resources (Exposure Data). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● ..175

Resources (Inspection and Enforcement). . . . . . . . . ...176

Resources (Market Entry, Exit, and

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*.*+.. ● ..*.*** + 176
Chapter 7

Sources of Information

for Evaluating Safety

An essential component of safety measurement

and evaluation is a complete and accurate database

containing relevant accident and exposure statistics.

Such a database permits identifying causal factors

contributing to accident frequency and severity, so

that programs and priorities for improving safety

can be established. No such database exists for motor carriers, although several public and private organizations collect motor vehicle accident data from

which information on heavy truck accidents can be

derived. In most instances, however, these reporting systems are designed for general traffic and safety

analysis, and often do not provide detail on heavy

truck accident characteristics.

This chapter describes and evaluates existing

sources of information for evaluating safety, including Federal, State, and industry accident, inspection, and exposure data and motor carrier market

entry, exit, and financial performance data. Gaps

in information are identified, and options are presented for strengthening the validity of truck safety

data and eliminating redundant efforts. Many interconnecting issues are pertinent to truck safety,

and existing data could be used to meet both national and more focused needs. Accident and exposure data have several potential uses: 1) general

level, time-history trend analysis, 2) analyses of the

underlying causes and contributing factors of accidents, and 3) evaluation by Federal, State, and individual carrier management of their respective motor carrier safety activities.

FEDERAL ACCIDENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Because several Federal agencies have different

responsibilities related to transportation safety,

many accident databases have been developed. Each

has different reporting requirements, and integrating information from the forms is not feasible currently.

Federal Highway Administration

The Office of Motor Carriers of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has maintained a motor carrier accident database, the Motor Carrier

Management Information System (MCMIS), since

1973. Prior to 1986, interstate carriers regulated by

the Federal Government were required to report to

MCMIS accidents resulting in a fatality, an injury,

or property damage of $2,000 or more. In January

1986, the property damage criteria was increased to

$4,200; and effective March 1987, increased again

to $4,400. It will continue to increase in accordance

with the gross national product deflator index to

keep the reporting threshold consistent with inflation.

Accident reports are filed by carriers on Form 50-T

(see figure 7-1), in a format that has remained relatively stable through the years. An FHWA analyst

corrects erroneous data on the accident reports received and determines whether the accident meets

the criteria for a reportable accident. The report is

then forwarded to a contractor for input into the

computer. During this phase of processing, validation checks are made for data field compatibility and

data input errors.

Because of its design, MCMIS provides far more

detail on truck accident characteristics than does

any other national accident database. It includes carrier identification and address, location of the incident, characteristics of the event, contributing factors, information on the cargo, and consequences

of the accident. /

However, many operators in the trucking industry, including many private carriers and most intrastate carriers, are not subject to the Federal regulations that require them to report and are

157
158

Figure 7.1 .-Motor Carrier Accident Report Form—Page One

Original and two copies of MCS 50-T shall be filed with the Director, Regional Motor Carrier Safety Office, FHWA, as

required by 394.9. Copy shall be retained in carrier’s file. Circle or ( X ) appropriate boxes below.

1. Name of carrier (Corporate business name) 2. Principal Address (Street ●■❄■❄ lo., City, State, ZIP Code.j

(7-21) (22-so)

(16-17) —— ——— .

ilk. Hours actually driving since last period of 8 consecutive hours off duty

❑ 5 hrs. ❑ 7 hrs. ❑ 9 hrs.

(18) ~ 2 hrs. ~ 4 hrs. ❑ 6 hrs. ❑ 10 hrs. ~ Not applicable ———— —

1lF. Estimated hours of driving for entire trip or portion of trip, since last period of 8 consecutive hours off duty

—— ——-— — — —

 1 hr . ❑ 3 hrs. ~ 5 hrs. ❑ 7 hrs. ❑ 9 hrs. ~ 11-12 hrs.

(19) @ 2 hrs. ~ 4 hrs. ~ 6 hrs. ~ 8 hrs. ~ 10 hrs. ~ Not applicable

11G. Condition of driver

~ Apparently normal ❑ Had been drinking ~ Medical wawer

❑ Dozed at wheel ~ Other (Specify) --- . . . .—-– —–.

11H. Date of last medical certificate (29-34) . . . . . . . . . . /

——..-—— — ——.
159

Figure 7-1 .—Motor Carrier Accident Report Form—Page Two

12. CARRIER’S VEHICLE(S) I

y li ed

Type Year Make

(35-39) (40-41) (42-43) (44-53)

A

- Truck

B Tractor

C Semi-trailer

D Full trailer

E Full trailer (2nd)

F Other

(Specify)__.. —

13. Total length of vehicle/comb. 13A. Total width of vehicle

(7-9) Ft. (10-11)

. .

TYPE OF BODY (70-74)

.

Model Company Auto

Van Flat Tank Other Carrier (Specify)

(54-63) (64-69)

,

I

I

I 1 I 1 I 1

x cargo 13B. Weight (cargo) 13C. Weight (gross)

Ft. (12-17) Lbs. (1$-23) Lbs.

14. Type Of fuel

1 1

❑ Gasoline E Diesel ❑ L.P.G. ❑ Other (Specify)————— (24-29)

15. Cargo at time of accident (Your vehicle)

—

(30-38)

28. Name and title of person signing report 29. Signature

I

SOURCE: Federal Highway Administration
160

therefore not represented in the accident statistics.

Furthermore, the accuracy and completeness of the

accident reports to MCMIS are open to question,

given Federal reliance on carriers to file reports and

minimal attempts by FHWA to ensure reporting

compliance. FHWA officials have publicly acknowledged that underreporting of accidents may be as

high as 40 percent, and they look to the full implementation of SAFETYNET1 and eventual completion of safety fitness ratings for all interstate carriers

as remedies.2

A more recent initiative, started in 1983, is a special monitoring study under which FHWA has enlisted several States to collect data on accidents and

exposure for all combination trucks operating on

the designated Interstate and Federal-aid highway

truck network. The goal is to acquire data for making comparisons between accidents among various

truck types and across different road features. Under the program, State highway agencies report accident and exposure data to FHWA every 6 months.

Data elements include vehicle-miles traveled by

route, number of trailers and axles, accident involvement by vehicles involved, injuries and fatalities,

width and type of lanes, shoulders and medians, degree of access control, and road curvature and

grade.3

This approach represents a reasonable attempt to

collect accident and exposure measures from the

same population. However, the study is limited both

by the relatively small number of participating States

and by the accuracy of information provided, particularly the completeness with which truck characteristics are reported and the ways exposure data

are estimated.

Currently being developed for FHWA is the Commercial Driver’s License Information System. This

system will eventually provide FHWA with informa-

!A comprehensive nationwide enforcement data system that will aid

State inspection activities and provide additional accident and safety

data.

‘John MacGowan, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal

Highway Administration, personal communication, Oct. 17, 1986. Problems with reporting accuracy in transportation accident information

systems are common, as noted in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Transportation of Hazardous Materials, OTA-SET304 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1986).

‘Director, Federal Highway Administration, Office of Highway Information Management, “Monitoring Operations of Larger Dimensioned Vehicles, ” memo to Regional Federal Highway Administrators,

Apr. 23, 1986.

tion on persons holding commercial driver’s licenses

and will be tied to State systems like SAFETYNET.

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

The National Center for Statistics and Analysis

of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) maintains accident data on policereported accidents, including those resulting in nonfatal injury and/or property damage. Initiated in

1979, the National Accident Sampling System

(NASS) is a file of reported accidents that provides

an automated, comprehensive, national traffic accident database. The accidents investigated in NASS

are a probability sample of police-reported accidents

in the United States; the investigations are carried

out by NHTSA contractors. These data are subsequently weighted to represent all police-reported motor vehicle accidents occurring in the Nation during the year. To be included in NASS, an accident

must: 1) be reported by police, 2) result in property

damage and/or personal injury, and 3) involve a

motor vehicle in transport on a roadway.4 A NASS

investigation is handled by field staff that examines

the vehicle and scene, interviews vehicle occupants,

and reviews medical and driver records. Approximately 12,000 cases are investigated each year by

50 teams.

The data collected for a NASS-investigated accident include over 300 variables describing characteristics of the accident, driver, occupants, and the

vehicle. For heavy truck accidents, several data fields

exist that describe truck operations in reasonable

detail. They include carrier type; number of trailers

and axles; body type; extent of Interstate Commerce

Commission (ICC) regulation; type of brakes and

cab configuration; cargo weight; gross vehicle

weight; hazardous cargo; vehicle length and width;

and jackknife, underride/override, or rollover involvement.

