Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce

Greenhouse Gases

February 1991

OTA-O-482

NTIS order #PB91-163428
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce

Greenhouse Gases, OTA-O-482 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

February 1991).

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form can be found in the back of this report)
Foreword

Our Nation has a history of people working towards common goals. It has demonstrated this in time

of war, in landing a man on the moon, and in reducing energy use during the oil crises of the 1970s.

However, in each case, the effort was sustained less than a decade; the desired goals were achieved or

the crises passed.

The United States is the world’s leading industrial society and largest single emitter of carbon

dioxide. Climate change therefore presents a unique challenge to this Nation. It is a threat that will require

major prudent political actions even before all the scientific certainties are resolved. The analysis,

prevention, and remediation of global warming will require unprecedented international cooperation and

action—an effort requiring actions sustained over decades, not just a few years.

Carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions are responsible for 80 percent of the

“global warming commitment” caused by human activities over the last decade. A landmark

international agreement to totally phase out the use of CFCs by the year 2000 is already in effect. Many

of the nations involved in that accord are now seeking ways to reduce the carbon dioxide emissions. This

task is clearly more daunting since most industrialized nations currently depend so heavily on fossil

fuels—the major source of carbon dioxide—for their economic well-being.

For this reason, this assessment focuses principally on ways to cut carbon dioxide emissions both

in the United States and in other countries as well, although it does examine all greenhouse gases. The

report responds to the concerns of six Committees of Congress who requested in 1988 that OTA

undertake this study. The Senate requesting Committees are: Commerce, Science, and Transportation;

Energy and Natural Resources; Environment and Public Works; and Governmental Affairs. The House

requesters are: Committee on Science, Space, and Technology; and the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

This assessment shows that major reductions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases will

require significant new initiatives by the Federal Government, by the private sector, and by individual

citizens. Many of these initiatives will pay for themselves; for others, the economic cost may be

considerable. And many of these efforts must be sustained over decades.

Although many ancillary environmental benefits will accrue from the actions necessary to effect a

major reduction of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, such a decrease will not, in itself, significantly

decrease the greenhouse effect. Other nations will have to take similar actions and, even then, those

actions will only slow any warming trend. An Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency estimated that at least a 50- to 80-percent worldwide reduction in

carbon dioxide emissions is needed to keep the atmosphere at today’s already altered level.

That level of reduction requires the world to wean itself from fossil fuels if it hopes to keep emissions

from growing steeply under the combined pressure of economic and population growth. Steps taken now

to use more efficient energy technologies would reduce emissions while buying time required for the

transition to nonfossil fuels.

OTA appreciates the support this effort received from hundreds of contributors both from the United

States and abroad. Workshop participants, reviewers, contractors, and informal advisers provided OTA

invaluable support as it attempted to sift through the voluminous material on this subject. OTA, however,

remains solely responsible for the contents of this report.

u JOHN H.-GIBBONS

Director
Changing By Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

OTA Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA

Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Robert Niblock, Oceans and Environment Program Manager

Rosina M. Bierbaum, Project Director

Robert M. Friedman, Senior Associate

Howard Levenson, Senior Associate

Richard D. Rapoport, Analyst

Nick Sundt, Analyst

Research Assistants

Jennifer H. Cohen Stanislav F. Kolar

Other Contributors

David Festa Gretchen Kolsrud

Susan Kulakowski Jana Milford

Mark Pastore Linda Sawyer

Dan Schechter Rhodri Walters

Eric Washburn Frances Wood

Fred Wood Andrew Wyckoff

Contractors

Susan Wintsch, Editor

Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Enterprise Development International, Inc.

Murray Feshbach

International Resources Group, Ltd.

Don Kash

Vicki Norberg-Bohm

Pacific Institute (SIDES)

Edward A. Parson

Princeton University

University of Washington

Michael P. Walsh

Administrative Staff

Kathleen A. Beil Sally W. Van Aller
Assessment Advisory Groups

Advisory Group

Fred Abel

Senior Economist

Office of Building Technologies

U.S. Department of Energy

Edward Baily

Vice President

Government and Industry Relations

Carrier Corp.

Douglas C. Bauer

Senior Vice President

ERC Environmental & Energy Services Co.

G.Z. Brown

Professor of Architecture

Department of Architecture

University of Oregon

William Chandler

Director, Advanced International Studies Unit

Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Armond Cohen

Senior Attorney

Conservation Law Foundation

Drury Crawley

Senior Research Scientist

Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Daniel Dreyfus

Strategic Analysis/Energy Forecasting

Gas Research Institute

Ezra Ehrenkrantz

President

The Ehrenkrantz Group

Dave Engel

Deputy Division Director

Technology and Research Division

U.S. Department of Housing and

Urban Development

Charles Field

Staff Vice President

National Association of Home Builders

Howard Geller

Associate Director

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy

Jim Gross

Deputy Director

Center for Building Technology

National Institute of Standards and Technology

on Buildings

Erik Haites

Principal

Barakat & Chamberlain

Cheryl Barrington

Commissioner

Maine Public Utilities Commission

Michael Joroff

Director, Laboratory of Architecture

and Planning

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Henry Kelly

Senior Associate

Office of Technology Assessment

David MacFadyen

President

NAHB National Research Center

Alan Miller

Director

Center for Global Change

University of Maryland

John P. Millhone

Deputy Assistant Secretary

Office of Building Technologies

U.S. Department of Energy

Ronald Morony

Director, Innovative Technology and Research

U.S. Department of Housing and

Urban Development

Brad W. Oberg

Program Manager

New Systems Laboratory

USG Corp.

Bill Prindle

Senior Program Manager

Alliance to Save Energy

Art Rosenfeld

Director, Center for Building Science

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

John Scalzi

Program Director, Structures and Building Systems

National Science Foundation

John Slayter

Director of Research and Engineering

The Ryland Group

NOTE OTA appreciates and IS grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory group members. The groups do

not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of i(s

contents

v
Peter Smeallia

Director, Geotechnical Board

National Research Council

Bill Staubitz

Manager Marketing Development

Sylvania Corp./GTE

Mary Tucker

Acting Manager, Energy Program

City of San Jose, CA

Steven Winter

President

Steven Winter Associates, Inc.

Richard Wright

Director

Center for Building Technology

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Advisory Group on Industry

John Barker

Vice President, Energy Affairs

ARMCO Inc.

Deborah Bleviss

Executive Director

International Institute for Energy Conservation

Kenneth Burgess

Vice President

Dow Chemical Co.

William Chandler

Director, Advanced International Studies Unit

Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Thomas J. Gross

Director, Improved Energy Productivity

U.S. Department of Energy

Hillard G. Huntington

Senior Research Associate

Energy Modeling Forum

Stanford University

Martin Klepper, Esq.

Partner

Skadden Arps

Paul Leiby

Economist

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Alastair McKechnie

Chief, Energy Efficiency and Strategy Unit

Industry and Energy Department

World Bank

Jeremy Metz

Director, Energy, Materials, and Technology

American Paper Institute

Steve Rayner

Coordinator, Policy, Energy and

Human Systems Analysis

Center for Global Environmental Studies

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Joe Roop

Staff Scientist

International Energy Agency

Organization for Economic Cooperation

& Development

Marc Ross

Professor

Physics Department

University of Michigan

Irv Snyder

Director, Research and Development

Dow Chemical Co.

Jack Vanderryn

Agency Director for Energy and Natural Resources

Bureau for Science and Technology

U.S. Agency for International Development

Ronald Wishart

Vice President for Public Affairs

Union Carbide Corp.

James Wolf

Executive Director

Alliance to Save Energy

Erie Young (retired)

Vice President of Environment and Energy

Environmental and Energy Department

American Iron and Steel Institute
Advisory Group on Energy Supply

Stanley R. Bull

Director, Solar Fuels Research Division

Solar Energy Research Institute

William Chandler

Director, Advanced International Studies Unit

Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories

David Choengold

Bureau Director, Systems Planning

Wisconsin Public Service Commission

Joel Darmstadter

Senior Associate

Resources for the Future

William Fulkerson

Director, Energy Division

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Michael German

Senior Vice President

American Gas Association

Connie Holmes

Senior Vice President for Policy Analysis

National Coal Association

Don Kash

Director

Science and Public Policy Program

University of Oklahoma, Norman

Daniel Lashof

Environmental Scientist

Natural Resources Defense Council

Doug McDonald

Economist

American Petroleum Institute

Joan Ogden

Research Professor

Center for Environmental and Energy Studies

Princeton University

Rajat Sen

Professional Senior Scientist

Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Fred Sissine

Analyst, Science and Technology

Congressional Research Service

The Library of Congress

Angelo Skalafuris

President

Modular Cogeneration Corp.

Jim Sullivan

Director, Office of Energy

Bureau for Science and Technology

U.S. Agency for International Development

Alvin M. Weinberg

Distinguished Fellow

Institute for Energy Analysis

Chris Whipple

Manager, Risk Communication

Electric Power Research Institute

Robert H. Williams

Research Professor

Center for Environmental and Energy Studies

Princeton University

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory group members. The groups do

not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report, OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its

contents.

vii
Advisory Group on Developing Countries

Robert H. Annan

Staff Director

Committee on Renewable Energy, Commerce and Trade

U.S. Department of Energy

Mark Bernstein

Director

Center for Energy and the Environment

University of Pennsylvania

James H. Caldwell

Independent Consultant

David Curry

Acting Director

Office of Regional and Resources Policy

U.S. Department of the Treasury

Ghazi Darkazalli

Vice President of Photovoltaics

Spire Corp.

Robert Ford

Foreign Affairs Officer

Office of Global Change

U.S. Department of State

Les Garden

International Trade Specialist for Renewable Energy

U.S. Department of Commerce

Michael Greene

Associate Director

Board on Science and Technology in Development

National Academy of Sciences

Erik Helland-Hansen

Principal Technical Advisor

Bureau of Program Policy and Evaluation

United Nations Development Programme

David Jhirad

Senior Energy Advisor

Office of Energy

U.S. Agency for International Development

Linda Ladis

Director of Programs

U.S. Export Council for Renewable Energy

Mark Levine

Program Leader

International Energy Studies

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

Frances Li

Acting Director

Office of Global Change

U.S. Department of State

Janice Mazer

Major Projects Officer

U.S. Department of Commerce

Mohan Munasinghe

Division Chief

Brazil Energy and Infrastructure

Operations Division

World Bank

D. Lou Peoples

Vice President & Manager of Marketing

and Strategy

Bechtel Power Corp.

Paul Schwengels

Senior Analyst

Air Economics Branch

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Joseph Sedlak

Director of Domestic Programs

Volunteers in Technical Assistance

James Sullivan

Director, Office of Energy

Bureau for Science and Technology

U.S. Agency for International Development

Franklin Tugwell

Project Director, Biomass Energy

Winrock International Institute for Agricultural

Development

Jack Vanderryn

Director, Energy and Natural Resources

Bureau for Science and Technology

U.S. Agency for International Development

Frank Vukmanic

Director, Office of Multilateral Development Banks

U.S. Department of the Treasury

Timothy Weiskel

Warren Weaver Fellow

Rockefeller Foundation

Gerald T. West

Vice President for Development

Overseas Private Investment Corporation

Thomas Wilbanks

Corporate Fellow and Senior Planner

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

John W. Wisniewski

Vice President for Engineering

Export-Import Bank

!////
Advisory Group on Transportation .

Alvin Alm

Vice President

Science Applications International Cm-p.

Clark Bullard

Director, Office of Energy Research

University of Illinois, Urbana

Roger Carlsmith

Director

Conservation and Renewable Energy Program

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

David Kulp

Manager

Fuel Economy Planning and Compliance

Ford Motor Co.

Robert Maxwell

Director, Certification Division

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Barry McNutt

Policy Analyst

U.S. Department of Energy

William Chandler Harriet Parcells

Director, Advanced International Studies Unit Transportation Associate

Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories National Association of Railroad Passengers

Robert Dewey Marc Ross

Associate Professor

Center for Auto Safety Physics Department

Carmen Difiglio University of Michigan

Deputy Director Maxine Savitz

Office of Policy Integration Director

U.S. Department of Energy Garrett Ceramic Components

Nick Fedoruk Jim Scott

Director Director, 2020 Project

Energy Conservation Coalition National Academy of Sciences

Helen Kahn (retired)

Formerly with Automotive News

Richard L. Klimisch

Executive Director, Environmental Activities Staff

General Motors Technical Center

NOTE: OTA apprccmtcs and 1s grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful mitjques provided by the advisory group members. The groups do

not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this repon. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its

contents.

ix
Contents

Chapter Page

Chapter l: Summary .. .. .. .., .. ., .. . $ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 2: A Primer on Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Chapter 3: Energy Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Chapter 4: The Buildings Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 5: The Transportation Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 6: The Manufacturing Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 7: The Forestry Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 8: The Food System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 9: International Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix A: Summary of the OTA Emissions Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix B: State Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix C: Conversion Factors, Abbreviations, and Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix D: Reviewers and Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

115

149

177

201

243

273

313

327

332

337

345

x
Chapter 1

Summary
CONTENTS

CLIMATE CHANGE AND GREENHOUSE GASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. SECTORAL ANALYSES AND PROJECTIONS OF C02 EMISSIONS

Current Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . 3

. . . . . . . . . . . 7

. . . . . . . . . . . 7

Future Emissions Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

OPTIONS FOR REDUCING U.S. EMISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Technical Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Policy Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Sectoral Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

U.S. INFLUENCE ON THE REST OF THE WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Developing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

U.S. Policy Options To Help Limit Greenhouse Gas Emissions Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

CONCLUDING REMARKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

CHAPTER PREFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Boxes

Box Page

l-A. The OTA Study in Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

l-B. The OTA CO2 Emissions Reduction Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

l-C. Agencies and Organizations That Can Influence Greenhouse Emissions Abroad . . 35

Figures

Figure Page

l-1. Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 1985, by Region, and the Contribution

of Each Greenhouse Gas to Global Warmingin the 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1-2. Summary of OTA’s Analysis of Carbon Emissions With and Without

“Moderate” and “Tough’’ Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 6

l-3. U.S. Energy Consumption and Associated Carbon Emissions in 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1-4,

1-5.

1-6.

1-7.

1-8.

1-9.

1-1o.

1-11.

Table

1987 U.S. Co2Emissions by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Carbon Emissions Under the Base Case, Moderate, and Tough Scenarios . . . . . . . . . 9

Federal Government Funding for Energy Supply R&D, 1980 to 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Demand-Side Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Electric Utility Supply-Side Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Forestry Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Per Capita Energy Consumption . . . . . . . . . .

World Population Growth, 1750-2100 . . . .

Tables

l-1. Measures To Lower U.S. Carbon Emissions

l-2. Policy Instruments To Reduce COZ . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Chapter 1

Summary

CLIMATE CHANGE AND

GREENHOUSE GASES

The first photographs from space brought home

the fact that Earth is an integrated and isolated

system. Concern that human impacts could be

changing the equilibrium of this system grew in the

1970s as theories about ozone depletion and the

‘‘greenhouse effect developed. The concept of the

Earth changing over various time scales was not

new: solar and astronomical cycles, the waxing and

waning of ice ages, and seasonal changes have long

been recognized. What was new was the realization

that humans can have a lasting and far-reaching

impact on Earth’s natural fluctuations and cycles.

Potential human impacts on climate are linked to

the globally increasing emission of “greenhouse

gases’ 1

through activities such as burning fossil

fuels (coal, oil, natural gas); deforestation; fertilizing croplands; and heating, air-conditioning, and

lighting buildings. Greenhouse gases, like other

atmospheric gases, allow sunlight to reach and warm

the Earth’s surface; unlike other atmospheric gases,

however, they trap much of the heat and keep it from

escaping back into space. Such gases, therefore, aid

in warming the surface of the Earth. Some of

them-the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons—

also react with sunlight in the upper atmosphere to

destroy the ozone layer around the Earth. In industrialized countries, greenhouse gas emissions are

primarily related to energy use; with only 20 percent

of the world population, these countries account

for 75 percent of annual energy use, In developing

countries, current greenhouse gas emissions are tied

primarily to changes in land use practices (e.g.,

deforestation).

We cannot yet predict the magnitude of climatic

effects from greenhouse gas emissions with accuracy. But it is clear that the decision to limit

emissions cannot await the time when the full

impacts are evident. The lag time between emission

of the gases and their full impact is on the order of

decades to centuries;2

so too is the time needed to

reverse any effects. Today’s emissions thus commit

the planet to changes well into the 21st century. And

the lag times between identification of policy

options, legislation of controls, and actual implementation can also be considerable. For example,

the recent reauthorization of the Clean Air Act took

10 years; implementation of the Act will begin now

and continue over the next 10 to 20 years.

Among individual countries, the United States is

the leading contributor of greenhouse gases. With 5

percent of the world’s population, the United States

accounts for about 20 percent of the worlds

warming commitment (ref. 56; see figure l-la). U.S.

C O2 emissions (20 percent of the global total)

originate almost exclusively from fossil fuel combustion. Anthropogenic sources of methane in the

United States account for about 6 percent of global

emissions from all sources; among the anthropogenic sources, landfills, coal mining, and domestic

animals account for most of the U.S. total (2, 24).

The United States also consumes between 20 and 30

percent of the world’sCFC-11 and CFC-12, the two

most damaging chlorofluorocarbons in terms of

global warming. Roughly 60 to 70 percent of these

CFCs are used in air-conditioning or in the production of thermal insulation; these gases are scheduled

to be phased out by the year 2000 under the revised

Montreal Protocol. U.S. nitrous oxide emissions

(roughly 15 to 20 percent of the manmade global

total; refs. 6, 24) originate primarily from fertilizer

breakdown and high-temperature fossil-fuel combustion. Greenhouse gas emissions are closely

entwined in the United States with energy use;

currently, America uses about 15 times more energy

per person than does the typical developing country.

The warming commitment or ‘‘radiative forcing

caused by the different greenhouse gases is not

equal. It depends on the absorbing characteristics,

concentration in the atmosphere, and the lifetime of

each gas. Although the other gases are more potent

on a per molecule basis, currently CO2 accounts for

2De ~tmosphmc ]jfcllmc of C02 js 50 tO XXI years; N20, about 150 years; CFCS and Mom, from 60 to ~ Y~s; and CJ34S 10 Y-s cm

replacements allowed under the Montreal Protocol for the next several decades have lifetimes of less than 40 years,

t~e us, Dcp~m~n( of Ene,r~ (DOE) found tit of an I ~-percent reduction in residential ener~ use between 1972 and 1 g~”$, one-third w~ due

to behav iord changes (53).

–3-
4 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box l-A—The OTA Study in Context

The six congressional committees requesting this assessment asked OTA to focus on a very specific question:

<

‘Can the United States reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the near term?”

Changing by Degrees does not examine in depth many equally difficult questions such as the science of climate

change, the uncertainties and state of atmospheric modeling, or the projected ecological effects of global warming.

Rather, most of OTA’s resources have been devoted to analyzing technical options to decrease CO2, although

methane, nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions are addressed wherever possible. At the time of

their request, the congressional committees were well aware of ongoing international efforts to phase out CFCs and

halons; since OTA’s study began, successful negotiations have been completed.

To answer the question Congress posed, OTA focuses specifically on potential emissions reductions in the

next 25 years. The analysis is structured around six key sectors of the U.S. economy: Buildings, Transportation,

Manufacturing, Energy Supply, Forestry, and Food. To the extent possible, the report quantifies the potential for

emissions reduction within each sector—areas where gains in efficiency, product substitution, conservation, or other

technical options can ameliorate increases in CO2 and other greenhouse gases. A selection of policy options that

appear to offer the most promise for achieving these reductions in the United States is presented. OTA was charged

to look abroad as well, so the special needs of Eastern Europe, the U. S. S. R,, and developing countries-with respect

to both energy and natural resource issues—are also addressed.

In our detailed analysis of potential emissions reductions for the United States, we consider an extensive suite

of technical options. For example, we estimate the potential increments of CO2 reduction from electric utility fuel

switching, possible improvements in automobile efficiency, changes in commercial building construction, more

efficient manufacturing processes, etc. Most of the options relate to decreasing emissions, although some, such as

reforestation, involve recapturing gases already emitted to the atmosphere.

The assessment lays out three paths: a Base case (“business as usual”), a Moderate (essentially “no-cost”)

case, and a Tough case. Only the last fulfills the congressional request and reduces future C02 emissions—to a level

in 2015 that is 20 to 35 percent lower than today. Some will argue that our estimates of emissions reductions are

both politically unattainable and costly. Others will decry a 20-to 35-percent reduction as not being nearly enough;

the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recently estimated

that the world must reduce CO2 emissions by at least 50 to 80 percent to stabilize the atmosphere. Congress’ request

that we work within a 25-year timeframe in the study proved to be a two-edged analytic sword. It forced OTA to

take a close look at where U.S. C02 emissions were heading without policy intervention. But, 25 years also is too

short a period to include a scenario in which fossil fuels are supplanted with such nonfossil fuel sources as renewable

and improved nuclear energy sources.

Indeed, the United States described 25 years hence in this report does not sound fundamentally different from

what we know today. However, an underlying theme in OTA’s report is that a strong R&D effort is pivotal to

bringing non-C02 (i.e., nonfossil fuel) sources to commercialization as quickly as possible, even as all sectors of

the economy move to use more efficient equipment and decrease energy consumption. If long-term R&D is geared

to that purpose, then new nonfossil supply technologies can start to replace existing powerplants and equipment

early in the next century.

Many of the technical options evaluated here are worth pursuing for other reasons in addition to climate change,

because they address other important U.S. goals such as energy security, local environmental quality, and economic

competitiveness. They can reduce emissions in the short-term, reduce total energy demand, and serve to bridge the

U.S. economy from a fossil-fuel age to a nonfossil future.

The warming commitment or ‘‘radiative forcing’ tons of carbon in 1988) as to swamp the higher

caused by the different greenhouse gases is not radiative forcings per unit of the other gases (24).

equal. It depends on the absorbing characteristics, Still, CFCs are responsible for 24 percent of the

concentration in the atmosphere, and the lifetime of current commitment to global warming; CH4 is

each gas. Although the other gases are more potent responsible for 15 percent and N2O for 6 percent (see

on a per molecule basis, currently CO2 accounts for figure l-lb).

an estimated 55 percent of the commitment to global Recently, public interest and concern over global

warming. This is largely due to the fact that so much changes intensified with the discovery of the annual

CO2 has been emitted worldwide (6 billion metric ozone hole over Antarctica, thinning ozone over the
Chapter 1--Summary ● 5

Figure l-l—Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 1985, by Region, and the Contribution of Each Greenhouse Gas

to Global Warming in the 1980s

a. Other developing

countries

27%

b.

N 2O

6%

, China and centrally

planned Asia

r~ 7%

co*

55%

Eastern Europe

and U.S.S.R.

22%

, /’

-. /

-$$$$ I ‘

-

Other CF

\\ 7%

&

~

‘,

, CFCs

15%

c

-11 a

17%

nd -

Rest of OECD

23%

NOTE: Figure at left shows the share of greenhouse gas emissions by region, weighted by their contribution to radiative forcing between 1980 and 1990. It

includes all greenhouse gases and C02 from deforestation and fossil fuel use. Estimates for COZ emissions from deforestation range from less than

10 to about 30 percent of total COZ. If the upper range proves to be correct, developing countries’ shares would be larger. Figure at right shows the

contribution of each of the manmade greenhouse gases to the change in radiative forcing from 1980 to 1990. The contribution from urban ozone may

also be significant, but cannot be quantified at present.

SOURCES: Figure at left: adapted from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1990. Figure at right: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Scientific

Assessment of C/irnate Change, Summary and Report, World Meteorological Organization/U.N. Environment Program (Cambridge, MA:

Cambridge Unlverslty Press, 1~90). -

Arctic, the severe drought of 1988, and recent

abnormal weather patterns in Europe. International

concern was demonstrated by the recent rapid

renegotiation of the Montreal Protocol to completely

phase out CFCs and assist developing countries in

achieving that goal. Many industrialized countries,

principally in Europe, have further called for a

20-percent reduction in CO2 emissions from the

developed world by 2000 or shortly thereafter;

several have pledged to freeze or reduce emissions

whether or not the rest of the world participates.

Meanwhile, there is debate here as to whether and

when a freeze or a 20-percent reduction in U.S.

greenhouse gas emissions could be achieved in the

near-term. A 20-percent reduction in U.S. C02

emissions would represent a 3-percent decline in

current worldwide emissions of CO2 and less than a

2-percent decline in current worldwide emissions of

all greenhouse gases. More importantly, however,

even if a 20-percent cut by all developed Nations

could be achieved, it would not be enough to

stabilize the atmosphere at today’s level, let alone to

reduce greenhouse gases to pre-industrial levels. To

stabilize the atmosphere, the Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change (24) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (56) suggest,

would require much more—up to an 80-percent

global reduction in CO2 emissions from current

levels as well as significant reductions in the other

greenhouse gases. To achieve this under the combined pressures of economic and population growth,

nonfossil fuel technologies such as solar or nuclear

power would be needed to replace much of today’s

fossil fuel use.

Energy conservation is the logical first step for the

United States if it wishes to reduce its own CO2

emissions below present levels over the next 25

years. For comparison, if no actions are taken,

emissions of CO2 will likely rise 50 percent during

the next quarter century. Under a set of modest

policies designed to encourage people to choose

technologies that are cost-effective, emissions of

CO2 probably will rise about 15 percent over the

next 25 years. This policy package is labeled OTA’s

“Moderate’ scenario.

OTA also identified an energy conservation,

energy-supply, and forest-management package that

can achieve a 20- to 35-percent emissions reduction.

This package is labeled OTA’s “Tough” scenario.

While difficult to achieve, major technological

breakthroughs are not needed. Existing equipment

would not have to be instantly scrapped and replaced

with untested prototypes. The requisite energyrelated technologies are either already available or

are demonstrated and close to commercialization

12
6 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

today. Most of the forestry-related practices also are

proven and already commercialized. OTA’s Tough

scenario thus does not represent ‘‘maximum technical potential. ’ Although it could be argued, for

example, that there is a ‘‘technical potential’ for a

massive return to nuclear power by 2015, we assume

that this is not feasible for the United States, given

lead times and current public concerns. Likewise, we

assume that a massive penetration of solar-based

electricity generation will not take place by then.

Nor will most people be driving 80 mile per gallon

(mpg) cars, although prototypes are available today.

In each of these cases, though, increased research,

development, and demonstration (RD&D) could

bring substantial benefits within a half-century.

In the OTA analysis of’ energy-related activities,

only those technical options that would result in CO2

emissions reductions without loss of comfort or

convenience were examined. If implemented, the

energy conservation options discussed in our Moderate scenario would likely save consumers money

over the lifetime of, for example, an energy-using

appliance, given today energy costs. Greater reductions are quite feasible, as our Tough scenario

shows, with technologies that are either technically

challenging or more expensive. Even greater reductions are possible if consumers can be persuaded to

forego some amenity or comfort;3 however, because

many such actions are reversible, they may not

continue if energy prices drop and so are not

considered here.

U.S. carbon dioxide emissions in 1987 expressed

as carbon equivalents were about 1.3 billion metric

tons per year (see figure 1-2). OTA projects that

under ‘business-as-usual’” conditions (i.e., our Base

case) emissions in 2015 will rise to 1.9 billion metric

tons per year. In order to reduce emission levels 20

percent below 1987 levels by 2015 (i.e., to about 1.0

billion metric tons), we must not only attain zero

growth over the 1987 level, but must also trim that

level by an additional 0.3 billion metric tons. As

figure 1-2 shows, a 20-percent emissions reduction

is much more than OTA’s Moderate scenario but

less than its Tough scenario.

Figure 1-2-Summary of OTA’s Analysis of Carbon

Emissions With and Without “Moderate” and

“Tough” Controls

~ 2.0 1 50%

2

a

o 125% $

~ 1.5 CD3

2 1 00% ;

al % .

\

g 1.0 75% g

o -4

.-vL 50% :.

g 0.5 La

c 25% :“

.-o

Z 0.0 0%

1987 2015 2015 2015

Base Base Moderate Tough

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

During the 1970s the extraordinary freeze in

energy consumption-while the Gross National

Product (GNP) grew 35 percent—was about twothirds due to increases in energy efficiency and

one-third due to structural change5 in the economy.

Investments in more efficient technologies were

facilitated by higher energy prices and the regulatory

climate. We already have shown our ability as a

Nation to change our energy consumption patterns.

The Nation’s track record gives us confidence that

such improvements could continue to be achieved,

especially if energy prices were to significantly rise

again. To achieve lasting reductions in energy

consumption, government signals (e.g., pricing and

regulatory policies) need to be consistent and

reinforcing. Otherwise we are likely to see reversals—

as in the 1980s, when energy prices decreased and

U.S. fossil fuel consumption started climbing again.

For example, higher gasoline prices in the 1970s and

early 1980s led to increased purchases of fuelefficient automobiles. As gasoline prices fell and

long-term energy problems were discounted by

national leaders, car buyers shifted their attention

away from efficiency toward higher luxury and

power. Similarly, Federal R&D funding for renewable technology plummeted 90 percent (in constant

dollars), from $1.3 billion in 1980 to $0.14 billion in

s~c u s Dcp~ment of &erU (DOE) fomd UMt of an lg.per~cn[ reduction in residential energy use between 1972 and 1984, one-~fid was due . .

to behavioral changes (53).

4U s COZ emlsslom were 4,7 billion ~e~c tom~ For the Pqoses of ~s report, all ernjsslo~ are Show as W+@t of carbon. TO convert to C02 . .

equivalent, multiply the weight of carbon by 3.67.

51 e dmlines ~ ener= -int ensive indus~ and increases in the Sf3ViCf3 SNtOr. For ffier dews see ref. ‘$7.

. ,,
Chapter 1--Summary ● 7

Figure 1-3—U.S. Energy

a. U.S. fuel use

Percent of total consumption

50% ~

40%

30%

20%

Consumption and Associated Carbon Emissions in 1989

.-=

---J Transport

1 , ~;} Industry

I = Buildings

b. U.S. carbon emissions

Percent of total emissions

50%

N$N$ Utilities

IF

40%

II

30% 4

I 1 20%

II

~

10% II g

g

&

k

/ .4

0% . -- = nw ~–

- Utilities

~; Transport

=? Industry

= Buildings

1“>- ., - ,

=;”-.’:/”5 .2-,,.,

v r. 0il Coal Gas Nuclear Hydro- Biomass

“.

Oil

-m

electric

Coal Gas Nuclear Hydro- Biomass

electrlc

1989 total ● 84 quadrillion Btu

- -

1989 total = 1.4 billion metric tons/yr

NOTE: Emission estimates In the right-hand figure calculated by multiplying fuel use (from left-hand figure) by fossil-fuel carbon emission factors. Coal, 55 to

60 Ibs C/mmBtu; 011,45 Ibs C/mmBtu; gas, 32 Ibs C/mm Btu. Wood em!ssions are similar to coal; however in the United States, wood is currently regrown,

so we show no net emissions for biomass.

SOURCES: Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1991, using DOE, ‘1990.

1990 (see figure 1-6 below), The United States has

recently become a net importer of solar thermal and

wind systems after dominating the market in the

mid- 1980s.

A variety of policy interventions will be required

to reduce CO2 emissions 20 to 35 percent below

current levels by the year 2015. These could include

regulatory ‘ ‘push’ and market ‘‘pull’ mechanisms

to provide maximum encouragement and flexibility.

They could affect both energy supply and demand

and forestry and agricultural practices. Without an

increase in and refocusing of current Federal initiatives—including performance standards, incentive

programs, energy taxes, and RD&D activities—the

use of greenhouse gas reducing technologies is

unlikely to increase greatly in the next few decades.

Many of the measures discussed in this study will

have ancillary environmental benefits, including

abating acid rain, urban smog, ozone depletion in the

stratosphere, and groundwater contamination. Decreasing oil use—primarily affecting the transportation sector—will reduce our dependence on foreign oil. Developing and producing renewable

energy technologies with worldwide applicability

may strengthen U.S. trade markets and our competitiveness abroad. Given that about a dozen industrialized countries have officially pledged to stabilize or

reduce CO2 emissions by 2005, and that energy

demand in rapidly growing, developing countries

must increase, burgeoning markets for efficient and

lower CO2

-emitting technologies are likely. The

United States, as the world’s largest producer of

greenhouse gases, has an opportunity both to set a

good example and be in the forefront of developing

new markets for the associated technologies and

products.

U.S. SECTORAL ANALYSES AND

PROJECTIONS OF

C02 EMISSIONS

Current Emissions

Total U.S. energy use has risen since 1987, the

year OTA’s modeling effort begins. In 1989, energy

use was about 84 quads (quadrillion British thermal

units). As shown in figure 1-3a, in 1989 oil

accounted for about 40 percent, coal and gas each

provided about 23 percent, nuclear power provided

7 percent, and hydroelectric power and biomass each

contributed about 3 to 4 percent of energy use.7

6AS of January 1991, Austria, Australi& canad.~ Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New ~aland, Norway, sw~enl

United Kingdom, Some of these countries’ policies are still subject to change.

TData for 1989 energy consumption are from ref. 5’$.
8 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 1-4-1987 U.S. CO2 Emissions by Sector

Buildings:

Water heat 9%

Lights 14%

Cooling 14%

Appliances 20% Industry: /-. \

,/

Lease and plant 3%

Space heat 43% //;’- \ Feedstocks 6%

[

Buildings HVAC and light 6%

/:/ ‘

36% \

Off-highway oil 7%

Process heat 19%

—’

(

Industry

32%

~anf3po</ )

\

Steam 27%

Transportation:

Nonoil-based 2%

Rail, marine 7% 1, 32% $,, ,/“1 Machine drive and

Aircraft 14% ‘\.–----/. ’

electrolytic 32%

I I Heavy trucks 14%

Light trucks 20%

Automobiles 43%

NOTE: Total earbm emissions from all three sectors equaled about 1.3 billion metric tons in 1987. Emissions have

cxmtinued to increase since then.

SOURCE: Office oi Technology Assessment, 1991.

About two-thirds of the total energy was used

directly as fuel in “end uses,” for example as

gasoline to run our cars and natural gas to heat our

homes. Another 35 percent was used to generate

electricity; well over half of that electricity was

generated from coal.

Carbon dioxide emissions (as carbon) from energy use in the United States in 1989 totaled about

1.4 billion metric tons (this is up from 1,3 billion

metric tons in 1987), about 20 percent of the world

total. As shown in figure l-3b, oil accounted for

about 48 percent of carbon emissions, coal about 34

percent, and natural gas about 18 percent. One-third

of the energy was used to generate electricity. Oil

dominates direct uses; coal dominates electricity

generation. Coal and wood contain the highest

concentrations of carbon per unit energy--commonly about 55 to 60 pounds of carbon per million

Btu (lbs C/mmBtu). Natural gas has the lowest

concentrations (32 lbs C/mmBtu) and petroleum is

intermediate (45 lbs C/mmBtu).

When the emissions from the generation of

electricity are allocated to the sector in which the

electricity is used, total emissions from energy use

are roughly equal in the buildings, transportation,

and industrial sectors. Figure 1-4 displays emissions

by sector, as well as the major components within

each sector. We have detailed estimates of how

energy was used in 1987, the reference year for our

model. For that year, 36 percent of carbon emissions

were from the buildings sector—about 20 percent

from activities within our homes and apartments and

16 percent from energy use in commercial buildings.8 Another 32 percent of emissions are transportation related and 32 percent come from industry.

Future Emissions Scenarios

For the energy-related sectors, OTA projected

future CO2 emissions under a “business as usual”

scenari o--our baseline or ‘‘Base’ case. Two scenarios were then modeled, based on ‘‘Moderate’

and ‘‘Tough” technical measures respectively (see

@f the 36 percent of to[al C02 em]lssiom coming from the buildings sector, one-third is ffom fossil fuels (i.e., oil and gas) burned dtiectly Witi

residential and commercial buildings; two-thirds come indirectly as a result of the generation of electricity used in buildings.
Chapter l-Summary ● 9

box 1-B for a description of the model). Moderate

measures typically require some initial capital investment but later save money through future fuel

savings; in most cases savings more than compensate for initial costs. None of the measures are

difficult to achieve technically, though inducing

consumers to use them may not be easy.

The ‘‘Tough’ measures would lower energy demand even further, but in many cases at a higher cost

for the same level of convenience and comfort All

of the Tough measures analyzed are technically

feasible, but most are not based on the best available

prototypes or practices; OTA made judgments about

what will be feasible for widespread use. Fully

implementing the Tough measures would be challenging-politically, logistically, and perhaps economically.

The model only included energy-related sectors.

For the forestry sector, OTA independently evaluated Moderate and Tough measures; these were

chosen by the same criteria as measures in the model

(i.e., difficulty and cost) and estimates of C02 uptake

over time were calculated. Data were not sufficient

to calculate potential emissions reductions from the

food sector.

Overall Modeling Results

Based on the OTA energy modeling analysis,

under current trends and regulations carbon emissions by 2015 will be close to 50 percent greater than

today’s level—almost 1.9 billion metric tons per

year (see figure 1-5). This Base case projection

assumes that some efficiency improvements will

occur even in the absence of new legislation. For

example, by then we assume new homes will require

15 percent less heating, recently adopted appliance

standards will have taken effect, and new cars will

average close to 37 mpg.

By adopting all Moderate measures that lower

energy demand, CO2 emissions in 2015 could be

held to about a 22-percent increase over 1987 levels.

The emissions savings achieved by the Moderate

measures are shown for each demand sector (buildings, transportation, industry) as well as for electricity supply in figure 1-5. Changes in the fuel mix used

to generate electricity can lower emissions an

additional 6 to 7 percent, The Moderate forestry

Figure 1-5-Carbon Emissions Under the

Base Case, Moderate, and Tough Scenarios

I---7

n

,’

l---rw

1

rmductlona

from 201S

lwwo

[ ----

L

Of faet from —

forestry

meaaureo

t

F

:

150%

125% $

m5

100% :

50%

25%

o%

1987 2015 2015 2015

Base Base Moderate Tough

■ Buildings ~~ Industry ~~j Transport ~ Electric utilities

NOTE: The boxes outlined with dashed lines represent the reductions in

carbon emissions associated with control measures applied in each

of the three demand-side sectors (i.e., buildings, industry, and

transportation) and electricity supply (electric utilities); additional

carbon offsets afforded by forestry measures are also shown. The

boxes outlined with solid lines represent tofa/ emissions from each

demand-side sector. Emissions associated with electricity generation have been allocated to the three demand-side sectors.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

measures provide about a 0.2-percent offset in

carbon emissions by 2015. All Moderate measures

together hold emissions to 15 percent above 1987

levels.

Finally, OTA’s Tough scenario could lower net

emissions by 2015 (excluding offsets from forestry

measures) to 29 percent below 1987 levels—i.e., to

about 0.9 billion metric tons per year. This is about

half of our Base case forecast for 2015. Tough

forestry measures could reduce emissions another 7

percent. The detailed emissions reductions estimated for the Tough scenario analysis are shown in

table 1-1, by individual measures within sectors.

costs

While we think the Moderate scenario is achievable at a net savings,9 nonetheless substantial shifts in

the economy would have to occur. For example,

energy expenditures would be 15 percent lower than

they would be otherwise, but the cost of appliances,

cars, and houses would be higher.

We believe that overaIl savings are possible because, on balance, fuel savings (as-surning projected 2015 prices) will exceed annual capital and

operating costs.
Box l-B—The OTA C02 Emissions Reduction Model

OTA developed a simple energy accounting model to estimate the effectiveness of various technical options

for lowering CO2 emissions. The model is based on a larger system of energy and economic models used by the

Gas Research Institute (GRI) to forecast energy use through 2010 (23)1

. Of all the integrated energy/economic

forecasting models available, the GRI approach includes the greatest detail on the demand side for specific

technologies. (Other models may contain, for example, estimates of total residential electricity demand, but do not

include breakdowns of heating, cooling, refrigerators, freezers, clothes dryers, etc.) With such information, changes

in CO2 emissions can be simulated in detail based on changes in technology.

GRI provided OTA with detailed output from its model simulations of energy use through 2010. We, in turn,

built a very much simplified set of models by “modeling” GRITS detailed output. For example, to estimate the

energy demand for heating homes, GRI’s residential sector model starts with the number of existing furnaces, heat

pumps, and electric heaters. It then forecasts the number that must be replaced through time (with more efficient

technology) based on typical equipment lifetimes. The number of new homes (which, of course, must also be heated)

is forecast based on economic conditions. Whether consumers buy gas, oil, or electric heaters is forecast in part

based on economics and in part on historical buying habits,

OTA took the GRI forecasts of energy use by each technology category (e.g., gas furnaces) and built a series

of simple models that simulate the number and energy efficiency of each technology type through time, based only

on the GRI detailed output data, rather than the economic decisions that influence the forecast. Note that for two

categories-highway vehicles and electric utilities-we felt that the GRI model did not have adequate detail for our

needs. For highway vehicles, we used Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s “Alternative Motor Fuel Use Model” (but

used GRI’s oil price assumptions for consistency). For electric utilities, we built our own model using detailed data

from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration.

We total all the energy use and C02 emissions from each technology and sector. This forms the basis for our

Base case forecast that emissions will be approximately 50 percent above today’s level by 2015. In the Base case

(business as usual), OTA implicitly assumes GRI’s economic forecast of GNP growth averaging 2.3 percent per

year and energy price increases averaging 1.7 percent per year for coal, 3.7 percent per year for oil, and 4.8 percent

per year for natural gas over the next two decades. This represents a reasonable future picture barring major changes

in energy supply, economic, or regulatory conditions.

Then we estimate the effect of changes in technology (e.g., more efficient gas furnaces than included in the

GRI forecast) or policy (e.g., forcing coal-fired plants to retire after 40 years of operation) in two alternative

scenarios: “Moderate” and “Tough.” Our model, for the most part, assumes the same level of “services” as the

GRI base case. In the alternative scenarios, CO2 emissions are reduced, for example, by using more efficient

furnaces, switching fuel, or insulating houses, but not by assuming people keep their homes at lower temperatures

in the winter or warmer in the summer like they currently do. In a few cases, most notably the transportation options,

all “services” are not identical. For example, one of the measures that we include is to reinstate a 55 mph speed

limit. Under our most aggressive scenario, we assume that cars will be somewhat smaller than they are today (for

either economic or regulatory reasons). Both of these include some loss of convenience to consumers.

1~ GRI modeling system has as its core the U.S. Energy Model, developed by Data Resources, Inc. (DRI). The model hlu*s fow

submodels: the industrial sector, ]widentid sector, commercial sector, and electric utilities. Economic p~jections, which drive the Energy

ModeL come ftom the DRI Macrwxonomic Model of the U.S. economy. Additional inputs are generated from the Industrial Sector Tmhnology

Use Model, developed by Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc.; the GRI Hydrocarbon Supply Model; and the RDI Coal Model, developed

by Resource Data International.

Many of the Tough scenario measures entail costs by 2015, after subtracting fuel savings (assuming

in excess of projected fuel savings; others are cost forecasted 2015 fuel prices).10 This range is equal to

effective over their lifetime but are difficult to savings of a few tenths of a percent to a cost up to 1.8

implement. A rough estimate of the cost range for percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) prothe Tough scenario is a savings of $20 billion to a jected for 2015. For comparison, all environmental

cost of about $150 billion per year (in 1987 dollars) compliance costs today are about 1.5 percent of

l~For exmplc, WC ass~e that oi] p-ices by 2015 will bc about $50 per barrel.
Chapter 1--Summary ● 11 ———_

Table l-l—Measures To Lower U.S. Carbon Emissions

(expressed as percentage of 1987 total emissions)’

Reductions in 2015 Reductions in 2015

Moderate Tough Moderate Tough

(in percent) (in percent) (in percent) (in percent)

DEMAND-SIDE MEASURES

Residential buildings

New investments:

Shell efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3

Heating and cooling equipment . . . 0.1

Water heaters and appliances . . . . 1.2

O&M, retrofits:

Shell efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8

Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6

2.0

0.4 to 0.6

1.5 to 2.3

0.9

0.8

All residential measures together . . . . 4

Commercial buildings

New investments:

Shell efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3

Heating and cooling equipment . . . 1.0

Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1

Office equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6

Water heaters and appliances . . . . 0.1

Cogeneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2

O&M, retrofits:

Shell efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8

Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5

All commercial measures together . . .

Transportation

New investments:

New auto efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New light truck efficiency . . . . . . . . .

New heavy truck efficiency . . . . . . .

Non-highway efficiency . . . . . . . . . .

O&M, retrofits:

improved public transit . . . . . . . . . .

Truck inspection & maintenance . .

Traffic flow improvements/

55 mph speed limit. . . . . . . . . . . .

Rldesharing/parking controls . . . . .

All transportation measures

together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.6 to 6.6

4.0

1.2 to 1.9

3.0

2.1

0.1

1.5 to 2.3

0.8

0.5

8.5 13 to 15

0.8

0.5

0.4

0.5

0.2

0.3

1.2

0.4

3.5 to 3.8

2.5 to 2.7

2.4 to 2.4

1.2

3.5

0.4

1.4

1.0

4 14 to 15

Industry

New investments:

Efficient motors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 3.7 to 4.0

Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.7 to 0.8

Process change, top 4

industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 8.2

Fuel switch to gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 2.4 to 2.7

Cogeneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 5.2 to 5.8

O&M, retrofits:

Housekeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.0

Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2

All industrial measures together . . . . . 8

ELECTRIC UTILITY SUPPLY-SIDE MEASURES

Existing plant measures:

Improved nuclear utilization . . . . . . 4.1

Fossil efficiency improvements . . . . 1.7

Upgraded hydroelectric plants . . . . 0.5

Natural gas co-firing . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

New plant measures:

No new coal; higher fraction

of new nonfossil sources . . . . . . . -–

C02 emission rate standards . . . . . 0.4

All utility supply-side measures

together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6

FORESTRY MEASURES

Afforestation:

Conservation Reserve Program . . . 0.2

Urban trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

Additional tree planting . . . . . . . . . . —

Increased timber productivity . . . . . . . —

increased use of biomass fuels . . . . . —

17 to 18

4.1

1.7

0.5

3.7

0.0 to 4.7

0.0 to 0.1

9.9 to 14

0.2

0.7

2.3

3.1

1.2

All forestry measures together , . . . . . 0.2 7.5

al percent of 1987 emissions = 13 milllon metric tons C = 0,7 percent of 2015 emissions.

SOURCE office of Ttwhnology Assessment, 1991.

GNP; direct fossil fuel and electricity consumption GNP effects over the first few years of a suddenly

purchases account for about 9 percent of GNP. instituted policy could be 5 percent or more.

Other groups have tried to estimate the costs of CBO also looked at two longer term econometric

CO2 reductions, but with different control scenarios, models that forecast energy use past 2000, one

often a carbon tax. For example, using several constructed by the Environmental Protection Agency

short-term econometric models (i.e., analyses that (EPA) and the other by the Electric Power Research

extend only to the year 2000), the Congressional Institute (EPRI). These models’ projections for Base

Budget Office (CBO) estimated that a $100 per ton case energy use in 2015 are reasonably close to each

carbon tax phased in by the year 2000 would hold other and to OTA’s Base case and thus offer useful

CO2 emissions at just about current levels or reduce comparisons of reductions and costs. The model

them to 25 percent below current levels by 2000 used by EPA forecasts that holding emissions to 10

(45). By the end of the first decade, GNP would be to 15 percent below current levels would lower GNP

lowered by about 0.5 to 2.0 percent (about $40 to by about 1 to 1.3 percent by the year 2015. The EPRI

$130 billion per year in 1987 dollars). However, model forecasts that holding emissions to 20 percent
11 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

below current levels would lower GNP about 3

percent by that year.

The costs associated with any scenario depend on

many factors—including the price of fuel projected

under Base case conditions. For example, we are

assuming the price of crude oil will be $42 per barrel

(in 1987 dollars) by the year 2010(23) and about $50

per barrel by 2015.11 Net costs for an emissions

reduction scenario would be higher if 2015 fuel

prices are lower than projected; for example, if oil

prices are $5 per barrel lower in 2015 than we

forecast (and other energy prices remain the same as

forecast), costs will be about $15 billion higher.

Similarly, net costs would be lower if energy prices

rise more than projected. NO quantitative estimates

have been made of the ancillary air, water, soil,

health, economic, and energy security benefits that

result from reducing energy use and associated

pollutants.

OPTIONS FOR REDUCING

U.S. EMISSIONS

The major options available or likely to be

available for reducing CO2 emissions in the nearterm fall into three categories:

1. increasing energy conversion and efficiency in

end-use technologies,

2. changing use patterns to conserve energy, and

3. shifting energy supply away from high CO2

-

emitting fuels.

Additional options to offset CO2 emissions are

primarily forestry-related or agricultural. If Congress chooses to pursue any of these options, it

obviously will also seek: to assure continuous

economic progress.

When choosing policy options Congress must

consider two interdependent components: the universe of possible technical (or in some cases,

behavioral) changes and the policy instruments

(e.g., taxes, regulations, financial incentives) available to require or encourage the technical change.

One policy option, for example, would be to reduce

CO2 emissions through regulations (i.e., a policy

instrument) to require more fuel-efficient autos (i.e.,

a technical option). An alternative or perhaps

complementary policy option would be to use a high

Photo credit: Chip Moore

Solar panels supply all of the hot water and up to 70 percent

of the space heating needed for the 80,000-square-foot

building in which OTA is housed.

‘‘gas guzzler’ tax (i.e., policy instrument) to stimulate purchase of fuel-efficient autos.

Technical Options

This report identifies a range of C02-reducing

technical options available or likely to be available

to the Nation over the next 25 years, and what their

contribution might be. There are a large number of

technical options to pick from and many targets of

opportunity within each sector, as figure 1-4 shows.

Significant progress in reducing U.S. CO2 emissions will require that most of these options be

pursued simultaneously.

Presently available energy “supply” options for

achieving major C02 reductions over the 25-year

timeframe of this assessment include: replacing high

carbon-emitting fuels (e.g., coal) with lower carbonemitting fuels (e.g., natural gas); using highefficiency, electricity-generating technologies (e.g.,

high-efficiency gas turbines or cogeneration); and

using nonfossil fuels.

While nonfossil energy offers the greatest longterm potential for achieving deep cuts in CO2

emissions, we cannot count on large-scale use of

I I FOr ~Omp~sO% DOE’S Energy ~omation A&nhis@-dim estinudcd the price of oil to be $28 to $46 per barrel by 2010; tie fi~can G*

Association projected $48 per barrel in 2015.
Chapter I---Summary ● 13

nonfossil energy sources to replace fossil fuels

within 25 years. These sources do not yet offer the

performance, costs, or social acceptance needed to

fully displace fossil fuels in such a relatively short

period of time (42). Only three nonfossil sources are

presently being used on a significant scale in the

United States: hydroelectric power, biomass, and

nuclear light-water reactors (LWRs). Because of a

combination of low baseload demand growth, cost,

and environmental and social problems, no orders

for new LWRs have been initiated in over a decade

and there are no plans underway to build new

reactors in the United States. Environmental factors

set an upper limit on the number of potential new

dam sites for hydroelectric facilities and on biomass

production.

On the energy “end use” side, the technical

options available today are primarily more efficient

technologies or changes in energy use patterns. The

first requires time and investment, whether for old

equipment to be replaced or new equipment to be

purchased. Changing energy use can include immediate (but reversible) changes such as fewer miles

driven, lights dimmed, etc. In addition to the

currently available technical options there is a large

menu of additional options that could be developed

over time. A diverse suite of energy R&D is

ongoing, but what it will make available in the next

quarter century depends greatly on Federal funding

for demonstration.

Several technical options are available in the

forestry sector to provide some offsets of CO2

emissions. Increasing forest productivity and planting new trees can result in increased carbon storage

that offsets fossil-fuel related emissions. Planting

short-rotation tree crops for use as biomass fuels can

partially replace the use of fossil fuels in some

situations. These and other forestry options have

attendant uncertainties and difficulties. For example, attempts to increase productivity focus on the

timber component of forests (i.e., the commercially

valuable portion). However, it is unclear whether

increases in timber productivity actually indicate

whether or not productivity in the entire forest has

increased,

Policy Instruments

Policy instruments are the means government

uses to require or encourage a desired technical or

behavioral response. Many potential targets exist

within each sector to achieve CO2 emissions reductions (see figure 1-4). Whatever the CO2 reduction

goal, Congress will have to use a variety of policy

instruments to stimulate a diverse set of decisionmakers to use the appropriate fuels, technologies,

and forestry and agricultural practices and to adopt

energy use patterns that conserve energy.

Identifying the relevant decisionmakers will be

critical to selection of appropriate policy instruments. Within the energy system, for example,

appliance and lighting use patterns represent the

collective decisions of nearly all Americans. In

contrast, utility fuel choices are made within a

relatively small community of decisionmakers (e.g.,

utility executives, State regulators, and segments of

the financial community).

Certain generalizations nonetheless can provide

guidance:

●

●

●

Decisionmakers generally prefer lower cost

options and many individuals prefer low firstcost options over low life-cycle cost options.

Highly efficient “cutting edge” technologies

often have relatively lower life-cycle costs but

higher front-end costs.

Historically, fragmented decisionmaking reinforces the preference for low first costs, especially in the buildings sector-decisions relevant to efficiency are made by developers and

builders, not by the occupants who will be

paying the energy bills.

A wide range of possible policy instruments could

be used to influence decisionmakers. Table 1-2

groups them into six generic categories:

1. taxes;

2. financial incentives;

3. marketable permits;

4. regulations;

5. research, development, and demonstration

(RD&D); and

6. information and public education.

Just as there is no single technical option that is a

cure-all, many policy instruments will be needed.

The synergisms possible among taxation, regulation, incentives, information, and RD&D programs

are key to significantly reducing emissions. Taxes,

if properly set, can be used to adjust prices to tilt

purchase decisions. Regulation (codes and standards) can be used to remove the least efficient

equipment, appliances, and buildings from the
14 ● Changing by Degrees; Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

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Chapter I-Summary ● 1 5

market. Incentive and information programs can be

used to clarify cost information and help create a

market for improved energy performance. Education

programs also provide consumers with the knowledge and information needed to make wiser energy

choices. Government-sponsored RD&D can help

provide producers and consumers with new technical options that can be used to reach national goals,

as well as reduce, by cost-sharing, the risk to industry of developing these new options.

Taxes

Taxes offer a way to make high CO2

-emitting

technical options more expensive than lower CO2

-

emitting options. If Congress so desires, new tax

monies could help fund incentive programs, offset

the budget deficit, or replace other existing taxes.

Three possibilities include: 1) a general energy

tax, 2) a carbon tax, and 3) initial purchase taxes. A

general energy tax is levied on the energy (i.e., Btu)

content of fuels. A carbon tax is set to reflect the fact

that some fuels emit more carbon per unit of energy

than do others. Both of these are thus “fuel” taxes.

An initial purchase tax is levied on energyconsuming technologies, rather than fuels; the tax

would be based on estimates of lifetime energy use

or carbon emissions.

The first-a general energy tax-would stimulate

greater energy efficiency, regardless of whether

energy is derived from fossil or nonfossil fuels. By

making all energy more expensive, it would apply

pressure to reduce total energy use. On the other

hand, a carbon tax would not only stimulate energy

efficiency, but also shift the energy system from

high carbon-emitting fossil fuels to nonfossil fuels

or lower carbon-emitting fuels (e.g., natural gas).

Initial purchase taxes could have effects broadly

similar to either an energy or carbon tax, depending

on whether they were based on lifetime energy use

or carbon emissions. Because consumers are often

more concerned with the initial cost of a technology

than with ‘‘life-cycle’ costs (i.e., including fuel

costs), purchase taxes can be more effective than

either type of fuel tax in many situations, An

example of an initial purchase tax is the current ‘‘gas

guzzler’ tax on autos, which was increased in the

1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (Public

Law 101 -508). In a similar fashion, a tax on less

efficient appliances or houses could serve to reduce

Photo credit: Chevron

The Trans-Alaska pipeline has been in operation since

1977. North Slope oil production is currently declining,

and a Iittle less than 2 million barrels of crude oil

per day now flow through the 800-mile pipeline.

The United States currently uses 17 million

barrels of oil each day.

consumer preferences for lower initial costs rather

than life-cycle costs.

Energy and carbon taxes have the advantage of

affecting all emitters simultaneously, rather than

focusing on a few selected technologies. A carbon

tax is a particularly effective way of targeting the

heaviest economic sanctions against the worst emitters of CO2

. A carbon tax would stimulate greater

demand for natural gas relative to other fossil fuels.

This, in turn, could drive natural gas prospecting and

resource recovery technology development. Over

the longer term, it could also motivate development

of noncarbon energy sources whereas a straight

energy tax would probably not.

Financial Incentives

Through financial incentives (e.g., tax incentives,

low cost loans, and direct payment subsidies), the

government pays part of the costs of utilizing

desirable fuels, technologies, or practices. Tax

incentives can be powerful instruments for stimulating desired actions by corporations and individual

taxpayers looking for ways to reduce tax liabilities;

however, tax incentives have little effect on those

who pay low or no taxes.
16 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

—

Low-cost loans either defray some portion of loan

interest or eliminate lender risk by insuring against

loss. Low-cost loans can be effective policy instruments to stimulate utilization of CO2

-reducing

technical options by both individuals and corporations. Direct payments for utilization of C02

-

reducing options (e.g., cash bonus for scrapping an

old, fuel-inefficient car) are especially effective in

stimulating the use of desired options by lowincome or financially strapped decisionmakers.

Marketable Permits

Marketable permits and carbon taxes are closely

related. Under a marketable permit system, policymakers fix the amount of carbon that can be

emitted. The government then issues the allowed

number of permits to emit a given amount of carbon.

Permits can be bought and sold by energy users just

like fuels. For example, for every 1 million Btu’s of

coal purchased, the user must also own (or purchase)

permits to emit 57 pounds of carbon. To burn 1 million Btu’s of natural gas, the user must own or

purchase permits to emit 32 pounds of carbon. If

demand for energy rises, the price of a carbon permit

will rise to reflect the cost of lowering emissions.

Some holders of permits will find ways to lower

emissions (e.g., purchase more efficient equipment,

switch from coal to natural gas) so that they can sell

their permits (at a profit) to others. Theoretically, the

effective price of fossil fuels will rise just high

enough to meet the allowed carbon emission target.

Just how high prices will rise, however, is difficult

to forecast.

Marketable emission permits is the current U.S.

method for enforcing the Montreal Protocol and

controlling CFC emissions. A marketable permit

system also is the regulatory mechanism for limiting

emissions of sulfur dioxide to control acid rain under

the new Clean Air Act Amendments (Public Law

101-549).

Marketable permits could be required for all fossil

fuel users or only for large users such as electric

utilities, factories, and even large commercial installations. Permits could be required for wholesalers

who sell gasoline, rather than for individual drivers.

Regulations

Regulations are policy instruments that can eliminate inefficient and/or high CO2

-emitting activities

from the market. They can take the form, for

example, of performance standards and building

Figure 1-6-Federal Government Funding for Energy

Supply R&D, 1980 to 1990

1990 dollars (billions)

6

5

4

3

2

1

n Iiil Iliii

Supporting

O Research

U Environment

U Conservation

= Renewable

= Fossil

= Fusion

= Fission

W 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

Year

NOTE: The bars represent Federal budget authority for research, development, and technology demonstrations, in 1990 dollars. “Supporting” refers to research in basic energy sciences.

SOURCES: J.P. Holdren, “Energy in Transition,” .Sckntific American

263(3):1 56-163, September 1990, original datacompiledfrom

the Office of Management and Budget, B@ef of the Urited

States Government, Fiscal Years 1990 Zhrough 1991 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980 through

1990); Inter-society Working Group/American Association for

the Advarwment of Science, Research and Development FY

1980-1997 (Washington, DC: 1980 through 1990); and Environmental and Energy Study Conference, Wwkly Bulletin(s)

and Speck/ Rqwrt(s) (Washington, DC: several years).

codes. Performance standards can be established for

many diverse types of technologies (e.g., lighting

standards) and applied nationwide; they are currently used for automobile efficiency and appliance

efficiency. Building codes traditionally have been

the province of local governments and their effective

use depends on enforcement at that level.

Research, Development, and Demonstration

(RD&D)

Through RD&D, government can search for and

free-tune technological frees to the greenhouse gas

emissions problem. In fact, climate change can

only be effectively addressed over the long-term

with the development and worldwide use of

better nonfossil energy sources. Government can

speed the process of testing and commercializing

many energy-supply and end-use technologies. However, only about 5 percent of the $2.7 billion national

budget for energy technology R&D in 1990 was

devoted to renewable (including biomass energy)

and only 7 percent to energy conservation. Fossil

fuels had 25 percent of the research budget, nuclear

fusion 12 percent, and nuclear fission 9 percent (see

figure 1-6).
Chapter 1--Summary . 17

Information

Information as a policy instrument has the potential to change the awareness level and perceptions of

decisionmakers. Information programs rest on the

assumption that if decisionmakers are better informed they will make better decisions. The most

common goal of information programs is to stimulate decisionmakers to opt for least cost (life-cycle)

savings, as opposed to initial-purchase savings, in

their energy decisions. For example, although the

most efficient model of an appliance usually costs

more initially, energy savings accrue over its useful

life. Information can be supplied by Federal, State,

or local governments, utility programs (see ‘DemandSide Management’ below), manufacturers, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Information can be delivered to all decisionmakers in many ways, for example via label and

rating systems and audits. Label and rating systems

serve to provide purchasers with a basis for comparing front-end versus life-cycle costs at the time of

purchase. Energy audits provide building owners

and occupants with information they need when

considering whether to purchase, rent, or retrofit

alternatives. Energy audits can be effectively coupled with financial incentives to carry out retrofits

that provide greater efficiency, and thus reduced

CO2 emissions.

Sectoral Policy Options

Buildings Sector

Figure 1-7 summarizes the emissions reductions

possible for each ‘ ‘demand-side” option modeled

by OTA under both the Moderate and Tough

scenarios. For buildings, improving shell efficiency

and lighting are the two technical options with the

greatest potential for lowering C02 emissions.

Under the Base case, OTA assumes that by 2015

new homes and apartments will be designed such

that they need about 15 percent less heating and 8

percent less cooling than current new homes. By

adopting Moderate shell efficiency measures, such

as thicker insulation and better windows, new homes

will require an estimated 50 percent less heat and 25

percent less air-conditioning than today’s average

new home (27). With Tough measures, homes can be

built to require an estimated 85 percent less heat and

45 percent less air-conditioning (20).

Figure 1 -7—Demand-Side Measures

-Moderate controls --lncremental reductions

with Tough controls

Shell efficiency

New lighting

HVAC equipment

Water heat and appl.

Cogeneration

Office equipment

Building retrofits

Retrofit lighting

Process changes

ISTIG cogeneration

Efficient motors

Fuel switching

Housekeeping

Industrial lighting

Retrofit lighting

New auto MPG

Mode shifting

New light truck MPG

New heavy truck MPG t

Traffic flow/55 mph

Non-highway efficiency

VMT reduction

Operation and maint. F~-–

0% 2% 4% 6% 8%

Reductions in 2015 as a

percent of 1987 emission

NOTE: Reductions presented as a permntage of total U.S. carbon

emissions in 1987.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

As shown in table 1-1, Moderate shell improvements in new residential buildings can reduce U.S.

carbon emissions by 1.3 percent of current levels by

2015. By implementing Tough improvements in the

North and Moderate ones in the South, reductions

of 2 percent in new residential buildings might be

achieved. Tough measures for new commercial

building shells can achieve reductions equal to 4

percent of 1987 levels by 2015.

Existing homes can also be made more efficient

by installing more efficient heating and cooling

equipment, insulation, windows, etc. The Base case

assumes that existing homes will require 6 percent

less heating by 2015 because of replacements and

improvements that will happen anyway. Moderate

measures boost this to 25 percent by 2015 and Tough

measures boost it to 40 percent by 2015 (20). Tough

measures in the North and Moderate ones in the

South would reduce carbon emissions from existing

buildings by 4 percent by 2000, but would have a

declining effect thereafter as many of the older

homes are replaced by new ones.

Improving the efficiency of lighting in new

commercial buildings is another technical option

that can yield substantial reductions. The Tough
18 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

scenario measures together—a combination of highefficiency fluorescent bulbs and ballasts, improved

reflectors, and better use of daylight—would lower

lighting energy needs by 60 percent in these

buildings (18). This achieves reductions equal to 3

percent of 1987 emissions by 2015.

Gains in commercial buildings can also be made

by simply replacing existing bulbs with highefficiency ones—without replacing fixtures—

as shown under the ‘‘Operation and Maintenance’

heading of table 1-1. Replacing the most heavily

used incandescent bulbs in homes with compact

fluorescent and using high-efficiency fluorescent

in commercial buildings can lower emissions by 1.3

percent under our Tough scenario.

The instruments listed in table 1-2 and the policies

described below appear to offer the most promise to

achieve these reductions. While a carbon tax will

certainly help, because there are so many different

decisionmakers-some of whom may not be that

responsive to price changes-a larger arsenal of

policy instruments is needed. These include demandside management (with the utilities as partners) as

well as a series of targeted financial sanctions,

incentives, and regulations.

Demand-Side Management (DSM)-DSM refers to electric utility programs designed to encourage customers to modify their patterns of energy use.

Particularly promising-from a global warming

perspective—are those situations where utilities

allow energy conservation to compete with traditional supply technologies (e.g., powerplants) to

balance energy supply and demand. DSM can be an

effective approach to reduce energy consumption by

improving building shells as well as the equipment

inside buildings. In some cases, utilities pay for

rebate programs, give out high-efficiency light

bulbs, or otherwise stimulate end-use efficiency

improvements, and save energy at a fraction of the

cost of new power supplies.

Demand-side management can result in greater

investments in energy efficiency than customers

would otherwise make. Utility programs have long

time horizons and can capture the potential in both

the new and retrofit markets, for both equipment

efficiency and building shell improvements. There is

already considerable support for DSM by many

State energy offices, State legislatures, and public

utility commissions.12

However, in order for DSM to stimulate significant investment in conservation, incentive structures

must be changed so that utilities can profit from

demand-side investments. Any Federal legislation

concerning DSM would need to be general enough

to allow States flexibility in implementation and

specific enough to have a genuine impact on

conservation. Congress could provide funding to

evaluate various incentive structures currently being

examined by States and utilities. Should Congress

wish to pursue more direct action, it could require

States to formally consider demand-side resources in

their planning, with oversight by the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission (FERC).

The Federal and State Governments share the

regulation of electric utilities, and there is a history

of tension over this sharing of jurisdiction (48).

Congress can play a powerful leadership role in the

direction of utility planning through legislation that

guides FERC (which has jurisdiction over wholesale

electricity transactions). An example of such legislation is the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of

1978 (PURPA), which required utilities to purchase

electricity from qualifying facilities at avoided cost.

Recently Congress addressed some aspects of this;

for example, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation

Act amended PURPA to eliminate the 80-megawatt

capacity limitation for qualifying facilities fueled by

wind, geothermal, solar, or waste energy.

Further, the Federal Government could mandate

that environmental externalities be considered in

evaluating supply-side options (as New York State

has done-i. e., penalizing polluting options based

on estimates of the costs of environmental damage

that would accrue; ref. 33). Congress has already

mandated, in the 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric

Power Planning and Conservation Act (Public Law

96-501 ), that the Northwest Power Planning Council

adopt rate structures that give conservation measures a cost break over other, more traditional

supply-side measures.

Technology-Specific ReguZations--Congress can

directly mandate efficiency improvements through

appliance standards and building energy codes.

lzFor a discussion of state initiatives in ]eaS[-coSt planfing, s~ ref. ~.
Chapter 1Summary ● 1 9

Appliance Standards-Appliance standards, by

fiat, remove inefficient appliances from the market. The National Appliance Energy Conservation

Act (Public Law 100-12), passed in 1987, are

expected to lower residential energy use by up to 10

percent by the year 2000 (17), However, even

stricter standards are possible.13 The law requires

review of appliance standards twice during the

1990s, which provides an opportunity to obtain

additional energy reductions through more stringent

standards. Congress could also consider extending

standards to other equipment such as commercial

heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning equipment; lightbulbs; and building components such as

windows.

Standards could be even more effective if used in

conjunction with other incentives. Policies such as

utility programs, appliance labeling, and tax

schemes provide incentives to do more than standards require.

Building Energy Codes—Building energy codes

serve a function analogous to that of appliance

standards by preventing the least efficient buildings

from being constructed. Building codes have traditionally been under the jurisdiction of States and

localities. Currently, there is little support from the

States or the construction industry for a mandatory

national building code. In 1976, Congress enacted

legislation that required the development of the

Building Energy Performance Standards (BEPS), a

mandatory national code based on performance

standards. In 1983, the law was modified to be a

mandator-y code only for Federal buildings.

Greater energy savings could be achieved by:

1. mandating compliance with a uniform code or

creating incentives for States to adopt the

national code;

2. developing a more stringent national code; and

3. increasing funding for implementation and

enforcement.

The National Affordable Housing Act of 1990

(Public Law 101-922) requires the Department of

Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to develop

energy efficiency standards for new public housing

and for housing subject to mortgages under the

National Housing Act.14

Financial Measures-congress can choose from

among several sector-specific financial mechanisms,

including building tax credits and subsidies and

initial purchasetaxes for appliances and other equipment.

Building Tax Credits and Subsidies--Tax credits

and subsidies for using more efficient technologies

can promote retrofitting of existing residential and

commercial buildings. The Federal Government, for

example, passed legislation that provided solar and

conservation tax credits for the years 1978 through

1984. By 1983, 24 million households claimed a

residential tax credit of up to $700 each for

investments in energy conservation; however, no

evaluation or monitoring of energy saved by this

program was ever conducted. The 1986 Tax Reform

Act allowed the energy conservation tax credits for

residential use to expire but extended residential

solar tax credits and some commercial energy

conservation Credits.ls

The Federal Government currently funds several

subsidy programs. The Institutional Conservation

Program, the Weatherization Assistance Program,

and the Low Income Home Energy Assistance

Program all pay for some energy conservation

measures in low-income housing. The recently

expired Solar Energy and Energy Conservation

Bank helped finance energy conservation and costeffective solar energy in low- and moderate-income

housing and in commercial buildings owned by

nonprofit organizations. Under these programs, the

Federal Government provides funding to States,

who in turn provide matching grants and loan

subsidies. Such programs could be reinstated or

expanded.

Initial Purchase Taxes and Rebates for Appliances and Other Equipment—An initial purchase

tax scaled to penalize inefficient equipment could

accelerate the market penetration of efficient equipment, Examples include a lump-sum tax on appliances and equipment at the time of purchase. Taxes

collected on the most polluting items could be used

I l~e ~mendnlenls define ~]1 ~ncra.efficiency inlprovments ~,lth a payback of 3 yea~ or less as ~~n~mica]]y jus[ificd. Any paybacks longer than

3 years must be $hown to be economically justified.

{4[ ~ , mortgages thilt ~nc[u~e ~ loan, under the Nati~n~ Housing Act, for financing energy.conse~lng irnp~vernents or ad(ilrlg solar ener~ SyStCIIIS,

15~e omnibus Budget Rcconclllation Act of 1990 ~xtcndcd tie 1 ()-percent business energy tax cr~i( for SOIM and g~[hermal property through Dec.

31, 1991
20 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

to provide a rebate on the least polluting items.

However, although an initial purchase tax sends

appropriate signals regarding consumer purchasing

decisions, it would not—unlike an energy or carbon

tax--change use of an appliance once it is purchased.

Consumer Information and Marketing Programs-Lack of information and uncertainty have

been identified as key barriers to greater investment

in energy conservation in the buildings sector. The

large number of highly cost-effective investments in

energy efficiency that are not chosen by consumers

indicates that price alone does not stimulate optimal

investment decisions. Therefore, information dissemination is a key element of several of the policy

options discussed above, including the sectorspecific financial measures and general energy and

carbon taxes.

Home Energy Rating Systems-The Federal Government has been involved in home energy rating

systems—which tell buyers how efficient their

prospective homes or offices are-through its role in

the mortgage market. In addition, the National

Affordable Housing Act of 1990 requires HUD to

develop a plan to make housing more affordable

through mortgage financing incentives for energy

efficiency. The Federal Government could play a

further role by developing a uniform energy rating

system for all residential and commercial buildings,

making it easier and less expensive for lenders to

include energy costs in their mortgage evaluations.

State Information Programs-The State Energy

Conservation Program (SECP) provides financial

assistance to the State energy offices to promote

energy efficiency and conservation in commercial

and residential buildings. The Energy Extension

Service (EES) is a Federal/State effort to provide

small-scale energy users with individually tailored

technical assistance for energy conservation and

increased use of renewable. The SECP and the EES

were consolidated under the 1990 State Energy

Conservation Programs Improvement Act (Public

Law 101-440).

Energy Audits—The Federal Residential Conservation Service, created in 1978, mandated that gas

and electric utilities provide their customers with

onsite energy audits. The program was implemented

in 1981 and recently expired. There has been little

evaluation of the program, and little reliable information has been kept on its success in reducing

energy consumption. However, while it is unclear

whether information from audits alone is enough to

encourage conservation, it would certainly seem to

be useful when combined with other measures.

Building Research, Development, and Demonstration--Major barriers to private investment in

RD&D in the buildings sector include the fragmented structure of this sector and the short-term

perspective of many of the decisionmakers (e.g.,

builders, renters). In addition, the U.S. Government

currently spends a negligible amount on housing

research. In contrast, in countries such as Sweden

and Japan, RD&D spending has been part of a trend

toward energy-efficient prefabricated housing. This

spending has contributed to the energy efficiency of

homes through standardization of energy-saving

features and quality control in the design and

manufacture of building components.

As a step, Congress has required HUD, in the

National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, to develop a plan to encourage and improve energy

efficiency in newly constructed, rehabilitated, and

existing housing; and demonstrate various methods

of improving the energy efficiency of existing

housing. Such projects should encourage the development of “energy efficiency businesses’ that can

bridge the gap between owners, builders and occupants of buildings. Congress also required HUD to

encourage the use of private energy service companies in public housing projects.

The Federal Energy Management Program

(FEMP), administered by the Department of Energy,

works with government agencies to implement

cost-effective, energy-efficiency improvements. Congress could authorize FEMP to test and demonstrate

performance, acceptance, and cost-effectiveness of

new technologies in Federal buildings.

Transportation Sector

Urban passenger travel in cars and light trucks

(i.e., light vehicles) in the United States requires the

largest share of transport energy, consuming 15

percent of the world’s oil production. The two main

opportunities for reducing transportation’s contribution to global warming are measures to increase the

energy efficiency of light vehicles and measures to

encourage urban passengers to drive less. Thus,

under OTA’s modeling exercise, the major reductions come from higher auto and truck efficiency,
Chapter l--Summary ● 21

better control of traffic, and, under the Tough

scenario, more use of public transit (see figure 1-7).

With respect to auto efficiency, our Base case

assumes that new cars will average about 32 mpg by

2000 and about 37 mpg by 2010. Under the

Moderate scenario, new car efficiency averages 35

mpg by 2000 (9) and 39 mpg by 2010 (1 O). Under the

Tough scenario, we assume a range of new car

efficiencies. For example, efficiencies of 39 mpg by

2000 and 55 mpg by 2010 might be possible even if

consumers maintain their current preferences for car

size and performance (10). If consumers are willing

to buy smaller cars, new car fleet average efficiencies of 42 mpg by 2000 and 58 mpg by 2010 might

be achievable, Given this range of assumptions,

reductions amount to about 3.5 to 3.8 percent of

current emissions by 2015 (see table l-l).

Reductions of about 2.5 to 2.7 percent from light

trucks and another 2.4 percent from medium- and

heavy-duty trucks are achievable under our Tough

scenario, as well.

Traffic speed affects fuel consumption, too. By

reinstating the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit and by

reducing traffic congestion in urban areas in order to

speed up travel, reductions of 1.4 percent by 2015

are possible under our Tough scenario. *G

Measures to move people out of their cars and into

mass transit under the Tough scenario would yield

reductions of about 3.5 percent by 2015. To achieve

this, however, urban auto traffic would have to be

reduced by 10 percent through urban light rail,

busways, and improved urban design. Additionally,

5 percent of car travel between cities would have to

shift to high-speed intercity rail.

The following four policy instruments will promote new car efficiency: gasoline taxes, vehicle

taxes and rebates, fuel economy standards, and

incentives for vehicle manufacturers. In addition,

improved operation and maintenance practices will

reduce energy use in existing cars. Two other

measures, transportation control measures (TCMs)

and controlling settlement patterns, can help reduce

CO2 by reducing vehicle miles traveled.

Gasoline Taxes—A gasoline tax would create

incentives for both increased efficiency and reduced

travel. Taxes would induce consumers to use less

fuel while leaving them free to choose how they

adjust their behavior. In concert with increasing fuel

economy standards (see below), a long-term impact

on the efficiency of the vehicle fleet could be

achieved.

Although the effectiveness of taxes is hard to

predict from studies of past responses to price

changes, one might expect a 10-percent hike in

gasoline prices to yield a 1- to 6-percent drop in gas

consumption. 17 A 50-percent increase in price might

reduce consumption 5 to 20 percent over the near

term, even more over the longer term. A doubling or

tripling in price (approaching the costs in Europe

and Japan) might yield an immediate decrease of 13

to 20 percent and a longer term response of a 35- to

40-percent reduction in gasoline consumption. About

half of this longer term adjustment to high price is

expected from driving less, and the other half from

more efficient vehicles. For example, consumers

might choose to spend money on fuel-efficient

technologies or to use mass transit, carpool, or

simply travel less.

A gasoline tax, however, is regressive and thus

affects the poor proportionately more than the rich.l8

To ameliorate this, Congress could provide rebates

to low-income households. It could also phase in the

tax to give consumers time to adjust their purchasing

decisions and operation and management practices.

Vehicle Taxes and Rebates—Taxes on inefficient vehicles can create incentives to choose better

fuel economy and forego large size and extra power.

Such a program would be most effective if accompanied by rebates for highly efficient cars. In a

‘‘revenue neutral” program, the money taken in

from the taxes would be redistributed through the

rebates. The Federal Gas Guzzler Tax19 already

applies to cars with fuel economies below certain

thresholds; the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act

of 1990 recently doubled the tax for cars getting less

than 22.5 mpg.

I~cN$ use gaso~c most Cfficiendy in the range of 35 to 45 mph slower travel (due to congestion) and faster mavel lead 10 losses iII effici~cy.

ITTWO ~Went s~dles (4, ~) review the ‘‘elasticity’ of gasoline use relative to price (i.e., the ratio of the percentage change in use to the percentage

change in price).

[8 For ~xmple, in 19s5, households Wlfi eMfing5 exceeding $’35,)()() spent 4 per~nt of income on gasoline whereas households earning $5,()()0 tO

$10,000 spent 11 percent.

Ime Enm= Tax Act of 1978 (Public Law 9s-6 18).
22 ● Changing by Degrees. Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases —

Photo credit: Bressler Editorial Cartoons, New York, Artist: Packer

A World War II poster encouraging car pooling. Urban

commuters average 1.2 passengers per vehicle to and

from work.

An expanded program of auto purchase taxes

and rebates could complement fuel economy

standards and taxes, but it could also pose serious

trade difficulties as long as the high-efficiency end

of the auto market is dominated by imports. If

implemented suddenly, such measures would put

domestic manufacturers at a disadvantage; on the

other hand, measures designed to protect domestic

manufacturers might conflict with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules.

Fuel Economy Standards-Standards influence

the tradeoffs among cost, performance, size, and

efficiency that underlie the development and introduction of new models. The current fuel economy

standards for cars, in place since 1978, have helped

to increase auto fuel economy (21), More stringent

standards can both lower C02 emissions and reduce

our dependence on imported oil. Redesigned standards that vary with vehicle volume can help minimize the burden on U.S. manufacturers that offer a

full range of car sizes (31, 49).

Incentives for Vehicle Manufacturers-One incentive, aimed at producers instead of consumers, is

the use of government-sponsored competitions to

induce manufacturers to develop high-efficiency or

alternate-fueled cars. A variant of the incentive

scheme injects competitive elements into a highefficiency rebate program. For example, the government could identify a few classes of vehicles most in

need of fuel economy improvement and offer a

competitive reward in the form of consumer rebates

on a large (e.g., 200,000 units) production run of a

new vehicle achieving the best fuel economy above

a specified threshold.

Efficient Vehicle Operating Practices----Changes

in vehicle operating practices offer small potential

reductions individually but often have short startup

times and do not require large, upfront capital

investment. They include reimposing (and enforcing) the 55-mph speed limit; requiring efficiency

inspections for trucks; and charging efficiencypromoting parking fees at Federal offices.

Transportation Control Measures (TCMs)—

TCMs include a wide variety of measures to reduce

the number of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and

lower congestion. They are attractive because they

typically have short startup times and low capital

costs, and can reduce energy use and greenhouse

emissions even within existing settlement and employment patterns. In aggregate, TCMs appear to

hold modest promise for reducing VMT. They

include:

ridesharing (promotion and matching services);

employer-based transportation management

(high parking charges, transit or vanpool subsidies, and expedited transactions-e. g., bus

passes, van leasing, and insurance made available at work);

High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes (restricting lanes on freeways to cars with three or

four occupants and to buses);

parking management (parking taxes or development surcharges, restricting street parking,

and mandating high parking charges at workplaces);

Park and Ride (intercept drivers near their

origins);
Chapter I-Summary . 23

●

●

●

●

mass transit improvements (bus service expansion, operational changes, and fare changes);

travel substitution (telecommunications, workat-home, 4-day work weeks);

traffic flow improvements (sophisticated signals, ramp metering, intersection improvement); and

bicycling promotion.

Under the Energy Tax Act of 1978, employerprovided vanpools between an employee’s residence

and place of work were excludable from the

employee’s income if the vehicle was capable of

carrying nine people. Congress could consider

reinstating this provision or a variation of it.

Under present law, employer-provided transit

passes, tokens, fare cards, and employer reimbursements for travel over $15 per month are considered

taxable income. However, under current Federal tax

law the value of parking provided to an employee is

excludable from the gross income as a fringe benefit.

Congress could consider making reimbursements

for public transportation nontaxable or making

parking taxable.

Controlling Settlement Patterns—Long-term reductions in emissions can be achieved by changing

patterns of settlement to reduce the need for travel.

This can be accomplished through higher densities,

or through mixing uses so that residences, jobs, and

services are roughly balanced at a local scale. When

more destinations are close to home, more trips can

be made by foot; when densities are higher, public

transit can serve more people effectively.

In the United States, except possibly for some

high-growth areas in the South and West, efforts to

change the shape of settlement in major cities may

meet local resistance. Nevertheless, some changes

are feasible in suburban areas nationwide, Stringent

suburban restrictions on development—sometimes

only on commercial and industrial development,

sometimes on new residential development as well—

have been attempted in some regions of the United

States (12).

Transportation RD&D-American automakers

lag behind their Japanese, and to a lesser extent their

European, counterparts in moving research results to

the market (3). In the 1980s, a program to support

more aggressive research and development in the

American auto industry-the Cooperative Automotive Research Program-was briefly attempted by

the Department of Transportation. A revived, combined government/industry program could be successful if domestic automakers, their suppliers, and

innovative research companies all are key players.

The program could target important efficiency areas

such as continuously variable transmissions, energystorage systems, new engine designs for heavy

trucks, improved safety for lighter vehicles, and

innovations to permit increased intermodal freight.

An area of longer term research that deserves

special attention is development of truly clean,

economically acceptable, alternative fuels and a

supporting infrastructure. Fuels with the greatest

potential-electricity or hydrogen from noncarbon

energy sources (e.g., solar and nuclear) and woody

biomass fuels grown on a sustainable basis—are the

furthest from large-scale technical viability. Research in these areas could be

parallel programs to assess and

actual performance of a variety of

Manufacturing Sector

expanded, with

demonstrate the

fuels.

For manufacturing, as shown in figure 1-7, three

types of technical improvements offer the greatest

promise. The first area is ‘ ‘process changes. ’ The

top four manufacturing energy consumers (paper,

chemicals, petroleum, and primary metals)--which

account for more than 75 percent of energy use in

this sector—improved their energy efficiency by

between 2.3 and 4.3 percent per year between 1980

and 1985 (52). If this pace can be maintained, as we

assume in our Tough scenario, reductions equal to

about 8 percent of current emissions (by 2015) will

result.

Cogenerating electricity and steam for industrial

processes is a second promising option. When

utilities generate electricity, about two-thirds of the

energy from burning the fuel is released as heat. If

electricity is generated at industrial sites where the

heat can be used, the efficiency of fossil fuel use can

be increased dramatically. Under our Tough scenario, we assume that 90 percent of new and

replacement industrial steam boilers will cogenerate

electricity. Such measures can lead to reductions

equivalent to about 5.8 percent of current total U.S.

emissions.

More efficient motors are a third technical improvement that can lead to substantial improvements. Moderate and Tough measures might improve motor efficiencies by 10 percent and 30
24 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

percent (l), respectively, yielding reductions of

about 1.2 percent by 2015 under the Moderate

scenario and 4 percent under the Tough one.

The following policy instruments could encourage these technical measures: carbon taxes, DSM,

efficiency standards, marketable permits, tax incentives, informational policies, and RD&D.

Carbon Tax-A carbon tax would levy economic

penalties against the highest industrial emitters of

CO2

. Under such an approach, the tax would be

highest on coal, low for natural gas, and zero for

noncarbon sources (e.g., wind, solar, geothermal, or

nuclear). For industries where the cost of energy is

particularly important, carbon taxes should encourage energy efficiency, fuel switching and cogeneration.

Using several econometric models, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that a carbon tax of

$100 per ton would lower CO2 emissions from

industry by between 10 and 35 percent by the year

2000. The higher reduction estimate reflects a

70-percent reduction in coal use,

Demand-Side Management-DSM programs—

joint programs between electric utilities and their

customers discussed previously-can help lower

electricity use in the industrial sector. The major

programs are:

1. rebates to customers who install approved

equipment;

2. low-interest loans to customers for conservation installations; and

3. installation of conservation equipment at utility

cost (37).

Many large industrial customers of electric utilities receive special lower rates because they supply

the utility with a large, dependable portion of

electricity demand. Utility programs could facilitate

reductions in greenhouse gas emissions if these

special rates were contingent on efficient use of

electricity. This differs from demand-side management in that the financial burden of improving

energy efficiency is placed on the manufacturer, not

the utility.

Standards—A more traditional regulatory policy

is to require efficiency standards for common

energy-using equipment, similar to those existing

for automobiles and some appliances. Motors would

be the most likely candidate for this approach.

Photo credit: American Iron and Steel Institute

About 60 percent of the fossil fuels and electricity used by

industry provides process heat, steam, and cogenerated

heat and steam. Energy in manufacturing is also used

for feedstocks, mechanical drive, electrolysis,

lighting, and space heat.

Marketable Permits--C02 emissions can be

regulated by requiring permits for emissions; manufacturers could be issued permits based, for example,

on some percentage of their 1990 emissions. Reductions might be accomplished by installing energyefficient technologies and fuel switching; offsets

could result from approved reforestation/afforestation projects. It would be up to the manufacturer to

choose the most cost-effective strategy. Marketable

permits would allow firms to trade their unused

carbon rights to a firm that is exceeding its budget.

Manufacturing Tax Incentives-Much industrial equipment is old and energy-inefficient compared to the best available technology. In many

cases, replacing old equipment improves energy

efficiency by 10 to 50 percent. Financial policies,

such as tax credits or accelerated tax depreciation

schedules, aimed at stimulating rapid replacement of

older equipment have the potential to stimulate
Chapter 1--Summary ● 25

improvements in energy use, Such policies have a

precedent: the Energy Tax Act of 1978 provided a

10-percent added ‘‘energy investment tax credit”

for certain energy-conservation investments (as well

as tax credits for some energy-supply investments).

The tax credits were available until 1985 and applied

to a specific list of technologies. However, rather

than specify which technologies qualify, Congress

could foster innovation by offering similar-or

greater-tax breaks for company-chosen conservation technologies.

Informational Policies-A barrier to reducing

emissions in the manufacturing sector is lack of

information about how to improve energy useespecially for smaller, less energy-intensive industries. Informational policies can include performance goals, the collection of performance data,

labeling of the energy performance of equipment,

training, and performance audits.

Renewed support for cooperative government/

industry information-sharing programs could help.

For example, DOE’s Energy Analysis and Diagnostic Center program funds faculty and students at

several universities to perform free energy audits for

small and medium-sized manufacturers in more than

30 States. Because costs saved by manufacturers

translate to increased taxable income, the program

can provide additional tax revenues to the Federal

Government. The biggest cost savings have come

from efficiency improvements associated with cogeneration, space heating, lighting, and process equipment

maintenance and replacement (in descending order

of savings; ref. 25). This program could be expanded

or new programs could be modeled after it.

Manufacturing R&D—Research and development sponsored by DOE’s Office of Industrial

Programs in waste energy reduction and industrial

process efficiency, if funded, are projected to save

more than 3 to 4 percent of energy used by industry

per year over the next decade. Research areas

identified by Oak Ridge National Laboratory as

particularly promising are: improved use of catalysts

in chemical production; intelligent sensors and

controls; and heat recovery and cogeneration (16).

R&D in nonenergy areas, such as materials science,

also holds promise for partial replacement of energyintensive materials like steel and aluminum. Likewise, research and development to improve the

quality of products made with recycled materials

could help reduce energy use by increasing the

Figure I-8--Electric Utility Supply-Side Measures

_ Moderate controls* ~ Tough controls**

Existing plant measures:

‘mproveft~::~f::~

Fossil efficiency

improvements

~

Upgraded hydroelectric plants P

Natural gas -j

co-firing ~

New plant measures:

No new coal; higher

fraction of new

L

nonfossil sources ‘-XZZ~.~l’Z~aZ~.lY?

C02 emission rate

standards . -—-–— –- - — –7 — . . . . , —— ,

O% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8%

Reductions in 2015 as a percent of

of 1987 emissions

● assureing Moderate demand-side measures

● assuming Tough demand-side measures

NOTE: Reductions presented as a percentage of total U.S. carbon

emissions in 1987.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

demand for recycled materials such as paper, steel,

and aluminum.

Electricity Generation

About one-third of U.S. carbon emissions come

from generating electricity (see figure 1-3); by 2015

under our Base case this may be as high as 45

percent. Thus measures that lower the rate of carbon

emissions per kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity

generated would translate into substantial reductions.

Figure 1-8 shows OTA’s estimate of the technical

potential for emissions reductions in the electric

utility sector depending on the demand for electricity and the stringency of policies. Moderate utility

supply-side measures can lower emissions by about

6.6 percent (see table l-l). The two with the greatest

reduction potential are: 1) increasing the efficiency

of fossil fuel-fired plants (by about 5 percent)

through improved maintenance (14); and 2) operating existing nuclear powerplants 70 percent of the

time (similar to Western Europe and Japan (16) and

extending their useful life to 45 years.

Our Tough measures eliminate coal use wherever

possible. A combination of renewable energy sources,

nuclear plants with improved designs that may be

available after 2005, and high-efficiency gas turbines are the only new utility plants built under the
26 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Tough scenario. However, if all the Tough demandside measures in the buildings and industrial sectors

are implemented, growth in demand for electricity is

so low that very few new plants are needed through

2015. Thus, the only way to lower emissions under

this scenario is to either cofire existing coal plants

(e.g., with 50 percent natural gas), or retire existing

coal plants after 40 years of operation (rather than

the typical 60 years) and replace them with renewable or nuclear fuels or natural gas. The former

measure would reduce emissions by about 3.7

percent by 2015; the latter, by about 4.7 percent of

current levels by 2015.

The following policy options could be used to

encourage these technical measures: carbon taxes,

marketable permits, subsidizing noncarbon sources,

emissions limits and standards, and RD&D.

Carbon Taxes—A carbon tax, if set high enough,

would encourage fuel switching and conservation. A

carbon tax in the range of $75 to $150 per ton would

make natural gas a more economic choice than coal

at many facilities. A carbon tax would also provide

added motivation to develop more noncarbon energy

sources.

Marketable Permits---Utilities could be issued

marketable permits for CO2 emissions allowed from

their coal-fired units, based on their generation in a

historic year (e.g., 1990) multiplied by an allowed

emission rate. Under this approach some utilities

could curtail coal use more than necessary to meet

their limits and sell permits to others exceeding their

limits.

A variant on the above approach is to simply issue

permits for a limited amount of coal use in existing

facilities. Such an approach would be simpler to

administer than emission permits, but it does not

give credit to more efficient coal plants or to those

plants that use lower CO2

-emitting coals.

To hold new coal plant construction between now

and 2015 to a predetermined level, a limited number

of coal permits (or carbon permits specific to coal

plants) could be auctioned each year to the highest

bidder. If such a policy were adopted in combination

with marketable permits for existing coal plants,

utilities could be allowed to freely trade among new

and existing facilities.

Subsidize Noncarbon Sources-Any of the general financial instruments, such as a carbon tax or

fossil fuel energy tax, will serve to encourage use of

nonfossil sources for electricity generation. According to one estimate (42), a 2 cent-per-kWh subsidy

or its equivalent20 for only renewable sources of

electricity might double the contribution of renewable sources of electricity by 2010-i. e., allow them

to supply 40 percent of new demand under a Base

case growth scenario. Under our Tough scenario, we

assume nonfossil sources can provide between 30

and 45 percent of new demand (depending on the

success of other demand-side measures).

CO2 Emission Limits and Efficiency Standards—

Congress could mandate reductions by setting C02

emission limits or efficiency standards. For example, an emission rate limit of 0.55 pounds carbon per

kWh (lbs C/kWh) would require a typical Midwestern plant burning Illinois coal to burn between about

10 and 30 percent gas, depending on its efficiency.

At 0.55 lbs C/kWh, the most efficient new coal

burning technologies (e.g., integrated coal gasification combined cycle, or IGCC) would just qualify

burning coal alone.

Two somewhat different strategies could be

pursued to set C02 emission limits for new plants. If

the intent is to force development of ultra-efficient

coal technologies, then a standard in the range of

0.35 to 0.40 lbs C/kWh would be appropriate.

Molten carbonate fuel cells, if successful, might be

able to achieve such emission rates using bituminous

coals. If the intent is to limit new fossil fuel-fired

generation to the cleanest sources only—advanced

combined cycle turbines burning gas—then a new

source performance standard of about 0.25 lbs

C/kWh would be more appropriate. To speed up

replacement of old plants with new, lower emitting

ones, Congress could mandate the retirement of

existing fossil-fuel-fired plants earlier than their

expected lifetime of 60 years.

In addition, powerplant efficiencies are not routinely monitored and industry attention to methods

for improving efficiencies is only fairly recent (15).

To demonstrate how better monitoring affects energy efficiency, Congress could require TVA and the

Federal power agencies (e.g., Bonneville Power

Authority) to undertake improvement at their own

facilities. About 4 percent of the electricity genermA 2 cent.per.k~~ subsidy is quivcalerlt tO a carbon tax of $75 per ton of carbon for cod and about $150 per ton of carbon fOr natural g~.
\

Photo credit: Southern California Edison Co,

A 500-kW wind turbine mounted on a vertical axis is

insensitive to wind direction. All renewable sources of

energy (wind, solar, geothermal, hydro, and biomass)

currently contribute 5 to 10 percent of

U.S. energy supply.

ated from fossil fuels comes from Federal power

agency facilities (13).

The Federal Government, through the Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), also has

indirect ability to influence private utility operations

through its authority over the prices and conditions

of interstate wholesale power sales. If Congress feels

that the State Public Utility Commissions are not

identifying and enforcing efficiency improvements,

it could direct FERC to consider these issues when

regulating interstate wholesale power sales.

Energy RD&D Funding-Over the last decade,

Federal funding for renewable energy, conservation,

and nuclear (fission) R&D fell rapidly (see figure

1-6). The 1990 combined energy technology R&D

Chapter l--Summary ● 2 7

budgets (in 1990 dollars) for these three categories

were 82 percent lower than they were in 1980. To

reinstate the funding levels of 10 years ago would

require adding about $2.6 billion. By doing so, the

Federal Government could hasten the development

and demonstration of supply technologies that

would reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The most

promising of these technologies include: commercial fuel cells; storage technologies for solar electricity; biomass-driven turbines; variable-speed wind

turbines; and better designs for nuclear powerplants.

Many experts estimate that these technologies could

be commercially available within the next few

decades.

The government could also play a role in reducing

the perceived risk of new technologies and integrating renewable energy sources in existing energy

systems by conducting demonstration projects or,

perhaps, providing government-backed loans. To

encourage new nuclear energy sources, a two-track

process appears best: the Department of Energy

could help fund full-scale demonstrations of both

new ‘‘evolutionary’ light water reactors and “revolutionary’ design changes such as a modular

high-temperature gas reactor.

For existing nuclear powerplants, the goal should

be to increase the number of hours of operation,

rather than to increase efficiency of fuel use, A

Department of Energy demonstration program (coordinated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission)

might bring U.S. hours of nuclear plant operation

from well below to above the average for Western

Europe and Japan. Key elements of such a program

would include improving preventive maintenance;

installing automated controls to improve reactor

operation; and speeding up time spent refueling.

Forests

Forestry-related measures with the greatest potential to offset carbon emissions include increasing the

productivity of existing forests, planting trees in new

areas, and growing tree crops for biomass energy; we

consider these to be Tough measures, with the

exception of ongoing tree planting in the Conservation Reserve program. As shown in figure 1-9, OTA

estimates that the increased carbon uptake from

increasing productivity on about 60 million hectares

of timberland might be equivalent to annual emissions reductions of about 3 percent of current levels

by 2015. Planting new trees (i.e., afforestation) on

farmland and other nonforested areas and in cities
28 ● Changing by Degrees. Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

might result in carbon storage equivalent to emissions reductions of about 12 percent of current levels

by 2015. Planting trees for biomass energy might

result in an additional reduction of about 1 percent

by 2015.

There are several caveats to this potential for

offsetting emissions. Trees planted today can continue to store carbon beyond this report’s 25-year

timeframe. But this carbon eventually will be

released to the atmosphere, either when trees die and

decompose naturally, when they are harvested and

burned, or when products made from wood eventually decompose. Unless the wood is used to displace

fossil fuel use or is permanently stored under

conditions that do not allow decomposition, carbon

offsets in later years will dwindle, These estimates

also assume that increasing the productivity of a

forest’s commercial timber component is equivalent to increasing the productivity of the entire

forest ecosystem, but this assumption needs to be

tested. Finally, forests—and the feasibility of using

forestry practices to offset emissions-are likely to

be affected by future climate changes. Therefore,

forestry options in industrialized countries such as

the United States cannot be considered a substitute

for reducing total energy use, but rather as a way of

‘‘buying’ time while developing alternative nonfossil fuel sources and improving the efficiency of

energy use in general.

Congress could promote management practices

that increase carbon storage or offset CO2 emissions

by augmenting existing forest management and tree

planting programs of the U.S. Forest Service (USFS)

and the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation

Service, and by enhancing the biomass energy

research program of the Department of Energy. In

addition to direct support for such programs, Congress also could consider using financial mechanisms (e.g., changing income tax policies to encourage more investments in forest management; imposing a tax on fossil fuels to make biomass fuels more

competitive).

Incentives To Increase Carbon Storage on

Forest Lands—Incentives to increase productivity—

i.e., net carbon storage-will differ for publicly and

privately owned forests. On public lands, which are

located mostly in the West, management objectives

Figure 1-9--Forestry Measures

Forestry measures

g Moderate controls EZZ Tough controls

Increased tree

productivity y

More tree planting -

Increased use of

biomass fuels

Conservation

Reserve Program

Urban trees

r,,,, ,

O% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8%

Reductions in 2015 as a percent of

1987 emissions

NOTE: Offsets presented as a percentage of total U.S. carbon emissions

in 1987.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

are determined by planning processes legislated by

Congress. 21 Government investments in these lands

are likely to focus on reforestation and timber stand

management. Congress could direct the USFS and

Bureau of Land Management to, for example,

increase reforestation activities and to conduct

research on the ability of ‘‘new forestry’ practices

that proponents contend might help to both maintain

higher levels of diversity and allow commodity

production.

Privately owned forests are most extensive in the

East and South. For nonindustry private forests,

Congress could continue to increase assistance to

States and private landowners under programs such

as the Forestry Incentives Program and the Agricultural Conservation Program. These programs currently reach only about 2 percent of nonindustry

private owners (32), even though these owners

undertake over 40 percent of all reforestation. The

Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act

for fiscal year 1991 almost doubled funding for the

USFS’s State and private forestry programs, which

include tree planting and management. The 1990

Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act

(Public Law 101-624), known as the 1990 Farm Bill,

ZtEg, for NatioMl F~rmts ~ tie Renewable R~ources pi-Act (Public Law 93-378) and National Forest Management Act ~bfic ~w 94-585),

within the framework set fortb in the Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 (Public Law 86-5 17).
Chapter 1--Summary . 29

Photo credit: James P. Blair (c) 1990 National Geographic Society

The effects of clearcutting U.S. forests can be seen on the steep slopes of the Mount Baker-Snoqualmie National Forest below the

Clearwater Wilderness.

also authorized a forestry stewardship program in

which the USFS would work with State and local

governments, land grant universities, and the private

sector to improve resource management on privately

owned forest land.

For industry-owned timberland, investments might

be stimulated through changes in capital gains

provisions (e.g., restoring preferential tax rates or

providing a partial exclusion from taxable income

for timber held longer than 20 years) or allowing full

annual deductions for expenses, as well as by

increasing funding for Federal assistance programs.

One possibility for increasing support of such

programs is to use funds that would accrue if

below-cost timber sales in National Forests were

eliminated.

Incentives for Growing New Trees on Unforested and Urban Lands—Mechanisms to promote

afforestation include the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the President’s proposed America the

Beautiful program, and financial incentives such as

tax credits for carbon storage. In general, any

tree-planting program needs to consider the costs of

maintaining trees in a healthy state once planted; this

will be even more critical as climate changes occur.

Congress could expand the CRP by increasing its

tree-planting goals and its incentives for enrolling

land for tree planting (e.g., higher rentals, greater

share of reforestation costs, longer contracts) .22 The

1990 Farm Bill expanded CRP eligibility criteria to

include, for example, marginal pasture lands previously converted to wetlands or wildlife habitat,

 of production for 10 years receive a 

payment for one-half the cost of protective vegetation.
30 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

marginal pasture lands to be converted to trees in or

near riparian areas, and croplands that contribute to

water quality degradation.23 Another option would

be to, encourage new shelterbelts, perhaps through

tax credits or by conservation compliance requirements tied to commodity support programs.

The 1990 Farm Bill authorized startup funds for

the America the Beautiful tree-planting program, as

well as funds for urban and community tree planting

and maintenance. The Interior and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1991 did not fired

the program, although, as noted above, tree planting

was included in funding for the USFS’s State and

private forestry programs. Infrastructure for increased planting also may need to be developed,

since current planting is near the historical peak, and

funding for long-term maintenance also will be

needed.

Congress also could consider providing tax incentives (similar to those once more widely available

for energy conservation) for properly planting and

maintaining urban trees, especially near homes and

buildings to save energy used for cooling.

Incentives for Biomass Energy To Offset C02

Emissions--Growing short-rotation woody crops

on nonforested land for use as an energy source

shows some promise. Congress could increase

funding for Department of Energy research on

uncertainties regarding long-term productivity, including effects on nutrient availability, and costs.

Increasing fossil fuel taxes would make biomass

fuels more competitive. Even then, farmers wishing

to invest in biomass crops maybe limited by loss of

base acreage in commodity support programs and by

lack of revenues for several years. Thus, changes in

support programs or provision of some subsidy may

be needed to stimulate investments in biomass crops

on current cropland.

Food Sector

In the other U.S. sectors, C02 is the primary focus

of OTA’s analysis, although both CFCs (e.g., in

buildings and transportation) and methane (e.g.,

from natural gas production and distribution) also

are assessed. The food sector, though, differs in two

important aspects. First, the relative importance of

methane (CH4

) and N20 emissions is greater than in

other sectors. Although estimates are uncertain, the

food sector may account for one-third of global CH4

emissions and anywhere from one-tenth to one-fifth

of current global N2O emissions. Its contribution to

total U.S. CH4 emissions is roughly 9 percent (its

contribution to U.S. N20 emissions is uncertain,

though).

Second, fossil fuel-related C02 emissions (i.e.,

from farm machinery, irrigation equipment, fertilizer manufacturing, food transport, processing and

packaging, and cooking) and CFC emissions (primarily from refrigeration) are subsumed in the

transportation, industry, and buildings analyses

summarized earlier. Further, C02 emissions from

agricultural-related deforestation in the United

States are very small (although they are very

important in developing countries). To place the

food sector in perspective, though, we estimate that

it accounts for at least 8 percent of total U.S. C02

emissions and about 5 percent of U.S. CFC-11 and

CFC-12 emissions (worldwide, it may account for

one-fifth of global CO2 emissions and up to 15

percent of globalCFC-11 and CFC-12 emissions).24

In the past, congressional concern about agriculture largely has focused on farm production, promotion, and income. With the passage of the 1985 Food

Security Act, Congress began dealing with some of

the environmental impacts of U.S. agriculture.

Although the 1990 Farm Bill expanded these efforts,

including extending the CRP until 1995, additional

steps can still be taken, as discussed below for

methane and nitrous oxide emissions,

Some of the opportunities discussed earlier for the

buildings, industry, and transportation sectors also

can affect food sector activities (e.g., more efficient

cooking, processing and packaging, etc.). In addition, fossil fuel-related C02 emissions from the U.S.

food system could be reduced by making fertilizer

manufacture, farm machinery, and irrigation more

energy efficient.

Dms ~11 e~nce tie c~ces of ac~eving tie CRP’S goal of reducing soil erosion problems; some of these lands could be devoted tO tiee planting.

~A&)ut 70 peKent of tie U.S. food smtor’s COZ emissions (i.e., about 5 percent of total U.S. C02 emissions) comes from fossil fuel combustion for

food refrigeration, residential cooking, and food processing and packaging; the remainder comes tlom farm machinery, fertilizer manufacturing, and

onfarm electricity use. These COZ emissions do not represent a complete accounting of emissions from the U.S. food sectoc for example, C02 emissions

associated witb food transport are not included.
Chapter l-Summary ● 3 1

Reducing Methane Emissions—U.S. methane

emissions from the food sector are primarily from

ruminant anumals (e.g., cattle, sheep). Congress

could direct the U.S. Department of Agriculture

(USDA) to determine the potential for techniques

such as improved nutrient management, feed additives, and manure management to reduce methane

emissions. To limit future growth in, or even reduce,

livestock populations in the United States, Congress

could consider reducing or removing price supports

for feed grains, which might make beef and dairy

products more expensive (although it is unclear if

the costs would rise or fall over the long term). Such

a policy could cause large near-term economic

disruptions for some farmers and portions of the

food industry, however,

Reducing N20 Emissions—To reduce nitrous

oxide emissions, Congress could modify commodity

program policies, which now encourage monocropping and heavy fertilizer use, to give farmers more

control over the types of crops they plant without

losing program crop base acreage and support

payments.

25 Congress Could provide cropping flexibility only to those farmers who adopt environmentally sound cropping patterns. Congress also could

make implementation of best management practices

(BMPs) a prerequisite for receiving Federal price

and income supports. BMPs, designed by the Soil

Conservation Service (SCS) to reduce soil degradation and water contamination from agricultural

activities, include more efficient fertilizer use, water

impoundments, permanent vegetative cover, and

manure storage. 26 At present, however, the SCS does

not have statutory authority to promulgate enforceable regulations. Such a cross-compliance policy

also would not apply to the one-third of U.S.

croplands that are not enrolled in Federal farm

support programs. In addition, enrolling more farm

land in the CRP would help reduce N2O emissions

from fertilizer use (as well as CO2 emissions from

onfarm fossil fuel use and offsite fertilizer manufacturing).

Food RD&D--The development of an accurate

emissions database for the food sector is perhaps the

most critical research priority. Increased research is

needed to quantify CO2 emissions from agricultural

land-clearing activities, CH4 emissions from ruminant animals (and from rice cultivation, particularly

in the developing world), and N2O emissions from

nitrogenous fertilizers. The emissions reduction

potential of different alternative practices must also

be investigated; for example, support is needed for

research on methane-reducing techniques, especially for livestock in confined and rangemanagement systems. Congress also could increase

funding for RD&D efforts to develop new alternative practices, especially those that simultaneously

increase crop yields and reduce greenhouse gas

emissions per unit of food output.

U.S. INFLUENCE ON THE

REST OF THE WORLD

There are many reasons why the U.S. Congress

should seek to promote the reduction of greenhouse

gas emissions abroad. First, climate change is a

global problem. Solutions must come from all

emitters, as reductions made by one country will

only make a small dent in total greenhouse gas

emissions.

Second, emissions of greenhouse gases will rise

in the developing countries. Because the developing countries have higher growth rates for energy

use, population, and Gross National Product (GNP)

than do industrialized countries, and because their

current energy use per person is so low, their

emissions of greenhouse gases will continue to rise

signnificantly, Stabilizing or even reducing greenhouse gas emissions from developing countries will

be next to impossible to achieve (at least until

nonfossil energy sources are widely available),

given their need to increase energy consumption for

supplying basic services. However, the United

States could influence emissions growth rates in

developing countries and also assist these countries

to achieve economic progress by helping them to

increase energy production based on nonfossil fuels

(e.g., solar or nuclear) and to make both their energy

production and consumption more efficient.

Third, energy-related improvements may be

cheaper and relatively greater—at least in the

short term—in developing countries, Eastern

~TTN 199t3 Farm Bill now allows fa.rrne~ to plant a limited amount of selected crops on land designated for other commodity promm Hops without

losing program benefits.

‘bThis idea also could be extended to other energy-intensive inputs such as pesticides and irrigation water. For example, the SCS could establish

guidelines on how, and in what quantities, various inputs should be applied to crops in specific regions of the country.
32 ● Changing by Degrees. Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Europe, and the U.S.S.R. than in the United

States. For example, because energy use in all the

sectors of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe is

relatively inefficient, significant efficiency gains

may be achieved at modest expense. In developing

countries, much of the energy infrastructure is yet to

be built; these countries can take advantage, for

example, of new technologies that may be costeffective for new construction but expensive for

retrofits.

Fourth, tropical deforestation contributes between 7 and about 30 percent of worldwide CO2

emissions; these forests are being lost at an estimated rate of over 17 million hectares per year-an

area exceeding that of Virginia and West Virginia

combined. In addition, much more than CO2 emissions is at stake. Tropical forests harbor at least half

of the world’s species, are the source of many

products used by people living in the forests and

elsewhere in the world (e.g. , medicines, nuts, fibers,

fruits), and serve many critical functions such as

watershed protection.

Developing Countries

The OECD countries (which include the United

States), U. S. S. R., and Eastern Europe currently

contribute about one-half to two-thirds of all greenhouse gas emissions, mostly from combustion of

fossil fuels to power their economies (see figure 1-1;

note the caveat on the figure regarding how the wide

range of estimates of CO2 emissions from deforestation affects estimates of the relative contribution

from each region). In contrast, developing countries

contribute about one-third to one-half of emissions,

mostly from land use changes and practices (e.g.,

deforestation of tropical forests, cultivation of rice,

and raising of livestock).

Most current forest-related greenhouse emissions come from tropical forests, which are located

almost exclusively in developing countries and

which are being felled, burned, and degraded on an

27 In contrast, l0SS of temperateunprecedented scale.

zone forests, located mostly in developed countries,

currently contributes little to C02 emissions, although many of these forests were cleared in the

past.

The major causes of tropical deforestation and

degradation are the conversion of forests to temporary agriculture (e.g., ‘‘shifting’ cultivation) and

permanent agriculture (including cattle ranching),

and poor timber harvesting practices. However,

these are driven by underlying social, economic, and

political factors—poverty and lack of land tenure for

most people, national development policies, and

foreign debts—that are exacerbated by rapid population growth (60). These factors encourage rapid

exploitation of natural resources, for example to

expand development and obtain foreign currency for

servicing debts.

Emissions from fossil fuel use in developing

countries are relatively less important now but will

increase significantly in the future. Decisions that

these countries make within the next 5 to 10 years

about how to pursue economic growth and expand

energy services and infrastructure (e.g., industrial

bases, electric generation) will influence their share

of emissions for decades to come. The ongoing OTA

assessment, “Fueling Development: Energy and

Technology in Developing Countries, ” will continue to examine this issue. A background report

(51) discusses linkages between energy use, economic development, and environmental quality.

Figure 1-10 shows the great disparity in per-capita

energy use in different parts of the world. Although

a person in a developing country uses about onefifteenth the amount of energy as does the average

U.S. citizen,28 even modest gains in per-capita and

total economic growth in these countries translates

into emissions that will exceed those from the

developed world within a few decades. And such

growth is likely to be more than moderate. Developing countries have been increasing their total energy

use by approximately 6 percent per year, in contrast

to 1 percent in OECD countries, and they increased

their electrical power consumption by an average of

8 percent per year between 1971 and 1987; most of

the added electrical capacity was provided by

conventional power-plants (which are high CO2

emitters) and was used for manufacturing and in

buildings (43). Further increases will be needed

since many countries are continuing to fully electrify

cities and beginning or continuing rural electrifica27’ *Deforestation” means converting forest land to other vegetation or uses (e.g., pasture, cropland, darns). “Degradation” involves practices that

leave trees as the predominant vegetation but degrade overall forest quality (e.g., soil erosion; damages to trees and streams from selective logging).

m~e average fiefican uses about 260 million Btu’s. The average for the entire developing world (defined by the World Bank as ‘‘lower aml middle

income’ countries) is about 20 million Btu’s. The average for the selected developing countries shown in figure 1-10 is 25 million Btu’s.
Chapter l--Summary ● 33

Figure I-l O-Per Capita Energy Consumption

OECD

p-=.~ Canada

E. Europe/U.S.S.R.

Developing

~: r ~c. =-.. Mexico . -. ..-7.,

. .~.~ Brazil

;.”.-.”: China

L Indonesia

.“, India T

o 50 100 150 200 250 300

Million Btu’s per person per year

1

350

SOURCES: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Energy

in Developing Countriesr OTA-E-486 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, January 1991),

tion programs, and since refrigeration and airconditioning are becoming more widely available.

Moreover, rapid population growth, in combination

with economic growth, will continue to fuel increased demands for energy and land resources long

beyond the time frame of this study; the world

population now grows by over 10,000 people per

hour (figure 1-11 ), with virtually all of that growth

occurring in developing countries.

U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe

The economies of the U.S.S.R. and of Eastern

European countries have been centrally planned for

decades but now are changing, rapidly in some

cases.

29 These countries account for about one-fifth

of current global greenhouse gas emissions, mostly

from the combustion of fossil fuels to provide

energy. In 1988, the U.S.S.R. accounted for 18

percent of global primary energy consumption,

Eastern Europe for 6 percent. The energy infrastructure in place in these countries is generally old and

inefficient.

Efforts to promote energy conservation and efficiency in Eastern Europe and the U. S. S. R., and

thereby reduce future growth in carbon emissions,

face major obstacles. First, energy is highly subsiFigure I-l I—World Population Growth, 1750-2100

Population (billions) Projected +

‘

2 

~I 1 -1 I

10 - 4

<

8 -- -- - -—

i

/-

/’” ‘ / 1

6

!-”-. . . . .

. .

r

. . -.— .— .—— .—

Developing

4 — .-. . . . . . --/ countries

2 ---- ----– /

I

I

Developed

0 countries

1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100

SOURCE: Population Reference Bureau, 1990 World Population Data

Sheet (Washington, DC: 1990).

dized, so consumers (particularly industries) bear

only a small portion of its real costs.30 Second, the

central economic planning systems set rigid quotas

for production (i.e., gross output) of goods and

services. Enterprises must consume virtually all of

the supplies allocated to them by central planners,

even when not all are needed, in order to receive the

same amount next year. Third, the production quotas

require investments in heavy industries (e.g., steel,

aluminum, chemicals) at the expense of services and

consumer goods. Finally, implementation of plans

for alternative energy sources is hindered by a

fragmentation of responsibilities among multiple

government agencies.

Thus, even when opportunities exist, there are

strong disincentives to save energy and raw materials or to invest in energy efficiency. These obstacles

have led to high industrial demand for energy,

energy-inefficient production of goods and services,

less availability of electricity for nonindustrial

consumers, low standards of living, and severe

environmental problems in many areas.

U.S. Policy Options To Help Limit

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Abroad

Earlier sections in this summary set forth specific

policy options that the United States could pursue to

reduce or offset its own greenhouse gas emissions.

By taking such actions to reduce its own emissions,

the United States can provide leadership through

‘gEastcrn Europe as defined here includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (prior to unification with West Germany), Hungary, Poland, and

Rornama.

wIn poland, for exmple, subsidies account~ for 49 percent of the delivered price of coal and 83 percent of the delivered Price of ~tuml gas ti 19

8

7

(ref. 4 1).
34 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

example. In the broader context, the United States

also can work towards the adoption of international

conventions and protocols regarding climate

change, similar to those developed for phasing out

CFCs and halons.

The United States also can attempt to help developing countries, Eastern Europe, and the U.S.S.R.

to minimize their greenhouse gas emissions, without

hindering the prospects for needed economic development. Indeed, strategies to lower greenhouse

emissions can simultaneously help these nations

become more economically efficient. Numerous

existing programs and organizations in the United

States and on the international scene directly influence development and indirectly can affect greenhouse gas emissions (see box l-C). The United

States, for example, provides direct bilateral assistance through the U.S. Agency for International

Development (A. I,D.). Numerous other U.S. agencies--

such as the State Department, the Commerce Department, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Treasury Department, the Agriculture Department, and

the Environmental Protection Agency—support technology transfer and development assistance in

certain areas. Through these U.S. and international

organizations, the United States currently contributes about $9 billion annually in foreign aid assistance (including bilateral aid, food aid, securityrelated economic support funds, and multilateral

aid) to developing countries.31

The United States can continue to work through

its own bilateral assistance programs and international organizations, as well as through NGOs, to

increase the development and transfer of technologies and policies related to energy, family planning,

and land use and management practices that provide

sustainable alternatives to deforestation and dependence on fossil fuels. General congressional issues

regarding developing countries, the U. S. S. R,, and

Eastern Europe fall into five categories:

. technology transfer and trade;

. building local institutional capacities;

● redirecting energy policies;

. redirecting natural resource policies; and

. redirecting family planning assistance policies.

Technology Transfer and Trade

With Other Countries

The opportunity seems ripe for U.S. businesses to

increase exports of energy-efficient and renewable

energy technologies (as well as CFC-free technologies) to developing countries, since much of the

energy infrastructure needed to fulfill development

aspirations has yet to be built. For example, a market

of $370 to $900 billion for electric power equipment

is expected over the next 20 years (43). In addition,

the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe have antiquated

infrastructures in place; in these countries, the

United States could provide modern equipment, as

well as engineering and management services.

The U.S. Government promotes private sector

technology transfer to non-OECD countries through

government departmental programs (e.g., the Committee on Renewable Energy Commerce and Trade,

or CORECT, led by the Department of Energy) and

through independent government agencies and corporations (e.g., Eximbank, Overseas Private Investment Corp.). Some programs focus directly on

energy technologies, while others are more general

in nature.

Options-Congress could attempt to facilitate

U.S. trade in renewable and efficient energy technologies in several ways. First, it could expand the

financial resources of agencies that fund feasibility

studies and project preparation (e.g., A. I.D., U.S.

Trade and Development Program) or that provide

financing for exports (e.g., Eximbank, Overseas

Private Investment Corp.), as well as direct them to

focus some resources on specific technology areas.

For example, the fiscal year 1990 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Public Law 101-167)

directs Eximbank to set aside 5 percent of its energy

industry export funds for renewable energy projects.

The Act also directed A.I.D. to focus on energy

efficiency, renewable energy resources, and leastcost energy planning in the development of national

energy plans, but additional funds were not appropriated. The Overseas Private Investment Corp. is

planning a $100 million Environmental Investment

Fund.

~ ICompmed t. ~thercounmlcs, uS, forei~l aid and assisti~ is a relatively smaller percentage of its GNp. me U.S. Pofiion was 019 Pmcent in 1987

and 0.21 percent in 1988. In 1987, the larger Western European countries provided an average of 0.42 percent and Japan provided 0.31 percent; Notway

topped the list at 1.1 percent.
Chapter 1--Summary ● 3.5

Box l-C—Agencies and Organizations That Can Influence Greenhouse Emissions Abroad

This box briefly describes major U.S. and international “players” looking at climate change. While no

organization seems to place a premium on discouraging climate-modifying emissions for that reason alone, most

are exploring the ways in which their policies and programs may affect climate change. In addition to those listed

below, there are also many regional organizations, industry-sponsored consortia, non-governmental organizations,

and philanthropic foundations that influence energy and environment policy internationally.

U.S. Government Agencies

The Agency for International Development is the lead agency for administering foreign economic assistance,

through training, education and research, policy advice, technical assistance, and technology transfer. It is the

second largest bilateral aid donor in the world (following Japan), spending over $2 billion in 1989 on nonmilitary

Overseas Development Assistance. Of that sum, about 1 percent (between $100 to $2(X) million) is spent on energy

projects. A.I.D. is presently undertaking an inventory of its activities and their related effect on climate change.

The Department of Agriculture promotes U.S. agricultural products and coordinates agricultural trade policy

with other U.S. agencies. The Forest Service administers timber sales and other activities in national forests and is

involved in international forestry issues. The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service administers

programs that provide cost-sharing for tree planting and forest management.

The Department of Commerce supports U.S. manufacturers and businesses in pursuing overseas export

opportunities, collects and disseminates commercial information, and supports other U.S. overseas programs,

including the Eximbank and the Overseas Private Investment Corp.

The Department of Energy is exploring, as a part of the forthcoming National Energy Strategy, how the U.S.

energy program contributes to climate change problems and what technologies may be best suited to mitigate the

problems. Among other programs, the department leads the multi-agency Committee on Renewable Energy

Commerce and Trade, which promotes trade of U.S. renewable energy technologies.

The Department of State has responsibility for overall conduct of U.S. foreign policy. It is the lead agency in

negotiating any international agreements and heads U.S. participation in the IPCC! process.

The Department of Treasury has primary responsibility for U.S. financial policies affecting other countries and

for international financial institutions. The department’s Office of Multilateral Development Banks directs the U.S.

Executive Directors that sit on the boards of the multilateral development banks (e.g., the World Bank); through

the directors, the United States has been active in scrutinizing the banks’ environmental policies. The department

examines approximately 400 bank projects per year that might have adverse environmental effects.

The Environmental Protection Agency is examining climate change issues (including energy use,

deforestation, sea-level rise, CFCs, and methane) in developed and developing counties; it provided technical

support for U.S. involvement in the IPCC.

The U.S. Trade Representative is charged with formulating overall trade policy and with bilateral and

multilateral trade negotiations.

Independent U.S. Agencies/Corporations

The Export-import Bank (Eximbank) is an independent government agency that facilitates exports of U.S.

goods and services, particularly in developing countries. Its main programs include direct loans to foreign

borrowers, export credit guarantees and insurance, and discount loans. Since it is not a development assistance

agency, it must have a reasonable assurance of repayment.

The Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC) is a public/private corporation created by Congress that

directly finances projects sponsored by U.S. private investors in developing countries and provides insurance

against political risks for U.S. private investments in those countries. In 1987, OPIC accounted for over $8 billion

in insurance and $230 million in directly financed projects.

The U.S. Trade and Development Program, housed in the U.S. International Development Cooperation

Agency, funds feasibility and planning studies for projects involving export markets for U.S. goods and services;

its focus is primarily on large public sector projects.

Continued on next page
36 ● Changing by Degrees,” Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box l-C--Agencies and Organizations That Can Influence Greenhouse Emissions AbroadContinued

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)

The World Bank, the largest multilateral development bank, spent approximately$15 billion in 1989, including

$3.3 billion in the energy sector. Bank funding for free-standing environmental projects from 1990 through 1992

is expected to be about $1.3 billion. The Bank recently issued an operational directive outlining procedures for

assessing the environmental consequences of proposed projects; it is too early to ascertain its effects. In 1990, the

United States lost its position as the largest international aid donor to Japan This change will reduce the U.S. voting

share in the Bank.1

The three regional MDBs--the Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, and Inter-American

Development Bank—are also major sources of assistance and have a larger role than the World Bank in many

countries, for example in Central America. The latter two banks have provided about $1 billion for energy sector

projects since 1988. The Inter-American Development Bank, like the World Bank, has established procedures for

evaluating environmental impacts.

United Nations Agencies

The UN Development Program (UNDP) provides funding and advisory services to developing countries

dealing with trade in development technology. It spent approximately $122 million in 1988 for natural resource,

energy, and environment projects.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is active in rural and agricultural research and

development, fuelwood and charcoal projects, and forestry issues (including coordinating the Tropical Forestry

Action Plan).

The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) provides technical and monetary assistance to developing countries on

population issues. It provided about $169 million in 1988 for programs in 141 developing countries.

The UN Environment Program (UNEP) coordinates environmenta1 activities within the United Nations and

led the development of the Montreal Protocol to Protect the Ozone Layer. Along with the World Meteorological

Organization, UNEP coordinated the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and is one of the

managers of the World Climate program.

The UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) promotes industrialization in developing countries

and provides assistance to improve industrial use of energy.

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) monitors climate trends, provides a framework for research

on global climate models, and facilitates the exchange of meteorological information between countries, Along with

UNEP, it plays an important role in many activities involving climate change issues (see UNEP above).

International Science and Natural Resource Organizations

The International Council of Scientific Unions coordinates scientific research projects worldwide and works

with non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental agencies. It runs the International GeosphereBiosphere Program and is a joint manager of the World Climate Program with UNEP and WMO.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (WCC), setup in 1988 under the auspices of UNEP and

WMO, has been the primary international forum for addressing climate change. Its three working groups were

charged with: 1) assessing scientific evidence on climate change; 2) assessing likely impacts resulting from such

change; and 3) considering possible response strategies for limiting or adapting to climate change. The groups were

chaired by the United Kingdom, U. S. S.R., and United States, respectively. The IPCC’s final report was presented

to the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1990.

Other organizations focus on agriculture and forestry. The International Fund for Agricultural Development,

funded by OPEC and OECD members, makes financial resources available on confessional terms for agricultural

development in developing countries. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research is a network

of organizations that conducts agricultural research in developing countries. The International Tropical Timber

Organization provides a framework for coordination between tropical timber producing and consuming countries,

and the Tropical Forestry Action Plan attempts to enhance donor coopemtion and funding in sustainable forestry

management.

11111984, b utited States had 19.5 percent of the voting power in the World B* Thi$ VV8S hw-*~~ voting power

of the next three highest donors.
Chapter 1--Summary ● 37

On December 26, 1990, the United States announced that it will double the number of joint

trade-promotion programs in 1991; top priority will

be given to helping the U.S.S.R. increase its oil and

gas exploration and production capabilities—a

means of obtaining needed hard currency, In December 1990, the President also approved credit guarantees for Soviet purchases of up to $1 billion in

American commodities, making the U.S.S.R. eligible for some Eximbank credits and guarantees.

However, the continuing upheaval in the U.S.S.R.

suggests that the Soviets may be unable to take full

advantage of these programs for some time. In

addition, the June 1990 trade agreement signed by

President Bush will not be submitted to Congress for

approval until Soviet emigration laws are revised, so

“Most Favored Nation” status cannot yet be conferred on the U.S.S.R.

Second, Congress could continue the process of

streamlining restrictions on technology exports to

Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. This could be done

as part of the reauthorization of the Export Administration Act and/or by providing new directions on

U.S. participation in the Coordinating Committee on

Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), a nontreaty

agreement among 17 Western countries established

to harmonize export control policies.

Third, Congress could provide further direction

regarding ‘‘tied-aid’ financing (i.e., linking foreign

aid to financing of foreign purchases of U.S products); such financing runs counter to free market

policies but is used by other OECD countries.

Congress already appropriated some resources for

tied-aid financing to Eximbank, which decided to

join with A.I.D. in creating a $500 million tied-aid

pool to leverage financing for exports of U.S.

products.

Congress also could consider supporting-with

the cooperation of the host countries and perhaps in

conjunction with other donor countries-technology research and/or assistance centers in Eastern

Europe and developing countries. EPA already is

coordinating the establishment of the Budapest

Center in Hungary, and A.I.D. has proposed that a

Global Energy Efficiency Initiative be developed to

promote pricing reform, end-use energy efficiency,

cogeneration, and private-sector activities.

“

.

Photo credit: W Westermeyer

St. Basil’s Cathedral, located on the edge of Red Square in

Moscow, U.S.S.R. The Soviet infrastructure is both

massive and inefficient; investments are needed both

in new, more efficient facilities and in retrofitting

existing facilities for better energy use.

Building Local Institutional Capacities

Many developing country and Eastern European

governmental agencies and NGOS lack the resources

and experience needed to plan and implement

projects, meet requirements of international donors,

and assess the impact of policies and budgets on

resources (29, 61). Building the institutional capacities of these governmental agencies and NGOs is

critical to the success of energy and natural resource

policies and programs. Bilateral agencies such as

A.I.D. and multilateral assistance agencies such as

the World Bank, United Nations Development

Program (UNDP), and United Nations Environment

Program (UNEP) already provide some assistance to

help build these institutional capabilities.32

Izmc 1989 In~CrmtioMl Development and Finance ACI (~bliC Law 101-24.0) requires the U.S. Executive Dtiectors to tic multlIateral development

banks to promote increased assistance and support for non-I-J.S, NGOs.
38 ● Changing by Degrees. Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Options--Congress could direct A.I.D. to evaluate the effectiveness of its activities in this area. If

found lacking, Congress could direct A.I.D. to

increase its emphasis on this component, This would

likely require increased funding for education and

training; environmental information gathering and

analysis; conservation planning and policy analysis;

and coordination of regional authorities and communitybased organizations.

Redirecting Natural Resources Policy

Most developing country economies are based on

natural resources (29, 61), many of which have been

exploited rapidly during the past few decades. However, short-term revenue gains have come at the expense of the underlying resource base and the

long-term economic outlook for some countries.

During the 1980s, for example, some countries that

once were net exporters of tropical hardwood

products found that their forests could no longer

maintain a positive export flow. Resource depletion

in one area also can have unintended consequences

elsewhere----e. g., upland deforestation has increased

silting of reservoirs and flooding in many downstream areas.

Many national and multilateral development policies foster resource exploitation, including subsidies

for cattle ranching and short-term, low-rent licenses

for timber harvesting. Fortunately, direct bilateral

and multilateral assistance is beginning to be restructured to promote more environmentally sensitive economic development, although much more

needs to be done. A. I.D., the World Bank, the

Inter-American Development Bank, and UNDP,

among others, are all developing or have recently

adopted environmental assessment guidelines.

In addition, the food sector in developing countries is a major direct source of greenhouse gas

emissions, particularly methane from cultivating

rice and raising livestock. Most people in developing countries also rely on biomass fuels to meet their

cooking and heating needs,, in some cases, this has

led to localized deforestation (from cutting fuelwood) or loss of soil nutrients (when dung and

agricultural residues are used as fuels).

Options--Congress could influence what happens in tropical forests through several means:

1. encourage continued change in multilateral

development bank (MDB) policies. For example, Congress should continue to review MDB

2

3.

4.

5.

6.

progress in implementing environmental impact assessment procedures, and in making

loans contingent on host country development

policies (e.g., eliminating subsidies that encourage inappropriate cattle ranching and poor

logging);

increase funding for A.I.D. projects on agroforestry, sustainable agriculture, natural forest

management, and nontimber forest products;

direct A.I.D. and the State Department to help

make the Tropical Forestry Action Plan and the

International Tropical Timber Organization,

both of which have been severely criticized

lately, more effective vehicles for promoting

forest conservation and improved commercial

forest management;

support development of a global forestry conservation protocol;

address family planning, land reform, and debt

reduction issues; and

provide directions for U.S. participation as a

donor in the new Global Environmental Facility, established in November 1990 (and coordinated by UNEP, UNDP, and the World Bank)

to provide funding for projects on greenhouse

gases (e.g., non-CO2-emitting energy sources,

energy efficiency, reforestation, CFC substitutes), biological diversity, and marine pollution.

The United States also can have some influence

on emissions directly emanating from the food

sectors of developing countries. Some of the policies

described above for tropical forests, for example,

would specifically involve agricultural projects.

U.S. bilateral aid programs could attempt to introduce more efficient (in terms of greenhouse gas

emissions) agricultural practices; this must, however, be carefully tailored to fit existing social

traditions and economic conditions. At the same

time, Congress could help fund, through U.S.

bilateral aid programs and through multilateral

lending organizations, various research organizations (e.g., the Consultative Group on International

Agricultural Research centers) so that they could

expand existing programs in developing countries to

include methane reductions from livestock.

Redirecting Energy Policies

A. I.D., United Nations agencies, and the World

Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program provided over $200 million in fiscal year 1988
Chapter I-Summary ● 3 9

for energy-related grants and assistance; in addition,

over $6 billion was provided for energy-related

loans. Including technical assistance from other

countries and technical support derived from portions of the loans, total technical assistance for

energy may be on the order of $500 million per

year-less than 1 percent of total annual energy

expenditures by developing countries (28).

Until recently, much of this assistance, particularly that from bank loans, focused on conventional

energy supply projects such as large hydroelectric

dams and coal plants. In 1989, for example, World

Bank lending for solar, geothermal, and wood-based

energy projects amounted to less than 1 percent of its

energy sector funding. Similarly, energy efficiency

has not been a significant focus (57).

Options-Congress could redirect U.S. (and attempt to redirect multilateral) energy policies away

from large-scale energy projects, such as oil- and

coal-fired powerplants, and toward energy efficiency, renewable technologies, and least-cost planning. Congress could ensure that A,I.D. and the

Department of Treasury have sufficient resources

allocated to comply with the provisions of the fiscal

year 1990 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act

(Public Law 101-167), which is a step in this

direction .33

Congress also could consider expanding A.I.D.’s

Office of Energy program, which provides assistance to developing countries in formulating strategies for price reform. Similarly, it could encourage

A.I.D. and the MDBs to work with the Eastern

European and Soviet governments to initiate reforms in pricing policies.

To overcome agency reluctance to fund small

projects, Congress could promote “bundling”-

combining several small energy projects into one

large project that supplies a substantial amount of

energy and involves financial scales customarily

handled by large development banks (e.g., $5

million or more). Public Law 101-167 instructs the

Secretary of Treasury to work with borrowing

countries to develop loans for bundled projects on

end-use energy efficiency and renewable energy,

Photo credit: African Development Foundation

The juxtaposition of old and new technology: Guide

leads oxen around solar cells at water pump, part

of the Basaisa Project, Egypt.

Congress also could promote greater funding by

smaller development organizations.34 For example,

the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) and the African Development Foundation (ADF) work closely

with the larger Inter-American and African Development Banks to find or implement community-scale,

grassroots development programs. These smaller

foundations generally have a greater ability to

examine smaller scale, modular programs than do

their parent organizations, but to date they have

rarely been involved in energy projects.

