United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on National Security, International

Affairs, and Criminal Justice, Committee

on Government Reform and Oversight,

House of Representatives

April 1996 DRUG CONTROL

U.S. Interdiction

Efforts in the

Caribbean Decline

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-119

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-271376 

April 17, 1996

The Honorable William H. Zeliff, Jr.

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 International Affairs, and Criminal Justice

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

According to U.S. law enforcement officials, approximately 30 percent of

the cocaine entering the United States comes through the Caribbean

section of the transit zone. As you requested, we have reviewed (1) the

nature of drug-trafficking activities that are occurring in the transit zone

with particular emphasis on the Eastern Caribbean; (2) host nation

impediments to an effective regional strategy; (3) the capabilities of U.S.

agencies to interdict drug-trafficking activities throughout the Caribbean

transit zone; and (4) the extent of federal agency planning, coordination,

and implementation of U.S. interdiction efforts. This report is the second

in a series of reports that we plan to issue on various U.S. international

strategies to control the flow of cocaine and heroin into the United States.

The first report dealt with heroin from Southeast Asia.1

Background A primary goal of the U.S. national drug control strategy is to reduce the

amount of cocaine entering the United States. In November 1993, the

executive branch issued a counternarcotics policy for cocaine in the

Western Hemisphere. The strategy called for, among other things, a

controlled shift in emphasis from the transit zone to the source countries.

The transit zone is the 2-million square mile area between the U.S. and

South American borders and covers the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of

Mexico, Central America, Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific. For the

purposes of this report, the Caribbean portion of the transit zone consists

of the leeward islands, the windward islands, the Bahamas, Jamaica, the

Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

In April 1994, the executive branch issued the National Interdiction

Command and Control Plan to strengthen interagency coordination. The

plan called for creating several joint interagency task forces made up of

1

Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in Southeast Asia (GAO/NSIAD-96-83,

Mar. 1, 1996).

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

representatives from federal agencies, including the Department of

Defense (DOD), the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

Within the transit zone, the Department of State manages and coordinates

U.S. government efforts while DOD supports U.S. law enforcement agencies

by tracking suspected drug-trafficking activities and provides training to

host nations. The U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Coast Guard also

provide aircraft and ships to assist in tracking and interdicting

drug-trafficking activities. The various U.S. activities are expected to be

coordinated through the Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-East),

located in Key West, Florida. JIATF-East was to be supported by personnel

from various agencies such as the Department of State, the Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Results in Brief Cocaine trafficking through the Caribbean region is a major drug threat to

the United States. During the past several years, traffickers in the

Caribbean have shifted their operations from primarily air-related

activities to maritime activities. Furthermore, traffickers are using

improved technologies, such as global positioning systems, to counter

efforts by U.S. agencies to identify and monitor their activities.

A major part of the U.S. strategy in the Caribbean is to strengthen the host

nations’ political will and capabilities to support U.S. international

counternarcotics objectives. The State Department has made some

progress in implementing the strategy though new agreements with

Caribbean countries and islands that promote increased air and maritime

cooperation. However, U.S. officials generally believe that a number of

host nations lack the capabilities needed to conduct effective antidrug

operations. U.S. officials believe that antidrug efforts are also inhibited by

corruption, which exists throughout the Caribbean nations.

Budget reductions for interdiction efforts in the transit zone have reduced

the ability of DOD and law enforcement agencies to identify, track, and

intercept drug traffickers. Funding for drug interdiction declined from

about $1 billion in fiscal year 1992 to $569 million in fiscal year 1995. DOD’s

budget reductions resulted in fewer ship days, flight hours, and

ground-based radars devoted to drug interdiction. While a reduction in the

interdiction effort was envisioned in the new cocaine strategy, the strategy

also anticipated an increase in source country funding that never

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

materialized. Cocaine seizures in the transit zone declined from a peak of

70,336 kilograms in 1992 to 37,181 kilograms in 1995.

The executive branch has not developed a plan to implement the cocaine

strategy in the transit zone, fully staffed interagency organizations with

key roles in the interdiction program, or fully resolved issues on

intelligence sharing. U.S. officials noted that neither the Director of the

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) nor the U.S. Interdiction

Coordinator (USIC) had the authority to command the use of any agency’s

operational assets.

Drug-Trafficking

Activities Are

Changing, and

Interdiction Is

Becoming More

Difficult

According to the State Department’s 1996 International Narcotics Control

Strategy Report, about 780 metric tons of cocaine is produced each year in

South America. U.S. officials believe that about 30 percent of the cocaine

shipped into the United States comes through the Caribbean into Puerto

Rico and other U.S. entry points. The remaining 70 percent is shipped

through Mexico. While trend data on the amount of cocaine shipments

through the Eastern Caribbean and Puerto Rico are based on inexact

information, U.S. officials believe that the level of activity may be

increasing. Figure 1 shows the drug-trafficking routes in the Eastern

Caribbean.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

Figure 1: Drug-Trafficking Routes in the Eastern Caribbean

Gulf of Mexico

Pacific


Ocean

Caribbean Sea

Atlantic


Ocean

The 


Bahamas

Dominican


Republic

Haiti

Cuba

Jamaica

Mexico

Guatemala

Honduras

Belize

El Salvador Nicaragua

Costa


Rica

Panama

Ecuador

Colombia

Brazil

Venezuela Guyana

United 


States

United 


States

Turk and 


Caicos Islands

Puerto


Rico

Virgin Islands

Anguilla

St. Martin

Antigua

Guadeloupe

Dominica

Martinique

St. Lucia

Barbados

Grenada

Trinidad


and


Tobago

St. Vincent

Galapagos


Islands

Cayman Islands

Confirmed noncommercial maritime routes


Airdrop area

Air routes


Source: DOD.