Although NASS has several strengths, such as

sampling design and comprehensiveness of the accident investigation, one major deficiency is the relatively small number of heavy truck accidents that

constitute the NASS sample in a given year. As a

+National Highway Traffic safety Administration, ~at;ona~ Accident Sampling System (NASS): Analytical User’s Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1985).
161

result, questions may be raised about the representativeness of the NASS sample for a single year in

evaluating national issues involving heavy truck

safety, particularly issues that are narrowly focused

and require considerable detail.

This problem may be further compounded by

planned changes in the NASS data collection program. In 1988, two separate data collection systems

will be implemented: 1) the Crashworthiness Data

System (CDS), and 2) the General Estimates System (GES). CDS will include the more thorough

accident investigation described previously, but it

will be limited principally to accidents involving cars,

light trucks, and vans towed from the accident

scene. GES will provide national estimates of accident trends from sampled police reports, using a

larger accident sample than in the past and will include all vehicle types. The new approach will meet

NHTSA’s objectives of preserving crashworthiness

information for the vehicles that are most numerous on the highway, while reducing data collection

costs. It will also portray more accurately annual

trends in the number and severity of accidents involving heavy trucks, but will reduce the ability to

conduct detailed analyses of motor carrier safety

issues.

Accidents that result in the l0SS of human life are

also classified separately in the Fatal Accident

Reporting System (FARS), which has been in operation since 1975. FARS contains over 90 variables

for describing accidents in which an accident-related

death occurs within 30 days of the accident.’ FARS

is not a national sample; rather, it is a census of all

fatal traffic accidents reported in the United States.

This information is collected by each State, under

contract to NHTSA. While FARS is generally accepted as the most complete database for fatal accidents, it is limited to this one category of accidents.

Furthermore, because the investigation is not as extensive as that for NASS observations, details on

truck operation and motor carrier type are not available.6 For example, FARS distinguishes only between straight trucks and combinations, and only

jNational Highway Traffic Safety Administration, fatal Accident

Reporting System: 1986 Coding and Validation Manual (Washington,

DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1986).

‘Joel Dandrea, Truck Accident and Exposure Dara (Washington,

DC: American Trucking Associations, June 1986).

among several broad weight classes.7 Details about

accidents involving the trucks described in box 7-A

could not be extracted, for example.

National Transportation Safety Board

The National Transportation Safet y Board

(NTSB) conducts multimodal, on-scene investigations of transportation accidents. NTSB’s jurisdiction for conducting an investigation is based on the

definition of a major vehicular accident for each

mode, as described in the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 49.

An NTSB investigation begins with a multipleday field investigation involving the shipper, carrier, government agencies, associations, and other

interested parties. Its subsequent report goes through

several cycles of review and comment before it is

final. A major advantage of the NTSB process is

that the investigations involve other participants besides the carrier, are extremely thorough, and take

place over a longer time frame so that the full impact of the accident can be more accurately identified. Because of the resources required to conduct

such a thorough investigation, the number of accidents that are examined is relatively small and findings often cannot be generalized to the national population.

Recently, NTSB has embarked on an extended

special study of heavy truck safety.8 The study

covers a minimum of 200 accidents involving heavy

trucks that meet the following criteria: 1) the accident involves a truck of greater than 10,000 pound

gross vehicle weight rating, and 2) the truck receives

damage sufficient to require towing away from the

scene. NTSB plans to document thoroughly the accident characteristics related to the driver, vehicle,

roadway, and motor carrier. This will provide valuable information. However, the NTSB special

study will include a static file of 200 cases rather than

a continuous database.

‘National Academy of Sciences, Transportation Research Board,

Truck Accident Data Systems: State-06 the-Art Report, Transportation Research Circular 231, ISSN 0097-8515 (Washington, DC: September 1981).

8Nationa] Transportation Safety Board, “NTSB Heavy Truck

Studv: Status Report of NTSB Cases,” presented at the National Motor Carrier Safety N’orkshop, Washington, DC, Mar. 11, 1987.
162

BOX 7-A.—Hot Shot Trucks

Hot Shot Trucks are relatively new phenomena, appearing over the past 5 years as large freight vehicles.1

Hybrid trucks that do not fit within standard industry classifications, Hot Shots are often modified pickup trucks

pulling 48-foot trailers. While heavier trucks are increasingly being built to serve as Hot Shots, some weighing

as much as 26,000 pounds, no average weight has been established. They are used to haul light-weight freight,

such as insulation, plastic piping, or construction materials.

Economics are the major attraction for these vehicles. A Class 8 tractor-trailer purchased for $100,000 may

require $1 a mile to move the same load that a Hot Shot, initially costing $50,000 or less, can move for 35

cents. Hot Shots offer the advantages of weights that allow them to avoid Federal Highway Use taxes levied

on trucks with taxible gross weights over 55$000 pounds and truck tractor Chassis Excise tax imposed at the

time of first retail purchase on vehicles over 33,000 pounds gross vehicle weight rating.2

While no reliable numbers exist on how many of these vehicles are on the roads, experts estimate that they

currently number less than 10,000. Sales of Hot Shots are projected to increase 125 percent over the next 5 years.

Because no type of classification exists for these vehicles, no industry or Federal safety standards have been

established. Hot Shots have lower centers of gravity than standard tractors, and observers have noted more

complete air brake systems, diesel engines, and sturdier suspension systems in recent purchases. Because the

trucks do not fall into readily recognizable categories, accident report forms do not have identifying classes for

them. Consequently, accumulating data on how many accidents Hot Shots are involved in and how many

miles they are driven is next to impossible.

IH~~~Y &{ff, MOtOr V&iC[~ Manufacmrer’s &~iation and willi~ Snow, National Highway Traflic saf~y Adminiswation, Wr~n~ communication%

]UIY 22, 1988.

Z&ady Col}lns, Ammican Trucking Asmiations, pCrSOtNd communication, Aug. IOJ 19W+

State Databases responsibilities on the scene related to administerState accident data generally do not use a coming emergenc y first-aid and maintaining traffic flow,

often making it difficult to be thorough when common threshold for reporting and therefore do not pleting accident reports. Moreover, few enforcement

easily lend themselves to aggregation on a national

basis.” However, because manv State reports inofficers are well trained in accident investigations.

.

elude more detail on certain types of accidents, analysis of State accident data is extremely useful. Furthermore, as a significant proportion of heavy truck

accidents occur in the several large States that have

considerable heavy truck populations, analyses of

accident data from these States are probably representative of the characteristics of most heavy truck

accidents. Finally, because State accident files include reports on accidents of varying injury severity, the full range of accident consequences may be

examined.

A limitation of State databases is that they are

gathered from police reports, which in turn depend

partly on drivers’ statements. Drivers may not know

the answers to some specific questions or may be

reluctant to admit violations or noncompliance with

regulations.10 Furthermore, police have important

NHTSA maintains a directory of State accident

reporting systems. 11 State reporting systems show

wide variation in accident reporting thresholds,

reporting variables, and definition of variable fields,

particularly for items related to heavy truck safety

analysis, where detail on truck configuration and

use is essential.

To create some consistency in accident reporting

at the State level for crash avoidance research purposes, NHTSA developed the Crash Avoidance Research Datafile (CARDfile). It consists of automated

police accident reports of six States (Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington). All data contained in CARDfile have been —

coded in a common format, regardless of the particular format employed by the State from which
163

the information originated.12 The file contains information on accident, vehicle, and driver characteristics. However, because States do not yet use

common data elements and include limited information about truck configuration and operations,

analysis that can be based on CARDfile is limited.

The Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA)

is working to establish uniform accident reporting

through the design of a report form that includes

standard variables and variable fields that all States

would use.13 (See figure 7-2.) This has proven to be

difficult, since each State has different means of collecting accident data, different agencies charged with

collecting data, and different forms on which the

information is reported. Nonetheless, CVSA anticipates that agreement can be reached on data items

that focus on issues of major concern.14

The National Governors’ Association is also developing recommendations and guidelines for States

to adopt for uniform reporting of heavy truck accidents. Their focus includes both reporting criteria

and data elements for the accident report form. A

preliminary list of 19 data elements has been proposed, covering driver, carrier, vehicle, accident,

highway, and environmental characteristics, as well

as any hazardous cargo. A survey of existing State

accident reporting systems revealed that for every

State in the Nation, the majority of data elements

are either not presently collected or are not currently

collected as prescribed.15

Industry Sources

Many medium and large carriers maintain detailed

records of their drivers and vehicles that permit the

identification of characteristics affecting truck safety.

Carrier accident data has several advantages over

public domain databases, particularly because it allows analysis of accidents over time and provides

lzN~tiO~~] Hi~hWay Traffic Safety Administration, File Structure:

Crash Avoidance Research Datafile (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, May 29, 1986).

ljAt a minimum, this would include common use of essential data

fields, with each State having the latitude to retain additional data fields

for its own use. For further information on the Commercial Vehicle

Safety Alliance, see ch. 3.

