[Cite as In re K.H., 2013-Ohio-5743.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

Nos. 99981 and 99982 

IN RE: K.H. 

A Minor Child

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Juvenile Division 

Case No. DL 13100558 

BEFORE: Jones, P.J., S. Gallagher, J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 26, 2013 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 

Timothy Young 

State Public Defender 

Sheryl A. Trzaska 

Assistant State Public Defender 

250 East Broad Street 

Suite 1400 

Columbus, Ohio 43215

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Joseph J. Ricotta 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J.: 

{¶1} Juvenile-appellant, K.H., appeals his commitment to the Ohio Department of 

Youth Services (“DYS”). We affirm. 

I. Procedural History

{¶2} In 2009, K.H. was found delinquent of aggravated robbery with a one-year 

firearm specification and felonious assault. He was committed to DYS for a period of 

two years up to his twenty-first birthday. When he was released from DYS, he was 

placed on parole, but he violated parole, and was placed at a residential center and 

continued on probation. 

{¶3} In 2013, K.H. was charged with escape and with violating his probation in 

his aggravated robbery case after he failed to return to the residential center after being 

allowed to visit his father during the 2012 Christmas holiday. He admitted to both 

charges and the juvenile court committed him to DYS for a minimum of one year, 

maximum to his twenty-first birthday. The court also revoked his probation in his 

aggravated robbery case and committed him to DYS for a minimum period of 90 days. 

The court later issued a nunc pro tunc journal entry and ordered that the two 

commitments be served consecutively. 

{¶4} K.H. filed a delayed notice of appeal in both cases and this court granted him 

leave to appeal. K.H. raises the following three assignments of error for our review: 

[I]. The juvenile court committed plain error when it 

ordered [K.H.] to serve a 

minimum period of ninety days 

for a revocation of his supervised 

release, because the court is 
limited to determining whether the 

child should be returned to the 

Department of Youth Services, 

and may not commit a child for a 

prescribed period of time. R.C. 

5139.52(F). 

[II.] The juvenile court committed plain error when it ordered [K.H.’s] 

revocation be served consecutively to his new commitment, because a 

juvenile court may not order a revocation of supervised release to be served 

consecutively to a new commitment to the Department of Youth Services. 

R.C. 2152.17. 

[III]. [K.H.] was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney 

failed to object to the imposition of an unlawful, consecutive commitment. 

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitutions; Ohio 

Constitution Article I, Sections 10 and 16. 

{¶5} We have consolidated the two appeals for briefing and disposition. 

II. Law and Analysis

Length of Commitment 

{¶6} In the first assignment of error, K.H. claims that the trial court erred when it 

ordered him to serve a minimum sentence of 90 days for his violating the terms of his 

probation. According to K.H., only DYS, not the court, may impose a term longer than 

30 days for a violation of his supervised release. K.H. concedes that because he did not 

object to the trial court’s imposition of sentence, he has waived all but plain error. Plain 

error exists when, but for the error, the outcome would have been different. In re J.T., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93241, 2009-Ohio-6224, ¶ 67. 

{¶7} R.C. 5139.52(F) governs the violation of supervised release and provides, in 

part: 

If the court * * * determines at the hearing that the child violated one or 
more of the terms and conditions of the child’s supervised release, the court 

* * * may revoke the child’s supervised release and order the child to be 

returned to the department of youth services for institutionalization or, in 

any case, may make any other disposition of the child authorized by law that 

the court considers proper. If the court orders the child to be returned to a 

department of youth services institution, the child shall remain 

institutionalized for a minimum period of thirty days * * *. [T]he release 

authority, in its discretion, may require the child to remain in 

institutionalization for longer than the minimum thirty-day period, and the 

child is not eligible for judicial release or early release during the minimum 

thirty-day period of institutionalization or any period of 

institutionalization in excess of the minimum thirty-day period. 

{¶8} The state notes that this court dealt with an analogous situation in In re D.B., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87445, 2012-Ohio-2505, and held that R.C. 5139.52(F) 

authorizes juvenile courts to impose a sentence greater than the minimum 30-day 

commitment period for a supervised release violation. 