Drug-Trafficking Activities

Occur Throughout the

Caribbean

Puerto Rico is the major entry point for cocaine moving through the

Eastern Caribbean. U.S. drug officials believe that after 1993 traffickers

moved some of their activities from the Bahamas to Puerto Rico because

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

U.S. interdiction efforts in the Bahamas had increased the risk to

traffickers. Puerto Rico has become the primary transshipment point into

the southeastern United States. An August 1995 U.S. interagency report

stated that Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands accounted for

26 percent of the documented attempts to smuggle cocaine into the

continental United States during 1994. U.S. officials stated that

cocaine-related activity in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands has

increased. The U.S. Customs Service cocaine seizures increased from

5,507 kilograms in fiscal year 1993 to 8,700 kilograms in fiscal year 1995.

Reports are mixed on whether drug-trafficking activities are increasing

throughout other islands in the Eastern Caribbean and into the southern

United States. A June 1995 local law enforcement report of air-smuggling

activities in southern Florida concluded that there were significant

increases in drug-trafficking activities occurring from the Caribbean into

south Florida. The report also stated that drug-trafficking activities in

southern Florida are resulting in a return to the patterns of the 1970s and

early 1980s when drug detection and interdiction efforts in the Caribbean

were minimal. In contrast, DOD officials stated that they did not have any

data indicating that there was air-smuggling activity into Florida from the

Caribbean area. USIC staff also noted that they were unaware of significant

increases of air smuggling into southern Florida. However, U.S. law

enforcement officials stated that various intelligence sources confirm that

cocaine-related air activities are increasing in southern Florida.

A brief summary of drug-trafficking activities occurring in Eastern

Caribbean nations follows:

The Bahamas According to the State Department, total drug seizures in the Bahamas

represented only a small percentage of cocaine trafficking in the transit

zone. DEA officials stated that recently traffickers increased their activities

throughout the area, but they could not accurately assess the extent of this

increase. U.S. Customs reported that, since the destruction of the base at

Gun Cay during hurricane Hugo and the diminution of maritime

enforcement since that time, there have been fewer drug interdiction

missions in the Bahamas. Neither Customs nor Royal Bahamian Defense

Forces are able to deny access to the favorite off-load and stash sites used

by drug traffickers. In March 1996, the State Department reported that,

although cocaine seizures during 1995 remained below the levels of the

late 1980s, there were indications of increased cocaine-trafficking

activities.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

Hispaniola Hispaniola refers to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Hispaniola serves

as a convenient staging area for air and maritime drug-related activities

because its long, unpatrolled coastline and numerous airstrips facilitate

staging and refueling operations. A May 1995 U.S. report stated that

cocaine transshipment through Haiti had reemerged since the lifting of the

United Nations embargo in October 1994. The U.S. Embassy reported that

drug trafficking may be also increasing in the Dominican Republic.

Leeward Islands The leeward islands extend from the U.S. Virgin Islands to Dominica and

include the British Virgin Islands, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, 

St. Martin, St. Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat, Guadeloupe, and Dominica. The

islands are hubs for commercial air and sea traffick. Their proximity to

Puerto Rico makes them vulnerable to drug trafficking. Most of the drugs

shipped through the islands are destined for further transit through Puerto

Rico to the United States.

Windward Islands The windward islands extend from Dominica to Grenada and include

Martinique, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada, Barbados,

and Trinidad and Tobago. The islands are used for drug transit and

storage. For example, Trinidad and Tobago is only 7 miles from Venezuela

and is a natural staging site for drugs smuggled from South America to

other Caribbean islands. However, significant increases in drug-trafficking

activity have recently been observed. In February 1994, the U.S. Embassy

in Barbados reported that law enforcement officials throughout the islands

had reported an escalation in air drops and other trafficking activities,

which were leading to increases in crime.

Drug Traffickers

Increasingly Use Maritime

Vessels

Drug enforcement officials told us that drug traffickers are increasingly

relying on noncommercial and commercial maritime vessels (such as

go-fast boats, sailing and fishing vessels, and containerized cargo ships) to

transport drugs. DOD records show that the number of known

drug-trafficking aircraft events in the transit zone declined by about

65 percent from 1992 to 1995 and that known maritime events increased by

about 40 percent from 1993 to 1995. ” Known events,” according to DOD

officials, represent clear, firm information about a drug shipment,

confirmed delivery, aborted mission, or apprehension. “Results” are

apprehensions, seizures, or jettisons. Table 1 lists the number of air and

maritime events and results for 1992-95 and shows that maritime drug

activity accounted for more events and results than drug shipments via air.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

Table 1: Air and Maritime

Drug-Trafficking Events and Results

(1992-95) 

Air Maritime

Year Events Results Events Results

1992 344 66 a a

1993 217 71 174 122

1994 154 45 223 172

1995 125 26 249 135

aMaritime data for 1992 are not available.

Note: Traffickers’ aborts were not counted in results.

Source: DOD.

According to DOD, drug smuggling by commercial vessels is the primary

maritime method for shipping drugs in the transit zone. U.S. Customs and

DEA officials believe that smugglers have concealed large shipments of

cocaine in legitimate containers aboard commercial sea vessels. In some

cases, crew members have attached smaller shipments in parasite

containers attached to the hull of the mother vessel. DOD and U.S. Coast

Guard officials stated that the large number of ships and complexity of

smuggling via commercial vessels severely restricts interdiction at sea.

These cargo ships are not routinely inspected because they contain

perishable goods that, if inspected, could spoil.

U.S. officials stated that the large number of noncommercial vessels

traveling in the transit zone makes it difficult to detect or intercept many

drug-trafficking activities. Vessels routinely transporting cocaine between

the Bahamas and Florida can blend in with legitimate traffic. DOD believes

that the number of noncommercial vehicles is difficult to quantify.

While air events and results have decreased significantly since 1992,

smugglers continue to use general aviation aircraft to move cocaine to

transshipment and staging areas in the Caribbean or Mexico. The decline

in recorded air events could be due to a combination of factors, including

a reduced capability by U.S. agencies to detect air activities, increased

sophistication by cocaine smugglers, and traffickers’ preference for

maritime smuggling methods.

Drug Traffickers Are Using

Improved Technologies

Drug traffickers are using sophisticated communications technology and

global positioning systems to avoid detection when airdropping cocaine to

boats in the transit zone. U.S. officials stated that the traffickers use

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

cellular phones and global positioning systems to determine drop

coordinates prior to departure. The traffickers relay the coordinates to the

boats who will pick up an airdrop. According to U.S. officials, the global

positioning systems are available commercially and are accurate to within

10 meters of a target. Because of these systems, traffickers do not have to

openly communicate as frequently as they did in the past. According to

DOD and U.S. law enforcement officials, the increasing use of these

technologies makes it more difficult to gather the information needed to

track and interdict cocaine shipments through the Caribbean because

traffickers can detect whether they are being followed.

Host Nation

Impediments Hinder

Counternarcotics

Efforts

According to State Department and U.S. law enforcement officials, most

Caribbean host nations are cooperating in fighting drug trafficking.

However, most Caribbean nations lack resources and law enforcement

capabilities and have some corruption problems that hamper their efforts

to combat drug trafficking. The Department of State’s March 1996

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report provides a detailed

discussion on the Caribbean countries. With few exceptions, the report

concluded that cooperation with U.S. authorities was excellent in 1995.

For example, Barbados was recognized for its excellent cooperation with

U.S. law enforcement, strong enforcement, tough courts, and public

mobilization that resulted in a drop in crime and an increase in drug arrest.

However, the report noted that the governments of many Caribbean

countries were unable to finance their law enforcement operations at a

level commensurate with the trafficker threat.

The report noted the following:

• The Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas strives to fulfill

the goals and objectives of U.S.- Bahamian bilateral counternarcotics

accords. A key objective of U.S. counternarcotics assistance is to

strengthen the Bahamas’ counternarcotics institutions so they can assume

a greater share of the financial burden of combating traffickers. However,

even with stronger counternarcotics institutions, the Bahamas will

probably remain dependent on U.S. assistance because of the Bahamas’

small population, geography, and limited resources.

• The Government of the Dominican Republic has fully cooperated with U.S.

agencies. However, it lacks effective enforcement mechanisms and the

political will to expose and eliminate the corruption that threatens the

country’s fragile democratic institutions.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

• The Government of Haiti has shown the political will to cooperate, but its

lack of institutional experience undermines its effectiveness. Haiti lacks a

national police counternarcotics unit and coast guard, a maritime law

enforcement agreement, money laundering legislation, and a national

counternarcotics plan.

• The Government of Jamaica and U.S. law enforcement cooperation is

considered to be at the highest level in 5 years. However, Jamaica has not

completed its counterdrug legislation or fully implemented it. Although the

government passed an asset forfeiture act in 1994, it has still not

prosecuted an asset forfeiture case.

• The Governments of Antigua and Barbuda do not have an effective drug

and money laundering enforcement policy.

• The Government of Dominica has severe resource restraints but has fully

cooperated with U.S. law enforcement agencies.

In 1995, JIATF-East personnel developed their own assessment of various

Eastern Caribbean nations’ maritime law enforcement capabilities. The

assessment was based on a subjective judgment of JIATF-East officials

regarding the relationships they experienced in operations with host

nations. The assessment concluded that, while several countries had

relatively good law enforcement capability, others had only fair to poor

law enforcement capabilities.

In table 2, we show JIATF-East’s inventory of the Eastern Caribbean

nations’ interdiction assets. The table shows that few assets are available

to Caribbean nations for counternarcotics purposes.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

Table 2: Selected Eastern Caribbean

Host Nation Maritime Interdiction

Assets

Nation Interdiction assets

British Virgin Islands 6 patrol boats and 1 aircraft

Anguilla 2 boats

St. Martin/Guadelope

Martinique

3 patrol boats, 6 fixed-wing aircraft, and 4 helicopters

Antigua/Barbuda 3 boats

St. Kitts 4 boats

Montserrat 1 patrol craft with 1 crew and limited fuel

Dominica 4 boats

St. Lucia 4 boats, 2 of which are damaged

St. Vincent 4 boats

Barbados 5 boats, 1 possibly damaged

Grenada 4 boats

Trinidad and Tobago Large, medium, and small platforms

Source: JIATF-East.

State Department officials stated that many national forces do not always

cooperate with one another because of insufficient political will, an

inability to coordinate, and insufficient available resources. A

February 1995 law enforcement agency reported that cooperation between

local law enforcement agencies in Trinidad and Tobago has not been good.

In August 1995, a U.S. law enforcement agency reported that there was an

underlying problem of mistrust between the Dutch government and local

law enforcement agencies in the Antilles and Aruba.

U.S. officials stated that Caribbean nations will always have limited

capabilities because they have small populations and limited funds

available for counternarcotics. As a result, U.S. officials are trying to

improve interdiction capabilities by signing agreements that allow U.S.

personnel to conduct antidrug sea and air operations within the territorial

waters and airspace of these nations. U.S. agencies are also providing

limited supplies and training to the police forces and the judicial

institutions.

By the end of 1992, the United States had entered into bilateral agreements

with the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, and Belize regarding shipboarding,

shipriding, and pursuit and entry into territorial waters. Since March 1995,

the State Department has concluded a series of maritime counternarcotics

agreements with the Dominican Republic, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago, and St.

Vincent and the Grenadines. As of March 1996, other maritime

counternarcotics agreements were pending with Barbados, Jamaica,

Honduras, Haiti, Colombia, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic.

Many of these agreements are limited to maritime matters, and most of the

agreements do not authorize overflight and ordering aircraft to land.

Currently only the Trinidad and Tobago agreement allows overflight of

territorial airspace for the counternarcotics operations along with

order-to-land authority. The Bahamas agreement contained overflight

authority. Eastern Caribbean nations have authorized overflight authority

on an ad hoc basis in support of combined operations. New efforts are

underway to address overflight and air issues. Even though the United

States has reached agreement with some Caribbean countries, it does not

have one with Cuba that would allow forces to either track or interdict

drug-trafficking activity that may occur within Cuban territorial waters or

airspace. U.S. Customs reported that in both maritime and aviation, they

have noted the use of the waters and airspace adjacent to Cuba as a

transfer location or air-drop location. However, DOD data indicate that, for

the period between fiscal years 1991 and 1995, there were only 13 out of

947 known air events that flew over Cuban airspace.

Government Corruption

Exists

Various U.S. officials told us that, despite changes in governments,

corruption is still widespread throughout the Caribbean. Drug traffickers’

influence in the region is evident. Payoffs are a common form of

corruption, particularly in countries with poorly paid public servants. Law

enforcement and State Department reports support these statements.

A February 1995 law enforcement agency report on one island indicated

that corruption may be occurring at high levels of the government. This

report stated that there were indications that the leader of a political party

was linked to the illegal drug trade. Furthermore, the report also stated

that there were numerous allegations regarding corruption in the country’s

customs operation at the airport.

A March 1995 U.S. law enforcement report stated that in the Bahamas drug

law enforcement efforts have been plagued by corruption. The report

further stated that, faced with promises of instant wealth, police officers

assigned to these islands often succumb to the bribes offered by

traffickers. Corruption, according to the report, can also be found in

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

Nassau in just about every police division. Efforts by honest authorities

are often thwarted by corrupt officials.

Other 1995 U.S. agency reports stated the following:

• Although there were no official confirmed cases of corruption in St. Lucia,

a recent undercover operation indicated the appearance of impropriety by

high-ranking law enforcement officials.

• On one island, there were continuing rumors and allegations regarding the

corruption of high-ranking government officials (including officials in the

police department). Also, the current administration and opposition party

were both perceived to be involved in illegal activities.

• In Antigua and Barbuda, some individuals with close ties to the current

regime are involved in narcotics trafficking. In 1994, authorities reported

processing 148 cases involving 152 defendants. Convicted traffickers could

pay a heavy fine instead of going to jail.

During February and March 1995, the State Department reported the

following:

• In St. Kitts, violence involving politics and drugs plagued the island in

1994, threatening the stability of its minority government. In 1994, a private

pleasure craft with the former St. Kitts ambassador to the United Nations,

his wife, and family aboard disappeared and was presumed to be lost at

sea. The former ambassador had been publicly accused of money

laundering and drug charges. Both Colombian and local traffickers have

attempted to exploit a tense domestic environment.

• In Trinidad and Tobago unsubstantiated rumors regarding corruption have

included ministers, politicians, and judicial and law enforcement

personnel at every level. Despite these rumors, authorities have not

initiated any investigations. In addition, alleged police drug payoffs

identified by a 1993 Scotland Yard team have not been pursued. The report

noted that the team could not fully develop cases because of limited police

cooperation. According to the report, structures to deal with corruption

issues are either not in place or not functioning.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
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Capabilities to

Interdict Drug

Traffickers in the

Transit Zone Have

Been Reduced

From fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 1995, the budgets for most federal

activities in the transit zone declined significantly. A presidential directive

issued in November 1993 called for a gradual shift in emphasis from the

transit zone to the source countries. As indicated in table 3, the shift in

U.S. resources away from the transit zone actually began as early as fiscal

year 1993. DOD and most other federal agencies had a large portion of

transit zone resources reduced in fiscal year 1994.

Table 3: Counternarcotics Funding in

the Transit Zone (fiscal years 1991-95) Dollars in millions

Agency 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

DOD $407.1 $504.5 $426.0 $220.4 $214.7

Coast Guard 565.2 443.9 310.5 314.4 301.2

Customs a a 16.2 12.5 12.8

DEA 26.2 28.8 29.1 28.7 29.6

State 35.9 36.2 14.0 7.9 10.6

Total $1,034.4 $1,013.4 $795.8 $583.9 $568.9

aCustoms data for 1991 and 1992 are unavailable.

Source: Indicated federal agencies.