“Rick Owens, chairman, Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Data

Collection Committee, memo to committee members, Sept. 12, 1986.

lsNational Governors’ AssWiation, Center for Policy Research, “Report 2 of the Motor Carrier Accident Reporting Committee,” unpublished manuscript, January 1988.

consistent exposure data for determining accident

rates. Also, some issues, such as driver hours-ofservice and training, are likely to be more accessible and accurate in the carrier database.

However, carrier concerns about confidentiality

must be respected, and generalizing the results of

such studies to the trucking industry nationwide is

risky. Analysis of an individual carrier represents

a single data point within the industry.

Trade associations, such as the American Trucking Associations and the Private Truck Council of

America, periodically collect accident rate statistics

from their member carriers. However, this information is reported only as an aggregate rate for the industry (and carrier type), and no information is

available for examining an individual accident, its

contributing factors, or its severity.

Other Relevant Databases

Insurance companies that underwrite motor carriers maintain detailed financial and statistical data

on insurance policies and claims. Much of this information is also transmitted in aggregate form to

the Insurance Services Offices, Inc. (ISO), a nonprofit corporation that makes available advisory rating, statistical, actuarial, policy form, and related

services to U.S. property/casualty insurers.16 The

statistical data collected by ISO are quite detailed

and permit the investigation of several industry characteristics, such as driver age, vehicle age, size of

claim, geographic location, vehicle weight, and zone

rating (distance-based). The primary statistic used

for safety analysis is a loss ratio.17 However, because information is reported in aggregate form to

ISO, and the insurance industry is interested in financial performance rather than accident causes,

this database does not provide useful information

for safety analyses.

The University of Michigan

Transportation Research Institute

The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) has developed a database

lbNot all U,S. insurers recognize and participate in Insurance Serv”

ices Office, Inc. data collection.

‘TAnn Lavie, Insurance Services Office, Inc., personal communication, Apr. 10, 1987.

87-004 0 - 88 - 5

165

that combines the coverage of FARS with the detail of the FHWA motor carrier accident database.

All heavy truck accidents in the FARS database (beginning with 1980) are identified and the records

matched with the FHWA records for accidents in

which a fatality occurred. Police reports of the accidents are reviewed and a single accident record created that includes information from all sources.18 

Because of different definitions of industry coverage and missing items in many FARS reports, a considerable amount of post-accident investigation has

been undertaken by UMTRI to complete the information in the database. Followup investigation is

handled primarily through telephone conversations

with owners of the involved trucks, a painstaking

and labor-intensive process.

All of the FHWA data and most of the postaccident information depends on the accuracy of

the responses provided by the owners. Furthermore,

the UMTRI database includes only accidents involving a fatality—less than 2 percent of the overall roadway accidents involving heavy trucks. Thus, while

this database represents the most severe occurrences,

it may produce findings unrepresentative of most

truck accidents occurring in the United States.19 

(See table 7-1 for a summary of accident reporting

databases.)

‘a~”niversity of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, Trucks

Involved in Fatal Accidenrs, 1983, UMTRI-86-24 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, May 1984).

“Federal Highway Administration, Development of a Large ?_’ruck

Safety Dara Needs Study Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. Department

of Transportation, February 1986).

EXPOSURE DATA

To address the truck safety question comprehensively, it is important to derive estimates of both

accidents and exposure. Exposure data serve as a

denominator in establishing accident rates, and are

necessary for determining whether increases in accidents are due to a deterioration in safety practices

or an increase in the amount and type of truck

travel.

Compared with other freight modes, trucking has

the poorest available shipment data. Two principal

databases are available publicly for analyzing trucking sector flows: the Truck Inventory and Use Survey (TIUS) and the Commodity Transportation

Survey (CTS). Neither presents a complete picture

of the trucking sector. These databases and other

sources of exposure information are described in this

section.

Truck Inventory and Use Survey

The TIUS has been conducted roughly every 5

years by the Bureau of the Census as part of the

census of transportation. It includes sample data on

the physical characteristics and operational use of

commercial and private trucks in the United States,

but does not show year-to-year changes or trends.

The 1982 TIUS contains data on the character and

use of slightly over 120,000 trucks (including light

trucks, pickups, and vans), drawn from an estimated

Phofo credit: Michael Hines, OTA Staff

Exposure data are essential for interpreting and

understanding highway accident statistics.

total of 33.8 million. The sampling rate is skewed

toward large trucks (approximately 5.6 million vehicles) to enhance that portion of the data, but the

sample size is still quite small. Among the specific

items contained in the TIUS are vehicle identification number, operator class, range of operation, vehicle design characteristics, annual mileage, and

commodities carried.

The TIUS provides a global assessment of both

the number of trucks in use and the mileage they
Table 7-1 .—Truck Safety Information Resources (Accident Data)

Database Kept by r . Years Strengths Weaknesses

50-T (part of)

.

FHWA, Office of Motor Carriers

MCMIS)

FHWA, Special Monitoring

Study

NASS

FARS

NTSB

State databases

CARDfile

Motor carrier industry

insurance

companies

UMTRI

FHWA, Office of Highway Information

NHTSA, National Center for Statistics and

Analysis

NHTSA, National Center for Statistics and

Analysis

NTSB

Various State regulatory agencies

NHTSA

Individual carriers,

trade associations

Individual companies,

ISO

UMTRI

1973 to present ● Good detail on truck accident characteristics

● Exclusive truck focus

1983 to present

1979 to present

1975 to present

1986 to 1987,

single collection

1982 to present

1980 to present

. Involves accident and exposure data

. Exclusive truck focus

. Statistical sampling design

● Comprehensiveness of accident investigation

. Reasonably good detail on truck accident

characteristics

. National estimates of accident frequency

● Census of all fatal accidents

. Comprehensiveness of accident investigation

● Comprehensiveness of accident investigation

● Good detail on truck characteristics

. Exclusive truck focus

● Census of all accident types

● Census from several States

● Uniformity in reporting format

● Some individual carriers maintain excellent

detail on accidents and movements

. Exclusive truck focus

● Detailed financial and statistical data on truck

insurance policies and claims

. Combines coverage of FARS with detail of 50-T

. Post-accident investigation to complete missing

information

. Exclusive truck focus

. Missing several portions of the truck population

. Accuracy and completeness of reports not

consistent

. Relies on carrier participation

● Restricted to aggregate accident reporting

. Limited number of participating States

● Missing some truck detail

. Small number of heavy truck accidents in database

● Detailed causal analysis sometimes difficult

. Limited details on truck configuration and operation

. Nonfatal accidents not represented

. Limited sample of accidents under investigation, not

representative of truck crashes generally

● Based solely on police reports at scene

. Varying detail on truck accident characteristics

. Lack of uniformity from State to State

● Limited truck detail due, in part, to limited uniform

variables listed

. Based solely on police reports at scene

. Limited to a few States

. Individual carrier represents single observation in

industry

● Access to individual carrier records is not in the

public domain

. Trade associations report accident rates but not

details on accident characteristics

. Aggregate reporting of information by insurers

. Primary concern over loss ratio rather than accident

causation

. Reliance on information provided by carrier during

past-accident investigation

. Restricted to fatal accidents

KEY: MCMIS - Motor Carrier Management Information System.

FHWA - Federal Highway Administration.

NASS = National Accident Sampling System.

FARS - Fatal Accident Reporting System.

CARDfile = Crash Avoidance Research Datafile.

NTSB = National Transportation Safety Board.

NHTSA = National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

ISO = Insurace Services Offices, Inc.

UMTRI = University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1998.
167

accumulate, but lacks any origin-to-destination flow

information or precise definition of commodities.

The TIUS is based on voluntary responses from the

owners of the vehicles selected; a 90 percent response

rate has been achieved in the past. Since the TIUS

focuses on aggregate activity based on typical yearly

vehicle use, it does not provide information about

the driver, vehicle cargo weight, number of trailers,

road class, and time of day. The TIUS can be a useful source for static data, such as model year and

size of carrier operation. Results from the TIUS now

under w ay are projected to be ready in summer

1989.20

Commodity Transportation Survey

The CTS was collected by the Bureau of the

Census in approximately 5-year intervals starting

in 1963. It contains flow data for commodities

shipped by manufacturing establishments selected

from several hundred industries. Each record lists

the total tons shipped from a given origin to a given

destination for a specific commodity, mode of transport, weight, and value. The data are based on

voluntary responses from approximately 16,000 establishments to which survey forms are sent. Data

are checked against the Census of Manufacturers

Survey using the value of shipment information to

ensure that the expanded value of shipments made

corresponds closely to the value of commodities

produced. 21

While the census’ main strength is its multimodal nature, it has real limitations. Shipment data

on waste materials, agricultural products, and raw

materials are not reported. The CTS also reflects

shipments only from point of manufacture to first

destination (which many analysts claim is typically

a warehouse), missing all subsequent movements in

the distribution chain. Data submission is voluntary, creating unknown biases due to nonreporting.