Population Policy Issues

The U.S. Government supported the right of

couples worldwide to control the number and

spacing of their children beginning in the mid1960s; under the Foreign Assistance Act as amended

in 1965, family planning is considered an important

contributor to economic development and improved

health and nutrition (11, 46). Most nations now

firmly support family planning assistance.

However, at the world population conference held

in Mexico City in 1984, the United States reversed

its historic position by declaring that population

growth was a ‘‘neutral’ factor and that economic

~~~b]lc ~w 101-] 67 directed AID. t. j~entifi) key ~ldd]e. and lo~_~come Counrnes ~ w~ch ene~ and foms~ Poficies could Sl@lCilIltly

.

reduce greenhouse gm emissions, Four countries-Chin~ Bmzil, Indonesia, India-appear to emit as much greenhouse gases as the other developing

countries combined. Other countries considered strong candidates for attention inc!ude Poland, Egypt, Mexico, Thailand, ColombiA the Philippines,

Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Zaire. A.I.D. currently does not provide direct assistance to Chin% Poland, or Mexico.

.~other mec~nlsms t. faclll~te private-sector made in ener=.efficient ad renewable energy technolo@ti were discussed above (see ‘ ‘Technology

Transfer and Trade With Other Countries” above).
40 ● Changing by Degrees; Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

development could compensate for any population

level. Associated with this change were new restrictions on A.I.D. Thus, two important international

population assistance programs lost U.S. funds-the

International Planned Parenthood Federation at the

end of 1984, and the United Nations Population

Fund (UNFPA) in early 1986. Moreover, U.S.

funding earmarked specifically for A. I.D. ’s main

population account has declined in recent years,

from $290 million in fiscal year 1985 to an estimated

$218 million in fiscal year 1990 (44).35

Some people argue that family planning assistance should be reduced or eliminated as a part of

international aid (1 1). However, the UNFPA (38)

concluded that more assistance is needed if the

world’s population is to stabilize--sometime early

in the 22d century-at a level of 10 or 11 billion

people (this is the UN’s ‘‘mid-range’ projection). In

particular, more assistance is needed to eliminate the

large ‘‘unmet need’ for family planning services;

the UNFPA estimates that the additional direct cost

of providing contraceptive services would likely be

less than $1 billion per year, but that several billion

dollars per year also are needed for a range of backup

activities (e.g., education and communication, women’s

programs, research and evaluation).

Any global Warmin g policies thus must include

decisions on the U.S. role in international family

planning. As indicated above, this issue has been and

still is highly contentious. Nevertheless, Congress

could reconsider the appropriate level of funding,

how funds should be distributed, and under what

restrictions or sanctions they should be distributed.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Currently, the United States and other industrialized countries (including the U.S.S.R. and Eastern

Europe) contribute up to two-thirds of all greenhouse gas emissions, mostly from fossil fuels used

to power these highly energy-consumptive societies.

There are opportunities for industrialized countries

to stabilize or decrease their annual emissions of

greenhouse gases. However, some sectors in Eastern

Europe and the U.S.S.R. are; also likely to increase

CO2 emissions still further. In the U. S. S. R., for

example, there is only 1 car for every 25 people. In

Poland and Hungary, living areas average 10 to 15

square meters per person as opposed to the U.S.

average of 60.

Developing countries currently contribute at least

one-third of greenhouse gases, mostly from land use

changes and practices (e.g., tropical deforestation,

rice cultivation, and livestock). But, CO2 emissions

will surely rise for developing nations still building

an industrial base, just beginning to supply electricity to their people, and increasing the use of modern

methods for cooking, heating, and transportation.

Efficiency investments, while crucial to growth, can

only decrease the need for new power; they can not

eliminate it. Thus, if current trends continue, the

greenhouse gas contribution from developing countries will grow quickly within a few decades to equal

or exceed those from the developed world.

Social, cultural, and economic differences will be

of paramount importance in any international negotiations that take place regarding climate change, For

example, reductions in per-capita living standards

(which reflect many of the above factors) are not a

desirable policy goal, especially for countries that

are well below the average. A goal for these

countries is to decouple greenhouse gas emissions

from desired economic growth. Conceptually, there

are several ways to achieve this-switching to

nonfossil fuels (e.g., solar, nuclear), increasing the

efficiency of energy and materials use, reversing

tropical deforestation, and implementing sustainable use of forest and agricultural resources. Moreover, no examination of the nature and dynamics of

development, natural resource and energy use, and

environmental protection can omit consideration of

population growth nor, for that matter, issues such as

foreign debt.

Options for the U.S. Congress are limited when

dealing with the actions of other sovereign nations.

However, Congress could directly encourage reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by adjusting aid

policies and processes to take greenhouse gases into

account. It could also encourage development and

transfer of appropriate technology, encourage corporate ventures into nongreenhouse gas emitting technologies, and work towards adoption of international protocols.

~S~ese ~e act~ or estimated expendi~res and vary slightly from oftlcial authorizmions. ‘Ibtal funding for population-related prOJeCtS was Slighfly

higher, bwause some family planning projects also are funded under other accounts.
Chapter I--Summary ● 41 —.

The United States is the world’s leading industrial

society and largest single producer of CO2. Major

reductions of C02 and other greenhouse gases will

require significant new initiatives by the Federal

Government, the private sector, and individual

citizens. The economic cost of these initiatives could

be considerable. And many of these efforts must be

sustained over decades.

OTA’s analyses suggest that if the United States

enacts a ‘‘Moderate set of low-cost technical

options, CO2 emissions in 2015 will be about 15

percent higher than 1987 levels. If the United States

enacts a ‘‘Tbugh’ package, CO2 emissions in 2015

could be as much as 35 percent below 1987 levels.

But, if the United States takes no action, emissions could increase by 50 percent in the next 25

years. This would continue the trend seen in the

1980s. Since the last two oil crises in the 1970s,

concerted efforts to conserve energy have dwindled

on all fronts-from government research and development to personal purchasing decisions. Many

other goals diluted these efforts as energy prices

dropped in the 1980s.

Now, as we begin the 1990s, several overarching

issues loom on the horizon-energy insecurity, m

demonstrated by the events in the Persian Gulf;

domestic environmental problems as evidenced

by numerous oiI spills and persistent air pollution;

global environmental degradation such as the

Antarctic ozone hole, and tropical deforestation; and

sustainablc development as the Third World struggles to bring burgeoning populations into the

industrial age and compete in world markets.

All of these concerns are difficult to control

unilaterally, yet the changes they could induce in the

average (J. S. citizen's 1ifc over the next few decades

may be profound. However, a common thread runs

through these issues and can serve as an overall

national g(~al-efficient energy use and conservation of’ natural resources. Ultimately, achieving

this goal can help to sustain industrial output,

competitiveness, and our overall quality of life.

However, getting there will not be easy. Many of the

options identified in this report can help move us in

this direction while simultaneously reducing greenhouse gases.

1.

2.

3.

4,

5,

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13

14.

15,

16.

17.

18.

19,

~~

21.

~z,

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55. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and

Emergency Response, Characterization of Municipal Solid Waste

in the United States: 1990 Update, EPA/530-SW-90-042 (Washington, DC: June 1990).

56, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy, Planning

and EvaIuatioQ Policy Options for Stabilizing Global Climate, draft

report to Congress (Washington DC: June 1990).

57. U.S. Export Council for Renewable Energy, Energy hnding at The

World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (Arlingtom

VA: January 1990).

58. World B@ World Development Report 1987 (Washington DC:

1987).

59. World Ba~ “World Bank Support for the Environment: A

Progress Repo~” Development Committee Pamphlet No. 22

(Washingto% DC: September 1989).

60. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

61. World Resources Institute, Natural Endowments: Financing Resource Conservation for Development (Washington DC: September 1989).
Chapter 2

A Primer on Climate Change

8 to 12°C ❑ 4 to 6°C

❑ 6 to 8°C 2 to 4°c

Photo credit: IPCC, 1990 from atmosphere-mixed layer ocean model of S. Manage.

Projected surface temperature increases due to a doubling of C02
CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

What Is Climate and Climate Change?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Climate Change Due to Greenhouse Gases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

THE GREENHOUSE GASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 53

Carbon Dioxide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Methane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Nitrous Oxide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Chlorofluorocarbons and Ha.ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

CHAPTER PREFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

APPENDIX 2A: FERTILIZING THE OCEANS WITH IRON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Boxes

Box Page

2-A. Models of Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

2-B. Stratospheric Ozone Depletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

2-C, The Montreal Protocol on CFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Figures

Figure Page

2-1. U.S. Annual Temperature and Precipitation, 1895-1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

2-2. The Greenhouse Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

2-3. Global Temperature Anomalies by Hemisphere, 1861-1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

2-4. Decline in Radiative Forcing Through Time From a Pulse of Greenhouse Gas

Emitted in 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

2-5. Carbon Dioxide Concentrations at Mauna Loa, Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

2-6. Carbon Dioxide Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

2-7. Global Carbon Emissions From Fossil Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

2-8. U.S. Carbon Emissions From Fossil Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

2-9, The Global Carbon Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

2-10. Atmospheric Methane Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

2-n, Atmospheric Nitrous Oxide Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

2-12. Concentratiom of CFC-l 1 in the Atmosphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

2-13. Estimated CMA Reporting Country and U.S. Use of CFC-ll and

CFC-12, by Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

2-14. Ozone Depletion Potential and Global WarmingPotential of CFCs and

Replacement Compounds (HFCs and HCFCs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Tables

Table Page

2-1. Highlights of the IPCC 1990 Scientific Assessment of Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . 46

2-2. Major Greenhouse Gases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

2-3. Alternative Estimates of Global WarmingPotential of Selected

Greenhouse Gases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

2-4. Estimated Annual Global Methane Emissions and U.S. Contribution

to Man-Made Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

2-5. Estimated Sources and Sinks of Nitrous Oxide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

2-6. Chlorinated and Brorninated Compounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Chapter 2

A Primer on Climate Change

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

Scientists are confident that human activity is

dramatically changing the chemical makeup of the

Earth’s atmosphere. Atmospheric concentrations of

several "greenhouse gases,"1 which trap heat in the

atmosphere, have risen rapidly over the last 100

years. Some of these gases (carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide) occur naturally, but their

rapid increase is generally a consequence of human

activity. For example, the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide is currently increasing about

30 to 100 times faster than the rate of natural

fluctuations indicated in the paleoclimatic record (7,

53); concentrations are already 25 percent above

average interglacial levels and 75 percent above the

level during the last glacial maximum (37). Likewise, the atmospheric concentration of methane is

increasing more than 400 times natural rates of

variability (13a, 37). Other greenhouse gases—

chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons--are synthetic chemicals that have been introduced into the

atmosphere only during the last 50 years. The United

States currently accounts for about 20 to 25 percent

of all greenhouse gas emissions associated with

human activity.

Many climate models used to predict global

average surface temperatures suggest an increase of

0.5 to 2 ‘F (0.3 to 1.1 ‘C) should have occurred over

the past 100 years due to increased atmospheric

concentrations of greenhouse gases. Natural climate

variability and other factors (measurement errors,

urban heat island effects, etc.) confound detection of

the expected change. The Intergovernmental Panel

on Climate Change, or IPCC (37),---(a group of

several hundred scientists from 25 countries)--

concluded that the global temperature record over

this period indicates that the Earth actually has

warmed by about 0.8 ‘F (0.45 0C),2 which is within

(but at the low end) of the range of estimates.3 See

table 2-1 for a summary of the IPCC findings.

Although there are many uncertainties about

climate change, the IPCC (37) concluded that if

present emission trends continue, global average

temperatures could rise by roughly an additional

2.2 ‘F (1.0 ‘C) by the year 2030.

Unfortunately, scientists have much less confidence in predictions for specific regions than for

global averages, in that regional climate change is

heavily affected by shifting and difficult-to-predict

atmospheric and oceanic circulation patterns. Greater

warming is likely to occur in some geographic areas

compared to others; negligible change or even

cooling is expected in some places. Some regions

may experience more drought, others more precipitation and perhaps changes in the frequency and

]Greefiouse gases map heat in tie atmosphere lns[ead of letting it radiate out into space. Much of the ficrease in ~ese gases over ~tur~ levels is

due

●

●

●

●

to actions of humankind. The key greenhouse gases and their primary anthropogenic sources are:

Carbon dioxide (COz&which is responsible for an estimated 55 percent of the emhancedgreenhouse effect fmm 1980 to 1990 (37), primarily from

fossil fuel burning in industrialized counties and deforestation in less developed countries. COZ is increasing in the atmosphere at 0.5 percent/year.

Methane (CH,&15 percent of the effec~ emitted from nce paddies, ruminant animals, coal mining, natural gas leakage, landtllls, and biomass

burning. CHQ is increasing at 0.9 percent/year.

Nitrous oxide (NIO~ percent of the effect; sources are nitrogenous fertilizers, fossil fuel combustion, and biomass burnin g. N20 is increasing

at 0.25 percent/year,

Chlorofluorocwbons (CFCs&24 percent of the effecq these are manmade chemicals used primarily for refrigeration and insulation. CFCS are

mcreasmg m the atmosphere at the rate of 4 percent/year. The revised Montreal Protocol (see box 2-C) will phase out these chemicals over the next

two decades in participating counties.

This estimate is based on a weighted average of measurements from sites around the globe, corrected to remove warming due to urban growth. The

WCC estimate dld not include data for 1990, which is reported to be the warmest year of the instrumental record. Temperature data for the global land

surface, total global surface (land and oceans), and troposphere indicate that 1990 was about 0.1 ‘C, 0.05 ‘C, and 0.02 ‘C warmer, respectively, than

any prior year m the 1980s or m the entire record; satellite data suggest that 1990 was the fourth warmest year since observations began (34 1 @ 13b,

30a),

‘+ Several hundred scientists from 25 countries participated in this multi-year effort spon..ored by the World Meteorological organization and the

Unltefi Nations Environment Program,

-45 -
46 ● Changing by Degrees. Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Table 2-l —Highlights of the IPCC 1990 Scientific Assessment of Climate Change

The IPCC is certain that:

. There is a natural greenhouse effect that already keeps the Earth warmer than it would otherwise be.

. Emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases.

The IPCC calculates with confidence that:

● Atmospheric concentrations of the long-lived gases (C02, N20, and the CFCs) adjust only SlOWIY to changes in emissions. continued

emissions of these gases at present rates would commit us to increased concentrations for centuries ahead.

. The longer emissions continue to increase at present-day rates, the greater reductions would have to be for concentrations to stabilize

at a given level.

. immediate reductions (on the order of 60°/0) in emissions of long-lived gases (C02

, N20, and the CFCs) from human activities would

be required to stabilize their concentrations at today’s levels; methane would require a 15 to 200/. reduction.

Based on current model results, the IPCC predicts that:

● Under the I PCC Business-As-Usual Scenario,a global mean temperature will increase about 0.3 ‘C per decade (with an uncertainty

range of 0.2 to 0.5 ‘C per decade), reaching about 1 ‘C above the present value by 2025 and 3‘C before the end of the 21st century.

. Land surfaces will warm more rapidly than the ocean, and high northern latitudes will warm more than the global mean in winter.

● Global mean sea level will rise about 6 cm per decade over the next century, rising about 20 cm by 2030 and 65 cm by the end of the

21st century.

All pred ictlons are subject to many uncertalnties wit h regard to the timing, magnitude, and regional patterns of climate change,

due to incomplete understanding of:

. sources and sinks of greenhouse gases,

. clouds,

. oceans, and

● polar ice sheets.

The IPCC judgment is that:

. Global mean surface air temperature has increased by about 0.45 ‘C (with an uncertainty range of 0.3 to 0.6 ‘C) over the last 100

years, with the five globally averaged warmest years occurring in the 1980s.

. The size of this warming is broadly consistent with predictions of climate models, but it is also of the same magnitude as natural climate

variability. Thus, the observed temperature increase could be largely due to natural variability; alternatively, this variability y and other

human factors could have offset a still larger human-induced greenhouse warming. The unequivocal detection of the enhanced

greenhouse effect from observations is not Iikely for a decade or more.

aAssumes that emissions of all greenhouse gases continue at 1990 levels. See note 7 in text and ref. 37.

SOURCE: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, %’entific Assessment of C/irnate Change, Summary and Report, khld Meteorological

Organization/U.N. Environment Program (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

intensity of storms.

4 At this stage it is impossible to

confidently project the magnitude of the impacts of

global warming, the speed with which they will

develop, or where they will manifest themselves

most severely.

We appear to be pushing the climate system

beyond the limits of natural rates of change experienced by the Earth for hundreds of thousands and

probably millions of years (9, 37, 53). The projected

rate of climate change may outpace the ability of

natural and human systems to adapt in some areas

(37, 81). While it maybe many years before climate

monitoring proves global warming is statistically

significant, each year that passes increases the

severity of the policy actions that would be needed

to slow or reverse these climate trends. The IPCC

(37) estimates that stabilizing trace gas concentrations at current (perturbed) levels would require an

immediate 60-percent reduction in carbon dioxide

emissions, 15 percent in methane emissions, and 70

percent in nitrous oxide and CFC emissions.

THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT

What Is Climate and Climate Change?

The Earth’s climate is driven by many factors.

The primary force is radiant energy from the Sun,

and the reflection or absorption and reradiation of

this energy by atmospheric gas molecules, clouds,

and the surface of the Earth itself (including, for

@eneral circulation models (GCMS) predict that warming could exacerbate summer drought over land at mid-latitudes prirnarily through a

combination of earlier spring snownwlt and enhanced evaporation of soil water (30, 56). In Hansen et al. ’s (30) model, both extremes are intensifkd;

wet areas tend to get wetter, dry areas tend to get dryer. However, predictions of regioml drought occurrence and intensity are uncertain because they

are sensitive to uncertain components of GCMS, particularly soil moisture conten~ clouds, and ocean circulation patterns (30, 59). Precipitation data

for land suggest some broad consistency with model projections, but with many unexplained discrepancies (17). Warming could also result in more

intense or frequent storms of some types, including hurricanes and thunderstorms (20, 55, 30). Some studies indicate that maximum sustainable hurricane

intensity should increase with global warming (20). Moreover, the region where hurricanes are viable may expand (30). However, present modeling

results provide no consistent, convincing evidence that storms and related climate extremes will increase or decrease in frequency or intensity. Better

understanding of regional climate change must await higher resolution climate models (37, 85).
Chapter 2--A Primer on Climate Change ● 47

Figure 2-1—U.S.

U.S. National Temperature

January— December 1895.1989

Degree Fahrenheit

55.0

54.0 i -

. .

Annual Temperature and Precipitation, 1895-1989

U.S. National Precipitation

January– December 1895-1989

Degree Celsius Inches - MiIIimeters

33.0

854

12.7

12.4

12.1 30.5

1’

7

11. 8

: , ,,

. .

/-+ 11.5 28.0

1

1 824 . .

I

1. I

!

I j 1! 644

614

584

50.0 10.0 1895 1905191519251935 1945 1955 196519751985

18951905191519251935 19451955 196519751985

Fluctuation in temperature and rainfall can be dramatic from year to year even over an area as large as the United States (6 percent of the

global land area and 2 percent of total global surface area). No trend can be interpreted from these data.

SOURCE: National Climatic Data Center, NOAA.

example, forests, mountains, ice sheets, and urbanized areas), A portion of the reradiated energy leaves

the atmosphere. Over the long-term, balance is

maintained between the solar energy entering the

atmosphere and energy leaving it. Within the bounds

of this balance, variations in global and local climate

are caused by interactions among the atmosphere,

snow and ice, oceans, biomass, and land. An

example is El Niño, a large-scale warmin g of the

tropical Pacific that occurs periodically, apparently

due to complex interactions between the ocean and

atmosphere (60).

A region’s general climate is defined by aggregate

weather patterns-e. g., snowfall, predominant wind

direction, summertime high temperature, precipitation—averaged over several decades or longer.

These patterns can vary substantially from one year

to another in a given area. The mean annual

temperature of the United States, for example, can

differ by 2 to 3 ‘F from one year to the next and

annual rainfall can differ by 4 or more inches (see

figures 2-la and 2-lb).

When scientists talk about climate change, they

are generally talking about trends that persist for

decades or even centuries, over and above natural

seasonal and annual fluctuations. One type of

change arises from forces that are external to the

Earth’s climate system. The ice ages and glacialinterglacial cycles, for example, are thought to have

been triggered in large part by changes in the

seasonal and geographical distributions of solar

energy entering the Earth’s atmosphere associated

with asymmetries in the Earth’s orbit around the

Sun. Also, major volcanic eruptions can pour

aerosols (e.g., sulfur particles) into the stratosphere,

partially blocking or screening sunlight from reaching the surface of the Earth and thus temporarily

cooling the Earth’s surface. Variations in volcanic

activity, ice sheets, forest cover, marine phytoplankton populations, and/or ocean circulation, among

other factors, may have interacted with solar variability (including changes in the Sun’s brightness) to

determin e the Earth’s past temperature record (4a,

11, 12, 24, 46a, 76, 108, 114). Scientific research

continues to improve our understanding of climate

as a very complex system (37, 38, 99, 102, 103).

Emissions of greenhouse gases due to human

activity constitute a new force for climate change,

acting in addition to the natural climatic phenomena.

Because of natural variability in climate, the IPCC

(37) concluded that the observed 20th century

warming trend will have to continue for one to two

more decades before it can be unambiguously

attributed to enhanced greenhouse gases (18, 52,62,

86, 87). However, given the potentially severe

consequences of climate change, policymakers are

faced with the challenge of making decisions under

conditions of considerable scientific uncertainty.

Climate Change Due to Greenhouse Gases

Overview

About 30 percent of the solar radiation reaching

the Earth is reflected by the atmosphere and Earth

back to space, and the remainder is absorbed by the

atmosphere, ice, oceans, land, and biomass of Earth

(see figure 2-2). The Earth then emits long-wave
48 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 2-2—The Greenhouse Effect (radiation flows expressed as a percent of total Incoming or outgoing energy)

n“ IN,:,l,G

-90°c \

‘flT\ I\ ‘A

100 \- ENERGY

25

~ ABSORBED

Incoming solar radiation is partially reflected back into space (30 percent) and partially absorbed by the atmosphere, ice, oceans, land, and

biomass-of the Earth (70 percent). The Earth then emits radiant energy back into space. The “Greenhouse Effect” refers to the trapping

of some of the radiant energy the Earth emits by atmospheric gases, both natural and anthropogenic. As a result of this effect, the Earth’s

surface and lower atmosphere warms.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

radiation, which is partially absorbed and ‘‘trapped’

by atmospheric gases.5 The net result of these natural

processes is the ‘ ‘greenhouse’ effect—a warmingo f

the Earth’s atmosphere and surface. Without the

natural heat trap of these atmospheric gases, Earth’s

surface temperatures would be about 60 ‘F (33 ‘C)

cooler than at present, and life as we know it today

on Earth would not be possible.6 Water vapor (in the

form of clouds) and carbon dioxide (CO2) are the

major contributors to this effect, with smaller but

still significant contributions, from other trace gases,

such as methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and

ozone (O3

).

Human activities during the last century have

resulted in substantial increases in the atmospheric

concentrations of CO2

, CH4, and N2O, as well as the

introduction and rapid increase of the synthetic

chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). All other things being

equal, as concentrations of these gases increase,

more radiation should be trapped to further warm the

Earth’s surface and atmosphere. However, as more

heat is trapped and the Earth and atmosphere warm,

more thermal radiation should be emitted back to

space, eventually restoring the energy balance or

equilibrium, but with a warmer climate.

The basic “heat trapping” property of greenhouse gases is essentially undisputed. However,

there is still considerable scientific uncertainty about

how and when Earth’s climate will respond to

enhanced greenhouse gases. The more uncertain

aspects of climate response include: climate feedbacks that will help determine the ultimate magnitude of temperature change (i.e., ‘ ‘equilibrium”

warming); the role of the oceans in setting the pace

of Warming; and other climate changes that might

accompany warming and how specific regions of the

world might be affected.

SGme~ouse ~mes bo~ emit and absorb mdiation The net effect is abso~tion because hey absorb relatively intense radiation from the w~er Et@h

iind emit relatively weak radiation at cooler atmospheric temperatures. Thermal radiation declines as the temperature of the emitting object declines.

s~ls dso explains differences among surface temperatures on Venus, MS, and Eti.
—

Chapter 2--A Primer on Climate Change ● 49

“Benchmark” Warming-The Effect of

Doubled CO2 Concentrations

Predictions of future warming due to greenhouse

gases are highly uncertain, largely because of the

uncertainties inherent in both the climate models

themselves and in the projection of future greenhouse gas emissions levels (box 2-A discusses

climate change models). Future emissions will be

tied to population and economic growth, technological developments, and government policies, all of

which are difficult to project.

To avoid the pitfalls and complexity of estimating

future emissions, and to provide a common basis for

comparing different models or assumptions, climate

modelers typically examine climates associated with

preindustrial levels of atmospheric CO2 concentration. These are compared to “equilibrium”

climates—i.e., when the climate system has fully

responded and is in equilibrium with a given level of

radiative forcing associated with double those levels. Although such ‘‘sensitivity analyses’ provide

useful benchmarks, they are unrealistic in that they

instantaneously double CO2 concentrations, rather

than increase them gradually over time. In the last

few years, scientists have intensified research using

more realistic ‘‘transient’ climate models where

CO2 increases incrementally over time (28, 37, 90,

105).

Many models indicate that a rangeof3to8“F ( 1.5

to 4.5 oC) bounds the anticipated equilibrium

warming in response to a doubling of CO2 from

preindustrial levels (37, 54, 84, 101). Uncertainty as

to the actual figure is primarily due to uncertainty

about feedbacks—processes that occur in response

to initial warming and act either to amplify or

dampen the ultimate equilibrium response. The

lower end of the range (3 o

F change) roughly

corresponds to the direct impact of heat trapping

Box 2-A—Models of Climate Change

Climate models consist of sets of mathematical expressions that describe the physical processes associated with

climate-e. g., seasonal changes in sunlight, large-scale movement of air masses, evaporation and condensation of

water vapor, absorption of heat from the atmosphere into the oceans, etc. In the most detailed models, known as

general circulation models (GCMs), the atmosphere is sectioned off into “cells” roughly 300-miles square at the

Earth’s surface, and the cells are stacked several layers deep. The vertical layers reach about 20 miles into the

atmosphere. For each cell and period of time (e.g., an hour), the sets of mathematical expressions are solved to

predict such variables as temperature, humidity, air pressure, and wind speed. In simulating a century’s worth of

climate, the process is repeated billions of times,

At the core of climate models are expressions of physical principles such as the conservation of energy or mass

(e.g., of air or water vapor). Such “laws” govern interactions among the atmosphere, oceans, sea ice, land, and

vegetation. However, using fundamental principles is too cumbersome to model some processes--because the real

scale involved is much smaller than the dimensions of a GCM cell. In these cases, modelers are forced to rely on

observed (i.e., empirical) relationships. For example, statistics on how cloud occurrence (i.e., types, altitudes)

depend on temperature and humidity levels could be used to predict when clouds should be “created” during a

model simulation. A potentially critical problem with using empirical relationships, rather than fundamental

physical principles, is the possibility that observed relationships may not hold for conditions other than those under

which the observations were made.

In climate models developed to date, atmospheric conditions have been treated more comprehensively than

oceanic or biosphere (i.e., land and vegetation) conditions. Atmospheric conditions are the first to adjust to changes

in radiative forcing such as increased greenhouse gas concentrations, and the seasonal cycle of climate provides a

good test of the ability of models to simulate the short-time-scale processes involved. Although they are not treated

in as much detail, some changes in the oceans and in the extent of sea ice are also predicted and fed back into further

predictions. Efforts to improve oceanic components of models are a major focus of current research. Finally,

conditions of land and vegetation are usually fixed before a simulation is run and are not changed during it. The

rationale for holding these conditions fixed is that they are expected to respond to climate change comparatively

slowly. However, these simplifications could mean that some important processes or feedbacks are ignored (15, 51,

55).

State-of-the-art climate modeling is focusing on: higher spatial resolution of models; coupled models that link

atmosphere, ocean, land, and ice models; and more realistic model representations of key climate processes such

as cloud formation and atmosphere-oceans-biomass interactions (37).
50 ● Changing by Degrees. Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

associated with doubled CO2, with little amplification from feedbacks. The upper end of the range (8 o

F) accounts for feedback processes that roughly

triple the direct heat-trapping effect. Hypothesized

feedbacks that could release extra CH4 and C02 into

the atmosphere are not included in present models

(37, 5 1), so warming could be even more severe. On

the other hand, clouds may block much more solar

radiation than models presently assume and thereby

reduce the warming (see ‘‘Climate Feedbacks’

below).

It is important to realize that a 3 to 8 ‘F warming

only bounds model predictions of warming in

response to this reference or benchmark CO2 level.

Higher CO2 concentrations, or a combination of

greenhouse gas levels equivalent to more than a

doubling of C02

, could lead to greater warming.

Likewise, lower greenhouse gas concentrations lower

the eventual warming. EPA (98) projected that in the

absence of a slowdown in emissions growth, an

‘‘effective C O2 doubling (i.e., accounting for

increases in other trace gases as well as CO2

) could

occur as early as 2030 assumin g high rates of

population and economic growth, or be delayed for

about a decade if lower growth prevails. The IPCC

“business as usual” emissions scenario7 projects a

global mean temperature increase above today’s

level of about 0.54 ‘F (0.3 ‘C) per decade, or an

increase of roughly 2.2 ‘F (1.0 ‘C) by 2030 and 6.6

o

F (3.0 oC) by 2100 (37).

Detecting Climate Change-Warming Over the

Past Century

Change in global average surface air temperature

is the most common measure of climate change.

There has been much debate over whether warming

consistent with greenhouse theory predictions actually has been observed in the global temperature

record of the past century. High regional variability

of both the ‘‘natural’ climate and of ‘‘enhanced

greenhouse’ effects make detection of climate

change difficult (37). Nonetheless, the six warmest

years of the past century occurred since 1980 (37,

40) and, overall, global warming appears to have

occurred over the last century (see figure 2-3) (30).8

Based on a review of all major global temperature

series, for both land and ocean, the IPCC (37)

concluded that global mean temperature has increased by 0.54 to 1.08 ‘F (0.3 to 0.6 ‘C) over the last

100 years.9 However, the IPCC noted that ‘ ‘the size

of the observed warming is also of the same

magnitude as natural climate variability.

The midpoint of the IPCC range is at the low end

of most estimates from models of the warming that

should have occurred to date,1O even when the

delaying effect of the oceans is taken into account.

For example, Wigley and Schlesinger (1 10) estimated that between 1850 and 1980, a global

temperature increase of about 0.7 to 2.0 ‘F (0,4 to

1.1 ‘C) should have been caused by emissions of

CO2 and other greenhouse gases.11 Dickinson and

Cicerone (18) analyzed the effects of increased

greenhouse gases and estimated a similar expected

warming trend of 0.5 to 1.8 ‘F (0.3 to 1.0 ‘C) for the

period 1900 to 1985. In general, models that use

historical increases in greenhouse gas concentrations as inputs (as opposed to instantaneous doubling calculations) show a warming of about 0.4 to

1.1 ‘C (depending on model assumptions) through

the year 1990 (26, 37, 83, 110, 111).

Nonetheless, given uncertainties in the models,

the magnitudes of observed and predicted warming

are considered ‘‘broadly consistent’ (37, 86, 87),

Most puzzling, however, is the interruption in the

warming trend that occurred during the middle of

7~e IPCC $ ‘business ~ Usti$’ SCe:do ~sumes that emissions of selected greenhouse gases (C02, CHd, NZO) continue at 1~ levels from 1~

to 2100. For CFCS, the scenario assumes that the MontreaJ Protocol is implemented, albeit with only partial participation (see box 2-C). The atmospheric

concentration of COZ would double (over preindustrial levels) by about 2060, but the ‘‘effective’ COZ concentration (the cumulative effect of all trace

gases) would double by 2025. The tPCC temperature projections cited here assume a “best estimate” climate sensitivity of 2.5 ‘C for equilibrium

warming.

ll~e Hmen estimtes (29) were compd~ us~g &@ from iand-based sites; no da@ fmm ,sNps w~e included, Comparison with the trend estimated

by Jones et al. (38& 39), who used data taken aboard ships as well as on land, suggests that this omission had only a small effect on the overall trend.

The method used to combine individual station data attempted to minimize errors due to uneven coverage. Preliminary surface temperature data indicate

that 1990 was the warmest year of the past century (3a, lOa, 30a).

~rban heat island effects can be large in spectic areas (42, 112a) but are estimated to account for no more than 0.05 to 0.1 ‘C in the global averages

(40, 41, 43).

IOSome Sc1enti5ts believe tie ac~ wting has been closer to the low end of this range due to errocs from uncorrected urban h~t island effects (s)

(but see footnote 9), ocean temperature measurement problems (1 16), and various discontinuities or inconsistencies in the temperature data (2 1, 62).

1 IB~ed on mode] predlctio~ ~1 a lernpera~c increase in the range of 3 to 8 ~ (1.5 t“ 4.5 ‘C) would ultimately result from instantaneously doubling

atmospheric COZ concenhations; and including a range of time lags due to the uncertain effect of the oceans in delaying warming.
Chapter 2--A Primer on Climate Change ● 51

this century (see figure 2-3), when the Northern

Hemisphere cooled and the Southern Hemisphere

temperature was ‘‘ flat.’ This underscores the possibility that other ‘natural ‘‘ influences-e. g., changes

in volcanic dust, solar radiation, or ocean circulation—

have affected 20th century climate, The IPCC (37)

concluded that ‘‘the observed [temperature] increase

could be largely due to this natural variability;

alternatively this variability and other human factors

could have offset a still larger human-induced

greenhouse warming. ’ The IPCC (37) further concluded that ‘‘ [t]he fact that we are unable to reliably

detect the predicted [enhanced greenhouse] signals

today does not mean that the [enhanced] greenhouse

theory is wrong, or that it will not be a serious

problem for mankind in the decades ahead. ”

Hansen and Lebedeff (29) examined the observed

changes in average temperatures at different latitudes and found that the past century’s warming was

especially enhanced at high northern latitudes,

which is consistent with model results. However, the

trend is not smooth. Cooling actually occurred in the

high northern latitudes between 1940 and 1965. And

the 1980s’ warming was driven by changes in the

low latitudes, with relatively level temperatures or

cooling in much of the mid- to high-northern and

southern latitudes (3, 29). A significant reduction in

summer/winter temperature differentials (over the

past century is also consistent with model calculations (29).

Finally, oxygen isotope data recovered from air

trapped in Greenland and Antarctic ice allow scientists to place the temperature record of the past

century in geologic perspective (50, 100). The IPCC

midpoint estimate of global warming over the past

century (0.8 OF or 0.45 ‘C) is about one-fourth as

large as temperature variations (3.6 o

F or 2 oC

minimum to maximum) estimated to have occurred

during the past 10,000 years. Thus, attributing some

part of the warming since the late 1800s to natural

variations would be consistent with the longer term

record. The IPCC (37) concluded that ‘‘[a] global

warming of larger size has almost certainly occurred

at least once since the end of the last glaciation

without any appreciable increase in greenhouse

gases. Because we do not understand the reasons for

Figure 2-3—Global Temperature Anomalies

~

0.6

~

0.4

5

0.2

;

0.0 F

u

c

.0.2

—* .0.4

E .0.6

~

a -0.8

VJ 0.6 3

-Z

5

0.4

0

a 0.2

@

b 0.0

4

c

-0.2

$ -0.4

~ .0.6

~ .08

by Hemisphere, 1861-1989

Northern Hemisphere

t

1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990

Southern Hemisphere

(b)

I _l

1670 1690 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990

Temperatures over land expressed as differences relative to

1951-1 980: Northern Hemisphere, Southern Hemisphere. Three

research groups have produced similar analyses of hemispheric

land surface air temperature variations. All three analyses indicate

that during the last decade globally averaged land temperatures

have been higher than in any decade in the past 100 to 140 years.

SOURCE: IPCC, 1990: annual values from P.D. Jones (bars); smoothed

curves of values from PD. Jones (1861-1989) (solid lines),

Hansen and Lebedeff (1860-1987) (dashed lines), and Vinnikov

et al, (1861 -1987 Northern Hemisphere and 1881-1987 Southern Hemisphere) (dots).

these past warming events, it is not yet possible to

attribute a specific proportion of the recent, smaller

warming to an increase of greenhouse gases.

Climate Feedbacks

“Direct’ heat trapping, or “radiative forcing”

refers to the expected warming due to greenhouse

gas emissions if potential climate feedbacks—processes that occur in response to warming either augmenting or diminishing the effect—are ignored. 12

The radiative forcing effect of greenhouse gases

l~Radlatlve forcing “r heat ~applng is calculated with models of the energy balance Of the Earth/atmosphere sYstem. ~esc models calculate ‘tiace

temperature adjustments to increased greenhouse gas concentrations from information about the radiative absorption ~haracteristics of the gas mo!ecules,

and globally averaged profiles of gas concentration versus height in the atmosphere. The models also require information about preexisting

condillons+,g,, atmospheric temperature profiles; the amount of solar energy entering the atmosphere and the amount reflected from the Earth’s surface

and from atmospheric acrmols and gases; and the rate at which heat is redistributed through mechanical mixing processes.
52 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

added to the atmosphere since the late 1800s is

equivalent to about a 1.4 ‘F (0.8 ‘C) equilibrium

increase in global average surface temperatures (18,

70, 71).

However, scientists expect that some climate

feedbacks will operate. Enhanced radiative forcing

is expected to lead to changes in oceanic and

atmospheric circulation patterns, the hydrologic

cycle of precipitation and evaporation, vegetation

cover, and snow and ice clover, all of which could, in

turn, stimulate further, complex climate change.13

Most climate models suggest that, overall, feedback will amplify warming by a factor of up to 3 (26,

31, 37). Two fairly well understood feedbacks result

from increases in atmospheric water vapor and the

melting of snow and ice. As temperatures increase,

air can hold more water vapor (itself a greenhouse

gas). This can more than double the effect of

radiative forcing (25, 37, 72).14

Melting of snow and ice due to warmer temperatures enhances warming in two ways:

1. reducing the reflectivity of the Earth’s surface

(land or ocean), so less solar radiation is

reflected and more is absorbed; and

2. reducing the insulating effect that sea ice has on

the ocean, so heat escapes from high-latitude

oceans more readily.

Snow and ice feedbacks result in only a 10 to 20

percent increase in warming on a global scale, but

they can increase local warning at high latitudes by

up to a factor of 4, particularly in winter ( 19,72, 78).

Indeed, the greatest warming due to increasing

greenhouse gas concentrations is predicted to occur

in winter, at high latitudes. In particular, General

Circulation Models’ (GCMs) highest estimates of 8

‘F global warming in response to doubled CO2 rest

on predictions that wintertime warmin g in high

latitudes will exceed 15 ‘F, with lesser changes

occurring during other seasons and at lower latitudes

(82, 84).

Twentieth century warming has not been large

enough to cause widespread, detectable melting of

high latitude snow and ice, with the notable exception of the retreat of some alpine glaciers (although

with periods of readvance [113]). Sea ice, snow

cover, and ice sheet data either indicate no clear

overall trends or are too limited or unreliable for

identifying trends (37). There is recent evidence that

at least parts of the Antarctic and Greenland ice

sheets are actually thickening (37, 67a, 118), possibly because of increased snowfall due to warming in

those areas (1 19). (This somewhat counterintuitive

result can be explained if: a) warmer surface

temperatures increase evaporation from the oceans,

which would increase absolute humidity and precipitation; and b) the precipitation falls as snow, not

rain, so long as temperatures are still below freezing

[37]). Recent modeling results from coupled atmosphere-ocean GCMs suggest that amplified high

latitude warming may not occur at least in the

Southern Hemisphere around Antarctica (37, 57,90,

105), with the implication that temperatures in this

region will remain below freezing.

Finally, how climate will respond to greenhouse

forcing depends, in part, on what will happen to

clouds (37). Clouds play a dual role in Earth’s

energy balance: depending on their shape, altitude,

and location, their dominant effect can either be to

reflect solar radiation or to absorb or trap thermal

radiation (from Earth). Recent satellite data demonstrate that the dominant effect of clouds at present is

to reflect solar radiation and hence help cool the

Earth, and that the magnitude of this cooling is about

three to five times the expected warming effect of

doubled CO2 (73). However, as conditions change,

the cooling effects of clouds may increase or

decrease. If all types of clouds simply increase in

area, or if lower, broader stratus clouds increase,

they will reflect more sunlight back into space and

cool the Earth. If taller, narrower clouds or cirrus

clouds form, they will actually exacerbate the

warming effect. Overall, GCMs are extremely sensitive to assumptions about cloud cover; a recent

model intercomparison concluded that clouds can be

either a strong positive or negative feedback on

global Warming (13, 49). Depending on the model,

clouds can halve the warming expected from doubled CO2 (64) or double it (72, 73).

l~~e complexity and viability of cli~te change suggests that simukaneously I’nOttitOMg a me nmber of relev~t p arameters will increase the

chances of detecting significant change (6, 37, 43, 115).

Idsome (52, 66) believe tit tie water vapor feedback will actually dimtiish ra~er ~~PMY C02 w

arming, due to drying of the air at high altitudes

and increased intensity of convection These are topics of continuing scientific research and debate.
Chapter 2-A Primer on Climate Change ● 53

Several feedbacks involving emissions of greenhouse gases are so speculative that they have not

been incorporated into most climate models. These

potential feedbacks are discussed below, in the

sections on C02 and CH4

. If worst case conditions

hold, they could greatly increase atmospheric CO2

and CH2 concentrations, resulting in twice as much

warming as current GCMs predict (98).

Delays in Climatic Response

Based on the 1.4 ‘F increase in radiative forcing

estimated to have occurred from 1880 to 1980, and

assuming that positive feedbacks could amplify

warming by a factor of up to three, a global average

warming of about 1.4 to 4 ‘F is eventually expected

as a result of the greenhouse gas concentration

increases of the past century. (This estimate does not

include any warming from current and future emissions. ) As noted, this degree of warming has not yet

been seen. In fact, scientists do not yet expect to see

it, primarily because: 1) the natural variability of

climate would mask or could even offset some of the

change due to greenhouse gases; and 2) heat uptake

by the oceans would delay the warming of the air.

The oceans have an enormous capacity to absorb

and store heat. However, it takes several years for the

ocean’s rapidly mixed surface layer (i.e., the top 100

meters) to equilibrate, on average, with warmer air

temperatures, and it takes decades to centuries for

the deep oceans to reach full equilibrium(31 ). Thus,

global average surface temperatures would continue

to increase for decades after greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilized. For example, scientists

estimate that only about half the 1.4 to 4° F warming

expected from emissions over the last century

should have been realized by now because of this

ocean effect (18, 26, 31, 110). The actual observed

warming has been at the low end of this range,

suggesting one or more of the following:

. the ‘‘enhanced greenhouse effect is considerably weaker than models predict, due perhaps

to stronger negative feedbacks;

● natural variability is offsetting a large part of

the enhanced greenhouse;

●

●

Sea

other anthropogenic factors (e.g., sulfur aerosols) are offsetting some of the enhanced

greenhouse; 15

ocean thermal lag is longer than thought.

Level

Sea level, averaged globally, is estimated to have

risen 4 to 8 inches (10 to 20 cm) over the past century

(22, 37, 61). Scientists express high confidence that

sea level will rise as a result of warming, but

questions of how much and how rapidly are controversial (37, 61). The IPCC (37) has attributed 20th

century sea level rise primarily to thermal expansion

of ocean water as it warms and to partial melting of

alpine glaciers. Hoffman et al. (32) predicted that sea

water expansion and glacial melting could cause sea

level to rise about 4 to 8 inches (10 to 20 cm) by

2025, and 16 to 80 inches (40 to 200 cm) by 2075.

The IPCC reviewed all available evidence and

estimated about the same sea level rise by 2030 (3.2

to 11.6 inches, or 8 to 29 cm with a best estimate of

18 cm) but a considerably smaller rise by 2070 (8.4

to 28,4 inches, or 27 to71 cm with a best estimate of

44 cm). This lower estimate includes the counteracting sea level drop due to (warming-induced) increased snow accumulation in Antarctica (37).16 The

possibility that a polar ice sheet (such as the West

Antarctic ice sheet) could slide into the ocean and

raise sea level is very speculative. The IPCC (37)

concluded that ‘‘[a] rapid disintegration of the West

Antarctic ice sheet due to global warming is unlikely

within the next century, and cautioned that sea

level projections more than a few decades into the

future ‘ ‘are fraught with many uncertainties. . .“

THE GREENHOUSE GASES

Historical and current growth rates in greenhouse

gas concentrations (see table 2-2) fuel concerns

about the possibility that human activity has been

and will go on altering climate. Increases in CFC

concentrations are unambiguously due to human

activity, as they are synthetic chemicals that do not

occur naturally. Human activity also is thought to be

largely responsible for raising concentrations of

N2O, CH4

, and C02 above preindustrial levels,

ls~c IpCC (37 ) ~oncludcd tittie c]lmatlc effec~ of manmade sulfur emissions are ‘highly unceflain+ ‘‘ but that ‘ ‘it is conceivable that this radiative

forcing has been of a comparable magnitude, but of opposite sign, to (he greenhouse forcing earlier in this century. ” Over the longer term, the IPCC

concluded that greenhouse forcing is likely to be larger on a global basis, but that forcing fmm sulfur emissions could be significant on a regional basis.

Predictions are difficult due to uncertainties about the direct and indirect radiative effects of sulfur aerosols (including their impact on clouds) as well

as future levels of sulfur emissions,

l~R~ent research (63) ~uggcsts a sea level rise toward the lower end of the IPCC range of eStiIIKNeS for 2030.
Table 2-2—Major Greenhouse Gases

Assumed Projected Annual Emissions from U.S. share Contribution

concentration Concentration concentration growth rate human activity of emissions

Gas

to warming

in 1880ain 1990b

in 2030C

as of 1990b din 1985 in 1985 1880 -1980a

Carbon dioxide (CO2) . . . . . . . . . 260-290 ppm 353 ppm 440-450 ppm 0.5 %/yr 6-9 billion metric tons Cb

20%c66%

Methane (CH4) . . . , . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 ppm 1.72 ppm 2.5-2.6 ppm 0.9%/yr 350 million metric tons CH e

1 O%c 15%

Nitrous oxide (N20) . . . . . . . . . . . 290 ppb 310 ppb 340 ppb 0.25 %/yr 1 4-10 million metric tons N NEg

3%

CFC-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.28 ppb 0.5 ppb 4 %/yr 3,000 metric tonsf

22%c4%

CFC-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.48 ppb 1.0-1.1 ppb 4 %/yr 4,000 metric tonsf

30°/0’ 50/0

Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NEg

NE NE NE NE NE 7%

aV. Ramanathan et al., ‘Trace Gas Effects on Climate, ” in Atmospheric Ozone 1985, Global Ozone Researti and Monitoring Project Report No. 16, World Meteorologic’ Organization, National

Aeronautics and Space Administration (Washington, DC: 1985).

blntergovernmental panel on Climate Change, Scientific Assessment of Climate Change, Summary acd Report, World Meteorological OrganizatiotiU.N. Environment Program (Camtidge, MA:

Cambridge University Press, 1990).

CUS. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation, Po/icy Options for Stabilizing G/oba/ C/irnafe, Draft Report to Congress (Washington, DC: June 1990).

dlmpact on warming over the next three d~es of reducing us. EPA’s (1 990) projected annual emissions of ea~ gas by an amount qual to 20 percent of 1985 levels. Expressed as a f KICtiOfl

of the impact of redua”ng projected annual carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent of 1985 levels.

‘R.J. Cicerone and R .S. Oremland, “Biogeochem’kal Aspects of Atmospheric Methane, ” Global Biogeochemical Cycles 2:299-327, 1988,

fJ,K. Hammitt et al., PKKAJc~ uses ar)dkfafiet Trends for Potentia/ Ozone4ep/eting Substances, 1985-2000 (Santa Moni=, CA: RAND Corp., May 19~).

9NE - no estimate.
Chapter 2--A Primer on Climate Change ● 55

Table 2-3--Alternative Estimates of Global Warming Potential (GWP) of Selected Greenhouse Gases

OTA estimates of GWP for the timeframe noted

IPCC based on cumulative emissions between 1995 and 2015

Lifetime (years) 100-year GWP 2015-2100 2025-2100 2035-2100

CO* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 1 1 1 1

CH1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 21 12 6.9 4.6

N2O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 290 290 300 300

CFC-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 3,700 3,600 3,400 3,200

CFC-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 7,600 7,800 7,900 7,900

HCFC-22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1,500 1,000 620 390

HCFC-123 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 87 6 0 0

HFC-134a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1,300 860 550 350

HFC-143a ......,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 2,900 2,700 2,400 2,200

HFC-152a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 140 11 0 0

NOTE: The 100-yearGWPestlmate Isslrghtlydlfferent than the IPCCIOO-yearestimatedue toslightdifferences lnmodeling thelifetime ofCOz,The 120year

lifetlme for C02k3approxlmate,

SOURCE. Of ffce of Technology Asessrnent, 1991, using data from IPCC, 1990,

although natural sources of these gases also exist

(14,47, 74, 88, 107). U.S. emissions (see table 2-2)

are disproportionate to its 5 percent share of the

world’s population; in particular, U.S. emissions of

C O2 and CFCs account for about one-fifth and

one-fourth of the world’s estimated totals, respectively.

The warming effect of a greenhouse gas depends

on several factors, including its concentration,

radiative absorption and emission characteristics,

and, in some cases, radiative interferences with other

gases. 17 Radiative forcing calculations (see table

2-2) suggest that increased CO2 accounts for about

two-thirds of the equilibrium warming ultimately

expected to result from growth in greenhouse gas

concentrations over the past century. Growth in

CH4 concentrations has contributed an additional 15

percent, CFC-11 and CFC-12 together about 10

percent, and N2O about 3 percent (70).

Reducing greenhouse gas emissions can reduce

the level of equilibrium warming projected for 2030.

However, the effects of reducing different greenhouse gases vary (see table 2-3 and figure 2-4). The

IPCC has proposed a method for comparing the

warming from equal quantities of greenhouse gases.

It defines Global Warming Potential (GWP) as the

ratio of the amount of warming from a pound of a

greenhouse gas to the warming from a pound of CO2,

over a period of 20, 100, and 500 years. It prefers to

use the 100-year- timeframe for its policy analysis,

—- . — —— ——

Figure 2-4—Decline in Radiative Forcing Through

Time From a Pulse of Greenhouse Gas

Emitted in 2000

Radiative forcing

,00% (as a percent of year 2000 forcing)

1

:1o (1 o

“ \ r, “n ,: c

80% ~ o [

-Vk. \

1:

‘~ -

+>

60% . . -

.

-..—— 4

m +

20% j . +

. ,

* , ‘

0% t

2000 2005 201 0

- 2015 2020 2025 2030 203 5

‘- C02 ‘ CH4 * HFC-152a

N20 HCFC-22 “ CFC-11

The radiative forcing from each gas is considered equal to 100

percent when it is emitted in the year 2000. The graph illustrates

the decline in radiative forcing over the next 35 years as the

greenhouse gases decompose in the atmosphere.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, using data from IPCC,

1990.

which is shown in the second column of table 2-3.

However, while GWP may be a good way for

comparing the effects of different gases emitted well

into the next century-when the effects from warming are likely to be greater-it may not be the

appropriate choice for comparing the merits of

alternative near- term policy measures (i. e., with in

the 25-year timeframe of this assessment).
56 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 2-5-Carbon Dioxide Concentrations at

Mauna Loa, Hawaii

350;

345 !

340

335

310 ‘ ‘ -- - ‘- 1 ‘ ‘-L ‘ 1- , U .J. L .—L 1 , L. - L 1 I

1957 1961 1965 1969 ‘1973 1977 1981 1985 1989

The solid line depicts monthly concentrations of atmospheric CO2

at Mauna Loa Observatory, Hawaii. The yearly oscillation is

explained mainly by the annual cycle of photosynthesis and

respiration of plants in the Northern Hemisphere. The increasing

concentration of atmospheric C02 at Mauna Loa since the 1950s

(dashed line) is caused primarily by the CO2 inputs from fossil fuel

combustion.

SOURCE: P. Tans, National Climatic Data Center, GMCC, 1990.

Some gases decay much more rapidly than others

(see figure 2-4). For example, if we define the

radiative forcing from a pound of CO2 emitted in

2000 to be equal to 100 percent, by 2010 the amount

left in the atmosphere will have radiative forcing

equal to 75 percent. Similarly, by 2025 the radiative

forcing from N2O is about 85 percent of its original

value 25 years earlier and CFC-11 is about 65

percent of its original value. But note that the shorter

lived gases, such as HFC-152a (a replacement for

CFCs) and CH4

, behave differently. By 2010 HFC152a will have almost completely decomposed. By

2025, the radiative forcing from CH4 will be about

10 percent of the amount 25 years earlier.

The IPCC measure assumes that an increment of

warming today is equal to an increment of warming

in the future. We have constructed our own formulation of GWP that we feel is more appropriate for

evaluating the near-term policies presented in this

report. Our measure focuses on the amount of

warming that would be prevented during a specified

period of concern during the 21st century, by

elimin ating a pound of greenhouse gas emissions

Figure 2-6-Carbon Dioxide Concentration

(parts per million by volume)

360

Carbon dioxide

340 -

/

300

280

I

1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000

The history of atmospheric C02 presented here is based on ice

core and atmospheric measurements. The data show that C02

increased slowly in the 1800s and more rapidly in the 1900s when

temperate forests were converted to agricultural land. The rapid

rise since the 1950s is due primarily to fossil fuel combustion and

tropical deforestation. The current rate of increase is unprecedented in the ice core records.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, from IPCC, 1990.

each year between 1995 and 2015. Because it is not

possible to pick one particular year when one might

begin to be concerned about global warming effects,

table 2-3 presents three versions of our measure,

starting at either 2015,2025, or 2035. Again note the

differences in the shorter lived gases. Methane is less

than half the IPCC’s 100-year estimate and the

effects of several of the short-lived CFC substitutes

drop considerably. Thus, over the near-term,

Congress may wish to focus efforts on the longer

lived greenhouse gases—C02

, N20, and CFCs.

Carbon Dioxide

Along with water vapor and clouds, CO2 is a

major natural greenhouse agent, without which

Earth would be uninhabitable. However, CO2 concentrations are estimated to have increased by about

25 percent since the mid-1800s, from around 280

ppm to about 350 ppm now (see figures 2-5 and 2-6).

The continuous record of CO2 concentrations measured at Mauna Loa since 1958 shows a steady

year-to-year increase superimposed on a clear sea-
Chapter 2--A Primer on Climate Change ● 57 — -.. ————.

Figure 2-7—Global Carbon Emissions From

Fossil Fuel

Carbon emissions (billion metric tons)

6 1

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion alone have grown from

less than 0.1 billion metric tons C in the mid-1850s to approximately 6 billion metric tons C in 1989. Emissions have more than

tripled in the last 40 years.

SOURCE: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Carbon Dioxide Information

Analysis Center, “Trends ’90 A Compendium of Data on Global

Change” (Oak Ridge, TN:1990).

sonal cycle.l8 Most of the increase occurred in the

20th century (37, 45,80, 88) and is attributed largely

to fossil fuel consumption (see figure 2-7).

C O2 concentrations in air bubbles trapped in

Antarctic ice indicate that present CO2 levels are

already higher than at any time in the past 1601000

years. Past CO2 concentrations ranged from roughly

200 ppm during glacial episodes to 280 ppm during

interglacial periods and were roughly correlated

with temperature (7, 37, 53). Unless steps are taken

to reduce emissions, CO2 concentrations in 2030 are

projected to be about 450 ppm, up more than 60

percent from preindustrial levels and 30 percent

from 1985 levels (28, 37, 70, 98).

CO2 accounted for an estimated two-thirds of the

enhanced radiative forcing that occurred from 1880

to 1980, with the share declining to about 50 percent

during the last decade as CFCs grew in importance

(29, 70). With anticipated controls on CFC emissions, however, CO2

’S comparative contribution is

expected to rebound in the future (98). Assuming

feedbacks amplify the direct radiative forcing effect

by a factor of 1 to 3, climate models suggest that the

Figure 2-8--U.S. Carbon Emissions From

Fossil Fuel

Carbon emissions (billion metric tons) 1.4 :

I

Total

1.2

‘“”k

0.6

1

Solids

Liquids

0.4 “,

1- >~.-. /’

0.2- ‘

L–––

>’- “

Gases

Cement &

1950 1960 1970 1980

U.S. emissions of carbon from fossil fuels are currently about 1.3

billion metric tons C. Emissions have doubled since the industrial

revolution.

SOURCE: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Carbon Dioxide Information

Analysis Center, “Trends ’90: A Compendium of Data on Global

Change” (Oak Ridge, TN: 1990).

30 percent increase in CO2 concentration projected

for the period from 1985 to 2030 would add 0.45 to

1.3 ‘C to the equilibrium warming already expected

from current greenhouse gas levels (98).

Of the total (estimated) cur-rent CO2 emissions

due to human activity (5.8 to 8.7 billion metric tons

of carbon), 5.2 to 6.2 billion metric tons is due to

fossil fuel burning, and 0.6 to 2.5 billion metric tons

is due to deforestation (37).19 Fossil fuel emissions

are estimated to have increased more than 50-fold

since the middle of the last century and are expected

to reach 9 to 12 billion metric tons of carbon in 2025

without deliberate action to reduce them (98).

The United States, with less than 5 percent of the

world’s population, is responsible for almost 25

percent of fossil fuel CO2 emissions, more than any

other nation (58). U.S. emissions dropped during the

two energy crises but have recently increased (see

figure 2-8). Current emissions from deforestation in

the United States are considered negligible (see ch.

7). Electricity production (for industrial, residential,

and commercial use) dominates U.S. C02 emissions, followed by transportation, and then by direct

l~~e smsond] variation rCfICCt.S winter-to-s~mer changes in photosynthesis (C02 storage) and respiration {COZ release) in live plan~$.

l~othcrs (~s, 36) estimate that deforestation could conmibute up to 2,8 billion metric tons of carbon (see ch. 7). Note that 1 billion metic tom of ctibon

is equivalent to 3.7 billmn metric tons of C02 (37).
58 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

fossil fuel use in industrial and buildings applications. Oil and coal combustion each account for

roughly 40 percent of U.S. emissions, natural gas the

other 20 percent (see ch. 3).20

The United States is projected to contribute about

2 billion metric tons of carbon in 2025, slightly more

than its current contribution in absolute terms, but a

smaller fraction of the world’s total than at present

(98; also see ch. 3). China and other developing

countries, the U. S. S. R., and centrally planned European countries are projected to be major emitters in

2025 (98; see ch. 9).

Calculating atmospheric concentrations of CO2

from anthropogenic emission levels is complicated;

annual emissions from human activity are small

compared with natural exchanges of carbon among

the atmosphere, oceans, and biosphere (see figure

2-9). These natural exchanges are substantial, yet not

very well understood (16, 37, 68). For example,

about 100 billion metric tons of carbon in the

atmosphere is stored annually in living vegetation

through the process of photosynthesis; an approximately equal amount of carbon is put back into the

atmosphere through plant respiration and decay of

dead vegetation (34). (The seasonal variation in the

Mauna Loa CO2 data (see figure 2-5) is caused by the

seasonal imbalance between these processes, which

roughly even out on an annual basis.)

An estimated 90 billion metric tons of carbon is

exchanged between the oceans and the atmosphere

each year (4). Over the past 30 years, the net effect

of this exchange has been uptake and absorption by

the oceans of roughly 2 to 3 billion metric tons of

carbon from the atmosphere per year. If biosphere/

atmosphere exchanges are ignored, this means that

effectively about 45 percent of each year’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion have been offset

by absorption by the oceans (4). However, the

fraction of fossil fuel CO2 that is absorbed by the

ocean appears to be declining (46). One partial

explanation may be that the surface layer of the

ocean has warmed, and warmer water absorbs less

C O2

Recent analyses suggest that the oceans are not

the only major sink for CO2 and that terrestrial

ecosystems may absorb a larger amount of CO2 than

previously thought (91). The IPCC (37) estimated

that about 30 percent of today’s CO2 emissions is

absorbed by the oceans and 23 percent by the land

biota, and that 47 percent remains in the atmosphere.

However, sequestering by the land biota is not well

understood, and the biota could become saturated at

some point in the future. In this event, the atmospheric accumulation would increase even faster,

unless the oceans could somehow make up the

difference (or CO2 emissions declined). Appendix

2-A discusses the idea of fertilizing areas in the

Antarctic Ocean with iron, in order to stimulate

phytoplankton productivity and increase carbon

sequestration in the ocean.

Greenhouse gas/global warming feedbacks may

affect the natural balance between CO2 storage and

release. For example, some plants respond to increased atmospheric CO2 by storing more carbon, at

least under laboratory and horticultural greenhouse

conditions; at the same time, warmer temperatures

can speed up respiration and decay and hence

accelerate the release of CO2 to the atmosphere (see

ch. 7). Some scientists hypothesize that feedback

mechanisms are already operating and that they may

explain: 1 ) the increase over the past three decades

in the difference between wintertime peak and

summertime low CO2 concentrations (46); and 2)

the recent acceleration of annual growth in CO2

concentrations, despite leveling off of fossil fuel

emission rates (35).

Because of the long atmospheric lifetime for CO2

(50 to 200 years), the IPCC (37) estimated that

anthropogenic CO2 emissions would have to be

reduced to 50 percent of their present level by the

year 2050 in order to limit the atmospheric CO2

concentration in 2050 to “only” 420 ppm (50

percent above the preindustrial level). The IPCC

(37) estimated that an immediate 60 to 80 percent

reduction in anthropogenic CO2 emissions would be

necessary to stabilize atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 1990 levels (353 ppm).

Methane

Methane concentrations have steadily risen at

about 1 percent per year, from about 1.52 ppm in

1978 to about 1.68 ppm in 1987 (see figure 2- 10). Ice

core data show that CH4 concentrations have approximately doubled over the past two centuries and

are currently higher than at any time during the past

160,000 years. Like CO2 concentrations, they have

riper each tit of CnerH pr~uced, though, c02 emissions from coal combustion are highest, followed by ofl and then mtu~l gas.
Chapter 2-74 Primer on Climate Change ● 59

Figure 2-9--The Global Carbon Cycle

ATMOSPHERE

740 (IN 1988)

+ 3 PER YEAR

(BIOLOGICAL 100 I AND I

(PHOTOSYNTHESIS) 1-2 5

I

(DEFORESTATION) (FOSSIL-FUEL USE) ----- CHEMICAL

PROCESSES)

50

(RESPIRATION)

1

I AND I

CHEMICAL

PROCESSES)

VEGETATION

— ~—~—

FOSSIL FUELS

5,000-10,000

1,500

SOIL

AND LITTER 3

The carbon fluxes and reservoirs are shown in billions of metric tons C.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

been roughly correlated with temperature over this

period (37, 75, 89).

Per molecule, CH4 is about 25 times more

effective in trapping heat than CO2 (98). Increases in

CH4 over preindustrial levels contributed about 15

percent of the total greenhouse gas forcing estimated

to have occurred from 1880 to 1980 (70, 71). In the

absence of steps to reduce CH4 emissions, average

CH4 concentrations in the year 2030 are projected to

reach about 2.5 ppm (28, 70, 71, 98). This nearly

50-percent rise above current atmospheric concentrations would increase expected equilibrium warming by about 0.2 to 0.5 ‘F above currently projected

levels.

Current CH4 emissions are estimated to range

between 290 and 965 million metric tons per year (8,

14, 37, 98). Rice paddies and domestic animals

(mainly cattle and sheep) are thought to be the

largest sources related to human activity (see ch. 8),

although natural gas production and delivery, coal

production, and landfills also contribute substantially (see table 2-4). The United States apparently

contributes about 6 percent of the CHd emissions due

to human activity, mostly from landfills, natural gas

and coal production, and domestic animals. Without

action to reduce emissions, EPA (98) projects that

annual worldwide CH4 emissions will increase by

about 10 to 30 percent by 2025, with a slight decline

in the relative U.S. share. The largest increases axe

projected from landfills and production and distribution of fossil fuels; smaller increases are projected

from domestic animals and rice production.

Methane molecules emitted today will remain in

the atmosphere for an average of 10 years. Methane

removal occurs primarily via a chemical reaction

with a hydroxyl radical (OH-), which is a short-lived

fragment of a water vapor molecule (69). However,

the average lifetime of CH4 molecules may be

increasing, due to reductions in hydroxyl radical

levels (69). Hydroxyl radicals can be lost due to

reactions with CH4 or carbon monoxide (CO), and

emissions of both gases are thought to be increasing.

Currently, OH- depletion is estimated to have an

effect equivalent to emitting a few additional million
60 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

—

Figure 2-10-Atmospheric: Methane Concentration

(parts per billion by volume)

1,800

1,600

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600 ,

Methane (CH4

)

, 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, from IPCC, 1990

Table 2-4-Estimated Annual Global Methane

Emissions and U.S. Contribution to Man-Made Sources

Range in Us.

annual contribution

emissions (percent of

(million global

Source metric tons) number)

Natural wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Termites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Oceans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fresh water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Methane hydrate

destabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Domestic animals . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rice paddies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Biomass burning . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Coal mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Natural gas drilling, venting

transmission losses . . . . . . . . .

Landfills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

100-200

1o-1oo

5-20

1-25

0-1oo

65-100 9

60-170 1

20-80 <1

19-50

2 2

a

25-50

20-70 37

290-965 6

alncludes both coal mining and natural gas sources.

SOURCES: R.J, Cicerone and R.S. Orclmland, 1988; D.W. Barns et al.,

1989; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1990.

metric tons of CH4 per year, but this could increase

in the future (14).

Climate change feedbacks could also potentially

increase CH4 emissions levels. Warmer temperatures could increase emissions from wetlands and

rice paddies, because the rate at which organic

matter is decomposed in these environments increases with temperature (15). However, warming

and a drier climate could decrease emissions from

high-latitude tundra soils, as a result of lowered

water tables (109). Warmer temperatures could also

release CH4 from permafrost where it is stored as

‘‘methane-hydrates (37). With a global average

temperature increase of 5 ‘F (3 *C), as much as 100

million metric tons of CH4 per year (48) to several

times this amount (76) could be released from

methane-hydrate deposits. In order to stabilize

atmospheric CH4 concentrations at current levels,

the IPCC (37) estimated that an immediate 15 to 20

percent reduction in global anthropogenic CH4

emissions would be necessary.

Nitrous Oxide

Nitrous oxide concentrations apparently began to

rise rapidly in the 1940s, and increased about 0.2 to

0.3 percent per year during the mid-1980s. Current

concentrations are about 310 ppb, compared to about

285 ppb during the late 1800s (see figure 2-1 1). Ice

core measurements indicate that the preindustrial

N2O level was relatively stable at about 285*5 ppb

for at least the past 2,000 years (37). Thus, today’s

N2O atmospheric concentration appears to be without historical precedent. Unless N2O emissions are

reduced, concentrations are projected to rise to

between 340 and 380 ppb by 2030 (28, 70, 71, 98).

Per molecule, the radiative forcing effect of N2O

is about 200 times greater than that of CO2 (98). The

almost 10 percent increase in N20 concentration that

has occurred over the past century contributed about

2.5 percent of the total greenhouse gas forcing

during that period (70, 71). Adding 35 ppb to the

atmospheric N2O burden by 2030 would increase the

projected equilibrium warming by about 0.1 to 0.2

*F (().()55 to 0.1loC).

N2O emissions levels are extremely uncertain;

EPA (98) estimated the total to be 11 to 17 million

metric tons per year, primarily from microbial soil

vitrification and denitrification. Several kinds of

human activity also result in N2O emissions. Both

the use of nitrogenous fertilizers for agriculture (ch.

8) and microbial activity in groundwater aquifers

contaminated by nitrogenous compounds are sources

associated with human activity (79). N2O is also

produced during fossil fuel combustion, although

the magnitude of emissions from this source is

highly uncertain (65). Biomass burning releases

N2O as well, but clearing of primary tropical forests

could lower subsequent N2O emissions if the soils

then emit N2O at a slower rate (77). In fact,
Chapter 2--A Primer on Climate Change ● 61

Figure 2-1 l—Atmospheric Nitrous Oxide

concentration (parts per billion by volume)

310 1

I

Nitrous oxide (N20)

300

290

I

1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000

SOURCE: Office of Technology l%sessment, 1991, from IPCC, 1990.

emissions from fossil fuel and biomass combustion

appear to be considerably less than once thought.

The IPCC (37) concluded that N2O emissions of

10 to 17.5 million metric tons N per year are needed

to account for the observed increase in atmospheric

N2O concentration. Yet the IPCC could identify only

4.4 to 10.5 million metric tons N per year from

known sources (see table 2-5). The IPCC (37)

concluded that the data suggest the likelihood of

unaccounted for or underestimated sources of N2O.

Despite uncertainties as to what these are, the IPCC

concluded that “the observed increase in N2O

concentrations is caused by human activities.

N20 has an atmospheric lifetime of about 150

year; (37, 117). It is destroyed via reactions that

occur in the stratosphere (70, 71) and possibly via

removal by soils (37). The IPCC (37) estimates that

to stabilize N2O concentrations at current levels, an

immediate 70 to 80 percent reduction in anthropogenic N2O emissions would be needed.

Chlorofluorocarbons and Halons

Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons are longIived synthetic chemicals containing chlorine, fluorine (and in the case of halons, bromine), and carbon.

They are released to the atmosphere from many

sources: venting during servicing of appliances such

as refrigerators or air-conditioners; leaks from such

appliances (while in use or after disposal); production of ‘open-cell’ foams; deterioration of ‘closedTable 2-5—Estimated Sources and Sinks of

Nitrous Oxide

Annual emissions

(million metric tons

Source/sinks per year)

Sources:

Coal and oil combustion . . . . . . . . . . 0.10-0.3

Biomass burning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.02-0.2

Fertilized croplands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.01 -2.2

Forest soils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9-5.2

Oceans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4-2.6

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-10.5

Sinks:

Removal by soils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No estimate

Photolysis in the stratosphere . . . . . 7-13

Atmospheric increase . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4.5

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-17.5

SOURCE: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, SdenfificAssessmentof Climate Charrge, Summary and Report, W%rfd Meteorological Organizatiori/U.N. Environment Program (Cambridge,

MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

cell’ foams; and during use as aerosol propellants,

solvents, and fire extinguishers. Emissions could be

avoided from many of these applications, for example, through recapture and recycling or through

incineration rather than disposal. Such measures are

seldom taken.

CFCs and halons were first introduced in the

1930s, and worldwide production increased steadily

until the mid- 1970s (see table 2-6 and figures 2-12

and 2-13), when the use of CFCs in nonessential

aerosols was banned in the United States and a few

other counties. Largely because of this ban, which

was enacted in response to concerns about the

destruction of stratospheric ozone, growth rates in

atmospheric concentrations of CFCs have slowed,

from an average of about 10 percent per year

(between 1975 and 1985) to about 4 percent per year

now. Atmospheric concentrations of the most widely

used CFCs (CFC-11 and CFC-12) were 230 and 400

ppt, respectively in 1986, and 280 and 484 ppt in

1990 (37).

Outside the United States, however, both CFC- 11

and CFC-12 are still commonly used in aerosol

sprays. CFC- 11 use in the United States is dominated by production of synthetic rigid foams for

cushioning and insulation, while the largest use of

CFC- 12 is for motor vehicle air-conditioning.

CFCs and halons have extremely long lifetimes,

typically on the order of 65 to over 100 years (see

table 2-6), before they are eventually destroyed in
I ●

Table 2-6--Chlorinated and Brominated Compounds

Atmospheric Annual Ozone Global Atmospheric Worldwide d U. S., shared

concentration growth depletion warming lifetime use in 1985 of use

Compound Formula (ppb) a rate (%)a potential (ODP)b potential (GWP)b

(years)a

(billion grams) (percent)

CFC-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CFC-11 0.28 4 1 1.0 60 340 22

CFC-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CFC-12 0.48 4 0.9- 1.0 2.8-3.4 130 440 30

CFC-113 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CFC-113 0.06 10 0.8-0.9 1.3-1.4 90 160 45

HCFC-22 , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HCFF-22 0.12 7 0.04-0.06 0.32-0.37 15 206 N A

c

Carbon tetrachloride ... , ., . CCI4 0.15 2 1.0- 1.2 0.34-0.35 50 1,030 27

Methyl chloroform , . . . . . . . . CH3CCI 3 0.16 4 0.10-0.16 0.026-0.033 7 540 50

Halon-1211 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CF2ClBr 0.002 12 2.2-3.0 N A

C

25 11 25

Halon-1301 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CF3Br 0.002 15 7.8-13.2 NA 110 11 50

alntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, scientific Assessment of Climate Change, Summary and Report, WorM Meteorobg”kal Organization/U.N, Environment Program (Cambridge, MA:

Cambridge University Press, 1990).

~ASA, Present State of Knowkc@e of the UpperAfrrrosphere 1990.’ An Assessment Report (Washington, DC: 1990). Ozone depletion potential and global warming potential per unit mass emitted,

relatwe to that of CFC-1 1.

CNA - not available.

dJK Hammltt ~t al, pr~ucr uses ~“d &,fafiet Tre~& for pofen~ja/ @one~e@efjng su~s~a~~, lgs~z~u (Santa Mon~a, CA: RAND COrp., May 1986); data for HCFC-22 for 1984, from U.S.

Environmental ProtectIon Agency, Office of Policy Planmng and Evaluation, Pofky Options for Stabilizing Global Climate, Draft Report to Congress (Washington, DC: February 1989).
Chapter 2--A Primer on Climate Change ● 63

Figure 2-14—Ozone Depletion Potential and Global

Warming Potential of CFCs and Replacement

Figure 2-1 2—Concentration of CFC-11 in the

Atmosphere (parts per billion by volume)

0.3 r

—

Compounds (HFCs and HCFCs)

$

,,1! f

11

1

.,:

I 11’

.,

r.

“b\;’lY;’;;” ‘“

Elm: I.,

I I

J

<j

1

CFC1l (CFCI3)

1

0.0 ~, 1

J

I

[ 1 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000

(

Total reported production of CFC-11 and CFC-12 increased

rapidly throughout the 1960s and 1970s, reaching a maximum of

813,000 metric tons in 1974. Aerosol applications declined since

the mid-1970s, while nonaerosol applications continued to increase.

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1991, from IPCC, 1990.

t, F

k )..!

o

${ F 4 . ‘~ ~

IJ:, 1 2 3 4 7

Global warming potential

Note that there is a strong correlation between ozone depletion

effect and global warming potential; this relates to the lifetime of

the compound in the atmosphere. Those with few chlorine and/or

bromine atoms decompose more quickly (therefore causing less

environmental damage) than fully chlorinated or brominated

compounds.

SOURCE: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1990; and Office

of Technology Assessment, 1991.

Figure 2-13—Estimated CMA Reporting Country and U.S. Use of CFC-11 and CFC-12, by Product

1 00% “

75% ~

50% j

I

25% .

I

o% ]

100% 7

CFC-12 uses;

= Home refrigeration

= Mobile air conditioning

CFC-11 uses:

m Flexible molded

C Flexible slabstock

~ Chillers

~ Unallocated

‘~~~ Rigid foam

_ Aerosol

- 1

m Retail food refrigeration

50% ~ Miscellaneous /

~ Chillers

~ Unallocated

= Rigid foam

= Aerosol

United

States

All reporting

countries

United

States

All reporting

countries

Use ● (75,000 mt) (300,000 mt) Use ● (135,000 mt) (365,000 mt)

SOURCE J K. Hammitt et al Product Uses and Market Trends for Potenfia/ 0zone4ep/etmg Substances, 1985-2000 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.,

May 1986).
64 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

the stratospheric reactions that also deplete stratospheric ozone (see box 2-B). Evidence regarding

ozone destruction mounted steadily in the 1980s (see

box 2-B). In response, 47 countries negotiated the

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the

Ozone Layer, which was signed in September 1987

and strengthened in 1990 (see box 2-C).

The radiative forcing effect of CFCs is on the

order of 10,000 times greater, per molecule, than that

of CO2 (70). CFC-11 and CFC- 12 contributed about

9 percent of the total radiative forcing increase that

occurred over the last hundred years (70). Recently,

however, their contribution has been much higher—

approximately 25 percent over the last decade (30).

Based on EPA projections conducted before the

Montreal Protocol was strengthened in 1990, the

added contribution of CFCs from the late 1980s

through 2030 was projected to be an equilibrium

warming increment of about 0.2 to 0.5 ‘F (0.1 to 0.3

oC) (98). Other chlorinated and brominated compounds have had less impact to date because their

concentrations in the atmosphere are low, but

molecule-for-molecule they can contribute as much

to ozone depletion and global warming as CFC-11

and CFC- 12. Concentrations of some of these

compounds are growing rapidly (see table 2-6).

The hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) being considered as CFC

replacements have shorter atmospheric lifetimes,

generally 1 to 40 years for HFCs and HCFCs,

compared to 65 to 130 years for CFCs (37) (see

figure 2-14 and table 2-6). Thus, a rapid phaseout of

CFCs coupled with aggressive substitution of HFCs

and HCFCs (especially those with the shortest

atmospheric lifetimes) would be expected to significantly lower net atmospheric concentrations of

radiatively active gases, with a commensurate reduction in ozone depletion and global warming

potential (37).

..4,

●

#-

Photo credit: A, KOVaCS

Carbon dioxide trapped in air bubbles in Antarctic ice indicates that present C02 concentrations are higher than at any time in the

past 160,000 years. Ice core data also show that CH4 concentrations have approximately doubled over the past two centuries;

measurements for N20 suggest that atmospheric concentrations remained stable for 2,000 years and started to climb

during the industrial revolution.
Chapter 2-A Primer on Climate Change ● 65

Box 2-B—Stratospheric Ozone Depletion

Stratospheric ozone (03) shields the Earth from solar radiation in the biologically harmful range of ultraviolet

wavelengths known as W-B (the wavelength band extending from about 280 to 320 rim). In humans, the harmful

effects of exposure to W-B radiation include sunburn; premature aging of the skin; nonmelanoma skin cancer;

occular disorders, including cataracts; and suppression of immune system responses. Though uncertain, malignant

melanoma skin cancer may also be linked to W-B exposure. Excessive W-B exposure can also damage plants

and animals in terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems.

Ninety percent of the protective ozone is contained in the stratosphere.l The natural balance of stratospheric

ozone is maintained through a continuous cycle of production and destruction involving solar radiation, molecular

oxygen (02), and naturally produced molecules containing hydrogen, nitrogen, chlorine, and bromine atoms. CFCs,

halons, methyl chloroform, and carbon tetrachloride-all of which are synthetically produced chlorinated or

brominated compounds-an severely alter this balance by speeding up ozone destruction. Because they are

catalysts (i.e., they are not destroyed by the reactions in which they participate), one chlorine or bromine molecule

can destroy thousands of molecules of ozone.2

The amount of UV-B radiation that reaches Earth’s surface depends on season, time of day, latitude, and

altitude. At present, on a clear day at the equator, only about 30 percent of the UV-B that enters Earth’s atmosphere

reaches its surface. Fractions as low as 10 percent reach the surface at higher latitudes or when clouds are present.

However, for each l-percent reduction in ozone concentrations, the penetration of biologically active UV-B is

predicted to increase by roughly 2 percent. In turn, the Environmental Protection Agency (33) estimates that with

a 2-percent increase in W-B radiation, the incidence of nonmelanoma skin cancer in the United States would

increase by about 2 to 6 percent over the current rate of roughly 400,000 new cases per year; and that the incidence

of malignant melanoma in the United States would increase by 1 to 2 percent over the current rate of about 26,000

new cases and 6,000 fatalities per year.3

In October 1987, the amount of ozone over Antarctica fell to the lowest levels ever observed. Averaged over

100 latitude bands extending south from 60o

, 70o, and 80o S, respectively, total column ozone (i.e., the amount of

ozone directly overhead at a given site) had dropped by 24,40, and 50 percent compared to October 1979. At some

locations and heights, the depletion reached 95 percent. observational evidence very strongly suggests that chemical

mechanisms involving chlorine from human-made sources are the primary cause of this rapid decline (106). In

particular, chlorine and bromine released from CFCs and halons are primed for ozone destruction by chemical

interactions with cloud particles. With the extremely cold temperatures of the Antarctic winter, clouds form readily

in the polar stratosphere. The greatest ozone depletion occurs during the austral spring, when the air above the

Antarctic is chemically primed and isolated from air at lower latitudes, and sunlight is available to participate in

ozone-destroying reactions. More normaI ozone levels were observed in 1988, indicating that meteorological

conditions have to be “right” for severe ozone depletion to occur. The Antarctic ozone hole appeared in both 1989

and 1990, the first time such depletion was observed in two consecutive years. The 1990 hole was nearly as severe

as the record levels found in 1987 and persisted longer.

Observations in the Arctic in December 1988 and February 1989 indicated that Arctic stratospheric ozone also

had fallen, although on a much smaller scale than in the Antarctic. Observers found increased amounts of potential

ozone-destroying compounds (C1O and OC1O), suggesting that the potential exists for significant destruction of

ozone in the Arctic (106).

ll%e stratosphere is the region of the atmosphere that extends from about 8 to 17 km (depend@ on latitude) ti up to *out so km dove

the Earth’s surface. The remaining 10 percent of the ozone is found in the troposphere, the region of the atmosphere extending from Earth’s

surface up to the base of the stratosphere.

2~e ‘@oUse” w.= c% ~4, ~d %0 *O ~=t s~tfw~c ozone. ~CI=S@ C02 or CH, wo~d tend to ~CRWW rather than

reduce stratospheric ozone. C02 cools the stratosphere, which generally slows the rates of ozone-destroying -ctions. ~4 helps tie-uP c~ofie

in “inactive” moleeules that do not react with ozone. Increasing N20 can either increase or reduce stratospheric omne, dw~~ on he ~la~v~

amounts of chlorine and nitrogen oxides present.

3Pmp1e ~~ Ii@t sw r~ or blond hair, and blue or green eyes are most susceptible tO developing nonmel~o~s~ c~er.

 A 1 ‘0

2 percent mortality rate is associated with the disease.

(Continued on next page)
66 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 2-B—Statospheric Ozone Depletion-Continued

Measurements of total column ozone show that ozone has declined at mid-latitudes in the Northern

Hemisphere, with the reduction being especially pronounced in winter (see figure 2B-1). While computer models

of stratospheric ozone have predicted an ozone decrease due to CFC emissions, the observed wintertime depletion

is up to three times greater than has been predicted (106). The IPCC (37) concluded that, after allowing for natural

variability, the Northern Hemisphere (300 to 64° N latitude) mean winter ozone level decreased by about 3.4 to 5.1

percent between 1%9 and 1988 (with no statistically significant trends during the summer).

The compounds implicated in stratospheric ozone depletion have two characteristics: they contain chlorine or

bromine, and they are not broken down before they reach the stratosphere. Table 2-6 presents estimates of the

‘‘ozone depletion potential" (ODP) per molecule, relative to that ofCFC-11, of eight widely used compounds. ODP

depends on the number of chlorine or bromine atoms in the molecule, its atmospheric lifetime (i.e., how long it takes

before it is broken down or removed from the atmosphere), and the mechanisms involved in breaking it down. The

compounds of greatest concern are extremely long-lived, with lifetimes on the order of 100 years, and are only

broken down by reaction with intense solar radiation in the stratosphere. Thus, even though the Montreal Protocol

has been strengthened to accelerate elimination of long-lived CFCs (see box 2-C), it will take a century for prior

emissions to dissipate from the atmosphere.

Figure 2B-1—Estimated Percentage Changes in Total Column Ozone at Northern

DECLINE IN THE OZONE SHIELD

Mid-Latitudes, 1969-66

~~

-2 3 % -6 20/0 + 0.4 %

-3,0 -4. 7 -2 I

-1 7 -2 3 -1 9

Changes in total ozone concentration, 1969-66, by latitude bands in Northern Hemisphere. Winter months: December, January,

February, March. Summer months: June, July, August. .

SOURCE: R.T. Watson et al., Resent State d KnowWge of the L@psr Afmos@we 1988: An Aesesstrwnt RqMrl (Waehlngton, DC: National

Aeronautics and Space Administration, 19SS), figure supplied by F.S. Rowland, 1990.
Chapter 2--A Primer on Climate Change ● 67

Box 2-C—The Montreal Protocol on CFCs

In response to growing international concern about the role of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in destroying

stratospheric ozone, 47 nations reached agreement on a set of CFC control measures in September 1987. Entitled

the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the control measures laid out a schedule of

production and consumption reductions for many CFCs (95). Nations with high CFC use, such as the United States,

were to reduce production and consumption of certain CFCs and halons to 50 percent of 1986 levels by 1998.1 Those

developing nations with low per-capita use were allowed to increase their use through 1999 and then were to cut

back to 50 percent of 1995-97 levels over the following 10 years.

While the agreement represented a milestone in international environmental cooperation, many observers felt

that the scope and time frame of the reduction schedule was insufficient to protect the ozone layer from further

damage. For example, EPA estimated that even under the best participation scenario, future concentrations of CFCs

11 and 12 would double and triple, respectively, by 2030 without additional action (see figure 2C-1) (98). OTA

concluded that the uncertainties of the agreement were such that under the most optimistic conditions the

consumption of CFCs 11 and 12 could range from a 20-percent increase to a 45-percent decrease from 1986 levels

(95). Finally, IPCC (37) has estimated that “[t]o stabilize, and then reduce, the current atmospheric concentrations

of the fully halogenated CFCs (e.g., 11, 12, and 113) would require approximate reductions in emissions of 70 to

75 percent, 75 to 85 percent, and 85 to 95 percent+ respectively. ”

ISUb~@Ce~ ~0~~~~ ~d~ ~~x A ae: KS –11, -12,-113, –114, –115 ~d ~o~ 1211. 1301~ 2402.

(Continued on next page)

Figure 2C-1—Atmospheric Concentrations of Chlorocarbon Molecules

PPBV

7,0 ;

60 .

50

1

4.0 j

3.0 -

I

2.0 J

I

1.0

0.0

1950

T T I T 1

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Year

Actual observations to 1990; calculated future

concentrations if emissions remain constant at

1986 levels.

Calculated future concentrations with cutbacks in

CFC emissions specified in Montreal Protocol in 1987

(20°0 in 1 994; future 30% in 1999)

— Calculated future concentrations with complete phaseout

of CFCs by year 2000.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, from F.S. Rowland, 1990.
68 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 2-C—The Montreal Protocol on CFCs-Continued

With these concerns in mind, delegates met in June 1990 to finalize a significantly stronger version of the

Montreal Protocol (2, 93, 94). The new agreement regulates 10 additional CFCs and requires participating countries

with high use per capita (greater than 0.3 kilograms) to reduce production and consumption by 20 percent of 1986

levels in the next 3 years, achieve a So-percent reduction by 1997, and a 100-percent phaseout by the year 2000.2

HaIon production and consumption are to be frozen at 1986 levels by 1992 and steadily phased out by 2000, except

for certain “essential uses,” to be determined. Methyl chloroform (an industrial solvent that destroys stratospheric

ozone) and carbon tetrachloride have been included in the Protocol for the first time; they will be phased out by 2000

and 2005, respectively. Parties to the Protocol are also required to declare their intent to phase out

hydrochlorofluo rocarbons (HCFCs), which are less damaging, shorter lived substitutes for CFCs, no later than

2040.

Countries with low per-capita consumption of CFCs (i.e., developing nations) are given a lo-year grace period

on all 1990 Montreal Protocol deadlines to allow them to meet their “basic domestic needs” (i.e., they are not to

build up an export industry, but may produce CFCs for internal consumption). Such countries will also be assisted

in their transition to CFC substitutes by a Multilateral Fund, financed by industrialized nations and designed to

facilitate technology transfer and ease the financial burden of compliance with the control measures. This fired is

meant to encourage key nations such as China and India to join the 65 signatories to the agreement.3 For the first

3 years the fund is expected to total $160 million, but it could increase to $240 million if China and India decide

to participate (94).4 Their cooperation is considered vital if the Montreal Protocol is to achieve its long-term

objectives of stabilizing global CFC emissions and allowing the stratospheric ozone layer to fully recover.

Trade with nonparties (those nations which have not signed or acceded to the agreement) is also restricted by

the Protocol. Imports from and exports to nonparties of controlled substances is prohibited as of January 1990, and

a list of products containing such substances is to be developed and their import banned by 1993. The feasibility

of listing and banning products produced with CFCs and halons (e.g., computer chips) will be under consideration

until 1994.5

In the new Clean Air Act Amendments, the U.S. Congress included provisions to control ozone-depleting

substances that are slightly more stringent than those in the revised Montreal Protocol. First, the reduction schedule

calls for specific reductions in each year until production ends. Second methyl chloroform is to be phased out 3

years earlier than required by the international agreement (i.e., by 2002 instead of 2005). Finally, a reduction

schedule is laid out for HCFCs, with a freeze in 2015 and production prohibited in 2030 (10 years earlier than the

Montreal Protocol’s suggested but not binding deadline). Congress has also authorized $30 million over the next

3 years to support the Multilateral Fund; the amount will be raised to $60 million if India and China officially join.

The House so far has appropriated $10 million for fiscal year 1991. Public Law 101-513 (Sec. 534) states that “not

less than $10 million” of the funds appropriated to fund the Foreign Assistance Act shall be used to fund activities

related to the Montreal Protocol.

2SubS~= con~~~ -r 11.nnex B are: CKs -13,-111,-112,-211,-212, -213,-214,-215,-216, -217, carbon tetmchloride, ~d

1,1,1 -trichloroethane (methyl chloroform).

3_tp~es~me the U.S.S.R., Polar@ Hungary, and Germany, as well as large developing nations such as @YXIt@ B~kdes4

Brazil, Egyp$ Indonesm Mexico, and the Philippines. Notably absen~ as of December 1990, are lkkey (the ouly OECD non-signatory), ChiI%

and India.

%se totals are based on estimates extrapolated from case studies conducted by EPA and agreed on by the conferees. On the basis of

the United Nations assessment sczd~ the United States would be responsible for a quarter of the voluntary contributions (W. Smi@ U.S.

-mt Of State, personal COImti@@ Aug. 23, 1990).

$fMs time SCIMXMC is for AXMMX A substances only (see footnote 1). Trade restrictions on AXUMX B subs@ices will k impklllUlted

according to a slower schedule (gmerally a 2-year lag) to accommodate their recent inclusion and relatively rare use.
Chapter 2-A Primer on Climate Change ● 69

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2.

3.

3a.

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6.

7.

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9.

10,

1 Oa.

11

12,

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13a.

13b

14.

15.

16.

17.

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72 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases —

APPENDIX 2-A: FERTILIZING THE

OCEANS WITH IRON

The idea of “fertilizing” some Antarctic oceanic areas

with iron to increase phytoplankton productivity and CO2

uptake has recently attracted scientific and popular

attention. The purpose of such an undertaking would be

to offset anthropogenic emissions of carbon into the

atmosphere. 1 Some opponents view this idea as an

untested but tempting “tech-fro” that might delay

policies to reduce fossil fuel use in industrialized countries (e.g., 4, 5). Proponents contend that ocean fertilization experiments to address emission offsets should begin

now (3), because global carbon emissions might increase

even if greenhouse policies are enacted.

Phytoplankton and Nutrients

The relationship between phytoplankton and the availability of such nutrients as iron, nitrogen, and phosphate

is the key to the fertilization hypothesis.2 Nearshore

Antarctic waters, for example, tend to have relatively high

concentrations of dissolved iron (apparently from upwell -

ing of iron-rich sediments from the shallow bottom), as

well as nitrogen and phosphorus, so high phytoplankton

productivity is both possible and common (7, 10). In turn,

this supports an enormous amount of marine life,

including krill, whales, seals, and penguins.

In contrast, many offshore ocean waters lack sufficient

nutrients to sustain high productivity. However, some

offshore waters—notably in the Antarctic and Gulf of

Alaska-while low in iron, have relatively high concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorus. But, they still exhibit

low productivity. Martin et al. (8) conducted some

short-term laboratory bottle experiments using water

collected from the Gulf of Alaska and concluded that lack

of iron was limiting phytoplankton growth, Martin et al.

(10) also hypothesized that low levels of iron in offshore

Antarctic waters prevent phytoplankton from using more

than a small portion of available nutrients,

Fertilizing the Antarctic—The Proposal

and the Uncertainties

Hence the idea to stimulate phytoplankton growth in

offshore Antarctic waters by slowly releasing iron and

‘‘fertilizing’ the water. In theory, this could allow

phytoplankton to use a greater share of other nutrients,

and permit both phytoplankton populations and carbon

uptake from the water to increase substantially.

However, uncertainties about the effects of a largescale operational program exist from many perspectives.

For

●

●

●

●

example:

Experimental--Is iron really the limiting factor? The

data demonstrating iron limitation are from small,

short-term laboratory experiments from one region

and may not be generalizable (2, but see 9). Whether

other factors might limit productivity over large

areas even when sufficient iron is available is

unknown. Increasing the scale from small lab studies

to large field studies also poses problems, not least

of which is conducting well-designed “control’

experiments. And, even if iron is the limiting factor,

a recent National Research Council (NRC) workshop noted the uncertainties in estimating how much

iron might be needed and how much carbon would

be taken up in a large-scale operation (1, also see 5a,

1la).3

Practical-Can the iron be made available? Since

iron is not readily soluble, one constraint is a

mechanism for retaining iron in a biologically

available form and for keeping it on or near

frequently rough surface waters long enough to be

used by phytoplankton (hours to several days).

Another constraint could be economics (e.g., costs of

iron and of transporting it to appropriate areas) (1).

Environmental-What changes might occur in the

ecosystem? Whether iron might preferentially enhance growth of some phytoplankton species over

others and/or change the composition of existing

marine food chains is unknown. Little is known

about ecological relationships among phytoplankton

populations, Some participants at the NRC workshop noted that the effect of rapidly increasing

phytoplankton populations on organisms such as

krill, a major component of antarctic food chains,

cannot be predicted at this time (1, 4).

Geochemical--Will carbon be sequester in sufficient amounts for sufficient periods? Removal of

large amounts of carbon for decades to centuries

would be desirable. A recent study (1 la; also see 5a),

however, points out that Antarctic surface waters

have a limited capacity to take up atmospheric CO2

and that sequestration of carbon in deeper portions of

the Antarctic depends on the rate at which surface

and deeper waters mix (i.e., the rate of vertical

mixing). It concludes that this rate is too slow to have

a significant effect on atmospheric CO2 concentrations. In addition, whether carbonaceous compounds

l~hytopla~ton arc short-lived, miCrOSCOpiC marine plants that use COZ during photosynthesis. Their remains, which retain some of the carbon, can

fall to the ocean’s bottom, thus serving as a ‘ ‘sink” for cwbon.

zphytopla&ton 1lve neti tie oc~n’s surface, where conditions are conducive to photosynthesis (e.g., pmWr temperate, sufficient llghtt C02

dissolved in the water, and nutrients, which often control their rate of growth).

~~e wor~hop was held in Octo&r 1~ in h-vine, California. Two NRC committees (the Committee on Global Cbnge and the Panel on policy

Implications of Global Warming) have been involved during the past year or so in examining the ide% but the NRC has not yet released any public reports.
Chapter 2--A Primer on Climate Change . 73 ——— -- ——.

will accumulate on the ocean floor and serve as a

long-term carbon “sink” depends in part on the

concentration of dissolved CO2 in the water column

(11 ). Moreover, if upwelling brings other nutrients to

the surface, it might also bring up carbon-ric h

sediments and release CO2 back to the atmosphere,

Policy Implications -

Marine phytoplankton form the basis of most oceanic

food chains, from which much of the world’s commercial

fisheries are derived. Fertilizing the oceans to increase

carbon storage might be justified if it was relatively

certain that only ‘‘ minimal environmental impacts

would occur. But uncertainties about the probability and

magnitude of potential impacts are great. The costeffectiveness of large-scale fertilization is unknown,

because widely accepted estimates of its effects on CO2

uptake (and on marine ecosystems) and of its implementation costs are not available today.

Participants at the NRC workshop suggested that a

‘ ‘transient iron experiment,’” with a suggested area of

about 400 square kilometers, be under-taken to gather

morc informatation and data on the iron 1 imitation hypothesis. They did not envision detrimental environmental

impacts from such an experiment but noted that the

impacts of a large-scale treatment cannot be evaluated at

this time given our current lack of knowledge ( 12). The

American Society of Limnology and Oceanography is

planning a symposiurn in early 1991 to focus on the issue

of what controls phytoplankton production in nutrientrich areas of the open ocean.

Field studies of a few years duration would probably

yield useful information about the effects of iron enrichment on the short-term] productivity of phytoplankton In

otherwise nutrient-rich waters: this would be an appropri- -

ate topic for biological and oceanographic research.

[Linger studies would probably be needed to ascertain

longer-term impacts on phytoplankton and marine ecosystems in general. The relative utility of a large operation

at that time would depend in part on how successfully we

develop energy-efficient and renewable energy technologies and practices and better land use management

practices-choices that clearly can be implemented today

(see ch. 1).

1.

7-,

3,

4,

5.

Ta.

6.

7

8.

9.

lo.

11.

1 1a.

12.

Appendix 2-A References

Anderson, C., ‘‘ Iron Solution No Solution, ’ Nafure

348: 188, Nov. 15, 1990.

Banse, K., ‘ ‘Does Iron Really I.imit Phytoplanktorr

Production in the (lffshore Subi~r~ti~ Pacific?’ Limnol

O(-eun(~,qr. 35(3):772-775, 1990.

Baum, R., ‘ ‘Adding Iron to Ocean Makes Waves As Way

To Cut Greenhouse C’OJ, ’ Chemi(al L? IZrz,qlncrrllliq NPW.T

68(27):21 -~~, JU[Y 2, 1990.

131akeslee, S., ‘‘ ideas for Making Ocean Trap CarhoII

Dioxide Arouse Hope and Fear, ’ NW }rork ‘l”une,~, p C4,

Nov. 20, 1990.

Bow’n, W., ‘‘Flipp]ng Oceans Could T\lrn Up the IIeat, ’

Nc~I S(-~cnf/sf 127:21, Aug. 25, 1990,

Keir, R. S., ‘‘ troning Out Greenhouse Efects, Nafure

349: 198-199, Jan. 17, 1991.

,Martin, J.H. and S.E. Fitzwatrr, ‘ ‘Iron Deficiency Limits

Phytoplankton Growth in the Nm-th-ea.\t Pacific Subarctic, ’ Nl]ture 331 :341-343, Jan. 28, 1988.

Mw-tin, J,H. and R.M. Cordon, ‘‘Nmthe&st Pacific Iron

Distributions m Relation to Phytoplankton Productivity, ’

D(YJ?-LSC(l R(’seill’(’}1 35(2):1 77-19(5, 1988.

.Martin, J.H. et d,, ‘ ‘VERTEX: Ph~t(~pl:~nkt(~nflr{>ll Studie$ in the (3ulf of A]ask,i, Deep.5”P,I Rc.~ear{h 36:649

680, 1989

Martin, J.H. et al., ‘ ‘Yes, It Does: A Reply to the Cc>nmw]lt

by Banse, ’ I.lmn(ll, Ocran(~,\~r 35(3):775-777, 19(X).

Mar-tin, J.H. et al., ‘ ‘Iron in Antarctic Waters, ’ Narurc

345: 156-158, May 10, 1990,

Mlot, C’., ‘ <Whit e

-Water Bounty, Blo.$clcncc 39(4):222-

224, April 1989.

Peng, T. [1. and W. Broecker, ‘‘ ~nafni~al Linlit:ltiOns ~}n

the Antarctic Ionization Strategy, ” Nature 349:227 -22[1,

Jan. 17, 1991.

Zaborsky, O. R., National Research Council, review comments to OTA, Dec. 18, 1990.
Chapter 3

Energy Supply

Photo reedit: Casazza Schultz& Associates, Inc.

A high-voltage transmission corridor
CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Fuels and Their Carbon Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Electricity Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

CARBON-BEARING ENERGY SOURCES . . . . . . . 81

Fossil Fuels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Biomass Fuels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

CARBON-FREE ENERGY SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Renewable Energy Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS FROM

ELECTRICITY GENERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Introduction to Technical Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Fuel Switching and More Efficient

Generating Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Electricity Transmission and Distribution

Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

OTA EMISSION REDUCTION SCENARIOS . . . . . 94

Alternative Scenarios of Demand for Electricity . 95

Technical Options for Lowering CO2 Emissions

From Electricity Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

POLICY OPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Energy Taxes and Tax Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Marketable Permits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Increase Research Development and

Demonstration Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Plugging the Leaksin the Existing System . . . . . 106

Improving Electricity Supply: Meeting Demand

With Lower CO2 Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

CHAPTER PREFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Boxes

Box Page

3-A. Energy From Biomass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

3-B. Carbon Dioxide Scrubbing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

3-C. Electric Utility Demand-Side Management

Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Figures

Figure Page

3-1. World and U.S. Energy Consumption,

By Fuel, 1988-89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Page

3-2. World and U.S. Carbon Emissions From

Energy Use, By Fuel 1988-89 .. ... ... ......79

3-3. World Carbon Emissions From Fossil Fuels,

By Region, 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

3-4. Carbon Emissions From Electric Generating

Technologies as Compared to Emissions From

the Average Existing Coal-Fired Power Plant . 92

3-5. OTA Electricity Demand Scenarios . . . . . . . . . 96

3-6. CO2 Emissions From Electricity

Generation Under the OTA Demand and

Supply Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

3-7. CO2 Emissions Reductions From Moderate

Supply-side Measures, Expressed as a Percentage

of 1987 Electricity Emissions, Under the

Moderate Demand Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

3-8. CO2 Emissions Reductions From Tough

Supply-side Measures, Expressed as a Percentage

of 1987 Electricity Emissions, Under the

Moderate and Tough Demand Scenarios . . . . 101

3-9. CO2 Emissions From Electricity Generation

Under the Base Case and Selected Control

Scenarios, By Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

3-10. Fuel Use By Electric Utilities In 2015

Under the Base Case and Selected Control

Scenarios, By Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

3-11. U.S. Energy Technology Research

and Development Budgets, 1978-88 . . . . . . . . 105

Tables

Table Page

3-1. Commercial Fuel Consumption in 1988 by

Region, Selected Countries, and Fuel Type . . . . 78

3-2. Coal Resources, Consumption, and Trade . . . . . 82

3-3. Petroleum Resources, Consumption,

and Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

3-4. Natural Gas Resources, Consumption,

and Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

3-5. CO2 Emission Rates From Fossil-Fuel-Fired

Electric Generating Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

3-6. Electricity Generation Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Chapter 3

Energy Supply

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines carbon dioxide and methane emissions from world and U.S. energy production and distribution and looks at technical alternatives for reducing those emissions during the next 25

years.

At the broadest level, four options exist for

reducing carbon dioxide (CO2

) emissions in the

energy supply sector:

●

●

*

●

switch from high-carbon sources (i.e., coal) to

low-carbon sources (i.e., natural gas);

switch from carbon-based fuels to noncarbonbased fuels;

convert fossil fuels to usable heat and electricity more efficiently; and

remove carbon from fossil fuels before the fuel

is burned, or capture CO2 from combustion

exhaust gas for deep-well or ocean disposal.

This chapter focuses on the first three approaches;

we do not consider the fourth a near-term, proven

technical option, though it is certainly worthy of

further research and development effort.

Primary energy sources include nonrenewable

fossil fuels (coal, petroleum, natural gas), nuclear

power, potentially renewable biomass, and renewable such as solar, geothermal, and hydropower.

Electricity is a secondary energy source produced

from the primary energy sources. From the standpoint of greenhouse gas emissions, primary sources

can be divided into two categories--carbon-bearing

(coal, oil, gas, biomass) and carbon-free (wind,

solar, hydropower, geothermal, nuclear).

The four carbon-bearing fuels are discussed in

terms of their impact on global warming; their

availability (location, production, and consumption); and the technical alternatives and policy

options that exist for reducing CO2 and methane

emissions during their production and transport. We

also discuss carbon-free energy sources and their

potential for substituting for fossil fuels; the conversion of carbon and noncarbon energy sources into

electricity; and key issues associated with implementing or changing technologies.

Assuming current trends and regulations, U.S.

carbon emissions from electricity generation might

double by 2015, as compared to 1987 levels. We

estimate that stringent measures to lower the demand for electricity (discussed in chs. 4 through 6)

have the potential to lower emissions to 10 percent

below 1987 levels by 2015. Further measures

applied to utilities—in particular, increased use of

natural gas and nonfossil sources-have the potential to lower emissions further, to about 50 percent

below 1987 emissions by 2015.

However, it will be increasingly difficult to hold

emissions at this low level past the 25-year time

horizon of this assessment. Ultimately demand for

electricity will begin to rise again. Moreover, much

of the potential for lowering emissions comes from

switching from coal to natural gas, which will

become increasingly difficult to obtain in quantities

sufficient to meet the increasing demand. If emissions are to remain low, intensive research, development, and demonstration activities will be needed so

that abundant and acceptable nonfossil sources of

energy will be available by 2015.

Fuels and Their Carbon Emissions

Total world energy consumption in 1988 was

between 350 and 400 quadrillion Btu’s (quads).

Fossil fuels provided 78 percent of energy consumed

(35 percent from oil, 25 percent from coal, 18

percent from natural gas), biomass roughly 13

percent, and noncarbon emitting sources (mainly

hydropower and nuclear) the remainder (see figure

3-l). In the United States, the percentages are 87

(fossil fuels), 3 (biomass), and 10 (noncarbon),

respectively. Total U.S. energy consumption in 1989

was about 84 quads, with oil accounting for 40

percent, coal and gas about 23 percent each, nuclear

power 7 percent, and hydropower and biomass about

3 percent each.1 Table 3-1 shows commercial fuel

consumption in 1988 by region, country, and fuel.

]Da[a for 19~~ ~ncra, ~onsumptlon is from Ener~ Information Adminis&ation (80), me 2 ~ quads of biomass fuels is an estimate fOr 1987,

–77-
78 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

50%

40%

30%

20%

Figure 3-l—World and U.S. Energy Consumption, By Fuel, 1988-89

Percent of total consumption Percent of total consumption

50% 7

~~~] Electricity

= Direct use

40%

30%

= Utilities

1

~ Transport

= Industrial

= Buildings

- .-

Oil Coal Gas Nuclear Hydro Biomass - O i l 0il Coal Gas Nuclear Hydro Biomass

1989 total ■ 385 quadrillion Btu 1989 total = 84 quadrillion Btu

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Energy, /rrtemafiona/ Energy Annua/, 1988, DOE/EIA-021 9(88) (Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration,

November 1989) and U.S. Department of Energy, Armua/ Energy Review, 1989, DOHEIA4384(89) (Washington, DC: Energy Information

Administration, May 1990).

Table 3-l—Commercial Fuel Consumption in 1988 (quads) by Region, Selected Countries, and Fuel Type

Region/country Oil Natural gas Coal Hydroelectric Nuclear Total —

OECD aTotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74.64 32.08 35.07 11.81 15.13 168.73

(44.20/.) (19.0%) (20.80/o) (7.0%0) (9.0%)

Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.45 0.17 0.16 0.31 J >1.09

Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.43 — 0.29 — — >0.72

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.69 1.01 0.74 0.73 2.24 8.41

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.61 1.68 2.90 0.90 1.75 16.83

Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.78 — — 0.71 0.65 >2.27

United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.21 18.49 18.84 2.64 5.68 79.86

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.01 2.01 3.51 0.39 1.46 12.39

U.S.S.R./Eastern Europe-Total . . . . . . 22.77 25.25 25.52 2.62 2.95 79.11

(28.8%) (31 .9%) (32.30/.) (3.3%) (3.7%)

U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.82 21.78 14.00 2.27 2.26 59.13

Bulgaria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.60 0.21 0.52 — o.13 >1.46

Czechoslovakia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.69 0.39 1.88 0.07 0.23 3.26

East Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.72 0.39 2.76 — 0.11 >4.00

Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.43 0.41 0.19 — 0.13 >1.16

Poland, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.72 0.47 5.28 0.04 >6.57

Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

—

0.73 1.59 0.85 0.12 — >3.30

Developing—Total c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.50 10.07 32.35 6.62 0.82 84.36

(40.9%) (11 .9%) (38.3%) (7.8%) (1 .0%)

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.54 0.54 19.51 1.08 0 25.67

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.24 0.26 3.83 0.63 0.07 7.04

Other Asia and Oceania . . . . . . . . . . 7.02 1.84 3.59 0.93 0.69 14.07

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.74 — 0.41 1.96 <0.01 5.23

Other Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.90 2.82 0.45 1.48 0.06 12.71

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.11 3.23 0.12 0.09 0 9.56

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.96 1.38 3.46 0.45 0.11 9.37

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132.22 67.64 92.97 21.31 19.06 333.21

(39.7%) (20.3%) (27.9%) (6.40/o) (5.7%)

~rganization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

b—means included in “other” category in U.S. Department of Energy (1989) database.

cExcluding U.S.S.R. and Eastern EIurope.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy (1989),
Chapter 3---Energy Supply . 79

Figure 3-2—World and U.S. Carbon Emissions From Energy Use, By Fuel, 1988-89

Percent of total emissions

50% 1

40% “

30%

I

20% ‘

1 o% -

0 %

Lz.i! Electricity

m

m Direct use

Percent of total emissions

50% -

40% 1 ‘ ‘

I

:=-=.

., 1 bi

INN Utilities

~.