As indicated in table 4, the anticipated shift of U.S. funding to efforts in the

source countries never materialized, and counternarcotics funding in the

source countries declined from fiscal year 1993 to the lower levels in fiscal

years 1994 and 1995. Although the actual amount of funds dedicated to

source country efforts decreased, source country funding as a percentage

of the total increased.

Table 4: Counternarcotics Funding in

Source Countries (fiscal years

1991-95)

Dollars in millions

Agency 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

DOD $76.1 $120.7 $154.9 $144.5 $148.7

Customs a a 6.0 3.9 5.2

DEA 18.4 21.5 21.0 20.7 21.3

State 160.7 123.6 105.1 55.2 54.8

Total $255.2 $265.8 $287.0 $224.3 $230.0

aCustoms data for 1991 and 1992 are not available.

Source: Indicated federal agencies.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
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Various agencies stressed that decisions to reduce the funding devoted to

drug interdiction were often beyond their control. For example, DOD noted

that a resource shift from the transit zone to source countries did not

occur because its overall drug budget was reduced in fiscal year 1994 by

$300 million, $200 million of which was taken from transit zone

operations. Also, the U.S. Coast Guard noted that during the early 1990s, it

was involved in increasing emigrant activity in the Caribbean that

culminated in two mass exoduses of emigrants from Haiti and Cuba.

During this period, assets were reallocated from counterdrug missions to

respond to this high-priority, national and international humanitarian

crisis.

The U.S. Customs Service also reported impacts that budget reductions

had on its ability to fulfill its missions. The Customs Marine Law

Enforcement Program lost 51 percent of its budget, 54 percent of its

personnel, and 50 percent of its vessels in fiscal year 1995. According to

the U.S. Customs Service, these reductions resulted in a significant impact

on its ability to fulfill its traditional maritime role.

Between December 1994 and November 1995, DOD deactivated three

Bahamian Aerostat radars, two Caribbean Basin Radar Network sites, two

mobile tactical radars, and two remote high-frequency Link 11

transmitters/receivers. As indicated in figure 2, the loss of these radars

significantly reduced the coverage area. Between 1994 and 1995, DOD

activated two Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar systems. Although this

radar system provides a larger area of coverage footprint than microwave

radars, it has less probability to detect an air event and is not as accurate

in vectoring in interceptions as microwave radars.

U.S. law enforcement officials have reported that lost radar capabilities

have hampered their operations in and around the Bahamas. A March 1995

report concluded that the loss of radar coverage had hampered operations

to detect suspect aircraft flying to the Bahamas. Another report noted that

the loss of aerostat balloons and ground base radars left the Bahamas

virtually free of detection and monitoring assets. DEA officials stated that

the reduction in law enforcement resources and direct asset support 

(e.g., aircraft) have impacted their operations.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

Figure 2: Lost Radar Surveillance Capabilities (1994-95)

1994 1995

#1 #1 & #2

Source: DOD.

As indicated in table 5, the number of ship days devoted to drug

interdiction went from 4,448 ship days in the peak fiscal year 1993 to 2,668

ship days in fiscal year 1994 and 2,845 ship days in fiscal year 1995. The

reductions involved almost all classes of ships.

Table 5: JIATF-East Maritime Assets

(fiscal years 1991-95) In number of ship days

Ship type 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Logistic 128 287 71 40 0

Cruiser 524 558 753 742 488

Destroyer 909 699 602 118 224

Frigate 1,874 2,008 1,441 785 727

Amphibious 51 87 188 9 0

Coast Guard 0 0 138 0 401

Other 750 533 1,255 974 1,005

Total 4,236 4,172 4,448 2,668 2,845

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As table 5 shows, in fiscal years 1993 and 1994, the number of ship days for

frigates significantly declined from fiscal year 1992 levels. During the same

period, the Navy began to deploy other classes of vessels, such as

Ocean-Going Radar Picket Ships. This change resulted in reduced

capability. These radar picket ships are outfitted with air search radar and

are deployed for aerial detection and monitoring. They are not employed

for surface law enforcement and, due to their low speed, are not well

suited for a surface mission.

In addition to reduced radar coverage and reduced maritime deployments,

the number of Airborne Warning and Control System sorties also declined

between fiscal years 1993 and 1995. For example, DOD reported that flight

hours flown in the transit zone declined by 52 percent—from 38,100 hours

in fiscal year 1992 to 18,155 hours in fiscal year 1995. DOD officials stated

that Airborne Warning and Control System were flown at the maximum

extent possible based on crew availability, operational tempo, and reduced

asset availability due to other world hot spots.

Cocaine Seizures Have

Declined From 1991-92

Levels

Cocaine seizures in the entire transit zone have declined from 1991-92

levels. As shown in figure 3, cocaine seizures dropped significantly from

70,336 kilograms in fiscal year 1992 to 37,181 kilograms in fiscal year 1995.

Air seizures accounted for the greatest amount of decline, from 40,253

kilograms in fiscal year 1992 to only 14,564 kilograms in fiscal year 1995:

Maritime seizures increased as a proportion of total seizures, accounting

for about 61 percent in fiscal year 1995 compared to about 43 percent in

fiscal year 1992.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

Figure 3: Cocaine Seizures (fiscal years 1991-95)

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

Fiscal year

Kilograms

Air seizures Surface seizures

Source: JIATF-East.

The decline in recorded cocaine seizures is likely due to a combination of

factors, including reduced capability by U.S. agencies to detect air and

maritime activities and cocaine traffickers’ increased smuggling

sophistication.