Furthermore, the scope of the survey is heavily dependent on Federal budget decisions, and the questions asked are not consistent between surveys, making trend analyses on some issues difficult. Finally,

the data are released only at the State-to-State or

“’Robert Crowther, Bureau of the Census, Business Dl\islon, personal communication, Aug. 9, 1988.

‘[Bureau of the Census, Commoci~ry Transportation Sur\’ev: SumMarl,, TC~~.CS (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

June 1981).

production area-to-production area level; the Bureau omits any flows that would compromise the

confidentiality of the survey’s respondents.

Motor Carrier Census File

As part of its MCMIS, FHWA maintains the Motor Carrier Census File. This database contains a

basic description of each commercial motor carrier

and/or shipper known to FHWA. The unique number assigned to each carrier is included in all forms

and records used in the MCMIS.

While this database is used primarily to monitor

carrier safety and identify problem motor carriers,

it could be used to develop measures of carrier activity and travel pattern indicators. The database contains information on each carrier’s State base of

operations; States served; type of commodities carried; carrier classification; miles operated; number

of drivers; and number of trucks, truck tractors, and

trailers, segmented by type of ownership. Unfortunately, the database is incomplete, owing to the

many carriers FHWA has yet to evaluate and locate,

as well as to those carriers that are not presently

subject to Federal motor carrier safety regulations

and FHWA oversight.

Highway Performance Monitoring

System

The Highway Performance Monitoring System

(HPMS) is a combined effort of Federal, State, and

local governments to collect national data that provide current statistics on the mileage and characteristics of various highway systems. The annual

database is derived from general statistics provided

b y States for their total system and from more

detailed data for a prescribed sample of their highway systems. The sample sections were established

using a statistically-designed sampling plan. The plan

was based on the random selection of road sections

within predetermined average, annual, daily traffic

volume groups for each functional highway classification. 22

The primary purpose of this database is to obtain

very specific highway and traffic data for a sample

‘JFederal Highway Administration, Highway Performance Monitoring Sysrem Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, January 1984).

87-004 0 - 88 - 6
168

of different highway types. Although area-wide vehicle classification data are reported by the number of axles of single-unit, single-trailer, and multiplecombination vehicles, other vehicle characteristics

are not reported. The estimates of truck volumes

for these categories are sometimes less accurate for

lower functional highway classifications. 23

Truck Weight Study

The Truck Weight Study (TWS) is compiled annually by FHWA from information collected voluntarily by the States. It is composed of vehicle classifications and truck weight data, which are collected

at preselected sites where such operations can be accommodated. Each State has between 10 and 20

sites, and locations remain relatively constant from

year to year. In total, more than 10 million vehicles are classified, and more than 200,000 trucks are

weighed on an annual basis.

Classification counts are conducted for three 8-

hour shifts that cover all hours of the day, but are

not necessarily consecutive. At each location, all of

the vehicles in the traffic stream are counted and

classified. Several truck types are included, and for

each type, the number of axles and axle configurations are recorded. Weighing operations are a separate activity that occur immediately upstream or

downstream from the point of classification. Each

‘

} Federal Highway Administration, op. cit., footnote 19.

Photo credit: California Department of Transportation

Data on vehicle weights are often based on statistics

from unsophisticated and temporary State

weigh stations.

surveyed vehicle is described by vehicle type, body

style, fuel type, class of operation, loaded status,

commodity carried, and axle spacing. In those States

using weigh-in-motion equipment, survey data are

limited to axle spacing and weights, vehicle type,

and body type; however, a census of trucks is not

always taken, particularly at high-volume locations.

In these cases, the more frequently occurring truck

types are weighed during one or more 10- to 15-

minute intervals in an hour. Less common types are

fully sampled.24

The main deficiency of the TWS for exposure

analysis in the past has been that the counting sites

are not statistically representative of the States’ highway systems and cannot be used to estimate vehiclemiles traveled by vehicle type. Also the collection

stations tend to be oriented toward the Interstate

and rural primary systems. Furthermore, many

trucks operating in violation of weight standards

travel on circuitous routes to avoid weigh stations.

FHWA is currently investigating ways to address

these concerns and to establish a data collection

scheme consistent with the HPMS approach.25 Evidence of progress to date is the recent FHWA decision to modify TWS site selection guidelines so that

States are encouraged to sample from HPMS locations. 26

The method of collection for TWS data is imprecise—using one or more observers to classify vehicles moving in the traffic stream can pose problems

in high-volume locations, poor lighting, and bad

weather. Furthermore, since each State determines

its method for establishing vehicle classification and

truck weight (see figure 7-2), the error in the estimates may vary.

Industry Sources

Trade organizations generally do not keep commodity flow or truck population and mileage data.

The American Trucking Associations (ATA), for

example, keeps only aggregate statistics on tons and

‘qIbid., p. 20.

‘

5 Federal Highway Administration, Development of a Srarew’ide

Trafi’c Counting Program on the Highway Performance Monitoring

System (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, March

1984),

“These guidelines have been included in the Federal Highway

Administration, Trafi”c Monitoring Guide (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, June 1985).
169

ton-miles derived from reports filed with ICC. The

firms that submit the data are principally less-thantruckload common carriers, so the data lack information about bulk shipments and private carriage

operations. Shipper organizations, like the American Petroleum Institute and the Chemical Manufacturers Association, are in much the same position as ATA. The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers

Association maintains statistics on truck registrations derived from self-reported factory sales data

provided by truck manufacturers.

Some individual carriers, however, do keep data

on their own movements. Large trucking firms generally keep computerized traffic databases that include origin, destination, commodity (by a variety

of codes), shipment weight, and shipment date. Major shippers, like the large chemical and petroleum

companies, also keep computerized data on their

truck shipments.

National Motor Truck Data Base

Started under contract with the Association of

American Railroads in 1977, the National Motor

Truck Data Base contains information on approximately 36,000 movements per year. The data are

collected at 18 selected truck stops, typically in the

West and Midwest, in an attempt to sample longhaul moves selectively. For the shipments it covers,

the database includes origin city and State, destination city and State, commodity, vehicle and operator characteristics, and an operator profile. The

data are sometimes cross-checked against fuel sales

at the truck stops and against volume counts on

selected Interstates.27

Concerns over the utility of this database focus

on the sampling approach and the survey design.

The survey deals primarily with driver perceptions

and statements about what they do and believe; it

is thus subject to question as an indicator of actual

behavior.

National Truck Trip Information

Survey

UMTRI has recently developed an independent

survey—the National Truck Trip Information Survey (NTTIS)-based on information at the trip level

rather than at the level of a vehicle’s annual mileage. The owner of each vehicle in the survey is contacted by telephone four times a year and asked

about the vehicle’s usage on a random day. The information includes trailer usage, cargo and cargo

weight, and driver age for each trip. The trips are

split into daytime and nighttime mileage, and each

trip is mapped to distinguish urban and rural highway use. Roads are also divided into limited access

highways, other major highways, and other roads.

By summing the data for all trips, annual mileage can be estimated by company type, power unit,

number of trailers, trailer type and body, cargo, actual cargo weight, actual combination gross weight,

driver age, and highway type. A sample of 8,144 vehicles was originally drawn from State registration

files maintained by a national data firm, R.L. Polk,

from which a subsample of 5,000 vehicles was used

for the mileage survey. Response rates have been

averaging 85 percent, roughly similar to response

rates achieved by the TIUS.28

Preliminary analysis of the aggregated NTTIS data

yields estimates that are roughly comparable to the

TIUS in the total number of heavy trucks, configuration, and cab style, validating results of the TIUS

and thus providing valuable information. The average daily mileage from TIUS data is slightly higher

than similar estimates derived from NTTIS data.

ZTOffice of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 2, P. 48.

28University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, The

UMTR1 Research Review, vol. 17, No. 1, July-August 1986.
170

INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT DATA

Government oversight activities directed at carrier, driver, and vehicle qualifications have grown

considerably in recent years, particularly at the State

level. In support of these activities, a large amount

of data has been collected and maintained for monitoring compliance. This information is also useful

in assessing safety in the industry.

Federal Activities

Inspection, compliance, and enforcement actions

taken by FHWA are included in MCMIS. Inspection activities consist of two separate reporting procedures, one for driver-vehicle roadside inspections

and the other for motor carrier safety audits.29

The driver-vehicle inspection report documents

findings of roadside inspections of drivers and vehicles conducted by FHWA field personnel and

State personnel under the Motor Carrier Safety

Assistance Program (MCSAP). The inspection program and reporting form have undergone considerable change since their inception in 1968, making the data inconsistent, a problem compounded

by the unequal quality of information collected. For

example, the information obtained from drivers is

sometimes incorrect and/or obsolete, and many

other fields in the report are incomplete, because

of the limited information available to investigators

at the time of inspection.

As of October 1, 1986, safety management audits

have been handled through a three step process to

1) provide technical assistance and evaluate safety

fitness; 2) assess compliance with recommended

changes; and 3) pursue enforcement actions if compliance is unsatisfactory. The new system replaces

the previous safety management audit and includes

several reporting forms that are coded into MCMIS

for later use.

The first step, a safety review, is compiled on form

SR-1. Carriers are selected using sampling techniques

to improve program efficiency and increase the number of safety contacts made annually. The SR-1 is

used to determine whether the company has an adequate safety program in place. Additionally, the

~gR.P. Landis, Federal Highway Administration, personal communication, Apr. 17, 1987.

SR-1 is used to establish “safety fitness ratings” for

the approximately 185,000 motor carriers that have

not been previously evaluated by FHWA.

To assure the close monitoring of companies identified as having safety problems and to pursue enforcement actions, a selective compliance and enforcement program has also been established.

Companies with unacceptable safety fitness ratings

are subject to a compliance review, using form CR-1.

The compliance review is a followup, on-site assessment to determine if a new rating is warranted or

whether enforcement action is necessary. If enforcement action is required, such action is recorded on

form 33B. Data from this form supplement an enforcement file, which FHWA has been using for

years to track the status of legal actions taken against

motor carriers or shippers in noncompliance with

the safety regulations. This program also includes

a component for monitoring companies that are in

compliance, but are overrepresented in carrier/

driver/vehicle at-fault accidents. The goal is to identify problem areas and implement safety countermeasures that could reduce at-fault accidents.

State Programs

Several States conduct roadside inspections as part

of MCSAP. To satisfy reporting requirements to

FHWA, these States maintain aggregate records on

the vehicles inspected and on related findings. The

information collected includes the number of inspections; driver violations, such as hours of service and

medical certificate; vehicle defects, such as brakes,

coupling devices, and exhaust systems; and proper

adherence to hazardous materials regulations. Violations requiring immediate out-of-service action are

tracked separately. As MCSAP continues to grow,

it will also be possible to track inspection findings

to support trend analyses. The level of sophistication in storing and maintaining these data varies

considerably across States.

A second MCSAP-supported State activity is the

conduct of safety management audits (Federal SR-1

and in-depth safety audits) by State inspection personnel. Fewer States conduct audits than do roadside inspections; however, increased emphasis is now

being placed on terminals. States with exemplary
171

Photo credit: California Department of Transportation

State inspectors are vital contributors of

highway safety data.

terminal audit programs include Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Alaska, participants in a pilot Federal program. In Oregon, for example, the audit

database includes the number of vehicles each carrier operates, the type of payroll system used by each

carrier, time documents or logbooks, hazardous materials transport violations, and maintenance functions. These data are cross-checked to make sure

that the companies are not passing off fictitious

paperwork as true safety programs. Trucks can be

traced and cross-referenced in the database either

by their vehicle license numbers or by the Oregon

Public Utilities Commission plates of all vehicles

based in Oregon.30 The current MCMIS has capabilities similar to the Oregon system’s, with the exception of some design specifications included in

Oregon to accommodate State-specific needs.

The wealth of information potentially available

for State inspection activities will be pooled by

FHWA into a national database as part of SAFETYNET, the Motor Carrier Safety Information Network. SAFETYNET is a database management

system designed to support MCSAP. The first component of the system will allow States to manage

data collected during the inspection process. The

key to the system is the development of a standardized format that permits individual States the

flexibility to include additional data to satisfy specialized information needs. In theory, an individual State will be able to retrieve from the database

a complete record on a carrier that also operates in

other States. SAFETYNET is envisioned as a more

comprehensive system that could potentially include

accident and safety management information.31 

‘“Larry Koeneke, State of Oregon, personal communication, April

1987.

“Safety Network News, vol. 1, No. 1, fall 1986.

MARKET AND FINANCIAL DATA

Under the present deregulated environment,

tracking carrier entry into and out of the marketplace and tracking the impact of financial performance on safety investment are important for ensuring safety. Several useful sources of information are

available for these purposes.

Interstate Commerce Commission

ICC has long had primary responsibility for moning industry. Prior to 1980, ICC required annual

reports from virtually all motor carriers of property,

Classes I, 11, and 111. Very small Class III carriers,

those with annual revenues under $500,000, were

exempted from the annual report filing requirement.

Over time and through rulemaking, ICC has reduced reporting requirements for motor carriers of

property. Also, revenue levels for the various carrier classes (see below) have been raised over time,

also reducing reporting requirements. Further, since

itoring economic activities in the interstate truck- ICC no longer analyzes these data on many of the
172

carrier segments, it has granted exemptions from the

reporting requirements to many firms simply because

they asked to be exempted. 32 

The first change in reporting requirements affected

Class III carriers, and by 1981, Class III firms were

no longer required to file any financial reports. In

dropping these requirements, ICC relinquished any

possibility of tracking progress made by these firms,

even if they subsequently grew to Class 1 or II status. All motor carriers granted their initial ICC operating authority are originally classified as Class III.

Thus, virtually no data exist for new entrants. 33 

Also, in 1980a number of other changes affected

reporting requirements. First, ICC raised carrier revenue limits. Class I carriers were redefined from annual revenues of $3 million or more to $5 million

or more. Class II revenue levels were raised from

the $500,000 to $3 million range to a $1 million to

$5 million range. Class III, previously under $500,000

in revenues, was raised to under $1 million. Because

of this change, a number of firms previously filing

the Class I and II annual report fell back to the (exempt) Class III group. It is estimated that some 500

carriers were “lost” as a result. 34 

During this time, ICC also began granting exemptions to Class I and II carriers from the annual

reporting requirements. In 1980 alone, 324 Class 1

and 11 carriers were exempted, and more have been

added to this list in recent years.

At one time, the data from annual reports provided sufficient detail to track freight activities at

several levels by type of carrier, commodities carried, services provided, size of operation, expenditures and income, and vehicle utilization. However,

ICC has reduced the amount of information required on the report form as well as reducing the

reporting population. At the present time, annual

report data are collected only from Class I and 11

carriers (those not given exemptions). A recent initiative by ICC to dispense with its accounting system and to reduce annual report forms to one page

was contested vigorously by several interest groups.

~JRonald D. Roth, American Trucking Associations, personal communicauon, Mar. 24, 1987.

‘7bld.

‘+lbid.

However, ICC’s proposed rulemaking effectively reduced the number of motor carriers reporting to

ICC from 2,500 to 950 and permitted carriers to use

alternatives to the uniform accounting system. Since

January 1, 1987, the annual report form has contained only 10 pages, a considerable reduction over

previous requirements, although the requirements

are under review.35 ICC data are maintained by

the American Trucking Associations and include

extensive error-checking programs to verify the accuracy of reported information.

Dun & Bradstreet

The actual number of companies entering and

leaving the trucking industry is tracked by Dun &

Bradstreet. New entries are monitored by Dun &

Bradstreet through sources such as requests made

to ICC for operating authority. Carrier failures are

monitored by Dun & Bradstreet reporters, who are

assigned to local jurisdictions to examine court

records daily concerning bankruptcy filings. Companies are categorized by the Standard Industrial

Classification system, although the reliability of the

process used to assign trucking companies to appropriate classifications is a concern. Because of the

structure of the database, mergers and changes in

ownership cannot be identified through Dun &

Bradstreet.36

The Insurance Industry

The insurance industry is understandably concerned about the financial solvency of the motor

carriers its members consider for coverage. Although

some financial records exist in-house, the industry

also contracts with outside firms to gather additional

financial data. This information is drawn from several State regulatory agencies where carriers are registered and from the more limited data available

through ICC.37

~jTraffjc World, “Agency Eases Rules on Accounting, Reporting for

Regulated Truck Lines,” Apr. 6, 1987; and Ronald D. Roth, American Trucking Associations, internal memo, Jan. 15, 1988.

~T1zlana Mohorol,ic, Dun & Bradstreet, persona] communication,

Ju]y 21, 1987.