{¶9} In In re D.B., D.B. violated his probation; the court revoked his probation and 

committed him to DYS. The court subsequently granted him judicial release and placed 

him under DYS supervision (parole). D.B. violated the terms of his parole and the trial 

court sent him back to DYS for 90 days. He was released from DYS custody, but was 

later recommitted to the institution for another 90 days after again violating the terms and 

conditions of his parole. 

{¶10} After D.B. was released from DYS, he violated parole another time and was 

recommitted to DYS. As part of his commitment, the trial court ordered that he be 

returned to DYS custody for a period of not less than 90 days or until he completed a 

specialized release program. D.B. appealed, arguing that the trial court did not have the 

authority to order more than a 30-day commitment. 
{¶11} This court disagreed, concluding that although the governing statute, R.C. 

5139.52(F), provides that a child “shall remain institutionalized for a minimum period of 

thirty days, the statute does not provide that a child may only be institutionalized for only 

30 days; rather, it states that the child must be given a minimum commitment of 30 days.” 

In re D.B. at ¶ 18. 

{¶12} This court reasoned that R.C. 5139.52(F) gives a juvenile court the 

discretion to “make any other disposition of the child authorized by law that the court 

considers proper” and “[u]se of the word ‘any’ means that the trial court had discretion to 

take any steps the court believed necessary to fully and completely implement the 

rehabilitative disposition of the child, including that of committing D.B. to DYS for 90 

days.” Id. 

{¶13} K.H. acknowledges our holding in In re D.B., but urges this court to reverse 

and follow the Second, Eleventh, and Twelfth Appellate Districts in holding that R.C. 

5139.52(F) does not authorize a juvenile court to return a child to the custody of the DYS 

for more than the minimum period of 30 days. In re J.C., 11th Dist. Geauga No. 

2012-G-3105, 2013-Ohio-2819; In re I.M., 2d Dist. Clark No. 2012 CA 20, 

2012-Ohio-3847; In re L.B.B., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-01-011, 2012-Ohio-4641.1

 

We decline to do so. 

{¶14} For reasons stated in D.B., we find that the statute allows the trial court to 

sentence a juvenile to more than 30 days of commitment. The trial court in this case had 

 1

The Ohio Supreme Court certified a conflict on this issue and the matter is pending review. 

In re L.L.B., 134 Ohio St.3d 1446, 2013-Ohio-347, 982 N.E.2d 726; In re H.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1417, 
the discretion and authority to fashion a sentence it found most appropriate for K.H. As 

will be discussed under the second assignment of error, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in sentencing K.H. to a 90-day commitment to DYS for his probation violation. 

{¶15} The first assignment of error is overruled. 

Consecutive Commitments 

{¶16} In the second assignment of error, K.H. argues that the court erred in 

ordering K.H.’s revocation be served consecutively to his new commitment because a 

juvenile court may not order a revocation of supervised release to be served consecutively 

to a new term of commitment. 

{¶17} A juvenile court’s order of disposition will not be reversed absent an abuse 

of discretion. In re D.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 361, 2006-Ohio-5851, 856 N.E.2d 921, ¶6. 

An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, 

or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 

(1983). 

{¶18} K.H. argues that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive terms of 

commitment because R.C. 2152.17(F) does not allow a court to impose a commitment for 

a parole or probation violation consecutive to another term of commitment. R.C. 

2152.17(F) provides: 

If a child adjudicated a delinquent child for committing two or more acts 

that would be felonies if committed by an adult and if the court * * * orders 

the commitment of the child for two or more of those acts to the legal 

 

2013-Ohio-158, 981 N.E.2d 884.
custody of the department of youth services * * * the court may order that 

all of the periods of commitment imposed under those sections for those 

acts be served consecutively * * * . 

{¶19} According to K.H., a court may only sentence a juvenile to consecutive 

terms of commitment when a court adjudicates a child delinquent for two or more acts 

that would be felonies if committed by an adult; that is, Ohio law does not authorize 

consecutive commitments for parole or probation violations. The state argues that R.C. 

2152.17(F) is not the sole governing authority that allows a juvenile court to impose 

consecutive sentences; because a juvenile court enjoys broad discretion to craft an 

appropriate disposition for a child adjudicated delinquent, the court has discretion to 

impose consecutive terms of commitment. 