-. ] Transport

~~~; Industrial

= Buildings

- <.

Oil Coal Gas Nuclear Hydro Biomass “ Oi l Oil Coal Gas Nuclear Hydro Biomass

1988 total = 63 million metric tons/year 1989 total ■ 1.4 million metric tons/year

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, calculated using data from U.S. Department of Energy, /nterrrationa/ EnergyAnnua/(19S8) and Annual

Energy Review (1989).

About two-thirds of the total world energy was

used directly to fuel end uses; for example, gasoline

is used to run cars and natural gas to heat homes.

One-third of the energy was used to generate

electricity, Oil dominates direct uses; coal dominates electricity generation.

U.S. energy consumption mirrors the world pattern: about two-thirds of the energy was used

directly in end uses (60 percent of that was provided

by oil), and one-third to generate electricity. Well

over half the electricity in the United States is

generated from coal.

Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil and biomass fuels are estimated to be responsible for half

the greenhouse warming that occurred during the

1980s (83). Coal and wood contain the highest

concentration of carbon per unit energy--commonly about 55 to 60 pounds of carbon per million

Btu (lbs C/mmBtu). Natural gas has the lowest

concentrations (32 lbs C/mmBtu) and petroleum is

intermediate (45 lbs C/mmBtu),

World CO2 emissions from energy use total about

6.3 billion metric tons of carbon per year.2 Of that,

about 6.0 billion metric tons derive from fossil fuels

either burned directly for end uses or to generate

electricity. Included in this estimate are the relatively small but significant emissions of C02 associatcd with making carbon-bearing fuels available to

consumers, primarily during fuel processing (e.g., to

refine petroleum).

Oil accounts for about 42 percent of carbon

emissions, coal follows closely with 38 percent,

natural gas emits about 15 percent, and biomass

between a few and 10 percent (see figure 3-2). The

range of estimates for biomass emissions is wide

because it is not known how much of biomass fuel

burned in developing countries is harvested on a

sustainable basis (see ch. 7). Although actual burning of such fuels releases 1.1 billion tons of carbon

per year, we estimate that net emissions from

biomass fuels are about 0.3 billion tons per year.

This estimate assumes that about half of the wood

used for fuel is not being regrown on a sustainable

basis. Figure 3-3 shows emissions from fossil fuel

only, by region.

U.S. carbon emissions from energy use are about

20 percent of the world total, or about 1.4 billion

metric tons each year. Oil is the largest source,

followed by coal, and then natural gas. s T h e

percentages of U.S. emissions from oil and gas are

both somewhat higher than the world average; coal

emissions somewhat lower (see figure 3-2),

Fossil fuels also are a major source of methane,

accounting for perhaps 15 percent of al1 methane

emissions throughout the world each year. Because,

molecule for molecule. methane is far more effectivc

—
80 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 3-3—World Carbon Emissions From Fossil

Fuels, By Region, 1988

Un

Europe 23%

East 3%

3%

merica 5%

a 7%

Total 1988 emissions:

6 billion metric tons/year

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, calculated using data

from U.S. Departrnen! of Energy, /nfemationa/ Ehergy Armua/

(19ee).

than C02 in trapping energy in the atmosphere,

smaller emissions of methane can have as powerful

an impact as larger emissions of CO2

. Methane,

however, is converted in the atmosphere to CO2 after

10 to 20 years (see ch. 2).

Fossil-fuel-related methane emissions occur primarily through leakage from natural gas production

and transport, oil production, and coal seams.

Methane emissions from all sources are estimated to

be responsible for about 15 to 20 percent of the

greenhouse warming that occurred during the 1980s

(83).

While carbon-free energy sources themselves do

not release climate-modifying gases to the atmosphere, the steps required to exploit them may

nevertheless entail some emissions. For example,

the uranium required to run most nuclear powerplants must be extracted, processed, enriched, and

manufactured into fuel rods prior to use. The energy

this requires typically is provided by fossil fuels.

The resulting emissions, however, are still quite low

compared to those that would result from using

carbon-bearing fuels in place of noncarbon fuels.

The latter therefore are gaining attention as lowemission alternatives to fossil fuels.

Electricity Generation

In 1987, nearly two-thirds of the approximately

2,500 gigawatts (Gw) of” electric generating capacity

in the world ran on carbon-bearing fossil fuels; this

accounted for nearly all of the CO2 emissions

associated with generating electricity. Most of the

balance (over one-third) of world generating capacity operates on carbon-free energy sources and does

not routinely emit comparable quantities of climatemodifying gases. These low-emission options are

dominated by hydropower (about one-quarter of the

total world electric capacity) and nuclear power.

Over three-quarters of the world’s generating

capacity is concentrated in the developed countries

of Europe, the U. S. S. R., North America, and Japan.

The largest electricity generator is the United States,

which in 1987 accounted for about 30 percent of

world capacity.

About 30 percent of U.S. electric power in 1987

came from carbon-free energy sources; nuclear

power dominated, followed closely by hydropower.

All other carbon-free energy-sources (e.g., wind,

geothermal, and solar) accounted for less than 0.5

percent of the electric power generated in the United

States in 1987. For the United States to supply a

large portion of its current electric power from solar,

wind, and geothermal energy, enormous growth in

those industries would have to occur.

The average efficiency of a U.S. powerplant is 33

percent (14)—that is, only one-third of the energy in

the fossil fuel leaves the plants as electric power. The

rest is discharged as waste heat. Conversion efficiencies in most industrialized countries are comparable,

but they often are quite low (around 25 percent) in

developing countries and regions such as China, the

Middle East, and Africa (66, 83).

Worldwide growth in capacity has been extremely

rapid over the last quarter century. Growth was

fastest in the developing world, though this occurred

from a much smaller base than in the industrialized

countries. In 1987, developing countries accounted

for only about a quarter of all the electricity used in

the world (see ch. 9). China, India, and Brazil

together accounted for nearly a third of the capacity

in the developing countries in 1987. Demand for

electric power has increased at an annual rate of over

8 percent for the last 20 years (ch. 9; also see refs. 1,

87). The developing countries are expected to

continue to increase their share of world capacity

during the next quarter century.
CARBON-BEARING

SOURCES

Fossil Fuels

Introduction

Chapter 3--Energy Supply ● 81

ENERGY

Important international variations exist in the

magnitude of fossil fuel reserves, production and

consumption, imports and exports, and prices (see

tables 3-2 through 3-4), These variations are key

considerations in any U.S. effort to limit production,

consumption, or trade of fossil fuels.

Reserves--Globally, the most plentiful fossil fuel

is coal. Proven reserves of both petroleum and

natural gas are far smaller. The largest proven

reserves of fossil fuels are within the U.S.S.R. and

Eastern Europe; very large amounts are also found

in the United States.

Production and C’onstimption-in 1988, petroleum accounted for over 40 percent of the world’s

fossil fuel production, coal for nearly a third, and

natural gas for the rest.4 The U.S.S.R. and the United

States account for between 40 and 45 percent of the

world’s fossil fuel production and also for a very

large portion of consumption.

Trade—The extent to which each country’s

production meets its demand varies widely. Some

countries, such as Japan, are heavily dependent on

imports of all three fossil fuels. Others, such as the

U. S. S. R., are large exporters of all three fuels. The

most commonly traded fossil fuel is petroleum;

nearly 40 percent of crude oil production and 20

percent of refined products were traded internationally, World trade is far less important for natural gas

and coal, largely because they are more difficult to

handle. The industrial market economies are the

largest importers of fossil fuels. The Middle East

region is the most important exporter of fossil fuels.

Prices—Typically, coal prices are considerably

lower than those of other fossil fuels. U.S. coals

prices (per Btu) in 1988 were about one-third lower

than natural gas prices. Fossil-fuel prices have gone

up considerably since 1970, but declined between

1980 and 1988. Coal prices have been less volatile

than gas and oil prices. The relatively low and stable

price of coal has much to do with its popularity. U.S.

——— ——

qrn~lu~ln~ natural gas plant liquids.

~B1tumlnous and subbltumlnous coal, and h~ite.

energy prices, in general, are lower than those of

most other developed countries. This is particularly

true for petroleum products, and to some extent

reflects much higher tax rates outside the United

States (76).

Coal

Emissions-Coal combustion produces approximately 40 percent of the global CO2 emissions from

fossil fuels and 35 percent of U.S. CO2 emissions.

Electricity generation accounts for about 50 percent

of coal use globally, and 80 percent of U.S. coal use.

Coal also accounts for a significant portion of the

world’s methane emissions, mostly from newly

opened mines. Preliminary estimates suggest coal

production may contribute around 5 to 10 percent of

methane emissions directly attributable to human

activities worldwide (35a). In the United States, coal

may contribute between 10 and 20 percent of total

anthropogenic methane emissions.

Resources and Their Use---Coal is the most

abundant fossil fuel and is available in many parts of

the world. Nevertheless, three countries-the United

States, China, and the U.S.S.R.—together account

for roughly two-thirds of world reserves. These three

countries also were the world’s largest producers

and consumers of coal in 1988. In recent years,

increases in coal production and consumption have

been most rapid in China and in India. Very large

increases in production also have occurred in

Australia, largely to meet rapidly growing export

markets, Far smaller, though important, increases

occurred in the United States, Canada, and the

U.S.S.R. (76).

China, already the world’s largest consumer of

coal, might triple its consumption of coal to over 3

billion tons by the year 2030, which would increase

total world coal production by 50 percent (10). Coal

use in India (currently fifth worldwide) also is likely

to rise in the future. Many development organizations have encouraged coal use in developing

countries because of the availability of domestic

supplies.

Over 10 percent of world coal production is

traded, at a total value of about $16 billion per year.

The United States and Australia are the world’s

largest coal exporters. Several other countries export
Table 3-2-Coal Resources, Consumption, and Trade (percentage share of worldwide total)

Reserves, 1989 Production, 1989 Consumption, 1989 Imports, 1987 Exports, 1987

1. United States. . .....24.1

2. U.S.S.R. . ..........22.1

3. China . ............15.4

4. Australia. . ..........8.4

5, India . . . . . . . . . . .. ...5.7

6. ‘West Germany . .. ...5.4

7. South Africa ... , .. ...5.1

8. Poland . ............3.7

9. East Germany . ......1.9

10. United Kingdom .. ....0.6

Other . .............7.6

100.0

1. United States. . .....23.9

2. China . ............22.9

3. U.S.S.R. . ..........13.9

4. Poland . ............5.0

5. Australia. . ..........4.4

6. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.1

7. West Germany . . . . . .3.3

8. East Germany . ......2.9

9. United Kingdom. .. ...2.7

10. Czechoslovakia ., .. ..1.8

Other . ............15.1

100.0

1. China . ............22.6

2. United States. . .....21.2

3. U.S.S.R. . ..........12.9

4. Poland

a . ...........5.7

5. India

a . . ............4.1

6. Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . ..3.4

7. South Africaa , . ......3.4

8. West Germany .. ....3.3

9. East Germanya .. ....3.0

10. United Kingdom .. ....2.8

Other . ............17.6

100.0

1. Japan . ...............27.0

2. South Korea . ..........7.4

3. Italy . ..................5.7

4. Canada . ..............4.3

s. France , --. , ... ... ... ..3. $$

6. Netherlands. . ..........3.6

7. Belgium/Luxembourg .. ..3.0

8. Denmark . .............2.9

9. West Germany . ........2.8

10. U.S.S.R. . .............2.3

Other . ...............37.1

100.0

1. Australia. . .........29.7

2. United States. . . . . . .22.6

3. South Africa. . ......10.9

4. Canada . ............8.3

7.6

6. Poland . ............7.3

7. West Germany .. ....3.0

8. Colombia . ..........2.4

9. China . .............2.1

10. United Kingdom ., .. ..0.8

Other . .............5.3

100.0

aApparent ~n~um~ion for poland, l~ia, ~uth Af~a, and East Germany is obtain~ from U.S. Department of Energy (I g~). It represents their share of world apparent consumption in 1987 (not

1989).

NOTE: Approximately 10 percent of coal productionkonsump tion is trachd internationally.

SOURCES: Unless othemvisespecif ied, data forresources/reserves/production and consumption are from the British Petroleum Company, BPStatisti~/Reviewot %fiEnwgy(kntin, UK: British

Petroleum, June 1990). Data on imports and exports are derived from U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Intematbrral Energy Annual, 1988

DOE/EIA-021 9(88) (Washington, DC: November 1989).

Table 3-3-Petroleum Resources, Consumption, and Trade (percentage share of worldwide total)

Reserves, 1989 Production, 1989 Consumption, 1989 Imports, 1987 Exports, 1987

1. Saudi Arabia . ......25.2

2. Iraq . ..............9.9

3. Kuwait . ............9,3

4. Iran . ..............9.2

5. Abu Dhabi . .........9.1

6. U.S.S.R. . ..........5.8

7. Venezuela . .........5.8

8. Mexico . ............5.6

9. United States . ......3.4

10. Libya . .............2.3

Other . . . . .........14.4

100.0

1. U.S.S.R. . .........19.7 1. United States , .. ...25.6 1. United States . .....18.5

2. United States . .....14.0 2. U.S.S.R. . .........14.0 2. Japan . ...........12.5

3. Saudi Arabia . .......8.3 3. Japan. . ............7.5 3. West Germany .. ....6.5

4. Mexico . . . . . . . , .. ...4.6 4. China . .............3.8 4. Italy . ..............5.6

5. Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 5. West Germany .. ....3.5 5. France ... , . ........5.4

6. China . .............4.5 6. Italy . ..............3,0 6. Netherlands . .......4.8

7. Iraq . ..............4.5 7. France . ............2,9 7, Spain . .............2.9

8. Venezuela . . . . . .. ...3.2 8. United Kingdom .. ...2.6 8. United Kingdom .. ...2.8

9. United Kingdom .. ...3.0 9. Canada ... , . .......2.5 9. Singapore . .........2.7

10. Canada . ...........2.6 10. Brazil

a . ............2.0 10, Belgium . ...........2.2

Other . ............31.0 Other . ............32.6 Other . ............36.1

100.0 100.0 100.0

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

U.S.S.R. . ............10.8

Saudi Arabia. . ........10.5

United Kingdom . .......5.7

Iraq . .................5. 0

Iran . .................4. 8

Kuwait . ...............4.4

United Arab Emirates .. .4.3

Venezuela . ...........4.2

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..4.0

Nigeria ... , . ...........3.3

Other . ..............43.0

100.0

aBrazil’s apparent consumption is obtained from U.S. Department of Energy (1989). It represents Brazil’s share of world apparent consumption in 1987 (not 1989).

NOTE: Imports and Exports, as listed above, include both crude oil and refined p&roleum products. Neady 40 percent of crude” oil production was t~aded internationally in 1987;

nearty 20 percent of production was traded internationalty in the form of refined products.

SOURCES: Unless otherwise specified, data for resources/reserves/production and consumption are from the British Petroleum Company, BP Statistic/ Review of Wbti Energy (Imndon,

UK: British Petroleum, June 1990). Data on imports and exports are derived from U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annua/, 1988

DOEHA-0219(88) (Washington, DC: November 1989).
Table 3-4--NaturaI Gas Resources, Consumption, and Trade (percentage share of worldwide total)

Reserves, 1989 Production, 1989 Consumption, 1989 Imports, 1987 Exports, 1987

1. U.S.S.R. . .........37.6 1. U.S.S.R. . ........37.5 1. U.S.S.R. . ........33.0 1. West Germany . .......17.8 1. U.S.S.R. ... , . ........33.6

2. Iran . .............12.5 2. United States. .. ..25.5 2. United States .. ...28.6 2. Japan . ..............16.0 2. Netherlands . .........13.7

3. Abu Dhabi . .........4.6 3. Canada . ..........5.1 3. Canada . ..........3.1 3. United States . ........11.3 3. Norway . .............11.7

4. Saudi Arabia . .......4.5 4. Netherlands . ......3.1 4. West Germany .. ...2.6 4. France . ..............10.7 4. Canada . .............11.2

5. Qatar. . ............4.1 5. Algeria . ..........2.3 5. United Kingdom .. ..2.6 5. Italy . .................9.3 5. Algeria . ...............9.8

6. United States . ......4.1 6. United Kingdom .. ..2.2 6. Japan . ...........2.5 6. United Kingdom . .......4.9 6. Indonesia . ............8.5

7. Algeria . ............2.9 7. Romaniaa . ........2.0 7. Italy . .............2.2 7. Belgium/Luxembourg .. ..3.7 7. Malaysia . .............3.2

8. Venezuela . .........2.5 8. Indonesia . ........1.9 8. Romaniaa . ........2.0 8. Poland . ...............2.9 8. United Arab Emirates .. .1.2

9. Iraq . ..............2.4 9. Nonway . ..........1.6 9. Netherlands . ......1.8 9. Czechoslovakia . .......2.9 9. United States . .........0.6

10. Canada . ...........2.4 10. Mexico , . .........1.3 10. France . ..........1.4 10. East Germany . ........2.9 10. West Germany . ........0.0

Other . ............22.4 Other . ..........17.5 Other . ..........20.2 Other . ..............17.5 Other . ...............6.6

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

aRomania’s production and consumption are obtained from U.S. Department of Energy (1989).

NOTE: Approximately 13 percent of worfd natural gas productioticonsum ption is traded internationally.

SOURCES: Unless otherwise specified, data for resources/reserves/production and consumption are from the British Petroleum Company, BP Statistic/ Review of Wor/cf Energy (London,

UK: British Petroleum, June 1990). Data on imports and exports are derived from U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual,

1988 DOBEIA-0219(88) (Washington, DC: November, 1989).
84 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

large quantities of coal, and still others intend to

become major traders. By far the largest importer of

coal is Japan, accounting for 25 percent of world

imports (76).

Issues--several technical options exist to reduce

coal-related emissions without abandoning coal as a

fuel. For example, methane emissions from coal

mines can be relatively quickly reduced with available technology, Coal can be used to simultaneously

provide heat and electricity through cogeneration.

The efficiency of coal use can be markedly improved

in other ways as well, as detailed later in this chapter.

The fact remains, however, that coal emits more

carbon per unit of energy than any other fuel. There

is no cheap and otherwise acceptable way of

removing and disposing of the large amounts of CO2

generated through coal combustion (see box 3-B

below). Consequently, beyond the limited options

just mentioned, the only other near-term alternative

to reduce emissions by large amounts is to switch to

lower carbon-emitting fuels.

Unfortunately, even limited actions will be difficult to implement because coal is an important and

low-priced source of energy for many countries of

the world, including the United States. Aggressive

attempts to limit its production, consumption, and

trade will have profound social and economic

impacts. Both at home and abroad, great resistance

may develop from entities heavily dependent on

coal; these range from unions of coal miners to

countries, such as China, whose ambitious plans for

development rest squarely on the greatly expanded

use of coal.

Petroleum and Natural Gas

Emissions—Petroleum combustion contributes

about 40 percent of worldwide CO2 emissions and

45 percent of U.S. emissions. End uses account for

about 90 percent of world and 95 percent of U.S.

petroleum consumption. Natural gas combustion is

the source of about 15 percent of worldwide CO2

emissions and about 18 percent of U.S. emissions.

About 75 percent of the world’s natural gas consumption directly fuels end uses and 25 percent is

used to produce electric power. For the United

States, these figures are 85 and 15 percent, respectively.

bFOr a discussion of natural gas resources, see refs. w, 45, and 53.

7AISo see refs. 22, 32.

Methane is also released to the atmosphere when

oil and gas are produced and when natural gas is

transported and stored; two of the more important

sources include venting of methane at the well-site

and leaks from pipelines. The global magnitude and

distribution of methane emissions from these sources

remain largely undefined and are matters of contention. However, evidence suggests that emissions are

greatest at the extreme ends of natural gas systems—

the production end and in low-pressure distribution

systems. Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that the

Soviet Union’s emissions may be extremely high;

the U.S.S.R. accounted for nearly 40 percent of

world natural gas production in 1989 and its

transmission and distribution system is notoriously

leaky. One estimate places transmission losses and

direct losses during extraction at 8 percent of total

U.S.S.R. production (22a).

Resources and Their Use—Proven natural gas

reserves are heavily concentrated in two regions: the

U.S.S.R. and the Middle East. Large additional

resources, including probable reserves, exist,

though estimates of their precise magnitudes are

highly disputed and vary widely.6

The world’s largest gas producer is the U.S.S.R.

(about 40 percent of world production). Overall

world production increased by over a third between

1977 and 1987, though production in the United

States has declined by 25 percent from a peak in the

early 1970s. Global production during the next

quarter century will continue to increase, particularly in the U.S.S.R. and in developing countries

(42).7 The U.S.S.R. was also the largest exporter of

natural gas in 1986, accounting for over a third of

world exports. The major importers were the European countries, with West Germany far in the lead

(27).

While natural gas is important in developing

countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela,

China, and Algeria, many developing countries have

not exploited their natural gas reserves because of

the large infrastructure required for a natural gas

distribution system. In addition, most of the market

for gas is local, making it difficult for foreign oil and

gas companies to recoup investments through hard

currency earnings (39).
Chapter 3-Energy Supply . 85

Petroleum reserves are concentrated in the Middle

East and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. The

United States produced about 14 percent of the

world’s petroleum in 1989, ranking it second behind

the U.S.S.R. (which produced 20 percent). About a

dozen other countries, concentrated in the Middle

East, accounted for most remaining production.

Unlike coal and natural gas, which tend to be

consumed by the countries that produce them,

petroleum is heavily traded; indeed, 40 percent of

crude oil and 20 percent of refined products are

transferred internationally. Exports are dominated

by the huge quantities of oil that flow from the

Middle East. The largest world importer is the

United States, followed by the European nations

(both East and West) and Japan.

Excluding China, oil accounted for over half of

the commercial fuel use in developing countries.

Compared with the United States, the developing

countries use relatively more oil for electricity

generation and for industry than for transportation

(35). While some countries have large oil supplies,

many others must use hard currency to purchase oil

on the international market. Even so, while oil

consumption decreased in the OECD during the

price shocks of the mid-1970s and early 1980s, it

steadily increased in the developing countries. Its

relative share of commercial fuel use in developing

countries, however, has been declining since 1979.

Issues—As with coal, options exist for ‘ ‘tightening’ the petroleum and natural gas systems to make

them less emissive without necessarily affecting the

relative attractiveness of the fuels. One of these is to

limit emissions of unburned natural gas, especially

in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Another is to

place greater emphasis on the efficient use of

petroleum and natural gas, through cogeneration and

by more efficient end-use technologies in general.

Beyond these steps, further measures can be taken

to make petroleum less attractive as a fuel. Aside

from reduced emissions, the advantages of reduced

petroleum use include reduced petroleum imports,

trade deficits, and vulnerability to oil-supply cutoffs.

Of the many alternatives, the most commonly

discussed supply-side alternative is increasing the

tax on gasoline (see ch. 5).

Policies affecting the relative attractiveness of

natural gas must balance two needs:

I. the need to limit natural gas use because of its

methane and CO2 emissions, and

2. the need to promote its use as a near-term

alternative to higher emission alternatives such

as coal or coal-based electric power.

Policies will have to improve the position of natural

gas relative to coal, while simultaneously reducing

its appeal relative to options with still lower

atmospheric impacts.

A carbon tax could provide an incentive to switch

to lower carbon-content fuels such as natural gas.

However, care must be taken to structure the tax

such that it reflects the methane emissions associated with supplying natural gas. For imports, this

will require detailed information on methane emissions in the exporting country as well as leakage in

transit.

Biomass Fuels

Emissions

During photosynthesis, plants transform solar

energy into chemical energy as they convert atmospheric carbon and water from the soil into carbonbased compounds. The resulting plant tissues are

known as “biomass.”8

Plant biomass and animal

wastes are used as energy sources around the world.

“Biomass fuel’ is burned for cooking and space

heating in developing countries, and for industrial

processes and electricity generation.9

When biomass fuels are burned for energy (or

when residues from harvesting and processing of

plants into fuel decompose), the carbon in them is

released to the atmosphere. Unlike fossil-fuel carbon, however, the carbon released from biomass

fuels was taken from the atmosphere over the past

few decades. If biomass fuels are used on a

sustainable basis (e.g., if harvested trees are always

replanted), the carbon emitted will be resequestered

over the next few decades as the plants grow and

become available once again for use.

8’ ‘Biomass’ in general refers to any living material, including animals and their wastes.

‘%urning biomass fuels should be distinguished from burning vegetation to clear forests for crop and range land or to remove crop residues from

harvested areas; in these latter cases, use of biomass for fuel does not occur. Biomass burning and natural decomposition of biomass are major sources

of COZ, methane, and other greenhouse gases (see chs. 7 and 8).
86 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

—

In contrast, the carbon emitted from fossil fuels

was taken from the atmosphere millions of years

ago. Essentially no carbon is recycled back to fossil

fuel (in timeframes of interest to the next several

generations) when fossil fuels are burned, since coal

and other fossil fuel feedstocks form only very

slowly over geologic time.

The net carbon emissions from biomass fuels

depends on how they are managed and on the

timeframe considered. Dung and agricultural waste

used as fuel are typically not considered net emitters

because they would rapidly decompose anyway.

Twigs and branches will regrow, taking carbon from

the atmosphere, over a few years. Carbon emitted by

burning harvested trees can be reclaimed in decades,

assuming that replacement trees are replanted (see

box 7-A in ch. 7).

Resources and Their Use

Data on biomass fuel use are sketchy. By one

rough estimate, about 15 percent of the world’s

energy was obtained from biomass fuels in 1987

(57), considerably more than was provided by

nuclear and hydroelectric power combined. Wood

accounted for about 60 percent of the biomass fuels,

dung and agricultural residue for most of the

remainder (55).

The importance of these fuels varies among

different countries, largely according to economic

conditions, Developing countries may derive up to

one-third of their energy needs from biomass (55),

but even among these counties, the percentage

varies greatly. For example, biomass energy in

China, India, and Kenya accounts for about 25, 40,

and 80 percent of the total energy use in each

country, respectively (74). In rural areas in many of

these countries the energy contribution of biomass is

often much higher. Traditional biomass fuels (wood,

crop residues, animal dung) are relied on for

household cooking and heating, particularly in rural

areas and in the poorer developing countries in

general (21; also see chs. B and 9). While logs and

charcoal are often traded in commercial markets,

most biomass use is not reflected in statistics on

primary commercial energy consumption.

In industrialized countries, biomass fuels account

for only about 3 percent of energy supplies, although

in a few cases—-particularly in the forest products

industry-wood is a significant part of the fuel mix.

In Finland, wood accounted for about 15 percent of

total energy use in the early 1980s (58, 62). In the

United States, forest residues and wood wastes

supplied about 2 percent of energy use during the

late 1980s, with one-third used at residences and

two-thirds by industry (59).

Today, biomass fuels are most commonly used in

their unprocessed forms (e.g., wood logs) and are

burned directly in residential stoves or industrial

boilers or combustors. However, biomass can also

be processed into liquid or gaseous fuels for use in

boilers, gas turbines, or highway vehicles. Municipal solid waste can be a biomass fuel source in some

situations-through combustion in incinerators, with

subsequent use of steam (either directly or to drive

turbines), or from collection of methane produced

when biomass (e.g, paper, food wastes) decomposes

in landfills. (See box 3-A for a discussion of how

biomass can be used for energy.)

Issues

The Department of Energy (DOE) estimated (86)

that using fast-growing, short-rotation woody crops

as biomass fuels could offset 3 to 5 percent of current

annual U.S. CO2 emissions, assuming current production and conversion technologies, and up to 35

percent, assuming technology advances and using a

high estimate of land availability. OTA’s more

moderate estimate indicates that planting 0.5 million

ha/year in short-rotation woody crops might offset

about 1,2 percent of current U.S. CO2 emissions (see

ch. 7).

The major constraint on production and use of

biomass fuels as an energy source in the United

States is their general lack of economic competitiveness with fossil-fuel energy sources. A recent report

by several national laboratories, though, projected

that biomass fuels might account for 7 to 13 percent

of energy use—two to three times current levels—by

the year 2030, depending on the level of Federal

support for R&D of different conversion technologies (59) and on whether vigorous measures are

taken to promote them. However, developing a

sustainable and balanced biomass energy industry

also depends on how several questions are resolved,

including whether: productivity of short-rotation

crops can be maintained over long periods, sufficient

infrastructure to support a biomass fuel industry can

be developed, market conditions will be conducive

to investments in such an industry, and alternative

land uses are more desirable.
Chapter 3-Energy Supply . 87

CARBON-FREE ENERGY

SOURCES

Renewable Energy Sources

The use of renewable, carbon-free energy sources

results in no or relatively low emissions of climatemodifying gases. ’”

Water

Hydroelectric power is the largest worldwide

nonfossil source of electricity. Most installed capacity is located in the United States, Canada, and the

U.S.S.R. From 1977 through 1987, worldwide

hydroelectric power production expanded by about

40 percent, though by less than 15 percent in the

United States.

Worldwide hydropower capacity could ultimately

triple (19). Among the developed countries, the

U.S.S.R. has by far the largest resources, followed

by the United States and Canada. In the developing

countries, the largest potential is in Zaire, China,

India, Indonesia, Colombia, and Brazil.11 Hydropower does not directly contribute greenhouse gas

emissions, but its high capital costs, associated

flooding and deforestation, and impacts on indigenous peoples make it controversial in many developing countries. As a result, U.S. Agency for International Development policy is to no longer fund large

hydropower projects. Some governments (e.g., China,

Brazil) also have scaled down some large projects

because of environmental concerns or the realization

that end-use energy efficiency could reduce the need

for some new generating capacity.

Geothermal Energy

Geothermal energy is heat, hot water, or steam

obtained from the Earth’s crust.12 In some cases, the

hot water comes from wells. In others, cold water (or

other working fluid) is pumped down to the hot rock,

heated, and returned to the surface to drive a turbine.

This heat has many possible applications, but the

most common is the generation of electricity. The

technology to convert geothermal energy to electricity is relatively well developed for some types of

sources (i.e., geysers) but not for all (9).

Photo credit: California Energy Co.

Coso Geothermal project in California.

In 1989, worldwide geothermal capacity totaled

over 5,400 megawatts of electricity (MWe). Fortyseven percent of this capacity was in the United

States (about 0.4 percent of U.S. generating capacity). Other countries with some geothermal electric

capacity were the Philippines, Mexico, Italy, Japan,

New Zealand, and Indonesia.

Despite the low absolute use of geothermal

energy, growth over the last decade has been

extremely rapid; from 1970 to 1988, total geothermal generating capacity in the United States increased from 78 to 2,409 MW of electricity. An

additional 7,325 MW were planned worldwide as of

April 1989 (20). By the year 2000, U.S. geothermal

capacity could reach 6,800 MW. Most will be

located in California, Hawaii, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and Utah (52). Rough estimates indicate substantial reserves. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that on the order of 23,000 MW might

be recoverable from high-temperature geothermal

resources in the United States (59).

Wind

Wind power is widely used for pumping water.

The technology used to turn wind into electricity is

well developed, though advanced wind turbine

designs (e.g., variable speed rotors) are just beginIONOte tit ~we Me hybridt~~hn~logi~s mat Supplement non~bon so~c~ of energy with c~bon fuels. Most existing SOkU thed elW~C

powerplants, for example, are supplemented with natural gas.

1 I For a detailed listing, S= ref. 85.

lzFor more on tie technology of geothermal power, see ref. 69.
88 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 3-A—Energy From Biomass

Biomass is a renewable energy resource obtained from organic, nonfossil materials such as wood and wood

byproducts, agricultural crops and their residues, animal wastes, municipal solid waste (MSW), and sewage sludge

(see figure 3A-l). Most biomass energy currently comes from direct combustion of solid biomass (e.g., wood, plant

herbage, MSW) for space and process heating, cooking, and a small amount of electric generation. Biomass also

can be converted to various gaseous and liquid fuels (often called biofuels) which can be easily stored and

transported

In the United States, biomass sources currently supply about 2.8 quadrillion Btu’s (quads), or about 3 percent

of the Nation’s energy needs (81), an amount typical of industrialized countries. About 87 percent of this energy

comes from wood and its byproducts; wastes and alcohol fuels made from biomass account for about 10 and 3

percent, respectively. If fully developed, biomass energy might eventually contribute about 14 quads, or about 17

percent of current U.S. energy consumption (59); Oak Ridge National Lab (47, 48) estimates a potential 14 quads

from biomass-based liquid fuels alone.

Direct Combustion of Wood and Wood Wastes—In the United States, the largest amounts of energy from

biomass come from the direct combustion of wood and wood wastes. (See ch. 7 for a discussion of forest product

resources.) The lumber, pulp, and paper industries account for about 65 percent of all wood consumed for energy,

and the residential sector about 35 percent (79). In industry, about 95 percent of this energy is used to produce

process heat or steam, while the remaining 5 percent is converted to electricity using onsite cogeneration systems.

Direct Combustion of Municipal Solid Waste—Today, about 14 percent (by weight) of the MSW generated

in the United States is incinerated (84).1 About 120 facilities out of the 160 in the United States that incinerated

MSW also produced energy in the form of steam (45 perent of the plants), electricity (26 percent), cogenerated

electricity (20 percent), and refuse-derived fuel burned elsewhere (8 percent) (25,70). These “waste-to-energy”

plants account for about 4 percent of the biomass energy consumed in the United States (59). Expansion of this

capacity in the United States is uncertain because of public concern over air pollution and possible health impacts

of incinerator emissions and ash.

Methane Gas From Landfills-Municipal solid waste (MSW) landfills produce methane gas due to the

anaerobic decomposition of organic wastes, which makeup approximately three-quarters of all MSW (70). While

current estimates of methane emissions from landfills and other sources are highly uncertain“ , waste disposal in

landfills around the world might account for 5 to 18 percent of all methane emissions (8).2 Since methane is a more

potent short-term greenhouse gas than CO2 (ch. 2), from a climate perspective it would be most desirable to recover

and process it for energy. Out of the approximately 6,000 active U.S. landfills in operation in 1986, only 123

collected methane for energy recovery (70). Methane emissions are drawn, sometimes with vacuum pumps, through

a series of trenches and/or collection pipes running throughout the landfill. The gas is later purified and can be used

to generate steam for heating or electric generation. Today, landfill gas accounts for only 0.3 percent of energy from

all biomass sources (36), but if fully developed this resource could supply between 0.2 to 1.0 quads of energy

-between 1 and 5 percent of all natural gas consumption, or 0.2 to 1 percent of total U.S. energy demand (59,82).

Methane Gas From Anaerobic Digesters-The decomposition of organic material inside devices called

anaerobic digesters essentially mimics similar processes in oxygen-poor environments such as landfills and rice

paddy muds, but methane is produced more efficiently because the process can be carefully controlled Ideal

biomass feedstocks include sewage sludge, fresh animal manure, aquatic plants, and wet food-processing wastes.

The amount of energy that could be recovered from these sources in the United States is about 1 quad (59).

Syngas From Wood, Crops, and Waste--Solid biomass can be converted, through a process called

“gasification, “ into gas suitable for fuels or chemical synthesis. Lower Btu gas produced using air-blown gasifiers

is used as boiler fuels or furthered processed into liquid fuels (e.g., methanol, see below), whereas higher Btu gas

from oxygen-blown gasifiers can be added to the natural gas distribution system

IA~ut 83p-t by weight of MSW consists of COl?t6Z#d&& --SSUCh M W~~, plastics, *,*, wood,

and food and yardwastcs; the mmamlng ‘ ‘ 17pCrC@conaistsof noncomh.m”bzes, sachasgiass,metals, andmisce~ inorganic wastes (81).
Chapter 3--Energy Supply ● 89

Ethanol From Grains and Sugar Crops—In 1987, about 3.2 billion liters of ethanol were sold in the United

States, mainly as a transportation fuel, making it the world’s second largest consumer after Brazil (see chs. 5 and

8) (61). Over 80 percent of U.S. ethanol plant capacity in 1986 was dedicated to fermentation of corn feedstocks

(78). Other grain and sugar crops, such as grain sorghum, molasses, and food-processing wastes, also can be used

for feedstock; in Brazil, sugarcane is used. More than 8 percent of the gasoline sold in the United States is a 10

percent ethanol blend (i.e., “gasohol”).

Methanol From Wood, Crop Residues, and Grass Crops—Methanol is used primarily as a feedstock in

chemical manufacturing, but also as a transportation fuel. In 1986, 1.1 billion liters of methanol were consumed in

the United States for transportation, accounting for about 0.09 percent of this sector’s energy demand (78). Methanol

has traditionally been produced using natural gas feedstocks, but it can also be produced from biomass through

pyrolysis or oxygen-blown gasification (as described above) and then converted to methanol using catalysts (67).

Significant improvements in both conversion technology and all aspects of the growing and harvesting cycle for

biomass-to-methanol production are necessary for biomass-based methanol to become competitive with natural gas

feedstocks (73).

Certain plant seeds, such as rape seed, sunflowers, or oil palms can be pyrolyzed to form intermediate biocrude

liquids, and then catalytically converted to gasoline, diesel, or jet fuel. Oil seeds maybe able to supply as much as

0.4 quads (47).

Figure 3A-l—Alternative Methods of Using Biomass Energy

Biomass

Processes End uses

\ 5 . I

Steam

Electricity y

Space A water heat

Cooking

Process heat

Space & water heat

Electricity y

Cooking

Stationary engines

Fuel gas plpellne

Mobile engines

Stationary engines

Gas turbines

Space & water heat

Cooking

Process heat

Steam

Electricity y

Space & water heat

Process heat k*lJ.at.ra,,asPPene

Examples of how biomass can be processe d

Process number:

1,2,3,4

2,3,4

1,2,3,4

1,2,3,5

5

5

5

(see boxes above)

Wood & wood wastes

Agricultural crops

Crop residues

Municipal solid waste

Sewage sludge

Animal wastes

Aquatic plants

Stationary engines

Mobile engines

SOURCE: Adapted from U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Energy From Biological Processes, Volume l/--T& nical and

Envirorrrnenta/ Analysis, OTA-E-1 28 (Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, September 1980).
90 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

ning to emerge. 13 In areas with good winds, wind

turbines can be a cost-effective method for meeting

a portion of power needs. ‘Generally, the wind energy

flux is greatest in coastal areas in the mid and

northern latitudes and along exposed mountain

ridges throughout the world. In the United States,

good wind resources are widely dispersed, from

coastal New England to the mountain passes of

southern California (17).

In mid-1989, installed wind turbine electric capacity was roughly 1,760 MW worldwide. In the

United States, capacity amounted to roughly 1,520

MW14, triple the capacity 5 years earlier but still

only a fraction of a percent of total U.S. electric

generating capacity (26). However, a study sponsored several years ago by the Electric Power

Research Institute indicated that the market potential

by the end of the century could be as high as 21,000

MW (54). Worldwide, the magnitude of the usable

wind energy resource cannot be accurately determined because of the current lack of data. Though

the annual theoretical potential is quite large, only a

small portion of this could be exploited during the

next quarter century (19). India reportedly has plans

for 5,000 MW of wind power by the year 2000(1 1).

Solar Energy

The amount of solar energy reaching the Earth’s

surface in a year is thousands of times that of

worldwide annual fossil fuel use (28). Of course,

many factors limit the usefulness of this energy,

Much of the solar energy shines onto oceans or other

locations where it is not easy to capture. Furthermore, insolation (exposure to sunlight) varies geographically, seasonally, daily, and over other periods

of time. Despite these limitations, the amount of

available energy is enormous. Solar energy can be

used to provide light, heat, steam, and even air

conditioning for buildings and industry.

Solar Thermal Energy—The sun can provide

power for diverse applications in buildings and

industry either in passive or active solar energy

systems. Passive systems usually use building structures (e.g., windows, walls, floors) for collection and

storage. Active systems rely on pumps and fans for

heat distribution from solar collectors to areas of use,

Passive solar techniques have been used since at

least the days of ancient Greece, and are used to

varying degrees in virtually all buildings today.

They include many conceptually simple methods,

such as orienting buildings north-south, planting

trees to block the sun in the summer and let it

through in the winter, installing skylights to provide

light, and using building materials that absorb or

reflect heat (also see ch. 4).

Active solar technologies are much more common

than expressly designed passive systems. They are

also better suited to the needs of the retrofit market.

The central feature of an active solar energy system

is the collector, which captures the solar radiation

and turns it into heat to warm buildings and provides

steam to drive machinery. Solar air-conditioning is

developed, but has yet to be widely commercialized.

The outlook for active and passive solar technology is mixed. The field could experience rapid

growth over the next 25 years (59). However, even

optimistic market forecasts see this technology

contributing 1 percent or less of U.S. energy needs

over the next 25 years (59,47).

Solar Electricity Generation-Currently, solar

power supplies only a minuscule amount of the

world’s electricity and only 0.07 percent of U.S.

electricity. Few expect solar power to provide a

significant fraction of electricity world-wide within

the timeframe considered in this report (i.e., by

2015)--at most, only a few percent of projected U.S.

electricity supply will be solar-based in 2015. On the

other hand, this does represent tremendous growth in

the relative share of solar energy in the United

States, and this could set the stage for even more

dramatic increases in the ability of solar power to

meet U.S. and world energy demands after 2015. In

the optimistic scenario of one study, solar energy

(not just solar electricity) could meet roughly 15

percent of U.S. energy needs by 2030 (59).

While growth in the use of solar and wind power

in developing countries is expected, it is unclear

whether this will represent much of an increase in the

share of the power generation market. Solar and

wind power may be most competitive in rural areas

where fuel supplies and maintenance services are

expensive and energy infrastructure (e.g., power

lines) is minimal (see ch. 9).

13For a de~nption of the t(3ChUO]Ogy, SW mf. 59.

ldc~~orfia alone accomts for 8(3 Pement of the world total, with most of that capacity located ti ~wmomti passes.
Chapter 3--Energy Supply ● 91

Photo credit: Solar Energy Industries Association

Parabolic trough collector at the Luz solar thermal plant in

California.

Issues

Renewable, carbon-free energy sources collectively are now a major source of energy around the

world, and they have the potential to meet a sizable

h-action of future electric and nonelectric energy

needs. These sources cannot, however, fully displace fossil fuels in the near term. The greatest

near-term potential lies in hydropower and the

radiant energy of the sun; a large but substantially

smaller potential also exists for wind and geothermal

energy. All are economically competitive to some

degree today, but their competitiveness varies widely

depending on location, application, and other variables. Hydroelectric and wind power are the least

expensive; photovoltaics are currently expensive

and therefore competitive only in remote or specialized applications.

Each alternative possesses some advantages over

fossil fuels, ranging from photovoltaics’ remarkable

modularity to the short lead-times of small geothermal units. But the technologies also suffer from

serious disadvantages relative to the fossil fuels.

Among these are the difficulty of access to transmission capacity, the intermittent nature of photovoltaics, lack of information about the quality and

distribution of the resources, high capital costs

relative to fossil-fuel competitors, and various regulatory constraints. Rapid and favorable changes

must occur in many of these areas if the technologies

are to realize their full potential during the next

quarter century.

Nuclear

The emissions of CO2 from the use of nuclear

powerplants are small compared to those from use of

fossil-fuel-fired plants.

Resources and Their Use

Worldwide, nuclear power provided about 15

percent of electricity in 1988. The United States

possessed the largest amount of nuclear capacity,

with about 30 percent of the total; other countries

with large amounts of nuclear generating capacity

were France, the U. S. S. R., Japan, and West Germany (34). A few countries, such as France, draw

more than 50 percent of their electric power from

nuclear plants (64). Despite the strong presence of

nuclear power in many countries, and in contrast to

the rapid increase in nuclear capacity over the last

two decades, the immediate future suggests relatively slow growth in capacity. Some countries, such

as France and Japan, are continuing to press ahead

with ambitious nuclear programs (46), but in many

countries growing concern over the safety and

long-term appropriateness of nuclear energy has led

to a virtual halt in development,

Though several developing countries have operating nuclear power capacity (Argentina, Brazil, India,

Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan) (64), it plays a minimal role in most. Nuclear

power is unlikely to increase substantially in developing countries in the near future, even though some

are planning on building facilities by the end of the

century (e.g., Bangladesh, China, Cuba, Egypt,

Israel, Morocco, Turkey) (64). Most developing

countries have not signed the nuclear weapons

Non-Proliferation Treaty, which makes it difficult

for nuclear nations to assist these countries in further

developing their nuclear energy industry.

Issues

Nuclear power’s strong point is that its emissions

of CO2, methane, and other pollutants are quite low

compared to those of its fossil-fuel competitors.

Moreover, if the public is willing to accept nuclear

power, it could once again become a viable alternative to fossil-fuel-fired generation in the United

States. However, several key issues cloud the future

of nuclear power and restrict its near-term potential:

Lead Times-Many of the steps required to

commercially deploy additional nuclear power,

ranging from the development and demonstration of
92 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

new designs to the licensing and construction of

commercial plants and reactors, require long periods

of time. This limits the near-term contribution of

nuclear power.

Safety and Environmental Issues—These range

from concerns about the possibility of catastrophic

failure of nuclear plants to questions about waste

disposal and decommissioning.

Costs-The cost of nuclear powerplants has been

high compared to electricity from fossil fuels.

Considerable uncertainty exists over what the future

costs—including decommissioning and waste disposal-might be.

Proliferation—Increased dependence on nuclear

power will aggravate nuclear proliferation problems. This raises a host of domestic and international

issues. Promotion by the United States of nuclear

power in key developing countries will be limited by

these considerations and related legal obligations.

Some of these concerns are being addressed by

efforts to develop improved reactor designs and to

change government regulations; however, they are

certain to remain important in the near term. For a

more complete discussion of these issues, see ref. 68.

REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS FROM

ELECTRICITY GENERATION

Introduction to Technical Options

There are four basic ways to reduce emissions

from electricity generation:

1.

2.

3.

4.

reduce demand for electricity (see chs. 4 and 6),

use more nonfossil energy sources (see previous section),

switch to fossil fuels with a lower carbon

content per unit energy, and

lower the rate of CO2 emissions from fossil

fuels through improvements in combustion

efficiency and electricity manumission and

distribution.

The third and fourth strategies-lowering the rate of

emissions from fossil fuels by switching to lower

carbon fuels and by using more efficient electric

generating and transmission technology-are discussed below.

Figure 3-4-Carbon Emissions From Electric

Generating Technologies as Compared to Emissions

From the Average Existing Coal-Fired Powerplant

Carbon emissions from alternative electric power plants

_ Coal ~~q Petroleum ~ Natural gas

r 1

F===— >.—1

—1

J

.

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 1 00%

Emissions as a percentage of average

exIstlng coal-fired plant

NOTE: The numbers of the technologies on this figure are the same as

those presented in table 3-5. Arktitional details on the technologies

are presented in the table.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, calculated using data

from EPRI, Twhnkx/Assessrnent Guide (1989).

Fuel Switching and More Efficient

Generating Technologies

The amount of CO2 that fossil fuels release when

burned depends, in part, on their carbon content,

which varies from fuel to fuel. Therefore, even if the

total quantity of fossil fuels in the energy supply

remains the same, CO2 emission levels can be

affected by changing the ratios of coal, oil, and

natural gas we burn-a CO2 abatement strategy

called fuel switching. Fuel switching can bring large

reductions in emissions, since 85 percent of U.S.

utility CO2 emissions now come from coal-burning

plants.

Emission levels also depend on the efficiency of

the plants that burn those fuels. Another way to

reduce CO2 emissions from this sector, therefore, is

to make powerplants more efficient. Small gains

(less than 5 percent per plant) are possible with

relatively minor “tune-ups” (49). Similar measures

may well have bigger impacts-on the order of 10

percent-in developing countries (66). Larger gains

are possible through ‘‘repowering’ ‘—the replacement of the basic combustion components of existing powerplants with new technologies.
Chapter 3-Energy Supply ● 93

Table 3-5--CO2 Emission Rates From Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Technologies

Net heat rate lb C/kWh Technology development

Technology Fuel full load (from fuel only)a

rating

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

Dispersed fuel cell, advanced

molten carbonate

Intercooled steam-injected gas

turbine (ISTIG)

Combined cycle, conventional

Combined cycle, advanced,

reheat steam cycle

Dispersed fuel cells, phosphoric

acid, first generation

Steam powerplant

Conventional subcritical, w/wet

Iime flue gas desulfurization, 200

MW unit

Conventional combustion

turbine

Pressurized fluid bed combustioncombined cycle

Conventional subcritical, w/wet

Iime flue gas desulfurization, 200

MW unit

Supercritical, demonstration state

of the art, advanced limestone

flue gas scrubber

Integrated gasificationcombined cycle (IGCC), 200 MW

unit

Conventional supercritical w/wet

lime flue gas desulfurization,

Atmospheric fluidized bed

combustion (circulating bed))

Conventional subcritical, w/wet

lime flue gas desulfurization, 200

MW unit

Combustion turbine,

conventional

Natural gas

Natural gas

Natural gas

Distillate

Distillate

Distillate

50% pulverized

bituminous coal,

50°/0 natural gas

Natural gas

Bituminous coal

75% pulverized

bituminous coal

250/~ natural gas

Pulverized bituminous coal

Bituminous coal

Pulverized bituminous coal

Bituminous coal

Pulverized bituminous coal

Distillate

6,450

7,260b

8,230

7,580

8,550

9,680

10,210

15,040

8,980

10,210

9,080

9,320

9,640

10,060

10,210

14,020

0.20

0.23

0.26

0.34

0.38

0.45

0.46

0.49

0.51

0.53

0.52

0.53

0.56

0.57

0.59

0.64

Laboratory

Pilot

Mature

Demonstration

Demonstration

Mature

Mature

Mature

Pilot

Mature

Demonstration

Demonstration

Mature

Demonstration

Mature

Mature

aThis does not Include other C02 emissions that maybe associated with use oft he technology. For example, the figure for the fluidized bed technologies does

not include the COZ emissions released by the limestone used.

bBased on efficiency of 47°/0.

SOURCES: All heat rates are average annual heat rates. Heat rate values, with the exception of that for the ISTIG and liquid-fuel-fired steam plants, are from

Electric Power Research Institute, TAG-7iihrica/Assessment Guide, Vo/. 1 Rev.6 Heckicity Supp/y--l989 (Palo Alto, CA: November 1989),

EPRI P-6587-L.

Liquid-fuel-fired steam values from Electric Power Research Institute, TA+T&#mka/Assessment Guide, Vo/. 1: E/ectria”ty Sup@y—1986

(Palo Alto, CA: December 1986), EPRI P-4436-SR.

Heat rate for ISTIG f rom R. H. Williams and E. D. Larson, Aircraff-flerivative Turbines for Stationary Power (Princeton, NJ: Center for Energy

and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, 1988), review draft.

Alternatives to the average existing coal-fired

powerplants vary by emission rate (see figure 3-4).

Far greater gains are possible by switching away

from coal to other fossil fuels (shown as lighter bars)

than by switching among coal technologies (the

black bars).

Technology options also vary by heat rate—the

amount of fuel needed to generate 1 kilowatt-hour

(kWh) of electricity—and by CO2 emissions per

kWh for the particular combination of technology

and fuel (see table 3-5).

Burning conventional pulverized coal with a

sulfur dioxide scrubber (technologies 13 and 15 in

figure 3-4 and table 3-5), yields emission rates

typical of coal boilers installed during the 1980s.

With the most efficient coal technologies, CO2

emissions are about 10 percent lower. These include:

1) pressurized fluid bed combustion; 2) state-of-theart pulverized coal boiler; and 3) integrated coal

gasification, combined cycle (IGCC) (technologies

9, 11, and 12, respectively, in figure 3-4 and table

3-5). By replacing conventional coal plants with

high-efficiency turbines burning natural gas, the
94 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

same amount of electricity can be generated with

about a 60-percent reduction in C02 emissions

(technologies 2 and 3). This is, in part, because gas

releases far less CO2 per unit energy than does coal.

However, coal plants need not be completely

repowered to achieve some of the benefits of fuel

switching. One option is to change coal-fired plants

to natural gas co-fired or intermittently fired plants,

that is, plants that use both coal and natural gas

simultaneously or sequentially to heat the boilers

(technologies 7 and 10). Since the boiler technology

remains essentially unchanged, a co-firing boiler is

about as efficient as a purely coal-fired one, though

efficiency may drop a few percent when burning gas

(18). The CO2 reductions result mostly from the fact

that natural gas has less carbon. A co-firing plant

burning 25 percent gas and 75 percent coal would

emit about 10 to 15 percent less CO2 than a pure

coal-burning plant. Burning 50 percent natural gas

would lower emissions by 20 to 25 percent.

Fuel switching, however, is not without its problems. The major one is that it can deplete gas

reserves and strain the gas pipeline distribution

network. This fact is especially germane since

several other strategies discussed in this report rely

on increased gas use. Just how much natural gas

exists is poorly quantified, If natural gas does

become a “lynch pin” of domestic or global CO2

reduction strategy, demand and prices could rise to

very high levels. Increased use of natural gas also

carries with it the risk of increased leakages of

methane.

One additional control option is theoretically

possible-the removal of CO2 from combustion

exhaust gases for disposal in the deep oceans or

wells. Box 3-B discusses this concept, which we do

not consider to be a feasible near-term alternative.

Electricity Transmission and Distribution

Improvements

The electricity transmission and distribution (T&D)

system connects the producer of electricity with

consumers. During T&D, a certain amount of

electricity is lost due to resistance as well as

inefficient operation and maintenance of the distribution network. This loss averages 5 to 10 percent in

—

the developed countries (83). The United States

loses roughly 8 percent of its electricity in T&D (14).

In developing countries, Eastern Europe, and the

U.S. S. R., T&D losses can be much higher. Losses in

developing countries commonly exceed 20 percent

(India, for example, loses 21 percent (66) and some

countries report losses as high as 30 percent between

generation and delivery (83; also see ch 9)). Less is

known about the T&D losses in Eastern Europe.

Still, a large number of cost-effective opportunities

exist to reduce losses.15 The one limitation is that in

some countries up to half the T&D loss maybe from

theft (66). Eliminating theft could be more difficult

than eliminating other losses (and might not lower

overall demand very much).

Transmission and distribution systems also affect

the ability of low-emission generators to fill the need

for electric power. Many of the opportunities for

relatively low emission power generation are remote

from existing transmission facilities. Geothermal

and wind resources, for example, are often located

far from existing lines. Similarly, one region may

have excess hydroelectric or nuclear capacity at the

same time another region is experiencing a power

shortfall and being forced to burn more fossil fuels. 16

OTA EMISSION REDUCTION

SCENARIOS

OTA developed a simple energy accounting

model that allows us to estimate the effectiveness of

various technical options for lowering CO2 emissions (see app. A). The model is based on a much

larger system of energy and economic models used

by the Gas Research Institute (GRI) to forecast

energy use through 2010 (29).

About 35 percent of total U.S. CO2 emissions

comes from fossil fuels burned to generate electricity. By 2015, this might increase to 45 percent. In

this section we examine how changes in supply-side

characteristics can lower C02 emissions from electricity generation. We class@ supply-side options

into two categories-’ ‘Moderate’ measures and

more aggressive and costly ‘‘Tough’ measures.

Because supply-side options will have different

effects depending on the demand for electricity,

however, we frost review our estimates of electricity

Isone World B~ study, for e~pl{;, not= tit ‘‘Witi rdistic limits, for many distribution systems, ]0sS redUCtiOIl is a fti Ch=per alternative

than adding new generating and bulk transmission capacity” (44,66). For exampIes with rapid paybacks in the United States, see ref. 43.

1@ptions relating to tbese issues are discussed in a recent OTA report (71).
Chapter 3--Energy Supply . 95

Box 3-B-Carbon Dioxide Scrubbing

In addition to reducing CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel-fired plants by using more efficient combustion

technologies and fuel switching, it is also possible to remove CO2 from flue gases and liquefy--through a process

known as “scrubbing.” Theoretically one could pump the liquefied C02 through pipelines to disposal sites, for

example, the deep ocean, where it is hoped it will remain rather than entering the atmosphere. While each individual

component appears technically feasible, the entire system has never been tried. We do not consider CO2 scrubbing

as one of our near-term technical options, but the concept merits further research.

Carbon dioxide scrubbing basically involves:

. compressing and cooling the stack gases;

● removing C02 from the gases via a reaction with a solvent solution;

. heating and steam-stripping the CO2

-enriched solution to reverse the reaction, yielding uncondensed steam

and COz

;

. condensing and removing water vapor, leaving the recovered CO2

; and

. compressing and liquefying the recovered CO2

.

The Department of Energy (DOE) examined the feasibility of using scrubber systems at all fossil-fuel-fired

powerplants operating as of 1980 (74a). To remove 90 percent of CO2 emissions would require about 11 to 16

percent of total electrical power capacity in gas- and coal-burning regions, respectively. Electricity production costs

would increase between 50 and 120 percent, depending on the region, averaging 75 percent nationwide. About 85

to 90 percent of the cost was for removal, recovery, and liquefaction; the remainder was for pumping liquefied CO2

through pipelines for disposal.

DOE suggested three possible disposal methods for liquefied C02—1) injection in the deep ocean (i.e., at least

500 meters deep, 100 miles offshore); 2) storage in depleted oil and gas wells; and 3) storage in excavated salt

caverns. Some concern has been expressed over whether 500 meters is deep enough for permanent ocean disposal;

injection to 3,000 meters would require a 200-mile pipeline. For any of these methods, DOE envisioned carrying

the recovered liquefied CO2 in small (6-inch diameter) pipelines from each powerplant to collection centers, and

then carrying it from the centers to ultimate disposal sites in larger (36-inch diameter) pipelines. DOE concluded

that most of the CO2 would have to be disposed of in the ocean.

A recent study in the Netherlands (27a), however, suggests that the increased electricity costs might be

less-perhaps half as much per kWh--if an intermediate gas product from an Integrated Gasification, Combined

Cycle (IGCC) powerplant is used (technology 12 in table 3-5). This process involves:

. using a gasifier to convert coal into heat and a gas composed primarily of hydrogen (H2) and carbon

monoxide (CO);

● converting the CO to CO2 using an iron-chromium or nickel-chromium catalyst (the H2 would subsequently

be used as fuel in the combined cycle process);

. recovering CO2 from the gas mixture by using a physical absorption process, with a solvent known as

selexol; and

● drying and compressing the CO2.

To remove 88 percent of the CO2 from the exhaust gas, about 13 percent of the plant’s electrical production

would be needed to run the system. Electricity production costs would rise about 25 percent for recovery and

compression and an additional 5 to 10 percent for pumping to final disposal sites. (For the Netherlands, exhausted

natural gas fields were proposed as disposal sites.)

demand over the next 25 years under our model’s about 2.2 percent per year. In this and later chapters,

alternative demand-side scenarios. we present two other scenarios of energy demand:

one lowers demand by imposing a series of ModerAlternative Scenarios of Demand for ate demand-side measures; a second lowers demand

Electicity even further through an ambitious set of Tough

demand-side measures. Under the Moderate sceUnder OTA’s Base case scenario, electricity nario, demand for electricity is held to 3,4 trillion

demand grows from about 2.7 trillion kWh in 1990 kWh by 2015, an average increase of 1.0 percent per

to 4.6 trillion kWh by 2015, an average increase of year over the next two decades (see figure 3-5), The
96 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps TO Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 3-5-OTA Electricity Demand Scenarios

Energy demand (billion kWh/year)

5,0001 Base case

4,000 ,1

3)000” ~’- “-”

Tough

1,000 J

() >-–-——T–— - T - --––—- 1

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

NOTE: Scenarios of electricity demand are discussed in detail in chs. 4

through 6 (Buildings, Transportation, and Manufacturing). For the

analysis of electriaty supply-side measures discussed in this

chapter, we have summed demand from each of these sectors.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

measures used initially require some capital investment, but result in lower fuel costs in the future. Over

the life of the investment, these measures cost little

or even save money.

The Tough measures lower energy demand even

further, but only at a higher cost for the same or

similar service. In this scenario, demand for electricity in 2015 is 2.2 trillion kWh-somewhat lower

than demand in 1990 (see figure 3-5). Demand drops

fairly sharply until about 2005 and then begins to

rise again. Existing generating capacity is adequate

to meet demand until sometime between 2015 and

2020. Descriptions of the sector-specific technical

options that lower demand from the Base case in

each of the two scenarios are included in chapters 4

through 6.

Emissions generally reflect electricity demand,

with some variation due to the changing mix of fossil

and nonfossil sources through time. The changing

mix is especially important in the Tough demand

scenario. Because demand for electricity in this

scenario is less than potential supply from existing

plants, fossil sources can be idled and hydropower

and nuclear sources can supply a larger fraction of

total supply. Thus, CO2 emissions decline in the

Tough demand scenario because both electricity

demand and CO2 emission rates (pounds of carbon

per kWh) are lower than they are today.

Technical Options for Lowering C02

Emissions From Electricity Generation

As mentioned, we also categorize methods for

lowering CO2 emissions from the supply side (i.e.,

from utilities) as Moderate or Tough, thus creating

two alternatives to the Base case or business-asusua1 supply-side scenario. We evaluate Base case,

Moderate and Tough supply-side options for each of

the three demand-side scenarios to create nine

possible approaches to emission reductions (see

figure 3-6). The highest CO2 emissions (twice 1987

levels by 2015) will occur under the combined

business-as-usual scenarios-demand for electricity

follows Base case projections with no supply-side

changes. Still assuming the base case demand for

electricity, Moderate supply-side measures will

limit the growth of emissions somewhat, to about a

75 percent increase above 1987 levels by 2015;

Tough supply-side measures can hold emissions to

about a 45 percent increase by 2015.

Supply-side measures have somewhat greater

impacts under the Moderate demand scenario. With

no supply-side changes (i.e., only lowered demand),

emissions will increase by about 45 percent by 2015.

By adopting Moderate supply-side measures as well,

emissions will increase by only about 25 percent.

Tough electricity supply-side measures in combination with Moderate demand for electricity can lower

emissions to about 20 percent below 1987 levels by

2015.

Supply-side measures have slightly lower effects

under the Tough electricity demand scenario. The

Tough demand scenario alone (i.e., with no change

in supply-side technologies) will lower emissions to

about 20 percent below 1987 emissions by 2015. By

adopting Moderate supply-side measures in addition, emissions can be lowered to 30 percent below

1987 levels by 2015. Tough supply-side measures

can cut emissions to about half of 1987 levels by

2015.

In each of the supply-side scenarios, we examine

measures that apply to existing sources, measures

that apply to new sources, and measures that require

early retirement of existing sources with more

stringent requirements for the replacement sources

(see table 3-6).

Technical options for lowering emissions from

existing plants include:
Chapter 3--Energy Supply ● 97

100 ”/0

75 ”/0

500%

25%.

Figure 3-6--CO2 Emissions From Electricity

Generation Under the OTA Demand and

Supply Scenarios

Increase or decrease from 1987 levels (percent)

..—. ——- A

1’ .500/o

Base Moderate Tough

Electricity supply-side measures

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991,

Base

case

Moderate

demand

Tough

demand

1. increased utilization of nuclear powerplants,

2. increased efficiency of fossil-fuel-fired plants

through improved maintenance practices,

3. substituting natural gas for some fraction of the

fuel burned in coal-fired powerplants, and

4. increasing the output from hydroelectric plants.

For lowering emissions from new plants, the

options that we consider include:

1. increased reliance on such renewable energy

sources as hydropower, geothermal, biomass,

and solar energy;

2. revitalizing the nuclear industry so that the next

generation of nuclear power technology is

ready for use by 2005; and

3. limiting the number of new coal-fired powerplants in the base case demand scenario and

declaring a moratorium on coal-fired powerplants in both lower demand scenarios, with

natural gas being the fossil fuel of choice until

2015.

Photo credit: U.S. Department of Energy

This demonstration project at Idaho Falls, Idaho,

consists of redeveloping the city’s three existing

hydroelectric powerplant sites. The three sites

will receive new turbines that are economical

for small-scale, low-head hydroelectric power

generation. The technology can be used

immediately; it does not need extensive

research and development.

We classify four of the technical options above as

Moderate, that is, able to reduce emissions at little or

no cost over the life of the investment. These

include:

1.

2.

3.

4.

modestly improving the efficiency of existing

fossil-fuel-fried plants (about a 5-percent improvement from better maintenance and dispatching procedures),17

increasing the output of existing hydroelectric

plants (by about 11 percent, primarily by

adding additional generating units to capture

energy from water currently bypassing the

plants),18

increasing utilization of existing nuclear powerplants (from 60 percent of the time, on

average, to 70 percent)19 as well as lengthening

their useful life to 45 years, and

using the most efficient generating technologies for new fossil-fuel-fired poweplants.20

We classify three of the supply-side options as

Tough, that is, technically feasible but not without

extra cost. The first is to regulate the mix of new

plants being built with the goal of using nonfossil

electricity sources whenever possible, or using

natural gas rather than coal when it is not feasible or

ITAn EIwtric power ReseMch Institite (EPRI) survey estimated that cost-effective improvements of about 4 percent wem achievable (16).

lane U.S. i%rny COt-pS of Engineers (12) estimated that by adding, replacing, or mdifjing generating units at bemeen 165 and 3~ of tie

approximately 1,300 existing hydroelectric plants in the United States, output could be increased by 10 to 12 pereent in a cost-effective manner.

IWUClear plan~ in both Japan and Western Europe operate about 75 pement of the tie (23).

mA state.of-~e-ti ~~vefized ~~ P}an[ MU emit 10 per-cent 1=s COZ than a conventional new plant. US@ cOSt data from EP~ (15), genera@3

electricity from a state-of-the-art coal plant may actually be a few percent cheaper than generation costs from a new conventional plan$ after fuel savings

are included. A combined cycle gas turbine emits about 45 percent less C02 than a conventional one. If used for more than infrequent peaking power,

the higher capital costs are justifed by lower fuel costs.
98 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

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O.i
Chapter 3-Energy Supply . 99

extremely costly. We assume that between 20 and 45

percent of new powerplants will use nonfossil

energy sources (depending on the demand for new

construction), as compared to about 10 percent in the

Base case. Most utilities would likely choose

renewable energy sources—primarily wind power,

hydroelectric power, and biomass—rather than nuclear powerplants, However, we also assume that by

2000 new and safer designs for nuclear powerplants

will be available and able to meet some of this

demand within the next decade.

As a second Tough option, we force existing

fossil-fuel-fired plants to retire after 40 years of

operation. In the absence of new regulations, existing utility boilers will probably last between 55 and

65 years before they are retired (83). Early retirement, combined with a moratorium on replacement

with coal, will remove inefficient plants and open up

additional opportunities for nonfossil energy sources

as well as additional gas-fired generation. Public

utility commissions typically allow a utility to

recover capital costs of building a new plant over a

30-year period, Thus, if a utility is forced to retire the

plant at any time after 30 years, it will have already

paid off the stockholders and bondholders who paid

for the plant. The additional costs incurred by early

retirement and rebuilding will be paid by the

ratepayers.

We assume that there are limits on the amount of

electricity that can be generated from both nonfossil

energy sources and natural gas. After reviewing

projections by the national laboratories for DOE (47,

59) and others, we believe that 100 GW is a

reasonable estimate of the potential for nonfossil

sources between 2000 and 2015 under a high

demand scenario. This is equal to about half of

today’s total nuclear and hydroelectric capacity. We

assume that under slower growth, fewer nonfossil

plants are likely to be built, though the percentage of

new plants using nonfossil sources will be higher.

Natural gas is limited to an increase of 3 quads above

the Base case-about twice today’s consumption of

natural gas by utilities (and about 15 percent of

forecasted total gas use by 2015). Under the

Moderate and Tough demand scenarios, the need for

new plants is low enough that a moratorium on

construction of new coal plants is possible through

2015. Under the Base case demand scenario, some

new coal plants must be built.

A third Tough alternative is to use some of the

additional 3 quads of natural gas to lower emissions

from existing coal-fired powerplants. This can be

accomplished by either gas co-firing, (i.e., simultaneously burning both gas and coal) or by switching

back and forth between gas and coal intermittently

(e.g., gas could be used in the summer when demand

from other uses is low). Under the Base case demand

scenario, we allow natural gas to substitute for up to

20 percent of coal use in existing plants. Under the

Tough demand scenario, we allow natural gas to

substitute for 50 percent of coal use.

The Effects of Supply Changes Under the

OTA Base Case Demand Scenario

Under the OTA Base case supply and demand

scenarios CO2 emissions from electricity generation

are 35 percent higher than 1987 levels by 2000 and

almost 100 percent higher than 1987 levels by 2015.

By 2015, 435 GW of new electric generating

capacity must be built to meet demand that is increasing at an average rate of 2.2 percent per year.21

(Current U.S. generating capacity is about 680 GW.)

About 10 percent (43 GW) of this new capacity uses

nonfossil sources and thus would lead to little or no

increase in C02 emissions. About 60 to 75 percent

of each year’s new construction is coal-fired and 15

to 25 percent uses natural gas. The relative shares of

each of the generating technologies for new construction in this Base case scenario closely follows

the projections developed by GRI (29).

The Moderate supply-side measures discussed

above achieve CO2 reductions of about 11 percent of

1987 levels by 2000, assuming all existing plant

improvements are made by that time. By 2015, the

combination of efficiency performance standards in

plants built after 2000 and the effects of the nuclear

zlNote that tie Gas Research lnsti~te (GRI) model used as a basis for the OTA anaIysis forecasts that electricity demand will increase at about 1.5

percent per year through 2010. This is about 0.5 to 1.Opercent lower than most other forecasts. The primary reason is that the GRI model uses a “bottom

up’ approach, that is, it forecasts the demand for electricity from current goods and services-the televisions and electric water htmters in our homes,

lights in our offices, and the energy to manufacture electricity-intensive goods and materials such as chemicals and aluminum. However, just as 10 years

ago a bottom up forecast would have missed the demand for electricity from personal computers and FAX machines, so too is the GRI forecast likely

to miss demand from new products by 2000. OTA has added an extra increment of demanM.75 percent per year--on top of the GRI forecast in our

base case. This resul~s in electricity demand growing at about 2.2 percent per year, an estimate much closer in line with those forecasts that use a statistical

‘‘top down’ approach to forecast demand using recent economic and energy use trends.
100 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

\

\ /

Photo credit: U.S. Windpower, Ed Linton, photographer

Maintenance crews performing a routine inspection of a

small wind turbine.

plant life extension boost reductions to about 21

percent of 1987 levels. Thus, the Moderate measures

lower emissions from about a 100 percent increase

above 1987 levels in the Base case to about a

77-percent increase above 1987 levels by 2015.

In our Tough scenario, we require all fossil fuel

plants to retire after 40 years and limit the amount of

construction of new coal plants to 50 percent of total

new builds. About 100 GW of nonfossil sources are

built between 2000 and 2015. This amounts to about

20 percent of the new plants needed to replace retired

facilities and to meet increasing demand for electricity. The Tough measures yield reductions of about

31 percent of 1987 levels by 2015. Combined with

the Moderate measures, utility emissions are held to

a 45-percent increase above 1987 levels by 2015.

The Effects of Supply Changes Under the

OTA Moderate Demand Scenario

Under the OTA Moderate demand case, CO2

emissions from electricity generation are about 10

percent higher than 1987 levels by 2000 and 45

Figure 3-7--C02 Emissions Reductions From

Moderate Supply-side Measures, Expressed as a

Percentage of 1987 Electricity y Emissions,

Under the Moderate Demand Scenario

New Source Performance

Standards for CO2 for

fossil fuel plants I

m 2000

i

Increase fossil fuel

k

m 2015

combustion efficiency

Increase nuclear utilization, 45-year retirement

Increase hydroelectric

output

All measures togetherP 1

I

1 , , 1 , r o% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Reductions as a percent of 1987 emissions

NOTE: The data presented above are the emissions reductions achievable

in some future year expressed as a percentage of 1987 electricity

emissions, not as a percentage dacrease in emissions below 1987

levels.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Asessment, 1991.

percent higher than 1987 levels by 2015. Emissions

are lower than under the Base case demand scenario,

reflecting a relatively lower consumption of electricity and a greatly reduced need for new generating

capacity (35 percent of requirements under the base

case demand scenario). Nevertheless, by 2015, 160

GW of new electric generating capacity must be

built to meet increasing demand. Similar to the Base

case demand scenario, we assume that most of the

new capacity would be fossil-fuel-fired, with about

60 to 75 percent of each year’s new construction

using coal and 15 to 25 percent using natural gas.

About 10 percent of new plants use nonfossil energy

sources.

By implementing our Moderate supply-side measures, additional reductions equal to about 10 percent

of 1987 levels can be achieved by 2000. Almost half

of the additional reductions comes from improving

the efficiency of existing fossil-fuel-fired plants,

one-third from increased utilization at nuclear powerplants and the remainder from improvements at

existing hydroelectric facilities (see figure 3-7).

By 2015, the Moderate supply-side measures

achieve reductions equal to about 19 percent of 1987

levels. Most of the additional improvement comes

from extending the lifetimes of nuclear powerplants
Chapter 3--Energy Supply ● 101

Figure 3-8—CO2 Emissions Reductions From Tough Supply-side Measures, Expressed as a Percentage of

1987 Electricity y Emissions, Under the Moderate and Tough Demand Scenarios

Tough Controls on Supply With Moderate Demand

NSPS for CO2

; increase

fossil fuel combustion

efficiency; increase hydro

output; increase nuclear P ‘- 

~ —,

utilization. 45-year . t“-- --””---—]

retirement — . .

No new coal plants; 40% ~1‘– All

new nonfossil fuel energy --- .+-

Above, plus 40-year

retirement for oil and ,-- -— —-— —

1-

~

gas plants .

25% gas co-firing f-,

40-year retirement for

fossil fuel plants; no new –– -- -—-

coal plants; 30% new

nonfossil fuel energy 1--- ‘------ ~ –—7 -–

All Moderate

measures

..—— ——.. — .

Moderate measures

plus

Tough measures

—.—. — - . J

.— — . r–

-- 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Reductions as a percent of 1987 emissions

Tough Controls on Supply With Tough Demand

NSPS for CO2

: increase

fossil fuel Combustion

P

efficiency; increase hydro .—

output: increase nuclear 1

utilization 45-year

retirement

+——————

.

No new coal plants; 45% All

new nonfossil fuel energy

Above, plus 40-year I

retirement for fossiil

fuel plants l-– -J

50% gas co-firing

.— —. I

40-year retirement for

fossil fuel plants; no new

coal plants; 45% new m-–-

nonfossil fuel energy; ~–———————

50% gas co-firing .——. ~— .——

0% 10% 2 0%

All Moderate

measures

.—

Moderate measures

plus

Tough measures

30% 40% 50 %

Reductions as a percent of 1987 emissions

, ..—— .

1-, 2015

NOTE: The data presented above are the emissions reductions achievable In some future year expressed as a percentage ofl 987 electricity emissions, not

as a percentage decrease in emissions below 1987 levels.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991,

thereby avoiding replacement with coal-fired ones.

Efficiency performance standards for new coal- and

gas-fired powerplants have only a modest effect (see

figure 3-7), in part because the need for new

construction is already much reduced under this

scenario. The combination of Moderate demand

measures and Moderate supply-side measures holds

utility emissions to about a 25-percent increase

above 1987 levels by 2015 (as compared to a 100

percent increase under Base case supply and demand).

Again, we considered Tough supply-side options

that are technically feasible but not without extra

cost. A series of Tough options together can achieve

reductions equal to about 45 percent of 1987

emissions by 2015 (see figure 3-8). These measures

include, first, accelerating the replacement of older,

higher emitting facilities by requiring all fossil fuel

plants to retire after 40 years of operation. Next, we

regulate the mix of new plants being built with the

goal of building nonfossil sources whenever possible. When it is not feasible or extremely costly,

natural gas is chosen for fuel (i.e., we impose a

moratorium on the construction of new coal-fired

power-plants from 2000 through 2015). About 30

percent of new electricity demand is met by nonfossil sources (85 GW between 2000 and 2015).

Figure 3-8 also illustrates the relative importance

of each of these and other Tough measures one at a

time. Changing the mix of new plants (i.e., no coal,

40 percent nonfossil sources, and the remainder

natural gas) achieves reductions equal to about 12

percent of 1987 levels by 2015. Forcing oil and

natural gas plants to retire after 40 years (and

replacing them with the mix of new plants listed

above) achieves another 9 percent reduction. Cofiring existing coal plants with 25 percent natural gas

can achieve another 8 to 9 percent reduction. Note

that this last option is the only one of the Tough

supply-side measures that can achieve significant

reductions by 2000.

The combination of Moderate demand, Moderate

supply-side measures, and all Tough supply-side

measures except natural gas co-firing lowers utility

C O2 emissions to about 20 percent below 1987

levels by 2015. Demand for electricity under this

scenario is too great to allow both natural gas

co-firing and 40-year retirement of all fossil fuel

sources, and hold the increased demand for natural

gas to below 3 quads.

The Effects of Supply Changes Under the

OTA Tough Demand Scenario

Under the Tough demand scenario, with no

additional supply-side measures, emissions drop to

10 percent below 1987 levels due to lowered demand

alone. No new plants are needed before 2010. Thus,
102 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

supply-side measures that apply to existing facilities

(i.e., efficiency improvements and gas co-firing) can

still lower emissions, but measures relevant to new

plants have no effect unless existing plants are

retired early. The effect of’ the Moderate supply-side

measures is about the same under this scenario as

under the other two. All Moderate measures together

achieve reductions equal to about 8 percent of 1987

levels by 2000 and 18 percent by 2015 (see figure

3-8).

By adopting a package of Tough supply-side

measures, additional reductions of 10 percent of

1987 levels by 2000 and 21 percent by 2015 are

possible. These measures include: co-fining of all

existing coal-fired plants with 50 percent natural

gas, forced retirement of all fossil fuel plants after 40

years of operation, and altering the mix of new plants

to 45 percent nonfossil sources and the remainder

gas-fired. All of the reductions in 2000 come from

co-firing existing units (see figure 3-8). By 2015,

somewhat over half of the Tough measure reductions come from the combination of early retirement

of fossil sources and their replacement with new

nonfossil and natural gas-fried plants.

The combination of Tough demand measures and

all Moderate and Tough supply-side measures lowers utility CO2 emissions to about 50 percent below

1987 levels by 2015.

Summary of Emissions Reductions From the

OTA Electricity Supply Scenarios

Figure 3-9 summarizes the aggregated effects of

the Moderate supply-side measures (under the Base

case and Moderate demand scenarios) and Tough

supply-side measures (under the Moderate and

Tough demand scenarios) through 2015. Note that

under the two scenarios with Moderate supply-side

measures, emissions continue to rise after 2000,

though at a slower rate than under the Base case.

Under the scenarios with Tough supply-side measures, emissions drop to 1987 levels or below by 2000

and continue to decline through 2015.

Figure 3-10 displays fuel consumed by electric

utilities under the Base case and several scenarios by

2015. Under the Base case, coal use grows from

about 55 percent of total fuel use to about 65 percent.

Under the scenario of Moderate supply-side measures and Moderate demand for electricity, the mix of

Figure 3-9--CO2 Emissions From Electricity

Generation Under the Base Case and Selected

Control Scenarios, By Year

Percent change from 1987 emissions

Moderate controls

1 20%

1

on supply with --

Base demand

100% Moderate controls on supply with — Base case

80% Moderate demand

~

Tough controls

on supply with ~

60% Moderate demand

Tough controls

40% on supply with ~

Tough demand

-20%;

‘\ - .

----

L

,

-40% ‘—=—=__.+—.—

-60% ~—~–z—–=---- -- -

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

SOURCE: Oifice of Technology Assessment, 1991.

fuels remains quite similar to today’s mix, but the

total increases about 25 percent above 1987 levels.

Under both scenarios with Tough supply-side controls, coal use falls to about 25 percent of the total

and the share of nonfossil sources rises to about 50

percent.

Costs of the Tough Electricity Supply Scenario

We estimate that the Tough electricity supply-

-side scenario will cost about $35 billion per year

(1987 dollars) by the year 2015, assuming it is

implemented along with all Tough demand measures. This is the cost of the Tough supply-side

measures alone and does not include the costs of

lowering electricity demand. (These are presented in

chs. 4 through 6.)

About half of the costs come from co-firing

existing coal plants with natural gas. By 2015,

natural gas is forecasted to cost over three times

more than coal on an energy equivalent basis. The

remaining costs come from forcing existing fossil-fuelfired plants to retire after 40 years of operation and

replacing them with natural gas and nonfossil

sources. Forcing the coal plants to retire early and

replacing them with highly efficient natural gasfired combined cycle turbines could increase electricity costs at affected plants by $0.04 to $0.05 per
Chapter 3--Energy Supply ● 103

Figure 3-10—Fuel Use By Electric Utilities In 2015

Under the Base-Case and Selected Control Scenarios,

By Year

Base, 1987

2015: ‘a8e20’5~—l?z?I ,

Moderate supply

controls with

Moderate demand I

~. – ~–. ~

o 10 20 30 4T

0 50

Quadrillion Btu’s

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 19!31.

kWh. 22 However, forcing existing oil and natural gas

plants to retire early saves money—about $0.01 to

$0.02 per kwh-because the replacement facilities

are so much more efficient. We have assumed that

the cost of electricity from nonfossil sources (either

renewable sources or nuclear power) will be comparable to natural gas-fired combined cycle turbines.

The cost effectiveness of early retirement of

existing fossil-fuel-fired sources and replacement

with natural gas and nonfossil sources is about $280

per ton of carbon eliminated. The cost effectiveness

of co-firing existing coal plants with natural gas is

about $510 per ton of carbon.

POLICY OPTIONS

A variety of policy options can be used to

implement the technical options to lower greenhouse gas emissions. Overarching approaches include: 1) energy and emissions taxes and tax

incentives, 2) marketable emission permits, and 3)

research and development on lower emitting technologies. Many of these themes will be addressed

again in chapters on individual emission sources

(see chs. 4 through 6). Broad approaches such as

energy and carbon taxes or marketable emission

permits have the advantage of affecting all emitters

simultaneously, but their effects are extremely

difficult to predict. They can be adopted alone or in

concert with source-specific options (e.g., appliance

or automobile efficiency standards).

Options specific to the energy industries include:

1) ways to lower emissions associated with the

extraction and delivery of fossils fuels, and 2)

options for controlling the amount of CO2 emitted

per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated. Sectorspecific options for lowering the demand for energy

are discussed in chapters 4 through 6.

Energy Taxes and Tax Incentives

Congress could impose direct financial burdens

(or benefits) on energy to curtail the use of energy

sources that are major contributors of greenhouse

gases. Two options that have been proposed are a

general energy tax and a carbon tax. Whereas a

general energy tax might be based on, say, the Btu

content of energy sources, a carbon tax would be

calculated on carbon emissions. Under such a

formula, the tax would be highest on coal, low for

natural gas, and zero for noncarbon sources.23 The

carbon tax is a particularly effective way of levying

the heaviest economic sanctions against the worst

emitters of CO2

. Either type of tax would lower

energy users’ overall demand. A carbon tax would

also change the mix of energy sources in the

economy. It would stimulate greater demand for

natural gas relative to other fossil fuels. That, in turn,

most certainly would drive natural gas prospecting

and resource recovery technology development. It

could also provide added motivation to develop

more noncarbon energy sources and more quickly

bring on line existing low-carbon technologies such

as natural gas-fired combined cycle turbines.

Using several econometric models, the Congresssional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that a carbon

tax of $100 per ton would, at minimum, hold CO2

emissions to just about current levels and might

lower them as much as 25 percent below current

—. —

22Note, however, that this estimate is very sensitive [o forecasted natural gas prices. The increase would be about $0.03 to $0.04 per klk% assuming

2010 prices. Note also, that once these existing facilities retire, cos(s I nust be compared to repl.~cement coal plants. Eleetriclt} costs from ncw coal-find

powerplants would be about $0,02 per kwh less than electricity from natural gas-fwed combined cvcle turbines assuming our 2015 prices and about $0.01

per kWh less assuming 2010 prices,

23cOngess wOul~ ~ve t. decide whe~er:0 @ blowss fuels. ~Ough biomass fiels emit CWbO~ if fuels we u~d cm a sustainable baSIS, the Cd30n

emitted will bc recaptured over the next few decades, Ideally, fuels grown sustainably would be exempt from a tax but those harvested with no prowsions

for replanting would be taxed at a rate similar to coal, In practice, this would be extremely difficult.
104 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

levels by 2000 (66a). By the end of the first decade,

the Gross National Product (GNP) would be lowered

by about 0.5 to 2.0 percent (about $40 to $130 billion

per year), though the GNP effects over the first few

years of a suddenly instituted policy could be 5

percent or more.

CBO looked at two different economic models

that forecast energy use past 2000, one used by the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the

other by the Electric Power Research Institute

(EPRI). Although they widely diverge by 2100,

primarily due to assumptions about Base case

growth, at 2015 they are reasonably similar to each

other and to our own base case and thus offer a useful

comparison of reductions and costs. The EPA model

forecasts that holding emissions to 10 to 15 percent

below current levels would lower GNP by about 1 to

1.3 percent by the year 2015. The EPRI model

forecasts that holding emissions to 20 percent below

current levels would lower GNP by about 3 percent

by that year.

Congress might also choose to adopt a modified

carbon tax that reflects methane emissions in addition to emissions of CO2

. Such a tax would still favor

natural gas, but not quite as much as when methane

emissions are ignored.

Oil and gas producers presently benefit from tax

incentives (e.g., through write-offs of intangible

drilling costs and a depletion allowance for small

producers). During the 1970s the depletion allowance was eliminated for large producers and significantly reduced for small producers. New tax incentives could be structured such that taxes decrease as

carbon content decreases. This would help make

natural gas (the lowest carbon-emitting fossil fuel)

more economically competitive, stimulate the

search for new sources, and spur development of

techniques for producing unconventional gas. Thus,

an appropriately crafted package of tax incentives

focused on natural gas would increase its role in the

U.S. energy system. If gas replaced some coal and

oil, CO2 emissions would also be reduced. The

primary difficulty with tax incentives is that as the

price of natural gas is reduced, the incentives for its

efficient use also decrease.

Tax incentives could also be used to encourage

electric utilities to use high-efficiency gas turbines.

Turbines historically have had shorter life spans than

conventional plants. A tax incentive program based

on efficiency could reduce the overall cost of using

the most efficient turbines. Similarly, cogeneration

activities could be made more attractive with tax

incentives.

Marketable Permits

Another market mechanism that can be used to

control CO2 emissions is the marketable emission

permit, an approach recently applied to control use

of CFCs and to limit emissions of sulfur dioxide to

control acid rain.

This regulatory mechanism, like carbon taxes, is

simple in theory. The government issues a limited

number of permits to energy users allowing a certain

level of carbon emissions. More permits would be

needed to burn coal than natural gas to produce the

same amount of energy, Permits can be bought and

sold on the open market.

As the economy expands and the demand for

energy rises, the price of a carbon permit will rise to

reflect the cost of holding emissions at a level fixed

by policymakers. Holders of permits will find ways

to lower emissions (e.g., purchase more efficient

equipment, switch from coal to natural gas, etc.) so

that they can sell their permits (at a profit) to others.

In theory, the effective price of fossil fuels (the cost

of the fuel plus the cost of the emission permit) will

rise just high enough to meet the allowed carbon

emission target. Just how high prices will rise,

however, is difficult to forecast.

With a carbon tax, the increased cost of fossil

fuels brings about similar results (more efficient

equipment and fuel switching), but the exact level of

emissions is difficult to predict. Theoretically, the

two approaches should yield the same result. If a

carbon tax of $100 per ton can lower emissions to 10

percent below current levels by the year 2000,

issuing marketable permits equivalent to emissions

10 percent below current levels should result in the

price of permits rising to $100 per ton. Taxes allow

more certain control over price. Permits offer more

certain control over emissions.

Marketable permits can be required for all fossil

fuel users or only large users such as utilities,

factories, and even large commercial installations.

For some uses (e.g., gasoline) regulations can be

written so that permits are required for wholesalers,

rather than individual end users (i.e., drivers).
Chapter 3--Energy Supply ● 105

A marketable permit system that applies to

utilities is discussed below (see ‘‘Improving Electricity Supply”).

Increase Research Development and

Demonstration Efforts

Over the last decade, Federal funding for renewable energy research development and demonstration (RD&D) has fallen rapidly (see figure 3-1 1).

Expressed in constant dollars, the 1990 combined

energy technology RD&D budgets were less than

half of what they were in 1980. Several recent

studies have suggested that for a comparatively

small increase in investment, the Federal Government could significantly hasten the development and

deployment of technologies that would reduce

greenhouse gas emissions. A study by the Oak Ridge

National Laboratory (ORNL) (47) recommends that

the government and major energy industry research

groups-namely the Electric Power Research Institute and the Gas Research Institute-increase spending levels by about a third over 1988 combined

RD&D budgets (to a level that is still below the 1980

combined budgets). Improved energy efficiency and

nuclear power are considered the two most promising RD&D approaches to achieving major reductions in CO2 emissions.

The Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI)

reached somewhat different conclusions about where

to spend the money. In a 1990 report (59), SERI

focused strictly on nonnuclear, nonfossil energy

sources. Nevertheless, it came to many of the same

conclusions as ORNL about how much energy

nonfossil-fuel sources could be contributing to the

U.S. economy over the next 20 to 40 years. In the

SERI Business-as-Usual scenario, nonfossil sources

contribute 15 percent of U.S. energy supply in 2030.

ORNL’s “Base Case” projected a 5 percent contribution by 2020. In SERI’s “Intensified R&D”

scenario, the nonfossil contribution in 2030 is about

30 percent. In the “High Efficiency’ scenario for

ORNL, that figure is about 35 percent.

At the very least, increased governmental RD&D

activity could result in some reduction in greenhouse

gas emissions if some of the fossil fuel conversion

technologies now in testing phases could be brought

on line sooner. The development of a commercial

fuel cell, could for example, lower CO2 emissions

per unit of energy from electricity generation. In

addition, even if the role of nuclear power in the

Figure 3-1 1—US. Energy Technology Research and

Development Budgets, 1978-88

1990 dollars (billions)

71

m Supporting

research

➤= Environment

u Conservation

= Renewables

~ Fossil

= Fusion

= Fission

80818283848586878889 90

Year

Funding for energy research in the United States has declined

sharply since 1980. The bars represent Federal budget authority

for research, development and technology demonstrations, in

1990 dollars. “Supporting” refers to research in basic energy

sciences.

SOURCE: J.P. Holclren, “Energy in Transition,” Scientific American,

September 1990, pp. 157-163.

energy supply system is to continue at a modest

level, research into better designs, waste disposal,

and related issues will have to continue. Of particular interest is the development and prototyping of

advanced reactors with ‘‘passively safe’ features.

Renewable energy sources face a host of technical

and institutional barriers that increased R&D support could help overcome. In addition to supporting

efforts to develop some of the more promising

technologies (e.g., storage technologies for solarelectricity, biomass-driven turbines, and variablespeed wind turbines), government actions could

reduce the risk of new technologies and help

integrate renewable in existing energy systems. The

former could be achieved with demonstration projects or, perhaps, government-backed loans. Both

SERI and ORNL concluded that the Federal budget

in this area was only about half of what it should be.

Increased resource characterization could also

help reduce CO2 emissions. For wind, geothermal,

solar, and natural gas to play a bigger role in meeting

global energy needs, it is vital to improve prospecting techniques and expand what is known about

these resources’ potential. In some instances, increased demand for an energy source or a properly
106 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

---2 , .-.. @ ,

Photo credit: U.S. Department of Energy

The south-facing roof of Georgetown University’s

Intercultural Center supports a 300 kilowatt photovoltaic

power system, the largest roof-mounted photovoltaic

system in the world consisting of over 4,400 PV

modules. Electricity generated by the roof is

channeled into the local power grid.

designed tax structure will provide an adequate

incentive for the private sector to undertake prospecting on its own. In other cases, however, market

forces alone may not provide enough incentive. It

could be difflcult to keep information on, for

example, wind or geothermal resources proprietary.

The financial commitment necessary for extensive

exploration might be prohibitive. The government

could perform, subsidize, and provide regulatory

incentives for resource assessment.

If natural gas is to play a significant role in CO2

emission reductions, it is important to find ways of

retrieving ‘‘unconventional’ gas reserves, geologic

reservoirs that hold significant amounts of the

resource but are difficult to exploit for one reason or

another. Accelerated development of leak-resistant

transportation systems could also be encouraged.

Plugging the Leaks in the Existing System

The present energy supply system could be

tightened to reduce energy and methane losses. As

noted earlier, significant electricity losses occur

during transmission and distribution. Better information is needed on the extent and nature of these

losses worldwide, particularly in non-OECD countries. Assistance in the form of money, equipment,

or expertise could help reduce losses in these

countries.

Some fossil fuel is lost during geologic extraction

and transport to the end user. Leaked gas is of

particular concern because of its contribution (of

methane) to the greenhouse effect. Several actions

could help reduce the amount of emissions from

natural gas extraction and delivery, oil extraction,

and coal mining. Regulations against venting gas in

the United States have effectively limited the release

of’ methane to the atmosphere in this country. The

U.S. rate is about 0.5 percent of annual production of

natural gas (83). The United States could encourage

other nations to follow suit. The United States also

has a well-developed infrastructure to transport and

sell gas with little leakage. Development aid to other

nations (see ch. 9) could support their construction

of the requisite infrastructure. The United States

could also export the technology and ‘‘know-how’

to deal with unwanted gas without releasing it to the

atmosphere. Such techniques, like the reinfection of

gas into oil wells, have been developed here in

association with production in remote locations,

most notably Alaska (83).

Improved data is needed on methane emissions

through leakage, particularly in non-OECD countries. Better and more meters to track gas distribution, along with improved monitoring practices,

could provide information crucial to formulating

response strategies for all sectors using natural gas

in these countries. Finally, incentives are needed

(both financial and regulatory) for the development

of technology to capture coal seam methane.

Improving Electricity Supply: Meeting

Demand With Lower CO2 Emissions

Emissions of CO2 from utilities can be lowered in

two ways: by reducing demand for electricity, and

by changing supply characteristics to lower the rate

of emissions (i.e., pounds of CO2 per kilowatt of

electricity generated). This section focuses exclusively on the latter approach, presenting policy

options for encouraging more efficient use of current

powerplants, use of fuels with inherently lower C02

emissions, and use of nonfossil energy sources.

Demand-side management programs are discussed

briefly in box 3-C and in greater detail in chapter 4.

We present options designed for existing plants

and for those not yet built, as well as a set of overall

policies that affect all plants.

Measures That Apply to Existing Plants

Earlier we presented three “Moderate” technical

options that can lower CO2 emissions from existing

plants at little or no additional cost when averaged

over the life of the program. These include:
Chapter 3--Energy Supply ● 107

Box 3-C--Electric Utility Demand-Side Management Programs

Utility planners are already beginning to look at ways to encourage the adoption of energy conservation

measures among residential, commercial, and industrial ratepayers as a way to reduce the need to build expensive

new powerplants. Conservation and other measures are part of a larger concept known as demand-side management

(DSM). In addition to encouraging energy conservation, DSM programs also include “load management” options

such as alternative rate structures to change the timing of eletricity use and measures to reduce excessive demand

during peak hours (e.g., hot summertime afternoons).

Electric utilities conduct DSM programs in various ways (27b):

. information dissemination (e.g., mass media attachments to electric bills);

● onsite energy audits and technical assistance;

● financial incentives (e.g., rebates, low-interest loans, and rate discounts);

● direct installation (e.g., low-flow showerheads, water heater wraps); and

● cooperation with trade allies (e.g., manufacturers and dealers, architects, engineers, builders).

Utility Conservation Case Study: The Northwest Power Planning Council 1990 Power Plan

The Northwest Power Planning Council] (NPPC) is an interstate compact agency approved by Congress that

reviews the activities of the Bonneville Power Administration, the Federal power marketing agency in the Pacific

Northwest. Recently the NPCC proposed a series of cost-effective conservation measures to reduce electricity

demand by 8 percent in the region by 2010, compared to forecasted levels (46a). These measures will eliminate the

need for six new coal-fired powerplants, at roughly half the cost.

Residential measures include those that lower space heating demands in new and existing homes (e.g.,

improved insulation, storm windows, reduced air leakage); more efficient water heating (e.g., insulated water

heaters, pipe wraps); and more efficient refrigerators, freezers and other appliances. The measures proposed by the

NPCC can reduce electricity demand in the residential sector by about 10 percent by 2010. Well over half is from

measures to lower space heating demands.

In the commercial building sector, the NPCC has proposed conservation memsures targeting lighting, space

heating, and cooling that can reduce commercial electricity use by about 13 percent by 2010. Measures that can be

retrofit in existing buildings are responsible for the majority of these reductions.

For the industrial sector, the NPCC has identified such conservation measures as improved motors, motor

controls, and lighting that can lower electricity demand in this sector by 3 percent by 2010. The NPCC has proposed

conservation measures that apply to agricultural irrigation that can reduce electricity use by about 12 percent (46a).

l~acm~=~~~ ~~1~ N~~~~@ p~wm _@ co~ad~ A@ ~b~~ ~~ 9&501), & fo~ No~st SW=

of Idaho, MontaIw OregoIL and Washington entered into an interstate compact in 1981. ‘l%e Act required the NPPC to develop and adopt a

2&year electrical power ptan and a program to protect, mitigate, and enhance f@ and wildlife resources in the region.

1. improving the efficiency of fossil-fuel-freed

plants through improved maintenance,

2. increasing the use of existing nuclear powerplants not currently operating at full capacity,

and

3. renovating existing hydroelectric generating

facilities to increase their output.

A fourth “Tough” option is to change the fuel mix

at existing plants.

have the authority to regulate retail electricity rates,

and thus have considerable influence over utility

operations. In practice, however, a few percent gain

in efficiency is not a top priority for many utilities or

States, nor are efficiencies routinely monitored.

Recently, however, some industry attention has

been given to methods for improving efficiencies

(15). The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

has a multi-year research program underway on

Improved Operation--Overseeing the operation methods to lower electricity costs through efficiency

of utilities is, in general, the responsibility of the improvements. The Federal Government could parStates. Theoretically, utilities should already be ticipate in this effort as well. In addition to DOEoperating their powerplants at optimal efficiency so funded research, TVA and the Federal power agenas to provide electricity to their consumers at the cies (e.g., Bonneville Power Authority) could underlowest cost. State public utility commissions (PUCs) take improvements at their own facilities. About 4
108 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

percent of the electricity generated from fossil fuels

comes from these Federal facilities (14).

The Federal Government, through the Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has some,

albeit indirect, ability to influence private utility

operations through its authority over prices and

conditions of wholesale power sales. Virtually all

generating utilities sell power to other utilities at

some point. If Congress feels that State PUCs are not

identifying and enforcing efficiency improvements,

it could direct FERC to include such considerations

when regulating wholesale power sales.

For nuclear powerplants, the relevant goal is to

increase the number of hours of operation, rather

than efficiency of fuel use. The most promising

option here is to establish a demonstration program

to increase utilization from the current 65 percent

(5,700 hours per year) to 75 percent (6,600 hours per

year). In 1975, Japanese nuclear plants operated

about 50 percent of the time. A 7-year improvement

and upgrade program increased utilization to 75

percent (23), Western Europe averages 75 percent,

as well. A coordinated demonstration program by

DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

might foster improvements to boost U.S. hours of

operation above the average in a timely fashion. Key

improvements would include preventive maintenance; installation of automated controls to improve

reactor operation, thereby reducing the number of

unscheduled shutdowns; and speedier refueling.

Switching to Lower Emitting Fuels—in addition

to efficiency improvements, CO2 emission rates

from existing fossil-fuel-fired utilities can be lowered by switching to lower emitting fuels, For

example, a typical Midwestern powerplant burning

Illinois coal emits about 0.60 pounds of carbon per

kWh of electricity generated (lbs C/kWh). By

burning a mixture of 75 percent coal and 25 percent

natural gas (or burning coal 9 months and gas 3

months per year) emissions will be lowered by 10 to

15 percent.

Such a goal can be achieved in several ways. A

high enough carbon tax (discussed above) would

encourage natural gas use by utilities. However, the

effect of such a policy would depend on the relative

price of coal and gas at each location. A carbon tax

in the range of $75 to $150 per ton would make gas

a more economic choice at many facilities, at least

over the next decade. 24 If the tax were much lower,

few utilities would find natural gas attractive; if it

were much higher, demand for gas could be so great

that prices would rise sharply.

A much more certain outcome would result from

setting Co2 emission limits. An emission rate limit

of 0.55 lbs C/kWh would require atypical Midwestern coal plant burning Illinois coal to burn about 10

to 30 percent natural gas, depending on its efficiency. Plants burning western coals, for example

from the Powder River basin, or Texas lignite might

have to burn between 25 and 45 percent gas to meet

this limit. Some efficient plants burning high-heatvalue eastern and western coals might meet the

standard with only a few to 10 percent natural gas,

but almost all existing facilities would need to burn

some gas to continue operation. At 0.55 lbs C/kWh,

the most efficient new coal-burning technologies

would just qualify (e.g., integrated coal gasification,

combined cycle, or IGCC) by burning coal alone.

Because some facilities will have difficulty getting natural gas or converting their boilers to use gas,

a marketable permit approach might be preferable.

Utilities would receive permits for the amount of

CO 2 that they are allowed to emit from their

coa1-fired units; permits could be traded on the open

market. Utilities would receive such permits based

on their generation in an historic year (e.g., 1990)

multiplied by an allowed emission rate (0.55 lbs

C/kWh, using the example above). Some utilities

would curtail coal use more than necessary to meet

their limits and others less, but the overall impact on

CO2 emissions would be the same as setting uniform

emission limits.

A variant on the above approach is to simply issue

permits for a limited amount of coal use in existing

facilities. Such an approach would be simpler to

administer than emission permits, but does not give

credit to more efficient coal plants or to lower

CO2-emmitting coals.

Measures That Apply to New Plants

Controlling Emission Rates FromNewFossil-FuelFired Plants—Many of the policy options available

to control emission rates from new fossil-fuel-fired

plants are similar to those for existing plants, but

greater opportunity exists for more stringent control.

Earlier, we discussed three electricity demand sce-

‘A carbon tax of $75 to $150 per ton would approximately double or triple coal prices and increase natural gas prices by over 50 percent.
Chapter 3-Energy Supply ● 109

narios, a Base case and two lower demand scenarios,

that assume “Moderate” and “Tough” conservation measures, respectively. Under the Base case

scenario, we estimated that at least some new coal

plants would have to be built (between 25 and 50

percent of all new plants) to meet demand. Under the

two lower demand scenarios, we estimate that

natural gas and renewable sources of energy are

plentiful enough to meet demand through 2015,

without the need for new coal plants. The choice of

appropriate policy options will depend on whether

the goal is to slow the rate of growth of new coal

plant construction or to impose a temporary moratorium on new coal plants through 2015 to allow time

to develop more efficient technologies. Under all of

our scenarios, however, some fossil fuel sources will

be needed to meet demand.

To limit construction of new coal plants a

predetermined number of coal permits (or carbon

permits specific to coal plants) could be auctioned

each year to the highest bidder. If such a policy were

adopted in combination with marketable permits for

existing coal plants, permits could be freely traded

among new and existing facilities.

Adoption of stringent CO2 emission limits for

new plants is one way of imposing a temporary

moratorium on new coal plants. Two somewhat

different strategies could be pursued. If the intent is

to force development of ultra-efficient coal technologies, then a standard in the range of 0.35 to 0.40 lb

C/kWh would be appropriate. Molten carbonate fuel

cells, if successful, might be able to meet such

emission rates using bituminous coals.

However, such a new source performance standard would do little to encourage improvement of

other fuel technologies. Current combined cycle

turbines burning distillate oil can meet such a

standard, and similar technologies burning natural

gas emit about 0.26 lb C/kWh. If the intent is to limit

new fossil-fuel-fired generation to the cleanest

sources only—advanced combined cycle turbines

burning gas—then setting a new source performance

standard at about 0.25 lb C/kWh would be more

appropriate.

Measures To Encourage Use of Nonfossil Fuel

Sources-Any of the general financial options

discussed above, such as a carbon tax or fossil fuel

energy tax, will serve to encourage use of nonfossil

sources for electricity generation. The Solar Energy

Research Institute and the National Laboratories

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Diagram of the Modular High Temperature Gas Reactor

(MHTGR), one of several new nuclear reactors designed to

be “passively safe.” In the event of loss of coolant, fuel

temperatures increase slowly enough to allow heat to be

conducted to the surrounding earth, thereby avoiding

massive failure and release of radiation.

recently evaluated the effect of a 2-cent/kWh subsidy for renewable sources of electricity (an increase

of 25 to 30 percent over the base case cost for

electricity) (59). They concluded that such a subsidy

(or, conversely, a tax on fossil fuel) would double the

penetration of renewable sources of electricity by

2010 as compared to a business-as-usual case and

allow these sources to cost-effectively meet 40

percent of the new demand for electricity. Hydroelectric power, wind power, and biomass provide the

bulk of the energy. A 2-cent/kWh subsidy is

equivalent to a carbon tax of $75 per ton of carbon

for coal and about $150 per ton of carbon for natural

gas.

Although nuclear power might benefit somewhat

from a carbon tax, the utility industry is unwilling to

undertake construction under the current social and

regulatory climate. New technologies are needed for

a revival of nuclear power in this country, but

utilities are not likely to order these technologies

until they have been demonstrated in full-scale

operation. Given the shape that the nuclear industry
110 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

.

is currently in, the pace of such demonstrations is

likely to be slow (if they happen at all). Appropriating funds to demonstrate new technologies is a

promising way of giving nuclear power another

chance at success.

A two-track program would offer the greatest

flexibility. DOE could help fund full-scale demonstrations of both new ‘‘evolutionary’ light water

reactors (LWR) and ‘revolutionary design changes

such as a modular high temperature gas reactor

(MHTGR). Demonstrations of the new technologies

that started operation by 2000, if successful, might

conceivably result in additional units on line by

2010. Evolutionary designs might be able to come

on line more quickly than revolutionary ones,

especially if one of the goals of the program is to

develop standardized designs to minimize licensing

time (68).

As noted earlier, research, development, and

demonstration funds are needed to increase the role

of renewable sources as well. SERI has estimated

that if current funding for renewable research were

increased to about $270 million per year (about two

and a half times current levels), the penetration of

renewable sources of electricity might double by the

2010-to-2020 timeframe (59). This has about the

same effect as a 2-cent/kWh subsidy. The SERI

forecast may overestimate the effectiveness of

accelerated research in lowering the cost of renewable technologies, but it is clear that research and

demonstration will help, particularly with respect to

geothermal and wind sources.

Measures To Hasten the Rate of Retirement of

Existing Facilities-Under the Base case demand

scenario, about 7 percent of the utility capacity

operating in 1990 will retire by 2015. One final

option for lowering emissions is to force older

fossil-fuel-fried plants to retire earlier than their

expected lifetime of 60 years. If all fossil-fuel-fired

plants were forced to retire after 40 years of

operation, about 35 percent of the existing capacity

will be eliminated by 2010 and 50 percent by 2015.

When combined with the measures discussed above

for new plants, considerable reductions are possible.

The 40-year time is arbitrary; it could be 30 or 35

years if desired, or longer if the costs for 40-year

retirement are thought to be excessive.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

22a.

23.

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Chapter 4

The Buildings Sector

Photo credit: SuperStock
CONTENTS

Page

OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

BUILDINGS IN OECD COUNTRIES . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Trends in Energy Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Techniques To Reduce Energy Use and

CO2 Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

CFC and Halon Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

BUILDINGS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES . . . 127

Trends in Energy Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Opportunities To Reduce Energy Use . . . . . . . . . . 128

OTA EMISSION REDUCTION SCENARIOS . . . 129

Base Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Moderate Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Tough Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Costs of the Tough Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

POLICY OPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Overview: Barriers and Policy Instruments . . . . . 134

End-Use Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Initial Purchase Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Tax Credits and Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Demand-Side Management (DAM) . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Appliance Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Building Energy Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Consumer Information and Marketing

Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Research, Development and Demonstration . . . . 142

CHAPTER PREFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Boxes

Box Page

4-A. Sweden: Surprising Room for Improvement . . 120

4-B. Energy Use in Soviet and Eastern European

Buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

4-C. Insulation and R-Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

4-D. Energy Management Systems and "Smart"

Homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

4-E. CFCs and Halons in Buildings... . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Figures

Figure Page

4-l. Contribution of the U.S. Buildings Sector to

U.S. CO2 Emissions From Fossil Fuels . . . . . 116

4-2. CO2 Emissions From the U.S. Buildings

Sector in 2015, Under the Base Case,

Moderate, and Tough Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

4-3. Annual Expenditures for Energy in Average

U.S. Households, 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

4-4. Components of Change in Fossil Fuel

Energy Use in Residential and Commercial

Buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

4-5. Energy Efficiency of Various Light Sources . 122

4-6. Space Heat Requirements in Single-Family

Dwellings in the United States and Sweden.. 124

4-7. Energy Efficiency Potential of U.S.

Residential Appliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

4-8. Summary of CO2 Emissions From the

U.S. Buildings Sector by Year, Under the

Base Case, Moderate, and Tough

Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

4-9. Fuel Use Under the Base Case, Moderate,

and Tough Scenarios, by Fuel Type . . . . . . . . 132

4-10. CO2 Emissions Reductions in 2000 and

2015 Expressed as a Percentage of 1987

Building Sector Emissions, by Control

Method, Under the Moderate Scenario . . . . . . 133

4-11. CO2 Emissions Reductions in 2000 and

2015 Expressed as a Percentage of 1987

Building Sector Emissions, by Control

Method, Under the Tough Scenario . . . . . . . . . 133

Tables

Table Page

4-1. Residential Buildings: Measures in the OT.A

Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

4-2. Commercial Buildings: Measures in the OTA

Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Chapter 4

The Buildings Sector

OVERVIEW

The buildings sector includes all activities related

to residential and commercial buildings.1 Two

greenhouse gases are of primary importance in this

sector-carbon dioxide (CO2

) and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). CO2 is emitted when fossil fuels and

biomass are burned (either directly onsite, or at

electric powerplants) to provide services such as

space conditioning, water heating, lighting, cooking,

refrigeration, and entertainment. CFCs are emitted

from foam insulation, air conditioners, and refrigerators.

Worldwide, the buildings sector accounts for

about 30 percent of CO2 emissions (108):

●

●

●

direct, onsite burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil,

gas) accounted for an estimated 14 percent of

global C02 emissions in 1985 (108);

electricity use in buildings accounted for 13

percent (i.e., over one-half of all CO2 emissions

from electricity generation) (108); and

burning fuelwood for domestic heating and —

cooking accounted for an additional few percent.

In the United States, the buildings sector accounts

for an estimated 36 percent of CO2 emissions (see

figure 4-1 ) and roughly 20 percent of CFC emissions

(35).

Activities in the buildings sector are directly

linked to other environmental and social concerns as

well. Burning fuelwood and coal, for example,

results in emissions of air pollutants such as

particulate matter and acid gases. Building new

residential and commercial developments can involve clearing forests and paving agricultural land.

The spatial pattern of such developments greatly

affects subsequent transportation requirements (see

ch. 5). Construction materials are supplied through

activities such as timber harvesting and processing,

and sand and gravel dredging which can also have

environmental impacts.

There is no single formula for reducing emissions

in the buildings sector. To do so, many technical

options will have to be implemented for both

residential and commercial buildings. Otherwise,

the effect of emission reductions in one area could

easily be negated by growth in another.

OTA modeled potential CO2 emissions in the U.S.

buildings sector for three scenarios (Base case,

Moderate, Tough). In the Moderate scenario, currently available technologies that pay for themselves

over the life of the equipment are adopted; these

include high-efficiency appliances and equipment,

increased insulation, and more efficient lighting

devices and designs. In this case, OTA estimates that

U.S. CO2 emissions in 2015 from buildings can be

reduced by about 5 percent relative to 1987 levels

(see figure 4-2). In the Tough scenario, technologies

that are expected to be commercially available in the

next decade could reduce U.S. building sector

emissions in 2015 by about one-third relative to

1987 levels (see figure 4-2). These projected reductions are achievable without major changes in the

mix of fossil fuels used for generating electricity for

buildings. Because a large portion of the energy used

in buildings is supplied by electricity which is

produced primarily by coal, the most CO2

-intensive

of the fuels, further reductions could be achieved by

changing how electricity is generated (see ch. 3).

In the United States, available policy levers to

implement these technical options include: energyuse taxes, initial purchase taxes, electric utility

‘ ‘Demand-Side Management, ’ appliance standards,

building codes, consumer information and marketing, and research and development. These options

can act synergistically to influence decisions regarding the design and operation of buildings and

building services.

In developing countries, the demand for energy

services in buildings will grow rapidly during the

next 25 years: per-capita growth in energy consumption in this sector is about 10 times that of counties

in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD)2 (72). While developing counl~e ~ommercl~ ~wtor ~ncompm~e~ ~ny ~nteqfi~es, includlng offices, wmeh~uses, schoo]s, he~~ cme, food sales and servlccs, and lodging.

‘The 24-member OECD includes Australi% Austi& Belgium, Canada, Denmark, FinIand, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, h-eland, Italy, Japan,

Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nonvay, Pontugal, Spai% Sweden, Switzerland, lbrkey, U. K., and U.S.

–115–
116 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 4-l–-Contribution of the U.S. Buildings Sector to U.S. CO2 Emissions From

Fossil Fuels

Industry

32%

Water heat 9%

Lights 14%

I Cooling 14%

Buildings Appliances 20%

36%

Space heat 43%

Transportation

32%

Percent of total by sector

(1.3 billion metric tons/year)

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

tries currently meet a large share of their energy

needs in buildings by using biomass, much of their

growth in energy demand (and hence greenhouse gas

emissions) in the buildings sector is associated with

the spread of electrical services throughout their

economies, The use of energy-efficient technologies

and practices can slow the rate of increase of CO2

emissions without compromising economic development. However, net reductions below current

levels are unlikely.

BUILDINGS IN OECD

COUNTRIES

Trends in Energy Use

In OECD countries, the buildings sector accounted for 38 percent of primary energy use in

19853—23 percent in the residential portion and 15

percent in the commercial portion (67). Space

conditioning (heating or cooling) dominates energy

use, accounting for 60 to 80 percent of final energy

demand in residential buildings and 60 to 65 percent

in commercial buildings (30, 67).4 Most of this is for

heating; air-conditioning, for example, accounted

for only 3 percent, on average, of residential energy

Percent of

emissions from buildings

(0.47 billion metric tons/year)

use in 1980 throughout the OECD. Water heating

and lighting generally are the other major uses in

commercial buildings; water heating, electric appliances, and cooking are the other major uses in

residential buildings.s

In the United States, space heating is the dominant

energy user in buildings, accounting for 43 percent

of CO2 emissions from the entire sector (figure 4-l).

In the residential portion, space heating accounted

for 30 percent of the annual energy expenditures in

average U.S. households in 1987 (see figure 4-3).

Other important end uses in both types of buildings

are lighting, water heating, and air-conditioning,

along with refrigeration and cooking in residences

and ventilation in commercial buildings (10, 75, 76).

More than 20 percent of all electricity generated in

the United States is used for lighting, primarily in

buildings (other uses include, for example, street

lighting) (97). In contrast with the OECD as a whole,

air-conditioning is a significant end-use in the

United States (78), accounting for 22 percent of the

CO2 emissions in the commercial sector, for example.

~~q energy ~oumes include nonrenewable fossil fuels (coat, petroleum, natural gas), potentially renewable biomass, and renewable such as

solar, geothermal, and hydroelectric power. Electricity is a secondary energy source produced from primary energy sources.

4Space ~ondltioning refens tO ‘ ‘active ‘‘ methods of cooling or heating, i.e., requiring inputs of fuel and usually some kind of mechanical deviee that

must be deliberately activated or deactivated aeeording to needs. Passive mctiods operate with relatively little deliberate intervention depend on natural

flows of energy (e.g., sohu energy), aud are mediated by building design.

5EnerW use dufig cons~ctlon i~i not covered here; s~dies in fhe 1970s indicated mat it is a relatively smw portion Of tO@l energy USe in tie

buildings sector, equal to about 5 yearn of operational energy use (36, 84).
Chapter 4--The Buildings Sector * 117

Figure 4-2—CO2 Emissions From the U.S. Buildings

Sector in 2015, Under the Base Case, Moderate,

and Tough Scenarios

Emissions in 2015 as a percent of 1987 levels

~-—

.— I

1 20%

I@

I

100% ~

I 4

~1987 level

~ Water heat r— 20%

w ,“

Base Moderate Tough

1987 emissions ■ 470 million metric tons/year

For comparison, lines representing the 1987 baseline and 20

percent below that level are indicated. Emissions from biomass

fuels are not included here.

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1991,

Figure 4-3--Annual Expenditures for Energy

in Average U.S. Households, 1987

Refrigerator/freezer $239 A ;- -

\

Dishwasher $12 ~, ‘ Washer/dryer $77 ..F

Microwave $7 +’-

Furnace fan $46 ! =

Color TV $22~

q~

Range/oven $42 ~

Other appliances $22

Lighting $84

Water

heating $154

Space

heating $350

Total annual expenditure = $1,164

Five major end-uses---space heating, refrigerating, water heating,

air-conditioning, and lighting—account for 80 percent of average

household expenditures. (This chart shows electric appliances

only and assumes average cost of 7 cents per kWh.)

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, adapted from U.S.

Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,

Household Energy Consumption andExpenditure (Washington,

DC: 1989), figure 9 and table 3. Lighting data provided by A.

Meier, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory.

Energy use in U.S. residences, on a per-squarefoot basis, is higher than in Japan, Italy, and Sweden,

but lower than in France, the United Kingdom, and

West Germany (77, 105). Energy use for heating and

electricity in commercial buildings in Canada and

the United States, after accounting for differences in

climate, is 20 to 30 percent higher per unit area than

in Europe (78).

Most OECD countries have undertaken considerable efforts since 1973 to conserve energy (see ch.

9). These efforts have significantly slowed the

growth in energy demand in residential and commercial buildings. Figure 4-4 shows how U.S. residential energy use dropped due to a combination of

technical efficiency improvements, conservation

(using less), and demographic changes (decreasing

household size and migrating to warmer climates).

A countervailing trend, though, has been an

increase in electrification, due to increases in the use

of electricity for space and water heating and for

electric appliances, and, in the United States, for

air-conditioning. Of new U.S. homes built in 1986,

44 percent were electrically heated, compared to

only 15 percent in 1983; 70 percent were built with

central air-conditioning in 1986, compared with 34

percent in 1970. As a result, primary energy use in

the United States between 1979 and 1985 increased

by 9.1 percent in the commercial sector and 0.7

percent in the residential sector (62).

The net effect of electrification on CO2 emissions

depends partly on the mix of fuels used to generate

electricity. If electricity is generated from nuclear

power or renewable sources (i.e., solar, wind,

geothermal, nuclear, biomass), more electrification

will not increase CO2 emissions, all other things

being equal. The net effect also depends on the

relative efficiencies of fuel- and electric-driven

equipment. For example, electric resistance heat

(e.g., electric baseboard radiators, or portable or

wall-mounted coil heaters) uses about three times as

much primary energy per delivered unit of final

energy (the average efficiency of a U.S. powerplant)

as the most efficient gas or oil furnaces and the most

efficient electric heat pumps. When gas heat pumps

reach the market, they will use even less primary

energy per unit of delivered energy than today’s

electric heat pumps (see table 4-l).

Over the next 25 years, slow growth in the

demand for energy services is expected in the

residential sector of OECD countries. This is because population and household growth are expected to be low, and because there is a saturation of

major appliances in these countries. Most homes in

OECD countries already have hot water, refrigera-
118 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 4-4-Components of Change in Fossil Fuel Energy Use in Residential and Commercial Buildings

Residential

Delivered energy (quadrillion Btu’s)

147

Commercial

Delivered energy (quadrillion Btu’s)

141

13

12

11

1 0

9

8

7

6

5

0

72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86

c1

Ez2

Migration

Wood use

Sh

hell efficiecy

new homes )

Household size

?B?l%!:!ciency

Space heating

Appliance use and

efficiency

Actual energy use

A number of factors contributed to the 4 quads of delivered energy

savings in the residential sector in 1986”:

-.

●

●

●

●

●

✎

●

Appliance Use and Efficiency: 1.0 quad. This reflects both the

increase in more efficient household appliances and wiser use

of appliances in general.

Space Heating Behavior: 1.0 quad. This includes short-term

reversible actions, such as adjustments to thermostat settings

and closing off unused living areas. These savings are less

than in 1982, suggesting a return of thermostat settings to

higher levels.

Shell Retrofits: 0.8 quad due to weatherstripping, insulation,

and caulking. This component has decreased in recent years

partly due to lower fuel prices and the end of energyconservation tax credits.

New Home Shell Efficiency: 0.4 quad. New homes and the

equipment in them are more energy efficient.

Wood Use: 0.3 quad, reflecting consumer use of wood in place

of conventional heating fuel.

Household Size: 0.3 quad. The number of persons per

household has decreased steadily from 1972 to 1986, resulting

in less energy use per household.

Migration: 0.3 quad. This includes the population shift to the

= Non-shell retrofits

n New buildings

_ Shell retrofits

-_ Actual energy use

6

5

o’

72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86

Three major factors contributed to the 1.7 quads of delivered

energy savings realized by the commercial sector in 1986:

●

●

●

Non-Shell Retrofits: about 1.4 quads. These include more

energy-efficient maintenance procedures, use of computerized

energy-management systems, replacement of heating and

cooling equipment, and more energy-efficient lighting.

New BuiIdlngs: about 0.1 quad. The savings are attributable to

the addition of new, more energy-efficient building designs with

energy efficient equipment.

Shell Retrofits: about 0.2 quads. These include increased

insulation, weatherstripping, and installation of special windows.

South and West regions of the United States, where households use less energy for heating but more for cooling.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, Energy Conservation Trends: Understanding the Factors That Affect

Conservation Gains in the U.S. Economy, DOt3PE-0092 (Washington, DC: September 1989).

tors, electric lights, and central heating (which are electronic equipment in offices, for example, is

kept at comfortable temperatures) (57, 32). On the projected to increase. In the United States, the

other hand, increased domestic use of air- demographic shift to the South and West also will

conditioning could occur. enhance the trend toward electrification—buildings

However, energy demand in commercial build- in these regions are likely to be electrically heated,

ings could grow rapidly if OECD economies con- while buildings in the Northeast are generally heated

tinue to expand. Use of computers and other by oil or gas (78).
Chapter 4--The Buildings Sector ● 119

Techniques To Reduce Energy Use

and CO2 Emissions

Energy use will vary with the type of building, In

commercial buildings, for example, key determinants include the mix of activities (e.g., manufacturing v. office space v. living area), amount of floor

space, thermal characteristics of the building, and

types of fuel used. These factors in turn are

influenced by the density, design, and distribution of

surrounding buildings-e. g., demographic characteristics; climate; availability of land, materials, capital, and labor; energy costs; cultural and individual

preferences; and the capabilities of the architects.6

Cost-effective reductions in energy use (and

associated CO2 emissions) can be achieved through

greater use of energy-efficient equipment (lights,

heaters, air conditioners), insulation, and improved

windows; fuel switching; better operation and maintenance (O&M) practices; and changes in how

families and businesses occupy buildings and use

energy within them (30, 43, 50, 60). Reductions in

CFC emissions also are possible (see below),

Because the average lifetime is about 100 years

for a home and 50 years for a commercial building

in the United States, initial reductions in greenhouse

gas emissions will come primarily from retrofitting

existing buildings with energy-efficient equipment

and better insulation, windows, and other energyconserving structural features (27, 28, 39). Existing

commercial buildings, for example, can be retrofitted with lighting, insulation, and windows that use

20 to 25 percent less energy, with typical payback

periods of 2 to 3 years (50). Since appliances and

other equipment wear out significantly faster than

buildings (lifetimes of about 10 to 25 years),

replacement with more efficient equipment can

bring about reductions in CO2 and CFC emissions

relatively quickly.

By 2010, however, about one-third of residences

and over one-half of commercial buildings in the

United States will have been built after 1990, so

changes in building codes for new construction

could also have an important effect over the next 25

years. Installing better insulation and efficient equipment during construction of new buildings is less

expensive and more effective than retrofitting them

later. New commercial buildings designed to be

energy efficient use about one-half the energy on

average of existing buildings (54).

In all buildings, more efficient operation and

proper maintenance can significantly reduce energy

use, generally at a relatively small cost compared to

the cost of providing additional energy. A wide,

available array of electronic systems, for example,

can be installed to automatically control heating,

lights, air conditioners, and other energy-using

devices (for example, see box 4-D below).

Because the structure of energy use in the

buildings sector is comparable throughout the OECD

(67), these technical options should generally be

applicable in most other OECD nations, despite

variations in energy prices and weather conditions.7

Even in countries like Sweden that have long

promoted energy efficiency in buildings, reductions

in CO2 emissions still are possible (see box 4-A).

The potential for improved energy efficiency and

reduced CO2 emissions is even greater in Eastern

Europe and the U.S.S.R. (see box 4-B).

Lighting

The amount of energy used for lighting can be

reduced by using more efficient bulbs, automatic

lighting controls (such as occupancy sensors and

individual controls), and design improvements such

as task lighting. Lighting accounts for over 25

percent of CO2 emissions in the commercial sector;

it offers perhaps the single largest, and certainly the

most cost-effective, method for reducing fossil fuel

use in the commercial sector. Many of the options

for reducing energy use in lighting offer paybacks in

less than 2 years, depending on how intensively they

are pursued.

The common incandescent bulb uses electricity to

heat a filament until it glows, but approximately 90

percent of the electricity is converted to heat, not

light. Replacing incandescent with fluorescent bulbs

can reduce energy use by up to 75 percent (figure

4-5). Further gains of up to 50 percent are possible

with the use of high-efficiency lamps and ballasts.8

In addition to reducing the electricity needed for

lighting, more efficient lighting gives off less heat to

6For ~lscusslom~ of tie hlst~ri~a] ~O]e of ~]lmate in determining he quality and l~a[ion of buildings, S& mfS, 19, 20.

7However, ~o]lclcs t. jmp]ement tiese measures are not necessady the same ~oughout ~c OECD (see ch 9).

8A balla~[ is ~ device that Provides a ~o](age high enough 10 ionize ~~apor jn the tube and fhen ]lrnlls the Currerll for stable O~tXatIOfl.
120 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 4-A—Sweden: Surprising Room for Improvement

Sweden is often viewed as a model energy-conserving society. For example, it is noted for having the most

demanding construction standards in the world for new buildiings and, hence, the world’s most energy-efficient

buildings. Approximately 40 percent of buildings in Sweden are heated with district heat. Further, much of the heat

comes from variety of unconventional sources including urban ‘waste-to-energy’ plants, large (up to 20 MW) heat

pumps using sewage water as a heat source, wood waste, industrial waste heat, agricultural waste, and even solar

energy (supplying housing developments at a scale of up to about 300 to 400 units per system). Despite this, there

may still be room for improvement.

Building Standards and Policies

As early as 1975, thermal requirements for windows were set at levels that could only be satisfied by triple

glazing, a practice not common in new homes at the time. The 1976 standards also required heat recovery systems

for commercial and large apartment buildings, and insulation of heat distribution pipes. Sweden has tightened its

standards several times since then (77, 112). To help meet these standards, Sweden also provided various incentives

(1 12). For example, grants to promote energy conservation in existing buildings, available since 1984, have been

given if adequate energy conservation measures are included in retrofit projects. “Soft loans” have been available

for improvements in residential buildings more than 30 years old, and subsidies that cover about 50 percent of

interest costs have been offered for multifamily houses. Some of these mechanisms, however, were suspended

between 1987 and 1989 (100).

Other policies contributed to construction innovations. In the 1970s, for example, by promising to cancel loan

payments for projects that did not produce expected energy savings, the government eliminated economic risks

involved in testing experimental designs and technologies. National R&D funds for technology development helped

bring new products, such as residential heat pumps, onto the market. These programs were implemented during a

period of rising oil prices and low electricity prices (1 12).

A Scenario for Future Improvements

Potential for reducing energy use in buildings still may exist. One study estimated future energy use in Sweden

based on implementing the best currently available technologies and advanced technologies expected to be

commercialized between now and the year 2020 (31, 32). It projected dramatic reductions in CO2 emissions, ranging

from 78 to 90 percent, primarily as a result of: 1) major efficiency improvements; and 2) a shift away from direct

use of fossil fuels toward electrification based on nonfossil fuel generating capacity. As a result, the building sector’s

share of total energy use was projected to drop from 35 to 20 percent.

This scenario also demonstrates how reducing demand can create more flexibility on the supply side. As

demand is reduced, the most costly supply technologies, from an environmental and national security standpoint,

do not have to be pursued, or at least their use can be minimized. For example, Sweden’s program to reduce energy

use in buildings is part of its strategy for eliminating nuclear power and reducing dependence on foreign oil over

the next few decades.

the room, thus reducing air-conditioning require- trols that permit light levels to be dimmed when less

ments.

Excess use of light can be avoided by: placing

light switches in convenient locations; installing

individual switches for each light; and using automatic controls to turn lights off or to adjust their

intensity. This can be done with simple timers, or

sensors that measure light levels or detect whether or

not an area is occupied. Excess energy use also

occurs when individual lights generate more light

than is needed. This can be avoided by using

lower-wattage bulbs, task lighting, and using conlight is required.

Space Conditioning

The amount of energy used for heating and

cooling can be decreased through improved thermal

integrity, improved equipment energy efficiency,

and siting and landscaping decisions.

Thermal integrity can be improved by insulating

buildings to reduce infiltration of outside air. To

retrofit buildings9—with typical savings of 20 to 25

percent and paybacks in 2 to 9 years (50), the most

9Bulld1ng ~cmoflts me modifications t. exlsllng equipment or the building shell to reduce energy use (e.g., adding imularion, up~ading ventilation

quipmcnt in commercial buildings, iidding storm windows, etc),
Chapter 4--The Buildings Sector . 121

Box 4-B—Energy Use in Soviet and Eastern European Buildings

U.S.S.R.

The Soviet building sector accounts for approximately 20 percent of final energy use, including 49 percent of

all heat and 14 percent of all electricity (71). Within the sector, energy is used predominantly for heat (77 percent),

followed by electricity (17 percent) and direct fuel use (6 percent).l As of 1985, per-capita energy consumption in

Soviet buildings was less than one-half that in the United States (7), at least partly because of smaller per-capita

living area and less use of appliances (74).

Several opportunities exist for conserving energy in buildings. First, the thermal integrity of buildings could

be greatly improved, as over one-third of all energy used in buildings is wasted (71). Housing shortages and lack

of capital allocated to the sector have resulted in hastily erected apartment buildings with poor therma1 integrity.

Building energy efficiency codes are very low; for example, recommended wall insulation for Moscow is the same

as in California, which has a much warmer climate (74).

Second, heat losses from district heating distribution systems (due to poor insulation of pipelines, long

distances between sources of heat and end use, lack of antirust materials, and frequent power outages) could be

reduced (71). A large portion of urban Soviet buildings are heated by district heating, up to half of which may be

cogenerated.

Third, the energy efficiency of appliances could be irnproved this is particularly important in light of expected

growth in appliance use. Current Soviet appliances are less efficient than western ones; for example, Soviet

refrigerators use an estimated 30 to 40 percent more electricity than larger sized models in western countries (71).

Fourth, natural gas, which the U.S.S.R. has in abundance, could be used in place of, for example, coal.2 The

building sector is the only branch of the Soviet economy where coal is the most prevalent fuel; in 1980, coal supplied

over 40 percent of all heat for housing and municipal buildings. This accounted for one-third of total fuel use.

Electricity is projected to supply only 13 percent of the sector’s energy needs by 2000 (7).

One major obstacle to achieving these opportunities is government subsidization of energy costs to

consumers-for example, occupants in Soviet buildings pay a fixed fee for heating based on the square footage of

their apartments, regardless of how much energy they use (also see ch. 9). Metering systems are almost nonexistent.

And, gains made in improved thermal integrity of buildings and in production of more efficient appliances could

be more than offset by per-capita increases in living area and use of appliances, depending on the overall rate of

economic growth.

Eastern Europe

Buildings accounted for 28 percent of primary energy demand in Eastern Europe in 1985 (46). As incomes

grow, so will other attributes such as air-conditioning, living area per capita, and, consequently, overall energy

demand. One study projected that without major policy changes encouraging energy efficiency, total energy

consumption in the buildings sectors would double between 1985 and 2025; even with the implementation of

energy-efficiency policy measures, energy consumption was still projected to increase by nearly 50 percent.

Not surprisingly, potential changes vary considerably among countries. In the residential sector, for example,

no decline in energy use per square foot should be expected in Romania, because energy consumption in Romanian

residences already is very low. In contrast, improvements could occur in Poland, because high-quality coal or natural

gas could replace low-quality coal, which currently provides the vast majority of heat in residences.

IDkect fuel usc &ludes fuels not used to pmduee thermal power for space heating. However, many dual-purpose stoves u~ fOr mo~g

and heating, and t%eled mostty by coat and wood, are emsidered indireet fhel consumers. Here, direet fuel use includes onty natural gas, liquefied

petroleum gas, and kerosene used for stoves, small boilers, hot water in laundries and Whmoma, etc. (71).

z~e~er~$ would reduce greenhouse gas emissions depends partly on whether the U.S.S.R. can reduee its mte of methane l-ge from

natural gas production and distribution.

feasible options generally are to: 1) caulk and e.g., through installing double- and triple-paned

weatherstrip cracks around doors and windows; 2) windows with higher insulating values (see box

add more insulation in roofs and walls; 3) install 4-C). Just adding attic insulation alone in homes

draperies and/or shades; and 4) improve windows, with little or none can reduce space heating require-
122 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 4-5-Energy Efficiency of Various Light Sources

Incandescent

Mercury

Fluorescent

Metal halide

High pressure

sodium

Low pressure

sodium

o 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

Light delivered (lumens per watt)

fluorescent includes ballast losses.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficient Lighting, DOE/CE-0162 (Washington, DC: 1986).

ments by 15 to 33 percent with simple paybacks in to one-half of the energy required by the average

2 to 6 years (33).10 new house (see figure 4-6).

New buildings can be constructed with more Improved equipment for heating, ventilating, and

compact forms, oriented to take advantage of air-conditioning (HVAC) will be important to desunlight, and designed with less and/or different crease energy use in commercial buildings (39). The

glazing. ‘‘Passive’ solar-heating systems can be best new HVAC equipment uses 30 to 90 percent

used to exploit the Sun’s energy during cold periods. less energy than existing stock (39). Automatic

The most energy-efficient new houses use one-third controls play an increasingly important role; these

1~~.shelter~ homes, which use the surrounding earth itself as insulation and for protection from winds, can be cost-effective in colder CkIateS

with low humidities and proper soil and siting conditions (37, 48).
Chapter 4--The Buildings Sector ● 123

Box 4-C--Insulation and R-Values

Keeping buildings warm in winter and cool in summer requires a considerable amount of energy. This energy

use can be cut by reducing the amount of heat (or ‘coolness”) lost through the ceiling, walls, and floor of a building.

All materials conduct heat to some extent, but some conduct more than others. A material’s resistance to heat

flow is measured in units called “R”. A ceiling with an R-value of 20, for example, will lose only half as much

heat as a ceiling with an R-value of 10. Some typical R-values for ceilings, walls, and floors in several locations

in the United States are shown below. In general, homes in colder climates have higher R-values. Uninsulated homes

have very low R-values.

Representative R-values

Ceilings walls Floors

Uninsulated home . . . . . . . . . 1-3 2-5 1-5

New homes:

Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-22 11-12 0

Washington, DC . . . . . . . . 30 12-17 11-19

Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 17 19

Almost half the heat in an uninsulated building is lost through the ceiling, about one-fourth through windows

and air flow, 20 percent through the floor, and 12 percent through the walls. Increasing R-values can reduce these

losses. Adding about 3.5 inches of wall insulation, for example, will increase wall R-value by about R-12. Achieving

R-38 requires 9 to 18 inches of insulation. Increasing ceiling insulation in Washington, DC, from none to R-19 can

reduce heating bills by about 40 percent and cooling bills by about 20 percent.

A normal single-glazed window is rated at about R-1, whereas a standard insulated wall is rated at R-n or

better. Heat lost through windows can be cut in half by adding a second pane of glass (largely due to the insulating

space between the two panes); such storm windows are rated R-2. Coating one of the inner surfaces with a thin film

of a transparent low-emissivity material (such as tin oxide) reflects infrared heat back into the house-this will raise

the rating to R-3. Replacing the air between the two panes of glass with better insulators (such as xenon or argon)

will yield a R-4.5 to R-6 window.

Figure 4C-1 below de- Figure 4C-1-Superinsulated Wall and Window

picts some of the newest insulation technologies for homes

and windows. Superinsulated m?

walls and windows can reduce

home heating needs by more

than 75 percent compared with

homes built before 1973. This

wall (built in Sweden) prevents heat seepage by using

I-beam studs of masonite held

between two pine flanges. The

heavily insulated walls are

sealed on the inside with a

plastic membrane to prevent

indoor moisture from condensing on the cold insulation in

the wall. Heat loss through

windows is cut by coating one

of the double-glazed windows

with tin oxide and filling the

air space with argon or xenon

gas. SOURCE: A.H. Rosenfeid and D. Hafemeieter, C’Energy-Efficient Building,” SckntMc

SOURCES: Refs. 17,70,80,86. American 25S(4):78-S5, April 1988.
124 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 4-6-Space Heat Requirements in SingleFamily Dwellings in the United States and Sweden

UNITED STATES

Average house

New house (1980)

California standards

Range of selected -———

energy-efficient homes

SWEDEN

Average house

Built to 1975 Codes

FRange of selected ~+

energy-efficient homes

t ‘–~--

-

T

––

7- ‘-T

-

T

–

‘T ‘–T +

0 20 40 60 80 10012014016 0

Btu’s per square meter per degree-day

The most energy-efficient new homes in Sweden and the United

States use one-third the energy of the average new home and

even less than the average home in general (including older

homes).

SOURCES: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, adapted from Goldemberg et al., 1988.

range from common household programmable thermostats to electronic devices that are capable of

responding to ambient conditions (e.g., outside and

