MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

Commission Meeting with the President and Vice President ofthe United States 

29 April 2004, 9:25-12:40 

Location: Oval Office 

Commission: All Commissioners and Executive Director Zelikow 

White House: President, Vice President, Alberto Gonzales, Bryan Cunningham, and 

Tom Monheim ' 

Drafted by: Zelikow (also consulting notes taken by other commissioners to prepare as 

complete a record as possible) 

Reviewed by: Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Gorelick, and Roemer (as ofMay 12) 

The meeting was preceded by a brief (5 to 10 minutes) meeting of the Chair and Vice 

Chair with the President, Vice President, and Chief ofStaff Card. · 

The President and Vice President were seated in chairs in front ofthe fireplace. The 

President's demeanor throughout was relaxed. He answered questions without notes. 

Commissioners and Gonzales were on sofas and chairs. Zelikow, Cunningham, and 

Monheim sat against the wall. 

The portrait ofWashington was over the fireplace, which was flanked by busts of Lincoln 

and Churchill. Paintings ofsouthwestern landscapes are on the wall. It was a beautiful 

spring day. 

Notes arc not verbatim. 

. The President welcomed the Commission and expressed gratitude for its work. He 

wanted to be sure to say, at the outset, that he was extremely disappointed with the 

actions ofthe Attorney General (in publicizing documents to attack Commissioner 

Gorelick). The White House was not involved. He shared the Commission's concern. 

He was more than disappointed. He understood how the Commission felt Government 

sometimes works that way. This wasn't necessary. The President added that he wanted 

the Commission to be able to do a good study. It should not be about blaming people. 

The Commission could help in studying how best to fight terror. The country was ill 

served by playing the blame game. The people would know about our displeasure (with 

Justice). 

The President smilingly said he knew time was limited and he would try to answer 

questions briefly. 

Declassified Under Authority of the 

lnteragency Security Classification Appeals 

Panel, E.O. 13526, Sec. 5.3(b)(3) 

ISCAP Appeal No. 2012-163, document 1 

Declassification Date: November 9, 2022 
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Chainnan Kean thanked the President for this meeting. He asked about the spring and 

summer of2001. As the President was getting the ominous threat reports, how did he 

view his role? · 

.The President said he wanted to make sure things get done. He explained how he set up 

the White House. He met with George Tenet every day at 8:00, right here, along with the 

Vice President, Condi Rice, and Andy Card. They talked about the threats ofthe day. 

They assessed them. It was a discussion, more than a briefing. First they would discuss 

the threat, then take up what was being done. 

Condi Rice would deal with the operators. She would help organize discussion among 

the principals. Steve Hadley ran the Deputies Committee. He wanted to correct some 

misunderstanding about the Deputies. The deputies were people he knew well. He had 

worked with them in the campaign and in other ways. The Deputies Committee was 

designing strategies to be implemented. · 

Tenet would bring up a threat. There were a lot ofthem in May, June, and July. He 

would ask: What's being done about it? A summary on this had been prepared for him; 

here it is. (He showed a paper to Chairman Kean, which Kean took after the meeting 

with the President's permission. It is attached.) 

He was being briefed on infonnation and operations. He knew meetings were going on· 

to take care ofthe threat. He was told about meetings, the development of action plans, 

and he saw actions taking place, such as the arrests ofterrorists in places like Y ernen. 

Chairman Kean asked about the President's reaction to the August 6 PDB. Did he 

discuss it with Dr. Rice? 

The President said they had a close relationship and talked all the time. But he didn't 

think she was in Crawford that day. They saw threats overseas. He·asked CIA to analyze 

threats in America. There was only one reference to threats in America during my 

presidency to that point - and he had asked for it! Not one arrived at his desk. 

The report itself was historical in nature. It said what al Qaeda was doing. He had 

known that since he had become President. He knew about the Cole, about the affiliates 

in this country. Bin Ladin had long been talking about his desire to attack America. 

There was some operational data on the FBI. That 70 investigations were underway was 

heartening, that this was taking place. 

Three years ago seemed like a long time. As best he could recollect, Condi mentioned 

that the Yemen threat (surveillance offederal building in New York in May) had been 

· looked into May and June. They didn't see any actionable intelligence. The article 

reminded that al Qaeda was dangerous, that it was a problem to be dealt with. He knew 

that; so his government was developing a strategy to eliminate it. 

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Chairman Kean asked ifthe President remembered seeing other intelligence about 

aircraft as missiles, or about Islamic extremists learning to fly. 

No, the President said. The only report was the one about a potential hijacking for the 

release ofprisoners, mentioned in the PDB ofAugust 6. 

Chairman Kean asked why the President stayed in the education event when he got word 

ofthe second plane hitting the World Trade Center. 

The President said he saw the first crash. Halfway into the event, Andy (Card) walked in 

and whispered to him about the second plane, and that America was under attack. He 

was collecting his thoughts. He stayed in the event, he thought, for about 4 or 5 minutes. 

His instinct was to be calm, not have the country see a rattled president in a high moment. 

The country was under attack. He was trying to understand what that means. He was 

looking at the press corps and saw them on their telephones. He felt he should project 

calm and strength, until he could understand better what was happening. 

He went out He called the Vice President He called Governor Pataki. He thought he 

also called FBI Director Mueller. He worked on the initial remarks. He thought it was 

important to keep his body language calm in the face ofdanger. As the president, he was 

conscious that ''people react offme." 

Chairman Kean asked what immediate decisions the President thought he needed to 

make. 

The President said he was pressured to get on the plane. Made some quick remarks and 

blasted out ofthere. Asked again about decisions, the President mentioned his calls to 

the Vice President. He also called Condi. He wanted to check on his wife. There were 

all kinds ofrumors. One was that the Capitol was under attack. His wife Laura was 

supposed to be on Capitol Hill that morning. He was concerned about his family. 

He remembered the Vice President saying, 'Don't come home.' Rice said that too. It 

was his duty to protect the continuity of the presidency. Ifsomething happens to the 

President in an emergency, there would be even more chaos. The Secret Service was 

aware ofthis too. 

He talked to the Vice President as he was arriving at Air Force One, or on Air Force One, 

about rules ofengagement. The Vice President advised him not to come back. He asked 

him to authorize this - he (the VP) was at the PEOC then. Get in an operational position. 

The Vice President is rushing to the PEOC. After the Vice President gets there, the 

President and the Vice President talked about rules ofengagement. 

The President understood this from his experience in the Texas Air National Guard. He 

had been trained to shoot down planes. He understood generally how this worked - one 

plane would lock on, one would ID. He understood the consesquences for the pilot, how 

a pilot might feel to get the order to shoot down a US airliner. It would be tough. He and 

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Dick discussed it. He talked about what it would be like. Yes, engage the enemy. You 

have the authority to shoot down an airplane. · 

At Air Force One, the communications were not as good as they should have been. There 

were all these rumors. He had heard ofthe fog of war. That day he saw it, firsthand. He 

wanted to go back to D.C. They were going to Barksdale (AFB). An Air Force colonel 

came to him and said Air Force One was a target. He asked the colonel: How do you 

know? A call to the Situation Room, he answered. There was the report about a possible 

· attack on Crawford. 

They had an open line to the PEOC, but it kept cutting off. Later the Vice President told 

him about the incoming aircraft. Our fighters were engaged. They were enacting his (the 

President's) order. Locked on. He told people (perhaps indicating Ari Fleischer) his 

order was now in effect. 

Chairman Kean asked the Vice President ifthe first time he talked to the President was 

on his way to the PEOC, in the tunnel. 

The Vice President said he would recreate this as best he can. He was in his West Wing 

office, with speechwriters. His secretary said the World Trade Center had been hit. They 

turned on the TV. Then he and the President talked, after 9:00. At 9:1S or so he and the 

President talked. They talked about the statement, describing an act ofterror. 

The Vice President said it was when the second plane hit the World Trade Center that the 

connection was made that this was an attack. He contacted Condi and asked her to make 

sure that the CSO was stood up. He watched the President's statement (from Florida). 

Then Secret Service agents came in and said we have to leave immediately. The agent 

put his hand on the back ofhis belt - they don't carry you but . . . . They were evacuated 

to the basement. They had to open the door, then there were stairs, and then into the 

tunnel to the PEOC. 

The Vice President said he was alone in the tunnel [with the Secret Service]. He heard 

that a plane had been a minute or less out ofWashington. That was what had triggered 

the Secret Service action to evacuate him. But the time bad passed and nothing had 

happened to the White House. He later learned that this was American 77, which had 

flown a circle over the Washington area and then had flown into the Pentagon. 