ONDCP-Supported Transit

Zone Study

In 1995, the ONDCP contracted with Evidence-Base Research to conduct a

study to (1) develop a baseline inventory for fiscal year 1994 of

interdiction and law enforcement operations and resources in the transit

zone and (2) consider the impact on disruption success rates with a

$200-million and a $500-million increase in resources. The study had a

number of recognized limitations, including a low level of confidence in its

predictions and a limited scope. For example, the scope of the study did

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

not analyze the potential benefits of investing resources in the source

countries.

It reported that in fiscal year 1994, drug smugglers were not disrupted in

69 percent of the attempts to bring drugs into the United States. With a

$200-million and a $500-million increase in spending, the study estimated

within a 10- to 20-percent confidence level that the smugglers success rate

would decline to 58 percent and 53 percent, respectively. If funding was

increased, it suggested the following order of priority:

• Increase intelligence, which because of its relative low cost, has the

greatest leverage and is critical for responding to the maritime threat.

• Improve disruption capability because, without it, law enforcement would

be unable to respond to the targets identified by increased and improved

intelligence.

• Increase detection and monitoring to fill geographic gaps and ensure an

ability to link intelligence and disruption capability.

The study noted that the federal policy challenge is not only to determine

the benefits from direct investment in the transit zone but also to consider

whether the investment of a similar level of resources elsewhere in the

drug strategy might produce even more benefits.

U.S. officials stated that they generally agreed that if additional funds were

provided for the transit zone that they should follow the priorities

contained in the contractor’s report. However, they pointed out that the

study’s low confidence level made the conclusions about stopping drug

activities highly questionable. DEA officials stated that the conclusions of

the study were questionable because no one knows the actual amount of

cocaine that is flowing through the transit zone into the United States.

These data would be needed to address the study’s conclusions about

potential success of increased interdiction efforts.

Lack of Regional Plan

Hampers Interdiction

Effort

The executive branch has not developed a plan to implement the U.S.

antidrug strategy in the Caribbean. DOD, the Department of State, and law

enforcement agencies have various agreements to implement the national

drug strategy in the Caribbean region. However, counternarcotics officials

expressed concern over the lack of overall responsibility for implementing

the current cocaine strategy in the Caribbean. Although agencies had

developed individual operational plans, they cited the lack of a

coordinated regional action plan as the foremost impediment to

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

accomplishing the goals of the national strategy. Furthermore, they

believed that implementing a coordinated regional plan, if one was

developed, would be difficult unless someone with real authority was in

charge. DOD officials responsible for implementing the detection and

monitoring program stated that, because no authority existed that would

require participating agencies to commit resources to drug interdiction

efforts, it was difficult for them to develop effective plans. Participating

agencies indicated that they often had to juggle competing priorities at a

time when they were downsizing.

Various U.S. officials noted that there is a need for leadership and

commitment by ONDCP to ensure that agencies are carrying out their

missions to achieve U.S. counternarcotics objectives in the Caribbean.

These officials stated that neither ONDCP nor the USIC had authority to

direct other participating agencies in meeting agreed-to resource

commitments and operational plans. DOD officials stated that if the U.S.

government was serious about eradicating drugs in the United States,

ONDCP needed to become more authoritative and directive.

Interagency Staffing

Responses Are Inadequate

Because participating agencies have not adequately staffed JIATF-East, it

has not achieved the interagency culture initially hoped for at its creation.

In April 1994, ONDCP and the participating agencies approved the National

Interdiction Command and Control Plan. This plan provided for

establishing three geographically oriented counterdrug Joint Interagency

Task Forces and a Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center. The

task forces were to be headed up and staffed by DOD, the U.S. Customs

Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

A major premise of the plan was that the full-time personnel assigned to

the task forces would become stakeholders in its operations. It was

anticipated that this would ensure close planning and operational

coordination; the availability of federal assets; and a seamless handoff of

suspected air, sea, or land targets. Other agencies who either had an

interest in or who are impacted by the operations were to provide liaison

personnel. Unfortunately, participating agencies have not provided the

required staffing to the task force and, thus, JIATF-East has been dominated

by DOD personnel and has not achieved the intended interagency makeup.

The U.S. Customs Service has provided only 8 of 22 authorized staff. U.S.

Customs stated that it could not provide additional staff due to agency

downsizing. Furthermore, JIATF-East officials experienced problems with

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

the personnel assigned by the U.S. Customs Service. For example, some

U.S. Customs personnel lacked the proper security clearances and could

not be trained as operators in the classified watch environments. Also,

U.S. Customs personnel sent to fill the high-level positions of Vice Director

and Deputy Director for Plans had not obtained the security clearances

required for these positions and could not participate in planning for and

using DOD classified assets.

The Department of State has not filled a position to meet the JIATF-East

requirement due to downsizing. Although the Federal Bureau of

Investigation periodically assigned an intelligence analyst on temporary

duty, it has not assigned a full-time person because of personnel

constraints. Federal Bureau of Investigation officials stated that they have

developed a plan to assign two agents—an intelligence analyst and a

Supervisory Special Agent. These officials stated that the plan has not

been approved. Although DEA had a Supervisory Special Agent performing

as a liaison officer, DEA disagreed with JIATF-East on the integration of a

DEA person into the operational aspects of JIATF-East and did not fill an

intelligence analysis position because of resource constraints.

Agency responses to staffing the USIC have also been inadequate. ONDCP

agreed to an interagency staffing level of 11 positions for USIC, including 

5 positions to be filled from the U.S. Coast Guard and 1 each from the

Joint Chief of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Central

Intelligence Agency, the U.S.Customs Service, the Department of State,

and DEA. As of March 1996, 2 of the 11 positions had not been filled. The

Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have not

filled these positions.

Intelligence Sharing

Remains a Contentious

Issue

Although progress has been made in improving intelligence sharing in the

last 2 years, it remains a contentious issue among various collectors and

users of intelligence data. In June 1994, DOD, along with other federal

agencies, assessed counterdrug support programs in the transit zone. A

major conclusion of the review was that, although accurate intelligence

was essential to efficient transit zone operations, transit zone intelligence

functions were hampered by (1) legal and agency-imposed limitations on

access to law enforcement intelligence, (2) limited predictive analysis, and

(3) problems of host nation corruption. Available intelligence information

was not considered timely or specific enough regarding locations to

support successful operations. DOD concluded that better coordination of

intelligence and targeting information among users would improve

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

resource use and recommended a concerted effort to alleviate the effects

or reduce the scope of constraints in interagency information sharing.

According to DOD officials, the requirements for collecting, retaining, and

sharing counterdrug information and intelligence with other federal

agencies are contained in a myriad of executive orders, individual agency

regulations, and agreements between agencies. Also, the sharing of

counterdrug information and intelligence with U.S. allies is governed by

many of the same executive orders, regulations, and agreements, as well

as existing bilateral agreements.

JIATF-East officials told us that they had found limited understanding of

regulations and much misinformation about intelligence sharing within the

counternarcotics community. DOD officials stated that ONDCP had issued

the Interdiction Intelligence Support Plan in March 1995 to ensure that the

JIATF-South, the Domestic Air Interdiction Control Center, the Intelligence

Analysis Center, and the U.S. Customs Service National Aviation Center

were provided access to tactical information necessary to perform their

mission. DOD officials believe the current regulations allow sharing and

dissemination of significant information beyond that currently being

provided. They also believe that restrictions on information sharing are

most likely the result of institutional practices and can be rectified by

implementing existing procedures, not by creating additional procedures.

U.S. law enforcement officials believed that the sharing of their

intelligence and information with other agencies was consistent with the

legal limitation on the availability of the information and existing

regulations. DEA officials noted that there are limitations on what

intelligence they can legally provide other federal agencies developed from

Grand Jury information, wire taps, and court sealing orders. They also

noted that some intelligence is not released to protect sources and the

integrity of ongoing investigations. DEA officials also stated that the 

El Paso Intelligence Center provides JIATF-East with the necessary

information to track suspect aircraft and vessels until the respective U.S.

and foreign authorities can take appropriate law enforcement action.

While the debate over whether DOD is receiving required intelligence

continues, ONDCP has been involved in developing an intelligence

infrastructure to implement the plan and improve intelligence sharing.

Agencies have installed a system that allows the various agencies to pass

information from one data base to another on an interagency network.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

Moreover, according to JIATF-East officials, Caribbean host nations are also

concerned about the significant lack of counterdrug information flowing

back to their counterdrug forces. The officials said that continued host

nation cooperation in counterdrug programs may depend on

improvements to intelligence and information sharing with host nation

forces. However, given the widespread corruption within the region, it

may be difficult to strike a balance that satisfies all parties.

Some Requests for

Operational Assistance Are

Not Met

JIATF-East records covering known counterdrug events occurring between

October 1, 1994, and November 30, 1995, showed that in 87 of 92 cases

other federal agencies have fully cooperated with them and provided

required operational assistance. JIATF-East officials stated that they were

pleased with the cooperation and contributions from U.S. Customs air

resources. We noted five occasions where the U.S. Customs Service did

not to support JIATF-East requests to track and pursue suspected drug

smugglers. In these cases, JIATF-East officials stated that U.S. Customs

always had valid reasons such as asset limitations, the geometry of the

intercept problem, or the timeliness of the notification.

Recommendation We recommend that the Director of ONDCP develop a regional action plan

focused on the Caribbean part of the transit zone to fully implement the

U.S. policy for cocaine in the Western Hemisphere. At a minimum, the plan

should determine resources and staffing needed and delineate a

comprehensive strategy to improve host nation capabilities and

commitment to counternarcotics interdiction.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

ONDCP, USIC, and DEA provided written comments on a draft of this report

(see apps. I through III); the Departments of State and Defense and the

U.S. Custom Service provided oral comments.

ONDCP, the Departments of State and Defense, and the U.S. Customs

Service generally agreed with the report’s major conclusions and

recommendations. ONDCP stated that many of the recommendations were

sound and that it was in the process of implementing some of them. ONDCP

said it will carefully examine all of the recommendations in preparing the

1996 National Drug Control Strategy.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

Several agencies, including USIC, provided additional information or

suggested language to clarify the facts presented in this report. We have

incorporated these comments into the report.

DEA raised concerns regarding intelligence sharing in the Caribbean. DEA

believed that every effort was being made to share intelligence within the

counternarcotics intelligence community. However, as we noted in our

report, JIATF-East and DOD still voiced concerns on intelligence sharing.

Several agency comments addressed the impact that budget reductions

and downsizing have had on the ability to support transit zone operations.

For example, State Department officials noted that the Congress had

substantially reduced the State Department’s budget below the levels

requested by the President for international law enforcement programs.

Also, ONDCP stated that successive cuts in the interdiction budgets over the

past several years have served to reduce dramatically the resources

available in the interdiction efforts from the transit zone to the source

countries.

Scope and

Methodology

We interviewed officials and reviewed pertinent documents in

Washington, D.C., at ONDCP, the Departments of State and Defense, DEA,

the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Customs Service. We also interviewed

officials and reviewed documents at the Office of the U.S. Interdiction

Coordinator, located within the headquarters of the U.S. Coast Guard.

In addition, we interviewed officials and reviewed pertinent documents at

the U.S. Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia; the JIATF-East in Key West,

Florida; the offices of the DEA, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S.

Coast Guard in Miami, Florida. We also interviewed officials from the U.S.

Customs Air Wing in Puerto Rico and the DEA’s office in Nassau, Bahamas.

We conducted our review between November 1995 and March 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its

issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Director of ONDCP, the

Secretaries of the Departments of Defense and State, the Commissioner of

the U.S. Customs Service, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard and

the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, the Administrator of DEA, the Director of

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
B-271376 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and interested congressional

committees. We will make copies of this report available to others upon

request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were

Louis Zanardi, Ronald Hughes, and Robert Jaxel.

Sincerely yours,

Jess T. Ford, Associate Director

International Affairs and Trade Issues

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Office of National

Drug Control Policy

28

Appendix II 

Comments From the

United States

Interdiction

Coordinator

31

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Drug Enforcement

Administration

36

Tables Table 1: Air and Maritime Drug-Trafficking Events and Results 7

Table 2: Selected Eastern Caribbean Host Nation Maritime

Interdiction Assets

10

Table 3: Counternarcotics Funding in the Transit Zone 13

Table 4: Counternarcotics Funding in Source Countries 13

Table 5: JIATF-East Maritime Assets 15

Figures Figure 1: Drug-Trafficking Routes in the Eastern Caribbean 4

Figure 2: Lost Radar Surveillance Capabilities 15

Figure 3: Cocaine Seizures 17

Abbreviations

DEA Drug Enforcement Agency

DOD Department of Defense

JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

USIC U.S. Interdiction Coordinator

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

The following is GAO’s comment on the Office of National Drug Control

Policy’s (ONDCP) letter dated April 3, 1996.

GAO Comment 1. ONDCP has the statutory authority to certify the drug budgets of every

federal agency and department. However, ONDCP has limited authority to

direct agencies to meet agreed-to resource commitments and operational

plans.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the United States

Interdiction Coordinator

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Now on p. 3.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 2.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 3.

See comment 1.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the United States

Interdiction Coordinator

See p. 5.

Sentence deleted

from final report.

See pp. 8-11.

See comment 2.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the United States

Interdiction Coordinator

Now on p. 16.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 16.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 20.

See comment 1.

See pp. 20-21.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the United States

Interdiction Coordinator

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the United States

Interdiction Coordinator

The following are GAO’s comments on the United States Interdiction

Coordinator’s letter dated March 15, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. We have made appropriate technical changes to the report.

2. The Joint Interagency Task Force East’s (JIATF-East) assessment of the

political will was deleted from the report after further discussions with the

State Department and JIATF-East officials. However, the State Department

concurred with our conclusion that U.S. antidrug activities are impeded by

some countries’ lack of political will, corruption, and limited local law

enforcement capabilities. These conclusions are supported by State

Department’s March 1996 Internatinal Narcotics Contol Strategy Report.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Now on pp. 2, 8-12.

See comment 4.

Now on p. 10.

See comment 5.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

Now on pp. 3 and 18.

See p. 22.

Now on p. 3.

Now on p. 5.

See comment 6.

Now on pp. 5-6.

See comment 7.

Now on p. 7.

Now on pp. 11-12.

See comment 8.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

See pp. 14-17.

Now on p. 18.

See comment 9.

Now on pp. 20-22.

See comment 10.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

The following are GAO’s comments on the Drug Enforcement

Administration’s (DEA) letter dated April 2, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. The JIATF-East assessment of the countries’ political will was deleted

from the draft report after further discussions with the Department of

State and JIATF-East.

2. The report includes information on the El Paso Intelligence Center’s

role in providing information to JIATF-East.

3. The Department of State concurred with our conclusion that U.S.

counterdrug activities are impeded by a lack of political will, corruption,

and limited local law enforcement capabilities in some countries.

Furthermore, the report is consistent with the State Department’s

March 1996 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

4. The report clarifies JIATF-East’s subjective views.

5. The statement is supported not only by statements made by JIATF-East

officials but also by various law enforcement agency reports.

6. We have clarified the report and eliminated the apparent contradiction.

7. Notwithstanding the fact that drug seizures were relatively high before

1994, they still represented a relatively low percentage of drugs transiting

the area.

8. This information is taken from Department of State reports and law

enforcement reports. Moreover, the concern of those reporting

unsubstantiated rumors and allegations is not only whether they are true

but, more importantly, that often the country is not investigating them.

While most U.S. officials agreed that corruption was a problem, the

evidence that it occurred was admittedly weak and we took care to

properly detail it as such.

9. Our prior reports dealt with existing conditions in the 1989 to 1991 time

frame. We are not suggesting that increased funding cited in the ONDCP

study will lead to any greater interdiction success.

10. We have added DEA statements concerning their belief that JIATF-East is

receiving all the actionable intelligence it requires and the limitations DEA

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

has in providing intelligence. Nevertheless, there is clearly a disagreement

between JIATF-East and DEA over whether it is getting all of the necessary

intelligence notwithstanding the fact that progress has been made,

including the stationing of two JIATF-East personnel at the El Paso

Intelligence Center. DOD believes that better understanding of current

regulations would further improve the sharing of intelligence information.

(711161) Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-96-119 Drug Control
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