inside temperature and humidity, as well as information from local utilities). Some designers and

builders have attempted to develop ‘‘smart’ homes,

in which energy management is electronically integrated with other household services (see box 4-D).

The efficiency of HVAC systems also can be

improved through proper maintenance. Air conditioners, for example, contain heat exchangers that

absorb heat from the building’s air and discharge

heat outside the building. The efficiency of these

heat exchangers is compromised if dirt, dust, and

debris reduce the flow of air over the exchangers and

the rate of heat flow from the exchanger.

Building designs can be improved to make more

use of natural ventilation and rely less on fans or

air-conditioning. Planting trees and shrubs near

buildings can reduce the use of energy through direct

shading effects in the summer and wind protection

in the winter (1; also see ch. 7). Large numbers of

trees and light building surfaces may lessen the

“heat island’ effect associated with large cities and

thereby reduce energy use (1, 42).

Changes in how buildings and energy are used by

occupants also can contribute to energy savings. One

option is to heat and cool only some rooms of a home

and to conserve hot water. Another possibility is to

minimize the conditioned space used per person, for

example by purchasing smaller housing or by having

more occupants in existing housing (e.g., children

living at home for longer periods, renting rooms to

borders). Multifamily dwellings share outside walls,

thereby reducing wall area exposed to the elements

and reducing space conditioning requirements.

Water Heating, Appliances, Cooking

The efficiency of other major end-uses also can be

improved (28). The best 1988-model refrigerators,

freezers, gas space heaters, air conditioners, electric

water heaters, and lights are all at least 30 percent

more efficient than typical models in use today (see

figure 4-7). Several studies indicate potential lifecycle savings for a range of efficiency improvements

in refrigerators, freezers, and water heaters (53, 101).

Equipment expected to become available in the

1990s shows additional promise for efficiency gains.

The National Appliance Energy Conservation Act

of 1987 (NAECA, Public Law 100-12), which set

minimum-efficiency standards for many appliances,

ll will result in the least efficient appliances

being taken off the market. One study estimated that

this will lower residential energy use by about 0.9

quads (about 5 to 10 percent of current residential

energy use) by the year 2000 (28). The American

Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy estimated

that appliances sold through the year 2000 in the

United States could be operated at peak periods with

25 fewer large powerplants than would have been

required had efficiency improvements not been

made (2). However, NAECA does not set standards

as high as can be achieved by the best currently

available models,l2 nor is it specifically technologyforcing (28). The Act does require that standards be

1 l~een Product ~~ we ~cluld~: 1) refrigerators, ~frigerator-freez~s and &z~s; 2) room air conditioners; 3) central ah conditioners and

central air-conditioning heat pumps; 4) water heaters; 5) fhrnaces; 6) dishwashers; 7) clothes washers; 8) clothes dryers; 9) direct heating equipment;

10) kitchen ranges and ovens; 11) pool heaters; 12) television sets; and 13) fluorescent lamp ballasts.

IZFrom a Cost-effwtivm=s ~ryWtive, rhk may be remonable for heating and cooling equipment--e. g., a tigh+filciency ~ce ~Y be a

reasonable investment in Maine, but it would no[ save enough energy to recover first costs in Florida.
.

Chapter 4-The Buildings Sector ● 125

Box 4-D—Energy Management Systems and “Smart” Homes

Large reductions in energy use (and hence emissions) are possible with energy management systems. These

systems basically allow energy demand in a building to be managed to meet a variety of objectives, including greater

convenience, improved security, lower operating costs, and energy conservation. They range from relatively simple

programmable thermostats for homes to expensive, sophisticated microprocessor systems for large commercial

buildings.

One ambitious project in the United States involves designing, building, and operating a home that integrates

energy management and other household functions in an electronic system that is linked to outside information

sources. This “Smart House Project” is a cooperative effort headed by the Research Foundation of the National

Association of Home Builders. As typically conceived, a house might use as many as 150 microcontrollers, all

capable of being individually controlled and monitored but all integrated into a single system that permits control

of any individual component from many locations within the building. Occupants could program the operation of

appliances in advance. Appliance energy use and performance could be monitored, providing information that could

be used to cut energy use and maintenance costs. The linkage with outside entities could allow inputs such as

price-signals from the local utility or remote commands from absent occupants. This type of approach to automation

is seen by some as being potentially revolutionary (9, 29, 47). Figure 4D-1 below is a diagram of a Smart House.

The Smart House Project is one of many whole-house automation efforts, including programs in Europe and

Japan. These projects represent one area of a broader movement to increase the automation of buildings for a variety

of reasons, ranging from load management (91) to improved building security. A small but rapidly expanding

number of commercial buildings presently are automated with energy management systems (27, 59). Barriers to

further penetration include a lack of familiarity with such systems, high costs, and lack of standardization.

Figure 4D-1—A “Smart House”

IE#

.$ .J -

S-row

ltJTERc Qt.!

OETECTOR

HUt.hlTY 8

2-B

., ! / –– --——- - - ---u- –-–- — c

“Smart Houses” offer increased comfort at a reasonable price and are far more energy-efficient than the average home. At the hear

of each house is an automated-control box that monitors heating, air-conditioning, lighting, and security systems. In more advanced

homes, the owner can adjust the temperature and humidity and turn appliances on and off by touching a wail-mounted screen.

Passive measures, including well insulated walls, roofs that reflect solar radiation, and shade trees (particularly on the south and

west sides of the building to mitigate the Sun’s heat), can also save energy.

SOURCE: R. Bevington and A.H. Rosenfeld, “Energy for Buildings and Homes,” Sdentifichwican 263(3):76-66, September 1990.
126 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 4-7—Energy Efficiency Potential of

U.S. Residential Appliances

Thousands of kWh/year

5 1

x

T

1

3 - 0 x

0

2 - A

A

A

1

k

1- 0 1

A

1

0

Water Refrig- Central

Potential range

Average

New model (1988)

Best commercial

heater erator air

SOURCE: li.S. Geller, “Residential Equipment Effiaency: A State+f-theArt Review,” contract prepared for the U.S. Congress, Office of

Technology Assessment (Washington, DC: American Council

for an Energy-Efficient Eocmomy, 1988).

reviewed twice in the 1990s and allows for raising

them. To date, 1993 standards for refrigerators,

freezers, and small gas furnaces have been promulgated;13 standards are currently being developed for

dishwashers, clothes washers, and dryers (87).

Direct Energy Use in Buildings

In addition to changing how buildings use energy,

as described in the preceding sections, energy

savings also are possible by changing how buildings

get energy. This can involve, for example, renewable fuels, cogeneration, and district heating.

Renewable energy sources such as wind, biomass,

and solar power can be used directly at building

sites. In 1981, the Solar Energy Research Institute

estimated that renewable energy sources applied

directly at buildings might replace 4 to 5 quads of

energy by the year 2000(81), equivalent to about 15

to 20 percent of energy consumption in U.S.

buildings in 1985. Nearly a decade has passed

without major progress toward this goal, however.

Cogeneration is the production of electricity and

useful heat at the same time, which improves the

overall efficiency of fuel use.14 Energy savings then

can be achieved in buildings by using cogenerated

heat to heat space and water, and to drive cooling

devices. One obstacle to cogeneration is that buildings often are distant from their source of heat. This

can be overcome by situating cogeneration facilities

near or inside buildings. “District’ heating systems,

which supply heat (commonly in the form of steam)

to a network of buildings, also can be developed.15

Cogeneration thus is particularly appropriate in

medium- and large-sized commercial buildings (including shopping centers; see ref. 85), multifamily

buildings, and densely settled residential communities.

To date, however, cogeneration has barely penetrated the buildings sector in the United States—

only about 50 megawatts of cogenerating capacity

were installed as of 1987 (5).16 While heat can be

used in many ways in industrial settings, its primary

use in commercial buildings is for space heating,

which is only needed during part of the year. In some

buildings where heat build-up from people and

office equipment is a problem, additional heat often

is not needed. One possibility is to use cooling

systems run with heat (i.e., “thermally activated

refrigeration’ ‘); some air conditioners that use waste

heat are available on the market (4, 11, 22, 56).

Additional R&D is needed on computer monitoring

and control technologies for integrating cogeneration into utility grids and reducing maintenance

costs. Also needed are institutional arrangements to

manage interconnected cogeneration facilities.

CFC and Halon Use

Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons are major

agents of the destruction of stratospheric ozone and

also are important greenhouse gases (see ch. 2).

CFCs are used in large quantities in buildings,

principally in insulation and air-conditioning; they

also are used in refrigeration (see ch. 8). Halons are

used in fire extinguishers because they possess

lsof u c~sses of ~figerators, refi-igemtor-free~, and freezers, only 7 models out of 2,114 listed in the directory Published by the Association of

Home Appliance Manufacturers (6) m[eet the 1993 standards. Most models must therefore be improved or redesigned over the next 3 years (8~.

ld~le a ~i~fossd fuel powerplant achieves fuel use tilciency of around 30 to 35 percent by capturing waste Wcogenemtion facilities ~

achieve efficiencies of 45 to 80 percent or more (see ch. 3).

]sD1s~ct hM@ ~~y is used ex,te~ive]y ~ ~ny E~p co~tfies. It is ~latively ~ h he Ufited Stites, dthOUgh it iS Used hl pOfiOIIS Of

some major cities (e.g., New York and St. Paul) and in several entire small towns in the Midwest.

16&@ates of tie tW~~ ~ten~~ for ~gmmtion fi commerci~ b~~gs r~e bew~ 3 and 40 gigawatts (i.e., Seve!d hulld!d tim~ whilt

is currently installed) (5, 62).
Chapter 4--The Buildings Sector ● 127

Box 4-E--CFCs and Halons in Buildings

In the buildings sector, the main sources of CFCs are in insulation and air-conditioning; halons are a principal

component of fire extinguishers. Because the United States and other signatories to the Montreal Protocol (see ch.

2) have agreed to rapidly reduce and eliminate production of CFCs, intensive efforts are being made to limit

emissions from current sources and to deploy alternatives. Additional information on alternatives discussed in this

box can be found in refs. 88, 106, and 107.

Insulation-some CFCs used in insulating foams are released during the manufacturing process, but most

remain in the foam and slowly leak out over time. A large reservoir of CFCs therefore exists within existing

buildings. Opportunities to change this situation are limited. For new buildings, though, some emissions can be

reduced during foam manufacturing and, more significantly, alternatives to CFC-based insulation exist and others

are being developed. In addition, building designs and construction techniques can reduce the need for supplemental

insulation.

Air-conditioning--CFCs are released during the manufacturing, servicing, and disposal of air-conditioning

units. Some emissions can be reduced at each one of these steps, for example, through recycling. Over the long term,

the use of CFCs can be reduced by exploiting alternative ways to maintain comfortable temperatures in buildings.

These range from using other refrigerants (such as HCFC-123 or -134a), using air-conditioning technologies based

on waste heat or solar energy, and designing and constructing buildings in ways which reduce the need for

air-conditioning in the first place.

Fire-extinguishers— Halons can be released from fire extinguishers as a result of leaks, testing, or actual use

to suppress fires. For existing equipment, halon emissions can be reduced by using effective leak detection

technologies and methods for testing fire-extinguishing systems without releasing the halon components. Use of

existing halon-based extinguishers also can be limited to applications where their advantages are most critical-for

example, fires in sensitive electronic equipment or aircraft. In the longer term, alternative fire extinguishing

substances can be developed and deployed.

excellent flame-extinguishing properties and are coal) .18 This percentage varies widely from country

nontoxic to humans.

CFCs are used to produce rigid foams, which are

used primarily for insulation in buildings. In 1985,

roughly one-third of CFC-11 production in the

United States was for this purpose (83). Globally,

approximately 39 percent of CFC-11 and 12 percent

of CFC-12 consumption in 1985 were for rigid

foams (35).17 CFC-11 and CFC-12 also are used in

large, high-volume air conditioners, although most

air conditioners use CFC-22, which is somewhat less

damaging to stratospheric ozone (see ch. 2). Methods for reducing the use of CFCs and halons in

buildings are described in box 4-E.

BUILDINGS IN DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES

Trends in Energy Use

About 40 percent of total energy use in developing countries currently is derived from noncommercial sources (e.g., firewood, crop residues, charto country (e.g., from nearly 100 percent in Nepal, to

less than 10 percent in Libya) (72). Much of this

noncommercial energy use occurs in the buildings

sector, particularly in rural areas and residences. One

study, for example, estimated that households accounted for 35 to 60 percent of total energy use in

four low-income countries and 15 to 35 percent of

total energy use in four transitional developing

countries (52). Lower income households tend to use

noncommercial fuels mainly for cooking; thus

cooking is the largest end-use of household energy

in developing countries.

The use of commercial fuels (i.e., coal, oil, gas,

and electricity) is growing, however. Between 1978

and 1984, for example, growth in per-capita commercial energy use was about 18 percent in Asia, 21

percent in Latin America, and 36 percent in West

Africa (72). In comparison, OECD growth rates for

this period were 2 to 3 percent. Although developed

countries are currently responsible for the largest

share of CO2 emissions in the buildings sector, the

ITI,e,, ~ Counrnes ~W~ing tieirpr~uction to he Gemical Wnufacturers Association; countries with centrally planned economies & not includ~.

ls~e distinction betw~n commemi~ and noncommercial fuels, though, is blurry (see ch. 9 and ref. 94).
128 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

developing countries’ share of energy use and

associated CO2 emissions in the sector should

increase over the next 25 years.

There are many reasons why energy use will

increase in these countries, including their continuing urbanization and adoption of modern cooking

technologies 19 and appliances. Greater urbanization

and wealth tend to lead to the construction of

western-style buildings, both residential and commercial, which generally require commercial energy

sources for space conditioning. The number of

commercial buildings will continue to grow. Ownership of electric appliance s--+. g., refrigerators, televisions, washing machines-is also growing rapidly

in some countries (72, 94). These factors and

population growth are causing electricity demand to

climb sharply, yet current electric power generating

infrastructures often are already short of capacity

(89).20

Lighting currently accounts for only a small

fraction of total energy use in developing countries

(94). In rural areas, people often are limited to light

from wood fires or perhaps kerosene wick lamps—

the primary sources of light for more than 2 billion

people. As rural incomes increase, or as people move

to urban areas, though, lighting services (e.g., butane

or pressurized kerosene mantle lamps, electric

lighting) and the energy used to provide them

increase dramatically.

Using energy to heat buildings is not an important

end-use in the majority of developing countries,

since most have tropical climates, although it is

important in mountainous, and mid- and highlatitude areas (e.g., northern China) (94). Similarly,

little energy currently is used for space cooling,

despite typically hot climates. Traditional building

designs (e.g., natural ventilation and other techniques that do not require additional energy inputs)

and careful siting have long been used to moderate

temperatures and keep indoor environments as

comfortable as possible (18, 20, 21, 114). However,

urbanization and increasing use of commercial

building materials, mechanical ventilation, electric

fans, and air-conditioning are making traditional

designs less common and increasing energy requirements.21

Opportunities To Reduce Energy Use

As the economies of developing countries grow,

demands for energy will continue to increase. As this

happens, developing countries will have many

opportunities to employ technologies and practices

that allow for the most efficient generation and use

of this energy. Given the critical needs for economic

development in many countries, this will not reduce

energy demand below current levels, but it can allow

overall energy use (and associated CO2 emissions)

to grow more slowly without hindering overall

economic development.

In the residential sector, more efficient cooking

practices are the most pressing need. This can be

accomplished by switching to modern fuels such as

natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, kerosene, or

electricity, or using more efficient wood stoves (see

ch. 7). Significant opportunities also exist for using

electricity more efficiently; the technologies for

reducing appliance and lighting energy use are

basically the same as those discussed above for the

OECD countries.

Commercial buildings now being built in developing countries will last well into the next century.

Opportunities for more efficient energy use in

commercial buildings are similar to those available

in industrialized nations, with similar levels of

potential savings (12, 23, 24, 32). Nonetheless,

because of the anticipated growth of demand for

energy services in the buildings sector over the next

25 years, there is likely to be an aggregate growth in

energy consumption, despite increased efficiency.

Energy conservation can slow this growth and also

reduce foreign debt accumulation by minimizing the

importation of fossil fuels and equipment for building electricity-generating installations.

l~e use of m~em cooking fue]s (i.e., natural gas, propane, fuel oil, kerosene, biogas) and cooking technologies makes a 5UbSti~ difference iD

energy efficiency. The average consumption level for cooking with biomass is 9.5 to 14 million Btu’s per year compared to 1,9 to 2.8 million Btu’s per

year for fossil fuels. Thus, a switch to more modem fuels, per se, is not necessarily associated with an increase in total residential energy use, but it is

associated with the increase in ancillary energy uses that goes along with higher income levels.

%e exact effect on COZ emissions will depend on the mix of fuels (including electricity); the relative efficiencies of commercial versus

noncommercial fuels; and whether the use of noncommercial fuels was causing deforestation or forest degradation (see ch. 7).

zlAir.conditiofig Cwenfly is r~~ ti r~identi~ buildings in developing countries, but it is UA in many commercial buildings (73).
Chapter 4--The Buildings Sector ● 129

OTA EMISSION REDUCTION

SCENARIOS

Tables 4-1 and 4-2 show the assumptions that we

used to model potential CO2 reductions in U.S.

residential and commercial buildings, respectively,

for three scenarios—business as usual (Base case),

and after the adoption of Moderate and Tough

controls (app. A describes the model in detail). There

are three major strategies for controlling emissions

(see table row headings). The Operation & Maintenance/Existing Stock category involves measures

that are possible with existing stock; these can be

implemented quickly and require no new investment. New Investment incentives would encourage

a consumer to buy, for example, a more efficient

heater when the existing one needs to be replaced. In

the Accelerated Turnover and New Technology

category, retirement of old equipment and use of

new technologies would occur 5 years sooner than

now anticipated.

The model’s projections of CO2 emissions in the

year 2015 for the three scenarios are given as a

percentage of 1987 emissions, with a breakdown by

end-use (see figure 4-2). The model’s overall results

from 1987 to 2015 are shown in figure 4-8 as a

percentage change from 1987 emissions.22 Under the

Base case, we estimate that U.S. CO2 emissions in

2015 from the buildings sector will be almost 30

percent higher than emissions in 1987. In the

Moderate case, if technologies that are currently

available and that pay for themselves over the life of

the equipment are adopted, CO2 emissions in 2015

from the U.S. buildings sector can be reduced by

about 5 percent relative to 1987 levels. In the Tough

case, technologies that are expected to be commercially available in the next decade could reduce

buildings sector emissions by about one-third relative to 1987 levels by 2015,

Other analyses of future energy use in the U.S.

buildings sector yield results ranging from an

increase of 11 percent by 2010 (27, 28) to a net

reduction of 41 percent (based on total penetration of

cost-effective, energy-saving technologies) by 2020,

relative to 1985 emissions (3 1). Our scenarios

generally fall within the midrange of these estimates.

These projected reductions do not assume major

changes in the fuel mix used to produce energy for

buildings (figure 4-9 shows this mix for each

scenario). Note that a large portion of the energy

used in buildings is electricity. Since electricity in

the United States is produced primarily from coal,

which is the most CO2

-intensive fuel, additional

emissions reductions could be achieved by changing

how electricity is generated. Dramatic changes in the

fuel mix used by utilities (see ch. 3) to generate

electricity would affect potential CO2 reductions in

the buildings sector.

23 A major shift to nonfossil fuels

might even change the attractiveness of some

technical options; for example, cogeneration could

become less attractive.24

How the use of wood would change in response to

shifts in demand for other energy sources is not

modeled. Most residences burning wood also have

a second fuel source. As energy prices for these

secondary sources increase, wood will be used more.

Conversely, as oil and gas energy bills drop as a

result of falling prices or conservation investments,

wood may be partially replaced with these purchased

fuels. The effect of different levels of wood use on

CO2 emissions depends on how quickly wood is

being grown. If wood is grown at least as fast as it is

burnt, then wood use effectively has zero CO2

emissions. However, since wood is often burned

inefficiently, the emissions from wood burning

(especially when deforestation is factored in) may

exceed even coal emissions (per unit of useful

energy).

Base Case

For residential buildings, the base case shows a

6 percent increase in CO2 emissions by 2015,

relative to 1987 levels. This projected increase is

lower than other studies (16, 105) and even GRI’s

base case (41) because we include the effects of the

new NAECA standards. We assume slower growth

‘zNote that the results presented in this figure show emissions as a percentage change from 1987 levels; this should not be confused with the format

presented in figures 4-2, 4-10, and 4-11, which present results as a percentage of 1987 emissions.

231n the United States, the average emission factor per quadrillion Btu’s of delivered electricity currently is 57 million metric tons of carbon, based

on a fuel mix of 55 percent coal, 11 percent gas, 5 percent oil, and 30 percent nonfossil sources (including hydroelectric power, nuclear, and rcnewables)

(44).

‘~c~nges in the ]eve] of demand for electricity a]so might affect supply choices by utilities (e.g., very low demand would retie it mom. difficult for

utilities to justify investments in new, less carbon-intemive generating technologies).
Table 4-l—Residential Buildings: Measures in the OTA Model

Base case Moderate controls Tough controls

Operation and maintenance/

existing stock:

Housing shell retrofits

Compact fluorescent

New Investments:

Shell efficiency of new homes

HVAC equipment

Gas space heat

Oil space heat

Electric space heat

Wood space heat

Appliances

Water heaters

Gas water heaters

Heat pump water heaters

Accelerated turnover and new

technology:

HVAC equipment

Appliances

Water heaters

10% savings by 2015

None

New homes 15°A more efficient

than existing average

82% efficient by 2005

Gas heat pump introduced in 1995,

10% new share by 2015

81% efficient by 2005

Heat pump COP of 2.5 by 2015

None

National appliance standards

National appliance standards

None

Not applicable

Not applicable

Not applicable

20% savings by 2015

Replace heavily used bulbs, net 35°/0

savings

New homes space heat 50°A more

efficient than existing average, AC

25% more efficient

Mix of 84% and 92°/0 (pulse combustion)

Same as Base case

Same as Base case

Replace 20$40 of new electric resistance

space heat with heat pump

None

Most efficient on market today

Same as Base case

Replace 80% of new electric water

heaters with heat pump water heater

Not applicable

Not applicable

Not applicable

Northern homes 30°/0 savings by 2000.

Southern homes same as Moderate.

Replace more bulbs, net 50°/0 savings

(technical maximum about 650A)

Northern new homes space heat 8570 more

efficient than existing average, AC 45°/0

more efficient. Southern new homes same

as Moderate.

All gas pulse combustion

Move market share of gas heat pump forward

by 5-10 years and reduce other gas heat

Same as Base case

Replace 5070 of new electric resistance

space heat with heat pump

Improved efficiency of wood use

Most efficient on market today

Same as Base case

Replace 100% of new electric and oil water

heaters with heat pump water heater

Existing equipment lifetimes 5 years

shorter

Gas heat pump heating COP of 1.7 by 201 5;

electric heat pump heating COP of 2.8 by

201 5; improved AC efficiency

New prototype appliances (for example, heat

pump dryer)

Replace gas water heat with 80% efficient

prototype

Abbreviations: AC=air-nditioning; COP=coefficient of performance; HVAC-Heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning equipment.

SOURCE: Office of Technobgy Assessment, 1991.
Table 4-2—Commercial Buildings: Measures in the OTA Model

Base case

—

Moderate controls Tough controls

Operation and maintenance/

existing stock:

Building retrofits

Lighting

New investments:

Shell efficiency of new buildings

HVAC equipment

Gas space heat

Electric space heat

Air-conditioning

Cogeneration

Water heaters

Lighting

Electronic office equipment

Accelerated turnover and new

technology:

HVAC equipment

Cogeneration

Water heaters

60% savings by 2015

None

New buildings 150/. to 22%0 more

efficient than existing 1987 average

84% efficiency by 2010

Gas heat pump introduced in 1995,

2% new share by 2015

Heat pump COP of 1.95 by 2015

None

0.13 quad by 2005, 0.20 quad

by 2015

None

None

Increased usage

Not applicable

Not applicable

Not applicable

150/0 savings by 2005, 25% by 2015

High efficiency bulbs, net 120/. savings

(80°/0 of 15%--assume 20% market

already)

New buildings 500/. more efficient than

average (42% above new Base case

buildings)

Mix of 640/. and 920/. efficient

Same as Base case

Replace 20°/0 of new electric resistance

space heat with heat pump

Adjust variable speed drives and

economics, net 200/0 savings

0.18 quad by 2005, 0.26 quad

by 2015

Replace 80°/0 of new electric water

heaters with heat pump water heater

Combination of high efficiency bulbs,

ballasts, reflectors, and daylight;

net 50°/0 savings in new, 40% in

replacements

50% savings from improved technology

and 20°/0 in reduced idle time: total

600/0 savings by 2015

Not applicable

Not applicable

Not applicable

40% savings by 2000

High efficiency bulbs, net 120/. savings

(80°/0 of 150/assume 200/’ market

already)

New buildings 75°/0 more efficient than

average (71 0/0 above new Base case

buildings)

All 92% efficient

Move market share of gas heat pump

forward by 5-10 years and reduce

other gas heat

Replace 50% of new electric resistance

space heat with heat pump

Same as Moderate case

0.64 quad by 2015

Replace 100% of new electric water

heaters with heat pump water heater

Combination of high efficiency bulbs,

ballasts, reflect, and daylight; net 60%

savings in new, 50% in replacements

65% savings from improved technology

and 40°/0 in reduced idle time: total

80% savings by 2015

Existing equipment lifetimes 5 years

shorter

Gas heat pump COP of 1.4 by 2015,

electric heat pump COP of 2.4 by 2015.

Heat exchangers yielding 28% AC

savings

0.96 quad by 2015 including fuel cells

and improved chillers

Replace gas water heater with 80%

efficient prototype

Abbreviations: AC-air*onditionmg; COP-coefficient of performance; HVAC-Heating, ventilating, and air-nditioning equipment.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.
132 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 4-8-Summary of C02 Emissions From the U.S.

Buildings Sector by Year, Under the Base Case,

Moderate, and Tough Scenarios

Percent change from 1987 emissions 40% 1

1

Base case

30%

20%

10%

o%

- 10%

- 20%

\’ ‘----

~.. ------ . . . . . . ------ --

Moderate

-30%

I

1-.2°?

-40% ‘

- —_.———- ——-–T— 1

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

SOURCE: Office of Technology A.ssassment, 1991.

in electricity use than do other models; of the major

commercial energy sources electricity is still the

fastest growing energy source in the sector. However, in OTA’s base case, residential electricity use

increases by 0.5 percent per year, whereas other

models assume it increases by 2 to 2.5 percent per

year, at least until the year 2000.

For commercial buildings, CO2 emissions in the

base case grow about 50 percent between 1987 and

2015. While total delivered energy use in commercial buildings increases by about 40 percent between

1987 and 2015, the increase in CO2 emissions is

greater because we assume that electricity use grows

by about 68 percent, primarily because of growing

demand by commercial users for air-conditioning

and office equipment. This corresponds to an

electricity growth rate of 1.9 percent per year. Since

electricity generated by U.S. utilities currently

exhibits relatively high CO2 emissions per unit of

delivered energy, increasing electricity consumption

increases CO2 emissions disproportionally faster

than does increasing use of other energy sources in

this sector.

Moderate Scenario

In the Moderate scenario, improving the shell

efficiency (or thermal integrity) of new (residential

and commercial) buildings can reduce emissions by

about 10 percent of 1987 levels by 2015; similar

improvements in existing buildings can achieve a 4

percent reduction by 2015 (see figure 4-10). installing new, more efficient lights and electronic office

Figure 4-9--Fuel Use Under the Base Case, Moderate,

and Tough Scenarios, by Fuel Type

Fuel use (quadrillion Btu’s)

20

15

10

5

0 —

u Solar

Coa l

= Wood

n oil

Electricit y

= Natural gas

Base Base Moderate Tough

1987 2015 2015 2015

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

equipment will reduce emissions in 2015 by about 6

and 5 percent of 1987 levels, respectively; these two

options, along with cogeneration, were applied only

to commercial buildings in the model. Installing

more efficient water heaters and appliances will

reduce emissions in 2015 by about 4 percent,

primarily in residential buildings.

After accounting for growth in energy use between now and 2015, together these Moderate

residential and commercial options can reduce CO2

emissions by about 5 percent in 2000 and 2015,

compared to 1987 levels (see figures 4-2 and 4-8).

Controls in the commercial sector account for over

two-thirds of the reductions. In 2000, New Investment options for both residential and commercial

buildings contribute over 70 percent of the total

reductions, but by 2015, when a greater proportion

of old buildings has been replaced, this percentage

increases to over 80 percent. In both residential and

commercial buildings, improvements in building

shells yield the highest reductions of any individual

option.

Tough Scenanio

In the Tough scenario, more ambitious investment

in increasing the shell efficiency of new residential

and commercial building can reduce emissions by

about 18 percent relative to 1987 levels by 2015,

while similar improvements in existing buildings

(i.e., ‘‘building retrofits”) can reduce emissions by

4 percent (see figure 4-1 1). Retrofits provide the
Chapter 4--The Buildings Sector ● 133

Figure 4-10--CO2 Emissions Reductions in 2000 and

2015 Expressed as a Percentage of 1987 Building

Sector Emissions, by Control Method, Under the

Moderate Scenario

Moderate controls

Shell efficiency ~~1

f:

HVAC equipment “ 2000

+

: ,

= 2015 Lighting l+

Office equipment*

Water heating

and appliances k

Cogeneration

F --- _

New ‘nvegtments

Building retrofitswOperation and maintenance/

. existing stock

Lighting

F -, ~ -

0 5 10 15 20

Reductions as a percent of 1987 emissions

Note that emissions reductions are expressed as a percentage of

1987 emissions. This format should not be confused with the

format in figure 4-8, which presents emissions, by year, as a

percentage change from 1987 emissions.

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1991.

largest reductions of any individual option in the

short term (i.e., around 10 years), but this option

becomes less effective over time since fewer older

buildings remain in which to install retrofit technologies. Installing new, more efficient lights and

electronic office equipment will reduce emissions in

2015 by about 8 and 6 percent of 1987 levels,

respectively. As in the Moderate scenario, these last

two options, along with cogeneration, were applied

only to commercial buildings.

More reductions could be achieved if existing

equipment is replaced 5 years sooner than normal

with new technologies that could become available

within the next 20 years (see thin bars in figure

4-1 1). This accelerated schedule can augment total

emissions reductions from each of the above three

options by another 2 percent in 2015 compared to

1987 levels. About half of these additional reductions come from increasing the rate of turnover and

half come from the new technologies themselves.25

Together, these Tough options can reduce CO2

emissions in 2000 by about 28 percent below 1987

levels and about one-third below 1987 levels by

Figure 4-1 1-CO2 Emissions Reductions in 2000 and

2015 Expressed as a Percentage of 1987 Building

Sector Emissions, by Control Method, Under the

Tough Scenario

Tough controls

Shell efficiency I

HVAC equipment + –+

‘ightingk Office equipment v. 200 0

Water heating

and a~diances b+

Cogeneration New investments

‘-:=~~~’andmj~enanc; Building retrofits

Lighting 

P

‘7

 -T-- ~ ‘Xist!ng ‘tock.

o 5 10 15 20

Reductions as a percent of 1987 emissions

Note that emissions reductions are expressed as a percentage of

1987 emissions. This format should not be confused with the

format in figure 4-8, which presents emissions, by year, as a

percentage change from 1987 emissions.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

2015 (see figure 4-8). Controls in the commercial

sector alone account for about 60 percent of these

reductions. In 2000, New Investment options for

both residential and commercial buildings contribute about 55 percent of the total reductions from the

buildings sector, but by 2015, when a greater

proportion of old stock has been replaced, this

percentage increases to about 70 percent.

Costs of the Tough Scenario

Costs for all Tough measures that are applicable

to buildings in both the residential and commercial

sectors fall in a range between net savings (i.e.,

equipment costs minus fuel savings) of $53 billion

per year to net costs of $7 billion per year (1987

dollars). The costs of the individual measures are

summarized below and presented in greater detail in

appendix A.

Costs for the residential sector are best estimated

by household. By 2015, there will be about 115

million households, 35 million built after 1995 and

80 million built before. We estimate that shell

improvements to pre-1995 houses under our Tough

~The effect of increasing the turnover rate is greatest in space heating, where furnaces have a long lifetime, and in appliances, where the difference

between new and average efficiencies is large; increased R&D has the biggest impact on appliances because numerous promising developments exist

in this area (25, 27).
134 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

scenario will cost about $2,300 per single family

house in northern climates and $1,000 per single

family houses in southern ones.26 The cost of shell

improvements in post- 1995 houses under our Tough

scenario are somewhat higher. In northern climates,

costs might be in the range of $6,000 to $8,000 per

house and about $2,500 per house in the South. For

the 25 percent of households that live in multifamily dwellings, shell improvements will cost

about half of the single-family home estimates given

above. More efficient furnaces, air conditioners,

water heaters, and appliances might total about

$1,000 to $1,500 per household.

Assuming the shell improvements have a 30-year

life and the more efficient appliances average a

15-year life, total costs for the residential sector will

be in the range of $30 to $40 billion per year.

However, fuel savings from these appliances are

about $55 billion per year assuming 2015 fuel prices.

Thus, the net costs for the residential sector fall in the

range of savings of $15 to $25 billion per year. The

cost effectiveness of these reductions is in the range

of -$175 to -$300 per ton of carbon (i.e., savings of

$175 to $300 per ton of carbon avoided).

By 2015, we anticipate about 72 billion square

feet of commercial building space (up from about 45

billion today). Though costs of energy efficiency

improvements vary by budding type, they appear to

cluster in the range of $5 to$11 per square foot (65a)

for a package of measures similar to our Tough

lighting, shell, and heating and cooling equipment

efficiencies. Costs for these improvements are in the

range of $30 to $65 billion per year but fuel savings

are approximately $55 billion per year at 2015 fuel

prices. Thus net costs for these measures fall

between savings of $25 billion per year and costs of

$10 billion per year. The cost effectiveness of these

reductions ranges between --$190 per ton and $75 per

ton of carbon avoided.

The remaining reductions from installing cogeneration equipment and more efficient office equipment might yield net costs in the range of savings of

$3 billion per year to costs of $12 billion per year,

Thus total costs for the commercial measures fall

between savings of $28 billion to costs of $22 billion

per year.

POLICY OPTIONS

Reducing CO2 emissions from the buildings

sector will require implementing numerous technical options, as well as individual behavioral changes,

and removing a variety of barriers to investment in

energy conservation. For example, translating our

‘‘Moderate’ residential emission reductions into

practice means that all existing homes are retrofitted

to achieve an average shell improvement of 20

percent; new home shells must be, on average, 50

percent more energy efficient than today’s homes. In

our ‘Tough’ scenario, existing homes are improved

by 30 percent in northern (cold) parts of the

country

27 and 20 percent elsewhere; new home

shells are 85 percent more efficient than the existing

average in the same five areas of the country.28 To

accomplish such changes on a broad scale will

require a combination of policies and consistent

fiscal and regulatory signals.

This section discusses a wide range of ways to

implement the various tactics available to control

greenhouse gas emissions from buildings. In many

cases, there is not a clear distinction between policy

instruments that change, say, maintenance and those

that accelerate actual turnover of equipment. Congress could combine several options to achieve

modest or aggressive reductions from this sector

depending on its goals.

Overview: Barriers and Policy Instruments

In both residential and commercial construction,

minimization of upfront costs often takes precedence over total life-cycle costs because of the

overriding concerns about cash flow and the cost of

capital at the time of purchase. This creates a barrier

to greater investment in energy conservation. In

addition, most consumers lack expertise in evaluating energy information and prefer products similar

to those they are replacing. An additional barrier is

that those who make purchase decisions (e.g.,

builders) are often not those who pay utility bills.

Policies for reducing emissions must address these

obstacles.

Zssee ref. 65a for tie prim~ tita source from which the costs of ow TOU@ S~@O me estimated.

27 U~1ng tie cen~u~ ~epom, ~~ illc]udes West ad &st Nofi cen~~, New EWlad, Mid-Atintic, ~d Mountain region # 2.

2s~s efficiency level is ~~een that of tie Mfieso~ Energy Efficient Housing Demonstration Project Home (a well-i~ulatd home; see ref. 32)

and the Northern Energy Home (a superinsulated home with triple-glazed windows and night shutters; see ref. 61).
Chapter 4--The Buildings Sector ● 135

Rowhouses, churches, warehouses, and factories densely

packed in Reading, Pennsylvania.

Policies for reducing CO2 emissions in the

building sector include: end-use taxes, initial purchase taxes, utility least-cost planning, appliance

standards, building codes, consumer information

and marketing, zoning ordinances, and research and

development. The synergisms possible among these

policies are vital to reducing emissions. Taxation

sends the price signals to reduce energy consumption. Regulation (codes and standards) can be used

to remove the least efficient equipment, appliances,

and buildings from the market. Incentive and information programs can be used to create a market for

exceeding the standards, as well as to provide

consumers with the information needed to make

energy-conserving choices in response to price

signals from taxation. There is also a role for

government-sponsored R&D in the construction

industry, the fragmented nature of which discourages the private sector from making capitalintensive and risky investments.

Congress could also mandate increased energy

conservation in government procurement and in

buildings the Federal Government owns or operates. 29 Such steps would reduce perceptions of risk

and provide an example for the rest of the country

(98). Also, demonstration projects can provide data

to improve our ability to predict savings from

conservation measures. The Federal Government is

the single largest consumer of energy in the Nation;

Federal buildings consume 2 percent of the energy

used in this sector—about 2 quads at a cost of $8.7

billion (105a). Congress has directed Federal agencies to reduce their energy use by 10 percent (per

square foot of floor space) from 1985 to 1995 (Public

Law 1,00-615). The DOE Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) is responsible for reporting

to Congress on the progress toward this goal.30

Legislation in 1986 authorized31-and legislation in

1988 required32—Federal agencies to establish a

program of ‘Shared Energy Savings’ (SES). Agencies were to contract with private energy-service

companies (for up to 25 years) who would supply the

capital for improvements to Federal facilities in

exchange for a portion of cost savings. By the end of

1990 only four contracts were in place. Congress

could try to streamline the contract process or

provide further incentives for compliance.33

End-Use Taxes

Energy end-use taxes would increase the price of

energy, thereby encouraging lower energy consumption. Thus, they affect all levels of our model: O&M,

new investment decisions, the rate of turnover, and

the intensity of private sector R&D. End-use taxes

can stimulate conservation in both new and existing

buildings, and can send signals regarding energy use

and purchases. However, end-use taxes can often be

less effective in influencing consumer purchase

decisions than other policy measures such as appliance standards, building codes, and initial purchase

taxes or rebates set at similar levels of stringency.

Taxes do not address issues such as the lack of

290TA is completing a study in this area ‘‘Energy Use in The Federal Government’ which will be released in summer 1991.

~xecutive Order 12003, issued in 1977, mandated a 20 percent reduction in Federal energy use below 1975 levels by 1985. When the order expired

in 1985, the executive agencies had not reached the goal, During the following 3 years, energy use rose 6 percent (98a).

slconsolidat~ Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) Public Law 99-272.

sz~e Federal Energy Wmgement Improvement Ad (FEMIA) Public ~w IW-6 15.

s~Ref. 108a discusses several impediments that exist under the current SES s~cture.
136 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

information about life-cycle costs, uncertainty, and

divergent incentives between purchaser and user.

The large number of highly cost-effective energyefficient investments currently not chosen by consumers indicates that price alone does not stimulate

optimal investment decisions (61 ).

If fuel taxes reflected ‘ ‘externalities” (or nonmonetary costs of a good or service) fuel choice

could be influenced. We did not model taxes, but

other organizations have. Their results are not

necessarily consistent with one another (45, 55, 63,

90). From these studies, price and income elasticities34 appear to be such that a high tax rate would be

needed to achieve substantial reductions in energy

consumption over the 25-year timeframe of this

study.

High end-use taxes based on CO2 emissions

would generate a larger amount of government

revenue. For economic (and political) reasons it may

be necessary to reduce other taxes. Assuming that

the cuts are applied to expenditure taxes and that the

net impact is revenue neutral (i.e., as much is given

out as is taken in), end-use taxes raise equity issues

and might

households.

An initial

impose hardships on lower income

Initial Purchase Taxes

purchase tax would place a lump-sum

tax on energy inefficient appliances and equipment

(and possibly buildings and homes) at the time of

purchase. 35 It could be applied to all equipment and

appliances, to only the most polluting, or on a

revenue neutral basis (i.e., fees on the most polluting

items, and rebates for the least polluting that are

equal in sum to the amount collected for the most

polluting). The major advantage of an initial purchase tax is that it will send the appropriate signals

regarding consumer purchasing decisions, which are

often based largely on first cost. This type of tax

would not affect usage decisions.

Tax Credits and Incentives

The combination of financial incentives to pursue

efficiency coupled with disincentives for high energy use--the ‘‘carrot and stick’ approach-can be

particularly effective. For example, investment tax

credits can be aimed at changing both the level of

investment as well as investment targets (e.g.,

commercialization of high-efficiency heat pumps,

installation of energy-efficient equipment). Generally speaking, however, this country has not experimented extensively with financial carrots expressly

to induce conservation, although it has experimented

with regulatory/statutory energy-related carrots

such as tax credits for powerplant investment and the

Price-Anderson oil depletion allowances. One problem with the experience to date is that there has been

little effort made to evaluate the strengths and

weaknesses of different approaches.

The Federal Government passed legislation that

provided solar and conservation tax credits for the

years 1978 through 1984. The 1986 tax reform act

allowed the energy conservation tax credits for

residential use to expire but extended residential

solar tax credits and some commercial energy

conservation credits. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 extended the 10-percent

business energy tax credit for solar and geothermal

property through December 31, 1991. Studies on the

impact of these credits are inconclusive. Some say

they were too low to affect homeowners’ behavior.

However, one study indicates that the level of the tax

credit may not be as important as its presence (39).

The Federal Government also funds several subsidy programs. Four State and local assistance

Programs (SLAP), administered by DOE provide

States with Federal technical assistance as well as

money for specific energy conservation programs,

including low-income home weatherization, matching grants to schools and hospitals for energy

conservation projects, energy education, and various

other State and local conservation programs. The

SLAP programs are funded through both direct

congressional appropriations and the States’ use of

Petroleum Overcharge Funds.36 Congress has maintained funding for these programs throughout the

1980s despite administration recommendations that

these programs be termin ated. The Institutional

Conservation Program (ICP) pays for audits and half

of any conservation investments in schools and

hospitals. State and Federal officials rate this program successful, with over 32,000 buildings participating since 1977 and a cumulative energy bill
Chapter 4--The Buildings Sector . 137

savings of $1.9 billion .37 The Weatherization Assistance Program funds States to retrofit low-income

housing with insulation to conserve energy .38 The

State Energy Conservation Program (SECP) provides financial assistance to the State Energy offices

to promote energy efficiency and conservation in the

commercial and residential sectors. The Energy

Extension Service (EES) is a Federal/State effort to

provide small scale energy users with individually

tailored technical assistance for energy conservation

and increased use of renewable. The SECP and the

EES have been consolidated under the State Energy

Conservation Programs Improvement Act (Public

Law 101-440), signed into law October 18, 1990.

Other federally funded programs include the Low

Income Home Energy Assistance Program

(LIHEAP), the Residential Conservation Service

(RCS), and the Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Bank (SEECB); the RCS and SEECB have

recently expired. RCS is discussed under ‘‘Home

Energy Audits” below. SEECB helped finance

energy conservation and solar measures in low- and

moderate-income housing and in commercial buildings owned by nonprofit organizations. LIHEAP (a

Department of Health and Human Services program) gives grants to States to subsidize energy bills

in low-income housing; 15 percent of the funding

can be used for retrofits. The 1990 amendments to

the Housing and Community Development Act of

1974 also included low-income housing conservation and efficiency grants to be administered by the

Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Demand-Side Management (DSM)

DSM refers to utility programs designed to

encourage customers to modify their pattern of

electricity usage (17a). Particularly promising—

from a global warming perspective-are those

situations where utilities allow energy conservation

to compete with traditional supply technologies

(e.g., powerplants) to balance energy supply and

demand .39 Because demand-side investments can be

less expensive than new supply, and because utilities

traditionally have longer time horizons than consumers, DSM can result in greater investments in

energy efficiency than would be made by consumers

alone. Utility programs can capture the potential in

both the new and retrofit markets, for both equipment efficiency and building shell improvements.

The ability to reach retrofit markets is particularly

attractive because they are difficult to reach through

building codes. Another attractive feature of DSM is

that there is already considerable support for it by

many State energy offices, State legislatures, and

public utility commissions (34) (also see app. B, and

box 3-C in ch. 3). Recalling figures 4-10 and 4-11,

the biggest CO2 savings from the buildings sector as

a whole came from increased thermal integrity of

building shells and from raising the efficiency of

space conditioning equipment. Therefore, DSM

could play an important role in reducing greenhouse

gas emissions from the buildings sector.

For DSM to stimulate significant investment in

conservation, incentive structures must be changed

so that utilities are equally willing to make supplyand demand-side investments. Currently, there can

be a disincentive for investment in conservation,

because utility revenues and profits depend on the

amount of electricity sold. Methods used by some

States to address this problem include:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

a volume-of-sales adjustment that adjusts retail

prices when the level of forecasted sales differs

from actual sales; thus, sales drop due to

conservation efforts, but a utility’s return on

investment will not drop;

a higher rate of return on conservation investments;

shared savings between customers and shareholders;

a contract bonus based on energy conservation

performance in the form of increased rate of

return, or an expanded concept of the rate base

(i.e., adding conservation investments to the

rate base); and

comparative bill earnings in which the performance of a utility is compared to that of other

utilities in the region, with a higher rate of

return available to utilities that achieve above

average energy savings.40

37 DOE testimon y of May 2, 1989, as reported in ref. l~a.

3tlRWent]y ~bllc ~w 101.~ expanded tie ~n~~ f~u~ of his P~o~ to inc]ude cooling efficiency modflcations in an effort tO emphasize

annual energy efficiency.

3Q0TA references t. DSM in ~1~ ~~pter include ~emue~ impmv~g efficiency as well M innovative pro~ams to reduce total demand.

40For a dl~cus~lon of tie Compmative bill emnings scheme, see ref. 58. For discussion of all of ~ese oPtio~% see ref. 13.
138 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Federal and State governments share the regulation of electric utilities. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has jurisdiction over

wholesale transactions, both inter- and intra-state.

This gives FERC jurisdiction over inter-utility sales

for interstate holding companies and power pools

and over many transactions within a State.41 Congress can play a leadership role in directing utility

planning through the legislation that guides FERC.

This ability is most apparent in the Public Utility

Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), which

required utilities to purchase electricity from qualifying facilities at avoided cost. Qualifying facilities

include cogeneration and those using renewable

energy sources. Recently Congress amended PURPA

(Public Law 101-508) to eliminate the 80-megawatt

capacity limitation for qualifying facilities fueled by

wind, geothermal, solar, or waste energy.

The Federal Government also maintains a Least

Cost Utility Planning Program at DOE; appropriations for 1991 were increased from $1 to $3 million.

Its limited budget had allowed it to play only a

catalytic role, working closely with the national

laboratories and industry research institutes to provide utilities with data and analysis on a variety of

DSM issues.42

There has been considerable activity in demandside planning by State commissions, trade associations, and utilities themselves. Different approaches

may be most appropriate to different utilities, States,

or regions. As DSM implementation is still nascent,

it may be useful to let diversity flourish. Thus, any

Federal legislation would ideally be general enough

to allow States flexibility in implementation and

specific enough to have a truly positive impact on

conservation.

To promote demand-side planning, Congress

could:

1. require Federal electric utilities (like the Tennessee Valley Authority) to expand DSM

programs and set rates for their distributors

based on achievement of DSM goals;

2. require States to formally consider demandside resources in their planning;

3. require least-cost planning for utilities whose

projects fall under the jurisdiction of Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission; and

4. require all utilities to use least-cost planning.

Congress could also encourage public utility commissions to formally assess the various incentive

rate schemes and determine if any were applicable to

their utility. This step would be analogous to the one

taken in 1978, when PURPA directed the States to

review a wide range of strategies to promote pricing.

To increase the possibility of useful findings from

the process, funding could be included so that

nonprofit groups could participate in these proceedings.

Congress has already mandated, in the 1980

Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and

Conservation Act (Public Law 96-501), that the

Northwest Power Planning Council adopt rate structures that give conservation measures a cost break

over other, more traditional supply-side measures.

To move beyond the above measures, Congress

could also direct the Federal Government to establish a cost for the environmental externalities of

supply-side options. The New York Public Service

Commission, for one, requires explicit consideration

of environmental factors (with a weight that amounts

to 15 percent of the total score or up to 1.4 cents per

kWh for the most polluting sources; see app. B) in

utility assessment of bids for supply and demand

resources (82). Or, Congress could require all States

to develop a method for making demand-side

investments

ments.

Appliance

emphasis on

as attractive as supply-side investAppliance Standards

standards overcome the problem of

first cost by fiat, by removing inefficient appliances from the market. Properly set,

standards can also be ‘technology forcing. A DOE

study comparing various policy alternatives concluded that standards result in more savings than

other methods, including tax credits, rebates, and

consumer education (101).

The National Appliance Energy Conservation Act

(NAECA), approved by Congress in 1987, set

minimum-efficiency standards for many appliances

(see “Space Conditioning” above). The NAECA

Amendments in 1988 extended the standard to some

commercial building lighting ballasts. NAECA redl~ere is a ~stofy of tension over the sharing of jurisdiction for electricity pl- (93a).

d~on~ess hM co~ider~ expandiclg PURPA to include DSM as a new fO~ Of Wid@’@ facdlv
Chapter 4--The Buildings Sector ● 239

quires that the standards be reviewed twice during

the 1990s, which provides an opportunity to obtain

additional energy reductions through new or more

stringent standards. Congress could consider extending standards to other equipment such as commercial HVAC equipment, light bulbs, and building

components such as windows.

When Congress set the current standards, a

payback period of 3 years was termed ‘ ‘economically justifiable. ’43 Alternatively, a longer payback

or a lifecycle costing rule could be used to set the

standard.44 Because current economic analyses do

not include the costs of environmental externalities,

more stringent standards could be justified as a way

of reflecting these environmental costs.

Congress could make standards even more effective by using them in conjunction with other

incentives. For example, standards can be used to set

a regulatory ‘‘floor, ’ removing the least efficient

equipment and buildings from the market, while

policies such as utility programs, appliance labeling,

and tax schemes can provide incentives to exceed

the standards.

One problem with standards is that they may drive

up the purchase price so that a prohibitively large

upfront payment is required. This problem could be

remedied with loans, purchase credits, or some other

form of initial purchase cost defrayment.

Building Energy Codes

Building energy codes serve a function analogous

to that of appliance standards in that they keep the

least efficient buildings from being constructed.

Similarly, they can be used in conjunction with other

policies such as utility programs, building rating

systems, and tax schemes. Since most of the CO2

savings in 2015 in the Moderate case come from

improved space conditioning equipment and better

thermal integrity, codes could play an important role

in controlling CO2 emissions.

Building codes have traditionally been under the

jurisdiction of States and localities. Mandatory

national building codes are finding little support

from the States or the construction industry (61).

Photo credit: M. Jackson

The Manhattan skyline: Commercial buildings harbor

tremendous potential for energy savings. Replacing the

lights and the heating, ventilating and air-conditioning

(HVAC) systems with new equipment can cut a building’s

energy costs by 30 percent.

During the 1970s, however, there was some interest

in a national code as a response to the patchwork of

codes passed at the State level. 45 In 1973, the

National Council of States Building Codes Standards asked the National Bureau of Standards (now

the National Institute for Science and Technology,

or NIST) to provide the technical basis for a

performance-type standard for energy conservation

in buildings.46 By the time of the oil embargo, the

Bureau of Standards, in cooperation with consultants from design professions and industry, had

prepared a document defining energy budgets based

on the specific functional requirements of buildings

4~Add1tion~ly, factors such ~~ impact on ~ons~e~ ~d impact on man~ac~ers Cm be used to determine what is tXOnOmiCalIy justified.

44 Elmrnc SUPPIY projects typically have paybacks of well over one dmtie.

45some States, no~bly c~ifor~, have ~stl~t~ ~ndatory building s~n&ds for both residential and commercial buildings.

ti~ls chrono]o~ supplied by ref. 113
140 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

and providing energy- and cost-effective choices for

components of energy systems in buildings. The

document and the energy budgets were turned over

to the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating,

and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) as bases

for developing a national consensus standard.

ASHRAE released standards in 1975 and updated

them in 1980. According to an independent evaluation (53a), energy savings would range from 10 to 60

percent, compared to then-conventional practices, at

reduced construction costs. Extra costs for higher

performance envelopes were more than offset by

savings in the space conditioning equipment required.

In addition to NIST, DOE also plays a role in

developing building standards. In 1976, Congress

enacted legislation that required the development of

the Building Energy Performance Standards (BEPS),

a national code based on performance standards. In

1981, prior to DOE releasing a final version of

BEPS, the law was modified so that the standards

were mandatory only for Federal buildings. (It is

voluntary for non-Federal buildings, although DOE

is mandated to encourage its adoption by States and

localities.) DOE’s proposed standards became effective 6 months after they were placed in the January

1989 Federal Register (102). Since then DOE has

initiated demonstration grants.

DOE shares its role in building energy code

development with the ASHRAE.47 The proposed

Federal building code is nearly identical to the

recently released ASHRAE; standards (3). All 50

States have adopted all or a portion of the ASHRAE

standards. The 1980 standard was estimated to result

in reduced energy use in commercial buildings of 5

to 25 percent compared to buildings constructed in

the late 1970s (15). The new standard is expected to

provide 20 to 25 percent energy savings in commercial buildings over the existing code (27). However,

the average energy efficiency of new homes in most

States now exceeds the existing (i.e., 1980)

ASHRAE standards (39).

Recently, the National Affordable Housing Act of

1990 (Public Law 101-922) required the Department

of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to

develop energy-efficiency standards for new public

housing, and housing subject to mortgages under the

National Housing Act (i.e., mortgages that include a

loan for financing energy-conserving improvements

or adding solar energy systems).

Changes in Federal building code policy that

could achieve greater energy savings by changing

the investment decisions of builders and buyers

include:

1.

2.

3.

4.

the establishment of a uniform code by either

mandating compliance or creating incentives

for States to adopt the national code;

the development of a more stringent national

code;

the development of energy standards for all

existing buildings, with compliance taking the

form of a mandatory performance test upon sale

(an option that could also quickly affect O&M

practices detailed in our model); and

increased funding for implementation and enforcement.

Adequate enforcement is difficult, but necessary, for

a building code to achieve significant savings.

Consumer Information and Marketing

Programs

Lack of information is a key obstacle to greater

investment in energy conservation. It adversely

affects O&M practices, investment decisions, and

incentives to develop new energy-efficient technologies. The Federal Government can play a role in

overcoming this barrier by providing information

about opportunities to increase energy efficiency.

Information dissemination is a key element of

several of the policy options discussed above,

including appliance standards, building codes, and

utility planning.

In the past, the Federal Government has played a

role in several consumer information and marketing

programs. These include:

Energy rating systems. Energy rating systems tell

buyers how efficient their prospective home or

office is. One national survey found energy savings

from a home energy rating system (HERS) to be 15

to 50 percent (110, 111). (No study has been done on

a newer rating program for the commercial sector.)

The Federal Government has helped to legitimize

the use of HERS through its involvement in the

47~e Dep~ment of Housing and ~Jrban Development ~)~so plays a ro]e in bui]ding COdH through its regulation Of manufactured housing

(mobile homes). For a discussion of regulation of manufactured housing, see ref. 92. HUD k currently contemplating s@t%xmt changes to its codes.
Chapter 4-The Buildings Sector . 141

Photo credit: Dr. J. Hill, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute

of Standards and Technology, Building Environment Division

Caulking joints and increasing insulation can be

relatively inexpensive ways to reduce energy use

in old buildings.

mortgage market.48 Currently many successful rating systems are funded through State offices and run

via third-party, nonprofit organizations. The Federal

Government could play a further role in expanding

these partnerships by establishing a uniform energy

rating system and a national housing databank for

both residential and commercial buildings.49 If

ratings are not standardized, the added overhead

expenses for lending agencies to include the energy

costs in their evaluation of mortgages may be

unacceptably high. A national databank of all rated

homes would allow profiling of the energy efficiency of housing stock in any part of the country.

More importantly, typical energy costs for different

house types with different fuel mixes could be

generated. This would allow lenders and buyers to

better evaluate the savings of more efficient houses .50

As a first step in this direction, the National

Affordable Housing Act of 1990 requires HUD to

develop a plan to make housing more affordable

through mortgage financing incentives for energy

efficiency.

Home energy audits. The Federal Residential

Conservation Service (RCS) was created in 1978 to

provide consumers with information on energy

conservation for their homes. It mandated that gas

and electric utilities provide their customers with

on-site energy audits. The program was implemented in 1981 and recently expired. There has been

very little evaluation of the program, and little

reliable information has been kept on its success in

reducing energy consumption.51

Any future Federal initiatives in the utility sector

to provide energy audits should require the audits to

generate a uniform energy rating with regular

reporting of all audited/rated houses. This would

make the data collected from the utility-audited/

rated houses available for future analysis.

Appliance labels. Energy users often have very

little knowledge about appliance energy use and

energy costs (46a). Appliance labels to supply this

information for selected appliances were required by

the National Energy Policy and Conservation Act of

1975. These labels were required on refrigeratorfreezers, freezers, room air conditioners, clothes

washers, dishwashers, and electric and gas water

heaters. These labels provide information on energy

use and costs, and also indicate the highest and lower

energy costs for models with similar features.

Evaluations of the effectiveness of these labels

have been inconclusive. Some have argued that

information, such as appliance labels, are necessary

48~e Feder~ Natio@ M~figage A~~Wiation ~d the Feder~ Home ban Mortgage Corp. have endorsed MS concept and approve HERS for

qualification in the seeondary mortgage market. The Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration have their own set of qualified

HERS.

d~or a discussion of the technical considerations in developing HERS, see ref. 69.

5OFor ~xaple, ifn enau.efflclent home is being purchasd, mortgages could be approved for a higher Wrmntage of a home buyer’s income ~~

on anticipated lower monthly energy expenses.

51@e smdy (37) ~onclud~ hat the ~roum’ contribution t. mtio~ energy savings ww m~l. However, some of the State programs worked wel],

suggesting that home energy audits could be a successful part of a home energy consemation policy.
142 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

but not sufficient for improving efficiency—that

such information programs, when combined with

financial incentives and other programs, will be

most effective (1 la).

General information campaigns. As mentioned

above, the Federal Government funds a Stateimplemented information service called the Energy

Extension Service (EES). It serves as a local source

of information on energy use and efficiency. Discussions with State Energy Officers indicate that

generalized advertising was their least effective tool.

They found onsite workshops, auditor training, and

campaigns targeted to a specific group to be their

most effective activities (39). The Federal Government has also supported consumer information and

outreach activities by State energy offices (e.g., New

York), trade associations, and national laboratories.

Research, Development, and Demonstration

There are major barriers to private investment in

R&D in the building shell, prefabrication, construction, and design industries. These barriers include

the fragmented industry structure and the short-term

perspective of many of the decisionmakers. Thus,

the Federal Government has a key role to play in

funding R&D for this sector.

The U.S. Government currently spends a negligible amount on housing research. In contrast, Sweden, with a population of only 9 million, spends

more on research for home construction than the

United States (93). In countries such as Sweden and

Japan, R&D spending has been part of the trend

toward prefabricated housing, which has contributed

to the energy efficiency of homes through standardization of energy saving features and quality control

in the design and manufacture of building components.

Areas that could benefit from more governmental

R&D efforts include:

Building shell systems. Items of potential energysaving value include wall materials that are highly

insulating and load-bearing, inovative window systems, and insulating foams that do not need CFCs.

Energy-efficient field practices, In order to fully

realize the advantages of the new, standardized

building components, it will be necessary to evaluate and improve current construction (on and offsite)

techniques and technologies (e.g., joint sealants and

structural support units).

Manufacturing and design tools. In order to

maximize the energy savings possible with new

techniques and technologies, designers need to have

design tools that enable them to factor in energy

efficiency. As was mentioned earlier, the lack of

design tools is a significant barrier to the diffusion

of energy-efficient technologies and techniques.

Similarly, better manufacturing techniques are needed

that will allow builders to cut the costs (and energy

requirements) of producing new construction components.

Technology performance, Energy requirements

can be minimized through better prediction of

building performance (66). In many instances the

estimates of how much energy will actually be saved

by certain measures prove incorrect, yet little effort

goes into studies of why this is so. For example, the

Hood River Conservation Project achieved 40 percent of predicted savings (38). Evaluation programs

should be aimed at boosting measured performance

and developing more accurate estimates of savings.

Equally important is evaluation aimed at anticipating future problems caused by energy efficiency

measures. For example, as houses are tightened to

decrease infiltration, moisture buildup and indoor air

quality problems can ensue.

Demonstration. As a first step, Congress has

required HUD, in the National Affordable Housing

Act of 1990, to develop a plan to improve energy

efficiency in newly constructed, rehabilitated, and

existing housing; and demonstrate various methods

of improving the energy efficiency of existing

housing. Such projects should encourage the development of ‘‘energy-efficiency businesses’ that can

bridge the gap between owners, builders, and

occupants of buildings.

The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP),

administered by the Department of Energy, works

with government agencies to implement costeffective, energy-efficiency improvements. Congress could authorize FEMP to test and demonstrate

performance, acceptance, and cost-effectiveness of

new

1.

2.

technologies in Federal buildings.

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OTA-E-246 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

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September 1986).

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and the American Economic Tran.nn”on, Choices for the Future,

OTA-TET-283 (Springfield, VA: Natioml Technical Information Service, May 1988),

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessmen~ E/ecm”c

Power-Wheeling and Dea[ing: Technological Considerah’ons

for Increasing Compe~ition, OTA-E-409 (Washington, DC: U.S.

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De~’e/oping Countn”es, OTA-E-486 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, January 1991).

U.S. Department of Energy, DOE Assistant Secretary’s Review

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Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, October 1986).

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1986).

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and Renewable Energy, ‘‘Amual Report on Federal Government

Energy Management, Fiscat Year 1987” (Washington DC:

1987).

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Information, Buildings Energy Technology (Oak Ridge, TN:

1988).

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lnternafional Energy Annual 1987, DOE/EIA-0219(87) (Washington, DC: October 1988).

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inc[uding En~lronmentalAs sessment (D OEIEA-0372) and Regu -

latory lmpacr Analysis, COE/CE-0239 (Washingto~ DC: November 1988).

102.

Ima.

103.

Iw.

105.

105a.

106.

107.

108.

108a.

109.

110.

111.

112.

113.

114.

U.S. Department of Energy, OffIce of Conservation and Renewable Resources, ‘‘Energy Conservation Voluntary Performance

Standards for Commercial and Multi-Family High-Rise Residential Buildings; Mandatory for New Federal Buildings; Interim

Rule,” Federal Register 54(18), Jan. 30, 1989.

U.S. Cmgress, State Energy Eficiency Programs [mprovemenr

Act of 1989, Calendar No. 433, Report 101-235, Jan. 10, 1988,

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Natural Resources to accompany S. 247.

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1990).

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Management and Conservation Programs Fiscal Year 1989

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States, draft (Washington DC: Nov. 3, 1989).

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Federal Register 55(84):18256-18273, May 1, 1990.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Policy Options for

Stabilizing Global Climate, Draft, Report to Congress (Washington, DC: June 1990).

U.S. Government Accounting Oftlce, Report to the Congresn“onal Requesters on Federal Shared Energy Savings Contracting, GAO/RCED/89-99 (Washington, DC: April 1989).

Van der RyIL S. and P. Calthorpe (eds. ), Sustainable Communities (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club, 1986),

Vine, E,, B.K. Barnes, and R. Ritschard, Evaiuah’on o-f the

[implementation of Home Energy Ran”ng System, Nationat

Technical Information Service No. PC A02/MF AO1 (Berkeley,

CA: Lawrence Berkeley Laborato~, 1987).

Vine, E., B.K. Barnes, and R. Ritschard, Home Energy Rating

Systems: Program Descriptions, LBL-229 19, UC-95d (Berkeley,

CA: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 1987).

Wilsoq D. et al., ‘‘Policies and Programs for I%omoting Energy

Conservation in the Residential Sector: b.ssons From Five

OECD Countries, ’ LBL-27289 (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence

Berkeley Laboratory, June 1989).

Wright, R., Director, Center for Building Technology, National

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OTA, Jan. 29, 1990.

YuarL L.J., ‘‘Traditional Housing: A Solution to Hopelessness in

the Third World-The Malaysian Example, ” The Ecologist

18(1):16-23, 1988.
Chapter 5

The Transportation Sector

Photo credit: Bressler Editorial Cartoons, New York, Artist: Packer

A World War II poster encouraging carpooling. Today, urban commuters average 1.2 passengers per vehicle to and from work.
CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

CURRENT TRANSPORT :EMISSIONS

AND ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Source of Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Trends in Passenger Travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Trends in Freight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

Trends inefficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

TECHNOLOGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL

INFLUENCES ON EMISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 154

Reducing Vehicle Miles Traveled . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

The Role of Land-Use Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Factors Affecting Carbon Dioxide Emissions

Per Mile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

OTA EMISSION REDUCTION SCENARIOS . . . 160

The Base Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Moderate Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Tough Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Summary of the OTA Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Costs of the Tough Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Alternatively Fueled Vehicles, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

POLICY OPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Fuel Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

Fuel Economy Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

Vehicle Taxes and Rebates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Incentives for Manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Policy Directed at Operation and Maintenance.. 168

Transportation Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Controlling Settlement Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

CHAPTER PREFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Boxes

Box Page

5-A. Chlorofluorocarbons in the Transportation

Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

5-B. Transportation Energy Use in Eastern Europe

and the U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

5-C. Successful Urban Bus Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

5-D. Congestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

5-E. Safety v. Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

5-F. The Los Angeles Air Quality Plan . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Figures

Figure Page

5-l. Contribution of the Transportation Sector

to CO2Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

5-2. Vehicle Travel per Year per

Driving-Age Adult . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

5-3. Trends in New Passenger Car Fuel Economy,

1978-90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

5-4.The Effect of Vehicle Speed on

Fuel Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

5-5. CO2 Emissions Reductions in 2000 and 2015

Expressed as a Percentage of 1987 Transport

Sector Emissions, by Control Method,

Under the Moderate Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

5-6. CO2 Emissions Reductions in 2000 and 2015

Expressed as a Percentage of 1987 Transport

Sector Emissions by Control Method,

Under the Tough Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

5-7. Summary of CO2 Emissions Under the

Base Case, Moderate, and Tough Scenarios,

by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

5-8. Summary of CO2 Emissions by 2015,

by Transportation Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

5-9. International Gasoline Prices and

Taxes, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

Tables

Table Page

5-l. Carbon Emissions From Transportation . . . . . . 150

5-2. Trends in Passenger Travel for

Six Selected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

5-3. World Auto Registrations, 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

5-4. Projected Fuel Economy Impacts of

Auto Technical Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

5-5. Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Alternatively

Fueled Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

5-6. Transportation Sector Conservation

Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Chapter 5

The Transportation Sector

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the relationship between

activity in the transportation sector and global

warming. It looks at both the technology and the

economics of passenger travel and freight within the

United States and, to a lesser extent, the rest of the

world. In 1987, transport contributed about one-third

of the U.S. total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions

(figure 5-1 ). Worldwide, transportation is responsible for about 20 to 25 percent of total CO2 emissions

from fossil fuels (27, 73).

Assuming current trends and regulations, we

estimate that U.S. transportation-related CO2 emissions will grow by about 25 percent by 2010. The

Energy information Administration (69) forecasts

growth of between 16 and 32 percent, depending on

oil prices. in the developing world, transportation

fuel consumption could nearly triple over the next 20

to 30 years (27), These forecasts imply that the

transport sector will continue to be a major source of

CO2 emissions throughout and well beyond this

study timeframe.

A number of measures could be initiated to reduce

CO2 emissions from transport, but OTA’s analysis

reveals that it will be very difficult to reduce U.S .

emissions much below 1987 levels through changes

in technology alone. Reducing emissions below

1987 levels by 2015 would require, in addition,

some behavioral compromise such as the acceptance

of smaller cars, carpooling or increased use of mass

Figure 5-l—Contribution of the Transportation Sector

Buildings to CO2 Emissions

/,/------’ ---- ---- .- . . .

[ (

\

1

\ /

)

Transportation ————--

2

,

\

32%

;’/ ‘, ‘, \\J

“=- /,> -

- 

-

-

3 6 %

- L

Non-oil-based 2%

Rail, marine 7%

Aircraft 14%

Heavy trucks 14%

Light trucks 20%

Automobile 43%

Industry

32% Emissions from transportation,

Percent of total by sector by category

(1.3 billion metric tons/year) (0.42 billion metrtc Ions/year)

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1991.

transit, or lower growth in the expected increase in

demand for highway or air travel.

The difficulty of holding emissions low will be

compounded even further past the 25-year time

horizon of this assessment if population and demand

for travel per person continue to grow, The gains

possible over the next few decades can be easily lost.

Lunger term progress will depend on either lowering

the need for travel (e.g., through innovations in

urban design or telecommunications) or drastically

cutting emissions per mile through use of lower

emitting fuels (e. g., methanol derived from sustainably harvested wood).

To be most effective, any program to promote

more efficient modes of transport and discourage

less efficient ones should incorporate both ‘ ‘regulatory push” and “market pull” mechanisms. One

obvious tool is government standards, particularly

for passenger car and light-truck fuel economy. Fuel

economy standards appear to have been an effective instrument for raising efficiency levels over the

past decade, though some believe that much of the

improvement was due to higher fuel prices. Another

obvious tool is fuel taxes. Though effective, taxes

are more severely felt by low income segments of the

population. Other financially oriented policies, such

as rebates on high efficiency vehicles, do not have

the same near-term potential as fuel taxes alone.

Nevertheless, they could bean important element in

a diversified strategy to reduce CO2

.

To help ensure success, a reduction program

could incorporate an extensive group of policies,

some of which may be worth implementing because

they will lay the groundwork for future progress;

because, when taken as a package, they can achieve

larger gains; or even for their symbolic value.

Support of R&D in new technologies (e.g., novel

engine and transmission designs and lightweight

materials) may result in longer term gains. A

package of strategies to encourage people to change

travel patterns (i.e., parking controls, vanpools or

cat-pools, expanded mass transit, and increased

‘‘telecommuting’ can achieve large gains. Stepped

up support for innovation in the above activities

could have significant impacts on the U.S. ability to

control its CO2 emissions.

–149-
150 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

CURRENT TRANSPORT

EMISSIONS AND ACTIVITIES

Source of Emissions

About 80 percent of transport’s contribution to

global warming comes from the carbon dioxide

released by burning fuel. The remaining 20 percent

comes from chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) used in

vehicle fabrication and for transport air-conditioning

(see box 5-A).l

The United States is the single largest emitter of

transport CO2 emissions, with Western Europe and

Eastern Europe following at some distance. The

developing world presently adds about 20 percent of

the CO2 from this sector (see table 5-l).

Trends in Passenger Travel

Total vehicular travel per person ranges from an

average of several thousand miles per year in the

industrial countries to several hundred miles per

year in the developing world. Table 5-2 shows trends

in passenger travel for six countries and the primary

means of transportation--private car, buses, rail

water, air. Values for the poorest countries are biased

downward because they omit walking, cycling, and

animal transport (37).

Total travel, car ownership, and travel by car have

all increased steadily throughout the world over the

past two decades, gradually in the industrial countries and rapidly in the developing countries. Currently, car ownership ranges from one car per 1.8

people in the United States (in 1987) to one car per

1,075 in the People’s Republic of China (see table

5-3). In many of the developing countries, travel and

car ownership have been growing faster than income

(49). Recent political changes and hoped for economic progress in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.

could lead to especially large increases in transportrelated emissions in these countries (see box 5-B).

In the United States, travel per person (all modes)

increased from 10,400 miles in 1970 to 13,300 in

1985, an average annual increase of 1.7 percent(11,

40). About 90 percent of travel was by car and light

trucks, 9 percent by air, and 2 percent by bus and rail.

Figure 5-2 illustrates the increase in annual auto

travel per driving-age adult from 1960 to the present.

Table 5-l—Carbon Emissions From Transportation

Transport

share of

Transport Share region’s

CO* of world fossil C02

U.S.A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413 36% 30%

Canada and Western

Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 23 31

Japan, Australia and

New Zealand . . . . . . . . 90 8 30

U.S.S.R. and E. Europe . . 171 15 12

S. and E. Asia . . . . . . . . . 50 4 19

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2 4

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4 26

Latin America . . . . . . . . . . 83 7 36

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2 14

World total. . . . . . . . . . . 1,153 2 2 %

aTransport share of world’s fossil-fuel C02 emissions.

SOURCES: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Po/icy QXions for

Stabilizing Global Climate, draft report (Washington, DC:

1989), app. B; and ICF Inc., background tables to EPA

stabilization report, personal communication to OTA, 1989.

Figure 5-2—Vehicle Travel per Year per

Driving-Age Adult

Miles per year 10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

1 , , I

0 I 1 1 T 1 , T ! 1 T ! r 1 T r T 8 r 1 I T , 1

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

SOURCES: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers As=”ation, Facts and Figures

’89 (Detroit, Ml: 1990). U.S. Department of Commerce, T he

Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, DC:

1989).

These trends reflect changing economics, demographics, and settlement patterns. As the large

post-war “baby boom” generation and unprecedented numbers of women moved into the

workforce, employment increased much faster than

the total population—it grew even in metropolitan

IAs de~~ in ~x 5-A, U.S. CFC emissions total about 53,(XXI metric tons of CFC-12 and 15,000 metric tons of Cm-l 1 -tily. U.S. COZ

emissions from transportation amount to about 420 million metric tons of carbon per year. One ton of CFC-12 has a global warming potential equal to

about 2,000 tons of carbon (28). The corresponding figure for CFC-I 1 is about 950.
Chapter 5--The Transportation Sector ● 151

Box 5-A-Chlorofluorocarbons in the Transportation Sector

Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are used in transport as working fluids for air-conditioning, and in smaller

quantities in foam seats, padding, and insulation. Because of their destructive effect on the stratospheric ozone layer,

they have been restricted by an international agreement, the recently ratified Montreal Protocol (see box 2-C in ch.

2). These compounds are also major contributors to global warming.

Three CFCs are used in transport: CFC-12,CFC-11, and CFC-113, all controlled under the Montreal Protocol.

CFC-12 is the working fluid in auto air conditioners, and is also used for blowing rigid foam insulation. CFC-11

is used in vehicle manufacture for blowing flexible foam seat cushions and interior padding, and for blowing rigid

foam insulation in refrigerated trucks and rail cars. CFC-113 is a solvent used for cleaning electronic components

in vehicle manufacture. Table 5A-1 shows estimated 1985 CFC use in American transport. The largest component,

CFC-12 in mobile air-conditioning, represents about 20 percent of total U.S. CFC use.

All three of the CFCs currently used in transport will have to be cut back under the terms of the Montreal

Protocol. For each of them, there are new techniques or substitute materials under development to reduce emissions.

Just as the CFCs differ in their ozone depletion potential, they also differ in their relative greenhouse effect. Chapter

2 discusses both the ozone depletion and greenhouse potential for the three CFCs used in transport and some

possible substitutes,

Although emissions of CFCs are much smaller than emissions of CO2, the greenhouse potential per ton of

CFC-12 is roughly 2,000 times greater than that of CO2 (measured in tons of carbon) (28), so the CFC contribution

to human-induced warming is significant. CFC emissions from all sources (not just transportation) are estimated

to account for about one-quarter of the current effect from all greenhouse gases (28).

The United States dominates the world mobile air-conditioning market, and mobile air-conditioning dominates

U.S. CFC use in transport. In the 1986 model year, 80 percent of new U.S. domestic cars and light trucks, and 50

percent of imports, were air-conditioned. About 65 percent of the total U.S. vehicle fleet was air-conditioned in 1985

(45). In contrast, only 20 percent of new vehicles-sold in the rest of the world are air-conditioned (24); because

air-conditioning is growing, the fraction in the fleet would be lower still.

Of the 115 million pounds of CFC-12 produced for U.S. mobile air-conditioning in 1985,35 percent went to

charging new systems, 25 percent to recharging after leaks, 35 percent to recharging after service venting, and 7

percent to recharging after accidents.

New compounds are being developed to replace CFC-12 in air-conditioning systems. HCFC-134a is a

promising replacement candidate because it resembles CFC-12 closely enough to be used in existing systems. It

will require development of new lubricants, though, because it is not soluble in present mineral oil lubricants, and

still requires several years of toxicity testing. Other possible substitutes include HCFC-22, mixtures, and

hydrocarbons, but these presently require substantial system redesign and retooling. DuPont has recently announced

a promising new blend requiring minimal retooling (2).

For blowing flexible foams, several alternative

blowing agents are available. Carbon dioxide and

methylene chloride are both used at present (58), and

a new water-blown process is under development

(38a). For cleaning electronic components, methyl

chloroform can replace CFC-113 in many but not all

applications. Nearly complete capture and recycling of

CFC-113 will be possible, though (38a).

In summary, CFCs are a significant contribution

to total transport greenhouse emissions, especially

through leaks from mobile air-conditioning systems.

Control of CFCs in transport will likely continue to be

driven by concern over ozone depletion. Greenhouse

considerations, though, should preclude a strategy

based on replacing present CFCs with new ones that

are less damaging to stratospheric ozone but just as

active as greenhouse gases.

Table 5A-1—1985 U.S. Transport CFC Use,

Millions of Pounds

CFC-11 CFC-12 CFC-113

Air-conditioning . . . . . . . . . . . 113.1

Foam seats and padding . . . . 24a

Rigid foam insulation . . . . . . . 7.8 2.5

Solvents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . b

We of CFC-I 1 for flexibte foams is about 33 million pounds, whioh

indudesfurniture, bedding, paokaging, and oarpet underlay aswell as

vehicles. Unestimated 24million pounds isthetransport share, based

on roughly 2 pounds for each of the 12.2 million I“@ht vehicles

manufactured in the United States in the 1986 model year (38a).

%otalCFC-113 use for solvents wzs 164 million pounds. Transport

share not available,

SOURCE: T.G. Statt, ‘me Use of CFCS in Refrigeration, Insulation,

and Mobile AC in the U.S.,” paper prepared for the EPA

Conference on Substitutes and A/ternativse to CFCS and

Ha/ens, Washington, DC, Jan. 13-15, 198S.

I
152 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Table 5-2—Trends in Passenger Travel for Six Selected Countries

—

Mode shares (percent)

Passenger miles People Road

per person per car (private) (public) Rail Water Air

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197CI

198CI

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197C’

1980

752

2,270

76

145

34

15

27,700

—

28

33

66

62

23

32

5

3

70

61

0

0

7

6

2

2

0.2

1.8

—

.

India ... , . . . . . . . . . . 1 970’

1980

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1970

1980

263

487

2,700

3,366

902

718

12.0

4.9

7

7

51

57

52

52

41

41

0.5

0.9

12

11

34

26

9

7

1

1

2

5

United Kingdom . . . . . 1971

1981

4,817

5,643

1,624

2,976

79

85

6

19

12

8

38

41

0.4

0.6

—

3.6

147

32

U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . . . . 1970

1980

43

27

1

1

12

13

NOTES: 1. The division of road transport into private and public for Japan, Brazil, China, and India is estimated based on other studies.n

— .

2. Walking and cycling, large modes in China and India, are excluded.

aFor Japan, a 1968 Tokyo study on trip split has been used for 1965 and 1970 (81 percent private, 19 percent public; Moavenzadeh and Geltner, table 4-14),

and aggregated mode splits for Japan, Australia and New Zealand in 1979 used for 1980 (84 percent private; Ang, table 6.6). For Brazil, a 1867 Sao Paolo

trip survey has been used for 1965 imd 1970 (30 percent private; Moavenzadeh and Geltner, table 4-14), and a 1977 trip survey of all metropolitan areas for

1980 (Poole, table 3.2). For China, because of extremely low auto ownership, all road travel has been called public. For India, a crude estimate was derived

from registmtion data presented in Dtinkerley et al. It was assumed that annual miles per bus were triple the value for autos, and that buses averaged 30

occupants versus 2 for automobiles. These assumptions yielded estimates of 89 percent private in 1965, 88 percent in 1970 and 1980.

SOURCES: B.W. Ang, “Modelling Worfd Energy Demand for Transport,” Discussion Paper EDP 28 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, Energy Research

Group, Aug. 25, 1983); J. Dunkerley et al., “Energy and Transport: The Indian Experience,” Pacific andAsian Journa/of Ehergy, 1987; G. Leach,

L. Jarass, G. Obermair, and L. Ho ffmann, Energy and Growih:A Comparison of 13 Irrdustrialand Developing Countries (London: Butterworth

Scientific, 1986); F. Moavenzadeh and D. Geltner, “Transportation, Energy, and Economic Development: A Dilemma in the Developing World,”

Eneryy Research, Vo/ume 5 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1984); Motor Vehicle Manufacturer’s Association, Facts and F@Jres (Detroit, Ml: various

years); A. Poole, “Energy and Transport in Brazil,” report to U.S. Agency for International Development (Washington, DC: Resources for the

Future, January 1983) ;A. Tretyakovaand B. Kostinsky, USSR: MotorFue/Useand Conservation in Transportation andAgriculture, 1970to 1984,

Center for International Research, U.S. Bureau of the Census, CIR Staff Paper No. 32 (Washington, DC: D~mber 1987); J. Yenny and L.V. Uy,

“Transport in China,” Wortd Bank Staff Working Paper No. 723 (Washington DC: 1985).

areas that lost population between 1960 and 1980.

The accompanying increase in work travel accounts

for much of the growth in per-capita car ownership

and travel. Also during this period, low-density

suburbs grew more rapidly than central cities.

Although data are ambiguous on whether or not

average trip length has increased, it seems plausible

that it increased through the 1960s, and has leveled

off or declined since the 1970s.2

The large increase in air travel since 1960 can be

attributed both to rising personal incomes and to the

declining real cost of air travel brought about by

technological advance and, in the 1980s, deregulation. Events of the last few years suggest, though,

that industry consolidation may bring higher real

prices, moderating current growth trends.

In 1985, passenger travel accounted for two-thirds

of the energy consumed in U.S. transport. The other

major energy user was freight, which consumed

roughly one-quarter of the total transport energy.

(11).

Trends in Freight

Freight has been growing worldwide at roughly

the same rate as gross domestic product (GDP) in

OECD countries and faster than GDP elsewhere (32,

44,60, 77). Freight intensity (ton-miles of freight per

dollar of GDP) varies greatly among countries,

generally as a function of country size, population

density, and economic structure. Intensity increases

as an economy moves from agriculture into primary

industry, then declines slowly as an economy shifts

toward secondary manufacturing and services. U.S.

freight statistics have followed this trend.

In 1987, U.S. freight activity amounted to about

11,000 ton-miles per person. About 37 percent was

by rail, 25 percent by road, 22 percent by pipeline,

16 percent by water and less than 1 percent by air.

These shares have been roughly constant since the

‘See discussions in table 3.26 of ref. 43 and refs. 30 and 34.
Chapter 5--The Transportation Sector ● 153

Table 5-3--World Auto Registrations, 1987

Cars Population

Continent/country (thousands) per car

North & Central America

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,500 2.2

Honduras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30,000 170

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,402 16

U.S.A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137,323 1.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156,776 2.6

South America

Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,060 8

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,527 16

Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579 55

Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390 56

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,165 17

Asia

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 1,075

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,471 566

Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 193

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29,478 4.2

Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272 404

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43,782 65

Oceania

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,666 2.4

Africa

Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417 131

Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 774 149

South Africa Republic . . . . . . 3,078 12

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,860 80

Europe

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,950 2.5

Germany, East . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,462 4.8

Germany, West . . . . . . . . . . . 28,304 2.1

Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,800 2.5

Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,193 46

U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,000 22

United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . 20,096 2.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159,958 5.2

World total

1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394,209 13

SOURCE: Motor Vehiele Manufacturer’s Association, Facfs and Figures

‘89(Detroit, Ml 1990).

mid-1970s, while over a longer period freight has

shifted gradually from rail to truck and pipeline.

Continued movement of producers to suburbs, often

far from rail spurs, and increased use of sophisticated inventory management (e.g., just-in-time delivery systems) is likely to provide a continuing

advantage to trucking or novel combinations of road,

rail, and other modes.3 Worldwide, continuing

industrialization in the developing countries will

likely offset reductions in U.S. freight intensity. For

Figure 5-3-Trends in New Passenger Car Fuel

Economy, 1978-90

Miles per gallon (EPA test combined city-highway)

35

1 —-~-~’”~

30

b

/--

:tie

15

10 )

1 -

‘- Domestic

5

European

o L——— ~-+ ‘---- 

T

- -

‘

—

”

- - - -

1978 1980 1982

43--+=-$s-+ +3=----- .---—’--.:’ ’—-’”

- - -

+ All new cars

— Asia n

T + ‘~ ‘–– t-—-~–~ ‘–-T –

‘

- -

1984 1986 1988 1990

SOURCE: R.M. Heavenrich and J.D. Murrell, “Light-Duty Automotive

Technology and Fuel Economy Trends Through 1988,” U.S.

Environmental Protection Ageney, Office of Mobile Sources,

EPA/AA/CTAB-88-07 (Ann Arbor, Ml: June 1988).

example, between 1960 and 1980, the freight

intensity of Korea increased by more than 40

percent, that of Brazil by over 25 percent (77).

Trends in Efficiency

The energy efficiency of transport has increased

both in the United States and worldwide. The largest

gains have been in American light vehicles (see figure 5-3). New-vehicle average fuel economy almost

doubled (from 13 to 24 miles per gallon (mpg))

between 1973 and 1985 through the combined

effects of technical progress, oil price shocks, and

regulation (29). During the same period, new-car

efficiencies in the United Kingdom increased from

21 to 31 mpg; in Japan, from 23 to 30 mpg; and in

West Germany, from 23 to 31 mpg. Almost no

efficiency gains have been made in new vehicles

since 1985, however (11, 25).

In freight, the broad trend worldwide is towards

energy-intensive modes, but with substantial efficiency improvements within each mode. For example, in the United States, truck freight efficiency

improved by 20 percent between 1970 and 1985

(66). Less dramatic but nevertheless substantial

efficiency gains have been made in other modes

worldwide.

7An ~ncfin factor fi fumm frel@t de=nd and ~~ctum, at l-t in tie OECD, is ~yc~g, & to~ materi~ demands &orne SIIMkX, a larger

fraction can be met by recycled materials. This fact changes the basic path of material travel through the economy from a once-through trip to a circular

one. The overall effect on total freight requirements could be an increase or decrease. (For more on reeycling, see ch. 6.)
154 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

.

Box 5-B-Transportation Energy Use in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.

Eastern Europe--The transportation sector currently accounts for about 13 percent of energy demand in

Eastern Europe. Railroads account for 30 to 55 percent of total passenger miles, depending on the country, and for

a greater share of freight transport (31). While railroads are expected to remain important, passenger and freight

transport are expected to increasingly shift to private cars and large trucks, especially as per-capita car ownership

increases. Air travel also is expected to increase rapidly.

Kolar and Chandler (31) projected that if only minimal improvements occur in automobile fuel economy,

primary energy demand in the sector will more than double by 2025. In contrast, significant increases in vehicle

fuel economy (e.g., from the current East European average for passenger cars of 27 miles per gallon to 47 miles

per gallon) and conversion of the truck fleet from predominantly gasoline-powered to predominantly

diesel-powered engines, could limit energy demand growth in this sector to about 50 percent.

U.S.S.R.—In the U. S.S.R., transportation is responsible for about 12 percent of total fossil fuel carbon

emissions (60). The most prevalent modes of passenger travel are public transportation (40 percent) and rail (25

percent). 1 The U.S.S.R. has about 45 personal cars per 1,000 people, roughly one-tenth the ratio in Western Europe

and the United States. This situation is likely to change as more automobiles become available and as per-capita

incomes rise. U.S.S.R. passenger car production increased dramatically during the 1970s; while growth plateaued

during the early 1980s, at least three new auto assembly plants are planned and production is expected to increase

again in the 1990s.

Freight transportation accounts for a much larger sham of transport fuel consumption in the U.S.S.R. than

passenger transportation. In 1982,66 percent of freight transportation was by rail, 22 percent by river or ocean, and

9 percent by truck (60). Truck transportation traditionally has been based on gasoline engines, rather than diesel

engines, which are more energy-efficient.2 However, the portion of diesel-powered trucks is slowly increasing,

which partly explains why total freight turnover increased by 40 percent between 1975 and 1985 even though total

fuel consumption remained unchanged (60).

There is little doubt that energy use in passenger transportation will increase, but how fast demand will grow,

how fast it will be satisfied by domestic production of passenger automobiles, and what type of fuel will be used

are unknown. Soviet vehicles tend to be inefficient and highly polluting, so opportunities exist to reduce emissions

by producing new cars using more modern technologies and new car designs. The U.S.S.R. also could attempt to

strengthen and improve its well-developed urban transportation system, which would partially offset growth of

passenger automobile use.

l~va~ cars a~~t for 19 percent and air travel accounb fm 13 Pment.

21n 1984 diesel-engine trucka comprised only 19 percent of Soviet truck freight haulage, compared with over 80 percent m Western

Europe, and more than 40 percent in the United States (60).

TECHNOLOGICAL AND Reducing Vehicle Miles Traveled

INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES Very little travel is done for intrinsic pleasure;

ON EMISSIONS people travel in order to get somewhere they want to

be. In the United States, travel for work, travel for

Three factors—population growth (especially in family business, and travel for recreation each

developing countries), miles traveled per person, account for roughly one-third of passenger vehicle

miles traveled (VMT) (38). Existing settlement and greenhouse gas emissions per unit of travel— patterns, economic activity, and available transpor- will determine future world transport greenhouse tation infrastructure determine both how much travel emissions and the trajectory of emissions growth.

These factors will in turn be influenced by the is needed and how it is accomplished.

economic development of different countries or Americans exhibit a strong preference for travelgroups of countries and by a number of technologi- ing in cars and light trucks, primarily alone. Since

cal and institutional forces, many, but not all, of passenger travel consumed two-thirds of U.S. transwhich are amenable to policy intervention (see last port energy in 1985 and nearly 90 percent of that was

section of this chapter). in light vehicles (i.e., cars and light trucks), control-
Chapter 5---The Transportation Sector ● 155

ling light vehicle VMT would have a large effect on

transport CO2 emissions (11). However, the only

ways to reduce light vehicle VMT are to displace

single-occupancy driving with other transportation

modes, reduce the need for trips through altered

work scheduling (e.g., 4-day workweeks) or by

combining errands, or to shorten each trip through

better urban design.

The primary alternatives to single-occupancy

driving are carpools and mass transit. American

ridership shares of public transit remain low, in

contrast to some non-U.S. cities (see box 5-C).

Strategies to reduce the number of single-occupancy

car trips include: improved mass transit, employer

rideshare and mass transit incentives, parking management (higher parking meter fees, eliminating

employer-subsidized parking, etc.), vanpool purchase incentives, auto use restrictions, and highoccupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes. Collectively such

measures are referred to as transportation control

measures (TCMs)

Several key generalizations about TCMs can be

drawn from past programs to reduce air pollution in

various cities (63). First, TCMs will be most

effective if implemented as a package of several

measures simultaneously. For example, ridesharing

programs and mass transit are likely to be more

successful if some highway lanes are restricted to

buses and carpools, or if parking in business districts

is restricted or expensive. A recent comparison of

the business districts of San Francisco, Portland,

Seattle and Denver found that transit shares were

highest in the cities with the highest parking prices

and most limited parking (26). In general, larger

reductions in emissions are likely to be achieved if

TCM programs are coordinated throughout an area

and over an extended time horizon, than if measures

are developed on a piecemeal or sporadic basis.

Major capitol projects such as development of mass

transit obviously require long lead times and sustained efforts.

TCM programs have to be tailored to each

individual area, and thus must be implemented

locally. Critical local characteristics that need to be

considered in developing TCM programs include:

population and employment distributions and densities, city layout and transportation routes, highway

system capacity and level of congestion, access to

mass transit, and parking availability and costs.

Finally, the success of many transportation control measures depends to a large degree on public

acceptance and participation. In the absence of

widespread support, past experience indicates that

political resistance to involuntary restrictions on

peoples’ modes or amount of travel can be insurmountable.

The Role of Land-Use Planning

Land-use patterns play an important role in either

tying people to their cars or facilitating other modes

of transportation. As an illustration, people who live

within a few miles of work might choose to walk or

bike. But where urban areas consist of sprawling

residential suburbs and separate business districts or

industrial parks, few people have these options. A

recent comparison of 10 U.S. cities found that per

capita gasoline consumption is relatively low in

cities with high population and job density, and

relatively high in cities with abundant roads and

parking. Per capita gasoline consumption is 10 times

higher for residents of suburbs outside of Denver

than for residents of Manhattan (39).

Between 1980 and 1986, about 85 percent of the

population growth in the United States was in

metropolitan areas. About three-fourths of that

growth occurred in the suburbs of those areas.

According to a task force formed to advise the

.— .

@---- --- ——- - ---

I

Photo credit: American Public Transportation Association

The Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority

promotes public transportation with billboards like this one

in Cincinnati, OH.
156 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 5-C-Successful Urban Bus Systems

Every author who looks at public transit concludes that Americans just don’t like it. This could change. Many

cities in other industrial countries have efficient, heavily used public transit systems; some cities similar in many

ways to American ones have attracted large numbers of motorists to public transit through service improvements.

Ottawa, Canada a metropolitan area of about 600,000, began a major transit improvement in the mid-1970s

(coupled with the abolition of free parking downtown for Federal public servants).l The cornerstone of the program

was construction of a 20-mile dedicated busway, separated from other traffic but with ramps feeding into arterial

roads at major stations, spaced at about l-mile intervals. The program also included premium-priced express service

between outlying suburbs and major employment centers, expanded connections to intercity terminals, mom buses,

and many operating innovations.

The program‘s success has been impressive. A greater percentage of people ride the bus in Ottawa than in any

other medium-sized city in North America. Along major suburban corridors, 23 to 45 percent of ail trips are taken

in buses. That is up from 2 to 20 percent in 1971. The system covers a steady 60 percent of operating costs from

revenue.

Curitiba, Brazil, is a prosperous and rapidly growing metropolitan area with a population of about 1.5 milliom2

Faced with bad traffic congestion in the early 1970s, the city developed a comprehensive public transport plan based

on a 35-mile network of separated bus lanes along the medians of radial arterial roads. The lanes are not grade

separated at intersections, but have signal priority. The system is operated by several private companies with

coordinating management committees to oversee such matters as intercompany reimbursementfor transferring

passengers. Fares are low, and the companies are profitable.

In 1970, about 40 percent of trips in Curitiba were made by private auto, indicative of the higher incomes here

than in other Brazilian cities. (The nationwide average for metropolitan areas was 30 percent.) The remarkable

success of the transport system is that between 1970 and 1980, while Curitiba’s auto fleet grew by more than 10

percent per year, the fraction of metropolitan trips made by auto declined to 30 percent

The experiences of both Ottawa and Curitiba suggest that attracting riders from cars to public transit depends

on comprehensive attention to details of service convenience and quality. Major gains can be made when, because

of priority treatment on congested roads, public transit is faster and more convenient than driving.

l~s section is drawn from ref. M.

2N section is drawn fmn M. ~.

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), this site development. Permit reviews typically ensure

pattern of growth is expected to continue (20).

However, growth in the suburbs does not necessarily

have to mean more and longer commutes in private

cars. The FHWA’s task force anticipates that the

density of residential development in the suburbs

will increase as rising housing costs and declining

household sizes necessitate construction of apartments and compact townhouses rather than expansive subdivisions (20). This increase in density

could facilitate transit service. And, some analysts

have suggested, land-use policies could guide development to limit reliance on driving.

Land-use planning and regulation are traditionally activities carried out by local governments,

whereas transportation planning is more apt to be a

State or regional responsibility. Land-use policies

are implemented through local zoning laws and

permit requirements for subdivision and commercial

that public works (e.g., water, sewers, roads, interchanges, and parking) are adequate to support the

development. Interaction between transportation

and land-use planning agencies usually takes the

form of assessing the impacts of new developments.

The number of trips that would be generated by a

proposed development is estimated and compared

with the capacity of nearby roads and intersections.

If a transportation system is inadequate to support

new development, it maybe expanded, sometimes at

a developer’s expense. Increasingly, where funds are

limited or congestion is already an issue, developers

are being required to take steps such as providing

convenience stores on site or providing transit

shelters or bike paths, in order to reduce potential

transportation impacts. Downtown developers in

several cities have been faced with caps on the

number of parking spaces they can provide. In Los
Chapter 5-The Transportation Sector ● 157

Angeles, area-wide land-use regulations are being

developed to help reduce traffic congestion and air

pollution. The guiding principles include: promoting development in areas with existing mass transit

services; encouraging development within developed areas to increase population density and thus

make transit services easier to provide; and promoting housing construction in job-rich areas or employment opportunities in residential areas. Due to

the links between land-use policies, jobs, and tax

revenues, local political resistance is apt to be the

major problem in trying to modify land-use regulations (12).

Factors Affecting Carbon Dioxide

Emissions Per Mile

Carbon dioxide emissions per unit of travel are

largely determined by two types of factors: operation

and maintenance practices (including occupancy

level, the speed at which vehicles are operated, and

vehicle tuning) and vehicle efficiency technology

(including such market-determined factors as the

average size and power of vehicles in the fleet),

Vehicle speed has a significant effect on fuel use

(figure 5-4). The lowest fuel use per mile (and thus

lowest CO2 emissions per mile) occurs in the range

of 35 to 45 mph. Traveling at 65 mph typically

results in 20 to 25 percent higher CO2 emissions per

mile than traveling at 55 mph. Traveling at 75 mph

results in about 50 percent higher emissions. Speeds

lower than 35 mph, often a result of highway

congestion, result in higher emissions, as well.

Increasing urban highway congestion has, and will

continue to, cut overall on-road efficiency (see box

5-D).

Even if revived public transit reduces projected

VMT growth, cars and light trucks (pickup trucks,

minivans and four-wheel drive ‘ ‘sport’ vehicles)

will continue to dominate U.S. transport. Assuming

the mix of types and sizes of vehicles remains about

the same, the single most important factor determining future transport energy use and CO2 emissions

will be the rate of light vehicle efficiency gains.

Today’s best production models and prototypes

surpass 50 mpg and 80 mpg respectively, indicating

that cars can be much more efficient than they are,

on average, today (see table 5-4). More efficient cars

make some sacrifices in performance and size, but,

with further development, significant efficiency

gains should be possible even with today’s vehicle

Figure 5-4—The Effect of Vehicle Speed on

Fuel Consumption

Fuel use (as a percent of fuel use at 35 mph)

180% 1

160%

140%

1 20%

1 00%

80%

60%

40%

20%

o%

1

L

15 25 35 45 55 65 75

Speed, miles per hour

SOURCE: S.C. Davis, D,B. Shortka, and P.S. Flu, Automated Transportation Energy Data Book (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National

Laboratory, May 31, 1988), table 3.35.

size and performance. The rate of improvement

possible for the entire fleet is discussed in detail in

“OTA Emission Reduction Scenarios, ” below.

In addition to efficiency gains from new technologies, additional improvement can be had by shifting

sales to smaller cars. Difiglio et al, (14) estimate that

by 2000, a new-vehicle fleet-average efficiency of

about 39 mpg is the maximum technologically

achievable without changing the size mix of the

fleet. An additional 5 to 7 mpg average is possible if

between 75 and 95 percent of car purchases are from

the smaller, most fuel-efficient car lines. However,

not all consumers would be satisfied with these

vehicles. Moreover, shifting to smaller vehicles

raises safety concerns (see box 5-E).

Large efficiency gains can be achieved if consumers will accept much smaller, lighter, and less

powerful cars as second vehicles. While limited in

applications, very small cars are suitable for some

purposes such as urban commuting. If a substantial

fraction of mileage was driven in cars sized for the

number of passengers traveling and the purpose of

the trip-say, 20 percent of vehicle miles in halfwidth cars getting 120 mpg and the remainder at 34

mpg (the average we forecast for the year 2010)--

then fleet average efficiency would increase by

about 6 mpg. Whether such vehicles could meet

safety requirements is unknown, however.
158 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 5-D-Congestion

Traffic is increasing in many cities. Average automobile speeds in London are reportedly as low as 8 miles

per hour (mph), and in Tokyo speeds are even lower (46). In Los Angeles, average speeds are expected to decline

from about 35 to 19 mph between 1984 and 2010 (55). A drop in average speed in the range expected in Los Angeles

could result in a one-quarter reduction in average automobile fuel economy for these vehicles.1

According to the Federal Highway Administration, in 1987, congestion on U.S. freeways alone created about

2 billion hours of delay and wasted about 2.2 billion gallons of fuel due to the negative effects of stop-and-go driving

on automobile fuel economy (33). This amounted to about 2 percent of total gasoline consumption in the United

States in 1987. The cost of this loss in productivity (i.e., time lost sitting in traffic) and excess fuel consumption

totaled about $16 billion in 1987. If no further improvements are made to our transportation system, by 2005,

congestion-induced gasoline use on freeways is expected to contribute about 12 percent of the total consumption

(68).

To mitigate the congestion wrought by the projected growth outlined above, we can choose to either improve

the highway system or take steps to reduce the rate of growth in vehicle miles traveled (VMT). Increasing the

capacity of, and the traffic flow on, existing highways could ease congestion, but the benefits may only be temporary

since VMT growth could eventually meet and surpass future capacity. Reducing the rate of VMT growth, or

demand through the adoption of transportation control measures can also help ease congestion, but such measures

require region-wide cooperation among municipalities as well as public acceptance and participation. In a strategy

that targets both transportation supply and demand, the Los Angeles area estimates that traffic delays in 2010 can

be reduced by 50 percent over what they would have been without any further improvements.

l~s cs~e ~sumes thal the relationship between fuel ccOnOmy and speed is linear between 20 and 35 mph (@e M. 33), -tit*

average automobile fuel economy of late-model-year automobiles is about 25 miles per gallon at 20 mph and about 34 miles per gallon at 35

mph (see ref. 11).

Table 5-4:—Projected Fuel Economy Impacts of Auto Technical Changes

Energy and Environmental

Analysis study (2005) Cheng study (2010)

mpg improvementa c mpg improvementb c

Source of change (percent) (percent)

Platform:

Weight reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aerodynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rolling resistance and lubricants . . . . . . . . .

Accessories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Engine:

Spark ignition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Prechamber diesel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Direct diesel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transmission:

Conventional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Continuously variable transmission . . . . . . .

Engine on-off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Overall new car test mpg . . . . . . . ... , ... , . . .

Fleet on-road mpg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-14.3

(2,450-2,600 tbs.)

7.1-8.8

3-4

1.5-2

13-15.6

(includes 2-stroke)

—

4-6

0.9-1.5

44.3 -48.1

37-40d

10-20

(2,150-2,535 Ibs.)

2-3

2-.3

2.3

5.3-6.5

1.5

6.2-11.6

2.75

3.4-5.9

0.3-0.7

35-41

.- 29.6 -34.2

aEEA’s gains are estimated relative to a typical 1987 car weighing 3,070 pounds and achieving 28.0 mpg.

bcheng’s gains are estimat~ relative to a typical 1985 car weighing 2,900 pounds and aChieVing 27.0 mpg.

cGains shown here weight each author’s estimated technical effect by his estimated market penetration.

dE~&es not present fleet on-road mileages. This figure is calculated assuming the same ratio between newandfleet

figures as in Cheng.

SOURCES: Derived from H.C. Cheng, “Potential Reductions in U.S. C02 Emissions in 1995 and 2010 by Technology

Improvements in Electricity Generation and Transportation Sectors” (Upton, NY: Brookhaven National

Laboratory, Process Sciences Division, April 1988); Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc., Deve/op

ments in i’he Fuel Economy of Light-Duty Highway Vehicies, draft final report for U.S. Congress, Office of

Technology Assessment (Arlington, VA: June 1988).
Chapter 5-The Transportation Sector ● 159

Efficiency improvements are more readily adopted

in other modes than in private vehicles for two

reasons. First, commercial operators pay more

Box 5-E—Safety v. Efficiency

Are efficient cars necessarily more dangerous?

Other things being equal, a larger and heavier car is

both safer and less fuel-efficient (9). Any factor that

shifts the vehicle fleet toward smaller and lighter

cars-with other factors held constant-will increase fatalities; the National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA) states that major

downsizing of vehicles to increase fuel economy

above 27.5 mpg would result in increased fatalities

and injuries (72). This argument applies not just to

standards, but also to any market or regulatory

effect that pushes toward lighter cars.

NHTSA analyzed single-vehicle crashes involving passenger cars (through model year 1986) for

the years 1970 to 1989 (72a). In nonrollover

crashes, reduced car weight had little or no effect on

the risk of fatality but was related to a small increase

in the risk of nonfatal injury. In rollover crashes,

however, smaller cars had art increased risk of fatal

injury of about one-third; under the same crash

conditions, narrow, light, short cars had higher

rollover rates than wide, heavy, long cars.

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety

(IIHS) examined actual death rates in car crashes,

by car size, body style, and age and sex of driver

(27a). Only 1 small car was among the 10 with the

lowest death rates, while 12 small- and 3 mid-sized

cars were among the 15 with the highest death rates.

Cars with high percentages of young and/or male

drivers tended to have higher death rates.

However, good design and safety features can

offset the effect of decreasing vehicle weight, as the

steady decline in fatalities per mile traveled since

the mid-1970s illustrates.l Moreover, the IIHS

analysis reveals that some small cars in several of

the body style categories exhibited actual fatality

rates that are just as low as those of the best

mid-sized and large cars.

Nevertheless, a substantial move to smaller and

lighter cars while maintaining or improving occupant safety will continue to be a major engineering

challenge.

IBetw~n 1975 and 1988 new-ear fuel economy doubled and

average weight declined by 1,000 pounds, but deaths dropped

from 3.6 to 2.4 per hundred miltion vehicle miles. This decline

represents a combination of technical advances, increased

seatbelt use, and crackdowns on drunk driving.

attention to life-cycle costs. Second, each vehicle

typically is operated more often so that fuel is a

larger fraction of total life-cycle cost. As mentioned,

the trend in freight is towards more energy-intensive

modes (i.e., trucks) but also greater efficiency within

those modes.

Air efficiencies are also improving thanks to

technological advancements and changed routing

(which increases the number of passengers per trip).

The next generation of aircraft, which could start to

appear in the mid- 1990s, could make use of advances in engines, wings and general aerodynamics,

and lightweight structural materials that would yield

significant savings in energy per seat-mile. For

example, current airplanes such as the Boeing 757

and 767 achieve 70 seat-miles per gallon (with a full

airplane). Boeing forecasts that the 7J7 will achieve

130 to 150 seat-miles per gallon and that it might be

possible to have an airplane operating at 200

seat-miles per gallon early in the 21st century (59).

Similarly, innovations in nonrail freight (e.g., trailers that double as railroad cars and the use of

wingsails to help power ships) can further reduce

transport energy intensity.

This assessment assumes petroleum will remain

the fuel of choice in both passenger and freight

modes through 2015. However, other fuels are under

development, including methanol derived from natural gas (and, past the timefrarne of this study,

possibly from coal), ethanol derived from corn or

wood, and natural gas in compressed or liquefied

form.

These alternative fuels are being considered for

reducing urban air pollution but not all are good

candidates for lowering emissions of greenhouse

gases (see table 5-5). Methanol made from natural

gas will have a negligible to modest effect on

reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Natural gas

systems can leak and since methane-the prime

constituent in natural gas—is a powerful greenhouse

gas, even low leak rates can offset much of the at best

modest gains achieved by switching from oil to

compressed natural gas. Gas or methanol made from

woody biomass offers considerable reduction potential, but only if emissions are offset with additional

biomass growth. (Wood emits a high amount of CO2

for every useful unit of energy it provides. See ch. 7.)

Electric vehicles will produce more CO2 emissions than gasoline vehicles if recharged with

electricity from coal-fired plants but almost no
160 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Table 5-5-Greenhouse Gas Emissions

From Alternatively Fueled Vehicles

Percent change

Fuel and feedstock from present

Methanol:

M85, current natural gas conversion

technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

M1OO, improved vehicle and gas

conversion technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

M1OO, improved vehicle and best coal

conversion technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Natural gas:

Compressed, from domestic sources. . . . .

Biomass fuels:

Ethanol from corn using coal for

process heat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Synthetic natural gas from woody

biomass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Methanol from woody biomass . . . . . . . . . .

Electricity:

Recharging from coal-fired plant. . . . . . . . .

Recharging from current electricity mix. . . .

Recharging from best gas turbines . . . . . . .

Recharging from nuclear plants. . . . . . . . . .

Recharging from solar or hydropower . . . .

Hydrogen:

Hydride vehicle, nuclear electrolytic

hydrogen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Liquid hydrogen, all solar hydrogen . . . . . .

-2

-17

+25 to +30

-14 to o

–lo to +30

-70 to –60

-70

+5

-23

-45

-80

-85

-55

-85

SOURCE: Modified from M.A. DeLuchli, State-of-the-art Assessment of

Emissions of Greenhouse C;ases From the Use of Fossil and

Nonbssi/ Fuels, klfth Emphasis on Alternative Transportation

Fue/s, draft report (Davis, CA: University of California, June 3,

1990), table 10. Estimates rocatculated by MA. DeLuchi, Dee.

11, 1990.

emissions if renewable or nuclear sources are used.

Improved vehicles recharged with electricity from

the current U.S. mix of powerplants might lower

emissions per mile by about 25 percent. Hydrogen

(if generated from renewable or nuclear energy)

offers significant long-term potential, but is the least

technically advanced of any of the options. Table 5-5

compares greenhouse gas emissions from alternative

fuel and gasoline vehicles. For more information on

the status of alternative fuel vehicles, see a recent

OTA report, Replacing Gasoline: Alternative Fuels

for Light-Duty Vehicles (64).

OTA EMISSION REDUCTION

SCENARIOS

OTA developed a general energy accounting

model to track the effects of various policy measures

on U.S. CO2 emissions 4 (see app. A). Within the

transportation sector, we forecast about a 35-percent

increase from 1987 emission levels by 2015 as our

“Base case” scenario. By simulating a series of

Moderate control measures in the model, CO2

emissions were held to about a 20 percent increase

by 2015. Only under our Tough scenario did CO2

emissions fall below current levels, to about 10

percent below 1987 emissions. Table 5-6 includes

details about the control measures in the Moderate

and Tough scenarios. We assume that gasoline

prices rise to about $2.00 per gallon (1987 dollars)

by 2015.

The Base Case

A basic assumption of the OTA Base case is that

people will continue to place a high value on

performance and vehicle size and continue to prefer

single-occupancy driving to any other mode of

transportation. The model projects combined auto

and light truck VMT to grow at an average annual

rate of 2.6 percent through 2000 and about 1.5

percent from 2000 to 2015. Thus, much of the

growth in CO2 emissions in the OTA Base case

comes from a steady rise in VMT. This growth more

than offsets the CO2 reduction from a 25-percent

improvement in auto fuel efficiency (to a new-car

fleet average of about 37 mpg by 2010).

Moderate Control Measures

CO2 emissions growth could be slowed but not

reversed by implementing policies that would encourage measures that we classify as Moderate. If

adopted by 1995, all of the Moderate measures

together (see table 5-6) would lower transportation

emissions by about 10 percent of 1987 levels by

2000 and by 13 percent by 2015 (see figure 5-5).

However, emissions increases more than offset these

savings: by 2015, CO2 emissions still rise 20 percent

relative to 1987 levels.

Before the year 2000, the greatest savings come

from those measures OTA categorized as “Operation and Maintenance of Existing Stock” (O&M).

These measures include improving truck maintenance, reducing VMT through rideshare programs

and parking controls, and enforcing a 55-mph speed

limit.

dFor tie ~mpflation ~ctor tie O:fi Ridge Natio~ h~ratory’s “Alternative Motor Fuel Use Model” was used m the modeling fr~ework for

highway vehicles (41).
Table 5-6-Transportation Sector Conservation Measures

Base case Moderate measures Tough measures

1. Operation & maintenance/

existing stock

Operation & maintenance.

Other efficiency measures

2.

3.

VMT reduction measures .

Mode shifting ., . . . . . . . . .

New investments:

New auto mpg

(1995, 2000, 2010) . . . .

New light truck mpg . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . . .

. . . . . Auto & light truck VMT increases

at 2.6%/yr 1987-2000, 1.50/.

post-2000

. . . . .

. . . . . 29.8, 31.9, 36.6 mpg (EPA rating,

not in-use efficiency)

. . . . . 22.5, 25.4, 33.3

New medium truck mpg . . . . . . . 8.5, 9.4, 11.5 mpg

New heavy truck mpg . . . . . . . . . 5.5 mpg in all years

Mode shifting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nonhighway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aircraft efficiency improved

by 200/0

Accelerated new investments:

Auto lifetimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New auto mpg

(1995, 2000, 2010) . . . . . . . . .

Mix of autos and light trucks , . . .

Truck inspection & maintenance--

5°/0 improvement

Enforce 55 mph--4% savings for

light vehicles

Traffic flow improved-20/~ fuel savings

Ridesharing/parking control-reduce

urban light vehicle VMT by 2°/0

Urban public transportation innovations

and improvements-1% savings

31.5, 35.0, 39.0 mpg

23.8, 27.9, 35.5 mpg

9.0, 10.3, 12.3 mpg

5.7, 5.8, 5.9 mpg

Aircraft efficiency improved by 30%

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

Same as moderate measures

Same as moderate measures

Same as moderate measures

Ridesharing/parking controls--reduce urban

light vehicle VMT by 30% by 2000, 50% by 2010

Same as moderate measures

32.0, 39.0, 55.0 mpg

24.2, 31.1, 50.0 mpg

9.1, 11.5, 17.3 mpg

6.5, 7.6, 8.9 mpg

Busway, urban light rail--50/~ decrease in urban light

vehicle passenger miles

High-speed intercity rail-50/0 decrease in nonurban light vehicle passenger miles, 10%

decrease in air passenger miles

Urban bike/pedestrian planning-5% decrease in

urban light vehicle VMT

Aircraft efficiency improved by 50%

Average vehicle lifetimes 3 years shorter

34.0, 42.0, 58.0 mpg due to smaller cars

Shift mix of autos and light trucks so that they

increase at the same rate
162 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 5-5—CO2 Emissions Reductions in 2000 and

2015 Expressed as a Percentage of 1987 Transport

Sector Emissions, by Control Method, Under the

Moderate Scenario

Moderate controls

J

New auto MPG

New light truck MPG

New heavy truck MPG

Aircraft efficiency

Mode shifting New investments

— ———.-——————

Urban traffic flow

E

Operation and maintenance/

existing stock

55 mph speed limit ‘

Truck operation

F>

m 200 0

and maintenance = 201 5

VMT reduction

o246a 1’0 12- 1’4

Reductions as a percent of 1987 emissions

NOTE: The data presented above should be interpreted as the emissions

reductions achievable in some future year expressed as a percentage of 1987 emissions from the transportation sector, not as a

percentage decrease in emissions bdow 1987 levels.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

Though the contribution from these measures

grows very little with time under the Moderate

scenario, O&M still accounts for about half the total

annual reductions by 2015. Over half of the total

savings from Moderate O&M measures comes from

returning the speed limit to 55 mph and improving

traffic flow. The balance comes from better truck

maintenance and reductions in VMT through carpooling and vanpooling and parking controls. In this

scenario no additional funds are devoted to mass

transit infrastructure.

Improving fuel efficiency starts out as an important but modest part of the saving and increases over

time. Measures to increase vehicle fuel efficiency

can reduce transport emissions by about 2 percent of

1987 levels by 2000 and 7 percent by 2015. Autos

and light trucks account for the greatest proportion

of savings.

In our Base case, we assume that new cars will

average about 32 mpg by 2000 and 36.5 mpg by

2010. Under the Moderate scenario, new car efficiency averages 35 mpg by 2000 ( 15) and 39 mpg by

2010.

Figure 5-6--CO2 Emissions Reductions in 2000 and

2015 Expressed as a Percentage of 1987 Transport

Sector Emissions, By Control Method, Under the

Tough Scenario

Tough controls

New auto MPG

New Iight truck MPG r

New heavy truck MPG T

Aircraft efficiency New investments

Mode shifting

Urban traffic flow Operation and maintenance/

existing stock

55 mph speed limit

Truck operation u 200 0

and maintenance = 2015

VMT reduction 1 1 , 1 1 ,

024 6 8 10 12 14

Reductions as a percent of 1987 emissions

NOTE: The data presented above should be interpreted as the emissions

reductions achievable in some future year expressed as a percentage of 1987 emissions from the transportation sector, not as a

percentage decrease in emissions below 1987 levels. The thin

horizontal bars show additional reductions possible if existing

vehicles are replaced sooner than expected.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

Tough Control Measures

In OTA’s Tough scenario, CO2 emissions from

the transport sector fall to about 5 percent below

1987 emissions by 2015 even with light vehicle size

and performance more or less at current levels. If

some consumers can be moved into smaller or less

powerful cars and old cars are retired somewhat

more rapidly, then emissions could fall to 10 percent

below 1987 levels.

Reductions from the O&M component are similar

under the Moderate and Tough scenarios (see figure

5-6). Note, however, that O&M plays a smaller role

under the Tough scenario (about one-fifth of the total

saving) than it does in the Moderate one (one-half of

the savings).

New-car efficiencies of 34 mpg by 2000 and 55

mpg by 2010 might be possible with an aggressive

introduction of technical improvements, including a

shift to diesel engines. This assumes that consumers

buy cars of the same size and performance as today’s

(14), If the majority of consumers are willing to

purchase smaller cars, new car fleet average efficiencies of 42 mpg by 2000 and 58 mpg by 2010 might

be achievable ( 14). Assuming such efficiencies (and

policies that encourage people to buy fewer light
Chapter S--The Transportation Sector ● 163

trucks and buy new cars an average of 3 years earlier

than they would otherwise) car emissions might be

reduced by about 12 percent of 1987 levels by 2015.

In addition, 8 percent reductions from light trucks

and 7 percent from medium- and heavy-duty trucks

are achievable under our Tough scenario,

Measures to move people out of their cars and into

mass transit under the Tough scenario would yield

reductions of about 11 percent of 1987 levels, To

achieve this, however, urban auto traffic would have

to be reduced by 10 percent through urban light rail,

subways, and urban bike paths. High-speed intercity

rail would have to lower interurban car travel by 5

percent and air traffic by 10 percent.

Summary of the OTA Scenarios

Figure 5-7 summarizes the aggregated results for

the Moderate and Tough scenarios through 2015.

Figure 5-8 summarizes the results by mode of travel.

As shown, all of the Moderate measures together are

able to reduce the growth of emissions but not

eliminate all growth above 1987 levels. Under the

Tough scenario, emissions drop to about 10 percent

below current levels. If future VMT growth turns out

to be lower than we forecast, then greater reductions

are possible. However, if vehicle miles traveled keep

increasing at the rates we assumed and if those miles

continue to be dominated by private cars of current—

or increasing—size and performance, it will be

difficult to hold down C02 emissions. The critical

factors are how fast society is willing to adopt more

Figure 5-7—Summary of C O2 Emissions Under the

Base Case, Moderate, and Tough Scenarios, by Year

Percent change from 1987 emissions

40% ]

I Base case

Tough

-20%1 T — 1

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

NOTE The data presented above shows emissions reductions achievable

In some future year expressed as a percentage decrease In

em rs.slons be/ow 1987 levels.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991,

efficient technologies and the extent to which

society will accept changes in how it moves people

and goods.

Costs of the Tough Scenario

We estimate that the net costs (increased cost of

the measures minus fuel savings) of the Tough

scenario range between savings of about $35 billion

per year to costs of about $38 billion per year

(1987$) in 2015. The range is quite large because

cost data exist for only some of the measures. For

others, we assumed that costs were comparable to

similar measures (e.g., truck efficiency improvements cost about the same as car efficiency improvements). Details on the calculations are presented in

appendix A.

Overall, we estimate that the Tough new-vehicle

efficiency measures will save money by 2015, given

the expected rise in the price of gasoline (to about

$2.00 per gallon). They are considered “Tough”

primarily because they are technically challenging

goals. We assume that the additional cost of fuel

efficiency improvements to achieve a 55 mpg

new-car fleet average by 2010 will be in the range of

$500 to $750 per car (1987$) (14). Achieving a 58

mpg car fleet by encouraging consumers to buy

smaller cars might require a subsidy of about $250

to $500 per vehicle (1 5). Thus we use $750 to $1,250

as our range of new car costs, Assuming light-duty

truck efficiency improvements under the Tough

scenario will also cost $500 to $750 per vehicle, we

Figure 5-&Summary of C02 Emissions by 2015,

by Transportation Mode

Emissions in 2015 as a percent of 1987 levels

140 %

20%

~1 reduction 1

1 20% 4 = Non oil-based

——

1 00%

I“+

~ ...: Other oil

80% H

= Aircraft

Go% ,d~’ ‘~-~ Heavy trucks

j

n

?<

~= Light trucks

40% “1

= Automobiles

20%

nwurn

Base Moderate Tough

1987 emissions = 420 million metric tons/year

NOTE: The data presented above should be interpreted as the emissions

reductions achievable in 2015 expressed as a percentage of 1987

emissions from transportation, not as a percentage decrease in

emissions bekwv 1987 levels.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.
164 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

estimate total passenger vehicle costs will be about

$30 to $50 billion per year.

However, the higher efficiency under the Tough

scenario saves about $58 billion in fuel costs. Thus,

net costs for improved light-duty vehicle efficiency

are in the range of savings of $8 to $28 billion per

year. The cost effectiveness of these measures is in

the range of –$340 to –$100 per ton of carbon.

Lacking estimates for the costs of heavy-duty

truck improvements, we assume similar dollar per

ton costs as for light-duty vehicles. Savings amount

to between $7 and $15 billion per year. For lack of

a better estimate, we assume that cost of the aircraft

efficiency improvements will equal fuel savings.

The cost of the O&M measures in figure 5-6

varies widely. We estimate that using mass transit

costs about $0.13 to $0.21 per passenger mile more

than using cars. Mass transit and intercity rail costs

under our Tough scenario total $26 billion to $55

billion per year, or about $1,200 to $2,500 per ton of

carbon. Urban traffic flow improvements, truck

inspection and maintenance programs, and improved urban planning are all probably low cost

measures. Fuel savings from these programs amount

to about $15 billion per year. The remaining

measures-55 mph speed limit, ridesharing, parking

controls, etc.—all have associated inconvenience

costs. Depending on what we assume for the value

of these inconvenience costs, we estimate net costs

in the range of savings of’ $9 billion to costs of $9

billion per year.

Alternatively Fueled Vehicles

Though discussed in an earlier section, we do not

include use of alternative fuels as one of our

near-term Tough control measures. Two of these

fuels, however, offer considerable potential for

lowering emissions past the 25-year time horizon of

this assessment: methanol made from sustainably

harvested wood and electricity generated from

nonfossil fuels. Thus Congress may choose to adopt

an alternative fuel program that will serve as a

demonstration program for possible wide scale use

of alternatively fueled vehicles after 2015.

Table 5-5 included comparisons of greenhouse

gas emissions between current gasoline and alternatively fueled vehicles. Under our Tough scenario,

the ultimate effectiveness of alternatively fueled

vehicles will depend on:

1. how rapidly the efficiency of alternatively

2.

fueled vehicles can be improved in comparison

to efficiency improvements possible with gasoline and diesel fuels; and

whether these fuels (methanol and electricity)

will be made from low emitting primary

sources, i.e., sustainably grown biomass fuels

for methanol and nonfossil sources to generate

electricity.

To provide insight into the near-term gains from

a large-scale, alternative fuel demonstration program, we estimated the emission reductions assuming that 15 percent of new passenger cars purchased

between 2000 and 2015 use alternative fuels, evenly

split between electricity and biomass methanol. By

2015, about 1 out of every 10 vehicles would be

alternatively fueled.

In our scenario, electricity is generated according

to our Tough supply scenario discussed in chapter 3.

The potential for biomass fuels is sufficient to

supply the feedstock for all of the methanol vehicles

in the program (about 1 quad of biomass, see ch. 7).

We assume that both electric and methanol vehicles

improve through time, faster than under our base

case but not as rapidly as gasoline or diesel vehicles

under our Tough scenario.5

Assuming that the alternatively fueled vehicles

substitute for those under our Tough scenario, such

a program would achieve reductions equal to about

3 percent of 1987 CO2 emissions. The program

would also lower petroleum consumption by the

transportation sector by about 5 percent.

POLICY OPTIONS

Urban passenger travel in cars and light trucks

(i.e., light vehicles) consumes the largest share of

transport energy in the United States. It is also in

light vehicles that the market for fuel efficiency

seems to operate least effectively. Consequently,

policy to lower transport’s CO2 emissions could be

directed, first, at measures to increase the energy

swe ~Sue hat in 2000 tie efficiency of rnetinol vehicles is 15 percent higher than our Moderate scenario vehicle and that efficiency till fipmve

by another 15 percent between 2000 and 2015. We assume that the efficiency of electric vehicles will improve by 25 percent between 2000 and 2015.

These estimates are consistent with the ranges presented in ref. 13.
Chapter .5-The Transportation Sector ● 165

efficiency of light vehicles, and second, at measures

to encourage urban passengers to drive less by

ride-sharing, switching to more energy-efficient

modes, or reducing travel.

To increase efficiency and reduce VMT, a combination of several policy initiatives would seem to be

best. These might include:

1.

2.

3,

4.

5,

taxes on fuel and/or sales or registration taxes

based on efficiency,

fuel efficiency standards,

rebates on new fuel-efficient automobiles,

programs to change the way people meet their

transportation needs, and

government support for research, development,

and demonstration of new technologies and

fuels.

Fuel Taxes

The United States has relatively inexpensive fuel

prices relative to other industrialized countries,

primarily due to low fuel taxes (see figure 5-9). A

higher fuel tax would create incentives for increased

efficiency and travel reduction for all modes. Its

theoretical attractiveness is that it allows consumers

to choose how they adjust their behavior to use less

fuel: spend money on fuel economy technologies,

use mass transit, carpool, or simply travel less. In

practice, taxes do send powerful signals throughout

the economy and can enhance the effectiveness of

other policies such as fuel economy standards (see

below). But there are several problems with fuel

taxes. First, they are regressive-that is, they affect

the poor relatively more than they affect the rich. For

example, in 1985, households with incomes greater

than $35,000 per year spent about 4 percent of their

income on gasoline. Those with incomes in the range

of $10,000 to $15,000 per year spent about 9 percent

and those households between $5,000 and $10,000

per year spent about 11 percent of their income on

gasoline (23).

Second, the effectiveness of taxes is hard to

predict, hence it is difficult to set a tax to achieve a

desired result. Studies document a wide range of past

consumer response to gasoline price increases. Over

the short term, one might expect a 10-percent gas

hike to yield a 2-percent drop in gas consumption

Figure 5-9-international Gasoline Prices and Taxes,

1989

Dollars per gallon

41

3“

2

1

1-

0

L

.=. /

United Canada West

States Germany

United

Kingdom

France Japan

= Price per gallon ~=~ Tax per gallon

SOURCE: Business Week, Jan. 30, 1989, p. 20.

(though some studies indicate a 6-percent drop;

others, less than 1 Percent).6 A 50-percent increase

in the price of gasoline might yield about an

8-percent drop (between 5 and 20 percent). Assuming one can extrapolate in this fashion, a doubling or

tripling in price-similar to prices in Europe and

Japan—might yield a 13- to 20-percent drop in

gasoline consumption.

Over the long term (i.e., allowing enough time for

consumers not only to change their driving habits

but also the efficiency of the cars they buy), the

response is likely to be greater. A 10-percent gas

hike might yield about a 7-percent drop in gas

consumption in the long run. However, uncertainty

with respect to the long-term response is even

greater than uncertainty as to the short-term response, and it grows as prices increase. About half

of the long-term response might be attributable to

driving less and the rest to more efficient vehicles.

Unfortunately, the data on which these estimates rest

are from the 1970s. Fuel efficiency improvements

may be more expensive today, hence consumer

response to gasoline price increases may be lower.

Thus, the long-term response one might expect from

a relatively large price hike might be stifled by a lack

of cost-effective technology. Still, one would expect

that a doubling of gasoline price would elicit a

long-term response somewhat greater than the short-

~wo recent studies (refs. 4 and 10) reviewed the relationship between gasoline price and consumption, based on dozens of published papers that

have estimated the “elasticity” of gasoline consumption to price, i.e., the ratio of the percentage change in consumption to the percentage change in

price. We use 0.2 as a best guess of short-term elasticity and 0.4 to 0.8 as a range for long-term elasticity (with the lower end of the range applying when

technology changes are constraining).
166 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Photo credit: Office of Technology Assessment

Highway congestion leads to greater fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. When traffic slows to speeds below about 35 mph,

fuel use per mile increases.

term response, possibly as high as a 25- to 30-

percent drop in gasoline consumption. A tripling of

gasoline price might lower consumption by as much

as 35 to 40 percent.

If Congress deems that a fuel taxis a desirable part

of a program to reduce CO2 emissions, it might also

pursue policies to minimize the problems described

above. To make the tax program less regressive, it

could, for example, provide lump-sum rebates to

low-income households. Congress could also phase

in the tax to give consumers time to adjust their

purchasing decisions and operation and management practices.

Fuel Economy Standards

Fuel economy standards influence tradeoffs among

cost, performance, size, and efficiency that underlie

new model design and introduction decisions. The

current fuel economy standards for light vehicles, in

place since 1978, have helped to increase auto fuel

economy. Renewed and possibly redesigned standards offer significant benefits as a component of a

fuel economy policy.7

New standards must take account of engineering

time scales and thus are somewhat slower to take

effect than fuel taxes. Typically a vehicle reaches

market 4 years after manufacturers make initial

design decisions pertinent to its fuel economy;

manufacturers need adequate lead time to respond to

new standards.

Redesigned standards might compensate for differences in manufacturers’ size mixes. The present

Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) scheme

imposes unequal burdens on different automakers—

full-line manufacturers get hit harder than those

specializing in small cars. An efficiency regime that

varies with vehicle volume could meet these concerns, One such regime is the proposed Volume

 cons of economy standards are still the subject of some debate. For a see ref. 19.
Chapter 5--The Transportation Sector . 167

Average Fuel Economy (VAFE), which sets fuel

efficiency standards based on the interior space of a

car (35). Further, by using load capacity instead of

interior room, light trucks could be pushed to the

same level of technical effort as automobiles.8

The VAFE approach is not without problems,

however. First, it does not recognize efforts some

manufacturers have already taken to downsize their

fleet to achieve higher corporate average fuel

economy (Chrysler Corp. has frequently pointed this

out). Second, since there is no minimum fuel

economy standard for a manufacturer’s overall fleet,

shifts from small to large cars could occur, reducing

the net improvement in fleet average fuel efficiency.

Finally, a large potential for fuel economy performance resides with downsizing to lighter vehicles. The

VAFE approach does not inherently include this

downsizing incentive (whereas CAFE does).

As with taxes, the ‘right level for new standards

is difficult to define. It will depend to a large degree

on the intent of the standards. If Congress desires

standards that are cost-effective (i.e., fuel cost

savings about equal to increased vehicle costs), the

Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that standards by 2000 should be set at between 32 and 36 mpg

(12a). In 2000 (assuming unchanged real gasoline

prices), a fleet economy of 32 mpg would be

cost-effective for a car’s first owner (4-year ownership); over the car’s 10-year life, 36 mpg would be

cost-effective.

If Congress wanted to push consumers to conserve even further, standards would have to be

higher. DOE calculated that the toughest standard

that is technically achievable (without requiring

significant size shifts, disrupting the orderly development of new models, or unduly disrupting the

required flow of earnings) would be 39 mpg by 2000.

The 39-mpg car would be cost-effective at $1.70 per

gallon (1989 dollars) or more (assuming consumers

are willing to accept the technology changes necessary to achieve this level of fuel efficiency) ( 15). The

corresponding maximum-technology figure for 2010

was 40 to 55 mpg, depending on the assumed

penetration of diesels or other new engines (15).9

These estimates assume that size, luxury, and

performance of the fleet is frozen at 1987 levels

(though the recent trend has been toward larger or

more powerful vehicles).

J’chicle Taxes and Rebates

Taxes and rebates on vehicles can create incentives to sacrifice some size and performance for

economy. Taxes on inefficient vehicles would be

most effective if accompanied by rebates for highly

efficient cars. The program could be designed so that

it was ‘‘revenue neutral’ ‘—all the money taken in

from the taxes would be recycled through the rebates. To achieve this over an extended period, the

thresholds for both tax and rebate will have to increase over time as average fuel economy increases.

The Federal Gas Guzzler Tax,10 already applies to

cars whose economy is below certain thresholds.

Until recently, the tax started at $500 for cars below

22.5 mpg, increasing to $3,850 for those below 12.5

mpg, Legislation passed in the 101st Congress

doubled the tax to between $1,000 and $7,700 per

vehicle. 11 The tax was originally intended to be

coupled with a rebate for extremely efficient cars,

but the rebate was never enacted.

An expanded program of vehicle taxes and rebates

could complement fuel economy standards and

taxes, but it could pose serious trade difficulties as

long as the high-efficiency end of the auto market is

dominated by imports. Such measures would discriminate against domestic manufacturers. And, any

such measure that set out to protect domestic

manufacturers might conflict with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules.

Incentives for Manufacturers

Government-sponsored competitions could be

used as incentives to induce manufacturers to

develop high-efficiency cars. A bill proposing this

was introduced in Congress in 1982.12 However, it

BFor f~her discussion of size-class standards, see ref. 61.

~orty mpg with no additional diesel penetratio~ 55 mpg with 100 percent penetration. Note that representatives of Ford and General Motors at OTA’S

workshop disputed these figures. They asserted that economy gains achievable from the technologies listed were smaller, and their costs were larger.

l~~b]ic LAW $)5-618, the Energy Tax Ad of 1978.

I l~b]lc ~w ]01 -508, the tiibus Reconciliation Act Of 1990.

~z’rhe Shamansky bill would have spo~ord a competition to produce an 80-mpg gasoline car or a l~mpg diesel Cwmeeting finim~ Wffo~nce,

safety, and emissions criteria To win, the car would have to be put into limited production.
168 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

is unlikely that the government would pay enough in

prize money to induce major manufacturers to

participate (3).

A variant of the incentive scheme injects competitive elements into a high-efficiency rebate program

(48). The government could identify a few classes of

vehicles most in need of economy improvement and

offer a competitive reward in the form of large (e.g.,

$500) consumer rebates on a large production run

(e.g., 200,000 units) of a new vehicle achieving the