In the tunnel, the Vice President said, there was a TV and a phone on the wall. He knew 

they were under attack. He asked operators to get the President on the phone. It took 

some minutes for them to do that. The TV was on. He saw a broadcast showing the 

Pentagon bad been hit. He wondered ifthis was between 9:35 and 9:37. 

He got the President on the phone. He told him that Washington was under attack. He 

strongly recommended that the President delay his return to Washington. There was no 

telling how much more the threat might be. The President agreed, reluctantly. The 

President asked the Vice President to take necessary steps and stay in close touch. 

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The Vice President said that while he was there in the tunnel, Condi and his wife, Lynne, 

joined them there. They left the tunnel then and made the long walk to the PEOC, which 

was under the East Wing side of the White House. They got there at about 9:40 -- 9:45, 

he thought. (I believe the Vice President seemed to look to Judge Gonzales for 

confirmation ofthis timing.) 

The Vice President said that when he arrived in the PEOC, there were not many people 

there, just some of the staff. Secretary Mineta arrived at about the same time. Secretary 

Mineta had already instructed FAA to ground planes. He was working the aircraft 

problem. They tried to determine how many aircraft were still unaccounted for. Two 

had gone into the World Trade Center. They thought three aircraft were still out. 

The Vice President remembered getting ''word then that they [Air Force] were trying to 

cap up" over D.C. He opened up a line to the President and raised the issue of rules of 

engagement. He (the President) authorized shootdown. The President approved this 

before 10:00. Condi heard his (the Vice President's) end ofthe conversation. 

The Vice President discussed the unaccounted flights. Reports kept coming in, some 

false. A plane was down on the Ohio-Kentucky border. That was false. A car bomb had 

gone off. That was false. This was not mentioned in the original conversation, in the 

tunnel, in which he recommended that the President not return to D.C., the Vice President 

said, but later they heard about a threat to Air Force One. That was false. That was the 

process. Watching TV, they saw the news from New York about the first tower going 

down. 

Then that the first order for ashootdown came up. An officer came to him in the PEOC. 

Was the military authorized to shoot down an aircraft? There was a report ofa plane that 

was 80 iniles out .., Yes. They came and asked again ... Yes. This happened two or 

three times. The first occasion, the Vice President thought, was related to United 93. 

Then they heard that an aircraft was down in Pennsylvania. The Vice President thought 

we'd shot it down. It took a while to sort this out. In the next half hour there were two or 

three occasions like this: a report of an incoming, would he reiterate authorization? Yes. 

In every case, though, the problem was resolved without shots being fired. Later in the 

day there were other reports ofincidents ... a jet squawking a hijack code, a Korean 

Airlines jet. There was a lot ofthis, five reports during the day ofhijacked planes. None 

turned out to be true. 

The President remembered the confusion when he arrived that afternoon in Nebraska. He 

remembered coming into a room full ofofficers. He spoke briefly to them, that this was 

a tough day for America. Next, they told him about a flight coming from Madrid and 

asked for authorization to shoot it down. This was about two minutes after he arrived 

there. He told them to follow their rules of engagement. Then a few minutes later they 

told him the plane had landed in Madrid! A lot of confusion. It was troubling to him. It 

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dawned on him-there was an alert, a shoot down order, then the plane is landing in 

Spain? Had to look into this, a commwrications problem. 

Chainnan Kean asked, When was the first time a shoot down was authorized? 

The Vice President said it was in his third call with the President. There was the call 

from his office, then the one in the tunnel - the one about Washington being under attack. 

The third call was from the PEOC, shortly after he arrived in the PEOC. 

Chairman Kean asked ifthey were aware that aircraft had been scrambled out of 

Andrews AFB, outside the NORAD chain ofcommand, under instructions from the 

Secret Service. 

The President, surprised, asked the Chairman to repeat "ordered by the Secret Service?" 

The Chairman affinned that. The President said he did not know about that. 

The Vice President said there was a lot going on, including in the Situation Room. 

Initially Secretary Rumsfeld had not been inside the Pentagon. The Vice President talked 

to Secretary Rumsfeld right after the crash. Later, they spoke about Rumsfeld not having 

access to secure video. 

The President said he tried to get Rumsfeld on the phone and they couldn't find him. He 

did talk to him briefly earlier, then later they couldn't find him for a period. It was 

frustrating. (With note of exasperation) They found the PEOC. The PEOC was his main 

contact He was very frustrated about not being able to make contact with different 

people. He expressed this frustration to Andy (Card) on Air Force One. 

The Chairman asked whether the President was concerned about the direction of the 

nation's defenses that day. 

The President commented that there was not good television on the aircraft (Air Force 

One) then. They have satellite television now. They have real-time secure 

communications, including video. 

The Vice President said some things worked well, people doing the jobs they were 

trained to do. The President interjected that Mineta was an example of good 

perfo1111ance. The Vice President thought the process for continuity of government had 

worked pretty well. He had spent a lot oftime in the 1980s on this issue, with teams 

located in a secure setting, working on nuclear scenarios. They were protecting the 

presidency. The Speaker also was taken out of town. Provisions had been made. 

At about 10:05, Vice Chair Hamilton took over the questioning. He thanked the 

President for the meeting. He said the President's comments about the actions of the 

Attorney General and his staff were helpful and appreciated. 

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Vice Chair Hamilton then asked how well the President and Vice President thought the 

crisis management system had worked. He was future-oriented. Were they confident 

that the difficulties had been improved today? · 

The President said yes, but he warned that there would inevitably be confusion before 

matters could get sorted out Air Force One and the PEOC were now effective. But 

communications then were not as good. The Commission could get experts to look at 

that. 

A problem that had not been resolved, the President went on, was how to insure that 

information was accurate. On the plane he was told the ranch at Crawford was under 

attack. He 'told Andy to make sure that nobody was at the ranch, but . . . . It was important 

to sort that problem through. If you can get good information then you could act on it in 

an orderly way, with systems in place to bring order out of disorder. Systems 

management could do this. 

Vice Chair Hamilton asked ifthe situation was better now. 

The President said he thought it was as good as it can get, or at least that was what he was 

told. They had real-time secure video communications on Air Force One. That seemed 

pretty modem to him. 

Vice Chair Hamilton then asked ifthe President thought the national strategy for 

countering terrorism was where it needed to be. 

The President said the strategy was divided into three parts. 

First. he said, you had to take on the terrorist organizations. On that the situation was 

better than it was two years ago. The diplomacy was in better shape. Pakistan and Saudi 

Arabia were more willing to go after al Qaeda. International cooperation was good. 

The hardest part, he thought, was to remind the American people that we're still at war. 

The default mode was to be passive. 

On (international) intelligence cooperation, he gave it a "B." There was jealousy 

between nations about sharing information. He gave an example ofSpanish reluctance to 

work with the FBI after the recent Madrid bombings. 

On finances, he thought the cooperation was good. 

On bringing terrorists to justice, their approach was not as tough as ours. Foreign 

governments were less willing to kill them, to go after them in the remote places ofthe 

world. · 

Our own agencies, the President said, were pretty darn robust. He thought they were 

under resourced at CIA. They needed to be able to conduct more operations, to go into 

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the caves after the terrorists. Their resources were stressed..H ave an examplefrom 

Iraq, which Tenet had mentioned. The CIA was, working . Butthat 

meant they could not focus as much on Zarqawi withheld per 1.4(a)(c)(d) The President said 

he felt strongly about the intelligence community. He observed that the first Americans 

in the fight in Afghanistan were intelligence operatives. · 

The President thought the military was better poised now to fight terror. Their forces 

were lighter and more lethal. They were quicker. They were reconfiguring their forces. 

The special operations forces were good. He had been told recently that the military was 

finding it hard to recruit enough people for those forces; the standards were so high. 

The second part ofthe strategy was protection of the homeland. We need, the President 

said, to button up as best we can. It was very hard. The situation was better than before 

9/11. 

The FBI and CIA were communicating regularly. He met constantly with Director 

Mueller. Why didn't this happen before? There was a fear oflooking like they were 

politicizing the FBI through such meetings. This was a "Hoover hangover." Presidents 

and the FBI also feared that they might jeopardize cases through such discussions. But 

after 9/11 he just put that aside - get Mueller in here. This was better. 

There were still deficiencies with the FBI, but he felt their efforts are about 80% 

complete. The computers are more interoperable. They could share information across 

jurisdictions. 

The Department ofHomeland Security was doing a good job, the President said. 

Changing cultures was difficult. The response mechanisms were pretty darn good. 

FEMA was a good indicator, looking at their responses to storms, where they have 

displayed good communications. This had become much better. 

The TTICwas something the Commission needed to look at. It was an interesting 

innovation. It was sharing knowledge, working jointly. 

Vice Chair Hamilton asked ifit was working well. 

It was working pretty well, the President answered. The operational entities were getting 

closer, planning to work in the same building. We were better equipped to fight terror. 

He hoped the Commission would analyze how this was going and make some 

recommendations. He did not want to steer the report for the Commission. He hoped the 

Commission would look forward. 

The third part of the strategy was to change the conditions that caused terror to arise. In 

early 2001 he and his administration had spent a lot oftime on this. 

They worked on establishing stronger links with Uzbekistan, to strengthen the ability to 

base there. 

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They had also worked on relations with Saudi Arabia. This was a difficult problem. 

Crown Prince Abdullah was unhappy about the U.S. approach toward the intifada. He 

did not like the U.S. position. He did not like the Mitchell plan. He did not like the 

Tenet plan. He was disgruntled with the United States. The Vice President had phoned 

him in July and could talk about that. 

Pakistan was too close to the Taliban. They had to change Pakistan's behavior. But the 

country was smothered in congressional sanctions; there were no carrots they could use. 

After 9/11 this changed. 

' In the case ofTurkey, the U.S. had supported IMF loans to strengthen stability. 

With Iraq, the U.S. had a sanctions regime in place that was recruiting terrorists. Their 

propaganda with reports ofstarving Iraqi children were hurting us. The military was 

firing at cable and communication stations. 

There were issues the U.S. had to deal with. After 9/11, there was an opportunity to 

strengthen the forces ofdemocracy in the region. The enemy helped give us an 

opportunity. They attempted to kill Musharraf. After 9/11, Colin Powell faced 

Musharraf with a choice. (Gesturing at Commissioner Kerrey) You have made the point 

about needing to go to war. That was right, but you couldn't fight a war in Afghanistan 

without fighting from or next to Pakistan. 

Al Qaeda tried to kill Musharraf twice. That helped him change some more. The same 

was true with al Qaeda and Riyadh. The U.S. warned the Saudis about a possible attack. 

Then came the bombings in May 2003. After that, the Saudis were better war fighters. 

Vice Chair Hamilton asked ifthe President and Vice President had thought about ways to 

solve the coordination problems, whether they were looking at changing the organization 

of the intelligence community. 

The President said yes, but he didn't want to prejudge the outcome ofthis Commission or 

the one under Robb and Silberman. One thing his advisers had made clear to him: The 

FBI and CIA do not want an American MIS. (Commissioners laughed. Yes, they said, 

they had heard that.) On intelligence sharing, the President was looking forward to the 

Commission's recommendations; 

The Vice President said this was a hard problem. He tended to be careful about relying 

too much on organizational fixes. Americans tended to think ofthese solutions. He 

remembered arriving at the Pentagon and asking for an organizational chart. It covered 

and spilled over his whole desk. He put it in his desk drawer and never looked at it again. 

The problems, he said, were with problems in analysis, with data collection, and with 

integration. The impact of the organizations on this . . .. People recommended giving 

CIA a bigger role. His friend Brent Scowcroft had recommended this. The CIA had 

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problems. It wasn't clear to him that the solution was to take an agency with problems 

and put them in charge ofothers. 

The President emphasized that it was important to communicate with the people who 

were gathering the intelligence. He found that the CIA was incredibly important to him 

in doing his job. They had smart people producing interesting analysis. Tenet was also a 

good strategist. The President liked bouncing ideas offofTenet He had great 

confidence in him. George was a good war fighter. But he had to manage that building. 

That caused a lot ofstress. 

The President urged the Commission to keep in mind that the President needs to interface 

with the DCI and his people, like the briefers who come in. Sometimes they would have 

a meeting at Camp David and bring the analysts out there, talking about the enemy 

situation or economics. It encouraged people doing the work to have access to the 

President It was important, no matter what, for the President to decide who he sees. 

The Vice President added that the political community also has obligations, like the 

Congress. The standards that bad been applied to the intelligence community had left 

them inclined to be risk averse. The penalties were high for getting involved in actions 

that might later be judged to be inappropriate. Hementioned the example ofhaving nasty 

people on the CIA payroll. The officials then try to be careful; they don't take things on. 

The President smilingly said he had promised not to filibuster. But he warned about 

being careful with the PDBs. You don't want to put them out in public, or you won't get 

good, candid advice. He had worked on that in trying to cooperate with the Commission 

and was grateful for the Commission's efforts. But he wouldn't let Capitol Hill get them. 

The President said he had to get honest, open advice. Make the process more public and 

he wouldn't get this kind ofadvice. He didn't need people coming in and saying, Mr. 

President, you're looking beautiful today. (Commissioners laugh) He needed people 

who would come in and say, you're wrong. 

Vice Chair Hamilton asked how they thought they could make the country less 

vulnerable to attack. 

The President said they were trying to kill a lot ofthe enemy. They are killers. We had 

to kill them before they kill us. · 

Commissioner Roemer thanked the President for his meeting, recalling the President's 

example ofbipartisanship in discussing his education initiative with Democrats and 

Republicans, in which the commissioner had taken part. The President would again be 

important in getting action on the Commission's recommendations. 

Commissioner Roemer said the President seemed to have been frustrated with the process 

in working on counterterrorism during 2001, talking in the spring of2001 about his 

exasperation with "swatting flies." The President agreed. So, Commissioner Roemer 

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asked, what was going on? What was the President doing to try to push the policy 

process? 

The President said Condi is too polite. It wasn't just about swatting flies. He had wanted 

to know: Where's the action? I'm an impatient person, he said. I get frustrated by the 

· . slow movement ofgovernment. Our papers referred to an elimination strategy how are 

· we going to eliminate al Qaeda? The problems were more than this or that guy. There 

would be a report ofa threat in Jordan. An action would be taken on that. Good, that 

was one problem. There would be a threat somewhere else. That was another problem. 

That is what he meant by flies, and that was fine. But the long-range approach where 

was it? 

The President repeated that it was his nature to be impatient. It was not a good quality. 

He added, smiling, that his wife doesn't think it is such a good quality either. He was 

frustrated with the process. But he understood the nature ofpolicy development: 

diplomatic, financial, and military policies had to mesh. He was frustrated with the time 

it took to get that ready. But he was not frustrated with the response to specific threats. 

The President said he knew what the deputies and other officials were doing. He knew 

they were developing a strategy to get rid ofthis danger. On the particular threats, you 

could move and take some action. There wasn't frustration there. His frustration was 

because it took so long to get a plan on his desk to eliminate the entire threat - the big 

strategy. He knew it was in process. It just took a long time. 

Condi was his point person. He talked to her every day. He expected her to do her job. 

He didn't need meetings for that. He had his morning discussions (associated with the 

PDB briefings) with Condi, the Vice President, and Andy Card every day. He would ask: 

What is happening? What are you doing? She would say: I just got off the phone with 

Don Rumsfeld and Colin Powell. She would talk each morning to Secretary Rumsfeld 

and Secretary Powell. How did that experience feel? Condi got most of his frustration. 

Commissioner Roemer said he wanted to ask a follow-up question. Chairman Kean said 

the commissioners needed to move along. The President interrupted with a smile and 

said, "It's my Oval Office. Go ahead." · 

Commissioner Roemer asked, ifthe process took too long, how could this be fixed? 

The President cautioned that an integrated plan required a focused effort by the Deputies 

to develop agency plans that were "interoperable" with the plans being developed by 

other agencies. He started his explanation with diplomacy. 

They needed diplomatic conditions to be right, he said. Uzbekistan was essential. He 

spoke with Putin about this in the summer of 2001 . He remembered Putin complaining 

about Pakistan - and about Saudi Arabia - being safe havens for the terrorists, urging the 

need to find the source of these problems. Working with Putin was important. It would 

make it easier for the U.S. to base activity in the "Stans." This was hard for Russia, 

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historically, to accept. So he - the President -- was frustrated; he was an impatient 

person. But they had to analyze how to develop the ability to act. There were many 

moving parts. In retrospect, perhaps he had been too impatient, given the complex nature 

of the task. 

The NSPD being developed would not have stopped 9/11, the President said. But it was 

important. It might have made further attacks less likely. It helped them be ready to 

move after 9/11. 

Commissioner Roemer suggested that the U.S. could have sent a signal, though, in 

responding to the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. What was the President's thinking on that? 

The President said he was concerned about an empty response that Bin Ladin and others 

would use to propaganda advantage. They could have struck using cruise missiles or 

other standoff weapons, like bombers. If that had been ineffective, the enemy would 

have used it to show their ability to thwart U.S. technology and military might That was 

just the point they wanted to emphasize. So this could have set the U.S. back much 

further than any advantage that would be gained from the strike. He looked at the 

intelligence. Hitting Bin Ladin with cruise missiles . . .. These were important 

individuals. But you strengthen the group ifyou launch missiles but do not harm them. 

The President said you must use ground forces for a job like this. If you're going to go 

after them, you have to get people on the ground. We weren't ready yet, but we were 

developing a strategy to do so. 

During the transition, the President said be remembered asking Tenet about the value of 

killing Bin Ladin. First, this would not destroy al Qaeda. Second, they never had a shot 

at him. The President believed that Tenet thought he (Tenet) had authority to kill Bin 

Ladin. 

Commissioner Gorton said the Commission was deluged with conspiracy theories. He 

hoped the President could help them address a few ofthem. For example, why, after' 

hearing ofthe first plane hitting the World Trade Center, did the President go ahead with 

the event at the school? 

The President said he thought it was an accident. He recalled that he and others thought 

the building had been hit by a twin engine plane. He remembered thinking, what a 

terrible pilot. · 

And the news ofthe second building being hit?, Commissioner Gorton asked. 

The President said there were no more details. He stayed in the education event for about 

another five minutes, he has been told .. He had told us about this. He was trying to 

absorb the news. He remembered a child, or someone, reading. He remembered 

watching the press pool and noticing them talking on their phones. He realized the 

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country was watching his behavior. He had to send the right signals. He wanted to 

collect his thoughts. 

\ 

Commissioner Gorton asked ifthe President had made a connection to the terrorists, or 

was worried that the school or Air Force One might be a target. 

The President said no, he was not worried about that. After the event he finalized an 

initial public statement. There was a hustle to get it written. He talked to the Vice 

President about it. Eddie DiLorenzo, the head of his Secret Service protective detail, was 

pushing to get them out ofthe school and back to the plane. It was his job to protect the 

President. 

As to Air Force One, he thinks he first heard about that threat after they were airborne. It 

was comforting to see the fighters pull up alongside Air Force One. 

Commissioner Gorton asked ifthe President or the Vice President had been involved in 

permitting planes carrying Saudi nationals to leave after 9/11. 

No, the President said. He had no idea about this until he read about it in the papers. 

. The Vice President also gave a negative answer (hard to hear). 

The President turned to the problem ofconspiracy theories. He said the Commission had 

a duty to make it absolutely clear that this action was perpetrated by hateful, evil people. 

I can't tell you, he said, how strongly I feel about this. He had seen some of the theories 

some people had written. Some ofthe things in the German press, for example, were 

worse than anything he had seen coming out of even the John Birch Society in Midland, 

Texas. 

Commissioner Ben-Veniste thanked the President and Vice President for agreeing to 

meet with the full commission. He said that the President and the Commission were on 

the same team. They wanted to deal with as many of these conspiracy themes as 

possible. Their goal was to make the country safer. 

Commissioner Ben-Veniste turned to the "summer ofthreats" in 2001. The Commission 

had met with DCI Tenet. Tenet had apparently been confused or uncertain about how 

often he had met with the President during August. The President was getting 

intelligence about specific attacks being planned. 

The President interjected: Overseas. 

Commissioner Ben-Veniste, continuing, said the President had commented on 

stimulating the writing of the August 6 PDB. The analyst had titled it: "Bin Ladin 

Determined to. Strike in US." Had the President received information before on the 

potential for an attack in the United States? 

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None, the President answered. We were aware that Bin Ladin had sympathizers in the 

United States. As to cells - no one ever said that to him. There were things like Khalid 

Sheikh Mohammed had studied at a college in North Carolina. But he couldn't recall 

people walking in here (the Oval Office) and worrying about cells in the United States. 

Not one PDB was commenting on a threat in America. There was no actionable 

intelligence on such a threat - not one. 

Referring to the analyst and the title ofthe PDB, the President stressed that he had asked 

for it He couldn't remember when. And it didn't say anything about a specific attack. 

If there had been a threat from a cell, they would have moved to take care ofit. That 

never happened. He urged the Commission to read the PDB. It was a general 

assessment. It reaches the conclusion that Bin Ladin wants to attack us. Yeah, the 

President commented, he's trying to do that. So is al Qaeda. 

Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked if Dr. Rice had been there in Texas when that PDB 

was briefed. 

The President said she had not been there. But had he talked to her? Yes, at some point 

Smiling, he said he talked to her at least twice a day. He did remember talking about the 

particular threat cited in the document on Yemenis (surveilling a federal building in New 

York), to learn that the Yemeni situation had been cleared up. 

Talking to her about it?, Commissioner Ben-V eniste asked. Yes. 

Commissioner Ben-Veniste discussed the Yemeni episode. He said a White House 

background briefer had put out a story that was ill serving the President -- that the 

Yemenis had just been a couple oftourists and the matter was put to bed. But our staff, 

he said, had come to some conclusions about the Yemenis. The staff, he said, had found 

that these two individuals had been apprehended in Manhattan, taking photos ofthe 

federal building at 26 Federal Plaza and ofthe building next door that also housed FBI 

NARA Regulation for FOIA andofthe street, which included a security checkpoint. When 

questioned theYemenis had said they were taking the pictures because a co•worker in 

Indianapolis wanted them. -The INS detained the Yemenis, who were interrogated by the 

FBI. Commissioner Ben-Veniste added that when the FBI attempted to locate the 

individual in Indianapolis, they discovered that this person was operating under an 

assumed name and then left abruptly, leaving behind an uncashed paycheck, shortly after 

the two Yemenis were detained. The FBI, he said, had continued to work on this case for 

two years and have never identified the man who fled. 

First I've heard ofit, the President said. But he said he wasn't sure that aspect ... 

Commissioner Ben-V eniste said the episode stimulated the FBI in New York City to 

complain about the level of protection being given by the General Services 

Administration to government buildings. John O'Neill and Barry Mawn were involved. 

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The President said this was news to him. 

Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked about presidents not wanting to meet, before 9/11, with 

the Director ofthe FBI because of concerns about politicization ofthe Bureau. 

And criminal justice reasons, interfering in pending cases, the President said. 

Commissioner Ben-V eniste asked if the President had asked Dr. Rice to follow up? Had 

she followed up? 

The President said he could not recall the details. He remembered that the information in 

the PDB about 70 pending FBI investigations seemed good, helpful of Rice]. Ifthey 

found something, he wanted to know about it. Ifthere was any information on a problem 

he wanted to hear about it, whether from George Tenet or Condi. Ifthey came in and 

said, we've found a cell, his action would have been: Destroy it. That never happened. 

Commissioner Ben-Veniste said important information in the possession of the CIA and 

the FBI didn't get to the President, or to Dick Clarke. He gave the examples of 

Moussaoui and Mihdhar and Hazmi, and Middle Eastern men learning to fly. Ifthat had 

gotten to the President, perhaps there would have been some action. In meetings with 

Tenet, did he mention Moussaoui? 

The President could not recall. He explained how these conversations went. Tenet 

would come in: Mr. President, we have a serious threat. He would describe it. The 

President would turn to him and others and say: What are we doing about it? . That never 

happened (for a threat in the United States). No one said there was a problem 

domestically. The threat was overseas - that was what George said. The world is riled 

up; he would review the threats. 

The Vice President said that some of that action had come to him. He called Saudi 

Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah on July 5. He went over what was known to him about 

the al Qaeda and Bin Ladin threat. He said the U.S. wanted to send a team to Saudi 

Arabia to alert Saudi counterparts about a potential attack. Tenet was talking to Prince 

Turki about this. The team would come over to work on this. 

The President said he thought that if there had been a serious concern in August, he . 

would have known about it. 

Commissioner Ben-Veniste commented that the domestic capabilities were principally 

under the Attorney General and also the Secretary ofthe Treasury. After receiving the 

August 6 PDB, had the President discussed with Attorney General Ashcroft whether it 

would be useful to make sure the FBI was addressing the problem? 

