United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

March 1996 DRUG CONTROL

U.S. Heroin Program

Encounters Many

Obstacles in Southeast

Asia

GAO/NSIAD-96-83

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-270792 

March 1, 1996

The Honorable William F. Clinger, Jr.

Chairman, Committee on Government

 Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman

Chairman, Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The Honorable William H. Zeliff, Jr.

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 International Affairs, and Criminal Justice

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

In response to your requests, this report discusses (1) the extent of the

heroin threat to the United States, (2) the primary impediments to

successful heroin control efforts in Southeast Asia, and (3) the

effectiveness of the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) in

Burma. Appendix I addresses the feasibility of stemming opium

production in Burma through direct U.S. assistance to Burma’s Wa people,

the ethnic minority group responsible for most of the opium poppy

cultivation in Southeast Asia.

Background Like cocaine, heroin is produced outside the United States and is

smuggled into the country illegally. Trafficking in both drugs has spawned

several criminal industries, including money laundering, organized crime

syndicates, and associated smuggling operations. Opium poppies, from

which heroin is derived, are grown primarily in three regions of the

world—Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and Latin America. Heroin is

produced in a variety of geographic regions and trafficking routes are

more geographically dispersed than cocaine. Unlike most South American

cocaine organizations, heroin trafficking organizations are not vertically

integrated1

 and heroin shipments rarely remain under the control of a

single individual or organization as they move from the overseas refinery

to the streets of the United States. The principal source of heroin

1

Cocaine trafficking organizations control the production, financing, brokering, exporting, importing,

and final distribution of their product from the beginning of the process to the end. In heroin

trafficking organizations, separate groups operating in concert are responsible for each of these

phases.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

consumed in the United States is Southeast Asia, most of which originates

in one country—Burma. According to the Office of National Drug Control

Policy (ONDCP), in fiscal year 1993, the United States spent an estimated

$52.3 million, or about 10 percent of the international narcotics control

budget, on international heroin control activities. In fiscal year 1994, ONDCP

estimated the United States spent $47.6 million on international heroin

control activities or about 14 percent of the international narcotics control

budget.

U.S. heroin control programs have the following general objectives:

(1) assisting source countries in attacking opium production and heroin

refining, trafficking, and use; (2) gaining greater access to

opium-producing regions through bilateral and multilateral initiatives;

(3) pooling U.S. intelligence resources to assist U.S. and foreign law

enforcement agencies in targeting and arresting key leaders of major

heroin trafficking organizations; and (4) reducing the flow of heroin into

the United States. Current efforts focus on Southeast Asia because it is the

primary source of heroin smuggled into the United States.

Results in Brief While heroin is not the primary illegal narcotic in use in the United States,

heroin production, trafficking, and consumption are growing threats. Since

the late 1980s, worldwide production of opium has nearly doubled, and

U.S. emergency room episodes resulting from heroin overdoses have

increased by 50 percent. Although U.S. heroin control programs in

Southeast Asian countries other than Burma have had some limited

success, U.S. efforts have not reduced the flow of heroin from the region

because producers and traffickers shift transportation routes and growing

areas into countries with inadequate law enforcement capability or

political will. In 1994, Burma accounted for about 87 percent of the opium

cultivated in Southeast Asia and approximately 94 percent of the opium

production in the region. Thus, a key to stopping the flow of heroin from

Southeast Asia is addressing opium production in Burma. However, there

are several reasons why achieving this objective will be difficult.

• Since 1988, the U.S. government has not provided eradication assistance to

the Burmese government because it violently suppressed a pro-democracy

movement, began establishing a record of human rights abuses, and

refused to recognize the results of national elections in 1990 that removed

the military government from power. More importantly, because of the

complex Burmese political environment, U.S. assistance is unlikely to be

effective until the Burmese government demonstrates improvement in its

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

democracy and human rights policies and proves its legitimacy to ethnic

minority groups in opium-producing areas.

• The Burmese government is unable or unwilling to make a serious

commitment to ending the lucrative drug trade and is unlikely to gain the

required political support to control most of the opium cultivation and

heroin-trafficking areas within Burma.

• While heroin control efforts in Thailand and Hong Kong have achieved

some positive results, there has been little counternarcotics cooperation

with China, where important regional drug-trafficking routes have recently

emerged.

• UNDCP’s crop control, alternative development, and demand reduction

projects in Burma are too small in scale to significantly affect opium

poppy cultivation and opium production levels.

Heroin Poses a

Serious Drug Threat

to the United States

ONDCP views heroin as a serious danger to the United States, a threat

second only to cocaine. ONDCP reports that Americans consume an

estimated 10 to 15 metric tons of heroin annually, an increase from the

estimated 5 tons consumed each year in the mid-1980s. Heroin abuse has

increased due to the wider availability of high-quality heroin at low retail

or street prices.

From 1987 to 1994, the estimated worldwide production of opium grew

from 2,242 metric tons to 3,409 metric tons. The two leading source

countries, Burma and Afghanistan, are responsible for much of this

increase. For example, in 1994, Burma produced about 2,030 metric tons

of opium, or about 60 percent of worldwide production. The Department

of State estimates that this amount of opium could be refined into

approximately 169 metric tons of heroin, enough to meet U.S. demand

many times over. Although Burma’s 1994 production was limited by

adverse weather conditions, a recent survey in Burma indicates a

resurgence in production during the 1995 growing season that will

approach record levels. Figure 1 shows recent worldwide trends in opium

production in the primary source countries; figure 2 shows the primary

opium poppy cultivation areas in Southeast Asia.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

Figure 1: Worldwide Opium Production by Country, 1987-94 (in metric tons)

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

Metric tons

Burma Afghanistan Other countries

Source: Department of State.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

Figure 2: Southeast Asian Opium

Cultivation Areas

Low Density

High Density

India

China

Burma

Thailand

Laos

Vietnam

Vientiane

Rangoon

Andaman


Sea

Source: National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report, 1994.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

Southeast Asia supplies the majority of the heroin coming into the United

States. The Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) analysis of heroin

seized by law enforcement agencies in the United States during 1994

shows that 57 percent of the heroin originated from Southeast

Asia—virtually all of which was from Burma.2

 While Latin American

heroin is produced in smaller quantities compared to Southeast Asia, DEA

reports that the availability of South American heroin in the United States

has increased in recent years. U.S. counternarcotics officials are

concerned that Colombian drug-trafficking organizations are ready to

further augment their share of the U.S. market. While Southwest Asian

countries produce more opium than those in Latin America, the primary

market for Southwest Asian heroin is Western Europe.

High-Quality Product Is

Now Available for a

Cheaper Price

In recent years, the purity of heroin available on U.S. streets has risen

significantly, while prices have fallen. This combination is a key indicator

of the increasing availability of heroin in the United States. In its

August 1995 annual report, the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers

Committee stated that the nationwide average purity for retail heroin was

40 percent in 1994, a dramatic increase from the single-digit purity levels

of the mid-1980s and much higher than the 26.6-percent purity level

reported in 1991. In New York City, the largest importation and

distribution center in the United States for Southeast Asian heroin,

average purity levels have risen from 34 percent in 1988 to 63 percent in

mid-1994. This rise in overall purity levels has been attributed to the

increased availability of high-quality Southeast Asian and South American

heroin. While purity levels have risen, heroin prices have fallen to their

lowest levels ever, according to ONDCP. For example, DEA reports that

heroin prices in New York City dropped from $1.81 per milligram in 1988

to $0.37 by mid-1994.

U.S. counternarcotics officials believe heroin’s greater availability is

allowing increased experimentation with a highly addictive drug.

Moreover, the higher purity levels permit users to ingest heroin through

nasal inhalation versus injection with hypodermic syringes. Users find

inhalation attractive because it is easier than injection, and they can avoid

contracting the diseases associated with using needles.

2

The results of 1994 seizure data show that 32 percent of the remaining heroin seized was from South

America, 6 percent from Southwest Asia, and 5 percent from Mexico.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

Heroin User Population

May Be Increasing

The U.S. heroin user population may be increasing in response to the

increased availability of heroin. ONDCP estimates there are up to 

600,000 hardcore heroin addicts in the United States. While there is no

evidence suggesting there is an epidemic of new users, reports indicate

that the heroin user population may be gradually increasing. Much of this

increase is among drug users whose prime drug of abuse is not heroin.

ONDCP reports that this link is especially strong for long-term users of

“crack” cocaine, who use heroin to counter the depressive effects of

withdrawal from cocaine use. Furthermore, data on heroin-related

emergency room visits show that the problems associated with long-term

heroin use are also on the rise. For example, the annual number of

emergency room episodes involving heroin increased from 42,000 in 1989

to almost 63,000 in 1993, a 50-percent increase. According to the Substance

Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, emergency room

admissions for heroin abuse in Baltimore alone increased 364 percent

from 1989 to 1993.

Regional Approach

Required for an

Effective Heroin

Control Effort

The U.S. international heroin strategy, signed by the President on

November 21, 1995, calls for a regional approach focused on Southeast

Asia and the need to reduce opium production in Burma to stop the flow

of heroin into the United States. The objectives of the new strategy remain

similar to the earlier objectives. The implementation of the Burma portion

of the strategy relies on the development of counternarcotics dialogue

with Burmese authorities, exchange of counternarcotics information,

in-country counternarcotics training, and continued support for UNDCP

efforts. Implementation guidelines for the new strategy are currently under

review and it is not clear at this point to what extent resources will be

dedicated to support the strategy.

As noted in the strategy, Burma remains the key to successful regional

heroin control efforts, due to its status as the world’s leading heroin

producer. However, the United States does not provide significant

counternarcotics assistance to Burma because of its record of human

rights abuses and the Burmese military dictatorship is not equipped to

address ethnic disputes that impact on development of an effective

regional program. Moreover, difficulties in tracking and interdicting

heroin-trafficking organizations have limited the effectiveness of

international law enforcement efforts against the criminal organizations

responsible for moving the drug from Southeast Asia into the United

States. In addition, poor law enforcement cooperation between the United

States and China demonstrates the difficulties in interdicting key

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

heroin-trafficking routes. Despite these obstacles, U.S. efforts have

achieved some positive results in countries or territories with sufficient

will to implement counternarcotics activities, such as Thailand and Hong

Kong.

Burma Is the Key to

Implementing an Effective

Southeast Asian Heroin

Strategy

The key to effective U.S. heroin control efforts in Southeast Asia is

stopping the flow of Burmese heroin into the United States. In 1994,

Burma accounted for about 87 percent of the opium cultivated in

Southeast Asia and approximately 94 percent of the opium production in

the region. Most of the heroin smuggled into the United States originates

in Burma’s eastern Shan State. Unless the United States addresses opium

poppy cultivation and production in Burma, U.S. regional heroin control

efforts will have only a marginal impact. However, several factors create

substantial difficulties in establishing effective programs in Burma. U.S.

policy toward Burma prohibits providing significant levels of

counternarcotics assistance until the Burmese government improves its

human rights stance and recognizes the democratic process. In addition,

the Burmese government does not control the majority of opium

cultivation areas within its borders and has not seriously pursued opium

reduction efforts on its own. Moreover, ethnic insurgent armies that

control most of the opium cultivation and heroin-trafficking areas are

reliant on proceeds from the drug trade and are unlikely to relinquish this

source of income under the current Burmese government.

U.S. Policy Prohibits

Counternarcotics

Assistance to Burma

In response to Burmese government human rights abuses and

unwillingness to restore democratic government, the United States has

terminated almost all counternarcotics assistance. In 1988, the Burmese

military violently suppressed antigovernment demonstrations for

economic and political reform and began establishing a record of human

rights abuses, including politically motivated arrests, torture, and forced

labor and relocations. In 1990, the Burmese people voted to replace the

government in national elections, but the military regime refused to

recognize the results and remained in power. Further, for decades, the

Burmese government has engaged in fighting with insurgent armies

representing ethnic minority groups who want autonomous control of

territory they occupy within Burma’s borders. Some of these groups,

particularly the Wa people of Burma’s eastern Shan State, control major

opium production and heroin trafficking areas and have fought

successfully to maintain their independence from the central government.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

Over the past 8 years, the military regime has consolidated its control and

virtually eliminated any threat to its power in Rangoon.

In 1988, the United States discontinued foreign aid to Burma in response

to concerns over human rights abuses by the Burmese government. U.S.

assistance had supported the Burmese government’s opium poppy

eradication program during fiscal years 1974 through 1988. In response to

the Burmese government’s insufficient efforts to address increasing opium

production and heroin-trafficking within its borders, the President has

denied certification for counternarcotics cooperation since 1989.3

While the United States does not provide direct counternarcotics funding

support, limited U.S. assistance has continued through low-level

counternarcotics cooperation between Burmese law enforcement

authorities and DEA. For example, DEA shares drug intelligence with the

Burmese police on a case-by-case basis and conducted a basic drug

enforcement training seminar in December 1994. In August 1995, a training

course was offered to Burmese law enforcement officials on customs

screening and interdiction techniques. These activities are closely

monitored by the U.S. embassy in Rangoon to ensure the Burmese

government does not interpret the cooperation as a sign that the United

States is deemphasizing its policy priorities of furthering human rights and

democratization.

Although law enforcement cooperation is needed to upgrade a poorly

equipped and trained Burmese police force and establish information

sharing, U.S. counternarcotics officials believe that the key to stopping the

flow of Burmese heroin into the United States is through crop eradication

and alternative development support. More importantly, because of the

complex Burmese political environment, U.S. assistance is unlikely to be

effective until the Burmese government demonstrates improvement in its

democracy and human rights policies and proves its legitimacy to ethnic

minority groups in opium producing areas. In October 1995, the Assistant

Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

Affairs stated that in the long run, an accountable Burmese government

3

Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, sets out requirements for withholding

of bilateral foreign assistance and opposition to multilateral assistance to major illicit drug-producing

countries and major drug transit countries. These provisions will not apply in cases in which, under

section 490(b), the President determines and certifies to Congress that either (1) the country has

cooperated fully during the previous year with the United States or has taken adequate steps on its

own to achieve compliance with the goals and objectives established by the United Nations

Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances or (2) vital national

interests of the United States require support for such assistance.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

that enjoys legitimacy in opium-growing areas will be more willing and

able to crack down on the drug trade.

Burmese Government Has

Not Demonstrated a

Serious Commitment to

Drug Control Efforts

In furthering its consolidation of power, the Burmese government has also

furthered opium production and heroin-trafficking activities through

cease-fire agreements it has signed with some ethnic insurgent armies.

According to the Department of State, in 1989, the Burmese government

reached a cease-fire agreement with the United Wa State Army (UWSA),

which controls 80 percent of the opium cultivation areas in Burma. In the

cease-fire, UWSA agreed to stop its armed insurgency against the

government in exchange for government acquiescence to Wa control of

Wa territory. According to the Department of State, the agreement also

stipulated that the Wa would give up their participation in the drug trade

and that the Burmese government would provide developmental support

to assist the Wa in raising their standard of living. Other minority groups in

opium poppy cultivation areas, such as the Kokang, have reached similar

accommodations with the Burmese government.

The Burmese government and UWSA have done little to pursue

counternarcotics initiatives. For example, the government discontinued its

aerial eradication program with the cutoff of U.S. assistance in 1988 and

has only conducted limited eradication efforts in areas under its control

since that time. In September 1994, the government proposed an 11-year

plan for developmental assistance that also included crop eradication in

cultivation areas. However, according to the Department of State, the plan

does not provide details on how eradication will occur, and the

government lacks adequate resources to support its proposal.

Since 1988, opium production has nearly doubled in Burma, and UWSA has

become one of the world’s leading heroin-trafficking organizations. With a

force of 15,000 troops, it provides security for Wa territory while

controlling up to 80 percent of Burma’s opium crop. UWSA relies on the

proceeds from its extensive involvement in the drug trade to fund

procurement of munitions and equipment. UWSA is involved in heroin

refining and maintains contact with an extensive international

drug-trafficking infrastructure to move its heroin out of Burma and into

foreign markets.

While elements of the Wa political leadership have recently proposed

relinquishing participation in opium poppy cultivation and heroin

trafficking in exchange for direct developmental assistance from the

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

United States and other potential donors, it is questionable whether UWSA

leadership would seriously consider doing so. Such a decision would mean

giving up the major funding source that allows it to maintain its army and

protect the Wa people from potential renewed aggression from the

Burmese government. To equip and maintain its military force, UWSA

depends on funds generated from taxes on opium that Wa farmers

cultivate and produce.

Without these tax revenues, UWSA would have serious funding problems.

UWSA has no incentive to reduce its size or end its involvement in opium

trafficking until (1) alternative sources of income are found to replace

opium-generated revenues or (2) the threat of Burmese government

aggression is diminished or removed. Neither of these possibilities appears

likely to happen.

The Burmese government has been in armed conflict with another major

heroin-trafficking organization operating within its borders—the Shan

United Army (SUA) located in the Shan State on Burma’s border with

Thailand. SUA has a force of about 10,000 soldiers to defend extensive

heroin-refining facilities and drug-trafficking routes into Thailand, Laos,

and Cambodia. While SUA claims to be fighting for Shan State

independence, until recently, the Burmese government has chosen not to

accommodate this group as it has done with other ethnic minority groups.

Instead, the government increased military efforts against SUA in late 1993.

The conflict has caused significant casualties on both sides and disrupted

SUA drug-trafficking and -refining operations. Despite these successes, the

operations have had limited impact on the flow of drugs out of Burma.

According to Department of State officials, in January 1996, the Burmese

army and SUA ended their armed conflict in accordance with a recent

cease-fire agreement. The cease-fire will cause temporary disruptions in

SUA’s narcotics trafficking operations, but it is difficult to determine the

long-term effects of the agreement on the flow of Burmese heroin.

Southeast Asian

Heroin-Trafficking Routes

Pose Significant Law

Enforcement Challenges

According to DEA, each heroin producing region has separate and distinct

distribution methods that are highly dependent on ethnic groups,

transportation modes, and surrounding transit countries. These factors

combine to make the detection, monitoring, and interdiction of heroin

extremely difficult. Heroin-trafficking organizations are not vertically

integrated, and heroin shipments rarely remain under the control of a

single individual or organization as they move from the overseas refinery

to the streets of the United States. These organizations consist of separate

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

producers and a number of independent intermediaries such as financiers,

brokers, exporters, importers, and distributors. Since responsibility and

ownership of a particular drug shipment shifts each time the product

changes hands, direct evidence of the relationship between producer,

transporter, and wholesale distributor is extremely difficult to obtain.

From Southeast Asia, heroin is transported to the United States primarily

by ethnic Chinese and West African drug-trafficking groups. According to

DEA, the ethnic Chinese groups are capable of moving multi-hundred

kilogram shipments, while the West African groups usually smuggle heroin

in smaller quantities. Generally, the shipment size determines the

smuggling method. The larger shipments, ranging from 50 to

multi-hundred kilogram quantities, are secreted in containerized freight

aboard commercial maritime vessels and air freight cargo. Smaller

shipments are concealed in the luggage of airline passengers, strapped to

the body, or swallowed.

The impact of U.S. efforts to interdict regional drug-trafficking routes has

been limited by the ability of traffickers to shift their routes into countries

with inadequate law enforcement capability. For example, Thailand’s

well-developed transportation system formerly made it the traditional

transit route for about 80 percent of the heroin moving out of Southeast

Asia. However, in response to increased Thai counternarcotics capability

and stricter border controls, this amount has declined to 50 percent in

recent years as new drug-trafficking routes have emerged through the

southern provinces of China to Taiwan and Hong Kong or through Laos,

Cambodia, and Vietnam (see fig. 3). Similarly, cooperation between U.S.

and Hong Kong law enforcement authorities has helped reduce the use of

Hong Kong as a transshipment point for Southeast Asian heroin, but law

enforcement weaknesses in China and Taiwan have encouraged drug

traffickers to shift supply routes into these countries. Until law

enforcement efforts aimed at heroin-trafficking organizations and

drug-trafficking routes can be coordinated regionally, the flow of

Southeast Asian heroin to the United States will likely continue unabated.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
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Figure 3: Primary Southeast Asian Heroin-Trafficking Routes

Malaysia

Bay


of


Bengal

Beijing

Hong


Kong

Guangzhou Kunming

Burma

Laos

Thailand

Vietnam

India

China

South


Korea

Japan

Taiwan

Philippines

to the


United


States

Indonesia

Singapore

Bangkok

Pacific


Ocean

Opium Poppy


Cultivation


Region

Source: DEA.

Limited Chinese

Counternarcotics

Cooperation Impedes U.S.

Heroin Control Efforts

Inadequate Chinese cooperation with U.S. law enforcement also limits the

impact of regional U.S. heroin control efforts. DEA has identified a

substantial increase in the use of drug-trafficking routes for Burmese

heroin through China and believes that closer interaction with Chinese law

enforcement authorities is essential. DEA has attempted to increase drug

intelligence sharing with Chinese authorities and has conducted a number

of law enforcement training seminars to (1) develop better information

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

about trafficking methods and routes, (2) augment the number of arrests

and seizures, and (3) enhance Chinese police capabilities. However,

according to DEA officials, Chinese cooperation has been reluctant and

limited. For example, the Chinese government requires that DEA funnel all

communications through a single point of contact at the Ministry of Public

Security in Beijing before dissemination to local provincial police units for

action. The resulting delay slows dispersal of counternarcotics

intelligence, thus making it difficult to undertake joint investigations and

make timely arrests and seizures in China. Further, DEA has had difficulty

measuring the usefulness of the information it provides to Chinese

authorities because the Chinese do not provide feedback on whether it has

proven accurate. This lack of responsiveness may be attributed, at the

local level, to insufficient manpower and to the lack of sophisticated

computer and communications equipment. Despite the lack of

communication, DEA officials believe Chinese authorities have made some

arrests and seizures based on DEA-provided information. Finally, the

Ministry of Public Security has not shared information about its

independent interdiction efforts, arrests, and prosecutions, or any

counternarcotics intelligence it has developed that could possibly assist

DEA investigations.

Furthermore, it is possible that the 1997 transition of Hong Kong from

British to Chinese control will complicate U.S. counternarcotics activities

in the region. The four-person DEA office in Hong Kong is currently

responsible for covering counternarcotics activity in Hong Kong, China,

Taiwan, and Macau. However, after the 1997 transition, DEA will be

required to cover China from an office at the U.S. embassy in Beijing.

While the State Department has approved the opening of a two-person DEA

office at the embassy (one special agent and one administrative assistant),

it is still unclear when the positions will be filled and the degree of

movement that will be afforded DEA personnel within China. Also, the

Chinese government is unlikely to approve continued regional coverage of

Taiwan from Hong Kong or the office in Beijing. As a result, DEA’s ability to

assist other countries in the region in interdicting heroin-trafficking routes

opened through southern China and Taiwan may be constrained greatly.4

4

According to DEA, an increasing share of Southeast Asian heroin is imported to the United States

through southern China and Taiwan. Large-scale heroin shipments, mostly from Burma, move across

southern Chinese provinces to ports on China’s eastern and southern coasts. From there, the heroin is

often shipped to Taiwan by Chinese fishing trawlers and transferred to Taiwanese vessels for

movement to the United States. Taiwan also serves as a transshipment point for heroin brought by

fishing trawlers from Thailand, usually by way of ports in southeastern China.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
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U.S. Efforts Have Achieved

Positive Results in

Thailand and Hong Kong

While the impact of U.S. heroin control efforts on a regional level in

Southeast Asia has been limited, some U.S. counternarcotics assistance

programs in countries that possess the political will and capability to

engage in counternarcotics activities have achieved positive results. In

Thailand, for example, we found that sustained U.S. support since the

early 1970s and good relations with the Thai government have contributed

to abatement of opium production and heroin trafficking. Examples of

effective U.S. counternarcotics activities in Thailand include the following:

• Through $16.5 million in Department of State supported efforts since 1978,

the Thai government has reduced opium production levels from an

estimated 150 to 200 metric tons in the 1970s to 17 metric tons in 1994. As

a result, Thai traffickers no longer produce significant amounts of heroin

for export.

• Successful law enforcement training programs funded by the Department

of State, and support for Thai counternarcotics institutions provided

primarily by DEA, have enhanced Thailand’s drug law enforcement

capability. For example, using U.S. assistance, the Thai police captured 

10 key members of Burma’s SUA heroin-trafficking organization in

November 1994. The United States also has provided support for the

establishment of a task force in northern Thailand that should foster

intelligence analysis and information sharing among Thai counternarcotics

police organizations.

• According to U.S. embassy officials, U.S. assistance has helped Thailand

assume a leadership role in regional heroin control efforts. For example, in

1994, the Thai government implemented tighter controls at checkpoints on

the Burma border. This ongoing effort has restricted heroin-trafficking

routes into northern Thailand that SUA uses. The Thai police also have

sponsored drug law enforcement training for other countries in the region.

In Hong Kong, the professionalism of the Hong Kong police and the

absence of drug cultivation limit the need for U.S. counternarcotics

assistance, which, to date, has focused on law enforcement support from

DEA. The sharing of DEA intelligence with Hong Kong law enforcement

authorities has resulted in the seizure of heroin shipments destined for the

United States and the capture of major drug traffickers. The U.S. and Hong

Kong governments also have worked closely to arrange extraditions of

drug traffickers to the United States for trial.

Moreover, according to DEA, Hong Kong has enacted legislation that has

enhanced counternarcotics cooperation with the United States. For

example, a 1989 law allows the Hong Kong police, pursuant to confiscation

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
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orders, to seize assets of convicted drug offenders. A bilateral agreement

also permits seized assets to be shared between Hong Kong and the United

States. As of August 1995, Hong Kong had frozen or confiscated

approximately $54 million5

 in drug traffickers’ assets under this

agreement. Of this amount, the seizure of at least $26 million in assets was

based on information that U.S. law enforcement agencies provided.

UNDCP Project in

Burma Has Not

Significantly Reduced

Drug Flow

A key element of U.S. heroin control efforts is the increasing reliance the

United States places on international organizations, such as the United

Nations, in countries where the United States faces significant obstacles in

providing traditional bilateral counternarcotics assistance. In Burma, the

United States has been a major donor for UNDCP drug control projects,

providing about $2.5 million dollars from fiscal years 1992 through 1994.

However, we found that the projects have not significantly reduced opium

production because (1) the scope of the projects has been too small to

have a substantive impact on opium production, (2) the Burmese

government has not provided sufficient support to ensure project success,

and (3) inadequate planning has reduced project effectiveness.

UNDCP’s project in Burma to reduce opium production created small

“opium-free zones” in certain areas of Wa territory. According to U.S.

government and other officials, the opium-free zones are merely

demonstration projects; they will have no substantive impact on opium

production. The zones are located typically along roadways where it is

easy to verify that opium is not being cultivated. However, the officials

told us that the farmers simply move their planting sites to other areas,

usually ones that are in more remote areas. Further, UNDCP projects have

not significantly reduced opium production because of a lack of significant

voluntary or forcible eradication.

UNDCP has also experienced difficulties in obtaining sufficient Burmese

government support for its projects in the Wa territory, which has reduced

their effectiveness. As part of the project agreements, the Burmese

government stated it would provide in-kind resources to support UNDCP

activities. However, UNDCP officials told us that the Burmese government

did not furnish the necessary civil engineering personnel or basic

commodities, such as fuel, that it had committed to supply. As a result,

UNDCP had to hire outside people at additional cost. In addition, the

Burmese government has not always cooperated in granting UNDCP worker

access to the project areas.

5

Figures are in U.S. dollars.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

Additionally, inadequate planning has reduced project effectiveness. For

example, according to UNDCP officials, aerial surveys of areas designated

for opium poppy crop reduction were not conducted until March 1995, 

18 months after the projects began. As a result, it will not be possible to

evaluate accurately the effectiveness of the supply reduction projects

because UNDCP did not establish any baseline data at the outset. Further,

the projects lacked measurable benchmarks, such as timetables for

eliminating opium poppy fields, and plans were not developed to follow up

on eradication efforts to ensure that opium poppy cultivation had not

resumed in areas where opium poppy plants were destroyed.

Despite these problems, U.S. counternarcotics officials believe that UNDCP

projects offer the only alternatives to U.S.-funded opium poppy crop

eradication and alternative development programs in Burma at the present

time. Further, the projects are allowing UNDCP access to the Wa. This

access could prove useful if the political environment within Burma

changes and creates new opportunities for implementing drug control

efforts. In fact, UNDCP is expanding its current efforts, with a 5-year,

$22 million project that will include a supply reduction component. U.S.

and UNDCP officials told us that the supply reduction component will

provide for aerial surveys to determine cultivation levels and establish a

baseline to measure progress during the life of the project. Further, these

officials believe that the project should include measurable benchmarks

for reduction of opium poppy cultivation in designated areas to ensure

that successful eradication is taking place as well as provisions to ensure

that UNDCP workers have easy access to project areas. According to a

Department of State official, the United States plans to provide additional

funding over a 5-year period to increase UNDCP efforts in the region, but the

exact amount is still under consideration. However, it is doubtful, for

reasons already stated, that these projects will significantly reduce opium

production.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

ONDCP stated that the report provided an excellent analysis as to why

heroin control is a major foreign policy objective of the United States and

presents an accurate portrayal of the current worldwide heroin-trafficking

situation. (See app.II for ONDCP comments.) ONDCP stated that heroin

control is a vital national security interest and that the U.S. government

has to work with undemocratic governments such as Burma, Afghanistan,

China, and Syria in furtherance of international narcotics control. The

Department of State stated that ethnic insurgent armies are unlikely to

relinquish drug income under any Burmese government absent strong and

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

effective law enforcement efforts and these efforts may require large-scale

sustained military operations. (See app. III for Department of State

comments.) Both the Department of State and ONDCP noted that

congressional pressure has constrained the U.S. counternarcotics effort

and recently passed legislation further restricts what the United States

could do in Burma.6 ONDCP, the Department of State, and DEA (see app. IV

for DEA comments) provided updated information on an agreement

between the SUA and the Burmese authorities that is, according to the

Department of State, likely to allow SUA to continue its narcotics-related

activities.

We recognize that the U.S government may at times have to deal with

undemocratic governments. However, in our review, the issue in heroin

drug trafficking is how effective alternative development, law enforcement

training, and intelligence-sharing activities can be with the current

Burmese government. As noted in our report, the current Burmese

government does not control most of the opium poppy growing regions, is

unlikely to obtain international support for either large-scale alternative

development or sustained military campaigns against ethnic armies, and

has entered into truce agreements with ethnic groups allowing them to

continue narcotics-related activities.

With regard to congressional pressure and recently passed legislation, it

should be noted that both the Clinton and Bush administrations made

policy decisions not to provide additional assistance to the Burmese

government in response to its anti-democratic policies and human rights

abuses. It is unclear what can be accomplished with assistance to a

government that is either unwilling or unable to take effective action

against those ethnic groups responsible for opium poppy cultivation and

heroin production. We have attached more detailed comments in

appendixes II through IV.

We conducted our review from February 1995 through January 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The

scope and methodology for our review is discussed in appendix V.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further

distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time, we

6

The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, as referred to in title III

of P.L. 104-99 (the appropriation act for fiscal year 1996 pertaining to a balanced budget), contains

language that would prohibit funds “from being used for international narcotics control or crop

substitution assistance for the government of Burma.”

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
B-270792 

will send copies to the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Administrator,

Drug Enforcement Administration; the Director, Office of National Drug

Control Policy; and other interested congressional committees. Copies will

also be made available to other interested parties upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, I can be

reached on (202) 512-4268. The major contributors to this report are listed

in appendix VI.

Jess T. Ford

Associate Director,

International Relations and Trade Issues

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Obstacles Limiting the

Feasibility of Direct

Assistance to Burma’s

Wa People

22

Background 22

U.S. Legislation and Policy Restrict U.S. Government

Involvement in Burma

23

UWSA Would Oppose U.S. Direct Assistance to the Wa People 24

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Office of National

Drug Control Policy

26

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Department of State

30

Appendix IV 

Comments From the

Drug Enforcement

Administration

35

Appendix V 

Scope and

Methodology

37

Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to

This Report

39

Figures Figure 1: Worldwide Opium Production by Country, 1987-94 4

Figure 2: Southeast Asian Opium Cultivation Areas 5

Figure 3: Primary Southeast Asian Heroin-Trafficking Routes 13

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Contents

Abbreviations

CPB Communist Party of Burma

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council

SUA Shan United Army

UNDCP United Nations Drug Control Program

UWSA United Wa State Army

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Obstacles Limiting the Feasibility of Direct

Assistance to Burma’s Wa People

In 1993, Burma’s ethnic Wa people proposed to the international

community that the Wa people would cease opium production if they were

to receive direct assistance during a transitional period in which they

would attempt to move away from using opium production as their

primary source of income. We examined the proposal and found that the

feasibility of providing direct assistance to the Wa people is limited.

Numerous obstacles would hinder the implementation and monitoring of

assistance programs. These obstacles include (1) U.S. legislation and

policy that restrict U.S. government involvement in Burma; (2) opposition

by the government of Burma; and (3) opposition by the United Wa State

Army (UWSA), which controls the territory occupied by the Wa people.

Moreover, the ability to overcome these obstacles will be limited until the

government of Burma has access to all areas, including those that ethnic

insurgents control.

In addition, the United States is currently funding counternarcotics efforts

of the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) in

Burma. However, according to numerous officials, UNDCP’s efforts in

Burma are merely showpieces. They have not had, and will not have, a

substantive impact on reducing opium poppy cultivation and heroin

production because (1) they are small programs relative to the large size of

the problem, (2) the government of Burma does not have access to many

areas in which opium is cultivated, and, (3) UWSA would not allow UNDCP to

reduce opium production substantially.

Background The Wa people are an ethnic minority group of about 1 million poor

subsistence farmers living in an isolated, mountainous area of eastern

Burma—a Southeast Asian nation of about 35 million people that is

slightly smaller than the state of Texas. The current regime, known as the

State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), is comprised mostly of

ethnic Burmans and has been largely unsuccessful in its efforts to

overcome the Wa insurgency. SLORC has had no control over Wa territory

since 1989, when it abdicated its governance after years of fighting and

signed a cease-fire agreement with Wa leaders. This enabled the Wa people

to openly cultivate opium poppies with no government interference.

Many Wa farmers cultivate opium poppies and sell their harvest to drug

traffickers. In recent years, opium grown in Wa territory has increased

dramatically to the point that, currently, the Wa opium crop is the largest

in the world. The Wa people have cultivated opium poppies for

generations. Since the signing of the cease-fire with SLORC, however, the

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Obstacles Limiting the Feasibility of Direct

Assistance to Burma’s Wa People

Wa have substantially augmented opium production. Specifically, in 1995,

over 85 percent of opium poppy cultivation in Southeast Asia occurred in

Burma, and cultivation in Wa territory accounted for over 80 percent of

Burma’s cultivation. Despite the increase, however, Wa farmers have

experienced little, if any, change in their economic status because Wa

leaders strongly encourage them to grow opium poppies, levy taxes on

their harvest, and use the tax revenues to support UWSA. Little, if any, tax

revenue has been used for badly needed development.

Elements of UWSA are comprised of many of the fighting forces of the

former Communist Party of Burma (CPB). For many years, Communist

China supported CPB, including providing (1) food, mainly rice, that

enabled the Wa people to maintain a subsistence existence with little

dependence on cash generated from opium cultivation and (2) military

equipment that had enabled the Wa people to successfully defend Wa

territory against SLORC. However, following the collapse of communism

worldwide and the subsequent withdrawal of support for the CPB by

Communist China, UWSA was formed. UWSA relies on funds derived from

opium trafficking to buy arms and support its forces. The withdrawal of

support from Communist China, combined with the SLORC’s unfulfilled

promises of development assistance, has resulted in hardships for many of

the Wa’s subsistence farmers.

U.S. Legislation and

Policy Restrict U.S.

Government

Involvement in Burma

U.S. legislation and policy restrict the level of assistance to the

government of Burma. The restrictions are based largely on the SLORC’s

(1) insufficient progress in stopping opium cultivation and heroin

trafficking within its borders, (2) record of human rights violations, and

(3) refusal to install a democratically elected government. Before SLORC

took over the government of Burma, the United States was supporting

counternarcotics activities in Burma. However, we reported in

September 1989 that, “eradication and enforcement efforts are unlikely to

significantly reduce Burma’s opium production unless they are combined

with economic development in the growing regions and the political

settlement of Burma’s ethnic insurgencies.”1

 Regardless of the U.S.

position, SLORC is nonetheless the recognized government of Burma, and

Wa territory is considered to be part of Burma. As such, bilateral U.S.

assistance to the Wa people would require the SLORC’s knowledge and

consent. However, according to U.S. government officials, SLORC would

strongly oppose direct U.S. assistance to the Wa people. The officials

stated that SLORC would react with anger and regard such direct assistance

1

Drug Control: Enforcement Efforts in Burma Are Not Effective (GAO/NSIAD-89-197, Sept. 11, 1989).

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Obstacles Limiting the Feasibility of Direct

Assistance to Burma’s Wa People

as a violation of their sovereignty. Furthermore, because of U.S. policy,

which strongly criticizes Burma’s human rights violations and SLORC’s

refusal to install a democratically elected government, U.S.

counternarcotics assistance efforts in Burma are nearly nonexistent.

Because of the common border between Burma and China, U.S. assistance

to the Wa people could be provided directly into Wa territory through a

cross-border program from China’s Yunnan Province, which borders Wa

territory. The provision of assistance through China would require the

approval of the government of China. However, according to U.S.

government officials, the Chinese would strongly disapprove of such

involvement for several reasons. One of these reasons is that the United

States has not returned a Chinese drug trafficker witness to China after the

Chinese government released him to U.S. law enforcement officials for

testimony in a U.S. domestic drug case. U.S. officials want to return him

but cannot until his appeal for asylum in a U.S. court is resolved. In

addition, U.S. government officials stated that it is unlikely that China

would allow the U.S. government or nongovernmental organizations’

officials to implement programs from a base of operations in China.

Wa territory shares no common border with Thailand, and any attempt to

assist the Wa people through Thailand would involve operating in the

southern Shan State area of Burma, which is not under SLORC control.

However, U.S. government officials told us that the government of

Thailand would not be willing to risk its sensitive relations with SLORC by

permitting cross-border counternarcotics assistance to the Wa people

through Thailand.

UWSA Would Oppose

U.S. Direct Assistance

to the Wa People

In 1993, the Wa people proposed to the international community that they

would cease opium production in exchange for receiving economic and

development assistance while the Wa people transitioned from an

opium-based economy to one based on other sources of income.

According to U.S. officials, however, the proposal is not a genuine offer

because UWSA, a drug-trafficking army, which has almost complete

authority and control over the people within Wa territory, would not agree

to participate in stopping opium cultivation and production from taking

place. Without UWSA consent, the proposal could not be implemented. As

such, the proposal has not been acted upon.

For decades, there was considerable fighting between Burmese

government military forces and CPB, many of whose members were Wa. In

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Obstacles Limiting the Feasibility of Direct

Assistance to Burma’s Wa People

1989, the two parties agreed to a 10-year cease-fire. The autonomy

provided in the agreement has had the effect of allowing the Wa people to

cultivate and process opium without SLORC interference. The agreement

also includes a SLORC commitment to provide development assistance in

Wa territory. In exchange, the Wa people agreed to halt their active

insurgency against SLORC. However, because of the long-standing dislike

and distrust between SLORC and Wa, both parties have undertaken a

large-scale and costly arms buildup. In order to equip and maintain its

military force, UWSA depends on funds generated from taxes on opium that

is produced by Wa farmers and from taxes on heroin refining. Without

these tax revenues, UWSA would have serious funding problems. Since

1989, opium production in Wa territory has more than doubled at the

encouragement of UWSA in order to support UWSA forces. UWSA has no

incentive to reduce its size or end its involvement in heroin trafficking

until alternative sources of income are found to replace drug-generated

revenues or the threat of SLORC aggression is diminished or removed.

Neither of these possibilities appears likely at the present time.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See pp. 17-18.

See pp. 17-18.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 4.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

See pp. 17-18.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

The following are GAO’s comments on ONDCP’s letter dated January 25,

1996.

GAO’s Comments 1. We have made appropriate technical changes and the report has been

updated to reflect recent developments in Burma.

2. The political realities included the Burmese government’s desire to

reach accommodation with ethnic minorities. As part of this strategy, the

Burmese government entered into a truce agreement with the Wa and

other ethnic minority groups that controlled most of the opium poppy

cultivation regions in Burma. These factors, as well as the limited

resources of the Burmese government are fully discussed in this report.

3. While the Burmese government has recently entered a cease-fire

agreement with a prominent armed drug-trafficking group, the Shan

United Army (SUA), it is still unclear whether this will significantly affect

the heroin trade in Burma or whether other groups like the Wa will assume

control of SUA production and trafficking activities. Moreover, the Burmese

government does not control Wa territory, the location of 80 percent of

opium poppy cultivation in Burma. Furthermore, we agree that unless the

Burmese government has the economic capability to foster alternative

means of livelihood, it is doubtful that gaining control will, in and of itself,

significantly reduce opium poppy cultivation areas.

4. The Burmese government has not made a commitment to end the drug

trade and economic factors alone were not responsible for this lack of

government commitment. Over the past 8 years, the primary political

objective of the Burmese government was to consolidate its power in

Rangoon. To accomplish this consolidation, it entered into truce

agreements with ethnic minority groups responsible for opium cultivation

and production resulting in the doubling of opium production.

5. Even though ONDCP states this, the U.S. government continues to support

an expanded UNDCP opium drug reduction program.

6. This report and appendix I provides a detailed discussion on the

feasibility of providing direct U.S. assistance to the Wa people.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of State

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of State

Now on p. 2.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 8.

See pp. 17-18.

Now on p. 9.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 9.

See pp. 17-18.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 11.

See comment 4.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of State

Now on p. 11.

See comment 1.

See comment 5.

Now on p. 16.

See comment 1.

Now on pp. 16-17.

See pp. 17-18.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of State

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter

dated January 23, 1996.

GAO’s Comments 1. We have made appropriate technical changes to the report and updated

the section discussing SUA to reflect the recent cease-fire agreement

between the SUA and Burmese authorities.

2. The reference to decertification has been deleted from the final report.

We have changed the report to note that executive policy emphasizing

human rights concerns and the Burmese government’s failure to recognize

the democratic process were the reasons for eliminating direct U.S.

counternarcotics funding.

3. We understand that this issue is very complex and involves the

willingness of the United States to provide assistance to the Burmese

government and the reaction that various elements of the Wa leadership

would have to a central government that improved its human rights

practices. Also, the Department of State appears to be modifying the

position it took in testimony before Congress in July 1995 when it stated

that the United States will be in a stronger position to make real gains at

reducing the Southeast Asian heroin threat if there is progress on U.S.

human rights and democracy concerns.

4. While the Burmese government and UWSA have reached a cease-fire

agreement, the long-standing dislike and distrust between the Burmese

government and Wa has resulted in both parties undertaking a large-scale

and costly arms build-up. It is doubtful that the current regime will ever be

able to convince ethnic minorities that their autonomy will be secure

without having their own military capability to deter Burmese government

aggression. While a democratically elected government also poses a

potential threat to autonomy of ethnic groups, it may stand a better chance

to reach a peaceful accommodation with the Wa military, especially if it

offers economic incentives supported by the international community.

5. The point of this section is not to describe Chinese counternarcotics law

enforcement efforts, but to outline how their lack of cooperation in this

area affects U.S. heroin control objectives in the region. Bilateral law

enforcement cooperation, including counternarcotics intelligence

information sharing, is a key element of U.S. efforts. Without

improvements in cooperation, DEA will encounter significant obstacles in

interdicting important heroin-trafficking routes in southern China and

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of State

assisting the Chinese in improving their counternarcotics law enforcement

capability.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

The following is GAO’s comment on DEA’s letter dated January 24, 1996.

GAO’s Comment 1. We have made appropriate technical changes to the report. We have

also made changes regarding recent developments in Burma based on

discussions with Department of State officials.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix V 

Scope and Methodology

To obtain information for this report, we spoke with appropriate officials

and obtained documents in Washington, D.C., from ONDCP, DEA, and the

Departments of State and Defense. We also discussed counternarcotics

issues with officials of several non-governmental organizations and a

representative of Burma’s Wa people. At the Joint Interagency Task

Force-West in Alameda, California, we collected information on

Department of Defense support for U.S. counternarcotics efforts in

Southeast Asia.

At the U.S. embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, we interviewed the

Ambassador; Deputy Chief of Mission; and responsible officials from the

Narcotics Affairs, Political, Economic, and Consular Sections; the Defense

Attache Office; DEA; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Immigration

and Naturalization Service; the U.S. Customs Service; the Agency for

International Development; and the United States Information Service. To

examine and evaluate U.S. heroin control efforts, we reviewed documents

prepared by U.S. embassy personnel and supplemented the information in

interviews with U.S. officials. We also met with the Consul General and

DEA attache at the U.S. consulate in Chiang Mai. To obtain the views of the

Thai government, we spoke with officials from Thai counternarcotics

agencies, including the Office of the Narcotics Control Board and the

Royal Thai Police Narcotics Suppression Bureau. To discuss multilateral

drug control efforts in Southeast Asia, we met with officials from the

UNDCP’s regional office in Bangkok. We also discussed these issues with

officials at the Australian and British embassies in Bangkok.

At the U.S. embassy in Rangoon, Burma, we interviewed the Charge 

d’ Affaires, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and responsible officials from the

Political Section, the Defense Attache Office, DEA, and the United States

Information Service. To examine and evaluate U.S. heroin control efforts,

we reviewed documents prepared by U.S. embassy personnel and

supplemented the information in interviews with U.S. officials. We also

discussed the status of multilateral projects in Burma with appropriate

UNDCP officials. Finally, we met with officials at the Australian and

Japanese embassies in Rangoon to discuss their counternarcotics

programs.

At the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong, we interviewed the Consul General,

the Deputy Principal Officer, and responsible officials from the Political

and Consular Affairs Sections, the Defense Liaison Office, DEA, the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and

the U.S. Customs Service. To examine and evaluate U.S. heroin control

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix V 

Scope and Methodology

efforts, we reviewed documents prepared by U.S. embassy personnel and

supplemented the information in interviews with U.S. officials. We also

met with officials of the Royal Hong Kong Police and the Hong Kong

Customs and Excise Department to discuss their heroin interdiction and

anti-money laundering activities.

We provided a draft of this report to officials from the Departments of

State and Defense, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Office

of National Drug Control Policy and discussed it with them. The

Department of State, ONDCP, and DEA provided formal written comments.

The Department of Defense did not provide written comments but fully

concurred with our findings.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Louis Zanardi

Allen Fleener

Dennis Richards

George A. Taylor

Daniel J. Tikvart

Steven K. Westley

(711160) Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-96-83 Drug Control
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