best fuel economy above a specified threshold.

Policy Directed at Operation

and Maintenance

Government action targeting the way vehicles are

maintained and operated can help lower transport

CO2 emissions. These offer smaller potential reductions—typically ranging from less than 1 up to 5

percent each in the OTA model. Still, they may be

important because they move in the right direction,

may bring other benefits, or may be reminders of a

commitment to energy efficiency. More significantly, most of the measures that these polices

promote have short start-up times and do not require

large, up-front capital investment. They include

reimposing (and enforcing) the 55-mph speed limit;

requiring fairings for trucks to lower wind resistance, enforced through efficiency inspections; requiring high-efficiency tires and oils on Federal

vehicles; preferential use of rail and intermodal

freight (i.e., freight that can travel on both roads and

railroad tracks) for Federal shipping; and charging

efficiency-promoting parking fees at Federal offices

and contractors.

Transportation Control Measures

Several American cities are now experimenting

with policy measures intended to reduce travel in

private automobiles. While many cities have experimented with a few of these, the most ambitious

program is just beginning in Los Angeles (see box

5-F). The advantage of these measures, collectively

called Transportation Control Measures or TCMs, is

that they directly address urban passenger miles

traveled. They also share some of the characteristics

of the operation and maintenance steps described

above: individually, they only slightly reduce CO2

emissions but have short startup times, low capital

costs, and can reduce energy use and CO2 emissions

even within existing settlement and employment

patterns.

However, TCMs are in a very early stage of

adoption. Moreover, the range of possibilities and

the complexity of interactions among different

measures means that any major TCM initiative must

proceed by trial and error.

A recent study summarizing U.S. experience with

several major categories of TCMs (5) concluded that

information on TCMs was incomplete and quantitative data was lacking on the effects of several

promising categories. Some of the TCMs evaluated

by the authors, Cambridge Systematic, include:

●

●

●

●

●

Areawide Ridesharing: Promotion and matching services achieved areawide reductions of

0.1 to 3.6 percent in VMT (average 0.3 percent)

in 32 programs now in place.

Employer-based Transportation Management:

Comprehensive programs are run at the

workplace to get people out of single-occupancy cars and into any alternative--carpools, vanpools, bike, or transit, The programs

combine high parking charges for solo drivers

with transit or vanpool subsidies and expedited

transactions-e. g., bus passes, van leasing, and

insurance are all on sale at work. Such programs have achieved movements of 30 to 80

percent of all workers into nonsolo modes at

large workplaces, with reductions of commuting VMT from 10 to 50 percent. Feasible

areawide VMT reduction depends on the concentration of workplaces, but is estimated

around 1 percent.

High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) Lanes: Restricting lanes on freeways to cars with three or

four occupants or to buses can reduce congestion and give time incentives for ridesharing.

The 14 examples operating in the United States

as of 1985 showed reductions of 5 to 10 percent

in peak corridor VMT during peak commuting

times. (Some of this reduction comes from

commuting at a different time rather than

finding different ways to commute.)

Bicycling Promotion: Comprehensive programs including bike lanes or paths, secure

locking facilities and showers, and public

education and promotion can reduce areawide

VMT by 0.05 to 0.1 percent. The data are very

weak, though, and American experience with

bicycling promotion programs is very limited.

Parking Management: This includes parking

taxes or development surcharges, restricting

street parking, and mandating high parking
Chapter 5--The Transportation Sector ● 169

charges at workplaces (usually with special

rates for carpools). American data are very

weak, but the experience of Ottawa suggests

that the impact can be large, especially if

coordinated with improvement of alternatives

to driving.

Park-and-Ride: There are two approaches.

Remote park-and-ride tries to reduce VMT by

intercepting drivers near to their origins, but the

remote lots pose theft problems; peripheral

park-and-ride seeks principally to reduce downtown congestion and has little effect on total

VMT. Cambridge Systematics estimates a potential of 2- to 4-percent VMT reduction within

specific corridors.

Transit Improvements: Even large investments in rail systems have achieved at most

3-to 5-percent reduction in areawide VMT.

Short-range improvements including bus service expansion, operational changes, and fare

changes have been much more successful.

Cambridge Systematic cites experience in

nine cities showing increases in transit ridership from 8 to 50 percent and reductions in

VMT from 0.1 to 0.5 percent.

Travel Substitution (telecommunications, workat-home, and flexible hours): Views are still

mixed on the potential for telecommunications

and work-at-home to reduce travel. The Los

Angeles plan takes an ambitious stance and

projects 20-percent reduction in worktrips due

to telecommuting and 10 percent due to alternative work schedules, for a net decrease in

areawide VMT of 6.8 percent. Cambridge

Systematic estimates the total impact of flexible schedules as only 0.1- to l. O-percent

reduction in areawide VMT.

Traffic Flow Improvements (sophisticated

signals, ramp metering, intersection improvement): These measures are principally intended

to reduce congestion, but secondarily reduce

energy and greenhouse emissions because less

fuel is burnt idling in stopped traffic and

average speeds increase. Reductions in fuel

consumption up to 6 percent have occurred on

particular routes, but areawide impacts have

not been measured in American cities. If faster

traffic induces people to drive more, such

measures can increase fuel consumption,

though. A recent study in Perth, Australia found

just this unintended effect (39).

In aggregate, transportation control measures

appear to hold modest promise for reducing VMT,

but much more experimentation and data are needed

before their potential impact can be assessed.

However, even modest VMT reductions in congested areas can improve traffic flow, thereby

reducing both miles traveled and fuel consumption

per mile.

Controlling Settlement Patterns

Emissions can be reduced in the long run by

changing patterns of settlement to reduce the need

for travel or to increase the utility of mass transit.

This can be accomplished through higher densities,

or through mixing uses so that residences, jobs, and

services are roughly balanced at a local scale. When

more destinations are close to home, more trips can

be made by foot, and public transit can serve more

trips effectively.

In the United States, except possibly for some

high-growth areas in the South and West, efforts to

change the shape of settlement in major cities is

likely to have limited impact in the near term.

Because we are entering a period of slower population growth, the shape of cities might not change as

drastically as it did in the 1950s and 1960s. In a

period of slow population growth, change in urban

shape proceeds only marginally faster than the

replacement of the standing building stock, which

takes 50 to 100 years.

Nevertheless, some changes are feasible, particularly in the balancing of homes and workplaces in

the suburbs. The Los Angeles air quality plan, for

example, includes measures to balance jobs and

housing through a combination of market and

regulatory measures. It projects that 12 percent of

jobs and 6 percent of housing in the region will be

affected by the measures, and reductions of about 10

percent in VMT will be achieved (55).

Changes in density are also possible in the United

States through changed zoning and infilling. The

difficulty will be that urban residents often strenuously resist increasing densities. Paradoxically,

traffic congestion is often cited as one of the reasons

to oppose higher density development, although

with fixed travel needs, congestion is often higher in

lower density areas.
170 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 5-F—The Los Angeles Air Quality Plan

The Los Angeles area is notorious for its air pollution problems. Despite numerous control measures, the region

still exceeds Federal standards for ozone, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and suspended particulates--giving

it the worst air quality in the Nation. The South Coast Air Quality Management District and the Southern California

Association of Governments have recently completed a comprehensive Air Quality Management Plan (AQMP)

designed to bring the region into compliance with all standards except the strict State standards for ozone and

particulate by the year 2007 and hold total vehicle miles traveled (VMT) to a 30-percent increase (rather than the

projected 72 percent) by 2010 (22, 54).

Although the AQMP does not directly address the problem of global climate change, it contains many

transportation control measures that may serve as models for other local, State, and national governments in their

attempts to reduce CO2 emissions.

The Plan’s control methods are divided into three sections, or “tiers,” depending upon their readiness for

implementation. Since cars and trucks contribute the majority of carbon monoxide, reactive organic compounds,

and nitrogen oxides emissions in the Los Angeles Basin (53), each of the tiers contains a number of measures

designed to modify transportation methods and behaviors.

Tier I—The first phase of the Plan provides controls on motor vehicles, transportation systems, and land use

that can be implemented within the next 5 years and that will encourage alternative fuel use, improve efficiency,

and lead to reductions in congestion and VMT (54, 55).

New buses in the region will be fueled by methanol and current transit buses will be retrofitted to accommodate

other alternative fuels such as ethanol, propane, and compressed or liquefied natural gas. Owners of commercial

and public fleets (15 or more vehicles) will also be required to purchase vehicles capable of operating on an

alternative fuel when replacing units or expanding operations. Conversion to such fuels can be positive or negative

in terms of global warming depending 011 what type of feedstock is used to produce the fuel.1

Transportation control measures focus on trip reduction programs (to ease the congestion and associated

emissions; see box 5-D) and strategies to shift use toward more efficient modes. They promote the use of alternative

work schedules, telecommuting, ridesharing, public transit, and vanpool-purchase incentives and better parking 2

management in addition to the current Los Angeles trip reduction ordinance. Tier I measures also require merchants

to provide incentives for public transit and facilities for nonmotorized transportation users (e.g., advertised bus

passes and bicycle lockers).

Local ordinances would require special-event centers (stadiums, amphitheaters, etc.) to establish and operate

park-and-ride programs and provide incentives for public transportation use. The plan also calls for designating

auto-free zones in areas with dense pedestrian activity in conjunction with park-and-ride services. The transportation

infrastructure will be improved through the construction of more high-occupancy-vehicle (HOV) facilities and at

least 80 miles of light rail service. Finally, truck traffic patterns will be modified through rerouting, changing

delivery times, and diverting port-related truck traffic to rail to increase efficiency and ease congestion at peak hours.

Land use is to be modified through growth management designed to attain job/housing balances in local

jurisdictions. Implementation methods include modified zoning, development fees, density bonuses, and fast-track

permit processing for those developments beneficial to the job/housing balance targets. The plan also calls for new

job- or residence creating public facilities to be located in strategic areas to minimize commuting.

Tier II—Unlike Tier I, the second phase of the AQMP will require significant advances in current applications

of existing technology and strong regulatory action for successful implementation by the year 2007 (54, 55).

To further encourage trip reduction through telecommuting, Tier II calls for implementation of tax incentives

for telecommunications development and local ordinances requiring employers with multiple facilities to devote

five percent of the building space to satellite work centers.

To ensure progress in alternative fuels technology, research and development will be funded by a $30 million

alternative fuels program, which also contains provisions for demonstration projects and fuel infrastructure

enhancement. In addition, Tier II contains supplemental measures for imposing technology-forcing standards and

limitations on the number of gasoline- and diesel-powered vehicles registered in the L.A. Basin.
Chapter 5--The Transportation Sector ● 171

Tier III—The final tier of the AQMP depends on “. . . commitments to research, development, and

widespread commercial application of technologies that may not exist yet, but maybe reasonably expected given

the rapid technological advances experienced over the past 20 years” (54). These technologies may include

improved fuel cells, solar cells, storage batteries, and superconductors for use in private and public transportation.

Short-term actions to be taken by air-quality management agencies to promote RD&D in these areas area part of

the current Plan and will be updated regularly.

Tier III also anticipates extensive electrification of transportation modes, which, although eliminating the

mobile sources of pollution, does not necessarily reduce overall carbon emissions and will increase demand for

power generation. To mitigate these effects, the Plan contains proposals for energy conservation and noncarbon fuel

promotion.

Finally, Tier III presents a number of contingency measures of last resort (including emission charges on

vehicles, parking lots, and gasoline) that will be imposed if the control measures previously enumerated are not

implemented or fail to perform as well as expected.

l~or ~~ple, if COSI is used as tie feedstock to make methano~ greenhouse gas emissions can increu.re by 30 FCent compm~ to

gasoline; if woody biomas s is the feedstoc~ greenhouse gas emissions can decrease by about 70 percent (see table 5-5).

2The 1987 ordinance applies to all employers of 100 or more people (about 8,000 busk%ses). mPIoyers ~ _ to PW~

comprehensive trip reduction plans, with the goal of reducing the number of private motor vehicle trips by 10 pczcent. While falling short of

this goal does not vioIate the onhanee, failure to submit a phm or amuaI update or to provide any stipulated incentives exposes the employer

to possible civil penalties (63).

Photo credit: Genera{ Motors Corp.

General Motors’ prototype electric vehicle, the Impact. The

Impact’s battery pack, shown being installed, takes up t he

center portion of the vehicle. The current range of the

vehicle is over 100 miles between charges. If recharged

with electricity generated from natural gas or nonfossil

sources, CO2 emissions per mile are much lower than

from gasoline vehicles. With improved batteries- key

hurdle facing this technology-both range and efficiency

would increase.

will have little effect on congestion unless coordinated over entire metropolitan areas, and may even

increase congestion if they reduce opportunities for

people to live near work.

Research and Development

Large R&D efforts will be essential for further

technical efficiency advances beyond the turn of the

century. A recent study of the state of fuel efficiency

research and development in the auto industry found

that American automakers lag far behind their

Japanese and, to a lesser extent, European, counter

parts---especially in moving research results to the

market (3). During the late 1970s, the Department of

Transportation funded the Cooperative Automotive

Research Program (CARP) to support more aggressive research and development in the American auto

industry. Unfortunately, it foundered in the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust between the industry and

government and was cut back under the Reagan

administration (3).

For such a program to be successful, domestic

automakers, their suppliers, and innovative research

Traffic congestion is already prompting some companies all need to be key players. The program

could target medium-term technologies such as remarkably stringent suburban restrictions on devel-

. . -. - continuously variable transmissions and energyopment—some apply only to commercial and indus- storage systems. Other areas where federally suptrial development, some apply to new residential ported R&D could have substantial impact include

development as well (16). However, these measures new engine design for heavy trucks, improved safety
172 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

for lighter vehicles, and innovations to permit

increased intermodal freight.

One area of longer term research that deserves

special attention is development of truly clean,

cost-effective, alternative fuels. Those fuels with the

greatest potential-hydrogen or electricity from

nonfossil sources (e.g., solar or nuclear power) and

woody biomass fuels grown on a sustainable basis—

are the furthest from large-scale technical viability.

Expanded research programs are needed to envision

and expand the range of options available. At the

same time, demonstration programs can assess the

actual performance of a variety of fuels.

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Subcommittee, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation+ U.S. Senate, May 2, 1989.

U.S. Congress, Offke of Technology Assessment, “Increased

Efficiency Potential for the U.S. Fleet of Highway Passenger

Vehicles, ’ Testimony of Steven E. Plotkin to Subcommittee on

Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, Apr. 10, 1989.

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment Catching Our

Breath: Next Steps for Reducing Urban Ozone, OTA-O-412

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Oflke, July 1989).

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Replacing

Gasoline: Alternative Fuels for Light Duty Vehicles, OTA-E-364

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September

1990).

U.S. Department of Commerce, The Statistical Abstract of the

United States (Washington DC: 1989).

U.S. Department of Energy, Assessment of Costs and Benefits of

Fl~”ble and Alternative Fuel Use in the U.S. Transportation

Sector, Progress Report One: Context and Analytic Framework

(Washington, DC: January 1988).

U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,

Annual Energy Outlook: 1987, DOE/EIA-1383(87) (Washingto~

DC: Mar. 28, 1988).

U.S. Department of Energy, Long Range Energy Projections to

2010, DOE/PE-0082, Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis

(Washington, DC: July 1988).

U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration+

Annual Energy Outlook: 1990, DOWEIA-0383(90) (Washington,

DC: January 1990).

U.S. Department of Transportation% “The Safe Fuel-Efficient Car:

A Report on Its Feasibility and Marketability, ” HS 805-644

(Washington, DC: 1980).

U.S. Department of Transportation OffIce of Environment and

Safety, The Costs and Effectiveness of Transportation Control

Measures in Achieving Air Quality Goals (Washington, DC:

August 1981).

U.S. Department of Transportation, Eflect of Car Size on Fatali~

and Injury Risk in Single-Vehicle Crashes, HS 805-729 (Washingto~ DC: National Highway Traffice Safety Administration:

August 1990).

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Policy Options for

Stabilizing Glo.!xd Climate, draft report (Washington, DC: 1989).

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1989 Fuel Economy

Guide (Washington DC: 1989).

Walsh, M. B., review comments submitted to OTA (Arlingtow

VA: December 1989).

World Meteorological Organization and United Nations Environment Progr arnme, Scientific Assessment of Stratospheric Ozone:

1989, Ju1y 1989.

Yenny, J., and L.V. Uy, “Transport in China, ” World Bank StafY

Working Paper No. 723 (Washington DC: 1985).
Chapter 6

The Manufacturing Sector

Photo Credit: Sun Oil Co.
CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

PAST AND PRESENT EMISSIONS

AND ENERGY USE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Recent Changes in Energy Use.. . . . . . . . . . 179

ANATOMY OF ENERGY USE IN

MANUFACTURING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

Services Provided by Energy in the

Manufacturing Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

The Largest Users of Energy in the

Manufacturing Sector... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

Energy-Efficiency Improvement

Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

OTA EMISSION REDUCTION

SCENARIOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Base Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

Moderate Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

Tough Controls . . . . . . . ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

Costs of the Tough Control Scenario . . . . . . 192

POLICIES FOR REDUCING CO2

EMISSIONS FROM THE

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

Policy Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

CHAPTER PREFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Boxes

Box Page

6-A. Potential for Industrial Energy Efficiency

in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe . . . . 187

Figures

Figure Page

6-1. Contribution of Industry CO2

Emissions in 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

6-2. U.S. Energy Intensity: Energy

Consumption Per Dollar of Gross

Domestic Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

6-3. Manufacturing Consumption of Energy

for Heat and Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Figure Page

6-4. Direct and Indirect Energy Use

Associated With Imports and Exports . 180

6-5. 1987 Industrial Energy Use by

Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

6-6. Consumption of Fossil Fuels and

Electricity by Selected Manufacturing

Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...* 182

6-7. Emissions in 2015 Under the Base Case,

Moderate, and Tough Scenarios, by

Energy Service Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

6-8. Summary ofC02EmissiOns Under the

Base Case, Moderate, and Tough

Scenarios, by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

6-9. Fuel Use Under the Base Case, Moderate,

and Tough Scenarios, by Fuel Type . . . 188

6-10. CO2 Emissions Reductions in 2000 and

2015 Expressed as a Percentage of 1987

Manufacturing Sector Emissions,

by Control Method,Under

the Moderate Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

6-11. CO2Emissions Reductions in 2000 and

2015 Expressed as a Percentage of 1987

Manufacturing Sector Emissions,

by Control Method, Under

the Tough Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

6-12. Ranking of Manufacturing Industries by

Direct and Indirect Primary

Energy Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .* 193

Tables

Table Page

6-1. Manufacturing’s Use of Energy

in 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

6-2. Ranking of 1985 Manufacturing

Energy Intensities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

6-3. Electricity Cogeneration by Industry,

1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

6-4. Industrial Sector Conservation

Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Chapter 6

The Manufacturing Sector

INTRODUCTION

Manufacturing is a diverse sector of the U.S.

economy, consisting of a heterogeneous group of

industries that employ a wide array of technologies

to produce everything from aircraft to toy dolls.

Because of this diversity, a somewhat different set of

policies is needed to address this economic sector

than those discussed for other sectors such as

transportation or buildings. This chapter explores

manufacturings energy use and emissions, the

major emissions-contributing industries, scenarios

for the future, and policies that could effect the

future.

OVERVIEW

Manufacturing accounts for about 30 percent of

all energy consumed in the United States, and 80

percent of industrial energy use (51a). (Agriculture,

mining, and construction account for the remaining

20 percent.) About one-third of U.S. carbon dioxide

(CO2

) emissions result from all industrial activity.

Due to data limitations, this chapter uses data for the

broader category of industry as a proxy for that of the

manufacturing sector.

Onsite combustion of fossil fuels and biomass for

heat and power account for about half of industrial

emissions, and purchased, fossil-fuel generated electricity accounts for most of the remainder. Some

additional greenhouse gases are also released to the

atmosphere as byproducts of manufacturing processes. For example, CO2 is released during cement

manufacture; chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are emitted from industrial solvents used in the electronics

industry. Such noncombustion processes probably

account for about 2 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas

emissions. This chapter is principally concerned

with energy-related emissions and the potential for

their reduction.

Energy use in manufacturing can be changed in

three ways:

1. by reducing the amount of energy consumed,

2. by switching to energy sources that emit lessor

no greenhouse gases, and

3. by changing the mix of industries and products

within the manufacturing sector.

. --

By and large, policies for reducing greenhouse gas

emissions from manufacturing focus on the frost two

strategies. Macroeconomic policies such as trade or

monetary policies tend to affect the industrial

makeup of the manufacturing sector.

PAST AND PRESENT EMISSIONS

AND ENERGY USE

U.S. manufacturing consumed over 17.5 quadrillion Btu’s (quads) of fossil fuel and electricity in

1985 (see table 6-l), about one-quarter of the

economy-wide total. This total would be 24 percent

higher if the energy consumed in electricity generation and transmission were included (56).

Industrial energy consumption and electricity

generation losses accounted for about 32 percent of

U.S. CO2 emissions. Nearly a third of these emissions came from electricity used to power machines

and electrolytic processes. Over a quarter of the

emissions came from process steam and a fifth came

from process heat (see figure 6-l).

Although industry uses significant energy, its

consumption relative to that of other sectors has

diminished over time. In 1960, the industrial sector

used 46 percent of all energy consumed in the United

States (56). By 1980, industry’s share of energy use

had fallen to 40 percent, and in 1989 it had slipped

to 36 percent (56). Some of this decline can be

attributed to energy efficiency improvements within

industry and to growth in the building and transportation sectors.

Table 6-l—Manufacturing’s Use of Energy in 1985

(quadrillion Btu’s)

Total fuel consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.6

Total purchased fuels and electricity . . . . . . 9.7

Fuel byproduct (i.e., coke gas) . . . . . . . . . . 1.1

Process byproducts (i.e., wood chips) . . . . . 2.8

Raw material (feedstock) inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0

Less fuel byproducts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1.1)

Total primary energy consumption . . . . . . . . . . 17.5

NOTE: The Department of Energy does not account for generation and

distribution losses associated with the production of electricity in

these estimates of energy use.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,

Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey: Consumption of

Energy, 1985, DOEIEIA-0512(85) (Washington, DC: 1985).
178 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 6-l-Contribution of Industry CO2 Emissions in 1987

—

Elui Idi rtgs

36%

Percent of total by sector

(1.3 billion metric tons/year)

Lease and plant 3%

Feedstocks 6%

74

HVAC and light 6%

Off-highway oil 7%

Process heat 19°/0

Industry

32% Steam 27%

Machine

drive and

electrolytic 32%

Emissions from industry,

by category

(0.42 billion metric tons/year)

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

Within industry, the manufacturing sector also

has changed significantly in the recent past. From

the 1950s through about 1972, the energy intensity

of manufacturing (the energy used to produce a

dollar’s worth of output) was relatively flat (see

figure 6-2). Thus, growth in manufacturing seemed

to be directly coupled to growth in energy use.1

Since 1972, however, the economy has suffered two

unanticipated energy price shocks. In addition,

legislation to control energy-related pollution was

enforced and many of the biggest manufacturing

firms experienced rapidly declining demand for their

products (30). As a result of efficiency improvements and rising fuel prices, the energy intensity of

manufacturing fell by more than a third from 1972

to 1985, with coal and oil intensities falling by

almost 40 and 50 percent, respectively (33) (see

figure 6-3). Shortages of natural gas after 1972

contributed to a 50 percent drop in energy intensity

in manufacturing between 1971 and 1985 (33).

The electricity intensity of manufacturing increased rapidly from 1958 to 1970 and then, partly

because of a rise in the price of electricity, began to

level out (33). At 1987 average prices, it cost almost

five times as much to use electricity as natural gas to

provide equivalent heating value. Manufacturers

thus use electricity not as a simple substitute for fuel,

but to perform functions that require electricity or in

specific processes where the overall efficiency of

electricity is much higher than that of fuel. This

illustrates that while different forms of energy can be

discussed in terms of a common unit, Btu’s, their

utility for specific uses varies (20).

Because industries within the manufacturing sector differ in energy intensity by more than a factor of

10 (see table 6-2), a shift in output mix can have a

significant effect on the energy intensity of the

sector as a whole. In fact, roughly one-third to

one-half of the decline in manufacturing’s energy

intensity between 1972 and 1985 can be attributed to

a shift in the mix of output, with ‘‘smokestack’

industries like steel declining relative to lighter

manufacturing industries like electronics (7, 27).

Our manufacturing sector’s contribution to climate change is larger than these measures indicate.

The United States now imports large amounts of

energy-intensive manufactured products, including

cars and steel. The energy embodied in these goods

does not enter into U.S. energy intensity calculations, nor is it included in measures of our dependence on foreign energy (44). Nonenergy imports

have doubled (as a percentage of GNP) since 1970,

increasing the need to account for the energy they

represent.

Such accounting can be done by assuming that all

nonenergy imports can be made domestically at the

same price using a similar mix of inputs as their

domestic counterparts. When this is done for 1985

nonenergy imports, U.S. use of imported energy

rises by over 50 percent, from 13 to 20 quads (see

Isome amlysts ~We that a strong link still exists (6).
Chapter 6--The Manufacturing Sector ● 179

Figure 6-2—U.S. Energy Intensity: Energy

Consumption Per Dollar of Gross Domestic Product

1,000 Btu’s consumed per dollar of GDP

40

35

30

25

c)n

.

‘ ‘1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Energy Use

and the U S Economy, OTA-BP-E-57 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Off Ice, June 1990).

Table 6-2—Ranking of 1985 Manufacturing

Energy Intensities (thousand Btu’s per constant

1980-dollar value of shipments)

Stone, clay, and glass products . . . . . . . . . . . .

Primary metal industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Paper and allied products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chemicals and allied products . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Textile mill products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Petroleum and coal products . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rubber and miscellaneous plastics , , . . . . . . .

Food and kindred products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fabricated metal products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Furniture and fixtures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Electrical and electronic equipment . . . . . . . . .

Instruments and related equipment . . . . . . . . .

Transportation equipment ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Printing and publishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Machinery, except electrical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16.6

14.6

13.9

12.4

4.8

4.4

3.1

2.7

2.3

1.6

1.4

1.2

1.2

1.1

0.9

0.9

All manufacturing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey: Changes in Energy

Efficiency 1980-1985, DOE/ElA-0516(85) (Washington, DC:

January 1990), table ES1, p. viii.

figure 6-4).2 While the energy embodied in U.S.

exported products stayed relatively steady in the

early 1980s, the energy embodied in imported

products increased as the U.S. trade deficit deepened

Figure 6-3—Manufacturing Consumption of Energy

for Heat and Power

Quadrillion Btu’s per billion $1982

5

4

3

2

1

0

&—’—’— %

$. \

‘+ +.

I “ f. {, ,, ~ - +. .* %. .+ ,.

43 -* +7 .? .

‘ . . *, ,f F. t. .-+ --- L u ~T ~ -

------

. --------- ”

t 1, ,

. .,

1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985

Coal Purchased electricity

— Natural ga s

,. Oil

SOURCE: M. Ross, “Industrial Energy Conservation,” Natural Resources

Journa124(2):369, April 1984.

(see figure 6-4). The trade balance has improved

somewhat since 1985 and so presumably net imports

of embodied energy have declined.

Recent Changes in Energy Use3

Total energy use in the United States increased by

an estimated 6 quads (8 percent) between 1985 and

1988. This gain breaks a 13-year trend, begun in

1972, of relatively level energy use (15). The energy

intensity of the economy continued to decline from

1985 to 1988, but by only –1.0 percent annually as

opposed to –2.4 percent annually from 1972 to 1985.

Detailed data is lacking on how manufacturing

fared during this 3-year period, but preliminary

figures suggest a 6-percent increase in energy use.4

There is, however, no indication that the energy

efficiency of production processes declined. In fact,

the annual rate of investment in new plants and

equipment from 1985 to 1988 was 7 percent, as

opposed to 5 percent from 1972 to 1985. It is likely

that these new investments boosted energy efficiency (47).

Rather, a reduction in the cost of energy, coupled

with increased spending and changes in what was

being bought, favored a shift towards relatively

~This estimate matches the U.S. Department of Energy’s 1984 estimate (48) and is roughly in line with the 8 quads estimated for the energy embodied

m 1984 exports in another recent U.S. Department of Energy study (54).

7This section is based on rcf 44.

Xprcllmlnwy, data from us, Dep~rnenf Of Energy’s ]988 kfunu~u(”~uring Ener~y ~~n~~~~fi’~jn Sun’~Y! ~ suppliefl to OTA 4pr. 5, 1990, b}’ J L

Preston.
180 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 6-4-Direct and Indirect Energy Use

Associated With Imports and Exports*

Quadrillion Btu’s

3 0 -

2 0

P

10

0

- 1 0

- 2 0 T T T 7— 1 T

–

T

63 67 72 77 80 82 8 5

‘fear

The United States directly imports and exports energy. Although

direct exports have stayed relatively steady, imports rose dramatically between 1963 and 1977 and then declined from 1977 to

1985. The United States also uses energy indirectly in the form of

energy embodied in nonenergy exports (e.g., grain) and imports

(e.g., autos). Prior to the emergence of a trade deficit this indirect

use of energy was in balance, but by 1985 the indirect use of

energy associated with imports boosted our dependence on

foreign sources of energy by 50 percent.

● Production recipe kept constant at 1985 level.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Techology Assessment, Energy Use

and the U.S. Economy, CITA-BP-E-57 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, June 1990).

energy-intensive industries from 1985 to 19885 (44),

which could account for the increased energy

consumption by manufacturing. For example, nondefense purchases by the Federal Government fell in

real terms by 16 percent over the 3-year period, and

defense purchases, which are about one-and-a-half

times as energy intensive, grew by 10 percent (47).

The export sector also grew faster than other

economic sectors over this period, increasing its real

share of GNP from 10 to 13 percent. Since most

exports are manufactured goods, such a shift tends to

result in increased energy use. Contributing to the

export surge were such energy-intensive products as

aluminum (44-percent growth in exports) and steel

mill products (121-percent growth in exports) (l).

The shift toward more energy-intensive industries

might be a temporary one. Two potentially conflicting policy goals may interact to shape future

manufacturing-the desire, on the one hand, to

improve the sector and revive exports to lessen the

trade deficit (44); and the need, on the other hand, to

reduce CO2 emissions by shifting from more to less

energy-intensive manufacturing activities.

ANATOMY OF ENERGY USE IN

MANUFACTURING

The previous section provided abroad perspective

on manufacturing’s energy use, which is useful for

a general understanding of the sector and its

relationship to the economy. This section tracks how

energy is specifically used in manufacturing, particularly by the four most energy-consumptive manufacturing industries: primary metals, paper and

allied products, chemical and allied products, and

petroleum refining.

Services Provided bv Energy in the

Manufacturing Sector

About half of the fossil fuels and electricity used

by industry provides process heat, steam, and

cogenerated heat and steam (see figure 6-5). Energy

in manufacturing is also used for feedstocks, mechanical drive, electrolysis, lighting, and space heat.

Boilers and Process Heaters

The basic materials industries (metals, chemicals,

petroleum) rely on many high-temperature processes, hence large amounts of process heat. For

example, steel is heated so that it can be shaped into

specigic products such as sheet, tube, or wire.

Process heat also accounts for most of the energy

used for metals smelting, petroleum refining, and

cement manufacture. Improved insulation around

heaters, computer-controlled regulation of fuel combustion, and increased utilization of waste heat have

led to major improvements in process-heat fuel

efficiency since 1973 (37).

Cogeneration of Electricity and Steam

Cogeneration refers to the combined production

of heat (usually steam) and electricity from the same

energy source. Nationwide about 20 to 25 percent of

the cogenerated energy output is electricity, the

remainder is steam (14). Depending on the degree to

which cogenerated steam is utilized, cogeneration

technologies can almost double fuel efficiency (33)

for user firms, reducing their need to purchase

energy. Cogeneration is usually restricted by economic considerations to applications where heat of

sDa~a for 1985 and 1988 from refs. 47 and 46, reS~ctively,
Chapter 6--The Manufacturing Sector ● 181

Figure 6-5—1987 Industrial Energy Use by Function

(percent)

Table 6-3-Electricity Cogeneration by Industry, 1985

, ~- ....,-

Cogeneration boilers 13%

‘ -..

t

!$

Process heating 17% ‘ ,, ,,

..,.

Electrolytic 2% -~x-- t

Machine drive 8%

‘ Feedstocks 22%

Nonmanufacturing 19 %

SOURCE: Gas Research Institute, Industrial Natural Gas Markets: Facts,

Fa//aaes, and Forecasts (Washington, DC: 1989).

Million

Industry kWh Percent

Paper and allied products . . . . . . . . .

Chemicals and allied products . . . . .

Petroleum and coal products . . . . . .

Primary metal industries . . . . . . . . . .

Food and kindred products . . . . . . . .

Transportation equipment. . . . . . . . .

Textile mill products . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Stone, clay, and glass products . . . .

Machinery, except electrical . . . . . . .

Rubber and miscellaneous

plastics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fabricated metal products . . . . . . . .

Printing and publishing . . . . . . . . . . .

Other manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32,866

19,827

5,507

4,556

3,618

318

305

207

194

69

65

26

2,197

47

28

8

7

5

<0.5

<0.5

<0.5

<0.5

<0.5

<0.5

<0.5

3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69,755 100

low-to-moderate temperature is needed on a regular

basis. In 1958, more than one-fifth of the electricity

manufacturers used was cogenerated. This dropped

to 8 percent in 1981, but rebounded to 10 percent in

1986 (33). This recovery trend is likely to continue;

in fiscal year 1988, more than 300 cogeneration

facilities with a planned capacity of 7,005 megawatts were registered for operations (12).

The four most energy-intensive manufacturing

industries dominate use of cogeneration (see table

6-3). Industrial and commercial cogeneration capacity is currently about 23,000 megawatts, almost 4

percent of total U.S. electric generation capacity

(19). An additional 60,000 megawatts may be

technically and economically feasible (18).

Feedstocks

Unlike other energy services, feedstocks (i.e.,

petroleum feedstocks in chemicals and plastics

manufacture) are raw material inputs to manufactured goods. Since feedstocks are generally not

combusted (the notable exception is coke, used in

steel manufacture), their consumption does not lead

to emissions of greenhouse gases, except to the

extent that heat is required to process them.

Mechanical Drive

Energy is used for mechanical drive equipment,

conveyers, stamping presses, pumps, compressors,

blowers, and fans (31). Diesel- and gasoline-driven

engines provide a small amount of this energy

service, but electric motors are by far the most

prevalent machine-drive technology in manufacturing, accounting for two-thirds of industry’s electricity use (9).

NOTE: Total does not add to 100 due to rounding.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,

Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey: Consumption of

Energy, 1985, DOEIEIA-0512(85) (Washington, DC: November

1988), table 9, p, 39.

Electrolysis

Electrolytic processes use electricity, rather than

heat and pressure, to change matter at the atomic

level. Electrolytic processes account for 10 to 15

percent of all electricity used by manufacturing (9).

Two industries, aluminum and chlorine manufacturing, dominate energy use for electrolysis (37). Gains

in electrolysis efficiency can result in reductions of

greenhouse gas emissions if the electricity is supplied by fossil fuels. In 1989, 70 percent of

utility-generated electricity came from fossil fuel

combustion (55).

Space Heat

Manufacturing, by and large, uses the same space

heating and cooling technologies as does the buildings sector (see ch. 4), although waste heat from

thermal processes is employed in some cases. Potential gains in energy efficiency can be made by

improving heating and cooling technologies, and by

utilizing waste heat more extensively.

Nonmanufacturing Industry Uses

Nonmanufacturing energy use is concentrated in

four industries: mining, natural gas production,

agriculture, and construction. About one-quarter of

nonmanufacturing industrial energy use is used to

prepare natural gas for pipeline delivery; another

one-quarter is used in off-highway vehicles in

agriculture, mining, and construction. Most of the

remainder is used in boilers and process heaters ( 14).
182 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 6-6-Consumption of Fossil Fuels and

Electricity y by Selected Manufacturing Industries

r

. . . -— . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .

Total manufacturing ‘;.;<’~j~,., ‘“.59/’$+flL./~/~ +/9/417.5

<=<<. <-:=.: -’----- . . . . . . . . . . . . .,

Petroleum and coal ~“””z;-”--

production ~..~.<~.- j 5.1

L

7- --7 -2

Chemicals and products -’~ 3.6 .--J

Primary metalS ~~~ 2.6

r

Paper and products ~,; 2.2

Food products ~ 1

stone, clay and glass . 0.9 7:---

Other manufacturing ~ 1

2.1 ~.. .

--– — ——. —— .——

0 5 10 15 20

Quadrllllon Btu’s

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,

Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey: Changes in Energy Efficiency 1980-1985, DOE/EIA-051 6(85) (Washington,

DC: January 1990).

The Largest Users of Energy in the

Manufacturing Sector

The four biggest manufacturing energy consumers are paper and allied products, chemicals and

allied products, petroleum and coal, and primary

metals (see figure 6-6). Collectively these industries

account for over three-quarters of manufacturing’s

energy use. Each of the four industries is responsible

for between 14 and 19 percent of manufacturing’s

CO2 emissions, although their principal emission

sources differ. The primary metals industry, for

example, was third in terms of energy consumption

but first in CO2 emissions because of its heavy use

of coal.

Each of these industries is an important “upstream’ producer that sells its output to industries

‘‘downstream’ for further processing into final

goods. Given this interdependence, efforts to curtail

emissions should focus on the potential for improving energy efficiency, rather than on limiting output.

Reducing domestic output would probably result in

these materials being imported, which would do

little to affect the global generation of greenhouse

gases.

Paper and Allied Products

The paper industry consumes more fuel oil for

heat and power than any other manufacturing

industry (53). Nevertheless, both energy and cost

reduction activities at the mills have reduced energy

intensity (energy consumed per ton of product).

Most important among the changes affecting energy

use are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

water is being recirculated more, instead of

being discharged, reducing steam requirements;

recycling of post-consumer fibers is increasing,

which reduces pulping energy requirements;

thermo-mechanical pulping (TMP) (an improved method for grinding the wood) is

increasing, boosting electricity requirements;

and

cogeneration of electricity and steam, historically very strong at pulp and paper mills,

continues to expand.

In addition, the use of biomass byproducts (pulping liquor, bark, sawdust) for energy has increased

significantly. In 1972, 40 percent of the energy used

by the industry was obtained from biomass; in 1985,

56 percent (33). As a result, the use of conventional

fuels and electricity (including losses) for papermaking fell from 24.8 to 17.8 million Btu’s per ton

between 1972 and 1985, an average rate of decline

of 2.5 percent per year.

Further gains in energy efficiency can be made in

the paper industry by improved process optimization

and pressing and drying, continued investment in

cogeneration and other energy-efficient technologies, and increased paper recycling (41). Use of

scrap paper, rather than virgin timber, permits the

pulping process to be bypassed and reduces the

Photo credit: International Paper Co.

The settling pond in the foreground is part of the paper

mill’s environmental protection system. Behind looms

the recovery boiler, which can meet a significant

portion of a mill’s energy needs by burning waste

from the pulping process.
Chapter 6--The Manufacturing Sector . 183

amount of energy required for manufacturing some

grades of paper products (42).

Chemicals and Allied Products

In 1985, the chemicals industry was the second

largest manufacturing industry in terms of energy

use, consuming almost 3.6 quads of energy (53). It

is the most complex of the four main energyintensive industries. Instead of one specific product,

it produces a wide range of intermediate and final

goods, including agricultural chemicals, plastics,

and paints. The purposes for which energy is used by

the chemicals industry are correspondingly varied—

the use of energy as feedstocks accounts for a large

portion of consumption; large quantities of energy

are also expended on process heat, steam heat,

mechanical drive, and electrolysis. Natural gas is the

dominant energy source in the industry, and is used

both as a feedstock and as a source of heat and

power.

From 1972 to 1985 the basic chemicals industry

reduced its energy use per pound of product by 36

percent (32). This probably reflects the combined

effects of initially high energy intensity, a high level

of technical capability (e.g., the relatively large

number of process engineers at chemical plants), and

the modest thermodynamic requirement (e.g., low

temperature) of many processes. A recent increase in

cogeneration has provided a significant savings as

well. The most substantial improvements in energy

efficiency in the future will come as older equipment

is replaced and as energy-inefficient processes are

abandoned in favor of more efficient ones (33). The

three main opportunities for increased energy efficiency through new technologies and/or process

modifications are distillation, waste heat recovery,

and product integration (i.e., whereby intermediate

products such as ethylene are produced in petroleum

refining complexes) (40).

Petroleum and Coal

The petroleum and coal industry is the largest

energy user among manufacturing industries, consuming more than 5 quads of energy in 1985 (53).

Petroleum refining dominates the industry’s energy

use, accounting for 90 to 98 percent of total annual

energy consumption (37, 45, 49).

Unlike the paper industry, which has a large

resource base of domestic timber and relies mainly

on self-generated energy, U.S. petroleum refineries

depend on a foreign supply of crude oil for both

Photo credit: PPG Industries, Inc.

A plant for the production of ethylene glycol is shown

above. Glycol is used for making polyester fibers, photo

film, and plastic bottles.

feedstock and energy source. This supply is subject

to sudden changes in the price, quantity, and type of

crude imported, all of which can influence energy

consumption by refineries. Recent trends toward use

of ‘‘heavy’ crude oil, for example, have increased

the energy needed for processing as compared to

lighter crudes.

Two additional factors influencing energy use are

shifting demand for different types of products and

environmental regulations. Demand has decreased

for most sulfurous fuels (such as residual fuel oil)

and high-octane unleaded gasoline (40). Environmental regulations limiting sulfur and lead content

in fuels have mandated extra processing of fuel,

hence increased use of energy for refining.

Improvements in refinery equipment and operations and computer process controls have led to

nearly a 13-percent drop in the energy required per

barrel of output from 1972 to 1985 (32). Key

improvements have been made in steam systems.

Large savings have resulted from rationalizing these
184 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

systems, reducing leaks, renovating steam traps,

using low-pressure steam that used to be vented, etc.

In addition, new installations of boilers that cogenerate electricity and steam are allowing refineries to

meet their medium pressure steam needs more

efficiently.

Primary Metals

Steel and aluminum manufacturing account for

most energy used in primary metals, which totaled

about 2.6 quads in 1985 (53). The primary metals

industry is the biggest industrial user of both coal

and electricity, and is a leading emitter of CO2

,

accounting for about 5 percent of total U.S. CO2

emissions in 1985.

Steel—Production of steel involves many energyintensive processes, most requiring large amounts of

process heat to alter the chemical makeup of input

materials and for shaping the steel into useful forms.

Three types of steelmaking furnaces are currently

used in the United States. Open hearth furnaces are

the oldest and now least used type. Basic oxygen

furnaces, which speed the steelmaking process by

blowing oxygen into the furnace, are the most

common type. Electric arc furnaces, which produce

steel by electric arcing between carbon electrodes,

are the most efficient type of furnace used today and

are responsible for a growing share of U.S. steel

production.

In the early and mid-1980s, U.S. producers reduced cost and improved energy efficiency by

closing obsolete and unneeded mills and facilities—

unfortunately, though, over half the jobs in the

industry have been lost as a result. Between 1972

and 1985 additional investments in modernization

reduced energy use per ton of steel mill products by

21 percent, or 1.8 percent per year (33). Specifically,

the electric arc furnace has resulted in increased

substitution of scrap for iron ore, which allows

steelmakers to bypass the beneficiation and smelting

processes and reduce energy use by 30 to 40 percent

(37). Continuous casting, which permits increased

working of hot steel, reduces the energy spent on

reheating metal at various stages of the production

process by about 15 to 20 percent, while vastly

increasing the production yield (37). The continuous

casting of steel has risen from 9.1 percent of all steel

production in 1975 to 61.3 percent in 1988 (l).

Photo credit: Amercan Iron and Steel Institute

The slab is being torch cut after emerging from the

continuous slab caster. Continuous casting eliminates

the need for ingot stripping, reheating, and primary

rolling. Continuous casting is also more energy

efficient because less metal must be returned to

the steelmaking process in the form of waste.

Aluminum—The aluminum industry, like the

steel industry, uses large quantities of energy to

convert ore into metal and form the metal into

finished goods. Manufacture of aluminum, however,

involves somewhat different processes and a different mix of fuel types. Electricity accounts for most

energy use in aluminum manufacture-77 percent in

1981 (45). Hydroelectric power, which currently

provides about 10 percent of electricity generation

capacity in the United States, accounts for over

one-third of electricity used by the aluminum

industry (10). Thus, electricity used in the aluminum

industry is significantly less CO2-intensive than the

nationwide average. Production of aluminum has

also become more energy-efficient in recent years

due to the introduction of new technologies.

How quickly the energy efficiency of the primary

metals industry improves in the future will largely

depend on the rate of capital stock turnover. Because

of slow growth in the primary metals industry and

the long lifetimes of most capital equipment, accelerated replacement of energy-using equipment in the

near future is unlikely without incentives.6

6An exmple of such an incenti,~e is tie Department of Energy’s cooperative program with tbe steel companies to ~se~ch neW continuous

steelmaking technologies.
Chapter 6--The Manufacturing Sector ● 185

There is potential for significant reductions in

energy use in the near future through recycling of

primary metals. Production of aluminum from scrap

requires about 90 percent less energy than production from bauxite ore. Production of steel from scrap

consumes about 40 to 50 percent less energy than

production from iron ore (8). As of 1987, the United

States recycled about 43 percent of all aluminum in

municipal solid waste and over 55 percent of used

aluminum beverage cans (42).

other Manufacturing Industries

Aside from the four largest industries, and the

stone, clay, glass, and food processing industries,

most manufacturing involves the intermediate processing of raw materials. The intermediate processing

or ‘‘second-tier’ industries together accounted for

30 percent of the manufacturing sector’s total use of

fossil fuels in 1985, and almost half the sector’s

electricity use (49).7 The heavy use of electricity

reflects the extent to which these industries rely on

mechanical drive. While second-tier industries do

not require much process heat, they consume most

of manufacturing’s space heat energy, since they are

generally more labor intensive than the basic materials industries. The stone, clay, glass and food

processing industries also use significant natural gas

for heating purposes.

In contrast to the four largest industries, secondtier manufacturers usually give low priority to

improved energy efficiency and energy conservation. Hence, they offer a potentially significant

target for reducing manufacturing’s energy use (32).

Energy-Efficiency Improvement Techniques

Energy efficiency can be improved in manufacturing by changing operations and associated equipment to reduce energy use, and/or by significantly

changing overall production processes (33). Equipment changes and energy conservation add-on

technologies involve significant investment (typically $100,000 to a few tens of million dollars),

which are often justified by reduced energy costs.

Changes in the major production processes often

require a new facility, at costs which usually exceed

$100 million.

Energy-Efficient Operations

Energy-efficient operations are achieved, in part,

by good housekeeping practices by well-qualified

staff with leadership and support from top management. General energy conservation practices include: inspections to encourage conservation activity; training programs for operations of energyintensive equipment; scheduling of energy-intensive

activities; better space heating/cooling controls;

systematic maintenance programs; accounting procedures to charge energy costs to specific production

departments; and low-level investments such as for

inspection equipment. At some plants, employee

suggestions for and participation in energy conservation have led to improved operations (32).

Energy Management Systems

Equipment can be turned off or down as appropriate by an energy management system, i.e., a

microprocessor connected to major energy distribution lines and/or equipment, which records and

partly controls energy use. For example, it is still

common industrial practice to leave electrical equipment on between production shifts. Large energy

savings can be achieved by turning off equipment at

these times and by selectively turning off or down

equipment when production is below capacity.

However, costly installation of wiring and switching

is often required for systematic shut-downs of

process equipment, lights, and fans.

Extensive changes may be required to selectively

turn off appropriate equipment in a major factory.

The typical cost of an energy management system in

an auto plant with a load of 100 million kWh per year

is about $750,000, with energy savings of about 10

percent. Exact costs and savings are, of course, site

specific (33). Energy management systems have not

yet been installed in most factories.

Changes in Energy-Intensive Equipment

Some of the major technologies that can reduce

the energy intensity of a given process are more

efficient burners, more efficient motors and lights,

heat recovery, automatic controls, the capture and

reuse of waste materials, cogeneration, and insulation. The following discussion expands on a few of

these.

T~ese ~umber~ include the stone, clay, g]ass, and f~pr~essing industries. Without these four industries, the ~nufacturing sector’s use of fossil

fuel and electricity would be 12 and 34 percent, respectively.
186 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Heat recovery refers to the capture of waste heat,

its application, and, in some cases, the upgrading of

heat quality (i.e., with a heat pump). The main

sources of heat are burner stack gases, heated

product, and other hot material streams. The main

applications are production of steam for general use

(e.g., in waste-heat boilers) and the preheating of

materials, such as water destined for a boiler, a

product stream destined for a heater, or fuel or air

destined for combustion.

High-efficiency motors are now routinely ordered

at many firms when a motor is being replaced. (Most

larger motors, however, are not replaced when they

malfunction but are rewound. ) High-efficiency motors typically cost about 20 percent more than

standard motors (e.g., $60/hp compared with $50/

hp) and save about 5 percent in electricity, depending on the size of the motor (2).

Motors can also be equipped with electronic

variable-speed drives, allowing the motor to be run

at a speed appropriate for the task at hand. Variablespeed drives typically replace conventional, constantspeed applications where:

1. motors provide more flow than is usually

required,

2. motors work against variable-flow restriction

devices, or

3. motors are turned on and off to regulate flow.

Typically, variable-speed drives reduce electricity

use by about 20 percent (21).

Savings from more efficient lighting can be

relatively large. If high-pressure sodium lamps

replace mercury-vapor lamps for area lighting,

energy savings of 50 to 60 percent can be achieved.

Similarly, efficient high-frequency ballasts and specular reflectors can be installed in fluorescent lighting

systems with electricity savings of 50 to 60 percent.

With half as many bulbs this combination delivers

about 90 percent as much light as the standard

installation, Nonetheless, many improvements in

lighting technology have yet to be widely adopted.

The importance of automatic controls is, of

course, increasing as microelectronic technology

improves. Such controls include:

1. process controls that sense characteristics such

as temperature, chemical composition, and

flow rate and immediately optimize them;

2. burner controls such as those that control the

air-to-fuel ratio;

3. motor controls that, for example, adapt motor

speed to the load; and

4. energy management control systems (discussed

above).

While industry has made a start in applying some

automatic controls (i.e., first generation burner

controls and process controls), opportunities remain

for further applications, particularly of more advanced models. Motor controls have not yet been

extensively applied.

Changes in the Production Process

For this report, production activity is discussed at

the level of an integrated mill or factory. The

introduction of new processes in factories (i.e., new

ways of transforming materials) and shifts in the

relative use of competing processes are among the

most important sources of declining energy intensity

in materials manufacturing. The growing use of

recycled material, both fabricators’ scrap and postconsumer scrap, also has a major impact on energy

savings. Only about one-tenth as much energy is

required to melt scrap aluminum as to reduce

aluminum ore to make the same amount of molten

metal.

Many energy-saving opportunities relate to the

capture and use of materials that have previously

been disposed of, such as (flared) organic byproduct

gases, organics in waste streams (e.g., in exhaust

gases at a paint dryer), water, or steam condensate.

Reducing material flows can also save energy.

Material recovery projects have been widely

implemented since the first oil shock both to achieve

energy savings and to meet pollution standards.

Increased heat recovery equipment was widely

installed where higher fuel prices made it very

profitable; thus less retrofit activity can be expected

in this area, unless fuel prices rise again.

Energy Savings as a Byproduct of Adopting

Other Technologies

Potentially, the greatest decrease in emissions

will not be the result of direct efforts to reduce

energy consumption but of indirectly pursuing other

economic goals like improved product quality,
Chapter 6---The Manufacturing Sector . 187

Box 6-A—Potential for Industrial Energy Efficiency in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe

U.S.S.R.

The Soviet industrial base is similar to that of past decades in the United States and many other OECD

countries, with a strong reliance on energy-intensive industries (e.g., primary metal, mineral, mining, and chemical

works), along with the production of energy itself. These will continue to be needed in order to produce the housing,

appliances, vehicles, and transportation infrastructure desired by Soviet citizens.

Industrial energy consumption currently represents more than 50 percent of total energy use in the U.S.S.R.

Ferrous metallurgy, fuels and power, machine building, and chemicals, petrochemicals, and petroleum refining

consume 70 percent of all industrial energy, or about 40 percent of total Soviet energy consumption (34). Improving

end-use energy efficiency in these industries is possible, but it will require continued reforms in the Soviet economic

system (see ch. 9).

One Soviet analyst (3) estimated that the industrial sector could reduce energy use by about 20 percent by using

the most efficient, currently available technologies. This might require a substantial increase in Soviet foreign trade

with OECD countries, though, because the majority of these technologies are presently used and produced only in

those countries.

Eastern Europe

Industry is the largest energy-consuming sector in Eastern Europe, accounting for 59 percent on average of

primary energy consumption in 1985 (26). Despite major growth in the residential and commercial sectors,

industrial energy use is expected to continue to dominate the energy supply and demand picture in Eastern Europe

well into the 21st century. i

Kolar and Chandler (26) projected that policies encouraging energy efficiency might reduce energy demand

in the overall Eastern European industrial sector by about 6 quads by 2025. This does not reflect the effects of

potential economic reform on structural changes and overall energy intensity. Some people in Czechoslovakia, for

example, have called for reducing the production of steel to one-half of its present level, and even more dramatic

changes have been recommended for nonferrous metallurgy and chemicals production.

lower product costs, or pursuing specialized markets.8 For example, the innovative float process of

making glass was not adopted solely because of

energy savings, but because of the production

flexibility that the new system offered (22). The

major impact of the continuous casting of steel is not

energy saved, but improved product yield (60). The

shift in the steel industry from large, very energyintensive open hearth furnaces to more energyefficient basic oxygen and electric furnaces has

occur-red in a large part because of the demand for

small, regular shipments of products with special

metallurgical and dimensional characteristics (17,

36). Metal stamping plants have implemented new

techniques for cushioning their presses not because

of the 10 percent energy savings involved, but

because of the desire for a more consistent product

achieved with fewer maintenance costs (33).

Canada’s National Energy Board concluded that

most of the industrial energy-efficiency gains that

the country achieved have “. . . resulted from the

adoption of new processes, motivated by concerns

for competitiveness and productivity, rather than

energy costs’ (28). Future industrial savings are

also likely to be associated dividends of larger goals,

given the increased competition from foreign fins,

the advent of information technologies that allow

production to be more closely monitored, and the

movement towards high-value-added products.9

In the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, the industrial

sector consumes a much larger share of total energy

than in the United States. Many opportunities exist

for energy savings in the rapidly changing industrial

economies of these nations (see box 6-A).

OTA EMISSION REDUCTION

SCENARIOS

OTA developed an energy technology model to

track the effects of various technical options to

reduce CO2 emissions (see app. A). Figure 6-7

summarizes CO2 emissions from the manufacturing

8~c steel industv is one cX~ple ( 171 36).

~or more on this conclu,;ion, see refs. 27, 33.
188 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 6-7—Emissions in 2015 Under the Base Case,

Moderate, and Tough Scenarios, by Energy

Service Category

Emissions in 2015 as a percent of 1987 levels

I -1

+’ HP+ L—J

100% “LJ ➤ _-,

60% ]

40% 4

20%

o %

Base Moderate Tough

Lease and plant

Feedstocks

HVAC and light

Off-highway oil

Process heat

Steam

Machine drive and

electrolytic

1987 emissions ● 420 million metric tons/year

NOTE: The data presented above should be interpreted as the emissions

reductions achievable in 2015 expressed as a percentage ofl 987

emissions from industry, not ac; a percentage decrease in emissions

be/ow 1987 levels.

SOURCE: Offirx of Technology Assessment, 1991.

sector in 2015 as a percentage of 1987 levels, by type

of energy service, for the Base, Moderate, and Tough

scenarios. Figure 6-8 shows our projections of

industrial emissions as a percentage change from

1987 industrial emissions under the Base, Moderate,

and Tough scenarios up to the year 2015. In the Base

case or ‘‘business-as-usual scenario, no new policies are adopted, resulting in about a 45 percent

emissions increase, from about 420 million metric

tons of carbon in 1987 to about 610 million metric

tons in 2015. Over the same period, energy use is

projected to increase by about one-third. Carbon

emissions increase more rapidly because coal and

purchased electricity both gain market share over the

period (see figure 6-9).

Application of technologies that are currently

available and cost-effective on a life-cycle basis (the

Moderate scenario) still result in emission levels in

2015 that are about one-quarter above 1987 levels.

Only in the Tough scenario, where technologies are

employed that are either currently expensive or not

expected to be commercially available in the next

decade, do emission levels drop below the 1987

level by 2015, to about 10 percent below 1987

levels.

Figure 6-&Summary of CO2 Emissions Under the

Base Case, Moderate, and Tough Scenarios,

by Year

Percent change from 1987 emissions

50%

I

Base case

40%

30%

I

20%

1

1 o%

I

o% -..

-.

.-= Tough - 10% j ——...——

- 20% T -- ––-T -- - ––-–~ , - , –- — ~- - -

1985 1990 1995 200 0 200 5 2010 2015

NOTE: The data presented above shows emissions reductions achievable

in some future year expressed as a percentage decrease in

emissions be/ow 1987 levels.

SOURCE: Office of Technology /Qsessment, 1991.

Figure 6-9-Fuel Use Under the Base Case,

Moderate, and Tough Scenarios, by Fuel Type

Fuel use (quadrillion Btu’s)

3 0 7

u

Base Base Moderate Tough

1987 2015 2015 2015

~ Waste gas

Il%!Z# Coal

= Wood

~~ Oil

= Electricity

= Natural gas

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

Table 6-4 lists the technical options considered in

each of the above categories. The column headings

(Base case, Moderate, and Tough) denote the three

different levels of commitment. Listed underneath

them are technological improvements and operational changes that could be expected to occur as a

result of the implementation of the strategy.
I

I

Table 6-4—industrial Sector Conservation Measures

—

Base case Moderate controls Tough controls

1.

2.

3

Operation and maintenance/existing stock:

Housekeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lighting retrofits . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New investments:

Motors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Product/process changes . . . . . .

Fuel switching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cogeneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

— —

—

Standard motors

Standard lighting

Coal gaining share, gas

maintaining share

26 GW in 2005, 39 GW in 2015

50/. savings by 2000

High-efficiency bulbs net 12% savings

High-efficiency motors and ASD

save 1070

High-efficiency ballasts, reflectors net

50°/0 savings

Four major industries’ energy

intensity reductions average

about 1.5°/0 per yeara

Same as Base case

700/0 of new and replacement

50% savings by 2000

High-efficiency bulbs net

12% savings

High-efficiency motors and ASD

save 30%

Same as moderate controls

Four major industries’ energy

intensities set to historical

improvements, b other industries

at -0.5%/yr, beyond Base case

No new coal boilers, market share

goes to natural gas

90°/0 of new and replacement

boilers cogenerate steam and boilers cogenerate steam and

electricity electricity y

Accelerated turnover and new investments (technologies and rate):

Early equipment retirement . . . . Not applicable Not applicable Average equipment lifetimes

5 years shorter

High efficiency (ISTIG)

cogeneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not applicable Not applicable Replace 25% of new gas-fired

cogeneration in 2000 and 50% after

2005 with ISTIG

aThe following efficiency improvements were assumed for the Moderate Scenario: paper, 1.70/. per year; chemicals, 1.2”/. per year; petroleum, 1.30/. per year; primary metals, 1 .8% per year.

~he following efficiency improvements were assumed for the Tough scenario: paper, 2.8?/. per year; chemlcais, 3.8% per year; petroleum, 4.30/. per year; primary metals, 2,30/’ per year.

ABBREVIATIONS: ASD = alternating speed drive; GW - gigawatts; ISTIG - intercooled steam-mjected gas turbnes.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

I

I

I
190 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

While the column headings characterize levels of

commitment measured in terms of overall costs, the

row headings (Operation & Maintenance/Existing

Stock, New Investments, Accelerated Turnover and

New Technology) loosely reflect the lead times

(going from short to long) associated with a particular group of changes. Operation & Maintenance/

Existing Stock focuses on improving efficiency

within the confines of the existing capital equipment

stock. New Investment includes what might occur if

policies were adopted that steer purchasing decisions towards high-efficiency equipment. Accelerated

Turnover and New Technologies simulate what

might be possible with policies that hasten the

development of new technologies and the retirement

of old equipment.

The energy conservation opportunities in the

industrial sector are more difficult to analyze than in

other sectors because the uses of energy are very

heterogeneous and are often interrelated. Energy

conservation can result from investment in individual pieces of equipment (e.g., a high-efficiency

motor) or in changes to a whole manufacturing

process (e.g., continuous casting steel). To deal with

this problem, the analysis of the industrial sector

examines efficiency in specific types of equipment

that are used in many types of industrial processes

and specifically focuses on likely process changes in

the four biggest energy-consuming industries—

paper and allied products, chemicals, petroleum

refining, and primary metals.

Note that in this analysis, emissions reductions

are not linked to major changes in the utility fuel mix

that produces electricity for industry. Because over

half of U.S. electricity is produced by burning coal

(the most CO2

-intensive fuel), the emissions reductions described in this chapter could be augmented

by changing how electricity is made (see ch. 3).

Base Case

OTA’s Base case projection of a 45 percent increase in emissions from 1987 to 2015 reflects the

Gas Research Institute’s 1988 baseline projections.

Industrial production is projected to increase 2.7

percent per year, but energy use is estimated to grow

more slowly. The result will be a continuing decline

in the energy intensity of U.S. industry, including

that of each of the four biggest energy using

industries.

By 2015, we assume there will be about 39

gigawatts of industrial cogeneration capacity in the

Base case. Most of the electricity is used internally

by industrial fins, but about one-quarter is sold to

utilities. Gas is projected to be the fuel most used for

cogeneration, but coal’s share increases significantly by 2015.

Moderate Controls

Adopting Moderate control measures could reduce CO2 emissions by 77 million metric tons per

year below Base case projections for 2015; emission

levels would still exceed 1987 levels by 25 percent

(see figure 6-7). Figure 6-10 shows the emissions

reductions achievable in 2000 and 2015 by each of

our Moderate control measures. Product and process

changes that reduce the energy intensity of the four

biggest energy-using industries achieve the greatest

emissions reductions (about 9 percent of 1987

levels) (52), The impacts of other conservation

measures (motors and lighting) may overlap with

those of process and product changes; the scenario

is adjusted to avoid double counting of the same

emission reduction opportunities. Improvements in

housekeeping and new, more efficient motors reduce

emissions by 6 percent and 4 percent of 1987,

respectively, by 2015.

Increased cogeneration based on gas and biomass

achieves CO2 emission reductions equivalent to

about 3 percent of 1987 levels by 2015, even though

energy delivered and consumed increases. The OTA

model assumes that cogeneration systems are designed to deliver both electricity and steam for

internal use rather than to maximize electricity

production. The assumed design maximizes the

technical fuel efficiency and therefore minimizes

carbon emissions, even though in some cases it may

not be the least-cost alternative.

Tough Controls

By 2015, emissions under the Tough control

scenario fall to about 10 percent below 1987 levels

(see figure 6-7). Total emissions are about 40

percent lower than the Base case in 2015. Figure

6-11 shows the emissions reductions in 2000 and

2015 for each of the Tough measures as percentages
Chapter 6---The Manufacturing Sector . 191

Figure 6-10--C02 Emissions Reductions in 2000

and 2015 Expressed as a Percentage of 1987

Manufacturing Sector Emissions, by Control

Method, Under the Moderate Scenario

Efficient motors

Lighting

Process changes

Fuel switching

Cogeneration

Housekeeping

Lighting retrofits

Moderate controls

L :1 200 0

k = 2015

1- ~

I not applicablei 

I

b

New investments

+

~ Operation and maintenance/

!

existing stock

1

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Reductions as a percent of 1987 emissions

NOTE: The data presented above should be interpreted as the emissions

reductions achievable in a future year expressed as a percentage

ot 1987 emissions from industry, not as a percentage decrease in

emissions bdow 1987 levels.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

of 1987 levels. *O Reductions from all Tough measures total about 210 million metric tons, roughly half

of 1987 emissions. To achieve such reductions,

equipment stocks (e.g., boilers, motors, etc. ) must be

replaced 5 years sooner than they normally would

be. Operation and Maintenance/Existing Stock measures are the same as in the Moderate scenario, but are

introduced more quickly.

Process changes occurring in all industries achieve

about a 26 percent reduction by 2015, compared to

1987 emission levels, assuming the energy intensity

of the four largest industrial energy users continues

to decline at the 1980-85 rate. Other industries are

assumed to experience an additional energy intensity reduction of 0.5 percent per year compared to

the Base case.

High-efficiency motors, which use 30 percent less

energy than standard motors, reduce emissions by 12

percent of 1987 levels by 2015. If existing motors

are replaced 5 years sooner than scheduled, an

additional 1 percent reduction can be achieved.

Figure 6-11—CO2 Emissions Reductions in 2000

and 2015 Expressed as a Percentage of 1987

Manufacturing Sector Emissions, by Control

Method, Under the Tough Scenario

Efficient motors

Lighting

Process changes

Fuel switching

ISTIG cogeneration

Housekeeping

Lighting retrofits

Tough controls

b

-.

Er--T 200 0 .— —..

= 201 5

—>

t-L

New investments

, —

1 Operation and maintenance/

I

existing stock

~—r—T—-——

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Reductions as a percent of 1987 emissions

NOTE: The data presented above should be interpreted as the em issions

reductions achievable in 2015 expressed as a percentage of 1987

emissions from industry, not as a percentage deaease in emissions

bekwv 1987 levels. The thin horizontal bars show the additional

reductions possible if existing equipment is replaced sooner than

scheduled.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

If the building of new coal-fired boilers is

stopped, and the entire market share for new coal

shifts to natural gas (the fuel-switching measure), an

8-percent reduction in industrial CO2 emissions

would be achieved by 2015 (9 percent if existing

boilers are replaced 5 years sooner than scheduled).

New investments in cogeneration can achieve

about a 7 percent reduction in CO2 emissions by

2015, assuming that cogeneration provides 61 gigawatts (GW) in 2015 and meets 90 percent of new

industrial steam demand.11 New, more efficient

cogeneration technologies, such as intercooled steaminjected gas turbines (ISTIG), should become widely

available in the 1990s. We estimate that if ISTIG

cogeneration replaces about half of the new gas-freed

cogeneration after 2005, then industrial CO2 emissions can be reduced by about 16 percent in 2015,

relative to 1987 levels.

Because many of the Tough measures have

overlapping effects, total reductions under the Tough

scenario are lower than the sum of the reductions

from each individual measure shown in figures 6-10

l~ls fomat should ~o[ ~ ~onfu~~ ~ith the one ~resentcd fi flWe 6-8, w~ch shows emissio~~ as a pcent change from 1987 ]eve]s

I I Note t~t [his cate~ow is not included in figure 6-11. The more stringent ISTIG cogeneration technology 1s presented instead.
192 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

and 6-11. For example, the potential reductions from

cogeneration are lower if other conservation measures that lower the demand for steam energy are also

assumed. On the other hand, other emissions reduction options may exist that were not included in this

analysis. The potential savings calculated here

should not, therefore, be taken as an absolute limit.

In general, however, large emissions reductions may

be very difficult to achieve by 2015, in part because

of continued growth in the manufacturing sector,

and in part because industry has already invested in

energy efficiency.

Costs of the Tough Control Scenario

We estimate that the cost of all the Tough

industrial control measures falls in the range of $18

billion to $55 billion per year. The cost of individual

measures are summarized below and presented in

greater detail in appendix A.

Use of more efficient motors and lighting and

general housekeeping improvements are all measures that are either low cost or save money due to

large fuel savings. We estimate cost savings from

these measures of about $9 billion per year.

The extensive use of extremely efficient cogeneration technologies under our Tough scenario costs,

on average, about an additional $0.02 to $0.07 per

kWh of electricity generated. Costs for cogeneration

total about $3 billion to $7 billion per year. The

cost-effectiveness of these reductions is in the range

of $55 to $120 per ton of carbon.

The moratorium on new coal industrial boilers

(assuming natural gas is the fuel of choice) would

increase natural gas use by about 2.3 quads over the

Base case. At our 2015 prices, this costs about $14

billion per year, with a cost effectiveness of about

$520 per ton of carbon reduced.

The largest share of the industrial reductions

comes from process change;. We have no source of

estimates for the cost of these reductions. We

assumed a range of $120 per ton to $520 per ton (the

upper bound of the cost-effectiveness of cogeneration to the cost-effectiveness of fuel switching from

coal to natural gas). Total costs for process changes

thus would fall in the range of about $10 billion to

$43 billion,

POLICIES FOR REDUCING

CO2 EMISSIONS FROM THE

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

Strategies for reducing emissions of greenhouse

gases from the manufacturing sector fall into three

categories: those meant to reduce overall energy use,

those intended to shift the composition of industrial

output, and those meant to encourage switching

from greenhouse gas-intensive energy sources to

sources that emit fewer or no greenhouse gases.

These strategies are outlined in greater detail below.

Policy options are presented in a following section.

Policy Strategies

Changes in Energy Efficiency

The energy efficiency of a manufacturing process

can be improved by increased housekeeping, equipment retrofit, or construction of entirely new production facilities. Housekeeping essentially involves

increased labor and management inputs to reduce

energy inputs. Equipment retrofit is a relatively

inexpensive alternative to actual equipment replacement. However, equipment replacement or construction of entirely new facilities, though costly, offer

the largest overall energy savings.

Improving energy efficiency in manufacturing

can be quite cost-effective. Between 1976 and 1988,

about 2,500 energy audits were performed free of

charge for small and medium-sized manufacturers

(i.e., under 180 employees) through the Energy and

Diagnostic Center (EADC) program sponsored by

the Department of Energy’s Office of Industrial

Programs. The program is administered by the

University City Science Center in Philadelphia and

currently has auditing centers at 18 universities,

During 1987-88, the audits performed contained

recommendations for savings of about 5 percent of

the total energy use by these manufacturers, equivalent to a financial savings of $13.6 million. While

these savings are certainly encouraging, much more

potential for improvement exists: only half of the

recommendations made by the energy auditors were

implemented by the manufacturers. 12 Most (73

percent) of the energy savings resulted from improved conservation and efficiency in production

and energy-service technologies (i.e., mechanical

IZRe~cwch ~~ng on tie imp~inlents t. adoption of energy-efficient technology will be presented in a foficomint3 OTA studYt ‘,s‘nergY

Efi’cienc-y. Past Trends and Future Opportunities.
Chapter 6-The Manufacturing Sector ● 193

drive systems and boilers). The remainder was saved

through housekeeping and in lighting and space

conditioning systems.

Depending on assumptions made about investment interest rates, the manufacturers’ annual rate s

of return from energy-conserving investments i n

1987-88 were between 488 and 663 percent. Th e

Federal Government, which paid for the audits,

earned between 60 and 77 percent per year on its

investment in increased taxes from manufacturers

(25).

Changes in Output

The energy intensity of manufacturing industries

is unevenly distributed (see figure 6-12). Of the 53

manufacturing industries, only 4 have a primary

energy intensity of 100,000 Btu’s or more per dollar

output; 11 are between 50,000 and 99,999 Btu’s; and

38 use less than 50,000 Btu’s (roughly the average)

per dollar of output (5). Thus, increased efficiency in

a few industries or a realignment of the economy

away from the most energy-intensive industries

could have a significant effect on the overall energy

intensity of manufacturing.

Indeed, decreased output of energy-intensive

goods accounted for about one-third of the decline in

energy use by the U.S. industrial sector between

1972 and 1982 (27). To the extent that consumers

substitute less energy-intensive goods for more

energy-intensive ones, C 02 emissions from U.S.

manufacturing can be reduced. However, the experience from 1985 to 1988 indicates that economic

output can also swing in the opposite direction

toward a more energy-intensive configuration.

Moreover, imports of energy-intensive products

increased in the period when U.S. manufacturing

shifted from more to less energy-intensive goods. To

calculate our total contribution to global problems

like climate change, and to formulate effective

energy reduction policies, it is important to include

estimates of the energy associated with nonenergy

imports. Failure to do so presents a false picture of

U.S. energy use and of the potential for savings.

Advances in information technologies have made

it possible to substitute information for materials,

leading to changes in production that indirectly save

energy. Instead of creating dozens of prototypes, for

example, Levi Strauss Co. is using computers to test

out new fabrics, patterns, and designs before ever

cutting a piece of cloth (4). Thus, quality and

Figure 6-1 2—Ranking of Manufacturing Industries

by Direct and Indirect Primary Energy Use

1,000 Btu’s

200 ‘

150

100

50

0

SOURCE: S. Casler and B. Hannon, “Readjustment Potentials in Industrial

Energy Efficiency and Structure,” Journa/ of Environmental

Economics and Management 17:93-108, 1989.

flexibility are enhanced and the use of materials and

associated energy is reduced. In essence, a shift in

output has occurred, with the software and information technology industries gaining (43a).

Fuel Switching

Manufacturing industries can also reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by switching to ‘cleaner’

energy sources. Natural gas and oil emit less CO2 per

unit of energy than does coal, and no greenhouse

gases are directly emitted by generation of electricity at hydroelectric or nuclear powerplants. In one

analysis, researchers found large-scale movement

towards refined petroleum products and electricity

from 1967 to 1972 and a movement away from

natural gas from 1972 to 1977, indicating that ‘‘. . .

many industries are able to exercise a great deal of

flexibility in their use of fuels over spans of time as

short as five years’ (5).

The decision to switch the type of energy used,

however, may be influenced by technical, economic,

environmental, and energy security factors. Any of

these factors may constrain movement from one type

of energy to another. Potential supply restraints also

can limit opportunities for fuel switching. Nevertheless, energy switching could reduce CO2 emissions

from manufacturing by as much as 5 to 10 percent;

these reductions could be much higher in the long

run if reliable, nonfossil energy sources are developed, without seriously conflicting with manufacturing interests.
194 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Policy Options

Several categories of policies can be used to

implement the emission-reducing strategies outlined

above. They include regulatory and financial policies; electric utility programs; and information and

research and development policies. Unfortunately,

no single policy is without flaws. Careful coordination of several types of policies is probably the best

approach for achieving significant emission reductions from the manufacturing sector.

Opportunities for reducing CO2 emissions in this

sector are more difficult to identify than in other

sectors because of the wide variety of uses for

energy. Thus, those policies that affect energy

consumption in general, for example, carbon taxes

or marketable permits for carbon emissions, are a

logical choice for this sector. Moreover, because

industrial decisionmakers are often both more knowledgeable and sensitive to prices than, for example,

residential energy consumers, one would expect

market-oriented options to be relatively more effective. Nonetheless, other types of policy approaches

in concert with market-oriented approaches can help

to ensure success.

Without any intervention, emissions may increase

by about 45 percent by the year 2015. Federal

policies to encourage energy efficiency, fuel switching, and CO2 offsets in the manufacturing sector

have the potential to reduce the sector’s CO2

emissions to about 10 percent below current levels

in the next 25 years. Such changes will not come

about by themselves. A coordinated policy effort at

the Federal level is needed to ensure success.

Regulatory Policies

One possible means of regulating CO2 emissions

from manufacturing is to require permits for CO2

emissions. Manufacturers could be issued permits to

cover a prescribed level of emissions, for example a

set percentage of 1990 emissions. Reductions can be

accomplished by implementing energy -efficient technologies or fuel switching, or by supporting approved reforestation/afforestation projects to offset

CO2 emissions from manufacturing activities (see

ch. 7). It would be up to the manufacturer to choose

the most cost-effective strategy, depending on costs

of available resources. Firms could be allowed to

trade their unused carbon permits to other firms

whose emissions exceed permit levels, thereby

creating a market for carbon emissions. Marketable

permits are the basis of the U.S. regulatory approach

for phasing out emissions of CFCs and for reducing

sulfur dioxide emissions to control acid rain. Marketable carbon permits are likely to be more difficult

to implement than permits for CFCs or sulfur

dioxide; nevertheless, such a system may still be less

intrusive to firms than mandated standards or

equipment. Marketable permits are discussed in

greater detail in chapter 3.

Another more traditional regulatory policy is to

require efficiency standards for common energyusing equipment, similar to those existing for

automobiles and some appliances. Motors are prime

candidates for such standards. Efficiency standards

historically have been opposed by industry because

standards can be inflexible (33). However, decisions

such as motor purchases and recycling are made by

professionals dealing with a wide variety of specific

situations and are not immune to shortsightedness or

mistakes. Even so, the rationale for mandating the

use of a particular type of equipment is not as strong

as it is for setting efficiency standards for cars or

appliances; the consuming public might not be

competent or willing to evaluate the technical details

bearing on efficiency.

Electric Utility Programs

Some programs sponsored by electric utilities—

Demand Side Management (DSM)--offer another

means of achieving reductions in greenhouse gas

emissions from manufacturing. The cost to utilities

of facilitating energy savings (especially in large

energy users such as industry), may be competitive

with the cost of adding new supply capacity: the

utility interacts with the customer to conserve

energy and maximize profits. Many of these programs are in their infancy and it is too early to judge

their effectiveness. The major programs are:

1. rebates to customers who install agreed-on

kinds of equipment;

2. payments (by the utility that solicits bids) for

electricity savings resulting from installations;

3. low-interest loans to customers for conservation installations; and

4. installation, at utility cost, of conservation

equipment (33).

See chapters 1 and 3 for more discussion of DSM.

Many large industrial customers of electric utilities receive special lower rates because they supply

the utility with a large, dependable portion of
Chapter 6--The Manufacturing Sector . 195

electricity demand. Utility programs could be used

to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by making these

special rates contingent on improved use of electricity. This differs from least-cost planning in that the

financial burden of improving energy use is placed

on the manufacturer, not the utility.

Energy or Carbon Taxes

The price of energy is obviously a very important

factor affecting its use. Prices can be affected

through a carbon tax, energy taxes (e.g., an oilimport fee), or regulation of electricity prices, to

name a few. These are discussed in greater detail in

chapter 3.

A carbon tax is a particularly effective way of

levying the heaviest economic sanctions against the

worst emitters of CO2. Under such an approach, the

tax would be highest on coal, low for natural gas, and

zero for noncarbon sources.

Using several econometric models, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that a carbon tax of

$100 per ton would hold CO2 emissions at from

about current levels to as much as 25 percent below

current levels by 2000 (38). Within the industrial

sector, the tax is estimated to lower CO2 emissions

in 2000 by between 10 and 35 percent below Base

case emissions in that year. The higher reduction

estimate is a result of a 70-percent reduction in coal

use.

However, analyses of pricing policies such as

carbon taxes may tend to overemphasize the role of

price. The fact that the energy intensity of the

economy began to decline before the first oil shock

and continued to fall during periods of declining

energy prices suggests that decisions about energy

use are not solely contingent on price. Energy prices

are important in decisionmaking, but are not the only

consideration. For example, reliability of supplies is

extremely important; facilities have been added at

many factories so that both natural gas and residual

oil can be burned and electricity generated.

Other very important considerations in energy

decisionmaking are the connections between energyusing technology and product quality, yield of

materials, maintenance of equipment, capacity of

production, and so forth. Energy conservation measures are not undertaken if managers believe that the

measures are at all likely to interfere with production

or if the return on investment is not extremely high.

In most industries, energy costs are not that important in the overall scheme of production. However,

many projects undertaken primarily to boost product

quality or to further automate production have side

benefits including saving energy. Such energyconservation projects, once identified, can be readily

undertaken.

Unlike other sectors, such as buildings or electricity generation, nearly every manufacturing industry

faces increasingly intense foreign competition. Caution should be exercised in increasing costs to

domestic manufacturers if there is not a commensurate increase in costs to foreign competitors, or some

sort of equalizing export subsidy. Unless the costs of

policies are relatively equal worldwide, domestic

manufacturers could beat a unique disadvantage and

demand would conceivably shift from domestic

producers of a product to foreign firms, doing little

to curb the global production of greenhouse gases.

Tax Incentives

Much of the energy-using equipment in industry

is old and inefficient compared to the best available

technology. In 1975, for example, more than 70

percent of equipment in manufacturing was at least

15 years old and more than half was over 25 years of

age (40), Because in many cases replacing old

equipment improves energy efficiency by 10 to 50

percent, financial policies (such as, tax credits or

accelerated tax depreciation schedules aimed at

stimulating rapid replacement of older equipment

with more energy-efficient stock) have potential for

achieving improvements in energy use. Newer

equipment also generally improves the overall

productivity and competitiveness of the company.

This strategy has been tried in the past. The

National Energy Act (1978) provided a 10-percent

added energy investment tax credit (EITC) for

certain energy conservation investments (as well as

tax credits for certain energy supply investments).

The tax credits were available until 1985. They

applied to a specific list of technologies such as heat

recovery devices.

One study of the EITC concluded, based on

interviews and scrutiny of records at 15 participating

corporations, that the 10-percent EITC seldom

affected investment decisionmaking even though

the tax credit was almost always applied for (33). In

effect, almost all of the identified investment projects relating to conservation provided excellent

returns and probably would have been undertaken
196 * Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

#lide

’49 —-

.,

. .

Photo credit: M. Procter

amples of successful Federal policy in this area.

Initiated in 1976, the EADC serves to transfer

state-of-the-art research information and energy

analysis expertise to manufacturers, who are able to

use the information for practical purposes. With

EADC finding, faculty and students at 18 universities perform free energy audits for small and

medium-sized manufacturers in more than 30 States.

From 1976 to 1988, nearly 2,500 audits were

undertaken, proposing a total of about 82 trillion

Btu’s of energy savings, mainly from efficiency

improvements associated with cogeneration, space

heating, lighting, and process equipment maintenance and replacement (in descending order of cost

savings). These recommendations represented about

$400 million (nominal) in cost savings to industry.

Actual implementation of EADC’s recommendations yielded savings of 50 trillion Btu’s of energy

and $247 million (nominal) over the 12-year period.

The program has had a cumulative cost to the

Federal Government of $11.25 million through 1989

(25).

The success of programs such as EADC depends

largely on the quality of work being performed; to

expand the program would require a significant

increase in the number of knowledgeable professionals involved. To the extent that increases are

possible, the success of EADC seems to make an

attempt worthwhile.

Bethlehem Steel main plant in Pennsylvania

Research and Development

even without the EITC. Many firms did not even

factor the EITC into their financial evaluation. An

additional objection to the EITC was that it specified

technologies; it thus ran counter to the essence of

technical change, which thrives on multiple new

technologies and concepts and often involves multipurpose goals.

Informational Policies

A major barrier to reducing emissions from the

manufacturing sector is a lack of information about

how to improve energy use. Informational policies

can include performance goals, the collection of

performance data, energy performance labeling of

equipment, training, or performance audits (32a).

The Department of Energy’s Office of Industrial

Programs EADC program and its research and

development information transfer program are exResearch and development sponsored by OIP in

waste energy reduction and industrial process efficiency is projected to save more than 3 quads of

energy per year by the year 2000, based on continued

funding of $30 million per year (1 1). Other federally

sponsored research, such as that done at Oak Ridge

National Laboratory (ORNL), will also contribute to

improved energy technologies. Particularly promising research areas identified by ORNL are: improved use of catalysts in chemical production,

intelligent sensors and controls, heat recovery and

cogeneration, and separation techniques (29). Research and development in nonenergy areas, such as

materials science, also holds promise for partial

replacement of energy-intensive materials like steel

and aluminum. Likewise, research and development

into the quality of recycled goods could help reduce

energy use by increasing demand for recycled

materials such as paper, steel, and aluminum (32a).
Chapter 6--The Manufacturing Sector ● 197

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Competitiveness and Technology, OTE-E-21O (Springfield, VA:

National Technical Information Service, August 1983).

42. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Facing America’s Trash: What Next for Municipal Solid Waste?, OTA-O-424

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October

1989).

43. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Making Things

Better: Competing in Manufacturing, OTA-ITE-443 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1990).

43a. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The U.S. Textile

and Apparel Industry: A Re\’olution in Progress, OTA-TET-332

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1987).
198 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

44. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Energy Use and

the U.S. Economy, OTA-BP-E-57 (Washingto~ DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1990).

45. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of

Manufactures: Fuels and Electric Energy Consumed (Washington, DC: 1972, 1977, 1981, 1982).

46, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,

Survey of Current Business 69(9) :s1-s2, 1988.

47. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical

Abstract cfthe Umted States, 1989 (Washington, DC: 1989).

48. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Policy Planning and

Analysis, Energy Use Trends in the United States 1972-1984

(Washington, DC: May 1985).

49. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration

Manufacturing Energy Consumption Suwey: Consumption of

Energy, 1985, DOE/EIA-05 12(85) (Washington DC: 1985).

50. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration

Monthly Energy Review (Washington DC: January 1987).

51. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration

Annual Review of Energy, 1987, 1988, DOWIA-0384(87)

(Washington, DC: May 1988).

51a. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration

Annual Review of Eoergy, 1989, DOE/EIA-0384(89) (Washington, DC: May 1989).

52. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration

Monthly Energy Review (Wa.shingtoU DC: June 1988).

53. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Conservation Multi-Year

Plan: 1990-1994 (Washingto~ DC: August 1988).

54. U.S. Department of Energy, Oftlce of Policy Planning and

Analysis, Energy’s Role in International Trade: Structural

Change and Competitiveness (Washington, DC: July 1989).

55. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration

Man@acturing Energy Consumption Survey: Changes in Energy

E“ciency 1980-1985, DOE/EIA-0516($5) (Washington DC:

January 1990).

56. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration

Annual Review of Energy, 1990, DOE/EL4-0384(89) (Washington DC: May 1990).

57. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Yearbook 1985 (Washingto~ DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986).

58. U.S. Federal Reserve B-FederaI Reserve Bulletin (Washingto~ DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

November 1989).

59. walker, w., ‘ ‘Information Technology and The Use of Energy, ’

Energy Supply, pp. 460461, October 1985.

60. Young, E., American Iron and Steel Institute, remarks at OTA

Energy Use in Industry Workshop, Washingto~ DC, May 11,

1989.
Chapter 7

The Forestry Sector

Photo credit: American Forestry Association
CONTENTS

Page

OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

SETTING THE STAGE: FOREST AREA AND EMISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Temperate-Zone Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

Tropical Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .204

MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN U.S. FORESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Managing Existing Forest Land and Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 207

New Forests and Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN TROPICAL FORESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

Providing Alternatives to Deforestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

Managing Existing Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .220

Managing New Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

POLICY OPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Options for U.S. Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Options for Tropical Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

CHAPTER 7 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .232

Boxes

Box Page

7-A. What Happens to Carbon in a Forest? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .203

7-B. Productivity and Ownership of U.S. Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

7-C. Harvesting Old-Growth Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .212

7-D. Forests and Future Global Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

7-E. USDA: Forest Service and Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service . . 225

7-F. Multilateral and Bilateral Institutions and Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Figures

Figure Page

7-1. Estimates of Relative Carbon Emissions From Fossil Fuel Use and Tropical

Deforestation, 1980 and 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

7-2. Potential for Forestry Practices To Offset U.S. Carbon Emissions,

Relative to 1987 Emissions Levels .....,.,.****.*....**,*.+,**..,.,,,....,.*.. 202

7-3. Commercial Status of All U.S. Forests and Distribution of Timberland

Ownership in 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209

7-4. Reforestation of U.S. Timberlands by Ownership Category, Fiscal Year 1989 . . . 210

7-5. Funding Levels for the U.S. Forest Service’s State and Private

Forestry Programs, 1988-91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

Tables

Table Page

7-1. U.S. Forest Management: Potential Carbon Storage/Savings and Percent Offset

of 1987 Carbon Emissions From U.S. Fossil Fuel Use, for 2000 and 2015 . . . . . . . 206

7-2. Tropical Forest Management: Potential Percent Offset of Estimated

1989 Carbon Emissions From Deforestation, for 2000 and 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

7-3. FAO Estimates of Plantations Established by End of 1980 and During 1981-85

in 111 Developing Countries and Territories, by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Chapter 7

The Forestry Sector

OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY

Humans have long altered forests and, in the

process, affected the flow of greenhouse gases—

particularly carbon dioxide (C02

)--between forest

lands and the atmosphere. In recent decades, the net

flow to the atmosphere appears to have accelerated.

Opportunities exist to moderate this trend through

practices such as increasing forest productivity and

tree planting in the United States, and agroforestry,

better timber harvest management, use of nontimber

forest products, and reforestation in the tropics. Most

of these also will provide other benefits such as

protection of watersheds, riparian habitats, and

biodiversity; provision of food; reduced soil erosion;

and stability in nutrient and hydrologic cycles.

Most current forest-related emissions come from

tropical forests. These forests, located almost exclusively in developing countries, are being deforested

and degraded on a widespread, unprecedented scale.1

Estimates indicate that tropical deforestation accounts for 7 to as much as 31 percent of worldwide

CO2 emissions from all sources (see figure 7-l).

Temperate-zone deforestation, mostly in industrialized countries, contributes comparatively little CO2

emissions; however, temperate-zone forests underwent massive alterations in the past.2

Since industrialized countries contribute the

vast majority of global CO2 emissions through their

use of fossil fuels (see figure 7-l), halting tropical

deforestation will not stop the accumulation of

greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Nor is reforestation feasible on a large enough scale to totally

offset CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use.3 To reduce

greenhouse gas emissions, industrialized countries

must first reduce fossil fuel use in their building,

energy, manufacturing, and transportation sectors

(see chs. 3 through 6).

At the same time, temperate-zone forestry management practices might offset---+ver the short

term-some emissions from industrialized countries. Although difficult, this can be achieved by:

●

●

●

increasing carbon storage in existing forests;

growing tree crops on unforested land for use as

fuel; and

planting and maintaining trees in urban areas

and marginal crop and pasturelands.

OTA estimates that forestry-related practices

in the United States might be able to offset about

2 percent of U.S. 1987 carbon emissions from

fossil fuel combustion in the year 2000 and 7.5

percent in 2015 (see figure 7-2), at an annualized

cost in 2015 of $10 to $13 billion per year (see app.

A for cost estimates). Congress could promote such

practices by enhancing or augmenting existing

forest management and tree planting programs of the

U.S. Forest Service and the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, and by enhancing the

biomass energy research program of the Department

of Energy. Congress also could consider using

financial incentives (e.g., tax policies to make

investments in forest management more attractive;

tax on fossil fuels to make biomass fuels more

competitive).

There are several caveats to this potential for

offsetting emissions. Trees planted today can continue to store carbon beyond this report’s 25-year

timeframe. But this carbon eventually will be

released to the atmosphere, either when trees die and

decompose naturally, when they are harvested and

burned, or when products made from wood eventually decompose. But unless the wood is used to

displace fossil fuel or is permanently stored under

conditions that will not allow decomposition, the

carbon offsets in later years will dwindle. In

addition, current estimates of forestry-related offsets

assume that increasing the carbon storage rate in a

14 ‘Deforestation” means converting forest land to other vegetation or uses (e.g., pasture, cmpland, d~~). “Degradation” involves practices which

leave trees .as the predominant vegetation but which degrade overall forest quality (e.g., soil erosio~ damages to trees and streams from selective logging).

% this report, the term ‘‘temperate-zone forests’ refers to temperate and boreal coniferous forests and temperate deciduous forests.

IFor exmple, estlmtcs of how much ~ee planting would be needet to offset global COZ emissions range from 5~ to ~most 1 billion hect~es of

new plantations exhibiting moderately high growth rates ( 1.55, 239, 240). The lower end of this range represents over 1.5 times the total area of U.S.

forest and more than 15 percent of the world’s total closed forest area,

–~()1–
202 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 7-1 —Estimates of Relative Carbon Emissions

From Fossil Fuel Use arid Tropical Deforestation,

1980 and 1989

Carbon emissions (billion metric tons)

lo~

I 1

m Fossil fuel use 44

2

0

ii..1

Low High

1980 estimates

--1

Low 

—, u

High

1989 estimates

“Low” and “High” represent the range of estimates for carbon

emissions during that year.

SOURCES: IWOdefomstat/on estimates from R.K. Detwilerand C.A.S.

Hall, “Tropical Forests and the Global Carbon Cycle,” Scierrce

239:42-47, Jan 1, 1988; and from R.A. Houghton et al., “The

Flux of Carbon From Terrestrial Ecosystems to the Atmosphere in 1980 Due to Changes in Land Use: Geographic

Distribution of the Globi~l Flux,” Tel/us 39B:122-139, 1987.

1989 cfeforesttitkm esthetes from R.A. Houghton, “Emissions of Greenhouse Gases,” Part 4 (pp. 53-62) in N. Myers,

Deforestation Rates in Tropical Forests and Their Climatic

/mp/&ations (Lmdon: Friends of the Earth Ltd., 1989); and

from N. Myers, Deforestation Rates in Tropical Forests and

The/r Climatic knplications (London: Friends of the Earth Ltd.,

1989). ?WOand 1989 fossil fitel use from U.S. Department

of Energy, /nternafiona/ Enegy Annual, DOE/EIA-0219(88)

(Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration, November 1989) (using estimated 1988 emissions, the latest year for

which estimates are available, as a surrogate for 1989

emissions).

forest’s commercial timber component will also

increase the total storage rate in the entire forest

ecosystem. Finally, forests-and the feasibility of

using forestry practices to offset emissions-are

likely to be affected by future climate changes.

Therefore, forestry options in industrialized countries cannot be considered a substitute for reducing total energy use or developing non-fossil fuel

alternatives, but rather as a way of “buying”

time while developing alternative sources and

improving the efficiency of their energy use in

general.

To reduce their current CO2 emissions, developing countries need to stop tropical deforestation and

degradation, which occur as forests are converted to

temporary agriculture (’‘shifting” cultivation) and

permanent agriculture (including cattle ranching)

and as a result of poor timber harvesting practices.

Figure 7-2—Potential for Forestry Practices

To Offset U.S. Carbon Emissions,

Relative to

Conservation Reserve

Increase productivity

Urban trees

General afforestation

Biomass energy

Total

1987 Emissions Levels

Moderate measure

~1

Tough measures

+

O 2 4 6 8 10

Potential offset as a

percent of 1987 emissions

LZ3 2000 ~ 201 5

For comparison with the energy model (see app A), OTA

considers the Conservation Reserve Program to be a “moderate”

measure, primarily because it is already being implemented. The

other forestry measures are considered “tough” measures because they will require greater efforts and investments to be fully

achieved. These estimates all depend on assumptions discussed

in the text.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment (from table 7-1).

However, these activities are driven by underlying

social, economic, and political factors—poverty and

lack of land tenure for most people, national

development policies, and foreign debts—that are

exacerbated by rapid population growth (337).

Emissions from fossil fuel use are relatively less

important now but are likely to increase significantly

as these countries develop (ch. 9).

The primary needs in developing countries, then,

are to remove incentives for deforestation; provide

for population planning, land reform, and debt

reduction; and provide alternative livelihoods for

millions of shifting cultivators and thousands of

rural communities. The suitability of alternatives

such as agroforestry and ‘‘sustainable’ agriculture,

improved forest management, increased use of

nontimber forest products, and reforestation depends on site-specific conditions and, in most cases,

giving local people a vested interest in seeing them

implemented.

The United States can ensure that its foreign aid

assistance programs (primarily of the U.S. Agency

for International Development), and those of multilateral lending and international assistance organizations (e.g., World Bank, U.N. Food and Agriculture

Organization), address developing country social
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector ● 203

Box 7-A—What Happens to Carbon in a Forest?

During the day, plants take carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and convert it into organic compounds

such as carbohydrates by using solar energy and water (i.e., photosynthesis). Plants emit CO2 during respiration,

when they use the energy stored in these compounds. The balance favors the net accumulation of carbon in trees,

shrubs, herbs, and roots. Much of the carbon in forests, however, is “hidden’ ’-almost 60 percent on average in

U.S. forests is stored below ground in organic matter (including roots) and organisms in the soil (18, 19).

The rate of carbon storage in an ecosystem is known as “net growth’ or “net productivity. ” Young, vigorous

forest stands tend to exhibit the greatest net growth rates. The total carbon stored at any time is greatest in older,

mature forests, even though they have a net growth rate near or sometimes less than zero (156, 288).

Unmanaged forests normally change over time as individual trees die and as new species move in during

succession (178). When trees die and decompose, they emit CO2 (although generally over a longer period and at

a slower rate than if harvested). The rate at which changes occur is determined by factors such as competition with

other plants for light, nutrients, and water, as well as by pest outbreaks and fire.

When forests are cut, the effect on atmospheric CO2 depends on how much carbon was stored (i.e., total

biomass), what happens to the cut wood, and how the lands are managed. If the time scale is long enough and the

land is used for a series of harvests, then the flux of carbon can be cyclic.

When cut wood is left on a site, microorganisms (e.g., fungi, bacteria) “decompose” it, along with leaf and

branch litter. Through their metabolic activities, microorganisms convert carbon in the wood into CO2 and other

compounds such as methane that are emitted to the atmosphere. Decomposition rates depend on factors such as

oxygen availability, temperature, and moisture.

If wood is burned, CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, particulate matter, and other chemicals are emitted. In some

cases, though, using wood as a fuel can replace the use of fossil fuels; over one-half of the wood removed from U.S.

forests in the early 1980s was burned for energy, either by the forest products industry or in households (274). The

net effect on CO2 depends on combustion efficiency, whether fossil fuel use is actually replaced, and the rate of

carbon storage in vegetation that replaces the harvested wood.

When wood is converted into products, some carbon is stored until the products begin to decompose.

Relatively durable products such as construction lumber can retain carbon for decades or centuries; about one-fourth

of U.S. stemwood harvested during the last 35 years has been converted to such products (241). Relatively

short-lived products such as paper may decompose and release CO2 or methane after being discarded, depending

on conditions at the discard site; recent research, though, indicates that decomposition of organic materials in

landfills proceeds slowly (209, 281, 327).

After harvesting, CO2 is again taken in by new vegetation growing on the site, assuming the land is not

converted to a highway, reservoir, or other nonvegetative state. The net effect in offsetting CO2 emissions from the

harvesting depends on the type of vegetation (e.g., crops, pasture, or trees), the rate at which it stores carbon, the

rate at which carbon reaccumulates in the soil, availability of nutrients, and how long the vegetation grows before

being harvested again.

and economic needs and promote alternative land- 1

use practices. The United States also could work to

make the Tropical Forestry Action Plan and the

SETTING THE STAGE: FOREST

AREA AND EMISSIONS

international Tropical Timber Organization more Carbon is stored in forests as they grow and is

effective vehicles for promoting forest conservation released when vegetation is removed or disturbed

and improved commercial forest management. In (see box 7-A). The net global flux of carbon from

addition, the United States could support a global forests to the atmosphere has not been measured

forestry conservation protocol, as recommended by directly, but it has been estimated using data on

the intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change changes in forest cover and on the amount of carbon

(1 14, 1 14a). held in vegetation and soils (105).4

~o~~~ ~~.WS beS1&S Coz ~e emitted When forests ~e cleared or burned. Fires, for example, release methane, carbon monoxide, nitic and nitrous

omde, methyl chloride, and other compounds, m well as pamculate matter (7, 8, 44a, 48, 124, 126, 137, 145, 206, 219).
204 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Temperate-Zone Forests

Temperate-zone forests (i.e., boreal and temperate

conifer forests, and temperate deciduous forests)

cover about 2.2 billion hectares, or 8.5 million

square miles (338). They are the source of most

wood and paper products used by industrialized

nations. About 42 percent are in the U. S. S. R., 20

percent in Canada, and 14 percent in the United

States.

Changes in Forest Cover

Current changes in temperate-zone forest cover

are small. Large-scale deforestation occurred mostly

in the past (e.g., 50 to 200 years ago in North

America and up to 5,000 years ago in the Far East).

During this century, forest cover has increased in

many areas of North America and Europe (9, 288)

through natural regeneration and planting of trees in

areas that have lacked forests for centuries, although

it has decreased recently in the United States.

Nevertheless, changes do occur. For example,

wooded areas near many U.S. cities are undergoing

rapid conversion for real estate development, which

often exacerbates runoff into nearby freshwater and

marine habitats (277). The U.S. Forest Service (299)

estimated that U.S. forest land declined by almost

6.6 percent (21 million hectares) from 1953 to 1987

and will decline another 2.2 percent (7 million

hectares) by 2010, mainly through conversion to

reservoirs, urban developments, highways, airports,

and surface mines. Losses in forest cover and

composition also are possible from airborne pollutants (80, 178, 276, 280).

Carbon Emissions

The magnitude of carbon reservoirs and emissions

in the Northern Hemisphere are Uncertain.s Published estimates suggest that CO2 emissions from

temperate-zone deforestation are relatively low,

around 25 to 130 million metric tons per year;

emissions are thought to be greatest from China and

the U. S. S.R., less significant from the United States

and Canada (103, 107, 161).

Extensive burning (from natural and human

causes) of forests and other biomass occurs in

temperate latitudes, but the magnitude of associated

emissions is Uncertain.6 While the amount burned in

both the United States and Canada generally declined from the 1920s through the 1970s, this trend

reversed during the 1980s and increased to a

post-war high.7 Large fires also affected other

temperate areas, including over 1 million hectares of

boreal forest in China and over 4 million hectares in

the U.S.S.R. in 1987 (34, 81, 138, 229, 256). Fires

also affect albedo (the Earth’s reflectivity) and thus

can have feedback effects on local climate. Crutzen

and Andreae (44a) estimated that biomass burning in

the temperate and boreal zone releases 150 to 300

million metric tons C yearly.

Tropical Forests

Changes in Forest Cover

Tropical forests cover about 2.1 billion hectares.8

Almost all are located in developing countries,

where they make up two-thirds of woody vegetation.9 They are home to some of the last huntergatherer tribes, harbor at least half of the world’s

organisms, and are the source of many products

(e.g., wood, medicines, fibers, fruits, nuts) (275).

JFor ~xmple, one ~ly~l~ (23, 24) concluded tit previous estimates of carbon content in bored fores~ are too high. Anotier (257), thoug~ suggests

that the Northern Hemisphere may be a larger terrestrial carbon sink than previously thought; whether this would involve boreal forests or other

ecosystems such as tundra is unknown.

@ther catastrophic incidents also affect forests. In 1989, for example, Hurricane Hugo darnaged at least 1 million hectares of forest in North and

south Carolina (33, 199).

TIn tie ufit~ sates, over I miuic}n hectares burned yearl y from 1985 to 1989, including over 2 milLion hectares in 1988 (205). However, fires

consumed over 10 million hectares annually during 16 years from 1926 to 1943 (287, 297). In Canad% over 24 million hectares burned during the 1980s,

including over 6 million in 1989, more than repotted in any other decade (55, 56, 189, 313). These estimates, however, also include some fires on

nonforest lands (e.g., grasslands, marshlands).

g~ey occur in many forms, under moisture conditions that range from wet (Amazonian ‘‘rain’ forest) to seasonally moist (Asian monsoon forest)

to dry (Sahellan open savanna).

me United States has jurisdiction over about 0.5 percent of tropical forests, mostly in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Hawaii, American Samo&

and Micronesia (275, 278). OtheT developed countxies, such as France, also have small areas of tropical forest under their jurisdiction.
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector ● 205

The overall rate of deforestation appears to

have increased in the last decade. As of 1980, the

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated

that 11.3 million hectares of closed and open forests

were being cleared annually (70).11 For 1989,

however, a preliminary report from FAO’s 1990

Forest Resources Assessment estimates that deforestation rates have increased by over 50 percent, to

around 17.1 million hectares (or 1.2 percent of

tropical forests) per year (76, 77, 264).12

Carbon Emissions

The level of carbon emissions from tropical

deforestation is uncertain. Estimates for 1980 range

from 0.4 to 2.5 billion metric tons C per year (50,51,

103, 105, 106, 107, 108). Since these estimates do

not include degradation of forests, and deforestation

rates appear to be greater now, current emissions

might be higher, Indeed, Houghton (104, 105)

estimated that emissions in 1989 were between 2.0

and 2.8 billion metric tons, roughly 25 to 31 percent

of all carbon emissions (see figure 7-1).13

MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN

U.S. FORESTS

Photo credit NASA/Courtesy Earth Resources Laboratory,

John C. Stennis Space Center, Mississippi

This Landsat image shows an area in southern Mexico

where a large rural population has converted most tropical

forest there into agricultural fields. In the adjacent

area in Guatemala, the rural population is sparse and

the forest is still mostly intact.

Deforestation of tropical forests (including fa.l10W) is occurring at an unprecedented rate.10 Aside

from carbon emissions, other effects of deforestation

and degradation-soil erosion, increased downstream flooding, desertification, decreased biodiversity, and effects on local microclimates-are

enormous.

Forestry-related management practices can store

carbon and/or offset some CO2 emissions in temperatezone areas. For the United States, OTA estimates

that by 2015 a combination of practices might offset

approximately 7.5 percent of current (i.e., 1987)

U.S. CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use (see table

7-l). Some observers contend that higher rates are

possible for individual practices (e.g., 230, 343).

Regardless, the practices also could provide other

benefits, many of which are goals of existing U.S.

legislation-e. g., reduced soil erosion, improved

water quality, and increased biodiversity, aesthetic

qualities, and recreational opportunities.

l~e tm ~~f~low~ $ or ~ ‘second~’ refe~ to foresm cleared for agriculture but now in the pm~ss of ~genemting

1 l~lle this es~ate ks been de~ted or rnoditled by others (25, 27, 50, 51, 70, 75, 107, 108, 155, 162, 172, 174, 288), it is based on tie ~mgest and

most systematic database available. No estimates exist regarding overall rates of forest degradation, but it is important in many areas, for example in

South and Southeast Asia (26).

12~e amu~ rate of defores~tion as of 1989 w~ ~ esti~ted 1,7 per~nt in Afri~, 1.4 per~nt in Asia, and 0.9 percent in htin Afnefica (where

over 60 pereent of global deforestation was occurring). Myers (174) estimated that deforestation in 1989 was 90 percent higher than a decade earlier,

although this has not been confirmed (1 14).

13~e5e es.ates do not nwe5sfi]y accomt for tie fact tit dlst~bed or degaded soils and vege~tion an Stiu SIOWly sequester CMbOn Over time

(28, 15 G), nor that deforested lands also typically support vegetation (e.g., grassland, amual crops).
Table 7-1—U.S. Forest Management: Potential Carbon Storage/Savings and Percent Offset of 1987 Carbon Emissions

From U.S. Fossil Fuel Use, for 2000 and 2015

Million Percent of 1987 Million Percent of 1987

metric tons C carbon offset metric tons C carbon offset Examples of

Management practice Assumptions ain 2000b

in 2000Cin 2015b in 2015C other benefits

Moderate measures?

Conservation Reserve

Program (CRP)

Tough measures!

Increase productivity

General afforestation

(excluding CRP)

Biomass energy crops

Urban trees

Total

Total enrollment 2.3 million ha 1995,

growth rate of 1 metric ton C/ha

Programs begin 1995. Nonindustry:

37 million ha, additional storage

0.5 metric tons C/ha/yr. Timber

industry: 20 million ha, storage

increment 1 metric ton C/ha/yr.

Programs begin 1995. Total 30 million ha,

storage increment 1 metric ton

C/ha/yr

Program begins 1995. 0.5 million ha

planted/year, storage increment

3 metric tons C/ha/yr

Program begins 1995.100 million trees/

yr, no savings from shading until 2005

2.3 0.2% 2.3 0.2% Soil and watershed

protection

10 0.80/0 40 3.10/o Increased timber revenues

7.5 0.6% 30 2.30/o Biodiversity, soil, and

watershed protection

4 0.3% 15 1.2% Less dependence on other

energy sources

1 0.1% 9 0.7% Less heat island effect,

aesthetics

2.0% 7.5%

asee text for greater dettil; in general, assumptions do not directly reflect ecmomic feasibility.

bAmunting for gradual implementation over a 2sywr period; i.e., some planting and growth or other management o~urs in year 1, b~ some d~s not ~ur until Y-r 25. ‘

cPercent of estimated 1.3 billion metric tons C from fossil fuel use. Individual percentage offsets not additive.

dFor@mpa~on with the energy model (s~ app. A), OTAconsiders the Conservation Res~ve pr~r~ to k a “m~emte” me~ure, primarily ~ause it isake~ being implemented. The other,

“tough” measures will require greater efforts and investments to be fully achieved.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector ● 207

Photo credit: Forest Service/USDA photo

Douglas-fir is the most abundant and important commercial

timber tree in the West. It is found in the Rocky Mountains

(as shown here on a steep slope in Colorado), Pacific

Northwest, and Pacific Southwest. Douglas-fir forests on

the Pacific slope in the Northwest are among the most

productive softwood forests in the United States.

Managing Existing Forest Land and Products

Increasing Productivity

In principle, forests can be managed to increase

the rate at which they store carbon (i.e., increase

productivity). Most people are concerned with

increasing the productivity of the ‘‘industrial’

portion (i.e., excluding branches, leaves, litter, etc.)

of commercially available timber, because investments in such management offer a chance for

increased economic returns (as opposed to trying to

increase productivity in wilderness areas and parks).

Whether increasing the rate of carbon storage in

commercial timber means that the rate of total

carbon storage in the entire forest ecosystem also

increases, however, is a critical, generally untested, assumption. The discussion here assumes

that total carbon storage also increases, but this

requires testing.

‘‘Conventional’ management often is used to

enhance productivity of commercial species. For

example, ‘‘thinning’ involves removing some young

trees or temporarily suppressing other vegetation to

lessen competition (for water, light, and nutrients)

and to adjust the number of trees per hectare.

“Stocking’ refers to obtaining the desired number

of trees, by thinning or additional planting, Growth

rates for the commercial portion of existing U.S.

forests are estimated to be 60 percent on average of

their fully stocked potential (155).

More ‘‘intensive management might increase

growth rates for the commercial portion beyond this

potential, at least for short periods (60, 156, 239,

274). This includes site preparation (e.g., minor

drainage, fertilization), genetic selection of superior

strains, improved nursery practices, and protection

from fire, insects, and disease. In one study, drainage, fertilization, and genetic selection resulted in

two- to four-fold increases in Douglas fir and

loblolly pine growth rates (60). Similar results have

been obtained with sycamore, eucalyptus, and other

pines (156, 177).

Intensive management is generally more suitable

for newly planted forests than for existing forests. Its

long-term feasibility is uncertain, however, partly

because research on this practice only began intensifying in the late 1970s. High growth rates have been

attained only for young individuals of selected

species and have not yet been sustained over

extended periods (155); again, whether total productivity of affected areas increases is unclear. Increased use of fertilizers and herbicides could have

other environmental effects (e.g., N2O emissions

and groundwater contamination from fertilizer application, CO2 emissions from fertilizer manufacturing), and preferences for monoculture would reduce

biological diversity. 14 Research is needed on how

repeated harvesting of intensively managed forests

would affect soil structure and erosion, wood y

debris, nutrient availability, and below-ground carbon storage (over one-half on average of the carbon

ldone stidy in red pine and oak/~ple forests in M~ssachusetM concluded that fertilization also reduced methane con.wunptionby sOil micrmrgafisms

by about one-third compared to control plots (255) (bacteria in forest soils produce and consume methane; methane-producing bacteria live in deeper

and wetter portions of soil where oxygen is absent, while methane-eonsuming bacteria live in surface layers of soil where oxygen is present). How this

might affect atmospheric concentrations of methane is unknown, The potential signitlcance of this effect deserves more research.
208 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 7-B—Productivity and Ownership of U.S. Forests

U.S. forests cover about 295 million hectares, or 32 percent of total land area, roughly one-quarter less than

in colonial times (155,299). Overall forest area declined by about 6.6 percent (or 21 million hectares) between 1953

and 1987. However, commercial timber volume has increased, at least during the last two decades. From 1970 to

1987, overall area declined by 3.5 percent but commercial volume increased by an estimated 4 percent (299, 300).

Forest area is expected to decline by an additional 2.2 percent from 1987 to 2010 (about 0.3 million hectares per

year), due to construction of reservoirs, highways, and airports; urban development; surface mining; and other

activities (300).

Timberland Ownership--Two-thirds of all U.S. forests are considered timberland--i.e., producing or capable

of producing industrial wood (which does not include roots, bark, branches, and leaves) at a rate of 20 cubic feet

or more per acre (or 1.4 cubic meters per hectare) per year (300). Some timberland is in parks and wilderness areas

and thus is protected from harvest (14 million hectares), but most is commercially available (1% million hectares).

Almost three-fourths of commercial timberland is in the East.

Of commercial timberland, governments own only 28 percent, including 18 percent in National Forests (see

figure 7-3) and 5 percent in State forests; the Federal portion is mostly in the West. Most commercial timberland

is owned by the timber industry, farmers, and other private entities. Over one-half of timber industry holdings are

in the South. Nonindustry landowners number in the millions, and their holdings often are small; most

farmer-owned timberland is east of the Mississippi River (300).

Timberland Productivity-Xn ecological terms, productivity is the rate at which solar energy is converted

during photosynthesis into living biomass. For timberland productivity, the U.S. Forest Service uses a more

restricted measure-the amount of industrial wood that can be grown per year in fully stocked natural stands (300).

It estimates that the overall average for U.S. timberland is around 3.2 cubic meters of woody biomass per hectare

per year.

About one-third of U.S. timberland (i.e., less than one-fourth of all U.S. forests) exhibits average productivity

rates of over 5.6 cubic meters per hectare per year. The timberlands with the very highest rates are primarily in the

South and West: 1) pine, oak, hickory, and cypress in the Southeast and Mississippi River delta; 2) Douglas fir,

hemlock-spruce, and red alder in the Northwest; and 3) redwood, spruce-fir, western hardwood, and ponderosa pine

in California (299, 300). High productivity timberland also occurs in the oak-hickory, maple-beech-birch, and

aspen-birch forests of the North.

Two-thirds of timberlands exhibit only moderate or low productivity, but their abundance makes them

commercially important; national forests tend to be located in these areas. Other forests that are not considered

timberland can be harvested, but generally not for industrial wood (300). Two areas account for almost three-fifths

of this “nontimberland”—the spruce-fir forests of interior Alaska and the pinyon-juniper forests of the Rockies.

in U.S. forests is below ground) (44, 60, 93, 253, on data in app. A). Intensive management on public

295).

Use of these techniques will vary with land

ownership and forest size. Private nontimber industry owners, generally with smaller holdings, seem

likely to use less intensive techniques, while timber

industry landowners seem likely to use a combination of techniques. Together, implementing these

practices on private lands might increase carbon

storage by 10 million metric tons per year in 2000

(0.8 percent of U.S. CO2 emissions) and by 40

million metric tons per year in 2015 (3.1 percent of

U.S. CO2 emissions) (see table 7-l), at an annualized

cost in 2015 of around $150 to $200 per ton C (based

lands seems-less likely because it would involve

government expenditures at a time when budgets in

general are being reduced, some expenditures on

public lands are being criticized (e.g., roads for

below-cost timber sales), and resources for maintenance are not always sufficient.

Nontimber Industry-About 112 million hectares (57 percent) of U.S. commercial timberland

consists of relatively small parcels held by private

nontimber-industry owners, including farmers (see

box 7-B and figure 7-3). Full stocking on these lands

might increase growth rates for commercially valuable wood by an average of about 0.5 metric ton C per
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector ● 209

Figure 7-3--Commercial Status of All U.S. Forests (by hectares) and Distribution of

Timberland Ownership in 1987

A

Nont timberland

86 Timberland

196

----

14 Timberland

Other Federal 2%

Other govt. 8%

Timber Industry 15%

Forest service 1 8%

Farmers 20%

Other private 37%

.-

All forests -- ownership

commercial status (percent)

(million hectares)

Two-thirds of all U.S. forests are considered timberland (i.e., forest producing or capable of producing “industrial” wood at a rate of 1.4 cubic

meters or more per hectare per year). Most of this is commercially available for harvesting, but some is in parks and wilderness areas and

is “reserved” from commercial harvest. Of commercially available timberland, the private sector owns 72 percent and the public sector owns

28 percent. (“Other govt.” refers to Bureau of Land Management, Native American, and State and local government lands.) The remaining

one-third of U.S. forests is considered nontimberland.

SOURCE: U.S. Forest Service, An Analysis of the Land Situation in the United States: 1989-2040, A Tmhnical Dmument Supporting the 1989 RR4

Assessment, General Technical Report RM-181 (Fort Collins, CO: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1989); U.S. Forest Service, An Ana/ysis of the

17mber Situation in the United Sfates: 1989-2040, Part/: The Current Resource and Use Situation, Draft (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

Agriculture, 1989).

hectare per year. 15 If a program encouraging the ‘se

of additional management techniques on one-third

of nonindustry timberland (i.e., 37 million hectares)

began in 1995 and was carried through 2015, then

additional carbon storage could amount to about

4,6 million metric tons in 2000 and 20 million metric

tons in 2015.16 However, this does not account for

carbon emissions from the removed vegetation,

some of which may be burned onsite or left to

decompose.

Timber Industry-The timber industry owns 29

million hectares (15 percent) of commercial timberland (see figure 7-3). This land should be amenable

to intensive management because it often is on more

productive sites and because large holdings should

provide economies of scale for such management.

Intensive management on a large scale, though, will

require that planting, site preparation, maintenance,

and other practices be conducted on an unprecedented scale. Since some research indicates that

large increases in timber growth rates are possible in

some circumstances (see above), OTA assumes that

the average productivity of affected systems might

double, i.e., increase by an average of 1 metric ton

C per hectare per year.

17 If a program to encourage

intensive management on two-thirds of industry

timberlands (i.e., 20 million hectares) began in 1995

and was fully realized by 2015, then additional

carbon storage could amount to 5 million metric tons

in 2000 and 20 million metric tons in 2015.18

]5Mmlmd (1 55) ~~tlmated, baxd on 1977 &@, hat tie average carbon storage rate for all U,S, tim~rland WaS ().82 metric ton C per hectare ~r yCa.f,

and that the potential average rate for fully stocked forests was an additional 0.53 metric ton C per hectare per year. Average growth rates have not

changed significantly since them and the average growth rate in 1986 for nontimber industry private lands was essentially the same as the average rate

for all U.S. timberland (300).

16A ~mgm of~uch ~~~de s=m ~onable, Sin= about 2 percent of the volume of commercial timber on nonindus~ lands is bested ~u~lY

(based on data in ref. 300). 17H1gher ~ow~ rates ~cw under exper-iment~ conditions; e.g., the average total growth rate of genetically improved loblolly Pine on one ‘igh

productivity site was 3 metric tom C/ha/yr over a 35-year period (based on data in refs, 18, 19). OTA assumes that average increases might be 1 metric

ton C/lu@r because of questions about maintaining high growth rates over long periods, and because the net effect depends on the extent of C02

emissions from harvesting and the disposition of bested wood (box 7-A).

ISA Progm of ,mch magni~de .WXmS r~~b]e, sin~ about 5 percent of the volume of commercial timber on ~bm fidus~ lands is h~ested

annually (based on data in ref. 300).
210 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Bringing 1 million hectares yearly under intensive

management would require dedicating all current

replanting efforts to such management (since planting seedlings or young trees on prepared sites

usually is required). Most forest regeneration in the

United States occurs naturally, but about 1.22

million hectares were intentionally planted in fiscal

year 1989, compared with 1.37 million hectares in

fiscal year 1988 and 1.23 million hectares in fiscal

year 1987 (301, 302, 303).19 In general, 80 percent

of the planting has been in the South and 85 percent

has been on private land (see figure 7-4).

“New Forestry” Practices—Planners also need

to consider how forests might be affected by future

climate changes, however uncertain these changes

might be (see box 7-Din ‘‘Policy Options’ below).

For example. monoculture may be more susceptible

to damage from increased pest outbreaks than are

natural forests with a mosaic of species and ages,

although some pests require a mixture of age classes

(220, 236, 237, 246, 275). Some evidence suggests

that harvesting practices that fragment Douglas fir

forests into smaller parcels can increase pest problems (200). Caution is needed, though, in making

generalizations (200, 237). For example, virulent

diseases such as chestnut blight and insects such as

gypsy moths have devastated natural, heterogeneous

forests.

Some ecologists suggest that making commercial

timberland more adaptable to future climate changes,

preserving biological diversity, and allowing timber

commodity production will require ‘‘new forestry’

management based on harvest patterns that maintain

the characteristics of old-growth forest ecosystems

(79, 83, 200, 236). For forests under multiple-use

management, for example, this would entail leaving

standing dead trees, fallen logs, and other woody

debris20; developing stands of mixed composition

and structure; using harvesting patterns that do not

fragment forests into numerous small parcels; and

using harvesting and reforestation methods that do

not greatly disturb the soil. This approach has been

tried on a small scale in the Pacific Northwest; more

Figure 7-4-Reforestation of U.S. Timberlands

by Ownership Category, Fiscal Year 1989

State and other government

3% Federal Government

Private nonindustry

43% ivate industry

42%

SOURCE: U.S. Forest Service, Report of the Forest Sarvicw, Fiscal Year

1989 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, February 1 990).

research is needed to determine whether its timber

production and resource conservation goals can be

meshed successfully in different situations.

Restrictions on Commercial Harvests-One unresolved issue is whether it is better to harvest

forests, sequester some of the carbon in products,

and replant the harvested area, or to leave forests

alone over the short term. Restricting commercial

harvesting to avoid releasing CO2 has been suggested. However, demand for wood and paper products will continue to be high-so if harvesting is

restricted on a large scale, wood will have to come

from elsewhere and be used more efficiently, or

energy will have to be used to extract other materials

and manufacture substitutes for wood products.

Moreover, even unharvested forests change over

time and can emit CO2 (see box 7-A). 21 A n

alternative to large restrictions in general could be to

assess the feasibility of ‘‘new forestry’ practices

(see above) that might allow some accommodation

between timber production and natural resource

conservation goals.

l~e5e refoms~tion ~t= ref~ to tile number of hectares planted, not the number of surviving trees. The 1988 phxN.@s irlvOkd nursw production

of 2.3 billion seedlings (over one-half from private nurseries).

mAl~ough ~s ~ould ~creme fiwe ~~s~, or ~cr~se Coz emissions from subs~uent dwompositio~ wmp~ed, for example, with b-the WOOd

in place of fossil fuels.

Ziover me 1ong tem ~estiq tie ~~ad ~mmenfly sques[e@ it or using it on a sus@nable his to replace fossil fuels could provide bigger

reductions in carbon emissions.
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector ● 211

Another possibility is smaller scale restrictions.

For example, restricting the harvesting of “oldgrowth” forests can be justfiled for a variety of

reasons, including the opportunity for the United

States to demonstrate leadership in global efforts to

preserve biodiversity and halt deforestation of virgin

forests. Its effect on carbon emissions, however,

would probably be relatively small (see box 7-C).

Increasing End-Use Efficiency and Recycling—

Other practices involve increasing end-use efficiency and conservation in the forest products

industry and its products (similar to increasing

efficiency in other sectors; see chs. 3 through 6).

OTA (274) discussed how the forest products

industry could use wood more efficiently to make

products and how end-use efficiencies of wood

products could be increased (e.g., improving building construction designs, using efficient fuelwood

burners).

Recycling of paper and paperboard products (e.g.,

newsprint, printing and packaging paper, cardboard)

has received great attention because of municipal

solid waste problems (281). Recycling these products can reduce the use of both virgin fibers and

energy in making some new paper products, and

help divert some municipal solid waste away from

landfills (91, 281, 296). If other demands for wood

fibers remain constant, then some trees might be left

unharvested because of recycling efforts; they would

continue to store carbon for some time.

Whether recycling offsets carbon emissions, however, depends on what happens to paper in landfills.

Some research suggests that landfilled paper may

not decompose into either CO2 or methane for

decades (see box 7-A). If true, then sequestering

paper in landfills might be better than recycling in

terms of avoiding greenhouse gas emissions, at least

in the short-term. However, since methane is a

potent greenhouse gas (see ch. 2), then recycling

might be preferred if landfilled paper does contribute

to methane emissions. But whether the methane

emitted from landfills is derived from paper or from

yard and food wastes is unknown. Regardless,

methane from landfills can be collected and used as

an energy source (see box 3-A in ch. 3), and

recycling itself involves emissions of CO2 from

transporting and processing recovered paper.

New Forests and Trees

General Afforestation and Conservation

Reserve Program

Afforestation—planting trees on land that has

never supported forests or where forests have been

cleared for decades or more--offers opportunities to

store carbon in new trees and help stabilize soil in

many areas. The extent of carbon storage depends on

factors such as soil conditions, rainfall, types of

trees, whether or not trees are harvested. and

maintenance. 22 Most U.S. cropland being taken out

of production (see below) is highly erodible, and

some of it may exhibit soil degradation from mineral

depletion, so not all is suitable for tree planting.

In general, trees planted on unforested lands are

unlikely to be intensively managed (except for

biomass fuel crops; see “Planting for Biomass

Energy” below), in contrast to plantations established to reforest harvested timberlands. A cautious

assumption is that average growth rates for the

woody portion might be similar to those on unmanaged timberland, about 1 metric ton C, per hectare per

years.

23 As noted above (see ‘‘Increasing Productivity’ ‘), whether this means that total productivity

increases is unclear. And, as with intensive management techniques, tradeoffs can include N20 emissions from fertilization and CO2 emissions from soil

disturbance.

To estimate potential carbon savings, it is reasonable to examine current tree planting in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the potential for

planting on non-CRP lands. Through 10-year contracts with farmers, the CRP aims to plant trees on

2.3 million hectares of cropland (as part of its overall

goal of removing 16 to 18 million hectares of cropland from production; see box 7-E in “Options for

U.S. Forests” below). If this goal is met by 1995 and

trees are retained through 2015, and if annual growth

rates average 1 metric ton C per hectare, then about

2.3 million metric tons C would be stored per year,

including both 2000 and 2015. For non-CRP lands,

zz~e drou@ Oi 1988, for ex~ple, killed about 250 million tree seedlings on 140,000 heetares of forest pl~tatio~ (205).

‘The average growth rate for the commercial wood on existing U.S. timberland is 1 to 2 short tons C per heetare per year (300). Similarly, the average

growth rate exhibited by spruce-fir forests with natural regeneration on an average site was 1.4 short tons C per hectare per year over a ti5-year rotation

(1 8). However, growth rates could be higher in some areas, particularly where croplands are more productive than average timberland.
212 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 7-C--Harvesting Old-Growth Forests

The Debate About Old-Growth Forests—”Old-growth” forests generally have a mixture of large old trees

(including dead “snags”), layers of small-and medium-sized trees, and fallen logs and other woody debris on the

ground (250, 326). However, disagreements exist about exact definitions for different regions and a result, about

the extent and location of remaining old-growth forests. Probably less than 2 percent of all U.S. forest land is still

old-growth. Almost all old-growth on private land has been cut. Ramaining stands are primarily in western national

forests, particularly Douglas-fir stands in the Pacific Northwest and spruce-hemlock stands in Alaska’s panhandle

(mostly in Tongass National Forest). Douglas-fir is the predominant commercial species in the Pacific Northwest.

Environmental groups support restrictions on future harvesting because most old-growth has already been cut

and the remainder, mostly on public lands, affords nontimber values such as biological diversity, watershed

protection, fisheries, and wilderness. They feel these values arc inadequately protected by national forest planning

processes.

l Much of the debate has centered around the northern spotted owl, an “indicator” species that is now

listed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service as threatened throughout its range.2

The timber industry contends that sufficient old-growth (over 0.4 million hectares of stands over 200 years old)

is already protected in wilderness areas, national monuments, and national parks; that some old-growth must be

harvested to meet demands for products such as special veneers and decking; and that restrictions will cause losses

of jobs and of revenues to counties from sales on Federal lands (25 percent of gross receipts from timber sales on

Federal lands is allocated to counties for road construction and education). Along with the USFS, it believes current

planning processes should not be interrupted (250, 251, 309).

Carbon Dioxide and Old-Growth---Old-growth forests contain large amounts of carbon (over 400 tons per

hectare in some areas of the Pacific Northwest) but exhibit little or no net growth or additional carbon storage. In

contrast second-growth forests contain less carbon but continue to take up and store carbon.

One model (93) projected that carbon storage m second-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest would not

approach the level of carbon stored in old-growth forests for at least two centuries, and that converting old-growth

to second-growth reduced net carbon storage on a forest site by a total of 305 metric tons per hectare over a 60-year

rotation.3 Current harvesting rates for old-growth maybe around 10,000 to 25,000 hectares per year.4 Using the

model’s projections and assuming that harvesting is not increased elsewhere, the net effect of not clearing this land

would be to hold about 3 to 8 million metric tons of carbon that would have otherwise been released and not

resequestered during the course of a 60-year rotations

~Ntiti FWCW p-~SCS ~ OUtlht06 iD the Multiple-use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, Forest and Ran@ad ~~e

RcsourccsPlamdug Actof 1974, ad National Forest Managcmcn t Act of 1976. Bureau ofLand-eatplanningia addressed irttheFedemi

Land Policy and MJMS=MM *tof 1976.

2WMle the Fkli and Wildlife Service was ~“ its listing determhtio% tlM U.S. Forest Scrvkx ad the Bureau of Land

IWmagemmt mm sued to batt harvesting in spotted owl habitat. Ensuing CQurt actions woutd have halted timber sales of more than 2 billion

bored feet oftimba (144, 309). In tlw fiscal year 1990 SpplVpliMiOtk3 for the hWcrior DcpWmont (Public Law 101-121), Congrcaa modified the

court actiona so that some old-growth ia protected and some saks can be offixedj althougb sates W are expected to dcclineby about 0.7 billion

board feet per year.

3ASSUmp~~ in b model j@Q@1)42 percent of bboles are convcsted to b@t@Jm= componats (with 2 pclccnt anaual

replacunent ofmwXures); 2) repeated barvest@ does not reduce long-term sito productivit$q 3) net productivity of second-growth bole wood

and bark pealrs at 30 years, at 8S mnric tons of C pm hectare per yeaq and 4) changing“ climatic condition do not ticct processing mtcs. The

model also amumea that old-growth foruts stay relatively

yti~~~ew~

constan$ but old-growth trcoa cvmtually die and release carborq even so, this would

emimbw-i.e., commomMro@oIuJ wmddhave “pukes” ovory600r so y- whereas old-growth staudsmigitt

.

sigmfhM emissions fbr centuries.

4’mlc wildcrmSa society (326) @imatcdthat25,000 kxtareS areharvestedyoarly .Howevq using a more rWt&tcdocologkxddefiniti~

as the society did elscwhac (324), 14s to the assumption that perhaps 10,OOO to IS,000 imtarca am harvostcd yearly.

s-fictora also win iafhu!ace these es@mm . For exarnpk, if harvti wood is used in @8CC of fod &k for W @UCtiOQ

tithe *t Cffectwmdd be lower. Wbtk nutrbt avaital@y ia sufflciertt to maintaincarbonz rates duriog a sorks 9fkarvc8trotationa

. unkmwxq fortilkationmighthc lp,but itwouldresult inNzOand COzemissions(aeeclL 8). Whotberidghuavcrage tmpaamm (ilornclknate

~nge) might dccreast theratcof mkrobkl decomposition (and associated emissions) of debris m them forests, or W&@er drkr conditkma

might Countcrtbis, also ia unknown
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector ● 213

Economic Effects of Restrictions—Estimates about how restrictions would affect local economies in the

Pacific Northwest and in Alaska are controversial and vary widely (57, 144). From a historical perspective, though,

the Pacific Northwest timber industry generally has been declining since the early 1970s, and employment is

expected to continue to fall because of improvements in mill automation (272). The Wilderness Society (325)

considers mill automation and a general decline in the availability of timber in general to be the most important

factors in overall job losses in the Northwest.

The decline in domestic timber availability is partly related to exports of unprocessed logs, harvested mostly

from second-growth stands on private and State lands.6 These exports are attractive to companies because of higher

overseas market prices and accounted for 39 percent by value of U.S. wood exports from 1980 to 1988; 42 percent

by value went to Japan (143). According to industry representatives, Japanese trade barriers discriminate against

value-added U.S. wood products (49, 148).

Linkages-The likely outcome of the debates and negotiations that have taken place over the last few

years-particularly since the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service must still decide how much critical habitat is needed

to support viable spotted owl populations—is a plan that provides for conservation of some additional old-growth

forests and for some harvesting. Although this would not preserve all remaining U.S. old-growth forests, it still

could enhance U.S. efforts to reduce tropical deforestation, provide for better tropical forest management, and

conserve biological diversity, particularly if international forestry protocols (see ch. 1) are negotiated. This also

could be linked with efforts to change U.S. harvesting patterns so that more old-growth characteristics are retained

(see “New Forestry Practices” above), as well as with efforts to ensure that the most valuable timber is used for

relatively long-lived products.

One way to stem domestic job losses might be to ban or tax exports of unprocessed logs from private and State

lands, to encourage domestic processing of these logs to obtain the added value of finished products (see “Options

for U.S. Forests”); we also can continue to improve the end-use efficiency of processing to obtain more from each

log (see “Increasing End-Use Efficiency and Recycling” above). Plans to set aside additional old-growth stands

on Federal lands also should consider provisions to help compensate loggers and communities for economic impacts

(e.g., see 86, 143).

kongress has prohibited, in the annual Interior Department appropriations, exports from Federal lands. Some loopholes atlow

‘‘substitution’ (i.e., when private landowners export timber from their lands and then purchase Federal timber for use in their mills).

economic opportunities for tree planting may exist This would require planting 1.4 million hectares

on around 30 million hectares.

24 If a program to plant

trees on 30 million hectares began in 1995 and was

maintained through 2015, then additional carbon

storage (assuming the same growth rates) would

amount to 7.5 million metric tons in 2000 and 30

million metric tons in 2015. OTA estimates that the

CRP and General Afforestation together might offset 0.8 percent of 1987 emissions in 2000 and 2,3

percent in 2015 (see table 7-l), at an annualized cost

in 2015 of around $35 per ton C (based on data in

app. A).

of unforested land per year, slightly more than

current rates on previously forested lands (see

‘‘Increasing Productivity’ above) .25 For unforested

lands, the highest planting rate under previous

Federal programs was 0.2 million hectares per year,

from 1957 to 1961 in the Soil Bank Program (which,

like the CRP, paid farmers to retire land from crop

production) (40, 168, 301).26 Under the CRP, current

tree planting rates average 0.25 million hectares per

year, with a total of 0.9 million hectares planted as

of March 1990 (286).

~The USFS estimates that opportunities exist on up to 33 million hectares of crop and pastureland (170, 305). After accounting for the CRP, the total

would be around 30 million hectares. For compariso~ about 350 million hectares might be available in the entire temperate zone, including over 250

million hectares in the U.S .S ,R. and much smaller amounts in Canada Europe, and ChiM (54, 102). h the U. S. S.R., however, O~Y 5 milIion hec~=

had been set aside as of 1984 for silviculmral treatment and much of the remainder was considered relatively imccessible (102, 288), and whether current

mamgement can be maintained has been questioned (12),