Not that I recall, the President said. He also didn't know whether Condi had discussed it 

with the Attorney General. 

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Commissioner Lehman said the Commission was united on trying to fix what was wrong. 

Its report could be a catalyst. There were things the President could not do. He hoped 

the Commission and the White House could consult about possible recommendations to 

be sure we're not working at cross-purposes. There were some big things being 

considered and this was an opportunity for action. 

The President said the White House had been passive so far in trying to influence the 

Commission's recommendations. They had been silent. He had thought he would hear 

what this Commission recommended, and the one chaired by Senator Robb and Judge 

Silberman, and then move. He was hesitant to be proactive with respect to the 

Commission. 

Commissioner Lehman urged the importance ofopening up a dialogue. The President 

said he would consider it. 

Commissioner Lehman said a big issue was the role ofthe Saudis. Much had been done, 

including some visible actions at the highest level. But there were problems ofcontinued 

funding. He alluded to a recent story in the New York Times about Saudi imams 

preaching jihad in Iraq. He mentioned a letter Prince Bandar had sent to the Commission 

that did not fully acknowledge the problem. He mentioned the problem ofthe fonner al 

Qaeda chief financial officer, and the U.S. having not received access to him during the 

late 1990s. He mentioned the belief ofan INS inspector who testified in January, 

Melendez, that there was pressure not to interfere with Saudis. 

The President replied that a fundamental political question for any President was how to 

deal with the Saudis. There was a sort of split personality there. Some found favor with 

al Qaeda and the extremists, supporting their radical policies. The U.S. had to have a 

process to push them to change their ways. 

The U.S. supported political reform. This stand had, the President commented, been 

widely disparaged. The last (to change) will be Saudi Arabia. The President understood 

that. But they were feeling the pressure. 

The royal family, the President added, was not a monolith. There were splits within the 

family. Crown Prince Abdullah may not know what his stepbrother is doing with certain 

NGOs spreading hate. The family was a complex organization, with different power 

centers. 

The President said he was worried about Saudi Arabia. He did not want it to become an 

al Qaeda country. Nor did he want it to form an alliance with Iran. He was not sure what 

else he could say, except that he was working the problem on a daily basis. There had 

been some progress on NGOs. 

The Vice President mentioned the al Haramayn foundation. 

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Commissioner Lehman said the President should expect the Commission report on this 

subject to be harsh. If that was done at a sufficient level, it might be useful. 

The President said he did not wish to justify their actions. But he said the Commission 

should also look at Saudi cooperation against al Qaeda inside their country. · 

The Vice President said he had worked on this issue during the summer of 2001 and at 

other times. He had talked to the President of Yemen. Saudi cooperation had increased 

after they were hit in Riyadh. He agreed with the President Saudi Arabia was a complex 

place. 

The President observed that the Crown Prince did not like the President's policy on 

Israel. He was really unhappy about it. 

Commissioner·Lehman said the intelligence issues involved more than moving the 

organizational boxes around. The cultural issues were more important Good people 

could make the boxes work. It was easy to see organizational fixes - get rid ofobstacles. 

Personnel was harder, to attract enough good people in a vast bureaucratic system, 

drawing creativity out ofthat 

The President said, speaking off the top ofbis head, that it was important to give people 

access to the President Analysts should know they can tell the President what they think. 

Ifthere was a meeting at Camp David, they should bring out the experts. When people 

feel they have access to important officials, it makes them feel better about their job. 

The government did need more HUMINT. You could work on the boxes, on 

communication, and on budgeting. But you needed more collection. The war could be 

won ifwe can get inside their tents. 

Commissioner Kerrey asked what action the President thought was required against al 

Qaeda. What happened on the Cole? Suppose the U.S. had been hit again, for instance, 

in March 2001? 

The President said that, on analysis, a cruise missile strike . . . . If you could not catch Bin 

Ladin, it was ineffective. He was against carrying out such operations until the, 

government had a plan to eliminate him. He could not remember when this conclusion 

was reached. It came from conversations with people coming in here (the White House) 

and maybe with Secretary Rumsfeld too. 

Commissioner Kerrey said he could appreciate the President's frustration. He asked 

about whether military capabilities had beeri presented to get Bin Ladin. 

No, the President said. There was not actionable intelligence, at least on Bin Ladin 

himself. They never saw a shot at him. 

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• d 

J ..,.,_ 
· (a)(a)(g) 

1.4(a){d)(g) 

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Commissioner Kerrey asked about special operations. They couldn't do a full invasion. 

But the Commander-in-Chief needs more options than that. 

The President said he did not see good options for special operations in Afghanistan. 

Other military options had not been prepared. At least from the time they had started, 

such options weren't presented to him. 

The President added, though, that special operations in Afghanistan could only work if 

there was a olace from which to launch them. In the Afghanistan case, it took time to get 1 The U.S. had to get the basing option established. 1.4(a)(d)(g) 

Next, the President went on, once the team was in, where do they look? There might not 

be a particular spot to go to. But he didn't remember a discussion about why no other 

options had popped up. 

The Vice President recalled that on the first night ofcombat operations against 

Afghanistan, special operations forces had gone after Mullah Omar's house. They had 

the location, although they did not find.him there. They had gone there withheld 

One oftheir helicopters crashed. withheld per EO 13526That was what they did after 

9/11. Getting withheld per EO 13526 1.4(a)(d)(g) to agree to that in advance -- he didn't know how they could 

have done that 

1 Commissioner Kerrey asked ifthis had been discussed with -

4(a)(d)(g) before 9/1 I. 

1.4(a)(d)(g) 

The Vice President said, not really. 1.4(a){d)(g) 

1.4(a)(d)(g) 

The President said that military operations required a strategy with much more in it than 

just a military plan. That was discussed. That was what caused him to direct the 

development ofan NSPD. 

Commissioner Kerrey asked if the CIA had done any analysis ofhijacking scenarios, 

analysis that might have shown up some of the security problems. 

The President said he was unaware ofreceiving such an analysis. The President said that 

on July 5 Andy and Coridi had called in folks from the different agencies. Looking back, 

he commented on weaknesses in watchlists and the lack ofhardened doors on cockpits. 

If someone had said, here's how al Qaeda could attack - there would have been a 

reaction. 

Commissioner Kerrey commented that FAA was not at a heightened level ofsecurity. 

The President wondered, though, what they would have done ifthey had increased their 

alert level. There had been alerts overseas. They would have been alerted here when ... 

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Commissioner Kerrey said the elements were there. FAA should have done the analysis. 

The President said that would have been helpful. 

Commissioner Kerrey turned to the intelligence budget. Since the budget numbers were 

classified, the public did not understand the way money was allocated. They did not 

understand how much money was spent on satellites or how little was soent on the CIA. 

They didn't understand that the DCI's budget for CIA was lower 1.4(c) 

The Presidentsaid the budget process did need to protect "dark'' programs. He did not 

want to compromise capability to win the war. The Vice President, he· said, had been 

involved in these issues. 

The Vice President said this had always been a problem. The House Intelligence 

Committee had just wanted to show the trend in spending. Porter Goss called the Vice 

President for help in getting the data in order to do that. The Agency wasworried about 

leaks ... 

Commissioner Kerrey suggested at least declassifying the top line and the overall 

numbers for individual agencies. The President and Vice President indicated interest. 

Commissioner Thompson thanked the President and Vice President for the meeting. He 

asked the President about the anecdote in Dick Clarke's book recounting a conversation 

in the White House Situation Room after 9/11 about Iraq, a conversation Clarke said he 

had found intimidating. 

The President said he had read that page in the book. He believes he might have talked 

with Dick. He didn't remember. But it wasn't true the way he characterized it. The 

book said the conversation occurred on the evening ofSeptember 12. But the President 

said he had not gone to the Situation Room at all that evening. He had gone to the 

Pentagon. Then he had gone to the Residence. And as for the idea that he was • 

wandering around the Situation Room alone? "I don't do that." He didn't think any 

president would do that, looking for something to do. He couldn't remember such a 

conversation. Asking about Iraq? He probably did at some point. Intimidating? He 

objected to that. 

The President said that after the 9/11 attack he wanted to know all he could about what 

happened. He didn't think the conversation was on September 12. He wanted to find out 

the facts. He asked the Commission to remember that Saddam Hussein had given money 

to suiciders. He was a threat. It would be a common sense question. But he didn't 

believe he intimidated anybody. Shrugging, he said, . I don't know, maybe I did. I don't 

remember. The facts are different from what the book said. 