‘;Andrew Schindel, Central Analysis Bureau, personal communication, July 21, 1987.
173

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS

Accurate, uniform, and representative information about heavy vehicle safety matters is essential,

so that effective programs for improvements can be

developed. However, OTA finds that with few exceptions, existing information systems have deficiencies that limit their value in supporting safety

policies and programs. In general, data collected

are of questionable usefulness for one or more of

the following reasons: 1) poor data element design

and lack of uniformity, 2) little or no quality control of the data collected, or 3) poor or nonexistent

data handling and storage systems. Although it is

virtually impossible to design and collect the “perfect” database, and some of the existing data are useful for analyzing narrow, specific truck safety issues,

truck safety information systems lag considerably

behind their modal counterparts in coverage and

accuracy.

Accident Data

None of the national accident databases is ideally

suited for addressing all the important motor carrier safety issues (see table 7-1). The MCMIS accident file lacks adequate information on the accident

experiences of most intrastate carriers. The FARS

database is a census for only one small subset of accidents (fatal accidents), and it does not distinguish

all truck types.

NASS offers the advantage of selecting accidents

by a statistically based sampling scheme, permitting

the derivation of national accident totals and annual trends. However, the changes made to NASS

for 1988 are likely to make it more difficult to conduct detailed motor carrier accident causality studies

using this database.

State accident reporting systems present several

promising alternatives because they can represent

a census of accidents, and many States have begun

to include additional fields for truck details. However, the lack of uniformity between States’ data

presents problems for extrapolating findings to the

national level. The efforts of NHTSA in establishing the CARDfile, and of CVSA and the National

Governors’ Association in striving for more uniform

State accident reporting practices are commendable.

OTA finds that a NASS-style approach could be

a cost-effective base for a truck accident data systern, for it allows a sampling of truck operations

by both geography and road use. To provide accurate and comprehensive information, each accident investigation could be handled by a field staff

that examines the vehicle and the accident site, interviews vehicle occupants, and reviews medical and

driver records. Finally, the report form could include

the necessary detail on truck vehicle and operating

characteristics to permit the type of study needed

for performing component safety analyses. For this

option to be effective, additional funds will be

needed both to restore the original approach and

to expand the system to meet truck safety concerns.

Furthermore, OTA concludes that training field

teams in truck accident investigation so that

vehicle-related factors are examined thoroughly

will be necessary.

Another alternative is the development of a completely independent truck accident data collection

system patterned after the NASS design. This approach would permit selection of sampling units

solely on truck criteria rather than for all motor vehicles. Such a program would be more costly because a new, independent system would have to be

developed. However, the system could provide the

type of detail needed to support better analysis of

motor carrier safety needs. NHTSA’s advice and expertise would be valuable regardless of whether

NHTSA or FHWA took the lead on such an initiative.

Congress may wish to consider requiring the

Department of Transportation to focus on coordinating and improving existing accident databases

and to take steps to develop a NASS focused on

heavy vehicles. At a minimum, FHWA programs

that encourage States to expand accident report

forms to accommodate truck detail and to establish uniform reporting thresholds and forms for a

minimum core of data elements could be aggressively

pursued. This would improve available truck safety

information and would move toward a national

census of accident history that could be used for

analysis. OTA concludes that NHTSA analysis of

motor carrier accident data has not been sufficient

to support regulatory initiatives, particularly
174

those related to the key areas of driver training

and performance. This shortcoming is serious,

given the preponderance of human error among accident causal factors. Congress may wish to require

DOT to address this issue. Coordination between

FHWA and NHTSA is essential.

Exposure Data

OTA finds that uniformity between accident

and exposure data, and accuracy in estimating

truck movement independent of accident rate formulation (see table 7-2) are priority needs. Each

existing exposure database has a different limitation.

However, FHWA’s work with the States on exposure has promise. For example, the HPMS and

TWS could be merged to form a national exposure

data collection system that still meets the original

objectives of each database. The level of detail collected by HPMS and TWS is sufficient for a truck

exposure database, provided that information on

the driver is included in the survey. FHWA is already in the process of resolving some of the issues

involved in developing such an exposure system.38

TWS data could be collected from sample sites

drawn from each HPMS functional classification

stratum. Classification counts could be scheduled

to take place at each site around the clock at periodic intervals. Truck weight sites would be selected

from sites identified for vehicle classification, recognizing that some sites are more conducive than

others for vehicle weighing and survey administration. Such a program would allow derivation of national exposure estimates by road type, vehicle, carrier, and driver. Also, if the statistical design for both

the accident and exposure databases were properly

formulated, accident rates could be established without necessarily having the same accident and exposure reporting sites.

As an initial step, Congress may wish to consider

extending FHWA’s reporting requirements to inelude all motor carriers, including intrastate and

those currently exempt from Federal reporting requirements. Using SAFETYNET as a model, a

Federal-State cooperative truck registration database

could be developed. State vehicle registration requirements could incorporate carrier identification

~BFederal Highway Administration, op. cit., footnote 25.

and exposure information for entry into the

database.

An alternate approach could include a Federal requirement for a brief annual report by intra- and

interstate carriers to FHWA. Useful information

would include carrier’s name, address, telephone

number, the number of trucks and buses with identifying numbers, categories of vehicles, and miles

traveled annually. The cost to the Federal Government would be minimal; additional staff would be

required for information processing. The information would provide valuable data about exposure

and distribution. Congress may wish to consider

legislation enabling DOT to implement this

reporting requirement.

The cost of both accident and exposure data collection programs is a function of the desired precision in the estimates. The variance of recorded measures both within and between sampling units has

an impact on the number of units and observations

required. To achieve reasonable confidence levels

for accident rates between truck types, close to 300

sampling units would be required at a total annual

cost of close to $2 million. Furthermore, the logistical

demands of establishing and maintaining cooperative arrangements with each jurisdiction are formidable.

If these obstacles are insurmountable, more economical alternatives can be considered, focusing primarily on expanding existing data collection instruments, such as the Motor Carrier Census, that are

producing some useful information. However, the

deficiencies that are associated with each of these

approaches are likely to persist. OTA concludes

that the importance and scale of activity of the

trucking industry, and the high costs associated

with heavy vehicle accidents make these important issues for Congress to weigh.

Inspection and Enforcement Data

A wide range of inspection and enforcement data

is being amassed (particularly at the State level) that

will provide useful information for safety analyses

(see table 7-3). Although the process by which vehicles and companies are targeted for inspection

varies between States, the inspection results are reported in a uniform way. SAFETYNET must ma-
Table 7-2.—Truck Safety Information Resources (Exposure Data)

Database Kept by Years Strengths Weaknesses

TIUS Bureau of the Census

CTS Bureau of the Census

Motor Carrier FHWA

Census File

(part of MCMIS)

HPMS FHWA

TWS FHWA

Motor carrier

industry

NMTDB

NTTIS

Individual carriers,

trade associations

Transportation Research and

Marketing (consulting firm)

UMTRI

Every 5 years,

most recently in

1982

Since 1983, every

5 years

Most recent 5

years

Annually

Annually

1977 to present

1988 to 1987,

single collection

KEY: TIUS = Truck Inventory and Use Survey.

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Covers all trucks used in the

United States

Sample biased toward heavy

trucks

Exclusive truck focus

Multimodal

Cross-checked against the

Census of Manufacturers

Provides flow data

Comprehensive listing of carriers

and truck fleet operators

Exclusive truck focus

Statistical sampling design

Detail on roadway characteristics

Truck classification and weight

data

Exclusive truck focus

Aggregate statistics on tons, tonmiles, and truck registrations

Detail flow records from

individual carriers and shippers;

can merge with similar accident

records

Exclusive truck focus

Focuses on long-distance truck

movements

Good truck and operator

classification detail

Exclusive truck focus

Good truck and operator

classification detail

Disaggregate and aggregate

analysis possible

Exclusive truck focus

CTS = Commodity Transportation Survey.

MCMIS = Motor Carrier Management Information System,

FHWA = Federal Highway Administration.

HPMS = Highway Performance Monitoring System.

TWS = Truck Weight Study.

LTL = less-than-truckload.

NMTDB = National Motor Truck Data Base.

NITIS = National Truck Trip Information Survey.

UMTRI = University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988.

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

No commodity flow data

Only rudimentary commodity

information

Reflects tractor use, not trailer use

Based on owner response

Shipment data on some products are

missing

Only shipments from point of

manufacture to first destination are

reported

Nonuniformity between surveys

Voluntary data submission

Many carriers missing from data

base

No commodity flow data

Limited truck classification detail

Counting sites are not statistically

representative

Method of data collection varies and

is subject to observer error

Truck data are based principally on

LTL carriers

Individual carrier represents single

observation in industry

Access to individual carrier records

is not in public domain

Purposely excludes short-haul truck

movements, especially in Northeast

Not in public domain

Relatively small number of

observations

Single collection
176

Table 7-3.—Truck Safety Information Resources (Inspection and Enforcement)

Database Kept by Strengths Weaknesses

MCMIS FHWA, Office of Motor .