~~In 1989, appr~ximately 225 million trees were pkimx! on Federal lands (30S). me ~esklent’s proposed “America the Beautiful” tree-planting

program (see “Options for U.S. Forests” below) called for planting 1 billion trees on 0.6 million hectares of rural land per year and 30 million trees

per year in communities (191, 304).

26unda the CJhelterbelt ~oject, ~n by be usFs from 1935 to 1942, about 1~,X)O h~~es were planted, including 18,000 mlI@i Of shelterbelts,

and a chain of tree nurseries was developed from Texas to Camda (52).
214 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse

CRP enrollment varies regionally, depending on

markets for food crops, promotion by State agencies,

and potential economic returns from trees (59, 169,

271).27 Timber becomes more valuable after its first

decade or so of growth, which could enhance

retention of trees for a few years.28 The 1985 Food

Security Act (which established the CRP) could

make it more difficult to reconvert to cropland,

through its swampbuster, sodbuster, and conservation compliance provisions (168) (also see ch. 8).

Planting for Biomass Energy

Unforested lands or even some previously forested lands also could be planted with quickgrowing tree crops that are harvested and used as a

renewable ‘‘biomass energy’ fuel.29 During the late

1980s, forest residues and wood wastes supplied

about 3 to 4 percent (2.5 to 3.0 quads) of U.S. energy

use, with one-third used at residences and two-thirds

by industry. Biomass crops might eventually supply

double this amount (273, 342); however, only about

3.7 quads were considered economically recoverable from biomass crops in the late 1980s (100).

The U.S. Department of Energy has sponsored

research since 1978 on producing ‘‘short-rotation’

woody crops that could be economically competitive with fossil fuels (290, 342). The research

involves intensive management (e. g., genetic selection, site preparation, fertilization) of fast-growing

species, and harvesting on a 3- to 10-year cycle.

Average growth rates of about 4 to 7 metric tons C

per hectare per year have been attained in trials, and

plots of hybrid cottonwoods have exceeded the goal

of around 9 metric tons C per hectare (99, 208, 343).

Current research is addressing genetic improvements

in disease resistance and energy qualities, species

adaptability, and economics (46, 187, 343),

Questions about short-rotation crops bear on:

. maintenance of productivity over long periods;

. long-term effects of repeated harvesting on soil

debris, nutrients, and erosion;

Gases

. effects on monoculture of pest and disease

outbreaks; and

. availability of advanced propagation and harvesting technologies (44, 112, 343).

More fertilizer use would lead to CO2 emissions

from its manufacture and possibly N2O emissions

after application (see ch. 8). Other tradeoffs include

CO2 emissions from soil disturbances (e.g., during

harvesting) and from energy use in planting, harvesting, transporting, and processing.

OTA assumes that growth rates for the harvestable biomass in large, long-term operations might be

3 metric tons C per hectare per year.30 How much

land might be dedicated to biomass crops is unclear;

only 7,500 hectares were in full-scale production or

research trials in North America in 1989 (342).31 The

amount of unforested U.S. land economically available for planting in general might be 33 million

hectares (see “General Afforestation” above), but

this could be higher if biomass becomes competitive

with other energy sources. However, the infrastructure for a large biomass industry (e.g., plantations,

equipment suppliers, processing plants, etc.) needs

to be developed (1 12). Whether landowners would

opt for biomass crops with unproven market performance, as opposed to subsidized tree planting

programs (e.g., the Conservation Reserve Program;

see ‘‘General Afforestation’ above) is unknown.

As a moderate estimate, if a program to plant 0.5

million hectares per year for biomass energy crops

began in 1995 and was carried through to 2015

without affecting other planting efforts, then additional carbon storage in the harvestable biomass

would amount to 7.5 million metric tons per year in

2000 and 30 million metric tons per year in 2015.

The energy content of this biomass would equal

about 1.2 quads per year in 2015. This would require

doubling cur-rent rates for all planting on unforested

lands, to about one-third the current rate on forested

lands. Not all of this storage would actually offset

CO2 emissions. The net effect would depend on:

~7About 85 percent of tie plan~g has been in the Mississippi Delta and the SOuth=st; most N maining eligible (i.e., highly erodible) crophmd is

concentrated in arid regions of the Plains and Rocky Mountains that are less amenable to trees (169, 299).

mover 85 Pement of tie acreage planted in the Soil Bardc program retained trees two decades later (4, 129), ht many trees planted dufig tie

Shelterbelt program have been cut as trees aged and marginal cropland was cultivated.

z~onw~ vege~tion (e.g., gras:; and le~e herbs, crop residues, ethanol feedstocks) also is suitable for biomass enerw.

-s assumption is lower than what has been achieved experimentally, but it is three times greater than average growth rates on unmanaged lands.

It accounts for uncertainties discussed above and for nonproductive areas (e.g., roads, fences, streams) that typically are not present in test plots but that

would be in larger operations; it also includes carbon storage in the soil and in nonindustrial wood components (e.g., roots, tvvigs).

qlTtials aISO me being conducted in at least seven European countries (92).
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector * 215

●

●

●

●

relative emissions of CO2 (and methane) from

energy-equivalent units of biomass and fossil

fuel;

CO2 emissions during harvest and transport of

crops;

what and how much fossil fuel is actually

supplanted by biomass; and

whether new crops are grown to replace those

used for fuel.

For example, using biomass to replace coal in boilers

would offset more emissions than using it (with an

additional conversion step) to replace transportation

fuels such as gasoline (which have less carbon and

fewer emissions per unit of energy than coal). Given

these uncertainties, OTA assumes that biomass fuels

can offset carbon emissions from an energyequivalent amount of fossil fuel by, on average,

one-half of the amount of carbon stored in the

harvestable portion of the crops. For the planting

program described above, this would amount to

about an offset of 4 million metric tons in 2000 (0.3

percent of 1987 emissions) and 15 million metric

tons in 2015 (1.2 percent of 1987 emissions) (see

table 7-1) at an annualized cost in 2015 of around

$67 to $133 per ton C (based on data in app. A).32

By 2015, much of the additional wood grown

through intensive management (as described in

“Increasing Productivity” above) will be available

for use as biomass fuel as well. Over the 20 years, the

management practices described earlier will have

yielded additional wood storage containing about 25

quads of energy. To continue to gain carbon benefits

from the increased productivity, the wood must

either be used as biomass fuel (on a sustainable

basis) or cut and permanently sequestered in some

way.

Urban Tree Planting

Trees and shrubs in urban areas store some carbon

and, once they are large enough, can reduce some of

the heat load on adjacent buildings in the summer

and shelter them from wind in the winter (1, 2, 110,

160, 197). Trees also help reduce the ‘ ‘heat island”

effect (i.e., increases in average ambient air temperatures) common in cities.

Photo credit: American Forestry Association

Many groups around the country sponsor tree-planting

efforts in their communities. Urban trees provide numerous

benefits, including beauty, carbon storage, shading of

buildings, and reduced “heat island” effects.

One modeling exercise estimated that planting

100 million trees around air-conditioned homes and

small commercial buildings in the United States

might save 8.2 million metric tons C per year in

avoided fossil fuel use for cooling; carbon storage in

the trees might increase this by 5 to 10 percent (1).33

However, these estimates are subject to uncertainties

such as feasibility of field application, potential for

feedbacks on local climate (e.g., evapotranspiration

from trees, changes in albedo), and potential for CO2

or methane emissions from the decomposition of

additional leaves.

Whe D~artment of Energy estimates that short-rotation woody crops could offset 3 to 5 percent of current annual U.S. COZ emissions, assuming

current production and conversion technologies, and up to 35 percent assuming technology advancements (e.g., higher conversion efficiencies and higher

growth rates) and using a high estimate of land availability (343).

~sAssumlng that one-~lf of peak demand (i.e., when energy is most often used for cooling) is supplied by coal and one-half by oil and gas.
216 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

If a program to plant 100 million trees near

buildings begins in 1995, and it takes trees about 10

years to reach a large enough size to provide

sufficient shade for reducing heat loads, and if

energy savings are as estimated by the model, then

carbon savings might amount to about 1 million

metric tons in 2000 (i.e., from carbon stored in

growing trees, but no energy savings yet from shade

because the trees are too small) and about 9 million

metric tons in 2015. This would offset about 0.1

percent of 1987 U.S. emissions in 2000 and 0.7

percent in 2015 (see table 7-l), at an annualized cost

in 2015 of around $180 per ton C (based on data in

app. A).

A critical issue in any tree-planting program

(whether the CRP or an urban tree program) is proper

planting and maintenance. Many urban trees, particularly along roadsides but also in parks, suffer from

inadequate root space, mechanical stresses, air

pollution, and poor maintenance (5, 22, 115, 127,

166, 167). Unfortunately, budgets for urban tree

maintenance have declined in most cities, and trees

are being lost faster than they are being replaced

(166, 167).34 Maintenance and other costs can

include damages from falling trees; destruction of

pipes; and labor costs of pruning trees, removing

trees that reach the end of their useful lives, finding

and marking underground power lines in highly

urbanized areas, and removing leaves from roadsides or parks.

MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN

TROPICAL FORESTS

Several management and land-use practices could

help reduce CO2 emissions associated with tropical

deforestation (see table 7-2), and provide other

benefits such as protection of soils, watersheds, and

biodiversity. While the theoretical potential for

reducing deforestation and CO2 emissions seems

relatively high, each practice faces obstacles in the

form of social attitudes, counterproductive development policies, and population pressures, not to

mention costs; these are discussed below in “Options for Tropical Forests. ”

Providing Alternatives to Deforestation

Agroforestry and “Sustainable” Agriculture

Traditionally, shifting cultivation involved clearing forests (typically on upland soils), producing

crops for a couple of years, abandoning the land for

a ‘‘fallow’ period that allowed nutrient levels to

rebuild, and then recultivating it two to three decades

later (72, 164, 207, 232, 275, 292).35 This did not

greatly affect tropical forests until recently. In the

last few decades, however, many people have

migrated from long-established farming areas into

forest areas, often along logging access roads, and

they have tended to use shorter fallow periods.

Population pressures, lack of land tenure, agricultural mechanization in some areas, and/or largescale colonization schemes have contributed to this

migration (62, 68, 107, 131, 174, 207, 231, 275). As

a result, shifting cultivation accounted for perhaps

45 percent of deforestation in 1980 (264).

Land-use practices such as agroforestry or “sustainable’ agriculture, which tend to be small-scale

and adaptable to variable conditions and traditional

farming systems, might lessen some of these pressures. More research is needed, though, to evaluate

their effects on forest conversion rates; it is unclear

how readily they will be adopted (especially without

financial and technical assistance) and how many

people they can support in a given area (6, 61, 151,

176, 295).

Agroforestry--Agroforestry means growing trees

and shrubs along with annual crops and/or livestock

(e.g., in windbreaks, along perimeters, intercropped

in fields), at the same time or sequentially. In

principle, it can help store carbon, improve soil

quality and reduce nutrient losses, provide food and

other nonwood products and shade, and increase

fuelwood supplies. While it has been practiced for

centuries or millenia, most formal research has been

conducted only in the last decade or so.36

Some projects initiated by local farmers and

peasants (with and without outside assistance) have

been successful and have been copied by others;

other projects are in early stages (43, 335). In

-~In 1986, City budge~ for planting and maintcn~ce totaled about $425 million, with average expenditures of $11 per hee, but MS WLS nOt ad~uate

for proper maintenance (115). Cities may contain over 600 million trees (167); while some may not need yearly maintenance, these data suggest that

proper planting and maintenance might require several billion dollars per year nationwide.

35 Conversion of fomstS t. ~ermanent ~rop~nd h~ ~cwed more often ~ nonmo~t~nous, lowland ~e~; it IIMy be a more hlpolliint CaUSe Of

deforestation in some areas, for example in much of Africa.

ME,g,, see refs. 6, 14, 72, 85, 133, 151, 176, 180, 181, 182, 185, 186, 192, 207, 211, 243, 254, 26~, 279, 314, 319, 329, 339, 3@.
Alternatives to deforestation:

Agroforestry 50 million ha by 2000, 200 million ha by 5-50 <1-2% 20-200 1 -7% Soil and watershed

201 5; net storage 0.1-1 metric ton protection, biodiversity

C/ha/yr

“Sustainable” agriculture 0.5 million ha/yr; see text 100 4 % Soil and watershed

protection, biodiversity

Reduced cattle ranching Reduce conversion by 1 million ha/yr by 100 7% Soil protection, biodiversity,

2000; by 2 million ha/yr by 2015 local climate effects

Improved cookstoves 300 million people by 2000, 1 billion 15-30 2-4% Increase time for social,

people by 2015; 40?4. less fuelstove educational activities

4%

3-4%

1%.

100

200

50-100

Managing existing forests:

Nontimber products (see text) NEd NE NE NE Soil and watershed

protection, biodiversity

Improved timber (see text) NE NE NE NE Biodiversity, soil and

harvesting watershed protection,

local climate benefits

Managing new forests:

Reforestation Double rate to 2 million ha/yr; storage 50 2% 200 7% Increase economic

5 metric tons C/ha/yr productivity, restore

topsoil

aSee text for greater detail; in general, assumptions do not directly reflect economic feasibility.

bAmountlng for gradual im~ementation Over a 2Syear period; i.e., some planting and growth or other management occurs in year 1, bld some does not Occur until Year 25.

cPercent of high estimate of 2.8 billion metric tons C/yr from tropical defor=tation (see text and figure 7-1); individual percentage offsets are not additive.

‘NE = No estimate.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

I

Table 7-2—Tropical Forest Management: Potential Percent Offset of Estimated 1989 Carbon Emissions From Deforestation, for 2000 and 2015

. —. —-

Percent offset Percent offset

Million from 1989 Million from 1989

metric tons C deforestation metric tons C deforestation Examples of

Management practice Assumptionsa

in 2000blevels by 2000C

in 2015b levels by 2015C other benefits
218 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Guatemala, for example, thousands of farm families

are planting a mix of tree species to produce poles,

fodder, fuelwood, and fruits and other crops, and to

stabilize slopes (260, 339).37

While agroforestry is promising, more and broader

research is needed (6, 14, 130). Relatively few projects have been conducted in wet lowland tropical

forests, on degraded forest lands, or on most major

soil types. Leguminous trees such as acacias and

leucaena have justly received attention, but research

is needed on other trees (1 16, 151, 315, 3 17). Other

constraints include lack of: land tenure for peasants,

local involvement in planning, markets for products,

and incentives to sustain projects once official

assistance ends (6, 14, 37, 43, 89, 151, 157, 176).

Published measurements of carbon storage in the

woody biomass of trees in agroforestry systems

range from 0.3 to 4 metric tons C per hectare per year

(54). 38 Most systems have short rotations, and

harvested crops generally are used in ways that

quickly lead to CO2 emissions, but some carbon is

stored in durable wood products that may last for

decades and some trees are retained as “live”

fencing. The net effect thus might be carbon storage

ranging from 0.1 to 1 metric ton C per hectare per

year. 39 If a very ambitious program were begun in

1995 to have 200 million hectares (one-fourth the

estimated cropland in tropical developing countries;

see ref. 338) in agroforestry by 2015, carbon storage

would be about 5 to 50 million metric tons in 2000

(1 to 2 percent of 1989 emissions) and 20 to 200

 funding million) for this is from Applied Energy Services, aiming to offset emissions from a new

coal-fired power plant in Connecticut. This is the first forestry-related project designed to offset emissions from a particular industrial In April

1990, the Netherlands budgeted a similar project in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, to offset emissions from two planned plants.

 would be higher foliage, fine branches, and below-ground carbon were 

 wood and of is durable products; 2) some are retained 

fencing; but 3) the majority, perhaps three-fourths or more, of trees and harvested wood is used in ways that quickly lead to emissions.
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector ● 219

Photo credit: W Parham

Agroforestry can take many forms, including interspersing various crops. This shows a field in

China’s southern Yunnan Province planted with rubber trees and tea plants. The government’s

Xishuangbanna Tropical Botanic Garden is experimenting with agroforestry in this area to

restore degraded lands and provide crops that can be sold or used directly by local people.

Other crops include peanuts, pomelos, coffee, cocoa vanilla, pineapple, sugar cane,

medicinal plants, and various nitrogen-fixing cover crops and firewood crops.

million metric tons in 2015 (1 to 7 percent of 1989

emissions) (see table 7-2), excluding savings from

avoided deforestation.

“Sustainable” Agriculture-in an agricultural

context, ‘‘sustainable’ generally refers to maintaining yields without impairing the land’s long-term

productivity. 40 “High-input” agricultural systems

involve relatively high use of fertilizers and pest

controls. Research in a few tropical forest areas has

shown that such systems can produce high yields for

several years, but they also require extensive sampling to determine appropriate fertilizer applications; this in turn requires technical assistance or

training of local people (61, 64, 132,232, 321, 322).

Most shifting cultivators and small rural farmers

lack capital for such practices and access to assistance and training.

One alternative, ‘ ‘low-input’ ‘ agriculture, is designed to minimize use of purchased fertilizers and

pest controls; emphasis is placed on locally adapted

crops and on recycling nutrients (e.g., crop residues,

manure). In the Peruvian Amazon, a 1-hectare

experiment yielded seven continuous crops in a

3-year period and replaced an estimated 5 hectares

of shifting cultivation before yields declined and the

area was left fallow (23 1, 233).41

The long-term utility of such systems remains

unproven. Nevertheless, if low-input systems could

be initiated on 0.5 million hectares each year, they

might save about 2 million hectares from shifting

 broader context, the U.N. general definition ‘‘meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generation to

meet their own needs’ (337).

 maximum residue no and minimal but use of commercial herbicides and manual 

weeds.
220 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

cultivation each year. Perhaps 100 tons C are

initially released from each hectare cleared by

shifting cultivation.

42 If the land is allowed a fallow

period, some CO2 will be stored in regrowing forest

vegetation, If this amounts to, for example, an

average of 50 tons C per hectare over the next two

decades, then the net effect-over the 25-year

timeframe of this report-of leaving 2 million

hectares of forest standing would be to avoid around

100 million metric tons of emissions per year (about

4 percent of 1989 emissions from deforestation) (see

table 7-2).

Reduced Cattle Ranching

Large areas of tropical forest have been converted

to pasture since the 1950s, particularly in Latin

America (98, 204); globally, an estimated 3 to 7

million hectares have been converted to pasture per

year (50). While some productive pastures have been

maintained for decades in countries such as Costa

Rica and Venezuela (29). some tropical forest soils

are not well suited for livestock and only support a

meager grass cover for a short period before weeds

and inedible grasses invade (88, 98, 263). This has

occurred in Southeast Asia and Latin America (264).

Reducing the annual forest-to-pasture conversion

rate by 1 million hectares by 2000 and 2 million

hectares by 2015 would avoid 100 million metric

tons of carbon emissions in 2000 (3 to 4 percent of

1989 emissions) and 200 million metric tons in 2015

(about 7 percent of 1989 emissions) (assuming

around 100 metric tons C are released per hectare

cleared) (see table 7-2). Another benefit might also

be a reduction in future methane emissions from

livestock (see ch. 8). However, the economic costs

of slowing conversion are unknown and the institutional and social barriers are likely to be enormous

(see “Policy Options” below). At the same time,

though, efforts also could be made to improve

existing cattle ranching (e.g., by using better forage

and grazing management) (242),

Use of Improved Cookstoves

The importance of fuelwood consumption as a

cause of deforestation is unclear (1 14, 134). Cutting

trees directly for fuel (especially to make charcoal)

can cause local deforestation, for example in drier

regions with open tree formations, in high montane

areas, and near urban areas and along roadways (123,

134, 155). In many areas, though, cutting trees for

fuelwood may be a more important cause of forest

degradation than of deforestation.

End-use demand for fuelwood can be reduced by

using better cookstoves. During the 1980s, some

improved charcoal cookstoves with higher heat

transfer efficiency than traditional stoves gained

consumer acceptance in many countries (1 1), In

Kenya, for example, an improved version of the

traditional ‘‘jiko’ ceramic stove can reduce fuel use

by 15 to 40 percent and pay for itself within a few

months (11, 94, 192, 211, 268).

Annual fuelwood use for cooking might be on the

order of 0.2 to 0.4 metric ton per capita.43 If

improved cookstoves reduced fuelwood consumption by 25 percent, a savings of 0.05 to 0.1 metric ton

C per year per capita might be achieved. If 50 million

additional households with 6 people per household

(300 million people) used such stoves by 2000, then

carbon savings would be around 15 to 30 million

metric tons (1 percent of 1989 emissions) (see table

7-2). If 175 million additional households (1 billion

people) used them by 2015, then carbon savings

would be around 50 to 100 million metric tons (2 to

4 percent of 1989 emissions) (see table 7-2).44

Managing Existing Forests

Harvesting Nontimber Forest Products

Many nontimber forest products provide services

and revenues to local people-e. g., nuts, herbal

medicines, fibers, latex, fruits, oils, spices, fodder,

palm thatch, bamboo, cork, tannin-but little has

been done to estimate their value or to identify new

products (47, 65,70,84,87,316, 317). In Indonesia,

the minimum export value of such products in 1987

dz~e ~om[ of above-ground c~fion varics with location and forest type, Closed tropical forests contain an estimated 138 to 192 metric tom C per

hectare in aboveground biomass (25), but open forests contain considerably less (27). Fearnside (68a) estimated that Brazilian Amazon forests contain

106 to 124 metric tons C per hectare,

d~Based on estimates for some developing countries that fuelwood used for cooking ranges from 8 to 18 Gigajoules peT person ( 11 ), and on conversion

factors of 1,054 joules per Btu and 55 pounds of carbon per million Btu (ch. 3).

~~ese estllmtes ~sume ]ess fut:]wo~ use rather than a shift of fuelwood to noncooking uses. Whether this is a fti assumption is unknown. ~oth~

question is whether any relationship exists between emissions from improved cookstoves and respiratory infections and chronic lung diseases, as has

been suggested for older cookstoves (11, 134, 171,247, 248, 268).
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector ● 221

was estimated at $238 million, more than 10 percent

of the value of all log exports (47). In the Peruvian

Amazon, net revenues from nontimber products on

1 hectare were estimated to be two to three times

higher than revenues from harvesting commercial

timber on a similar-sized plot (201, 202).45

However, because nontimber products tend to be

marketed locally and in a decentralized manner,

their value is generally hard to recognize and assess.

In contrast, timber products receive greater government support, partly because they generate foreign

exchange. High discount rates also enable entrepreneurs to obtain quick profits from intense timber

harvesting (66, 135, 201).

Nontimber products have been promoted in a few

cases by establishing ‘‘extractive reserves’ ‘—areas

of standing forest in which products are extracted,

usually with traditional methods. Such reserves have

been established in Brazil for nuts and rubber, for

example (211).46 Their potential effect on CO2

emissions cannot be estimated, however, without

knowing how many people can be supported,

establishment and maintenance costs, and transport

and market opportunities for products. Today, rubbertapping in the Amazon supports only a sparse

population and already is heavily subsidized by the

Brazilian government (65). In some cases, harvesting may even be nonrenewable (e.g., cutting palm

trees to more easily obtain their fruits) (22). Nevertheless, extractive reserves can play a role in more

integrated systems (e.g., with concurrent agroforestry in adjacent areas) .47

Improving Commercial Forest Management

Commercial logging, mostly in humid forests,

affected an estimated 4.4 million hectares annually

in 1980 ( 114, 264). Usually no more than 10 percent

of tree species are commercially favored, and these

typically are harvested by selective logging (i.e.,

‘‘high-grading’ ‘). Exports of these trees have generated major revenues during the last few decades,

particularly in Southeast Asia and Western Africa;

roughly one-half of the exports have been to

developed countries (175, 292).

How much commercial harvesting is conducted

on a ‘‘sustainable’ basis is controversial.48 In many

areas, high-grading and lack of long-term management have depleted the most valuable trees, and

harvesting has shifted elsewhere (214, 263). Highgrading also often degrades forests by damaging or

destroying noncommercial species and greatly reducing canopy cover (214, 215, 216, 263, 275).

Thus, many developing countries have lost or are

losing this revenue source.

49 In addition, logging

roads open up new areas to migrating cultivators and

ranchers.

Harvesting will continue, though, and research is

needed on how to improve it. Research has been

conducted in Southeast Asia and elsewhere on

harvest techniques that minimize damage to remaining trees and on management techniques that enhance growth rates of favored species (66, 121, 154).

In Costa Rica, a door manufacturer is trying different

harvest techniques to assure a sustainable supply of

mahogany in a project insured by the Overseas

Private Investment Council (see ch. 9).50

Opportunities also exist to increase the use of

lesser known species and of each harvested log (e.g.,

using residues for particleboard) (282). These efforts

might increase returns from a given area and reduce

pressures for harvesting other areas, but they also

would encourage clearcutting. The history of commercial logging and reforestation in the tropics

d~nis may be a special sltua(ion because a large, nearby market for perishable fTuits and the infrastructure for transporting and marketing the fruits

already exist.

~In a slml]ti manner, some wildlife species threatened with extinction are being ‘‘farmed’ to provide revenues for Iocd villagers, conserve ~biwts.

and increase species population=. g., butterflies in Papua New Guinea and crocodiles in several Asian and African countrim ( 183, 184). Othens, for

example some large African mammals, are managed in mtive habitats to provide revenues from tourism, hunting, and meat production for

community-based projects (336). By providing income, these projects can lessen pressures to clear forests for planting of cash crops.

dTOther effo~s t. preseme mopical forests and biodiversity in general also will help protect sources of nontimber prOdUCtS. One initiative, for example,

aims to develop conservation programs in collaboration with local organizations and national governments in 12 countries that contain an estimated 60

percent of the world’s species and much of the remaining primary @oplcal forest (41; also see 159).

~Some investigators conclude that very Iittle ‘‘sustaimble’ commercial harvesting actually occurs in tropicaI moist forests C39, 203). Also sec

“Tropical Forestry Action Plan” below.

4~e world Bank estimted tit only ] O of the 33 countries that were net expofiers of hopic~ forest products in 1985 would k net exportem by

2000 (215).

-~nstead of establishing plantations, the company buys natural forest tracts or marginal farmland where the tree is found and hires local farmers as

gwardians ( 194, 228).
222 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Table 7-3--FAO Estimates of Plantations Established by End of 1980 and During 1981-85 in

111 Developing Countries and Territories, by Region (number of countries in parentheses) (in millions of hectares)’

Estimated percent of annual

Established — Annual deforestation replaced

Region by 1980 1981-85 Total rate with plantations

Tropical:

Africa (42) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8

Asia (15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2

C. & S. America (27) . . . . 4.6

Oceania (6) . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1

Total (90) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7

Nontropical:

Africa (7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2

Asia (11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5

America (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6

Total (21) . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.2

0.6

2.2

2.7

0.1

5.5

0.5

O.3c

0.6

1.5

2.5

7.4

7.3

0.1

17.3

1.7

14.9

2.2

18.7

0.1

0.4

0.5

<0.1

1.1

0.1

O.1c

0.1

0.3

3%

21%

9%

34%

1 o%

N E

b

NE

NE

NE

aBased on oftieial government responses to FAO survey; does not include trees planted on small landowner plots (e.g., agroforestry, windbreaks) or plantations of nontimber trees such as rubber, oil palm, coconut, and shade trees.

*. not estimated.

cDoes not include value for China.

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1988.

suggests that clearcutting should not be allowed on

a large scale unless acceptable management plans

and stringent enforcement mechanisms are in place.

Another practice, ‘ ‘natural’ forest management,

combines natural regeneration with small clearcuts

to allow sustainable harvesting with little damage to

remaining trees. Natural regeneration typically involves the growth of volunteer seedlings and saplings; for some species, a small ‘ ‘gap’ in the canopy

is needed for seeds to germinate and grow initially.

In one project in Peru, this gap is simulated by

clearcutting long narrow strips from a mature forest,

on a 30- to 40-year rotation (96, 97). Native trees

regenerate naturally in the small, open strips. Oxen

remove felled logs, and the timber is processed at a

local cooperative run by villagers. In late 1989, the

cooperative shipped its first exports to U.S. buyers

(53).

Considerable research is needed on this and other

practices. In general, though, the major problems

associated with commercial logging are economic,

political, and institutional. To ensure that logging in

the tropics is conducted in accordance with accepted

management norms, national governments and international organizations must develop rational

management plans, enforcement mechanisms, and

trading systems (see ‘ ‘Options for Tropical Forests’

below).

Managing New Forests

Reforestation

Reforestation consists of establishing forests on

previously harvested lands, often in the form of

monoculture plantations, sometimes in more heterogeneous stands; it can be of great use in improving

watershed management and erosion control.

The potential for tropical reforestation varies

widely. On degraded lands, barriers include competition with invading grasses that support periodic

fires; hotter and drier microclimates in cleared areas;

lack of appropriate seed sources; and poor soil

characteristics (e.g., low nutrient and water-holding

capacity, compaction from overgrazing) (188, 245).

Reforestation is possible on degraded lands if proper

techniques and ecologically suitable species are

chosen (147, 149, 188), but it is likely to be difficult.

Many large reforestation projects involve establishing plantations on relatively less degraded land.

As of 1985, about 17 million hectares of plantations

had been established in tropical forest areas (see

table 7-3).51 Successful plantations have been established in countries as diverse as India, Malaysia, the

Philippines, and Trinidad and Tobago (71, 235).

However, the overall rate of establishing new

plantations is relatively low—about 1 million hecSIThese dam do not include trees planted around farm fields, as windbreaks, or tdong roadways (2~).

szHOwever, P-rg (I%) es~ated higherratw for 1981 to 1985—2.9 million hectares per ymof industrial timber plantations, 2.6 million hmw~

per year for nonindustrial purposes.
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector ● 223

tares per year in the early 1980s, or one-tenth the

estimated rate of deforestation (see table 7-3).52

Estimated growth rates for tropical plantations in

the early 1980s ranged between 2 and 10 metric tons

C per hectare per year (based on data in refs. 30, 71).

OTA assumes that an average annual growth rate of

5 metric tons C per hectare might be maintained on

plantations; this may be optimistic, given lower rates

on degraded lands, problems associated with plantations, and a lower net effect when plantations replace

previously forested land. How much land might be

available is unclear.53 If a program to double the

current establishment rate were to begin in 1995,

then carbon storage attributable to reforestation

might amount to 50 million metric tons in 2000 (2

percent of 1989 emissions) and 200 million metric

tons in 2015 (7 percent of 1989 emissions) (see table

7-2).

Problems with plantations include poor site and

species selection, faulty management, fire, and

disease (71). One of the largest projects, in Jari,

Brazil, has been more expensive and less productive

than anticipated (63), Some monoculture plantations

in Southeast Asia have lost thousands of hectares

due to pest infestations (204). Monoculture have

other opportunity costs such as reduced biodiversity

and less access to medicinal plants and other

products.

Any reforestation effort must also contend with

social issues such as land ownership and local needs.

Reforestation projects could be designed to provide

local people with products and services (e.g., medicines, food, etc. ) from different forest successional

stages, which would mean planting and managing

more heterogeneous forests (26, 116, 316, 318) (also

see ‘Harvesting Nontimber Forest Products’ above).

Mixed-species forests might also reduce the likelihood and intensity of infestations (310),

Attempts also could be made to restore degraded

lands to something resembling original conditions

(84, 120), Although relatively little is known about

how to do this, a pioneering effort to restore crop and

range land back into dry tropical forest is taking

place in northwest Costa Rica, on what will be over

70,000 hectares in Guanacaste National Park (158).

It is designed to benefit local residents through

watershed protection, employment, income from

tourism, and educational programs (21 1). Another

possibility is to restore damaged or cutover mangrove forests, which are important as sediment

filters and as habitat for many marine species (258,

275). Several Southeast Asian countries (e.g., Malaysia, Vietnam) are attempting to restore mangroves and other coastal vegetation (243a, 258).

POLICY OPTIONS

This section describes policy options for influencing forestry management and land use practices in

the United States and in tropical areas. Policy makers

should recognize that the management practices

described above might be affected by future climate

changes, the impacts of which are difficult to predict

for specific forest areas (see box 7-D).

Options for U.S. Forests

Policies to offset carbon emissions in the United

States fall into three general categories: those

encouraging increased carbon storage in existing

wooded areas; those promoting biomass energy; and

those for growing new trees in unforested rural areas

and in urban communities. Several U.S. Department

of Agriculture agencies, particularly the U.S. Forest

Service (USFS) and the Agricultural Conservation

and Stabilization Service (see box 7-E), could be

instrumental in carrying out these policies.

Incentives for Increasing Carbon Storage

in Forested Areas

Increasing carbon storage in forested areas as a

means of offsetting CO2 emissions actually means

increasing the rate at which an entire forest ecosystem removes CO2 from the atmosphere and stores it

in wood, leaves, roots, soil and soil organisms, etc.

While this carbon ultimately will be released back to

the atmosphere (see box 7-A) unless it is permanently stored under conditions that do not allow

decomposition, increasing total productivity still is

an appropriate goal for the 25-year timeframe of this

report. Most people are concerned with increasing

the productivity of a forest’s commercial timber

component, because of possible capital returns from

harvesting the timber. Whether an increase in timber

Wffomerly forested lands not currendy used extensively for agriculture or settlement, Houghton (10S) concluded @t 5W million hmt~es Of mos~)’

degraded land were available, including large areas of savanna in west Africa. In additio~ he concluded that 365 million hectares of faIlow areas could

be reforested if shifting cultivation were replaced with permanent agriculture. Orainger (88) estimated tha[ over 700 million hectares might be available

for reforestation.
224 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 7-D—Forests and Future Global Climate Change

The General Circulation Models (GCMs) currently used to make predictions about climate change have

only limited regional resolution and cannot predict how individual trees might respond to local climate

changes (see ch. 2). Nevertheless, they can be used to indicate, as a first approximation, how potential climate

changes might affect forests.

First, changes in average temperature and moisture can affect the physiology and competitive regimes

(i.e., with other plants), and hence survival and reproduction, of individual trees.l These effects could be

positive or negative. For example, warmer conditions might enhance growth rates in boreal forests (16, 125)

but decrease survivorship of some species’ seedlings elsewhere (31, 35,79, 205).

Second, the frequency and intensity of episodic disturbances (e.g., fires, windstorms, pest and disease

outbreaks) might increase in some areas, although they might decrease elsewhere. Little attention has been

given to this issue, even though such events could hinder efforts to reduce deforestation or increase carbon

storage. Where they occur, changes in episodic events may have greater effects on forest biomass and

composition than would changes in average conditions (79, 117, 193). Changes in average conditions such

as warmer winter temperatures also could allow some pathogens, parasites, and insects to expand into

unaffected forests (79, ‘190), although currently affected forests might experience reductions in such problems.

Several reports summarize projections of how North American forests might respond to changes in

average global climate (79, 117, 122, 136, 165,210,223, 294). The projections generally indicate that forests

will not shift as units, but that some species would migrate to higher elevations (e.g., in the Northwest) and

latitudes (e.g., in the East). For some species, however, shifts in suitable conditions may outpace natural

dispersal rates (31, 261 ). Some areas, such as the southern part of the Southeast United States, might convert

to scrub, savanna, or sparse forest. Shifts also could lead to competition with existing land uses (e.g.,

cropland).

Effects of these changes on CO2 levels are difficult to predict. If existing forests suffer diebacks, then

carbon emissions from decomposing trees could increase (223). Stressed trees that die also could increase fuel

loads and hence fire intensity. On the other hand, overall productivity of Northeastern forests could increase

if slow-growing spruces and firs are replaced by faster growing hardwoods.

Less is known about potential effects on tropical forests. Some consider it unlikely that higher

temperatures will be directly detrimental (e.g., ref. 95). Warmer temperatures could even lead to boundary

expansions, depending on factors such as changes in daily temperature regimes, how far polar air masses

penetrate into the tropics, and cloud cover. However, increased seasonality of rainfall in humid tropical forests

might greatly affect the fruiting of trees such as figs and palms that are important for humans and numerous

birds and mammals (78).

CO2 “Fertilization’’—Laboratory and greenhouse experiments on crops and a few trees show that

increases in CO2 concentrations can result in CO2 “fertilization” or “enhancement’ ’-increases in growth

rates, efficiency of water and nitrogen use, and ability to withstand water stress (128, 136,222, 289).

This raises the possibility that increasing atmospheric concentrations of CO2 might stimulate growth

rates and associated carbon storage in natural forests. There is no evidence yet that this has happened,

however, and debate about its likelihood continues (16, 125,238,289, 330). The experimental findings ca.nnmot

be easily generalized. Virtually all the experiments have been short-term, conducted under conditions unlike

those encountered by plants in natural conditions (13, 82,128,136, 190,330). In the field, plant growth may

be limited by other factors (e.g., water, nutrients) that interact with plant physiology, by competition with

other plants, and by pathogens.

Moreover, higher temperatures also might increase plant respiration rates, thereby increasing CO2

emissions and partially or entirely offsetting carbon storage resulting from increased photosynthesis (109,

136,330, 331). Higher temperatures also could increase oxidation and emissions of soil carbon (125) and the

production of methane in anaerobic environments (109).

l-es*~ght ~~ in soil conditions and d-f- ~ ~- anisms that help make soils amenable for plants (323).
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector ● 225

Box 7-E—USDA: Forest Service and Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service

U.S. Forest Service (USFS)-The USFS administers timber sales and other activities on national forest land,

under the National Forest Management Act of 1976 and the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning

Act of 1974. It also administers programs to stimulate investments by private nonindustry landowners in forestry

practices. Under the Cooperative Forest Assistance Act of 1978, the State and Private Forestry program provides

assistance to State forestry organizations, which then offer direct assistance to landowners for pest and fire

protection and forest management; this totaled $87 million in fiscal year 1989, including $2.5 million for urban

forestry (306, 309). Under the Renewable Resources Extension Act of 1978, the agency provides assistance for

forest management through extension service programs.

The International Forestry program assists international organizations such as the United Nations Food and

Agriculture Organization and the World Bank in evaluating and implementing projects (309). One of its units, the

Forestry Support Program, is managed with funding from A.I.D. and provides technical assistance to A. I.D., the

Peace Corps, and NGOs (283). The USFS also operates two tropical forest research centers (in Puerto Rico and

Hawaii) that conduct some research on agroforestry and reforestation (113, 278); the Forestry Private Enterprise

Initiative, which helps small forest-based businesses (including ecotourism) in the tropics; and the Forest Products

Laboratory, which conducts research on the use of temperate and tropical woods.

The USFS spent over $138 million on forest research in fiscal year 1989, including $14 million on global

change. The proposed fiscal year 1991 budget for global change research is $23 million (306).1

Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS)—The ASCS administers several programs

with technical assistance from USFS, Soil Conservation Service, and State agencies (45). The Forestry Incentives

Program (FIP) provides cost-sharing (up to 65 percent) for reforestation, timber management, and firebreaks, on

private forest lands of less than 400 hectares. The Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) provides

cost-sharing to farmers for soil and water conservation practices, including tree planting and timber improvement.

These programs treated over 140,000 hectares annually during the last few years, mostly (over 80 percent) for

reforestation; in 1986, the FIP provided over $11 million, over 75 percent in the South, while the ACP provided

over $6 million.

The ASCS also administers the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), with assistance from the Soil

Conservation Service and USFS. Established under the Food Security Act of 1985, the CRP is designed to improve

soil, water, and wildlife resources by paying landowners to remove highly erodible land from production (284, 285)

(also see ch. 8). Its goal is to have 16 to 18 million hectares enrolled by 1990, with one-eighth to be reforested. The

Federal Government enters into 10-year contracts with farmers, makes rental payments, and pays one-half the costs

of establishing protective vegetation. As of March 1990, about 0.9 million hectares were enrolled for tree planting

(40 percent of the reforestation goal), over 90 percent in the South (45, 170a).

l~e FORSr/AmOS@CR Interaction Priority Research Program is designed to research the effects Of climate c-e m f~sts @~M~

ecosystems (298). It builds on the Forest Response Prograq which conducted (through 1990) research on acidic deposition. The Forest

Ecosystems and Atmospheric Pollution Research Act of 1988 (Public Law IW-521) designated the USFS as the lead agency to continue reseamh

begun under the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program and carried out by the Forest Response Program.

productivity represents a similar increase in total For public lands, Congress could direct the USFS

productivity, however, is an issue that requires and Bureau of Land Management to increase reforesting. Assuming that it does, then incentives could estation activities (including more stringent reforesbe provided to increase timber productivity; incan- tation requirements in contracts with the private

tives will differ for publicly and privately owned sector) and to consider using carbon storage as a

forests, but all should account for potential tradeoffs criterion in forest planning processes (127).54 To

such as increased N2O emissions from fertilization, assess the extent to which ‘ ‘new forestry’ practices

increased erosion, or decreased biological diversity. (see ‘Increasing Productivity’ can maintain higher

~Ma~gement objectives for NationaJ For~~~, for ex~ple, are determined in accordance with provisions in tie Forest and ~ngeland Renewable

Resources Plaming Act and Natioml Forest Management Act, within the overall framework set forth in the Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act of

1960 (274).
226 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 7-5-Funding Levels for the U.S. Forest

Servicers State and Private Forestry Programs,

Million dollars 198$-91

200

1

150

i

I

u

1988 1989 1990 1991

Levels for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 are actual spending; level

for fiscal year 1990 is estimated spending; and level for fiscal year

1991 is appropriated funding. (All amounts are in real dollars.)

SOURCES: Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the

President, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal

Year 1991 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Off ice,

1990); U.S. Congress, “Continuing Appropriations for the

Fiscal Year Ending September, 1988,” Conference Report

100-498 (Washington, DC: Dec. 21, 1987); Congressional

Record, 136(1 50): H-124C19, Oct. 27, 1990.

levels of diversity and allow commodity production,

Congress could direct the USFS to increase research

on these practices in the National Forests.

For nonindustry private forests, Congress could

continue to increase assistance to States and private

landowners. In the Interior and Related Agencies

Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 1991, for example, Congress increased funding for USFS State and

private forestry programs (see box 7-E) from $104

million in 1990 to $183 million in fiscal year 1991,

continuing the trend seen in the late 1980s (see

figure 7-5). In addition, the 1990 Food Agriculture,

Conservation, and Trade Act (Public Law 101-624)

authorized a forestry stewardship program, in which

the USFS would work with State and local governments, land grant universities, and the private sector

to improve resource management on privately owned

forest land. Congress could also consider increasing

funding for programs administered by the Agricultural Conservation and Stabilization Service, such as

the Forestry Incentives Program (FIP) and the

Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) (see box

7-E) (also see 111, 179). These programs currently

reach only about 2 percent of nonindustry private

owners, although as a group these owners are

responsible for over 40 percent of all reforestation

(see figure 7-4). The fiscal year 1991 appropriation

for the Forestry Incentives Program was $12.5

million, the same as in fiscal year 1990.

For industry-owned timberland, investments might

also be stimulated through changes in capital gains

provisions. Congress could consider restoring preferential tax rates or providing a partial exclusion

from taxable income, for timber held longer than 20

years, and allowing full annual deductions for

expenses, as well as increasing funding for Federal

assistance programs.55 Analysts at the Natural Resources Defense Council (15) suggested that tax and

program benefits be made available only to owners

who comply with relevant forest management guidelines.

To increase Federal funding of assistance programs, one possibility is to use funds that would be

saved if “below-cost” timber sales in national

forests were eliminated,56 Timber sales in general,

along with USFS assistance in surveying and road

construction, are used to promote the U.S. forest

products industry .57 For all 122 national forests, net

revenues to the government from fiscal year 1989

sales amounted to $403 million (307). However, 66

forests exhibited net losses totaling $45 million.58

Some local job losses in the timber industry are

likely if below-cost sales are eliminated. In addition,

25 percent of gross revenues from all Federal timber

sales (including below-cost sales) are paid to States,

to be distributed to counties for roads and schools,

55T= ~mviSiom tit have be~ favomble for foresq investments include: capital gains; annwd exptXLSiIlg Of SOme WsLS; and a reforestation tax m~t

(15, 139,226, 301). The 1986 Tax Reform Act elimina ted differential rates for long-term capital gains.

‘Assurnin g that demand for wood remains the same, eliminating such sales would not effect carbon emissions because harvtxdng would shift

elsewhere.

sYRepetto andPezzeY(218) sugg~l ‘1

iminating, over time, all Federal appropriations for forest management, other than for protecting biodiversity

and other nonmarketable semices, me:~ propose fucing management expenses out of net receipts from forest operations, and establishing user fees

based on market values for nontimber values (which could increase pressure for more roads and other forms of access into old-growth and wilderness

areas).

58Tfi&.r &=ted from such ~eS accouted for about one.f~~ of be to~ best firjm IMtjomd fores~. The ody western forest tO ShOW a Dd

monetary loss was the Chatham unit of Tonga.ss National Forest in Alaska (270, 303, 307). GAO (270) provide-s slightly different estimates of net losses.
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector ● 227

and some of this would be lost as well.59 Some rural

towns and timber operators would probably need

training, development, m-relocation assistance. Banning exports of unprocessed logs also might offset

some ‘job losses (see box 7-C). Indeed, the current

ban on exports of logs from Federal lands, previously enacted annually in the appropriations process, has now been made permanent.

60 Congress also

could make cost-sharing assistance under the FIP

and ACP available only to States that ban exports

from private and State lands, Potential disadvantages of export bans (90) include countering freetrade policies (although Japanese trade policies

discourage imports of processed wood products);

adding to the U.S. trade deficit; and job losses

among longshoremen (possibly offset by new sawmill jobs).

Incentives for Biomass Energy To offset

CO2 Emissions

The Department of Energy’s research program on

short-rotation woody crops could be increased61 and

focused to reduce uncertainties regarding long-term

productivity and costs. Increasing taxes on fossil

fuel use (see ch, 1 ) will make biomass fuels more

competitive, although it also could increase pressures to cut trees for fuel wood on lands not dedicated

to biomass crops.62 Also, farmers wishing to invest

in biomass crops may be limited by loss of base

acreage in commodity support programs (see ch. 8)

and by lack of revenues for the first 5 years or so; this

suggests that changes in support programs or provision of subsidies may be needed to stimulate

investments in biomass crops on current cropland.

Chapter 3 discusses other options for increasing the

use of biomass fuels in electric utilities; chapter 5

discusses biomass use in vehicles. All of these

options assume that the infrastructure to support

cultivation and use of such crops is in place.

Incentives for Growing New Trees

Afforestation can be promoted through programs

such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)

and the proposed America the Beautiful program

and through financial mechanisms such as tax

incentives or credits. Any program must consider the

financial and technical resources needed to maintain

trees in a healthy state once planted, a factor that will

be even more critical if climate changes occur (see

box 7-D).

Congress could expand the CRP’s tree-planting

goals and its incentives for enrolling land for tree

planting (e.g., greater share of reforestation costs,

longer contracts).63 A variation might be to encourage new shelterbelts, perhaps through tax credits or

by conservation compliance requirements tied to

price support programs (see ch. 8).64

The Food Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade

Act of 1990 also authorized startup funds for a new

America the Beautiful tree-planting program (initiated by President Bush), as well as funds for urban

and community tree planting and maintenance. The

Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill

for fiscal year 1991 did not contain funding for the

America the Beautiful program, but it almost doubled funding for the USFS’s State and private

forestry programs, which include tree planting and

management (figure 7-5). However, infrastructure

for increased planting also may need to be developed, since current planting is near the historical

peak of about 1.4 million hectares per year; funding

for long-term maintenance also will be needed.

s~e TJCJFCJ budget rquest for fisc~ yew 1~ 1 propostd phasing out below-cost sales on 12 forests, and testing whetier inc~ased f~ding for

recreation would result in increased recreational usage to offset revenue losses to local economies caused by eliminating the sales. This proposal is

opposed by many States with targeted forests because of fears about revenue losses (58).

%e Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-382) permanently bans exports of unprocessed logs fmm Federal lands in the West, bans

exports of at least 75 percent of the annual sales volumes of unprocessed timber from State lands, and bars mills from ‘substituting’ unprocessed timber

from public lands for exported unprocessed timber originating from private lands.

~lFede~] SUppo~ for r~~~ch on enag from biomass and municipal waste dropped from $58 million in fiscal year 198 ] tO $13 JnilIion in fisml Yem

1989 (187),

62 However , a ta on ~fcmbon’ ~ pm se could ~ve tie opposite effect because the carbon content of wood is about ‘e ‘me as ‘it ‘f ‘d

631n tie F~ Agnculmre, Consematlon, and Trade ~t of 1~ (Wbfic ~w 101 -624), Cowess expand~ ~eligibi]i~ criteria to include, for

example, marginal pasture lands previously converted to wettands or wildlife habitat, marginal pasture lands to be converted to trees in or near tiparian

areas, and croplands that contribute to water quality degradation.

~options more r~dily implemented at the State and local levels include requiring developers to gTOW trees (onSite or elsewhere) or contribute to a

reforestation fund if they clear a certain portion of trees on a development site; and giving property tax breaks to landowners that agree not to convert

or degrade forest lands (e.g., as in North Dakota; see ref. 32).
228 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Congress also could consider providing tax incentives (similar to ones for energy conservation) for

planting and maintainin g urban trees (especially

near buildings, to save energy used for cooling).65

Options for Tropical Forests

Introduction

Policy makers must recognize that changes in

tropical forests are driven by underlying factors such

as national and multilateral economic development

policies, foreign debt, lack of land tenure, and

population growth.

Some governments favor development of tropical

forest areas because of concerns about national

security, population pressures, and foreign debt (17,

174, 215, 216, 235, 275, 340). Transmigration,

highway and dam construction, and other projects

undertaken in response to these concerns have

greatly increased deforestation (10, 66,67, 153, 174,

216, 249). Many projects have been partially funded

by multilateral development banks, which have only

recently begun to consider long-term environmental

costs in their decisions about projects. In addition,

forest products are exported to obtain foreign

exchange and service debts (225), but frequently at

a pace that cannot be sustained for long periods.

Some agricultural policies have promoted converting forests into large cattle ranches, particularly

in Latin America. In Brazil, for example, previous

tax laws penalized owners of “unimproved” forest

land but virtually exempted agriculture and ranching

from taxation (17, 66). The government suspended

most of these provisions (38), but ranches still are an

attractive hedge against inflation (17, 98). Many

countries also maintain low food prices to help urban

populations, which lessens incentives for better

agricultural practices.

Timber policies often enable forest industries to

generate profits by rapidly depleting timber stocks

(213, 214, 215, 216, 340). Such policies include

short-term concessions (e.g., less than 30 years), tax

holidays, low “rents,” and negative interest rates.

Industrialized nations, by erecting tariffs on processed tropical imports (to protect their own industries), encourage inefficient harvesting in tropical

forests because full market values for the resources

cannot be obtained.

Population growth exacerbates all of these factors. Populations in developing nations are expected

to almost double to 7 billion by the year 2025 (see

ch. 9). This growth, coupled with high poverty rates

and inequitable land distribution, increases pressures to clear forests for agriculture. In many

developing countries, most arable land is owned by

a small upper class or by middle-class land speculators (98, 173, 275). Without access and tenure to

productive farmland or access to alternative livelihoods, subsistence farmers often migrate into forest

frontiers (98, 101, 275).

Given this background, potential U.S. policies to

influence what happens in tropical forests can be

geared to:

*

●

●

●

●

A

encourage continued change in multilateral

development bank policies;

address population planning, land reform, and

debt reduction;

build host country institutions and increase

research;

provide assistance for nontimber alternatives;

and

promote improved commercial forest management.

number of U.S. and international agencies and

programs could be instrumental in pursuing such

policies (see boxes 7-E and 7-F). The United States

also could support development of an international

forestry convention or protocol that sets global

standards for conserving and managing forest resources, perhaps within the context of a global

climate change convention.66

Encourage Continued Change in Multilateral

Development Bank Policies

The International Development and Finance Act

of 1989 (Public Law 101-240) directed the U.S.

Executive Directors of each Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) (see box 7-F) not to vote in favor

of proposed actions that would have significant

65~e ~e-icmFOre5@ Ass~iatiOnh~ launched a‘ ‘G1oLMI Releaf project, the objeetive of which IS to plant 100 rnimon Young trees @ger ti

seedlings) around U.S. homes and buildings by 1992 (166, 167, 230); this would increase the numbez of trees in urban areas by an estimated 15 to 20

percent.

66As ~mmended by the FAO (76, 77), Kc (1 14, 1 14a), and Ullsten et al. (264), which diff~ somew~t, however, on the potential rddiOIIShip

between a forestry convention and a climate change convention.
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector . 229

Box 7-F—Multilateral and Bilateral Institutions and Programs

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) include the World Bank and its affiliate, the International

Development Association, and the Inter-American, Asian, and African Development Banks. World Bank lending

for forestry-related projects is expected to be about $1 billion by 1992 (334). Many MDB projects have led directly

or indirectly to deforestation, but recently the banks have begun to address these issues. U.S. Executive Directors

to the MDBs are directed through the Department of Treasury’s Office of Multilateral Development Banks (275).

International assistance agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN Environment Program (UNEP), and more regional agencies (e.g.,

Commission of European Communities) provide funding for tropical forestry. The FAO is the largest organization

addressing forestry; it inventories forest resources, conducts research on forest management practices, and

coordinates the Tropical Forestry Action Plan. Even so, less than 5 percent of FAO’s budget is allocated to forestry

(264).

The Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) was initiated in 1986 under the sponsorship of the World Bank,

UNDP, FAO, and World Resources Institute to provide a framework for enhancing donor cooperation and funding

in: integrating forestry into improved land use practices, improving forest-based industries, restoring fuelwood

supplies, conserving forest ecosystems, and building developing country institutions (73, 89, 142, 328, 340).

Coordinated by FAO, the TFAP initially involves a review of the forestry sector in requesting countries; to date,

over 50 countries have requested reviews. A nationa1 forestry action plan then is prepared that identifies potential

projects amenable to financing from donors. TFAP’s implementation, however, has been severely criticized (see

“Options for Tropical Forests”).

The International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) was established under the International Tropical

Timber Agreement (265), which came into force in 1985. Its goal is to provide a framework for coordination and

cooperation between tropical timber producing and consuming countries regarding tropical timber economies.

Operational since 1987, it has 43 member countries representing 95 percent of world tropical timber trade and over

75 percent of remaining tropical rain forests. It uses voluntary member contributions to support projects for

improved forest management and reforestation, increased domestic processing, market analyses, and better pricing

structures. Japan has been the largest supporter among industrialized nations that have made voluntary

contributions.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) provides bilateral support for agroforestry, natural

forest management, and reforestation projects through its own programs, the USPS Forestry Support Program (see

box 7-E), the ITTO and TFAP, and international research organizations. It spent $72 million in fiscal year 1989 on

about 160 tropical forest projects in 40 countries. It also provides support through the Food for Peace program, for

example by distributing food to villagers engaged in forestry activities (267), and through projects for distributing

more efficient cookstoves (268). The Foreign Assistance Act (amended by Public Law 99-529) requires A.I.D. to

conduct environmental assessments for projects that significantly affect natural resources in developing countries,

places priority on conservation and sustainable management of tropical forests and on practices such as agroforestry,

and requires that NGOs be used to manage relevant projects when feasible. A.I.D. has had environmental review

procedures for its projects since 1978; its Early Project Notification System requests information (submitted to

Congress semi-annually) from field missions and embassies, NGOs, and MDBs about potential environmental

problems associated with upcoming MDB loans (31 1).

environmental effects, unless an environmental ascertain its effect.67 Bank procedures also do not

impact assessment of the action and its alternatives provide for cross-compliance among different loans

had been conducted. The World Bank (332, 333), for to a country.

example, recently outlined procedures for assessing Congress could continue to review MDB progress

the environmental consequences of its proposed in implementing environmental impact assessment

projects. This is a critical step, but it is too early to procedures, particularly to learn how these proce-

~TFor cxmp]c, some obscmers ques[ion whetier sufficient staff will be hired or whether the public will have substantive input in decisionmaki~

(3, 20, 101, 262). Nor is it ~lear how to account for previous projec~s that lead to new ones with environmental consequences (e.g., Brazil’s pig-iron

smelter project will use railways and mines built with previous Bank funding).
230 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

dures actually affect tropical forests.68 It also could

direct the U.S. Executive Directors to promote

cross-compliance, so that even when all funds from

a loan have been distributed to the recipient country,

noncompliance with its environmental provisions

would result in loss of funds from other loans. In

addition, it can continue encouraging MDBs to:

●

●

●

make loans contingent on changes in host

country policies (e.g., elimination of subsidies

for ranching and poor logging);

increase loan provisions designed to strengthen

environmental ministries, extension services,

and monitoring capabilities of developing countries; and

increase involvement and capabilities of local

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and

communities in planning and implementing

projects.

Address Population Growth, Land Tenure,

Foreign Debt

Support Population Planning and Land Reform

—The United States could increase its assistance

through the Agency for International Development

(A. I.D.) for family planning services in developing

countries and for international organizations such as

the U.N. Fund for Population Activities and the

International Planned Parenthood Federation. This

critical issue is discussed in chapter 9, The United

States also could support both agrarian land reforms

initiated by developing countries (especially those

focused on large, unproductive landholdings in

regions where small farmers are leaving due to

mechanization and other factors) and urban projects

that increase employment opportunities for rural

migrants.

Debt Reduction and Debt-for-Nature Swaps—

One option to reduce foreign debts and promote

natural resources conservation is ‘‘debt-for-nature

swaps.’ Private, nonprofit groups can purchase debt

sold by commercial banks at discounted rates in the

secondary debt market, and then exchange or

‘‘swap’ the debt note with a developing country for

an obligation by that government to create some type

of conservation program. As of 1989, Bolivia,

Ecuador, Costa Rica, Madagascar, and the Philippines had participated in such swaps, with a reduction in external debt of $100 million (340).

Although only 1 percent of developing country

debt is traded on the secondary market, reorienting

even a small percentage of current debts to natural

resource conservation and management is helpful,

especially given the lack of funds generally available for such purposes in many developing countries

(141, 212, 320).69 Congress could direct the Internal

Revenue Service to publicize a 1987 ruling (and

clarifications) that allows creditors, including U.S.

banks, to receive full-value tax deductions when part

of a debt is donated to eligible NGOs for use in the

debtor country (293).70 Congress also could continue trying to have MDBs evaluate ways to

facilitate swaps.71

Provide Assistance for Institutions and Research

Environmental Ministries and NGOs—Few developing countries have adequate programs for

forestry management or agroforestry (84, 329).

Congress could direct A.I.D. to devote more resources to improving the abilities of environmental

ministries and extension services to collect data and

analyze environmental effects, monitor forest practices, improve planning, and enforce regulations.

Congress also could increase direct funding and

technical support through A.I.D. for U.S. and foreign

NGOs that work on forestry-related issues.72 These

groups often can quickly implement small-scale,

innovative projects; for example, CARE (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere) and the Pan

~~ a related veirl, tie United States could promote revision of the U.N. ’S accounting System fOr Ilationd eCOnOmiC Performan ce, which places little

vaIue on forest services such as watershed protection and nontimber products (92, 152, 215, 216, 217) (see ch. 9).

69swaps ~ve ken critic~ed, fioul~ for refocusing domestic priorities away from infrastructure, housing, and food suPPliM and for ‘giving’ awaY

resources, and in some cases for ignoring the needs and rights of tribal people living in affected areas. However, the debtor country retains ownership

of the resources in question and can decide for itself whether a proposed swap is worthwhile (141, 195).

70T0 &te,largerbanks have not found trading debt at discounted rates attractive. Most swaps have iINOkd the pUrChaSe of SeCon@ debt by N~s,

using funds from foundations and individual donors (341). As of 1988, onfy one bank had made a debt donatio~ to the amount of $250,000 (340).

TICmenUy, MDBIOanS cannot& used for swaps because they are not salable on secondmy markets and cannot be rescheduled (269, 293). ~ 1987.

Congress instructed the Department of Treasury to analyze potential ways in which MDBs could facilitate swaps. The 1989 International Development

and Finance Act directed the U.S. Executive Directors to promote protection of sensitive ecosystems through swaps.

Tz~e 1989 Intmmtio@ ~ve]oprnent and Finance Act alSO requires the. U.S. Executive Directors to MDBs to promote increased assis~nce and

supporl for non-U. S. NGOs.
Chapter 7—The Forestry Sector ● 231

American Development Foundation have been instrumental in agroforestry projects (89, 275, 335).

International Research Organizations-Congress could increase support for international research organizations that address forestry-related

issues, such as the International Council for Research in Agroforestry and the Consultative Group

on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).73

No central body, however, coordinates tropical

forestry research or offers help to donors and

national governments (1 19, 221, 252). The United

States could support development of an applied

research system that both focuses on issues not

currently covered adequately (e.g., nontimber forest

products, natural forest management) and coordinates existing efforts. Congress also could increase

support for U.S. university and Peace Corps programs to train U.S. professionals in tropical forestry

(54, 164, 266) and direct A.I.D. to expand its support

of research and training in forestry.

Provide Assistance for Nontimber Alternatives

Direct A.I.D. funding for tropical forestry projects

was $72 million in 1989 (see box 7-F), about 1

percent of total A.I.D. economic assistance. Congress could increase funding for A.I.D. projects on

agroforestry, sustainable agriculture, and nontimber

forest products (without reducing other programs).

Congress also could ensure that A.I.D. systematically assesses the potential for its projects to

decrease deforestation.74 USFS tropical research

centers and the Forest Products Laboratory (see box

7-E) could be expanded to include more research and

training on nontimber forest products.

Internationally, the United States could promote

alternative land use practices through its influence

on MDB policies, and it could promote sustainable

harvesting of nontimber products through its potential influence on the International Tropical Timber

Organization (ITTO) and Tropical Forestry Action

Plan (TFAP) (see next section).

Promote Improved Commercial Forest

Management

Where commercial timber harvesting occurs,

existing incentives for short-term use and mismanagement need to be replaced with incentives for

better practices (1 14a), For example, the United

States can work through international organizations

and

●

●

●

●

●

programs to promote:

longer terms for timber concession licenses;

increased ability of government ministries to

oversee harvesting;

increased research on natural forest management;

more plantations and agroforestry on degraded

lands; and

importing forest products only from areas

managed on a sustainable basis.

Some of this can be done through the MDBs and UN

agencies such as the FAO. Congress also could

direct U.S. agencies such as A.I.D. and USFS to

expand activities in these areas, as well as to work

together more often (e.g., as they did in Honduras on

a project contracted by USFS and funded by A.I.D.

in 1989).75

It may be even more important for the United

States to help make the TFAP and ITTO more

effective vehicles for promoting forest conservation

and improved commercial forest management (114a).

Tropical Forestry Action Plan—The TFAP was

designed to improve forestry practices in developing

countries through cooperative efforts between donors and host countries (see box 7-F). However, its

implementation has been criticized for stressing

export-oriented commercial forestry instead of conservation; failing to address issues such as land

tenure; perpetuating “top-down” planning; and

failing to develop the capabilities of host countries

(3, 36, 39, 101, 146, 224, 234, 259, 262). Some

groups oppose increased lending by MDBs for

73 For descrlptlons, ~= ~efs. 42,89, 151, 275; but also S= ~tici~~ in ref. 2~. CG~recenfly exp~d~ its ~date, to address tropic&d deforestation

through research on sustainable agriculture (42).

Td~blic Law 101.167 and A,I,D, ~eWlatlons ~ulre tie Wency to issue ~id~ce to i~ missio~ ~d bureaus on tie need to r~uce ~WIdlOUSe g=

emissions associated with i~s projects, and to identify key developing countries in which forest conservation along with energy efficiency and renewable

energy, could significantly reduce emissions.

75~e USFS hlstofically ~s h~ n. dlmc[ mandate for i~ intm~tio~] pmg~s$ congr~s could provide such aufhority, as we~ as provide stable

funding to the Forestry Support Program to directly serve NGOs and additioml fimding to the Forest Products Laboratory to develop new products

(including nontimber ones) from tropical resources and to transfer technologies to developing countries. The United States also could demonstrate

leadership by increasing research on reforestation of degraded tropical forest lands on its insular territories (278), through the USFS tropical forest

research centers (see box 7-E).
232 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

commercial logging projects until these issues are

resolved.

Two recent reviews, commissioned by the FAO

and the World Resources Institute (both original

cosponsors), confirmed many of these problems and

also noted that project quality control, public access

to information, and criteria for monitoring performance at the national and international levels are

lacking (264, 328). While the United States could

withdraw its support for and participation in the

TFAP, it probably is the only international vehicle

that could address these problems in a comprehensive manner.

The reviews recommended that TFAP be substantially restructured and redirected.76 Congress could

ask A. I.D., EPA, USFS, and the State and Treasury

Departments to assess progress in reforming TFAP.

Assuming the major problems are being resolved,

Congress could direct the agencies to increase

support for the new TFAP.77 This support can, for

example, include increased training for host institutions and NGOs, technical! assistance in assessing

needed policy reforms, and financial assistance in

carrying out new national Forestry Action Plans.

International Tropical Timber Organization

(ITTO) and Trade--Some people have called for

banning imports of tropical timber products in order

to reduce harvesting of tropical forests. Indiscriminate bans, however, might remove the few existing

incentives for improved management of those forests, which will continue to be cut for domestic

purposes and for foreign markets that do not impose

bans.

Alternatively, and along with improving the

TFAP, the United States could work through the

ITTO to link trade in tropical timber products with

improved forest management. The United States

could support ITTO efforts to have timberproducing countries adopt and implement guidelines

on sustainable forest management (1 18). It also

could support ITTO and other projects that explore

pricing reforms within host countries (e.g., increased

rents or fees from timber companies for the resources they harvest) and labeling mechanisms in

international trade. If labeling mechanisms could be

developed internationally, then imports (including

nontimber products) might be allowed only from

areas managed according to internationally acceptable forest management practices and labeled as such.

Improvements in internal pricing policies, labeling

mechanisms, and international guidelines for acceptable forest management could be incorporated

into new national Forestry Action Plans developed

under a revised TFAP. Moreover, ITTO and a

revised TFAP also might encourage harvesting only

in secondary forests, or at least reducing harvests of

low-value products in primary tropical forests. U.S.

influence in the ITTO currently is undermined,

however, because it is in arrears of dues (slightly

over $200,000). Congress could authorize payment

of dues and additional funding for financing ITTO

projects. 78

The United States and other developed countries

also could use ITTO and other forums to discuss,

with producer countries, lowering the high tariffs

that developed countries impose on imports of

processed tropical wood products. These tariffs are

enacted primarily to protect domestic processing

industries, but they lead to increased imports of

unprocessed tropical logs and reduce incentives for

better harvesting in tropical forests.79 Reducing

them would allow developing countries to obtain the

full market value for their resources, which might

stimulate development of more efficient processing

industries in these countries and allow them to

compete in world markets without subsidies from

their own governments (84, 204,215, 216).

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Effect” Press Release (Washington DC: Oct. 11, 1988),

World Resources Institute, Natural Endowments: Financing

Resource Conservation for Development (Washington DC: Sep

tember 1989).

World Wildlife Fund, “Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Conservation Tool, ” World Wildlife Fund Letter No. 1 (Washington DC:

1988).

Wright, L. L., J.H. CushmarL and P.A. Layton, “ ‘Dedicated Energy

Crops, Expanding the Market by Improving the Resource, ”

Biologue 6(3): 12-19, June/July/August 1989.

Wright, L. L., R.L. Graham, and A.F. llrhollow, “Short-Rotation

Woody Crop Opportunities To Mitigate Carbon Dioxide Buildup, ”

paper presented at North American Conference on Forestry

Responses to Climate Change (WashingtorL DC: Climate

Institute, May 15-17, 1990).

Young, A., “Hypotheses for Soil-Agroforestry Researck ” Agroforestry Today 1(1):13-16, January-March 1989.
Chapter 8

The Food System

. *
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EMISSIONS FROM THE FOOD SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Food Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Post-Harvest Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ALTERNATIVE PRACTICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rice Cultivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nitrogenous Fertilizer Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Land Use Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CFCs, CO2, and Refrigeration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cooking, Food Processing, and Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CO2 and Machinery, Fertilizer Manufacture, and Irrigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Research Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CFCs, CO2, and Refrigeration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nitrogenous Fertilizer Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .

Carbon Dioxide and Land Use Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CO2 and Machinery, Fertilizer Manufacture, and Irrigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER 8 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX 8-A: CALCULATIONS FOR FIGURE 8-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

243

244

245

251

253

253

256

256

257

259

260

260

261

262

262

264

264

265

266

266

270

Box

8-A. Overview of the World Food

8-B.

8-C.

8-D.

Nitrogen in the Food System . . . . . . .

Post-Harvest Food Losses and Waste

USDA’S Environmental Mission

Figure

8-1. The Food System . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Boxes

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .245

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .259

Commodity programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Figures

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,. 2 4 4

8-2. Contribution of Selected Food-Related Sources to Global Warmingin the 1980s . 246

8-3. Estimated Global Emissions of Methane . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-4. The Nitrogen Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-5. Effect of Nitrogen Fertilizer Application Rate on Maize

Soil Nitrogen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

Yield and

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

8-6. The U.S. Food System: CO2 Emissions From Selected Fossil Fuel Uses . . . . . . . . . 251

8-7. Consumption of CFC-11 Plus CFC-12 for Food-Related Refrigeration and

Other Uses in 1985, by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Chapter 8

The Food System

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The food system (see figure 8-1 and box 8-A)

encompasses all the activities associated with providing food to consumers. These include food

production (e.g., onsite clearing, cultivation, and

harvesting, and off site production of fertilizer and

other agricultural inputs) and post-harvest activities (e.g., food processing, transport, cooking) (see

figure 8-1).

Congress has become increasingly aware of the

environmental impacts of the food system and has

begun to address some of these through legislation.1

In addition to previously identified environmental

impacts of agriculture (pollution of surface and

groundwater by nitrate and pesticides, soil erosion,

depletion of aquifers to meet irrigation needs, loss of

natural habitat), the food system is now also

recognized as a potential contributor to global

climate change.

Figure 8-2 below shows the global food system’s

contribution to global warming in the 1980s. 2

Although estimates are uncertain, the food sector

may account for one-third of global methane (CH4

)

emissions; one-fifth of net global carbon dioxide

(C)2

) emissions3; up to 15 percent of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions; and anywhere from onetenth to one-fifth of current global nitrous oxide

(N2O) emissions. Food sector emissions of all these

gases will grow, barring efforts to contain them, as

efforts to provide food for the world’s growing

population intensify.

Uncertainty in agricultural emissions data currently makes it difficult to predict the efficacy of any

of the control methods available to reduce this

sector’s contribution to global warming, yet many of

these controls deserve consideration in their own

right as a means to combat other agriculture-related

environmental problems. Indeed, many have been or

are being considered by Congress for reasons other

than climate change,

In the United States and the industrialized

world in general, several options are available to

reduce food sector emissions in the near term.

Methane emissions from livestock could be reduced

by improving nutrient and manure management

(and, possibly, by increasing productivity) or by

reducing demand for livestock products.4 Fertilizers

and other sources of applied nitrogen, such as crop

residues and animal wastes, could be used more

efficiently; this may reduce N2O emissions, as well

as surface and groundwater contamination, and

would help conserve soil organic matter. Nitrogen

fertilizer manufacturing and onsite farm machinery

and cultivation practices could be more energy

efficient; while reductions in CO2 emissions would

be relatively small, other benefits such as decreased

local air pollution from fossil fuel combustion would

accrue. Land transformations that help remove

carbon from the atmosphere (such as converting

cropland to forest land) could be encouraged, while

those that increase CO2 emissions could be discouraged. In food refrigeration, emissions can be curbed

by preventing the release of CFCs from existing

refrigerators and eliminating their future use; and by

improving energy efficiencies. Further CO2 reductions could be achieved by designing stoves and

ovens that use energy more efficiently and by

increasing fuel efficiency in vehicles used in food

transport (see chs. 4 and 5).

In developing countries, slowing deforestation,

maintaining or increasing crop yields, and reducing

emissions associated with cooking can be more

effective, in the short term, than changing current

I such ~s the FOod Security .4ct of 1985 (Public Law 99-198) and the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 (Public Dw 101-624).

~Thcsc anci other estimates throughout the chapter arc rough and shouid be considered as order-of-magnitude estimates.

~~ls Cstlmalc ~cfcrs prlnl~iy t. Cmlssiom from~oo~pro~uffj{jn activities, including the clearing and burning Of fOr@S. Note hat ~e.$e Cmissions

are ,aircady included in deforestation estimates presented in ch. 7 but are discussed here to provide a more systematic understanding of the food sector.

In contrast, estimates of global COZ emissions from po.rt-h~ne.rt activities (including processing, transportation, and cooking) are not included because

(iata on which 10 derive such estimates arc iacklng; however, cmissions from these activities in the United Sta(es arc discussed below. Accurate estimates

of giobal crnisslons from cooking with biomass fucis arc also not avaiiablc,

QBY irlcrcaslng productivity (i.e., (hC ou~ut of mea[ or dairy products per unit of feed), the same amount of output could bc obtained from a s~l~cr

her(i size, thereby rcducmg total methane emissions. This assumes that the rate of output (e.g., milk beef,) per animal due 10 productivity enhancements

increa.scs faster than emlsslorrs of mc~~nc per animal and that the Icvcl of demand remains relatively unchanged.

–243–
244 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 8-l—The Food System

Food Production

Offsite activities

o Fertilizer

product ion

o Pesticide

product ion

o Equipment

manufacture

o Power

generation

Ons ite act i v i ties

o

0

0

0

0

0

Land clear

T i I I age

Livestock

operations

ing

Fer t i I izer use

Fossil fuel use

(machinery,

irrigation,

crop drying)

Rice cultivation

T

o Food losses

and wastes

Post-Harvest Activities

o Refrigeration

o Cooking

o Processing

r

o Transpor t

o Packaging

T-

~

1

0 Food losses

and wastes

— — I

:J

o Human o Consumption wastes

T

o Food losses

and wastes

(food wastes &

packaging)

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

patterns of fossil fuel use,5 Alternatives to clearing grams, multinational corporations, and participation

of tropical forests include increased use of agroforestry and “sustainable” agriculture, and decreased subsidies for cattle ranching on lands that

cannot support livestock for more than a few years

(see ch. 7). Crop yields maybe improved on existing

agricultural land with increased agricultural inputs

(e.g., fertilizers, irrigation, etc.), but this may increase greenhouse gas emissions per acre. Opportunities exist to reduce methane emissions from

livestock through technololgy transfer to developing

countries, but the relevant technologies may not be

readily applicable in most developing countries. In

general, direct U.S. Government influence in these

areas tends to be through the U.S. Agency for

International Development (A. I.D.), research proin multilateral lending institutions.

EMISSIONS FROM

THE FOOD SYSTEM

Activities in the food system affect the flows of

many substances to and from the atmosphere,

including small particles (aerosols) and numerous

trace gases. The system itself and key trends in

global food production and consumption are summarized in box 8-A. In some developing countries,

food production (i.e., activities up to and including

harvest) is the dominant source of greenhouse gases,

primarily because of CO2 emitted through land

transformations (e.g., land clearing and field burnSFo~~il fuel use M tie food sectors of developing cou&ies might rise in the future if farm mechanimtion md refrigeration increase; an impo~t

opportunity for industrialimd countries is to help developing countries increase the use of technologies that reduce costs of and emissions from such

increases.
Chapter &-The Food System ● 245

Box 8-A-Overview of the World Food System

Food production involves activities up to and including harvest-cultivation, manufacture and application of

fertilizers and pesticides, irrigation, and other practices (see figure 8-l). In 1985, the world’s production of plant

crops exceeded 3 billion metric tons, 60 percent of which was grains; meat, fish, and dairy products amounted to

an additional 0.75 billion metric tons (114, 133). In developed countries, agriculture represents about 3 percent of

the gross domestic product (GDP) output, whereas in some developing countries it contributes as much as 48 percent

of GDP (109).

World food production has increased rapidly during the last 40 years, although per-capita production leveled

off in the mid-1980s (114, 133). For example, grain yields per hectare more than doubled between 1950 and 1984

(12). To achieve this, existing agricultural lands and marine fisheries have been exploited more intensively, with

heavy dependence on fossil fuel, commercial fertilizers and pesticides, and water-worldwide fertilizer use

increased ninefold, irrigated acreage tripled, and farm tractor fleets quadrupled. Worldwide consumption of nitrogen

fertilizers increased by 60 percent from 1975-76 to 1985-86 alone, to about 70 million metric tons of nitrogen (111).

Water use for agriculture also has grown rapidly; more water is consumed in global agriculture than in all other

applications combined (2, 62).1

Agriculture also has expanded (and continues to expand) into previously uncultivated areas that are only

marginality suited for farming or ranching, including many mountainous and tropical forest areas. Varied

environmental stresses such as water pollution, soil erosion, downstream flooding, and loss of biodiversity have

come with this expansion.

A substantial portion of world crops is fed to animals. Nearly 50 percent of world coarse grain (i.e., barley,

corn, oats, rye, sorghum) production, and over two-thirds in the United States, as well as over 30 percent of the

world’s fisheries catch, is used for animal feed (89, 115). Livestock populations have increased rapidly since 1950

and exceeded 4 billion in 19882

, with India having the largest share (152). About one-third were cattle, and 8 percent

of these were in the United States. Chicken populations are also quite large, totaling about 9.7 billion worldwide

and about 1.3 billion in the United States alone (152).

Post-harvest activities take food once harvested or killed, through a varying series of steps (i.e., transportation,

processing, packaging, marketing, storage, and cooking) (see figure 8-l). In industrialized countries such as the

United States, most of the fossil fuel-related and CFC emissions associated with the food system result from

post-harvest activities. Cooking accounts for a relatively small portion of post-harvest emissions in industrialized

countries. In developing countries, however, cooking (mostly with coal or biomass) is probably the most important

post-harvest source of emissions.

1A ~hme, ‘(comwti” refers to Water withdrawn from surface or groundwater supplies and I.10t prompdy X-.J%@ @t

evaporates during use is considered consumed.

2Mclud~ ~Me, sheep, goats, pigs, hOfseS, ~~o~, ~ ~els.

SOURCE: OfWce of Technology ASessmentj 1991.

ing) and CH4 emitted through rice cultivation. 6

sources of CH4, particularly in the developing

Although global data on emissions from postharvest activities are poor, these activities are likely

the most important source of emissions in industrialized countries.

Food Production

Greenhouse gas sources from food production

activities include:

1. flooded rice fields, which are significant

countries of Asia;

2. livestock, a significant source of CH4 in many

industrialized and developing countries,

through direct emissions from animals as well

as their manure;

3. nitrogenous fertilizers, the use of which results

in N2O;

4. large-scale land transformations (e.g., clearing

tropical forests) in many developing countries

GPrcvlous ]and transformations still play a huge role in overall emissions. For example, rice paddies located on lands cleared tiousands of years ago

arc a major source of current methane emissions.
246 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 8-2-Contribution of Selected Food-Related

Sources to Global Warming in the 1980s

Energy use &

production 57%

Other industrial 3%

I

Selected foodsources* 16%

~,.Bi!bLand use

modifications 8%

Food-related sources include rice cultivation, enteric fermentation from domestic animals, nitrogenous fertilizers, biomass

burning, and CFCs from refrigeration; half of the emissions from

biomass burning are assumed to be food-related (1 43) (emissions

from biomass burning may be greater; see ref. 19a.) his would

increase the food related contribution by a few percent. The

“CFC” slice includes CFCs not used in the food system. We

assume that CO2 from fossil fuels used in cooking, food processing, packaging, and transportation are included in the energy-use

slice. The use of biomass for cooking is not included.

SOURCE: office of Teetrnolocw Assessment, 1991, ackmted from U.S.

5.

In

their

Environmental Prot”&tion Agency, Polky@tions forStabilizing

Global Climate, Draft, Report to Congress (Washington DC:

June 1990).

(see ch. 7); and, to a lesser extent, land use

changes in industrialized countries (e.g., urbanization), both of which result in COs

emissions; and

burning of vegetation to clear and/or prepare

land for agriculture (especially in developing

countries), which adds to atmospheric

concentrations of several gases, including

CO2

, CH4, N2O, and carbon monoxide.

general, emissions from food production and

contributions to climate change are difficult to

quantify because of the complex interactions of

biological and chemical processes in soils, water,

plants, animals, and the atmosphere, and because

studies are lacking for many topics and areas.7

Nevertheless, some approximations and projections

are possible. For example, EPA (143) estimates that

if current agricultural practices continue, CHA emissions from rice will increase by about 35 percent by

2025, those from livestock will rise by about 65

percent, and N4O emissions from fertilizers could

more than double.

Figure 8-3-Estimated Global Emissions of Methane

Rice paddies

Enteric fermentation

Biomass burning

Landfills

Other anthropogenic

Natural wetlands

Termites

Oceans & freshwater

CH4 hydrate

destabilization

~

Anthropogenic I f sources

) 4

t i

f {

t 4

1-— —–+

—T.—— 7 ——–– 1

o 5 0 100 150 2 0 0 2 5 0

Emissions (million metric tons/year)

Total methane emissions are about 290 to 960 million metric tons

per year; about 50 to 60 percent are from anthropogenic sources.

About 60 percent of the anthropogenic emissions are from

selected food-related emissions including rice cultivation, enteric

fermentation from domestic animals, and roughly half of the

emissions from biomass burning; we assume that about one-half

of the biomass burning emissions are agricultural-related deforestation (143). The estimate for food-related emissions does not

include animal wastes or post-harvest emissions from food losses

and wastes (although landfills include some emissions from the

latter category). Other anthropogenic sources include coal mining, and gas drilling, venting, and transmission.

SOURCES: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Sdentifie AssassmentotC/irnate Change, Summary and Report (Geneva:

Workt Meteorological Organization/U.N. Environmental Program, 1990); R.J. Cieerone and R.S. Oremland, “Biogeochemieal Aspects of Atmospheric Methane,” Global Biogeochemied Cyd6s 2(4):299-327, 1988,

Methane (CH4

Methane is produced when bacteria decompose

organic material in oxygen-deficient (i.e., anaerobic)

environments, such as sediments at the bottom of

flooded or rainfed rice paddies, landfills, and the

digestive tract of ruminant animals and termites;

CH4 is also emitted as a byproduct when wood and

other biomass are burned. Emissions from these and

other CH4 sources are very poorly characterized,

partly because they vary enormously on geographic

scales and over time. Available evidence indicates

that about one-third of total global CH4 emissions

comes from the food sector (16, 50); this represents

about 60 percent of total emissions from anthropogenic sources, or roughly 10 percent of global

warming in the 1980s.8

7A~~ough tie f~us in MS discussion is on CHd, N20, C02, and CFCS, large quantities of particulate are also emitted when forests md gr~slmds

are burned for agricultural purposes. ‘rhese partieulates are an important global source of cloud condensation nuclei, and clouds themselves are important

climatic variables (see ch. 2; also see ref. 19a for more extensive discussion).

g~ls ~sumes global CH4 emissions contributed about 19 percent of the global warming in the 1980s (143).
Chapter 8--The Food System ● 247

Photo credit: U.S. Department of Agriculture

Over 90 percent of the world’s rice is grown in the

developing countries of Asia. Global rice production has

tripled between the late 1940s and 1985. Methane is

produced when bacteria anaerobically decompose organic

matter in sediments at the bottom of paddies.

Rice Paddies—Rice provided about one-fourth of

the world’s cereal grains in 1985. China and India

produced well over half of the total, the United

States only 1 percent. Global rice production increased by nearly 200 percent between the late 1940s

and 1985, while acreage grew by 43 percent (1 14).

Estimates of CH4 released from rice paddies in the

mid-1980s range from roughly 25 to 170 million

metric tons, or about 15 to 30 percent of world

methane emissions from anthropogenic sources (16,

50) (see figure 8-3). Rice paddies thus accounted for

about 3 to 6 percent of the contribution to global

warming in the 1980s. These emissions estimates are

based on a few studies conducted in temperate

regions (California, Italy, and Spain), but because

C H4 emissions are likely to be highly site-specific,

the extrapolation of these data to other regions

(including tropical areas, where most of the world’s

rice is grown) is problematic. However, new data

from Japan, China, and the Philippines are now

becoming available (56, 78, 94, 154). Recent field

tests, for example, have shown that during the

growing season, rice fields in China emit up to 10

times more CH4 per hectare per hour than rice fields

in Europe and the United States (56). If new data

from China are representative of conditions in the

Far East (over 90 percent of the world’s rice is

produced in Asia), then CH4 emissions from rice

cultivation are higher than the estimates presented

above, although it is difficult to estimate by how

much.

Ruminants—Much of the world’s livestock consists of ruminant animals-sheep, goats, camels,

cattle, and buffalo (see box 8-A). One of the unique

features of ruminants is their four-chambered stomach, including one chamber called the rumen in

which bacteria break down food and generate CH4 as

a byproduct. Ruminants emitted an estimated 65 to

100 million metric tons of CH4 per year in the

mid-1980s, perhaps 10 to 20 percent of global CH4

emissions from all sources (16), or about 20 to 40

percent of total anthropogenic emissions.9 Therefore, ruminant digestion accounted for about 4 to 7

percent of the global warming in the 1980s, given

that all anthropogenic CH4 sources accounted for a

total of about 19 percent (143). Globally, cattle

account for about three-fourths of livestock CH4

emissions (58), or about 7 to 15 percent of total

global CH4 emissions from all sources. Beef and

dairy cattle in the United States account for about 1

percent of total global CH4 emissions (145).

The above estimates do not include CH4 emissions from animal manure. If manure decomposes

anaerobically, some of its organic matter is converted to CH4

. In industrialized countries, manure

handling practices at feedlots, dairies, and swine and

poultry farms may release significant methane. In

developing countries, however, most manure is

spread as fertilizer, burned for fuel, or left in

pastures; the magnitude of CH4 emissions from

these practices is poorly quantified but likely is low

since most decomposition takes place aerobically

(however, this leads to more CO2 emissions).

Preliminary estimates suggest global CH4 emissions

from manure are on the order of about 20 to 40

million metric tons per year (91, 141).

Biomass Burning-Burning vegetation contributes 20 to 80 million metric tons of methane per year,

or roughly 7 to 8 percent of global emissions from

%e amounts emitted per animal vary widely among species. A typical goat may emit 5 kg of methane per year, whereas a U.S. dairy cow might

average 84 kg over the same period (20), These averages mask variability arising from other factors such as diets.
248 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 8-4-The Nitrogen Cycle

Atmospheric nitrogen

N 2

//-\

Industrial Biological

Fixation Fixation

/

Volatilization

A ?

Nitrogen

Removed from

Cycle by

Harvesting

4

.

I

1 Livestock /---- I d,,

t q

N20 ~

1 Fertilizers I1

1- - - J4 / -.

,

1

-7F-

\ Ammonia \ Soil d /,%

1

Ii!

3

— — — — — — — —. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

.

-.

. . m.

——

Stmame

and

lakea

Denitrification

——————.

Groundwate r Denitrification

The cycling of nitrogen compounds from lightning and fires is not shown.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991; F.J. Stevenson, “soil Nitrogen,” fertilizer Nitrogen, Its Chemistry and hchrtology, V. Sauchelli (ad.) (New

York, NY: Reinhold Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 18-39.

anthropogenic sources and natural sources such as see ch. 7). Substantial but unquantified CH4 emislightning-induced forest frees (16, 19a, 50, 87, sions result from fires ignited deliberately-forests

143).10 This portion may be higher if recent data burned to produce rangeland or cropland; grasslands

indicating higher deforestation rates are correct (72; burned to enhance forage; and crop residues burned

i~e dl~~Wish ~.sl~ b-of vege~tion to clew ~d for agricultural purposes ffom burning of ‘hditiona.1 biomass fueb’ such ~ woo~ crop

residues, and manure for cooking and heating.
Chapter &The Food System ● 249

Box 8-B—Nitrogen in the Food System

Figure 8-4 shows how nitrogen flows through the environment Molecular nitrogen (N20--an element essential

to all plant and animal life--makes up 78 percent of the atmosphere, but few organisms can use it until it has been

“fixed” (i.e., made into usable compounds or ions). Much of the nitrogen stored in soil also is not readily available

to plants. Therefore, even though nitrogen is contained in relatively large amounts in the atmosphere and soil, it is

often the limiting nutrient in agricultural systems.

Some microorganisms take molecular nitrogen from the atmosphere (or the air spaces in soil) and convert (or

fix) it into ammonium and related nitrogen-containing compounds. Many microorganisms can do this, but the most

famous are bacteria that live m the root nodules of many legumes (e.g., peas, beans). Bacteria and fungi also

decompose organic materials (e.g., manure, crop residues) in the soil and release ammonia or ammonium as part

of their metabolic processes. Other bacteria then oxidize the ammonia or ammonium to nitrite, and another group

of bacteria then oxidizes nitrite to nitrate. This process is called nitrification. Nitrate and ammonium ions can be

directly taken up from the soil and used by plants. Animals then obtain nitrogen in the form of mom complex organic

compounds manufactured by plants.

Conversely, nitrogen compounds can be lost from the soil by leaching into ground and surface waters, and by

soil erosion. Moreover, yet another group of bacteria can convert nitrate, in the absence of oxygen, into gaseous

nitrogen compounds, including NZO, that are emitted into the atmosphere. This process is known as denitrification.

Other nitrogen-based gases, such as nitrogen oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2) (both of which are involved

in the formation of tropospheric ozone smog), are also emitted by these microbial processes. In fact, recent evidence

indicates that in some soils the emission of NO far exceeds that of NZO (106).

SOURCE: Office of Technology AWWmenc 1991.

to return nutrients to the soil. These emissions are

heavily concentrated in tropical countries, where

large areas of savanna and forest are burned or

cleared each year for agriculture (see ch. 7).11

Nitrous Oxide (N2O)

Agriculture introduces nitrogenous compounds to

the environment in the form of commercial fertilizers, legumes, and crop residues. N20 emissions from

soil and water occur through vitrification and

denitrification of these compounds (see figure 8-4

and box 8-B) and also result when vegetation is

cleared through burning (4, 19a, 27, 59, 146).

The magnitude of N20 emissions from terrestrial

and aquatic sources is very poorly characterized.

Based on annual increases in N20 atmospheric

concentrations, the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (50) estimates that total global N20

emissions should be around 10 to 17.5 million

metric tons per year; however, only 4.4 to 10 million

metric tons can be accounted for from known

sources (see ch. 2).

N2O emissions associated with fertilizer use are

not well understood and probably vary with factors

such as fertilizer type, method of application, and

amount applied. Worldwide nitrogen fertilizer conPhoto credit: International Fertilizer Development Center

Nitrogen from agricultural sources such as nitrogenous

fertilizers (e.g., anhydrous ammonia), crop residues, and

leguminous plants, can be converted to N20 through

chemical processes called vitrification and denitrification

which occur in both soils and water.

sumption is about 74 million metric tons per year.

China accounted for nearly 20 percent of this

consumption in 1987, the United States for about 13

percent (30). Current fertilizer-derived emissions are

on the order of 0.01 to 2.2 million metric tons per

year, about 0.2 to 20 percent of global emissions

I l~ge ~eas of taWrate.zone v%etation are burned annually from forest and ~s~d f~es (ch. 7).
250 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 8-5-Effect of Nitrogen Fertilizer Application

Rate on Maize Yield and Soil Nitrogen

Yield (tons/ha)

‘“l-----~’””

Y

, / .

4

.

/ -20 0

.

.’ ‘ Leachable nitrogen ,

in the soil

2

/’ .’ “ 100 .’

,- ..-

..-

.-

01 1 1 ,——---4

0 100 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 0 0

Application rate (kg/ha)

NOTE: Leachable nitrogen in the soil can be a significant source

of N20 emissions.

SOURCE: R.D. Hauck, “Agronomic and Public Aspects of Soil Nitrogen

Research,” Soil Use and hfanagernent6(2):66-70, June 1990.

from all sources, or about 10 to 80 percent of all

anthropogenic emissions (50).

The general relationship between nitrogen application rate and maize yields (see figure 8-5) illustrates that yields are highest at a certain optimal

nitrogen application rate; further additions result in

either stable or even lower yields (because nitrogen

is no longer used as effectively by plants), and

nitrogen concentrations build up in the soil. The

potential for nitrogen losses through leaching, volatilization, or denitrification grows.

Nitrogen application rates are generally higher in

developed countries. Although U.S. application

rates for wheat are comparatively lower than those

for many countries, U.S. rates for other crops (e.g.,

corn, rice) are among the highest in the world (64,

65). Although global fertilizer application data

provide a picture of overall intensity of fertilizer use,

they do not reveal whether nitrogen fertilizers

generally are being over- or under-applied for

specific crops and countries.

Leguminous crops (e.g., soybeans, peas, alfalfa)

also add nitrogen to agricultural soils; legumes use

atmospheric nitrogen directly and require much less

nitrogenous fertilizers than non-leguminous crop s

(see pp. 121-122 in ref. 128; see also box 8-B above

and “Alternative Practices” section below). Worldwide production of legumes increased by roughly 85

percent from the late 1940s to 1985. Two-thirds of

the world’s legume production is in developing

countries; only 2 percent is in the United States

(1 14).

Carbon Dioxide (CO2)

The flow of CO2 to and from the atmosphere is

influenced by food production in two ways:

1. changes in terrestrial carbon stocks associated

with land transformations, and

2. emissions from fossil fuel use. (See figure 2-9

inch. 2 for an illustration of the carbon cycle.)

Land Use Changes and Terresti”al Carbon—

Land transformations have characterized the entire

10,000-year history of agricultural development and

continue on a large scale today. Although concern

over deforestation now focuses on tropical areas,

many temperate forests have also been cleared at

least once during the last few hundred years. CO2 is

emitted in this process, and also when grasslands and

savannas are burned to enhance grazing conditions

and when carbon contained in soil organic matter is

carried off by erosion or converted into CO2 by

microorganisms. Urbanization claims additional

forest and agricultural land each year. These land

transformations greatly affect how carbon is distributed in organisms, soils, and sediments, and how it

flows to and from the atmosphere. The net result has

increased atmospheric carbon concentrations,

mostly as CO2 but also in the form of other carbon

compounds such as methane.

Today, up to one-fifth of net global CO2 emissions

may be attributed to clearing and burning tropical

forests for food production (see ch. 7). Additional

CO2 emissions result from burning savannas and

agricultural wastes, and using biomass fuels for

cooking (19a). Therefore, these activities might have

accounted for roughly 8 to 10 percent of the global

warming in the 1980s. As population and economic

pressures increase, the rate of deforestation could

accelerate. CO2 emissions from soil erosion may

account for about 1 to 2 percent of global emissions

(85), but data on this pathway are sparse and very

uncertain.

Fossil Fuel Combustion-Most food-related

CO2 emissions in the U.S. occur in the post-harvest

phase (see “Post-Harvest Activities’ below). However, fossil fuels are also used for food production,

for example to drive farm machinery such as tractors

and irrigation pumps and to produce, offsite, inputs

such as fertilizers and pesticides. Collectively, these
Chapter 8--The Food System ● 251

uses account for a relatively small share of world

fossil fuel use and for about 2 percent of U.S. CO2

emissions.12

Onsite Fossil Fuel Use---Global data are relatively poor but suggest that farms released perhaps

76 million metric tons of carbon annually during the

mid- 1980s through on site fossil fuel use (not including emissions from fertilizer and pesticide manufacture). 13 This represents about 1 percent of global

carbon emissions from fossil fuel use and accounted

for only about one-half percent of global warming in

the 1980s. Similarly, CO2 emissions from fossil fuel

use on U.S. farms during this period (about 14

million metric tons per year) represented about 1

percent of U.S. CO2 emissions from fossil fuels (see

figure 8-6). However, both total and per-hectare

energy use in the United States have declined

sharply since the mid- 1970s.14

Offsite Nitrogen Fertilizer Manufacturing—

Another 1 percent of world CO2 emissions from

fossil fuel use, or about 0.5 percent of the global

warming in the 1980s,15 results from commercial

fertilizer manufacture.l6 Nitrogen fertilizers account

for most of these emissions because they are

produced in large amounts and their manufacture

(often with natural gas as a feedstock) is very energy

intensive. l7 In the United States, nitrogen fertilizer

production accounted for about 0.8 percent of U.S.

CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use (see figure 8-6).

World fertilizer production increased at a rate of 6.2

percent annually from 1965 to 1985, and the outlook

is for continued growth, especially in developing

countries (1 13).

Post-Harvest Activities

Once harvested, some food is consumed directly

by livestock and humans. The bulk, however, is

processed, preserved (often though cooking), stored,

Figure 8-6-The U.S. Food System: CO2 Emissions

From Selected Fossil Fuel Uses

Percent of U.S fossil carbon emissions

Onslte fossil fuel

All fertilizer

Electrlclty

Comm./home refrlg

Food Industry

Resldentlal cooking

o 1 2 3

0 10 20 30 4 0

Emlsslons (million metric tons/year)

m Post-harvest activities

Food production

SOURCE: Office of Technology ~se.ssment, 1991.

and distributed with a certain amount of loss and

waste during transport. The major emissions from

these post-harvest activities include:

1, CFCs from refrigeration;

2. CO2 from fossil fuels used in food processing,

refrigeration, transport, and cooking, and from

biomass fuels used for cooking; and

3. CH4 from decomposition of food-related

wastes (including packaging).

Some of these post-harvest activities (e.g., food

transport, refrigeration) fall within sectors examined

elsewhere in the report but are highlighted here.

Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)

CFCs used in refrigeration are emitted through

refrigerant leaks, intentional venting (during manufacture, disposal, or repair), and deterioration of

insulation. Worldwide, about 47,000 metric tons of

CFC-11 and 85,000 metric tons of CFC-12—

roughly 15 percent of total consumption-are used

121n 1987, 1.6 ~d~ of ~nerD ~,ere ~~ed in agric~~e ( 103) (including dir~t use and energy WS~ to ~nufac~e fertifimrs and pesticides), Ollt Of

about 79 quads (137), This does not include energy used in post-harvest activities such as processing and transportation nor biomass energy used for

cooking.

13~e U,N. Fo~ ~d A@~]~re ~gani~tion (101) proj~t~titthe amount of energy to be l.1~ in 1985/86 for opemfig ftlrm IIMChillery ~d

for u-rigation would be 3.6 quads (95 percent for machinery and 5 percent for irrigation). Ifall is assumed to be petroleum, then projected emissions would

have been about 76 million metric tons (3.6 quads x 21 mgEttu).

[4per.hectare usage of diesel, gasoline, and liquid petroleum gas fell by 30 percent between 19?? and 1986 (103)

l~~s estfite ~mesto~l co2 emissiom from fossil fuel combustion of about 5.5 billion metric tordyem, total production of nitrogen fetitiem

of about 73 million metric tons (1986 estimate, from ref. 113); all fertilizer is produced with natural gas as a feedstoe~ which emits about 14.5 kg of

carbon per million Btu; and a nitrogen production efllciency of between 54 and 76 million Btu/metric ton of nutrient (based on ilmlIIOIlh and pri~d

urea production, respectively) (8). This figure may be an underestimate since some production uses coal and other fossil fuel feedstoeks.

ld~ese e~sslom are included in the manufacturing sector (see ch. 6).

ITMost commerci~ fi~gen ferti~ers combine hydrogen tiom methane with nitrogen ffOm the atmosphere tO prOdUCe @J’drOus monia.
252 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 8-7--Consumption of CFC-11 Plus CFC-12 for

Food-Related Refrigeration and Other Uses in

1985, by Region

United States

Western

industrialized

Easati~n;g~~

. . . .

Rest of world

} , , , 1

O% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%

Percentage of global consumption

= Other uses = Refrigeration

Total ■ 820 thousand metric tons/year

SOURCE: Derived from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of

Air and Radiation, Ana/ysk of the Environmenta//mp/kations of

the Future Growth in Denlafld for Partially-Halogenated Chlorinated Cwnpounds, draft report (Washington, DC: 1989).

for food-related refrigeration (see figure 8-7)

(142).18 CFCs used in the food system accounted for

about 2 percent of the global warming in the 1980s,

assuming that all are eventually emitted to the

atmosphere and that total CFC-11 and -12 uses

accounted for about 14 percent (143). Most CFC use

in refrigeration occurs in cold storage warehouses,

retail refrigeration, and refrigerated transport.

Lesser, but still substantial, amounts are used in

residential refrigerators and freezers.

Global use of CFCs has increased dramatically

during the 60 years they have been commercially

produced. From 1976 to 1986, despite mounting

evidence of the ozone-depleting properties of CFCs,

CFC-12 refrigerant sales increased by over 50

percent.

19 The United States used 41,000 metric tons

of CFC-11 and CFC-12 for food refrigeration in

1985. This represents one-third of world use for

food-related refrigeration and about 19 percent of

total U.S. use of the compounds (142).

CFC use is expected to rise rapidly in developing

countries. With the promise of funding from the

industrialized world, however, key countries such as

China and India are expected to join the Montreal

Protocol and pledge to reduce and eventually phase

out CFC use (97). (See box 2-C in ch. 2 for more

details on the Montreal Protocol.)

Carbon Dioxide (CO2

)

In developing countries, residential cooking is by

far the most significant source of post-harvest CO2

emissions. In industrialized countries, the most

significant post-harvest activities are processing in

the food industry, residential cooking, and refrigeration (i.e., powerplant emissions attributed to the

energy needs of refrigeration). In the United States,

energy used for residential and supermarket refrigeration, residential cooking, and food processing and

packaging accounted for about 5 percent of U.S. CO2

emissions from fossil fuel use (see figure 8-6), or

roughly 1 percent of global emissions from fossil

fuels. Additional CO2 emissions arise from other

activities (e.g., energy use in food wholesaling,

restaurants, and food transport).

In general, more fossil fuel is used in industrialized countries for post-harvest activities than during

food production. Even so, CO2 emissions from

post-harvest activities are relatively small compared

with those from the energy, building, transportation,

and manufacturing sectors (chs. 3 through 6).

Food Refrigeration—Accurate estimates of

worldwide CO2 emissions from refrigeration are not

readily available, although estimates for specific

countries suggest they are important within the food

sector but small relative to other sectors.

In the United States, energy use for household and

supermarket refrigeration accounted for about 3

percent of total U.S. CO2 emissions in 1985 (see

figure 8-6).20 Of this, two-thirds (24 million metric

tons) can be attributed to domestic refrigeration, and

about one-third to refrigeration at supermarkets. As

refrigerators have ‘‘saturated” the market in industrialized countries and average energy efficiencies

have improved (1, 107), growth in energy use for

refrigeration in these countries has slowed.

By contrast, refrigeration in China accounts for

only a small fraction of national energy use (only 0.4

percent of which goes to generate all electricity), but

this is rapidly changing. Between 1979 and 1987, for

example, China’s production of refrigerators inISCFC-11 1S ued to produce foam tiulatiow CFC- 12 is used PrimaIi ly as a rtigeran~ although it also is used to produce insulation.

l~s ~cludes o~y rewfig cclrnp~es Of the Chemical Manufacturers Association which includes most producers h COUUtrieS with market

economies at that time (15).

=S estimate does not include emissions from food transportation or from commercial refrigeration other than in supermarkets.
Chapter 8---The Food System ● 253

creased by a factor of 125, and many of the several

hundred million households that still do not have

one may acquire one in the next decade.

Processing, Transportation, and Cooking—h

the United States, post-harvest activities accounted

for over 19 million metric tons of emissions in 1985,

or about 1.5 percent of U.S. fossil fuel CO2

emissions (see figure 8-6); over 40 percent of this

came from purchased electric power (136). Cooking

in residences contributed approximately 12 million

metric tons of emissions, roughly 1 percent of total

U.S. carbon emissions. Emissions also result from

transporting food, but they are poorly quantified.

(See ch. 5 for details on transportation sources in

general.) The overall magnitude of emissions from

other sources-such as cooking in commercial

establishments and heating of hot water for dishwashing--cannot be readily calculated, In the

United States, these emissions could be important

given that about half of all meals are prepared

outside the home.

In developing countries, cooking is the major

source of CO2 emissions from post-harvest activities

and accounts for most household energy use (92).

Energy use in transportation and processing is

relatively small. Although CO2 emissions from

cooking have not been quantified, the most common

cooking fuels (e.g., biomass, coal) have high carbon

content. Traditional biomass fuels (animal dung,

crop residues, wood, etc.), which may account for as

much as 15 percent of world energy use, are used

extensively for cooking (44) and food processing

(e.g., for drying). Coal also is very important in some

regions. Over one-fourth of coal use in China, the

world’s largest coal consumer, is for domestic

purposes, primarily for cooking (45; also see ch. 9).

Methane (CH4

)

Following preparation and consumption of food,

solid wastes (e.g., food residues, packaging) and

sewage are generated. Under some disposal conditions, these wastes result in the emission of CH4 to

the atmosphere. In landfills, for example, carboncontaining compounds decompose in two stages—

frost aerobically, producing CO2 emissions; then,

once oxygen is used up, anaerobically (i.e., without

oxygen) by methane-producing bacteria. Landfills

may emit about 30 to 70 million metric tons of CH4

annually worldwide (see figure 8-3), about one-half

of what livestock emit (7, 16). In the United States,

about 6,000 municipal solid waste landfills were

operating in 1986 (127).

ALTERNATIVE PRACTICES

This section discusses alternative practices that

could be pursued to reduce future greenhouse gas

emissions from the food sector. While the overall

costs and benefits of these practices are not clearly

defined, collectively they could substantially reduce

some emissions. Many would carry other environmental benefits as well----e. g., reducing water pollution from croplands, reducing soil erosion, conserving water supplies, preserving biological diversity,

and reducing waste generation in food processing.

However, tradeoffs may be associated with some

alternatives. For example, some tillage practices

used to conserve soils require more pesticides. Also,

to reduce the pressure to open new lands to

agriculture, crop yields must be increased on existing acreage, which may require greater use of

fertilizer and other inputs.

Livestock

Livestock directly produce about 10 to 20 percent

of the world’s CH4 emissions through digestive

processes, and indirectly produce additional emissions from anaerobic decomposition of manure (see

figure 8-3). They also indirectly account for emissions of CO2 and N2O by virtue of the land and

agricultural inputs required to sustain them.

Decrease Methane Emissions Per Unit of Output

Opportunities exist for reducing, or at least

limiting, the growth rate of CH4 emissions from

livestock by increasing digestion efficiency and/or

animal productivity (i.e., the amount of animal

product produced per unit of feed). Emissions

reductions on the order of 25 to 75 percent per unit

of product are thought to be possible21 (141), with

most potential for change in developing countries

(industrialized countries have already made strides

in raising more productive animals). This range of

possible emission reductions roughly corresponds to

—

zl~e upPr end of fiis range mswes that: techniques to improve the diet of animals can be successfully introduced into developing countries; these

improvements will result in a twofold to threefold increase in productivity; and the number of livestock will decline as productivity increases, assuming

demand for animal products remains constant.
254 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

a 2- to 5-percent reduction in global CH4 emissions 5. improve reproductive efficiency.

(29).22

Specific options include (141): Enhancing animal productivity can reduce CH4 ,

emissions given the following assumptions: that by

1.

2.

3.

4.

supplement the diets of grazing animals to

correct nutrient deficiencies often found in

lower quality forage;

substitute feeds with low CH4-producing potential for feeds with higher CH4-producing

potential in the diets of animals in confined (as

opposed to free-ranging livestock);

develop feed additives that increase digestion

efficiency and reduce methanogenesis in the

rumen;

use growth promotants (e.g., bovine somatotropin); and

increasing productivity, the same amount of output

could be obtained from a smaller herd size; that the

rate of output (e.g., milk, beef) per animal increases

faster than emissions of CH4 per animal; and that

consumer demand for these products remains relatively stable. It is also assumed that more productive

cattle could be brought to market sooner, decreasing

the total lifetime CH4 emissions per animal. The

assumption that increased productivity could lead to

fewer livestock (and, thus, lower total CH4 emissions) could be challenged, though. In fact, a large

unmet demand for cattle products in developing

 from wastes; assuming penetration of technologies to improve livestock 

countries.
Chapter 8--The Food System ● 255

countries could lead to greater livestock populations

even if productivity increases.

Many productivity-enhancing/methane-reducing

strategies have been used with great success in the

United States and could be transferred to other

countries, However, for some countries, especially

in the developing world where most cattle graze in

unconfined situations, it is difficult to determine

how effective some of these options would be.

For example, feed additives called ‘ionophores,’

which can increase digestion efficiency, currently

are feasible only for confined cattle and therefore

may not be of immediate utility in developing

countries. 23 Growth hormones, such as bovine

somatotropin, have been used in nondairy cattle to

increase productivity per animal.

Another option, increasing the reproductive efficiency of animals, could help reduce CH4 emissions

by decreasing the number of cattle needed to

produce calves. This could be accomplished by

increasing nutrient-use efficiency, as described

above, as well as by improving breeding techniques. 24 However, some highly productive breeds

developed in industrialized countries may not adapt

well to the different environmental and feeding

conditions of some developing countries.

Reduce Methane From Animal Wastes

Manure storage piles, pits, and lagoons are

commonly used to reduce runoff from feedlots into

surface water and groundwater (e.g., 19, 32). Methane could be collected from these sources for later

use as a fuel, with technologies such as specially

designed biogas generators (141). About 50 to 90

percent of CH4 generated from waste lagoons could

potentially be recovered (28), achieving reductions

of up to 1 percent of total CH4 emissions (29). This

option is applicable where animals are kept in

confined situations, that is, primarily in industrialized countries.

In many developing countries, dried animal manure is an important fuel for cooking and heating;

that not used for cooking generally remains in

unconfined, pasture/forage systems. However, if

manure were collected and processed in anaerobic

digesters (see box 3-A in ch. 3), the CH4 generated

from this process could offset some of the demand

for wood fuels.25

Reduce Demand for Livestock Products

Finally, CH4 emissions might be reduced by

shifting meat production and consumption from

ruminants to non-ruminant animals, such as fish,

hogs, or broiler chickens, or to more vegetarian

diets. 26 For example, to produce a given amount of

protein, feedlot beef require nearly five times as

much feed as catfish raised in intensive aquiculture

systems (82). Lowering livestock numbers could

also help reduce: nitrogenous fertilizer used in

growing feed for livestock (and associated N20

emissions); pressures to expand agricultural acreage

in some countries; declines in soil productivity from

overgrazing; water pollution from erosion and from

runoff of wastes; and health costs of high cholesterol

diets, depending on what other foods are substituted

in diets (104).27

However, because animal products are also good

sources of calcium, iron, zinc, and high-quality

protein, reducing their consumption in developing

countries may put further nutritional stress on people

in some of these areas. In these countries, increased

demand for vegetable protein substitutes may also

create additional burdens on already stressed grain

supplies and have adverse environmental impacts.

For example, increased demand for poultry and hogs

would require increased amounts of feed and expanded manure handling. Moreover, reducing livestock numbers in developing countries may be

especially difficult because of the multifaceted

economic and cultural role they play. In many

developing countries where livestock are used

z31t also my be possible t. preheat feds wi~ genetically engineered bacteria designed to inhibit methanogenesis (i.e., tO decrease ~4). However,

this is seen as a more long-term option and would apply mostly to confiied cattle (141).

24F~r ~up]e, sc]ectlon for ~crem~ pr~uctivl~ k the &@ industry has enabled milk production to increase over the last seve~ decades, even

as the number of dairy cows has fallen.

tiln tie 1970s, c~encouaged tie b~ld~g of f~y.s~~ biogas digestms ad ~so built hun~ds of ‘‘biogas smtions’ for motor vehicIe fuels

as well as small biogas-fueled electricity generators. However, because of poor construction and maintenance, and in some cases, inadequate supplies

of fermentable materials, the number of family-sized digesters declined from about 7 million in the 1970s to about 3 to 4.5 million by 1984 (149).

Zb’I’hiS is alr~dy ~curnng to some extent in the United States, mainly because of greater health consciousness and because nOn-IUmiMnt prOtein

sources are becoming more economical.

Z7~e Sugeon Genera]’s repo~ ( 104) noted that the major dietary sources of fat for Americans are animal products and recommended ‘ ‘[rleduce[dl

consumption of fat (especially saturated fat) and cholesterol. ’
256 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

primarily for draft power and are kept as religious or

status symbols, opportunities for emissions reductions may be limited.

Rice Cultivation

In the near term, our ability to reduce CH4

emissions from rice appears very limited. However,

according to a panel of experts convened by the

IPCC, a long-term research effort begun today and

focusing on new irrigation techniques, more efficient fertilizer use, and developing new high-yield

rice species may someday (e.g., two decades) enable

global emissions reductions on the order of 10 to 30

percent (29).

High-yield varieties grow more quickly, permitting more than one crop to be grown per year. In

theory, increasing rice yields per hectare might

reduce the need to expand production onto uncultivated lands, thus reducing total CH4 emissions.

However, annual CH4 emissions per acre will also

increase with double harvesting. It is unclear

whether increasing harvests on existing lands would

result in higher or lower net annual greenhouse gas

emissions than clearing new lands for production.28

Average yields have not increased significantly

since high-yield rice varieties were introduced in the

mid-1960s, however, and are not expected to increase dramatically without new technological

breakthroughs (12), for example, genetic engineering to enhance resistance to viruses (37, 67).

Although existing high-yield varieties produce less

methane than traditional varieties (because of a

higher grain-to-straw ratio),29 no new technologies

to reduce per unit CH4 emissions are anticipated in

the near term (143).

Better flood control might help increase the

production efficiency of high-yield varieties, which

tend to show lower and more variable yields under

flooded conditions than under controlled irrigation.

Fertilizer losses from intermittent flooding would

also decline. More research is needed to develop

varieties that consistently produce high yields under

different conditions (e.g., dry upland environments,

rain-fed conditions); and to eliminate the need to

flood rice fields where flooding is not natural (e.g.,

California, South American savannas). Although

rice grown under dry-land conditions emits much

less methane than rain-fed or flooded rice paddies,

dry-land rice accumulates more soil cadmium (a

potentially toxic trace metal) than paddy rice. This

is a problem in some major rice-producing countries

where soil cadmium levels are already high (55).

Nitrogenous Fertilizer Use

If current trends continue, world fertilizer use will

double over the next few decades, rising 1.3 percent

per year in industrialized countries and 4 percent per

year in developing countries (150). Fertilizers often

are used very inefficiently; in parts of Asia, for

example, fertilizer losses are estimated to be about

50 to 60 percent of the amount applied (100).30

Inefficient fertilization practices result in losses of

soil nitrogen through several pathways. Denitrification is the predominant mechanism of loss,

through N20 formation (see box 8-B). The level of

N20 emissions from fertilized soils depends on

many factors: fertilizer type and amount, application

technique and timing, tillage and irrigation practices, use of pesticides, soil and crop type, and

amount of residual nitrogen in the soil. N2O emissions rates per hectare of cropland can vary by three

orders of magnitude depending on how the above

factors interact (9).

Several options are available to increase fertilizer

efficiency or reduce the need for fertilizers and

thereby reduce N20 emissions, although the extent

to which emissions can be reduced is not known.

Nonetheless, other environmental benefits such as

reduced nitrate contamination of groundwater and

surface waters can also be achieved. These options

include:

1. efficient fertilizer application,

2. low N20-emitting fertilizers,

3. slow-release fertilizers,

4. vitrification inhibitors, and

5, leguminous sources of nitrogen.

More Efficient Fertilizer Application

The efficiency of fertilizer use can be increased by

determining: how much nitrogen is already available

in the root zone as well as how much crops can

2sIn addition, ~@.field v~eties c)ften re@re greater ~OllntS Of OrgtiC ~d chticrd f@dkrS.

~n addition to organic material at [he bottom of rice paddies, straw or the stalk of the rice plant itself is an additional source of organic material that

can also decompose to form methane.

~ertilizer use efficiency refers to the amount of nitrogen in fertilizer applied to the soil that is ultimately taken up by plants.
Chapter &The Food System ● 257

optimally use; when during the growing cycle

fertilizers are most needed; and at what depth they

should be placed for various tillage systems. Under

certain conditions, for example, fertilizers applied in

the spring emit less N2O than those applied during

the fall (143). Efficiency also can be doubled under

some conditions by placing fertilizers deep in the

soil, rather than ‘‘broadcasting’ them on the surface

(loo, 143).

Low N2O-Emitting Fertilizers

The N2O emission potential of various fertilizers

has been studied only under highly site-specific

conditions (10, 11, 35, 96), limiting generalizations

about emissions reduction potential of particular

fertilizers. Research is needed on emission levels

under a variety of field and cropping conditions.

Studies suggest, however, that emission rates may

vary by one or two orders of magnitude, with

generally higher emissions for anhydrous ammonia

than for other nitrogenous fertilizers (143).31

Slow-Release Fertilizers and

Vitrification Inhibitors

Greenhouse studies with flood-irrigated rice suggest that slow-release fertilizers can considerably

reduce denitrification (46) and allow for more

efficient plant uptake. Under certain conditions this

can double fertilizer efficiency (100); whether N2O

emissions are simultaneously reduced is unclear.

Also, slow-release fertilizers may continue releasing

nitrogen after plants have been harvested, thereby

creating the potential for nitrate production and

leaching as well as additional N2O emissions during

the winter and early spring (48). Slow-release

fertilizers are not likely to become a viable technology until production costs drop.

Chemical additives in fertilizers can limit soil

vitrification processes and, in turn, reduce the

amount of nitrate available for denitrification. A

wide range of chemicals has been registered and sold

in the United States for use as nitrification inhibitors,

and under certain conditions these can reduce

nitrogen losses and increase fertilizer efficiency by

30 percent (47). Like slow-release fertilizers, these

compounds may only delay the emissions of N2O.

After the plants have been taken out of the ground at

harvest and nutrient uptake ceases, more soil nitrogen becomes available for nitrification, which then

can lead to further emissions.

Leguminous Sources of Nitrogen

Nitrogen can be added to the soil by growing

‘‘nitrogen-ftig’ legume crops such as peas or

beans (see box 8-B) in rotation with grains. A few

studies suggest that N2O emission rates from legume-based systems are similar to those Ii-em fertilized crop systems, and possibly higher if no-till

practices are used (43). If increased use of legumes

reduces demand for nitrogenous fertilizers, then CO2

emissions from fertilizer manufacturing might be

lowered. However, the lack of data on N2O emissions from legume cultivation and on the degree to

which legumes could offset fertilizer use makes it

difficult to determine the net effect on emissions.

Regardless of their effect on N20 emissions, the

planting of legumes makes sense from a soil

conservation standpoint (76).

Land Use Changes

As mentioned earlier, the food system’s single

largest contributor to global warming is deforestation (roughly 10 percent of the warming effect; see

ref. 143 and ch. 7). In developing countries as a

whole, deforestation is the dominant source of CO2

emissions; techniques to discourage tropical

deforestation are discussed in chapter 7. In this

section we discuss other ways to encourage land use

practices that store more carbon, techniques to

maintain or increase yields on existing agricultural

lands, and ways to cut production-related food losses

and wastes.

Encouraging Transformations That

Increase Carbon Storage

In developing countries a great deal of attention

has been given to agroforestry--growing trees along

with annual crops and livestock. The trees sequester

carbon and generate products and revenues for

small-scale farmers. (See ch. 7 regarding agroforestry’s potential to reduce deforestation.)

Replacing annual crops on existing agricultural

lands with perennial tree crops or woody plants

could provide a long-term ‘‘sink’ for atmospheric

carbon as well as produce desirable food products.

Examples are hazelnuts and chestnuts in temperate

311D fie United States, dy&OUS ammonia accounts for about 38 percent of nitrogenous fertilizer use; ammonium nitrate, 21 pereenq and urea, 11

pereent. [n Asia, urea accounts for about 60 to 65 percent of fertilizer use (100),
258 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

regions and palms in tropical regions. Whereas most

of the CO2 taken from the atmosphere during the

growth cycle of annual crops is released again during

post-harvest tillage, the roots of woody perennial

plants reach much deeper and lock carbon out of the

atmosphere for much longer periods (90). However,

woody crops still require fertilizer and pesticides.

Also, new varieties will have to be developed for

various cropping systems, and economic and cultural obstacles (e.g., development of sufficient

market demand, convincing farmers to switch farming practices) must be overcome.

With further research and development, several

wild, non-tree perennials, such as eastern gama

grass, giant wild rye, and Illinois bundleflower, may

provide the germ for future perennial agricultural

grains (26, 52, 84). Like their woody counterparts,

perennial grains would conserve soil and water

resources. However, the development of perennial

grain crops into widely used agricultural staples still

may be decades away.

Finally, taking highly erodible agricultural lands

out of production and converting them (or allowing

them to revert) to perennial grasslands or forests

helps conserve soil organic matter, a major carbon

reservoir. 32 This practice also helps protect surface

waters from agricultural runoff (124, 129, 138, 139,

140). N2O and CO2 emissions may also be reduced

through avoided fertilizer and fossil fuel use. Setasides can also increase or help maintain biological

diversity (129).

Maintaining or Increasing Yields

The rate of food production depends on crop

acreage and crop yields which, in turn, are determined by a complex set of variables, ranging from

soil and plant characteristics to pest outbreaks and

varying weather conditions. If per-acre yields are

limited or decline, food production can be maintained or increased only by expanding the area of

land exploited. In tropical forest areas, for example,

peasant farmers commonly respond to declining

yields by converting additional forest areas into

temporary croplands or by recultivating formerly

abandoned areas that have regrown a ‘‘secondary’

forest. Such transformations are likely to continue

unless efforts are made to redistribute land, slow

population growth, and stabilize or even increase

yields.

Several techniques can be pursued in both industrialized and developing countries to maintain yields

while limiting greenhouse gas emissions and limiting area of land used. More efficient fertilization

practices and techniques to maintain or increase

yields for rice were discussed above. It is important

to note that the push to increase yields may require

additional fertilizer inputs. As maximum yields are

reached, nitrogen efficiencies begin to drop (see

figure 8-5), which could lead to greater N2O

emissions and other adverse environmental impacts.

Reducing Food Losses

Food losses from pest damage may cut world food

production by one-third and rice production by up to

50 percent (74). Adverse weather conditions account

for the largest annual variations in food production

(74), which is ominous in view of possible future

climate change. Yields also can be unintentionally

reduced by human activities.33

Efforts could be increased to reduce various

wastes and losses in the food system. Techniques for

reducing erosion (e.g., conservation tillage,

streamside tree plantings) would help maintain

productivity (e.g., see 5,76, 120, 122). Post-harvest

losses and wastes from pests, spoilage, and other

factors could be reduced in several ways (see box

8-C). Nutrients from human wastes (e.g., food

residues, sewage) can be recycled back into the food

production system, rather than relegated to landfills

or discharged into surface waters. Treated wastewater from sewage treatment plants is now being

used for aquiculture (124) and for irrigation water in

countries like Israel (95). Recycling food wastes and

sewage wastewater can help improve soil quality,

thereby reducing the need for supplemental fertilizer

and other energy inputs. However, the costs of

processing and transporting wastes and the problems

associated with chemical and biological contaminants in the wastes (124, 127) pose disadvantages.

s?-~e us. D~~ment of Agri~l~re’s CoMemation Reseme Program is designed to do just th.is (WX ch. 7 a(ld “Pohcy @tiO13S” ~low). Note tit

this option is viable onty in areas that have excess amounts of land in production.

JJFor ex~p]e, Cmp productivity Can dec~e if SOfis hcornc more saline as a result of excessive irrigation or u lost due to erosion. S011 CXOSiOrI

removed over 2.7 billion mernc tons of soil in the United States in 1982 (131). Air pollution from nearby urban areas also carI undermine crop yields.

For example, ozone from localized air pollution in the United States reportedly reduces yields of key crops by 1 to 20 percent in various crop-growing

regions (63, 126).
Chapter 8---The Food System .259

Box 8-C—Post-Harvest Food Losses and Waste

From the moment of harvest to the time food reaches the consumer’s mouth, food losses and waste occur; these

range from deterioration in food quality to consumption by rodents or disposal as household garbage. Worldwide

losses and wastes appear to be substantial. For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that about

5 to 16 million metric tons of fish are caught and subsequently discarded by fishing vessels each year; this represents

6 to 20 percent of the amount that is retained (115). Additionally, about 10 percent of fresh fish supplies may be

lost because of post-harvest problems such as inadequate refrigeration. A study in the early 1980s suggested that

individual American households may waste 6 to 25 percent, or more, of their food-perhaps $30 billion of food

(34). Despite these and other examples, though, the magnitude of total losses and wastes remains very poorly

defined at all levels, from the local to the global scale.

In industrialized countries, post-harvest food losses up to and including the storage, processing, and packaging

steps (see figure 8-1) were relatively minor in the 1970s (1 to 2 percent) compared to developing countries, where

such losses totaled at least 10 percent and often were higher (25a). However, for secondary food processing,

marketing, and consumption, the situation is reversed. In industrialized countries, large amounts of food from eating

establishments outside the home (e.g., restaurants, cafeterias, airlines, carry-out fast food outlets) are wasted on the

plate and generally are discarded as garbage. In developing countries little food is wasted in this manner.

Cutting such losses and wastes offers an opportunity to increase food supplies without expanding food

production. This would help alleviate pressures on land crops and on fisheries, thereby facilitating efforts to slow

land transformations, and it also could help reduce the use of commercial fertilizers and fossil fuel inputs. Largely

motivated by a desire to improve diets around the world, a variety of national and international organizations have

called for efforts to reduce post-harvest losses and wastes (110, 117).

Serious obstacles impede progress in reducing losses, however. Even where losses can be quantified, solutions

may not be cheap or easy. Where losses and wastes are large and they can be reduced in a cost-effective manner,

a variety of opportunities are available. These range from encouraging education, training, and alternative

technologies, to supporting economic and social changes and financing a broad spectrum of local, national, and

international institutions (69, 75).

SOURCE: WIcc of Technology AsseasmenL 1991.

CFCs, CO2, and Refrigeration Other opportunities include using different working fluids (41, 68, 142) and energy sources. For

New refrigeration systems are significantly more example, refrigerators can operate on energy sources

energy efficient than older systems and, hence, emit such as natural gas, solar energy, and heat generated

less CO2 from electricity requirements. However,

efficiency improvements have not led to comparable

reductions in CFC emissions; indeed, these improvements are partially attributable to greater use of

CFCs in insulation. Political pressure, however, is

building to reduce both CO2 and CFC emissions,

and some new systems and components can reduce

or eliminate CFC use (both as a refrigerant and as

insulation) and reduce CO2 emissions. Some promising systems involve highly effective CFC-free

insulation that improves energy efficiency (155,

156). Using smaller refrigerators also can reduce

CFC and CO2 emissions. 34

from waste materials (14, 79, 105), all of which

would reduce CO2 emissions and energy costs. The

major drawback is the capital cost of shifting to new

technologies.

Emissions from CFCs already in use as refrigerants could be limited by minimizing accidental

emissions during repair (e.g., from leaks) and by

sequestering and/or destroying CFCs instead of

venting them during repairs or prior to final disposal

of refrigeration systems (33, 51, 77).35 The primary

drawbacks are the costs of recovery and disposal and

the costs of purifying CFCs for reuse (e.g., 73).

MU.S. refrigerators rquire more CFcs and ener~ to operate than units in most other industrialized countries. III 1983, the typical tJ.s. refrigerator

consumed roughly 1,290 kwh, as compared to 480 kWh for the typical German unit (93), principally because of the much larger size of U.S. units.

Sssome countries (e.g., West Germany) (80) and States (see app. B) have programs in place to encourage the use of rePair equipment mat PrevenE

CFC 10SS (80). This technology can be implemented quickly.
260 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Existing inefficient equipment also could be

retired early in order to accelerate deployment of

better technologies. The advantages include the

possibility of rapid implementation, reduced fuel

costs for new equipment, and, in some cases,

reduced costs for electric utilities, which may be

spared building additional generating capacity (39,

40). The primary disadvantages are the costs of

collection and disposal and of purchasing a replacement unit.

Cooking, Food Processing, and Packaging

Emissions from cooking can be reduced, in

theory, by changing the types of energy used or by

improving fuel-use efficiency. Any strategy that

promotes these changes, though, must consider fuel

costs and availability, how cooking is normally

conducted, and dietary and social preferences. In

addition, improved cooking efficiencies may simply

allow more cooking with the same amount of fuel,

with no substantive change in emissions. Because

these considerations have not been fully explored in

different parts of the world, assessments of the

global potential for limiting emissions from cooking

cannot be made readily.

The United States and other industrialized countries emit far less CO2 from cooking than from other

activities (see chs. 3 through 6). Even so, emissions

can be reduced by using more efficient ovens and

stoves. In developing countries significant CO2 and

other emissions result from cooking with coal and

biomass (see ch. 7). Shifts to other fuels have

occurred fairly quickly in some cases.36 Increases in

cooking efficiency also have occurred-often

through improved cookstove designs (53, 66, 112)

(see ch. 7)--and can significantly reduce emissions

per unit of delivered energy; however, they do not

necessarily reduce total emissions. Where fuel

availability is already constrained, improved efficiencies may allow people to cook more or to shift

fuels to other end-uses such as heating (147).37

There are also opportunities in the areas of food

processing and packaging to improve energy efficiencies and switch to low-emission energy sources.

Options range from gas-fired cogeneration of electricity and process heat to more fundamental process

modifications (3).

CO2 and Machinery, Fertilizer Manufacture,

and Irrigation

Although the impact of reducing emissions from

farm machinery (e.g., engines, pumps) and fertilizer

manufacture would be relatively small (see figure

8-6), technologies to improve energy efficiency

could help reduce reliance on fossil fuels and hence

save farmers considerable expense. Promising options to reduce fossil fuel use during food production

involve changes in the character and efficiency of

field operations (e.g., more efficient farm vehicles

and irrigation, use of ethanol fuels, and innovative

tillage practices and crop drying techniques) and

improved efficiency in fertilizer manufacturing.

Alternative energy sources such as wind and solar

could be used for some operations (e.g., 38, 61).

Efficiency Improvements for Farm Vehicles

Over the next 10 to 15 years, for example,

farm-tractor fuel efficiencies could be improved by

5 to 15 percent with new technologies such as

adiabatic engines equipped with turbochargers, electronic controls, and onboard system diagnostics (6).

However, these technologies require upfront capital

expenditures and their long-term reliability is unknown. In developing countries their potential

impact is unclear. In addition to costs, some analysts

suggest that mechanization will be slow because

tremendous labor supplies exist (85).

Fertilizer Manufacture

Energy efficiency in fertilizer manufacturing has

improved substantially. By the mid-1980s, new

plants were using about 20 percent less energy than

in the early 1980s primarily due to energy recovery

equipment (21). Several new urea processes could

decrease energy requirements by another 25 to 50

percent relative to the U.S. plant average (24). CO2

emissions reductions gained by improving energy

efficiency could be negated, however, if more coal

replaces gas as a primary feedstock in the production

process.

sbFor c~ple, one Smly of urban households in India (cited in 66) fourid that from 1979 to 1984, woodfuel usc fOr heaw and coo~ fe~ from

42 to 27 percent of total energy use fclr those purposes, kerosene incra.sed horn 19 to 36 perumt, and liquefied petroleum gas grew from 7 to 12 percent.

qy~ one region of CM, for example, over 80 percent of rural households lack enough coal ad biomass for cooking ~d hm~, imprwti Cooking

efficiency may result in increasing fiel use for heating, with the result being higher comfort levels rather than reducti consumption or emissions (147).
Chapter 8---The Food System ● 261

Efficient Irrigation

The energy intensity of irrigation in the United

States continues to rise, primarily because of increased pumping of groundwater (49); the same is

true for some developing countries such as India and

China (12). For U.S. food production activities,

energy use for irrigation ranks third (behind pesticide and fertilizer manufacturing and use, and farm

machinery use) (13). Worldwide, more than 60

percent of irrigation water, on average, is lost due to

inefficient practices (86, 151). Technologies available to reduce water and energy use in irrigation

include: Low Energy Precision Application (LEPA)

designed to apply irrigation water and agrichemicals

in small amounts and in precise locations (128);

sprinkler and drip-irrigation systems to reduce

evaporation; monitoring of soil moisture so water

can be applied when needed; liners in canals to

prevent seepage; and lasers to measure field levels

so that water can be evenly distributed.38 Recycling

of agricultural runoff and municipal wastewater can

also reduce demands for irrigation water, but energy

requirements for pumping may be high.39

Ethanol Fuels

As discussed in the transportation sector (see ch.

5), corn-based ethanol emits from 10 percent less to

30 percent more CO2 than gasoline (23a). In 1987,

about 3.2 billion liters of ethanol were sold in the

United States, making this country the world’s

second largest ethanol consumer after Brazil (98,

153). Over 80 percent of U.S. ethanol plant capacity

in 1986 was dedicated to corn feedstocks (134). 40

Although the above estimates do account for the

additional CO2 emissions associated with the manufacture of fertilizers, pesticides, and other energyintensive inputs needed for increased corn production, other impacts-such as additional N2O emissions from fertilizer breakdown, increased soil

erosion, and other environmental problems associated with corn crops grown in monoculture must

also be recognized.

Innovative Tillage Practices

By simultaneously laying seed and herbicides

onto unplowed soil, a farmer can limit tractor tips

to just one per crop cycle. This can reduce fuel use

and attendant emissions, as well as enhance the

soil’s ability to retain organically bound carbon and

water. This and other ‘‘conservation tillage" practices are primarily used to control soil erosion.

However, they tend to require more herbicides for

weed control than conventional tillage and therefore

may result in greater N2O emissions (43). They also

require more seed.

Crop Drying

In the United States, most crops sun-dry in the

field. Some mops are dried with heated air, though;

this accounted for about 3 percent of total on-farm

energy use in 1978, mostly for corn and tobacco

(102). Liquefied petroleum gas and natural gas are

the most common energy sources. Alternative

sources such as solar energy can reduce fuel use by

as much as 20 percent (148). At present, 2 percent of

U.S. crops are dried using active solar energy

systems (123). Many passive solar crop drying

systems (i.e., systems that rely on natural air

convection) are in use in developing countries.

POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS

Most options discussed in the preceding section

individually provide relatively small potential for

reducing greenhouse gas emissions. But the sum of

such efforts may someday provide substantial emissions reductions. In the case of livestock and CFCs

for refrigeration-two categories that together accounted for about 6 to 9 percent of the global

warming in the 1980s—promising, substantial opportunities may exist in the near term. While

reductions in CH4 emissions from rice cultivation

are theoretically possible, technologies to achieve

this are much farther off and will require significant

research and development. Techniques to increase

fertilizer-use efficiency are currently available and

38 Reducing water use ako would a.llevhte pressures on existing water supplies, possibly reduce the costs of _ water avtihble (e.g.. government

costs of water projects, farmer costs for water rights), and cause fewer environmental problems (e.g., increased salt levels in soil), Sprinkler irrigation

techniques can reduce water use but require more energy for water distribution compared with gravity-flow systems (49), On the otber han~ pressurized

irrigation systems may help reduce fertilizer requirements (49).

s~er= from photovoltic SOlar cells and wind power can be competitive with traditional diesel engines, particularly where fid W@ieS ~d

maintenance services are expensive and unreliable and where onty a few thousand people are served (116; aIso see ch. 9).

4oMoSt e~nol is US@ for 10 percent blends tith gmoltie (i.e., “gasohol”). One study estimated that relying on ethanol for 10 percent of U.S.

automotive fuel demands might require about 40 percent of the corn harvest (88). Another study estimated that 20 to 25 percent of the U.S. corn crop

would be needed to completely replace gasoline use on farms (6).
262 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

will help reduce localized water pollution problems,

but their effect on N2O emissions is inconclusive and

will require more study. Improvements in fuel

efficiencies of farm equipment and fertilizer manufacturing are likely to result in minor CO2 emissions

reductions in developed countries, even less in

developing countries where the level of mechanization is low and is likely to remain so in the near

future.

This discussion focuses on policy mechanisms

that Congress could use both to implement some of

the technical options discussed above for the U.S.

food system and to influence international emission

reduction efforts. Policy considerations extend beyond technological factors to include many social,

political, and economic issues. In the United States,

for example, choices will be greatly influenced by

farm support programs (see box 8-D). In many

developing countries, efforts to limit food sector

emissions and to gain associated environmental

benefits will have to be linked with efforts to combat

poverty, inadequate nutritional levels, inequitable

