Northeast Asia Regional Security 

and the United States Military: 

Context, Presence, and Roles 

Susan F. Bryant, Russell D. Howard, 

Jay M. Parker, and Albert S. Wilner 

INSS Occasional Paper 47 

November 2002 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of 

the Air Force, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, 

or the US Government. The paper is approved for public release; 

distribution is unlimited. 

******* 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS: 

Susan F. Bryant, Major, USA, is a Strategic Fellow on The Joint Staff. 

She received a B.S.F.S from the Georgetown University School of 

Foreign Service in 1989 with a major in International Politics)and an 

M.A. in International Relations from Yale University in 1998 with a 

concentration in security studies. MAJ Bryant began her career as an 

active-duty army officer serving as an ammunition accountable officer 

and company executive officer at Camp Page, South Korea. She then 

served as a platoon leader and material readiness officer for the 

Army’s opposing forces brigade (OPFOR) at the National Training 

Center, Fort Irwin California. MAJ Bryant then returned to South 

Korea, commanding a maintenance company in the Second Infantry 

Division. After leaving Korea, she studied at Yale University, and then 

went on to serve as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social 

Sciences at West Point. In 2001, Major Bryant won a Council on 

Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship. She chose to 

spend her fellowship working as a Special Assistant to the Under 

Secretary for Political Affairs in the State Department. She is coauthor of the chapter (with Russell D. Howard) ”Shrimp or 

Barracuda? Contemplating a Unified and Nuclear Capable Korea” in 

the INSS book Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: Strategic 

Considerations (February 2001). 

Russel D. Howard, Colonel, USA, is the Professor and Head of the 

Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy. In his 

previous position, Colonel Howard was an Army Chief of Staff Fellow 

at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. 

Formerly, Colonel Howard was the Commander of the 1st Special 

Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Lewis, Washington. Other recent 

assignments include Assistant to the Special Representative to the 

Secretary General during UNOSOM II in Somalia, Deputy Chief of 

Staff for I Corps, Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander for the 

Combined Joint Task Force, Haiti/Haitian Advisory Group. 

Previously, Colonel Howard was Commander of 3d Battalion, 1st

Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina. He also served as the Administrative Assistant to Admiral 

Stansfield Turner and as a Special Assistant to the Commander of 
iv

SOUTHCOM. Colonel Howard holds a Bachelor of Science degree in 

Industrial Management from San Jose State University, a Bachelor of 

Arts in Asian Studies from the University of Maryland, a Master of Arts 

degree in International Management from the Monterey Institute of 

International Studies, and a Masters of Public Administration degree 

from Harvard University. He previously served as an Assistant 

Professor of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, and as a 

Senior Service College Fellow at the Fletcher School of Law and 

Diplomacy, Tufts University, where he is completing his Doctorate. He 

is the author of the INSS Occasional Paper The Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army: “Short Arms and Slow Legs” (September 1999); of 

the chapter “The National Security Act of 1947 and Biological and 

Chemical Weapons” in the INSS book Searching for National Security 

in an NBC World (July 2000); and the chapter (with Susan F. Bryant) 

”Shrimp or Barracuda? Contemplating a Unified and Nuclear 

Capable Korea” in the INSS book Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: 

Strategic Considerations (February 2001).

Jay M. Parker, Colonel, USA, is Academy Professor and Director of 

International Relations and National Security Studies, Department of 

Social Sciences, United States Military Academy. A graduate of the 

University of Arizona, Colonel Parker earned masters’ degrees from 

Arizona State University and the University of Southern California, 

and a PhD in international relations from Columbia University where 

he currently serves as an Adjunct Associate Professor. He is also a 

graduate of the Naval War College. Commissioned as an infantry 

officer through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), he began 

his military career in Wiesbaden, Germany where he served as a 

mechanized infantry platoon leader, staff officer, and company 

commander. Prior to his most recent West Point assignment, COL 

Parker served as operations, plans, and training officer (S3) for the 

U.S. Army's tactical airborne psychological operations battalion and 

as commander of the unit responsible for U.S. Army and Joint Service 

psychological operations training and doctrine development. He is a 

Japan Society U.S.-Japan Leadership Fellow and during the 2002-

2003 academic year he is serving as a Visiting Fellow at Princeton 

University’s Center of International Studies. 

Albert S. Wilner, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, is an Assistant Professor of 

International Relations in the Department of Social Sciences at the 

United States Military Academy, West Point. In his previous position, 

LTC Willner served in the War Plans Division, Army Staff. An Army 

aviator and China Foreign Area Officer, LTC Willner has served in 

various operations and analytical positions in the United States, Hong 
v

Kong and Germany. LTC Willner received his Ph.D. in Foreign 

Affairs from the Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and 

Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia. His research interests are 

Chinese politics and government, China's role in East Asia, and U.S. 

foreign policy issues related to Asia. 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: inss@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
vi
vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summaries ix 

JAPAN’S CHANGING ROLE AND THE FUTURE OF US 

FORWARD PRESENCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA: CONTEXT, 

OPTIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES, Jay M. Parker

Introduction 1 

Background 6 

Three Scenarios for Security in Northeast Asia 12 

 Unilateral Independence 12 

 Regional Collective Security 16 

 Status Quo 19 

A Fourth Option 22 

Notes 26 

BEYOND THESUNSHINE POLICY: AN ARGUMENT IN 

FAVOR OF CONTINUED US MILITARY PRESENCE IN 

NORTHEAST ASIA, Susan F. Bryant

Introduction 35 

South Korea: An Overview 36 

North Korea: An Overview 38 

The Background of Reconciliation 41 

Current Status of Reconciliation Efforts 45 

Regional Perspectives 46 

 China 47 

 China and Korean Reunification 48 

 Japan 50 

 Japan and Korean Reunification 51 

 Russia 54 

 Russia and Korean Reunification 56 
viii

 North Korea 57 

 South Korea 59 

 Current US Perspectives 62 

Possible Role for the US Military in Promoting 

 Normalization of Relations 64 

Strategic Implications of Normalization of Relations 71 

Potential Roles and Missions for US Forces in a 

 Reunified Korea 78 

Conclusion 82 

Notes 83 

CHINA’S RISE AND THE US ARMY: LEANING FORWARD 

Russell D. Howard and Albert S. Wilner 

Introduction 93 

United States Assessment 97 

Chinese Concerns 99 

Military Exchanges 106 

Military Exchanges: The Way Ahead 112 

Hedging Our Bets 115 

Training to Fight: The Way Ahead 122 

Conclusion 123 

Notes 124 
ix

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this forty-seventh volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). Among its many contributions to 

United States security, two noted repositories of strategic expertise 

within the United States Army are its foreign area officer cadre and 

the Department of Social Sciences faculty at the United States 

Military Academy. This collection of papers on Northeast Asian 

regional security taps the combined strength of both; its authors are 

four Army officers with demonstrated regional expertise, all 

currently or formerly assigned to West Point’s Department of Social 

Sciences. The combined set of papers covers a broad and relevant 

swath of territory, both geographic and conceptual. The first paper, 

by Jay Parker, addresses the regional security context with special 

emphasis on that strategic landscape as viewed from the perspective 

of Japanese security and the United States roles both in Japanese 

security and within the broader region. Sue Bryant then fits the 

Korean peninsula into that regional security context, adding special 

emphasis on the Korean road toward unification and on the 

continuing United States military presence in Korea—both for 

peninsular and regional security reasons. Finally, Russ Howard and 

Al Wilner add China to the mix and also add the third level of 

analysis—their focus is on post September 11, 2001 issues and 

opportunities, and the specific military-to-military dimension of 

United States overall military presence and policy. Together, then, 

the papers cover the region as well as policy recommendations from 

macro United States security and military policy, to force presence, 

to the significant roles of individual service members. 

One caveat: these papers are going to press just as the press is 

reporting that the North Koreans have acknowledged the 

continuation of their nuclear weapons program in violation of 

assurances that the program was being abandoned. While this may 

certainly slow the pace of Korean normalization and heighten 

security concerns in the region—perhaps stretching out or 

amending a few of the recommendations here—it certainly 

underscores the centrality of security concerns within this vital 

region. And it adds an exclamation point to the authors’ calls for a 

continuing and focused United States military presence and security 

policy in Northeast Asia. 

About the Institute
x

INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, 

Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the 

Faculty, USAF Academy. Our other sponsors include the Secretary 

of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency; the Air Staff’s Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the Air Force's 39th 

Information Operations Squadrons; the Army Environmental Policy 

Institute; and the Air Force Long-Range Plans Directorate (XPXP). 

The research leading to the papers in this volume was sponsored by 

OSD/NA, DTRA, and XONP. The mission of the Institute is “to 

promote national security research for the Department of Defense 

within the military academic community, to foster the development 

of strategic perspective within the United States Armed Forces, and 

to support national security discourse through outreach and 

education.” Its research focuses on the areas of greatest interest to 

our organizational sponsors: arms control and strategic security; 

counterproliferation, force protection, and homeland security; air 

and space issues and planning; information operations and 

information warfare; and regional and emerging national security 

issues. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, 

selects researchers from within the military academic community, 

and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and 

workshops and facilitates the dissemination of information to a 

wide range of private and government organizations. INSS 

provides valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our 

sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our 

research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director 
xi

JAPAN’S CHANGING ROLE AND THE FUTURE OF US 

FORWARD PRESENCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA: CONTEXT, 

OPTIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES, Jay M. Parker

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Does the commitment of Japan’s Self Defense Force to the war 

on terrorism represent a bold and irreversible step toward greater 

military self reliance, or is this another in a long series of 

incremental, ambiguous, and reversible actions aimed at balancing 

domestic demands and external pressures? If this does represent a 

lasting change in Japan’s defense posture, what does that mean for 

America’s forward military presence in East Asia? 

The near-term prospects for America’s continuing role in the 

security and stability of Northeast Asia can only be effectively 

analyzed in light of Japan’s likely security posture and the context 

of related regional issues and events. Even before September 11th, 

almost daily events in and between virtually every nation in the 

region highlighted the continuing United States presence. In the 

past decade the domestic politics of Japanese national security, the 

dramatic if erratic momentum toward Korean rapprochement, the 

re-emergence of China as a regional hegemon, and America’s 

continuing reassessment of its global role have all combined to 

heighten attention to the future of American policy in East Asia. 

This study reviews several specific security scenarios for 

Northeast Asia, examines the possible roles for all nations in the 

region, and concludes that in the near term Japan’s domestic 

political and economic weaknesses combine with regional political 

dynamics to provide a significant, continuing US diplomatic and 

military presence. 

BEYOND THESUNSHINE POLICY: AN ARGUMENT IN 

FAVOR OF CONTINUED US MILITARY PRESENCE IN 

NORTHEAST ASIA, Susan F. Bryant 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The accepted logic behind the U.S. military presence in 

Northeast Asia is simple. American forces remain in the region to 

protect South Korea from another invasion from the North. This 

paper argues the reality is far more complex. The American 

military in Northeast serves as a stabilizing force among the powers 

in the region. So long as the United States remains committed in 
xii

Asia, both Japan and South Korea need not fear the possibility of 

resurgent Chinese hegemonic aspirations in the region. Similarly, 

the Chinese need not fear the possibility of nuclear proliferation 

from either Japan or South Korea, while the United States maintains 

its existing security guarantees. 

This paper argues that the possibility of Korean rapprochement 

hinted at in the June 2000 summit, should spur US policy makers to 

consider the role of US forces in the region during a reconciliation 

between the two Koreas and beyond. The researcher concludes that 

even given a scenario of peaceful Korean reunification the logic for 

a continued American military presence on the peninsula remains 

intact. 

This paper calls for a reevaluation of the missions the US 

military might undertake during Korean reconciliation and beyond. 

During reunification, the US military could provide external 

security, allowing Korea the opportunity to reunite free from the 

possibility of unwanted outside intervention. Possibilities for postreunification missions for the United States include off-peninsular 

contingencies such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 

CHINA’S RISE AND THE US ARMY: LEANING 

FORWARD, Russell D. Howard and Albert S. Wilner 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The United States led war on terrorism has already had a major 

impact on developing state relationships in Asia. China's changing 

role in the regional security environment provides the US Army 

with unique opportunities and challenges. Greater exposure to the 

Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in order to build trust and 

transparency must be carefully balanced by reinforcing 

commitments to US allies and friends and by remaining prepared to 

quickly respond should the relationship falter. 

This paper argues that the US Army should take a dual-track 

approach. First, efforts should be made to improve relations by 

expanding Army exchanges with its Chinese counterparts. A strong 

program, tied to set objectives and a reciprocal framework, would 

improve understanding between the two militaries. Specifically, 

efforts should be made to broaden Army humanitarian/disaster 

relief contacts, increase participation in joint multi-lateral non-warfighting and logistics related activities at locations such as the Asia 
xiii

Pacific Center for Security Studies, and to expand Army efforts in 

counter terrorism. 

It is understood that the relationship could turn negative, 

forcing the US Army into a more problematic scenario. This paper 

contends that America’s ground forces, together with the joint 

community, must increasingly be trained and educated to meet the 

emergence of a Chinese military challenge in the region. 

Recommendations include changes to the United States Military 

Academy, Command and General Staff College and Senior Service 

College curriculums, as well as the development of a PLA OPFOR 

element at the Combat Training Centers. 
xiv
JAPAN’S CHANGING ROLE AND THE FUTURE OF 

US FORWARD PRESENCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA: 

CONTEXT, OPTIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 

Jay M. Parker 

INTRODUCTION1

On 10 November 2001, almost 60 years to the day after the 

Imperial Japanese Navy sortied from the homeland to attack Pearl 

Harbor, ships from the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force 

sailed for the Indian Ocean to join the US Navy and other allied 

forces in the war against terrorism. This deployment of forces 

was a major step for Japan, following intense debate in the 

Japanese Diet.2

 Like many other nations, Japan shared the sense 

of threat from a global terrorist movement. Unlike other nations, 

Japan had constitutionally constrained its ability to combat such 

threats. 

More than half a century of formal rejection of security policy 

options considered normal and essential by other states produced a 

deeply ingrained national sense of pacifism. Despite the dramatic 

shock of the September 11th attacks, some in Japan still clung to 

the most restrictive traditional post-war views of self-defense. 

Even a recent series of armed clashes between Japanese ships and 

vessels suspected to be from North Korea set off a fierce public 

debate over Japan’s right to defend itself in its own territorial 

waters. Mindful of public opinion, some of Japan’s leaders 

worked to hedge their commitment to the war against terrorism.3

This deployment of Japanese forces marks another in a series 

of recent shifts in Japan’s defense posture. After the 

embarrassment of Japan’s ambiguous efforts to join the 

international coalition protecting its clear economic interests in the 
Japan’s Changing Role 

2

Gulf War, the Japanese made a series of small, halting steps 

towards greater participation in international peacekeeping. They 

reaffirmed, restructured, and revitalized the Defense Guidelines 

linking them to the United States. But while many in Japan—and 

many of Japan’s neighbors—oppose a robust Japanese security 

posture, for some in Japan and the United States these steps are 

still not enough. Japan, it is argued, must accept the normal 

national security responsibilities expected of any nation. 

Does this recent commitment of Japan’s Self Defense Force 

represent a bold and irreversible step toward greater military self 

reliance, or is this another in a long series of incremental, 

ambiguous, and reversible actions aimed at balancing domestic 

demands and external pressures?4

 And, if this does represent a 

lasting change in Japan’s defense posture, what does that mean for 

America’s forward military presence in East Asia? 

The near-term prospects5

 for America’s continuing role in the 

security and stability of Northeast Asia can only be effectively 

analyzed in light of Japan’s likely security posture and the context 

of related regional issues and events. Even before September 11th, 

almost daily events in and between virtually every nation in the 

region highlighted the continuing United States presence. In the 

past decade the domestic politics of Japanese national security, the 

dramatic if erratic momentum toward Korean rapprochement, the 

re-emergence of China as a regional hegemon, and America’s 

continuing reassessment of its global role have all combined to 

heighten attention to the future of American policy in East Asia. 

This study reviews several specific security scenarios for 

Northeast Asia, examines the possible roles for all nations in the 

region, and concludes that in the near term Japan’s domestic 
Japan’s Changing Role 

3 

political and economic weaknesses combine with regional 

political dynamics to provide a significant, continuing US 

diplomatic and military presence. 

There are several fundamental assumptions made in this 

study. The first is that any premise of a unilateral American role 

in the region is inherently flawed. America’s future in Northeast 

Asia can only be explained, described, predicted, and prescribed 

in the complex context of domestic politics within and interaction 

between the other nations of the region. Therefore, this paper will 

deliberately reverse the practice of discussing America’s role at 

length while discussing broader regional dynamics at the margins. 

The next assumption is that the presence of conventional 

military forces forward deployed in theater can and should be 

considered distinct from considerations of strategic or theaterbased missiles defenses. Clearly missiles (both strategic and 

theater) and conventional forces are integrated parts of a military 

force continuum. However, each possesses deterrent and 

responsive capabilities uniquely suited for specific types of 

threats, and each needs to be assessed separately.6

 This paper will 

focus primarily on conventional military forces. Furthermore, this 

paper focuses more specifically on forces deployed to contribute 

to the defense and security of the region as opposed to those 

forward based for use in out of sector missions. 

Related to this assumption is the argument that discussing 

military presence without noting political, social, and economic 

factors is, at best, a partial solution. The factors most likely to 

either trigger war or foster peace in Northeast Asia are not rooted 

in comparative military capabilities or troop placement. Instead, 
Japan’s Changing Role 

4

military capabilities and troop placement are inseparable from 

political, social, and economic factors. 7

Despite the hyperbole of the late 1980’s, this paper assumes 

that Japan is a nation severely weakened by its continuing 

inability to restore economic order and stability. Most of those 

who used to facetiously state that “The Cold War is over and 

Japan won” now recognize the reality of Japan’s precarious 

economic position. This combined with a slow response to 

needed domestic political reforms has greatly diminished Japan’s 

hopes for sustained regional (let alone global) hegemony.8

 

Furthermore, any proposals for assuming a more substantive 

security role must overcome the unique Japanese brand of national 

pacifism that blocks the required Constitutional revisions.9

Next, while full, peaceful Korean reunification will certainly 

not occur in the short term, there will be continuing engagement 

between the two Koreas resulting eventually in some form of 

permanent, stable reunification. Movement toward that eventual 

reconciliation proceeds at a far slower pace than had been 

previously expected. The optimism evident at the height of Kim 

Dae-Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” is clearly gone. The recent North 

Korean response to selection as part of the “axis of evil” was a 

setback to US relations with both Koreas. Nevertheless, progress, 

however glacial, continues. 10 

Meanwhile the nearly complete unraveling of the North 

Korean economy has not brought the anticipated collapse of the 

regime nor does such a collapse appear likely in the near term. 

Given all this, the reasons for stationing forces on the Korean 

Peninsula have not been fundamentally altered. However, 

growing domestic pressure in South Korea has undermined the 
Japan’s Changing Role 

5 

consensus for maintaining a United States presence and a number 

of actions have taken place over the past decade to reduce the 

visibility of the American footprint. 

This study also assumes that tensions between Taiwan and the 

mainland will continue. The decades-long brinkmanship between 

Beijing and Taipei remains a reflection of domestic politics in 

each capital as much if not more than it has in years past. 

Furthermore, some of the current tensions are also fueled by 

domestic politics in the United States. Despite these tensions the 

immediate likelihood of armed conflict is not high. This is 

significant to the US-Japan relationship because Japan has 

struggled to avoid being caught in the Beijing-Taipei conflict for 

reasons rooted as much in Japan’s recent colonial past as in 

Japan’s general strategic isolation.11 

A further assumption is that the recent reemergence of China 

in its traditional role as regional hegemon is the result of the 

uncertain dynamics of China’s internal economic and political 

modernization. It is not the result of a deliberate, aggressive 

policy of territorial or political expansion. Furthermore, the most 

significant bases for current political tensions with the United 

States are rooted in China’s domestic policy, not its foreign or 

defense policies.12 While an understandable rebuttal to this 

assumption would be to point out the conflicts with Taiwan and 

Tibet, it is important to remember that despite the perceptions of 

other nations, the PRC considers Taiwan and Tibet to be internal 

domestic issues. 

This paper also assumes that the continued presence of 

American forces in Northeast Asia is not a unilateral decision 

made at the discretion of the US military. Civilian political 
Japan’s Changing Role 

6

leaders, not the Pentagon, make American troop basing policies. 

Such decisions have significant political and economic 

implications beyond the scope and authority of military leaders 

whose power is limited to recommending and implementing such 

policies.13 

Next, while the United States could unilaterally choose to 

withdraw forces from anywhere in the region, it would not likely 

do so without giving consideration to the severe diplomatic 

consequences. Such a dramatic action would seriously reflect on 

other American commitments around the world. Needless to say, 

any attempts to station troops overseas without host nation 

consent would be, at the most extreme, tantamount to an act of 

war. While the United States does not have unconstrained, 

unilateral power to station or withdraw forces from overseas 

bases, host nations do have the power to evict. When they do—as 

was the case in France in the 1960’s, Thailand in the 1970’s, and 

the Philippines in the 1980’s—the United States must and will 

comply. 

BACKGROUND 

Ever since the Spanish-American War and the subsequent 

capture and colonization of the Philippines, there has been a 

constant American military presence in East Asia. For more than 

a century, the US forces forward based on Asian soil have carried 

out a variety of roles ranging from deterrent presence to the 

prosecution of total war. Like the briefer but far more visible US 

military role in Europe, American military presence in Asia has 

been an extension of America’s broader foreign policy aimed at 

securing and advancing US national economic and political 

interests.14 
Japan’s Changing Role 

7 

However, unlike the American presence in Europe, the United 

States military in Asia has not consistently been part of broader 

multilateral efforts based on formal security alliances such as 

NATO. Instead, the United States has carried out its Asian 

security policies bilaterally or at times unilaterally. During times 

of war in Asia the US has placed its efforts under the umbrella of 

multilateral alliances. Between the wars those alliances ceased to 

play a primary role in the development and execution of US 

policy. Indeed, one could argue that even while part of formal 

alliance structures for the purposes of waging war, America’s role 

was clearly assumed to be “first among equals.” 

The distinction between the traditional United States military 

role in Europe and the traditional American military role in Asia is 

important as one assesses the likely future. The prospects for a 

reunified Korea or the less immediate but certainly no less 

important peaceful resolution of the Taiwan-PRC relationship 

would alter the security landscape of Asia at least as much as the 

fall of the Berlin Wall altered Europe. However, while US forces 

remain in Europe after the dramatic events of the past decade, it is 

dangerous and naïve to assume a prolonged status quo for 

American forces in Asia.15 

A number of important, closely linked factors affect the future 

presence of the United States military in Asia. First is the 

traditional pattern of hegemony and power in East Asia, in sharp 

contrast to the European model. Simply stated, classic European 

balance-of-power politics do not fully apply to Northeast Asia. 

Consequently, assessments of East Asian international relations 

rooted in mainstream Realist International Relations literature are 

often flawed. Furthermore, most policy analysis and decision 
Japan’s Changing Role 

8

making is often unconsciously a product of this same Eurocentric 

view of diplomacy and security.16

For example, European diplomacy (and much of the scholarly 

literature that draws on European cases) is premised on multiple 

competing nations with roughly comparable but constantly 

shifting relative capabilities. These states either balance or 

bandwagon based on capabilities and their perceptions of threats. 

The result is constantly shifting patterns of conflict and alliance 

over the course of many centuries. 17 

Many of the states in Europe emerged as coherent political 

entities after centuries of internal struggle. State identities were 

sometimes geo-politically blurred by patterns of cross-border 

alliances and cultural affinities. We think of this as ancient 

history. However, it is worth noting that Italy and Germany were 

not unified modern states until late in the last century, Britain was 

not always the United Kingdom and still must contend with 

internal separatist movements, and many Central European states 

were manufactured, destroyed, then resurrected many times over. 

Complicating this were patterns of alliances built or reinforced by 

intermarriages among royal leaders. While this was meant to 

bring peace, more often it brought new conflicts, some more 

deeply personal than political or diplomatic. World War I was, 

among other things, a war between cousins.18 

Northeast Asia’s patterns of international politics emerged far 

differently. Rather than several competing potential hegemons, 

China has been the one consistent hegemon dominating the region 

culturally as well as politically for thousands of years. 

Furthermore, this hegemony was not exercised through military 

conquest and occupation but through the unique system of tribute 
Japan’s Changing Role 

9 

and cultural integration. There is no comparable example from 

European history. 

While the patterns of foreign policy in Europe reflected 

constant interaction and expansion, the patterns in Northeast Asia 

reflected isolation. The greatest threats and conflicts were 

internal. This had also been true in parts of Europe during the 

feudal era; however, there was no comparable Asian example of 

the kinds of religious and ideological battles that spanned national 

and ethnic boundaries. Asian states did not engage in the kinds of 

formal balancing and alliance behavior that dominated Europe 

well into the modern era and continues to dominate today. Asian 

internal conflicts also stayed largely internal. Europe’s prevalent 

patterns of diplomacy and intermarriage to gain domestic political 

advantage were not mirrored in Asia.19 

The most serious threat to these traditional patterns emerged 

in the 19th Century as European imperial intervention coincided 

with the domestic weakness and vulnerability of China. Seizing 

on the opportunity provided by Perry’s visits and mindful of 

China’s example, Japan emerged from its isolation. The 

traditional Asian order collapsed. The Japanese quickly filled the 

vacuum left by the demise of China’s hegemony. The adaptation 

of Western patterns of imperial behavior quickly brought Japan 

into the select group of the world’s most powerful nations. Within 

less than a century, this form of European imperial order had the 

same disastrous consequences for Asia that it ultimately had for 

Europe. 

In the post-World War II era, the traditional power patterns in 

Asia re-emerged and remain in the contemporary structure of 

existing regional relationships. Specifically, relationships 
Japan’s Changing Role 

10

between states are bilateral rather than multilateral. Now, 

however, the hegemon is America. Acting in the role of an 

offshore balancer, the United States assumes China’s traditional 

role as the hegemon dominating bilateral relationships. 

Meanwhile relationships between states in Asia reflect more than 

a century of bitter conflicts that have not been fully resolved. 

Unlike the European post-war experience, there is no NATO 

or EU style framework to provide for future resolution of 

conflicts. During the Cold War, the United States was able to 

either ignore or capitalize on Asian bilateral conflicts as a means 

of advancing its short-term regional interests and its larger, longterm global Cold War interests. In so doing, the United States 

often ignored the specific regional context. The preferred 

American lens for viewing international politics has been 

European rather than Asian. 

With the end of the Cold War, American policy required 

reassessment. That is not to say that the Cold War has, in fact, 

ended. This widespread belief is a continuation of traditional 

American Eurocentricity. While the European chapter of the Cold 

War appears to have drawn to a close (or, in the minds of some 

more cautious observers, taken a brief sabbatical), a Cold War still 

continues in East Asia. In fact, significant elements of the Cold 

War differ from Europe to Asia. Despite the fact that the United 

States viewed its Cold War actions in Asia as an extension of its 

actions in Europe, these were two very different wars. 20

As the new century begins, the nations in East Asia and the 

United States reassess their security roles in the region. In that 

reassessment, there are a number of potential misperceptions. 

Some are already evident in public discussions. The primary 
Japan’s Changing Role 

11 

misperceptions relate to Chinese capabilities and intentions. 

Speculation about PRC offensive military power and likely 

courses of action does not always match actual military strength. 

The greatest danger is an overestimation of PRC military strength 

and intent, followed by a buildup by other nations in response to a 

threat that is little more than speculation. In addition to 

endangering regional stability, this fuels internal domestic 

conflicts in China.21

An equally dangerous misreading is the assumption that Japan 

can be viewed as a balancing power rather than a threat. This is 

primarily an issue for American policy makers urging revision of 

the Japanese “peace” Constitution and modernization of the 

Japanese Self Defense Force. The perceived rearming of Japan 

stirs fears in Korea and China and reinforces hard-liners, 

particularly those in China suspicious of economic and political 

modernization at the expense of defense spending.22

A clearly related issue is the continuing inability of Japan to 

officially come to terms with recent history. As recently as 

summer 2001, Japan failed to effectively deal with regional furor 

caused by the perennial conflict over the treatment of Japan’s 

aggressive past in government-approved history texts. Added to 

this was the outcry over debate in Prime Minister Junichiro 

Koizumi’s cabinet about conducting official visits to Yasukuni 

Shrine, official resting place of the spirits of Japan’s war dead to 

include several executed war criminals. Attempts to sidestep the 

controversy by wordsmithing and “spinning” the nature of the 

visits only fueled regional anger and domestic cynicism.23

The recurring failure to deal with the recent past has two 

consequences. One is the continuing mistrust by those who 
Japan’s Changing Role 

12

experienced Japanese aggression. Much of this mistrust is 

genuine while some is cynically generated for domestic political 

purpose. Regardless of its foundation, this mistrust greatly 

complicates the likelihood for regional security cooperation. The 

second consequence is domestic. Without a realistic view of their 

own history, the Japanese are hard pressed to build an effective 

domestic consensus on security issues. The quasi-official 

toleration of outspoken nationalists and historical revisionists only 

serves to highlight the problem and delay resolution.24 

A seldom-mentioned issue is the likelihood that a reunified 

Korea could be seen as a threat by other nations, particularly 

Japan. Under any circumstance, the emergence of a new state 

with a strong sense of nationalism and a large, well-armed, welltrained military would serve to threaten its neighbors. This is 

even more significant given the recent tragic relationship between 

Japan and Korea and the failure of Japan to effectively confront its 

colonial and wartime past.25

THREE SCENARIOS FOR SECURITY IN NORTHEAST 

ASIA 

Unilateral Independence 

Given these assumptions, this background, and current 

concerns, there are three options currently under debate for 

structuring security in the region. Each overlap at points, but at 

their core they are distinct choices with different options and 

implications for the United States. These options are (1) 

independent capabilities and non-alignment, (2) multilateral 

alliance with shared defensive responsibilities and (3) continuation 

of the status quo with the United States as a balancer and honest 
Japan’s Changing Role 

13 

broker, providing the security umbrella through a series of 

bilateral relationships. 

The first option—independent capabilities—requires each 

nation to develop its own, independent military capabilities 

without consideration of possible alliances or bilateral 

arrangements. Under this option military forces are structured in 

accordance with assessments of specific threats and the limits of 

national resources. This option can prove deceptive. No nation 

has truly unlimited resources. One key resource is a nation’s 

limited ability to build and sustain a domestic political consensus 

for unlimited military spending short of an all out war for national 

survival. Each of the nations involved in the security of this 

region has specific limitations on its ability to be a truly 

independent, unilateral power. Two of these nations—China and 

the United States—can enjoy relative independence with specific 

but minor limitations. 

However, Japan’s security independence is severely 

constrained. The most obvious constraints are the legal limits 

imposed by the Japanese Constitution and the related limitations 

implied by the collective defense arrangement with the United 

States.26 In the unlikely event that both of these primary 

constraints could be lifted, other serious barriers to security 

independence exist. The first and most formidable is the culture 

of pacifism that has developed since World War II. Domestic 

opposition to Constitutional revision and enhanced military 

capabilities remains high. Even during periods when potential 

threats might have served to motivate a change in attitudes, 

political leaders have been unable to move public opinion in the 
Japan’s Changing Role 

14

direction of military modernization, let alone genuine security 

independence.27

In addition to a lack of popular support for revising the status 

quo, Japan lacks the financial resources to carry out a substantial 

military buildup. In a little over ten years Japan has gone from the 

economic envy of the world to a nation trapped in a major 

recession. Unemployment is on the rise, officials have begun to 

acknowledge a problem with homelessness, growth has averaged 

one percent, and financial institutions are burdened with almost 

unmanageable debts. Despite the initial popularity of Prime 

Minister Koizumi and his promise of economic reforms (as well 

as revisions to the security policy) domestic political institutions 

have proven incapable of responding to this crisis.28 

One could accept the premises that domestic public opinion 

has limited effect on Japanese political leaders, that military parity 

can be achieved with asymmetric high-tech solutions rather than 

expensive industrial-based weapons systems, and that a military 

buildup would cause a short-term economic bounce. Under such a 

scenario Japan could move toward some degree of effective 

rearmament; however, such a movement is not likely to succeed. 

Catching up implies that others wait for you. To do so one must 

presume ignorance and/or paralysis on the part of Japan’s 

neighbors. Inevitably, China would remain one or more steps 

ahead of Japanese capabilities and the legitimacy of hard liners in 

China would be further enhanced. Korea—whether divided or 

reunified—would not sit by idly. South Korean military 

capabilities already far outstrip those of Japan. Rearmament of 

Japan would be easily exploited as a popular rationale for 

sustaining Korean military capabilities even after reunification. 
Japan’s Changing Role 

15 

Even if it takes the almost unthinkable step of secretly developing 

and then announcing nuclear capability, Japan could not 

successfully establish security independence. It is simply not 

possible for Japan to get there from here. 

For China, the most significant limitation is domestic political 

consensus. The current regime—even given some periodic 

conservative retrenchment—is struggling to pursue economic and 

political modernization. This has meant balancing while 

maintaining domestic stability (most significantly, elite 

consensus) with dramatic and often disruptive economic change. 

This ambitious, high-risk undertaking also requires greater 

integration into the international community. With increased 

integration comes increased scrutiny and, inevitably, increased 

international criticism for a state with a strong sense of cultural 

superiority combined with a unique history of isolation and 

regional hegemony. 

Closely related to this challenge is the historic Chinese 

imperative for internal order, stability, and cohesion reflected in 

what most other nations choose to interpret as international rather 

than domestic political conflicts. Until September 11th, foremost 

among these in the minds of most western observers was the 

conflict over the status of Taiwan. Since then, the threat of 

Islamic fundamentalism in western China has received significant 

attention. Regardless of the specific threat, the widely shared 

domestic demand to maintain national territorial cohesion is 

reinforced by the remembered costs of failure to do so under the 

European onslaught in the 19th Century. The legitimacy of the 

nation’s leadership is directly tied to its ability to defend and 

maintain the nation’s geopolitical integrity. While serious 
Japan’s Changing Role 

16

divisions may exist on other domestic political issues, the 

perceived importance of Taiwan, the western autonomous regions, 

and Tibet is a view that crosses other political lines. 

Short of dramatic provocation (foremost of these being a 

formal Taiwanese declaration of independence from the 

mainland), China will not attack. However, China will continue 

to risk an arms race and international disapproval to ensure that it 

has the military capability needed to deter national 

dismemberment. To build and sustain that military capability, 

China must divert resources from pressing domestic economic 

needs while raising the concerns and suspicions of other nations. 

These other nations include those in the region, each of which has 

at least one unresolved territorial dispute with China.29

In a relative sense, China may be the most independent of the 

nations in the region. This independence is not without serious 

constraining pressures. These pressures become even more 

pronounced in a scenario where every other nation in the region 

seeks an independent security course. The result would easily be 

the kind of spiraling security dilemma that destabilizes the 

economy and domestic political order of the entire region. Given 

the significant share of the global economy tied to this region, 

such a disruption would be quickly felt around the world. 

Regional Collective Security 

It has been suggested that the best alternative for East Asian 

security is the building of a regional alliance to provide for 

collective security. Proponents of this concept look to post-World 

War II Europe for examples. Under such a proposal, Northeast 

Asian nations would form a multilateral security arrangement as a 

means of conflict prevention and resolution. 30 
Japan’s Changing Role 

17 

Such a proposal is hampered for a number of reasons. First, it 

is inconsistent with the practices and traditions of the region. As 

noted above, international relations in Northeast Asia have been 

bilateral rather than multilateral. While Europe has multilateral 

diplomatic practices and institutions dating back to the Treaty of 

Westphalia, Northeast Asia has no existing framework. Building 

such an arrangement from scratch—while certainly a worthy 

goal—is not likely to achieve immediate results. 

Such an arrangement also requires a motivation for action, 

normally in the form of a threat. What are the possible threats 

motivating such an alliance in Northeast Asia? Is terrorism by 

non-state actors a threat? Recent events certainly warrant closer 

cooperation. However, despite September 11th, there is little in 

the way of a substantial threat (beyond small, localized groups 

posing domestic dangers best handled by law enforcement) that 

might overrule existing barriers to a formal security alliance. Are 

there major external threats to the region requiring united 

response? No such threats appear immediately on the horizon. Is 

there a requirement for in-theater peacetime missions such as 

peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance beyond the scope of one 

state’s abilities? At present there are no peacekeeping 

requirements in Northeast Asia, and humanitarian assistance 

requirements have not appeared to outstrip the capabilities of the 

states affected. For example, during the Kobe earthquake 

Japanese government officials not only rejected large-scale 

assistance from the American military, but tried to oppose or 

restrict aid from their own Self Defense Force as well.31 

The perceived threats to the region are from nations within the 

region. As alliances evolve they may mitigate the potential of 
Japan’s Changing Role 

18

threats from those states within the alliance. Alliances do not 

form among states that view each other as a danger above all other 

potential threats. Japan, China, and the two Koreas view each 

other as threats. It may be an overt fear, as with Japan’s growing 

fear of China. It may be a covert threat, as with Japan’s fear of a 

reunified Korea. It may be an empty but rhetorically useful threat, 

as with Korea and China’s fear of Japan. It may be the collective 

threat that all states feel from the regions many unresolved 

territorial disputes. The result is the same. The nations of 

Northeast Asia do not have the baseline trust necessary to initiate 

and sustain a multilateral collective security alliance. 

A logical alternative would be the creation of bilateral 

alliances between states. In fact, such alliances already exist 

between the United States and Japan and the United States and 

Korea; however, these arrangements are not regional security 

agreements. They link nations in the region to a nation outside 

Northeast Asia whose security interests intersect but do not 

always wholly coincide with their own. To form such alliances 

within the region would necessitate excluding and, therefore, 

threatening other nations. Any such alliance would be inherently 

destabilizing. A Japan-Korea alliance (whether with the ROK or a 

reunified Korea) would certainly fuel China’s fears of 

encirclement, despite the fact that the two parties to such an 

agreement would not pose a serious, immediate military threat to 

the PRC. A Japan-China alliance excluding Korea serves no 

foreseeable purpose other than to antagonize Korea. An alliance 

between China and Korea (the most conceivable of all such 

arrangements) would be superfluous. Either of these two nations 
Japan’s Changing Role 

19 

alone is capable of dealing with a military threat from Japan and, 

in fact, Japan does not threaten either state. 

Japan brings three significant impediments to any alliance. 

The first is its limited military capabilities and the extraordinary 

domestic political difficulties inherent in attempting to overcome 

that limitation. Next is its current economic weakness. The 

largest impediment to any regional alliance involving Japan is that 

nation’s failure to come to acceptable terms with the region’s 

memories of World War II. This is periodically refueled by 

controversies regarding school textbooks. This dispute is more 

than a debate about history. To the other nations in the region it is 

a fundamental barrier to the kind of trust and transparency 

necessary for any form of alliance. 

Status Quo 

The third option open to the nations of the region is sustaining 

the status quo. The United States continues to serve as the 

security umbrella through bilateral defense agreements with Korea 

and Japan. Each nation operates within the opportunities and 

constraints of these agreements according to the limits of their 

existing capabilities, their financial resources, and their domestic 

political consensus. But while sustaining the status quo may seem 

the most obvious solution, it is far more obvious that the status 

quo cannot stand. 

Domestic political costs of the existing relationships have 

increased. The United States-Japan relationship is under pressure 

despite the initial success of the recent US-Japan Defense 

Guidelines revisions.32 In the years immediately following the 

negotiation of the new guidelines, there was some evidence of an 

attempt by Japan to adhere to the guidelines while increasing 
Japan’s Changing Role 

20

cooperation with and accommodation to China. Some policymakers are urging Japan to develop greater military capabilities 

and flexibility while maintaining close interdependence with the 

United States. However, greater capabilities and flexibility are 

likely to encourage domestic demands for greater independence. 

The economic and social costs of the recent banking crisis and 

the optimism brought by the Sunshine Policy have increased 

domestic political resentment of the American presence in South 

Korea. The American footprint has already been reduced in Seoul 

by relocating a number of military bases out of the city. While 

early hopes for reunification have diminished, the initial public 

discussions of a post-reunification role for US forces continue. 

Despite all this, Korea is clearly the most volatile location in 

the region. The two neighboring states are still technically at war. 

There is still widespread famine in North Korea. Armed troops 

are on hair-trigger alert along the Demilitarized Zone (one of the 

most inappropriately named locations in the world). Belligerent 

rhetoric is still the dominant tone of discussions across the 38th

parallel (and between the United States and North Korea). Earlier 

hopes for rapid progress in North-South diplomacy had already 

been severely challenged when tensions flared again in the wake 

of President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech. The realization that any 

outbreak of violence on the Korean Peninsula directly threatens all 

neighboring states has sustained often frustrated diplomatic efforts 

and involves Japan to a far greater degree than the threat of war 

over Taiwan.33 

An often-overlooked dimension of the conflict in Korea is the 

role of the PRC. While Beijing is routinely assumed to be the 

staunch ally of North Korea, China has built a substantial 
Japan’s Changing Role 

21 

diplomatic and economic relationship with South Korea. Lowlevel “Track Two” diplomacy and sub rosa trade in the early 

1980’s provided the early foundation for this relationship. Now 

trade and diplomatic exchange between the two nations is 

substantial and above board. China clearly has an interest in the 

long-term stability of the two Koreas. At the same time, the tragic 

state of the North Korean economy has created problems for 

China to include a flow of refugees seeking economic and 

political asylum. 34 

The most significant change has been in the relationship 

between China and America. President Bush has reassessed and 

significantly altered the Clinton Administration’s “strategic 

partnership” between the United States and China. Some of this 

reassessment can be attributed to US domestic political pressures 

from those concerned about political and religious rights. The 

confrontation over a US Navy surveillance aircraft and the tragic 

accidental bombing of the Chinese diplomatic building in Kosovo 

demonstrate that the US-China conflict is more than just an 

ideological debate. This change in the relationship may be less 

than it seems, however, as the United States and China continue to 

seek ways to sustain and build on their past diplomacy, 

particularly in the wake of September 11th.

35

Clearly, “status quo” is no longer an adequate term to describe 

the security environment in Northeast Asia. Previous alternatives 

to the status quo are not a realistic foundation for determining the 

future of the United States in the region. What, then, is a viable 

scenario? What role would United States presence in the region 

play in such a scenario? Is there still a window of opportunity for 
Japan’s Changing Role 

22

US policy makers that can promote the long-term common 

interests of a prosperous and stable region? 

A FOURTH OPTION 

Given all of the above, the central focus of any proposal for 

the future security architecture of Northeast Asia must center on 

the reunification of Korea. While this specific goal is clearly in 

the long-term interest of every nation in the region, it also 

provides an exceptional opportunity for building broader, 

multilateral frameworks for future cooperation and stability in the 

region. To succeed in this daunting task, there are important steps 

that each nation must take. 

The first common step is the recognition of shared dangers 

and shared opportunities. Next is the realization that this is an 

economic as well as a military challenge. Finally, there is the 

common obligation of accepting the long-term responsibilities 

inherent in reunification. One of the clearest lessons from the 

reunification of Germany is that the most demanding tasks come 

after actual reunification. By most estimates the actual costs of 

reunifying Korea—economic, political, and social—will far 

exceed the costs of reunifying Germany. 

In order to successfully move toward reunification and 

beyond, each state has specific steps it must take. The primary 

task for the two Koreas is the continuation of dialogue, no matter 

how slow or inconclusive the pace might appear to be. In recent 

years, South Korea has taken primary responsibility for initiating 

and sustaining this dialogue. Meanwhile, North Korean leaders 

are torn in conflicting directions. Survival of the nation requires 

opening one of the world’s most isolated societies, reforming and 

modernizing the economy, and integrating it into the global 
Japan’s Changing Role 

23 

economy. Survival of the particular regime in power requires 

avoiding all these steps. Mindful of the fate of the rulers of East 

Germany and Communist Romania, North Korean leaders are 

directly threatened by the very policies they must endorse. Other 

nations in the region can contribute to bridging this divide through 

diplomatic intervention and economic development assistance. In 

the end, resolution of the first steps in true reunification is a 

Korean responsibility. While awaiting this resolution, there are 

things other states should and, in some cases, should not do. 

One task that each nation should not undertake is the rapid 

alteration of the current strengths of the region’s military. In the 

near term this includes sustaining the level of American troops. 

Changes in troop posture can and should be considered as 

appropriate to reinforce and reward positive steps in the direction 

of peace and reunification. These changes in posture can include 

rebasing within the region, but not redeploying troops away from 

the region. American forces still play a vital role as both a 

deterrent and as a symbol of commitment. Removing them from 

the region could trigger a response from other nations that would 

easily escalate, even if the intent were to replace one-for-one the 

military capabilities withdrawn by the United States. One US 

Army division sustained in Korea is far less threatening than 

comparable military capabilities developed by the Japanese to 

replace the Americans. 

This in turn highlights the important task for Japan. Before it 

can contribute a viable force to the region’s security it must have 

the region’s confidence. Much of that confidence is tied to how 

Japan deals with its World War II history in the region. It cannot 

meet the goal of cooperation when neighbors still fear militarism. 
Japan’s Changing Role 

24

Those fears are also rooted in Japan’s domestic politics. Strong 

Japanese political leadership—one that has gained the trust and 

confidence of the people by restructuring of the economy and 

reforming the political process—will then have the credibility to 

build a consensus of support for a less constrained military policy. 

Until then, military modernization and Constitutional revision are 

far too much to expect. 

Furthermore, the rebuilding and strengthening of the Japanese 

economy before reunification is absolutely essential to both Korea 

and Japan. The immediate costs of reunification will be borne by 

Korea’s neighbors. In the long run, successful reunification will 

be to strengthen the region’s domestic economy and further secure 

its important global role. In the short run, reunification will mean 

refugees, massive humanitarian aid, a complete reordering of the 

political and economic infrastructure, some form of domestic 

peacekeeping, and major economic development investments that 

will not provide any significant fiscal return for years, perhaps 

decades. A Japan that is not economically strong enough to 

substantially contribute to that process will have two options. The 

first option is to endure the high costs and further weaken its 

domestic economy and political legitimacy. The second option is 

to attempt to isolate itself from the process, further weaken its 

regional legitimacy, and perhaps ultimately find itself excluded 

from the long-term economic benefits of successful reunification. 

For China, meeting this challenge can be almost as complex a 

task as it will be for Japan. China’s advantage is its existing ties 

with the two Koreas. This uniquely valuable position makes 

China crucial to this initial reunification process, reinforcing to 

other nations the importance of carefully sustaining a productive 
Japan’s Changing Role 

25 

diplomatic relationship with China. Carrying out this role also has 

domestic risks for China. The initial turmoil of reunification 

would be immediately felt in China. Economic refugees from 

North Korea’s current economic crisis are already making their 

way to China in growing numbers. The increasing number of 

North Koreans requesting political asylum from foreign embassies 

in Beijing has created a serious political and diplomatic crisis. 

China walks a delicate tightrope with its own domestic hardliners. Clearly it must do all that it can to prevent political and 

economic chaos in the two states on its borders. Of those two 

states, the regime most in need of change is its ideological ally 

while the other is one of its most important trading partners. 

Already struggling to maintain its own economic growth and 

internal political order, the rush of demands that will follow 

reunification will be difficult to absorb even for a nation as large 

as China. 

But if China has much to lose it also has much to gain. The 

economic and political benefits of ensuring successful 

reunification would be both international and domestic. Through 

full participation and leadership—where and when it can best do 

so—in this process, China can provide for broader regional 

stability. This process will develop confidence-building measures 

and networks for future cooperation and conflict resolution. To be 

fully successful, however, China must join other nations in the 

region in resisting the temptation to dramatically alter the current 

military balance. For example, a unilateral buildup of troops to 

contend with economic refugees from North Korea would, at best, 

send mixed signal to other nations. Hard liners in the United 

States would be likely to rhetorically exploit such a move no 
Japan’s Changing Role 

26

matter how logical it might be for the purposes of internal 

domestic order. Any change in the military balance as 

reunification draws near must be multilateral, transparent, and 

focused on humanitarian relief and peacekeeping. 

For the United States, the keys to this process are continued 

dialogue and cooperation with China, continued incremental 

rather than dramatic revisions to Japan’s security structure 

matched with dramatic rather than incremental revisions to 

Japan’s economic structure, continued involvement in the 

dialogue between the two Koreas, and continued regional 

presence. This delicate balancing act is clearly made more 

difficult by China’s tensions with Taiwan and the debate over 

missile defense, recurring battles with Japan over trade, and the 

notoriously mercurial leadership in North Korea. Other issues 

may cloud the regional picture at the margins. However, the 

peaceful reunification of Korea is the linchpin for long-term 

security and stability in the region. Those nations that fail to 

recognize this and fail to take part in the delicate, long-term 

process undermine the success of this important effort while 

dramatically diminishing any prospect for securing their own 

long-term interests in the region. 

NOTES 

 

1

 Interviews in support of this research were conducted in Japan and 

Hong Kong during the summer of 2001. Earlier versions of this 

paper were presented at the International Studies Association 

Conference in Hong Kong in July 2001 and at the Osaka University 

of Foreign Studies in August 2001. Thanks to Greg Beals, Peter 

Berton, Michael Bosak, Corinne Bridges, Susan Bryant, Victor Cha, 

Thomas Christensen, Robert Eldridge, Peter Fromm, Russell Howard, 

Seung-Ho Joo, C.S. Eliot Kang, Martin McGuire, Nozomu Nakaoka, 

Masashi Nishihara, Shinichi Ogawa, Pat Oyabe, Heigo Sato, 

Yoneyuki Sugita, Akio Watanabe, Al Wilner, and numerous 
Japan’s Changing Role 

27 

 

anonymous interview subjects as well as my students for their 

comments, questions, insights and sharp and valuable criticisms. The 

author also gratefully acknowledges the continuing research support 

provided by the Institute for National Security Studies of the United 

States Air Force Academy, the Dean’s Faculty Development Fund of 

the United States Military Academy, and the Strategic Studies 

Institute of the United States Army War College. 

2

 William Breer, “Japan’s Contribution To The Campaign Against 

Terrorism,” CSIS Japan Watch, October 18, 2001, 

http://www.csis.org/japan/japanwatch/jw0110.htm; “Japan anti-terror 

bill set for approval,” CNN.com World, October 18, 2001, 

http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORL...pcf/east/10/18/ret.japan.bill/inde

x.html; “Japan considers sending warships,” CNN.com World, 

(November 1, 2001); “LDP: More freedom on use of weapons,” The 

Ashahi Shimbun, November 10, 2001, http://www.asahi.com/english/ 

international/K2001111000242.html; “MSDF ships head for antiterror campaign,” The Asahi Shimbun, November 26, 2001, 

http://www.asahi.com/english/international/K2001112600219.html.

3

 “Military action against suspicious ships leaves Japan shaken,” 

CNN.com World, (March 24, 1999), http://www.cnn.com/ 

WORLD/asiapcf/9...M-Japan-Mystery Ships.ap/index.html; 

Masayuki Kitano, “Japan Coast Guard Chase, Sink Intruding Boat,” 

Reuters, December 22, 2001, http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/ 

20011222/wl/japan_boat_dc_5.html; “Spy Ship Sinking Draws 

Muted Response,” STRATFOR Strategic Forecasting Free 

Intelligence Briefing, January 3, 2002, http://www.stratfor.com/ 

home/giu/archive/010302.htm; “Aegis warship to stay behind,” The 

Ashahi Shimbun, November 1, 2001, http://www.asahi.com/ 

english/international/K2001110100441.html. 

4

 Masaru Tamamoto, “Tokyo’s Peace and the American Agenda,” 

The New York Times, July 1, 2001, A13; Jane Perlez, “Playing the 

Japan Card? Facing Down China Without Riling It Up,” The New 

York Times, Week in Review, August 5, 2001, 5; Editorial, 

“Legacies of the Gulf War,” The Japan Times, August 7, 2001, 18; 

Ilene R. Prusher, “War on terrorism challenges Japan’s pacifism,” 

The Christian Science Monitor, September 24, 2001, 7; Noriyuki 

Katagiri, “Japan’s case for missile defense,” Japan Today, February 

26, 2002, http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=commentary&id= 

154; Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions 

About Revitalization Of The US-Japan Alliance,” Asian Survey

XXXVII, no. 4 (April 1997): 383-402; Tsuneo Akaha, “Beyond selfdefense: Japan’s elusive security role under the new Guidelines for 
Japan’s Changing Role 

28

 

US-Japan Defense Cooperation,” The Pacific Review 11, no. 4 

(1998): 461-483. 