(driver-vehicle Carriers

inspection review, ●

enforcement)

●

State programs Various State regulatory ●

agencies (MCSAP)

●

Part of comprehensive safety ●

information system

New program initiated in 10/86 ●

will add safety management audit

activities

Exclusive truck focus

Roadside and safety management Ž

audits ●

Development of uniformity to

permit interface at a national level

through SAFETYNET

Exclusive truck focus

In the past, quality of information

collected has been poor

Quality of new program data

collection unknown

Not all States currently participate

Successful implementation of

SAFETYNET unknown at this time

●

KEY: MCMIS = Motor Carrier Management Information System.

FHWA = Federal Highway Administration.

MCSAP = Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988

ture before its information can be available in an

automated form on a national scale. The new procedure developed by FHWA for handling safety

management audits is such a recent development

that the contribution of this effort to the quality

of available information is largely unknown. OTA

concludes that an enforcement information database will provide a valuable resource for Federal

and State safety oversight. Congress may wish to

continue Federal support for this program.

Market Entry, Exit, and Financial Data

tion in the past 8 to 10 years has been toward curtailing reporting requirements (see table 7-4). OTA

concludes that the ICC reporting system no longer

adequately monitors carrier market entry, exit,

and financial performance. The current lack of

information presents a significant problem for

both safety-related and broad policy decisions. A

data collection effort that includes Class III carriers,

scrutinizes requests for exemptions, and maintains

sufficient detail in the data elements to track financial performance would serve a useful purpose for

evaluating truck safety.

Little information is publicly available on the financial condition of motor carriers, and the direcTable 7-4.-Truck Safety Information Resources (Market Entry, Exit, and Financial Performance)

Database Kept by Strengths Weaknesses

ICC ICC ●

●

●

Insurance industry Individual insurers, ●

Central Analysis Bureau

●

Dun & Bradstreet Dun & Bradstreet ●

●

Primary source of financial data •

on carriers

Excellent historical detail

Exclusive truck force

●

●

Collectively utilizes best financial ●

information available for each

carrier under evaluation

Exclusive truck focus

Monitored based on filings for ●

operating authority and

bankruptcy ●

Exclusive truck focus

Intrastate carriers not included;

elements of interstate market

missing owing to exemptions and

changes in reporting requirements

Little concern over reporting

compliance

Diminishing financial detail with

new reporting requirements

Relies on developing composite

picture from variety of sources

Aggregate data reporting,

classification problems

Merger and change in ownership

cannot be identified

KEY: ICC = Interstate Commerce Commission.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988.
,

Appendixes
Appendix A

List of Acronyms

AADMV

A –American Association of Motor Vehicle

Administrators

AASHTO–American Association of State Highway

and Transportation Officials

ALV —automatic brake pressure limiting valve

ATA —American Trucking Associations

BAC —blood-alcohol concentration

BMCS –Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (now

OMC)

CARDfile –Crash Avoidance Research Datafile

CDL —Commercial Driver’s License

CDS –Crashworthiness Data System

COE —cab-over-engine

CTS –Commodity Transportation Survey

CVSA –Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance

DOT –U.S. Department of Transportation

FARS –Fatal Accident Reporting System

FHWA –Federal Highway Administration

FMCSR –Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Regulations

FMVSS –Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard

GES —General Estimates System

GVW —gross vehicle weight

HPMS —Highway Performance Monitoring

System

IBT —International Brotherhood of Teamsters

ICC –Interstate Commerce Commission

IIHS –Insurance Institute for Highway Safety

ISO –Insurance Services Office, Inc.

L C V —longer combination vehicle

LTL –less-than-truckload

M C A –Motor Carrier Act (1935, 1980)

MCMIS —Motor Carrier Management Information

System

MCSAP —Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program

MVMA —Motor Vehicle Manufacturers

Association

NASS –National Accident Sampling System

NGA —National Governors’ Association

NHTSA –National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

NMTDB –National Motor Truck Data Base

NPTA —National Private Trucking Association

NTSB –National Transportation Safety Board

NTTIS —National Truck Trip Information Survey

O MC —Office of Motor Carriers

PCC —Private Carrier Conference

PMI —preventive maintenance inspection

PTCA —Private Truck Carriers Association

PTDIA –Professional Truck Driver Institute of

America

RCCC —Regular Common Carrier Conference

RSPA –Research and Special Programs

Administration

SEP –State Enforcement Plan

STAA –Surface Transportation Assistance Act of

1982

TIUS –Truck Inventory and Use Survey

TL —truckload

TRB –Transportation Research Board

TSI —Training Safety Institute

TWS –Truck Weight Study

UMTRI –University of Michigan Transportation

Research Institute

UPS —United Parcel Service

179
Appendix B

Workshop Participants,

Reviewers, and Contributors

Workshop Participants

Participants in Technologies Affecting Truck Safety Workshop, March 10, 1987

George Jennings, Workshop Chairman

Manager of Motor Vehicle Operations

Mobile Oil Corp.

Philip T. Brown

Director

Marketing Resources Division

The Travelers Companies

Jerry DeClaire

Vice President of Research and Engineering

Automatize Operations

Rockwell International Corp.

Robert Ervin

Assistant Head

Engineering Research Division

Transportation Research Institute

University of Michigan

Paula Gustafson

Director of Product Environmental Management

Cummins Engine Co., Inc.

Thomas Hardeman

Manager of Public Affairs

United Parcel Service

Robert Heglund

Assistant Vice President

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.

Jerry Hughes

Director of Safety

Roadway Express, Inc.

James Johnson

Automotive Engineer

PACCAR, Inc.

William Leasure

Chief

Heavy Vehicle Research Division

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

James Lewis

Automotive Engineer

United Parcel Service

William J. Martin

Legislative Engineer

Navistar International Corp.

William J. Morgan

Former Vice President of Traffic

Frito-Lay, Inc.

Brian O’Neill

President

Insurance Institute of Highway Safety

Ernie Vaughn

Director of Program Development

Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association of

America

Don Vierimaa

Vice President, Engineering

Truck Trailer Manufacturers

Lyle Walheim

Inspector

Wisconsin State Patrol

180
781

Participants in the Human Factors Workshop, May 19, 1987

William A. Maloney, Workshop Chairman

Associate Administrator for Motor Carriers

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission

Robert Bleakley

Office of Program Management Support

Office of Motor Carriers

Federal Highway Administration

Michael Calvin

Certification Program Supervisor

Professional Truck Driver Institute of America

John C. Dannemiller

President and Chief Operating Officer

Leaseway Transportation Corp.

David Dinges

Unit for Experimental Psychiatry

Department of Psychiatry

University of Pennsylvania

Robert Inderbitzen

Manager

Safety and Training

Linde Bulk Gases

Union Carbide Corp.

Henry Jasny

Staff Attorney

Center for Auto Safety

Victor Jennings

Director of Insurance

Ryder Truck Rental

James Johnston

President

Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association of

America

Robert Kelly

Deputy Director

Tunnels, Bridges, and Waterways Department

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

John J. Killilee

Vice President of Safety

Consolidated Freightways

Rodger Koppa

Associate Research Engineer

Texas Transportation Institute

Texas A&M University System

Farrel Krall

Manager

Technical Legislation

Navistar International Corp.

Paul Melander

Manager

Transportation Investigation

Tennessee Public Service Commission

Vernon McDougall

Safety and Health Division

International Brotherhood of Teamsters

Vince Robison

President

Associated Motor Carriers of Oklahoma

Richard C. Schwing

Senior Staff Research Engineer

General Motors Research Laboratories

Patricia Loach

Bureau of Safety Programs

National Transportation Safety Board

Burton W. Stephens

Office of Safety and Traffic

Traffic Systems Division

Federal Highway Administration

Ken Thompson

Vice President, Safety

Yellow Freight System, Inc.

Patricia Waller

Associate Director

Highway Safety Research Center

University of North Carolina
182

Participants in Truck Safety Review Meetings, October 7, 1987 and March 23, 1988

Charles Curtis, Chairman

Van Ness, Feldman, Sutcliffe, & Curtis

Carla J. Berroyer

Deputy Director for Intergovernmental Affairs

Illinois Department of Transportation

Keith Bissell

Commissioner

Tennessee Public Service Commission

Philip T. Brown

Director

Marketing Resources Division

The Travelers Companies

Joan Claybrook

President

Public Citizen

John C. Dannemiller

President and Chief Operating Officer

Leaseway Transportation Corp.

R. V. Durham

Director

Safety and Health Department

International Brotherhood of Teamsters

Russ Fiste

Executive Director

Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance

James Johnston

President

Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association of

America

Robert Kelly

Deputy Director

Tunnels, Bridges, and Waterways

Port Authority of New York and

Department

New Jersey

Lillian Liburdi

Director

Management and Budget Department

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

William A. Maloney

Associate Administrator for Motor Carriers

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission

Paul Melander

Manager

Transportation Investigation

Tennessee Public Service Commission

John Meyer

James W. Harpel Professor

The Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

Robert Proulx

Manager

Corporate Traffic and Fleet Operations

Data General Corp.

Richard C. Schwing

Senior Staff Research Engineer

General Motors Research Laboratories

Robert Shertz

President

Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.

Dean Stanley

Corporate Vice President for Engineering

Navistar International Corp.

Walter Weiss

Safety Director

Leaseway Transportation Corp.
183

Reviewers and

Mike Adamy, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc.

Charles S. Allen, California Highway Patrol

Arthur J. Balek, Federal Highway Administration

William Barnett, Independent Truckers and Drivers

Association

Richard Beilock, University of Florida

Jim Bitz, Texas Department of Public Safety

William Boehly, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

Rita Bontz, Independent Truckers and Drivers

Association

Guy Boruff, Indiana State Police

William Bosserman, Ohio State Highway Patrol

William Buckley, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

Jack Burkert, Lancer Insurance Co.

Joseph Canny, U.S. Department of Transportation

C.C. Carter, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc.

Joanne Casey, American Trucking Associations

William P. Church, Navistar International Corp.

Robert Clarke, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

Harry Cohen, Transportation Research Board

Ron Coleman, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc.

Raymond D. Cotton, Maryland State Police

Ralph Craft, National Governors’ Association

James E. Daust, Michigan State Police

Gerold Davis, Federal Highway Administration

Raymond R. Day, Jr., Washington Utilities and

Transportation Commission

Daniel Dean, California Department of

Transportation

John Eicher, Federal Highway Administration

Nancy Emanuel, Federal Highway Administration

Daniel B. Fambro, Texas Transportation Institute

Kurt Faxon, Bendix Heavy Vehicle Systems

Daniel Folstad, Michigan State Police

Robert Forman, Greyhound Bus Lines

Arthur H. Fulton, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc.

Joseph V. Galati, Pennsylvania Department of

Transportation

John Grimm, Federal Highway Administration

Peter Griskivich, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers

Association

Ray Gurney, Land Line

Grace Hazzard, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

John Harpe, Federal Highway Administration

Doug Harwood, Midwest Research Institute

Kevin Heanue, Federal Highway Administration

Paul Henry, Public Utility Commission of Oregon

Richard Hildebrandt, Bendix Heavy Vehicle Systems

Contributors

Robert A. Hirsch, National Private Truck

Association

R.L. Hoffman, Arizona Department of Public Safety

Gary Hopkins, Bendix Heavy Vehicle Systems

Nancy Humphrey, Transportation Research Board

Thomas C. Hutchison, USA Training Academy

Alex Jankowsky, Michelin Tire Corp.

Harry C. Johns, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc.

Will Johns, American Trucking Associations

Ian Jones, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety

Bill Julian, Consultant, California State Legislature

Larry King, Federal Highway Administration

Michelle King, Michigan Department of State Police

Lee Klass, Independent Trucker, Portland, OR

Larry Koeneke, Oregon Public Utilities Commission

Rodger Koppa, Texas Transportation Institute

Richard P. Landis, Federal Highway Administration

Peter A. Latta, A. Duie Pyle, Inc.

Brenda S. Legge, Arthur H. Fulton, Inc.

David J. Leland, Ohio Public Utilities Commission

Ron Lipps, Maryland Department of Transportation

Charles F. Livingston, Highway Users Federation

John T. Loftus, USA Training Academy

John MacGowan, Federal Highway Administration

James W. March, Federal Highway Administration

Joe Masquero, Federal Highway Administration

James McAlpin, USA Training Academy

Douglas McKelvey, Federal Highway Administration

Joe Morris, Transportation Research Board

Rudolf Mortimer, University of Illinois at Urbana

David Murray, New York State Department of

Transportation

Phyllis Myers, California Highway Patrol

William Nalley, Federal Highway Administration

Debi Nicholson, Freightliner Corp.

L.J. Nickerson, Idaho State Police

K. Michael O’Connell, Professional Truck Driver

Institute of America

Susan Perry, American Bus Association

Magaly Petersen, Michelin Technical Services, Inc.

Larry L. Reynolds, Navistar International Corp.

George Ring, Transportation Research Board

John R. Risley, Navistar International Corp.

Ronald D. Roth, American Trucking Associations

Ronald D. Roudebush, Rockwell International Corp.

Philip Russell, Federal Highway Administration

Richard Schweitzer, Zuckert, Scoutt and Rasenburger

Angeli Sebastian, Federal Highway Administration

Henry Seiff, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers

Association

David M. Seiler, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration
184

William C. Seward, Leaseway Transportation

Richard G. Shaefer, Navistar International Corp.

Chris Shapeley, Engineering Consultant, Bedford,

New Hampshire

Asa Sharp, Goodyear Tire Co.

Kenneth E. Siegel, American Trucking Associations

Louis Silverstein, Honeywell, Inc.

Douglas T. Smalls, United Parcel Service

Bill Snow, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

Robert E. Spicher, Transportation Research Board

Walter E, Stone, Rhode Island State Police

Larry W. Strawhorn, American Trucking

Associations

Victor A. Suski, American Trucking Associations

Stephen J. Thompson, Congressional Research

Service

Bill Tracy, American Trucking Associations

Michael Trentacoste, Federal Highway

Administration

Justin G. True, Federal Highway Administration

Theresa del Tufo, Delaware Department of Public

Safety

Frank Tupper, Transportation Safety Institute

J. Terry Turner, Interstate Truckload Carriers

Conference

Gisela Vallandigham, National Association of Truck

Stop Operators

John Van Berkel, California Department of

Transportation

Fred E. Vanosdall, Michigan State University

Wendy Weingarten, Office of Technology

Assessment

Brian Wheeler, Volvo-GM Heavy Truck Corp.

Dave Williams, Smithers Scientific Services

Mike Wright, Great Dane Trailers
Other OTA Assessments in Progress as of September 1988

Communications Systems for an Information Age

Copyright and Home Copying

Information Technology and Securities Markets

New Clean Air Act Issues

Municipal Solid Waste Management

Managing Low-Level Radioactive Waste

Climate Change: Ozone Depletion and the Greenhouse Effect

Potential for Mineral Resources Development in Antarctica and the Convention of the Regulation of Antarctic

Mineral Resource Activities

Infrastructure Technologies: Rebuilding the Foundations

Technological Risks and Opportunities for Future U.S. Energy Supply and Demand

Increased Competition in the Electric Power Industry

High-Temperature Superconductors: Research, Development, and Applications

Oil Production in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR)

Technology, Innovation, and U.S. Trade

Superfund Implementation

Advanced Space Transportation Technologies

Maintaining the Defense Technology Base

Monitoring and Preventing Accidental Radiation Release at the Nevada Test Site

Enhancing the Quality of U.S. Grain in International Trade

Grain Quality in International Trade: A Comparison of Major Exporters

Agricultural Approaches To Reduce Agrichemical Contamination of Groundwater in the United States

Monitoring of Mandated Vietnam Veteran Studies

Unorthodox Cancer Treatments

Drug Labeling in Developing Countries–Phase I

Drug Labeling in Developing Countries–Phase 11

Federal Response to AIDS: Congressional Issues

Preventive Health Services Under Medicare

Adolescent Health

Rural Health Care

New Developments in Biotechnology

Methods for Locating and Arranging Health and Long-Term Care Services for Persons With Dementia

New Developments in Neuroscience

Genetic Testing in the Workplace

NOTE: For brief descriptions of these studies in progress, see OTA’s booklet on “Assessment Activities"–available from

OTA’s Publications Office, 224-8996.

185
Related OTA Reports

●

●

●

Safe Skies for Tomorrow: Aviation Safety in a Competitive Environment.

OTA-SET-381, July 1988, 196 pages.

GPO stock #052-003-01126-3.

Transportation of Hazardous Materials.

OTA-SET-304, July 1986, 276 pages.

GPO stock #052-003-01042-9, NTIS order #PB 87-100 319/AS.

Transportation of Hazardous Materials: State and Local Activities–Special Report.

OTA-SET-301, February 1986, 92 pages.

GPO stock #052-003-01016-0, NTIS order #PB 87-100 319/AS.

NOTE: Reports are available through the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC 20401-9325, (202)

783-3238; and/or the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161-0001, (703) 487-4650.

188