land distribution, and rapid population growth (see

chs. 7 and 9).

Research Issues

One of the most important research priorities for

understanding the relationship between the food

system and global climate change is the development of an emissions database representative of

agricultural systems and growing conditions

throughout the world. For example,

better CH4 emissions data are needed from the

large rice-producing areas in Asia and the

Pacific; the general biogeochemistry of CH4

production in flooded rice paddies also needs to

be established;

factors affecting CH4 emissions from rice

cultivation, such as climate, soil and water,

species type, use of fertilizers, cultural practices, site, seasonal and diurnal variations, and

relationship to other greenhouse gas emissions

(e.g., N2O) (145), need to be studied to establish

representative emission factors;

the relationships between N2O emissions and

natural factors; fertilizer type, application rate,

and placement; residual soil nitrogen; cropspecific nitrogen uptake; soil and water conditions; and timing need to be established;

●

●

●

uniform, simple, and inexpensive techniques

for measuring CH4 emissions from rice paddies

and N2O emissions from all types of fertilized

soils must be established so that comparable

data can be collected worldwide; and

how CH4 emissions from livestock vary by type

and age of the animal and by type of management system (e.g., how and what animals are

fed; manure handling) needs to be enumerated

for the many regions throughout the world with

large livestock populations.

the relationship between biomass burning and

emissions of trace gases (including CH4

, N2O,

NO, and others) and the effects of such burning

on the atmospheric and terrestrial environments.

Many international organizations already fund or

coordinate agricultural research (e.g., International

Fertilizer Development Center, International Board

for Soil Research and Management, International

Council for Research in Agroforestry, InterAmerican Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture)

(23, 125). However, there is no overall promotion or

coordination of research on the relationship between

agriculture and global climate change. The United

States could promote an international program to

focus greater attention on this issue and to develop

research protocols so that results can be meaningfully compared on a global scale. The Consultative

Group for International Agricultural Research

(CGIAR), an association of 13 regional and international agricultural research centers, might appropriately house such an effort.

Livestock

U.S. Practices

On the domestic front, Congress could direct the

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to determine the extent to which methane-reducing techniques, such as feed additives, ionophores, and other

nutrient management techniques, as well as animal

waste management, are currently used in the United

States. Such a program could also identify both

institutional and technical barriers that hinder more

widespread development and use of such techniques. Congress could provide additional support

(e.g., through the USDA Agricultural Research

Service and the National Science Foundation) for

research on these techniques.
Chapter 8---The Food System . 263

Box 8-D—USDA’s Environmental Mission and Commodity Programs

The USDA’s mandate under the 1985 Food Security Act (Public Law 99-198), the Food, Agriculture,

Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-624) and other statutes includes considering agriculture’s

effects on water quality, and the agency has established programs that seek to lessen these effects. For example,

through provisions such as the Conservation Compliance Program run by the Soil Conservation Service, about

800,000 farms were required to submit plans by 1990 to reduce erosion and to implement these plans by 1995. If

this is enforced, failure to comply with these plans will preclude eligibility for various commodity price supports

and other Federal programs.

However, other environmental effects are not explicitly included as part of USDA’s statutory mission.

Including a broader definition of environmental protection as a part of the agency’s mission could ensure that issues

such as the food sector’s effects on climate change are factored dirctly into national farm policies.

This could be particularly important with respect to USDA commodity programs, which are maintained to

stabilize and support crop prices and farmers’ incomes, as authorized in the Food Security Act. About two-thirds

of all U.S. cropland is enrolled in programs that support such crops as wheat, feed grains (e.g., corn, sorghum, barley,

oats), cotton, and rice. The cost to the Federal Government was about $11.6 billion in fiscal year 1990 (76).

Price and income supports are based on the amount of acreage devoted to a given crop (called “base” acreage)

and the average yield of that crop over the past 5 years (crop yields are currently frozen at the 1981-to-1985 average).

Farmers who plant any other crop besides the one designated for that base acreage not only lose payments for that

year, but also lower their base acreage for that crop and therefore lower future payments. This encourages farmers

to grow the same crop on the same plot of land, year after year, in order to maximize their Federal subsidies.

Furthermore, to comply with “cross-compliance” provisions (i.e., eligibility for a benefit depends on compliance

with other provisions), farmers may not plant any other crop unless it is within their allotted base. Therefore, a farmer

who wants to rotate crops using a crop in which he/she has little or no base acreage will lose all entitlements for

that year.

All of this encourages a tendency to overuse fertilizers and other inputs, because maintaining yields on

lands devoted to monoculture often requires significant amounts of these inputs. Excess fertilizer use, however,

can cause groundwater contamination (128), surface water eutrophication, N2O emissions from denitrification, and

loss of soil organic carbon.

Decoupling the rigid connection between Federal subsidies and production decisions would allow farmers

flexibility to plant crops based on market demand, without risking the loss of all income supports, and reduce

Federal expenditures on crops already in surplus (60,118,128).1 Proposals to achieve this include allowing farmers

to: 1) obtain payments for an enrolled crop, even if a portion of base acreage is planted with other crops; 2)

temporarily switch a portion of their base-acreage crop to another crop without losing the original base; and 3) plant

any combination of crops (allowed by USDA) within a designated “normal” acreage, if a certain portion of other

acreage on which these crops are grown is taken out of production. In fact, the 1990 farm bill (Public Law 101-624)

now allows farmers to plant a limited amount of selected crops on lands designated for other crops, without losing

commodity program benefits.

1~~ @OLU us-titthe Federal Government will continue providing fmancial assistance to farmersto compensate for droughts

and other poor growing conditions.

SOURCE: Offke of Technology Amessmen4 1991.

To limit future growth in, or even reduce, livestock producers might raise less meat. However,

livestock populations in the United States, Congress

could reduce or remove price supports (see box 8-D)

for feed grains, which might make beef and dairy

products more expensive (although it is unclear if

the costs would rise or fall in the long term). About

two-thirds of the total Federal grain subsidies apply

to livestock feed (76; also see box 8-D). Feed grain

farmers might grow other crops that make more

money and, if feed grain prices rose sufficiently,

this could cause large near-term economic disruptions for some farmers and portions of the food

industry.

Congress could also modify eligibility criteria in

the Conservation Reserve Program so that farmers

can choose to put more land now used to grow feed

grains into reserve; this also would reduce CO2

emissions from onfarm fossil fuel use and fertilizer

manufacture and N20 emissions from fertilizer use.
264 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Developing-Country Practices

In developing countries, programs to increase

productivity through improved breeding techniques

or to enhance animal waste management systems

must meet the special needs of livestock management systems in these countries, where livestock are

primarily pasture-fed and are used for many purposes other than provision of food. With this in

mind, Congress could contribute funds, through U.S.

bilateral aid programs and through multilateral

organizations (see ch. 9), to expand research programs in developing countries so that methane

reductions become an additional research priority.

For example, research institutes such as the International Livestock Centre for Africa and the International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases

are part of the CGIAR system, which receives U.S.

funding through A.I.D.

However, promoting technologies that lower

per-animal emissions or policies that reduce livestock numbers will probably be difficult. Many of

the technologies designed to reduce methane from

individual animals are geared toward controlling the

diets of animals in feedlot management systems,

which are less common in developing countries.

Also, efforts to introduce more productive livestock

breeds into developing countries must first recognize that the unique genetic qualities of indigenous

breeds that have evolved over thousands of years in

adaptation to different ecological conditions.

Because livestock in developing countries are

used for many purposes other than food production—as symbols of social status and wealth, for

their religious values, for draft (construction) activities, for the energy value of their manure, and as

alternative sources for income in the event of crop

failures-convincing peasants to change their livestock management habits or to reduce their livestock

numbers will probably be difficult.

Also, it may be difficult to decrease the lure of

cattle ranching to middle- and upper-class landowners and investors. In many countries (particularly in

Latin America), ranching is encouraged by national

development policies, land ownership patterns, and

land speculation (see ch. 7). Indirect opportunities

exist for Congress to influence this particular

situation, through its control of funding for bilateral

aid programs and influence on multilateral lending

institutions, but many obstacles must be overcome

(see ch. 7).

CFCs, CO2, and Refrigeration

In industrialized countries, obstacles to implementing energy efficiency options and other refrigeration improvements include consumer attitudes,

regulatory barriers, and technical problems (e.g.,

lack of equipment that can directly use replacements

for CFCs) (31, 108). The basic issues, though, are

not whether refrigeration can be accomplished more

efficiently and without CFCs, but how best to do this

and at what costs compared with the benefits of

emissions reductions.

Steering developing countries away from CFC

production, CFC-based refrigerators, and lowefficiency equipment will be more problematic.

Policy alternatives include encouraging these countries to sign and ratify the Montreal protocol, and

transfer-ring information, technologies, and capital

to enable them to pursue alternative and acceptable

refrigeration practices economically. Box 2-C in

chapter 2 discusses recent changes to the Montreal

Protocol, including funding mechanisms to help

developing countries.

Nitrogenous Fertilizer Use

Congress could promote more efficient fertilizer

use in the United States by changing commodity

programs so as not to encourage excessive production (see box 8-D) and to allow farmers to grow

crops and adopt practices that rely less on commercial fertilizers and other energy-intensive inputs,

without loss of program base acreage (41).41

Best Management Practices (BMPs) are designed

by the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) to reduce

soil degradation and water contamination from

agricultural activities.

42 At present, the SCS does not

have statutory authority to promulgate enforceable

regulations. Congress could require implementation

of BMPs through cross-compliance, i.e., make

implementation a prerequisite for receiving Federal

dlcoWe~~ ~o~d provide ~cropp~ flexibfli~ only to farmers who adopt environmentally ~und ~ter~tiv~. Congress co~d ~so provide

incentives to adopt these alternative practices by linking crop decisions to support payments and by giving tax credits to ease the potentially negative

financial impacts of adopting ‘‘low-input” practices.

42~ey include, for ex~ple, improved fetitier USe, water imPomdments, P ermanent vegetative cover, and manure storage.
Chapter 8--The Food System ● 265

43 However, such a poliCY price and income supports.

would not apply to the one-third of U.S. croplands

that are not enrolled in Federal farm support

programs. Congress also could provide incentives

(i.e., special services from USDA extension agents)

to farmers who voluntarily adopt BMPs.

Carbon Dioxide and Land Use Changes

Encouraging Land Use Changes That

Increase Carbon Storage

The goal of the USDA’s Conservation Reserve

Program (CRP) is to take 40 percent (16 to 18

million hectares) of highly erodible croplands (about

10 percent of all cropland) out of production, and in

some cases to plant trees or grasses on the land (see

ch. 7). Farmers who take lands out of production for

10 years receive annual rental payments from the

Federal Government. By the end of 1989, about 14

million hectares had been enrolled at a cost of over

$1 billion annually (71, 130, 132)44; the Food,

Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990

(Public Law 101-624) extended the sign-up period

through 1995. The USDA (130) estimates that the

CRP could reduce U.S. fertilizer use by as much as

3 percent.

Congress could modify the CRP by:

● increasing the acreage goal;

● including croplands eroding at moderate levels;

● including other environmental objectives such

as groundwater protection;

● increasing incentives for enrollment (e.g., provide options to extend leases, lengthen lease

periods, and/or increase rental payments); and

. providing incentives for managing existing

croplands in an environmentally sound manner.

All of these options will require additional program

appropriations. An expanded CRP could also have

detrimental economic effects on communities that

depend on local farm business (e.g., farm equipment

dealers, repair shops, agrichemical dealers, etc.)

(130), and consumers would likely protest if food

costs went up substantially.

Discouraging Land Use Changes That

Increase Emissions

Within the United States, limiting land transformations is primarily a local or State zoning issue.

However, some Federal benefits (e.g., housing and

infrastructure grants) and regulatory permits (e.g.,

for industrial facilities) affect the disposition of

agricultural land (25). Efforts to consider long-term

environmental issues in land-use decisions could be

important symbolically for international attempts to

influence land use decisions in developing countries.45 Efforts to slow urbanization can also reduce

urban infrastructure costs, limit automobile travel

(see ch. 5), and otherwise contribute to more livable

and affordable communities (18, 22, 81, 119).

Maintaining or Increasing Yields

Congress could require USDA to expand existing

programs (i.e., “Low-Input Sustainable Agriculture”) and develop new ones that focus on alternative practices, including techniques that maintain or

increase crop yields and reduce emissions per unit of

food output. Congress could also increase research

funding to define relationships among agricultural

practices, crop yields, and emissions (see ‘Research

Issues” above), and change existing U.S. domestic

agricultural commodities programs that discourage

farmers from pursuing alternative technologies and

methods such as crop rotation and integrated pest

management (76).

Congress also could promote alternative practices

overseas, particularly in developing countries, by

increasing support for:

●

●

A.I.D. assistance programs in sustainable agriculture (e.g., technical assistance, research and

development); and

multilateral programs such as those of the Food

and Agriculture Organization, CGIAR, and

numerous other international agricultural research institutions.

Projects funded through these sources must recognize, however, that alternative agricultural practices

developed by, and for, the industrialized world may

not be the most appropriate for the developing

qJsuCh ~ ~rOW ~~uld ~ ~Xt~n&d tO Otier ener~.~temive inputs Such as peStiCl& and ~gation Water. For example, the SCS could establish

guidelines on how, and in what quantities, various inputs should be applied to crops in specific regions of the country.

44C~t1c~ ~~tt. ~S pnCe ~g, ~~le Suppners ~we tit by reduclngp~duction Of p~ce-suppofled co~oditles, the mP reduces prim-depressing

crop surpluses and provides a net savings to the Federal Government. Estimates of the net effect of these factors are discussed briefly in ch. 7.

dsch. 7 discusses options for reducing deforestation in developing COUQtieS.
266 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

world. For example, in the humid areas of the

developing world, significant amounts of harvested

crops are lost due to inadequate storage, while in

other countries post-harvest losses may occur for

different reasons.

C02 and Machinery, Fertilizer Manufacture,

and Irrigation

Federal options for promoting efficiency in the

production and use of energy for agriculture are

numerous. They include increasing the cost of

energy; setting efficiency standards; supporting

research, development and! demonstration projects;

and providing incentives to retire old equipment and

deploy low-emission alternatives. Key issues range

from concerns about the magnitude and distribution

of costs and benefits to problems associated with

altering energy usage in complex, integrated industrial systems. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss options for

motor vehicles and manufacturing in general.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

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270 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Appendix 6-A: Calculations for Figure 8-61

General

Total U.S. CO2 emissions from fossil fuels in 1985: 1,300X1012 g,

SOURCE: USEPA (143).

Carbon emissions attributed to electricity use: 0.4 lb/kWh.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, based on national mix of energy sources used to produce electrical

energy (see ch. 3).

Food Production

Fertilizer

All fertilizer: (707,000 X10’> Btu)X(14X103 g C/Btu) = 9.9 X1012 g. Assumes all energy consists of direct consumption of

natural gas used as feedstock. While this is not the case, nitrogen fertilizer production accounts for the majority of

energy used in fertilizer production, and natural gas supplies most of that energy.

Share of total US. CO2 emissions: (9.9X1012 g)/(1 ,300 X1012 g) = 0.8%

SOURCE: Btu figure provided by ref. 42.

Elect riclt y

Electricity y consumed in “traditional” agricultural sector: (31,816X1 O6 kWh)X(O.4 lb C/kWh) = 12,726.4X1 O6 lb = 5.8x 1012

g. This does not include electricity consumed in producing inputs (e.g., fertilizer) for the agricultural sector.

Share of total U.S. CO2 emissions: (5.8X1012 g)/(1 ,300 X1012 g) = 0.4°A

SOURCE: kWh figure provided by ref. 42.

Onsite Fossil Fuel Use

Gasoline: (1 ,900,000 X103 gal) X(5.48 lb C/gal)X(1 kg/2.25 Ibs) = 4.6X1012 g

Diesel: (2,870,000 X103 gal) X(6 lb/gal)X(1 kg/2.25 lb) = 7.65X1012 g

Fuel oil: (78,400X103 gal) X(6 lb/gal)X(1 kg/2.25 lb) =0.2X1012 g

LP gas: (955,000X103 gal) X(13.6 kg C/10g Joules) X(97X106 Joules/gal) = 0.01X1012 g

(Assumes LPG is 100% propane, 92,000 Btu/gal)

Natural gas: (48,800X106 cf)X(16.3 kg C/l Og Joules) X(37.3X106 Joules/35.3 cf) =0.8X1012 g

Coal: (42,500 tons) X(22X106 Btu/ton)X(26 mg/Btu) = 0.243X1012 g

Share of total U.S. CO2 emissions: (13.5X1012 g)/(1 ,300 X1012 g) = 1.0%

SOURCE: Initial figure (i.e., quantity of fuel) in each calculation from ref. 103.

Post-Harvest

Food Industry

Electricity: (44,400 million kWh)X(0.18 kg/kWh) = 8X1012 g

Residual fuel oil: (6,290,000 barrels) X(6.289X106 Btu/barrel)X(20 mg/Btu) = 0.8 X1012 g

Distillate fuel oil: (4,360,000 barrels) X(5.82X106 Btu/barrel)X(20 mg/Btu) = 0.5 X1012 g

Natural gas: (464 billion cubic feet)X(1,020 Btu/cubic foot)X(14 mg/Btu) = 6.6X1012 g

LPG: (89 million gal) X(13.6 kg C/109 Joules) X(97X106 Joules/gal) = 0.1 X1012 g

(Assumes LPG is 100% propane, 92,000 Btu/gal)

Coal: (5,570,000 short tons) X(22X106 Btu/ton)X(26 mg/Btu) = 3.2X1012 g

Other: 121 trillion Btu

Total: 19.2X1012 g

Share of total U.S. C02 emissions: (19X1012g)/(1,300X10 12g) = 1.5%

SOURCE: See ref. 136.

Residential Cooking Energy

Electric ranges/ovens: (0.63 X1015 Btu)X(1 kWh/11,500 Btu)X(181 g/kWh) = 9.9 X1012 g

Gas ranges/ovens: (0.21 X1015 Btu)X(14mg/Btu) = 2.94 X1012 g

Total, excluding small electric appliances: 12.8 X1012 g of C

Share of total U.S. CO2 emissions: (12.8 X1012 g)/(1 ,300X1012 g) = 1.0%

SOURCE: Initial figures (i.e., Btu use) from ref. 135.

Supermarket/Domestic Refrigeration

Residential refrigeration: (1,850X1012 Btu)X(1 kWh/1 1,500 Btu)X(181 g/kWh) = 29X1012 g C

Based on total electricity use in 1985 of 1.85 quads (refrigerators: 1.41 quads; freezers: 0.44 quads)

Supermarkets: 9.5X1012 g. Based on: 1) 35,000 supermarkets in operation account for about 4% of all electric energy

used, and approximately one-half of that (i.e., 2°A of all electric energy used) is attributable to refrigeration equipment

(ref. 17); 2) emissions of CO2 from utilities amounted to about 460 teragrams in 1985 (based on data in ref. 144); and

3) (460 Tg)X(0.02) = 9.2X1012 g.

Total supermarkets and residential: (29 + 9.2)X1012 g C =38.2X1012 g C

Share of total U.S. CO2 emissions: (38.2 X1012 g)/(1 ,300 X1012 g) = 2.9%

SOURCES: Ref. 17,135,144.

1 Totals may not add up due to rounding.
Chapter 9

International Dimensions:

U.S. Influence and

Regional Trends
CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 273

Relative Greenhouse Gas Emissions . . . . . . . 273

Population Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

GENERAL AVENUES FOR U.S.

INFLUENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

U.S. Bilateral Organizations and Involvement

in Multilateral organizations . . . . . . . . . . . 279

Technology Transfer and Trade With

Other Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). 286

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES .. ............287

Contribution to Greenhouse Gas Emissions. 287

General Areas for lmprovements . . . . . . . . . . 288

Policy Directions for the United States . . . . 290

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S.S.R. . . . 294

Trends in Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

Trends in the U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

Options for Possible U.S. Influence . . . . . . . 2%

OECD COUNTRIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300

Trends and Projections in Energy Use and

Carbon Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300

Policies Regarding Energy and

Greenhouse Gases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

CHAPTER PREFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

Boxes

Box Page

9-A. Global Population Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

9-B. Agencies and Organizations That Can

Influence Greenhouse Gas Emissions . . . 282

9-C. U.S. Trade in Renewable and Efficient

Energy Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

Figures

Figure Page

9-1. Regional Trends in CO2 Emissions From

Fossil Fuels, 1950-86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

9-2. World Primary Energy Consumption,

1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. 275

Figure Page

9-3. Per-Capita Consumption of

Primary Energy . . . . . . . .*..,**. ● *...... 275

9-4. Projected Primary En ergy Consumption

by Region for ’’High Emissions” Scenario,

1985 to 2025 . . . . . . . ● ......, ● ......* ● . . 276

9-5, World Population Growth, 1750 to 2100 .277

9-6. The World’s 15 Largest Cities,

1970 (actual) and 2000 (projected) . . . . . 279

9-7. Projected CO2 Emissions in Selected

Developing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288

9-8. Projected Carbon Emissions in

the U.S.S.R. . *..**..**.**,,.,......*.. 2 %

9-9. Projected Carbon Emissions in the

European Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

Tables

Table Page

9-1. Fossil Fuel Use, by Region . . * **+**,... 274

9-2. Countries Ranked by Population Size for

1950, 1989, and 2020 ● ...**..*.*..***. 278

9-3. Examples of Avenues for U.S. Influence . 280

9-4. Funding for Major Energy Assistance to

Developing Countries, 1988-89 . . . . . . . . 292

9-5. Total Foreign Trade as a Percentage of

GNP, 1988, for Selected Countries . . . . . 297

9-6. Policies Enacted for Energy Efficiency

by OECD Countries, 1970s and 1980s . . 303

9-7. Official Greenhouse Gas Emission

Stabilization and Reduction Policies

of OECD Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304

9-8. New Plans and Programs in

OECD Countries, Specifically Designed

To Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions,

as of 1990 ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
Chapter 9

International Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends

INTRODUCTION

Greenhouse gas emissions are a function of many

factors, including level and rate of technological

development, rate of energy use (and types of fuels

used), rates of land conversion and resource depletion (e.g., deforestation), agricultural practices (e.g.,

wet v. dry rice farming), and population growth and

urbanization. These factors, their cumulative impact

on emissions, and the problems faced in attempting

to slow the growth rate in emissions vary greatly

from one region or nation to another. These variations will be of paramount importance in any

international negotiations regarding climate change

and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.

This chapter discusses three groups of countries:

●

●

●

developing countries, most with market economies, some with centrally planned economies; 1

Eastern Europe and the U. S. S. R.--countries

with centrally planned economies, many of

which are changing to market economies; and

the Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development (OECD)---developed countries with market economies (18 countries in

Western Europe plus Australia, Canada, Japan,

New Zealand, Turkey, and the United States).

Since energy use is likely to increase as material

living standards rise in developing countries, an

appropriate goal for the United States and other

OECD countries is to help developing countries

adopt technologies and practices that minimize

emissions yet still enhance economic growth. This

can be done by promoting efficient energy and

materials use; renewable, nonfossil fuels (e.g., solar,

nuclear, geothermal, biomass); and more sustainable

use of forestry and agricultural resources. The same

goal also is appropriate for U.S. and OECD policies

regarding Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. In these

countries, though, systemic obstacles to more efficient energy use (particularly rigid, centralized

economic planning and highly subsidized energy

resources) must be overcome.

Clearly our impact in these spheres will depend on

our own domestic policies. The United States and

other OECD countries face the daunting task of

implementing technologies and practices to reduce

their own energy use without major economic

disruptions.

Relative Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Worldwide carbon emissions from primary energy use account for an estimated 55 percent of the

current ‘radiative forcing effect’ (see ch. 2) associated with all greenhouse gas emissions from anthropogenic sources (32). Overall estimated carbon

emissions have risen in all regions since 1950 and

have been highest in OECD countries, the U. S. S. R.,

and Eastern Europe (see figure 9-l). Since the early

1970s, however, carbon emissions have been relatively stable in OECD countries while continuing to

rise elsewhere.

The OECD countries, U. S. S. R., and Eastern

Europe currently contribute one-half to two-thirds of

Figure 9-l—Regional Trends in CO2 Emissions From

Fossil Fuels, 1950-86

Carbon emissions (billion metric

1.4

1

,? ,/ ‘i

.) 4

,~/ -

1.21 / ,’

I

,/ f

1.0 ;

/},/ ,.

.—

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

-.—

tons)

United States

Western Europe

U.S.S.R. & E. Europe

Developing countries

China

0.0 m-l-m

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990

SOURCE: G. Mariand et al., Estimates of C02 Emissions From Fossi/ fuel

Burning and Cement Manufacturing Using the United Nations

f%ergy Statistics and the U.S. Bureau of Mines Cement

A4anufactuting Data ORNUCDIAC-25, NDP-030 (Oak Ridge,

TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Carbon Dioxide Information

Anatysis Center, October 1988).

l~e World Bank defines ‘‘developing co~ties’ as low-income (e.g.,- India, PaMstam Kenya) and middle-income (e.g., Indonesi~

Philippines, Mexico, Brazil) (132). Also see ref. 104 for additional details.

–273–
274 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Table 9-l—Fossil Fuel Use, by Region

Average annual growth in fossil

fuel use, 1950-95 Energy use by sector, late 1980s

Total Per capita Industry Buildings Transportation

Developed market economies . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0% 1 .1% 35% 32% 33%

Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2% 3.4% 60% 27% 13%

Centrally planned Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5% 7.8% 45% 50% 5%

Developing market economies . . . . . . . . . . 6.4% 3.7% 49% 24% 27%

SOURCE: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Energy and /ndustry Sub Group Report (Geneva: May 31, 1990).

all greenhouse gas emissions, mostly from combustion of fossil fuels to power their economies. In

1986, the United States and other OECD countries

accounted for over 40 percent of estimated emissions (1 10), although they are home to only 16

percent of the world’s population (66). The U.S.S.R.

and Eastern Europe, with 8 percent of the world’s

population, accounted for over 20 percent of estimated emissions.

The rest of the world—in essence the developing

countries--contributed at least one-third of global

emissions. Among developing countries the most

important emitters are China, Brazil, Indonesia,

India, Mexico, Thailand, and Ivory Coast (56).2

China and India had the highest emissions from

fossil fuel use, while Brazil and Indonesia had the

highest estimated emissions from deforestation. The

developing world could be contributing as much as

one-half of global CO2 emissions if the highest

estimates of emissions from tropical deforestation

(see ch. 7) are accurate.

Most developing country emissions currently

stem from deforestation and other land use practices

(e.g., methane from cultivation of rice and raising of

livestock). Population growth probably will lead to

further increases of emissions from these activities.

Fossil fuel emissions are expected to grow very

rapidly, paralleling growth in population and in

energy consumption in all sectors (18, 31,32,56,76,

110). Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions also are

likely to increase, because not all developing countries are signatories to the Montreal Protocol; the

Protocol, moreover, permits those that did sign to

increase their use of CFCs for 10 years before

cutbacks are required (see box 2-C in ch. 2).

Emissions from OECD countries are expected to

remain relatively stable, while emissions in Eastern

Europe and the U.S.S.R. are expected to rise

moderately as more services become available and

as per-capita incomes rise (33).3 As a result, total

emissions from developing countries may equal or

exceed those from the developed world within a few

decades.

Energy Use

Globally, fossil fuel use has nearly quadrupled

since 1950, growing fastest in the developing

countries (see table 9-l). The OECD countries,

including the United States, still account for slightly

over half of global primary energy consumption,

while the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe account for

24 percent (see figure 9-2).4 Developing countries

account for about 25 percent of the total. When

estimates of traditional fuel usage are included, the

developing countries account for a greater share of

energy use, but such usage is not well quantified.s

Greater use of fossil fuels in OECD countries and

in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. reflects much

higher levels of per-capita energy consumption than

in developing countries (see figure 9-3). Per-capita

rates in OECD countries could drop if energyefficient technologies are more widely implemented,

~s report is part of a U.S. Agency for International Development effo~ mandated by the fiscal year 1990 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act

(Public IAW 101-167), to identify key developing countries contributing greenhouse gas emissions.

s~ojatiom of fu~ ~Aouse g,as emissions depend on assumptions about Mure energy supply and use, rates of economic and population groti

changes in land use practices, and emissions control policies.

4“-” or “P-COmmerCW” energy refers to energy commodities tit me widely traded in organized markets (e.g., coal, oil, gas, and

electricity; see ref. 104). “Traditional” or “biomass” fuels refens to fuewood, charcoal, animal wastes, and crop residues. Some biomass fuels,

particularly fuewood and charcoal, are tmded in organized markets.

5popu~tiom tit ~ve ~ ~~ Mm k developing COUUtrkS tend to have little access to commercial fiek and technologies. In these ~eW @titiO~

fuels satisfy most heating and cooking needs, and manual labor is used for most ag-riculhmd, transportation and industrial needs (104).
Chapter International Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends ● 275

Figure 9-2—World Primary Energy Consumption, 1988

6%

SOURCE:

Other

ed Stale8

24%

Ch

8

Eastern Euro Japan

5%

OECD

22%

U.S. Department of Energy, International Energy Annual,

DOWEIA-0219(88) (Washin~ton, DC: Energy lnfor~ation Administration, November 1989).

Figure 9-3—Per-Capita Consumption of Primary

Energy (excluding biomass)

OECD

zz.::zzzzz~~ .“ “7/~ ,/

q=,.. =

Canada

.-. &~zd.~y-~~~~~*;~~L~~%’&F< -/ 2ZZZ United States

.

~ France

~22Z Italy

E. Europe/U.S.S.R.

/k,~ZZyF&Y&~~a

~Z

 U.S.S.R.

~.= Czechoslovakia

Developing

&z2A Mexico

~ Brazil

!1z<3 China

[n Indonesia

~; India .— .— —r—

0 5 0 100 150 2 0 0 2 5 0 3 0 0

Million Btu’s per person per year

— 1

3 5 0

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Energy

in Developing Countries, OTA-E-486 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, January 1991 ).

since population levels are relatively stable and

economic growth is likely to be moderate. In contrast, per-capita rates in developing countries are

likely to increase as development measures (especially for electricity generation, direct industrial use,

and transportation) are implemented, even if energy

efficiency measures are included.

Hence, the developing countries’ primary energy

consumption is expected to grow much more rapidly

than that of the OECD countries, with Eastern

Europe and the U.S.S.R. exhibiting intermediate

growth (see figure 9-4). Various projections (31, 32,

34, 76, 110) indicate that the absolute portion of

primary energy use in developing nations will

overtake that of developed countries early in the next

century, even though the per-capita difference between developed and developing countries is likely

to persist well into the next century.

Deforestation

Tropical forests, located almost exclusively in

developing countries, are rapidly being deforested

and degraded (see ch. 7). Between 7 and 31 percent

of worldwide CO2 emissions may result from

deforestation. Temperate-zone forests, located mostly

in developed countries, currently contribute comparatively little to CO2 emissions- from deforestation,

although they have undergone massive alterations,

in some cases complete deforestation, in the past.

The major causes of tropical deforestation and

degradation are the conversion of forests to temporary (e. g., ‘‘shifting’ cultivation) and permanent

agriculture (including cattle ranching) and unsustainable timber harvesting practices. These practices

are driven by rapid population growth, poverty and

lack of land tenure for many people, national and

international development policies that favor conversion of forests to agricultural and grazing land,

massive foreign debts, and accounting systems that

do not recognize many nontimber forest values.

Population Projections

Rapid population growth, in combination with

economic growth, will fuel increased global demands for energy and land resources long beyond

the time frame of this study, particularly in the

developing countries. While decreases in current

population growth rates would not greatly affect

total emissions during the next two decades, they

could have major implications for emissions levels

during the remainder of the 21st century, depending

partly on how rapidly renewable fuels and/or nuclear

power replace fossil fuels.

For most of human history, the number of people

was probably no more than 5 to 10 million, and even

by 1750 it was still less than 1 billion. Since 1750,

however, population growth has been extremely

rapid (box 9-A). Now the world’s population stands

at 5.3 billion (figure 9-5), and it is growing at a rate

of over 10,000 people per hour. The relationships

among growth rates, birth and death rates, replace-
276 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 9-4-Projected Primary Energy Consumption by Region,

for “High Emissions” (I.e., Base case) Scenario, 1985 to 2025

Lower economic growth rate Higher economic

Quadrillion Btu’s ..—— .- Quadrillion Btu’s

1

1

,. ——— --– 600 600

500 I 500 I

4 0 0

3 0 0

2 0 ---0

100

0

growth rate

,/

/ ’

,/ 1

4 0 0

3 0 0

200

100

0

1985 2000 2025 1985 2000 2025

United States

E?! Other OECD countries

China and centrally planned Asia

I I Other developing countrie s

m U.S.S.R. and centrally planned Europe

This figure shows projections of primary energy consumption under a “High Emissions” scenario--a base-case situation in which few or

no steps are taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Continued population and economic growth result in increased energy use and

tropical deforestation; fossil fuels continue to dominate energy supply; and the share of coal increases. The figure on the left shows the

projection for a low economic growth case; i.e., the average annual rate of global GNP growth decreases from 2.2 percent per year for 1985

through 2000, to 2.1 percent per year for 2000 to 2025, and to 1.3 percent per year for 2025 to 2100. The figure on the right shows the

projection for a higher economic growth case; i.e., the average annual rate of global GNP growth decreases from 3.6 percent per year for

1985 through 2000, to 3.3 percent per year for 2000 to 2005, and to 2.6 percent per year for 2025to2100.

SOURCE: Intergovernmental Panel cm Climate Change, Emissions Scenarios, Report of the Expert Group on Ernisshns Scenatios (RSWG Steerihg

Committee, Task A) (Geneva: Response Strategies Working Group, April 1990).

ment fertility rates, and population age structure are

examined in box 9-A.

World Bank and United Nations projections

suggest that the world population will increase to

over 8 billion by 2025 and over 11 billion by 2100

(the U.N. projection discussed here is its “medium”

scenario, one of three scenarios modeled).6 The

Bank projects that population will stabilize at 11.5

billion some years later (2, 71). Projected growth

rates also portend major rerankings of countries by

population size (see table 9-2).

Over 90 percent of population growth is projected

to occur in the developing countries of Africa, Asia,

and Latin America (see figure 9-5). Unless current

trends change dramatically, the proportion of the

world’s population living in Africa, the continent

with the highest growth rate, would increase from 12

percent today to 26 percent in 2100. China’s and

India’s growth rates (1.4 and 2.1 percent, respectively), while far from the highest in the world, are

adding sizable numbers of people each year because

of built-in population “momentum” (see box 9-A)

and large population bases (21 and 16 percent,

respectively, of the global population) (66). The

proportion of people living in the developed countries is projected to fall from 23 percent today to

about 12 percent in 2100 (2). Growth rates in the

U.S.S.R. and most European and North American

countries are low, and three countries (Denmark,

bpop~ation Projections ~ not Prediction, but rather are estimates of future population levels given SSSWptiOnS (e.g., dwl~ b~ ~t~

throughout the developing world), models, and collections of base data that vary in accuracy. Projections are increasingly subjczt to error the

they reach into the future.
Chapter 9-international Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends . 277

Box 9-A-Global Population Growth

About 10,000 years ago, humans began to shift from a hunting and gathering lifestyle to a more settled

existence based on agriculture and domestication of animals. This shift permitted populations to increase, and by

1750 the world’s population had grown slowly to probably around 750 million (50,67). Over the next two centuries,

the world’s population tripled to 2.5 billion (see figure 9-5). Between 1950 and 1987, it doubled again, to more than

5 billion.l At current rates, the world adds almost a billion people every decade (66).

The first major increase, after 1750, occurred in the more developed countries as death rates began to decline

slowly, probably due to improvements in nutrition and sanitation, and birth rates remained relatively high. The net

increase was gradual (about 1.5 percent per year) (101). Eventually, though, birth rates also declined, and today the

developed countries are growing by only 0.5 percent annually (71). The shift from high birth and death rates and

low population growth to low birth and death rates with low or no population growth is called the demographic

transition. This transition in the developed countries took place over a relatively long period.

The second major increase in world population began after World War II in the developing countries of Africa,

Asia, and Latin America (101). It has been much more rapid than the first major increase for two reasons. First, death

rates declined very rapidly, because of the transfer of medical and agricultural improvements from developed

countries. Second, although lower birth rates followed rapidly in some countries (e.g., China, Mexico), in general

they have not yet begun to parallel the decline in death rates. As a result, net growth rates have been high (2.5 to

3.5 percent and even higher per year) and remain explosive in many countries. The demographic transition in these

countries is incomplete. Annual growth rates between 1990 and 1995, for example, are projected to be 6.7 percent

in Afghanistan (which will double its population in about 10 years), 4.1 percent in Kenya, and between 3 and 4

percent in many African and Middle Eastern countries (71).

The developing countries exhibit tremendous "population momentum” and will continue to grow for

one or more generations even after the average fertility rate drops to replacement levels. The degree of

momentum depends on the population’s age structure. When the majority of the population is still in or entering

the reproductive years, even replacement rates (2.1 children per couple, which accounts for the death of some

women during their child-bearing years) result in a net population increase. Many developing countries exhibit this

age structure. In contrast, the age structure in developed countries is such that births roughly balance deaths.

1A population’s doubLing time can be closely estimated by dividiug 70 by the gmwthrate. For W.XUPle, apO@Xion Wfig @s P@

per year will double in about 23 years (and increase by a factor of about 10 m a cemury).

Germany, and Hungary) exhibit zero or even nega- Figure 9-S-World Population Growthj 1750 to 2100

tive growth.

Population (billions)

Most developing countries support family plan- 12 ~ Projected +

ning, and over the past several decades many have / -

reduced their birth rates, resulting in improvements 10 -. ---- —-.

/

in maternal health and per-capita economic growth. 7 8 –-------------------- ---------------- ---/

However, while international support for family /

planning programs has remained relatively stable 6

. . --- ----- .- . . . . . . .- — --- .-. ---- . -—

-! A DeveiOplng

since 1972, it has declined as a percentage of official 4 --------------------- - ---

development assistance (92). 2

Urbanization—The world also is becoming in- ~~

 -

creasingly urban. In 1950, 29 percent of the world’s 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100

people lived in urban areas and today 48 percent do;

by 2010, 56 percent of the world’s population is SOURCE: Population Referenee Bureau, 199(7 W4v’kf Population Data

projected to live in cities (89, 105). Great variations Sheet (Washington, IN: 1990).

~n China for example, since Chou En Lai’s “Directive 51” in 1971 (101), fertility dropped from 5.8 births per woman in 1970 to the replacement

level of 2.1 in 1984 (50). In Thailand, Colornbti and South Kor~ it took 15 years or less to reduce average fertility from 6 to 3.5 births per woman

(105). Mexico’s fertility rate dropped from 6.8 births per woman in the early 1970s to 4.3 in 1982 and 3.8 in 1989, and it is projected to approach

replacement level by 2010 (50, 65).
278 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Table 9-2-Countries Ranked by Population Size for 1950,1989, and 2020

(population size In millions In parentheses)

Rank 1950 1989 2020 (projected)

1 China (563) China (1113) China (1523)

2 India (370) India (833) India (1308)

3 U.S.S.R. (180) U.S.S.R. (289) U.S.S.R. (355)

4 U.S. (152) Us. (248) Us. (294)

5 Japan (84) Indonesia (188) Indonesia (293)

6 Indonesia (83) Brazil (151) Nigeria (274)

7 Brazil (53)

Nigeria (115) /~:~aY2J:42)

Japan (123)

8 United Kingdom (50)

9 West Germany (50)

\

<

Bangladesh (115) Bangladesh (230)

10 Italy (47) Pakistan (1 10) Mexico (152)

11 Bangladesh (46) Mexico (86) Philippines (131)

12 France (42)

/ ’ ”

Vietnam (67) Japan (131)

13 Nigeria (41) Philippines (65) Iran (130)

14 Pakistan (39) West Germany (61)

/

Ethiopia (128)

15 Mexico (28) Italy (58) Vietnam (121)

16 Spain (28) United Kingdom (57) Egypt (101)

17 Vietnam (25) France (56) Turkey (92)

18 Poland (25) Turkey (55) Zaire (85)

19 Egypt (21) Thailand (54) South Africa (83)

20 Philippines (21) Irart (54) \ Kenya (79)

21 Turkey (21)

/ “

Egypt (53)

\

Thailand (71)

22 South Korea (21) Ethiopia (50) Tanzania (69)

23 Ethiopia (21) South Korea (43) Myanmar (67)

24 Thailand (20)

/

Myanmar (41) South Korea (58)

25 Myanmar (19) Spain (39) France (58)

26 East Germany (18) /

/

Poland (38) Sudan (57)

27 Argentina (17) South Africa (39) United Kingdom (57)

28 Iran (16) Zaire (34) Italy (57)

29 Yugoslavia (16) Argentina (32) West Germanya (56)

30 Romania (16) Colombia (32) Colombia (49)

aExcluding East Germany.

NOTE: This table shows that the relative population ranking of some ccwntries will change through time. For example, the United Kingdom is projected to drop

from Sth largest in 1950 to 27th largest in 2020, while Iran is projected to move from 27th to 13th position in the same period. The top four countries

are expected to retain their current rankings, although Indonesia and Nigeria will approach the size of the United States.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, based on U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, WvHPopu/ation Profile: 1989, WP-89

(Washington, Dc: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 19S9).

.

Photo credit: Philip Teuscher, United Nations

Urbanization is proceeding rapidly in most parts of the

developing world, following past trends in the developed

world; by 2010, 56 percent of the world’s population is

projected to live in cities.

exist among different countries and regions—for

example, over 70 percent of today’s population in

the developed world and Latin America is urban,

compared to 35 percent in Africa and 30 percent in

Asia. Urbanization is proceeding rapidly in most

parts of the developing world, though, following

past trends in the developed world. Rapid urban

growth in the developing world is reflected in the

shift in location of the world’s 10 largest cities away

from the developed world (figure 9-6).

GENERAL AVENUES FOR

U.S. INFLUENCE

Chapters 1 and 3 through 8 set out specific policy

options in various sectors (i.e., energy, buildings,

transportation, manufacturing, forestry, and food)

which the United States could pursue in order to

reduce or offset its own greenhouse gas emissions.

There are many compelling reasons to do so (see ch.
Chapter 9-international Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends ● 279

N e w York

Tokyo /Yokohama

Shanghai

London

Mexico City

Los Angeles

Par i 8

Buenos Aires

Beijing

Sao Paulo

Osaka/Kobe

MOSCOW

Rio de Janeiro

Calcutta

T i a nj i n

Born bay

Cairo

Seoul

Jakarta

Delhi

Teheran

L agos

Figure 9-6---The World’s 15 Largest Cities, 1970 (actual) and 2000 {projected)

Rank in Rank in

197 0 200 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

17

19

2 0

21

2 7

3 0

6 0

4

, .T. TT. ,TY.,T,.,,. TTT. ,. I.. T . . . .

———— . . — .,, ,.. .L.. “ ‘i L. \ L... s ~i , ., ., ,’, ,, , . . . ~ -3-

---,TN;;TTTmT:T1-’ ~

 - +

.L!J. .,. .. i..., 7 — —— ..—

2 2 .- .

P

——. ———— — - --- ; –- :- :

8

1 4

T

-

- 1

0 5 1 0 1 5 2 0 2 5 3 0

Millions of peopl e

_ 1970 !.~~~] I Increase, 1970-200 0

SOURCE: UN, Department of International Eeonom~ and Social Affairs, Prospacts of World Urbanization, 1988, Population Studies No. 112,

ST/ESA/SER./Vl 12 (New York: 1989).

1), and by taking such actions to reduce its own

emissions the United States could provide leadership through example.

The United States also could encourage other

countries to follow suit.8 This section summarizes

how the United States can, in general, potentially

influence other countries’ policies and practices:

through bilateral and multilateral assistance organizations, trade with other nations, and nongovernmental organizations (see table 9-3). The

United States also could participate in negotiations

on an international framework convention on greenhouse gas emissions. Such negotiations are expected

to begin early this year.9

U.S. Bilateral Organizations and Involvement

in Multilateral Organizations

The United States provides direct bilateral assistance to developing countries through the U.S.

Agency for International Development (A. I.D.) and

other government agencies, and it contributes to

multilateral assistance through its participation in

various international organizations (box 9-B).

8~e ~ectlon on the OE~ (see ( *OE~ Cow]tries’ &low) describes actions that several industrialized Countries have taken witiout waiting ‘or

the United States. As of December 1990, the United States was the only G-7 country without a COZ target goal. The G-7 (Group of 7) countries consist

of Camda, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States.

% July 1989, the G-7 countries agred at their Economic S urnmit that a U.N. framework convention on climate change setting out global principles

was needed and that protocols containing concrete commitments could be fit into the framework as scientific evidence permitted. Several precedents

exist for negotiating such agreements, most notably the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (see box 2-C).
280 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

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Chapter International Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends . 281

Total U.S. foreign aid assistance to developing

countries is about $9 billion annually. 10 This represents about 20 percent of all such assistance globally

and makes the United States the second largest

donor in the world, after Japan. Compared to other

countries, however, U.S. assistance is a small

percentage of its Gross National Product (GNP) (83,

113). The U.S. portion was 0.19 percent in 1987 and

0.21 percent in 1988. In 1987, the larger Western

European countries provided an average of 0.42

percent and Japan provided 0.31 percent; Norway

topped the list at 1.10 percent.

Technology Transfer and Trade With

Other Countries

More efficient energy production and use, renewable and/or nuclear energy sources, and CFC-free

technologies could help reduce, or at least slow the

rate of increase in, future greenhouse gas emissions

in Eastern Europe, the U. S. S. R., and developing

countries without necessarily impeding economic

development. Improvements in energy efficiency

are possible with available, commercialized technologies and services (see chs. 3 through 6).11 Nonfossil

fuel energy generation is possible with available

technologies and services, including photovoltaic,

wind turbine, geothermal, biomass, and nuclear

systems.

The opportunity seems ripe for U.S. businesses to

increase exports of energy-related technologies to

developing countries, since much of the energy

infrastructure needed to fulfill development aspirations is yet to be built, This is occurring to some

extent—for example, U.S. electric power equipment

manufacturers have entered into several energyrelated agreements with China (55), and U.S.

renewable energy companies have products installed

in 150 countries (94). Exports of photovoltaics

increased by 37 percent from 1987 to 1988, primarily in developing counties (82). The market in

developing countries for electric power equipment

over the next 20 years might be between $370 and

$900 billion (93).

Even so, U.S. businesses often have difficulty

competing in foreign markets (20, 37, 43). Several

U.S. Government and private sector programs exist

to facilitate U.S. trade in renewable and efficient

energy technologies (box 9-C), although some

analyses conclude they may not be as effective in

helping the U.S. private sector as are programs of

other OECD countries that provide similar assistance to their private sectors (94, 121).

Congress could facilitate U.S. trade in efficient

energy and renewable energy technologies in several

ways. First, it could expand the financial resources

of independent agencies that finance technology

exports, such as Eximbank and the Overseas Private

Investment Corp. (OPIC), or those that fund project

preparation work, such as A. I.D., as well as direct

these agencies to focus resources on specific technology areas. For example, the FY 1990 Foreign

Operations Appropriations Act (Public Law 101-

167) directs Eximbank to set aside 5 percent of its

energy industry export funds for renewable energy

projects, and directs A.I.D. to focus on energy

efficiency, renewable energy, and least-cost energy

planning in the development of national energy

plans. 12 Congress also could consider directing

agencies such as A. I.D., Commerce, Environmental

Protection Agency, and others to set up multiagency committees to promote trade in given

technology areas, perhaps using the Committee on

Renewable Energy Commerce and Trade

(CORECT) (see box 9-C) as a model for such efforts,

and to facilitate better matches between U.S. goods

and services and market conditions in host countries.

EPA’s National Advisory Council for Environmental Policy and Technology also might play a

role, for example through its International Cooperation Committee.

Second, Congress could consider further use of

‘‘tied-aid” financing (i.e., linking foreign aid to the

financing of foreign purchases of U.S products)-a

practice that runs counter to free market policies, but

one that is used by other OECD countries. Congress

appropriated some resources for tied-aid financing

to Eximbank, which joined with A.I.D. in creating a

$500 million tied-aid pool to leverage financing for

exports of U.S. products in developing countries (21,

Including bilateral and multilateral aid, food aid, and security-related eCOnOIniC suppofi funds.

I Ilnc]uding r~uCing e]ectr-ici~ transmission losses and methane leaks from naturat gas production and distribution. The latter wi~l be p~iculflly

important if natioml and international policies encourage fuel-switching from other fossil fuels to natural gas (122).

12~e ~t ~so ~ppmpnated $15 million for mater development and use of renewab]e energy and for fitiatives to reveme tropical deforestation.
282 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 9-B—Agencies and Organizations That Can Influence Greenhouse Gas Emissions 1

Many U.S. and United Nations agencies, multilateral lending institutions, and international science and natural

resource organizations have programs that can potentially influence greenhouse gas missions in different parts of

the world.

U.S. Government Agencies-The Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) is the lead government

agency for administering foreign economic assistance, through training and institution building, education and

research, policy advice, technical assistance, and technology transfer (115,1 16). In 1989, it spent $2.4 billion on

bilateral development assistance, 18 percent of total U.S. foreign operations appropriations (including Economic

Support Funds, military aid, and assistance channeled through multilateral organizations) (97).1 About $245 million

was authorized for family planning programs, slightly over one-third of all such international efforts. The Foreign

Operations Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1990 (Public Law 101-167) directed A.I.D. to concentrate more of

its resources on helping to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and fossil fuel use in “key”

developing countries. A.I.D. administers numerous programs related to forestry and agricultural resources (see ch.

7), the sale and donation of agricultural commodities under Public Law 480, and the Foreign Disaster Assistance

program. In the energy sector, A.I.D. has provided around $200 million annually over the last 5 years, about

two-thirds for the power sector.2 Current programs in this sector are emphasizing end-use energy efficiency and

renewable energy resources and increased attention to natural gas and coalbed methane fuels.

The Department of Agriculture (USDA) promotes and finances U.S. agricultural products, collects data on

foreign production and consumption, and coordinates U.S. agricultural trade policy with other U.S. agencies (95).

The agency’s Foreign Agricultural Service works in over 40 countries. The U.S. Forest Service plays an increasing

role in international forestry issues (see ch. 7).

The Department of Commerce helps U.S. manufacturers and businesses pursue overseas export opportunities,

collects and disseminates commercial information, and supports other U.S. overseas programs, including the

Eximbank and Overseas Private Investment Corp. (see box 9-C). For example, the department’s International Trade

Administration provides marketing assistance.

The Department of Energy (DOE) is examining how U.S. energy programs contribute to climate change

problems, as a part of the forthcoming National Energy Strategy. It also runs several programs, such as the

Committee on Renewable Energy Commerce and Trade (CORECT), to identify and promote energy technologies

that can mitigate greenhouse gas emissions (see box 9-C). The department-run National Laboratories spend about

$10 million annually (mostly from outside funding sources) to provide energy assistance to developing countries

(43). The department also has over 30 bilateral R&D agreements with developing countries (primarily newly

industrialized countries).

The Department of State is responsible for overall conduct of U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. representation

in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). U.S. Ambassadors are responsible for foreign aid and

all other U.S. policy in their assigned countries. In a given country, the mission director for A.I.D. and any in-country

representatives of other U.S. departments all report to the Ambassador (95).

The Department of Treasury is responsible for U.S. financial policies affecting other countries and for U.S.

participation in international financial institutions such as the World Bank. The Office of Multilateral Development

Banks directs the U.S. Executive Directors that sit on the boards of the MDBs; through the directors, the United

States has been active in scrutinizing MDB environmental policies.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is examining global climate change issues-particularly energy

use, deforestation, methane from agriculture, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and sea-level rise--in the United States,

Eastern Europe, U. S.S.R., and developing countries. It provides technical support for U.S. involvement in the lPCC.

IAtiut 80 percent of bilateral development W* was aliocatcd by Congrcas to functional sectors (e.g., Jmal@ population

agriculture). About 20 percent ($5(N) million) was alkmted to the Doveiopnmt Fund for Mica without mfercacc to fuwtiollal sectors.

21n f- years 1985 and 1986, over 80 percent of power sector asaistancc was for E-@~~tib~“ m distributed

among two dozen or so countries (93).
Chapter 9-international Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends . 283

The U.S. Trade Representative is a cabinet-level agency charged with formulating overall trade policy and with

conducting bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations.

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)-The MDBs--the World Bank and the three regional banks

(Inter-American, Asian, and African Development Banks)-loaned developing countries over $25 billion in 1986

(69). Although this represents less than 20 percent of all development investments by developing countries

themselves, it provides a more favorable atmosphere for other lenders (83,88,118). Many MDB projects have led

to tropical deforestation or inefficient energy use, but recently the banks have begun to address these issues.3

The World Bank, the largest MDB, spent approximately $15 billion in 1989 (128).4 Approximately $3.3 billion

was in the energy sector; about two-thirds of this was for electric power generation. Bank funding for free-standing

environmental projects during the period 1990 through 1992 is expected to be about $1.3 billion (13). The Bank

recently issued an operational directive outlining procedures for assessing the environmental consequences of

proposed Bank projects (see ch. 7). Environmental issues papers and action plans are being drawn up for borrowing

countries, and the Bank expects these to have a growing influence on lending activities (128). These are important

steps, but it is too early to ascertain their effect. In the energy sector, most projects now contain loan conditions,

where necessary, to improve fuel pricing and the efficiency of energy consumption. The Energy Sector Management

Assistance Program (ESMAP), established by the Bank and the UN Development Program in 1983 and funded at

a level of $12.5 million in 1988, conducts assessments in the energy sector and facilitates energy policy

recommendations and investments (43,131).

The three regional development banks have a larger role than does the World Bank in many countries, for

example in Central America. The African Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

provided about $1 billion for energy sector projects in 1988 (43). The IDB has sponsored projects on watershed

management, and meetings to coordinate activities with NGOs. With UNDP, it helped compile an agenda of

environmental topics in Latin America and the Caribbean to serve as a vehicle for donor cooperation. In 1990, the

IDB established an Environmental Protection Division to provide increased attention to environmental issues in

project design, and it established procedures for evaluating environmental impacts (30). The division expands

previous IDB efforts (including a 1979 policy statement and the establishment in 1983 of an Environmental

Management Committee) to address environmental issues.

United Nations Agencies—The family of United Nations agencies provides assistance for a multitude of

projects related in some way to climate change. Some of the better known agencies are briefly described here.

The U.N. Development Program (UNDP) allocated about $0.5 billion of its $3.8 billion portfolio to

environmental activities in 1989 (90). It provides funds and advisory services to developing countries for trade in

development technology (43,108). It also helps finance over 50 of the national plans being developed under the

Tropical Forestry Action Plan (ch. 7). UNDP also is developing Environmental Management Guidelines to identify

environmental issues as early as possible in its project design activities.

The U.N. Environment Program (UNEP) reviews global environmental trends and coordinates environmental

activities and provides policy guidance within the United Nations. It led the development of the Vienna Convention

and Montreal Protocol to Protect the Ozone Layer and along with the World Meteorological Organization, jointly

manages the World Climate Program and jointly coordinated the IPCC (see below).

The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is active in energy assessments, planning for rural and

agricultural development, fuelwood and charcoal projects, and tropical forestry issues (see ch. 7).

31XI con~~~ the ~ter~tio~ Monetary Fund-which affects economic practices in developing countries throum fOr e~ple, b

conditions of its structural reform packages-has not taken steps to incorporate environmental concerns in ita decisions (45).

‘@he World Bank includes the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development the International Development Association and

the International Finance Corp. ‘l’he IBRD provides loans at interest rates related to the Bank’s cost of borrowing the IDA provides interest-tie

credits with long grace periods to poorer developing countries; and the IFC raises fucing, generally in line with commercial lending rate%

for private companies and joint ventures (43).

(continued on next page)
284 * Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 9-B—Agencies and Organizations That Can Influence Greenhouse Gas Emissions--Continued

The U,N. Population Fund (UNFPA) promotes strategies and provides assistance to developing countries to

deal with national and international population problems. It provided about $169 million in 1988 for programs in

141 countries.

The UN. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) promotes industrialization in developing countries

and provides assistance to improve industrial use of energy.

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) monitors overall climate trends, provides a framework for

cooperative research on models of global climate, facilitates the exchange of meteorological information between

countries and, with UNEP, jointly sponsors the IPCC. It also jointly manages, with UNEP and the International

Council of Scientific Unions (see below), the World Climate Research Program

Regional Organizations--The developed countries are served by many regional organizations, including the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Energy Agency (IEA), and

European Economic Commission (EEC). The OECD’s Environment Committee, for example, is assessing energy

options related to climate change and socioeconomic implications of such change; its Development Assistance

Committee provides a forum to coordinate donor efforts in addressing environmentalproblems in developing

countries (109). The IEA provides a framework for promoting energy diversification, energy efficiency and

conservation, and alternative energy sources; it also runs information and data exchange centers dealing with energy

technologies.

Developing nations have some regional bodies that are beginning to provide similar services--for example,

tie South Asian Association forRegional Cooperation (SAARC), Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN),

Gulf Cooperation Council, Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SAD(X), and Organization

of American States (OAS) (45).

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (lPCC)--The IPCC was set up in 1988 under the auspices of

UNEP and WMO to serve as the primary international forum for addressing climate change. It has three working

groups charged with:

● assessing scientific evidence on climate change;

. assessing likely impacts resulting from such change; and

● considering possible response strategies for limiting or adapting to climate change.

The groups are chaired by the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and United States, respectively. To encourage

representation of developing country viewpoints, the IPCC established a trust fund to support the participation of

developing countries; as a result, developing countries have comprised about one-third of the national delegations

at recent IPCC meetings. On the other hand, no formal links have been established with the private sector or NGOs.

The WCC’S final report was presented to the Second World Climate Conference and the U.N. General Assembly

in late 1990. The findings from the scientific assessment working group are summarized in chapter 2.

International Science and Natural Resource Organizations-The International Council of Scientific Unions

(ICSU) coordinates worldwide scientific projects and works with NGOs and intergovernmental agencies in project

implementation. The ICSU runs the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, which conducts research on

basic global processes, and is a joint manager of the World Climate Research Program

Numerous other research and management organizations and plans address natural resource issues, primarily

in agriculture and forestry. For example, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (WAD), funded by

OPEC and OECD members, makes financial resources available on concessional terms for agricultural development

in developing countries (109). The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is a

network of regional and international organizations that conduct agricultural research in developing countries

(CGIAR and Other agricultural institutions are described in ch. 8). The International Tropical Timber Organization

provides a framework for coordination between tropical timber producing and consuming countries, and the

Tropical Forestry Action Plan attempts to enhance donor cooperation and funding in sustainable forestry

management. Both of these entities have come under severe criticism recently (see ch. 7).
Chapter 9-international Dimensions; U.S. Influence and Regional Trends ● 285

Box 9-C—U.S. Trade in Renewable and Efficient Energy Technologies

Various programs to help U.S. businesses overcome obstacles in exporting efficient and renewable energy

technologies to non-OECD countries have been established by the U.S. Government, independent government

agencies, and the private sector.

Agency for International Development (A. I.D.) Programs—A.I.D. promotes energy-related technology

development and transfer by supporting prefeasibility funding studies and by leveraging private, multilateral, and

other bilateral resources for projects. Some of the leveraging is accomplished through the MDBs, using the

Multi-Agency Group on Power Sector Innovation (MAGPI). The agency sponsors reverse trade missions and an

energy and environmental training program for host country nationals. A.I.D. has established a Private Enterprise

Fund for Eastern Europe to assist the export of U.S. technologies, including energy-related ones. It also is

collaborating with India on a 6-year Program for the Acceleration of Commercial Energy Research (PACER) that

promotes the commercialization of indigenous energy technologies and improvement of transmission and

distribution planning and technologies; PACER has helped establish consortia that link the industrial, commercial,

R&D, and government sectors.

Department of Energy and CORECT—The Committee on Renewable Energy Commerce and Trade

(CORE(X) is a multiagency committee led by the Department of Energy and involving 12 other Federal agencies.

Established in 1984, it promotes trade of U.S. renewable energy technologies (and is expanding its efforts to energy

efficiency), brings government and business personnel from other countries to the United States for trade

conferences and missions, provides technical assistance, and funds the Renewable Energy Design Assistance Center

(REDAC) at Sandia National Laboratories to provide technical assessments, prefeasibility and feasibility studies,

financing, and other forms of project support.

Export-Import Bank (Eximbank,)--Eximbank is an independent U.S. Government agency, chartered under

the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, that helps finance and facilitate the sale of U.S. goods and services to foreign

buyers, particularly in developing countries (95,123). Its main programs are direct loans, guarantees, and insurance.

The 1990 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Public Law 101-167) directed Eximbank to direct not less than

5 percent of its financial assistance in the energy sector to renewable energy projects. In FY 1990, Eximbank

provided support for over $6 billion in exports. In the energy sector, it provided final commitments to support $2.1

million, and had pending final commitments for an additional $11.8 million, in renewable energy projects (i.e.,

hydroelectric, photovoltaics). Assuming pending commitments are fried, Eximbank’s fiscal year 1990 support

for renewable energy projects would represent 7.4 percent of its total energy sector support (21).

Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC)-The Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC) is an

independent corporation created by Congress. It directly finances projects sponsored by U.S. private investors in

over 100 developing countries and provides insurance against political risks for U.S. private investments in those

countries. It can provide direct loans of up to $6 million to small- and medium-sized firms and investment guarantees

for up to $50 million. In fiscal year 1989, OPIC provided project insurance totaling over $l.5 billion and direct loans

and loan guarantees totaling $208 million (59). OPIC is developing a privately owned and managed Environmental

Investment Fund for business enterprises in developing countries and Eastern Europe that involve renewable

energy, ecotourism, sustainable agriculture, forest management, and pollution prevention (59,60,61). OPIC hopes

to capitalize the fund with $60 million of equity raised from U.S. businesses and institutional investors and $40

million in OPIC-guaranteed long-term debt,

Private Export Funding Corporation—The Private Export Funding Corp. (PEFCO) is a governmentsponsored commercial corporation that raises funds for export financing in the private market, using unconditional

Eximbank guarantees.

U.S. Trade and Development Program—The U.S. Trade and Development Program (TDP), in the U.S.

International Development Cooperation Agency. funds feasibility studies, consultancies, training programs, and

other planning services for projects involving export markets for U.S. goods and services. Its focus is primarily on

large public sector projects (43,93).

continued on next page
286 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Box 9-C—U..% Trade in Renewable and Efficient Energy Technologies-Continued

United States Export Council for Renewable Energy (US/ECRE)-US/ECRE is an umbrella organization

composed of eight national trade associations that represent manufacturers of renewable energy technologies. It

promotes exports of these technologies, specifically for alcohol fuels, biomass, geothermal, hydropower,

photovoltaics, solar thermal, wind and wood. It engages in country studies and market analyses; advises members

on overseas projects, procurement opportunities, and trade shows; and serves as a clearinghouse for inquiries

regarding renewable energy. It has collaborated with DOE and Volunteers in Technical Assistance on a low-orbit

satellite system that will allow NGOs to communicate with each other and obtain technical information on

renewable and other energy technologies.

Other Industry-Sponsored Efforts--The International Environmental Bureau (IEB) is a nonprofit educational

division of the International Chamber of Commerce, funded independently by its member companies (19 from

North America, 9 from Europe, and 1 from South America including such giants as ALCOA, Monsanto, and

ARCO). Its principal purpose is to make available know-how and expertise on environmental problems to

companies in developing countries and to medium- and small-sized companies everywhere, free of charge (36). It

was established in 1984 and by July 1989 had received about 80 requests for assistance.

The Foreign Credit Insurance Corp. (FCIC), an association of 50 or so private insurance companies, insures

against commercial risk in short-term transactions with repayment terms of up to 100 days.

The Industry Cooperative for Ozone Layer Protection was set up by nine major companies (including AT&~

Northern Telecom, Boeing, Ford Motor Corp.) in October 1989 to promote cooperation in ending the use of

chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) as cleaning agents. CFC-113, for example, is widely used as a degreaser in the

manufacture of computer and electronic parts. The cooperative intends to act as a clearinghouse for information on

new, safe substitute solvents and to encourage their adoption. Its formation followed a 1989 announcement by

Petrofirm that it had developed a citrus-based substitute for CFC-113.

I

22).

13 The extent to which this will be used f o r A.I.D. has proposed a Global Energy Efficiency

renewable and efficient energy technologies remains

to be seen, but Eximbank also is working through

CORECT to assist U.S. renewable energy businesses.

Third, Congress could continue to change restrictions on technology exports to Eastern Europe and

the U.S.S.R. This could be done as part of the

reauthorization of the Export Administration Act

and/or by providing new directions on U.S. participation in the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) (see section on

“Eastern Europe and the U. S. S. R.” for more

discussion).

In addition, Congress could consider establishing,

with the cooperation of host countries, technology

research and/or assistance centers in Eastern Europe

and developing countries, For example, EPA is

coordinating the establishment of a center in Budapest that will function as an environmental information clearinghouse for Eastern Europe (111).14

Initiative, to be supported in part by developed

countries and multilateral institutions, for promoting

pricing reform, end-use energy efficiency, cogeneration, and private sector activities in other countries

(99, 119). The National Laboratories could be

directed to increase R&D on technologies for

developing countries, as is being done for renewable

energy at the CORECT-sponsored Sandia Renewable Energy Design Assistance Center.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Private agencies and organizations, or NGOs,

have succeeded in mobilizing support from and

participation by local communities in development

and environmental projects around the world (129).

More than 1,000 are represented at the UNDP’s

Nongovernmental Environmental Liaison Office,

and over 240 were registered with A.I.D. as of 1989.

Some are multinational (e.g., Greenpeace, Friends of

the Earth). The U.S. funds foreign NGOs in developing countries through the Inter-American Founda-

—.

13~ojec~ would be ~ tie telecomm~icatiom, elmtic power (including renewable energy), colls~ctio~ and @8nSpOmtiOll S@OW wi~ an lniti~

focus on Indonesi% Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand (22).

1dln 1990, tie Semte Foreign Rela~ions Comllt@ appmv~ tie suppofl for fist EMop~n Democracy Act (SEED II). The act would have included

technical assistance for establishing business centers to provide information and logistical support for U.S. businesses operating in Eastern Europe and

the U.S.S.R. (15).
Chapter 9-International Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends . 287

tion and the African Development Foundation,

through direct grants, and through hundreds of

American NGOs that receive A.I.D. funding. Foreign and U.S. NGOs registered with A.I.D. received

$456 million in development assistance funds in

fiscal year 1989 (1 13) and an estimated $399 million

in fiscal year 1990 (97).

Congress has attempted to expand and strengthen

the role of U.S. and foreign NGOs in a number of

ways.

15 Many NGOs, however, still lack the resources (financial, technical, managerial) and experience to implement plans and projects (45, 136). By

building the capacities of NGOs, particularly in

developing countries, it may be possible to foster

more effective energy and natural resource policies

and programs.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Tropical deforestation is the major source of

current carbon emissions in developing countries

(ch. 7), while rice cultivation and livestock operations are the main sources of methane (ch. 8).

Emissions from fossil fuel use are relatively low but

are likely to increase as developing countries become more industrialized and their citizens use more

modern methods for cooking, heating, and transportation. Indeed, total and per-capita energy consumption is rising more rapidly in developing countries

than in developed countries.

The decisions that developing countries make in

the next decade about how to pursue economic

growth will affect emissions for decades to come.

Economic growth could require dramatic expansions in energy services and infrastructure (e.g.,

industrial bases, electric generation). Opportunities

exist today to implement efficient technologies and

services to help meet these demands. Opportunities

also exist to reverse or slow tropical deforestation.

However, massive foreign debts make it difficult for

developing countries to invest in energy-efficient

infrastructures and also provide an incentive for

rapid depletion of natural resources (in order to

service the debts). 16 Some developing countries may

not sign international agreements on climate change

unless their concerns about debt and other development issues are addressed (63, 134).17

Contribution to Greenhouse Gas Emissions

CO2 From Deforestation

Deforestation in developing countries accounts

for between 7 and 31 percent of global CO2

emissions, as well as unknown amounts of methane,

N2O, and other gases (ch. 7). While some deforestation occurs because of hydroelectric development

and fuelwood consumption, the major direct causes

are land use changes for agriculture (including cattle

ranching) and timber harvesting. Perhaps 17 million

hectares are deforested yearly.

CO2 From Energy Use

The developing countries’ share of world commercial energy use increased from 16 to about 25

percent between 1970 and 1988 (1, 31,43, 75, 76,

106, 127). China, India, and Brazil accounted for

about 45 percent of developing countries’ consumption of commercial and traditional fuels in 1988,

with China alone accounting for 30 percent (104,

106; also see ch. 3).

Commercial energy use will increase as developing countries expand industrial and transportation

infrastructures, continue to fully electrify cities, and

begin or continue rural electrification programs(71,

104). New electrical power generation is likely to be

based largely on domestic energy sources, primarily

coal and hydroelectric facilities (93).18 one-half of

planned electricity generation in China and India, for

example, is to be based on coal (56).

15FOr ~mple, public ~w 101.167 dirwted agencies such as A.I.D. to make increased use of U.S. and foreign NGOS ~d to provide tec~ic~

assistance in increasing the institutional capacities of foreign NGOS. The 1989 International Development and Finance Act (Public Law 101-240)

requires the U.S, Executive Directors to multilateral development banks to promote increased assistance and support for foreign NGOS. Congress also

appropriated $1 million in fiscal year 1991 for a project to launch a low-orbit satellite linking NGOS in an information network (see US/ECRE in box

9-C) (82).

]bkfuch of fiehwd Cuenwgenmated by developing counties flows back to ]enders to se~icedebts; annual inte~st payments on developing COUlltl_Y

foreign debt are over $60 billion (4 S). Debt service and austerity measures required under IMF structural adjustment agreements have led to government

cutbacks in operating expenditures, often in natural resource management programs (56).

17~c UN, resolution t. convene we UN, Cotiemnce on Environment and Development (91), to IX held in Bw.il kl 1992, includes the objectives

of devising agreements regarding climate change and addressing the concerns of developing countries about debt and development issues.

ltlpower genmatlon in developing Countfies rose by 8,6 percent annu~lY helWCen 197 I and 1987, compared wi~ an average of 3.ci percent annually

in developed countries (93). Most added capacity in developing countries has been fossil fuel plants, while much new capacity in OECD countries hm

been non-C02 emitting nuclem plants (34).
288 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

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. .

-.

.-f

-p -m -

.- 0 &

W.A

,, ~–d- d .

.

t*~

-“b *,=>.h-:::;-

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

Animal wastes are a “traditional” energy source for cooking

and heating in many countries.

One analysis (76) developed two scenarios for

CO2 emissions related to energy use in nine developing countries (four Asian, four Latin American, and

one African). One scenario assumed high emission

rates (i.e., no constraints on economic and energy

growth) and the other assumed lower rates (i.e.,

because of energy efficiency and fuel substitution

measures). The projected CO2 emissions rise significantly, even in the low emissions, energy-efficiency

scenario (figure 9-7)$

CFC Use

The main CFC producers among developing

countries are China, Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico.

In 1985 their total production was 19 percent of U.S.

production (1 10), but refrigeration, air-conditioning,

and other CFC applications are expanding rapidly

(26, 51, 76). For example, China has a goal of one

refrigerator per household by the year 2000(71), and

its population is growing by several million households per year. Its consumption of CFCs and halons

is projected to increase 12 percent annually between

1990 and 1996 (38). Future CFC use in these

countries thus will be significant if better technologies and substitutes are not widely and economically

available (see discussion of refrigeration in ch. 8) or

if limits on CFC use cannot be implemented (see box

2-C in ch. 2).

Figure 9-7-Projected CO2 Emissions in Selected

Developing Countries (including use of biomass)

China

India

Mexico

Brazil

South Korea

Indonesia

Venezuela

Nigeria

Argentina

1

= 1985

~ 2025 LO W

~ 2025 High

~ ‘- - 7– ‘–T ‘-- — ~ – —- ~ .7—..—7

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6

Emissions (billion metric tons/year)

C O2 emissions in developing countries are projected to rise

significantly by 2025, as shown here for four countries in Asia, four

in Latin America, and one in Africa. The “High” scenario assumed

no constraints on economic and energy growth. The “Low”

scenario assumed that policies are enacted to improve energy

efficiency and change the fuel mix.

SOURCE: J. Sathaye and A. Ketoff, COZ Emissions from h@orDevefoping

Countries: Better Understanding the Role of Energy in the Long

Term, Interim Report, LBL-29507 (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence

Livermore Laboratory, August 1990).

Methane

While there is great uncertainty regarding emissions levels, the main anthropogenic sources of

methane are rice production under irrigated or flood

conditions, livestock operations, fossil fuel production (including leaks from coal mines and natural gas

pipelines and flaring), and landfills.19 Rice cultivation and livestock operations account for an estimated 20 to 50 percent of global methane emissions.

Developing countries are the major contributors of

methane from rice production and, along with

developed countries, major sources of methane from

livestock (see ch. 8).

General Areas for Improvements

Important technical opportunities for stabilizing

or reducing future emissions from developing countries include:

● increasing efficiency of energy use;

. moving toward natural gas and nonfossil fuels;

. developing and disseminating CFC substitutes;

and

● slowing deforestation.
Chapter International Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends ● 289

Increased Energy Efficiency

Developing countries tend to have inefficient

energy production, transmission and distribution,

and consumption systems (16, 43). For example,

steam powerplants in many developing countries

may use 20 to 45 percent more fuel per kWh of

electricity than typical U.S. steam plants; many

plants are operational only 50 to 60 percent of the

time, compared with over 80 percent in developed

countries, because of frequent power shortages and

lack of proper maintenance (93). Electricity losses

during transmission and distribution also are high

(e.g., over 30 percent in the Dominican Republic and

Bangladesh, and over 20 percent in Pakistan, India,

and Egypt) (62, 93).

Many opportunities will exist over the next few

decades to invest in improved, cost-effective technologies (93).20 These technologies could include,

for example, variable speed drives for industrial

motors; electric arc furnaces for steel production;

energy-efficient lighting, water pumping, heating,

and refrigeration systems; and capacitors in electricity lines to reduce transmission and distribution

losses (see chs. 3 to 6). Cogeneration might also

increase effective electricity generation, primarily in

the industrial sector (27). One study, for example,

estimated that implementing energy-efficient technologies and practices in Brazil might reduce the

total electricity demand projected for the year 2000

by almost 20 percent, at a cost far lower than the

investments in new electrical generating capacity

that would otherwise be needed (124),

However, technical and institutional obstacles to

increased energy efficiency exist in developing

countries. For example, many developing countries

cannot use efficient motor-compressors in refrigerators because of problems with voltage fluctuations

(104). Moreover, almost all developing countries

grant monopolies to government-owned utilities for

electricity generation and distribution, and many

subsidize the price of energy supplied to consumers.

As a result, utilities often operate inefficiently and

end-users have little incentive to conserve.

Switching Fuels

Switching from coal to natural gas would reduce

carbon emissions by 15 to 50 percent per unit of

delivered energy, depending on the end product

(steam or electricity) and the technology used (ch.

3). Switching to natural gas, however, might require

retrofitting old facilities or building new ones

(including the distribution infrastructure) and ensuring that methane leaks from production and distribution systems are minimized (96, 122). Natural gas

also is not readily available everywhere; for example, China and India each contain less than 1 percent

of total world natural gas reserves (1, 106).

Nuclear and renewable energy sources have fewer

greenhouse gas emissions (and in some cases no

emissions at all) per unit of delivered energy.

Nuclear power currently plays a minimal role in

most developing countries, however, and is unlikely

to increase substantially in the near future (see ch. 3).

Issues of concern include lead times to develop

plants, safety and environmental risks, costs, and

nuclear weapons proliferation. Some renewable

energy supplies are modular, hence adaptable to

local situations and to decentralized power systems,

relatively easily maintained, and often costeffective, particularly in remote areas (94, 1 12).

Thousands of photovoltaic (PV) and wind systems

exist in rural areas for water pumping, drip irrigation, electric power, and lighting. PV modules often

are used to refrigerate vaccine supplies in rural areas.

Small hydropower systems (e.g., less than 10

megawatts) have been used for milling grains,

providing local electric power, and other applications. Biomass systems based on agricultural residues are used to produce electricity, process heat,

and/or liquid fuels.

However, various factors still limit the role of

renewable energy sources in developing countries.

Of the many renewable energy projects funded over

the past two decades by A.I.D. and other donors, few

have resulted in subsequent commercialization. This

is partly because donor agencies and host government institutions have rarely established appropriate

mechanisms for financing (including provision of

hard currency), business development, or consumer

credit; in addition, the private sector in most

developing countries plays a limited role in the

~A.I.D. (96) reviewed 1,500 energy proj~ts in 11 developing countries (involving measures such as waste reductlm fuel Stitchi% Process

optirniz~tio~ and cogeneration) and concluded that investments of $A6 million were yielding actual annual savings of $26 milliom with an average

payback period of 1.8 years,
290 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Photo credit: African Development Foundation

Thousands of photovoltaic and wind systems exist in rural areas for water pumping, drip irrigation, electric power, and lighting

systems. Here, people in an Egyptian village are viewing a solar-powered television at their community center.

development and operation of electric power systems (93).21

CFC Reductions and Substitutes

Research into CFC substitutes is extremely active

and some substitutes may be mass-produced within

a few years. Proposed substitutes such as hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and hydrofluorocarbons

(HFCs) have much lower ozone depletion potentials

than do CFCs; some have 30 to 70 percent of the

global warming potentials of the original CFCs (see

ch. 2). However, new refrigeration systems with

CFC-free (and more energy-efficient) insulation or

with energy sources such as natural gas and solar

energy show increasing promise (see ch. 8; also see

“Switching Fuels’ above on PV systems).

Slow or Decrease Deforestation

Slowing or reversing tropical deforestation will

require much local, national, and international

effort. Important steps include debt relief from

creditor nations, enhancement of environmental

ministries, promotion of sustainable commercial

forestry practices and of reforestation, land reform

within developing countries, and increased use of

practices such as agroforestry, sustainable agriculture, and harvesting of nontimber forest products.

These are discussed in detail in chapter 7.

Policy Directions for the United States

Since developing countries themselves finance 80

percent or more of their development activities (83),

U.S. assistance to them might be best viewed as a

catalyst for establishing cooperative programs to

address development issues, including controlling

greenhouse gas emissions (56, 83, 134). Congress

can gear U.S. assistance and influence toward

building local institutional capacities, and toward

redirecting energy, natural resource, and population

policies. Relevant sector-specific options (e.g., for

transportation, forestry) are discussed in chs. 3

through 8.

Building Local Institutional Capacities

Building local institutional capacities can play a

major role in redirecting natural resource, energy,

and population policies in developing countries.

Bilateral and multilateral lending and assistance

 few by A. I.D., have begun to open power production to the private sector, which provide some more

efficient production.
Chapter 9--International Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends ● 291

agencies (e.g., World Bank, UNDP and UNEP, and

A. I.D.) already provide some assistance in this area.

Most large A.I.D. projects, for example, contain

some training, education, and institutional development component, and many of its agricultural

projects have assisted in the development of national

agricultural universities and research institutions

(56). Congress could direct A.I.D. to increase its

emphasis on such activities. This would likely

require increased funding for education and training;

environmental information gathering and analysis;

conservation planning and policy analysis; and

coordination of regional authorities and communitybased organizations (56, 136).

Redirecting Natural Resources Policy

Most developing country economies are based on

natural resources (45, 136), and many of these

resources have been exploited rapidly during the

past few decades. However, short-term revenue

gains have come at the cost of reductions in the

long-term and even immediate economic outlook for

some countries. During the 1980s, for example,

some countries that once were net exporters of

tropical hardwood products found that their forests

could no longer maintain a positive export flow (ch.

7). Resource depletion in one area also can have

unintended consequences elsewhere—for example,

upland deforestation has increased silting of reservoirs and flooding in many downstream areas (129).

Many national and multilateral development policies foster resource exploitation, including subsidies

for cattle ranching and short-term, low-rent licenses

for timber harvesting (ch. 7). The effectiveness of

plans and programs such as the Tropical Forestry

Action Plan can be evaluated in light of these

considerations. Fortunately, direct bilateral and multilateral assistance is beginning to be restructured to

promote more environmentally sensitive economic

development. A. I.D., the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and UNDP, among

others, are all developing or have recently adopted

environmental assessment guidelines (ch. 7).

U. N.-endorsed procedures for estimating national

economic performance (e.g., Gross Domestic Product, or GDP) do not account for values such as clean

air and water, watershed protection, soil retention,

and biodiversity (45, 70, 135).22 To address this, the

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and the U.S.

Executive Directors to the multilateral development

banks (MDBs) could promote economic accounting

procedures that include natural resource values and

services. For example, this could be included as part

of the World Bank’s environmental assessment

procedure. Congress also could encourage A.I.D. to

expand its activities in promoting such accounting.23

Financing for resource conservation projects could

also be increased. A new multilateral fund-a

Global Environmental Facility or “Green Fund”--

was established in November 1990 to provide

funding for projects on greenhouse gases (e.g.,

non-CO 2 energy sources, energy efficiency, reforestation), biological diversity, marine pollution, and

CFC substitutes (29a, 130, 133).24 The World Bank

will administer the facility, UNEP will ensure its

policies are consistent with U.N. environmental

goals, and UNDP will conduct prefeasibility studies.

In addition to U.S. participation in the facility,

Congress could direct U.S. organizations such as

OPIC and A.I.D. to expand their activities in

financing similar resource conservation projects.

Redirecting Energy Policies

A. I.D., various U.N. agencies, and the World

Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) provided over $200 million in fiscal

year 1988 for energy-related grants and assistance

(table 9-4); in addition, over $6 billion was provided

for energy-related loans. Including technical assistance from other countries and technical support

derived from portions of the loans, total technical

assistance for energy may be on the order of $500

million per year-less than 1 percent of total annual

energy expenditures by developing countries (43).

Until recently, much of this assistance focused on

conventional energy projects such as large hydroZZThcSc procedures rneas~e the fIOW of economic activities rather than changes in resource stocks contributing to the activities; iII essence, shofi-te~

economic gains represent interest being obtained from a shrinking capital/resource base, The U.N. Statistical Commission and Statistical Office currently

is revising its guidelines on national accounting procedures, but provisions addressing the issue of natural resource depletion are not expected to be

included (45),

‘For example, A.I.D. is assisting Kenya and Niger in linking their cwnt development assistance programs to such an accounting system (56).

~Sifilflly, the World Resources hstitute su~ested establishing a global International Environmental Facility, jointly fl~nced by OECD bilater~

development agencies and MDBs ( 136), Its purpose would be to promote coordination among UN agencies, developing country governments, and NGOS

in identifying conservation needs and to help arrange financing from existing sources for projects.
292 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Table 9-4-Funding for Major Energy Assistance to Developing Countries, 1988-89

Organization Activity $ Million Yeara

Loans:

World Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Power sector loans 3,282 FY1989

Oil and gas loans 581 FY1989

African Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Energy project loans 567 1988

Inter-American Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . Energy sector loans 405 FY1988

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Power and gas loans 1,100 FY1988

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Energy loans 410 1988

Grants and other assistance:

U.S. Agency for International Development . . . . . . Energy projects 130 FY1988

U.N. Department of Technical Cooperation

for Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Technical assistance 25-30 1988

U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization . . . . . . . . . Rural energy assistance 20-30 1988

UN. Industrial Development organization . . . . . . . Industrial energy assistance 5-1o 1988

World Bank Energy Sector Management

Assistance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preinvestment studies, training 14 1988

aFY = fiscal year.

SOURCE: Lawrence Berkeiey Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, Solar Energy Research

Institute, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Energy Tec+mobgyforDevebping Countries: Issues forthe U.S. National

Energy Strategy, prepared for U.S. Department of Energy (Berkeley, CA: Lawrenee Berkeley Laboratory, December 1989).

electric darns and coal plants; only a few World

Bank and Inter-American Development Bank energy projects from 1980 through 1988 involved

renewable energy other than large hydroelectric

projects (126).25 For fiscal year 1989, US/ECRE

(1 12) estimated that World Bank lending for solar,

geothermal, and wood-bassed energy projects amounted

to less than 1 percent of its energy sector funding.

Energy efficiency and renewable energy receive

scant attention for many reasons, including:

insufficient capital in developing countries to

purchase technologies;

lack of access in developing countries to

relevant information on such systems;

artificially low fossil fuel prices;

reluctance by multilateral organizations to fund

small projects, because of overhead and staffing demands; and

lack of attention in assistance projects to disseminating commercial technologies and developing local infrastructures for their maintenance.

To address these problems, U.S. and multilateral

policies could focus on several areas-improving energy institutions in developing countries;

increasing energy efficiency; developing renewable

energy sources (and facilitating their trade); and

working with host governments to initiate reforms in

pricing policies (e.g., subsidies for energy production) (24, 25, 43, 93, 96, 115, 116, 127, 128).26

Several U.S. agencies (e.g., EPA, A. I.D.,

CORECT, and DOE) already provide technical

assistance and grants for energy efficiency and

renewable energy technologies, often linked to

financing from MDBs and private investments.

Recent U.S. legislation (Public Law 101-167)

directed A.I.D. to focus on least-cost energy planning, energy pricing policy reform, end-use energy

efficiency, and renewable energy. Congress could

direct A.I.D. to initiate activities in countries not

currently served by the agency (e.g., China and

Mexico) .27 The legislation also instructed the Executive Directors to the MDBs to promote end-use

energy efficiency and renewable energy as criteria in

decisions about new projects. Congress could ensure

~Of all multilate~ and bilater~ ene~ assistance from 1972 to 1980, an estimated 91 percent was for large, conventional el~tic~ Power Wsf~

(including nuclear), 5 percent was for fossil-fuel exploration and recovery, 3 percent was for renewable energy sources, and 1 percent was for technical

assistance (including energy plarming) (25).

~Note, however, that many deve]o;~d co~tr-ies, including the United States, also subsidize various aspects of the productio% distibutiow and u*

of fossil fuels.

Z?public ~W 101-167 ~cted A.I.D. to identify key middle- and low-income countries in which C-esin energy and fOn3Stry Poficies @@

signit3cantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In a report to A.I.D., ORNL (56) concluded that four developing countries stood out — Chin& Bmzil,

Indonesi~ and India (China and India because of cord use and rice cultivation, Brazil and Indonesia because of deforestation and all four because of

possible impacts from sea-level rise). CMher candidates for attention were Poland, EgypL Mexico, East Germany, Thailand, Colombia, the Philippine,

Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Zaire.
Chapter International Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends ● 293

that A.I.D. and the Department of Treasury have

sufficient resources to comply with these provisions.

A.I.D. also could review the effectiveness of the

Multi-Agency Working Group for Power Sector

Innovation (MAGPI), which was established in

1987 to coordinate activities among donors (including A.I.D. and the World Bank) in power sector

lending, in achieving these objectives.

To overcome the reluctance of agencies and

lending institutions to finance small projects, Congress could promote “bundling’ ‘----combining several small projects (e.g., for renewable energy) into

a large project that supplies a substantial amount of

energy and involves financial scales more customarily handled by large development banks (e.g., $5

million or more). Indeed, Public Law 101-167

instructed the Treasury Department to work with

borrowing countries to develop loans for bundled

projects on end-use energy efficiency and renewable

energy. The “Green Fund” (see above) might be

used to finance bundled projects. Congress also

could promote greater funding by smaller development organizations. For example, the InterAmerican Foundation (IAF) and the African Development Foundation (ADF) work with the larger

Inter-American and African Development Banks to

fund (IAF) or implement (ADF) community-scale,

grassroots development programs (102); to date,

though, they have rarely been involved in energy

projects.

population Policies

History of U.S. Population Policy—The United

States has supported the right of couples worldwide

to control the number and spacing of their children

since the mid- 1960s. The Foreign Assistance Act, as

amended in 1965, considered family planning an

important contributor to economic development and

improved health and nutrition (17, 44). The Act also

established A. I.D., which has been the major source

of U.S. population assistance funds.

In the 1970s, as developing countries became

increasingly worried about their ability to accommodate rising numbers, support for family planning

programs grew rapidly. A U. N.-sponsored conference in 1974, attended by 137 countries (including

the United States), adopted a “World Population

Plan of Action” that called for “socioeconomic

development as well as health and family planning

programs designed to reduce excess fertility” (63a).

It asked that governments provide individuals and

couples with the information and means to determine the number and spacing of their children.

Today, about 84 percent of the people in developing

countries live in countries with some type of

governmental population policy (29).

Meanwhile, the United States grew increasingly

conservative about family planning, primarily because of concern over abortion. At the 1984 world

population conference in Mexico City, the United

States reversed its earlier position by declaring that

population growth was a ‘‘neutral’ factor and that

economic development could compensate for any

population level.

New restrictions on A.I.D. made organizations

associated with abortion services in developing

countries ineligible for funding. Thus, in the mid1980s, two of the most important international

population assistance programs lost U.S. funds: the

International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)

and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

Current Issues for U.S. Population Policy—

With respect to family planning assistance, Congress can now consider the appropriate level of

funding, how funds should be distributed, and under

what restrictions or sanctions. Arguments for and

against attaching sanctions to funds, though, are

beyond the scope of this report.

U.S. funding earmarked specifically for A. I.D. ’s

population account declined from $290 million in

fiscal year 1985 to $218 million in fiscal year 1990

(97).28 Total funding for population-related projects

is slightly higher in each year, though, because of

funds allocated under the Economic Support Fund

and the Development Fund for Africa.29 Among

major donors, U.S. assistance is relatively high in

terms of absolute amounts but relatively low in

terms of its share of GDP (92).

~~ese we ac~~ or estimated expendi~res and vary slightly from ofilciat authorizations (e.g., $198 million authorized in fis~ y~ 1989, $202

million expended).

~For ~xmple, toml fudlng in fis~ Yw 1989 was about $245 million, Congess au~ori~ $198 million d~~fly for A.I.D. ‘S population p]aming

account, and population-related projects also received about $30 million from the Development Fund for Africa (3) and an estimated $18 million for

projects in Pakistan and Egypt funded under the Economic Support Fund (97, 98).
294 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

There is disagreement as to whether these levels

are adequate and appropriate. Some people argue

that family planning assistance should be reduced or

eliminated as a part of international aid (17).

However, the UNFPA (’71) concluded that more

assistance is needed if the world’s population is to

stabilize at or near the UN’s ‘‘medium’ projection

of 10 to 11 billion people.30 In particular, more

assistance is needed to meet the ‘‘unmet need for

contraception." 31 The UNFPA estimates that the

cost for direct contraceptive services and a range of

backup activities (e.g., education, women’s programs, research, and evaluation) would be several

billion dollars per year.

U.S. funding prior to 1986 was distributed primarily through bilateral aid, U.S.-based NGOs, IPPF,

and UNFPA. These pathways include a complex

network of donors and recipients, making it easier to

tailor assistance to the needs and conditions of

specific areas. A broad array of agencies and

channels can also be helpful when political factors

make some sources of aid more acceptable than

others. Loss of UNFPA and IPPF as channels,

however, has removed much of this flexibility and

reduced overall U.S. influence in family planning

assistance.

EASTERN EUROPE AND

THE U.S.S.R.

The U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries

account for about one-fifth of current global greenhouse gas emissions, mostly from combustion of

fossil fuels to provide energy.

32 Their existing

energy infrastructure is both massive and inefficient;

thus, investments are needed both in new, more

efficient facilities and in retrofitting existing facilities for better energy use.33

Efforts to promote energy conservation and efficiency and thereby reduce future growth in carbon

emissions in these countries must overcome several

systemic and institutional obstacles. Most resources,

including energy, are priced at artificial values that

do not reflect their true costs. Currencies convertible

in Western markets, needed for purchasing modern,

energy-efficient equipment, are lacking. Rigid quotas set by central economic planners for goods and

services provide no incentives for efficient production. Finally, implementation of plans for alternative

energy sources is hindered by a fragmentation of

responsibilities among multiple government agencies. Thus, even when opportunities exist, there are

strong disincentives to save energy and raw materials and to make efficient capital investments.

These obstacles have led to high industrial

demand for energy, energy-inefficient production of

goods and services, less electricity for nonindustrial

consumers, and low standards of living. Energyinefficient industrialization also has led to severe

environmental problems in the region. Many rivers

and groundwater aquifers in Eastern Europe and the

Soviet Union are seriously polluted from industrial

wastes and agricultural runoff (e.g., 9, 19, 77, 87).

Forests in the Black Triangle region (an area shared

by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany) and other

areas exhibit severe effects from anthropogenic air

pollutants (e.g., 49).

The political revolutions sweeping through Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R, augur many changes in

economic systems, energy-use patterns, and environmental protection. Eastern Europe is returning to

the economic traditions of Central and Western

Europe that prevailed in the region before World

War II. Hungary, for example, has been active in

introducing market mechanisms and decentralizing

its economy (39), and other countries are following

suit. Some Eastern European countries may become

observers to the European Community in a few

years, and some may even become members. Even

so, they are likely to remain tied to the U.S.S.R. for

decades, through trade and political agreements.

The United States can help Eastern Europe and

the U.S.S.R. cope with inefficient energy use and

greenhouse gas emissions, and at the same time

benefit from increased trade opportunities with these

countries. Opportunities exist to remove export

restrictions, facilitate joint ventures, and increase

~o achieve this goal, 56 percent of women in developing countries would have to use family planning by the end of the century, compared to 45

percent today,

slI.e., fie pacen~ge of ferti]e Wled and/or sexually active women who do not want more children or who wish to increase the intmal ~tween

births and are neither pregnant nor protected ffom pregnancy.

32~tmnEUoP inc]udes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Ge rmany (prior to uniilcation with West Germany in October 1990), Hungary, Poland, and

Romania.

ss~s differs from the si~tion in cievelophg muntries, which generally have less industial infrastructure (s@ above).
Chapter 9-international Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends ● 295

technical assistance (e.g., see 20, 27a). U.S. influence may be greatest in Eastern European countries,

where trade represents a greater proportion of GNP

than it does in the U.S.S.R. (albeit most of their trade

is with the U.S.S.R.). Trade and joint ventures with

Eastern Europe (particularly Poland, Hungary, and

Czechoslovakia at this time) might, however. be an

effective avenue for influencing energy use in the

U.S.S.R. The success of U.S. policies ultimately will

depend on the degree to which the U.S.S.R. and

Eastern European countries can reform their own

economies.

Trends in Eastern Europe

Energy Use

Eastern European countries accounted for 6 percent of world energy consumption in 1988 (see

figure 9-2). Coal was the predominant energy

source, accounting for 69 percent of primary energy

consumption in East Germany, 84 percent in Poland,

and 58 percent in the region as a whole in 1988 (see

table 3-1 inch. 3). Oil was somewhat more important

than coal in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, while

natural gas was the most important energy source in

Romania.

The industrial sector accounted for 60 percent of

primary energy demand in the six Eastern European

countries combined (32, 41). Residential and commercial buildings accounted for 27 percent, while

transportation accounted for only 13 percent, These

sectoral percentages differ sharply from those of the

United States and other OECD countries.

Per-capita energy consumption in at least some

parts of the region is roughly equivalent to that of

some OECD countries (see figure 9-3), although

per-capita income is much lower. For example,

Hungary’s per-capita energy use is about the same as

Japan’s, but its per-capita income is one-third to

one-fifth that of Japan (39). Poland and Austria

compare in a similar way (81).

According to one projection (41), without special

incentives for energy efficiency but with structural

changes (i. e., the composition of goods and services

making up the economy) that are likely to occur

anyway, primary energy demand in Eastern Europe

will increase by about 40 percent between 1985 and

2025. Over one-half of the increase would occur in

the buildings sector. In contrast, if incentives for

energy efficiency are enacted (e.g., standards requiring greater automobile fuel efficiency; price reforms

allowing energy prices to escalate to world market

levels), energy demand could remain at about

today’s levels. Demand would decline in the industrial sector and increase in the buildings and

transportation sectors.

Carbon Emissions

Projections of future carbon emissions have been

made for Hungary (39) and Poland (8 1). For

Hungary, without structural changes or energy

efficiency measures (i.e., a ‘‘Base’ case scenario),

projected emissions in 2030 are about 30 percent

greater than current levels. A combination of structural changes and energy efficiency measures result

in projected emissions in 2030 that are 20 percent

lower than current levels. For Poland, a combination

of structural changes and energy efficiency measures lead to a projected 20 percent reduction from

current levels by the year 2030.

Trends in the U.S.S.R.

Energy Use

In 1988, the U.S.S.R. accounted for 18 percent of

global primary energy consumption, second only to

U.S. consumption (see figure 9-2 above). Per-capita

energy consumption in the U.S.S.R. is comparable

to that of some OECD countries (see figure 9-3),

although per-capita income is much lower. In the

1960s and 1970s, the predominant fuel used in the

U.S.S.R. shifted from coal to petroleum; since then

natural gas has played an increasingly significant

role. As of 1988, natural gas supplied the U.S.S.R.

with 37 percent of its primary energy needs,

petroleum 32 percent, coal 24 percent, and nuclear

and hydroelectric power together 8 percent (see table

3-l). In the early 1980s, Soviet planners expected

nuclear power to meet at least 30 percent of the

U. S. S.R.’s electricity demand by the year 2000.

However, public opposition to nuclear power-e. g.,

reactions to Chernobyl, massive demonstrations at

the Ignalina facility in Lithuania, opposition to

construction of the Crimean plant in the Ukraine---

problems at the Soviet reactor construction facility,

and lack of capital have stalled the program.

The industrial sector accounts for over 50 percent

of total energy consumption (47). The most energyconsuming branches are ferrous metallurgy; fuels

and power; machine building; and chemicals, petrochemicals, and petroleum refining (72). The build-
296 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

ings sector accounts for approximately 20 percent of

energy use, transportation about 12 percent, and the

energy sector about 16 percent (47, 73).

Between 1975 and 1988, Soviet investments in

energy production increased almost fourfold, and in

1988 they represented 25 percent of all investments

in the economy (42). Even greater investments in

energy production may be needed if economic

growth is to occur at a rate of 2 percent or more per

year (47).

In light of such predications, Soviet authorities

have directed all sectors to make more efficient use

of energy. Goals for this were articulated in the

5-year plans for 1981-85 and for 1986-90. Soviet

planners hoped to use conservation and efficiency

measures to reduce projected energy demand by

about one-half (47). This was to be achieved by

restructuring the industrial sector (partly by reducing military expenditures) and adopting modern,

more efficient technologies.

The extent to which these goals can be achieved

is as yet unknown, particularly given the changes

now taking place in the Soviet economic system.

Energy savings are possible in the industrial, transportation, and buildings sectors (see chs. 4 to 6), but

increased consumption of” products and services

(e.g., automobiles, space heating, electric appliances, per-capita living space) and related energy

use is likely. The net effect on total energy use thus

is uncertain.

Carbon Emissions

The U.S.S.R. contributed an estimated 14 percent

of global greenhouse gas emissions during the 1980s

(1 10), primarily from fossil fuel combustion. If

current trends in energy use continue (i.e., ‘‘Base’

case), one model (47) projects that emissions will

increase 45 to 100 percent by 2020, depending on

rates of economic growth (see figure 9-8; the Base

case assumes economic growth at 3 to 3.5 percent

yearly through 2005 and 2.5 to 3 percent thereafter).

In an “Energy-Efficiency” scenario, projected

emissions would rise about “15 percent by 2020. This

assumes that energy intensity declines by an annual

rate of about 2 percent between 1990 and 2020, as a

result of measures such as regulated electric drive

motors, better lighting, gas turbines and combinedcycle plants, and multifuel boilers as efficient as

those in advanced capitalist countries. Projected

Figure 9-8-Projected Carbon Emissions in

the U.S.S.R.

Carbon emissions (billion metric tons/year)

1.5 1

.

.

.

.

1 . 3 . + -1- -+

.-+

I * Energy efficiency

0.5 i -4 + Nuclear energy

.

0.3 ;

Renewable

20% reduction

0.0 t T

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

Soviet researchers modeled future carbon emissions from the

U.S.S.R. In a “Base” case scenario, for example, current trends

in energy use continue and emissions increase by over 50 percent

by 2020. In an “Energy Efficiency” scenario, projected emissions

would rise about 15 percent by 2020. Projected emissions decline

from estimated 1990 levels only if concerted efforts are also made

to expand the role of nuclear power and renewable energy.

SOURCE: AA. Makarov and I.A. Bashmakov, Zhe Soviet Union: A

Strategy of Energy Deveioprnent rn”th Minimum Emission of

Greenhouse Gases, prepared for U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Richland, WA: Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, April 1990).

emissions actually decline from current (estimated)

levels only if concerted efforts are also made to

expand the role of nuclear power and renewable

energy (47).

Options for Possible U.S. Influence

The United States might influence energy use and

carbon emissions in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.

through technical assistance and expanded trade in

energy-efficient technologies. Several U.S. Government and private sector groups already promote

trade in energy-efficient and renewable energy

technologies—including CORECT, OPIC, Eximbank, U.S. Trade and Development program (TDP),

and the U.S. Export Council for Renewable Energy

(US/ECRE) (see box 9-C above).

However, trade is likely to be limited until

systemic changes occur in Eastern Europe and the

U.S.S.R. (9, 41). Some financial constraints to trade

result from the difficult economic transitions occurring in these countries. Eastern Europe faces additional trade constraints because of Soviet intentions

to make its oil supplies available at prevailing world
Chapter International Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends ● 297

prices (paid in convertible currencies) and because

of losses of scheduled oil shipments from Iraq (23).34

If these obstacles can be overcome, it might be

easier to use trade to influence policies in Eastern

Europe than in the U.S.S.R. Trade is a greater

percentage of GNP in Eastern Europe than in the

U.S.S.R. (see table 9-5), although much Eastern

European trade is with the U.S.S.R. Many of these

countries also have some tradition of Western

industrial practices. This and the current economic

and political changes occurring in Eastern Europe

could create a more positive climate for trade with

Western businesses.

Facilitating the use of energy-efficient technology

in Eastern Europe, through trade and joint ventures,

might also benefit the U. S. S. R.; almost 60 percent of

all Soviet imports comes from Eastern Europe and

technology comprises the bulk of the imports .35 U.S.

companies could also attempt to set up energyrelated joint ventures in the U.S.S.R.

Constraints in Centrally Planned Systems

As noted earlier, several systemic and institutional constraints pose barriers to increasing energy

efficiency and reducing energy use in Eastern

Europe and the U.S.S.R. Energy subsidies, for

example, substantially lower the cost of power to

consumers, particularly industries. In Poland, subsidies accounted for 49 and 83 percent of the delivered

prices of coal and natural gas, respectively, in 1987

(81); in Hungary, average consumer prices for

energy were only about 30 percent of those in

Western Europe (74). Rigid quotas for production of

goods and services and use of energy destroy any

incentive to save raw materials or energy. Enterprises must consume virtually all of the supplies

allocated to them by central planners, even when not

all are needed, in order to receive the same or a larger

Table 9-5--Total Foreign Trade as a Percentage of

GNP, 1988, for Selected Countries

Percent

Country of GNPa

Centrally planned countries:

Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 %.

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32%

Czechoslovakia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33%

East Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 %

Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41%

Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20%

U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9%

OECD countries:

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45%

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48%

Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35%

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26%

United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . 44%

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16%

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6 %

aForcentrally plannad countries, data converted at U.S. purchasing power

equivalents.

~ased cm 1987 trade data.

SOURCE: Basad on GNP and trade data in Central Intelligence Ageney,

Directorate of Intelligence, Hand&ook of Economic Statistics,

1989, CPAS 89-10002 (Washington, DC: Septembar 1989).

amount the next year.36 Funding for maintenance

(e.g., of pipelines; ref. 62a) often is inadequate. The

production quotas also lead to greater investments in

heavy industries (e.g., steel, aluminum, chemicals)

at the expense of services and consumer goods.

Trade with Western nations also is constrained by

lack of convertible currencies.

Fragmented institutional responsibilities also limit

governmental abilities to develop and implement

new energy and environmental policies (40). In the

U. S. S. R., six major ministries share the task of

supplying energy.37 Different ministries also direct

the development and the use of specific energy

sources.

38 In 1988, the high-level State Committee

for Environmental Protection, or Goskompriroda,

~Pe~oleU is tie U.S.S.R’S most im~rt~t means of earning hard curreney on western markets; in late 1987, Soviet oil ~d natural gm exports

supplied approximately 15 percent of Western Europe’s use of each fuel (57). The elimination of subsidized oil imports from the U.S.S.R. might result

in Eastern European countries consuming even more “brown” coal, unless and until investments m-e made to develop alternative energy soumes and

promote energy efficiency.

~STrade acco~ts for only 9 percent of the U.S .S .R. ’s GNP. Imports from OECD countries represent O@’ one-tenth of ~s, ~d t~hnolo&3Y is o~Y

a small Portion of these imports (6, 114). Energy in all forms comprises over one-half of the value of all Soviet exports.

~dFuel deliveries, for ex~p]e, me plann~ on a centralized basis in accordance with guidelines on enterprises’ assigned P~orities in tie mtio~

economy and their technical spedications, but the potential for energy conservation generally is not considered by planners.

3i’The Mlfis~es of 011 Industry, Gas Industry, Coal Industry, Electrification, Geology, and Atomic Energy. while tie Council ‘f ‘Stm

coordinates their activities, its owm membership is comprised of some 60 Soviet industrial ministries and committees. Research institutes, universities,

and academies of sciences in each republic also conduct R&D.

38 For ~xmp]e, identification of ~ {proven stocks’ ‘ of geo~e~ waters falls under tie Minis~ of Geo]ogy, but heir use for hinting fal]s under the

Ministry of Gas Industry. Likewise, development of solar power is entrusted to the Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry, but its use is under

the Ministry of Power and Electrification.
298 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Photo credit: W. Westermeyer

Gum’s department store in Moscow. All over the

U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, overcoming the obstacles

typical of centrally planned economies-and ensuing

economic and environmental problems-will be a

formidable challenge.

was created to clean up harmful pollutants. Its

powers were formerly distributed over numerous

bodies; however, legislation formally defining its

wide-ranging jurisdiction has not yet been enacted,

and opposition has emerged from many of the

ministries impinged on by Goskompriroda (40, 117).

Movements by various Soviet republics to gain more

autonomy will make jurisdictional questions even

more complex.

Added to these systemic and institutional constraints to increasing energy efficiency and reducing

energy use is the absence of global warming as a

topic in domestic policy discussions. Although the

U.S.S.R. has been significantly involved in the

International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and

chaired IPCC Working Group II on impacts (see box

9-B above), global warmingis unlikely to receive

high priority in the current domestic policy agenda

unless it overlaps and buttresses major domestic

economic and environmental issues such as improving energy efficiency and local pollution control.39

This is partly because devastating air and water

pollution problems are much more pressing in the

U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe (77), particularly in the

context of severe economic problems and changing

political atmospheres.

U.S. and OECD Policy Barriers

The United States has erected many restrictions

on technology exports to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern

Europe for national security and other foreign policy

reasons. U.S. restrictions were first codified in the

Export Control Act of 1949 and now are codified

primarily in the Export Administration Act (EAA) of

1979, which authorizes the President to prohibit or

curtail the export of goods and technologies.40 The

Byrd Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 (Amendment 435) also limits credit to the U.S.S.R. to $300

million in the aggregate without prior congressional

approval (100). Moreover, for much of the 1970s and

1980s, U.S. trade with the U.S.S.R. took place

within the context of ‘‘linkage’ (i.e., using trade to

moderate Soviet behavior). The Jackson-Vanik Amendments to the EAA linked the extension of most-favorednation trade status and eligibility for official export

credits to increased emigration of Soviet Jews; the

export of computers to the U.S.S.R. was linked to the

treatment of dissidents.

These restrictions are made partly within the

context of U.S. participation in the Coordinating

Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM),

a nontreaty agreement established in 1949 to harmonize export control policies among 17 OECD

nations (1 14). By the end of 1989, COCOM had

assembled a list of over 100,000 restricted items in

120 categories and developed guidelines for export

licensing, with restrictions generally more stringent

for the U.S.S.R. than for Eastern Europe.

Some bilateral and multilateral export restrictions

have been reduced as Cold War tensions have eased

(84). In June 1990, the United States agreed to

remove 30 proscribed categories from the COCOM

list, including advanced machine tools and computers, which are needed for modern automobile plants

and other facilities (1 14) and for some pollution

control equipment. The Administration also eased

other restrictions imposed on the U.S.S.R. in response to the 1980 occupation of Afghanistan.

Another indicator of liberalization in U.S. policies is

s~A few Sovlct Sclentlsts ~We Mtfume climate ChaWeS may benefit the U.S.S.R. (53), although this view do= not appear to k generally held by

Soviet officials.

d~~blic Law 96.72, as mended by tie 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (Public Law 100418); the 1atter allowed tiicensed exports

of nonstrategic technical data to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe (1 14).
Chapter 9-International Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends . 299

the Support for East European Democracy (SEED)

Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-179). SEED authorized almost $1 billion for Hungary and Poland for

fiscal years 1990 to 1992, made the two countries

eligible for OPIC and Eximbank loans and for TDP

assistance, and specified that environmental assistance be provided to them.41

Policy Options

Remove U.S. Barriers on Exports-Congress

could continue to liberalize export controls. One

possible venue is during reauthorization of the

Export Administration Act (EAA), which expired in

1990. 42 In this context, Congress could: specify

removal from the COCOM control list of all items

for which no specific justification for restriction

exists; allow technologies that can be exported to

China to also be exported to Eastern Europe and the

U. S. S. R.; allow -reexports among these countries;

and direct U.S. agencies (e. g., Commerce, Defense,

Energy, U.S. Trade Representative) to review their

procedures and policies to ensure that no unnecessary barriers exist on exports of energy-efficient or

renewable energy technologies (1 14).

To help foster trade, the United States can extend

most-favored-nation (MFN) status to more Eastern

European countries, making trade with those countries nondiscriminatory (primarily in the sense of

tariff concessions) (68).43 The United States currently has granted unconditional MFN status to

Poland (and Yugoslavia) and conditional status to

Hungary (68,114).44 After the President issued a

Jackson-Vanik waiver, Czechoslovakia and the United

States signed a bilateral trade agreement in April

1990. The President also signed a trade agreement

with the U.S.S.R. in June 1990 that, if approved by

Congress, would confer unconditional MFN treatment to the U.S.S.R. and provide procedures for

improving trade relations (14).45

Encourage Joint Ventures and Direct U.S.

Agencies To Enhance Trade—U.S. companies

could try to export more energy-related technologies

directly to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe and to

establish more joint ventures with these countries.

Joint ventures between U.S. companies and Eastern

Europe and the U.S.S.R. increased in all fields in the

late 1980s. While fewer than 10 were started in 1985,

60 started in 1989, and over 140 may start in 1990

(20). 46 However, known ventures in the energy

sector declined from 14 in 1985, to between 5 and 9

per year from 1987 to 1989.47 Potential U. S.-

U.S.S.R. joint ventures for construction projects in

developing countries are also being explored (5).

Lack of commercial financing by U.S. banks and

inability to change profits into Western currencies

still pose major obstacles to increasing trade in the

U.S.S.R, and Eastern Europe for some companies

(20). 48 The latter constraint apparently does not

apply to joint ventures that produce goods for export

from the U.S.S.R. These earn hard currency that,

under current Soviet law, the enterprises can keep.

U.S. business could be encouraged in the U.S.S.R.

and Eastern Europe by increasing OPIC, Eximbank,

and TDP resources and extending their activities to

more countries. OPIC currently is authorized to

11 SEED authorized EPA to spend $10 million on educational, research, and technical and fiincial assistance, for example in establishing an atiqu~ity

monitoring network in Krakow and a regional environmental center (managed by an international board of trustees) in Budapest. It authorized the

Department of Energy to spend $30 million for retrofitting a coal-fired commercial powerplant in Krakow with clean coal technology; assessing Poland’s

capability to manufacture equipment enabling mdusrnes to use fossil fuels cleanly; and improving end-use energy efficiency in Poland and Hungary.

42~e Expfl Facl]l[a[ion Act of 1990, which would have rewthorixd the EAA and liberalize Some U.S. mde po~cies, was ‘et~ bY ‘e ‘Sident

m November 1990.

~~MFN status also means tit p~les t. bilatmal ~de a=ements or to tie General A~~ment on T~fs ~d Trade (GAIT) Mve reciprocal

obligations.

44 HmgaV ~s conditional s~tus ~cause it is subject to an amual approval of a Jackson-Vanik waiver. Romania received conditio~ Wsta~s

m 1975 but dechned to have It renewed in 1988.

~S1n December 1990, the ~esldent walv~ tie Jac~~on_Van& provision and approved credit wntees for Soviet purckes of up to $1 billion in

American commodihes, making the U.S.S.R, eligible for loans to buy U.S. grain and for some Eximbank credits and guarantees. However, the June trade

agreement will not be submitted to Congress for approval until Soviet emigration laws are revised, so MFN status cannot yet be conferred on the U.S.S.R.

In addition, the continuing upheaval In (he U.S.S.R. may make it difficult for the Soviets to take full advantage of this for some time.

46As of Janu~ 1989, 191 joint stock Companies were registered in the US ,S .R., of which 164 were soviet-western or Soviet-Japan~~e comPafi~

Of these, 10 were in the energy sector,

47@ Da, 26, 1990, the Ufited States ~omced it will double he n~ber of joint ~ade.prornotion pro~ams k 1991; top @OritY ~ be giVeIl tO

helping the Soviets increase their oil and gas exploration and production capabilities-a means of obtaining needed hard currency.

48 Estimated debts ~nge ~~ high as $50 billion for tie U, S,SR, and ~ billion for poland; billions of dollms me spent in setVicing ]oaIl obligations.

Some European countries, such as Finland, have proposed forgiving portions of these debts in exchange for political and economic concessions.
300 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

provide risk coverage to transactions in Hungary and

Poland. 49 Eximbank is authorized to provide insurance, loans, and guarantees to transactions in Hungary and Poland (and Yugoslavia) because these

nations have MFN status, and in Czechoslovakia

because that nation recently received a JacksonVanik waiver (46). As part of these efforts, the

United States could target specific industries and

sectors that exhibit Potential for energy savings (e.g.,

ferrous metallurgy, refining techniques, appliances,

gas turbines, and building and automobile construction).

Congress could direct US. agencies and organizations such as CORECT to assess opportunities for

enhancing trade with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern

Europe in renewable and energy-efficient technologies, as discussed above in the context of developing

nations (see ‘‘Redirecting Energy Policies”). Some

agencies might be able to negotiate trade agreements; precedent exists, for example, in the form of

a bilateral maritime shipping agreement signed by

the United States and the U.S.S.R. (4). Congress

could also direct Eximbank to allocate more funds

for insuring exports of renewable energy technologies, beyond what is mandated in Public Law

101-167 (see ‘‘Technology Transfer and Trade With

Other Countries” above).

The United States also could work through the

IMF and World Bank to develop policy reforms and

loans that promote energy-efficient or renewable

energy technologies. Poland and Hungary already

are eligible for IMF structural readjustment loans,

and Czechoslovakia is being reviewed for such

status. Congress could consider authorizing funds

for the proposed new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is scheduled to

open in late 1990 (46, 52). It may also wish to

consider a Czechoslovak proposal (known as the

Dienstbier Plan, after the Czechoslovak Foreign

Minister) that Western countries establish a special

fund in the bank to finance exports from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to the U.S.S.R, (85).

Support Institutes or Centers for Energy Efficiency—The United States could support, either

unilaterally or with other OECD countries, the

creation of institutes or academic and research

centers in Eastern Europe or the U.S.S.R. that

promote energy efficiency and conservation. Initiatives to this effect are discussed in ‘‘Technology

Transfer and Trade With Other Countries” (also see

footnote 41).

OECD COUNTRIES

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) consists of the most industrialized countries in the world—18 Western European

nations, plus Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Turkey, and the United States.50 These countries, though they are home to less than one-fourth of

the world’s population, account for one-half of all

global primary energy consumption (see figure 9-2)

and, by EPA (1 10) estimates, for over 40 percent of

current greenhouse gas emissions. The vast majority

of emissions is from energy use, specifically the

combustion of fossil fuels such as coal and oil. The

United States alone accounts for almost one-half of

OECD emissions.

Trends and Projections in Energy Use and

Carbon Emissions

Energy Use

Total fuel use by OECD countries between 1973

and 1987 grew relatively slowly, and even declined

between 1980 and 1982; it increased between 1983

and 1987 by an average of 2.3 percent yearly (34).

Growth in electricity use, particularly in the residential and commercial buildings sector (especially for

appliances, also for space heating) has been strong,

accounting for over three-fourths of the growth in

energy consumption since 1973; nearly one-half of

all primary energy consumption in OECD countries

is for electricity generation. Energy consumption in

the OECD industrial sector, which accounted for 37

percent of total OECD energy consumption in 1985,

increased by 1.6 percent annually between 1983 and

1986.

Of total primary energy consumption in OECD

nations, oil accounted for 44 percent; natural gas, 19

percent; coal, 21 percent; hydroelectric, 7 percent;

and nuclear, 9 percent (see table 3-l). Over 60

@OPIC recently approved its first project in Eastern Europe (kance for a General Electric investment in a Hungarian electric lighting products

company) and is establishing an Environmental Investment Fund (see ch. 7) and a European Growth Fund applicable to these countries (60, 61).

%%e western European countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Grmany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the

Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, SpaiJL Swedem Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, Established in 1%1, the OECD promotes increased economic

growth and employment in its member countries and promotes the expansion of world trade in general.
Chapter International Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends . 301

percent of the electricity is generated from coal and

nuclear power, at least in the 21 OECD countries

belonging to the International Energy Agency (IEA)

(34).51

Total OECD primary energy requirements are

projected to grow by about 1,3 percent annually

through 2005, because of continued growth in the

industrial sector and expected increases in the use of

oil for transportation (18, 34). Even so, the OECD’s

overall share of total world energy demand is

expected to decrease from 50 to 40 percent because

of greater growth in developing countries, Eastern

Europe, and the U.S.S.R. How these projections are

affected by the Persian Gulf situation is unknown;

any lasting rise in oil prices might stimulate more

efficient use of oil, but it also could make coal more

attractive.

Many observers claim that the United States uses

more energy per unit of GDP (i.e., has a higher

‘‘energy intensity’ than other industrialized countries. Indeed, while our technologies are comparable

to those of other OECD countries, our energy usage

patterns often differ (107).52 For example, new car

fuel economy in the United States is similar to that

in Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom (78,

107). However, the United States has more cars,

higher vehicle miles traveled per capita, and an

increasing penchant for less efficient light-duty

trucks. Thus, transportation energy consumption per

person is twice that of other G-7 countries (107).53

U.S. residential heating efficiency, on a per square

foot basis, is about the same as that of many other

industrialized countries, but U.S. homes tend to be

bigger so energy use per house is greater. Energy

intensity in the U.S. industrial sector is relatively

high, at least partly because the United States has

large, energy-intensive industries (petrochemical,

chemical, and primary metals) that were developed

to use abundant energy supplies.

Carbon Emissions

EPA (1 10) estimates that OECD countries contributed slightly over 40 percent of all greenhouse

gas emissions in 1985. Emissions between 1973 and

1987 (see figure 9-1; also see ref. 8) were relatively

stable, even while economies and overall energy

consumption generally grew, because of structural

changes in economies and energy efficiency measures stimulated by the 1973 oil embargo (35). Major

structural changes included a continuing shift from

energy-intensive industries (e.g., steel and cement

manufacturing) to service-oriented industries and

continuing modernization of energy-intensive industries (35, 78). Energy efficiency measures have

been particularly important in end-use applications

such as passenger vehicles and electric appliances

(35).

Between 1987 and 1989, however, carbon emissions increased from some OECD countries, including the United States, primarily because of falling

energy prices, above-average growth in industrial

production, and a weakening of energy efficiency

programs (10, 18, 35, 103),

The European Community (12) modeled three

scenarios for projected carbon emissions between

1987 and 2010 from its 12 member States (see figure

9-9).54 The “Business As Usual’ scenario (Scenario

1) projects emissions increasing 24 percent by 2010,

with power generation and transportation accounting for about 60 percent of total emissions. The

‘‘How Things Could Go Wrong’ scenario (Scenario

2) projects emissions in 2010 about 40 percent above

1987 levels, In contrast, the ‘ ‘High Economic

Growth in Clean Environment” scenario (Scenario

3) projects emissions in 2010 about 17 percent

below 1987 levels.

sl~e IEA is ~ autonomous body established in 1974 within the framework of the OECD with the purpose of implementing an htematioti energy

program. It includes all OECD countries except for Finland, France, and Iceland.

szEnergy inteml~ (le., amomt of ener~ co~med per unit of production) is a common measure of changes in energy efficiency. However, this rahO

does not give a good picture of the relative efficiency of energy use in any one counby or a correct comparative picture between countries (see 79, 80).

Moreover, it can provide a false indicator of changes in relative energy efficiency in a country if the changes reflect the movement of eneIgy-intensive

industries overseas to developing countries, but the former host country still receives the benefits of the production (45, 104).

sqI,e,, Canada, France, ~rmany, Italy, Japa~ and the United Kingdom.

54~e i ~Buslne~s ~ usu~’sa~o ~ssmes economic ~o~ of 2.7 percent per Year and market-driven c~ges in energy use and conservation.

The ‘ ‘How Things Could Go Wrong’ scenario assumes economic growth of 3.5 percent yearly until 2000 and 2.5 percent thereafter in additiow energy

use in traditional heavy industries declines more slowly than expected, and transport congestion increases. The “High Economic Growth in Clean

Environment scenario assumes economic growth of 3.5 percent yearly until 20CHJ and 3 percent thereafter however, strict government policies on

energy consemation (e.g., changes in the fuel mix for power generatio~ including a doubling of nuclear power between 1987 and 2010) and

environmental protection are rapidly implemented.
302 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure 9-9-Projected Carbon Emissions in

the European Community

- Emissions (billion metric tons/year)

~ ‘“w + Scenario 2

2{ + Scenario 3

I

Ii

() L-- –,

,1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 201 0

The Commission of the European Communities modeled future

carbon emissions from its member nations under three scenarios:

“Business As Usual” (Scenario 1 ), “How Things Could Go Wrong”

(Scenario 2), and “High Economic Growth in Clean Environment”

(Scenario 3) (see text for assumptions). In Scenario 3, rapid

implementation of strict policies on energy conservation and

changes in the fuel mix (including a doubling of nuclear power

between 1987 and 2010) result in projected emissions in 2010

that are about 17 percent below ‘1987 levels.

SOURCE: Commission of the EuroPea n Communities, “Energy in Europe,

Major Themes in Energy, ’r Special Issue (Brussels: September -.

1969).

Policies Regarding Energy

Greenhouse Gases

Energy Use

OECD countries have enacted many

and

policies over

the last two decades regarding energy supply and

efficiency (see table 9-6) (U.S. policies are discussed

in chs. 1 and 3 through 6). On the supply side, many

policies have been oriented towards the development of indigenous energy sources-particularly

oil, natural gas, and coal, as well as hydroelectric

power to a lesser extent—and nuclear power.

Demand-side policies have focused on end-use

efficiency in the commercial and residential sectors

(e.g., appliance efficiency standards, conservation

programs developed by utilities for consumers, and

energy labeling for homes). Most countries also

have an active renewable energy development and

demonstration program; several countries, including

Denmark, West Germany, and the Netherlands, have

had subsidy programs for wind energy systems, with

subsidies tied directly to electricity production (54).

Overall government funding for the development of

wind turbine technology is estimated to be around

$80 million annually in Europe.

However, the trend has been for less government

involvement in energy policies (e.g., reduced subsidy programs, more deregulation, less emphasis on

energy efficiency and renewable energy) (10, 35).

Government energy research, development, and

demonstration (RD&D) budgets have declined in

the 21 IEA countries, from a total of $12.5 billion in

1980 to $6.9 billion in 1988 (35).55 In 1988, only 7

percent of this was devoted to energy efficiency and

only 8 percent was for renewable energy; 56 percent

was for nuclear power.

How this picture might change when the European Community becomes a more integrated economic entity in 1992 is unclear. In 1986, though, the

Community adopted policy objectives on which to

base national energy policies (10, 11). Energy

objectives for 1995 include reducing dependence on

imports of oil by diversifying the fuel supply and

improving the energy efficiency of end use by at

least 20 percent. However, attaining the 20 percent

goal is considered unlikely without stronger actions

(10), and any increases in the use of coal relative to

natural gas and oil would lead to greater greenhouse

gas emissions.

Greenhouse Gas Policies

Some OECD countries have announced plans to

unilaterally reduce their greenhouse gas emissions

(see table 9-7), and in October 1990 the European

Community pledged to stabilize CO2 emissions

from the community as a whole (although not

necessarily from all member countries) in the year

2000 at 1990 levels (2a). It remains to be seen

whether these countries can provide the regulatory

and market incentives needed to achieve significant

emission reductions. Nonetheless, their declarations

indicate a willingness to accept responsibility to

address global climate change.

~SAH fiWeS ti 1988 U.S. dollars. Energy RD&D expenditures in 1988 were less than 1 percent of each cOu.ntry’S GDP, HM@g fhm 0.14 tO 0.98

percenq excluding nuclear power, the range was 0.08 to 0.58 percent. The United States and Japan accounted for 61 percent of total RD&D. See ch.

3 for information on U.S. RD&D budgets during this period.
Chapter 9-international Dimensions: U.S. Influence and Regional Trends ● 303

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304 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Table 9-7-Official Greenhouse Gas Emission Stabilization and Reduction Policies of OECD Countries

Base level Stabilization Percent reduction

Jurisdiction year year target Target year

Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1988 2000 20%0 of all gases 2005

Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1987 Not declared 20% of CO* 2005

Canadab 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1988 2005 Not declared Not declared

Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1988 2005 200/0 of C02 2000

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1989/90 2000 Not declared Not declared

Germany a

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1987 — 25% of CO2 2005

Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1990 2000 20% of C02 2005

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1990 2000 Not declared Not declared

Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1989/90 1995 5% of C02 2000

New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1990 Not declared 20% of C02 2005

Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1989 2000 Not declared Not declared

Sweden b 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1988 Not declared Not declared Not declared

United Kingdom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1990 2005 Not declared Not declared

aExluding eastern Germany. The German Bundestag’s Enquete Commission (ref. 23a) has proposed a new target of 30 percent C02 reduction by 2005 for

the entire country.

~entative.

SOURCE: OTA Survey of Embassies; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and International Energy Agency, “Summary of Actions in

Member Countries To Deal With the Problem of Climate Change (Note by the Secretariat),” IEALSLT(90)51 (1 st Revision), draft (Paris: Standing

Group on Long-Term Cooperation, Committee for Energy Research and Development, Oct. 24, 1990).

Several European nations, Australia, Japan, and

New Zealand have taken the lead in declaring

official greenhouse gas emission reduction schedules (see table 9-7). Australia has the most ambitious

goal-a 20 percent reduction by 2005 in emissions

of all greenhouse gases. Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and New Zealand have CO2 reduction

goals ranging from 20 to 2.5 percent by 2005, while

the Netherlands has a CO2 reduction goal of 5

percent by 2000.56 Japan, Norway, and the United

Kingdom have thus far committed to a goal of

stabilizing CO2 emissions at ‘current” (i.e., 1989 or

1990) levels within the next 10 to 15 years.57 Canada

and Sweden have declared tentative CO2 emission

goals to stabilize emissions at current levels by the

year 2000. France has a goal of stabilizing CO2

emissions at a level about 10 percent over current

levels by 2000 (7). The United States has no official

goal-for either stabilization or reduction. However,

it is scheduled to host the first formal negotiating

session on a framework convention early this year.

Table 9-8 presents a more detailed summary of

OECD national policies and programs, both proposed and enacted, specifically designed to reduce

greenhouse gas emissions. Among countries with

official stabilization or reduction targets, the Netherlands has one of the most complete sets of proposals

for increasing energy efficiency and reducing emissions from transportation, including a tax on CO2

emissions. 58 The Swedish parliament also considered a tax on CO2 emissions, initially in the energy

production and transportation sectors (86), but it

decided not to implement the tax until it coordinates

its CO2 emissions policies with other European

countries (18a).

‘For Gemany, this schedule will apply to West German emissions only, since attaining large reductions in the currentiy inefficient East German

energy sector would be a relatively easy task.

sy~e I_Jnited tigdom chose 200!;. Japan also established a goal of stabilizing NZO, CHq, and other gases at ttiy’slevels.

ss~e COZ @ is ~ addition t. tie exis@ fossil fuel tax, which consists of a general fuel excise tax and an environmental levy; tie cOz m adds

an amount to the environmental levy.
Table 9-8—New Plans and Programs in OECD Countries, Specifically Designed To Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, as of 1990a

Plan or program AUS CAN DEN GERbJAP NET NEZ NOR SWE UK us

Carbon or C0

Modified utility planning/funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P —

2 emissions tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — P

P——

P— E

P—

— P E——

P P P P

Strengthened building or appliance standards. . . . . . . . . P — P—— P P P— E P

Support for renewable and/or alternative fuelsd . . . . . . . . P — P P P P P P P P P

TCMs or tightened fuel efficiency standards . . . . . . . . . . P P—— P P— P P— P

Land use planning and/or reforestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P — — — P P— P—— E

CFC reductions faster than Montreal Protocol

Energy audits and/or public information programs . . . . . . P — — — f

. . . . . . . . . E P— E——

P P E————

E E—— P

aNote that some countries may already be implementing these measures In programs previously established for other purposes (e.g., Canada has programs

for utility planning and energy audits). This table refers only to new programs and plans that address greenhouse gas emissions as a top priority.

bWest Germany only.

Cincludes policies to encourage fuel switching and cogeneration.

dAlternative fuels include ethanol, methanol, and other biofuels.

‘WCMS - transportation control measures (e.g., ride-sharing, public transit).

fsgg ch. 2 for more information about the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.

KEY: P. Proposed

E. Enacted

ABBREVIATIONS: AUS - Australia; CAN - Canada; DEN - Denmark; GER - Germany; JAP - Japan; NET. The Netherlands; NZ - New Zealand; NOR - Norway; SWE - Sweden; UK= United

Kingdom; US - United States.

SOURCE: OTA Survey of Embassies; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and international Energy Agency,“Summary of Actions in Member Countries To Deal Wth the

Problem of Climate Change (Note by the Secretariat),” IEAELT(90)51 (1 st Revision), draft (Pans: Standing Group on Long-Term Cooperation, Committee for Energy Research and

Development, Oct. 24, 1990).

●
306 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

1.

2,

2a.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15,

16.

17.

18.

18a.

19.

20,

21.

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Appendixes
Appendix A

Summary of the OTA Emissions Scenarios

Introduction to the OTA

C O2 Emissions Model

OTA developed a simple energy accounting model that

allows us to estimate the effectiveness of various technical options for lowering CO2 emissions. The model is

based on a much larger system of energy and economic

models used by the Gas Research Institute (GRI) to

forecast energy use through 2010 (19).1

Of all the integrated energy/economic forecasting

models that we reviewed, GRI’s includes the greatest

detail on energy demand by specific technologies. Estimates of total residential electricity demand, for example,

include breakdowns by heating, cooling, refrigerators,

freezers, clothes dryers, etc. Thus, we are able to simulate

the potential for lowering CO2 emissions through specific

changes in technology.

To do this, we first built a very much simplified set of

models based on detailed output from GRI model

simulations of energy use through 2010. For example, to

estimate the energy demand for heating homes, GRI

estimated the number of existing furnaces, heat pumps,

and electric heaters and forecast the number that must be

replaced through time (with more efficient technology)

based on typical equipment lifetimes. The number of new

homes to be heated is forecast based on economic

conditions. Whether consumers buy gas, oil, or electric

heaters is forecast in part based on economics and in part

on historical buying habits.

OTA’s simplified models simulate the number and

energy efficiency of each technology type (e.g., gas

furnaces) through time, based only on the GRI detailed

output data, not on the economic decisions that influence

the forecast. For two categories--highway vehicles and

electric utilities-we felt that the GRI model did not have

adequate detail for our needs. For highway vehicles, we

used Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s ‘‘Alternative

Motor Fuel Use Model” (27), but used GRI’s oil price

assumptions for consistency. For electric utilities, we

built our own model using detailed data from the Energy

Information Administration.

We total all the energy use and CO2 emissions from

each technology category in all sectors, which yields our

Base case forecast of emissions approximately 50 percent

above today’s level by 2015. For our Base case, OTA

implicitly assumes GRI’s forecast of Gross National

Product (GNP) growth (averaging 2.3 percent per year)

and energy price increases (averaging 1.7 percent per year

for coal, 3.7 percent per year for oil, and 4.8 percent per

year for natural gas) over the next two decades. These

estimates are reasonable, barring major changes in energy

supply, economic, or regulatory conditions. We specify

two alternatives to the Base case-the ‘‘Moderate’ and

‘ ‘Tough” scenarios, discussed in later sections. These

incorporate the effect that changes in technology or policy

could have on future energy use and CO2 emissions.

Our model, for the most part, assumes the same level

of ‘‘services’ as the GRI base case. In the alternative

scenarios, CO2 emissions are reduced, for example, by

using more efficient furnaces, by switching fuel, or by

insulating houses but not by assuming people keep their

homes at lower temperatures in the winter or air-condition

less in the summer than they currently do. In a few cases,

most notably the transportation options, all ‘‘services’

are not identical. For example, we consider the effect of

reinstating a 55 mph speed limit. Under our most

aggressive scenario, we assume that cars will be somewhat smaller than they are today (due to either economic

incentives or fuel economy regulations). Both changes

include some loss of amenity to consumers; however, the

“service” (number of miles traveled in reasonably

similar cars at highway speeds) remains quite similar.

U.S. Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions

Total U.S. energy consumption in 1989 was about 84