5

 By “near term” I mean three to five years. 

6

 The debate on the distinct qualities and advantages of conventional 

weapons over nuclear forces—both as deterrent and an offensive 

system—was a significant issue in American Cold War planning. For 

a discussion of this important aspect of the so-called “New Look,” 

see Michael J. Meese, Defense Decision Making Under Budget 

Stringency: Examining Downsizing in the United States Army, 

Chapter III-“The Post Korean War Years,” unpublished doctoral 

dissertation, (Princeton University, 2000); For a discussion of the 

value of conventional deterrence see John J. Mearsheimer, 

Conventional Deterrence, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); 

For study highlighting the specific issues of Theater Missile Defense 

(TMD) in the region, see Patrick M. O’Donogue, Theater Missile 

Defense in Japan: Implications for the US—China—Japan Strategic 

Relationship, Letort Paper Series Monographs (Carlisle: Strategic 

Studies Institute, Army War College, 2000). 

7

 This is hardly an original thought. See Carl Von Clausewitz, On 

War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1976). 

8

 Jay M. Parker “Japan at Century’s End: Climbing on China’s 

Bandwagon?” Pacific Focus XV, No. 1 (Spring 2000): 14-15; Ann 

Scott Tyson, “A Culture of Cheap Industrial Junk,” The Christian 

Science Monitor, May 3, 2001, 20; Ilene Prusher, “Well-ordered 

homelessness: life on Japan’s Fringe,” The Christian Science 

Monitor, May 14, 2001, 1, 8; David E. Sanger, “Bush Backs Japan’s 

Economic Plans, Sidestepping 2 Disputes,” The New York Times, July 

1, 2001, A12; Paul Krugman, “A Leap In the Dark,” The New York 

Times, July 8, 2001, Week in Review, 11. 

9

 Parker, “Japan at Century’s End,” 8-14. 

10 Tae-Hwan Kwak, “The Korean Peace Process: Prospects for Peace 

Regime Building After the Summit,” International Journal of Korean 

Reunification Studies 9, no.1 (2000); David Cohen, “Academics in 

South Korea Ponder a Future Tied Closely to the North,” The

Chronicle of Higher Education, April 20, 2001, A60-61; Ilene R. 

Prusher, “South Koreans Wait for North to return the favor,” The 

Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 2001, 7; Balbina Hwang, “The 

Bush Administration’s Cautious Approach to North Korea,” The 

Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1455, July 6, 2001. 
Japan’s Changing Role 

29 

 

11 Soeya Yoshihide, “Taiwan in Japan’s Security Considerations,” 

The China Quarterly, no. 165 (March 2001): 130-146. 

12 Russell D. Howard, “Discussion of ‘The Chinese Security Concept 

and its Historical Evolution,’” Journal of Contemporary China 10, 

no. 27 (2001): 285-292; Parker, “Japan at Century’s End,” 25-28. 

13 For an excellent discussion of the philosophical and political 

dimensions of American civilian political control over military force, 

see Suzanne C. Nielsen, Political Control Over The Use Of Force: A 

Clausewitzian Perspective, Letort Paper Series Monographs (Carlisle: 

Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2000). 

14 Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The US Army and the 

Pacific, 1902-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 

1997). 

15 Stephen Peter Rosen, “Strategic Traditions For The Asia-Pacific 

Region,” Naval War College Review LIV, no. 1 (2001): 15-21. 

16 Examples of the classic realist literature in international relations 

theory include Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The 

Struggle for Power and Peace, sixth edition, revised by Kenneth W. 

Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985). The most notable work 

on the subject in the Cold War literature is Kenneth Waltz’s study of 

structural realism, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: 

Addison-Wesley, 1979). For an overview of the current trends and 

developments in international relations theory, see Stephen M. Walt, 

“International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign 

Policy (Spring 1998): 29-44. 

17 Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University 

Press, 1987). 

18 There are countless scholarly accounts of the origins of balance of 

power theory and the history of the classic European era from the 

Congress of Vienna through the outbreak of World War I. For an 

interesting account of the human as well as the strategic elements 

involved, see Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: 

Macmillan, 1962). 

19 All this is not to say that the nations of East Asia—particularly 

China—have not skillfully practiced balance of power politics. Japan 

quickly adapted to the system after the Meiji Restoration, and by the 

turn of the century the Japanese were among the most skilled 

practitioners of systemic level balance of power. The Chinese 

showed particular skill after the end of the Cultural Revolution and 

the US and China began to reengage. Some of the most outstanding 

examples of balance of power can be seen in China during the Three 
Japan’s Changing Role 

30

 

Kingdoms era, while both Korean and Japan also have clear examples 

of internal balancing. These domestic political examples, however, 

are not the same as systemic level balance of power politics exercised 

by unitary actor states on a global or regional level. The historic 

pattern of state-to-state behavior in Asia has not followed the same 

dynamic as the patterns seen in Europe. My thanks to Russ Howard 

for helping me to clarify this key point. 

20 Kimie Hara, “Rethinking the ‘Cold War’ in the Asia-Pacific,” The 

Pacific Review 12, no. 4 (1999): 515-536; Seiichiro Takagi, “In 

Search of a Sustainable Equal Partnership: Japan-China Relations in 

the Post-Cold-War Era,” Japan Review of International Affairs 13, 

no. 1 (Spring 1999): 17-38. 

21 Parker, “Korean Stability and the US-Japan-China Relationship,” 

International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 9, no.1, (2000): 

35-37. See also Gerald Segal, “Does China Matter?” Foreign Affairs

78, no. 5 (September/October 1999): 24-36; Russell D. Howard, The 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army: “Short Arms and Slow Legs”, 

(Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, US Air 

Force Academy, Colorado, September 1999); Robert S. Ross, “The 

Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century,” 

International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 81-118; Howard, 

“Discussion of ‘Chinese Security,’” Bates Gill and Evan S. Medeiros, 

“Foreign and Domestic Influences on China’s Arms Control and 

Nonproliferation Policies,” The China Quarterly (reprint, 2000). 

22 Parker, “Japan at Century’s End,” 5-33; _____, “Korean Stability 

and the US-Japan-China Relationship,” International Journal of 

Korean Unification Studies 9, no. 1 (2000): 45-62. 

23 Ilene R. Prusher, “A history that Japan can’t forget,” The Christian 

Science Monitor, April 11, 2001, 1; Michael R. Baker, “Lingering 

distrust of Japan extends textbook row,” The Christian Science 

Monitor, 20 July, 2001, 7; Michael Green, “The Forgotten Player,” 

The National Interest, no. 60, summer 2000, 49; Reuters “Ghosts of 

war haunt Tokyo ties,” South China Morning Post, July 25, 2001, 8; 

Li Baodong, “South Korea Tougher on Japanese Textbook Issue,” 

Beijing Review 44, no. 30 (July 26, 2001), 9-10; “ Editorial: 

‘Feelings’ on Yasukuni issue threaten to jeopardize nation,” The 

Asahi Shimbun, August 6, 2001, 26; Susumu Takahashi, “Interview: 

Dialogue needed to escape textbook morass,” The Asahi Shimbun, 

August 6, 2001, 26; Nobuo Matsunaga, “Interview: Japan must 

understand suffering of S. Korea,” The Asahi Shimbun, August 6, 

2001, 26; “China cautions over history, stresses keeping peaceful 

ties,” The Japan Times, August 6, 2001, 1; “Cover Story: 2001 

Yasukuni,” The Asahi Shimbun, August 7, 2001, 1; Taro Karasaki, 
Japan’s Changing Role 

31 

 

“Tokyo board defends text selection; activists furious,” The Asahi 

Shimbun, August 8, 2001, 1; “China presses Yasukuni issue 

unofficially,” The Asahi Shimbun, August 8, 2001, 1; “Ministers 

avoid Yasukuni controversy,” The Asahi Shimbun, August 8, 2001, 1; 

Kanako Takahara and Toshi Maeda, “Yasukuni awaits as minefield 

for Koizumi,” The Japan Times, August 10, 2001, 3; Robert 

Marquand, “Why the past still separates China and Japan,” The 

Christian Science Monitor, August 20, 2001; “Editorial: Japan’s two 

wars, two faces,” The Korea Herald, December 22, 2001, 

http://www.koreaherald.co.kr...ata/html_dir/2001/12/12/2001121200

41.asp. See also Harold W. French, “An Outsider Teaches Japan 

About Itself,” The New York Times, February 2, 2002, B7; Thomas U. 

Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Antimilitarism,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven 

E. Miller, ed. East Asian Security: An International Security Reader

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996); and Peter 

Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: 

Structures, Norms, and Policies,” in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, 

ed. East Asian Security. 

24 John Nathan, “Profiles: Tokyo Story--Shintaro Ishihara’s 

flamboyant nationalism appeals to many Japanese voters who are 

looking for a change in government” The New Yorker, April 9, 2001, 

108-115; Herbert P. Bix, “Japan’s New Nationalism,” The New York 

Times, May 29, 2001, A15. 

25 Susan F. Bryant and Russell D. Howard, “Shrimp or Barracuda? 

Contemplating a Unified and Nuclear Capable Korea,” Nuclear 

Deterrence and Defense: Strategic Consideration, James M. Smith, 

ed. (Colorado Springs: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 

2001). 

26 My thanks to Shinichi Ogawa for helping to clarify the Japanese 

view of “collective defense” as opposed to “collective security.” 

27 Green notes a number of dramatic events in the mid 1990’s that 

seemed to stir some Japanese action on security, most notable among 

these the North Korean launch of the Taepodong Missile. Even with 

these events, Japanese public opinion still does not endorse 

Constitutional revision or substantial modernization of the military. 

Furthermore, even this increased attention from political leaders in 

the absence of public support has done little to stir concrete policy 

action beyond a combination of cautious moves toward closer ties to 

the US security umbrella and a tentative but clear attempt to 

accommodate China. Green, “Forgotten Player,” ibid; In Green’s 

latest book, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in 

an Era of Uncertain Power, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), he notes 
Japan’s Changing Role 

32

 

that while no alternative strategic visions to existing US dependent 

foreign policies have emerged, Japan is moving in a more 

independent, Japan focused direction than has previously been 

evident. See also Parker, “Japan at Century’s End.” 

28 Ilene R. Prusher, “Well-ordered homelessness: life on Japan’s 

fringe,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 14, 2001, 1; Marie 

Anchordoguy, “Will Japan’s sun rise with Koizumi,” The Christian 

Science Monitor, June 21, 2001, 9; Ilene R. Prusher, “Koizumi’s 

popularity rubs off,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 26, 2001, 

6; Hana Kusumoto, “In Japan, a leader whose words work 

wonders...”, The Christian Science Monitor, July 27, 2001, 7; David 

R. Francis, “Japan tries to fan growth, and avert global recession,” 

The Christian Science Monitor, August 20, 2001, 17; “Japan Sinks; 

Koizumi Soars,” STRATFOR Strategic Forecasting Free Intelligence 

Bulletin, October 31, 2001, http://www.stratfor.com/home/giu/ 

archive/102101.htm; Ken Belson, “Themes of Gloom and Doom Fill 

Japanese Bookstores,” The New York Times, November 19, 2001, 

C10; James Brooke, “Recession Saps Consumer Confidence in 

Japan,” The New York Times, December 6, 2001, A3; Yumiko Ono, 

“As Slide Drags On, Japan Inc. Sacrifices Its Youngest Workers,” 

The Wall Street Journal, December 19, 2001, 1; Takashi Oka, 

“Japan’s Economic ‘High Noon,’” The Christian Science Monitor, 

January 7, 2001, 9; Howard W. French, “After Firing, The Fallout: 

Japan’s Chief Stumbles,” The New York Times, February 2, 2002; 

Ilene R. Prusher, “Will PM’s reforms save Japan?” The Christian 

Science Monitor, February 28, 2002, 6. 

29 Howard, “Discussion of ‘Chinese Security;’” Gill and Medeiros, 

“Foreign and Domestic Influences on China’s Arms Control;” Parker, 

“Korean Stability,” 35-37; Sheldon Simon, “Alternative Visions of 

Security in the Asia Pacific,” Pacific Affairs 69, no.3 (Fall 1996): 

386-388; Fei-Ling Wang, “To Incorporate China,” The Washington 

Quarterly 21, no. 1, (1997); David Shambaugh, “China’s Military 

Views the World: Ambivalent Security,” International Security 24, 

no. 3 (1999/2000); Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the US-Japan 

Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International 

Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999); Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” 

Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996); Alastair Ian 

Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in 

Chinese History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); 

Ross, “Geography of Peace.” 

30 Masaru Tamamoto, “Tokyo’s Peace and the American Agenda,” 

The New York Times, Week in Review July 1, 2001, 13. For a 

proposal for great multilateral action more closely aligned with my 
Japan’s Changing Role 

33 

 

views than Tamamoto’s see Paul Dibb, “Strategic Trends: Asia at the 

Crossroads,” Naval War College Review LIV, no. 1 (2001): 22-38. 

31 Parker, “Japan at Century’s End.” 

32 Green, “Forgotten Player.” 

33 Ilene R. Prusher, “South Koreans wait for North to return the 

favor,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 2001, 7; “S. Korea 

favors renewed ties between Russia, North Korea,” The Japan Times, 

August 6, 2001, 3; Don Kirk, “North’s Reversal on GIs Jolts Seoul: 

Pullout Urged at Moscow Summit,” International Herald Tribune/ 

The Asahi Shimbun, August 7, 2001, 1; James Brooke, “South Korea 

and Japan Begin to Sweat After Bush Turns Up the Heat on North 

Korea,” The New York Times, January 31, 2002, A12. 

34 Robert Marquand, “China nudges North Korea toward the outside 

world,” The Christian Science Monitor, September 6, 2001, 7; Parker, 

“Korean Stability.” 

35 Neil King, Jr., “U.S., China Resume Business as Usual,” The Asian 

Wall Street Journal, July 27-29, 2001, 12; Ann Scott Tyson, “US, 

China cautiously rekindle military ties,” The Christian Science 

Monitor, February 20, 2002, 2. 
Japan’s Changing Role 

34

 
35 

BEYOND THE SUNSHINE POLICY: AN 

ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF CONTINUED US 

MILITARY PRESENCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA 

Susan F. Bryant 

INTRODUCTION 

It has become commonly accepted wisdom to call the Korean 

Peninsula “The last vestige of the Cold War.” The forces of 

democracy and capitalism remain arrayed against those of a 

Stalinist, totalitarian regime bent on uniting the peninsula under a 

communist system. Soldiers from both sides literally face off on 

the world’s most heavily fortified border. The fact the United 

States military remains deployed in South Korea to protect it from 

once again being overrun from the North is equally accepted 

wisdom. Although a true statement, it is hardly complete. The 

reality is far more complex. 

Clearly the United States’ military presence in Korea serves to 

guarantee peace on the Korean peninsula, but that is only one 

facet of America’s military role in Northeast Asia. The region is a 

potential flashpoint among four of the world’s great powers; The 

United States, China, Russia and Japan. Possible rapprochement 

on the Korean peninsula could rekindle old animosities. In the 

words of Dr. Henry Kissenger,

if American troops were to leave the rim of Asia, an 

entirely new and, above all, political situation would arise 

all over the continent. Were this to happen, even a 

positive evolution on the Korean peninsula could lead to a 

quest for autonomous defense policies in Seoul and 

Tokyo and to a growth of nationalism in Japan, China and 

Korea.1

 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

36 

Therefore, the question of the future of American military 

presence in Northeast Asia is one of the most critical questions 

facing American foreign policy makers today. 

At the time, the Inter-Korean summit in June 2000 was hailed 

as a major breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, although its 

significance seems less clear as time passes. Nonetheless, the 

status quo is not stable, and planning for change should continue. 

The purpose of this paper is to draw a strategic picture of the 

political situation in Northeast Asia in light of the reconciliation 

efforts made between the two Koreas and to examine the rationale 

for the continued presence of US forces in the region. This paper 

will argue that, in a future environment of reconciliation or even 

reunification of the two Koreas, the nations in the region will have 

security concerns and interests that can only be met in a stable 

environment predicated on a sizable United States military 

presence in the region. 

SOUTH KOREA: AN OVERVIEW 

During the past fifty years, South Korea has matured as a 

democracy. Its current president Kim Dae Jung, elected in 1998, 

is a former political dissident, who was imprisoned by the South 

Korean government for protesting for democratic reform in the 

ROK. Today, there is no doubt that South Korea is a full-fledged 

democratic state. 

From an economic standpoint, South Korea has also been a 

remarkable success. Touted as one of the “Asian Tigers,” the 

South Korean economy enjoyed tremendous growth in the 1970’s 

and 80’s. Currently, South Korea enjoys a GDP growth rate of ten 

percent and a per capita GDP of over $13,000. 2

 South Korea’s 

per capita GDP is thirteen times the size of the GDP of North 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

37

Korea and seven times that of India.3 For a country only slightly 

larger than the state of Indiana, South Korea has the 13th largest 

GDP in the world.4

Despite this tremendous economic record, South Korea, like 

most of Asia was severely affected by the financial crisis of the 

mid 1990s. The “Asian Contagion” exposed significant 

weaknesses in the South Korean economic growth model. These 

limitations included extremely high debt to equity ratios and 

massive foreign borrowing.5

 Because of the IMF bailout, the 

ROK is in no danger of economic collapse, however, the ROK has 

not yet fully dealt with the structural problems that caused the 

economic crisis. Signs of economic weakness remain.6

 The recent 

downturn in US spending on information technology has led to the 

sharpest decline in Asian exports in twenty years.7

 The 

government’s failure to deal with economic reform will continue 

to retard Korean economic growth. The major Korean 

conglomerates (chaebol) still carry excessive debt, which could 

precipitate further economic problems in the near future.8

 

Nonetheless, the ROK’s economic growth over the past fifty 

years has been remarkable. South Korea has achieved this 

tremendous economic and political progress while maintaining its 

side of one of the world’s most heavily armed borders, the DMZ. 

Residents of Seoul have never been allowed to forget they live 

within range of North Korean artillery. The North Korean 

government has never foresworn reunification of the peninsula 

through violence. As a result, the ROK army remains ever 

vigilant in deterring potential North Korean aggression. Because 

of this clearly defined enemy, the South Korean military has never 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

38 

been viewed as a regional force. It is postured specifically to 

combat the North Korean military. 

NORTH KOREA: AN OVERVIEW 

North Korea, a notorious member of the “Axis of Evil,” is 

arguably the most closed and isolated state on the planet today. 

Its official ideology, “Juche,” means “self-reliance.” In the 

decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea has 

proven that it is anything but self-reliant. North Korea’s economy 

has worsened considerably since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

Except for 1999, the country has experienced negative economic 

growth every year since the fall of the USSR.9

 It has also 

experienced recurring famine. It is estimated that anywhere 

between one and three million North Koreans have starved to 

death in the last five years.10 The DPRK runs an annual food 

deficit of two million tons.11 At the end of the Cold War, North 

Korea lost its primary ally, and source of support, the Soviet 

Union. It has also lost the unconditional support of its other longterm ally, China. As a result, the DPRK is isolated in the 

international community. 

Another serious crisis for North Korea after the Cold War was 

the death of its “Great Leader,” Kim Il Sung, in July 1994. 

Supreme power has transitioned from Kim Il Sung to his son, Kim 

Jong Il who is commonly referred to as “Dear Leader.” This 

transition has given North Korea the dubious honor of being the 

world’s only dynastic communist state. Although there were 

significant questions concerning Kim Jong Il’s ability to 

consolidate power in the wake of his father’s death, he seems to 

have done so. “Kim Jong Il appears to be well protected against a 

major coup. He has installed the brothers of his sister’s husband, 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

39

Chang Song Taek, in three of the most sensitive positions in the 

power structure.”12 However, there are those who still question 

his true level of authority, believing he has not yet risen to his 

father’s god-like status. 13

North Korea is an economic basket case. It cannot feed its 

own people even at the bare subsistence level. It needs 

international aid to prevent widespread famine.14 Despite these 

horrifying economic conditions, the North Korean government has 

shown that it is willing to allow its population to starve in order to 

ensure regime survival. Despite continued widespread famine, 

North Korea recently purchased $425 million worth of weapons 

from Russia.15 In spite of famine and economic strangulation, the 

North Korean regime does not appear to be on the brink of 

collapse. At any rate, it has shown that it can teeter on the brink 

indefinitely. 

Although not technologically sophisticated, the North Korean 

military is one of the largest in the world. North Korean rhetoric 

has softened over the years; however, Pyongyang has never 

formally renounced its intention to reunify the peninsula under 

communism. According to a South Korean Defense Department 

White Paper, 

Despite the ROK government’s consistent engagement 

policy toward the North, North Korea, based on its “One 

Chosun” logic, continues to refuse inter-Korean peaceful, 

coexistence and pursues the strategy of communizing the 

South. After forming a united front against the South and 

stepping up war preparations at home, the North seeks to 

communize the peninsula by means of a “violent 

revolution,” or “war by using force” when the crucial 

moment comes. A crucial moment is when a politically 

and militarily favorable atmosphere is created by social 

disorder in South Korea, the withdrawal of USFK, etc.16
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

40 

Although such threats may seem like nothing more than 

empty posturing, when coupled with the military capabilities of 

the DPRK they do give prudent observers pause. North Korea 

boasts the world’s fifth-largest army, maintains a constant war 

footing along the demilitarized zone, and has been responsible for 

numerous attempts at aggression and infiltration since the 

armistice was signed. 

In addition to its conventional capabilities, North Korea also 

has an arsenal of both biological and chemical weapons. There is 

also the strong possibility North Korea is a nuclear capable state. 

These capabilities have altered the North Korean threat. It is no 

longer possible for North Korea to successfully invade the South, 

but their missile technology and nuclear capabilities give them 

leverage nonetheless. 

Over the past decade North Korea has become adept at 

exploiting this leverage in the international community. In 

exchange for “good” behavior after some calculatedly moderate 

“bad” act, North Korea has been repeatedly successful at 

extracting concessions such as food aid and removal of sanctions 

from the west. An example of this behavior is the 1998 

Taepodong missile launch across the Sea of Japan. Professor 

Victor Cha, a noted Korean scholar, has explained the dangers of 

such a cycle. 

From Pyongyang’s perspective, the objective of such 

misbehavior is not to win some military advantage, but 

precisely to initiate a coercive bargaining process that 

eventuates in an outcome more favorable to the North. 

This is a dangerous and destabilizing strategy, but it is the 

sort of high stakes game that Pyongyang plays adeptly. 

What is more, it is rational, since the anticipated benefits 

of changing the status quo outweigh the risks and costs.17
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

41

The threat of North Korean aggression cannot be taken 

lightly. While the DPRK could not unify the peninsula by force, it 

certainly could set Northeast Asia’s market economies back 

decades, whether as a result of a miscalculation that leads to a 

conventional conflict or through the use of WMD. In either case, 

the result would be the destruction of a large part of the economic 

capability of the region’s economic infrastructure and the 

diversion of resources to prosecute the conflict and the following 

reconstruction. 

THE BACKGROUND OF RECONCILIATION 

The June 2000 Summit is now the touchstone for discussion 

about the future of the peninsula. Indeed, the summit may have 

represented a true breakthrough in inter-Korean relations. What is 

less familiar to most is the long history of international 

negotiations culminating in the June 2000 summit in Pyongyang. 

President Kim Dae Jung’s now familiar “Sunshine Policy” is 

by no means the first overture made by the South to North Korea. 

In fact, there is a long history of inter- Korean dialogue. Since the 

1970’s the two Koreas have held secret meetings that have led to 

public breakthroughs.18 The first of these secret meetings 

occurred when the United States and China began discussions to 

normalize their relations. Both Koreas worried about the 

implications for their security and began meeting in secret. This 

led to a joint statement agreeing to peaceful reunification in 

principle and public inter-Korean talks utilizing Red Cross 

representatives in 1972.19 Since the early 1970s the two Koreas 

have used the Red Cross as an unofficial means of inter-Korean 

communication. 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

42 

In the past, many of these meetings have been frustrating 

endeavors for the South Korean government. Some have 

described the process of inter-Korean negotiations as nothing 

more than another form of competition between the two 

governments that can be best understood as a zero sum game.20 

Nonetheless, several additional agreements have been made 

between the two Koreas. The most notable of these is the 1992 

“Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges, and 

Cooperation,” more commonly known as “The Basic Agreement.” 

This agreement affirmed the desire for peaceful reconciliation and 

unification of the peninsula. It also determined to “avoid armed 

aggression and hostilities, reduce tension, and ensure peace.”21 It 

was hoped that the implementation of the Basic Agreement would 

lead to measurable progress in inter-Korean relations, including 

visitation for separated families. However, the euphoria was short 

lived. By 1994 relations between the two Koreas were as strained 

as they had been since the signing of the armistice. 

In 1994 the United States and South Korea became aware that 

the North Korean government was removing spent fuel rods from 

its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. This caused significantly 

heightened tension, which some have said brought the peninsula 

to the brink of war. The standoff ended in October 1994, when 

North Korea signed the “Agreed Framework” and pledged to give 

up its quest for nuclear weaponry in exchange for fuel oil, the 

replacement of its nuclear reactors, and the gradual normalization 

of diplomatic relations with the United States.22 

In addition to allowing North Korea to reaffirm its 

commitment to the NPT, the Agreed Framework created the 

organization known as KEDO (The Korean Peninsula Energy 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

43

Development Organization). KEDO’s mission was to negotiate 

the construction of the light water reactors and fuel oil that had 

been decided upon in the Agreed Framework. Groundbreaking 

for the reactors occurred in 1997, and despite some hostile 

posturing on the part of the DPRK, KEDO provided a solid 

vehicle for inter-Korean dialogue.23 Despite a frustrating record 

of reversals in inter-Korean negotiation, some tentative signs of 

willingness to negotiate on the part of the North Koreans were 

becoming visible by 1997, when the North Koreans agreed to 

participate in “Four Power Talks.” The goal was to replace the 

currently existing state of war on the peninsula with a formal 

peace treaty. The participants in these talks included the United 

States, the two Koreas, and China. Despite some forward 

progress, there is no formal peace treaty.24

The June 2000 Summit was credited largely to the success of 

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy.” This 

policy, articulated at President Kim’s inauguration in 1998, 

represented a significant departure from previous administrations. 

It consists of three core principles. First, the ROK will not seek 

reunification through absorption of the North. Second, South 

Korea will not tolerate any provocation from the North, and 

finally, reconciliation will be pursued through expanded interKorean contacts and dialogue.25 

The culmination of this policy was the June 2000 meeting in 

Pyongyang. Although some dismiss it as largely a ploy by both 

leaders to bolster their political power, many argue that it was a 

tremendous first step towards normalization of relations on the 

peninsula. Key among the points agreed upon at the summit was 

the promise by both sides to maintain dialogue. Kim Jong Il 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

44 

promised to meet in Seoul for a second summit by the end of this 

year. Other evidence indicating a real thaw in relations include 

the three sets of family reunions that have already occurred, plans 

to connect a rail line across the DMZ, and the acceleration in the 

pace of North-South Cultural exchanges.26

There is also a history of economic cooperation between the 

two Koreas that predates the June summit. In several instances 

the South has already succeeded in helping the North expand its 

economy. During the 1990s South Korea’s trade with the North 

doubled to more than $330 million, which has already had a 

positive impact on the North Korean economy. The South Korean 

government has also pledged to help the DPRK rebuild its nowdefunct infrastructure.27 

A project that must be mentioned in the context of interKorean economic cooperation is the Mount Kumgang tourism 

project. Undertaken by the Hyundai Corporation, it guaranteed 

North Korea $942 million dollars in revenue through March 2005 

in exchange for tourist cruises from South Korea to Mt. Kumgang 

in the North.28 Although this was initially received with great 

optimism as a model for inter-Korean economic cooperation, the 

project has fallen on hard times. Currently Hyundai is in default 

to North Korea for over $10 million in fees. Given that the South 

Korean government has refused to bail Hyundai out, it is likely the 

tours will be suspended.29 “The ministry of unification, while 

acknowledging the importance of the tours, says the government 

will take a hands-off approach to Hyundai’s financial woes.”30 

Nonetheless, Korean conglomerates still look to North Korea for 

potential economic opportunity. Currently more than 200 South 

Korean companies have contracts with North Korean 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

45

manufacturers to produce such things as clothing and small 

electronics components and appliances.31 

Despite tangible indications of a thaw in inter-Korean 

relations, there is still substantial reason to question the DPRK’s 

motives. Recent events notwithstanding, the North Korean 

government remains an isolated totalitarian state whose leader 

enjoys a cult of personality that rises to the level of a secular 

religion. Despite some very optimistic signs, North Korea has so 

far shown little interest in any substantive political or economic 

reform. 

The recent thaw in inter-Korean relations notwithstanding, the 

history between the two Koreas has produced considerable reason 

for the ROK to be suspicious of the North’s intentions. From the 

North Korean attack on the Blue House in 1968, through the 

bombing of KAL 858, to the clandestine build up of nuclear 

weapons technology in the 1990’s, there has been considerable 

evidence in favor of caution. When looking forward, the past 

must not be ignored. 

CURRENT STATUS OF RECONCILIATION EFFORTS 

The current dialogue between the two Koreas points to a 

sense of cautious optimism. Progress has been made that 

hopefully will lead to a peaceful reconciliation and reunification 

of the two Koreas. However, peaceful negotiation represents only 

one possible reunification scenario. North Korea is isolated and 

its economic situation remains desperate. Despite historic firsts, 

the possibility remains something could go wrong, either through 

deliberate action by one side or through miscalculation. 

Because of the desperate economic situation in the DPRK, the 

North Korean regime has come to fear the possibility of 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

46 

absorption by the South. If absorbed, North Korea would simply 

cease to exist as a state, a scenario not unlike the reunification of 

East and West Germany. As part of his “Sunshine Policy,” South 

Korean President, Kim Dae Jung, has stated that, primarily for 

economic reasons, South Korea will not seek reunification 

through the absorption of the DPRK. However, the continuing 

economic woes and reluctance to reform make it impossible to 

ignore the North’s fear of reunification through collapse and 

absorption as impossible. 

Another possible outcome is reunification through violence, 

i.e. a second Korean War. This is the scenario most familiar to the 

American public. It assumes that as a result of desperation or 

miscalculation, the North Korean government will attempt to 

reunify the peninsula by force. Although the likelihood of war on 

the peninsula is low, it remains a possibility. The DMZ is the 

world’s most heavily armed border, where over a million and half 

soldiers remained deployed, and heavily armed. 

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES 

The divided Korean Peninsula is a remnant of the Cold War. 

When discussing reunification, the argument centers on the 

timeline and the circumstances. It is an issue of when and how, 

not whether. Agreement that Korea should be reunified does not 

make the actual process any simpler however. Considering the 

history of violence between the two states, reconciliation would be 

difficult in a vacuum, never mind at the intersection of four of the 

world’s great powers. The reunification of Korea will have farreaching economic and political repercussions, not just for Korea 

itself, but also for all of Northeast Asia. Understanding all of the 

implications of normalization of relations and, ultimately, 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

47

reunification, cannot be done without analyzing the perspectives 

of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States, the major powers 

in the region. In order to develop a full appreciation for the 

complexity of the situation, we must consider not only the 

interests of these states, but also what hurdles must be negotiated 

in order for each of them to accede to normalization of relations 

between the two Koreas. 

China 

In 2001 China announced its decision to increase defense 

spending by 17.7%. This was the largest increase in more than 

twenty years. China explained that it was responding to 

significant changes in the world’s political situation, specifically 

“that the United States is now China’s main threat and a roadblock 

on the path to regional supremacy.”32 This spending increase will 

bring China’s defense budget very close to the level of Japan and 

higher than that of South Korea.33

China is modernizing its military by acquiring new weapons 

systems, restructuring forces, and improving training. Much of 

China’s new military equipment has been purchased from Russia 

at bargain prices because of Russia’s lack of hard currency. 

China’s modernization is driven by several factors, including 

lessons learned from the Gulf War, the need to protect its vital 

economic interests and territory, the need to maintain internal 

stability, and a desire to be the leading power in Asia.34

Regionally, China has territorial disputes with many 

countries. “The most prominent examples are China’s claim to 

the South China Sea and its resolve to use force if Taiwan declares 

independence from the mainland.”35 Several US and Asian 

policymakers and scholars believe that China’s military capability 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

48 

increases, so does regional anxiety about its intentions. At 

present, many Asians believe that China’s threat is limited, but 

they are concerned that China will eventually have military 

capability to challenge them in contested areas.36 “Tempering the 

potential for aggression is China’s economic development, which 

relies heavily on foreign investment and trade.”37 Furthermore, 

many of China’s neighbors, like South Korea and Japan are also 

modernizing their militaries, and at a faster pace than China. 

China is a nuclear power. Its nuclear force is small, relatively 

primitive, and vulnerable—far smaller than those of the U.S. or 

Russia and much less sophisticated.38 But China is expanding and 

modernizing its nuclear arsenal, possibly with Russian assistance, 

and it is not constrained in its nuclear modernization efforts by 

any arms control agreements such as those (SALT, START, etc.) 

governing Russia and the United States.39 Beijing’s assessment of 

its nuclear force requirements may be driven by such factors as the 

India-Pakistan dispute, problems with Taiwan, or stability on the 

Korean peninsula.40 

Beijing’s assessment is also being driven by United States 

plans to deploy a missile defense system, which they regard as a 

threat to their security. “Many Chinese insist that the NMD is 

aimed at China, despite US statements saying that it is directed at 

rogue states, such as North Korea and Iraq.”41 Of course, China’s 

modernization efforts may well stimulate a nuclear modernization 

race among neighboring countries, including Russia, India, Japan 

and a unified Korea. 

China and Korean Reunification 

Most American policymakers believe that the reunification 

process will be lengthy and gradual, and that reunification on 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

49

Seoul’s terms is the desirable final objective. Beijing’s objectives 

are slightly different. Publicly, it welcomes reunification, 

provided that the resulting Korean state is not anti-Chinese. But 

Beijing does not want Pyongyang to undergo a full-scale 

conversion to capitalism, and it may not be happy to see the 

peninsula reunified under Seoul’s leadership, especially if US 

forces thereby have access to China’s southern border.42 China 

accepts a US-South Korean alliance in a divided Korea, but a 

unified Korea with a continued Korean-American military alliance 

would be undesirable.43

In order for China to support Korean normalization of 

relations (NOR), the United States and the two Koreas need to 

include China in the process. Kim Jong Il has made recent trips to 

Shanghai, possibly to study China’s economic processes.44 If 

North Korea were to begin the process of economic reform, 

allowing China an active role in that reform, it might serve to 

assuage China’s unease. Another way to include China in the 

process of reconciliation is to resume four-party peace talks to 

among the United States, the two Koreas and China to officially 

end the state of war on the peninsula. This will give China 

another opportunity for a voice in the process of reconciliation. 

The desperate economic situation in North Korea is already 

beginning to impact China. The famine in North Korea has 

created a growing refugee problem in China. According to recent 

reports, there are over 300,000 North Koreans currently hiding out 

in China. This number represents over one percent of the DPRK’s 

population.45 These refugees left North Korea in search of food 

and now cannot return for the certainty they will face criminal 

charges if they do.46 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

50 

Beyond the appalling humanitarian crisis, the refugee issue 

also has broader implications for regional stability. The area of 

China experiencing the refugee influx has a Korean minority 

population of over 2 million. It also has an unemployment rate of 

over 40%.47 The continued influx of refugees into Northeast 

China is potentially destabilizing to the Chinese government. 

China’s interests coincide with those of the United States and 

South Korea insofar as all concerned prefer a stable status quo to 

the uncertain outcome of eventual reunification.48 Both the US 

and the ROK want Korea to be reunified as democratic, free 

market economy. If this occurs, China will no longer have North 

Korea to act as a buffer. In order to accede to NOR and 

reunification under these conditions, China must have confidence 

that a reunified Korea will not be an enemy of China. Although 

this will be problematic, the best alternative is to ensure that China 

is included in the reunification process through four-party talks, 

humanitarian assistance missions, and economic investment into 

North Korea and eventually, the new Korean state. 

Japan 

Currently, the Japanese navy projects the most power in the 

region. Japanese military policy is restricted by the nation’s 

American dictated constitution. Under Article Nine of that 

constitution, the Japanese people forever renounce war or the 

threat of force.49 But Japanese constitutional restraint is fading as 

the United States encourages Japan to take on more of the security 

burden in the region. Potential new conflicts with China, and 

North Korea, and others have led many Japanese to call for a 

reinterpretation of the Constitution or an amendment giving 

Japanese armed forces greater freedom.50
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

51

For all of its constitutional restrictions and historical 

sentiments, Japan has built its self-defense forces into one 

of the most powerful Armies in Asia. Its annual military 

budget, of $45 billion is the second largest in the world 

after that of the United States. The size of the forces and 

the sophistication of its weaponry are roughly equivalent 

to those of Great Britain, which has an annual defense 

budget of about $33 billion. Japan has about 236,000 

military personnel compared to Britain’s 220,000.51

Japan and Korean Reunification 

Improved political and military relations between Japan and 

South Korea—now arguably the best they have been since 

normalization of relations in 1965—have mostly been based on 

the continued viability and hostility of the North Korean regime. 

Absent a hostile North Korea, the question arises: “Will interKorean détente necessarily mean a rise in anti-Japanese sentiment 

potentially destructive to the painstaking efforts to put these 

colonial ghosts to bed?”52

Memories are long in both North and South Korea. Japanese 

troops occupied South Korea from 1910 to 1945, setting up a 

brutal occupation government. During the last phase of 

colonization, from 1938-1945, all Koreans were forced to take 

Japanese names, the Korean flag was banned, and the 

schoolchildren were taught exclusively in Japanese. It is common 

today for Koreans in their sixties and seventies to know Japanese 

but refuse to speak it out of distaste for their former colonial 

rulers.53 South of Seoul is a museum dedicated to memorializing 

the hardships of Japanese rule. In the port of Chinhae, South 

Korean naval cadets study in the shadow of a museum devoted to 

the Korean Admiral Yi, who in the late 1500’s fought off repeated 

attempts by the Japanese warlord Hideyoshi Toyotomi.54
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

52 

Recently friendly relations between the two countries have 

been threatened over the issue of Japanese junior high school 

history texts. Many Koreans believe these texts “white wash 

Japanese atrocities during its colonial rule of the Korean peninsula 

from 1910-1945.”55 Specifically, Koreans are upset that these 

texts omit references to comfort women and cite the Japanese 

colonization of Korea as “a favor to Korean development because 

Japanese built infrastructure such as railways.”56 The South 

Korean government requested that 35 passages in the texts be 

amended. Japan has refused to comply stating that the texts were 

reviewed by an unbiased committee.57 South Korea responded by 

canceling a joint ROK-Japanese military exercise in a gesture of 

protest.58 The full impact of the flap over these texts remains to 

be seen, but it could lead to significant backtracking in ROKJapanese relations. 

The future course of Japanese-Korean bilateral relations is 

uncertain. There are those who argue Korean NOR will reignite 

Korean nationalism directed against Japan. Others contend 

mutual concerns over Chinese intentions will lead to 

rapprochement and a weakening of anti-Japanese sentiments in 

Korea.59

Regardless, a reunified Korea could have serious financial 

implications for Japan. The resolution of North Korea’s postcolonial claims against Japan could be the single largest source of 

funding to rebuild the North Korean economy.60 Japan paid South 

Korea $800 million in compensation for colonial and wartime 

activities upon normalization of relations in 1965.61 North Korea 

will expect similar compensation. Adjusting the South Korean 

payment for differences in population, accrued interest, inflation, 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

53

and appreciation of the yen since 1965 gives a figure of $20 

billion. The claims of “comfort women” who were pressed into 

sexual slavery in during World War II may add another $5-8 

billion.62

Japan is hardly in a position to pay claims this large, given its 

current economic situation. “Japan’s stumbling economy is 

teetering on the brink of a deeper crisis as falling prices eat into 

corporate profits and with Japan’s jobless rate standing at a 

postwar record.”63 The Japanese stock market has fallen to a 15 

year low, prompting the Japanese Finance Minister to state “The 

nation’s finances are near collapse.”64 

Korean NOR makes Japan nervous on several levels. First, 

Japan needs to be assured that a reunified Korea will not be hostile 

to Japan. In order to build confidence on this point, the United 

States, South Korea, and Japan need to continue using the 

Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) to maintain 

dialogue. Japan should be reassured that its present cordial 

relations with South Korea will not deteriorate as a consequence 

of Korean NOR. 

Second, Japan needs reassurance from the United States. The 

United States regards the US-Japan alliance as the “anchor” for 

US presence in Northeast Asia.65 The United States must ensure 

Japan understands America’s commitment to the US-Japan 

security alliance is not in question. 

Third, Japan will need time to repay its debt to North Korea 

upon normalization of relations. If Japan can structure its 

repayment over time, in conjunction with aid to North Korea from 

the IMF and the World Bank, then Japan could meet this financial 

burden without crippling its own economy. 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

54 

Normalization of relations with North Korea will inevitably 

affect Japan’s relations with China as well. 

Japan’s relations with China will also be affected by 

reunification. An antagonistic North Korea has enabled 

Japan to justify a number of security initiatives, such as 

enhanced military relations with the United States and the 

exploratory development of a missile-defense System. 

Even absent a hostile North Korea, Japan will wish to 

continue these security initiatives, which will then be seen 

as what they really are: means to protect Japan from 

China’s military modernization program.66

Russia 

“Russia’s basic policy toward Northeast Asia is to create an 

environment in which it can exercise its influence over the 

region.”67 This means helping establish lasting peace and stability 

on the peninsula and supporting direct talks between the two 

Koreas. “In line with such policies, Russia supports the peaceful 

coexistence of the two Koreas, exchanges and cooperation 

between the two, and denuclearization and arms reduction 

throughout the entire peninsula.”68

Although Russia would like to be a player in Northeast Asia, 

the Putin regime has little to offer. Russia’s economy is in trouble 

and it military power is in decline. Russia inherited 60 percent of 

the Soviet Union’s GDP, which has since declined by more than 

40 percent.69 In the wake of the 1998 financial crisis, predictions 

of slight economic growth since 1999 have given way to forecasts 

of further contraction, perhaps negative 2 to 4 percent.70 

Inadequate economic infrastructure, declining production, and 

crime are among the most troubling problems.71 The downturn in 

the Russian economy during the 1990s struck the Russian Far East 

particularly hard. Output in this region was lower than for the 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

55

country as a whole72: its share of the country’s economic output 

fell from 5 percent in 1991 to 3.8 percent in 1995.73 

Russia’s military is also in trouble. “The Kursk submarine 

tragedy, followed by Russia’s inability to launch a rescue mission 

at sea, is but one example of a defense establishment in steep 

decline. Ground and air units lack regular training, basic 

maintenance, housing, and social support for their personnel.”74

Russia’s military technical abilities have become 

increasingly outdated, and are repaired only in a most 

provisional way. Whole swaths of equipment, which 

exist only paper, have already either been shut down for a 

long time or sold off by corrupt officers for their personal 

enrichment. Thus it proved impossible to find divers in 

the entire Russian fleet, or the whole country, who could 

have dived down to the Kursk. When the army leadership 

steals and is corrupt, the majority of ordinary soldiers and 

sailors see no sense in their service and are completely 

demoralized.75

Military problems are even more severe in the Russian Far East. 

Just weeks after a major military exercise in the European Theater, 

Russian nuclear forces in the east had their power supply 

terminated because they had not paid their utility bill.76 The 

military industrial complex in the region is also in serious trouble. 

“The end of the Soviet Union meant a decline in military 

production enterprises, and the cities in Siberia and the Far East 

that relied upon them.”77

Moscow understands that the Russian Far East will be 

economically weak and militarily deficient for some time and 

worries that this resource-rich region could come under the sway 

of an increasingly powerful China.78 “The issue is often discussed 

in purely demographic terms, with a declining population of seven 

million Russians in the area contrasted with one hundred million 

or more Chinese just across the border.”79 Moscow recognizes 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

56 

that Russia’s economic and military weaknesses limit its 

opportunity to influence decisions in Northeast Asia. Thus Russia 

faces the long-term challenge of managing relations with China, 

Japan, and the two Koreas from a position of relative isolation. 

Russia and Korean Reunification 

Russia publicly supports Korean reunification, though not 

without some private concerns. Compared with China, however, 

which many Russians believe it to be desirous of keeping Korea 

divided because a unified Korea might lead to a stronger 

American presence in the region, or with Japan, which is 

concerned about traditional anti-Japanese sentiment among 

Koreans, Moscow does not have much to lose. Russia sees the 

following positive aspects of Korean unification: 

1)The disappearance of a potential threat near the Russian 

border; 2) a reduction in the size of the two large Korean 

armies and the possible withdrawal of American troops 

from a strategically important Far East region; 3) the end 

of Moscow’s diplomatic maneuvering between 

Pyongyang and Seoul, which has not brought many 

benefits to Russia; 4) the creation of more opportunities 

to solve regional security problems in cooperation with a 

unified Korea, including nuclear security, ecological 

security, terrorism, and illegal migration; and 5) the 

opportunity to develop economic cooperation with a large 

Korean economy.80

According to a senior Russian Korea expert, “Russia can 

accept any scenarios and formulas for Korean unification, 

provided they rule out foreign intervention and any forms of 

violence or the use of force, satisfy the people of the North and 

South, and are based on a democratic, evolutionary, negotiating 

process that is respectful of national and universal human 

values.”81 Although Moscow agrees that the truce agreement 

signed in 1953 after the Korean War has become obsolete, it 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

57

insists that efforts to replace it with another treaty should not be 

rushed. At present, according to Russian analysts, the 1953 

agreement is the only internationally recognized document that 

insures peace on the Korean peninsula. Russia prefers South 

Korea’s approach, whereby a Korean peace treaty would be based 

on a bilateral agreement between the South and the North, to 

North Korea’s suggestion that it be signed by North Korea and the 

US. Moscow wants to prevent any growth of US influence on the 

peninsula.82

Simply put, Russia wants to exert influence over the process 

of Korean unification that it does not have. Nonetheless, it is 

attempting to exert as much influence over the process as it can. 

Last July, President Putin became the first Russian leader to visit 

Pyongyang in more than a decade.83 Russia has been using 

military sales to both North and South Korea as a method to insert 

itself into the normalization process. Seoul is considering the 

purchase of over $500 million in Russian weapons,84 while 

Pyongyang concluded a purchase of $425 million in Aug 2001.85

North Korea 

North Korea is concerned with regime survival above all else. 

Given its non-functioning economy, it has had no choice but turn 

outward in search of economic support. Despite its “Juche” 

ideology, North Korea is not at all self-sufficient. In 2001 there 

were more than 150 foreign food aid administrators living in 

Pyongyang, monitoring food distribution in 163 of the country’s 

210 counties.”86 Through economic necessity, North Korea has 

been opening itself more and more to the international 

community. 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

58 

The North Korean government has made clear that it wishes 

to join and benefit from several international financial institutions, 

including the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development 

Bank (ADB).87 The heads of the IMF and the World Bank have 

agreed to make a survey of North Korea’s broken economy.88 

Although supported by South Korea, Pyongyang’s bid to join the 

ADB has been strongly opposed by both the United States and 

Japan, the bank’s two largest investors, who object on the basis 

that North Korea sponsors terrorism.89

There have been other signs North Korea has been trying to 

shed its pariah status and join the international community. 

Pyongyang has normalized relations with 12 out of 15 of the 

European Union Nations in the past year, with the likelihood of 

two of the remaining three to normalize relations in the near 

future.90 

North Koreas stance on the future of American soldiers on the 

peninsula is uncertain. Kim Jong Il purportedly agreed to 

continued American military presence on the peninsula during the 

reconciliation process. In the wake of the July 2000 summit, Kim 

Jong Il stated he would “welcome” the continued presence of 

American soldiers on the peninsula in order to ensure stability.91 

Kim Jong Il is reported to have made this statement privately to 

Kim Dae Jung during the June summit. However, Kim Jong Il has 

never confirmed these sentiments in public. 

In fact this statement has since been directly contradicted. In 

the Joint Declaration issued by Pyongyang and Moscow at the 

conclusion of Kim Jong Il’s visit in Aug 2001, Kim Jong Il stated 

“the withdrawal of American troops from Korea will endure no 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

59

delay.”92 South Korean officials responded by asserting this 

statement was primarily for “domestic consumption.”93

Despite these positive steps there is still reason to ponder the 

true meaning behind them. According to intelligence sources, 

North Korea has actually strengthened its military posture on the 

DMZ during the same time frame. “Over the past year, U.S. and 

South Korean military officials say they have observed a 

substantial build up in North Korea’s offensive firepower near the 

38th parallel.”94 Whether this has occurred for offensive or 

defensive reasons has remained open to interpretation. General 

Schwartz, the Commander of USFK, recently testified before 

Congress, “When I look North, I can see an enemy that’s bigger, 

better, closer and deadlier, and I can prove it.”95

Whatever the interpretation of DPRK motives, the primary 

requirement for the Pyongyang government is the assurance of its 

survival. Kim Jong Il has shown a willingness to push to the brink 

of war, as during the nuclear crisis of 1994. He has accepted the 

starvation of millions of his own citizens. North Korea will not 

engage in any dialogue that jeopardizes the regime’s existence. 

South Korea 

South Korea has effectively taken the lead on reunification 

with its “Sunshine Policy.” Through the initiatives of President 

Kim Dae Jung, real forward progress has been made. Despite this, 

the South Korean government has not given into euphoria and 

remains cautious regarding the nature and intentions of the regime 

to the North. 

Regarding reunification, South Korea has adopted a go-slow 

strategy, estimating reunification is still decades away. This 

strategy is based in large part on economic calculations regarding 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

60 

the cost of reunification.96 In 1990 the estimated cost of 

reunification was $319 billion. By 1995 the figure had risen to 

$754 billion and is currently estimated at more than $1.7 trillion.97 

South Korea studied the process of German reunification quite 

closely and came to the conclusion that for Korea, sudden 

economic integration would be a disaster. 

As economically painful as the process of reunification was 

for Germany, it would be even more so for Korea. There are key 

differences between Germany and Korea. South Korea does not 

have West Germany’s economic strength. The ratio of East 

Germans to West Germans was one to three, while the ratio of 

North Koreans to South Koreans is one to two. The per capita 

income ratio between East German and West Germany at 

reunification was one to four; the ratio between North Korea and 

South Korea is now one to seven98 and in one study was expected 

to reach one to twelve by the end of 2001.99 Although economic 

calculations of the cost of reunification differ, they tend to agree 

on two things: first, it will be quite expensive, and second, the 

costs rise over time. Thus, it is easy to understand the ROK’s 

preference for a calculated, decades-long process of reunification. 

Hopefully, it would allow the South the opportunity to revitalize 

the North’s economy and mitigate the economic repercussions that 

reunification would inevitably have on South Korea. 

Military concerns remain paramount for the South Korean 

government. Not all South Koreans agree with the President Kim 

Dae Jung’s engagement policy. Critics charge that inter-Korean 

cooperation is a one-sided process and that South Korea is doing 

all of the giving and getting nothing in return.100 The ROK 

remains particularly worried about KPA conventional war-
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

61

fighting capabilities and non-nuclear deterrents, namely the longrange artillery, tactical missiles and chemical warfare 

capabilities.101 

The 2000 Defense White Paper, published by the ROK 

ministry of Defense explains South Korea’s national defense 

policy as follows: 

the ROK government will maintain a firm security 

posture. . . . It is prepared to respond strongly to the 

North’s armed provocation. . . . Further, the ROK must 

establish a firm security posture, which will deter the 

North’s armed invasion and stimulate reconciliation and 

cooperation between the two countries.102

The above passage shows that although South Korea remains 

hopeful that reunification will occur peacefully, it remains vigilant 

and prepares for other alternatives. 

South Korea recognizes the process of reunification, even if 

achieved under it own preferred conditions, will be a long process 

fraught with both economic and military dangers. In order to 

ensure the ROK continues to pursue normalization of relations, 

these vulnerabilities need to be mitigated. 

First, the ROK must not feel as though its defensive 

capabilities are being in any way degraded as a result of the 

normalization process. The United States needs to ensure that its 

military commitment to defend South Korea remains 

unambiguous. The second major challenge faced by South Korea 

is economic. As previously discussed, the cost of reunification 

will be astronomical. South Korea will be overwhelmed if it has 

to bear this burden alone. The United States and Korea need to 

take a multilateral approach to aid and infrastructure 

reconstruction that allows all of the regional players the 

opportunity for involvement. Liberal use should be made of 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

62 

international financial institutions such as the IMF and the ADB. 

Current estimates are that successful reunification will ultimately 

result in a Korea that is one of the ten strongest economies in the 

world.103 

Current US Perspectives 

The United States military presence in Northeast Asia has 

long made important practical and symbolic contributions to 

regional security. US forces stationed in Japan and Korea, as well 

as those rotated throughout the region, promote security and 

stability, deter conflict, give substance to American security 

commitments, and ensure the continued access of other US forces 

to the region.104 

The United States’ National Security Strategy described 

American involvement in Northeast Asia as follows: 

The US-Japan security alliance anchors the U.S. presence 

in the Asia Pacific region. Our continuing security role is 

further reinforced by our bilateral treaty alliances with the 

Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the 

Philippines.105

The strategy further characterized its commitment to South Korea 

and Japan as a “vital interest,” meaning that American alliances in 

Northeast Asia are of “overriding importance to the survival, 

safety, and vitality of our nation.”106 The protection of these 

interests could include the use of unilateral and decisive military 

force if necessary.107 

The accompanying United States National Military Strategy 

articulated a similar policy. It considered North Korea a “regional 

danger.” It described the DPRK as a state whose intentions are 

hostile to those of the United States and its allies and whose 

capabilities make it a threat to our allies and American citizens 

alike.108 Despite the movement towards normalization of relations 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

63

between the two Koreas, American policy has not changed. The 

United States remains committed to the defense of South Korea, 

as it has since it signed the Republic of Korea-United States 

Mutual Security Agreement of 1954. By signing this agreement, 

both the United States and South Korea agreed to defend the other 

if attacked. The DMZ is administered by the United States as 

directed by the 1953 UN Armistice agreement, Article 1. 

Although the Clinton administration never officially adopted 

the “Sunshine Policy” as its own, it did support President Kim 

Dae Jung’s initiatives. The 1994 “Agreed Framework” put a 

freeze on North Korea’s nuclear program. The Clinton 

administration also attempted to negotiate a freeze on North 

Korea’s ballistic missile program, “but the agreement wasn’t 

completed because the United States couldn’t work out detailed 

procedures to verify North Korean compliance.”109

The Bush administration formed its policy towards North 

Korea slowly with both Koreas looking on, anxious over the 

outcome. It was generally perceived by all involved that the 

Republican administration would take a harder line towards North 

Korea than its Democratic predecessor had. 

During the first several months of the administration this was 

very true. The new government focused more on “reciprocity” 

than the Clinton administration, looking for concrete changes in 

the North Korean regime before continuing a policy of 

engagement. 

After a lengthy policy review, the Bush administration 

revalidated the status quo, continuing to support the “Sunshine 

Policy,” the Agreed Framework, and the Trilateral Coordination 

and Oversight Group. 110 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

64 

The main difference in approach [from the Clinton 

administration] was the U.S. desire for a more 

comprehensive dialogue. This is quite understandable, 

given that one of the primary complaints logged against 

the Clinton administration in its dealings with Pyongyang 

(by many South Koreans and Americans regardless of 

political affliation) was that it seemed to approach the 

Peninsula as a non-proliferation problem rather than as a 

regional security problem with an important proliferation 

dimension.111

Another important difference in the Bush administrations’ 

approach to the peninsula is that it is intertwined with the 

administration’s position on theater missile defense. South Korea 

is lukewarm on the idea, primarily because TMD does nothing to 

shield South Korea from Northern artillery, which constitutes the 

main threat to Seoul. In a poll conducted in South Korea, 55% of 

Koreans believed that deployment of missile defense would “have 

an adverse effect on the peninsula.”112 The administration’s 

pursuit of missile defense has also complicated diplomatic 

relations with Russia and China. The full impact of these 

changes, for better or worse, remains to be seen. 

POSSIBLE ROLES FOR THE US MILITARY IN 

PROMOTING NOR 

Although normalization of relations between the two Koreas 

will be a lengthy process with reunification still decades away, the 

United States should begin planning for the changes that will 

occur on the peninsula. Even under the best conditions, the 

process will be difficult and destabilizing. Both regimes are going 

to have to determine together what path the process of North 

Korean reconstruction should take and who should be involved. 

There are three options for reconstruction. First, the two Koreas 

could decide to manage the process alone forgoing any outside 

assistance. Alternatively, they could use the US-ROK alliance as 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

65

a basis, or finally, they could invite in a multinational commission 

to assist.113 

It is doubtful the Seoul and Pyongyang would choose to 

manage the process of reunification alone. The economic costs 

and manpower requirements would simply be overwhelming. 

This leaves either the option of a US led task force based on the 

ROK–US alliance or a multinational one. Regardless which one 

of these options the Korean governments ultimately choose, the 

United States would most likely take a leading role. American 

military presence already on the ground in conjunction with the 

ROK-US Alliance makes the use of US personnel a foregone 

conclusion. USFK provides an existing framework for command 

and control of the process. The American military is uniquely 

positioned to provide security and assistance to both Koreas as 

they undergo the normalization and reunification process. 

Although the United States has been primarily concerned with 

North Korea’s WMD program, conventional demilitarization must 

be dealt with as well. The two Koreas have been locked in an 

arms race for more than fifty years. Currently 70% of the Korean 

People’s Army remains forward deployed.114 In order for 

reunification to take place, the DMZ will have to be drawn down. 

This will require a level of trust not yet seen between the two 

Koreas. US forces, probably in conjunction with multinational 

observers, can play a key role in fostering that trust by providing 

independent oversight and verification of the demilitarization 

process. 

The issue of trust extends beyond the substantial military 

capabilities of both states. Unlike Germany, Korea did fight a 

fratricidal war that remains in living memory. As a result, the 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

66 

North may fear retribution from the South for the Korean War. 

Using US forces as neutral observers during the early phases of 

normalization could go far to allay this fear. 

The cost of reconciliation is also a significant concern to both 

states. The legacy of fifty years of bad economic decision making 

in North Korea is going to impact the peninsula for at least a 

generation after reunification has occurred.115 To begin, neither 

Korea will to able to maintain its current level of military 

expenditures during the process of reunification. Demobilization 

on both sides of the DMZ is necessary not only to build trust and 

confidence, but also to divert resources into the reconstruction of 

the shattered North Korean economy. The cost of maintaining a 

constant war footing on the peninsula is staggering. The North 

Korean government currently spends between 25% and 33% of its 

GNP on defense.116 This translates into five to seven billion 

dollars each year. Although South Korea’s military spending is a 

much smaller percentage of GNP (around 5%), it still approaches 

ten billion dollars annually and accounts for nearly 30% of the 

government’s annual budget.117 A substantial draw down will 

provide the initial capital necessary to begin the reconstruction 

process, although international aid will certainly also be required. 

During the normalization process, Korea will be required to 

manage internal and external threats to its security. The US 

military can help with both. The United States can play the role 

as the international balancer in the region to prevent any 

neighboring powers from becoming too adventurous. American 

forces can also provide humanitarian assistance and reconstruction 

support to North Korea during the first phases of NOR. Combat 

forces can be used to deter any outside power from taking 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

67

advantage of Korea’s weakened position, while logistics, medical 

and engineer troops can support the reunification process itself. 118

During the initial stages of reconciliation, the DPRK is going 

to resemble a country hit by a natural disaster. The North Korean 

people are going to be in need of food, temporary shelter, medical 

attention, communications capabilities and engineer support. The 

American military has tremendous experience with humanitarian 

relief operations. USFK could provide initial command and 

control for these missions. 

The United States military is in a position to establish the 

framework for long-term reconstruction of the North. The DPRK 

does not have a civil society that will understand the requirements 

for reform. US armed forces can provide civil affairs units to 

assist with the task of nation building in North Korea. 

These units are comprised of soldiers with unique skills 

and experience in all areas of government. They provide 

a capability for emergency coordination and 

administration where civilian political economic 

structures have been incapacitated. They can also assist 

commanders at all levels of civilian military planning. . . . 

In short, civil affairs units would be indispensable in the 

reconstruction of Korea.119

Although the United States military can be effectively used to 

begin the process of reconstructing North Korea, it should not 

keep this mission for long. After the border between the Koreas 

has been opened and the United States has laid the groundwork for 

reconstruction, civilian contractors should take over the process of 

reconstruction. The long-term focus of the American military 

should be guarding against outside challenges to Korean security. 

The United States can also provide forces to train the new 

Korean military. The job of incorporating the North and South 

Korean militaries will not be a simple one. Using American 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

68 

Special Forces to help train and integrate the Korean military will 

strengthen the US-Korean alliance post reunification. If the 

United States military takes an active role to help increase 

transparency and build confidence between the two Koreas, it is 

much more likely that American forces will be invited to remain 

on the peninsula in the long term. Continuing the ROK-US 

Alliance beyond NOR and into reunification could provide 

substantial benefits to both states. The extension of American 

security guarantees for Korea will allow the emerging state to 

focus on its internal development free from unwanted outside 

influence. 

Additionally, US military presence in a reunifying Korea 

could remove the temptation of nuclear proliferation on the 

peninsula. China is a nuclear power, and Japan is looked upon by 

the Koreans as a “quasi-nuclear” one.120 A reunified Korea will 

have genuine security concerns, and its historical experience may 

induce it to the take the nuclear option unless other security 

guarantees convince Koreans otherwise. China and Russia once 

exercised dominant influence on the Korean peninsula. Japan 

colonized Korea for thirty-five years in this century. The United 

States has provided security guarantees for South Korea for the 

past half-century. Without a strong US presence and continued 

willingness to underwrite a unified Korea's security, there is a 

definite possibility—or so many Koreans believe—that China, 

Russia, and Japan would again become assertive on the 

peninsula.121 To protect itself, a unified Korea might well 

combine the nuclear and missile assets and the conventional forces 

of North and South, thereafter gradually seeking force reductions 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

69

while providing for military personnel stability and force-structure 

efficiencies.122

By now, most are familiar with North Korean efforts to 

acquire nuclear weapons. South Korea’s story is much less 

commonly known. During the 1960’s South Korea decided to 

develop it own nuclear deterrent based on eroding confidence in 

US security guarantees. For several years, this program went 

completely unnoticed by the United States. When the US learned 

of these efforts in 1974, it threatened suspension of all trade, as 

well as immediate troop withdrawal from the peninsula.123 These 

threats effectively ended the ROK’s quest for an independent 

nuclear deterrent. 

The attempt to develop nuclear weapons was based wholly on 

a sense of insecurity and flagging confidence in American 

promises. If a reunited Korea were to once again feel insecure, it 

is not inconceivable it would turn to nuclear weapons. 

To forestall such action, the United States can use its 

influence to "leverage" a unified Korea away from the nuclear 

option and toward the continuation of a robust US–Korea bilateral security pact, which would entail continued stationing of 

some American forces on the peninsula. The United States would 

also need to encourage a unified Korea to sign bilateral security 

agreements with the other regional powers.124 

Another option would be to add to such bilateral arrangements 

a regional collective security regime that could provide a security 

guarantee similar to that which a reunified Germany enjoys in 

NATO. Of course, a Northeast Asian equivalent of NATO does 

not exist and could not be created overnight. However, “there 

already exist several forums for multilateral cooperation, such as 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

70 

the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Northeast Asia 

Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), and the Council for Security 

Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP)."125 These organizations 

arrive at non-binding consensus about matters of common 

interests and objectives like cooperative security. 

A combination of bilateral commitments with other regional 

actors, a multilateral confidence-building forum for security 

matters, and continued US interest could alleviate the concerns 

that might otherwise push a unified Korea to consider the nuclear 

option. 

Nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia is not the only 

potential consequence if the United States does not maintain a 

strong presence in a reunified Korea. Another potential problem 

is the resurgence of nationalism. Animosities in East Asia, unlike 

those in Western Europe, did not wither away during the Cold 

War. When the former Soviet Union was the enemy, most East 

Asian states, eventually including China, clustered around 

America for protection. "East Asia's two natural rivals, China and 

Japan, managed to curb their hostility, but never resolved it."126 

The new potential for a reunified Korea has rekindled concerns 

about historical animosities in the region. If the United States 

does not remain engaged in the region and provide encouragement 

for dialogue between Korea and Japan, the possibility for 

resurgent anti-Japanese nationalism is great. In this case, the 

Korean government may decide that it is better to lean towards 

China and away from the United States and Japan.127 

Unambiguous American commitment to the security of Korea is 

necessary to eliminate this potential. 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

71

The actual process of Korean reunification is murky at best. 

Although scholars and strategic planners blithely state, “Assuming 

Korean Reunification, we will do the following,” a tremendous 

number of unknowns remain. The United States military presence 

during this process will reduce the risks of miscalculation and help 

to ease the transition process regardless of what form it actually 

takes. 

Nonviolent reunification is not the only possible alternative. 

Although not the most likely scenario, the possibility of a second 

Korean War remains either occurring as a result of miscalculation 

or desperation on the part of North Korea. The continued US 

military presence on the peninsula will provide a clear signal to 

the DPRK that there is no benefit to open conflict and no viable 

alternative to engagement. 

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF NORMALIZATION OF 

RELATIONS 

Nothing is clear about the actual process by which the two 

Koreas will reunify. Most of the literature surrounding the issue 

suggests three scenarios, reunification through violence, 

reunification through the collapse of North Korea and 

reunification through negotiated settlement.128 The best strategy is 

to prepare for the first two scenarios while working to encourage 

peaceful settlement. 

Despite great hope for reunification through negotiation, 

major obstacles remain. By all indicators North Korea is a failed 

state whose days are numbered. The economic conditions in the 

DPRK and the mass starvation lead to the inescapable conclusion 

that a fundamental system change is required. This leaves the 

North Korean regime in a catch twenty-two. The DPRK has no 

option but to reform, but fears that reform will tear the regime 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

72 

apart.129 The issue then is how to proceed with the reconciliation 

process in as slow and non-threatening a manner as possible. 

Economic carrots will go further to precipitate change than sticks. 

Encouraging Kim Jong Il to change is definitely no small task, but 

there is no alternative. Kim Jong-Il must see that the best way to 

ensure his own survival is through reconciliation with the South. 

Therefore, in order for a reconciliation to occur in the near 

term, it must happen without the fundamental transformation of 

either state, at least initially. Although this seems impossible, an 

option does exist. A possible resolution to the dilemma could be a 

loosely federated but unified Korea that resembles the Chinese 

“One State, Two Systems” model currently in effect for Hong 

Kong and China. This would allow both governments to maintain 

their respective systems while still being recognized 

internationally as a single state. 

During the initial phases of reconciliation, the border between 

the two Koreas would remain closed. This would forestall a 

potential refugee crisis and allow both governments the 

opportunity to strengthen economic ties without weakening either 

political system. The logic of this approach is simply to create 

economic interdependence. As North Korea becomes more 

interdependent with the South Korean economy, outside influence 

and ideas will inevitably enter the North. Any substantive 

economic development in the North will require more openness. 

This openness could eventually lead to the rise of an opposition 

and then to the demise of the Kim regime. 

This is no doubt a long-term plan. However, it is one that is 

beneficial to the ROK as well. Allowing economic development 

to occur over time in North Korea will decrease the financial 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

73

burden on the South that would no doubt be incurred if were to 

inherit a defunct economy and a starving populace. 

During the summit meeting of June 15, 2000, leaders of both 

North and South Korea agreed they needed to reach an 

independent resolution on reunification. In the view of some 

Korea-watchers, there has been a distinct “Koreanization” of the 

issue,130 i.e., the two governments are increasingly interested in 

achieving reunification without the interference of foreign powers. 

This Koreanization may facilitate the formation of a loose 

federation.131

Federation is not a revolutionary idea. Both North and South 

Korea have proposed it as an interim step to reunification. The 

DPRK has promoted this idea in the form of the Democratic 

Confederative Republic of Koryo. Under this plan, both Koreas 

maintain their respective governments while creating a unified 

national government. 

As it is known, the DPRK has advanced the idea of the 

creation of the North-South Confederation in the form of 

the Democratic Confederative Republic Koryo. The idea 

allows preservation of the two existing social political 

systems. At the same time a unified national government 

will be formed with equal participation of the DPRK and 

ROK representatives. Under the leadership of the unified 

national government the North and South will practice 

self-government. 132

South Korea has also proposed confederation. In 1989, the 

ROK proposed the “Korean Commonwealth” which would 

operate through a common Council of Ministers from the two 

Koreas. The goal of this confederation was to work out the issues 

of divided families and to draft a constitution for a reunified 

Korean state.133 Although these two proposals differ in their 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

74 

intent and scope, there may be room to compromise on a 

confederation agreeable to both sides. 

Several circumstances could lead both governments to look 

favorably on federation. The North Korean economy is nonfunctional.134 The South Korean government shrinks from 

reunification in the near term because of the expense of rebuilding 

the North after reunification. Unfortunately, the cost of 

reunification increases the longer it is delayed. In 1990 the 

estimated cost of reunification was $319 billion. By 1995 the 

figure had risen to $754 billion and is currently estimated at more 

than $1.7 trillion.135 Given North Korea’s desperate economic 

situation and South Korea’s reluctance to take on overwhelming 

debt, a loose federation that provides potential economic benefits 

for the two governments without bankrupting the South may offer 

a satisfactory compromise. 

In several instances the South has already succeeded in 

helping the North expand its economy. During the 1990s South 

Korea’s trade with the North doubled to more than $330 million. 

The South Korean government has pledged to help the DPRK 

rebuild its now-defunct infrastructure.136 Although these projects 

do not indicate a desire for wholesale economic reform on the part 

of the North Korean government, they could provide revenue in 

amounts that would encourage the DPRK to seek other 

opportunities. 

Despite this positive news, North Korea remains 

dependent upon foreign assistance. By entering a 

federation, it could increase the amount of aid received 

from South Korea and continue slowly to expand its 

economy. Some form of federation might also reduce 

North Korea’s current reputation as a pariah in the 

international community, making the DPRK eligible for a 

variety of international economic packages, including war 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

75

reparations from Japan. When South Korea normalized 

relations with Japan in 1965, it received an immediate 

reparations and assistance package of $800 million.137 

If a federated Korea and Japan were to normalize relations, it 

could mean a windfall of several billion dollars for the North. In 

short, North Korea has substantial incentives to engage Japan and 

the rest of the international community, and it will be easier to do 

so, while maintaining internal political control, if it is federated 

with the South. 

Redirecting funding from defense spending to economic 

restructuring could benefit South Korea substantially. A recent 

economic study concluded a reduction in defense spending would 

boost South Korean exports, as well as spur investment thus 

strengthening the ROK economy. In other words, South Korea 

could experience a “Peace Dividend.”138 Federation would 

increase South Korea’s security by ending the state of war that has 

persisted on the peninsula for the past fifty years, while 

forestalling the economic disaster that would almost certainly 

accompany reunification through North Korea’s collapse and 

absorption. 

This, then, is the logic of a negotiated settlement resulting in a 

loose federation. South Korea could provide enough aid to 

prevent North Korea’s collapse and enhance the latter’s image in 

the international community. Federation could also reduce the 

costs of security for both sides, enabling the North to concentrate 

on basic development and the South to reclaim its economic 

prowess. 

During this process, the United States should provide 

assistance to Korea on its internal security issues. The United 

States presence would also serve to discourage unwanted 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

76 

overtures from other states in the region, while helping to 

coordinate welcome aid from other Northeast Asian states. 

A second alternative scenario to be considered is the collapse 

of North Korea and its absorption by the South. Although no one 

involved in the process wants this outcome, it must nonetheless be 

considered. Kim Jong Il could simply refuse to engage or 

continue the process of reconciliation. It is also possible that the 

North Korean economy is just too far-gone to recover at this point. 

As intractable as Kim Jong Il is there is no alternative to dealing 

with him. There is no one in the North Korean government 

capable of taking charge.139 If Kim Jong Il were to suddenly lose 

power, the result would be chaos. Given the desperate economic 

situation and the lack of alternatives to the current government, 

the collapse of North Korea must be considered as a potential 

scenario despite the fact it is not anyone’s desired result. 

The role of the United States military under these conditions 

would be enormous. The collapse of the North Korean regime 

could come with associated violence, or it the regime could simply 

dissolve, leaving the state in a vacuum. Under either scenario, the 

US military would be required to stabilize the situation in North 

Korea and to begin the process of economic transformation of the 

DPRK. 

The third scenario to consider is that of reunification through 

violence. Although one could argue that no rational North Korean 

leader would start a war he knows he could not win, the 

possibility of miscalculation remains. If Korea were reunified 

under this scenario, the effects on the peninsula and Northeast 

Asia as a whole would be devastating. The US-ROK alliance 

would win, but it would no doubt be an enormously expensive 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

77

victory. If another Korean war were to start, North Korea has 

enough artillery to “sustain a barrage of 500,000 rounds per hour 

for several hours.”140 Beyond the conventional threat, North 

Korea is estimated to have 5,000 metric tons of nerve agent stored 

along the DMZ, in addition to its stockpiles of blood, blister and 

choking agents.141 With these capabilities at their disposal, a 

second Korean War would devastate the peninsula for decades. 

Under this scenario, the United States military would perform 

the mission it has trained for in Korea since the armistice was 

signed. After assisting the ROK Army in winning the war, it is 

likely that United States military would then begin the process of 

helping rebuild both sides of the war-torn DMZ. Given the 

horrific nature of this scenario, it is in everyone’s best interest to 

maintain an open dialogue with the DPRK to reduce the 

possibility of miscalculation and needless violence. 

A final alternative to consider is Korea becoming two 

reconciled states. It is possible that North and South Korea could 

simply “agree to disagree” on ideology and regime type and 

coexist peacefully. There would be normalization of relations 

between the two Koreas but with no movement towards 

reunification. If this scenario were to occur, a likely outcome 

would be a Formal Peace Treaty officially ending the Korean War. 

The normalization of relations between two Koreas and the 

end of the Korean War could weaken the logic of stationing 

American combat forces on the DMZ and would require a 

restructuring of the American military presence in South Korea. It 

is likely that American troops remaining on the peninsula would 

be reconfigured as a regional force. With the signing of the 

formal peace treaty, the rationale for the United Nations’ 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

78 

Command comes into question. North Korea has actively sought 

to dismantle the UNC for years; there is little reason to believe 

that their rationale would change.142 Given this, a reconciliation 

of two independent Koreas would require a redefinition of the 

ROK–US Alliance and the role of the American military within it. 

From a regional perspective, this scenario, if it were to occur, 

would be seen as a positive development by the Chinese 

government. One of China’s major concerns is the potential loss 

of a buffer state between Chinese and US forces. Two reconciled 

Koreas would negate this concern. 

Although this scenario is possible, it is unlikely. Discussions 

of Korean reunification invariably center on when and how, never 

on if. Both Koreas believe that reunification of the peninsula 

should and will occur. It is the form that reunification will take 

that they disagree on. For these reasons, this scenario will not be 

discussed in further detail. 

POTENTIAL ROLES AND MISSIONS FOR US FORCES IN 

A REUNIFIED KOREA 

Although there are still myriad variables surrounding the 

timeline and process of Korean reunification, it is not premature to 

begin considering what shape the American military presence 

should take in a confederated or reunified Korea. There are 

fundamental questions to address: Should the United States 

military remain in Korea after normalization of relations? After 

reunification? If so, how should the military command for the 

region be structured? It is time to begin considering these 

questions so that when changes occur on the Korean peninsula, the 

issues are understood and alternatives have been explored. 

Even without the North Korean menace there are many 

reasons for American forces to remain in Northeast Asia, 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

79

chief among them to help foster better ROK-Japan 

relations, maintain strong mil to mil ties with important 

allies, keep an eye on China and Russia, and to ensure 

that American officers gain first hand experience in 

Asia.143

The United States military will no doubt have to reduce its 

footprint in a reunified Korea. Land is at a premium, and there are 

already issues in South Korea concerning US land requirements 

for basing and training areas. Without a clear North Korean threat 

it is extremely unlikely that Korean public opinion will allow the 

American military to have the amount of acreage it currently 

enjoys. 

However, negotiations should center more on strategy rather 

than simple acreage. A reduced footprint does not mean that 

American soldiers will have to leave the peninsula, rather that they 

should be reoriented to handle a broader range of strategic 

regional missions. These could potentially include such things as 

humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and peacemaking 

operations, as well as mil-to-mil contacts and counter-terrorism 

operations.144 American military forces will need to shift their 

efforts from the defense of South Korea to power projection in 

Asia. Given this, it makes sense that in the absence of a North 

Korean threat to consider moving American soldiers away from 

the DMZ and closer to major airfields, such as the one at Osan Air 

Force base. 

Although a reunified Korea could initially have reservations 

about allowing a United States regional response force to be based 

on the peninsula, it is not an impossible idea. “In a recent opinion 

poll, 82.1% of South Korean respondents agreed that one of the 

objectives of the US-ROK alliance was to maintain security in 

North East Asia.145 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

80 

Korea’s positive consideration of this idea could also be tied 

to its continued concerns about its place in Northeast Asia. In the 

words of a retired Korean four-star General, “Korea was the 

bridge connecting Russia, China and Japan. The Korean 

peninsula has been a historic avenue of approach. It will remain 

necessary to keep the bridge safe from both sides. Maintaining an 

alliance with the United States is the best solution for that 

problem.”146 There is logic then for a unified Korea to support 

continued American military presence in a regional response role. 

There is even precedent for Korean participation in this 

regional force. Although it may appear odd at first, the 

involvement of Korean soldiers in off-peninsula missions is not 

unheard of. 

Korean forces could be used for extra peninsular missions 

as well, if Korea so decided, in the way that South Korean 

forces were sent to Vietnam to fight alongside US Forces 

in the Vietnam War. Although it may not be desirable 

that Korean forces engage in combat missions overseas, it 

would certainly be possible to join in non-combat 

missions.147

Additionally, Korean participation in a regional response 

force could enhance Korea’s place in Asia. Allowing Korean 

forces to participate in off-peninsula contingencies would allow 

Korea to move from a position of dependence on the United States 

to one of a more equal partnership.148 

Changing the structure of the US-Korean alliance in the wake 

of reunification will be necessary in any case. Reorienting it to 

focus on regional stability could also have a positive impact on the 

future of the US-Japan alliance. If the American military is 

required to leave Korea in the wake of reunification, it will call 

into question the rationale for American Forces in Japan (USFJ). 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

81

Restructuring USFK to become a regional response force could 

allow for a simultaneous reorientation of USFJ to focus on 

regional stability as well. Maintaining a presence in Asia after 

Korean reunification should be the result of a three-way 

agreement between Korea, Japan and the United States.149

The future of American military forces in Northeast Asia is 

part of a larger question. After his election, President Bush 

ordered his Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to conduct an 

array of studies on the US Armed Forces to “create a new vision 

of the American military; looking at everything from missile 

defense and global strategy to the flaws of a Truman vintage 

personnel system.”150 

The Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), published in 

September 2001, provides some insight into the Department of 

Defense’s current thinking on Northeast Asia. The QDR states, 

“DOD’s new planning construct calls for maintaining regionally 

tailored forces forward and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, 

... to assure allies and friends.”151 Clearly the United States 

intends to maintain a forward presence in Asia. 

However, it is doubtful that presence will maintain its current 

configuration over the long term, regardless of the future course of 

inter-Korean relations. The QDR also states that “the new US 

global military posture will be reoriented to: Develop a basing 

system that provides greater flexibility ... placing emphasis on 

additional bases and stations beyond Western Europe and 

Northeast Asia.”152 This vision points towards a smaller footprint 

on the Korean peninsula, capable of being rapidly reinforced as 

necessary. The timeline for this change is has not been laid out; 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

82 

however, it is probable this change will occur within the next 

decade. 

Presently, bi-lateral security arrangements characterize the 

Northeast Asian security landscape. In the wake of Korean 

reunification, a multilateral approach to security will be required. 

Although this represents a new approach to security issues in the 

region, multilateralism is not completely unprecedented. 

Organizations such as ASEAN and the Asian Regional Forum, 

which just admitted North Korean into its ranks, illustrate some 

potential for cooperative problem solving in Northeast Asia. 

The reunification of Korea will usher in a new order in the 

region, which will have not only military but also far-reaching 

political and economic implications. All the regional players will 

be affected. A best-case scenario would envision greater trade, 

economic integration, and open and stable diplomatic relations. 

This can only occur if China, Japan, and Korea avoid renewed 

military competition, including a nuclear arms race. For the past 

fifty years, the United States has been the guarantor of stability for 

the peninsula and for the region. Korean reunification necessitates 

that the US reaffirm rather than abandon this role. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing German 

reunification took the world by surprise. In the Korean case, there 

is time to consider the implications of reunification and plan for 

its arrival. But such study and planning must begin now. 

CONCLUSION 

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks upon the 

United States, it easy to put all else aside and concentrate on what 

has obviously become America’s number one priority, the War on 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

83

Terrorism. No one should argue this should not be our current 

priority. 

However, we must guard against ignoring all else. The 

United States has made a tremendous investment in Northeast 

Asia, both in monetary terms and in human ones. The United 

States should continue to engage on several fronts to see its 

investment materialize fully. First, the US must maintain the 

presence of American forces in Northeast Asia. Second, it must 

support South Korea and its Sunshine Policy. Finally, America 

must continue to promote dialogue and free trade among the major 

powers in the region. 

People say the world changed on September 11, 2001. This 

seems incontrovertible. The events were so universally appalling 

that all states, with the exception of Iraq, came forward to express 

condolences and condemn the horrific loss of life. As President 

George W. Bush said, “Through my tears, I see opportunity.”153 

Perhaps this new unity of opinion can provide a starting point for 

greater cooperation in the region. 

Unsurprisingly, South Korea and Japan have stepped up as 

staunch allies in the coalition against terrorism. China also 

condemned the attacks and voted with the United Nations Security 

Council “to take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of 

terrorist acts,”154 and to cooperate more fully in intelligence 

sharing to prevent further attacks from occurring.155 Perhaps this 

common ground is an opportunity to open doors to greater 

cooperation among the powers in Northeast Asia. 

NOTES 

 

1

 Henry Kissenger, “Asia’s Future Being Settled on Korea’s 38th

Parallel,” The Houston Chronicle, March 4, 2001. 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

84 

 

2

 CIA World Factbook for South Korea, http://www.odci.gov/cia/ 

publications/factbook/geos/ks.html. Accessed online March 20, 

2001. 

3

 Ibid. 

4

 CNN Global GDP Rankings, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/ 

global.rankings/. Accessed online May 18, 2001. 

5

 Ibid. 

6

 C.B. Lee, “Korean Performance Picks Up in 1999,” Pulp and Paper 

International (San Francisco, July 2000). Accessed online September 

20, 2000. 

7

 ______, “Korea’s Conundrum,” Financial Times, August 3, 2001. 

Accessed online. 

8

 Samuel Len, “South Korean Figures Show Conglomerates Still 

Deep in Debt,” The New York Times, August 2, 2000. 

9

 The 1999 CIA World Factbook (http://www.odci.gov/cia/ 

publications/factbook/geos/kn.html#Econ) places the 1999 real 

growth rate in North Korea at 1%. However, many sources refuse to 

list GDP figures for North Korea due to the difficulty of obtaining 

accurate and usable data. 

10 CIA World Factbook 1999, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/ 

factbook/html. 

11 Marcus Noland, “The Summit and the Economic Future of the 

Korean Peninsula,” The Institute for International Economics, May 

1999. 

12 Selig Harrison, “Time to Leave Korea?” Foreign Affairs

(March/April 2001): 70. 

13 Round table discussion with Dr. Adrian Buzo, author of the The 

Guerilla Dynasty, Seoul, South Korea, March 19, 2001. 

14 Ibid. 

15 ______, “Food Aid to North Korea,” The International Herald 

Tribune, August 7, 2001. 

16 The Ministry of Defense, The Republic of Korea, Defense White 

Paper 1999, 46. 

17 Victor D. Cha, “The Continuity behind the Change in North 

Korea,” Orbis (Fall 2000). Accessed online. 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

85

 

18 Michael Baker, “Koreas Talk in Shadows: Official meeting set for 

April 11, but quiet dialogue may pave way for food deal,” The 

Christian Science Monitor, April 7, 1998. 

19 Ibid. 

20 Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge (Washington DC: United 

States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 99. 

21 The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, The 

Defense White Paper 2000, 291. 

22 Ibid. 

23 For a full treatment of North-South Korean negotiations, see 

Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge. It provides an excellent and 

detailed account of North Korea’s negotiating style. 

24 Bruce Cumings, “PERSPECTIVE ON KOREA; U.S. Must Get 

Behind North South Progress; Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy has 

helped open a door towards peace, whether it’s politics or not,” The 

Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2000. 

25 Lee See-young, “South Korea’s Challenges-Security and Peace,” 

The San Fransisco Chronicle, January 25, 2000. 

26 William J. Taylor, “North Korea, Steady as She Goes,” Northeast 

Asia Peace and Security Network, Special Report (#01-02) March 7, 

2001. 

27 Doug Struck, “North Korean Growth Reported,” The Washington 

Pos,. September 5, 2000. 

28 Hae Won Choi; “Korean Plans for Northern Détente Dented---

Hyundai May Put an End to its Tours If Fees Prove Too Much Too 

Bear, The Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2001. Accessed online. 

29 “Hyundai Pressed to Halt Kumgang Tours,” The Korea Herald,

March 7, 2001. 

30 Hae Won Choi. Op cit. 

31 Harrison, “Time to Leave Korea?” 71. 

32 John Pomfret, “China Planes Major Boost in Spending for 

Military” The Washington Post, March 6, 2001, 1. 

33 Ibid. 

34 “National Security: Impact of China’s Military Modernization in 

the Pacific Region,” United States General Accounting Office, 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

86 

 

(Chapter Report, 06/05/95, GAO NSIAD-95-84). Accesed online 

http://www.fas.org/ irp/goa/nsi95084.htm, 4. 

35 Ibid. 5. 

36 Ibid. 

37 Ibid. 

38 Russell D. Howard, The Chinese Liberation Army: “Short Arms 

and Slow Legs,” Institute for National Security Studies Occasional 

Paper 28, September, 1999,.27. 

39 Kathryn L. Gautier, “China as Peer Competitor?” Air War College 

Maxwell Paper, no. 18, July 1999, 10. 

40 Ibid. See also John Caldwell and Alexander T. Lennon, “China’s 

Nuclear Modernization Program, Strategic Review 28, no 4 (Fall 

1995): 28. 

41 Richard McGregor, “China Debates US Defence Plans,” London 

Financial Times, January 23, 2001, 5. 

42 “Sino-American Cooperation on the Peninsula: Prospects and 

Obstacles,” 5. 

43 Fei-Ling Wang, “Tacit Acceptance and Watchful Eyes: Beijing’s 

Views about the U.S. ROK Alliance,” Strategic Studies Institute 

Monograph, January 24, 1997. 

44 ______ “Great Power Game Unfolds in Northeast Asia,” Reuters, 

January 30, 2001. 

45 Fransesco Sisci, “Festering Pyongyang endangers all of Asia,” Asia 

Times, March 10, 2001. 

46 Aidan Foster Carter, “Refugees: North Korea’s Achilles Heel,” 

Asia Times: Pyongyang Watch, March 7, 2001. 

47 Fransesco Sisci, “Festering Pyongyang endangers all of Asia,” Asia 

Times, March 10, 2001. 

48 Fei Ling Wang, “Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: 

China’s Views and Policy on Korean Reunification, Pacific Affairs

72, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 168 

49 Calvin Sims, “A Virtual Battlefield Helps Keep Japan Alert,” New 

York Times, October 1, 2000, 1. 

50 Ibid. 

51 Ibid. 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

87

 

52 Ibid. 5. 

53 Ibid. 

54 Ibid. 

55 Meeyoung Song, “Japan’s History Texts Threaten New Korean 

Ties,” The Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2001, Eastern Edition, B7J. 

56 Ibid. 

57 Ibid. 

58 Don Kirk, “South Korea Scraps Military Exercise with Japan,” The 

New York Times, May 9, 2001, 9. 

59 Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism (Palo Alto, CA: 

Stanford University Press, 1999), 222. 

60 Marcus Noland, “Economic Alternatives for Unification,” Paper 

prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Spring 

2000, 13. 

61 Ibid. 

62 Ibid. 

63 ______, “Japan: Worst Yet to Come For Japanese Economy,” 

Agence France Presse, March 3, 2001. 

64 Eric Talmadge, “Papers: Japan’s Mori Will Resign,” The 

Associated Press, March 8, 2001. 

65 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, 

December 1999, 34. 

66 “Japan and China Eye Each Other Warily—as Usual,” Economist, 

September 2, 2000, accessed online at http://www.economist.com. 

67 ______, “Military Situation in Northeast Asia,” Republic of Korea 

Defense White Paper-1999, found on line at http://www.mnd.go.kr/ 

mnden/emainindex.html. 

68 Ibid. 

69 Sherman W. Garnett, “A Nation in Search of its Place,” Current 

History 98, no 630, October 1999, 328. 

70 Ibid. 

71 Richard Wade, “The Russian Far East—Ten Years Since the 

Vladivostok Speech,” found online at http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu. 

au/bulletin/bulsep.htr September 1999, 2. 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

88 

 

72 Ibid. 

73 Ibid. 

74 Sherman Garnett, 328. 

75 Vladimir Volkov and Julia Danenburg, “Putin’s Chernobyl: The 

Tragedy of the Russian submarine disaster in the Barents Sea,” World 

Socialist Website found online http://www.wsw.org/articles/2000/ 

sub-a23.shtml, August 23, 2000, 1. 

76 Sherman W. Garnett, 328. 

77 Volkov and Danenburg. 

78 Sherman W. Garnett, 332. 

79 Ibid. 

80 Vasily Mikeev, “Russian Policy Towards Korean Peninsula after 

Yeltsin’s Reelection as President,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 

11, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 1997): 362-363. 

81 Valentin Moiseyev, “Russia and Korea,” International Affairs 

Moscow 42. no 1, 42. 

82 Kong Vong Seek, “Russia’s Role in Korean Unification,” in 

Russian, Problems of the Far East, no. 1, 1999, 43. 

83 ______, “Great Power Game Unfolds in Northeast Asia,” Reuters, 

January 30, 2001. 

84 ______, “Korea, Russia To Hold Talks on Defense Industry,” The 

Korea Herald, February 6, 2001. 

85 Don Kirk, “North’s Reversal on Gis Jolts Seoul,” The International 

Herald Tribune. August 7, 2001. 

86 Harrison, “Time to Leave Korea?” 68. 

87 ______, “North Korea wants to join World Bank,” The Korea 

Herald, March 12, 2001. Accessed on line at 

http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2001/03/12/ 

2001120053.asp. 

88 Ibid. 

89 ______, “ADB reviewing N.K. Entry,” The Korea Herald, April 5, 

2001. Accessed on Line at http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/ 

html_dir/2001/04/04/200104050051.asp. 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

89

 

90 ______, “Pyongyang Ties Knot with Luxembourg,” The Korea 

Herald, March 6, 2001. Accessed online at http://www.englishjoins. 

com/article.asp?aid=20010306234034&sid=300. 

91 Robert Dujarric, “North Korea Sees Role for U.S. Troops,” The Los 

Angeles Times, August 28, 2000, 7. 

92 Don Kirk, “North’s Reversal on GIs jolts Seoul,” International 

Herald Tribune, August 7, 2001. 

93 Ibid. 

94 Jay Solomon and Eduardo Lachica “North Korea’s Military Build 

Up Threatens Peace Talks with Seoul,” The Wall Street Journal, 

April 2, 2001. Accessed online. 

95 Ibid. 

96 Ming Liu, “An Obsessed Task: Prospects, Models, and the Impact 

of Korean Reunification,” East Asia: An International Quarterly

(Winter 1999). 

97 Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Li Gang Liu, “The 

Economics of Korean Reunification,” The Institute for International 

Economics, Working Paper 97-5. 

98 Ming Liu, “An Obsessed Task.” 

99 Marcus Noland, “Some Unpleasant Arithmetic Concerning 

Unification,” The Institute for International Economics, Working 

Paper 98-2. Accessed online at http://www.iie.com. 

100 Taik young Hamm, “North South Reconciliation and the Security 

on the North Korean Peninsula,” unpublished paper presented at the 

Korean Institute of Defense Analysis, March 23, 2001, Seoul, Korea. 

101 Ibid. 9. 

102 The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, 

Defense White Paper: 2000, 65. 

103 Noland, Robinson, and Li, “The Economics of Korean 

Reunification.” 

104 William Cohen, "The United States Security Strategy for the East 

Asia-Pacific Region—1998," Speech at the Commonwealth Club, 

Los Angeles, CA, July 21, 1997. 

105 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White 

House, December 1999, 34. 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

90 

 

106 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999, 

1. 

107 Ibid. 

108 John M. Shalikashvili, “Shape, Respond and Prepare Now: A 

Military Strategy for a New Era,” 1998. 

109 Jim Mann, “Bush’s North Korea Stance Signals a Shift; Policy: In 

Breaking with Clinton’s efforts for speedy rapprochement, he makes 

good on campaign talk – and deal’s a setback to South’s Kim,” The 

Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2001. Accessed online. 

110 Ralph A. Cossa, “Bush Asia Policy Slowly Taking Shape,” 

Comparative Connections, An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral 

Relations (2d Quarter 2001). Accessed online at www.csis.org/ 

pacfor/cc/0102Qoverview.html. 

111 Ibid. 

112 ______, “57 percent of Koreans Oppose NMD,” The Korea Times,

April 9, 2001. Accessed online. 

113 William O. Odom, “The United States Military in a Reunified 

Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 10, no.1, (Summer 

2000): 10. 

114 Taik young Hamm, “North South Reconciliation and the Security 

on the Korean Peninsula.” 

115 Dr.Adrian Buzo, Author of The Guerilla Dynasty. Lecture given 

in Seoul, Korea, March 18, 2001. 

116 CIA World Factbook. Accessed online March 23, 2001. 

http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/kn.html#mil. 

117 According the CIA World Factbook, South Korea’s military 

spending is estimated to comprise only 3.2% of its GNP. 

118 Odom, “The United States Military in a Reunified Korea,” 17. 

119 Ibid. 

120 Robert Dujarric, “Korea after Unification: An Opportunity to 

Strengthen the Korean-American Partnership,” The Korean Journal 

of Defensese Analysi XII, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 55. 

121 Hwal-Woong Lee, "A Regional Approach to Korean Security," 

Nautilus Policy Forum Online, no. 1, January 3, 2000, 8. Accessed 

online at http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/napsnet010300.htm. 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy

91

 

122 Garrit Gong, "What if Korea Unifies," Worldlink, July 3, 2000, 4. 

Accessed online at http://www.worldlink.co.uk/stories/ 

storyReader$291 

123 Michael J. Siler, “US Nuclear Non-Proliferation policy in the 

Northeast Asian Region During the Cold War: The South Korean 

Case” East Asia: An International Quarterly (Autumn, 1998). 

Accessed online. 

124 Richard L. Bogusky, "The Impact of Korean Unification on 

Northeast Asia: American Security Challenges and Opportunities," 

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, X, no. 1, (Summer 1998): 

57-58. 

125 Ibid. 64. 

126 Ibid. 

127 Interview with Professor Chung Min Lee, Yonsei University, 

March 20, 2001. 

128 This framework is taken from Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min 

Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications,

The Rand Corporation 1999. 

129 Chung Min Lee, Interview at Yonsei University, March 20, 2001. 

130 Interview with Dr. Sung Han Kim, July 19, 2000, Seoul, Korea. 

131 When speaking of a federation, the two Koreas would reunify 

under one flag, but still maintain their respective separate economic 

and political systems. 

132 Evengeni Bajanov, “A Russian Perspective on Korean Peace and 

Security,” The Nautilus Institute. Accessed online at www.nautilus. 

org. 

133 Ibid. 

134 Ming Liu, “An Obsessed Task.” 

135 Noland, Robinson, and Li, “The Economics of Korean 

Reunification.” 

136 Struck, “North Korean Growth Reported.” 

137 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New 

York: Basic Books, 1997), 34. 

138 Uk Heo, Kwang H. Ro, and Chung Minh Hyun, “Redirecting 

South Korean Security Policy,” Pacific Focus, Inha Journal of 

International Studies XV, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 67. 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy 

92 

 

139 Interview with Professor Chung Min Lee, Yonsei University, 

March 20, 2001. 

140 Robert Wall, “North Korea Promises to be a Formidable Foe,” 

Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 22, 2000. 

141 Ibid. 

142 Robert Karniol, “UN Command in South Korea Sees Growth,” 

Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 7, 2001. 

143 Dujarric, “Korea after Unification,” 53. 

144 Michael O’ Hanlon, “Keep US Forces in Korea After Unification,” 

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis X, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 5. 

145 Narushige Michishita, “Alliance After Peace in Korea,” Survival 

(Autumn 1999): 68-83. Accessed online. 

146 Interview with GEN(R) Kim Jae Chang, March 18, 2001. 

147 Ibid. 

148 Michishita, “Alliance After Peace in Korea,” 68-83. 

149 Dujarric “Korea After Unification,” 60. 

150 Thomas. E. Ricks, “Rumsfeld on High Wire of Defense Reform,” 

The Washington Post, May 20, 2001, A01. 

151 The Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, 20. 

152 Ibid. 26. 

153 President George W. Bush, Address to State Department 

Employees, October 4, 2001. 

154 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted 

September 28, 2001. Accessed online. 

155 Ibid. 
93 

CHINA’S RISE AND THE US ARMY: 

LEANING FORWARD 

Russell D. Howard and Albert S. Wilner 

INTRODUCTION 

The United States led war on terrorism has already had a 

major impact on developing state relationships in Asia. The 

coalition of convenience that emerged in the aftermath of the 

September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the 

Pentagon has engendered a change in strategic thinking, 

perceptions, and influence. A significant shift in any of these 

three areas could have dramatic implications. For the United 

States, what is required is not only a reassessment of the new 

realities but also a strategy to take advantage of new opportunities 

and cope with potential threats. Perhaps nowhere is this need 

more apparent, or possible responses more fraught with risk, than 

in determining the impact of such strategic shifts on the US-China 

relationship, particularly in the security realm. 

To date, much of the thinking about the US-China military 

relationship has focused on averting a Taiwan or South China Sea 

clash. Prior to the September 11 attacks, these two areas and the 

Korean peninsula were seen as the most critical flashpoints 

affecting China. But the war on terror may alter the belief that the 

threat of US-China military confrontation resides primarily on the 

Chinese mainland’s eastern periphery. 

The changing security environment has generated more 

questions than answers. What impact will America’s new 

relationships with Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and 

Uzbekistan have as the war on terror evolves and in the postwar 
China’s Rise 

94

environment? Will China’s burgeoning military and economic 

relationship with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

(composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, 

Uzbekistan) be placed at risk? Will a potentially long-term US 

military presence and improved military relations with countries 

on China’s western and southwestern border be perceived by 

Beijing as calming or as exacerbating separatist sentiment in 

Xinjiang and Tibet as well as Taiwan? Does the emerging 

situation provide new opportunities for the United States to 

engage the Chinese on a number of fronts to include the bilateral 

military relationship? 

As China looks to alternative sources of fossil fuel, minerals, 

and raw material to feed its economic expansion, will it pursue 

options that are antithetical to United States interests? Will China 

emerge from this war a more responsible player committed to 

greater engagement or more of a threat to US concerns in the 

region? What type of security relationship will evolve and can the 

United States take actions now to shape that evolution rather than 

merely respond to its result? 

Recent Chinese assessments of US goals may offer insight 

into China’s current threat perceptions. Some Chinese security 

specialists see a US strategy emerging that seeks to limit China’s 

rising influence, in part by seeking military bases and new NATO 

allies in Central Asia, and in part by aiding separatist movements 

in Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang.1

 

Other Chinese analysts assert that the battle for resources is 

more likely to generate a war and that China, which has already 

committed major investments to oil exploration and drilling in 

Kazakhstan and to the extraction of mineral, oil and gas resources 
China’s Rise 

95

from Xinjiang, will assiduously guard against any internal or 

external forces that may disrupt these efforts.2

 Investment in its 

border regions is viewed as essential to meeting China’s resource 

needs and preventing secessionist threats. Combining economic 

and military initiatives is considered essential to ensuring that 

gains continue unimpeded. Necessary improvements include 

expanding transportation and communication capabilities, material 

stockpiles and quick reaction and control capabilities in the border 

areas. These actions and sensitivities, coupled with the everpresent possibility that Beijing may miscalculate or misperceive 

US intentions, could create a situation that leads both parties down 

the road to hostilities.3

One noted China watcher argues that “China’s move to 

conflict depends on politics, perceptions, and coercive diplomacy 

involving specific capabilities in specific geographic and political 

contexts.”4

 If we factor in a possible downward spiraling of 

China’s economy, overwhelming social disorder, and rising 

nationalist sentiment, then Beijing’s ability to maintain social 

peace may erode. Should the United States be seen as the source 

of such trouble, increased tensions or even conflict may result.5

 

While much of the focus of potential conflict has been on the 

Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the changing international 

environment emerging from the war on terror may portend 

significant future challenges for the United States in other areas 

surrounding China’s periphery. 

While we cannot predict what environment will emerge and 

how strategists and policymakers will act or react, the authors of 

this study believe that it is incumbent upon the US Army to 

conduct military diplomacy efforts in a manner that will reduce 
China’s Rise 

96

the potential for miscalculation and misunderstanding. We also 

believe, however, that America’s ground forces must increasingly 

be prepared, and in new ways, to meet the emergence of a Chinese 

military threat. 

This study will first address US assessments of China 

including possible conflicts. Next, it will consider Chinese views 

about meeting the US threat and China’s current and emerging 

capabilities. This will prepare the ground for the main topic of 

this paper: How should the US Army prepare now to meet 

China’s rise? If China is viewed as a competitive rising power but 

not a threat, what can be done to improve military relations and to 

contribute to reducing the chance that it will evolve as a threat? If 

China emerges at some point as a threat, what should the U.S. 

Army be doing to ensure that we help deter—and if that fails, to 

defeat—the Chinese? 

We contend that the US Army should take a dual-track 

approach that seeks to improve relations through increased 

military exchanges with Chinese counterparts while at the same 

time training and educating US ground forces to meet any 

potential threat. We disagree with those who believe that in 

preparing to meet a possible threat we inadvertently help bring 

that very threat into being. The US military must be ready for any 

eventuality in its emerging relationship with China for the sake of 

our own national security interests and those of others who depend 

on the United States. Shaping and preparing for China’s rise will 

surely be near the top of our national security priorities for many 

years to come. 
China’s Rise 

97

UNITED STATES ASSESSMENT

China watchers in the United States differ in their views about 

China’s rising power. Does Beijing pose a threat or will it 

become a responsible power focused on continued peaceful 

relations? One side perceives that “China’s military buildup [is] 

directly aimed at fighting a future war with the United States.”6

 

Those who subscribe to this view believe that China’s military 

forces will become the leading threat to the West in this century.7

 

Supporters of this view including many US policy makers, 

analysts and academics,8

 believe that China’s intent to challenge 

the United States is rooted in a rising tide of nationalism, its 

historical humiliations, and its drive to become an international 

power of consequence.9

 Some within this group advocate 

containment to meet this new threat and believe that the United 

States needs to prepare now for the inevitable. Among the actions 

they advocate in containing China are reenergizing US alliances 

and expanding military deployments in Asia.10

A recent study by the US Defense Department’s Office of Net 

Assessment, which looked at potential threats in Asia, bolsters this 

view. “China will be a persistent competitor of the United 

States. . . . A stable and powerful China will be constantly 

challenging the status quo in East Asia. An unstable and 

relative[ly] weak China could be dangerous because its leaders 

might try to bolster their power with foreign military 

adventurism.”11 In this view, China’s military buildup and 

ambitions suggest that Beijing is on a collision course with the 

United States.12

Proponents of this view offer suggestions that range from 

simply increasing awareness to active and focused program of 
China’s Rise 

98

countermeasures. A strong US forward presence in Asia is seen 

as critical, especially in order to reaffirm defense commitments to 

Japan, Korea, Taiwan and others. Military diplomacy should also 

play a role but should remain mostly limited to high-level contacts 

and avoid the transfer of war-fighting skills or technology.13

Others vehemently disagree, believing that, “If China is 

treated as an enemy it will become one.”14 Those who take this 

position feel that China’s military capabilities are not a threat and 

will not become one for a long time. Because heightened tensions 

and conflict are not foregone conclusions, proponents of this view 

believe that the United States must fully engage China in a host of 

different venues.15 Acknowledging that China’s interests are not 

necessarily antithetical to ours, the United States must 

aggressively expand its economic, political and cultural 

relationship with China building a more positive environment.16 

Advocates of a closer relationship believe a rising China is not 

aggressive or imperialistic and, as long as no threat appears on its 

periphery, will continue to focus mainly on resolving internal 

problems.17

Some United States and other Western academics and think 

tank analysts do not believe that China will have the ability to 

close the military gap and achieve anything even approaching peer 

competitor status. Because China cannot project power 

significantly beyond its frontiers, because it does not pose a threat 

to US interests, and because it is interested in maintaining the 

status quo, engagement is not only appropriate but imperative if 

the United States is to shape positive relations with China.18
China’s Rise 

99

CHINESE CONCERNS 

Shaping positive relations is critical, since China has already 

been expressing concerns about increasing United States influence 

in the region as a result of the war in Afghanistan. Chinese 

strategic analysts have noted that US deployments have 

successfully driven a strategic wedge in Central Asia19 and could 

“impact on security systems in Western China, and weaken the 

influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”20

Beijing recognizes that the war in Afghanistan has reduced its 

relative influence, particularly on its western periphery, and has 

tried to counter that loss by increasing and reinforcing diplomatic 

and military efforts in the region. China and its SCO partners 

have given qualified support for US anti-terror efforts. At the 

same time, however, the SCO has also called for a neutral 

Afghanistan and a limit on US expansion of the war on terror. 

Furthermore, China has pursued senior-level visits to India and 

continues its arms shipments to Pakistan.21 As China tries to find 

ways to deal with this growing US influence in Central Asia along 

with greater internal discord, potential security problems in its 

relationship with the United States loom large. 

In other areas, Chinese efforts in the war on terror have been 

supportive of US initiatives, both in the United Nations and in 

helping to improve Washington’s relationship with Islamabad. 

Beijing has also supported the war effort by increasing 

intelligence collection and sharing aimed at Afghanistan, 

reinforcing troop positions along its western border to keep Al 

Queda and Taliban forces from escaping and contributing to the 

search for bank accounts related to terrorist groups.22 These 

contributions however have not led to talks in such contentious 
China’s Rise 

100

areas as, for example, the proliferation of missile technology or 

issues related to Taiwan.23

Much of the current strategic and operational war-fighting 

discussion in China is focused on thinking “outside the box,” not 

only about potential opponents but also about how best to apply 

China’s resources to meeting its national security interests. Some 

Beijing conservatives believe that China, while naturally 

expecting conflicts of interest, needs to guard against a loss of its 

relative power over time. In order to prevent this, China must 

examine not only how to defend itself against current or emerging 

traditional threats but also to address “new frontiers of interstate 

competition.”24 The latter area embraces both military and non 

military threats. 

Current Chinese strategic writings are full of references to 

developing a strategy that recognizes the country’s relative 

weaknesses and the need to focus on “approaches in which 

inferior can defeat superior.”25 These commentaries focus on 

studying the way the United States has fought before, how it 

might be expected to fight in the future, and the need to select the 

best means with which to meet that threat. Chinese strategic 

thinkers devote much attention to analyzing US conflicts and 

determining lessons to be learned during the last decade. 

The three attacks and the five defenses (sanda wufang) have 

received much attention in recent Chinese military writings. The 

former recognizes the need to develop a strong capability by 

improving helicopter, tank, and airborne unit capabilities in an 

attack. The latter advocates attention to developing the ability to 

defend against nuclear, biological, chemical, electronic and 

precision-guided weapon systems. In addition, commentaries are 
China’s Rise 

101

advocating a push to increase the practice of deploying soldiers on 

operations and broadening the use of live-fire ammunition in 

training.26

Chinese war-fighting discussions also highlight the 

importance of employing strategic reconnaissance and warning; of 

preventing the introduction of large numbers of enemy troops 

through anti-access strategies; of destroying command, control 

and communications nodes; and of disrupting the logistics of 

deploying US military forces.27 Some in China argue that much 

more attention needs to be given to countering a high tech enemy, 

one that makes use not only of traditional war-fighting capabilities 

but is also now using precision, information and special operations 

in new ways.28 Such thoughts could only have been reinforced in 

the minds of those who have watched the American military’s 

performance in the Gulf War, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 

Balkans, and now in Afghanistan. 

Chinese military specialists have coined several terms that 

illustrate this new way of thinking. “Acupuncture warfare,” for 

example, means interrupting the enemy’s information capability 

by focusing on and “hitting critical joints.”29 “Flexible border” 

means generating earlier warning through improved 

reconnaissance techniques and more aggressive surveillance.30 

“Bee swarm” tactics envisions using waves of unmanned aerial 

vehicles as a low cost, low tech, high impact tool; “[the effect] 

could be as ants devouring a person or killer bees attacking a large 

scale animal that would be terrifying in its result.”31 

Such thinking complements PLA modernization during the 

last two decades. For the military, these efforts have focused on 

the acquisition of select weapons and equipment, the development 
China’s Rise 

102

of Rapid Reaction Forces (RRFs), increased training for 

specialized units, and a move, albeit slow, towards improving 

interservice coordination.32 

While most analysts believe that these efforts have benefited 

only a small portion of the military, improvements to RRFs and 

implementation of Resolving Emerging Mobile Combat Forces 

(REMCF) deserve special mention. During the past decade, 

China has placed increased emphasis on RRF training including 

an expanded capability to attack mountain regions with combined 

forces as well as a continued emphasis on the ability to conduct 

amphibious landings.33 The development of the RRFs has been 

linked to ensuring the ability to respond to internal and external 

threats in Tibet, Xinjiang, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China 

Sea.34 The REMCF, believed to consist of an infantry division in 

each of China’s seven military regions controlled by authorities in 

Beijing, is designed to meet a host of potential problems. These 

include border defense, internal flare-ups, and certain disaster 

relief requirements, all aimed at reestablishing central government 

control quickly and effectively.35 How effective the Chinese have 

been in actual implementation of the REMCF concept continues 

to be a source of debate. 

The degree of effectiveness aside, it is apparent that 

significant improvements are underway. Ground forces are being 

streamlined, and increased attention has been paid to improving 

ground mobility, special operations, and attack helicopter 

support.36 Giving ground troops the ability to make use of shortrange ballistic missiles could significantly enhance the Chinese 

army’s capability. Efforts to develop a responsible noncommissioned officer corps and retain key soldiers demonstrate a 
China’s Rise 

103

growing commitment towards an increasingly professionalized 

military. Attention is also being paid to the rudimentary digitizing 

of command nodes, to greater interoperability between units, and 

to improving joint operations37 though at a much slower and less 

advanced level than that of the United States military. As will be 

discussed later in this paper, the PLA is changing the way it trains 

to fight as well. 

Bureaucratic resistance, interservice rivalries, an entrenched 

command system, antiquated equipment, and limited resources 

will in many cases inhibit full implementation these plans. 

However, programmed improvements will change how China 

fights in the future. Potential opponents should not assume that 

China is unprepared to fight because it is still modernizing. The 

authors of this paper at least, believe otherwise. 

Even if one assumes that the United States has a limited 

chance of engaging China in conflict, the United States may well 

come into contact with forces being counseled by Chinese 

advisors, supported by Chinese logisticians, or trained by Chinese 

tacticians. By studying emerging Chinese war-fighting doctrine 

and activity, the US Army hedges its bets with other potential foes 

in the region as well. 

Should China have to fight in the near- to mid-term future, it 

would do so with a military that combines the growing strengths 

of selected elite units with improved capabilities and those of an 

older organization raised on earlier war-fighting concepts such as 

People’s War and Local War doctrine. During the next two to 

three decades, any potential opponent will face a complex 

amalgam of old and new capabilities, involving traditional and 

more recent strategies. Some Western analysts dismiss China’s 
China’s Rise 

104

military as ill-prepared, untrained, and unready to meet warfighting requirements in the 21st century. But limited contact with 

the Chinese has no doubt affected these (and all other) 

assessments. It is quite possible, we suggest, that such analysts 

seriously underestimate the degree to which the Chinese military 

can and will adapt their patchwork capabilities to meet a threat. 

The various competencies of these units, combined with unique 

Chinese cultural, geographic, and domestic imperatives, all 

indicate the need for serious study not only of its current warfighting status but also of its likely evolution. We believe the 

United States military, and in particular the US Army, should 

conduct an ongoing analysis of the Chinese capabilities and, if 

possible, exchanges, education, and training. 

The lack of recent combat experience by Chinese forces has 

had an impact on the development of the military. Since China’s 

1979 Vietnam incursion, much of its own ground force warfighting assessments have come from studying US actions. 

Chinese analysts have studied US operations in the Gulf War, 

Taiwan Strait, Somalia, and Kosovo38 and are sure to study recent 

actions in Afghanistan. An often quoted, widely available 

theoretical essay, Unrestricted Warfare, argues that Chinese 

strategic planning needs to take both military and non-military 

means, such as network hacking, attacking financial institutions, 

and using the media to counter US strengths.39 There is debate 

about whether this work by two Chinese colonels reflects broader 

PLA views and institutional commitment to change,40 but it 

clearly is significant. 

It is still unclear whether China will be able to generate the 

bureaucratic will or resources to implement recommended 
China’s Rise 

105

changes. Even if it does, how China intends to use these forces 

would need to be considered.41 One of the difficulties in 

determining China’s intent is that interactions between Beijing’s 

emerging military leaders and the United States and its allies have 

been extremely limited.42 While much has been written based on 

discussions with China’s think tank experts and on comprehensive 

studies of internally and externally circulated PLA documents, 

contact between war fighters at every level on both sides has been 

negligible. This has fueled mistrust and prevented transparency. 

Increased military exchanges between both countries’ ground 

forces could begin to reverse these trends. 

Even limited contact can have far-reaching impacts. A US 

military attaché in Beijing noted recently that a fellow US military 

officer discounted the likelihood the Chinese would take a 

particular operational stance with its modernized equipment 

“because that is not what we would do.”43 Cultural 

misunderstandings between the United States and China can have 

significant consequences. As Richard Betts and Thomas 

Christensen have noted, “China does not need to match American 

standards to reshape the strategic environment.”44 This holds 

equally true at the operational and tactical levels. 

Whether China is seen as having a weak or burgeoning 

military capability, as a benign or growing military threat, as a 

state with converging or conflicting interests, what is clear is that 

the US Army must do all it can both to meet a potential challenge 

and to reduce misunderstanding between the two countries. We 

believe it is incumbent on the US Army to pursue a two track 

approach: seek military-to-military opportunities that would build 

respect, trust, and reciprocity and prepare to meet a future Chinese 
China’s Rise 

106

threat. Exposure by US Army soldiers and units to the Chinese 

military in a reciprocal arrangement would allow greater 

opportunities to pursue common interests as well as enable us to 

understand a potential threat. 

MILITARY EXCHANGES 

Military exchanges and increased China-oriented training and 

education in US Army schools will open up a host of 

opportunities. Army Colonel Neal Anderson has offered some 

reasons for pursuing such contacts.45 First, contacts that lead to 

improved relationships will help shape China’s rise as a 

responsible power. The Chinese military will play a major role in 

the emerging global security environment. Discussions and 

exchanges between the US Army and the PLA can expose both 

organizations to each other’s perspectives. Mutual ignorance is in 

no one’s interest.46

United States allies in the region stand to benefit as well. 

Increased contacts with the PLA, when accomplished in 

coordination with allies in the region, can help reduce mistrust and 

miscalculation and, may even play a role in alleviating outbreaks 

of tension over volatile issues. Of course, the United States, allies 

and friends, especially in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, 

must not only be informed of such contacts but also actively 

consulted, since the outcome may have large implications for 

their future security.47 And military exchange efforts should 

complement ongoing political, economic, and social bilateral and 

multilateral initiatives as well. 

As we’ve noted, bilateral military exchanges can enhance 

transparency and mutual understanding and reduce distrust and 

miscalculation.48 Such exchanges also help both sides gain a 
China’s Rise 

107

better appreciation of the potential risks and costs of heightened 

tensions or an outbreak of hostilities. Likewise, such a 

relationship, some have argued may help “disabuse Chinese elites 

of any belief that they might have of the unwillingness” of the 

United States to fight.49 

One of the major difficulties with previous US military 

exchanges has been in defining what reciprocity means to both 

sides. On the U.S. side this has raised concerns that the Chinese 

have much more to gain from such contacts than Washington. 

The term “rough reciprocity,” sort of fudged this objection by 

giving the Chinese credit for showing movement and opening 

some doors to their military without providing true reciprocal 

visits. Detailed briefings and tours set up to support visits by 

Chinese military leaders to US Army Training and Doctrine sites 

as well as to infantry and armor units were reciprocated in China 

by scripted and limited orientations for US Army and joint 

delegations. In terms of showing United States strength there is 

much to be gained by such a program, but it does little to gain the 

United States insight into China’s own military environment. 

The idea that almost any exchange was a positive one 

seriously undermined the credibility of the program, especially as 

the Chinese began to request yet more detailed visits to view 

Army operations and training in places such as Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina, and the National Training Center in California, and even 

made requests directly to the posts they hoped to visit. All of this 

without the US Army getting truly reciprocal exchanges in China. 

The suspension of military engagement programs by the Bush 

administration in early 2001 and the introduction of a case-by-case 

review of each exchange was due in part to Secretary of Defense 
China’s Rise 

108

Donald Rumsfeld’s position that “the overriding objective in [the 

United States] military exchange program [needed] to ensure that 

these exchanges benefit the United States [and that] is the 

principle by which future such exchanges must be evaluated.”50 

This was clearly a rebuke of the previous administration’s 

engagement program. Indeed, any future program of military 

exchanges with the Chinese will doubtless have to meet much 

more specific objectives. Those participating will have to be 

better versed on those objectives and actually use such contacts to 

attain them. This will require officers in each service sensitive to 

such requirements and a mechanism for conveying those means 

and ends to participants of future exchanges. 

For the US Army, what is crucial to any future military 

exchange program will be protecting war-fighter capabilities while 

ensuring that such contacts do not build up Beijing’s own combat 

and power projection potential. While building transparency and 

reciprocity, future exchanges must also ensure that critical 

information remains secure. This will require coordinated and 

focused preparatory briefings for all participants in such a 

program, as well as after-action assessments funneled back into 

Department of the Army G-3. As the focal point, the Army G-3 

could operate as a clearinghouse for future endeavors, especially 

useful to those lacking regular contact with the Chinese. G-3 

would also be responsible for ensuring that exchanges carry out 

stated objectives in support of the Chief of Staff, Army, 

Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Command, the Chairman, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense. This will make it 

possible to judge the success of such exchanges and to arrange 
China’s Rise 

109

future engagement opportunities and cost-benefit analytical 

efforts. 

One of the most difficult issues continues to be Chinese 

resistance to more open discussions with military leaders at 

different levels as well as visits to sites in China that might allow 

greater transparency. China’s 1998 Defense White Paper 

emphasized the importance of military diplomacy as a way to 

engender greater mutual respect and benefits, especially with the 

United States.51 But, especially among the senior Chinese 

military leadership, there remains tremendous resistance within 

the PLA to allowing US military personnel to view specific 

Chinese defense locations, personnel and equipment. This is due 

in part to the embarrassment of the Chinese leadership over the 

backwardness of its military force, and in part to the secretive 

nature of the military in general.52 

However, it is perhaps also a deep suspicion of US motives 

and intent along a number of fronts, especially among these senior 

military officers and defense officials, which limits greater 

cooperation and significant improvement on issues related to 

transparency.53 In recent years the conflict in Kosovo, the 

accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade,54 the EP3 incident in the South China Sea off of Hainan Island, as well as 

a host of political and military actions by the United States which 

are viewed as antithetical to Chinese interests, have only served to 

exacerbate such views.55

Fortunately, there are indications that within the Chinese 

defense establishment, a generational divide may exist over SinoAmerican military exchanges. Rising mid-grade officers are often 

more open to expanding discussions with the US military. In 
China’s Rise 

110

general, these officers have benefited from greater education and 

training opportunities and have spent more time outside the 

mainland.56 These same individuals often have a much broader 

understanding of and a more critical perspective on foreign 

militaries. Future US Army military exchanges should seek to 

broaden contacts with these rising leaders. Increased attention 

should also be paid to expanding upon the success of contacts 

between US Army Foreign Area Officers (China) and their 

Chinese counterparts, which would promote contacts with those 

who are most likely to rise to the top of their respective countries’ 

military profession. Expanding such contacts could contribute 

significantly to the development of more positive security 

relations between China and the United States in the future as 

well. 

On the United States side, there also exist many challenges. 

During the mid-1990s, military contacts with China received a 

push from then Secretary of Defense, William Perry, with 

reciprocal support from his counterpart, Chi Haotian.57 The 

established engagement structure promoted high- and mid-level 

exchanges as well as confidence-building measures. In 2000 

alone there were thirty-four exchanges between Chinese and US 

defense representatives.58 On the United States side, the majority 

of these exchanges involved senior Defense Department and Joint 

Staff leaders, Pacific Command representatives, National Defense 

University students, Navy and Maritime representatives. There 

were also functional exchanges in such areas as medicine and 

logistics. US Army personnel participated in each of these, and 

the United States Military Academy Superintendent visited 

China.59
China’s Rise 

111

As noted, Secretary Rumsfeld is conducting a review of 

military exchanges with China, approving them on a case-by-case 

basis and only after determining that the proposed contact will 

benefit the United States.60 The Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) is reviewing United States defense objectives visà-vis China in order to improve the exchange program.61 While 

OSD recognizes that military exchanges create useful channels of 

discussion there is also a sense that the way ahead must include 

greater reciprocity.62 

United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) continues to 

rely on its Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) to guide its military 

engagement program with China. Chief among the TEP’s 

objectives are increased access, influence, and goodwill as well as 

improved bilateral relationships.63 However, measuring the 

degree of improvement by executing the TEP is difficult. 

Additionally, a senior officer at USPACOM notes that when it 

comes to China, US deterrence and defense activities in the region 

must hedge against potential threats but at the same time be 

careful to not take actions which could cause a threat to develop.64 

An officer working China issues in OSD, echoes this sentiment 

stating that care must be taken not to overstate the China threat 

making it a self-fulfilling prophecy. There is a need for vigilance 

but the threat should not be exaggerated.65 Additionally, there is a 

sense at USPACOM that the way ahead in military exchanges is 

to focus more effectively on mid-grade officers, since they are 

perceived to be more supportive of military-to-military contacts.66 

United States Army efforts to engage the PLA in recent years 

have focused on military law, history, training, and professional 

development exchanges.67 But limited reciprocal access by US 
China’s Rise 

112

Army representatives has lessened support for future exchanges 

and hampered the ability of both countries to move towards 

greater transparency and measures which build confidence. 

MILITARY EXCHANGES: THE WAY AHEAD

So what should be the way ahead? Subject to OSD guidance 

and in concert with joint engagement plans, the US Army should 

design an aggressive program of exchanges which meets definite 

objectives designed to enhance understanding while protecting 

key US war-fighter components. In addition, each approved 

mission should not only complement ongoing exchanges by its 

sister services and the joint community but should also ensure that 

it is linked to allied concerns in the region. Specifically, the US 

Army should: 

• Design a program that defines areas of interest for each 

military exchange and relay it in the form of guidance and 

topical points to US Army representatives meeting with 

Chinese. The goal here is to improve understanding of 

Chinese issues and to highlight continuing areas of 

interest in a way that builds transparency and respect for 

both sides. Standards should be devised that will allow a 

realistic assessment of each exchange and a 

comprehensive analysis as the overall program moves 

forward. 

• Encourage greater numbers of informed and prepared 

mid-grade level (Major to Brigadier General) Army 

exchanges designed to promote relationships with 

Chinese counterparts. These contacts should be made up 

of operations (combat arms and combat support) and 

operations support (Foreign Area Officer) delegations. 

Such a mix would not only enhance understanding during 

these bilateral visits but also improve intraservice 

knowledge of China-related and current US Army issues 

as well. 

• Broaden military academic exchanges between the US 

Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps, 

Command and General Staff College, and US Army War 
China’s Rise 

113

College and the equivalent schools in China. Again, 

these exchanges should have specific objectives and 

should integrate students with regional experts to ensure 

maximum benefit not only to the Army but the defense 

community as a whole. 

• Increase humanitarian assistance/disaster relief contacts 

using US Army personnel and equipment. Shared 

experiences in this arena could have tremendous benefits 

for both countries, not only by improving capabilities to 

respond to these activities but also by offering a relatively 

benign way to pursue reciprocal visits and enhance 

transparency. These contacts could lead eventually to 

joint and combined humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 

operations. 

• Broaden US Army participation in ongoing anti-terrorist 

efforts. While necessarily behind the scenes, there are 

natural links available with the war on terror that should 

be exploited to further meet national goals. In concert 

with those efforts ongoing with other countries in the 

region, expanding ties in this area could provide much 

insight into Chinese concerns and capabilities regarding 

internal and external terrorist threats. 

• Encourage United States and Chinese Army participation 

in multilateral non-war-fighting and logistics related 

venues. Examples include the Asia Pacific Center for 

Security Studies courses and the Pacific Armies 

Management Seminar, which could make possible 

mutually beneficial discussions in a non-threatening 

environment. These contacts, while not necessarily 

combat-oriented, should involve both US Army 

operations and operations support representatives with 

assigned tasks and cultural preparation. 

• Build on the success of the current Foreign Area Officer 

(China, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia) program by 

ensuring that each officer involved fully understands 

China-related OSD, Joint Staff, Army Staff, and 

USPACOM objectives and can convey them to their US 

Army counterparts in order to integrate them into future 

military exchanges. These FAOs should also be provided 

opportunities to “re-green” or return to war-fighteroriented positions at the Division, Corps, or Joint Task 
China’s Rise 

114

Force levels so that they can remain current on the 

complex changes taking place in the US Army. This is 

critical to building better support for future operations 

and ensuring that FAOs remain sensitive to war fighter 

requirements. 

• Link US Army exchanges with China to ongoing 

initiatives with allies and friends in the region in order to 

mitigate any concerns they may have and promote further 

cooperation. This will require a coordinated system of 

information transfer among FAOs and other regional 

experts in Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and 

Taiwan, which could then be further transferred to host 

nations. 

• Invest resources in military exchanges to improve 

understanding and reciprocity. Budgetary oversight and 

support by the Department of the Army tied to specific 

objectives and desired outcomes would allow subordinate 

commanders to expand initiatives for exposure to the 

Chinese and, should tensions arise, create a greater base 

of understanding throughout the Army about a potential 

adversary. 

Keys to the success of this military exchange program include 

not only resources but also a clear focus on the end state – one that 

does not compromise US Army war-fighting capability or 

contribute to China’s own combat readiness or deployment 

capability. Central coordination by the Army G-3 and 

consultation with war fighters in US Army Pacific, US Army, 

Japan, and US Forces, Korea and other Army and joint commands 

in the region is essential. So is incorporating the advice and 

analysis of the United States Defense Attaché Office, Beijing, into 

any proposed Army effort. Equally important are ties to Army G2 (Intelligence) and G-4 (Logistics), Joint Staff (J-5 Policy), and 

OSD (China Desk) to ensure awareness and integration of 

ongoing programs and concerns that can affect any initiatives. 
China’s Rise 

115

A strong program of military exchanges tied to set objectives 

and a reciprocal framework would improve understanding, help 

reduce tensions, and increase transparency. Such an initiative 

must be matched by a willingness on the part of the Chinese to 

meet the United States effort. The desire to improve relations 

must necessarily incorporate a military diplomatic effort of which 

an exchange program would be a central part. However, it is 

understood that, at any time, the relationship could turn 

increasingly negative. Should it do so, such an exchange effort 

must be matched by a complementary effort to prepare US Army 

units for a more lethal scenario. The next part of this essay 

addresses how we can best train and educate our forces to meet 

such a challenge. 

HEDGING OUR BETS 

The benefits of a more robust Army mil-to-mil program with 

the PLA are clear. The transparencies and confidence building 

measures resulting from the previous suggestions would reduce 

the opportunity for miscalculations on both sides when future 

crises occur—as they will. The Belgrade bombing and EP3-Orion 

downing are examples of incidents that will naturally occur as two 

major powers assert themselves in Greater Asia. Also, the Taiwan 

issue is always volatile and will not go away anytime soon. 

The likelihood of future crises underscores the need for better 

mil-to-mil relationships to reduce the opportunity for conflict. It 

also underscores the need for the United States Army to better 

understand how the PLA fights and if necessary, how to fight the 

PLA. While it is unlikely that the United States and China will 

engage in ground combat in the near future, it would be best to 

take some measures to prepare for such an eventuality. 
China’s Rise 

116

Unfortunately, research conducted for this paper indicates that the 

PLA spends much more time and energy learning how to fight us 

than vice versa. 

Since the Gulf War the PLA has changed the way it trains to 

fight. For China, the Gulf War was a wake-up call. Prior to 

Desert Storm, the PLA high command predicted that US forces 

would become bogged down in the Gulf, as the Soviets did in 

Afghanistan. They were very surprised. The Chinese leadership’s 

reaction to the US victory was deep and lasting.68 They were 

impressed with the precision of US attacks and the lack of 

collateral damage. They were “stunned,” and “every element of 

the allied strategy left the PLA aghast and hammered home as 

never before the backwardness of the PLA.”69 The Gulf War 

forced the PLA to study the ways and means of implementing 

rapid reaction force concepts, theories, and operations that could 

conceivably impede US capabilities. Chinese strategists continue 

to study the transformation of the US military in the wake of the 

campaign against Iraq and other more recent military endeavors.70 

Certainly, the PLA has become more serious and realistic 

about training. Currently, PLA ground force units train at three 

levels: individual, small unit, and combined arms regiments and 

divisions.71 As noted earlier, RRUs have priority in training.72 

Since 1990, the PLA has increased the number of their large-scale 

joint and combined arms exercises, which incorporate night 

operations, opposition force scenarios (discussed in detail later), 

and live fire exercises.73

Since 1995 the PLA has increased the complexity of its 

exercises by adding long-range and intra-regional rapid 

deployments into exercise scenarios. For example, rapid reaction 
China’s Rise 

117

forces (RRF) units in different military regions (MRs) have 

conducted long-range and mobile combined exercises in 

challenging topographical locations such as the Gobi Desert, the 

Tibetan and Xinjiang highlands, and China’s southwestern 

tropical forests.74

More important, there has been some effort to increase the 

realism of field training, mainly through opposed-force exercise 

formats where a Blue (enemy) Force contingent offers resistance 

as the Red Force drives to its objective. In fact, some in the 

Chinese press report that Chinese troops are being trained for war 

with the United States, using methods freely handed over to them 

by the US Army. According to Beijing Junshi Wenzha, an official 

Chinese military publication, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

visitors to US Army exercises went home “loaded with valuable 

information about how the U.S. would engage the PLA in the 

event of war.”75 The digest reported that Chinese military 

officials visited the U.S. Owensburg National Training Center 

(“Owensburg” may be Ft. Irwin) several years ago and observed 

“the sharp exchanges between US troops and a simulated 

opposition “Blue Force.” 

After the Chinese group of representatives returned home 

to China, they made a special report to the Central 

Military Commission,” the digest added. “In March of 

the next year, based on authorization from the CMC, the 

Nanjing Military Region [in southern China, responsible 

for the Taiwan Strait] formally organized a combined 

tactics training center. At this point, China then had its 

first ‘Blue Army’ base.76 

At a supposedly secret base in China’s eastern Anhui 

province, “training is held strictly in accordance with the 

commands and orders used in foreign armies and their training 

formats, with even the mess hall using knives and forks [similar to 
China’s Rise 

118

those in the United States].”77 The digest reports: “In today’s 

Chinese Army, there is a ‘Blue Army’ base specializing in 

simulating the war tactics of foreign militaries in order to compel 

our army in counter operations to ‘Know the Enemy’ and 

therefore ‘defeat the enemy.’” The publication leaves no doubt 

that the “enemy” is the United States, which generously taught 

China how to train its troops to fight us in a future war.78 

Many might speculate that this report is bogus. After all, it 

has been mainly referenced in the right-of center media and there 

is no Owensburg National Training Center. Still, other reports in 

the Chinese press lend it some credibility. Between July 1997 and 

January 2001, Chinese sources reported the establishment of 

combined arms tactical training centers and special aggressor 

units, designed to improve operational efficiency of the PLA in a 

combat environment. The 1997 Chinese Military Encyclopedia

(Zhongguo Junshi Baike Quanshu) refers to “components of 

combined arms tactical training centers consisting of a command 

system, a ‘blue’ or aggressor unit (moni budui), an opposition 

force (OPFOR) training site, a computer simulation room, a 

control center, and logistic service facilities.”79 The secret Anhui 

training center is referred to in a May 2000 article in the World 

Military Affairs Journal (Shijie Junshi) as the first combined arms 

tactical training center in China. The center is capable of 

supporting realistic combined arms tactical training and uses a 

secret OPFOR aggressor unit with some interesting 

characteristics. Troops assigned to this unit wear green berets, 

camouflage uniforms, and special badges. In communications 

with armored cars, tanks and armed helicopters, animal names are 

used instead of the local call signs which the PLA normally uses. 
China’s Rise 

119

During OPFOR exercises, weapons are fitted with laser-beam 

attachments for a realistic battlefield effect.80 

All seven of China’s military regions (MRs) have combined 

arms training centers that use OPFOR units. Based on several 

reports however, it appears that the more robust OPFOR 

capabilities are at the Anhui Training Center, which is in the 

Nanjing Military Region, and the Beijing Military Region’s 

training center.81 Under the old system, the PLA always managed 

to “trounce the aggressor unit,” but in 1997 that changed “to 

ensure a fair evaluation of tactical actions and to enhance the 

exercise effect.”82 OPFOR units in the Beijing and Nanjing MRs 

speak foreign languages, wear special uniforms and use tactics, 

equipment, organization and training which are exactly like those 

of a hypothetical enemy.83 Many, including the authors of this 

paper, believe that the “hypothetical enemy” is the United States. 

Fortunately, while the PLA’s “blue force” OPFOR is probably 

based on a United States model, it does not have—at least in the 

near term—US capabilities. Indeed, as with most articles 

concerning PLA in the Chinese press, one has to discern how 

much is wishful thinking and how much is reality. Dennis Blasko, 

perhaps the best-informed PLA watcher, speculates that 

“theoretically, the Chinese will seek to emulate U.S. or Western 

tactics, but the reality would be much harder to accomplish since 

the PLA has so little of the gear necessary to carry out U.S. 

tactical battle (Airland Battle) operations.”84 For example, “the 

entire PLA ground forces of some 2 million has a total of 250 or 

so helicopters of all types including transport, reconnaissance, 

attack, and medevac.”85 Compare this with the American 101st

Airborne (Air Mobile) Division which has about the same number 
China’s Rise 

120

of helicopters with greater capabilities in just one division.86 The 

PLA’s lack of helicopters, modern tanks, armored personnel 

carriers, and night fighting capabilities, would make it difficult to 

replicate what US forces can do on the battlefield. According to 

Blasko, “the PLA may be able to simulate U.S. forces, but they 

really could not be used to the same degree our forces could.”87 

True, the PLA has a great way to go to achieve more realism in 

combined operations training, but they seem to be following the 

US model. 

The U.S. Army’s approach to this problem was to create 

several training centers where units face a highly-trained 

opposing force (OPFOR) in a free-play exercise 

environment. Laser simulators, video and audio 

recording, impartial umpires, and elaborate 

instrumentation create a realistic combat environment and 

provide extensive feedback to the exercising unit. Central 

to the National Training Center experiences is the 

freedom to fail, in fact the freedom to be thoroughly 

trounced by the OPFOR if the commander, staff, and unit 

are not well prepared. . . . The training centers, 

simulators, and training programs took the U.S. Army 

over a decade to develop and implement. It will take the 

PLA at least as long, and that only after they embrace the 

concept of realism in training and the freedom to fail that 

entails.88

Notwithstanding their current limitations, the trend in the 

PLA’s training center philosophy seems to follow the United 

States example. There has been an effort to increase field training 

realism, through OPFOR exercise formats using enemy (Blue 

Force) contingents that counter PLA (Red Force) operations. Red 

Forces do not always win as they did in the past, which might 

indicate there is freedom to fail. Also, as mentioned previously, 

Chinese sources indicate the PLA are incorporating “miles-type” 
China’s Rise 

121

equipment, computer assisted simulations, and video assisted 

after-action reviews (AARs). 

Because the PLA has followed the United States example in 

setting up its training centers and fights against a Blue Force 

OPFOR with what seem to be “American characteristics,” one 

might assume that the US Army would in at least some scenarios, 

employ an OPFOR (referred to as the Red Force) that fights with 

Chinese Characteristics. Not true. The Red Force OPFOR at all 

US Army Combat Training Centers—the National Training 

Center at Ft. Irwin, California, Joint Readiness Training Center at 

Ft. Polk, Louisiana, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center at 

Hohenfels, Germany—are called Krasnovians and use modified 

Soviet tactics and equipment. The mission of the training centers 

is to provide tough, realistic combined arms and combat service 

support training for light and heavy battalion task forces in low-tomid-to-high intensity threat environments and to provide units 

with quality, standardized feedback on their performance. An 

integral part of accomplishing this mission is the OPFOR. The 

OPFOR replicates a motorized rifle regiment (MRR) and smaller 

operational units based on the forces of the former Soviet model, 

employing their organizations, doctrine, and tactics, as well as 

equipment that has been modified for today’s battlefield 

environment.89 

Interestingly, there is very little taught about the People’s 

Liberation Army in US Army schools. The Infantry School at Ft. 

Benning, Georgia does not teach anything about the People’s 

Liberation Army doctrine, operations, or tactics in either the Basic 

or Advanced Courses,90 nor do any of the Army branch 

qualification schools.91 The Army’s Command and General Staff 
China’s Rise 

122

College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas has a China survey course 

that deals with security issues, but not at all with how the PLA 

fights. 

The lack of PLA studies in the US Army training and 

education establishment is unfortunate. We believe that the US 

Army needs to devote more resources to understanding how the 

Chinese military approaches strategic issues and how they fight. 

The Chinese way of analyzing security problems and conducting 

warfare is often radically different from the West’s. In our 

opinion, a greater understanding of the thinking and outlook of 

China’s military planners, doctrine writers, and commanders is 

necessary if the United States and China are to avoid dangerous 

miscalculation in the future.92

TRAINING TO FIGHT: THE WAY AHEAD

If understanding how the PLA fights is important, how should 

the US Army go about it? These are our suggestions: 

• Insist that all military academies, mid-level and senior 

service schools teach the Naval Post-Graduate School’s 

“Seminar on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army” or 

the Army’s Command and General Staff College’s course 

titled “China: Military Art, Wars and Revolutions, and 

the People’s Liberation Army.” Shorter variants of either 

course should be taught at selected Branch School career 

courses. 

• Organize, train, and equip a PLA OPFOR unit. Consider 

using the US Army National Guard for this unit and 

employing the unit in an Mobile Training Team 

configuration at Combat Training Centers (CTCs), BCTP 

Warfighter exercises, and TRADOC branch schools. 

Develop a core group of China strategic and operational 

experts to devise realistic OPFOR plans and to advise US 

Army units on ways to operate against such a potential 

threat. 
China’s Rise 

123

• Consider using the 141st Military Intelligence Battalion 

(Linguist) from the Utah National Guard as a major 

resource from which to build a credible PLA OPFOR 

unit. 

CONCLUSION 

As noted at the outset of this paper, the emerging security 

environment in Asia poses significant challenges and 

opportunities for the United States. China’s strategic and 

operational perspective and plans are continuously being modified 

in reaction to domestic and international influences. It is critical 

that the United States do likewise to ensure that we not only help 

shape the future but remain ready to act and react should an 

environment develop counter to United States interests. The US 

Army, as always, plays a key role in that effort. 

Anticipating change is always difficult. What is beyond 

question is that China’s strategic and operational intent will 

continue to develop and the United States cannot be sure of what 

impact that development will have on US interests and goals in 

the region. It remains important for the United States to 

continuously review emerging capabilities and intentions of 

potential friends or foes to anticipate how best to retain the 

initiative, apply resources and address various alternatives. 

Likewise, we believe that it is important that any such a review 

provide specific proposals as to the way ahead so that we can best 

be postured to deter and defend in the future. It is hoped that this 

paper has contributed to that effort. 

Increased military exchanges with greater education and 

training best positions the US Army to deal with any eventuality 

in dealing with China. The skills needed to do both require a 

detailed and continuous planning, coordination and execution. 
China’s Rise 

124

The potential benefits for the US Army, the joint community and 

the nation can prove great if exchanges and training are done in a 

way that builds understanding by increasing communication yet 

hedges our bets but ensuring that we are trained to fight against 

this unique adversary should the occasion arise. China’s rise will 

continue. Leaning forward in the foxhole ensures that America’s 

ground forces will be ready for every eventuality. 

NOTES 

 

1

 Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment 

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), 316. 

2

 Ibid, xxxiii. 

3

 Ibid; Nan Li, “From Revolutionary Internationalism to Conservative 

Nationalism,” Peaceworks 39 (Washington, DC: US Institute of 

Peace, 2001), 33. 

4

 Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: 

China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International 

Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 5. 

5

 Ibid, 5-7; Fareed Zakaria, “China’s Redoubtable Weakness . . .,” 

Washington Post, April 9, 2001, A19. 

6

 Murray Hiebert, “Red Scare,” FarEastern Economic Review, 

October 12, 2001, www.feer.com/2000 /0010_12/p28. 

7

 Christensen, 5. 

8

 Ibid, 28. 

9

 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, “The Coming Conflict with 

America,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (March-April 1997): 19. 

10 Robert Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power,” Foreign Affairs

76, no. 2 (March-April 1997): 33. 

11 Robert G. Kaiser, “2025 Vision: A China Bent on Asian 

Dominance; Group Bids to Forecast Strategic Challenges,” 

Washington Post, March 17, 2000, A25. 

12 Hiebert, 28. 

13 Larry M. Wortzel, “How to Respond to China’s Coercive 

Behavior,” Background no. 1431 (Washington, DC: The Heritage 
China’s Rise 

125

 

Foundation, April 18, 2001), www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/ 

bg1431.html, 6-7. 

14 William Pfaff, “What’s the Rationale for Seeing China As Enemy,” 

International Herald Tribune, July 2, 2001, 1. 

15 Thomas Bickford, “Myths and Realities of China’s Military 

Power,” Foreign Policy in Focus 6, no. 14, April 2001, 1; Hiebert, 

28. 

16 “Long March to Modernization,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 11 

2001, ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin, 33, 43. 

17 Nicholas Berry, “China is Not An Imperialist Power,” Strategic 

Review (Winter 2001), 2. 

18 Ross, 34; Pfaff, 2. 

19 “Chinese Specialists are Concerned About U.S. Advance to Central 

Asia,” Wenweipo News, January 16, 2002; Mingpao News, January 

11, 2002. 

20 Ibid. 

21 David R. Sands, “China Counters U.S. Influence,” Washington 

Times, January 11, 2002, 13. 

22 Susan V. Lawrence, “It Takes More To Make A Revolution,” Far 

Eastern EconomicReview. 

February 14, 2002, www.feer.com/2002 /0002_14/p22. 

23 Ibid. 

24 Nan Li, 5. 

25 Pillsbury, 292. 

26 Bernstein and Munro, 51. 

27 Pillsbury, 278-9. 

28 Ibid, 46, 261-3; Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted 

Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 

February 1999), 45-6; Christensen, 12. 

29 Melinda Liu and Gregory Beals, “Peacekeepers of the Pacific,” 

Newsweek Special Edition (Issues Asia), Summer 2001, 28. 

30 Nan Li, 33. 

31 Chen Yuanchao, “Using ‘Bee Swarm Tactics’ to Attack an Aircraft 

Carrier,” Contemporary Navy(PRC), August 2001, 47. 
China’s Rise 

126

 

32 Dennis Blasko, as quoted in Pillsbury, 273. 

33 Andrew N.D. Yang and COL Milton Wen-Chung Liao, “PLA 

Rapid Reaction Forces: Concept, Training and Preliminary 

Assessment,” 50-1. 

34 Ibid, 56. 

35 Ibid, 49. 

36 “Long March to Modernization,” 3-4. 

37 Ibid, 4-5; Guangjiao Jing (Wide Angle), Hong Kong, China, March 

16, 2000, 19; Jiefangjun Bao, Beijing, China, September 8, 2000, 2. 

38 “Chinese Air Defense Radar Performance Requirements in HighTech Local Conflicts,” Huokong Leida Jishu (Fire Control Radar 

Technology), Xian, China, September 25, 2000, 2; Richard K. Betts 

and Thomas J. Christensen, “China: Getting the Questions Right,” 

National Interest 62 (Winter 2000-1): 8-9; “Long March to 

Modernization,” 18; Pillsbury, 25. 

39 Qiao and Wang, 1. 

40 Charles F. Hawkins, “The People’s Liberation Army Looks to the 

Future,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 2000): 16. 

41 Betts, 11. 

42 David Shambaugh, “China’s Military Views the World: 

Ambivalent Security,” International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 

1999/2000): 3. 

43 Conversation with US military attaché, Beijing, September 10, 

2001. 

44 Betts and Christensen, 18. 

45 Walter Neal Anderson, Overcoming Uncertainty: U.S.-China 

Strategic Relations in the 21st Century, Institute for National Security 

Studies Occasional Paper 29, October 1999, http://www.usafa.af.mil/ 

inss/ocp29.htm. 

46 Ibid. 

47 Ibid. 

48 Ibid. 

49 Ibid; Christensen, “Posing Problems,” 7. 
China’s Rise 

127

 

50 Letter from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Bob 

Stump, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States 

House of Representatives, June 8, 2001. 

51 Anderson. 

52 Ibid. 

53 David Shambaugh, “China’s Military Views the World: 

Ambivalent Security,” International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 

1999/2000): 2. 

54 Ibid, 12. 

55 Ibid; Conversation with US Military Attache, Beijing,, September 

10, 2001. 

56 Shambaugh, 2, 12; US Military Attache conversation. 

57 Anderson, 4. 

58 “Report on military to military exchanges with the People’s 

Liberation Army (Calendar year 2000 Military Program).” 

Attachment to letter from Wolfowitz to Stump, June 8, 2001. 

59 Ibid. 

60 Letter from Wolfowitz to Stump. 

61 Conversation with COL John Corbett, Jr., OSD China Desk 

Officer, June 21, 2001. 

62 Ibid. 

63 Discussion with senior US Pacific Command (USPACOM) officer, 

September 10, 2001. 

64 Ibid. 

65 Corbett. 

66 Senior USPACOM officer. 

67 Anderson. 

68 Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army: ‘Short 

Arms and Slow Legs,’ Institute for National Security Studies 

Occasional Paper 28, September 1999, 16. 

69 David Shambaugh, “China’s Military: Real or Paper Tiger?” The 

Washington Quarterly 19, no. 2 (Spring, 1996): 25. 

70 Kathryn L. Gauthier, “China as Peer Competitor? Air War College 

Maxwell Paper No. 18, July 1999, 23. 
China’s Rise 

128

 

71 James Mulvenon, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Army: 

The Struggle for Identity,” Rand, 15. 

72 Dennis Blasko, Philip T. Klapakis, and John F. Corbett, Jr., 

“Training Tomorrow’s PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks,” China 

Quarterly, June 1996, 552. 

73 Ibid, 490. 

74 Andrew Young, 51. 

75 Al Santoli, “Chinese Prepare for War Using Mock US Military 

Base,” China Reform Monitor No. 348, December 12, 2000, Internet, 

http://www.afpc.org/crm/crm348.htm. 

76 Ibid. 

77 Ibid. 

78 “U.S. Trains China for War.....With U.S.” NewsMax.com, 

December 13, 2000, Internet, http://wwwacs.ucsd.edu/~ucsdgop/tradechina.html. 

79 “Components of Combined Arms Tactical Training Centers,” 

Zhongguo Junshi Baike Quanshu (JBQ), Vol. 2, July 1997, 238-238. 

80 “Aggressor Unit.” Hainan Ribao, February 7, 2000, 1. 

81 Ibid. 

82 “Hainan Military District Picked its Best Company to Serve as 

Aggressor Unit,” Zhanshi Bao, November 20, 2000, 1. 

83 Qianwei Bao, August 20, 2000, 2. See also Asian Studies 

Detachment, Okinawa Report March 2001, paragraphs 5-C-4, 6-C-

(1), (2), and E-(2). 

84 Dennis Blasko, discussions re: PLA Training via e-mail, August 

31, 2001. 

85 Ibid. 

86 The exact numbers for the 101st are 24 AH64A, 48 AH64D, 32 

OH58D, 98 Uh60L, 16 UH 60A, 12 UH 60AA, and 48 CH47 

helicopters. 

87 Ibid. 

88 Lonnie Henley, “China’s Capacity for Achieving a Revolution in 

Military Affairs,” China and the Revolution in Military Affairs 

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies 

Institute, May 20, 1996). 
China’s Rise 

129

 

89 James R. Macklin, “Aviation Support at the NTC,” on the Internet 

http://www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/MayJun01/MS609.htm. 

See also, http://call.army.mil/products/ctc_bull/93-4/93-4prt6.htm. 

90 Phone conversation with Sgt. Tipton, Tactics Division, US Army 

Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, April 9, 2002. 

91 Conversations with Lieutenant General Val Alstyne, July 21, 2001. 

92 These were similar to the findings at a “Nixon Center Seminar” 

conducted in December 1998 that was attended by several China 

specialists including David Shambaugh, Michael Pillsbury, and David 

Lampton. Found on the web at http://www.nixoncenter.org/

publications/Program%20Briefs/vol4no19PLA.htm. 
China’s Rise 

130

 
INSS OCCASIONAL PAPERS 

 1. Explaining Weapon s Proliferation: Going Beyond the Security Dilemma. 

Gregory J. Rattray, July 1994. 

 2. The Ukranian Military: Instrument for Defense or Domestic Challenge? Oleg 

Strekal, November 1994. 

 3. North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration’s Response. 

William E. Berry, Jr., March 1995 

 4. Environmental Assistance as National Security Policy: Helping the Former 

Soviet Union Find Solutions to its Environmental Problems. Robert L. 

Dunaway, November 1995 

 5. Economic Power in the Sino-U.S. Relationship. Kevin F. Donovan, December 

1995 

 6. Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat? William H. Kincade, December 

1995

 7. Nuclear Proliferation: The Diplomatic Role of Non-Weaponized Programs. 

Rosalind R. Reynolds, January 1996

 8. Five Minutes Past Midnight: The Clear and Present Danger of Nuclear 

Weapons Grade Fissile Materials. Guy B. Roberts, February 1996 

 9. The International Legal Implications of Information Warfare. Richard W. 

Aldrich, April 1996 

10. Weapons Proliferation and Organized Crime: The Russian Military and Security 

Force Dimension. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., June 1996 

11. Melancholy Reunion: A Report from the Future on the Collapse of CivilMilitary Relations in the United States. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., October 1996 

12. Russia’s Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: An Opportunity for 

Arms Control. Stephen P. Lambert and David A. Miller, April 1997

13. Political-Military Affairs Officers and the Air Force: Continued Turbulence in a 

Vital Career Specialty. James E. Kinzer and Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, April 

1997 

14. Environmental Federalism and U.S. Military Installations: A Framework for 

Compliance. James M. Smith, June 1997. 

15. Nonlethal Weapons: Terms and References. Robert J. Bunker, July 1997. 

16. Threat Perceptions in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. William E. 

Berry, Jr., September 1997. 

17. NATO Counterproliferation Policy: A Case Study In Alliance Politics. Jeffrey A. 

Larsen, November 1997. 

18. Uncharted Paths, Uncertain Vision: U.S. Military Involvements in Sub-Saharan 

Africa in the Wake of the Cold War. Dan Henk, March 1998. 

19. USAF Culture and Cohesion: Building an Air and Space Force for the 21st

Century. James M. Smith, June 1998. 

20. A Post-Cold War Nuclear Strategy Model. Gwedolyn Hall, John T. Cappello, and 

Stephen P. Lambert, July 1998. 
21. Counterforce: Locating and Destroying Weapons of Mass Destruction. Robert W. 

Chandler, September 1998. 

22. Environmental Security in the Czech Republic: Status and Concerns in the PostCommunist Era, Paul J. Valley, October 1998. 

23. NATO: Potential Sources of Tension, Joseph R. Wood, February 1999. 

24. Juggling the Bear: Assessing NATO Enlargement in Light of Europe's Past and 

Asia's Future, David S. Fadok, March 1999. 

25. The Next Peace Operation: U.S. Air Force Issues and Perspectives, William C. 

Thomas and Jeremy D. Cukierman, May 1999. 

26. Interpreting Shadows: Arms Control and Defense Planning in a Rapidly 

Changing Multi-Polar World, David R. King, June 1999. 

27. Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria’s Nuclear Weapons Experience, Roy E. Horton, 

III, August 1999. 

28. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army: “Short Arms and Slow Legs,” Russell D. 

Howard, September 1999. 

29. Overcoming Uncertainty: U.S. China Strategic Relations in the 21st Century,

Walter N. Anderson, October 1999. 

30. The Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Policy: Moving Toward Space Control, 

Joan Johnson-Freese, January 2000. 

31. Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Implications for U.S. Security 

Concerns, Jerome M. Conley, February 2000. 

32. Cyberterrorism and Computer Crimes: Issues Surrounding the Establishment of 

an International Legal Regime, Richard W. Aldrich, April 2000. 

33. Sharing the Knowledge: Government-Private Sector Partnerships to Enhance 

Information Security, Steven M. Rinaldi, May 2000. 

34. Prospects for a Conventional Arms Reduction Treaty and Confidence-Building 

Measures in Northeast Asia, Bonnie D. Jenkins, August 2000. 

35. Water: The Hydraulic Parameter of Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa, 

Stephen D. Kiser, September 2000. 

36. This Arms Control Dog Won’t Hunt: The Proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off 

Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament, Guy B. Roberts, January 2001. 

37. The Rollback of South Africa’s Biological Warfare Program, Stephen Burgess and 

Helen Purkitt, February 2001. 

38. Constraints, Restraints, and the Role of Aerospace Power in the 21st Century, 

Jeffrey K. Beene, April 2001. 

39. Aerospace Power in Urban Warfare: Beware the Hornet’s Nest, Peter C. Hunt, 

May 2001. 

40. US Policy Towards Sucession in the Balkans and Effectiveness of De Facto 

Partition, Evelyn N. Farkas; and Improving US-Russian Relations Through 

Peacekeeping Operations, Beth L. Makros and Jeremy C. Saunders, June 2001. 
41. The Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), Edward G. Gunning, 

Jr., July 2001. 

42. United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-First Century, Peter L. Hays, 2002 

(published jointly with Air University Press). 

43. Lords of the Silk Route: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia, Troy S. Thomas 

and Stephen D. Kiser, May 2002. 

44. “All Our Tomorrows”: A Long-Range Forecast of Global Trends Affecting Arms 

Control Technology, James M. Smith and Jeffrey A. Larsen, June 2002. 

45. “Squaring the Circle”: Cooperative Security and Military Operation, Jeffrey D. 

McCausland, July 2002. 

46. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Debunking the Mythology, John T. Cappello, 

Gwendolyn M. Hall, and Stephen P. Lambert, August 2002. 
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY 

Lieutenant General John R. Dallager 

Superintendent 

Brigadier General David A. Wagie 

Dean of the Faculty 

HEADQUARTERS, US AIR FORCE 

NUCLEAR AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION DIRECTORATE 

Brigadier General Robert L. Smolen 

Director 

Colonel Franklin Wolf 

Chief, National Security Policy Division 

USAF INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES 

Dr James M. Smith 

Director 

Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Bidlack 

Deputy Director 

Ms Diana S. Heerdt 

INSS Budget and Program Assistant 

Ms Amarllis Hazlip 

Cover Design