Commissioner Thompson asked if he had talked about al Qaeda to President Clinton 

during the transition. 

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The President said that President Clinton had invited him here, to the Oval Office. He 

didn't remember much being said on al Qaeda. There was a lot on North Korea. That 

was high on the agenda. President Clinton was thinking ofgoing to North Korea. The 

President felt sure President Clinton mentioned terrorism ofsome kind. He shrugged. 

He did recall that President Clinton was hot at Arafat, and told him about the 

disappointment with Arafat and the recent developments in the peace process. 

Commissioner Thompson commented on the tendency of Americans to rely on 

hindshight and prepare to fight the last war. Who was responsible to insure that didn't 

happen? 

Me, the President replied. I'm in charge ofthat. You have to get good people, develop a 

good strategy, and hope it works. 

The President didn't see much point in assigning personal blame for 9/11. If the previous 

administration could have done something to stop it, he was sure they would have done 

everything in their power. The same was true for him. Nobody wants something like 

that to happen. They would have moved heaven and earth to stop it. 

The President said be was responsible: This was the job ofthe President. He had to pick 

a good group, then expect them to do their job with the right strategy. 

Killing the terrorists was the best strategy. It was the only way to do it. Kill them before 

they kill us. There would be no negotiations, no peace treaty with thesepeople. They are 

killers, cold-blooded killers who would not hesitate for a moment. They will kill women 

and children. They had killed all those commuters in Madrid. If Bin Ladin had weapons 

ofmass destruction he would likely kill more. In the short-term we had to find them. 

In the long-term, the President thought the spread of freedom was the key. He had a 

problem with a kind of arrogance in the world, a belief that certain people can't be free. 

It was so condescending to think that people in poor countries, people ofcolor, were 

down so low that freedom can't spread. The President strongly disagreed with this. He 

thought democracy and freedom were critical. 

There also needed to be a strategy for the homeland, the President continued. If people 

thought that defensive measures were inconveniencing them now, by having to take off 

their shoes, wait till we go to (alert condition) Red. It was difficult to defend America. 

He recalled that as Governor ofTexas he was familiar with the border problems, with the 

Mexican border. He remembered how the ''mules" would bring immigrants across. 

People hunting in south Texas would come across piles ofgarbage from where groups of 

immigrants had stayed on their journey. But people also might be willing to walk across 

borders to kill. 

Human intelligence had to improve in order to get actionable intelligence. If there was an 

attack on our watch, the President said, he would bear the responsibility for that. 

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He hoped the Commission would make recommendations for improving the situation 

without violating the constitutional rights ofcitizens. We can't forget why we are who 

we are. We can't change our love of freedom because they are out to kill us. 

The President supported the Patriot Act. He did not want to abridge it and would defend 

it to the ubnost. But he didn't want to suggest that opponents don't love America too. 

Commissioner Gorelick thanked the President. She said she wanted to raise some ''nits 

and picks." Turning back to the chronology ofthe morning of9/11, she asked the Vice 

President when the President gave shootdown authority - when the Vice President was in 

the tunnel or in the PEOC? 

The Vice President said that in the tunnel the conversation was general. Stay close and 

keep in touch. President told him to do what he needed to do. The discussion of the 

shootdown was in the PEOC. · 

Commissioner Gorelick said the staff timeline placed the Vice President in the PEOC 

between 955 and 1000. 

The Vice President said that two logs said he arrived in the PEOC at 944. There was a 

confusion of times about Air Force One too. It was a pretty confusing time. 

The President said: Look, he didn't give orders without my permission. 

Commissioner Gorelick said that the staff thought the Vice President had conveyed the 

engage order between 1 .005 and 101 S. 

The Vice President said his recollection was more like 1005. After the report about an 

aircraft 80 miles out. 

Commissioner Gorelick asked ifthere had been an earlier conversation than that on the 

need for the shootdown. · 

The President said he thought he had talked about that on Air Force One, or on the 

tarmac, or on the stairs up to the plane - he wasn't sure. 

The Vice President said that after he gave the first orders he conveyed this to the 

President again. Then there were two or three different decisions. 

The President said that he notified Ari (Fleischer) about the engagement, thatAri was 

aware ofthe second conversation on the shootdown. 

Commissioner Gorelick said the Vice President's times were different from those ofthe 

Commission staff. She said it appeared that the Vice President had been given a "literal 

tick tock" and that we needed to be sure that the Commission staff had what you have. 

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Judge Gonzales said he could provide that. 

Commissioner Gorelick asked ifthe President thought that, when he came into office, the 

CIA had authority to kill Bin Ladin. 

The President said he was never told that they didn't. When he asked George, during the 

transition, can you kill him, his answer was that killing Bin Ladin wouldn't disrupt al 

Qaeda. It was not that he didn't have the authority to do it. 

Commissioner Gorelick said that Attorney General Ashcroft had proposed getting new 

authorities for CIA in March 2001. Was the President aware that CIA brought new draft 

authorities to the White House at that time? 

The President said there was never a time he had heard that CIA did not have enough 

authorities. If that was so, George should have said something. I would have changed it. 

The President recalled that Woodward asked him about killing Bin Ladin. Look, the 

President said, I'm not subtle about this. He didn't know what the rules were before 

9/11. After, it was no problem. Commenting on the situation before 9/11, he was 

uncomfortable talking about this, wondering about what the law was then, so he was 

stuttering, sputtering, notreally answering Woodward's question, on the ground that he 

shouldn't discuss the assassination ofa public figure. That was the context for the ''blood 

boiling" before and after. After 3000 people had been killed, sure the situation was 

different, stronger. This wasn't the same as the problem before. 

It was important to understand the authority, the President said. His perspective was that 

they could kill Bin Ladin any time - they had the authority - and they wanted to. Ifthere 

was not enough authority, they had the obligation to tell him. 

The President said his style was access. He and Tenet had a great relationship. Tenet 

was doing a good job. "I like it." Tenet is a policy guy. He is a strategic thinker. He is 

confident enough to say that he did not have what he needed. The President knew this 

was never proposed to my level. He did not know whether it was proposed to Condi. 

Commissioner Gorelick asked about the morning meetings. How did that group deal 

with the domestic aspect of the threat? 

The President said they handled everything. Citing the nwnber oftimes he had been 

briefed before 9/11 on al Qaeda, the President said he had read every one. There was not 

one on a threat in America until the one he had asked for. As for the idea ofreaching out 

to domestic agencies, Andy was to the domestic agencies what Condi was to the foreign 

policy side. 

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Commissioner Gorelick asked then whether, in a meeting like the one in July among 

domestic agencies, the domestic agencies were the responsibility ofAndy Card, not 

Condi. 

The President said they were working together to assemble the group needed to deal with 

the threats at that time. Now this was Tom Ridge. Then it was Andy. 

At this point in the meeting, at about 11 :45, Vice Chair Hamilton and Commissioner 

Kerrey took their leave, apologizing for having to leave early. The President wished 

them well and said he hoped Commissioner Kerrey would remain spirited. After a 

friendly exchange the two commissioners departed. 

Looking forward, Commissioner Gorelick asked the President how he felt about the 

transition process, about the information flow during the transition and the amount of 

time it took to stand up the government to be ready. 

The President suggested with a smile that it would be better to win on election day. 

Gorelick also asked about the absence ofadministration officials during August 

vacations. The Vice President drily commented that this assumed you want them here 

when you get hit. 

The President mentioned the value ofreal-time communications. He had staffand 

facilities in Crawford. It was easier to work from Crawford than from Air Force One. 

They were better prepared to react there. But perhaps that situation was better now. 

As for the transition, a candidate, the President said, is not fully aware ofthreats. Maybe 

he shouldn't be. He would recommend that CIA brief John Kerry. He wasn't sure how 

to calibrate this. 

The transition happened pretty quickly. The problem was getting people in place. The 

delays were too long. He hoped it had not been the administration's fault, hoped that we 

got our nominations up in time. Perhaps the hearings had been delayed, he didn't know. 

It may make sense for some nominees not to be vetted as much as others are. 

The Clinton administration had been helpful, the President said. They held meetings to 

pass along information. Condi met with Sandy Berger. There was a good meeting at 

Colin Powell's house. It was a friendly change ofpower. It didn't appear to have been 

as chilly as, for ex.ample, the Truman-Eisenhower handoffhad been. 

The Vice President said that in August 2001 the SVTS wasn't fully up. Now there were 

facilities allowing secure video teleconferencing at his home in Wyoming and at his 

residence on Massachusetts Avenue. NSC meetingsroutinely involved people at 9 or 10 

sites, including General Abizaid or Jerry Bremer from Baghdad. 

One problem is that they had been really worried about having both the President and 

Vice President in Washington, DC. They kept a schedule in the White House that 

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showed in color (he displayed the chart, with pink-shaded blocks) when both the 

President and Vice President would be in the White House. They tried to keep those 

occasions to a minimum. 

The President mentioned that they had established SVTScommunication with Tony Blair 

too, also for real-time communication. The Camp David SVTS facility was fully 

equipped. The President or Vice President could go up there. The continuity of 

government issue was very serious. It was their solemn duty to do that. They now had a 

better ability to communicate from Air Force One. Fortunately, he did not know yet ifit 

would be good enough in a crisis. 

The President commented, however, that there would be a certain chain of confusion in 

any emergency. He mentioned first learning·this as a governor, dealing with hurricanes 

and floods. Good communications do not alleviate that. 

Commissioner Fielding thanked the President for the meeting, mentioning his experience 

with executive privilege issues. 

The President said he appreciated the Commission's help in gathering its infonnation, 

done the right way. Ifthere had not been an understanding, he wouldn't have sent her 

(Condi) up there. He couldn't do so without weakening the presidency. The 

Commission had helped a lot 

Commissioner Fielding returned to the subject of transitions. He thought they should 

avoid lapses. He recalled his Reagan administration experience, and the fog in March 

1981 after the attempted assassination ofPresident Reagan. Information was thrown at 

you. It was important for the President and Vice President to understand each other's 

views, in case ofa contingency under the 25th Amendment. 

The President, smiling, said that wasn't something the Vice President wants to spend a lot 

oftime talking to him about. He thought they had never discussed it. 

Judge Gonzales said they had discussed it once. The Vice President agreed, adding they 

had arranged to talk a lot among the lawyers - Al and David Addington. The President 

recalled the issue ofdefining incapacity. Judge Gonzales said this had been defined, at 

least on paper. 

The President said there was no problem with policy continuity. The Vice President 

understood our process and our strategies. The Vice President understands it just like the 

President would. 

Commissioner Fielding recalled the precedent of President Reagan's relationship with 

Vice President Bush, and the issue ofcommand authority. 

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The President said they were in good shape there. It was an interesting topic. Having 

been through other administrations, the President and Vice President had to discuss these 

things. One had to force them to do so. 

The Vice President commented that the 9/11 situation was unusual. It was better to have 

the President relate directly to the Secretary of Defense. 

The President said the relationship with the Vice President was good in part because there 

was no political rivalry. Relationships differ from administration to administration. 

Every one was different. He didn't worry because he had a unique relationship with the 

Vice President. ''The Vice President isn't interested in my job, and I'm not interested in 

his." This is important precisely for situations ofemergency. "That's why I picked him." 

The President recalled being out in a pasture in Crawford and the Vice President came to 

him with the results ofhis vice presidential search committee. The President recalled 

saying to Dick, ''You're it." This wasn't for when times are good. It is a decision for 

when times are bad. He had no idea that something like 9/11 was coming. It just turned 

out to be a wise reaction to his instincts. 

The President added that the temptation was to pick a political hotshot, for instance 

someone who could deliver the South. That was a different approach, which he thought 

should not be used as an example. 

The Vice President discussed the briefings for incoming presidents. They discussed the 

SIOP and nuclear weapons. The military scares the hell out ofthe president-elect and 

then they go away. He thought instead there should be a kind ofshort course by the 

military for the new civilian leadership. They should use exercises, cases, and scenarios. 

It should be educational. Incoming leaders don't even know what questions to ask. They 

ended up having to go through a crisis in order to understand what the issues were. 

The President said he remembered thinking that George Tenet, briefing him, thought he 

was in a job interview. George was used to presidents bringing in a new person and old 

CIA directors going. The CIA shouldn't be political, not at all. He remembered talking 

to Ge_orge,.reading his body language, and George trying to read him. He didn't know if 

it changed the way he acted or not. The issue was that the CIA director shouldn't feel he 

is auditioning for a job. 

Commissioner Fielding commented that ifit felt like a test, that would be on the CIA 

director's mind. 

Commissioner Roemer asked if the President had any recollection ofTenet's briefing on 

August 17, 2001. 

No, the President said. He probably saw him, but didn't remember it. He didn't 

remember anything particular about a threat then. 

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Commissioner Roemer asked ifTenet had said anything then about an Islamic extremist 

learning to fly. 

The President said no, and be thought he would have remembered that. George feels free 

to talk. The "PDB briefing" is actually a wider discussion, triggered by the PDB. 

Sometimes an item didn't merit discussion. But if you're sitting here (in the Oval 

Office), you cannot sit here ifyou're told about a threat. What's the action plan? That's 

the first question. Condi was on the top ofher game in situations like that. 

Condi, be said, had a strong personality. She had to have one to deal with people like 

Rumsfeld, Tenet, and Powell. Some people had wondered ifshe would have what it . 

takes as a relatively young woman dealing with these 'stars.' She does. She is 

phenomenal, especially given this cast of 'thoroughbreds.' She is not afraid to call them 

to account. Some people might be intimidated by Don Rumsfeld. He's an old pro. She's 

not. He is so confident when he tells you things. DOD reacted to that. Condi had daily 

phone calls with these principals and weekly lunches. 

Commissioner Roemer mentioned the Commission's visit the day before to CENTCOM 

and SOCOM headquarters. The need for better HUMINT had come up. 

The President said he sure would like it too. Without it, you don't have the infonnation 

to send troops in. There are no targets. 

Commissioner Gorton asked if it was true that, before 9/11, there was no authority in 

DOD to shoot down hijacked planes. Was that correct? 

Absolutely, the President said. The Vice President said that was also his understanding. 

Commissioner Lehman referred back to an earlier question posed by Commissioner 

Kerrey. Presidents had asked for options on Bin Laden and had basically been offered a 

choice of cruise missiles on one band and the Nonnandy invasion on the other. But there 

were other options, such as those developed in the era ofstate-sponsored terrorism -

options using special operations forces. Commissioner Lehman talked about some of 

these capabilities, including the penetrating C-130 variants at Hurlbut Field. President 

Clinton didn't know about those, he said. 

One reason for this problem, Commissioner Lehman contended, was that before 

Goldwater/Nichols all the chiefs would come in to briefthe President. Commissioner 

Lehman recalled some experiences with this in the Nixon administration, and the 

growing concern about showing military disagreements to the President. But the 

President could hear diverse military perspectives on a problem. Now it was just one 

voice. 

The President urged the Commission to remember that they were dealing with a 

capability to find a person. Fine. The problem, though, was that there was no larger 

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'. strategy to eliminate the whole group. He didn't remember getting briefed on the 

capabilities at Hurlbut. 

The Vice President said he did know about those capabilities. They weren't suggested at 

the White House until after the U.S. had got into Afghanistan. They had tried using 

special operations forces to get Mullah Omar, with good infonnation. Even then he'd left 

and they missed him. 

The President said that, before 9/11, we weren't on a war footing either. He had recently 

talked to Tony Blair about this. He told him that they were being criticized for not 

launching a preemptive attack against Afghanistan. And they were criticized for 

preemptively attacking Iraq. 

Blair had commented, the President recalled, that ifthe President had told him before 

9/11 that he wanted to put forces in Afghanistan, he - Blair - would have been floored. 

"I would have looked at you like a nut," Blair said. There was an appetite for a 'throat 

slit' (killing Bin Ladin), not a war footing. A president can't force preemptive war 

withouta cause. The country didn't like war. "I don't like it either," the President said. 

The President said he was interested in getting the NSPD, though, without 9/11. He 

would then have had the problem ofhow to take on the mindset ofthe nation before 9/11. 

This would be a doctrine ofstriking before being struck. The Commission couldsee it 

from his perspective as a doctrine ofpreemption. This would seem like an ul-timate act of 

unilateralism without a casus belli, in people's minds. It was one thing to send in a squad 

to do somebody in. It was another to attack al Qaeda with standoff weapons and the 

military. 

The President repeated that the problem would have been how to implement the NSPD 

without another attack on America. He was prepared to take that on. But people would 

have argued that he had lost his mind. · · 

The President observed that Commissioner Ben~V eniste seemed to be champing at the bit 

to ask a question, as usual. Commissioner Ben-V eniste smiled and then asked about the 

apparent disconnect between these decisions and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. Bin 

Ladin himself had not been linked to the Cole attack. But the premise was that 

diplomacy was supposed to get the Taliban to "cough up that hair ball" (Bin Ladin). The 

Clinton administration had issued a threat to the Taliban, to hold them accountable for 

any other attacks. The Cole had happened in October 2000. According to the staff, by 

mid-December 2000 the evidence had shown beyond any doubt that al Qaeda was linked 

to the Cole attack. 

The President said he was curious about that statement. The President said he was 

unaware that Clinton had made such a threat to the Taliban. The tenn ''preliminary 

judgment" had been argued to him. The report he saw said they might be connected. 

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Commissioner Ben-V eniste referred to the evidence implicating "Khallad.,, He 

acknowledged that the CIA and FBI had not reported a conclusion, but the evidence was 

clear. He said that Attorney General Ashcroft had testified to concerns over the 

"command and control" structure of al Qaeda, and that was mystifying to him. Why was 

it so important to link Bin Ladin directly to the al Qaeda attack on the Cole? The 

problem, therefore, was whether to make good on the threat by retaliating against the 

Taliban. 

The President said he had never said: Cough him up or I'll blast you. lfhe had said that, 

well - in that case you have to be ready to blast. 

Commissioner Ben-Veniste said there was intelligence that clearly established al Qaeda's 

responsibility. So then the threat to retaliate against the Taliban should have been 

triggered by the attack on the Cole. 

Judge Gonzales tried to clarify- they didn't strike the Taliban because they didn't know 

Bin Ladin was behind the attack? 

Commissioner Lehman recalled that the FBI and CIA claimed this was not established 

until August (2001 ). 

The President said Commissioner Ben-Veniste knew more about the evidence in the Cole 

case than he did. The commissioner had known more about the Yemeni courthouse case, 

and this. The President didn't remember hearing a definitive statement: They did it At 

least not at his level. Was it certain at lower levels? 

(Commissioner Roemer tried to interject and clarify the exchanges.) Commissioner BenV eniste reiterated that the staff had found that the intelligence community knew al Qaeda 

was clearly responsible for the Cole attack by December 12, 2000, at the latest. He 

agreed this had not been conveyed to the President in a report, but he wondered ifthe 

President had heard that statement - though the community was less sure about the links 

to al Qaeda's high command. 

The President said he didn't know what that meant. It didn't come to him. 

The President said he and his advisers did discuss what the appropriate response should 

be to the Cole attack. If the response is, say, cruise missiles, then you have to do the 

analysis. The enemy wants you to flinch - or put a cruise missile on a $15 tent. 

On the Taliban, the President continued, we didn't issue that threat. If you go after the 

Taliban, you have to eliminate the Taliban. A lesser response may mean you incapacitate 

Mullah Omar. But if you're wrong and miss him, you inflame the situation in an even 

worse way. From the enemy's perspective, ifthey defeat America's high technology, 

that's great. To them, the cruise missile is the ultimate expression of technology, 

opposed to the guerrilla fighter. 

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In other words, the President went on, unless you're real good, you're not going to get the 

Taliban. You must do what we did. That means a massive, smart operation. That means 

aircraft carriers, aircraft based in withheld per EO 13526 1.4(a)(d) 1.4(a)(d) overwhelming force, refueling, and other supply. You have to wipe out 

the Taliban. If you just get Mullah Omar, you haven't eradicated the Taliban and you 

haven't eliminated al Qaeda. 

Therefore, you tell the Tahban you've made a threat. They don't care. They do care.if 

they are eliminated. 

After 9/11, the President said, his blood was indeed boiling. He delivered an ultimatum 

to the Taliban. The Taliban did this (he used the fist up/bent arm gesture). But it served 

its purpose, and showed the perspective from the Commander-in-Chief. 

Commissioner Gorelick raised the issue ofevidence and action. 

The President said the best response on the Cole was to eliminate the group, eliminate 

their structure. You could arrest people, and they had. He thought that perhaps they had 

· arrested five ofthe seven people who had carried out the attack, though he recalled the 

Yemenis had let some people out and then got them back in custody. The law 

enforcement aspect worked OK. 

The Vice President remembered that the problem in the early months was getting the FBI 

in to be able to do its work. 

The President said that was to find the bombers and hunt for clues. He was trying to 

address a different question, which was bow the question ofresponsibility for the Cole 

related to action against the network not individuals. It was the question ofhow to bring 

Bin Ladin or the Taliban to account. 

Commissioner Ben-V eniste asked ifonly 9/11 could have done that. 

The President said the strategy was being developed before 9/11. He would have tried to 

use our power, and "our charm on preemption," without 9/11, because of the Cole. 

Commissioner Gorelick said it therefore looked like the NSPD put the President in a box. 

The President agreed. That is my point. But I was willing to pursue it, he said. It would 

not have been easy. He referred again to Prime Minister Blair's argument in their 

conversation earlier that day. But, he said, it was easier to make the case after 9/11. 

People could fully understand how different things were. 

Without the attack, the President said, suppose he had gone forward with this new 

strategy on September 30, developing a plan to wipe out al Qaeda People would have 

said, ''Whoa!" But he still would have pursued it. "It would have been a lot slower, 

Jamie," he said. They had to develop a complex strategy. It would not have been easy. 

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One ofthe commissioners noted that they had already been meeting for three hours. The 

President smiled and said he wanted to go at least for three hours and five minutes. 

Commissioner Ben-Veniste mentioned Condi Rice's statement that nobody had thought 

ofusing airplanes as weapons. 

The President said that nobody ever told her about this possibility. He stopped himself, 

saying he shouldn't speak for her. 

Commissioner Ben-V eniste said he thought the intelligence on this possibility had surely 

been available. 

The President asked ifthe commissioner was sure about that. 

Yes, Commissioner Ben-Veniste said. The intelligence community had collected a dozen 

instances ofplanned use ofsuicide planes. And there were the measures to protect the G8 summit in Genoa, including a CAP over Genoa and placement of antiaircraft batteries. 

The President replied that nobody had said: By the way, a vulnerability ofAmerica is .... 

Not to him or to Condi either. 

As for Genoa, the President continued, they close the airspace wherever he goes. That 

was not a tie-in to a warning that airplanes would be used as weapons. Genoa was a war 

zone. They had gotten all these threats. The President remembered flying in and seeing 

nothing but soldiers. They drove down the streets ofthe city and did not see anyone but 

police. 

The President repeated: How can a president think of a threat? You can invent a threat, 

because there is a no fly zone over Genoa. A president has to deal with real information. 

Commissioner Ben-V eniste said that President Mubarak claimed he had warned Italian · 

authorities about possible suicide planes. 

The President said he had never heard about that. Because the airspace was closed over 

Genoa, he should think ofaircraft hitting buildings? No. Presidents had to rely on real 

information. They can't be imagining things. That was why George Tenet was there 

every morning, with the briefer. · 

Chairman Kean thanked the President for a very good discussion. He thought the 

questioning had been good. He wished the President the best. 

The President said he hoped the Commission had enjoyed the opportunity. This is not a 

"gotcha moment" for me or my predecessor. They weren't playing "gotcha." This was 

too important for America. It would be good if citizens could take this moment and 

convert it into something for future presidents. 

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The President said it had been a good experience to meet with the whole Commission. It 

had been good for you to see us (the President and Vice President) and see how we 

interface with each other. He had been criticized for saying he had looked into Putin's . eyes and seen his soul. But the President thought that was important 

' 

The President added that this was a serious business. The country was still at war. 

Enemies want to kill us. He worried that the election cycle might give them an excuse. 

Aznar had lost not because ofthe attack, but because ofhow he had handled the attack. 

That sent a terrible signal, though, and placed us more at risk. 

Chairman Kean said a meeting like this could only happen in a democracy. The 

Commission would try to be practical in its approach. 

The President said he looked forward to the report. The White House would try to clear 

the draft report as quickly as possible. It would help ifthey could see some chapters 

earlier, as they were prepared. The clearance process would move - he wanted this to get 

out. They would get it done. 

The President quickly reviewed what he intended to say about the meeting to the press. 

Chairman Kean described the similar, and equally non-substantive, plan for Commission 

comments. The meeting then concluded. 

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