quads. As discussed in detail in chapter 3, oil provided

about 40 percent of this, coal and gas about 23 percent

each, nuclear power 7 percent, and hydroelectric power

and biomass about 3 percent each.2

Currently about 20 percent of CO2 emissions result

from activities within our homes and apartments; 16

percent come from commercial buildings. About onethird of these emissions are from fossil fuels burned

within residential and commercial buildings; two-thirds

comes from electricity use within them. About 32 percent

of emissions are transportation related and 32 percent

come from industry (table A-l).

1 The GRl modeling system has as its core the DRI U.S. Energy Model, developed by Data Resources, Inc. (DRI) The model includes four submodels:

the industrial sector, residential buildings sector, commercial buildings sector, and electric utilities. Economic projectiorm, which drive the Energy Model,

come from the DRI Macroeconomic Model of the U.S. economy. Additional inputs are genemted from the Industrial Sector Technology Use Model,

developed by Energy and Environmental Anatysis, Inc.; the GRI Hydrocarbon Supply Model; and the RDI Coal Model, developed by Resource Data

International.

zData for 1989 ener~ co~,umptio~ except for biomass fuels, is from ref. 3%

-313-
314 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Table A-l-Carbon Emissions by Activity

(percent of 1987 emissions)

Resldential buildings:

Heating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hot water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commercial buildings:

Heating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appliances, hot water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation:

Cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Light trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Medium r heavy trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rail & marine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Industry:

Motors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Steam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Process heat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Off-highway oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Heating, cooling, lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Feedstocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Electrolytic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lease and plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9%

5%

3%

2%

1 %

2 0 %

6%

4 %

4 %

2 %

16%

14%

6 %

4 %

4 %

2%

32%

9 %

9 %

6 %

2%

2 %

2 %

1%

1%

32%

SOURCE:Offica of Technology Assessmen~ 1991, basedon data from

Gas Reserarch institute, Baseline Projection DateBook, 1988

GRIBaseline ProjectionofL1.S. Energy Sup@yandDemandto

2010(Washington, DC, 1988).

About 9 percent of total U.S. CO2 emissions comes

from heating our homes and another 6 percent from

heating our stores and offices. About 5 percent comes

from cooling buildings and another 5 percent from

lighting them. Such major home appliances as refrigerators, stoves, washing machines, dryers, freezers, and

dishwashers each contribute close to a percent, totaling

about 5 percent occurrent emissions.

About 20 percent of emissions comes from passenger

cars and light-duty trucks. Freight (truck, rail, and ship)

accounts for about 10 percent of U.S. CO2 emissions.

Within industry, steam and process heat used in the basic

materials industries (e.g., metals, chemicals, and petroleum refining) account for about 15 percent of CO2

emissions. Electric motors on pumps, fans, and compressors are responsible for another 9 percent.

Carbon emissions can also be categorized by consumer

purchases (table A-2).3 About half of CO2 emissions

originate from the energy we purchase and use directly to

heat our homes, run our appliances and lights, fill the gas

tanks of our cars, and so on. The remainder originate from

the products and services that we buy-the energy to

manufacture cars, furniture, electronic equipment; to

process food items; and to heat and light the stores in

which we shop. As an example of the carbon emissions

associated with consumer purchases, consider 100 dollars’ worth of clothing. About half this amount goes for

the retailers’ markup, the other half goes to various

manufacturers primarily within the apparel industry.

Using the carbon intensities in table A-2, we can estimate

that about 60 lbs of carbon were associated with the

purchase of those clothes: 35 lbs to manufacture them4

and 25 lbs to operate the store in which they are sold.

Emissions

The OTA Base Case

Scenarios

OTA’s Base case can be compared to several other

recent forecasts (figure A-l). These include a high- and

low-growth scenario developed by the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) (34), high- and low-growth

scenarios developed by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) (33), and a base case forecast developed by

GRI (from which the OTA scenario was developed) (14).

We generated estimates of CO2 emissions from EIA and

GRI forecasts of fuel consumption.

Note that our Base case predicts higher emissions than

the GRI model, which forecasts the demand for energy

from current goods and services. However, just as 10

years ago such a “bottom up” forecast would have

missed the demand for electricity from personal computers and FAX machines, so too is the GRI forecast likely

to miss demand from new products by 2010. Thus for our

Base case we added an increment of demand for

electricity to the GRI forecast. 5 Our demand growth

forecast is similar to others (i.e., EIA’s) that use a

statistical (’ ‘top down’ approach based on recent

economic and energy use trends.

JC~bon emisslom from Comuer lp~~es accout for about two-thirds of total U.S. emissions in the accounting scheme tit we u~d. Of tie

remainder, about one-quarter was associated with exports, onequarter with government purchases, and half with private investment in capital goods

and structures. See the manufacturing chapter (ch. 6) for details on the analytical methods used to derive these estimates.

d~e cmbon (C) ~temi~ of tie apparel indus~ is about (),7 Ibs C/$ and that of retail trade is about 0.5 Ibs C/$. Thus, $50x 0.7 lbs C/$ for the g~ent

plus $50 x 0.5 lbs C/$ for operating the store totals 60 lbs of carbon.

5~e GM model foreat~ mat elec~cl~ de~nd ~~c~~e at about 1.5 pement per y-~u@ 2010. III OUI analysis, we added an extra klCrCUletM

of unspecitled demand-0,75 percent per year in the base case+-- for a totat growth in electricity demand of about 2.25 percent per year. Under our

Moderate demand scenario, we add an extra 0.56 percent per year increment of unspedled electricity dernand and under our lbugh scenario we add

0,38 percent per year.
Appendix A--Summary of the OTA Emissions Scenarios ● 315

Table A-2—Carbon Emissions From Goods and

Services: Household Purchases Only

Carbon Intensity

emissions (Ibs C/$) —Energy:

Petroleum refining and

related industries . . . . . . . . . . . .

Electric utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Natural gas utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Manufacturing:

Food and kindred products . . . . . .

Motor vehicles and equipment . . .

Apparel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Drugs, cleaning and toilet

preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Paper and allied products,

except containers . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rubber and miscellaneous

plastic products . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Printing and publishing . . . . . . . . . .

Household appliances . . . . . . . . . .

Household furniture . . . . . . . . . . . .

Radio, TV, and communication

equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other manufacturing ., . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation:

Air transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Motor freight transport . . . . . . . . . .

Water transportation. . . . . . . . . . . .

Local transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Railroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Services:

Wholesale and retail trade . . . . . . .

Health, educational & social

services and nonprofit

organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Finance and insurance . . . . . . . . . .

Hotels: personal and repair

services (except auto) . . . . . . . .

Real estate and rental . . . . . . . . . .

Automobile repair and services . . .

Water and sanitary services . . . . .

Amusements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22.5%

18.2%

7.4%

48%

7.1 %

3.1 %

1 .9%

1.1 %

0.8%

0.60/0

0.5%

0.5%

0.5%

0.5%

4.0%

20%

1 .7%

0.7%

0.4%

().4%

0.30/’

3%

1 2.0%

6.8%

1.60/0

1.50/o

1.570

1.1%

0.7%

0.6%

1 .0%

27%

N A

b

NA

NA

NA

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.8

1.8

1.2

0.7

0.9

0.8

0.6

0.8

1.8

1.1

2.6

0.9

1.0

1.4

0.5

0.5

0.3

0.5

0.1

0.6

1.6

0.4

0.4

aEm Issions expressed as percent of carbon from household purchases

(about 1 billion tons per year).

~ot applicable.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

Alternative Emission Scenarios

Under our Moderate scenario of energy demand,

technical measures are adopted that initially require some

additional capital investment but save money on fuel.

Over the life of the investment, these measures typically

save money or, in some cases, are of modest cost. None

of the measures are technically difficult to achieve,

though getting people to use them may not be easy.

Figure A-l-Comparison of Base Case Forecasts of

U.S. Carbon Emissions

Billion metric tons/year

2.6 I

2.4<

I

2.2 / —. GRI

+

-1

.

El A-low

ElA-high

EPA-low

EPA-high

OTA

1.2 “,

1.0 +— 7 – –T — -r -7 -– -

1985 1990 1995 20002005 2010 2015

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, calculated using

energy demand forecasts in: Holtberg, P.D. et al., 1988 GRI

Baseline Projection of U. S. Energy Supply and Demand to20 10

(Chicago, IL: Gas Research Institute, 1988); U.S. Department of

Energy, Annual Enagy ~look 19W, DOE/ElA41383(90) (Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration, January 1990);

and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy,

Planning and Evaluation, Policy +tions for Stabilizing Global

Climate, Draft Report to Congress (Washington, DC: June

1990).

The Tough scenario measures can lower energy demand even further, but they are either technically difficult

or will cost more for the same or similar service. We feel

that all of the measures are technically feasible, though

many will be challenging to implement. In most cases, the

performance of the technology is less than that achievable

by the best available prototypes, because we attempt to

make judgments about what will be feasible in widespread use.

Overall Modeling Results

Figure A-2 presents the results of our energy modeling

analysis. Under our Base case (upper line), by 2015

emissions are forecast to increase by close to 50 percent

above today’s level of about 1.5 billion metric tons of

carbon per year. A series of Moderate control measures

imposed on both the demand side and the supply side

(utilities) can lower emissions to about 15 percent above

today’s levels by 2015.

Moderate demand-side measures along with Tough

supply-side measures results in holding emissions to just

about current levels by 2015. Tough demand-side measures along with Moderate supply-side measures can lower

emissions to about 20 percent below current levels by

2015. Finally our most stringent scenario--Tough demandside and Tough supply-side measures--can lower emissions to 29 percent below today’s levels by 2015. Note

that under this scenario, CO2 emissions are about half of
316 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Figure A-2—Carbon Emissions Under the OTA

Scenarios, Energy Measures Only

6 0 - Moderate controls

g on supply with

o

Moderate demand

.-

g 40 “ Tough controls

.-

5

on supply with

Moderate demand

~ 20 - “7 ial m OMN---------;--’’”-Q I

d

g ‘Zo Moderate controls E

v on supply with

Tough demand

~-“~z

1

5-40 ‘ : Tough controls

on supply with ~-

2 Tough demand

-60 I 1 —r—–-r——

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assossrnent, 1991.

our Base case forecast for 2015 (i.e., 0.9 billion v. 1.9

billion metric tons of carbon per year).

Figure A-2 incorporates only those measures that lower

emissions of CO2 and does not include options for

removing additional CO2 from the atmosphere and

storing it in biomass. Figure A-3 includes all the

energy-related measures discussed above and adds forestry measures that can remove CO2 (and in some cases

lower fossil fuel use as well). On this graph, we show three

scenarios: 1) Base case emissions, 2) emissions assuming

all Moderate energy measures minus the carbon offset by

Moderate forestry measures, and 3) emissions after all

Tough energy measures minus the carbon offset by Tough

forestry measures. Under the most stringent scenario,

effective 2015 “emissions” (after accounting for the

offset from forestry practices) are 37 percent below

current levels. This is about 55 to 60 percent below our

Base case forecast for 2015.

Figure A-4 displays the effect of these measures as a

percentage of all the major greenhouse gas emissions

(CO2

, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), nitrous oxide, and

methane). 6 The decline in emissions other than CO2 is

primarily due to banning CFCs under the Montreal

protocol and the Clean Air Act (see ch. 2).

Results by Sector

Figures A-5, A-6, and A-7 show the change in

energy-related in carbon emissions under each of our

scenarios by sector: residential and commercial buildings, transportation, and industry. As noted, current

emissions from the three sectors are roughly equal: 36

Figure A-3—Carbon Emissions Under the OTA

Scenarios, Including Uptake From Forestry Measures

60% - Moderate controls

~

Tough controls

“~ 40% “ Tough controls

.-

:

p[U8 Tough

forestry measures

& 20% -

—

U:L , , r :

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

Figure A-4-Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the

OTA Scenarios, Including Carbon Dioxide,

Chlorofluorocarbons, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide

120% 1 (emissions scaled using IPCC 100-year GWPs)

a)

+.

G“ 20%

&

n

o%

1987 2000

RSSR Non-COz greenhouse gas emissions

_C02 emissions under Base case

L 1 C02 emissions with Moderate controls

“.—— . “ C02 emissions with Tough controls

2015

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991. Estimates of CFC

emissions from J. Wasson, ICF Inc., personal communication,

Aug. 30, 1990. Estimates of methane and nitrous oxide

emissions from A. Cnstofaro, Air and Energy Policy Division,

“The Cost of Redueing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the

United States” (Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1990).

~To Comptie the effects of the vmious greenhouse gases, we have used the 1(N) y~ “global w~~g potenti~” (G~) ~scussed ~ ch. 2.
Appendix A-Summary of the OTA Emissions Scenarios ● 317

-— —.

Figure A-5—Carbon Emissions From

Buildings Under the OTA Scenarios

Buildings

~ 60- ,

● Note that the upper range in each shaded area

c

represents no additional controls on supply (Base

o

1

.- supply); the lower range represents Tough

$ 40 controls on supply..—

g

~ I

Moderate controls ●

Base demand ●

& 20 on demand

a \

u

-60 ‘- ‘-—T ---— ~-–—–-–—————1

1985 1990 1995 200 0 2005 2010 2015

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1991.

Figure A-6—Carbon Emissions From Transportation

Under the OTA Scenarios

Transportation

2 I

G

~ -4 0

–-– Bas e ‘

-- Moderat e + Tough

a) I

o

$- ijo t----—- 7—— [ , , ) 1985 1990 1995 200 0 2005 2010 2015

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991

percent from buildings, 32 percent from transportation,

and 32 percent from industry. Each of the figures includes

three bands illustrating the effect of demand-side changes

within each sector. The top band is the Base case, the

middle band shows the effect of the Moderate measures,

and the lower band displays emissions with implementation of all the Tough measures within the sector. Within

each band, the upper end assumes that utilities will

continue to generate electricity as they do under the Base

case; the lower end of the range assumes that utilities will

adopt a series of Tough measures to lower COs emissions

per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated.

Figure A-7-Carbon Emissions From

Industry Under the OTA Scenarios

Industry

* 60

c

.-o

.3 40

:

2

2 0

g

g.

&

Q

g -2 0

2

0

--40

5

0

i -6 0

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

Under the Base case demand for energy in residential

and commercial buildings (figure A-5), emissions will

increase by 5 to 30 percent by 2015 (depending on what

actions are taken by electric utilities). By adopting all of

our Moderate scenario measures for buildings, emissions

by 2015 might decline by 5 to 35 percent below their

current levels. The Tough measures might lower emissions to 35 to 55 percent below their current levels. Utility

measures have such a large impact on this sector because

about two-thirds of the carbon emitted as a result of

energy use within buildings comes from powerplant

stacks.

Transportation emissions (figure A-6) are the most

difficult to control. Under our Base case, emissions go up

by about 35 percent. After applying all Tough measures,

emissions drop to about 10 percent below current levels.

Because such a small fraction of our transportation system

uses electricity, we have not shown the effect of utility

measures.

Industrial emissions (figure A-7) range from a 45-

percent increase by 2015 under the Base case to a

25-percent drop after applying all the Tough measures.

Reductions by Technical Option

In this report we express all reductions as a percent of

current (1987) emissions. One “percent of current

emissions’ is equal to 13 million metric tons of carbon.

To hold emissions at current levels, we must achieve

reductions by 2015 equal to 50 percent of current

emissions; this means reducing emissions expected under

Base-case forecasts by about 650 million tons per year. To

lower emissions to 20 percent below current levels by
318 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Table A-3-Measures to Lower U.S. Carbon Emissions

(expressed as percentage of 1987 total emissions)

2000 2015

Moderate Tough Moderate Tough

DEMAND-SIDE MEASURES

Residential buildings

New investments:

Shell efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Heating and cooling equipment . . . . . . . . . .

Water heaters and appliances . . . . . . . . . . .

O&M, retrofits:

Shell efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

All residential measures together . . . . . . . . . . .

Commercial buildings

New Investments

Shell efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Heating and cooling equipment . . . . . . . . . .

Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Office equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Water heaters and appliances . . . . . . . . . . .

Cogeneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

O&M, retrofits:

Shell efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

All commercial measures together . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation

New investments:

New auto efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New light truck efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New heavy truck efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Non-highway efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

O&M, retrofits:

Improved public transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Truck inspection & maintenance . . . . . . . . . .

Traffic flow improvments/55 mph . . . . . . . . .

Ridesharing/parking controls . . . . . . . . . . . .

All transportation measures together. . . . . . . .

0.5%

0.0%

0.5 %

0.6%

0.4%

1.9%

0.9%

0.4%

0.8%

0.5%

0.10%

0.1%

0.6%

0.2%

3.50/o

0.4%

0.3%

0.2%

0.3%

0.1%

0.3%

1.2%

0.3%

3.1%

2015, we must achieve reductions equal to 70 percent of

current emissions.

Measures were identified through technical reviews by

OTA staff and contractors and through a series of

workshops.

Buildings

For buildings (ch. 4), improved shell efficiency and

lighting are two of the largest measures (see table A-3).

Under the Base case, we assume that by 2015, new homes

and apartments will be designed such that they need about

15 percent less heat and 8 percent less air-conditioning

than current new homes. By adopting Moderate shell

efficiency measures, such as thicker insulation and better

windows, we estimate that new homes will require 50

percent less heat and 25 percent less air-conditioning than

today’s average new home (23). With Tough measures,

we estimate that homes can be built to require 85 percent

0.70/0

0.2%

0.5%

1.7%

0.6%

3.7%

1.4%

0.5% to 1.O%

1.1%

0.7%

O.lO

/O

0.4% to 0.6%

2.1%

0.2%

6.6% to 7.3%

0.8% to 1.2%

0.5% tO 0.8%

0.7% to 0.8%

0.7%

2.1%

0.3%

1.2%

0.5%

7.% to 7.8%

1.3%

0.1%

1.2%

0.8%

0.6%

3.9%

2.3%

1.0%

2.1%

1.6%

0.1%

0.2%

0.8%

0.5%

8.50/o

0.8%

0.5%

0.4%

0.5%

0.2%

0.3%

1.2%

0.4%

4.2%

2.0 %

0.4% to 0.6 %

1.5% to 2.3%

0.90/0

0.8%

5.6% to 6.6%

4.O%

1.2% to 1.9%

3.0%

2.1 %

O.lO/O

1.5% to 2.3%

0.8%

0.5%

13% to 15%

3.5% to 3.8%

2.5% to 2.7%

2.4% to 2.4%

1 .2%

3.5%

0.4%

1.4%

1.0%

14% to 15%

(Continued on next page)

less heat and 45 percent less air-conditioning (17).

Moderate shell improvements in new residential buildings can reduce carbon emissions by 1.3 percent of current

levels by 2015. Adopting Tough measures in the North

(and Moderate ones in the South) might achieve reductions of 2.0 percent. Tough measures for new commercial

buildings can achieve reductions equal to 4 percent of

1987 levels by 2015.

Existing homes can also be made more efficient by

installing insulation, new windows, and so forth. Under

our Base case, we assume that existing homes will require

10 percent less heating and cooling by 2015 because of

replacements and improvements that will happen in any

case. Moderate measures boost this to 20 percent by 2015

and Tough measures boost it to 30 percent by 2000 (18).

Tough measures in the North and Moderate ones in the

South would reduce carbon emissions by 1.7 percent by

2000; this would drop to about half that amount by 2015

as many older homes are replaced by new ones.
Appendix A--Summary of the OTA Emissions Scenarios ● 319

Table A-3-Measures to Lower U.S. Carbon Emissions-Continued

(expressed as percentage of 1987 total emissions)

2000 2015

Moderate Tough Moderate Tough

DEMAND-SIDE MEASURES

Industry

New investments:

Efficient motors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Process change, top 4 industries . . . . . . . . .

Fuel switch to gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cogeneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

O&M, retrofits:

Housekeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

All industry measures together . . . . . . . . . . . . .

UTILITY SUPPLY-SIDE MEASURES

Existing plant measures:

Improved nuclear utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fossil efficiency improvements . . . . . . . . . . .

Upgraded hydroelectric plants . . . . . . . . . . .

Natural gas co-firing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New plant measures:

No new coal higher fraction of new

nonfossil sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CO2emission rate standards . . . . . . . . . . . .

All utility measures together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FORESTRY MEASURES

Afforestation:

Conservation Reserve Program . . . . . . . . . .

Urban trees... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Additional tree planting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Increased tree productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Increased use of biomass fuels.... . . . . . . . . .

All forestry measures together . . . . . . . . . . . . .

— —

0.0%

3.4%

0.0%0

6.50/0

0.2%

—

—

—

—

0.2%0

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991

Improving the efficiency of lighting in commercial

buildings is another technical option that can yield

substantial reductions. Our Tough measures-a combination of high-efficiency fluorescent bulbs and ballasts,

improved reflectors, and better use of daylight--can

lower lighting energy needs by 60 percent in new

buildings and 50 percent in existing ones (15). This

translates to a 3-percent reduction in emissions by 2015.

Replacing heavily used bulbs in homes with compact

fluorescent (16) and using high-efficiency fluorescent

in existing fixtures in commercial buildings (15) can

lower emissions by 1.3 percent.

2000 and 36.5 mpg by 2010. Under the Moderate

scenario, new car efficiency averages 35 mpg by 2000 (7)

and 39 mpg by 2010 (8). By 2015, reductions of about 0.8

percent of current U.S. carbon emissions are possible.

We have constructed a range of Tough new car

efficiencies. Efficiencies of 39 mpg by 2000 and 55 mpg

by 2010 might be possible assuming that consumers

maintain their current size class preferences (8). By 2015,

reductions amount to 3.5 percent of current emissions. If

consumers are willing to purchase smaller cars, new car

fleet average efficiencies of 42 mpg by 2000 and 58 mpg

by 2010 might be achievable (8). Assuming such efficiencies, and policies that encourage people to scrap their old

cars an average of 3 years earlier than they would

otherwise, reductions of about 3.8 percent might be

achieved by 2015. Reductions of about 2.7 percent from

light trucks and another 2.4 percent from medium- and

heavy-duty trucks are achievable under our Tough

scenario as well.

Transportation

For transportation (ch. 5), the major reductions come

from higher auto and truck efficiency, better control of

traffic speed, and, under the Tough scenario, improved

public transit (see table A-3). Our Base case assumes that

new cars will average about 32 miles per gallon (mpg) by
320 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Traffic speed affects fuel consumption, too. By reinstating the 55 mph speed limit to slow down travel on

highways and by improving traffic congestion in urban

areas to speed up travel, reductions of 1.2 percent by 2000

are possible.7 We consider both of these to be Moderate

measures.

Measures to move people out of their cars and into mass

transit under the Tough scenario would yield reductions

of about 3.5 percent. To achieve this, however, urban auto

traffic would have to be reduced by 10 percent through

urban light rail, busways, and improved urban design.

High-speed intercity rail would lower interurban car

travel by 5 percent.

Industry

For industry (ch. 6), three types of technical improvements offer the greatest promise (see table A-3). Cogenerating electricity and steam for industrial processes is one.

About two-thirds of the energy from burning fuel for

electricity is released as heat. If electricity is generated at

industrial sites where the heat can be used, the efficiency

of fossil fuel use can be increased dramatically. Under our

Tough scenario, we assume that 90 percent of new

industrial steam boilers will cogenerate electricity. Such

measures can lead to reductions equivalent to about 5.5

percent of current emissions. More efficient motors are

another technical improvement that can lead to substantial

improvements. Moderate improvements might improve

motor efficiencies by 10 percent and Tough ones by 20

percent (3), yielding reductions of about 1.2 percent by

2015 under the Moderate scenario and 4 percent under the

Tough one,

The four top manufacturing energy consumers are the

paper industry, chemicals, petroleum, and primary metals, Between 1980 and 1985, these industries managed to

improve their energy efficiency by between 2.3 and 4.3

percent per year (10). If this pace can be maintained,

reductions equal to about 8 percent of current emissions

will result.

Electricity Generation

Measures that lower the rate of carbon emissions per

kilowatt-hour of electricity generated can achieve substantial reductions. All of the Moderate utility supply-side

measures can lower emissions by about 6.6 percent (see

table A-3). The two with the greatest reduction potential

are: 1) increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel-fired plants

(by about 5 percent) through improved maintenance (9)

and 2) operating existing nuclear powerplants 70 percent

of the time (similar to Western Europe and Japan) (13)

and extending their useful life to 45 years.

A series of Tough measures eliminate coal use wherever possible. A combination of renewable energy

sources, improved nuclear designs that may be available

after 2005, and high-efficiency gas turbines are the only

technologies allowed for new utility plants built after

2000. However, if all the Tough demand-side measures

are implemented, demand for electricity is so low that

very few new plants are needed through 2015. Thus, to

lower emissions from electricity generation (beyond the

Moderate measures) one must either cofire existing coal

plants with 50-percent natural gas or retire existing

fossil-fuel plants after 40 years of operation (rather than

the typical 60 years), replacing them with renewable,

nuclear, or high-efficiency natural gas. The former

measure would yield reductions of about 3.7 percent of

current levels by 2015 and the latter would yield

reductions of about 4.7 percent.

Forestry

The forestry measures (ch. 7) with the greatest potential

include increasing the productivity of existing forests and

planting trees in new areas (afforestation) (see table A-3).

Genetically selected seedlings, fertilization, and improved management might double forest productivity on

timber industry lands and increase productivity by 50

percent on other private holdings.8 The increased carbon

uptake would be equivalent to emissions reductions of

about 3.1 percent of current levels by 2015. Planting 33

million hectares (ha) (125,000 square miles) of new

forests and wood lots (35) as well as additional urban trees

(1) would be equivalent to emissions reductions of about

3 percent of current levels by 2015.

Estimating the Costs of OTA's

Tough Scenario

This section includes rough estimates of the costs of

control measures included under OTA’s “Tough” scenario. Table A-3 listed the emissions reductions associated with each of the control measures. Detailed descriptions of each of the measures are documented in tables

3-6, 4-2, 5-6, 6-4, and 7-1 in the energy, buildings,

transportation, industry, and forestry chapters, respectively. Table A-4 lists fuel savings from the demand-side

measures (in trillion Btus and billions of dollars) for both

the Moderate and Tough scenarios, Projected fuel prices

are listed in table A-5.

All costs presented in this section are in 1987 dollars.

A 7-percent discount rate is used to annualize capital costs

(typically over 30 years unless noted otherwise).

7C)TA calculatiom ba~d on data in ref. 38, for 55 mph speed limit and ref. 5 for cOWeSbOn.

80TA Calculation based on refs. 4, 24, 30.
Appendix A--Summary of the OTA Emissions Scenarios . 321

Table A-4-Changes in Fuel and Power Use and Costs

Energy (trillion Btu) Cost (billion 1987$, 2015 prices)

Change: Change:

Base Moderate Tough Base Moderate Tough

1987 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015

Residential buildings:

Natural gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commercial buildings:

Natural gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

industry:

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Natural gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Biomass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Electric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation:

Gasoline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Distillate oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Jet fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aviation gas... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Residual oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Natural gas.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Exogenous electricity . . . . . . . . .

All sectors:

Natural gas..... . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Biomass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4,462

2,854

1,590

74

837

8,980

2,421

2,525

1,086

107

6,139

2,678

7,044

4,725

2,230

2,679

19,355

13,393

3,338

2,872

45

817

571

17

21,053

0

14,497

8,074

27,866

2,859

3,067

56.364

4,198

3,323

1,124

62

1,516

8,707

3,387

4,264

922

114

8,687

4,598

7,685

5,041

3,520

4,398

25,242

16,380

5,140

4,686

48

1207

724

28

28,213

2,527

15,994

12,013

34,548

4,774

5,036

72,365

-639

-597

-174

- 8

-353

-1,418

4 1 6

-1,572

-259

-23

-2,270

-1,299

-227

-627

-298

-685

-3,136

-2,008

-420

-317

0

0

0

0

-2,745

-632

–1,282

-2,855

-3,805

-1,330

-651

-9,923

-1,320

-1,067

-374

-13

-897

-2,774

387

-2,922

-649

-43

-3,226

-3,088

- 2 4

-1,742

-1,370

-1,686

-7,909

-6,927

-1,586

-1,327

0

0

0

104

-9,736

-1,263

-957

-5,571

-12,605

-3,143

-2,267

-24,543

$!%

$11

$0

$169

$13

$69

$40

$97

$219

$244

$51

$70

$1

$10

$8

$ 3 9

$69

$160

$396

$436

$14

$1,006

-$7

-$20

-$2

-$0

-$29

-$44

-$3

-$51

-$4

-$2

-$5

-$15

-$26

-$30

-$4

-$5

$0

$0

$0

-$136

-$17

-$14

-$96

-$48

-$4

-$162

-$15

-$35

-$4

-$0

-$54

$4

-$81

-$6

-$0

-$84

-$9

-$0

-$14

-$37

-$60

-$103

-$16

-$20

$0

~

-$136

-$35

-$11

-$186

$16 3

-$9

-$369

SOURCE: Office ofTechnology Assessment 1991.

Total Costs

Adding results documented below by sector yields the

following net annual costs (i.e., annualized capital and

operating costs minus fuel savings):

Utilities: +$35 billion

Residential buildings: –$25 to–$15 billion

Commercial buildings: –$28 to+$22 billion

Transportation: –$35to+$38 billion

Industry: +$21 to+$58 billion

Forestry: +$l0 to +$13 billion

Total: -$22 to+$150 billion

GNP in 2015 is forecast to be about $8.4 trillion (1987

dollars).9

Thus, our Tough scenario may entail net savings

of a few tenths of a percent of GNP upwards to costs equal

to about l.8 percent of GNP.

Again, note these are net costs. The fuel savings for the

Tough scenario are about $370 billion in 2015 assuming

our projected 2015 fuel prices. Thus, annualized capital

and operating costs fall in the range of about $350 to $520

billion per year--somewhere between 5 percent less than

and 40 percent more than expected fuel savings.

The fuel savings for the Moderate scenario are about

$160 billion in 2015 assuming 2015 prices. Thus, even

%Ve obtain this estimate by extrapolating GRI’s 2010 GNP forecast using their estimate of GNP growth between 2005 and 2010.
322 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Table A-5--Projections of Future Fuel Prices

(1987 dollars per million Btu)

1987 2010 2015

Oil:

Residual fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $2.83

Distillate fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $3.83

Gasoline (retail) . . . . . . . . . . . $7.65

Natural gas:

Residential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $5.40

Commercial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4.58

Industrial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $2.48

Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $2.23

Coal:

Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1.50

Industrial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1.63

Electricity:

Residential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $21.83

Commercial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $20.46

Industrial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $14.11

Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$18.74

$6.50

$8.30

$13.20

$9.60

.$8.80

$730

$6.70

$220

$2.60

$25.70

$22.40

$17.40

$21.60

$8.00

$10.00

$14.90

$11.40

$10.50

$9.00

$8.30

$2.30

$2.90

$28.80

$24.20

$19.20

$23.80

SOURCE: Pricesfor1987and2010fromGasResearch Institute, f%selirre

Projection of U.S. Energy Supply and Demand to 2010 (Washington, DC: 1988). Prices for 2015 extmplated by OTA.

under the Moderate scenario, very large sums of money

change hands.

The cost effectiveness of these measures (i.e., tons of

carbon avoided per dollar of net costs) varies widely (see

figure A-8). Between about one-third to one-half of the

reductions either save money or are of very low cost.

About one-quarter of the reductions have costs exceeding

$200 per ton of carbon avoided. The costs and cost

effectiveness of the individual measures are discussed

below.

Other groups have tried to estimate the costs of CO2

reductions, but with different control scenarios. For

example, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the reductions and economic impacts from a carbon

tax (28a), CBO looked at two economic models that

forecast energy use past 2000, one used by EPA and the

other by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).

Although they widely diverge by 2100, primarily due to

assumptions about Base case growth, at 2015 they are

reasonably similar to each other and to our own Base case

and thus offer a useful comparison of the costs of

reductions. The EPA model forecasts that holding emissions to 10 to 15 percent below current levels would lower

GNP by about 1 to 1.3 percent by the year 2015. The EPRI

model forecasts that holding emissions to 20 percent

below current levels would lower GNP by about 3 percent

by that year. Results from the EPA model seem consistent

with our own cost estimates; the EPRI economic estimates appear to be somewhat higher than our own. Note,

however, that we estimate compliance costs (annual

capital and operating costs minus fuel savings) while the

CBO results are estimates of changes in GNP. The two are

a)

>.-

-

Figure A-$-Cost Effectiveness of Control Measures

Under the Tough Scenario

3,000 7

2,500 I

2,000 J

1,500 /

1,000 {

500 ‘

o L -

; -1,000

-50 0

1P

Iii 1 * -1,500 +-—–———r————r—

m 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 6 0 0 8 0 0 1,000

:

Carbon reductions, million metric tons/year

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

not directly comparable, but studies of the effect of other

environmental control costs on the economy indicate that

the estimates should fall within a factor of two of each

other. All of the analyses of the costs of controlling CO2

attempted to date should be considered as only rough

estimates and in need of considerable refinement.

Electricity Supply

We estimate that the Tough electricity supply-side

scenario will cost about $35 billion per year (1987$) by

the year 2015, assuming it is implemented along with all

Tough demand-side measures. This is the cost of the

Tough supply-side measures alone and does not include

the costs of lowering electricity demand (which are

discussed in the following three sections).

Low Cost Measures That Apply to Existing Plants—

Our Tough scenario includes the following measures that

we estimate are low cost (or save money):

1. modestly improving the efficiency of existing fossilfuel-fired plants (9),

2. increasing the output of existing hydroelectric plants

by adding additional generating units to capture

energy from water currently bypassing the plants (6)$

and

3. increasing utilization of existing nuclear power

plants and lengthening their useful life to 45 years

(13).

We assign no net costs for these measures.

Cofiring Coal Boilers With Natural Gas—About half

of this sector’s total costs come from cofiring existing

coal plants with natural gas. By 2015, we estimate that
Appendix A-Summary of the OTA Emissions Scenarios ● 323

natural gas will cost about $6 per million British thermal

units (Btu’s) more than coal. Cofiring coal boilers with

50-percent natural gas will increase generation costs by

about $0.03 per kilowatthour (kWh). In 2015, costs would

total about $18 billion per year, at a cost effectiveness of

about’$510 per ton of carbon avoided.

Early Retirement of Existing Facilities With a Moratorium on New Coal Plants-Most of the remaining

costs for this sector come from forcing existing fossil-fuelfired plants to retire after 40 years of operation and

replacing them with natural gas and nonfossil sources.

Forcing coal-fired plants to retire early and replacing them

with highly efficient natural gas-fired combined cycle

turbines could increase electricity costs at affected plants

by $0.04 to $0.05 per kWh. Forcing existing oil and

natural gas plants to retire early saves money—about

$0.01 to $0.02 per kWh--because the replacement

facilities are so much more efficient, Costs are based on

the projected 2015 fuel prices presented in table A-5;

efficiencies and capital and operation and maintenance

costs are from the Electric Power Research Institute

(EPRI) (12). Because existing facilities are fully depreciated after 30 years, no capital charges are applied to

electricity generated from existing plants.

Note, however, that once these existing facilities retire,

costs must be compared to replacement coal or natural gas

plants. Electricity from new natural-gas-fired combined

cycle turbines (assuming our 2015 fuel prices) would cost

about $0.02 per kWh more than electricity from a new

coal-fired powerplant, less than half the cost premium

over existing plants. Note, too, that costs are sensitive to

fuel prices. Costs are about $0.01 per kWh lower

assuming 2010 prices.

We have assumed that the cost of electricity from

nonfossil sources (either renewable sources or nuclear

power) will be about comparable to natural-gas-fired

combined cycle turbines. The cost of early retirement of

existing fossil-fuel-fired sources and replacement with

natural gas and nonfossil sources is about $17 billion per

year, at a cost effectiveness of $280 per ton of carbon

eliminated.

Buildings

Costs for all Tough measures that are applicable to

buildings in both the residential and commercial sectors

fall in a range between net savings (i.e., equipment costs

minus fuel savings) of $53 billion per year to net costs of

$7 billion per year (1987$).

Residential Buildings—Costs for the residential sector

are best estimated by household. By 2015, there will be

about 115 million households, 35 million built after 1995

and 80 million built before. We estimate that shell

improvements to pre-1995 houses under our Tough

scenario will cost about $2,300 per single family house in

northern climates and $1,000 per single family houses in

southern ones.10 Costs for shell improvements to pre1995 multifamily dwellings (about one-quarter of households) will average about $1,200 per dwelling in northern

climates and $600 in southern climates. All costs are

incremental costs for improvements over our assumed

Base case efficiencies. Northern climates include the New

England, Mid-Atlantic, North Central, and northern

Mountain Census regions.

The costs of shell improvements in post-1995 houses

under our Tough scenario are somewhat higher. In

northern climates, costs might be in the range of $6,000

to $8,000 per house; in the South, costs might be about

$2,500 per house. Shell improvements in new multifamily dwellings might cost $2,000 to $3,000 in northern

climates and $1,200 in southern ones.

Costs for more efficient furnaces and appliances might

total about $1,000 to $1,500 per household, based on the

following estimates of additional costs: furnace ($750),

water heater ($45), refrigerator ($1 85), air conditioner

($300), freezer ($50), washer ($28), dryer ($70), dishwasher ($18),11

Assuming the shell improvements have a 30-year life

and the more efficient appliances average a 15-year life,

total costs for the residential sector will be in the range of

$30 to $40 billion per year. However, fuel savings from

these measures are about $55 billion per year assuming

2015 fuel prices. Thus, the net costs for the residential

sector fall in the range of savings of $15 billion to $25

billion per year. The cost effectiveness of these reductions

is in the range of –$175 to –$300 per ton of carbon (i.e.,

savings of $175 to $300 per ton of carbon).

Commercial Buildings-By 2015, we anticipate the

United States having about 72 billion square feet of

commercial building space (up from about 45 billion

today). Though costs of energy efficiency improvements

vary by building type, they appear to cluster in the range

of $5 to $11 per square foot for a package similar to our

Tough measures.12 These are the most aggressive measures considered by the Northwest Power Planning Council and include somewhat better lighting improvements

than we assumed, reasonably equivalent shell improvements and heating and cooling efficiencies for several

building types, but lower improvements for others than

we assumed for other building types.

l~~e costs of ow Tough scenario are estimated primarily from data in ref. 26, tables 3-13, 3-14, and 3-36.

1 [All appliance estimates from ref. 26; except for furnaces from ref. 12.

l~osts tie derived from ref. 26, tables 54A through 54H.
324 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Costs for these improvements total about $30 to $65

billion per year but fuel savings are approximately $55

billion per year at 2015 fuel prices. Thus net costs for

these measures fall between savings of $25 billion per

year and costs of $10 billion per year. The cost

effectiveness of these reductions ranges between –$190

per ton and $75 per ton of carbon avoided.

By 2015, we assume the commercial sector will be able

to install 25 GW of cogeneration systems. We assign a

cost premium of $0,02 to $0.05 per kWh to cogenerated

electricity, the same cost we derive for cogeneration

within industry (see below). Costs total about $2.5 to $6

billion per year, at a cost effectiveness of $85 to $210 per

ton of carbon.

For the remaining reductions (from office equipment

and water heaters and appliances), we assume a range of

costs equal to the range of commercial measures discussed above: –$200 to $200 per ton of carbon. Net costs

for the remainder total between –$5.5 to $5.5 billion per

year.

Total costs for the commercial sector are between

savings of $28 billion per year to costs of $22 billion per

year. The cost effectiveness of these reductions falls in the

range of –$150 to $120 per ton of carbon avoided.

Transportation

We estimate that the net costs of the Tough transportation measures fall in a range between savings of about $35

billion per year to costs of about $38 billion per year

(1987$) in 2015,

Highway Vehicle Efficiency--The new-vehicle efficiency measures will save money by 2015, assuming the

expected rise in the price of gasoline (about $1.85 per

gallon in 1987$). They are considered “Tough” primarily because they are technically challenging goals. We

assume that the additional cost of fuel-efficiency improvements to achieve a 55 mpg new car fleet average by

2010 will be in the range of $.500 to $750 per car (1987$)

(8). Achieving a 58 mpg car fleet by encouraging

consumers to buy smaller can; might require a subsidy of

about $250 to $500 per vehicle (7). Thus we use $750 to

$1,250 as our range of new car costs. We assume

light-duty truck efficiency improvements under the Tough

scenario will cost $500 to $750 per vehicle (i.e., the same

as new cars without subsidies for smaller cars). Assuming

168 million cars and 74 million light trucks and amortizing the costs over 7 years, we estimate the increase in

passenger vehicle costs will be about $30 to $50 billion

per year,

However, the higher efficiency under the Tough

scenario saves about $58 billion in fuel costs per year.

Thus, net costs for improved light-duty vehicle efficiency

are in the range of savings of $8 to $28 billion per year.

The cost effectiveness of the Tough fuel efficiency

measure for cars is in the range of –$220 to –$110 per ton

of carbon avoided; for light trucks, the range is –$510 to

–$410 per ton.

Lacking estimates for the costs of heavy-duty truck

improvements, we assume similar dollar per ton costs as

light-duty vehicles. Savings amount to between $3 billion

and $9 billion per year. For lack of a better estimate, we

assume that the cost of the aircraft efficiency improvements will equal fuel savings.

Mass Transit—We estimate that travel by mass transit

costs about $0.13 to $0.21 per passenger mile more than

travel in cars. Mass transit costs were in the range of $0.45

per passenger mile for 1988.13 Passenger car operating

costs were about $0.382 per vehicle mile in 1989 (25).

Using a range of 1.6 passengers per vehicle (a 1983 urban

average from ref. 36 for all travel) to 1.2 passengers per

vehicle (urban work commuting average) yields costs of

$0.24 per passenger mile for all urban car travel and $0.32

per passenger mile for work commuting by car. Assuming

the per-mile travel premium derived above, mass transit

and intercity rail costs under our Tough scenario total $26

to $55 billion per year, or about $1,150 to $2,300 per ton

of carbon.

Other Measures—Urban traffic flow improvements,

truck inspection and maintenance programs, and improved urban planning are all probably low cost measures.

Fuel savings from these programs amount to about $15

billion per year, which we use as our estimate of the net

cost of these measures.

The remaining measures-55 mph speed limit, ridesharing, parking controls, etc.—all lead to fuel savings

but have associated inconvenience costs as well. We

assume that these fall somewhere in the range between 50

percent less than and 50 percent greater than fuel savings.

Because fuel savings from these measures are about $18

billion per year, net costs fall in the range of savings of $9

billion per year to costs of $9 billion per year.

Industry

We estimate that the cost of all the Tough industrial

control measures falls in the range of $18 billion to $55

billion per year.

Motors and Lights—Use of more efficient motors,

lighting, and general housekeeping improvements are all

measures that are either low cost or save money due to

lsAss~es a 5.yem av~age capi~ cost from ref. 2, table 38 (Federal contribution is assumed to be 7S percent of total). Operating Costs and passenger

miles traveled from ref. 37, tables 2.C9 and 2.13.
Appendix A-Summary of the OTA Emissions Scenarios ● 325

large electricity savings. The Electric Power Research

Institute estimates that more efficient motors can save

$0.03 per kWh and more efficient lighting can save $0.04

per kWh over the life of the equipment (22). We have

simply assumed that these two measures cost half of the

amount they save in electricity costs. We assume that

general housekeeping costs as much as it saves in energy.

Net cost savings from these measures total about $6

billion per year. The cost effectiveness of the reductions

from motors and lights is about –$130 per ton of carbon

avoided.

Lower Emitting Fuels--A moratorium on new coal

industrial boilers (assuming natural gas is the fuel of

choice) would increase natural gas use by about 2.3 quads

over the Base case. At our 2015 prices, this costs about

$14 billion per year, with a cost effectiveness of about

$520 per ton.

Cogeneration--While in many situations industrial

cogeneration will save money, assuming that 90 percent

of all new and replacement boilers would cogenerate

might add a cost penalty, on average, of $0.02 to $0.05 per

kWh. The higher cost is an EPA-contractor estimate]4

assuming that all noncogenerating industrial boilers

(existing and new) that burn oil or natural gas will

cogenerate; the lower estimate assumes that the most

expensive 7 percent of such boilers are exempt from the

requirement. Requiring in addition that all cogeneration

systems use equipment equal in efficiency to Intercooled

Steam Injected Gas Turbines might add another $0.01 to

$0.02 per kWh. We add the $0.01 to $0.02 per kWh

premium to all cogenerated electricity, including the

amount assumed to occur under our Base case, Costs for

cogeneration total about $3 to $7 billion per year. The cost

effectiveness of these reductions is in the range of $55 to

$120 per ton of carbon.

Process Change--The largest share of the industrial

reductions comes from process change. We have no

source of estimates for the cost of these reductions. We

assumed a range of $120 per ton to $520 per ton (the upper

bound of the cost effectiveness of cogeneration to the cost

effectiveness of fuel switching from coal to natural gas).

Total costs for process changes thus would fall in the

range of about $10 to $43 billion.

Forestry

We estimate that implementing our Tough forestryrelated measures would cost in the range of $10 to $13

billion per year. The cost effectiveness of these measures

averages $105 to $135 per ton of carbon sequestered.

Afforestation-Afforestation is estimated to cost about

$2.7 billion per year (about $1.6 billion for urban trees,

$0.3 billion for the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP),

and $0.8 billion for general afforestation). The cost

effectiveness of the CRP and general afforestation averages about $35 per ton of carbon sequestered; the cost

effectiveness for urban tree planting averages about $180

per ton.

For urban trees, we estimate maintenance at $10 per

tree per year (based on ref. 21), and planting of saplings

at $75 per tree (including time, transportation, and labor).

Planting and maintaining 100 million trees then would

cost $1.6 billion per year.

For the CRP, the total cost for a 10-year contract is an

estimated $1,420 per hectare (based on data in ref. 31).

Assuming that the current legislative goal of planting

trees on 2.3 million hectares is met, then costs would be

$0.3 billion per year.

For general afforestation, we estimate costs for land,

seedling and soil preparation, and labor at about $325 per

hectare (based on refs, 31, 32). Planting 30 million

hectares would cost $0.8 billion per year.

Increased Productivity-We estimate maintenance

costs in programs to increase productivity at about $10 per

hectare per year, exclusive of credits for sales or taxes

(based, for example, on ref. 28); and site preparation and

planting costs at about $420 to $600 per ha (based on ref.

39). Given this range in site preparation and planting

costs, increasing productivity on 140 million hectares of

already forested lands would cost between $6 and $8

billion per year. The cost effectiveness of these reductions

is in the range of $150 to $200 per ton of carbon

sequestered.

Biomass Fuels—We estimate biomass fuel to cost $2

to $3 per million Btu; this assumes that fuel costs $68 to

$102 per ton carbon (40) and that biomass fuels contain

55 to 60 lb of carbon per million Btu. We assign biomass

fuels a premium over coal (for use in utility or industrial

boilers) of roughly $1 to $2 per million Btu, including a

penalty for drop in efficiency. Given this premium, 1 quad

of biomass fuel would cost $1 to $2 billion per year. The

cost effectiveness of these reductions is in the range of

$67

1.

2.

3.

to $133 per ton of carbon sequestered.

Appendix A References

Akbari, H. et al., ‘‘The Impact of Surnm er Heat Islands on Cooling

Energy Consumption and C02 Emissions, ” paper presented at

ACEEE Summer Study on Energy Eficiency in Buildings (Asilomar CA: August 1988).

American Public Transit Association, 1989 Transit Fact Book

(Washington, DC: 1989)

Baldw@ S., ‘‘Energy-efficient Electric Motor Drive Systems, ’ in

TB. Johansson et al. (eds.), Eficient End Use and Nen~ Generation

Technologies, and Their Planning Implications (Lund, Sweden:

Lund University Press, 1989)

14we ~ve derived these eStimteS using the capital costs and fuel savings from ~f, 20 and ow OWII estimates of 2015 fuel pfiCFX.
326 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

4,

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11,

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

Birdsey, R.A., ‘‘Estimation of Regional Carbon Yields for Forest

Types in the United States,” draft manuscript (Washington, DC:

Feb. 13, 1990).

Cambridge Systematic, Inc., Improved Air Quality in Mancopa

and Pima Counn’es- The Application of Transportation Measures (Cambridge, MA: November 1986)

Davis, D.W. and J.J. Buckley, National Hydroelectric Power

Resources Study, Volume IX. Potential for Increasing the Output

of Exisn”ng Hydroelectric Pl~znts (Fort Belvoir, VA: Institute for

Water Resources, 1981).

DiFiglio, C. et al., “Cost Effectiveness of Future Fuel Economy

Improvements,” Energy Journal 11(1):65(87), January 1990.

DiFiglio, C., presentation at OTA workshop on transport and

global warming, Apr. 6, 1989.

Electric Power Resach Institute, Power Plant Pe~ormance

Monitoring and Improvement, EPRI report CS/EL-4415, vol. 3

(Palo Alto, CA: February 1986).

Energy Information Administratio~ Manufactun”ng Energy Consumption Survey: Consumption of Energy, 1985, DOE/EIA0512(85) (Washington, DC: 1990).

Electric Power Research Institute, TAG Technical Assessment

Guide. Volume 1: Electricity Supplp1989, EPRI report P-6587-

L, vol. 1 (Palo Alto, CA: September 1989).

Electric Power Research Institute, TAG Technical Assessment

Guide. Volume 2: Electn”cily End Use. Part I: Residential

E1ecm”city Use=--l987 (Palo A,lto, CA: 1987),

Fulkersom W. et al,, Energy Technology R&D: What Can Make A

Difference?, Volume 2, Supp/y Technology, ORNL-6541/V2/P2

(Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge Natioml Laboratory, 1989).

Gas Research Institute, Baseline Projection Data Book, 1988 GRI

Baseline Projection of U.S. Energy Supply and Demand to 2010

(Washington, DC: 1988).

Geller, H., “Commercial Building Efficiency: A-State-of-the-Art

Review, ” contractor report prepared for U.S. Congress, Office of

Technology Assessmen~ 1988.

Geller, H., “Residential Building Eftlciency: A-State-of-the-Art

Review, ” contractor report prepared for U.S. Congress, OffIce of

Technology Assessment 1988.

Goldembcrg, J. et al., EnergyJ~r a Sustainable World (New Delhi,

India: Wiley Eastern Ltd., 1988).

Goldman, C. A., “Measured Results of Energy Conservation

Retrofits in Residential Buildings,” presented at 1986 ASHRAE

Winter Meeting, San Francisco, CA, Jan. 19-22,1986, LBL-20950.

Holtberg, P.D. et al., 1988 GRI Baseline Projection of U. S, Energy

Supply and Demand to 2010 (Chicago, IL: Gas Research institute,

1988).

ICF Incorporated, Preliminary Technology Cost Estimates of

Measures Available to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Enu”ssions by

2010, repofl submitted to U.S. Environmental Protwtion Agency,

August 1990.

International City Management Association Trends in Urban

Forestry Management 20(1):1-17, January/February 1988.

Lammare, L., ‘‘New Push for Energy Efficiency, ” E,qRI Journal

15(3):4-17, April 1990.

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Buildings Energy Use Compilation and Analysis Project (Berkeley, CA: Mar. 6, 1986).

Marland, G., ‘‘The Prospect of Solving the COZ Problem Through

Global Reforestation,” DOE/NBB-0082 (Washington DC: U.S.

Department of Energy, Oftlce of Energy Researc~ Februaxy

1988).

Motor Vehicle Manufacturer’ sAssociatio% Facts andFigures ’89

(Detroit, Ml: 1990).

26.

27.

28.

28a.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

33a.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

4Q.

41.

Northwest Power Planning Council, Technical Appendix to

Conservation Supply for the 1990 Power Plan (Portland, OR:

1989).

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Alternative Motor Fuel Use

Model (Oak Ridge, TN: 1988).

Sedjo, R. A., The Comparative Econon”cs of Plantation Forestry,

A Globa/Assessment (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future,

1983),

U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Carbon Charges as

a Response to Global Warming: The Effects of Tm”ng Fossil Fuels

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August

1990).

U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, “Conservation Reserve Program Could Be Less Costly and More Effective, ”

GAO/RCED-9G13 (Washingto~ DC: November 1989).

U.S. Congress, Off’ce of Technology Assessment, Wood Use, U.S.

Competitiveness and Technology, OTE-E-21O (Sprin@lel~ VA:

National Technical Information Service, August 1983).

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Conservation Reserve program

Work Group, Progress Report and Preliminary Evaluation of the

First Two Years (Washington DC: January 1989).

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Stabilization and

Conservation Service, “Supplement I to ‘The Conservation

Reserve Program: Progress Report and Preliminary Evacuation of

the First Two Years (Signups 1-7)’,” draft report (Washingto~

DC: Feb. 13, 1990).

U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administratio~

Annual Energy Outlook With Projections to 2010, DOwIA0383(90) (Washington, DC: January 1990).

U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administzatio~

Annual Energy Review, 1989, DOE/EIA-0384(89) (Washington

DC: May 1990).

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Of31ce of Policy, Planning

and Evaluation Policy Options for Stabilizing Global Climate,

Executive Summary, &aft report to Congress (Washingto~ DC:

June 1990).

U.S. Forest Sewice, “National Tree Planting Initiative, Questions

and Answers About Trees’ (Washingto~ DC: U.S. Department of

Agriculture, Feb. 1, 1990).

U.S. Department of Transportatio~ Personal Travel in the US.

Volume H (Washington, DC: November, 1986)

U.S. Department of Transportation, National Urban Mass

Transportation Statistics. 1988 Section 15 Annual Report (Washington DC: December, 1989)

Westbroo~ F. and P. patterso~ ‘‘Changing Driving Patterns and

Their Effect on Fuel Economy,” paper presented at the 1989 SAE

Government/Industry Meeting, Washington-q DC, May 2, 1989.

Winj~ J.K., “Forest Regeneration Cost for PNW and Southeast, ’ ‘ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental

Research Laboratory, memorandum to D.A. Tirpak (Corvallis,

OR: June 14, 1988).

Wright, L.L., R.L. Graham, and A.F. Tbrhollow, “Short-Rotation

Woody Crop Opportunities to Mitigate Carbon Dioxide Buildup,”

paper presented at North American Conference on Forestry

Responses to Climate Change (Washington DC: Climate

hMitute, May 15-17, 1990)<

Young, C.E. and C,T. Osbor~ The Consemation Reserve Program, An Economic Assessment, Agricultural Economic Report

Number 626 (WaAingto~ DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture,

Economic Research Service, February 1990).
Appendix B

State Initiatives

In the last 2 years, some States have taken an active role

in addressing greenhouse gas emissions without waiting

for the Federal Government to act—usually through

legislation or executive orders, most often with respect to

energy efficiency and use of chlorofluorocarbons. Table

B-1 provides titles, dates enacted, and general substance

of several legislative and executive actions.

A few States have developed quantitative reduction

goals for greenhouse gas emissions. For example, Vermont’s policy calls for greenhouse gases to be reduced at

least 15 percent below current levels by the year 2000; it

promotes measures to reduce per-capita nonrenewable

energy use, increase alternative fuel use, and develop

renewable energy sources (table B-1; ref. 15). Oregon’s

goal is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 20 percent

below 1988 levels by the year 2005 (20).

Other States, while not formulating specific reduction

targets, have established relatively broad goals related to

global warming. New Jersey is seeking to reduce emissions by decreasing energy consumption and encouraging

energy conservation, public education, and tree planting

(table B-1; ref. 22). Its educational initiative is unique in

calling for improved public education about the causes

and effects of climate change; it asks colleges and

universities that train teachers to integrate environmental

education activities into course material. Connecticut’s

1990 global warming act includes a range of energyefficiency goals, requirements for transportation (e. g.,

passenger vehicle occupancy levels, telecommuting),

buildings standards, State vehicle fuel efficiency, recycling, and long-term energy use (table B-1; refs. 7 and 30).

A 1990 Iowa bill contains provisions addressing energy

efficiency in buildings, alternative fuels demonstration

grants, an Iowa Energy Center, and energy-efficiency

planning by utilities (table B-1; ref. 4).

Many State programs are specifically designed to

address CO2 emissions from individual sectors. Most

involve energy use and efficiency in the buildings,

transportation, and energy supply sectors. Many States

also developed programs during the 1970s and 1980s that,

although not designed to address concerns about global

warming, nonetheless can help reduce emissions. Most of

these programs have focused on energy supply (e.g.,

least-cost utility planning) and buildings (e.g., efficiency

standards) (16).

Table B-l—State Legislation and Orders Addressing Greenhouse Gas Emissions

State Document Date enacted Subjects emphasized

Arizona . . . . . . . . . .

Connecticut . . . . . .

Hawaii . . . . . . . . . .

Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . .

Maine . . . . . . . . . . .

Minnesota . . . . . . .

New Jersey . . . . . .

New York . . . . . . . .

Oregon . . . . . . . . . .

Texas . . . . . . . . . . .

Vermont . . . . . . . . .

Washington . . . . . .

Wisconsin . . . . . . .

House Bill 2206

Public Act 219

Senate Bill 1344

Senate File 2403

Public Law 622

Comprehensive Groundwater

Protection Act

Executive Order 219

Executive Order 118

Senate Bill 576

Senate Bill 740

Senate Bill 760

Act 59

Executive Order 79

House Bill 2198

Act 284

Public Service Commission

Order 05-EP-5

1988

1990

May 11, 1989

1990

Feb. 23, 1990

1989

Oct. 23, 1989

Dec. 28, 1988

1989

1989

1989

May 24, 1989

Oct. 23, 1989

Feb. 5, 1990

Apr. 21, 1990

Apr. 7, 1989

Air quality, natural gas, transportation control measures

Transportation control measures, building codes, State

vehicles, tree planting, State energy plan, recycling

CFCs

Building energy efficiency, alternative fuels demonstration

grants, utility energy-efficiency planning

CFCs

Nitrous oxides, agriculture

CO2 emissions, State equipment purchases, energy use,

CFCs, tree planting

State Energy Plan, energy use, CO2 emissions

Greenhouse gas emissions, energy conservation,

renewable resources, alternative fuels

State vehicles

Natural gas, alternative fuels, technologies

CFCs

CO2 emission reduction goals, energy efficiency,

renewable energy, alternative fuels

Residential buildings

CFCs

Utilities, cost of reducing CO2 emissions

SOURCE: Of fi@ of Technology Assessment, 1991.

–327-
328 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Most of the specific greenhouse gas-related actions

have occurred in the last year or two and some are not yet

legally effective, so the extent to which they will be

implemented and enforced remains to be seen. This

appendix presents examples of these actions, based

primarily on responses to an OTA survey of different

regions of the country; it is not intended to be an

exhaustive list.

Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and Halons

Of all the greenhouse gases, CFCs have been the most

widely addressed by State legislatures. In 1989, Hawaii

became the first State to enact legislation restricting the

use of CFCs (table B-1; ref. 33). The statute, which goes

into effect on January 1, 1991, requires mandatory

recycling of CFCs and prohibits the sale of CFC coolants

for air conditioners in containers smaller than 15 pounds

(the latter as a means of deterring inexperienced installers).

Soon after Hawaii’s action, Vermont enacted a statute

that bans the sale of cleaning sprays, containers of CFCs

smaller than 15 pounds, and halon fire extinguishers for

home use (table B-1; ref. 15). The law also prohibits the

sale of cars with CFC-using air conditioners, beginning

with model year 1993, and requires service stations that

repair automobile air conditioners to recycle CFCs.

Under Maine’s CFC-related statute, new cars using

CFCs may not be registered in the State after 1994,

automobile CFCs must be recycled, and the sale of small

quantities of CFCs is restricted (table B-1; ref. 17). The

legislation bans the use of CFC foam board for household

insulation, effective when alternative blowing agents are

available. 1

In Wisconsin, beginning in 1991, motor vehicle air

conditioner refrigerant in containers holding less than 15

pounds will be banned (table B-1; ref. 31). Beginning in

1992, anyone servicing or installing refrigeration equipment containing at least 5 pounds of CFC refrigerant must

use proper recycling procedures. In 1996, the distribution

or registration of new motor vehicles using air conditioners that contain over a specified amount of CFCs will be

prohibited.

Other States with legislation or directives that address

CFC emissions include California (see box 5-A in ch. 5),

Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,

Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Rhode

Island, and Oregon.2 Legislation has been introduced in at

least 7 other States (17).

Energy

Marty States have had energy planning and assistance

programs since the early 1970s and 1980s, largely in

response to the 1973 oil embargo. As of 1988, for

example, 24 States had collaborative energy-efflciency

projects with utilities, and 15 had State energy tax credits

for renewable energy sources (e.g., photovoltaics, wind,

biomass) (1, 16). Since the mid-1970s, many utilities and

State regulators have increased their interest in least-cost

planning (LCP), which aims to balance supply- and

demand-side management alternatives to meet energy

needs at the least possible cost (8a) (see box 3-C in ch. 3

for more discussion of demand-side management). As of

1990, 23 States had LCP strategies.3 Almost all States

also received funding from the Oil Overcharge fund, to be

used in energy conservation grants administered by the

U.S. Department of Energy. 4 More recently, several

States have enacted energy policies that directly address

greenhouse gas emissions.

I we previously pm5~ a MW pIohibi@ the use of polys~rene foam food packaging made with c~s; -=ota ~d mode ISl~d ~SO P~Sed

similar laws (25).

zInadditiom ~ome m~cip~tles ~ve pms~ comprehensive ordinances regulating CFC-hclutig Wine, C~O~% ~AuWst 1989; ~d ~ver>

Colorado (refs. 6, 12) in April 1990.

3~ordiW t. ref. 8% le~sla~es have pas~ LCP laws or given authority to utility commission tO establish ~d ~orce rel@atio~ ~ at lemt 16

States. Utilities also use LCP without legislative or regulatory mandates in a few other States.

d~ex fwd~ me ~at~ by tie Depmment to tie Shtes for previously authorized conservation projects; they are derivd from a 1986 U.S. Dis~ct

Court decision on alleged pricing violations by oil companies. The DOE grant programs are the Energy Extension Service, the State Energy Consemation

Program, the Institutional Conservation Program, and the Weatherhtion Assistance program (these are discussed inch. 4).
Appendix B--State Initiatives ● 329

As of September 1990, six State utility commissions

had modified the selection procedures of their electric

utility companies to account for residual environmental

damages (32).5 New York’s Public Service Commission

introduced guidelines for a competitive bidding process

for new electricity supply that includes the estimated cost

of environmental pollution, including CO2 emissions; the

cost is added to bids in order to make energy-efficient and

environmentally cleaner technologies more competitive

with traditional fossil fuel-fired generation technologies

(21, 23, 24).6 New York also has issued an Executive

Order (table B-1; ref. 21) establishing a statewide energy

planning process involving the State Energy Office,

Department of Public Service, and Department of Environmental Conservation.

In Vermont, an Executive Order (table B-1) calls for

increasing the effectiveness of energy-efficiency services

provided by utilities, private businesses, and State agencies, and for increasing Vermont reliance on renewable

energy supplies. The State Agency Task Force on Energy

was created to oversee the implementation of energy

efficiency and emission reduction strategies.

New Jersey’s goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions includes directives to State agencies to foster energy

conservation-for example, by purchasing and using

efficient heating, ventilation, air-conditioning, and lighting equipment; increasing reliance on lower emitting

fuels; and using alternatives to CFC- and haloncontaining equipment (22). New Jersey’s initiative is

distinguished from other State plans by its emphasis on

public education, as noted above.

In Wisconsin, the Public Service Commission issued

an order in 1989 that requires the Wisconsin Utilities to

assess the cost of using existing technologies to reduce

CO2 emissions by 20 percent below 1985 levels (31).

Some States are using Oil Overcharge funds to

establish energy-related programs. In Arizona, funds are

being used to construct a solar village on State Trust Land

(1 1). In New Mexico, some funds are being used for

municipal solid waste reduction and recycling projects

that result in net energy savings (10).

Transportation

As of 1988, a number of States had programs dealing

with public transportation, ridesharing, vehicle inspection

and maintenance, and high-occupancy lanes (16). For

example, at least 15 States provided some funding for

ridesharing. In the last few years, States such as Arizona,

California, Connecticut, and Texas have enacted legislation specifically designed to reduce CO2 emissions in the

transportation sector.

California probably has the most comprehensive plan

in the country regarding transportation policies, In

particular, the South Coast Air Quality Management plan

sets forth an ambitious and far-reaching program of

control measures that could greatly affect transportation

emissions (see box 5-F in ch. 5 for details).

Arizona’s 1988 air legislation (table B-1) includes a tax

break for use of compressed natural gas (CNG) and

funding for pilot projects on oxygenated fuels (29).7 It

also includes a variety of transportation control measures,

such as travel reduction programs, compensation for

vanpool costs, and prohibition of parking in certain areas.

Connecticut 1990 legislation (table B-1) requires that

new cars and trucks purchased by the State have an

average MPG rating of 45 and 35, respectively, by 2000

(30) and that alternative fuel vehicles be considered in

purchasing decisions. It also establishes a range of other

transportation goals, including increasing average car

occupancy levels, increasing use of public transportation,

providing disincentives for free parking, and eventually,

telecommuting for State agencies. The Department of

Transportation must provide the State with an analysis of

public transportation, paratransit (carpooling), and traffic

management.

Two Texas acts are designed to reduce transportation

CO2 emissions (table B-1; ref. 26). One prohibits State

agencies with 15 or more vehicles from purchasing or

leasing vehicles (after September 1991) not capable of

using CNG or other alternative fuels with lower emissions. By September 1994, 30 percent of a State agency’s

fleet must be capable of operating on CNG or other

alternative fuels; the percentage will increase to 50

percent by 1996, The second act requires the Air Control

Board to encourage use of natural gas, alternative fuels,

and more efficient technologies. Some Oil Overcharge

funds also have been allocated for transportation programs (e.g., traffic signal synchronization, traffic management, fleet management, alternative fuels).

sMassachusetts and New YOA are ass]~ing specific costs to environmental damages, u described in this ptiawwh for New Yo~; COIOradO~ ‘ew’

Jersey, and Vermont are using a point system that achieves a similar result without quantifying damages in monetary terms; and Wisconsin is assigning

a penalty to account for environmental damages (32),

6~e state (ref, 25) ~s estfiat~ me addjtjon~ CM Of mitigating environmental impacts from coal-f~ed plans to be uP to 1.@5 cents~~ CosW

for specific damages were estimated at 0,10 cents/kWh for COZ, 0.25 cents/kWh for SOZ, 0.55 cents/kWh for NOX, 0.005 cents/kWh for particulate,

0,10 cents/kWh for water impacts, and 0,40 cents/kWh for land use (e.g., terrestrial impacts, fuel delivery, noise, transmission, solid waste, aesthetics).

TU~c of “nconventlom] automotive fie]s for vehjc]es, such as natural gas or electricity, do not necessarily ~sult iII les~r cli~atic imPacts ~is

depends on many variables, ranging from the type of energy source used, to leakage rates (in the case of mturat gas) and efficiency levels (see ch. 5).
330 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Buildings

Connecticut has several legislative provisions addressing energy use in buildings (table B-l). It requires stricter

codes for commercial buildings; standards for State

buildings that would reduce energy use per square foot by

30 percent by 2000 and 50 percent by 2010; and State

purchases of energy-efficient appliances (30). It also

requires that preference be given to energy-efficient

projects in State housing grant and loan programs, and

calls for utilities to charge higher rates for new energywasting buildings beginning in 1993.

Many States have started loan programs for retrofitting

State, public school, and local government facilities, often

using funds from the Oil Overcharge fund. The LoanSTAR program in Texas, which commenced in 1988,

consists of a $98 million revolving loan program for

energy conservation retrofits in Texas State, local government, and public school buildings (27).8 The Governor’s

Energy Management Center expects that retrofits funded

through November 1, 1990, will generate annual utility

savings of $4.8 million and that retrofits now being

funded will generate an additional savings of $4 million

annually (26).

Both the California Energy Commission and the

Northwest Power Planning Council (NPPC) have established model energy-efficient building codes for residential and commercial buildings (1 1), The California

Legislature directed the California Energy Commission to

prescribe, through regulations, various building design

and construction standards (e.g., lighting, insulation,

automatic control systems) that will increase energy

efficiency in new buildings (8).9 In 1990, the State of

Washington enacted legislation adopting standards equivalent to the NPPC’s Model Conservation Standards for

residential buildings, requiring increased efficiency in

new homes and apartments (table B-1; ref. 28).10 The

State estimates that resultant savings will beat least 200

megawatts of electrical power and 21 million annual

therms of natural gas by 2010 (28). A State-utility

collaborative program established by the act includes a

public awareness and education element, as well as utility

rebates.

Food and Forestry

We are unaware of any States with agricultural

programs specifically designed to reduce greenhouse gas

emissions. However, Minnesota has legislation addressing the use of nitrogen fertilizers (table B-1; ref. 5). A

Nitrogen Fertilizer Task Force was established to study

the effects of nitrogen fertilizer use on water resources so

that the State can develop best management practices, a

fertilizer management plan, and nitrogen fertilizer use

regulations (14).

In Georgia, the State Office of Energy Resources has a

program funded by Oil Overcharge funds to increase

energy efficiency in the crop processing sector (19). The

Agricultural Processor Energy Conservation Service provides technical know-how and audits to processing plants.

For example, Georgia Tech University has noted that the

energy used in processing peanuts, at a cost of around $11

million per year, could potentially be reduced by 10 to 20

percent if cost-effective technologies are used.

Many States have long had forest management programs of one sort or another and some are now

establishing tree-planting programs in response to global

warming and other concerns (11, 13, 16). For example,

New Jersey’s 1990 Executive Order (table B-1; ref. 9)

calls for maximizing the number of trees in the State; a

program requiring replacement of trees lost as result of

State construction activities has been instituted through

the order.

1.

2.

3.

4.

4a.

5.

6.

7.

8.

8a.

9.

Appendix B References

Alliance to Save Energy, Profiles of Energy Eficiency Projects

Jointly Operated by States and Utilities (TVashingtow DC: November 1988).

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, ACEEE 1990

Summer Study on Energy Eficiency in Buildings, Proceedings

(Washington DC: 1990).

Arkamas Forestry Commission, ‘ ‘Arkansas’ Reforestation ProEPm” (Litie Rock AR: Januruy 1990).

Bean+ L., Iowa Department of Natural Resources, personat cornmunicatio~ Nov. 5, 1990.

Boyle, J., Fleishman/Hd“ lard Inc., personal communication, Jan. 14,

1991.

Buzicky, G., Nitrogen Fertilizer Task Force, Minnesota Department

of Agriculture, personal cornmunicatiou Oct. 30, 1990.

CarnaharL A., “Ozone-protection Bill OK’d,” Rocky Mountain

News, p. 7, Apr. 17, 1990.

Comecticut OffIce of Policy and Management, Energy Divisioq

Connecticut’s Energy Future, Making the Right Choices (Hartford,

CT: October 1990).

Deller, N. J., California Energy ComrnissioU personal communication, Nov. 14, 1990.

Electric Power Research Institute, Least-Cost Planning in the

United States: 1990, EPRI CU-6966, Project 2982-2, Finat Report

(Palo Alto, CA: September 1990).

Keene, M.L., ‘‘Leading States’ Policy Responses to Global Climate

Change, ” paper presented to The Massachusetts Task Force on

Global Climate Change (Medford, MA: lhfts University, Center

g~ms at a rate of 4,04 Wment APR (Avemge Percenmge Rate) are available for installation of energy-efficient lighting; heat@, ventilatio~ ~d

air-conditioning systems; building shell improvements; computerized energy management systems; boiler efficiency improvements; energy recovery

systems; and load management hardware.

%e Commission also is studying specific measures and policy options to reduce greenhouse gases, in response to Assembly Bill 4420 of 1988.

l~o offset any added costs to consumers b~ause of the requirements, the law requires electric utilities to provide $900 for new homes under 2,000

square feeq these payments will be avaitable from July 1, 1991 through June 30, 1995.
Appendix B-State Initiatives ● 331

10.

11.

12.

13.

14,

15,

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

for Environmental Managemen4 July 6, 1990).

Kowalski, J., New Mexico Department of Energy, Minerals, and

Natural Resources, personat communicatio~ Dec. 19, 1990.

Lashof, D.A. and E.L. Washburn, The Statehouse E“ect: Stare

Policies To Cool the Greenhouse (Washington DC: Natural

Resources Defense Council, July 26, 1990).

Lipsher, S., “Council Bans Sale of Oume-haming Chemicals, ”

The Denver Post, Apr. 17, 1990.

National Governom’ Association, Consensus for Change, A World

of Difference, Report of the Task Force on Global Climate Change

(Washington, DC: 1990).

Nitrogen Fertilizer Task Force, Recommendations of the Nitrogen

Fertilizer Task Force on The Nitrogen Fertilizer Management Plan,

to the Minnesota Commissioner of Agriculture (St. Paul, MN:

Minnesota Department of Agriculture, August 1990).

Parker, S,, Vermon( Public Services Department, Conservation and

Renewable Energy Unit, personat communication Oct. 30, 1990.

Renew America, Reducing the Rate of Global Warrm”ng, The States’

Role (Washington, DC: November 1988).

Rice, B., Center for Policy Alternatives, personal comrnunicatiou

Nov. 13, 1990.

Riggs, R. W., “State Responses to the Threat of Global Warming:

A Review of Policy and Ugislation, ” paper 90-141.4 presented at

83rd Annual Meeting & Exhibition, Air & Waste Management

Association (Pittsburgh PA: June 24-29, 1990).

Robertso% E, S., Georgia ~lce of Energy Resources, personal

commumcatio~ Nov. 6, 1990.

Sadler, S., Oregon Department of Energy, personal communication

Oct. 31, 1990,

Smith, P. R., New York State Energy OMce, personat communication, Dec. 4, 1990.

State of New Jersey Executive Departmen4 ‘ ‘Executive Order No.

219” (Trento~ NJ: Oct. 23, 1989).

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30,

31.

32.

33.

State of New York Department of Public Service, “Consideration

of Environmental Externalities in New York State Utilities’ Bidding

Programs for Acquiring Future Electric Capacity” (Albany, NY:

1989).

State of New York Public Service Commission, “Opinion and

Order Establishing Guidelines for Bidding Program, ” Opinion No.

89-7 (Albany, NY: Apr. 13, 1989).

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Facing America’s Trash: What Next for Municipal Solid Waste? OTA-O-424

(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October

1989).

Verdict, M., Governor’s Energy Management Center, State of

Texas, personal communication Nov. 6, 1990.

Verdict, M. et al., “Monitoring $98 Million in Energy Efficiency

Retrofits: The Texas ~anSTAR Program” (Austin, TX: 1989).

Washington State Energy Office, ‘‘Governor Gardner Signs Ihergy

Code Bill,” WSEO Dispatch, March-April 1990.

Weaver, R., American Public Transit Association, personal communication, Nov. 7, 1990.

Wes~ C., Connecticut OffIce of Policy and Management, Energy

Division, personal communication Dec. 11, 1990.

Wichert, D., Wisconsin Division of Energy and Intergovernmental

Relations, personal comrnunicatio~ Nov. 16, 1990.

Wiel, S., “Facing Up to the True Environmental Costs of Electric

Power Generation, ” preprint of paper presented at GermanAmerican Workshop on Analysis and Internalization of External

Environmental Costs of Electric Power Production and Utility

Acquisition (Oct. 24, 1990).

Zane, L., Hawaii Department of Planning and Economic Developmen~ Energy Divisio~ personal communication, Nov. 30, 1990.
Appendix C

Conversion Factors, Abbreviations, and Glossary

1 square kilometer (km2)=

0.386 square mile

247 acres

100 hectares

1 square mile=

2.59 square kilometers (km2)

6.4xl0 acres

2.59xl02 hectares

1 kilogram (kg}=

2.20 pounds (lb)

1 pound (lb)=

0.454 kilogram (kg)

1 quad (quadrillion Btu)=

1.05x 1018 Joules (J)

1.05 exajoules (EJ)

3.60xl05 metric tons, coal

1,72x106 barrels, Oil

2.36x105 metric tons, oil

2.83x101° cubic meters, gas

1.07x1012 cubic feet, gas

2.93xl02 terawatt hours

1 liter (1)=

2.64x10-1 gallons (liquid, U. S.)

Conversion Factors

Area

Weight

Energy

Volume

6.29x10-3 barrels (petroleum, U. S.)

1X10-3 cubic meters (m3

)

3.53x 10-2 cubic feet (ft3

)

1 gallon (liquid, U.S.)=

3.78 liters (1)

2.38x10-2 barrels (petroleum, U. S.)

3.78x10-3 cubic meter (m3

)

1.33x10-1 cubic feet (ft3

)

1 barrel (bbl) (petroleum, U.S.,)=

1.59x102 liters (1)

42 gallons (liquid, U. S.)

1.5%10-’ cubic meters (m3)

5.61 cubic feet (ft3)

Temperature

From Centigrade to Fahrenheit:

((9/5) X (“C))+ 32 =

o

F

1

1

I

1

1

1

acre=

0.405 hectare (ha)

1.56x10-3 square miles

4.05 square kilometers (km2

)

hectare=

0.01 square kilometer (km2)

3.86x10 -3 square miles

2.47 acres

metric ton (ret) (or “long ton’ ‘)=

1,000 kilograms or 2,200 lbs

short ton=

2,000 pounds or 907 kg

kilowatthour=

3.41x103 British thermal units (Btu)

3.6x106 Joules (J)

i Joule=

9.48x104 British thermal unit (Btu)

2.78x10-7 kilowatthours (kWh)

I British thermal unit (Btu)=

2.93x10 4 kilowatthours (kWh)

1.05x103 Joules (J)

1

1

cubic meter (#)=

1x103 liters (1)

2.64xl02 gallons (liquid, U. S.)

6.29 barrels (petroleum, U. S.)

35.3 cubic feet (ft3)

cubic foot (ft3

)=

2.83x 101 liters (1)

7.48 gallons (liquid, U. S.)

1.78x10-1 barrels (petroleum, U. S.)

2.83x10-2 cubic meters (m3

)

1 cord wood=

128 cubic feet (ft3) stacked wood

3.62 cubic meters (m3

) stacked wood

1 dry (i.e., no moisture) ton of wood

From Fahrenheit to Centigrade.

(5/9) X (oF - 32)= oC

Temperature changes:

—To convert a Centigrade change to a Fahrenheit change:

9/5 x (change in ‘C) = change in OF

—-To convert a Fahrenheit change to a Centigrade change:

5/9 x (change in ‘F) = change in oC

—-Example: a 3.0 oC rise in temperature = a 5.4 OF rise in temperature

–332–
Appendix C--Conversion Factors, Abbreviations, and Glossary ● 333

Carbon Contents of Various Fuel International System of Units (S1): Prefixes

Abbreviations

ACP —Agricultural Conservation Program

ADF —African Development Foundation

A.I.D. —Agency for International Development

AQMP —Air Quality Management Plan

ASCS —Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation

Service

ASD —Adjustable speed drive

ASHRAE —American Society of Heating, Refrigeration

and Air-Conditioning Engineers

ATNT —Accelerated Turnover and New

Technologies

BEPS —Building Energy Performance Standards

BLS —Bureau of Labor Statistics

BMPs —Best management practices

Btu —British thermal unit

CAFE —Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency

CARE —Cooperative for American Relief

Everywhere

CARP —Cooperative Automotive Research Program

CBO —Congressional Budget Office

CFCs —Chlorofluorocarbons

CGIAR —Consultative Group on International

Agricultural Research

CHq

-–Methane

CNG —Compressed natural gas

C02 —Carbon dioxide

COBRA —Comprehensive Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act

COCOM —Coordinating Committee on Multilateral

Export Controls

CORECT —Committee on Renewable Energy

Commerce and Trade

CRP —Conservation Reserve Program

CRS —Congressional Research Service

DOE

DSM

EAA

EADC

EES

EIA

EITC

EPA

EPRI

ESMAP

FAO

FBC

FEMIA

FEMP

FERC

GAO

GATT

GCM

GDP

GNP

GRI

HCFC

HERS

HFC

HUD

HVAC

IAF

ICP

IDB

—U.S. Department of Energy

—Demand-side management

—Export Administration Act

—Energy Analysis and Diagnostic Center

—Energy Extension Service

—Energy Information Administration

—Energy investment tax credit

—Environmental Protection Agency

—Electric Power Research Institute

—Energy Sector Management Assistance

Program

—Food and Agriculture Organization

—Fluidized-bed combustor

—Federal Energy Management Improvement

Act

—Federal Energy Management Program

—Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

—Forestry Incentives Program

—General Accounting Office

—General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

—General circulation model

—Gross Domestic Product

—Gross National Product

—Gas Research Institute

—Hydrochlorofluorocarbon

—Home Energy Rating System

—Hydrofluorocarbon

—U.S. Department of Housing and Urban

Development

—Heating, ventilation, air-conditioning

equipment

—Inter-American Foundation

—Institutional Conservation Program

—Inter-American Development Bank
334 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

IEA —International Energy Agency

IGCC —Integrated gasification-combined cycle

IPCC —Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change

IPPF —International P1anned Parenthood

Federation

ISTIG —Intercooled steam-injected gas turbine

ITTO —International Tropical Timber Organization

LCP —Least-cost planning

LIHEAP —Low-Income Home Energy Assistance

Program

LIMB —Limestone injection multistage burner

LWR —Light water reactor

MAGPI —Multi-Agency ‘Working Group for Power

Sector Innovation

M D B —Multilateral Development Bank

—Most Favored Nation

—Magnetohydrodynamic s

MHTGR —Modular high temperature gas reactor

N 2 0 —Nitrous oxide

NAECA —National Appliance Energy Conservation

Amendments

NAH A —National Affordable Housing Act

NASA —National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

NCSBCS —National Council of States Building Codes

NGO

NIST

NOAA

NPPC

O&M

OECD

Standards

—Non-governmental organization

—National Institute for Standards and

Technology

—National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

—Northwest Power Planning Council

—Operation and maintenance

—Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development

OIP

OPIC

ORNL

PACER

PURPA

PV

RCS

RD&D

REDAC

SCS

SECP

SEECB

SEED

SERI

SES

SLAP

TCM

TDP

TFAP

UNDP

UNEP

UNFPA

USDA

—Office of Industrial Programs

—Overseas Private Investment Corp.

—Oak Ridge National Laboratory

—Program for the Acceleration of

Commercial Energy Research

—Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act

—Photovoltaic

—Residential Conservation Service

—Research, Development, and

Demonstration

—Renewable Energy Design Assistance

Center

—Soil Conservation Service

—State Energy Conservation Program

—Solar Energy and Energy Conservation

Bank

—Support for Eastern European Democracy

—Solar Energy Research Institute

—Shared Energy Savings

—State and local assistance programs

—Transportation control measure

—Trade and Development Program

—Tropical Forestry Action Plan

—United Nations Development Program

—United Nations Environment program

—United Nations Fund for Population

Activities (UN Population Fund)

—U.S. Department of Agriculture

USECRE —U.S. Export Council for Renewable Energy

USFS —U.S. Forest Service

UV —Ultraviolet radiation

VAFE —Volume Average Fuel Economy

VMT —Vehicle miles traveled

WAP — Weatherization Assistance Program

WMO — World Meteorological Organization

Glossary

Aerosols: Microscopic particles suspended in the atmosphere, originating from both natural sources (e.g.,

volcanoes) and human activities (e.g., coal burning).

Al bedo: The reflectivity of the Earth.

Appliance: Any household energy-using device.

Biodiversity: Biological diversity, i.e., the variety of

species in a given area.

Biomass: Technically, the total dry organic matter or

stored energy content of living organisms in a given

area. As used by OTA, biomass refers to forms of

living matter (e.g., grasses, trees) or their derivatives

(e.g., ethanol, timber, charcoal) that can be used as a

fuel.

Btu (British thermal unit): The amount of heat needed

to raise the temperature of 1 pound of water by 1 ‘Fat

a specified temperature.

Carbon budget: The sum of the flows of carbon to and

from a carbon reservoir. See also Carbon cycle.

Carbon cycle: General term used in reference to the sum

of all reservoirs and flows of carbon on Earth. The

flows tend to be cyclic in nature; for example, carbon

removed from the atmosphere (one reservoir) and

converted into plant tissue (another reservoir) is

returned back into the atmosphere when the plant is

burned.

Carbon dioxide fertilization: The enhancement of plant

growth in response to an increase in the concentration

of atmospheric CO2

.

Carbon reservoir or sink: Within the carbon cycle, the

physical site at which carbon is stored (e.g., atmosphere, oceans, Earth’s vegetation and soils, and fossil

fuel deposits),
Appendix C--Conversion Factors, Abbreviations, and GIossary ● 3 3 5

Chlorocarbon: A compound containing chlorine and

carbon; examples include carbon tetrachloride and

methyl chloroform, both of which are ozone depleters.

Cloroflourocarbons: Compounds containing chlorine,

fluorine, and carbon; they generally are used as

propellants, refrigerants, blowing agents (for producing foam), and solvents. They are identified with

numbered suffixes (e. g., CFC-11, CFC-12) which

identify the ratio of these elements in each compound.

They are known to deplete stratospheric ozone and also

are ‘‘greenhouse’ gases in that they effectively absorb

certain types of radiation in the atmosphere.

Climate: The statistical collection and representation of

the weather conditions for a specified area during a

specified time interval (usually decades).

Climate anomaly: The “significant* deviation of a

particular climate variable from its long-term average.

Cogeneration: The simultaneous generation of both

electric power and heat; the heat, instead of being

discharged without further use. is used in some fashion

(e.g., in district heating systems).

Deforestation: Converting forest land to other vegetation

or uses (e. g., cropland, pasture, dams).

Demand-side management. The planning, implementation, and monitoring of utility activities designed to

encourage customers to modify their pattern of electricity usage.

Discount rate: The rate at which money grows in value

(relative to inflation) if it is invested.

Emissions: Flows of gases, liquid droplets, or solid

particles into the atmosphere. Gross emissions from a

specific source are the total quantity released. Net

emissions are gross emissions minus flows back to the

original source. Plants, for example, take carbon from

the atmosphere and store it as biomass during photosynthesis, and they release it during respiration, when

they decompose, or when they are burned.

Energy intensity: The amount of energy required per unit

of a particular product or activity. Often used interchangeably with ‘ ‘energy per dollar of GNP. ’

Energy services: The service or end use ultimately

provided by energy. For example, in a home with an

electric heat pump, the service provided by electricity

is not to drive the heat pump’s electric motor but rather

to provide comfortable conditions inside the house.

Feedback: When one variable in a system (e.g., increasing temperature) triggers changes in a second variable

(e.g., cloud cover) which in turn ultimately affect the

original variable (i. e., augmenting or diminishing the

warming). A positive feedback intensifies the effect. A

negative feedback reduces the effect.

Fluorocarbon: A compound containing fluorine and

carbon; among these are chlorinated fluorocarbons

(CFCs) and brominated fluorocarbons (haIons).

Fossil fuel: Coal, petroleum, or natural gas or any fuel

derived from them.

Generating capacity: The capacity of a powerplant to

generate electricity, typically expressed in wattselectric (e.g., kWe or MWe).

Greenhouse effect: The effect produced as certain

atmospheric gases allow incoming solar radiation to

pass through to the Earth’s surface, but prevent the

(infrared) radiation, which is reradiated from the Earth

from escaping into outer space. The effect responsible

for warming the planet.

Greenhouse gas: Any gas that absorbs infrared radiation

in the atmosphere.

Halocarbon: A compound containing carbon and at least

one halogen.

Halogen: Any one of the following chemical elements:

bromine, chlorine, fluorine, iodine, or astatine.

Halogenated: A compound containing a halogen. A fully

halogenated CFC is one in which all hydrogen has

been replaced with chlorine and/or fluorine. A partially

halogenated CFC is one in which some hydrogen

remains.

HaIon: Compounds containing bromine, commonly used

as fire extinguishing agents.

Heat-island effect: The tendency of large urbanized areas

to increase local temperatures, creating ‘heat islands’

surrounded by cooler countrysides.

Hydrochlorofluorocarbon: A chlorofluorocarbon that

contains some hydrogen (i.e., a ‘‘partially halogenated” chlorofluorocarbon); an example is HCFC-22.

Hydrofluorocarbon: Compounds containing hydrogen,

fluorine, and carbon. Unlike CFCs, they do not contain

chlorine.

Infrared radiation: Radiation with wavelengths roughly

between 700 and 1000 nanometers; these wavelengths

are longer than those of visible light.

Least-cost planning: In energy planning, the practice of

basing investment decisions on the least costly option

for providing energy services. It is distinguished from

the more traditional approach taken by utilities, which

focuses on the least costly way to provide specific

types of energy, with little or no consideration of less

costly alternatives that provide the same energy service

at lower costs.

Life cycle cost: The cost of a good or service over its

entire life cycle.

Methane: A compound consisting of one carbon atom

and four hydrogen atoms; it occurs naturally, often in

association with coal and petroleum (see Natural gas

below) and as a byproduct of the metabolic activities

of some microorganisms; it also can be synthesized

artificially.
336 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Monoculture: The exclusive cultivation of single species

(e.g., corn or soybeans), a common practice in modern

agriculture.

Montreal Protocol: The principal international agreement under which ozone-depleting compounds are

regulated.

Natural gas: A naturally occurring mixture of hydrocarbons (principally methane) and small quantities of

other gases found in porous geological formations,

often in association with petroleum.

OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development, an organization that includes most of

the world’s industrialized, market economies. Members include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,

Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New

Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.

Ozone: A molecule consisting of three oxygen atoms; in

the atmosphere, it is found in both the stratosphere and

the troposphere. Ozone effectively absorbs certain

forms of solar ultraviolet radiation known to damage

living organisms. It also absorbs certain wavelengths

of infrared radiation and therefore is a ‘‘greenhouse’

gas.

Ozone layer: Ozone found throughout the stratosphere.

Particulate: Airborne particles.

Photochemical reaction: A chemical reaction triggered

by sunlight.

Primary productivity: The rate at which radiant energy

is stored by the photosynthetic and chemosynthetic

activities of producer organisms (e.g., green plants) in

the form of organic substances which can be used as

food materials,

Radiation: See Infrared radiation and Ultraviolet

radiation.

Radiative forcing: The degree to which changes in the

radiative balance of the atmosphere cause changes in

temperatures.

Retrofit: To update an existing structure or technology by

modifying it, as opposed to creating something entirely new from scratch. For example, an old house can

be retrofitted with advanced windows to slow the flow

of energy into or from the house.

Sequester: To isolate and remove something. As used

here, the processes by which carbon dioxide is

removed from the atmosphere and retained for some

period in a carbon reservoir (e.g., trees).

Stratosphere: The upper portion of the atmosphere,

between 11 and 50 km above the surface of the Earth;

in contrast to the troposphere, temperatures change

little with changing altitude, clouds are rare, and

convection is minimal. The stratosphere also holds

relatively higher concentrations of ozone, resulting in

what is known as the ‘‘ozone layer’

Sustainable: A term used to characterize human activities

that can be undertaken in such a manner as to not

adversely affect the environmental conditions (e.g.,

soil, water quality, climate) necessary to support those

same activities in the future.

Temperate: Relating to the region between the tropics

and the polar circles (between 23.5° and 66.5 O) in both

hemispheres.

Trace gas: Atmospheric gases that exist in relatively

small or ‘ ‘trace’ concentrations.

Tropical: Relating to the region between the Tropic of

Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn (23.5o North and

23.5o South, respectively).

Troposphere: The portion of the atmosphere which

extends outward from the Earth’s surface to about 16

km, directly below the stratosphere; temperatures

generally decrease rapidly with altitude, clouds form,

and convection is active.

Ultraviolet radiation: Radiation with wavelengths roughly

between 200 and 400 nanometers; these wavelengths

are shorter than those of visible light and longer than

those of X-rays.

Watt (W): A common unit used in measuring power (i.e.,

as the flow of energy overtime), equivalent to 3.41 Btu

per hour. Where an ‘‘e’ follows the unit (as in kWe or

MWe), the watt is in the form of electrical energy.

Where a ‘‘t” follows the unit (as in kWt or MWt), the

watt is in the form of thermal energy,
Appendix D

Reviewers and Contributors

Five separate Advisory Panels are listed at the front of the report. The 106 members of the Advisory Panels participated

in the workshops listed below and reviewed drafts of the relevant chapters.

Energy Use in Buildings and Greenhouse Gas Emissions

March 29, 1989

William U. Chandler, Chairman

Workshop on Innovation in the U.S. Construction Industry

March 30, 1989

Henry Kelly, Chairman

Energy Use in Transportation and Greenhouse Gas Emissions

April 6, 1989

William U. Chandler, Chairman

Energy Use in Industry

May 11, 1989

William U, Chandler, Chairman

Energy Supply and Greenhouse Gas Emissions

May 16, 1989

William U. Chandler, Chairman

The U. S., Developing Countries, and Global Warming

September 13, 1989

Michael Greene, Chairman

Additionally, we had special review groups for the forestry and food chapters (listed below). Finally, many other people

contributed information and/or participated in several layers of external review over the past 2 years.

H. Akbari

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

Samuel Baldwin

Office of Technology Assessment

Scott Berg

American Forest Council

Clark Binkley

Yale University

Richard Birdsey

U.S. Forest Service

Daniel Botkin

University of California, Santa Barbara

Sandra Brown

University of Illinois

Stephanie Caswell

U.S. Department of State

Paul Cough

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Janet Cushman

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

John Ewel

University of Florida

Forest Review Group

Philip M. Fearnside

National Institute for Research

in the Amazon (INPA)

Brazil

Jerry Franklin

University of Washington

Jane Freeman

National Association of State Foresters

B.C,Y. Freezailah

International Tropical Timber

Organization

Carl Gallegos

U.S. Agency for International

Development

Ross Gorte

Office of Technology Assessment

Judy Gradwohl

Smithsonian Institution

Dwight Hair

American Forest~ Association

David Harcharik

U.S. Forest Service

Gary Hartshorn

World Wildlife Fund

–337-

Kate Heaton

Bruce Co.

Alison Hess

Office of Technology Assessment

Colin High

Dartmouth College

R.A. Houghton

Woods Hole Research Center

Twig Johnson

U.S. Agency for International

Development

Agnes Kiss

World Bank

John Michael Kramer

International Resource Group

Jean-Paul Lanly

U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization

Gerald Leach

Stockholm Environment Institute

Ariel Lugo

Institute of Tropical Forestry

Edward MacDonald

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
338 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Gregg Marland

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Gary A. Moll

American Forestry Association

Robert Moulton

U.S. Forest Service

Norman Myers

Oxford University

Phil O’Keefe

ETC (UK)

Keith Openshaw

World Bank

Walter E. Parham

Office of Technology Assessment

John Potter

Consultant

David C. Rinebolt

National Wood Energy Association

Frank Baker

Winrock International Institute for

Agricultural Development

Janet Brown

World Resources Institute

Lauretta Burke

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Michael DOW

National Academy of Sciences

Patricia Durana

Office of Technology Assessment

James Dyer

Rocky Mountain Institute

Debbie Fesser

National Corn Growers Association

Kirk Gadzia

Center for Holistic Resource Management

Earle Gavett

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Peter Groffman

University of Rhode Island

Thurman Grove

U.S. Agency for International

Development

Rick Adcock

Tufts University

Daniel Albritton

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Bruce Ross

International Resource Group

R. Neil Sampson

American Forestry Association

Jeff Schweitzer

U.S. Agency for International

Development

Roger Sedjo

Resources for the Future

Susan Shen

World Bank

P. Gregory Smith

Society of American Foresters

William Sommers

U.S. Forest Service

Benjamin stout

National Council of the Paper Industry for

Air and Stream Improvement, Inc.

Food Review Group

Kathleen Hartnett

National Cattlemen’s Association

Roland Hauck

Tennessee Valley Authority

National Fertilizer Development and

Environmental Research Center

Brian Holmes

University of Wisconsin

Gordon Hutchinson

USDA Agricultural Research Service

Donald Johnson

Colorado State University

Donald Kaufman

USDA Agricultural Research Service

Clyde Kiker

University of Florida

Elaine Matthews

Goddard Institute for Space Studies

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

John Nickel

Centro Internacional de Agricultural

Tropical

Colombia

Other Reviewers and Contributors

John Alic

Office of Technology Assessment

Ken Andrasko

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Tim Sullivan

Smithsonian International Center

Mark Trexler

World Resources Institute

Christopher Uhl

Pennsylvania State University

R.I. Van Hook

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Noel Vietmeyer

National Academy of Sciences

Jack Winjum

U.S. Environmental Protection Ageney

Calvin Parnell

Texas A&M University

David Pimentel

Cornell University

Norman Rosenberg

Resources for the Future

Philip Rutter

Badgersett Research Farm

Richard Straub

University of Wisconsin

Henry Tyrrell

USDA Ruminant Nutrition Lab

Richard Wiles

National Research Council

Richard Wheeler

Rodale Institute

Garth Youngberg

Institute for Alternative Agriculture

Jim Angell

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Bradford Ashton

Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories
Appendix D---Reviewers and Contributors 339

Adela Backiel

Congressional Research Service

Tim Barnett

University of California, San Diego

David W. Barns

Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Larry Bean

Iowa Department of Natural Resources

Richard Benedict

Conservation Foundation

Fred Bernthal

National Science Foundation

Peter Blair

Office of Technology Assessment

Stewart Boyle

Association for the Conservation

of Energy, U.K.

Richard Bradley

U.S. Department of Energy

Marilyn Brown

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Rodolfo Bulatao

World Bank

Sharon Burke

Office of Technology Assessment

Greg Buzicky

Minnesota Department of Agriculture

Sharon Camp

Population Crisis Committee

Ray Cantrell

Bureau of Mines

U.S. Department of the Interior

Robert Cess

State University of New York

at Stony Brook

Bill Clark

Howard University

Melvin Conant

Melvin Conant & Associates, Ltd.

Kenneth A. Cook

Center For Resource Economics

Ruth Caron Cooper

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

Alan Crane

Office of Technology Assessment

Ann Cronin-Cossette

Embassy of Canada

Charlie Curtis

Van Ness, Feldman, Curtis and Levenberg

Nancy Deller

California Energy Commission

Mark DeLuchi

Princeton University

Denis Dewez

Embassy of Belgium

Henry Diaz

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Roger Dower

World Resources Institute

Alford Drinkwater

Arkansas Industrial Development

Commission

V. Duleep

Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc.

Joy Dunkerley

Office of Technology Assessment

Jim Durana

EOSAT

Gautum Dutt

Princeton University

Jae Edmonds

Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Michael Faser

Oxford University

Jay Fein

National Science Foundation

Tom Foley

Northwest Power Planning Council

Doug Foy

Conservation Law Foundation

Robert Fri

Resources for the Future

Ken Friedman

U.S. Department of Energy

R.M. Fujita

Environmental Defense Fund

Inez Fung

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

John Garber

National Geographic

E. Norbert Garrett

Central Intelligence Agency

Clark W. Gellings

Electric Power Research Institute

Michael Gibbs

ICF Consulting Associates

Lev Ginzburg

Applied Biomathematics

Thomas Gleason

International District Heating and

Cooling Association

Peter H. Gleick

Pacific Institute for Studies in

Development, Environment, and

Security

Ronnie L. Goldberg

U.S. Council for International Business

Marshall Goldman

Harvard University

Norman Gomm

Embassy of Australia

Thomas O. Gray

Council for Renewable Energy Education

Eric Green

American Council on U.S.-Soviet

Relations

David L. Greene

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Paul Gromer

Massachusetts Division of Energy

Resources

Daniel Guttman

Spiegel & McDiarmid

David Hafemeister

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

Jeff Harris

U.S. Department of Energy

John Harte

Congressional Research Service

Barbara Harwood

Consultant

Carl Haub

Population Reference Bureau

Alan Hecht

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Susanna Hecht

University of California, Los Angeles

Karl Hellman

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Ed Hewett

The Brookings Institution

George Hidy

Electric Power Research Institute

Richard Hilt

Gas Research Institute

Eric Hirst

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

John Hoffman

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Sverker Hogberg

Embassy of Sweden

Paul Holtberg

Gas Research Institute

Mary Horn

World Bank

Ron Hughes

Energy Rated Homes of America

Peter Hunt

Peter Hunt Associates
340 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Edward Hutabarat

Embassy of Endonesia

Peter Impara

International Resources Group

Wes Jackson

The Land Institute

Barbara Jancar

State University of New York, Brockport

Kempton Jenkins

ARMCO

Roger Jennings

British Embassy

Skip Johns

Office of Technology Assessment

Eric Johnson

Georgetown University

Dennis Johnson

Tropical Research and Development, Inc.

Evy Jordan

Embassy of Denmark

John Justus

Congressional Research Service

Tom Karl

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Maurice Kaya

Hawaii Department of Planning and

Economic Development

Michelle L. Keene

Tufts University

Bill Keepin

Consultant

Dale Kellogg

University Corporation for Atmospheric

Research

William J. Kelly

Battelle Columbus Laboratory

Greta Kieman

New Jersey Board of Public Utilities

Andreas Klassen

Embassy of the Federal Republic

of Germany

Pat Koshel

U.S. Agency for International

Development

Paul Komor

Office of Technology Assessment

Jon Kramer

University of Maryland

John Kutzbach

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Karen Larsen

Office of Technology Assessment

Richard Lawson

National Coal Association

Marc Ledbetter

American Council for an Energy-Efficient

Economy

Henry Lee

Cambridge University

Henry R. Linden

Gas Research Institute

Ronnie D. Lipschutz

Pacific Institute for Studies in

Development, Environment, and

Security

Phil Liu

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Manuel Lorenzo

Embassy of Spain

J.E. Loveland

University of Washington

Nancy Lubin

Carnegie-Mellon University

James MacNeill

Institute for Research on Public Policy

John Martin

Moss Landing Marine Laboratories

Roger McKeska

National Cattlemen’s Association

Jim McMahon

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

A. Meier

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

Jerry Meehl

National Center for Atmospheric Research

Bert Metz

Embassy of the Netherlands

Steve Meyers

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Russell Mittermeier

Conservation International

David Montgomery

Congressional Budget Office

William Moomaw

Tufts University

Mary Lou Muntz

Wisconsin Public Service Commission

Roger Naill

Applied Energy Services, Inc.

Shinkichi Nakamura

Toyota Motors

John Newman

Office of Technology Assessment

Flo Ormond

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Erik Ovesen

Embassy of Denmark

Edith Page

Office of Technology Assessment

Garth W. Paltridge

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

S. Parker

Vermont Public Service Department

Bruce Pasternak

Booz Allen

Ralph Perhac

Electric Power Research Institute

Loretta Platt

Massachusetts Division of Energy

Resources

Steve Plotkin

Office of Technology Assessment

Philip R. Pryde

San Diego State University

Dave Publicover

Yale University

Lucio Reca

Enter-American Development Bank

Bill Rice

Center for Policy Alternatives

Lisa Ritter

National Geographic

Joseph Riva

Congressional Research Service

Walter Orr Roberts

University Corporation for Atmospheric

Research

Elizabeth Sparrow Robertson

Georgia Office of Energy Resources

Sherwood Rowland

University of California, Irvine

Chet Ropelewski

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

John Ross

Debt-for-Development Coalition

Dick Rowberg

Congressional Research Service

Regine Roy

Commission of the European

Communities

Robin Roy

Office of Technology Assessment

Nafis Sadik

United Nations Fund for Population

Activities

Sam Sadler

Oregon Department of Energy

Pedro Sanchez

North Carolina State University
Appendix D-Reviewers and Contributors ● 341

Roger Sant

Applied Energy Systems

J.L. Sarmiento

Princeton University

Maxine Savitz

Garrett Engineering Corp.

Gerson Scher

National Science Foundation

Lee Schipper

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

Michael Schlesinger

University of Illinois at

Urbana-Champaign

Steve Schneider

National Center for Atmospheric Research

Tom Secrest

Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Joanne Seder

Office of Technology Assessment

Stephen Seidel

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Eileen Shea

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Ed Sheets

Northwest Power Planning Council

Yasuhiro Shimizu

Embassy of Japan

Christine Shirley

Pacific Institute for Studies in

Development, Environment, and

Security

Marshall Shulman

Columbia University

Scott Sklar

U.S, Export Council for Renewable

Energy

John E. Smith

New York State Energy Office

Peter Smith

New York State Energy Office

Ralph Smuckler

Michigan State University

Robert Socolow

Princeton University

Bruce Strain

Enron Corp.

Joel Swisher

Stanford University

David Tarbell

International Economics and Energy

Affairs

The Pentagon

David Taylor

Embassy of New Zealand

Helene Kirwan-Taylor

Office of Technology Assessment

Dennis Tirpak

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Barbara Torrey

Bureau of the Census

Jim Tripp

Consultant

Comptom Tucker

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Malcolm Verdict

State of Texas Governor’s Energy

Management Center

Peter Vitousek

Stanford University

C. Waeterloos

Directorate-General for Energy

Commission of the European

Communities

Thomas F. Walton

General Motors Corp.

Thomas Waltz

World Bank

Robert Watson

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Rich Weaver

American Public Transit Association

Carolyn West

Connecticut Office of Policy and

Management

Bill Westermeyer

Office of Technology Assessment

Leif Westgaard

Embassy of Norway

Don Wichert

Wisconsin Division of Energy and

Intergovernmental Relations

Jonathan Wiener

U.S. Department of Justice

Jack W. Wilkinson

Sun Company Inc.

Richard S. Williams, Jr.

U.S. Geological Survey

Robert Winterbottom

International Institute for Environment

and Development

George M. Woodwell

Woods Hole Research Center

Mark Worwick

Oregon Energy Commission

Oskar Zaborsky

National Research Council

Lynn Zane

Hawaii Department of Planning and

Economic Development
Index
Index

acid rain: 7

afforesbtion: see tree planting

African Development Bank: 39, 283, 292, 293

African Development Foundation: 39,287, 293

Agency for International Development

bilateral aid: 34, 35, 37-40, 87,202,229-231,244, 264, 265,

279-282, 284, 286, 287, 289-293

congressional directives: 34, 39, 229, 274, 281, 282, 292

energy-related projects: 34,35,38,39,281,282, 284,291,292

“key” countries: 39, 282

natural resources projects: 34, 38, 229-232, 282

OffIce of Energy: 39

Agricultural Conservation Program: 28, 225-227

Agricultural Research Service: 262

Agriculturtil Stabilization and Conservation Service: 28, 35,

201, 223, 225, 226

agriculture: see crops, commodity support, food, forests

agroforestry: 201, 202, 216-219, 230, 231, 257, 290

air-conditioning: 3, 17, 33, 61,63, 116-121, 124, 126, 127, 131,

134, 151, 215, 288, 318, 328

Air Quality Management Plan: 169-171, 329

albedo: 215

aIuminum: .ree primary metals

American Society of Heating,

Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Engineers: 140

America the Beautiful Program: 29, 30, 227

Antarctica, Antarctic Ocean: 52,53, 58, 65,72,73

appliances: 8, 107, 116-119, 121, 124, 125, 128, 130, 132-136,

138-142, 302, 314, 315, 318, 323, 324, 330

also see regulations

Applied Energy Services: 218

Asian Development Bank: 36, 283

audits, energy: 14, 17, 20, 25, 107, 141, 192, 195, 196

Australia: 7,81, 82, 150, 300, 304, 305

automobiles and trucks

also see fuels, transportation, transportation

control measures

Cooperative Automotive Research Program: 171

Eastern Europe: 150, 154

electric vehicles: 159, 160, 164, 171-172

emissions: 8, 149, 157, 158, 162-164, 314

energy use: 20, 150, 154-157

fuel economy standards: 22, 149, 165-167, 305, 327

fuel efficiency: 11, 17, 21, 149, 153, 154, 157-166,301,318,

319, 324,327, 329

fuel prices: 149, 159, 160, 165, 166

GM Guzzler Tax: 167

hydrogen vehicles: 160, 172

manufacturers’ incentives: 167, 168

O&M: 157, 161, 162, 168,318, 324

ownership patterns: 150, 152-154

rebates: 149, 165-167

safety: 159, 171

size: 21, 149, 157, 159, 161, 162, 166, 167, 319, 324

speed limits: 160-162, 168, 320, 324

U. S. S. R.: 150, 154

vehicle miles travelled: 149, 150, 157, 158, 161-163, 165,

168-170, 324

best management practices: 31, 264, 265, 330

bicycles: 160, 161, 163, 168

biodiversity: 38,201,204-206,212,213, 217,221,225,253,291

biomass burning

agriculture: 85, 246-248, 250-253, 262

cooking: 38, 85, 86, 127, 128, 250-255, 260

forests: 60,86, 203, 204,248, 250

biomass energy: 13, 77,78, 80,85-89,97,99, 109, 126, 227,

273,287-289,321, 325

competitiveness: 28, 86, 103, 201, 202, 214, 227, 325

crops for energy: 27, 28, 85, 86, 89, 201, 202, 206, 214, 215,

227, 319, 325

emissions: 38, 79, 85, 214, 215, 319

in manufacturing: 182, 188, 190

traditional fuels: 38,85,86, 127-129,248, 253,260,274,288

Bonneville Power Authority: 26, 107

Brazil: 33,39,68, 78,80, 87, 89,91, 152, 153, 156, 221,223,

228, 274,275, 278, 287-289

brominated compounds: 61,62,64

buildings

also see heating, insulation, lighting, shells, windows

Building Energy Performance Standards: 19, 144

CFCS: 115, 119, 126, 127

codes: 14, 16, 19, 115, 119, 120, 124, 135, 137, 139, 140, 330

cogeneration: 126, 131-134, 138, 318, 324

commercial: 115, 118, 122, 128, 131-134, 318, 319, 323-324

cooking: 116, 124, 127, 128

developing countries: 127, 128

Eastern Europe: 119, 121, 295

emissions: 7, 8, 58, 115-117, 129-133, 314, 317-319

energy efficiency: 11, 17, 90, 119-134, 137, 323, 324, 330

energy management systems: 119, 124, 125

energy use: 115-133, 135, 140, 274, 300, 301, 313

home energy rating systems: 140, 141

mortgage incentives: 141

policies: 134-142

R&D: 20, 125, 133, 135, 142

residential: 115-118, 122, 128-130, 132-134, 301, 318, 323,

327

retrofitting: 118-120, 130-134, 136, 330

“smart’ homes: 124, 125

U. S. S. R.: 119, 121,295

Bureau of Land Management: 28, 209, 212,225

buses: 150, 156, 161, 169, 170, 320

California Energy Commission: 330

Canada: 7,33,81-83,87,117, 150,153,156, 165,187,204,275,

279, 297, 300,301, 304,305

carbon: see carbon dioxide emissions, taxes; individual fuels,

sectors, countries

cycle: 201, 203, 204

carbon dioxide, atmospheric

concentrations: 45, 54, 56, 58

contribution to radiative forcing: 54-57

doubling of: 49,50,52

global warming potential: 3,55, 56

ice core measurements: 56, 57

lifetime in atmosphere: 55, 58

Mauna Loa record: 56,58

–345–
346 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

stabilization of atmospheric concentrations: 46, 58

carbon dioxide emissions: 341, 56-58, 80, 92-110, 116, 117,

129-133,149,151, 155-1(X, 171,177, 181-195,201-223,

273, 274, 313-320

also see biomass burning, defonstation, emissions;

individual sectors, countries

carbon dioxide sinks: 58, 72, 73, 250

also see emissions (forestry offsets), forestry

carbon sequestration: see emissions (forestry offsets), forestry

carbon tetrachloride: 62, 65, 68

cattle: see livestock, tropical forests

cement manufacturing: 57, 177, 181

centrally -plarmed economies: see China, Eastern Europe,

U.S.S.R.

CFCS: see chlorofluorocarbons

chemical industry

cogeneration: 181, 183

efficiency: 183, 189

energy use, emissions: 179-183, 314

waste heat recovery: 183

Chemical Manufacturers Association: 63, 127, 252

China: 5,33,39,58,68,78,80-82, 84-87,91,128,150,152, 153,

204,219,247,249,252, 253,255,260,261,273-278, 281,

287-289, 292, 299

chlorocarbons: 67

chlorofluorocarbons: 3-5, 30, 61-68, 194, 282, 286, 316

aiso see Montreal Protocol, ozone

air-conditioning: 61, 63, 126, 127, 150, 151, 328

atmospheric concentrations: 45, 46, 48, 53, 54, 61-63

consumption: 67, 68, 127, 177, 251, 252

emissions: 115, 119, 126, 127, 150, 151, 177

global W arming potential: 55,56, 62,290

insulation: 3, 61, 63, 64, 126, 127, 151, 259

in transportation: 150, 151

lifetimes: 55, 61, 62, 66

other uses: 3, 252

ozone depletion potential: 62-6I6, 290

radiative forcing: 54-56, 64

recycling: 127, 151, 259, 327, 328

refrigeration: 61, 63, 126, 127, ‘243, 245, 251, 252, 259, 260,

264

State initiatives: 327-329

substitutes: 162, 259, 286, 290, 291

Clean Air Act Amendments: 3, 16, 316

clean coal technologies: 299

climate and climate change: 3, 45-68

also see individual gases

albedo: 215

“benchmark’ warrning: 49

clouds: 46, 48-50, 52, 65, 240

equilibrium warming: 48,49, 5;!-55, 57, 64

factors driving: 46,47,49

feedback processes: 48-53,58, 60

general circulation models: 45,46,49-52,224

g~enhouse effect: 3,45-53

historical trends: 47,50,51, 56

ice ages: 47

natural variability: 46-48, 50-53

precipitation: 45,47,52

predicted changes: 45,46,49,50,224

radiative forcing (heat trapping): 4, 48-57

role of oceans: 45-53, 58, 60, 61, 72, 73

sea level: 46, 53, 282

seasonality: 47, 57, 58

snow and ice: 46-49, 52

solar radiation: 46-48, 51, 52, 65

temperature: 45-53, 57

volcanoes: 47, 51

climate convention/protocol: 34, 279

clouds: 46, 48-50, 52, 65, 240

COZ: see carbon dioxide

coal

also see electricity (generation)

carbon content: 8, 79, 84, 333

carbon emissions: 8, 57, 58, 77, 79, 81, 86, 92-94, 97, 108

consumption: 7,8, 77,78,81,82,93, 115, 127,287,295,321

efficiency of use: 178, 179

methane emissions: 80, 81, 84, 106, 246

production: 82, 183

reserves: 81, 82

trade: 81, 82

USC in industry: 183, 188, 190

cogeneration: 11, 12, 17, 23, 25, 88, 104, 126, 131-134, 138,

180-182,184,189-192, 196,260,289,305,318-320, 324,

325

combined-cycle turbines: 26, 92, 93, 95, 108, 109, 323

commercial buildings: see buildings

commercial timberland: 28, 29, 208-210, 212, 213, 223

Commission of European Communities: 229,302

Committee on Renewable Energy Commerce and Trade: 34,35,

37,281,285,286,292,296, 299

COIIllTIOdity SUppOl_t: 31, 227, 262-265

Congressional Budget Office: 11,24, 103, 104, 195,322

Conservation Compliance Program: 263

Conservation Rese-me l%ogr~: 11,27-30, 201,202,206,211,

213,214,216,225,227, 319,325

Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research: 36,

38,231,262,264, 265,294

conversion factors: 332

cooking: 116, 127, 128, 220

cookstoves: 217, 220, 260

Cooperative Automotive Research Program: 23, 171

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere: 230

Cooperative Forest Assistance kt: 225

Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls: 37,

286, 298,299

Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency: 166

costs of reducing emissions

OTA estimates: 9-12, 102, 133, 134, 163, 164, 191, 192,208,

212, 213,215,216, 320-325

other estimates: 11-12, 24, 103, 104, 195, 322

crops

also see commodity support, food

annual vs. perennial: 257, 258

chying: 260,261

for energy: 27,28, 85,86,89,201, 202,206,214,215,227,

319,325

yields: 243, 244,250, 253, 256-258, 263

Customs and Trade Act: 227

Czechoslovakia: 33,78,82,83,187,275, 294,295,297,299,300

dam construction: 228

debt: 32,38,202,228,230,275, 280,287,291,299

debt-for-nature swaps: 230

effect on natural resource policies: 32, 202, 228, 275
Index ● 347

deforestation

COZ emissions: 32, 57, 201, 202, 205, 274, 275

government policies: 32, 38, 202,216, 228, 275, 290, 291

reasons: 32, 38, 202, 216, 220, 221, 228, 275, 287, 291

temperate zone: 32, 201, 204, 246, 275

tl_OpiCd: .32, 38, 201, 202, 205, 216, 220, 221, 228, 243-245,

275, 287, 290, 291

demand-side management: 18, 24, 107, 115, 137, 138, 194

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: 18, 138

Nofiwest Power Plaming Commission: 18, 107, 138

State policies: 18, 137, 138

utility programs: 18, 24, 107, 137, 138, 141, 194

denitrification: ,$ee nitrogen cycle

Denmark: 7, 78, 82, 276, 300, 302, 305

Department of Agriculture: 34, 35, 282

Agricultural Conservation Program: 28, 225-227

Agricultural Re,search Service: 262

Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service: 28, 35,

201, 223, 225, 226

commodity support programs: 31, 227, 262-265

Conservation Compliance Program: 263

Consemation Reserve Program: 11, 27-30, 201,202,206,

211, 213, 214, 216, 225, 227,319, 325

environmental mission: 263

Forestry Incentives Program: 28, 225-227

Forest Semice: see U.S. Forest Service

bw Input/Sustainable Agriculture Program: 265

Soil Conservation Service: 31, 263-265

Department of Commerce: 34, 35, 280-282, 285, 286, 299

Department of Energy: 10, 20, 25, 27,34,35,86, 95, 107, 108,

110, 135, 138, 140, 184, 281, 292, 299, 328

biomass energy: 28, 30, 86, 201, 214, 215, 227

COREC?T: 34, 35, 37,281, 285,286,292, 296,299

Energy Analysis and Diagnostic Center: 25, 192, 196

energy audits: 192, 196

energy efficiency centers: 37

Energy Extension Service: 20, 137, 142, 328

Energy Information Administration: 10, 12, 149, 313, 314

Federal Energy Management Program: 20, 135, 142

Institutional Conservation Program: 19, 136, 137, 328

hast Cost Utility Plaming Program: 138

Office of Industrial Programs: 25, 192, 196

State Energy Conservation Program: 20, 137, 328

Weatherization Assistance Program: 19, 137, 328

Department of Health and Human Services: 137

Department of Housing and Urban Development 19, 20, 137,

140-142

Department of State: 34, 35, 38,282

Department of Transportation: 23, 171

Department of Treasury: 34, 35, 39, 229, 280, 282, 293

developing countries:

also see deforestation, livestock, population, tropical forests;

individual sectors, fuels

agriculture: 38, 243-245, 247-250, 253, 255-258, 260, 262,

264

buildings: 115, 116, 127, 128

CFCS: 288

development needs: 31-34, 81, 128, 202,230,287

electrification: 32, 33, 116, 128, 275, 281, 287, 289

energy policies: 38, 39, 289-292

energy use: 7, 31-33, 78, 81, 84-86, 106, 115, 127, 128, 202,

273-275, 287, 288

forestry policies: 38, 202, 216,228-232

infrastructure: 32, 33, 287

institutional capacities: 37, 230-232, 290, 291

Montreal Protocol: 67, 68, 252, 274

natural resource policies: 32, 38, 202, 216, 228-232, 291

population growth: 31-33, 39,40, 274-278, 293-294

refrigerators: 128, 252, 253, 264

transportation: 150, 152, 153

development assistance

multilateral: 36, 38, 39, 219, 279, 283, 291, 292

percentage of Gross National Product: 34, 281

U.S. bilateral: 34,35,37-40,87,202,229-23 1,244,264,265,

279, 281,282

diesel fuel: 154

doubling time: see carbon dioxide

Eastern Europe

emissions: 5, 273, 274, 295

energy efficiency efforts: 121, 187, 284

energy use: 32, 94, 121, 154, 187, 273-276, 282, 294, 295

environmental problems: 33, 294, 298

institutional constraints: 33, 37, 39, 273, 294, 296, 297, 299

joint ventures: 37, 294,295, 297,299, 300

trade: 34, 37, 281, 286, 295-300

education programs: see information

efficiency, energy: see individual end-uses and sectors

electricity

also see cogeneration, demand-side management; individual

fuels, technologies, and countries

capacity: 80, 87, 90, 96, 98-100, 289

developing countries: 32, 33, 80, 90,91, 94, 116, 127, 128,

275,281,287,289

efficiency of use: 92-96, 178, 179, 184-186, 320, 322, 328,

329

electrification: 32, 33, 80, 116, 117, 118, 128, 275, 281, 287,

289

emissions: 25, 26, 57, 80, 92-94, 96-110, 129, 317

energy sources: 79, 80, 87, 90, 92-94

production technologies: 92-94, 96-99, 115, 190, 289, 323

transmission and distribution losses: 84,92,94, 106, 177,281,

289

use: 115, 116, 177-184, 188, 321

utilities: 7, 18, 23-27, 99, 106-110, 115, 132, 135, 137, 138,

141, 194,218, 319, 320, 327-330

Electric Power Research Institute: 11, 90, 103-105, 107, 322,

323, 325

electrolysis: 177, 178, 181, 183

efissions, current and historic: 3-8, 25, 56-58, 77-80, $)2-94,

115-116, 159, 201-205, 243, 253, 273-275, 295, 296,

313-315

also see individual sectors and countries

emissions, projected: 4-7, 149, 295, 296, 301, 302

fores~ offsets: 5,9, 11,27-30,202,206,208-211, 213,223,

316, 319,320

OTA model: 4-6,8-11, 17, 18,21,23-28,94-102, 117,

129-133, 160-163, 188-191, 315-320

Endangered Species Act: 212

energy use: 3,7,8,20, 77, 115-127, 150, 154-157, 177-185, 194,

195, 201,273-275, 294-296,300, 301, 313, 314

also see emissions; individual countries, fuels, sectors,

technologies

efficiency centers: 37, 286, 299, 300

intensity: 117, 178-184, 189-191, 193, 301
348 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

management systems: 118, 185

per-capita: 3,31-33, 115, 11’7, 127,274, 275,287,295

prices: 6, 10, 12, 21,81, 102-104, 108, 109, 129, 136, 149,

160,165,166,178,179, 183,195,301,313,320-324, 325

rating systems: 140, 141

research needs: 105, 106, 109, 110

supply: 77-110

taxes: see taxes

Energy Analysis and Diagnostic Center: 25, 192, 196

Energy Extension Se~ice: 20, 137, 142, 328

Energy Information Administration: 10, 12, 149, 313,314

energy investment tax credit: 25, 195

Energy Sector Management Assistance Program: 38, 283, 291,

292

Energy Tax Act: 22,25, 167

environmental assessments: 36, 38, 228-230, 283, 291

Environmental Protection Agency: 4,5, 11,34, 35,50,59,65,

67, 104,232,280-282, 2’?2, 299,300,322

emissions projections: 246, 314, 301, 322

energy efficiency centers: 37, 286, 299

ethanol: 89, 159, 160, 164, 261

Europe: see Eastern Europe, European Community, OECD

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: 300

European Community: 301-303

emission projections: 301, 302

greenhouse gas policies: 302

European Economic Commissicln: 284

Export Administration Act: 37, ‘286, 298, 299

Export Control Act: 298

Export Facilitation Act: 299

Export-Import Bank (Eximbank): 34,35,37,280,281,285, 286,

296, 299,300

exports: see trade

extractive reserves: 221

family pl arming: 38-40,202, 22;3, 230, 277, 282, 293, 294

also see population

Farm Bill: see Food Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act

farms: see crops, fodd

Federal Energy Management Program: 20, 135, 142

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: 18, 27, 108, 138

Federal Highway Administration: 156, 158

Federal Home ban Mortgage Corporation: 141

Federal Housing Administration 141

Federal National Mortgage Association: 141

feedback, climate: 48-53, 58,60

feedstocks, fossil fuel: 8, 86, 181, 183, 314

fertilization

also see crops, fertilizers, foocl

COZ fertilization of plants: 58., 224

fertilizing oceans with iron: 58,72, 73

fertilizers: 3, 244-246,248-251

also see commodity support, crops, nitrogen cycle, nitrous

oxide

application: 31, 60, 207, 249, ~250, 256-258, 263, 330

consumption: 245, 256, 265

forest management: 207, 211,212, 214, 225

manufacturing: 30,31,207,214,243,250, 251,260,262,270

Minnesota Nitrogen Fertilizer Task Force: 330

nitrogen: 245, 246, 248, 249, ;!56, 257

financial mechanisms

bundling: 39, 293

incentives: 7, 13-16, 19, 20, 103, 104, 107, 149, 165-167, 194,

195, 201

madcetable permits: 13, 14, 16, 24, 26, 103, 104, 108, 109,

193, 194

taxes: see taxes

tied-aid financing: 37, 281, 286

fires: 204,248

also see biomass

fluidized bed combustion: 92, 97

fluorescent bulbs: 17, 18, 119, 121, 130, 186,319

food (and agriculture)

also see crops, Department of Agriculture, fertilizers,

livestoek, methane, rice

CFCS: 30, 243,245, 251, 252, 259-261

COIllIllOdity SUppOrt: 31, 262-265

consumption: 244, 245, 259

cooking: 30, 243-245, 250-254, 260, 270

developing countries: 38, 243-245, 247-250, 253,255-258,

260, 262,264

emissions: 30, 38, 243-253

energy use: 181, 243, 244, 246, 250-253, 259-261, 266, 270

ethanol fuels: 261

forest clearing for agriculture: 30, 243-245,250, 257

grains and subsidies: 245, 262,263

irrigation: 30, 107, 244, 245, 251, 256, 258, 261

land use changes: 30,243, 244,257,258, 265

machinery: 30, 243, 244, 250, 260, 261, 266

methane: 30, 38, 243, 245-249, 253-256

nitrous oxide: 30, 243, 248-250, 255, 261

post-harvest activities: 247-244,251-253, 270

processing and packaging: 244, 251-253, 259,260

production: 243-252,258, 270

research needs: 31, 247, 256-258, 262, 265

soil erosion: 201, 205, 243, 250, 253, 255, 258, 261

sustainable agricultu~: 38, 202, 244

tiilage practices: 253, 256, 258, 261

wastes flosses: 251, 253, 258, 259, 266

Food Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act: 28-30,226,

227, 243,263, 265

Food and Agriculture Organization: 36, 259,265

Food Security Act: 30, 214, 243, 263

Foreign Assistance Act: 39, 229,293

Foreign Credit Insurance Corp.: 286

Foreign Operations Appropriations Act: 34, 39, 274, 281,282,

285

Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act: 28,

212, 224

forestry: see forests

Forestry Incentives Program: 28,225-227

forests and forestry

also see deforestation, tree planting, tropical forests, U.S.

Forest Service

biomass energy: 11, 13,27,28,30

commercial timberland, U. S.: 28, 29, 208-210, 212, 213, 223

effects of climate change: 210, 223, 228

efficiency of end use: 211, 213

emissions, offsets: 5, 9, 11, 27-30, 201-223, 316, 319, 320

fires: 204, 224

increased productivity: 11, 13, 27-29,202,206-210,223, 319,

320, 325

log exports: 213, 227

‘‘new forestry’ 210, 213, 225

old-growth: 210-217
policies: 223, 225-232

restrictions on hamesting: 210-213

timber industry, U. S.: 209-213

fossil fuels: 81-86

see also coal, emissions, natural gas, petroleum, taxes

emissions: 3, 5-8, 56-58, 77-80, 86, 92-94

prices: see energy use (prices)

use: 177, 182, 188, 189, 250, 251, 270, 274, 275

France: 7,33,78,82,83,91, 117, 131, 153, 165,275,278,279,

297, 300, 301, 303, 304

freight travel: see travel

fuel cell: 26, 27, 92,93, 105, 109, 171

fuels

also see energy, ethanol, gasoline, methanol, renewable

energy

alternative fuels: 23, 89, 149, 159, 160, 164, 170, 261, 305,

327, 330

economy standards: 149, 165-167

traditional: 38, 85, 86, 127-129, 248, 253, 260

fuel switching: 11, 12, 17, 24, 77, 84, 92-94, 96-99, 104, 108,

119, 128,129,134,177, 189,191-194,260,261, 289,290,

305, 319, 325

fuelwood

contribution to deforestation: 220

cookstoves: 217, 220, 260

gasoline

mileage standards: 149, 166-167

prices: 6, 21, 149, 160, 165-167

tax: 165-167

Gas Research Institute: 10, 94,99, 105, 129, 190, 313, 314

gas turbine: 25, 92, 93, 103, 320

General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs: 22, 167, 299

general circulation models: 45,46,49-52, 224

geothermal power: 18,39, 77,80,87,97,105,138, 273,281,292

Germany: 7,33,68,78,82-84,91, 117, 153, 165,259,275,276,

278, 279,292, 294, 297, 300-305

Global Environmental Facility: 38, 291

Global Releaf Program: 228

global warming: see climate

global warming potential: see individual gases

grains: see food

Green Fund: 291, 293

greenhouse effect: 3,45-53

also see climate

greenhouse gases: 3,45-68

also see climate, emissions; individual gases

Gross Domestic Product: 152,245, 302

Gross National Product: 6, 10,11,31,34,35.103, 104, 178-180,

281, 291, 301, 313, 321

groundwater contamination: 7, 207, 243, 263

Group of v: 279, 301

Guanacaste National Park: 223

halons: 3, 45, 61, 62, 65, 66, 68, 126, 288, 328, 329

also see Montreal Protocol

fire extinguishers: 61, 127, 328

global Wdg potential: 62

ozone depletion potential: 62, 65

harvesting of timber: see forests

heating: 3, 17, 117, 118, 120-122, 124, 130, 131, 133, 138, 181,

185, 188, 192, 196, 323, 324

afso see space conditioning

heating, ventilation, air-conditioning equipment: 8, 11, 17, 19,

118, 122, 124, 130, 131, 133, 138, 139, 318, 329

heat island effect: 45, 50, 124, 215

heat pumps: 117, 130, 131

heat recovery: 25, 186, 196

High Occupancy Vehicle lanes: 22, 155, 168, 170, 329

Home Energy Rating Systems: 140, 141

Hood River Conservation Project: 142

Housing and Community Development Act: 137

hydrochlorofluorocarbons: 55,56,62-64,68, 127, 151, 290

global Warming potential: 55,56, 62-64, 290

ozone depletion potential: 62-64, 290

hydroelectric power: 7, 11, 13, 25, 39, 77, 78, 80, 87,97-100,

107, 109, 184, 287, 289,291, 295, 303, 319, 322

hydrofluorocarbons: 55, 56,63,64, 290

ice ages: 47

incandescent bulbs: see lighting

India: 33,39,68,78,80-82,86, 87,90,91,94,152, 153,222,245,

252, 260,261,274-276,278, 284, 287-289

Indonesia: 33,39,68,83,87, 153,221,222,232,274, 275,278,

286, 288

industry: see manufacturing

Industry Cooperative for Ozone Layer Protection: 286

information programs: 13-15, 17,20,25, 115, 135, 140-142,286,

302, 303,305, 327

audits: 14, 17, 20, 25, 107, 115, 141, 192, 195, 302, 303, 305

Home Energy Rating System: 20, 140, 141

labels: 14, 17, 141, 142, 302,303

Institutional Consewation Program: 19, 136, 137,328

insulation: 11, 17, 18, 61, 63, 118-121, 123, 127, 318, 327

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety: 159

integrated gasification combined cycle: 26,92,93, 95, 108, 323

Inter-American Development Bank: 36, 38, 39, 280, 283,291,

293

Inter-American Foundation: 39, 286,287,293

Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture: 262

intercity rail: 21, 161, 163, 164, 170, 320, 324

intercooled steam-injected gas turbines: 17, 92, 93, 189, 191,

325

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: 4, 5, 36,4547,

282-284, 298

findings: 45=47, 50,51, 53, 55,58,60, 61,66, 67, 249

structure, working groups: 36, 283, 284, 298

Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act: 28,30, 226,

227

Internal Revenue Semice: 230

International Board for Soil Research and Development: 262

International Council for Research in Agroforestry: 231, 262

International Council of Scientific Unions: 36, 284

International Development and Finance Act: 228, 230, 287

International Energy Agency: 284, 301, 302

International Environmental Bureau: 286

International Fertilizer Development Center: 262

International Fund for Agricultural Development: 36, 284

International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases: 264

International Livestock Centre for Africa: 264

International Monetary Fund: 283, 287, 300

international Planned Parenthood Federation: 40,230, 293,294

International Tropical Timber Organization: 36, 38, 203, 229,

231, 232, 284

ionophoms: 255, 262

irrigation: 30, 244, 245, 256, 258

energy use: 251
350 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

technologies to reduce: 261

Italy: 7,33,82,83,87, 117, 153,247,275,278,279, 297, 300,

301, 303,304

Jackson-Vanik Amendment: 2’98-300

Japan: 7,20,21, 23,25, 33, 3:;, 36,78,80-85,87, 91,97, 108,

117, 125, 150, 153, 156,213,227, 229, 247,275,278,

279, 292, 295, 297, 300, 301, 304, 305

joint ventures: see trade

labels: 232

kmdfiis: 59, 60, 86, 88, 211, ~!46, 253

land tenure, reform: 32, 38, 202, 216, 218, 228, 230, 275

land use changes: see deforesti~tion, urbanization

land-use plaming: 22, 155-157, 169-171, 265, 305

least-cost utility plaming: 137, 138, 194, 292,327,328

legumes: 218,249, 250, 257

Mecycle cost: 15, 17, 134, 136, 139, 159

lighting

also see regulations (appliance standards)

automatic controls: 119-121, 186

energy efficiency: 11, 17, 118-121, 124, 128, 131-134, 185,

186, 189-192, 196, 318

energy use, emissions: 3, 115-117, 119, 181, 185, 186, 314,

318, 319

fluorescent bulbs: 17, 18, 119, 121, 130, 186, 319

livestock: 31, 38,59,60, 220, 2!48, 261, 262, 287, 288

also see methane, tropical forests

and grain subsidies: 263

developing countries: 220,244,245,253,255, 256,264,287,

288

manure: 31, 243, 247, 255, 262

productivity enhancements: 31, 243, 244, 253, 264

reduced demand for: 31, 243, 255, 256, 264

ruminants: 31, 246, 247, 253

United States: 31, 245,255, ;!62, 263

loans, low-interest: 14-16,24, 194

logging: see deforestation, forests

b Angeles

Air Quality Management Plan: 169-171, 329

tdfiC: 157, 158, 168

Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program: 19, 137

magnetohydrodynarnics

manufacturing

automatic controls: 185, 186

boilers: 180, 181, 185, 189-192,325

CFCS: 177

cogeneration: 11, 17,23,25, 180-184, 189-192, 196,319,320,

325

Eastern Europe: 187,295

efficiency: 11, 177-192

electrolysis: 177, 178, 181, 183, 314

emissions: 7,8,58, 177, 181-184, 187-195,314,317,319, 320

energy in imports: 178-180, 193

energy use: 177-186, 188, 190-193, 274, 300, 313, 320

fuel switching: 11, 17, 177, 189, 191-194, 319, 325

heat recovery: 25, 186, 196

housekeeping: 11, 17, 185, 1819-192, 319, 325

intercooled steam-injected gas turbines: 17, 189, 191, 325

lighting: 181, 185, 186, 188-192, 196,319

major industries: see chemical, paper, petroleum, primary

metals

mechanical drive: 8, 181, 183, 185, 188, 192

motors: 11, 17, 23, 24, 186, 189-192, 194, 314, 319, 320, 325

policies: 192-196

process heat: 8, 180, 181, 183, 185, 188,314,325

product and process changes: 17,23, 186, 187,189-192,319

recycling: 182-186

research: 25, 185

“second-tier” industries: 179, 181, 185

space heat: 181, 185, 188, 192, 196

structural changes: 177, 178, 192, 301

U.S.S.R: 187,295, 2%

variable-speed drives: 186

manure: see livestock

marketable permits: 13, 14, 16, 24, 26, 103, 104, 108, 109, 193,

194

also see financial mechanisms

mass transit: 11, 17, 21, 22, 149, 155-157, 161, 163, 164, 169,

170, 318-320,324

Mauna Ima COZ record: 56, 58

methane

also see landfiis, livestock, natural gas

atmospheric concentrations: 45, 46, 54, 58-60

control methods: 31,86,88, 106,211,220,253-256, 262-264

emissions, sources: 3, 5, 30, 38,45, 48, 59, 60, 79, 80, 84-86,

88, 106,203,207,211,220, 243,245-249,253,282, 285,

287-289, 316

global W arming potential: 55,56

lifetime in atmosphere: 55,59

methane-hydrates: 60

radiative forcing: 54-56, 59

methanol: 89, 159, 160, 164

methyl chloroform: 62, 65, 68, 151

also see Montreal Protocol

Mexico: 33,39,68,82-84,87,91, 153,274,275,277,278, 288,

292

microorganisms: 203, 207, 248, 249

model, OTA

also see costs

Base case: 5,6, 8,9, 12, 17, 21, 22, 25, 26, 94-102, 117,

129-133, 160-163, 188-190, 313-320

basic structure: 10, 313

buildings: 129-134

energy supply: 94-102

manufacturing: 187-192

Moderate: 5,6,8-11, 17,21-25,94-102, 115, 117, 129-133,

160-163, 188-190, 313,315-320

Tough: 5,6,8-12, 17, 21-26,94-102, 115, 117, 129-134,

161-163, 188-191, 313, 315-320

transportation: 160-164

monoculture: 210, 263

Montreal Protocol: 3,5, 16,45, 64,66-68, 127, 151,252, 264,

274, 305,316

1990 revisions: 5,45,64,68

and Clean Air Act Amendments: 16, 68, 316

developing countries: 67, 68,252, 274

initial agreement: 67

Multilateral Fund: 68

Most Favored Nation: see trade

motors, electric: 23, 24, 107, 186, 189-192, 194, 314, 319, 320,

325

Multi-Agency Working Group for Power Sector Innovation:

284, 293

multilateral development banks: 35, 36, 38, 39, 228, 229, 280,

283
Index ● 351

African Development Bank: 36, 39, 283,292

Asian Development Bank: 36, 283

development assistance: 36, 38, 39,229,283, 291, 292

environmental assessments: 36, 38, 228, 229, 283, 291

Inter-American Development Bank: 36,38,39,280,282,291,

292

role in deforestation: 38, 228, 283

U.S. Executive Directors: 35, 228-230, 282,287,291, 296

World Bank: see World Bank

Multilateral Fund: 68

Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act: 28, 212, 225

municipal solid waste: 86, 88, 211, 329

methane from landfills: 88, 211, 253

paper recycling: 211

national accounting procedures: 230, 291

natural resource values: 291

U.N. Statistical Commission: 291

National Advisory Council for Environmental Policy and

Technology: 281

National Affordable Housing Act: 19,20, 140-142

National Appliance Energy Consemation Amendments: 19,

124, 125, 129, 138, 139

National Council of States Building Codes Standards: 139

National Energy Act: 195

National Energy Policy and Conservation Act: 141

National Forest Management Act: 28, 212, 225

National Forests: 28, 29, 208, 226

National Highway Trtilc Safety Administration: 159

National Housing Act: 19, 140

National Institute for Science and Technology: 139, 140

National Research Council: 72

National Science Foundation: 262

natural gas

afso see electricity (generation)

carbon content: 8, 79, 333

carbon emissions: 8, 77, 79, 84, 85, 92-94, 108

co-firing: 11, 25, 26,57,58, 93,94,97-99, 101, 102, 108, 319,

320, 323

consumption: 7, 8, 77, 78, 81, 83, 84, 93, 99, 115, 127, 159,

160, 179, 183, 185, 188, 190,289, 295, 321

efficiency of use: 85, 178, 179

methane emissions: 59, 80, 84, 85, 94, 104, 106, 159, 246,

281, 288, 289

productim: SO, 81, 83, 84, 181

reserves: 81, 83

trade: 81, 83, 84

transmission and distribution: 30, 45, 84, 94, 159

Natural Resources Defense Council: 226

Netherlands: 7, 33, 82, 83,95, 300, 302-304

New York Public Service Commission: 137

New Zealand: 7, 87, 300, 304,305

vitrification: see nitrogen cycle

nitrogen cycle: 248, 250, 256

also see fertilizers, food

denitrification: 248, 249, 256

legumes: 249, 250, 257

vitrification: 248, 249, 256

role of microorganisms: 60, 248, 249

nitrous oxide

afso see fertilizers, food

atmospheric concentrations: 45, 46, 54, 60

emissions, sources: 3, 5, 30, 31, 48, 60, 203, 207, 211, 212,

214,225,243,245,246, 249,250,256,257,261-263, 316

global warming potential: 55,56, 60

lifetime in atmosphere: 55, 61

vitrification inhibitors: 256, 257

radiative forcing: 54-56, 60

non-governmental organizations: 35, 37, 230-232, 280, 286,

287, 294

nontirnber products: 38, 201, 202, 204, 217, 220, 221, 231

Northwest Power Planning Commission: 18, 107, 138,323,330

Norway: 7, 35, 83, 300, 304, 305

nuclear power

electricity generation: 7, 11, 25,26, 77,78, 80,91,92,97,98,

100, 108, 109, 289

emissions: 80, 91

Europe: 91, 108

improved utilization: 25, 27, 97, 98, 100, 107, 108, 319, 320,

322

light water reactor: 13, 110

modular high temperature gas reactor: 109, 110

opposition: 13, 91, 295

proliferation: 91, 92,289

U. S. S. R.: 295

waste: 92, 105

Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 27, 108

Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 10, 25, 105, 160, 196, 313

oceans

effects on global climate: 45-53, 58, 60, 61, 72, 73

fertilization with iron: 58,72, 73

role in carbon cycle: 45, 58, 72, 73

OffIce of Industrial Programs: 25, 192, 196

Official Development Assistance: 35

see Agency for International Development, multilateral

development banks

offsets, carbon: see emissions, forestry

oil: see petroleum

old-growth forests: 214-217

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: 37,

152, 153, 187, 276, 284, 291

emissions: 5, 273, 274, 301, 302

energy efficiency programs: 117, 119, 302, 303

energy use: 32, 85, 115-118, 273-275, 287, 300, 301

European Community: 301-303

greenhouse gas policies: 7, 302-305

member countries: 115, 273, 300

OTA model: see costs, scenarios

Overseas Private Investment Corp.: 34,35,221,280,281,285,

291, 296,299, 300

Environmental Investment Fund: 285, 300

ozone, stratospheric

depletion: 3,4,7,48,61, 64-67, 127, 252

also see chlorofluorocarbons, halons, Montreal Protocol

ozone, tropospheric: 249

Pacitlc Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation

Act: 138

Pan-American Development Foundation: 231

paper industry

cogeneration: 181, 182

efficiency: 182, 189

energy use, emissions: 179, 182,315

recycling: 182, 183

parking: 11,22,149, 155, 156,160-162,164, 168-170,318,324,

329
352 ● Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

particulate: 115

passenger travel: see travel

permits: see marketable permits, regulations

petroleum

carbon content: 8, 79, 333

cogeneration: 181

consumption: 7, 15, 77,78,81,82,84,85, 115, 127,295,301,

321

efficiency of use: 85, 178, 179, 183, 189

emissions: 8, 57, 58, 77, 79, 80, 84

Petroleum Overcharge Fund: 136, 328-330

production: 15,81, 82,85, 183

refining industry: 179-183, 189, 314, 315

reserves: 81, 82, 85

trade: 81, 82, 85

photosynthesis: 56,58,85,203,224

photovoltaics: 91, 105,281, 289, 290

phytoplanktom 47

fertilizing with iron: 72,73

pipeline leaks: 80, 84, 106, 281, 289

plantations: 201, 222

Poland: 33,39,68,78,82,83, 2!75, 278,294,295,297,299, 300

polar ice sheets: 46

population

age structure: 277

country, city rankings: 278, 279

family planning programs: 3840, 202, 228, 230,277, 282,

293, 294

global: 31-33,40, 278,293, 294

growth, projections: 31-33,39,40,274-278, 294

International Planned Parenthood Federation: 40, 293, 294

momentum: 276, 277

policies: 40,202, 293,294

UN Population Fund: 36,40,230,284, 293, 294

urbanization: 115, 128, 155, 250, 265, 277-279

U.S. funding: 40,282, 293, 2!94

world population conference: 39, 293

potential global warming: see individual gases

powerplant retirement: 98-102, 110

precipitation: 45,47,52

prices, energy: see energy, gasoline

prima.ty metals

aluminum: 180, 181, 184-186

cogeneration: 181

energy use, emissions: 179-180, 182, 184, 185, 189, 314

recycling: 185, 186

steel: 180, 181, 184, 187

Private Export Funding Corp.: 285

pr~ess heat: 180, 181, 183, 18!5, 188

productivity, increasing

livestock: 31, 243,244,253, 264

timber: 11, 13, 27-29, 202, 206-210, 223, 319, 320, 325

Program for the Acceleration of Commercial Energy Research:

285

proliferation, nuclear: 91,92, 289

Public Utility Commis sions: 27., 107, 108, 137, 138

Public Utility Regulato~ Policies Act: 18, 138

radiation

solar radiation: 46-48, 51, 52, 65

ultraviolet: 65

radiative forcing: 4, 48-57, 59, 60, 64

rebates: 20-22, 24, 149, 165-167, 194

recycling

al urninum: 184-186

paper: 182, 183,211

steel: 184, 185

water: 261

refining: 179-183, 189, 314, 315

reforestation: see tree planting

retigeration

alternative working fluids: 259, 290

CFCS: 61,63, 115, 126, 127, 243,245, 251,259, 260,264,

288,328

COZ emissions: 115,243, 251,252,259, 314

in developed countries: 252, 264

in developing countries: 33, 128, 252, 253, 264, 288

use of electricity: 252, 259, 260, 270

regulations: 12-14, 16, 18, 19, 24, 183

appliance standards: 16, 19, 115, 124,125, 135, 138, 139,302,

305

building codes: 14, 16, 19, 115, 119, 120, 124, 135, 137, 139,

140, 303,305, 330

emissions standards: 26, 27, 108, 109, 194, 305, 319

fuel economy standards: 22, 149, 165-167,305

@OmlUl@ standards: 14, 16

renewable energy: 4, 5, 12, 13, 25, 26, 77, 80, 87-92, 97-102,

105, 109, 117, 126, 202,260,273, 281,285, 289,292,

305,327-329

also see individual sources, technologies

R&D funding: 6, 16,27, 105, 110,302

trade, technology transfer: 281,285,286,292,299, 300

Renewable Energy Design Assistance Center: 285,286

Renewable Resources Extension Act: 225

research and development: 3,6,7, 13-16,27, 115, 120, 142, 196,

214,280,286,302, 303

residences: see buildings

Residential Conservation Service: 20, 137, 141

retrofitting: 11, 17, 118-120, 130-134, 136, 189, 192, 330

rice

also see methane

methane emissions: 59, 60, 245-247, 256, 262, 287, 288

production: 246, 247, 256

yields: 256

ndesharing: 11, 22, 149, 155, 161, 162, 164, 168, 170, 324, 329

rubber tapping: 221

ruminants: see livestock

safety issues: 159, 171

scenarios, OTA model: see model

scrubbers: 77, 92, 93, 95

sea level: 46, 53, 282

seasonality: 47, 57, 58

sequestration, carbon: see emissions (forestry offsets), forestry

shells, building: 11, 17, 18, 118, 130-134, 137, 142, 318, 323

Sheherbelt Program: 213

shifting cultivation: 202, 216, 217, 219, 275

short-rotation woody crops: 27, 28, 85, 86, 89

“smart” house: 124, 125

snow: 46-49, 52

Soti Bank: 214

Soil Conservation Service: 31, 225, 263-265

soil erosion: 201, 205, 207, 211, 225, 243, 250, 253, 255, 258,

261

solar energy: 5,6, 11, 18, 39, 77, 80,87,90,97, 122, 126, 138,

261,273,289,292
Index ● 353

electricity: 27, 90, 105

photovoltaics: 91, 105,281,289,290

Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Bank: 137

Solar Energy Research Institute: 105, 109, 110, 126

solid waste disposal: 86, 88, 253, 329

South Coast Air Quality Management Plan: 169-171,329

Soviet Union: see U.S.S.R.

space conditioning: 8,85, 115-118, 120-122, 124, 139, 181, 185,

188, 192, 196

also see air-conditioning, heating

spotted owl: 212, 213

standards: 7, 14, 16, 18, 19, 22, 24-27, 108, 109, 115, 119, 120,

124, 135, 137-140, 149, 165-167, 194,302,303,305,319

al.ro see regulations

State activities: 142, 327-330

Public Utility Commissions: 27, 107, 108, 137, 138,329

State and private forestry: 28-30,225-227

State Energy Conservation Program: 20, 137, 328

steel see primary metals

storms: 46

stratosphere: see ozone

structural changes: 6, 177, 178, 192

subsidies: 26, 38

see commodity suppoxt; individual fuels and sectors

Support for Eastern European Democracy Act: 286,299

Surgeon General: 255

sustainable agriculture: 38, 202, 244

Sweden: 7, 20, 78, 117, 119, 120, 124, 300, 304,305

taxes

capital gains: 29, 226

carbon: 11, 14-16, 18,24,26,85, 103, 104, 108, 109, 194, 195,

304, 305

energy-use: 3, 7, 14, 15, 26, 103, 104, 115, 135, 136, 195

fuel taxes: 21, 28, 85, 149, 165, 166, 201

Gas Guzzler: 21, 136, 167

initial purchase: 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 115, 135, 136

tax credits: 19, 24, 25, 29, 136, 195, 227, 230, 328, 329

tax incentives: 14, 15, 29, 30, 103, 104, 136, 195, 201,

226-228

Tax Reform Act: 19, 136, 226

technology transfer: see trade

telecommuting: 22, 149, 169, 170

temperate zone forests: 201-216, 275

also .ree forests

temperatures: 45-53

Tennessee Valley Authority: 26, 107, 138

termites: 60, 246

therrno-mechanical pulping: 182

till age practices: see food

timber: see forests

trade: 35, 37, 178-180, 281, 285-287

bundling: 39,293

COCOM: 37, 286, 298, 299

CORECT: 34,35, 37,281, 285,286, 292,296,299

Export Administration Act: 37, 286, 298, 299

Export Control Act: 298

Export Facilitation Act: 299

Export-Import Bank: 34,35,37,280,281,285, 286,296,299,

300

General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs: 22, 167,299

Jackson-Vanik Amendment: 298-300

joint ventures: 37, 294,297, 299,300

Most Favored Nation status: 37,299

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act: 298

Overseas Private Investment Corp.: 34,35,221, 280,281,

285, 291, 296,299, 300

percent of GNP: 301

renewable energy: 34, 281, 285, 286, 292, 299, 300

Support for Eastern European Democracy Act: 286,299

tied-aid fiiancing: 37, 281, 286

trade restrictions: 37, 213, 227, 228, 232, 298-300

tropical timber: 38, 221, 228, 232

US/lXRE: 280, 286, 287, 291, 296

U.S. Trade Development Program: 34, 35, 285, 296.299

with developing countries: 34, 38, 281, 285, 286

with Eastern Europe, U. S. S. R.: 34, 37, 187, 281, 286, 294

Trade Act: 298

tdfiCflOW: 11, 17, 22, 155, 164, 169, 170, 318

transmission and distribution: see electricity

transportation

also see automobiles, fuels, transportation control measures

aircraft: 159, 161-163

bicycling: 156, 161, 163, 168

buses: 150, 156, 161, 169, 170, 320

CFCS: 150, 151

congestion: 156-158, 168-171

Eastern Europe: 295

emissions: 7, 8, 20, 57, 149-151, 155-164, 171, 314, 315, 317

energy use: 20, 150, 154-157, 274, 301, 313

intercity rail: 21, 161, 163, 164, 170, 320, 324

land use pl arming: 155-157, 169-171

O&M: 22, 161, 162, 164, 168, 318, 324

rebates: 149, 165-167

R&D: 23, 149, 165, 170-172

taxes: see taxes

travel: see travel

U. S. S. R.: 295

vehicle miles traveled: 149, 150, 154, 155, 157, 158, 160-163,

168-170

transportation control measures: 22,23, 158, 168-170,305,327,

329

bicycling: 168, 170

High Occupancy Vehicle lanes: 22, 155, 168, 170, 329

mass transit: 11, 17,21,22, 149, 155-157, 161, 163, 164, 169,

170, 318, 319, 320, 324

parking management: 11,22, 149, 155, 156, 160-162, 164,

168-170,318, 324, 329

ndesharing, vanpools: 11, 22, 149, 155, 161, 162, 164, 168,

170, 324,329

telecornmuting: 22, 149, 169, 170, 327, 329

tR3.ffiC flOW: 11, 17, 22, 155, 164, 169, 170, 318, 319, 324

travel

air: 149, 150, 152, 154, 159, 315

freight: 149, 152-154, 159,315

marine: 149, 152-154, 315

passenger: 149, 150, 152, 154

r~: 149, 152-154, 315

tree planting, U.S.

also see forests

afforestation: 11, 27-29, 194, 202, 206, 211, 213, 214, 215,

227, 319, 320,325, 327, 330

America the Beautiful Program: 29, 30, 227

COZ offset, sequestration: 201,202, 205-209,211-216,223,

319
354 . Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Conservation Reserve Program: 11,27-30, 201,202,206,

211, 213,214,216, 22:;, 227,319, 325

Global Releaf Program: 228

reforestation: 28, 38, 194, 201, 202, 210, 226, 305

Shelterbelt Program: 213

Soti Bank: 214

urban trees; 11,27,29,30, ;!01, 202,206,215,216,227, 228,

319, 320, 325

tropical forests

also see cookstoves, deforestation, forests, shifting

cultivation, trade

agroforestry: 201, 202, 216-219, 221, 230, 231, 290

cattle ranching: 32, 38, 202, 217, 220, 228, 244, 264, 275

commercial logging: 38, 202, 217, 221, 222, 231, 232, 290,

291

emissions: 202, 205, 217-21!0, 223, 287

extent: 204

management: 38, 221, 230-232, 290, 291

‘‘natural” management: 222, 231

nontirnber products: 38, 201, 202, 204, 217, 220, 221, 231

plantations: 201, 222

policies: 228-232

reforestation: 217, 222, 223

sustainable agriculture: 216, 217, 219, 220, 290

Tropical Forestry Action Plan: 36, 38,203,229,231, 232, 283,

284

troposphere: 249

trucks: see automobiles and trucks

turbines: 12, 25-27, 90, 92, 93, 95, 105, 108, 109, 320, 323

United Kingdom: 7,36,82-83,117,152,153, 165,275,278,279,

284, 297, 300, 301, 303, 305

United Nations

Conference on Environment and Development: 287

Development Program: 36-38,229,283,286,291

Environment Program: 36-38,229,280,283,284, 291

Food and Agriculture Organization: 36, 202, 205, 229,231,

232, 243,263, 265, 283, 292

Industrial Development Organization: 36, 284, 292

Population Fund: 36,40,230, 284, 293, 294

Statistical Commission: 291

World Meteorological Organization: 36

U.S. Department of: see Department of

U.S. Export Council for Renewable Energy: 280,286,287,291,

296

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: 212, 213

U.S. Forest Service: 28, 35, 201, 204, 212, 223, 225, 231, 232,

282

below-cost sales: 29,226, 227

Forest Products Lab: 235

research: 28, 225, 226, 231

State and private forestry: 28-30,225-227

tropical research centers: 225, 231

U.S. Geological Survey: 87

U.S. Trade and Development Program: 34,35, 285,296, 299

U.S. Trade Representative: 34, 35, 87,282,299

U. S. S. R.: 5, 34, 36,68, 81-84,87, 91,94, 119, 121, 127, 150,

152, 153, 187,204, 273-276, 282, 284, 298

also see individual seetors

emissions: 5, 32, 33, 58, 273, 274, 296

energy efficiency efforts: 121, 187, 296

energy use: 32, 33, 121, 154, 187, 273-276, 294-296

environmental problems: 33, 294, 298

institutional constraints: 33, 39, 121, 294, 296-299

joint ventures: 37,294,297,299-300

trade: 34, 37, 187,281,286,294-300

urbanization: 115, 128, 155, 250, 265, 277-279

urban trees: 11, 27, 29, 30, 201, 202, 206, 215, 216, 227, 228,

319,320,325

utilities: 7, 18,23-27,99, 106-110, 115, 132, 135, 137, 138, 141,

194, 218,289,305, 319, 320,327-330

also see demand-side management, electricity

powerplant retirement: 98-102, 110,320, 323

vanpools, ridesharing: 11,22, 149, 155, 161, 162, 164, 168, 170

variability, climate: 46-48, 50-53

vehicle tax: 167

Veterans Administration: 141

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer: 283

volcanoes: 47, 51

Volume Average Fuel Economy: 167

water heating: 8, 11, 17, 107, 115-117, 124, 130-134, 314, 318,

323,324

Weatherization Assistance Program: 19, 136,328

wetlands: 60

Wilderness Society: 212, 213

windows: 17, 107, 118-121, 123, 139, 318

wind power: 18, 27, 77, 80,87, 90,99, 105, 109, 126, 138, 281,

289, 290,302

World Bank: 37,202,221,229, 276,280,283,291-293

also see multilatertd development banks

Energy Sector Management Assistance Program: 38, 283,

291, 292

environmental assessment guidelines: 36, 38, 229, 283, 291

funding: 36, 38,39,229,283,291,292, 300

Green Fund: 291, 293

World Climate Research Program: 283,284

World Meteorological Organization: 36,283, 284

World Resources Institute: 232,291

zoning ordinances: 22, 135, 169, 170, 265
24

25

211

27

28

29

.30

.31

.32

.33

34

35

36

37

38

.39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

Mexico City

Pueblo

Tampa

San Antonio

Houston

New Orleans

Miami

]acksonviler

Atlanta

Kansas City

St Louis

Norfolk

Washington D.C., Baltlmore

Philadelphla-Newark

New York City-Long lsland

Boston-Providence 

Montreal

Quebec,

Aurora borealis

Pittsburgh

Buffalo

Toronto

Cleveland

Detroitt

2 NORTH AMERICA

Fairbanks

Anchorage L

Edmonton

Winnipeg

Calgary

Medicine Hat

Vancouver

Seattle

Port/and

Inlerstate HIghway 5

San Francisco-Oakland

Los Angeles

Honolulu

San Dlego

Phoenlx

Tucson

El Paso

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

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14

48 Chlcago-Milwaukee

49 Minneapolis-St.Paul

50 Denver

51 Salt Lake City

17

18

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IDENTIFICATION CHART

G natural gas flares

F forest and

agricultural fires

KEY:

Forest and agricultural fires

Natural gas flares

City lights