{¶20} The state cites a recent decision by the Eleventh Appellate District to 

support its position. In In re N.P., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2012-A-0024, 

2013-Ohio-1288, appeal allowed, 136 Ohio St.3d 1449, 2013-Ohio-3210, 991 N.E.2d 

256, the Eleventh Appellate District held that, although R.C. 2152.17(F) is inapplicable to 

sentences for parole violations, because a juvenile court has discretion to craft an 

appropriate disposition for a child adjudicated delinquent, it has the inherent authority to 

run the child’s parole violation consecutive to another term of commitment. Id. at ¶ 17. 

A juvenile court may commit a child to the custody of ODYS for an 

indefinite term, not to exceed the child’s 21st birthday. R.C. 2152.16(A). 

It was therefore within the trial court’s inherent authority to run appellant’s 

parole violations consecutively. 

Id.; see also In re H.V., 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 11CA010139 and 11CA010140, 
2012-Ohio-3742, ¶ 9, appeal allowed, 134 Ohio St.3d 1417, 2013-Ohio-158, 981 N.E.2d 

884; In re K.P., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010183, 2012-Ohio-5814, ¶ 7 (holding that it 

is within the inherent authority of the juvenile court to run parole violations consecutively 

to DYS commitments for new crimes). 

{¶21} By the plain language of the statute, R.C. 2152.17(F) only applies when a 

child has been adjudicated delinquent for the commission of two or more acts that would 

be felonies if committed by an adult. Therefore, the statute is inapplicable to the case at 

bar. 

{¶22} We acknowledge that the Ohio Supreme Court is currently reviewing the 

Eleventh and Ninth Districts’ approach to consecutive terms of commitment when one of 

the terms is a probation or parole revocation. A juvenile court is mandated to impose 

dispositions that achieve the overriding purpose of R.C. 2152.01(B), which 

are to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development 

of children * * * , protect the public interest and safety, hold the offender 

accountable for the offender’s actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate 

the offender. 

In doing so, juvenile courts are specially charged with providing for the “care, protection, 

and mental and physical development of children subject to this chapter * * * .” R.C. 

2152.01(A). In allowing the trial court the discretion to fashion an appropriate sentence 

for a given child, including the imposition of consecutive terms of commitment, a court 

may best try to achieve these statutory purposes. 

{¶23} At the dispositional hearing in this case, K.H.’s father, stepmother, attorney, 

guardian ad litem, probation officer, parole officer, and the prosecutor were present in 
court. The juvenile court noted that K.H. failed to return to the residential center after 

being allowed to visit his father on a Christmas home pass. The court further noted that 

K.H. was not located until February 2013, when he was found at a hospital being treated 

for two gunshot wounds to the abdomen. 

{¶24} The court took into consideration that the residential center where K.H. had 

been living would not take him back, K.H.’s father told the court that his son had no 

remorse for his actions and would continue to “run the streets,” and K.H.’s guardian ad 

litem opined that the most appropriate placement for the child was DYS. The court also 

noted that K.H.’s history with the court began when he was 13 years old and shot another 

juvenile in the face; he then committed aggravated robbery and violated his parole. 

{¶25} The court determined it “literally ha[d] no other options to protect the safety 

of the community and [K.H.] besides ODYS.” The court told K.H. that it was 

specifically crafting his commitment so that he would be released from DYS around his 

18th birthday. 

{¶26} In light of the above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in running 

K.H.’s probation violation consecutive to his term of commitment for escape. 

{¶27} The second assignment of error is overruled. 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{¶28} In the third assignment of error, K.H. argues that he was afforded ineffective 

assistance of counsel because his attorney did not object to the length of his commitment. 

{¶29} “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 

counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In order to succeed on a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, K.H. must satisfy a two-prong test. First, he 

must demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 687. If he 

can show deficient performance, he must next demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the 

deficient performance. Id. To show prejudice, K.H. must establish there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of his 

dispositional hearing would have been different. 

{¶30} Because we have concluded that the court did not err in sentencing, we 

cannot conclude that counsel was ineffective for failing to object at the length of his 

commitment. Therefore, K.H. is unable to show that he received ineffective assistance 

of counsel. 

{¶31} The third assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶32} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. The finding of 

delinquency having been affirmed, any bail or stay of execution pending appeal is 

terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of commitment. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR