AND

TERRORIST

TRAVEL

 Staff Report of the National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
9/11 AND 

TERRORIST TRAVEL 

Staff Report of the National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 

By

Thomas R. Eldridge

Susan Ginsburg 

Walter T. Hempel II 

Janice L. Kephart 

Kelly Moore 

and 

 Joanne M. Accolla, Staff Assistant 

 Alice Falk, Editor 
Note from the Executive Director

The Commission staff organized its work around specialized studies, or monographs, 

prepared by each of the teams. We used some of the evolving draft material for these 

studies in preparing the seventeen staff statements delivered in conjunction with the 

Commission’s 2004 public hearings. We used more of this material in preparing draft 

sections of the Commission’s final report. Some of the specialized staff work, while not 

appropriate for inclusion in the report, nonetheless offered substantial information or 

analysis that was not well represented in the Commission’s report. In a few cases this 

supplemental work could be prepared to a publishable standard, either in an unclassified 

or classified form, before the Commission expired. 

This study is on immigration, border security and terrorist travel issues. It was prepared 

principally by Thomas Eldridge, Susan Ginsburg, Walter T. Hempel II, Janice Kephart, 

and Kelly Moore, with assistance from Joanne Accolla, and editing assistance from Alice 

Falk. As in all staff studies, they often relied on work done by their colleagues.

This is a study by Commission staff. While the Commissioners have been briefed on the 

work and have had the opportunity to review earlier drafts of some of this work, they 

have not approved this text and it does not necessarily reflect their views. 

 Philip Zelikow 
 9/11 and Terrorist Travel

Staff Report, August 21, 2004 

Table of Contents

Note from the Executive Director 

List of Illustrations 

Preface

1. Introduction: A Factual Overview of the September 11 Border Story 

2. The September 11 Travel Operation – a Chronology 

3. Terrorist Entry and Embedding Tactics, 1993-2001 

3.1 The Redbook 

3.2 Terrorist Travel Tactics by Plot 

3.3 Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure for Travel and Travel Tactics 

4. Immigration and Border Security Evolve, 1993 to 2001 

4.1 The Intelligence Community 

4.2 The State Department 

4.3 The Immigration and Naturalization Service 

5. Planning and Executing Entry for the 9/11 Plot 

5.1 The State Department 

5.2 The Immigration and Naturalization Service 

5.3 Finding a Fair Verdict 

6. Crisis Management and Response Post-September 11 

6.1 The Intelligence Community 

6.2 The Department of State 

6.3 The Department of Justice 

6.4 Response at the Borders, 9/11-9/20, 2001 

6.5 The Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A: Graphics 

Appendix B: The Saudi Flights 

Appendix C: Immigration Histories of Certain Individuals with Terrorist 

 Connections 
List of Illustrations 

In Appendix A: 

x Mohamed Atta’s visa 

x Ramzi Binalshibh’s visa application 

x Ziad Jarrah’s charred visa recovered in Somerset County, Penn. 

x Hani Hanjour’s visa application 

x Marwan al Shehhi’s application to change his immigration status 

x Mohand al Shehri’s visa application 

x Ahmad al Haznawi’s visa application 

x Saeed al Ghamdi’s visa application 

x Ahmed al Nami’s visa application 

x Mohamed Atta’s revised immigration arrival record 

x Handwritten notes of immigration official re: Atta’s record 

x Mohamed Atta’s Florida state driver’s license 

x Saeed al Ghamdi’s Immigration arrival record

x Saeed al Ghamdi’s Customs declaration 

x Salem al Hazmi’s USAID identification card 

x Khalid al Mihdhar’s USAID identification card 

x Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s alias visa application 

x Ahmed al Ghamdi’s state of Virginia identification card photo 
Preface

It is perhaps obvious to state that terrorists cannot plan and carry out attacks in the United 

States if they are unable to enter the country. Yet prior to September 11, while there were 

efforts to enhance border security, no agency of the U.S. government thought of border 

security as a tool in the counterterrorism arsenal. Indeed, even after 19 hijackers 

demonstrated the relative ease of obtaining a U.S. visa and gaining admission into the 

United States, border security still is not considered a cornerstone of national security 

policy. We believe, for reasons we discuss in the following pages, that it must be made 

one.

Congress gave the Commission the mandate to study, evaluate, and report on 

“immigration, nonimmigrant visas and border security” as these areas relate to the events 

of 9/11. This staff report represents 14 months of such research. It is based on thousands 

of pages of documents we reviewed from the State Department, the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of 

Defense, approximately 25 briefings on various border security topics, and more than 200 

interviews. We are grateful to all who assisted and supported us along the way.

The story begins with “A Factual Overview of the September 11 Border Story.” This 

introduction summarizes many of the key facts of the hijackers’ entry into the United 

States. In it, we endeavor to dispel the myth that their entry into the United States was 

“clean and legal.” It was not. Three hijackers carried passports with indicators of Islamic 

extremism linked to al Qaeda; two others carried passports manipulated in a fraudulent 

manner. It is likely that several more hijackers carried passports with similar fraudulent 

manipulation. Two hijackers lied on their visa applications. Once in the United States, 

two hijackers violated the terms of their visas. One overstayed his visa. And all but one 

obtained some form of state identification. We know that six of the hijackers used these 

state issued identifications to check in for their flights on September 11. Three of them 

were fraudulently obtained. 

The chronology that follows in chapter 2, “The September 11 Travel Operation,” is a 

detailed account of how each hijacker acquired a visa and entered the United States. In 

all, they had 25 contacts with consular officers and 43 contacts with immigration and 

customs authorities. They began acquiring their visas in April 1999 and began entering 

the country in December 2000. They successfully entered the United States 33 times over 

21 months, through nine airports of entry, most of which were on the East Coast. Neither 

the consular officers who adjudicated their visas nor the immigration inspectors who 

admitted them into the country had any knowledge of fraudulent al Qaeda documents. 

The next chapter, “Terrorist Entry and Embedding Tactics, 1993 to 2001,” explores the 

topic of fraudulent documents, which terrorists have long used to support their 

international travel. Indeed, the CIA studied these documents and published their 

commonalities as far back as the 1980s. They even made a training video for border 

inspectors to help them detect such fraud. This effort was abandoned in the early 1990s, 
just as the United States experienced the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. 

We reviewed information available on terrorist travel practices in the 1990s and 

identified numerous entry and embedding tactics, unknown at the time of these earlier 

attacks in the United States owing to the lack of analysis. No government agency 

systematically would analyze terrorists’ travel patterns until after 9/11, thus missing 

critical opportunities to disrupt their plans.

Chapter 4, “Immigration and Border Security Evolve, 1993 to 2001,” provides an 

overview of counterterrorism activities as they relate to border security in the Intelligence 

Community, the State Department, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Here 

we explore the evolution of the terrorist watchlist and explain the process of applying for 

a visa and for gaining entry into the United States. The reader is introduced to the Bureau 

of Consular Affairs in the State Department and visa policy in general. The various INS 

units working on counterterrorism are discussed, along with enforcement of immigration 

law and the immigration benefits system. 

Chapter 5, “Planning and Executing Entry for the 9/11 Plot,” discusses visa issuance and 

admission into the United States as it specifically applied to the hijackers. Thus, visa 

policy in Berlin, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, where the hijackers 

received their visas, is explored in depth. Similarly, we review aspects of the admission 

of the hijackers in detail, noting the immigration violations they committed. On both 

topics, visas and entry, we include excerpts of interviews with consular, immigration, and 

customs officials involved in the admission of the hijackers. We conclude with an 

assessment of how well the State Department and the INS performed in the period prior 

to 9/11.

“Crisis Management and Response Post–September 11,” chapter 6, reports on actions 

taken by the intelligence community, the departments of State and Justice, and the INS 

following the attacks, up to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. 

Particular attention is paid to programs implemented by the Justice Department, in some 

cases as part of the interagency process, including the Interview Project, Visa Condor, the 

Absconder Apprehension Initiative, and NSEERS, the National Security Exit and Entry 

Registration System. 

Appendix A contains graphics relevant to the 9/11 plot. In Appendix B, “The Saudi 

Flights,” we examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the departure of Saudi 

nationals from the United States in the days after the 9/11 attack. The procedure followed 

for each flight, including the inspection of passengers and their belongings, is covered in 

detail. Finally, in Appendix C, we describe the immigration histories of certain terrorists.

1

1

Introduction: Factual Overview of the September 11 Border Story 

Terrorists travel for many reasons, including to train, communicate with other terrorists, 

collect funds, escape capture and interrogation, engage in surveillance of potential 

targets, and commit terrorist attacks.1

To avoid detection of their activities and objectives while engaging in travel that 

necessitates using a passport, terrorists devote extensive resources to acquiring and 

manipulating passports, entry and exit stamps, and visas. The al Qaeda terrorist 

organization was no exception. High-level members of al Qaeda were expert document 

forgers who taught other terrorists, including Mohamed Atta, the 9/11 ringleader, their 

tradecraft.2

The entry of the hijackers into the United States therefore represented the culmination of 

years of practice and experience in penetrating international borders. We introduce our 

monograph with a retelling of the September 11 events from the perspective of border 

security as we understand it today.

The conspirators 

Twenty-six al Qaeda terrorist conspirators—eighteen Saudis, two Emiratis, one Egyptian, 

one Lebanese, one Moroccan, one Pakistani, and two Yemenis—sought to enter the 

United States and carry out a suicide mission.3

 The first of them began to acquire the 

means to enter two years and five months before the 9/11 attack. 

Intelligence about terrorist travel

Three hijackers were known or knowable by intelligence authorities as al Qaeda terrorists 

in early 2000, but their biographical information was not fully developed and 

communicated to border authorities for watchlisting at U.S. consulates abroad (by the 

State Department) and at the border (by immigration and customs border inspectors). The 

travel plans of all three also were known or knowable in 2000, in part because of 

cooperation from Arab and Asian country intelligence services and border authorities.

The 19 hijackers used 364 aliases, including different spellings of their names and noms 

de guerre.4

 As they passed through various countries, their names were recorded by 

governments and their intelligence and border authorities.

Three were carrying Saudi passports containing a possible extremist indicator present in 

the passports of many al Qaeda and other terrorists entering the United States as early as 

the first World Trade Center attack in 1993. This indicator had not been analyzed by the 

CIA, FBI, or our border authorities for its significance. Indeed, passports seized by the 

FBI in terrorist investigations were not routinely made available to the CIA for analysis. 

Two hijackers were carrying passports that had been manipulated in a fraudulent manner. 

They contained fraudulent entry-exit stamps (or cachets) probably inserted by al Qaeda 

travel document forgers to hide travel to Afghanistan for terrorist training. Our analysis 

of their travel patterns suggests that several more hijackers whose passports did not 

survive the attacks were likely to have had similar false stamps in their passports. The 

existence and significance of these stamps was not known to border authorities.
2

Two Saudis were carrying passports that might have been provided to them by a family 

member working in the Saudi passport ministry. The Saudi passport authority was rife 

with patronage and security weaknesses known by then to the State Department and CIA, 

but they were not the subject of intelligence analysis, diplomatic or security policy, or 

countermeasures. 

Visas

The 19 hijackers applied for 23 visas and obtained 22. Five other conspirators were 

denied U.S. visas. Two more obtained visas but did not participate in the attack for 

various reasons. 

They began attempting to acquire U.S. visas in April 1999, two years and five months 

before the attack. Consular officers were unaware of the potential significance of an 

indicator of potential extremism present in some al Qaeda passports, had no information 

about fraudulent travel stamps that are associated with al Qaeda, and were not trained in 

terrorist travel tactics generally.

Two Yemenis were denied visas in Yemen for reasons of U.S. immigration law unrelated 

to terrorism. At the same time, two Saudi hijackers obtained visas in Saudi Arabia. When 

these two Saudis later showed up in Afghanistan, they were selected for the mission in 

part because they already had U.S. visas. Later, most of the operatives selected were 

Saudis, who had little difficulty obtaining visas.

In early 2000, four conspirators sought U.S. visas to learn how to become pilots in the 

plot. An Egyptian and a Lebanese obtained visas easily in Berlin, because they had 

established ties to Germany and so did not look like intending immigrants. Both 

presented new passports. A Yemeni who wanted to be a pilot was repeatedly turned down 

for a visa because he did not have strong ties to Germany, failed to complete the 

necessary paperwork, and looked like an intending immigrant. 

Thirteen of the hijackers presented passports less than three weeks old when they applied 

for their visas, but the new passports caused no heightened scrutiny of their visa 

applications. 

Two hijackers lied on their visa applications in detectable ways, but were not further 

questioned about those lies.

Two hijackers were interviewed for reasons unrelated to terrorism. Most simply had their 

applications approved and their passports stamped with a U.S. visa. Consular officers 

were not trained to detect terrorists in a visa interview. Terrorism concerns were handled 

through the watchlist, and all the conspirators’ names were checked against the terrorist 

watchlist without producing a match. 

One Saudi, one Moroccan, and one Pakistani were each denied visas for reasons 

unrelated to terrorism. The last conspirator, the Pakistani, was denied on August 27, 

2001, in the United Arab Emirates. 

The mastermind of the operation, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, used a travel facilitator to 

acquire a visa on July 23, 2001, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, using an alias. 
3

Ports of entry 

Once the operation was under way, the conspirators attempted to enter the United States 

34 times over 21 months, through nine airports. They succeeded all but once. Border 

inspectors at U.S. airports were unaware of the potential significance of indicators of 

possible terrorist affiliation in conspirators’ passports and had no information about 

fraudulent travel stamps possibly associated with al Qaeda. No inspectors or agents were 

trained in terrorist travel intelligence and document practices. The culture at the airports 

was one of travel facilitation and lax enforcement, with the exception of programs to 

interdict drug couriers and known criminals. 

When they began to arrive at the U.S. airports in January 2000, the pilots traveled alone. 

With the exception of two of the hijackers, the “muscle” operatives arrived between late 

April and late June 2001. They came in groups of two or three, and in four cases were 

screened by the same inspector. 

All but one of the hijackers presented visitor visas that immigration inspectors used to 

decide whether to admit them as tourists or on business. All but two of the nonpilots were 

admitted as tourists and were granted automatic six-month stays. This allowed them to 

maintain a legal immigration status through the end of the operation. One of the two 

nonpilots admitted on business was granted a one-month stay; he, along with another of 

the nonpilot operatives, was in violation of immigration law for months before the attack. 

The one pilot who came in on a student visa never showed up for school, thereby 

violating the terms of his U.S. visa. Another of the pilots came in on a tourist visa yet 

began flight school immediately, also violating the terms of his U.S. visa. This pilot came 

in a total of seven times on a tourist visa while in school. In both cases, the pilots violated 

the law after their entry into the United States.

Five hijackers attempting entry were referred by primary inspectors for a more intensive 

review by secondary inspectors. One pilot was referred at two entries, in one case by a 

customs inspector trained to look for drug couriers, and in the other by an immigration 

inspector thinking the pilot might be an intending immigrant. One pilot was referred for 

having the wrong visa and one nonpilot hijacker for failing to have a visa. Two others 

were referred for failing to complete their arrival and customs forms and for being unable 

to communicate with the inspectors. No lookouts or visa revocations were posted alerting 

border authorities to the terrorist association of two of the hijackers until after each has 

entered the United States for the last time. 

Four hijackers were admitted after the secondary inspectors who interviewed them were 

unable to, or did not, verify information supplied by the operative, misunderstood the 

law, or failed to follow procedures. One was interviewed at length by a border inspector. 

The inspector concluded, on the basis of his hostile and arrogant behavior and 

contradictory statements, that he was unlikely to comply with U.S. immigration law and 

posed a risk. He was denied entry. The inspector was backed up by his superior, but acted 

in the face of a general expectation of leniency toward Saudi citizens at that airport. 

These entries occurred during a period when approximately 20 million people applied for 

visas, and more than 10 million people came into the United States through 220 airports 

of entry. 
4

In the United States 

Three hijackers filed applications for change of status to extend their stays in the United 

States and stayed in compliance with U.S. immigration laws through September 2001. 

These were among nearly 600,000 new applications received in September 2000 and 

were added to a backlog of 3 million others. Two pilots attached the same supporting 

financial documents to their immigration benefit applications and were adjudicated by the 

same official in the summer of 2001. 

The pending but unadjudicated benefits applications assisted two hijackers in persuading 

border inspectors to admit them during secondary inspections when they tried to reenter 

the United States. The adjudications were premised on the validity of their attendance at 

flight school, but in fact this school should not have been certified to accept foreign 

nationals. Another hijacker’s application allowed him to stay in the United States legally 

for an extra six months. 

While the applications were pending, one hijacker appeared at an Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (INS) office in Florida and requested a longer length of stay for a 

companion—possibly another hijacker—that would have enabled the other man to 

remain through September, when his own visa expired. The inspector refused that 

request, and realizing that the length of stay granted this hijacker during his secondary 

inspection was too long, rolled it back to midsummer 2001. The hijacker departed the 

United States in July and returned again ten days later, thereby acquiring a new length of 

stay that extended beyond September 11, 2001. 

On August 23, 2001, the CIA provided biographical identification information about two 

of the hijackers to border and law enforcement authorities. The CIA and FBI considered 

the case important, but there was no way of knowing whether either hijacker was still in 

the country, because a border exit system Congress authorized in 1996 was never 

implemented. 

One of the two overstayed his visa by less than six months. Without an exit system in 

place at the border tied to law enforcement databases, there was no way to establish with 

certainty that he remained in the United States. Thus, there was no risk that his 

immigration law violations would be visible to law enforcement, and there was no risk of 

immigration enforcement action of any kind. 

Immediate response to the attacks 

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, immigration and customs leadership jointly put in 

place their agencies’ most stringent security precautions, in the process nearly shutting 

down our borders; the backed-up traffic at the land borders caused a commercial crisis. 

Because resources were already strained, thousands of other enforcement officials in the 

National Guard, Border Patrol, and state and local police were needed to help border 

authorities reduce wait times for those seeking U.S. entry for tourism or business. 

Under Justice Department direction, the FBI and the INS initiated a series of 

counterterrorism-related security programs using immigration law violations as a 

predicate to interview, detain, and in many cases deport aliens from countries with 

possible ties to al Qaeda. Also at the urging of the Justice Department, the State 
5

Department, together with the FBI, initiated a series of programs to heighten scrutiny of 

visa applicants from countries with an al Qaeda presence. 

In the weeks after September 11, after the national airspace reopened, at least ten flights 

of Saudi nationals departed the United States. One flight sponsored by the Saudi 

government carried relatives of Saudi fugitive Usama Bin Ladin. Passengers on the 

flights were screened by the FBI prior to their departure, but allegations of high-level 

government involvement spurred theories that passengers received special treatment. 

1

 Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Oct. 23, 2002. After Ramzi Binalshibh failed to obtain a 

U.S. visa in May 2001, Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) asked Binalshibh to act as a contact between himself and 

Mohamed Atta to relay operational details that were too sensitive to trust to telephone or email. His travel 

in this capacity illustrates the importance of “courier” travel to al Qaeda planning and operations. To 

facilitate his travel, KSM provided Binalshibh with a genuine Saudi passport in the name of Hasan Ali al 

Assiri and a round-trip ticket to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where he was supposed to meet Atta. While in 

Kuala Lumpur, Binalshibh applied for a Yemeni passport. When Atta was delayed, Binalshibh went to 

Bangkok. Because Atta was still unable to meet him, Binalshibh traveled to Amsterdam on his Yemeni 

passport, took a train to Hamburg, and bought a ticket to Spain to meet Atta. Intelligence report, 

interrogation of a detainee, Oct. 1, 2002. Binalshibh finally met up with Atta in early July 2001 in Spain to 

discuss sensitive operational aspects of the 9/11 plot. Specifically, Binalshibh told Atta that UBL’s 

instructions were to attack the U.S. Congress, the World Trade Center, and the Pentagon, the “symbols of 

America.” Atta told Binalshibh, who passed the information to UBL through KSM, that planning had been 

completed with no problems and it could be operational in five to six weeks. 

2

 CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, Nov. 20, 2002, p. 1, 3. Atta, who reportedly learned these 

techniques in Afghanistan, cleaned Ramzi Binalshibh’s passport of its Pakistani visa and travel cachets. 

3

 In addition to the 19 hijackers, the seven other conspirators who sought visas were Mohamed al Kahtani 

(a Saudi), Saeed al Ghamdi (a Saudi, not the hijacker), Mushabib al Hamlan (a Saudi), Zakariya Essabar (a 

Moroccan), Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (a Pakistani), Ramzi Binalshibh (a Yemeni), and Tawfiq bin Attash (a 

Yemeni, also known as Khallad). An eighth individual who was a possible pilot in the 9/11 operation, 

Zacarias Moussaoui, entered under the Visa Waiver Program. 

4

 CIA analytic report, “Name Variants and Aliases of 11 September Hijackers and Associates,” Mar.2004. 
6

The 9/11 HIJACKERS AND CONSPIRATORS

American Airlines Flight 11—North Tower of the World Trade Center

Mohamed Atta Hijacker (Pilot) 

Abdul Aziz al Omari Hijacker 

Waleed al Shehri Hijacker 

Satam al Suqami Hijacker 

Wail al Shehri Hijacker 

American Airlines Flight 77—Pentagon

Hani Hanjour Hijacker (Pilot) 

Khalid al Mihdhar Hijacker 

Majed Moqed Hijacker 

Nawaf al Hazmi Hijacker 

Salem al Hazmi Hijacker 

United Airlines Flight 93—Pennsylvania

Ziad Samir Jarrah Hijacker (Pilot) 

Saeed al Ghamdi Hijacker 

Ahmed al Nami Hijacker 

Ahmad al Haznawi Hijacker 

United Airlines Flight 175—South Tower of the World Trade Center

Marwan al Shehhi Hijacker (Pilot) 

Mohand al Shehri Hijacker 

Hamza al Ghamdi Hijacker 

Fayez Banihammad Hijacker 

Ahmed al Ghamdi Hijacker 

Other Conspirators Involved with the Visa Process

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Mastermind 

Tawfiq bin Attash

(Khallad) Potential Pilot 

Ramzi Binalshibh Potential Pilot 

Zakariya Essabar Potential Pilot/Hijacker 

Saeed “Jihad” al Ghamdi Potential Hijacker 

Mushabib al Hamlan Potential Hijacker 

Ali Abdul Aziz Ali Financial Facilitator and Potential Hijacker 

Other Conspirator Involved with the Visa and Port of Entry Process 

Mohamed al Kahtani Potential Hijacker 
7

2

The September 11 Travel Operation 

The success of the September 11 plot depended on the ability of the hijackers to obtain 

visas and pass an immigration and customs inspection in order to enter the United States. 

It also depended on their ability to remain here undetected while they worked out the 

operational details of the attack. If they had failed on either count—entering and 

becoming embedded—the plot could not have been executed.

Here we present the facts and circumstances of the hijackers’ travel operation, including 

their 25 contacts with consular officers and their 43 contacts with immigration and 

customs authorities. We also discuss the 12 contacts with border authorities by other 

September 11 conspirators who applied for a visa. The narrative is chronological, 

retracing the hijackers’ steps from their initial applications for U.S. visas, through their 

entry into the United States, to their applications for immigration benefits, and up through 

their acquisition of state identifications that helped them board the planes. Along the way, 

we note relevant actions by U.S. government authorities to combat terrorism. There were 

a few lucky breaks for U.S. border authorities in this story. Mostly, though, it is a story of 

how 19 hijackers easily penetrated U.S. border security.

Overview of the hijacker’s visas 

The 9/11 hijackers submitted 23 visa applications during the course of the plot, and 22 of 

these applications were approved. The hijackers applied for visas at five U.S. consulates 

or embassies overseas; two of them were interviewed. One consular officer issued visas 

to 11 of the 19 hijackers. Of the eight other conspirators in the plot who sought visas, 

three succeeded, but only one of the three later sought to use the visa to enter the United 

States.

Hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar were the first to submit visa 

applications because they were originally slated to be pilots. The four hijackers who did 

become pilots applied for visas in 2000. The remaining “muscle” hijackers applied in the 

fall of 2000 through the spring and summer of 2001, three applying twice.

Most of the hijackers applied with new passports, possibly to hide travel to Afghanistan 

recorded in their old ones. It is likely that many of the hijackers’ passports contained 

indicators of extremism or showed ties to al Qaeda. However, this intelligence was not 

developed prior to 9/11, and thus State Department personnel reviewing visa applications 

were not trained to spot these indicators of a terrorist connection. Visa decisions for the 

hijackers and conspirators were consistent with a system that focused on excluding 

intending immigrants and depended on checking a database of names to search for 

criminals and terrorists. 

Overview of the hijackers’ entries 

The hijackers successfully entered the United States 33 of 34 times, with the first arriving 

on January 15, 2000, at Los Angeles International Airport. All others entered through 
8

airports on the East Coast, including 11 entries through New York area airports and 12 

through Florida airports.

The four pilots passed through immigration and customs inspections a total of 17 times 

from May 29, 2000, to August 5, 2001. Ziad Jarrah was the most frequent border crosser, 

entering the United States seven times. Mohamed Atta and Marwan al Shehhi came in 

three times each, entering for the last time on May 2 and July 19, 2001, respectively. 

Hani Hanjour was the only hijacker to enter on an academic visa, arriving on December 

8, 2000. He had already attended both English and flight training schools in the United 

States during three stays in the 1990s. Hanjour was also the only pilot who already had a 

commercial pilot’s license prior to entry, having acquired it in 1999 in Arizona.1

Though Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi came to the United States as early as 

January 2000, the remaining muscle entered between April 23, 2001, and June 29, 2001. 

They arrived in six pairs and one trio. Four pairs were processed by the same immigration 

inspector. Only three of the muscle were referred to a secondary inspection for further 

scrutiny. Of these, only one, Mohamed al Kahtani, was refused entry to the United States.

Entering the United States as tourists was important to the hijackers, since immigration 

regulations automatically guaranteed tourists six months of stay. Thus the 14 muscle 

hijackers who entered the United States in the spring and early summer of 2001 were able 

to remain in the country legally through September 11. The six-month tourist stays also 

assured the hijackers of sufficient time to make such preparations for their operation as 

obtaining the identifications some of them used to board the planes on September 11. 

Fourteen of 15 operatives and all of the pilots acquired one or multiple forms of U.S. 

state-issued identification. Only Satam al Suqami did not, possibly because he was the 

only hijacker who knew he was out of immigration status: his length of stay end date of 

May 20, 2000, was clearly inserted in his passport.

Note: Per an agreement with the Department of State, we have protected the identities of 

individual consular officers involved with the adjudication of visas to the hijackers. 

Throughout the chronology, each is referred to as “he,” regardless of the person’s actual 

gender. For similar reasons, we have chosen not to include the names of border

inspectors in this report. 

The Entry of the Hijackers: Acquiring Visas

November 1998. Upon the indictment of Usama Bin Ladin on November 4, a threat 

advisory was immediately sent by the headquarters of the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service (INS) to all immigration inspectors at ports of entry. Warning of possible 

infiltration into the United States by radical Islamic fundamentalists sympathetic to UBL, 

the advisory called for “hard” inspections of certain visitors from Middle Eastern 

countries, but only if they were referred to a secondary immigration inspection. This 

instruction applied to the countries of origin of all of the hijackers.2
9

April 1999 

On April 3, Nawaf al Hazmi applied for a B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, 

Saudi Arabia, submitting a written visa application, his passport, and a photograph. 

Hazmi was a Saudi citizen born August 9, 1976.3 Hazmi’s passport was new--issued on 

March 21, 1999, and it contained an indicator of extremism that has been associated with 

al Qaeda.4

Also on April 3, 1999, the same day that Nawaf al Hazmi was applying for his visa in 

Jeddah, another of the 9/11 conspirators, Khallad, attempted to get a visa in Sanaa, 

Yemen, using the alias Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf. He submitted a written 

application, a photograph, and a Yemeni passport, issued March 18, 1999, shortly before 

he applied for this visa. On his application, he listed his date of birth as January 1, 1974, 

and his nationality as “Yemeni.”5

Khallad listed his address in the United States as “Bothell W.A.,” and gave “Medical 

Treatment” as the purpose of his visit. Injured while fighting in Afghanistan, he had an 

artificial right leg. He indicated that he intended to arrive in the United States in April 

1999 and stay for a period of “aprox two months.”6

Khallad was interviewed, apparently by a consular officer, who took notes of their 

conversation on the visa application. As best as we can tell from the copy we have 

obtained, the officer wrote “Family in Shobanah and Br (unintelligible)—1 kid—has 

shops w/family—artificial leg—needs all med info.” He denied the application under 

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 221(g), the provision used to cover 

denials for incomplete applications or other unspecified reasons, seemingly out of 

concern that Khallad needed to present more information about his medical condition 

before he could secure a visa. In general, Yemenis had greater difficulty than wealthier 

Saudis convincing consular officers they were not intending immigrants.7

This is the only visa application we have located for Khallad, though he claims to have 

applied for one previously.8

April 7. Khalid al Mihdhar applied for a B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, 

Saudi Arabia, submitting a written application, his new passport, and a photograph. 

Mihdhar was a Saudi citizen born May 16, 1975.9 Mihdhar’s passport was issued on 

April 6, 1999.10 Mihdhar’s passport contained the same indicator of extremism as Nawaf 

al Hazmi’s. But because this indicator of extremism was unknown at the time to U.S. 

intelligence officials, the consular officer adjudicating their visas had not been warned to 

watch for it.

Both Hazmi and Mihdhar’s visa applications were destroyed before September 

11, according to routine State Department document destruction practices in place in 

Jeddah, so we could not review them. The electronic records of their applications, their 

photographs, and information about the visas issued to them still exist, however, and are 
10

maintained in the State Department’s Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), and we 

have reviewed this material. 

It is not possible to state with certainty whether either Hazmi or Mihdhar were 

interviewed by a consular officer in connection with their visa applications.11 The 

consular officer who approved Hazmi’s visa stated, “I do not remember these specific 

applications.”12 State Department computer records did not provide any help in this 

regard, because they do not indicate whether the applicant has been interviewed.13

If either of these two were interviewed, they must have convinced the officer they had 

good reasons to be going to the United States: both were issued visas after CLASS record 

checks showed no derogatory information about them. Hazmi’s visa was issued on April 

3, 1999. Mihdhar’s visa was issued on April 7, 1999. Both were one-year, multiple-entry 

visas.

January 2000

January 15. Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar arrived together at Los Angeles 

International Airport from Bangkok, Thailand. The two Saudis were admitted as tourists 

for six-month stays by the same primary immigration inspector, who was unaware of the 

indicators of extremism likely present in their passports.14

Neither Hazmi nor Mihdhar was on the watchlists available to border inspectors. 

However, Mihdhar was a known al Qaeda operative at the time, and a copy of his 

passport was available to the intelligence community.15

January 18. Marwan al Shehhi, an Emirati, was issued a ten-year B-1/B-2 (tourist/ 

business) visa in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.16 Shehhi submitted a new passport with 

his visa application. Although his application was destroyed prior to September 11, 2001, 

pursuant to routine document handling policies, an electronic record was maintained by 

State.17 The consular officer who issued the visa said Shehhi probably was not 

interviewed, explaining that UAE nationals were not interviewed in connection with their 

visa applications unless—as did not happen in this case—there was a watchlist “hit.”18

UAE nationals were considered good visa risks both on economic and on security 

grounds.19

April 2000

April 2. Nawaf al Hazmi’s visa expired,20 but that expiration had no bearing on his legal 

status in the United States. Any visitor who enters the country with a valid visa may 

remain through the length of stay granted by an immigration inspector upon arrival. 

April 5. Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi acquired California driver’s licenses.21

May 2000 

May 17. Mohammed Atta, an Egyptian, applied for and on the next day received a fiveyear B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa from the U.S. embassy in Berlin, Germany.22 The 

consular officer who adjudicated this visa said Atta “definitely” was not interviewed. 
11

According to the officer, because he was a third-country national who had long been 

resident in Germany (approximately five years), the visa interview requirement was 

waived, and Atta was “basically treated like” a German citizen. German citizens do not 

need visas, as they participate in a “visa waiver” program. Another factor in his favor was 

Atta’s strong record as a student in Germany.23 Atta’s visa application was destroyed 

prior to 9/11 pursuant to State Department policy then in effect, so we were able to 

review only the electronic record of his application.

Also on May 17, Ramzi Binalshibh, another Yemeni, applied for a B-1/B-2 

(tourist/visa) visa in Berlin. He listed Agus Budiman in Washington, D.C., as the person 

he would be visiting in the United States. Although his application was denied, 

Binalshibh did not give up on trying to get a visa to the United States, as we will soon 

see.24

May 25. Ziad Jarrah, a native of Lebanon, applied for and received a five-year B-1/B-2 

(tourist/business) visa in Berlin.25 The consular officer who issued the visa could not 

recall whether he interviewed Jarrah. However, our review of Berlin visa policy for thirdcountry nationals suggests that Jarrah was a strong visa candidate, given his long 

residence in Germany (approximately four years), academic involvement in Germany (at 

two universities), and Lebanese nationality. Third-country nationals with more than two 

years of residency in Germany met a threshold for visa approval. The officer who 

adjudicated his visa has stated that wealthy Lebanese families often sent their children to 

school in Germany as a way to keep them out of the Middle East’s turmoil, and that 

Jarrah looked like one of those wealthy expatriates.26

May 29. Shehhi arrived in the United States for the first time from Brussels, Belgium, 

landing at Newark International Airport in New Jersey. He was admitted by immigration 

authorities as a tourist for six months. However, he was pulled aside by a “roving” 

Customs inspector who conducted a secondary inspection. He was admitted after this 

two-minute examination, during which his bags were x-rayed but he was not personally 

searched and was admitted. The Customs inspector was trained to look for drug couriers, 

not terrorists.27

June 2000

June 3. Atta arrived from Prague, Czech Republic, at Newark Airport as a tourist. He 

was given a customary six-month stay, valid until December 2, 2000.28

June 5. Binalshibh’s May application was denied under INA section 221(g).29 This 

section was routinely invoked by the U.S. embassy in Berlin, without conducting an 

interview, to deny a visa application that was incomplete or weak.30 In such cases, the 

embassy would send a letter explaining the denial and inviting the submission of further 

documentation in support of the application.31 Under the law, such additional information 

can become part of the original application.32 The applicant then had six months to have 

the original denial reversed.33

June 10. Mihdhar left the United States against the wishes of the operational organizer 

of the plot, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. He traveled to Yemen.34
12

June 15. Binalshibh attempted a second time to obtain a B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa 

in Berlin.

June 27. Jarrah entered the United States for the first time on a tourist visa.35 He 

immediately violated his immigration status by going from the airport straight to full-time 

flight school. He studied at the Florida Flight Training Center in Venice, Florida, until 

January 31, 2001.36 Jarrah never filed an application to change his status from tourist to 

student. This failure to maintain a legal immigration status provided a solid legal basis to 

deny him entry on each of the six subsequent occasions in which he reentered the United 

States. But because there was no student tracking system in place and because neither 

Jarrah nor the school complied with the law’s notification requirements, immigration 

inspectors could not know he was out of status. 

June 27. Binalshibh’s second visa application was again denied under 221(g), apparently 

without his being interviewed by a consular officer.

July 2000 

July 3. Shehhi and Atta enrolled at Huffman Aviation to take flight lessons.37 Neither 

violated his immigration status: attending flight school was permitted as long as their 

entrance to the United States was legal and they sought to change their status before the 

expiration of their length of stay in late November and early December. As required by 

Huffman, both began training as private pilots.38

July 12. Nawaf al Hazmi filed to extend his stay in the United States, which was due to 

expire on July 14, 2000.39 Yet another opportunity to spot the suspicious indicator of 

extremism in his passport. 

July 18. A consular officer in Berlin interviewed Binalshibh in connection with his two 

visa applications submitted on May 17 and June 15, 2000. This time, a consular officer 

denied his application under INA Section 214(b), after concluding that Binalshibh had 

failed to prove that he was not an intending immigrant to the United States.40 Under this 

provision, discussed more fully in Chapter 5, the nonimmigrant visa applicant bears the 

burden of establishing to the satisfaction of the consular officer that they are entitled to 

nonimmigrant status. The consular officer noted on the application that Binalshibh had a 

poor academic record at German universities, attending only sporadically. The officer 

also noted that Binalshibh had no apparent source of income, no apparent job, and was 

traveling back and forth to the Middle East. All these factors led the officer to consider 

Binalshibh a bad visa risk. There is no evidence that the officer denied Binalshibh 

because of concerns about terrorism. 

August 2000 

August 14. Atta and Shehhi passed their private pilot airplane test at Huffman Aviation. 

Atta received a score of 97 (out of 100) in 69 minutes. Shehhi received a score of 83 in 

73 minutes.41
13

September 2000

September 3. Ahmed al Ghamdi, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2 

(tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He presented a new Saudi passport only 

13 days old. There is no evidence that he was interviewed.42

September 10. Hani Hanjour again applied for a B-1/B- (tourist/business) visa in 

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, submitting a new passport issued on July 24, 2000. His statement 

on the application that he would like to stay for three years in the United States raised 

concerns among the consular staff that he was at risk of becoming an immigrant to the 

United States. A consular employee who screened Hanjour’s application forwarded him 

to a consular officer for an interview. Hanjour told this officer that he was going to attend 

flight training school in the United States and wanted to change his status to “student” 

from “tourist” once he arrived in the United States.43 “Look, you have spent enough time 

in the States” to know what you want to do there, the officer told Hanjour. His prior 

travel to the United States, the officer said to him, disqualified Hanjour from receiving a 

tourist visa in order to go to the United States and find a school “because he had been in 

the States long enough to decide what he wanted.”44 For these reasons, the officer denied 

Hanjour’s application under INA section 221(g), a general denial that, as noted above, 

allowed the applicant to return with additional information in support of his application. 

September 15. Huffman Aviation’s Student Coordinator assisted Atta in filling out the 

student school form I-20M, required by the INS to demonstrate school enrollment.45

Shehhi also received an I-20M signed by this coordinator. Both Atta’s and Shehhi’s I539 applications to change their immigration status from tourist (B-1/B-2) to vocational 

student (M1) were mailed to the INS. Both applications requested that their status be 

maintained until September 1, 2001. The contents of the applications are substantially the 

same, including the same financial statement of support, bank statement, and lease.46

Also in September, the two took flying lessons at Jones Aviation in nearby Sarasota, 

Florida. They spent a few hours a day flying at Jones, struggling as students because of 

their poor English. They were aggressive, even trying to take over control of the aircraft 

from the instructor on occasion. They failed their instrument rating tests there, and 

returned to Huffman.47

September 16. Binalshibh’s third visa application was denied in Sanaa,Yemen, under 

INA section 214(b), the intending immigrant provision.48 There is no evidence that 

concerns about terrorism played a role in this denial. The consular officer wrote on the 

application “no ties” and “previous refusals in Berlin.” 

September 19. Atta and Shehhi’s I-539 applications were received by the INS.

September 25. Hanjour returned to the Jeddah consulate and, apparently having listened 

to what the consular officer told him, submitted another application for a student visa. 

This time, Hanjour stated a desire to attend the ELS Language Center in Oakland, 

California. A consular official—probably the intake screener—wrote a note on his 

application indicating that Hanjour had been denied a visa under section 221(g) on 
14

September 10. The same consular officer who had interviewed Hanjour in connection 

with his September 10 application also processed this one. He recalled to us that Hanjour 

or someone acting on his behalf submitted an INS school enrollment form, or I-20—

required to qualify for a student visa—to the consulate late on September 25, 2000.49 “It 

came to me, you know, at the end of the day to look at it. I saw he had an I-20, and it [his 

visa] was issued.”50

State Department electronic records indicate that this approval allowed Hanjour to 

“overcome” his September 10 visa denial, another indication that multiple applications 

can be considered “one case.” State Department records erroneously recorded the visa 

issued to Hanjour as a B-1/B-2 (business/tourist) visa when, in fact, it was an F (student) 

visa that was printed and put in Hanjour’s passport.51 In addition, Hanjour had already 

received an approved change of status to attend this same English language school in 

1996. But that approval was granted by the INS in the United States, and the State 

Department had no record of it. The consular officer told us that if he had known this 

information, he might have refused Hanjour the visa. 

October 2000 

October 17. Hamza al Ghamdi, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2 

(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. His application was incomplete.52 Al 

Ghamdi listed his occupation as “student” but left blank the question asking the street 

address of his school. Ghamdi’s travel patterns indicated that he may have presented a 

passport containing fraudulent travel stamps associated with al Qaeda when he applied 

for this visa.53 The consular officer who adjudicated his case was not familiar with this 

kind of manipulation; in addition, he told us that because of the workload in Jeddah, he 

rarely had time to thumb through passports. Ghamdi was not interviewed, because 

nothing in his application raised concerns in the mind of the consular officer who 

adjudicated it and there was no hit in the CLASS system.54 His visa application was 

granted.

October 23. Mohand al Shehri, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2 

(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. His application was incomplete. Al 

Shehri listed his occupation as “student,” but listed the street address of his school as 

“Riyadh K.S.A.” He claimed he was a 21-year-old student who would be supporting 

himself in the United States.55 He was not interviewed, according to the officer who 

issued this visa, because “We only interviewed Saudis if there was a previous denial of a 

visa application or if there was something wrong with the application.”56 Shehri 

apparently raised no such concerns. The officer noted that the lack of handwritten notes 

on the application was a further indication that he had not interviewed Shehri.57

October 25. Binalshibh applied for a visa again in Berlin, Germany, this time for a 

student (F) visa to attend aviation school in Florida. He accurately indicated on his 

application form that he had been denied visas previously in Berlin and Sanaa. 

October 28. Ahmed al Nami, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2 

(tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Nami’s application was incomplete.58 He 
15

listed his occupations as “student” but did not provide a complete address for his school. 

He listed his intending address in the United States as “in Los Angeles.” Nami’s passport 

may have contained fraudulent travel stamps associated with al Qaeda.59 However, his 

passport did not survive, so we can not be sure. On his application, Nami indicated that 

“My friend Moshabab” would be traveling with him. 

On the same day, Mushabib al Hamlan, a Saudi and a friend of 9/11 hijacker Ahmed al 

Nami, acquired a two-year B1/B2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.60

Hamlan was selected to participate in the plot but backed out after obtaining his visa, 

perhaps at the urging of his family. 

October 29. Jarrah arrived back in the United States, entering in Tampa, Florida, from 

Frankfurt, Germany, on a tourist visa. He received a six-month length of stay in the 

United States. He was still in flight school.61

November 2000

November 1. Binalshibh was denied in Berlin yet again under 221(g) for lack of 

adequate documentation and failure to show sufficient ties to Germany. His application 

was incomplete, and his prior denials in Berlin and Sanaa provided powerful grounds for 

this denial. Consular officials wrote on this application, “Incomplete [application], 

refused in Sanaa and here, bad case.” Once again, there was no evidence that officials 

were concerned about terrorism. A citizen of a poor, developing country, with tenuous 

ties to Germany, Binalshibh was considered an intending immigrant and a bad visa risk.

November 6. Atta and Shehhi took their instrument rating airplane test at Huffman 

Aviation. Atta received a score of 90 in 122 minutes and Shehhi received a score of 75 in 

89 minutes.62 After passing this test, Atta and Shehhi were able to sign out planes. They 

did so on a number of occasions, often returning at 2:00 and 3:00 A.M. after logging four 

or five hours of flying time.63

November 12. Ahmad al Haznawi, a 20-year-old Saudi national, applied for and 

received a two-year B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.64 There is 

evidence that Haznawi may have presented a passport with fraudulent travel stamps 

associated with al Qaeda.65 Haznawi listed his occupation as “student” but left blank the 

line on which he was asked to supply the street address of his present school. He stated 

that he would provide financial support for his visit. He was not interviewed. 

Also on November 12, Saeed al Ghamdi, a Saudi national, sometimes known as “Jihad” 

al Ghamdi—not to be confused with the 9/11 hijacker of the same name—applied for a 

B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah. Ghamdi’s application was denied after he was 

interviewed by a consular officer who believed he was intending to immigrate to the 

United States. Ghamdi wrote on his application that he intended to stay in the United 

States for “12 months,” a red flag because the usual period of admission for tourists 

granted by INS inspectors at ports of entry was six months. Contemporaneous notes by 

consular staff, probably taken during his interview, state: “To stay one year . . . no job . . . 
16

graduated from H.S. last year . . . he has SR [Saudi rials] 10,000 only and staying one 

year! . . . Not working.” Ghamdi was denied under INA section 214(b), the intending 

immigrant provision. There is no evidence that terrorism concerns played a role in this 

denial.66

November 20. Majed Moqed, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2 

(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. His application was incomplete. He 

claimed to be a “student” but left blank the line on which he was asked to supply the 

street address of his present school.67 The officer who adjudicated his visa said they did 

not interview Moqed: “I would have written some notes on the application form[] if I 

had.”68 He was not interviewed because, according to the officer who issued the visa, 

“We only interviewed Saudis if there was a previous denial of a visa application or if 

there was something wrong with the application.”69 Incompleteness by itself evidently 

did not trigger an interview. 

November 21. Satam al Suqami, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2 

(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.70 There is very strong evidence that the 

passport Suqami submitted with this application had fraudulent travel stamps now 

associated with al Qaeda.71 Suqami left blank the line on which he was asked to supply 

the name and street address of his present employer. The consular officer who issued the 

visa said he interviewed Suqami because he described his present occupation as “dealer,” 

the word Saudis often put on their applications when they meant “businessman.” The 

officer testified that he asked Suqami a number of questions, including, he believes, who 

was paying for the trip.72 Although the officer stated that notes were always taken during 

interviews,73 none were written on Suqami’s application, raising the possibility that the 

officer’s memory of having conducted an interview was false. In any case, Suqami 

evidently raised no suspicions and his application was approved. 

November 25. Jarrah rented a private plane for a one-day trip from Miami to Nassau, 

Bahamas, with a couple of companions. There is no immigration departure record, but 

there is a record of his reentry into the country. At the general aviation terminal where 

Jarrah arrived, he was subjected to both an immigration and customs check, including an 

inspection of the plane by customs for the presence of drugs, contraband, and currency. 

Nothing unusual was found and Jarrah was once again admitted as a tourist for six 

months. Again, he was still in school despite having a B-1/B-2 visa.74

December 2000

December 8. Hanjour entered the United States for the final time at the 

Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport, six months after the entry of the 

other pilots. He never attended the ELS Language Center in Oakland, California, the 

stated destination on his second visa application of September 25, 2000. His records do 

not indicate the length of stay the primary immigration inspector gave him.75
17

December 12. Zakariya Essabar, a Moroccan who intended to participate in the plot, 

submitted the first of two visa applications in Berlin. He indicated that he intended to 

arrive in the United States on February 15, 2001.76

December 19. Atta and Shehhi took their commercial pilot license tests at Huffman 

Aviation, completing their schooling. Atta received a score of 93 in 116 minutes and 

Shehhi received a score of 73 in 99 minutes.77

2001

January 2001

January 4. Atta departed the United States for the first time, having overstayed his 

tourist visa by one month. Although his application for a change of his immigration status 

was still pending, once he departed the country the application was considered 

abandoned.78

January 5. Jarrah returned from Dusseldorf, Germany, landing at Newark, New Jersey, 

and flying onward to Tampa, Florida. He was admitted as a tourist for six months. His 

flight school education continued.79

January 10. Essabar was interviewed and was denied a visa under INA section 221(g), 

on the grounds that he provided no evidence of a job in or other ties to Germany. Essabar 

applied for a visa again on January 28, 2001, but there is no record of the State 

Department’s ever having acted on this second application. On the same day, Atta

returned from Madrid to Miami. The primary immigration inspector who screened him 

told the Commission that he had been working as a primary inspector for less than a year 

when Atta presented himself. He said he knew that if he took more time than 45 seconds 

to determine a visitor’s admissibility or if he made too many referrals to secondary 

inspection, he could receive a poor performance appraisal. During an interview with the 

Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG), in November 2001, 

the primary inspector recalled some of his encounter with Atta. He told the interviewer 

that Atta presented an Egyptian passport with a tourist/business visa and an INS 

student/school form indicating that he was attending school. The inspector determined 

that Atta needed either an F-1 visa to attend an academic school or an M-1 visa to attend 

a vocational school, and had neither. The official’s “inspection results report” recorded 

Atta’s statement that he had “turned in” a student/school form to the INS in an attempt to 

change his status, but that he “has not had a response [from the INS], meanwhile he’s 

attending flight training school, already in school for 5/6 months.”80

The inspector, however, had already begun to process Atta for admission into the United 

States before noticing the visa problem. The I-94 arrival record, which was stamped and 

stapled into Atta’s passport, indicated that the primary inspector initially approved a onemonth stay as a B-1 business visitor.81

The second red ink admission stamp (located on the top of Atta’s passport in the figure) 

was that of a B-1 visitor, but the length of stay was left blank. We know this was the 

work of the primary inspector, as the stamp bears his assigned number. The inspector told 

us that the blank length of stay on the admission stamp indicated that while he was almost 
18

finished processing Atta, he stopped, realizing that Atta needed more scrutiny.82 He sent 

him to a secondary immigration inspection for closer examination. 

The immigration inspectors the Commission interviewed understood that INS policy 

permitted a commercial pilot coming to the United States for ongoing training to be 

admitted as a business visitor for the time necessary to complete his training. However, 

an alien wishing to pursue such training needed a vocational student visa.83 The primary 

inspector initially thought that Atta was already a pilot who was seeking continuing 

education, and then decided that Atta was studying to become a pilot and had the wrong 

visa.

The ten-year veteran immigration inspector who conducted Atta’s secondary examination 

admitted him as a tourist for eight months, though Atta had said he was still attending 

school and though as a tourist his stay should be legally limited to six months. This 

inspector initially recalled some aspects of this inspection in late 2001, when he was 

interviewed by the DOJ OIG; he said then that Atta was referred to secondary inspection 

as a possible overstay on a B1/B2 tourist visa. However, he told the Commission he no 

longer had any memory of this inspection and could not recall whether he asked Atta for 

his I-20 student/school form, checked the school/student system to verify Atta’s 

information, or asked Atta whether he was a part-time or full-time student, was attending 

flight school, or was still in school. The same inspector told the DOJ OIG that he had 

checked INS computer databases for information on Atta and learned that the Egyptian 

had filed for a change of immigration status from tourist to student. He told the 

Commission that because the student tracking system at that time was “garbage”—full of 

information that was no longer valid and lacking updates—he would not have checked it 

to verify Atta’s story that he was still in school.84

Yet the inspector told the DOJ OIG that he knew Atta had filed a change of immigration 

status from a computer check of his records. The inspector seems to have concluded that 

this application was still pending and that Atta was admissible. But under INS policy, 

Atta abandoned his application when he left the country. Other inspectors we interviewed 

were aware of this policy. Thus, Atta’s entry into the United States with the wrong visa 

should have been grounds for his removal.85

The Commission sought to understand whether the secondary inspector’s understanding 

of Atta’s pending application affected the decision to admit him. In a subsequent 2002 

interview with DOJ OIG, the inspector stated that if an alien departed the United States 

prior to his or her application for change of status being granted, then that application is 

considered abandoned. If that alien then seeks to reenter the United States as a student, he 

or she must obtain the correct student visa. Thus, according to the secondary inspector, 

Atta should not have been admitted. However, in response to a Commission staff 

question the inspector said that he thought the applicant in such a case “would still be in 

status; a gray area.”86

In fact, this was not a gray area. Other inspectors we interviewed, including the primary 

inspector in this case, said that leaving the United States while an application for change 

of status was still pending made it necessary for the alien to get a new visa overseas. 

Indeed, the DOJ OIG concluded that the issue of the pending application was a red 
19

herring: all that mattered was whether Atta had the correct visa to enter the United States 

at the time he applied for entry.87

The secondary inspector admitted Atta as a B-2 tourist, which automatically set the 

length of stay at six months. Only a supervisor could vary this period, allowing a tourist 

to stay up to one year in the country. Every inspector we interviewed verified this. 

However, this inspector gave Atta eight months, until September 8, 2001, without 

supervisory approval. Thus, both Atta’s admission as a tourist and his length of stay were 

improper.88

In addition, Atta had overstayed his previous visa by one month when he departed the 

United States on January 4, 2001.89 That overstay should have been obvious to a 

secondary inspector tasked with giving a thorough look at Atta, for his passport would 

have contained an entry stamp into a foreign country from the week before, and an 

original U.S. admission stamp dated seven months earlier. Though the overstay did not 

make Atta automatically inadmissible, it could have been considered. But there is no 

indication that the secondary inspector who adjudicated Atta’s admission took his 

overstay into account.90 In contrast, other inspectors have told us that overstays are a 

typical travel pattern of an intending immigrant, and are normally a red flag for those 

attempting reentry.91

The secondary inspector also could have admitted Atta into the United States for 30 days 

for a fee of $170, requiring Atta to present paperwork from his school to prove his 

current student status within 30 days. However, the inspector told us he had not 

considered the option of a deferred inspection.92 Such an inspection would have placed 

Atta in a difficult position: because he was already finished with school, he would have 

been unable to present paperwork indicating that he was still legally a student. 

January 18. Shehhi arrived at JFK Airport in New York on Royal Moroccan Air from 

Casablanca.93 He was screened by a ten-year veteran of immigration inspections at 

airports and the New York City seaport.94 When Shehhi came up to the primary 

inspection counter, the “room was full, with numerous flights coming in at the same 

time.” The inspector told the Commission that she was suspicious that Shehhi might be 

an intending immigrant, noting from the stamps in his passport that he had left the United 

States just a week earlier after a six-month stay. She typed into the computer record: “Sub 

left one week ago after entry in May. Has extension and now returning for a few more 

months.” She referred Shehhi to a secondary immigration inspection for closer 

examination.95

The secondary inspector told the Commission that Shehhi wore conventional Western 

clothing, had glasses and facial hair, and “did not look like he had just come from boot 

camp.” Though he had behaved badly in primary inspection, where his refusal to comply 

with the inspector’s instruction to go to the secondary inspection room made an escort 

necessary, once there Shehhi waited until he was called and was not aggressive. About a 

dozen other visitors were called into secondary inspection in the ten minutes before 

Shehhi’s referral.96

The secondary immigration inspector said that Shehhi had completed the required arrival 

and customs forms, adding that Shehhi spoke English well during the course of the 10–12 

minute interview. “I had the impression Shehhi had money,” the inspector said. “I 
20

remember looking at his passport, and it showed he had been in and out of the United 

States and there were other travel stamps. I remember asking how much money he had—

he had a substantial amount, three credit cards and more than $2,000.”97

Shehhi also mentioned applying for an extension of stay in the United States to remain 

until September 8, 2001; after waiting months for an answer and not getting one, he had 

finally left. To the inspector, “that seemed reasonable.” The inspector told the 

Commission he was not aware that leaving the country while an immigration benefit 

application was pending amounted to abandoning that application.98

The inspector asked Shehhi the purpose of his trip to the United States, trying to 

determine if he intended to remain permanently, as the primary inspector suspected. 

Shehhi told the inspector that he was coming back to the United States for continued 

flight training, that he had previously attended Huffman Aviation School, and that he was 

finished with flight school but wanted to log more hours in the sky. The inspector thought 

Shehhi was seeking private flying lessons, but did not ask Shehhi for supporting 

documentation.99

The inspector did not recall whether Shehhi showed him any papers to verify his previous 

flight school attendance at Huffman Aviation, nor whether he had asked for such 

paperwork. “I didn’t have any doubt he did go to school, and I didn’t think he was trying 

to use his change of status application to remain here in the United States for illegitimate 

reasons. My belief was that he was coming back to log flight hours with a private 

instructor.” Under this inspector’s understanding of INS guidelines, a pilot here for a 

form of continuing education, such as private flight lessons, may be admitted as a 

business visitor. Although the baseline time at JFK International for business visitors was 

three months, Shehhi asked for four and got it.100

The inspection results tell a somewhat different story; they read: “Was in U.S. gaining 

flight hours to become a pilot. Admitted for four months.” They thus suggest that the 

inspector actually may have considered Shehhi a student, not already a pilot.

The difference between Shehhi being a student seeking to become a pilot or already was 

a pilot was not an insignificant nuance. According to immigration law applied at ports of 

entry, if Shehhi was already a pilot, the B-1 business entry he was granted was arguably 

legitimate. However, if Shehhi was a full-time student, his admission as a business visitor 

was erroneous. And because Shehhi, like Atta, had left the country while his application 

for a change of immigration status was still pending, this application should have been 

considered “abandoned.” In other words, Shehhi needed to obtain the proper student visa 

overseas in order to reenter the United States. The facts of this adjudication are simply 

not clear enough to reach a conclusion about the appropriateness of this entry.

January 26. Jarrah departed the United States for the fourth time.101

February 2001 

February 25. Jarrah enters for the fifth time at Newark as a business visitor, but still 

receives a six-month stay. This was unusual, as most inspectors told us that standard 

operating procedures were to give business visitors a stay of one or three months, 

depending on the port, and six months only when the visitor could document the purpose 

of the stay.102
21

March 2001

March 30. Jarrah departed for the fifth time.103

April 2001

April 12. Shehhi obtained a Florida driver’s license.104

April 13. Jarrah entered at Atlanta from Amsterdam and was granted a three and a half 

month stay on business.105

April 21. Ahmed al Nami acquired a new Saudi passport, #C505363, replacing the one 

(#C115007) he had used to acquire a visa on October 28, 2000, in Jeddah, a visa he never 

used. He may have acquired this new passport because there was evidence of travel to 

Afghanistan in his previous one.106

April 23. Nami applied for and received a B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah with 

his new passport. There is evidence from a handwritten note on his application that Nami 

was interviewed briefly, either by a consular officer or by a consular staff member, to 

clarify an entry on his application. The words “My friend Mosh” are crossed out under 

the question asking the “names and relationships of people traveling with you.” This is 

probably a reference to Mushabib al Hamlan, another potential 9/11 hijacker who applied 

for a visa with Nami on October 28, 2000. Nami also crossed out a box checked “no” 

under the question asking if he had ever applied for a U.S. visa previously, changing his 

answer to “yes.” It is not clear what prompted this change—possibly his brief interaction 

with a consular official—but it is accurate. However, he failed to complete his response 

and state where and when he had previously applied for a U.S. visa. Doing so would have 

revealed that he was applying for a new visa long before the expiration of the two-year 

visa he acquired the previous October. Nami’s action could have raised questions, had it 

been coupled with the fact that he was applying with a new passport. But it would not 

have been noticed by the consular officer who issued the visa, because Saudis were not 

required to fill in their applications fully, Saudis were rarely interviewed, and State’s 

name check system did not automatically call up prior visa issuances; it called up only 

prior refusals.107

April 23. Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami, both Saudis, entered together at 

Orlando from Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Suqami was the only Saudi muscle hijacker 

admitted on business, and only for one month. Shehri was admitted as a tourist for a sixmonth stay. Both were admitted by the same primary immigration inspector.108 Suqami’s 

passport survived the attack: a passerby picked it up from the World Trade Center and 

handed to a New York Police Department detective shortly before the towers 

collapsed.109 Later analysis showed that it contained what are now believed to be 

fraudulent travel stamps associated with al Qaeda.110 Upon reviewing color copies of the 

document, the inspector who admitted Suqami told the Commission he did not note any 

such fraud.111 Indeed, he could not have been expected to identify the fraud at the time of 

Suqami’s admission—it was not discovered by the intelligence community until after the 

attacks.
22

May 2001

May 2. Majed Moqed and Ahmed al Ghamdi arrived together at Dulles International 

Airport in Washington, D.C. Both Saudis were admitted as tourists for six months by 

different immigration inspectors. Ghamdi’s Customs declaration indicated that he had 

more than $10,000 with him upon entry, but the Customs inspector who processed him 

did not fill out the required additional electronic forms when money in excess of $10,000 

is brought into the United States.112

Also on this day, Shehhi arrived in Miami and was granted a six-month tourist stay.113

Meanwhile, Atta and, we believe, Jarrah were attempting to extend Jarrah’s length of 

stay to September 2001.

Atta’s walk-in inspection at the Mi ami Immigration District Office

On May 2, 2001, Atta and two companions stood in a long line at the Miami District 

Immigration Office. INS district offices adjudicate all types of immigration benefits 

inspections, including naturalization interviews, applications for permanent residency 

based on marriage to a U.S. citizen, and deferred inspections for students lacking the 

proper paperwork upon entry. But Atta had something else in mind. He wanted his 

companion, who was likely Jarrah, to obtain the same eight-month length of stay that he 

had (wrongfully) received in January.114

By late morning, Atta finally made it to the inspection desk. An inspector from Miami 

International Airport was getting ready to take a break for lunch at about 11:30 A.M.

when three men approached her at the counter. This inspector had worked primary and 

secondary inspections at airports, as well as of ship crews, since 1988 in Fort Lauderdale 

and Miami. However, because she had never before worked at this district office, she 

recalled the encounter with Atta vividly.115

One of Atta’s companions, proficient in English, spoke first. He told the inspector, “My 

friends have a question about their I-94 arrival records.” When she asked, “Do you need 

to see immigration?” he said no. The inspector then instructed him to go sit down and 

that she would help him with his friends, and he complied. She told them that the person 

needing help should write his name on the sign-in sheet. In large capital letters, he wrote, 

“ATTA.”116

Atta told the inspector that he wanted his friend to receive an eight-month length of stay 

as he had. The inspector recalled taking both passports to see if they had genuine visas. 

She also looked at the I-94 arrival records in the passports. Atta’s companion had 

received a six-month stay as a tourist, with an end date of September 8, 2001. She also 

noticed that Atta had been admitted as a tourist for eight months. During this time, Atta 

was quiet. She told Atta, “Someone gave you the wrong admission and I’m not giving 

your friend eight months.”117

The inspector then went to her supervisor, informed him that Atta had been granted an 

incorrect length of stay, and asked permission to roll it back to six months. The 

supervisor agreed. The inspector then tore the I-94 record out of Atta’s passport, and 
23

created a new I-94 for six months, which allowed Atta to remain in the United States 

until July 9, 2001. On the record she wrote: “I-94 issued in error at MIA [Miami 

International Airport]. New I-94 issued.” The inspector then took a red-inked admission 

stamp, rolled the date back to January 10, and stamped Atta as a B-2 tourist. She wrote in 

a length of stay until July 9, 2001, and handed Atta back his passport and new I-94 

record. Atta took the documents, said thank you, and left with his companions.118

May 2. Atta and Jarrah acquired Florida driver’s licenses.119

May 4. Waleed al Shehri obtained a Florida driver’s license.120

May 5. Waleed al Shehri acquired a duplicate Florida driver’s license, this time with a 

different address.121

May 16. Waleed al Shehri and Suqami again traveled together, this time out of the 

country to the Bahamas, where they reserved three nights at the Bahamas Princess 

Resort.122 They turned in their arrival record, which was now acting as an exit record, 

boarded the plane, and arrived in Freeport.123 The trip was intended to extend Suqami’s 

legal length of stay in the United States.124 Bahamian immigration refused the two entry, 

however, because neither had a Bahamian visa.125 They therefore had to return to their 

starting point, in this case Fort Lauderdale. Because they never entered the Bahamas, 

under U.S. immigration law they had never left the United States. After being refused 

entry by the Bahamian INS at Freeport, they were sent through U.S. “pre-clearance” 

before boarding the plane back to Miami. By making possible immigration inspections of 

U.S.-bound travelers prior to their arrival, preclearance helped ease the burden of 

admission at busy U.S. airports. These stations also prevented travelers deemed 

inadmissible from boarding U.S.-bound planes.126 In this preclearance process, 

immigration waived them through but customs stopped Shehri. The inspection lasted one 

minute; Shehri was not personally searched, nor was his luggage x-rayed. They boarded a 

plane and returned to Miami.127

May 20. Suqami joined the millions of overstays in the United States after failing to file 

for an extension of stay with the INS after he returned from the Bahamas. Had he been 

allowed into the Bahamas, upon his return to the United States he would have likely been 

granted an additional length of stay in the country as a tourist. As it was, he remained in 

illegal status until September 11. 

May 24. Jarrah obtained a duplicate Florida driver’s license.128

May 28. Hamza al Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami arrived together 

at Miami from Dubai, United Arab Emirates.129 The three Saudis were admitted as 

tourists for six months by different primary inspectors.130

June 2001

June 1. The Visa Express Program was introduced for all Saudi citizens applying for 

visas in Saudi Arabia in an effort to make the consular workload more manageable and to 

reduce the size of the crowds outside of the embassy. The concept was simple. Instead of 

going to the U.S. consulate to apply for a visa, the applicant filled out the form at one of 

ten approved travel agencies. After collecting the application, the visa application fee, 
24

and the applicant’s passport, the travel agency delivered these documents to the embassy 

in Riyadh or to the consulate in Jeddah, and picked up the package of documents the next 

day. If the application was approved, then the agency was responsible for returning the 

passport (now containing the visa) to the applicant. If the consular officials determined 

that an interview was necessary, then the travel agency was responsible for so notifying 

the applicant by providing him or her with a letter from the consular section. Applicants 

were rejected only after an in-person interview.131 (Visa Express will be discussed in 

further detail in chapter 5.)

June 8. Ahmad al Haznawi and Wail al Shehri arrived together at Miami from Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates. Both Saudis were admitted as tourists for six months by the same 

primary inspector.132

June 10. Saeed al Ghamdi acquired a new Saudi passport, #C573895, replacing the one 

(#B516222) he used to acquire a visa on September 4, 2000, in Jeddah. He may have 

acquired this new passport because there was evidence of travel to Afghanistan in his 

previous passport.133

June 12. Just like Nami (who applied April 23), Saeed al Ghamdi acquired a second 

two-year B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah. His application was incomplete and 

he was not interviewed. Ghamdi’s visa application indicated that he had never applied for 

a U.S. visa before, a curious similarity to Nami’s application.134 This was not true, since 

he had applied for and acquired a visa on September 4, 2000. However, the State 

Department computer system was not set up to catch this false statement; as noted above, 

it called up only prior refusals. Ghamdi’s application was submitted by Minhal Travel 

and processed through the Visa Express program.135 We considered the possibility that 

the false answer reflected a mistake by the travel agency personnel, but the same 

signature appears on both visa applications, and State records indicate that the September 

application was submitted in person. Thus, it appears that Ghamdi was directly involved 

in preparing the June visa application containing the false statement. He may have 

omitted information about his prior visa in order not to raise suspicion about his new visa 

application in his new passport—without the travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan—when 

his old visa, which was multiple entry, was still valid.

June 13. Mihdhar applied for and received his second B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in 

Jeddah. Mihdhar’s passport had been issued only 13 days earlier and, like up two other 

hijackers, it contained an indicator of possible terrorist affiliation still unknown at that 

time to U.S. intelligence officials. His application was incomplete. For example, he listed 

his occupation as “businessman,” but left blank the name and street address of his present 

employer. Mihdhar’s application also indicated that he had not previously applied for a 

U.S. visa or been to the United States, though he had in fact traveled to the United States 

on a B-1/B-2 visa issued in April 1999 (also in Jeddah). Thus, his application contained 

two false statements. However, the State Department’s computer system was not set up to 

catch these false statements by bringing up Mihdhar’s prior visa history. Mihdhar’s 

application was processed through the Visa Express program, and his application was 

submitted by Al Tayyar Travel. It is possible that these questions were answered falsely 

because of a mistake by the travel agency personnel; and unlike Ghamdi’s, Mihdhar’s 
25

application was signed only on the line for the “preparer” of the application. It is unclear 

why Mihdhar or the travel agency would wish to hide the fact of his prior travel. Mihdhar 

may have feared that it could compromise operational security of the 9/11 plot. He also 

may not have wanted to highlight that he had obtained a new passport since his previous 

visa.136

Consular officials have told us that evidence of the prior visas or travel to the United 

States actually would have reduced concern that the applicants were intending to 

immigrate. Thus, if the officers had learned the truth about these issues—and received an 

adequate explanation for the mistakes on the applications—they likely would have had no 

good reason to deny visas to these hijackers. On the other hand, if they had interviewed 

Mihdhar, Nami, and Ghamdi and received suspicious answers to their questions, the 

outcome might well have been different. 

June 18. The INS belatedly approved Nawaf al Hazmi’s extension of stay to January 15, 

2001. Technically, the application was late, since the INS received it in July 2000, after 

his length of stay had expired; they therefore should not have adjudicated it. However, 

even with this late adjudication Hazmi was still an overstay as of January 16, 2001. 

Hazmi never knew that his extension had been approved—the notice was returned as 

“undeliverable” on March 25, 2002.

June 18. Abdul Aziz al Omari, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2 

(tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. There is strong evidence that Omari 

presented a passport containing the travel stamps now known to be associated with al 

Qaeda when he applied for this visa since the fraudulent stamps predate this application. 

Moreover, his application was incomplete, and he listed his home address as a hotel in 

Jeddah. He was not interviewed. His application was processed through the Visa Express 

program and was submitted by Attar Travel.137

June 18. Fayez Banihammad, an Emirati, applied for and received a B-1/B-2 

(tourist/business) visa in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Banihammad’s passport was 

only five days old. His application was incomplete; a number of sections were left 

completely blank.138 The consular officer who adjudicated this visa has stated that 

interviews were almost never required of UAE nationals in connection with their visa 

applications, that the UAE was considered a welfare state that took very good care of its 

citizens, and that the UAE was treated as a de facto visa waiver country.139 Banihammad, 

a former immigration officer in the UAE, was not interviewed.140

June 19. Marwan al Shehhi acquired a duplicate Florida driver’s license.141

June 20. Salem al Hazmi, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2 

(tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. His application was incomplete, and he 

listed his occupation as “unemployed.” The passport he supplied was four days old and 

contained an indicator of possible terrorist affiliation. 142 His application, processed 

through the Visa Express program, was submitted by Ace Travel. According to the 

consular officer who approved this application, the fact that Hazmi was “unemployed” 
26

was not of concern “because they have a terrible unemployment problem in Saudi Arabia, 

and a lot of people have money but they don’t have jobs.”143 Although unemployment 

would have been a “big deal” in another country, the officer said, Saudis like Hazmi 

“weren’t looking for jobs even though they were unemployed.”144

June 25. Nawaf al Hazmi obtained a Florida driver’s license.145

June 26. Hamza al Ghamdi obtained a Florida identification card.146

June 27. Banihammad and Saeed al Ghamdi arrived at Orlando from Dubai. The two 

were processed by different primary inspectors. Banihammad was admitted as a tourist 

for six months.147 Although he handed in customs and immigration forms using two 

different names, the anomaly was not noted, because customs and INS inspectors did not 

review each other’s forms. The immigration inspector who admitted Banihammad told 

the Commission that in the 45 seconds allowed for processing each visitor, it was not 

possible to fully check the contents of the forms. He said that if he had noticed the two 

different names forms he would have referred Banihammad to a secondary inspection, 

suspecting that the Emirati was attempting to hide his true identity.148

Saeed al Ghamdi, a Saudi, was admitted as a tourist for six months, but only after a 

secondary inspection. The Orlando primary inspector who referred him for further 

examination had worked as an immigration inspector for three years. He said that he 

insisted that a visitor communicate with him in order to be admitted and that he always 

asked to see a return ticket. The inspector also told us that he looked closely to see 

whether the Customs declaration and I-94 arrival form listed a full address of intended 

destination. Ghamdi met none of these requirements.149

Saeed al Ghamdi’s June 27, 201 Customs declaration reviewed by the primary 

inspector during his adjudication.

The inspector’s inspection record reads, “Subject speaks very little English. No return 

ticket, no address listed; please question.”150 His Customs declaration, listing $500 for a 

stay of one month, was, according to the primary inspector, “pushing it a little bit, along 

with the fact that he didn’t know where he was going.” The inspector confirmed that he 

did not have the discretion to give Ghamdi the one-month stay he sought—the law 

required a mandatory six-month stay for tourists traveling on a visa. The inspector 

referred Ghamdi to secondary inspection so an interpreter could attempt to flesh out his 

purpose in coming to the United States.151

In secondary inspection, Ghamdi convinced a different inspector that he was a tourist and 

admissible. His secondary inspection report reads: “Tourist. Valid docs. Sufficiently 

financed. B-2, six months.” Although the inspector who admitted Ghamdi does not recall 

the inspection, which lasted ten minutes, he told the Commission that he did not normally 

consider money a valid criterion for determining admissibility. He told us that Ghamdi 

must have had credit cards to supplement the $500 in cash he was carrying. The inspector 

said he was not concerned that Ghamdi’s arrival record failed to list an exact address; 

central Florida is overflowing with hotel rooms and thus a tourist need not have precise 

lodging to be admissible. Ghamdi’s travel documents looked valid to him as well.152
27

June 29. Abdul Aziz al Omari and Salem al Hazmi arrived at JFK Airport in New 

York from Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Both Saudis were admitted as tourists for six 

months by the same immigration inspector.153 Omari’s passport was doctored, containing 

what we believe are the same fraudulent travel stamps associated with al Qaeda.154 The 

passport survived the attacks on the World Trade Center because Omari’s luggage never 

made it onto the plane when he transferred from his flight from Portland, Maine. Salem al 

Hazmi’s passport contained an indicator of possible terrorist affiliation. We know this 

because a digital image of Hazmi’s passport was found on a hard drive in a safehouse in 

Pakistan.155

Ahmed al Nami obtained a Florida state identification card.156

July 2001 

July 2. Hamza al Ghamdi obtained a Florida driver’s license; Mohand al Shehri, a 

Florida identification card. Moqed and Salem al Hazmi acquired USA identification 

cards in July.157 The Hazmi brothers’ identifications were found in the rubble at the 

Pentagon and appeared genuine upon examination.158

July 3. Wail al Shehri acquired a Florida identification card.159

July 4. Mihdhar reentered the United States at JFK Airport.160 He was on no watchlist, 

though he should have been watchlisted in January 2000. He was admitted as a business 

visitor for three months—the standard at JFK for a business entry.161 His passport 

contained an indicator or possible terrorist affiliation. 162 Two and a half years later, the 

inspector who admitted Mihdhar on July 4, 2001, still could not identify the indicator, as 

the information has yet to be unclassified and disseminated to the field. She did note, 

however, that Mihdhar’s passport, which had been acquired a month earlier, lacked an 

expiration date; that absence, she told us, could have been a bar to admission had it been 

noticed.163

July 4. Mohamed al Kahtani, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2 

(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He was processed through Visa Express. 

There is no evidence that Kahtani was interviewed.164

July 5. In the West Wing, the Counterterrorism Security Group of the NSC, headed by 

Richard Clarke, hosted an emergency CIA briefing for operational agencies, including 

INS, Customs, U.S. Secret Service, FBI, FAA, and Coast Guard. The INS and Customs 

sent two people each to the briefing; none were senior managers. Only one of them had 

heard any threat reporting on al Qaeda prior to this meeting. The attendees said the 

briefer told them that there was to be no dissemination of the information discussed at the 

meeting. The discussion focused on the potential of an overseas target, but a domestic 

attack was not ruled out.165 An NSC official recalls a somewhat different emphasis, 

saying that attendees were asked ti take the information back to their home agencies and 

“do what you can” with it, subject to classification and distribution restrictions. 

The midlevel INS intelligence analyst who attended the meeting, who had never been to 

the White House before, recalled in her interview with us that during the meeting the 
28

briefer discussed the possibility of “Mideastern” terrorists attempting entry into the 

United States using European passports. This same analyst summarized the meeting in a 

report, briefed her boss, and called the White House after the meeting to request 

declassification of the information so that she might develop a threat advisory for the 

ports of entry. She never received a response. Nor did the acting commissioner of the INS 

at the time, Kevin Rooney, ever hear about the meeting or a potential threat from al 

Qaeda. However, the Customs attendee at the meeting, somewhat familiar with the 

atmosphere of threat at this time, decided that the information was important to get to all 

inspectors in the field through the shared customs and INS computer system, TECS, and 

prepared a “Terrorism Advisory—Heightened Threat Environment.”166

July 6. The threat advisory compiled by the Customs officer contained unclassified 

information that supported the classified information briefed by the CIA the previous 

day. The message was received by all immigration and customs personnel at ports of 

entry, but was addressed only to Customs employees. It did not contain any operational 

information about persons, places, or travel documents. The alert listed five ongoing U.S. 

trials of radical Islamic terrorists and warned: 

U.S. Customs personnel are requested to be vigilant during the summer months 

against potential threats from foreign terrorists against U.S. interests domestically 

and abroad. Recent terrorist trials and convictions (noted below) have created an 

environment of heightened animosity towards the U.S. from extremists looking 

for an opportunity to attack. If you encounter suspicious activity suggesting a 

potential terrorist attack follow your established security procedures, coordinate 

with the local office of Investigations and advise Headquarters, Anti-Terrorism 

Intelligence Section.167

July 7. Atta departed the country, as the abbreviated length of stay he received from the 

Miami District Office inspector expired on July 9.168

July 10. Haznawi obtained a Florida driver’s license with a learner’s permit. Jarrah

acquired a duplicate Florida driver’s license.169 Saeed al Ghamdi and Banihammad got 

Florida state identification cards. Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, and Omari acquired USA 

identification cards.170

July 17. Atta’s application to change his immigration status from tourist to student was 

approved to September 1, 2001. The application was approved by the same person who 

adjudicated Shehhi’s change of status application in September 2000.171

July 19. Atta entered the United States for the last time, returning from Madrid on July 

19 at Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport. Atta was admitted as a business visitor 

until November 12, 2001.172 The primary inspector who screened him did not recall the 

entry.173 Because Atta had only been out of the United States for three weeks during the 

previous 13 months, he should have been flagged as an intending immigrant and was a 

candidate for a secondary inspection. There was no secondary inspection, however, and 

Atta was now legally in the United States until the day of the planned attack.
29

July 23. Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (KSM), a Pakistani and the chief tactical planner and 

coordinator of the 9/11 attacks, obtained a B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa to visit the 

United States.174 Although he was not a Saudi citizen and we do not believe he was in 

Saudi Arabia at the time, he applied for a visa using a Saudi passport under the alias of 

“Abdulrahman al Ghamdi.” On his application, KSM listed his address in the United 

States as “New York.” We believe someone else submitted his application, passport, and 

a photo to the U.S. embassy in Riyadh through the Visa Express program from the travel 

agency Minhal Travel,175 the same agency used by Saeed al Ghamdi for his June 12 

application.176 Because he used an alias, KSM obtained a visa even though he was on the 

TIPOFF terrorist watchlist since 1996. There is no evidence that KSM ever used this visa 

under this alias to enter the United States. 

Acquisition of Virginia identification cards. Three Salvadoran immigrants living in 

Virginia, two illegally and one as a lawful permanent resident, were found guilty of 

helping four September 11 operatives use fraudulent documentation to obtain Virginia 

identification documents. Two were convicted of helping Ahmed al Ghamdi and Abdul

Aziz al Omari obtain fraudulent residency certificates.177 Another was convicted of 

providing false residency information on behalf of Hanjour and Mihdhar after being 

solicited by the two hijackers at a 7-Eleven in Falls Church, Virginia. For a fee, the 

Salvadoran falsely certified his old Virginia address as the residence of the hijackers.178

These residency certificates were then used to support their applications for Virginia 

identification cards issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles on August 1 and 2, 

2001, respectively.179 The Salvadoran’s address was also recycled by Moqed and Salem

al Hazmi to use on their Virginia identification cards issued on August 2, 2001.180

Jarrah followed suit on August 29, using a fictitious residency address and a 

certification of that address by Hanjour, who again used the address provided to him on 

August 1, 2001 to acquire his Virginia identification card.181 One of the men charged in 

these cases recognized these hijackers as having been together at the Arlington, Virginia, 

DMV on August 2, 2001.182 In all, the five hijackers based their Virginia identification 

documents on the residency information of one bribed Salvadoran. 

August 2001 

August 1. Mihdhar and Hanjour fraudulently obtained Virginia identification cards in 

Falls Church. Ahmed al Ghamdi and Moqed obtained USA identification cards in 

August as well.183

August 2. Ahmed al Ghamdi, Moqed, Salem al Hazmi, and Omari acquired Virginia 

identification cards, with help of Mihdhar and Hanjour. All of these identifications were 

obtained fraudulently. 

August 4. Mohamed al Kahtani, a Saudi, the only operative other than Mihdhar who 

appears to have attempted a solo entry, arrived on August 4, 2001 at Orlando, Florida. He 

was also the only operative to be refused entry to the United States.184 Records indicate 

that Atta was waiting for him at Orlando International while Kahtani was in secondary 

immigration inspection. Atta did not leave the Orlando airport until after it was clear that 

Kahtani was going back home.185
30

Both the primary and secondary inspectors remembered Kahtani well. Records indicate 

that Kahtani presented a Saudi passport with a two-year U.S. tourist visa. The primary 

inspector said that she recalled Kahtani for two reasons: he was the first Saudi she had 

ever encountered in her four years at Orlando that claimed to not speak English and his 

customs and arrival forms were not filled out. More subjectively, he made the inspector 

feel uneasy. Because she was unable to adequately communicate with Kahtani, she 

referred him to secondary inspection.186 The secondary inspector who refused to admit 

Kahtani into the United States testified before the Commission on January 26, 2004.187

The secondary inspector who recommended and gained approval from his supervisor to 

deny Kahtani entry developed his interviewing skills as a 26-year veteran of the U.S. 

Army, through limited INS training, and ten years of experience conducting primary and 

secondary inspections at Miami and Orlando airports. The inspector noted Kahtani’s 

hostility from the moment he called his name through the hour and a half spent 

interviewing him with the help of a Department of Justice translator. Kahtani was cleancut with a military build. He had no return ticket and became threatening when asked 

where he was going, how long he was going to stay, and who was meeting him. Although 

he had enough cash for a ticket home, he did not have any credit cards.

Kahtani’s answers to questions kept changing. Without a return ticket and limited funds, 

the secondary inspector sought to exclude him as an intending immigrant. The inspector’s 

real concern, however, was that Kahtani was up to no good. The inspector told the 

Commission in his written testimony: 

My first question to the subject (through the interpreter) was why he 

was not in possession of a return airline ticket. The subject became 

visibly upset and in an arrogant and threatening manner, which 

included pointing his finger at my face, stated that he did not know 

where he was going when he departed the United States. What first 

came to mind at this point was that this subject was a “hit man.” When 

I was in the Recruiting Command, we received extensive training in 

questioning techniques. A “hit man” doesn’t know where he is going 

because if he is caught, that way he doesn’t have any information to 

bargain with.188

This inspector had noted on prior occasions that Saudis coming through Orlando had a 

reputation for spending a lot of money at Disney World. Denying a Saudi entry was 

unusual, and inspectors told us they were generally concerned about the repercussions of 

taking such a step. However, after Kahtani refused to answer any questions under oath, 

the inspector decided to seek his supervisor’s approval to recommend that Kahtani be 

barred as an “expedited removal,” meaning that he could be deported without a hearing. 

After the inspector was questioned, approval to remove Kahtani was granted. The 

inspector convinced Kahtani to pay his own way home, saving paperwork and 

government funds.189

Because an “adverse action” was taken against Kahtani, he was required to be digitally 

photographed and fingerprinted through the INS biometric system. (This action would 

help to quickly verify Kahtani’s identity when he was detained in Afghanistan after 9/11.) 

His passport was copied, although the inspector noted no fraudulent manipulations. In 
31

fact, Kahtani’s passport does contain a stamp listed as fraudulent and associated with al 

Qaeda.190 The inspector did not check Kahtani’s luggage.

August 9. Shehhi’s application to change his immigration status from tourist to student 

was approved through September 1, 2001. 

August 23. The CIA sent a classified electronic message to the State Department, FBI, 

INS and the Customs Service, recommending that Mihdhar and Hazmi be added to the 

watchlist database accessible to the INS and Customs. They were suspected terrorists.191

August 24. Both Hazmi and Mihdhar were entered into separate lookouts. These 

lookouts are automatically checked when passports are scanned at ports of entry. The 

lookouts were identical, warning of “possible travel to the U.S.” Immigration inspectors 

were instructed to refer them to secondary immigration inspection and to notify 

investigations and intelligence divisions at headquarters if they attempted to enter the 

United States. In addition, their passport numbers and travel itinerary were to be 

recorded.192 These lookouts were not used by U.S. airlines to screen passengers seeking 

to fly on domestic flights. 

August 27. Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, the nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, applied for a 

U.S. visa in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Ali’s application stated that he intended to 

enter the United States on September 4, 2001, for “one week.” As a Pakistani visa 

applicant in a third country, he would have received close scrutiny from U.S. officials. In 

any event, it was deemed possible that he intended to immigrate, and accordingly he was 

denied a visa under section 214(b).193

August 27. Hamza al Ghamdi acquired a duplicate Florida driver’s license.194

August 29. Jarrah obtained a Virginia identification card, with the help of Hanjour and 

Mihdhar.195

August 31. A new listing for Mihdhar was placed in an INS and Customs lookout 

database, describing him as “armed and dangerous” and someone who must be referred to 

secondary inspection.196

Identification Documents of the 9/11 Hijackers 

Mohamed Atta 

FL DL, 05/02/01 

Marwan al Shehhi 

FL DL, 04/12/01 

FL DL duplicate, 6/19/01 

Khalid al Mihdhar 

CA DL, 04/05/00 

USA ID card, 07/10/01 

VA ID card, 08/01/01 

Nawaf al Hazmi 

CA DL, 04/05/00 

FL DL, 06/25/01 

USA ID card, 07/10/01 

VA ID card, 08/02/01 
32

Hani Hanjour 

AZ DL, 11/29/91 

FL ID card, 04/15/96 

VA ID card, 08/01/01 

Failed VA DL test, 08/02/01 

MD ID card, 09/05/01 

Ziad Jarrah 

FL DL, 05/02/01 

FL DL duplicate 5/24/01 

VA ID card, 08/29/01 

Satam al Suqami 

No DL or ID card 

Waleed al Shehri 

FL DL, 05/04/01 

(duplicate issued with different address, 

05/05/01)

Ahmed al Ghamdi 

USA ID card, 07/2001 

VA ID card, 08/02/2001 

Majed Moqed 

USA ID card, 07/2001 

VA ID card, 08/02/2001 

Hamza al Ghamdi 

FL ID card, 06/26/01 

FL DL, 07/02/01 

(duplicate issued 08/27/01) 

Mohand al Shehri 

FL ID card, 07/02/01 

Ahmed al Nami 

FL DL, 06/29/01 

Wail al Shehri 

FL DL, 07/03/01 

Ahmed al Haznawi 

FL DL, 07/10/00 

(duplicate issued 09/07/01) 

Fayez Banihammad 

FL ID, 07/10/01 

Saeed al Ghamdi 

FL ID card, 07/10/01 

Salem al Hazmi 

USA ID card, 07/01/01197

VA ID card, 08/02/01 

Abdul Aziz al Omari 

USA ID card, 07/10/2001 

VA ID card, 08/02/2001 

September 2001 

September 4. The State Department used its visa revocation authority under section 

221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to revoke Mihdhar’s visa under section 

212(A)(3)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for his participation in terrorist 

activities.198

September 5. Hanjour obtained a Maryland identification card.199

The same day, the INS entered the September 4 notice of revocation of Mihdhar’s visa 

into the INS lookout system. State identified Mihdhar as a potential witness in an FBI 

investigation, and inspectors were told not to detain him.200
33

September 7. Brothers Salem and Nawaf al Hazmi, along with Moqed, requested that 

their Virginia identification cards be reissued. Haznawi obtained a duplicate Florida 

driver’s license.201

September 11. As the hijackers boarded four flights, American Airlines Flights 11 and 

77, and United Airlines Flights 93 and 175, at least six used U.S. identification 

documents acquired in the previous months, three of which were fraudulently obtained in 

northern Virginia.202 Suqami, the only hijacker who did not have a state-issued 

identification, used his Saudi passport as check-in identification for American Airlines 

Flight 11.203

Findings of Fact - Visas 

When we examine the outcomes of the 9/11 conspirators’ engagement with the visa 

issuance process, we see they are consistent with a system focused on excluding 

intending immigrants and dependent on a name check of a database to search for 

criminals and terrorists. When hijackers or conspirators appeared to be intending 

immigrants, as happened most often when applicants were from poorer countries, they 

were denied a visa. If they met that threshold, however, and the name check came up 

clean, there was little to prevent them from entering the United States. Among our 

findings:

 Fourteen of the 19 September 11 hijackers obtained new passports shortly before 

they applied for their U.S. visas. 

 Three of the hijackers, Khalid al Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, and Salem al Hazmi, 

presented with their visa applications passports that contained an indicator of 

possible terrorist affiliation. We know now that Mihdhar and Salem al Hazmi 

each possessed at least two passports, all with this indicator. 

 There is strong evidence that two of the hijackers, Satam al Suqami and Abdul 

Aziz al Omari, when they applied for their visas presented passports that 

contained fraudulent travel stamps that have been associated with al Qaeda. There 

is reason to believe that three of the remaining hijackers presented such altered or 

manipulated passports as well. 

 Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals.

 Two of the Saudi 9/11 hijackers (brothers Waleed and Wail al Shehri) may have 

obtained their passports legitimately or illegitimately with the help of a family 

member who worked in the passport office. 

 Two of the hijackers were issued visas in Berlin; two were issued visas in the 

United Arab Emirates. The remaining 15 were issued a total of 18 visas in Saudi 

Arabia, 14 of which were issued in Jeddah (11 by the same consular officer), and 

4 in Riyadh.204
34

 Of the 23 hijacker visa applications, five were destroyed routinely along with 

other documents before 9/11 and before their significance was known. The visa 

applications of Nawaf al Hazmi, Khalid al Mihdhar (in 1999), Mohamed Atta, 

Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah were destroyed. 

 All 19 of the still-existing hijacker applications were incomplete in some way, 

with a data field left blank or not answered fully.

 Twenty-two of the 23 hijacker applications were approved.205

 Only two of the hijackers appear to have been interviewed at the visa stage.

 Of the 15 Saudi hijackers, 4 acquired their visas after the creation of the Visa 

Express Program in June 2001. 

 Eight other conspirators in the plot attempted to acquire U.S. visas during the 

course of the plot; three of them succeeded. 

 Of the three who succeeded, one was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind 

of the 9/11 plot, who obtained a visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in July 2001 under 

an alias. The other two who succeeded were Mushabib al Hamlan, who ultimately 

did not participate, and Mohamed al Kahtani, who was refused entry into the 

United States.

 Of the five conspirators who failed to obtain visas—Tawfiq bin Attash (Khallad), 

Ramzi Binalshibh, Saeed al Ghamdi, Zakariya Essabar, and Ali Abdul Aziz Ali—

none were denied because consular officials believed they were potential 

terrorists. They were denied visas either because consular officials believed they 

might be intending immigrants or because they had failed to submit documents 

supporting their application.

 Of these conspirators who failed to obtain visas, two were Yemeni, one was 

Moroccan, one was a Pakistani, and one was a Saudi. Their visa applications were 

denied in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany. 

 In summary, a total of 27 individuals—hijackers and other conspirators—

attempted to obtain visas during the course of the 9/11 plot. These individuals 

submitted a total of 35 applications. Of these, 25 were approved. 

1

 Hani Hanjour was the first 9/11 hijacker to acquire a U.S. visa and come to the United States. He entered 

four times before September 11, three times to seek a U.S. education. Immigration records for Hanjour 
35

indicate that he acquired a B-2, or tourist, visa in Saudi Arabia before traveling to the United States in 

September 1991 and March 1996. Records of Hanjour’s earlier visa applications were destroyed at the 

Jeddah post. DOS memo from Richard Baltimore, Consul General, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Nov. 28, 2001, 

describing a search that recovered “all applications and documents available on file relating to issuance of 

their [the 9/11 hijackers’] visas,” and stating that Hanjour’s earliest application was his 1997 visa 

application. See also Consular Officer No. 5 interview (Mar. 2, 2004), describing how, generally, Jeddah 

post kept visa applications for two years. Hanjour entered the United States on these visas within a month 

of acquiring them on October 3, 1991, and Apr. 2, 1996. There is no record as to when Hanjour left the 

country after his first visit, although he was permitted a six-month stay. INS record, NIIS record of 

Hanjour, Oct. 3, 1991 and Apr. 2, 1996. 

Hanjour’s March 1996 tourist visa was issued with a notation on the application stating 

“prospective student, school not yet selected.” INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Apr. 2, 1996 with visa 

issuance date of Mar. 19, 1996. Records indicate that when Hanjour returned on April 2, 1996, he received 

another six-month length of stay as a tourist. INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Apr. 2, 1996 with length 

of stay until Oct. 1, 1996. On June 7, 1996, Hanjour filed an INS I-539 application to change his 

immigration status from tourist to academic student to attend the ELS Language Center in Oakland, 

California. During this time, Hanjour also had contact with the Caldwell Flight Academy in New Jersey 

and the Sierra Academy in Oakland. Caldwell Flight Academy record of Hanjour, June 6, 2001, and Sierra 

Academy of Aeronautics record of Hanjour, Sept. 3, 1996. The application was quickly approved 20 days 

later, on June 27, 1996, and allowed Hanjour to stay in the United States until May 20, 1997. INS record, I539 Application to Change Nonimmigrant Status of Hanjour, May 24, 1996. Hanjour attended the Sierra 

Academy from September 3 to September 9, 1996. Well before his length of stay expired, Hanjour departed 

the United States in November 1996. INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour April 2, 1996 with date of 

departure of Nov. 26, 1996. 

On his November 1997 visa application, Hanjour answered “no” to the question “Have you ever 

applied for a U.S. visa before, whether immigrant or nonimmigrant?” He also answered “no” to the 

question “Have you ever been in the U.S.A.?” DOS record, visa application of Hanjour, Nov. 2, 1997. It is 

difficult to establish the intent behind these false statements. The application does bear a signature that 

appears identical to the signature on Hanjour’s two 2000 visa applications. DOS record, visa applications of 

Hanjour, Sept. 10 and Sept. 25, 2000. However, the application form also indicated that it was prepared by 

“Siddiqi/Samara Travel.” DOS record, visa application of Hanjour, Nov. 2, 1997. Thus, the false statements 

may have been made inadvertently by a travel agent who filled out the form on Hanjour’s behalf. The 

consular officer who adjudicated Hanjour’s 1997 visa application interviewed him on November 2, 1997. 

This officer said that they would interview 50–60 percent of the Saudi applicants. DOS Office of Inspector 

General Memorandum of Conversation (OIG MOC) with Consular Officer No. 5, Feb. 5, 2003. The officer 

who interviewed him about his application did not recall many details of the interview, but was able to 

reconstruct some aspects of it from notes on the visa application. DOS OIG MOC with Consular Officer 

No. 5, Feb. 5, 2003. The officer said he would not have known about Hanjour’s prior travel to the United 

States unless it was reflected in his passport. The officer also said he could not understand why Hanjour 

would have sought to cover up prior travel to the United States, adding, “It’s perplexing that they would 

hide that because it works in their favor.” Consular Officer No. 5 interview (Mar. 2, 2004). He did say, 

though, that a Saudi who had been to the United States twice before, as Hanjour apparently had been, and 

who then applied to go to the United States for English studies would have “raise[d] an eyebrow” because a 

student visa applicant must demonstrate that he or she has made reasonable progress in their studies. Ibid. 

The officer said underperforming Saudi students were denied visas on some occasions. Ibid. In general, the 

officer told us, they felt they could make visa adjudications with only the basic biographical information 

Saudis typically provided. However, the officer made a point of telling us that “it bothered me; it disturbed 

me” to accept so many incomplete applications from Saudis. When they raised it at post, they were told by 

the local staff, “Well, we have always done it this way.” Ibid. There is no evidence they sought to raise the 

question with their superiors. 

Hanjour traveled to the United States on November 16, 1997 on that visa and was granted a twoyear length of stay by an immigration inspector. The visa allowed Hanjour to attend the ELS Language 

Centers in Florida. But Hanjour instead began flight training at Cockpit Resource Management Airline 

Training Center in Scottsdale, Arizona. Seven months later, on June 16, 1998, Hanjour filed an I-539, 

seeking a change of status from academic student (F-1) to M1 vocational student (M-2) to attend the 
36

Cockpit Resource Management from July 30, 1998 to July 29, 1999. Eight months later, the INS asked 

Hanjour to supply supporting evidence for his request. INS record, I-539 Application to Change 

Nonimmigrant Status of Hanjour, June 9, 1998, and INS record, I-539 Notice of Action of Hanjour, June 

16, 1998. The application was not approved until Jan. 16, 2001, for a retroactive length of stay from July 

30, 1998, to July 29, 1999. Having attended the flight school and received a commercial pilot’s license 

from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in April 1999 without ever receiving INS approval to 

change his status, Hanjour left the country that month. For flight school attendance and FAA approval, see 

Penttbom Summary, Feb. 29, 2004. INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Nov. 16, 1997, with a departure 

date of April 28, 1999. His I-539 was not approved until January 16, 2001. By that point, Hanjour had 

already acquired a new academic visa and reentered the United States for his last time. DOS record, Visa 

Application of Hanjour, Sept. 25, 2000; INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Dec. 8, 2000.

2

 INS memo, Ken Elwood, Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner, Office of Field Operations to the 

field, Nov. 11, 1998. 

3

 DOS record, NIV Applicant Detail of Nawaf al Hazmi, Nov. 19, 2001. 

4

 FBI record, copy of Nawaf al Hazmi’s passport. 

5

 DOS record, visa application of Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf, April 3, 1999. 

6

 Ibid. 

7

 Ibid. Yemenis has a 66 percent refusal rate for “B” visas in fiscal year 1999. DOS record, “Visa Issuance 

and Refusal Data for the Country of Yemen,” June 18, 2004. 8

 Khallad claims he applied for a visa before the 1999 application. DOS has searched for this application 

using his real name and known aliases, but has been unable to locate any records supporting this claim. 

However, the records could have been destroyed and no electronic record retained. 9

 DOS record, NIV Applicant Detail of Khalid al Mihdhar, Nov. 8, 2001; Copy of Khalid al Mihdhar’s 

passport number B721156.. 

10 FBI Penttbom Timeline, Dec. 5, 2003. 

11 A consular officer serving in Jeddah at this time told Commission staff that Saudi citizens were 

considered security risks by Jeddah consular officers, that they interviewed “the majority” of Saudi males 

between the ages of 16 and 40, and that they were not shy about turning down Saudi male visa applicants 

on security grounds—including applicants whom the officers felt had no good reason to be going to the 

United States. This officer told us he would be “shocked” to learn that they had not interviewed Saudi 

males like Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar, who were between 16 and 40 years of age and traveling 

alone. However, he did not handle their visa applications. Consular Officer No. 12 interview (Feb. 24, 

2004). 

12 DOS OIG MOC with Consular Officer No. 6, Feb. 3, 2003. 

13 Although today consular officers typically take notes electronically while interviewing an applicant—

notes made part of the permanent CCD record—that was not the case in April 1999. 

14 INS records, NIIS records of Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar, Jan. 15, 2000 and primary 

inspector interviews for both these entries (May 24, 2004). 

15 CIA cable, “Activities of Bin Ladin Associate Khalid Revealed,” Jan. 4, 2000.

16 DOS record, NIV Applicant Detail of Marwan al Shehhi, Nov. 8, 2001.

17 DOS OIG MOC with Consular Officer No. 7, Feb. 11, 2003. 

18 Ibid. 

19 Consular Officer No. 10 interview (Mar.1, 2004).

20 DOS record, NIV Applicant Detail of Nawaf al Hazmi, Nov. 19, 2001, with visa expiration date April 2, 

2001.

21 American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) memo, “9/11 hijacker driver license 

and identification paper trail,” May 28, 2004. 

22 DOS record, NIV Applicant Detail of Mohamed Atta, May 17, 2000. The hijackers received visas of 

different lengths dependent on reciprocal agreements in place between the United States and their countries 

of origin. A copy of Mohamed Atta’s U.S. visa is attached in Appendix A. 

23 Consular Officer No. 9 interview (Feb. 20, 2004). 

24 DOS records, visa applications of Ramzi Binalshibh, May 16, June 5, Sept. 15 and Oct. 25, 2000. A copy 

of the first page of Binalshibh’s first visa application is attached in Appendix A. 

25 DOS record, NIV Applicant Detail of Ziad Jarrah, Nov. 8, 2001. Jarrah’s original visa application was 

destroyed, but an electronic record, including his photograph, remains in the State Department’s electronic 
37

records. A partly-burned copy of Jarrah’s U.S. visa, recovered from the crash scene of Flight 93, is attached 

in Appendix A. 

26 DOS OIG MOC with Consular Officer No. 8, Feb. 11, 2003. 

27 INS record, NIIS record of Marwan al Shehhi, May 29, 2000, and Customs record, Customs Secondary 

Inspection Result of Marwan al Shehhi, May 29, 2000. 

28 INS record, NIIS record of Mohamed Atta, June 3, 2000. 

29 Ramzi Binalshibh’s NIV Applicant Detail produced to the Commission by the State Department lists the 

adjudication dates of his Berlin visas as June 5, June 27, July 18, and Nov. 1, 2000. 30 That provision of law states: “No visa . . . shall be issued to an alien if (1) it appears to the consular 

officer, from statements in the application, or in the papers submitted therewith, that such alien is ineligible 

to receive a visa . . . under section 212, or any other provision of law, (2) the application fails to comply 

with the provisions of this Act, or the regulations issued thereunder, or (3) the consular officer knows or 

has reason to believe that such alien is ineligible to receive a visa . . . under section 212, or any other 

provision of law.” 

31 DOS regulations, Authority to Require Documents of Visa Applicants, 22 C.F.R. § 41.105(a)(1): “The 

consular officer is authorized to require documents considered necessary to establish the alien’s eligibility 

to receive a nonimmigrant visa. All documents and other evidence presented by the alien, including briefs 

submitted by attorneys or other representatives, shall be considered by the consular officer.” 

32 22 CFR § 41.103(b)(2) (additional information as part of application). 

33 Consular Officer No. 9 interview (Feb. 20, 2004); 22 CFR § 41.121 (Refusal of individual visas) 

provides, “If the ground(s) of ineligibility may be overcome by the presentation of additional evidence, and 

the applicant has indicated the intention to submit such evidence, a review of the refusal may be deferred 

for not more then 120 days.” 

34 FBI report, “Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004. 35 INS record, NIIS record of Ziad Jarrah, June 27, 2000. 

36 FBI report, “Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004. 

37 Huffman Aviation enrollment records of Marwan al Shehhi and Mohamed Atta; DOJ OIG Memorandum 

of Investigation (MOI), interview of company president, Rudi Dekkers, April 10, 2002. Dekkers also stated 

that Atta and Shehhi had previously attended Jones Aviation in Sarasota, Florida, but were asked to leave 

that flight school because of their bad attitudes. 

38 DOJ OIG MOI, interview of Rudi Dekkers, Apr. 10, 2002. FBI report of investigation, interview of Sue 

Costa,, Sept. 15, 2001. 

39 INS record, I-539 Application to Extend Nonimmigrant Status of Nawaf al Hazmi, July 12, 2000. 

40 According to an official in the State Department’s Visa Office within the Bureau of Consular Affairs, 

State records support a conclusion that Binalshibh’s first two visa applications amounted to “one case” that 

was denied on July 18, 2000 under 214(b). The records themselves also support this conclusion. Copies of 

Binalshibh’s visa application show no writing on his June 15, 2000, application. Rather, notes taken on the 

May 17, 2000, application described the reasons why both applications then pending were denied, and 

included the dates of June 5 and July 18—both dates of refusals, according to the State computer system. It 

appears that Binalshibh’s two applications were first denied under 221(g) (on June 5 and June 27) without a 

face-to-face meeting with a consular officer—a common practice in Berlin during this time period; 

Binalshibh was denied under 214(b)—the more serious denial—only after a formal interview with a 

consular officer on July 18, 2000. This surmise is supported by a note on Binalshibh’s last application, 

denied November 1, 2000, on which a consular official wrote “two prior refusals”—i.e., one in Berlin and 

one in Sanaa, Yemen. 

41 FBI report of investigation, interview of Sue Costa, Sept. 15, 2001. 

42 DOS record, Visa Application of Ahmed al Ghamdi, Sept. 3, 2000. 

43 The consular officer’s testimony before Congress reflects his misimpression that Hanjour applied for this 

visa under the Visa Express program. Testimony of Consular Officer No. 3 before the U.S. House of 

Representatives, Committee on Government Reform, Aug. 1, 2002, p. 38. This error led the officer to 

state—incorrectly, we believe—that he had denied Hanjour under section 221(g) in order to call him in for 

an interview. Ibid, pp. 38–39. “I remember that I had refused him for interview, because he had applied for 

a tourist visa and he said that his reason for going to the United States was to study,” the officer recalled.); 

Ibid, p. 39 (221(g) denial was “for administrative reasons.” It meant “No. Come in. I want to talk to you”). 

In fact, the date Hanjour applied (as shown on his written application) and the date he was denied (as 
38

shown both on the application and on State’s electronic records) are the same: September 10, 2000. A copy 

of Hanjour’s September 10, 2000, visa application is attached in Appendix A. 

44 Ibid. 

45 The student coordinator told the FBI that on “one occasion, Atta was very upset with the date of his visa 

and wanted it changed.” Atta did not tell her what upset him about the date or why he wanted the visa date 

changed. (We assume this reference is to Atta’s length of stay.) FBI report of investigation, interview of 

Nicole Antini, Sept. 13, 2001. 

46 INS record, I-539 Applications to Change Status for Mohamed Atta, undated; and Marwan al Shehhi, 

Sept. 15, 2000. A copy of al Shehhi’s I-539 is attached in Appendix A. 

47 FBI report of investigation, interview of Ivan Chirivella, Sept. 16, 2001. 

48 On his Oct. 25, 2000, visa application, Binalshibh lists the date of his Sanaa visa application as Aug. 12, 

2000. However, the application itself is dated Sept. 15, 2000, and the date stamped on the application for 

the denial is Sept. 16, 2000. 

49 Ibid. 

50 Ibid. 

51 DOS record, NIV Applicant Detail of Hanjour, Nov. 8, 2001. We were unable to interview the primary 

inspector who admitted Hanjour on Dec. 8, 2000, to determine how the tourist visa may have been changed 

upon Hanjour’s entry at Cincinnati International to an academic student visa entry. 

52 DOS record, visa application of Hamza al Ghamdi, Oct. 17, 2000. 

53 FBI report, “Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 24, 2004. 

54 DOS OIG MOC with Consular Officer No. 1, Jan. 22, 2003. 

55 DOS record, visa application of Mohand al Shehri, Oct. 23, 2000. A copy of al Shehri’s visa application 

is attached in Appendix A. 

56 DOS OIG MOC with Consular Officer No. 4, Jan. 24, 2003. 

57 Ibid. 

58 DOS record, visa application of Ahmed al Nami, Oct. 28, 2000. 

59 FBI report, “Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 24, 2004. 60 DOS record, visa application of Mushabib al Hamlan, Oct. 28, 2000. 

61 INS record, NIIS record of Ziad Jarrah, Oct. 29, 2000. 

62 FBI report of investigation, interview of Sue Costa, Sept. 15, 2001. 

63 FBI report of investigation, interview of Karen Goduto, Sept. 14, 2001. 

64 DOS record, visa application of Ahmad al Haznawi, Nov. 12, 2000. A copy of Haznawi’s application is 

attached in Appendix A. 

65 FBI report, “Summary of Penttbom Investigations,” Feb. 24, 2004. 

66 DOS record, visa application record of Saeed al Ghamdi, Nov. 12, 2000. A copy of al Ghamdi’s visa 

application (in which he spelled his last name “al Gamdi”) is attached in Appendix A. 

67 DOS record, visa application record of Majed Moqed, Nov. 20, 2000. 

68 DOS OIG MOC with Consular Officer No. 4, Jan. 24, 2003. 

69 Ibid. 

70 DOS record, visa application record of Satam al Suqami, Nov. 21, 2000. 

71 Although Suqami had false travel stamps in his passport as of 9/11, we do not know if these stamps were 

placed in his passport before or after submission of his visa application, although the dates on some of the 

false stamps pre-date the date he applied for his visa.

72 Testimony of Consular Officer Number No. 2 before the House Committee on Government Reform, 

Aug. 1, 2002. 

73 Ibid. 

74 Customs record, TECS II Private Aircraft Enforcement System record of Ziad Jarrah, Nov. 25, 2000; and 

customs inspector of Ziad Jarrah on Nov. 25, 2000 interview (May 18, 2004). 

75 INS record, NIIS record of Hani Hanjour, Dec. 8, 2000. On failure to attend school, see FBI report, 

“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004.

76 DOS record, visa application of Zakariya Essabar, Dec. 12, 2004. 

77 FBI report of investigation, interview of Sue Costa, Sept. 15, 2001. At some point during their schooling, 

Atta and Shehhi were reportedly offered jobs as co-pilots for a new airline, “Flair” by Huffman’s president, 

Rudi Dekkers. FBI draft report of investigation, interview of Nicole Antini, Sept. 13, 2004. 
39

78 INS record, NIIS record of Mohamed Atta, June 3, 2000, with length of stay until Dec. 2, 2000, and a 

departure date of May 18, 2000. For the INS abandonment policy, see INS Memorandum of Tom Cook, 

Acting Assistant Commissioner for Adjudications addressed to all Service Center Directors, District 

Directors, and Officers in Charge, June 18, 200. It stated: “Service officers are reminded an alien on whose 

behalf a change of nonimmigrant status has been filed and who travels outside the United States before the 

request is adjudicated is considered to have abandoned the request for a change of nonimmigrant status. 

This has been, and remains, the Service’s long-standing policy.”

79 INS record, NIIS record of Ziad Jarrah, Jan. 5, 2001. 

80 Primary immigration inspector of Mohamed Atta on Jan. 10, 2001interview (Mar. 25, 2004); DOJ OIG 

primary immigration inspector interview, Nov. 27, 2001. INS record, Inspection Results Report record of 

Mohamed Atta, Jan. 10, 2001. 

81 Primary immigration inspector of Mohamed Atta on Jan. 10, 2001 interview (Mar. 25, 2004). INS record, 

I-94 arrival record of Mohamed Atta, Jan. 10, 2001. 

82 The “VOID” handwritten over top of this stamp is not the handwriting of the primary inspector, 

according to him. It is likely the handwriting of the secondary inspector, who told the Commission he could 

not recognize his own handwriting stating: “I’ve hurt my writing finger too many times and my 

handwriting keeps changing; couldn’t recognize it.” 

83 This policy was in contradiction to the stricter language of the INS Field Guidelines, which had 

specifically delineated business categories for admission. Continued training as a pilot was not within the 

language of those guidelines. 

84 Secondary immigration inspector of Mohamed Atta on Jan. 10, 2001interview (Mar. 25, 2004); DOJ OIG 

interview of secondary immigration inspector of Atta on Jan. 10, 2001, Dec. 20, 2001. We asked these 

questions because under immigration law, “part-time schooling” is considered incidental to the primary 

purpose of a visit, and did not require a new student visa or a change of status from tourist to student. 

85 Secondary immigration inspector of Mohamed Atta on Jan. 10, 2001interview (Mar. 25, 2004). For the 

abandonment policy, see INS Tom Cook policy memo stating that pending benefits applications are 

considered abandoned if the alien leaves while the application is pending, therefore requiring the applicant 

to attain a visa abroad for that same benefit prior to re-entry. (There is no reference to this policy in the INS 

Field Inspectors’ Manual.) In other words, if Atta wanted to study in the United States and filed an 

application to that effect but left the country while it was pending, he needed to get a student visa abroad in 

order to return to the United States. The initial application was considered no longer valid. For other 

inspectors aware of this policy, see Commission interview of inspector for Atta’s deferred inspection on 

May 2, 2001. 

86 Secondary immigration inspector of Mohamed Atta on Jan. 10, 2001interview (Mar. 25, 2004). DOJ OIG 

interview of secondary immigration inspector of Atta on Jan. 10, 2001, Mar. 21, 2002. 

87 Secondary immigration inspector of Mohamed Atta on Jan. 10, 2001interview (Mar. 25, 2004). Also see 

Justice Department Inspector General Report, The INS Contacts with Two September 11 Terrorists, (May 

20, 2002), p. 56-58. 

88 The eight-month time period is recalled by another inspector who reviewed Atta’s I-94 arrival record in 

May 2001, as this inspector changed Atta’s length of stay from eight months back to six months. The 

electronic admission record also noted an eight month stay. The admission stamp, (although hard to read), 

bares this secondary inspector’s number. It appears that the secondary inspector wrote “VOID” on the 

primary inspector’s one month B1 admission stamp in Atta’s passport, and instead admitted Atta as a 

tourist for eight months, apparently to accommodate Atta’s schooling. The same handwriting appears on 

Atta’s I-94 arrival record as well, crossing out the primary inspector’s one month stay and replacing it with 

a sloppy handwritten date which looks to be September 8, 2001, with the same length of stay that listed on 

the original immigration arrival record. 

89 If an alien files an application for a change of status while they are legally in the United States, they may 

stay in the country until the application is adjudicated. In addition, Atta could have qualified for a deferred 

inspection if the inspector was convinced that “the case could possibly be resolved in the alien’s favor,” see 

INS Field Inspectors’ Manual at 17.1. 

90 Secondary immigration inspector of Mohamed Atta on Jan. 10, 2001interview (Mar. 25, 2004). 91 Commission work product chart, September 11 Hijacker border inspection interview results: Red Flags 

Resulting in Secondary Interviews, May 20, 2004. 92 On deferred inspections, see INS Field Inspectors’ Manual at 17.1. 
40

93 INS record, NIIS record of Marwan al Shehhi, Jan. 18, 2001. 

94 Primary immigration inspector of Marwan al Shehhi on Jan. 18, 2001 interview (Mar. 26, 2004). 95 INS record, INS Inspections Results Report record of Marwan al Shehhi, Jan. 18, 2001. In the interview 

of Marwan al Shehhi’s primary immigration inspector , she said: “I referred him to secondary and he didn’t 

want to leave the booth. ‘What is your problem?’ I said. He simply said, ‘No.’ I had to get out of the booth 

and take him into secondary because I thought he would bolt, and I sat him down. I told someone in 

secondary to watch him. He made me remember him; if he had been smart he wouldn’t have done that,” see 

Primary immigration inspector of Marwan al Shehhi on Jan. 18, 2001 interview (Mar. 26, 2004). 96 Secondary immigration inspector of Marwan al Shehhi on Jan. 18, 2001 interview (Mar. 22, 2004). For 

length of time Shehhi spent in secondary, see INS record, INS secondary inspection roster for JFK on 

January 18, 2001, during the time frame Shehhi was referred to secondary. 

97 Secondary immigration inspector of Marwan al Shehhi on Jan. 18, 2001 interview (Mar. 22, 2004). 98 Ibid. 

99 Ibid. 

100 Ibid. For baseline time given for business visitors at JFK International Airport (the baseline differed 

amongst the air ports where the hijackers entered, see Commission work product chart, September 11 

Hijacker border inspection interview results: Primary Inspection Procedures Prior to September 11, May 

20, 2004). Also see Commission interviews of three JFK inspectors who had contact with the 9/11 

hijackers (March 22, March 25 and May 24, 2004).

101 INS record, NIIS record of Ziad Jarrah, Jan. 5, 2001with a departure date of Jan. 26, 2001. 102 INS record, NIIS record of Ziad Jarrah, Feb. 25, 2001. For baseline time given for business visitors at air 

ports of entry, see Commission work product chart, September 11 Hijacker border inspection interview 

results: Primary Inspection Procedures Prior to September 11, May 20, 2004. 103 INS record, NIIS record of Ziad Jarrah, Feb. 25, 2001with a departure date of March 30, 2001. 104 AAMVA memo, “9/11 hijacker driver license and identification paper trail,” May 28, 2004. 105 INS record, NIIS record of Ziad Jarrah, April 13, 2001with a length of stay until July 30, 2001. 106 On Ahmed al Nami’s passports, see DOS record, NIV Applicant Detail for Ahmed al Nami (Nov. 8, 

2001).

107 DOS record, DOS visa application of Ahmed al Nami, April 23, 2001. A copy of al Nami’s application 

is attached in Appendix A. 

108 INS records, I-94 Arrival Records for Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami, Apr. 23, 2001. 109 The passport was recovered by NYPD Detective Yuk H. Chin from a male passerby in a business suit, 

about 30 years old. The passerby left before being identified, while debris was falling from WTC 2. The 

tower collapsed shortly thereafter. The detective then gave the passport to the FBI on 9/11. See FBI report, 

interview of Detective Chin, Sept. 12, 2001. 

110 Analytic reference report, Apr. 1, 2003. In addition, the Forensic Document Analysis of Satam al 

Suqami’s passport indicates that on page 8, “An Arabic stamp impression located near the top of page 8 has 

been partially covered with correction fluid,” see INS letter from John Ross, INS Supervisory Forensic 

Document Examiner, to Lorie Gottesman, FBI Document Examiner, Nov. 2, 2001. 

111 Primary immigration inspector of Satam al Suqami interview (Apr. 23, 2001). 112 INS records, I-94 Arrival Records for Majed Moqed and Ahmed al Ghamdi, May 2, 2001 and Customs 

record, Customs Declaration for Majed Moqed, May 2, 2001. On the requirement to fill out electronic 

reports on amounts declared over $10,000, see Rick Colon interview, June 14, 2004. 

113 INS record, NIIS record of Marwan al Shehhi, May 2, 2001with a length of stay until Nov. 2, 2001. 114 In regard to the identification of Atta’s companions, the inspector identified two of three. She said all 

three had olive skin tone and dark features. She told the Commission she would never forget Atta, whom 

she told a colleague was “an ugly man, he looked like a bulldog.” The companion who first spoke to the 

inspector, she recalled “was a great looking kid,” which she also mentioned to a colleague. When the FBI’s 

Most Wanted photo of Adnan G. El Shukrijumah appeared on the inspectors’ bulletin board after 

September 11, and after the FBI interviewed her, the inspector says she told her supervisor at the port that 

she was “75 percent sure” that she could identify the man who was with Atta as Shukrijumah. In checking 

Shukrijumah’s immigration status, she learned that he was a legal resident and had worked in south 

Florida. Information about the September 11 plot has not to date associated Shukrijumah with the plot. 

However, Shukrijumah is considered a well-connected al Qaeda operative, otherwise known as “Jafar the 

Pilot” and he is still wanted by the FBI. Shukrijumah’s father is a well known imam in South Florida, 
41

having testified on behalf of Sheik Rahman during his trial for the conspiracy to destroy New York 

landmarks in June 1993. The inspector cannot recall what the third companion looked like, and did not 

recognize any of the photos of other hijackers shown to her. The Commission, however, believes that 

Jarrah may have been one of Atta’s companions. He was the only hijacker who matched the facts as told by 

the inspector, that Atta’s “friend” had come back in January and received a six month stay. It is also known 

that Jarrah was with Atta later that day, driving north to get a Florida driver’s license. See immigration 

inspector of Mohamed Atta on May 2 interview (Mar. 25, 2004). 

115 See immigration inspector of Mohamed Atta on May 2 interview (Mar. 25, 2004). 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid.; a copy of Atta’s May 2, 2001, INS record (I-94) is attached in Appendix A. 119 AAMVA memo, “9/11 hijacker driver license and identification paper trail,” May 28, 2004. A copy of 

Atta’s Florida Driver License is attached in Appendix A. 

120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 2, 2004. 123 For departure date of May 16, 2001, INS record, Immigrant Admission Information of Satam al Suqami, 

Sept. 14, 2001and INS record, NIIS record of Waleed al Shehri, Apr. 23, 2001 with a departure date of 

May 16, 2001. There was a mistake on Shehri’s port of departure on this record, however, stating that he 

left from Fall River, Massachusetts, as opposed to Fort Lauderdale. An FBI phone interview indicates that 

an immigration inspector in Freeport, Bahamas checked the local immigration records and noted that the 

two arrived together on Gulfstream Continental flight 9273 at 8:20 am. FBI report of investigation, 

interview of Freeport, Bahamas immigration inspector, Sept. 18, 2001. 

124 Interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, Apr. 7, 2004. 125 FBI report of investigation, interview of Freeport, Bahamas immigration inspector, Sept. 18, 2001. 126 Preclearance stations existed prior to September 11 in Canada, Ireland, the Bahamas and the Caribbean. 127 Customs record, Secondary Inspection record of Waleed al Shehri, May 16, 2001. The attempted threeday jaunt by Shehri and Suqami to the Bahamas would cause difficulty for the INS in assisting the FBI’s 

investigation into 9/11 since the INS records indicated the two had left the United States and not returned. 

This is because when the two left Miami for the Bahamas, they handed in their I-94 departure records as 

required. When they were turned around in the Bahamas for a lack of visas, under U.S. immigration law 

they never left the United States. However, they were not given new arrival records when they physically 

returned to the United States. Therefore, when the attacks occurred, investigators thought that Suqmai and 

Shehri had departed the U.S., which is what the INS records indicated. 

128 DOJ record, “Hijacker Identity Documents: Passports, Visas, Licenses/Identification Cards.” 129 Nami obtained a Florida driver’s license, but we do not know when. AAMVA memo, “9/11 hijacker 

driver license and identification paper trail,” May 28, 2004. 

130 INS records, I-94 Arrival Records of Hamza al Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami, May 

28, 2001. 

131 DOS record, DOS cable from the Embassy Riyadh to Secretary of State, Aug. 19, 2001. 132 INS records, NIIS records for Ahmad al Haznawi and Wail al Shehri, June 8, 2001. 133 DOS record, NIV Applicant Detail of Saeed al Ghamdi, Aug. 12, 2002. 134 DOS record, Visa Application of Saeed al Ghamdi, Nov. 19, 2001. 135 Ibid. 136 DOS record, visa application of Khalid al Mihdhar, June 13, 2001, and a digital image of Khalid al 

Mihdhar’s C551754 passport. 

137 DOS record, visa application of Abdul Aziz al Omari, June 18, 2001. 138 DOS record, DOS visa application of Fayez Banihammad, June 18, 2001. 139 Consular Officer No. 10 interview (Mar.1, 2004). 140 FBI memo from Legat Riyadh, “Penttbom case,” Oct. 25, 2001. 141 DOJ, “Hijacker Identity Documents: Passports, Visas, Licenses/Identification Cards.” 142 See CIA analytic reference report, “A Reference Guide for Terrorist Passports,” Feb. 14, 2003. 143 Testimony of Consular Officer Number No. 2 before the House Committee on Government Reform, 

Aug. 1, 2002. 

144 Ibid. 
42

145 AAMVA memo, “9/11 hijacker driver license and identification paper trail,” May 28, 2004. 146 Ibid. 147 INS records, NIIS records of Fayez Banihammad and Saeed al Ghamdi, June 27, 2001. 148 INS record, I-94 Arrival Record and Customs record, Customs Declaration of Fayez Banihammad, June 

27, 2001. For admission of Banihammad, see primary immigration inspector for Fayez Banihammad 

interview (May 19, 2004). 

149 Primary immigration inspector of Saeed al Ghamdi interview (Mar. 17, 2004). This inspector did not 

know that a September 11 hijacker came through his line until a colleague had told him a few months prior 

to the Commission’s interview request. Most of the inspectors we interviewed were not aware they had 

adjudicated the entrance of a 9/11 hijacker. 

150 INS record, INS Inspection Results record of Saeed al Ghamdi, June 27, 2001. 151 Customs record, Customs Declaration record of Saeed al Ghamdi, June 27, 2001 and primary 

immigration inspector of Saeed al Ghamdi interview (Mar. 17, 2004). Copies of Ghamdi’s Customs 

Declaration and I-94 are attached in Appendix A. 

152 INS record, INS Inspection Results record of Saeed al Ghamdi, June 27, 2001and primary immigration 

inspector of Saeed al Ghamdi interview (Mar. 17, 2004). The Commission cannot verify whether Ghamdi’s 

travel documents were clean since no copies survived the attacks or were recovered elsewhere. 

153 INS records, I-94 Arrival Records of Abdul Aziz al Omari and Salem al Hazmi, June 29, 2001. 154 CIA analytic reference report, Apr.1, 2003. 155 FBI record, Penttbom Major Case # 182, DOCEX document, undated. 156 DOJ document, “Hijacker Identity Documents: Passports, Visas, Licenses/Identification Cards,” 

undated. 

157 AAMVA memo, “9/11 hijacker driver license and identification paper trail,” May 28, 2004. A copy of 

Salem al Hazmi’s USA ID document is attached in Appendix A. 

158 USSS report, “Physical examination of identifications of ‘Salem Alhazmi’ and ‘Alhazmi’ found at the 

Pentagon, Sept. 25 and 27, 2001. 

159 AAMVA memo, “9/11 hijacker driver license and identification paper trail,” May 28, 2004. 160 INS record, I-94 Arrival Record of Khalid al Mihdhar, July 4, 2001. 161 Commission work product chart, September 11 Hijacker border inspection interview results: Primary 

Inspection Procedures Prior to September 11, May 20, 2004. 162 A digital copy of Mihdhar’s passport was recovered during a search of an al Qaeda safehouse. 163 Primary immigration inspector for Khalid al Mihdhar interview (May 24, 2001). 164 DOS record, visa application record of Mohammad al Kahtani, July 4, 2001 and DOS record, NIV 

Applicant Detail for Mohammad al Kahtani, Jan. 16, 2004. 

165 Veronica Cates interview (May 25, 2004); Rocky Concepcion interview (June 15, 2004); Rick Colon 

interview (June 14, 2004); Dan Cadman interview (June 14, 2004); and Kevin Rooney interview (Jan. 8, 

2004). 

166 Veronica Cates interview (May 25, 2004); Rocky Concepcion interview (June 15, 2004); Rick Colon 

interview (June 14, 2004); Dan Cadman interview (June 14, 2004); Kevin Rooney interview (Jan. 8, 2004). 167 Customs record, TECS II-Administrative Message record, July 6, 2001; and Rick Colon interview (June 

14, 2004). 

168 INS record, NIIS record of Mohamed Atta, Jan. 10, 2001, with departure date of July 7, 2001 and length 

of stay until July 9, 2001. 

169 DOJ dcument, “Hijacker Identity Documents: Passports, Visas, Licenses/Identification Cards,” undated. 170 AAMVA memo, “9/11 hijacker driver license and identification paper trail,” May 28, 2004. A copy of 

Mihdhar’s USA ID is attached in Appendix A. 

171 INS record, INS I-539 Application to Change Status of Mohamed Atta, undated. 172 INS record, I-94 Arrival Record of Mohamed Atta, July 19, 2001. 173 Primary immigration inspector of Mohamed Atta on July 19, 2001 interview (May 17, 2004). 174 DOS record, NIV Applicant Detail record of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad under alias of Abdulrahman 

AA Al Ghamdi, Jan. 13, 2004. A copy of KSM’s U.S. visa application is attached as Appendix A. 

175 DOS record, visa application of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad under alias of Abdulrahman AA Al Ghamdi, 

July 23, 2001. 

176 DOS record, NIV Applicant Detail of Saeed al Ghamdi, Nov. 19, 2001. 
43

177 United States v. Kenys A. Galicia, U.S.D.C.E.D. Va., Oct. 2001 term, Indictment, Paragraphs 7, 8, Oct. 

25, 2001. 

178 United States v. Luis A. Martinez-Flores, Affidavit in Support of a Criminal Complaint and an Arrest 

Warrant, E.D.Va, Sept. 28, 2001. 179 See Martinez-Flores and Galicia cases. 180 For Moqed’s use of the same address, see Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles Residency Form 

DL51 for Majed Moqed, Aug. 2, 2001. 

181 Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles Residency Form DL51 for Ziad Jarrah, with residency certified 

by Hani Hanjour, Aug. 29, 2001. Hanjour used as his address the same address he had fraudulently 

obtained on Aug. 1, 2001. Jarrah’s listed address is fictitious.

182 United States v. Herbert Villalobos, Affidavit in Support of a Criminal Complaint and an Arrest 

Warrant, E.D.Va. 

183 AAMVA memo, “9/11 hijacker driver license and identification paper trail,” May 28, 2004. In addition, 

Hanjour had also acquired Arizona and Florida driver’s licenses in 1991 and 1996, respectively. A copy of 

Ahmed al Ghamdi’s Virginia identification document is attached in Appendix A. 

184 INS record, I-94 Arrival Record of Mohammad al Kahtani, Aug. 4, 2001, with “Application Withdrawn 

to Depart Foreign Under Safeguard” stamped on the record. Also see INS record, Withdrawal of 

Application for Admission/Consular Notification of Mohammad al Kahtani, Aug. 4, 2001. 

185 A combination of evidence gathered by the FBI supports this conclusion: vehicle rental records for Atta 

during this time period; parking records for this vehicle at Orlando International Airport during the time 

frame in which Kahtani was attempting entry; and phone records from a public phone to a phone number 

associated with both Atta and Kahtani. FBI record, Documentation Sufficient to show Mohamed Atta’s 

Presence at the Orlando International Airport on August 4, 2001, including rental vehicle, parking and 

calling card records, Aug. 11, 2003.

186 Primary immigration inspector of Mohammed Kahtani interview, April 18, 2004. 187 Jose Melendez-Perez testimony, Jan. 26, 2004. INS headquarters had previously interviewed the 

secondary inspector on a couple of occasions. However, no one from the FBI or intelligence community 

spoke to this inspector or to the primary inspector prior to Commission interviews. 

188 Ibid. 189 Ibid. 190 We compared the copy of Kahtani’s passport with the U.S. Government publication Counterfeit Travel 

Stamp Directory (Dec. 2003). 191 CIA cable to DOS, INS, FBI, and Customs, Aug. 23, 2001. 192 Customs records, TECS II records of Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar, Aug. 24, 2001. 193 DOS record, visa application of Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Aug. 27, 2004 and DOS record, NIV Applicant 

Detail of Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Jan. 13, 2004. 

194 AAMVA memo, “9/11 hijacker driver license and identification paper trail,” May 28, 2004. 195 Ibid. 196 FBI record, Customs Service information on TECS II database review of Khalid al Mihdhar, Sept. 12, 

2001.

198 INS record, Lookout Inquiry record for Khalid al Mihdhar, Sept. 4, 2001. 199 AAMVA memo, “9/11 hijacker driver license and identification paper trail,” May 28, 2004. 200 FBI Report of investigation, Customs Service information on Khalid al Mihdhar, Sept. 12, 2001. The 

Commission was unable to locate the text of the lookout explaining what action the inspector should have 

taken.

201 AAMVA memo, “9/11 hijacker driver license and identification paper trail,” May 28, 2004. 202 FBI records of airline personnel indicate that some recall specific hijackers presenting U.S. 

identification documents with their airline tickets. The American Airlines ticket agent at Logan Airport 

recalls the al Shehri brothers presenting drivers’ licenses at check-in. FBI report of investigation, Elvia C., 

Sept. 13, 2001. When Hamza al Ghamdi and Ahmed al Ghamdi checked in at Logan Airport in Boston, 

Hamza al Ghamdi used his Florida driver’s license and Ahmed al Ghamdi used his fraudulently obtained 

Virginia identification card. FBI report of investigation, interview of Gail J., Sept. 21, 2001. At Dulles, 

Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed provided their fraudulently obtained Virginia identification cards at 

the ticket counter. FBI report of investigation, interview of Susan S., American Airline ticketing agent, 
44

Sept. 13, 2001. A “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Student Identity Card” was found in the rubble at the 

Pentagon with Moqed’s name on it. Forensic examination indicated that it may have been fraudulent. 

United States Secret Service Forensic Services report for the FBI PENTTBOM investigation regarding the 

physical examination of forensic science research request, Oct. 10, 2001. Hijackers Omari, Wail al Shehri 

and Hanjour also had international driver licenses and Jarrah had an international student identification 

card.

203 FBI report of investigation, interview of Caprice C., Sept. 13, 2001. She was employed as a ticket agent 

by American Airlines at Logan Airport on September 11, 2001. 

204 This sum does not include Hanjour’s 1997 visa application in Jeddah because this pre-dates the plot. 205 Hanjour’s second application in September 2000 was approved after he supplied additional paperwork. 
45

3

Terrorist Entry and Embedding Tactics, 1993 to 2001 

The relative ease with which the hijackers obtained visas and entered the United States 

underscores the importance of travel to their terrorist operations. In this section we 

explore the evolution of terrorist travel tactics and organization. We begin with terrorist 

plots in the 1990s and conclude with the 9/11 attack.

3.1 The Redbook 

Since the early 1970s numerous terrorist organizations have provided their 

operatives with a wide variety of spurious documents. After showing their 

spurious passports and papers at border control, these terrorist operatives have 

proceeded to hijack airplanes, plant bombs, and carry out assassinations. These 

terrorist acts, however, can be stopped. . . .

If we all screen travelers and check their passports, as past experience proves, 

terrorist will lose their ability to travel undetected, and international terrorism will 

come one step closer to being stopped! 

—The Redbook (1992)

By definition, transnational terrorist groups need to travel to commit terrorist acts. 

Indeed, without freedom of movement terrorists cannot plan, conduct surveillance, hold 

meetings, train for their mission, or execute an attack. Terrorists rely on forged passports 

and fake visas to move around the world unimpeded and undetected. This has been 

known for more than three decades. It is difficult today to judge with certainty what else 

was known about terrorist travel methods in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the existence 

of a CIA training video and manual is evidence of an understanding that terrorists relied 

on certain tactics when they traveled and that they could be stopped by alert individuals 

who recognized the use of those tactics.

In the early 1980s, the Central Intelligence Agency produced “The Threat Is Real,” a 

training video to help border officials, customs officers, and consular employees identify 

terrorists (and other criminals) by analyzing their travel documents. The video drew on an 

unclassified manual known as the Redbook, also produced by the CIA, which contained 

information on commonalities among forged passports and travel cachets, or visas, used 

by terrorists. The 1992 edition of the Redbook claimed that more than “200 people 

carrying forged passports provided by terrorist groups have been identified before they 

could engage in terrorist acts.”1

The Redbook focused on five types of travel document fraud committed by terrorists: 

forgeries of some 35 national passports and the travel cachets of at least 45 countries; 

forged documents terrorists purchased from commercial vendors; stolen blank passports,

which terrorists could fill in with biographical data of their choosing; information on 

genuine altered passports that had been photo-substituted or given an extended validity 

date (discussed in greater detail in the Passport Examination Manual, a companion to the 

Redbook); and genuine, unaltered passports, most likely procured with the knowledge of 

the issuing country or through a corrupt government official.2
46

As the Redbook makes clear, by early 1993, when first attack on the World Trade Center 

took place, the intelligence community already had decades of experience with the modes 

of travel of terrorist groups. But the Redbook ceased publication with the 1992 edition: 

terrorist travel documents would not be studied in earnest again until after the September 

11 attacks owing to a lack of new exemplars.3 This lack of analysis however, did not 

reflect a lack of raw data. Law enforcement investigations during the 1990s provided a 

rich trove of information on the travel tactics of terrorists as they moved around the 

globe. From the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center to the disruption of the 

millennium plot in December 1999, information suggested that al Qaeda continued to 

employ all five methods of document fraud first noted in the Redbook years earlier, along 

with some new methods of their own. 

3.2 Terrorist Travel Tactics by Plot 

During the 1990s, al Qaeda was either directly or indirectly involved in a number of 

terrorist plots in the United States that partially or totally failed. A study of these plots 

and how those involved in them moved about clearly indicates that foreign terrorist 

operatives were being planted in the United States and that foreign terrorist operations 

were being planned against Americans here at home. 

The attempted operations were valuable to those carrying them out despite their lack of 

success: they gave Islamic terrorists critical operational experience in entering and 

“embedding” in the United States. Although there is evidence that some land and sea 

border entries without inspection occurred, these conspirators mainly subverted the legal 

entry system by entering at airports.4

 In doing so, they relied on a wide variety of 

fraudulent documents, on aliases, and on government corruption. Because terrorist 

operations were not suicide missions in the early to mid-1990s, once in the United States 

terrorists and their supporters tried to get legal immigration status that would permit them 

to remain here, primarily by committing serial, or repeated, immigration fraud, by 

claiming political asylum, and by marrying Americans. Many of these tactics would 

remain largely unchanged and undetected throughout the 1990s and up to the 9/11 attack.

Thus, abuse of the immigration system and a lack of interior immigration enforcement 

were unwittingly working together to support terrorist activity. It would remain largely 

unknown, since no agency of the United States government analyzed terrorist travel 

patterns until after 9/11. This lack of attention meant that critical opportunities to disrupt 

terrorist travel and, therefore, deadly terrorist operations were missed. 

By analyzing information available at the time, we identified numerous entry and 

embedding tactics associated with these earlier attacks in the United States. 

The World Trade Center Bombing, February 1993. Three terrorists who were 

involved with the first World Trade Center bombing reportedly traveled on Saudi 

passports containing an indicator of possible terrorist affiliation. Three of the 9/11 
47

hijackers also had passports containing this same possible indicator of terrorist 

affiliation.5

In addition, Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the attack, and Ahmad Ajaj, who was able 

to direct aspects of the attack despite being in prison for using an altered passport, 

traveled under aliases using fraudulent documents. The two of them were found to 

possess five passports as well as numerous documents supporting their aliases: a Saudi 

passport showing signs of alteration, an Iraqi passport bought from a Pakistani official, a 

photo-substituted Swedish passport, a photo-substituted British passport, a Jordanian 

passport, identification cards, bank records, education records, and medical records.6

 (See 

sidebar on Ajaj and Yousef.) 

Once terrorists had entered the United States, their next challenge was to find a way to 

remain here. Their primary method was immigration fraud. For example, Yousef and 

Ajaj concocted bogus political asylum stories when they arrived in the United States. 

Mahmoud Abouhalima, involved in both the World Trade Center and landmarks plots, 

received temporary residence under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers (SAW) program, 

after falsely claiming that he picked beans in Florida.7

 Mohammed Salameh, who rented 

the truck used in the bombing, overstayed his tourist visa. He then applied for permanent 

residency under the agricultural workers program, but was rejected.8

 Eyad Mahmoud 

Ismail, who drove the van containing the bomb, took English-language classes at Wichita 

State University in Kansas on a student visa; after he dropped out, he remained in the 

United States out of status.9

Ajaj and Yousef: A Case Study in Fraud 

This case study illustrates some of the techniques used by two of the 1993 World Trade 

Center bombing terrorists to enter and remain in the United States. Almost all of these 

tactics—italicized here for emphasis—would continue to be used by al Qaeda during the 

1990s and in preparation for the 9/11 attack.

Using the services of a travel agent in Pakistan and traveling under aliases, on August 31, 

1992, Ahmad Ajaj and Ramzi Yousef boarded Pakistan International Airlines Flight 703 

in Peshawar and flew to Karachi, Pakistan, and then on to Kennedy Airport in New York 

City.10 They sat in first class during both legs of the trip, believing they would receive 

less scrutiny there. Between them, they carried a variety of documents to support their 

alias identities, including identification cards, bank records, education records, and 

medical records.11

Upon Ajaj’s arrival at Kennedy, the immigration inspector noted that he was traveling on 

a photo-substituted Swedish passport. Ajaj was sent to secondary immigration inspection, 

where he claimed he was a member of the Swedish press.12 His luggage was searched and 

officers found a partially altered Saudi passport and a passport from Jordan, the 

documents supporting their alias identities, a plane ticket and a British passport in the 

name of Mohammed Azan, bomb-making manuals, videos and other material on how to 

assemble weapons and explosives, letters referencing his attendance at terrorist training 
48

camps; anti-American and anti-Israeli material, instructions on document forgery, and 

two rubber stamp devices to alter the seal on passports issued from Saudi Arabia.13 The 

immigration inspector called an agent on the FBI Terrorist Task Force to tell him about 

Ajaj, but the agent declined to get involved, instead requesting copies of the file. The 

inspector also called the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, which was “not 

interested.”14

Meanwhile, Yousef also was sent to secondary immigration inspection for lacking a 

passport or a visa that would allow him to enter the United States. He there presented an

Iraqi passport he allegedly bought from a Pakistani official for $100.

15 Upon 

questioning, Yousef said that the passport was fraudulent and that he bribed a Pakistani 

official in order to board the flight. Inspectors also found in his possession an Islamic 

Center identity card with Yousef’s photo and the name Khurram Khan, under which Ajaj 

had traveled into the United States. They also found a boarding pass in the name of 

Mohammed Azan.16 Although their documents were thus oddly intermingled and both 

men were in secondary inspection, Yousef was not linked to Ajaj. Rather, Yousef was 

arrested for not having a visa. He made a claim for political asylum and was released into 

the United States pending a hearing.17

Ajaj told authorities he had a political asylum claim from a prior entry in February 1992, 

and was detained pending a hearing. The evidence suggests that Ajaj left the United 

States in April 1992, thereby abandoning his asylum claim. In fact, it appears that he 

traveled under an alias to attend a terrorist training camp on the Afghan-Pakistani 

border.18

Ajaj later pleaded guilty to a charge of use of an altered passport and served six months 

in prison. Not surprisingly, Yousef never appeared for his hearing. The World Trade 

Center was bombed on February 26, 1993. Ajaj was released from prison shortly 

thereafter, although he had no grounds for remaining in the United States. He was 

arrested in connection with the attack on March 9, 1993. Yousef was indicted on 

September 1, 1993, but had left the United States on a fraudulent Pakistani passport. He 

was captured in Pakistan and returned to the United States to stand trial on February 8, 

1995.

Although Ajaj was arrested for involvement in the bombing, he did not give up on his 

political asylum claim. He petitioned for a new attorney and an exclusion hearing—held 

to determine whether someone is admissible into the United States—in Houston, where 

he had filed his original political asylum claim. Ajaj’s request was denied on April 24, 

1993, on the grounds that a passport holder from a visa waiver country who uses a 

fraudulent passport—Ajaj had used a bogus Swedish passport to enter the United 

States—is not entitled to such a hearing. Not satisfied with that outcome, Ajaj asked to 

file a new political asylum claim and was given ten days by an immigration judge to do 

so. Thus, Ajaj was able to file a political asylum claim after his arrest for involvement in 

the bombing of the World Trade Center. 

Yousef was sentenced to 240 years in prison; Ajaj was sentenced to 90 years.
49

The Landmarks Plot, June 1993. Note: Because most of the conspirators in this plot 

were married to American citizens they were able to obtain legal permanent residency 

status or citizenship. As a result, the Department of Homeland Security declined to 

provide us with copies of their immigration files, citing the Privacy Act.

In the landmarks case, a group of terrorists led by Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman (the 

“Blind Sheikh”) and including some of his supporters, who also were involved in the 

World Trade Center bombing, similarly traveled on fraudulent documents and then 

committed serial immigration fraud in order to stay in the country; others were married to 

Americans. 

For example, Rahman was issued several visas on different passports to travel to the 

United States, although he was a known radical in Egypt. He was later granted legal 

permanent residency as a “Special Immigrant, Religious Teacher.” This status was later 

revoked on grounds of polygamy. Rah men then filed an application for asylum, which 

was also denied after the attack on the World Trade Center (see text box on the Blind 

Sheikh). Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali, the mastermind of the plot, married an American. 

Mohammed Saleh, who provided fuel from his Yonkers gas station to make bombs, 

obtained legal permanent residency by marrying an American. Ibrahim Ilgabrowny 

passed messages between conspirators and obtained five fraudulent Nicaraguan passports 

for his cousin, El Sayyid Nosair, and his family.28 Nosair, convicted of conspiracy, 

married an American in 1982 and became a citizen in 1989. He was also convicted of a 

gun charge in the killing of Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1990. Amir Abdelgani picked up fuel 

and helped determine targets; he, too, was married to an American. His cousin, Fadil 

Abdelgani, mixed explosives; he overstayed his 1987 tourist visa and obtained legal 

residency by marrying an American. Others who had married Americans included Tarig 

Elhassan, who also mixed explosives, and Fares Khallafall, who bought fertilizer for the 

bombs.29 Biblal Alkaisi initially filed an application for temporary protected status, using 

what turned out to be a fake Lebanese birth certificate. He then filed an application for 

political asylum but failed to appear for the interview.30 Matarawy Mohammed Said 

Saleh was supposed to get stolen cars for the plot; he married two American women in an 

effort to gain legal permanent residency.31

The Case of the Blind Sheikh 

Appearances can be deceiving. One consular officer remarked, “Now he looked like a 

sweet old man. I can tell you that he did not look like a terrorist. He was a charming, little 

old man.”32 But Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman regularly preached jihad at mosques in New 

York and New Jersey to individuals who participated in the February 26, 1993, bombing 

of the World Trade Center building.33 He himself was convicted on charges that he was 

“a leader” of their criminal organization and was sentenced on January 17, 1996, to life in 

prison.34 Subsequent investigation revealed that Rahman entered the United States and 

remained in the country owing to a series of exceptional failures in the border security 

system, some with eerie parallels to the 9/11 hijackers.35 For example: 
50

x Rahman used multiple passports to structure his visa applications and travel 

over a four-year period from 1986 to 1990. 

x In 1986, Rahman was issued a visa in Khartoum, Sudan, even though there 

arguably was sufficient information about him in the U.S. embassy in 

neighboring Egypt as early as 1981 to justify denying that visa.36 Before he 

ever applied for a visa, Rahman was well known to U.S. officials in Egypt as a 

“high-profile” opponent of secular Egyptian regimes accused of issuing a 

fatwa that resulted in the 1981 assassination of Egypt’s president, Anwar 

Sadat. This knowledge was not conveyed to officials in Khartoum. The officer 

who approved it later stated that he may have done a poor job of scrutinizing 

Rahman’s application.37

x In April 1987, Rahman received a visa in Cairo, Egypt, after providing formal 

documentation that Islamic Brotherhood, Inc., in Brooklyn, New York, was 

sponsoring him as their spiritual leader during the upcoming holy month of 

Ramadan, and would be financially responsible for him. The officer “knew 

who the Sheikh was, but after receiving the needed documents decided to 

issue the visa because of his understanding that the Sheikh had not been 

convicted of any crime.”38 In fact, Rahman’s applications “were incomplete 

and misleading” and questions were possibly “answered falsely,” since he had 

been convicted of passing bad checks.39 Further, by 1987, the Cairo embassy’s 

political section had a biographical file on Rahman and his subversive 

activities “that would make him ineligible for a visa.”40 However, this 

derogatory information was not shared with the Consular Section, which 

issued visas. 

x Even though Rahman had been placed on an internal State Department 

watchlist on August 7, 1987,41 his watchlisting was not discovered by 

consular officials when he applied for another visa in 1988. The visa, which 

was initially granted, was “canceled” on the same day under the intending 

immigrant provision when a local staff member pointed out that Rahman was 

a leading radical in Egypt. If the denial had instead been based on his presence 

on the watchlist, that fact also would have been recorded in the INS database. 

Then he could have been denied entry by the INS if he somehow later 

managed to obtain a U.S. visa.42

x In fact, on May 10, 1990, the Sheikh did receive another visa—his third—in 

Khartoum, Sudan, after a State Department foreign service national who 

processed the application falsely indicated that he had checked the watchlist 

on microfiche. He later stated that he had decided not to check because of 

Rahman’s age, his physical appearance, and his success in receiving previous 

U.S. nonimmigrant visas.43 The consular officer who issued this visa did not 

know that on May 2 and May 3, 1990, Embassy Cairo alerted Embassy 

Khartoum by cable that Egypt’s “leading radical” had left Egypt for Sudan, 

possibly to seek exile in the United States, and asked Khartoum to provide 
51

information on his activities.44 By this point, U.S. officials knew that Rahman 

had been arrested repeatedly in Egypt between 1985 and 1989 for attempting 

to take over mosques, inciting violence, attacking police officers, and 

demonstrating illegally, and that he had been imprisoned and placed under 

house arrest until he left Egypt for Sudan in early 1990.45

x On November 26, 1990, about six months after it first learned it had issued the 

visa, the State Department revoked Rahman’s visa and sent a notice to the INS 

for entry in their National Automated Immigrant Lookout System (NAILS), 

which was done on December 10, 1990.46 However, Rahman had already used 

the visa to enter the United States on July 18 and November 15, 1990. 

x Even though he was finally on the NAILS watchlist, Rahman used the visa to 

enter the United States again on December 16, 1990. He avoided detection at 

the port of entry by using on his entry form (I-94) a variation of the name in 

his passport: to identify potential terrorists, the INS watchlist needed an 

almost exact name match. 

x Even though the INS office in New York had begun an investigation of 

Rahman by January 1991 to determine if he had made material misstatements 

on his visa application that could subject him to prosecution, deportation, or 

both, on January 31, 1991, he filed an application for Permanent Residence 

with the Newark INS office as a Special Immigrant, Religious Teacher. The 

agency was unaware that it had two files on Rahman, one in New York and 

one in Newark, or that he had been watchlisted; and on April 8, 1991, the 

Newark office granted him permanent resident status. His change of status 

enabled Rahman to successfully use his valid I-551 green card to enter the 

United States after he was detected and detained at JFK Airport on July 31, 

1991.

x On March 6, 1992, the INS rescinded Rahman’s permanent resident status on 

grounds he was a polygamist, had been convicted of bad check charges in 

Egypt, and had failed to disclose these facts in his application.47 However, he 

avoided being removed from the United States by filing an application for 

asylum and withholding of deportation to Egypt on August 27, 1992. An 

immigration judge held a hearing on Rahman’s claim on January 20, 1993, 

shortly before his followers bombed the World Trade Center, killing six 

people and injuring 1,042. On March 16, 1993, an immigration judge denied 

Rahman’s application.48

The important factors in Rahman’s success in traveling freely can be found in the cases 

of many other terrorists who have targeted the United States, including some of the 9/11 

hijackers: 

x Rahman’s visa applications were incomplete. 

x Rahman’s visa applications contained lies; 
52

x Rahman used multiple passports to structure visa applications and travel. 

x Prior visa approvals helped Rahman avoid close scrutiny when he sought 

again to come to the United States. 

x Uncertainty in visa law played a role in the Rahman’s getting his visas. 

x Failure by a local staff member to do his job—by checking microfiche—

allowed Rahman to defeat the watchlist. 

x Information on Rahman’s subversive activities that should have been shared 

within the government was not, a failure that repeatedly played a role in his 

acquiring visas. 

x Even after Rahman was placed on two terrorist watchlists, he was not detected 

and stopped, because those using the lists lacked an effective search engine 

and the technology they needed. 

x Failure by the State Department to promptly watchlist Rahman played a role 

in his gaining entry to the United States; 

x Poor coordination between INS computer systems allowed Rahman to gain 

lawful permanent residency and thus remain in the United States. 

x Rahman committed fraud on his benefits applications. 

x Rahman abused the asylum system to remain in the United States. 

Atlantic Avenue Subway Plot, July 1997. Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer committed serial 

immigration fraud during his planning to destroy the Atlantic Avenue subway in 

Brooklyn with explosives in 1997.49 Mezer was arrested on his third illegal entry into the 

United States along the northwest border with Canada. He asked to be deported to 

Canada, but Canada refused to accept him. He then filed a political asylum claim in the 

United States and was released on bond. Mezer withdrew the application, claiming he 

had returned to Canada when in fact he was in Brooklyn. His co-conspirator, Lafi Taisir 

Mufleh Khalil, was originally issued a C-1 transit visa; but upon his arrival at JFK 

Airport in New York, the immigration inspector incorrectly treated him as a tourist, 

which allowed Khalil to stay in the United States for six months. Khalil overstayed his 

visa and was arrested along with Mezer on July 31, 1997, the morning of the planned 

attack50.

The East Africa Bombings, August 1998. Although the attacks were carried out on 

foreign soil, the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and 

Nairobi, Kenya, featured al Qaeda operatives linked to the United States. Ali Mohamed, 

an Egyptian national, married an American woman he had met on the airplane on his first 

visit to the United States in 1985. He entered the United States as a lawful permanent 

resident in San Francisco in June 1986, and his affiliation with al Qaeda dated to 1991. In 

1993, Mohamed traveled to Kenya to conduct surveillance against American, British, 

French, and Israeli targets, including the U.S. embassy. Another operative, Khalid Abu al 

Dahab, was granted permanent residency after his third marriage to an American and 

later became a naturalized citizen. During his 12 years in the United States, he reportedly 

provided money and fraudulent travel documents to terrorists around the globe; he was 

thereby implicated in multiple terrorist attacks, including the East Africa bombings. Wadi 

el Hage studied in the United States in the late 1970s and mid-1980s; in between, he went 

to Pakistan to aid in the fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan. He served as a 
53

personal secretary to Usama Bin Ladin and gained permanent residency when he married 

an American.51

The East Africa embassy bombings provided further evidence that terrorists used 

particular tactics when traveling. Had they been analyzed, they would have provided 

investigators with additional information about the techniques that terrorists would 

continue to use until the 9/11 attacks.

The Millennium Plot, December 1999. Following a familiar terrorist pattern, Ahmed 

Ressam and his associates used fraudulent passports and immigration fraud to travel. In 

Ressam’s case, this involved flying from France to Montreal using a photo-substituted 

French passport under the name of Tahar Medijadi. Under questioning, Ressam admitted 

that the passport was fraudulent and claimed political asylum. He was released pending a 

hearing, which he failed to attend; his political asylum claim was denied. He was arrested 

again, released again and given another hearing date. Again, he did not show. He was 

arrested four times for thievery, usually from tourists, but was never jailed nor deported. 

He also supported himself selling stolen documents to a friend who was a document 

broker for Islamist terrorists.52

Ressam eventually obtained a genuine Canadian passport through a document vendor 

who stole a blank baptismal certificate from a Catholic church.53 With this document he 

was able to obtain a Canadian passport under the name of Benni Antoine Noris. This 

enabled him to travel to Pakistan, and from there to Afghanistan for his training, and then 

return to Canada.54 Impressed, Abu Zubaydah, one of al Qaeda’s leading travel 

facilitators, asked Ressam to get more genuine Canadian passports and send them to him 

for other terrorists to use.55

Another conspirator, Abdelghani Meskini, used a stolen identity to travel to Seattle on 

December 11, 1999, at the request of Mokhtar Haouari, another conspirator. Haouari 

provided fraudulent passports and visas to assist Ressam and Meskini’s planned getaway 

from the United States to Algeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 56 One of Meskini’s 

associates, Abdel Hakim Tizegha, also filed a claim for political asylum, though in the 

United States rather than Canada, on the grounds that he was being harassed by Muslim 

fundamentalists.57 He was released pending a hearing, which was adjourned and 

rescheduled five times. His claim was finally denied two years after his initial filing.58

His attorney appealed the decision, and Tizegha was allowed to remain in the country 

pending the appeal. Nine months later, his attorney notified the court that he could not 

locate his client and a warrant of deportation was issued.59

The unraveling of the millennium plot to blow up Los Angeles International Airport in 

December 1999, which began with the arrest of operative Ahmed Ressam, was yet 

another opportunity to focus on the importance of travel to successful terrorist operations. 

This plot demonstrated that difficulties with travel documents restricted terrorist 

movement.60 Investigators also confirmed that terrorists had bought genuine blank 

baptismal certificates and filled them in with personal data.61
54

Thus, despite evidence that difficulties with travel documents restricted terrorist 

movement, no agency of the U.S. government was analyzing terrorist travel patterns or 

immigration abuses before 9/11.62 Because the government simply did not know what it 

knew, it missed opportunities to disrupt terrorist mobility and, therefore, terrorist 

operations. Conversely, by 2000, when al Qaeda began inserting participants in the 

September 11 plot into the United States, their operational knowledge of our 

immigration, visitor, and border systems was considerable. 

Terrorist Travel Tactics in the 1990s 

By the time of the 9/11 attacks, available information suggested that terrorists could use 

up to 21 different entry and embedding tactics: 

x Operatives typically traveled on fake passports and often had more than one 

passport.63

x Terrorists’ passports were sometimes photo-substituted.64

x Terrorists were trained in passport forgery, including erasing and adding 

visas.65

x Document forgers altered stolen or borrowed passports.66

x Searches of homes of terrorists and their associates turned up travel 

documents and blank visas.67

x Travel facilitators, some of whom were identified or known to investigators, 

provided terrorists with fraudulent passports.68

x Genuine blank passports and visas could be purchased for a price and filled in 

with personal data.69

x Terrorist traveled extensively.70

x Operatives attempted to keep evidence of travel to and from Pakistan out of 

their passports.71

x Smugglers were used to sneak operatives into Afghanistan.72

x Terrorists reported their passports lost, stolen, or damaged in order to acquire 

new, “clean” new passports and to avoid revealing previous travel indicated in 

the old passport.73

x Terrorists’ passports contained fake travel cachets.74

x Document forgers created fraudulent passports and travel cachets, or visas.75

x Corrupt government officials facilitated travel at border points.76

x Operatives tried to acquire sophisticated graphics software to assist them in 

forging documents.77

x Terrorists and their supporters committed serial immigration fraud.78

x Terrorists overstayed their visas. 

x Terrorists requested political asylum. 

x Terrorists studied in the United States.

x Terrorists traveled under aliases.

x Terrorists entered the United States without an immigration inspection. 
55

3.3 Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure for Travel and Travel Tactics

The ability of terrorists to travel clandestinely—including to the United States—is 

critical to the full range of terrorist activities, including training, planning, 

communications, surveillance, logistics, and launching attacks. A body of 

intelligence indicates that al-Qa’ida and other extremist groups covet the ability to 

elude lookout systems using documents with false identities and devoid of travel 

patterns that would arouse suspicion.79

Like their terrorist predecessors, members of al Qaeda clearly valued freedom of 

movement as critical to their ability to plan and carry out attacks prior to September 11. It 

is equally clear that al Qaeda relied heavily on many of the same basic travel tactics 

associated with these earlier groups to satisfy its substantial travel requirements. What 

distinguished al Qaeda’s tactics was its heavy reliance on travel facilitators and document 

forgers, as well as its ability to adapt its techniques to defeat screening mechanisms, such 

as visa issuance systems. 

Much of what is known about al Qaeda’s travel tactics was learned after 9/11. Recall that 

there was no comprehensive analysis of terrorist travel methods after the Redbook ceased 

publication in 1992.

Lack of Travel Documents Disrupts Operations. Significantly, there is evidence that 

the lack of appropriate travel documents delayed or interrupted terrorist operational plans. 

For example, scrutiny in the United Arab Emirates of the travel documents of Ahmad al 

Darbi, who was involved in a plan to attack oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz, caused 

him to divert the ship he was escorting away from port in Yemen to Somalia. 

Immigration officials in the UAE strongly suspected that Darbi was the same person as 

someone on their watchlist traveling on an alias; he feared he might also be watchlisted in 

Yemen.80 The plan never came together after that. 

In August 2001, two operatives were instructed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) to 

return to Saudi Arabia on September 15, 2001, to renew their passports in preparation for 

an unspecified operation. They were instructed to obtain new photos of themselves clean 

shaven to be used in applying for visas to the Philippines. After getting their passports 

they were to travel to the United Arab Emirates, where they would be met and informed 

of a suicide operation in the Philippines. But because of problems with one of their 

passports the operation was not carried out.81

In yet another case, in mid-2002, the senior al Qaeda operative Abd al Rahim al Nashiri 

scheduled an operational planning trip to Saudi Arabia. He was delayed for more than a 

month while document facilitators tried to get him a new passport.82

Conversely, the ability of operatives to travel easily to certain countries often determined 

the location of operational and planning meetings. Malaysia, for example, was viewed by 

both Usama Bin Ladin and KSM, the mastermind of the 9/11 plot, as an “excellent” 
56

venue for meetings because “Muslims could enter without a visa, including those with 

Saudi and Gulf passports.”83

Organization and Training. Underscoring the high premium placed on travel, two 

senior al Qaeda operatives, KSM and Abu Zubaydah, played key roles in facilitating 

travel for the group’s terrorist operatives. In addition, al Qaeda had a division of 

passports and host country issues under its security committee. The office was located at 

the Kandahar airport and was managed by Muhammed Atef, al Qaeda’s chief of military 

operations and the number two man in the organization. According to a detainee, the 

committee altered papers, including passports, visas, and identification cards.84 Following 

the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, the office moved to Pakistan.85

Certain al Qaeda members were charged with organizing passport collection schemes to 

keep the pipeline of fraudulent documents flowing. To this end, al Qaeda required 

jihadists to turn in their passports before going to the front lines in Afghanistan. If they 

were killed, their passports were then recycled for use by others.86 Its operational mission 

training course, as well as an urban warfare course and a four-month explosives course, 

taught operatives how to forge documents.87 Certain passport alteration methods, 

including photo substitution as well as erasing and adding travel cachets, were also 

taught. Manuals demonstrating how to “clean” visas were reportedly circulated among 

operatives.88

The purpose of all of this training was twofold: to develop an institutional capacity for 

such techniques and to enable operatives to make necessary adjustments in the field. It 

was well-known, for example, that if a Saudi traveled to Afghanistan via Pakistan, his 

passport, showing a Pakistani stamp, would be confiscated upon his return to Saudi 

Arabia. Operatives thus either erased the Pakistani visas from their passports or traveled 

through Iran, which did not stamp visas directly into passports.89 Mohamed Atta, the 

presumed pilot on American Airlines Flight 11, was reported to have been trained in 

passport alteration techniques.90

Travel Facilitators. Despite the activities of the passport office and its various training 

programs, al Qaeda relied heavily on a small cadre of operatives and their assistants to 

facilitate travel for the network.91 Chief among them were Abu Zubaydah, a facilitator we 

will call “the African facilitator,” and Riyadh. Broadly speaking, a terrorist travel 

facilitator assisted operatives in obtaining fraudulent documents, arranging visas (real or 

fake), making airline reservations, purchasing airline tickets, arranging lodging and 

ground transportation, and taking care of any other aspect of travel in which his expertise 

or contacts were needed.92 The following profiles illustrate how the al Qaeda network 

organized and carried out these activities.

Abu Zubaydah. Al Qaeda’s most seasoned travel facilitator was Abu Zubaydah. A 

Palestinian national, he was born in the early 1970s in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where his 

father worked as a teacher.93 He attended a computer school in India, although he 

considered studying in the United States before and after this training.94 He is suspected 

of having illegally entered Pakistan during the Afghan war against the Soviets. After the 
57

war he remained in Pakistan; in 1992 he moved to Peshawar, where he set up a honeytrading business.95

Abu Zubaydah began his work as a travel facilitator in Peshawar, living and working at 

the Martyr’s House, where he aided mujahideen coming to and going from Afghanistan. 

He provided them with false passports and visas until about 1994, when he went to the al 

Faruq camp in Afghanistan to train Tajiks. He remained there for seven to eight months, 

returning to the Martyr’s House to continue his work as a travel facilitator.96

In 1996, he helped al Qaeda members move from Sudan to Afghanistan. By 1997, Usama 

Bin Ladin asked him to continue his facilitation work for the organization.97 For recruits 

at the Khaldan training camp he opened the first of three safehouses in Rawalpindi, on 

the outskirts of Islamabad, Pakistan, in the spring of 1998. There, Zubaydah and his 

assistants doctored passports and visas.98 In 2000, Usama Bin Ladin put him in charge of 

foreign communication, or external relations, for al Qaeda.99

Abu Zubaydah considered himself an expert at moving people.100 Indeed, he went beyond 

the technicalities of altering documents to prepare operatives and mujahideen to travel 

undetected.101 Zubaydah told travelers to cut their hair, to shave their beards and 

mustaches, and to always be polite. He told them what kinds of clothes to wear, what 

kinds of airline tickets to purchase, how to alter their appearances, and what to carry in 

order to avoid attracting suspicion from border authorities. He tried to recruit operatives 

who spoke the language of the country whose travel documents he provided them. 

Zubaydah said he spared no expense on operational travel.102

Abu Zubaydah described the activities of another facilitator who we will call The

African Facilitator. Sometime in his late teens, The African Facilitator left his native 

country and joined the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan.103 In the early to mid1990s, he used a photo-substituted Saudi passport to travel to the Sudan with Usama Bin 

Ladin.104 He and a companion were subsequently arrested in an African country for 

entering without a visa. His fraudulent passport also was discovered, and he spent time in 

a Saudi prison.105

After his release, The African Facilitator traveled to Pakistan.106 In 1996, he met Abu 

Zubaydah and the two began collaborating. According to Zubaydah, The African 

Facilitator would send him copies of passports and tickets and Zubaydah would get exit 

permits to match, either legally or by bribing officials. He also asked Zubaydah to 

provide him with passports, although sometimes he would buy them from vendors in 

Peshawar and Islamabad.107 He tasked Zubaydah with examining the passports of all new 

arrivals at his safehouse and with copying and passing to him any new visas and entry 

and exit stamps in the arrivals’ passports.108

The African Facilitator soon became al Qaeda’s man in Pakistan, with responsibility for 

overseeing its logistical network in the country. Indeed, according to a senior detainee, he 

was “famous” for his ability to arrange whatever one needed in Pakistan, as well as for 

his work with the al Qaeda document committee in Afghanistan.109 For a few months in 
58

1999, four assistants worked for him, buying tickets for Yemeni and Saudi family 

members who wanted to return home after visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan.110

As noted above, the document committee altered passports for mujahideen in 

Afghanistan. In 2000, The African Facilitator reportedly had a house in the al Qaeda 

compound at the Kandahar airport. Although he was not himself skilled in the methods of 

passport forgery, he supervised Kenyans who performed this work.111 From this base, he 

facilitated the movement of mujahideen who attended one of al Qaeda’s terrorist training 

camps, providing them with the necessary passports, stamps, and visas to travel; greeting 

them when they arrived; and sending them home after their training was completed.112 He 

also kept track of the passports used by fighters on the front lines. When one of them was 

killed, he would cross their name off of his list and make that passport available for 

reuse.113

Riyadh, an al Qaeda Facilitator. Riyadh reportedly joined the al Qaeda organization in 

1998 after stints fighting in Bosnia and Burma.114 Based in Yemen, he facilitated the 

travel of mujahideen to the training camps in Afghanistan.115 Riyadh and his assistant 

worked out of the al Jaziri hotel providing Yemeni passports; Egyptian, Pakistani, or 

Saudi visas; money; plane tickets; contact numbers; and transportation to the airport for 

travelers. They reportedly had contacts in the Pakistani and Yemeni governments who 

helped them by providing necessary travel documents.116 In recognition of his wide range 

of contacts, in 1999 Usama Bin Ladin gave Riyadh the responsibility of organizing the 

travel of Muslim youth.117

Sometime in 2000, Riyadh left for Afghanistan.118 After receiving additional training in 

the camps, he moved to Karachi, Pakistan, and resumed his activities facilitating the 

travel of Yemeni mujahideen to Afghanistan.119 Riyadh was well-known in Karachi 

under the name Aziz and did little to protect his security. He also may have facilitated the 

flow of funds to al Qaeda, allegedly passing $500,000 in late 2001 from Saudi donors to 

extremists and their families in Pakistan.120

Reliance on Outsiders. As these profiles make clear, in addition to its own travel 

facilitators, al Qaeda relied on outsiders to help move operatives around the world. Al 

Qaeda relied on hundreds of these vendors of fraudulent documents, corrupt government 

officials, travel agencies, and human smugglers.121

Document vendors provided al Qaeda with a wide range of bogus and genuine documents 

and were valued for their forgery skills. Through these vendors, al Qaeda operatives had 

access to an “impressive range of fraudulent travel, identification and other documents,” 

including passports from countries in almost every region of the world, travel cachets, 

blank visas, foils, stamps, seals, laminates, and other material.122 Some of these forgers 

are dedicated to al Qaeda’s cause and tend to be located along main travel routes; others 

are interested only in profit.123

Corrupt government officials have facilitated terrorist travel by selling genuine travel 

documents. Ramzi Yousef, convicted of attempting to blow up a tower of the World 
59

Trade Center in 1993, claimed he bought an Iraqi passport from a Pakistani official for 

$100.124 Two of the 9/11 hijackers, Waleed and Wail al Shehri, reportedly received new 

Saudi passports from a relative in the passport office.125 Al Qaeda also relied on bribery 

to get passports and the special plastic used inside them to protect biographical 

information.126 Moreover, corrupt officials have been known to take bribes at the border 

from a terrorist lacking proper documentation.127

Travel agencies have sometimes supported terrorist travel. Many travel agencies will 

work with anyone who is willing to pay. For example, Abu Zubaydah said that in 

Peshawar, it was generally understood that local Arabs were training in the camps in 

Afghanistan, but the travel agencies they used never asked any questions. In addition, 

Zubaydah said that he did business with several travel agencies in Pakistan, depending 

on which one offered him the best deal.128

There is also evidence that terrorists used human smugglers to sneak across borders.129

Smugglers were typically paid to make all logistical arrangements, including mode of 

travel and lodging, and to pay off corrupt officials if necessary.130 A typical smuggling 

scheme aided jihadist youth wanting to travel through Iran to Afghanistan to train in al 

Qaeda’s camps. They would first travel to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to meet with a 

facilitator, who would then contact a second facilitator, who would buy plane tickets. 

When the jihadists arrived in Iran they contacted the first facilitator again and told him 

the name of their hotel. He would then tell an associate in Iran to meet them and smuggle 

them into Afghanistan.131

Because the penalties for these crimes tend to be inadequate, they have not been 

vigorously prosecuted. Laws against document fraud, for example, are generally weak 

and punishment light.132 For example, in Spain, police officers assigned to the Foreigners 

Division have told Department of Homeland Security agents that crimes involving the 

possession and use of stolen or altered documents are not worth pursuing once the 

suspect is in the country.133

This lax legal environment, coupled with the need for clients, allows facilitators to 

operate only semi-clandestinely. In addition, travel facilitators operate in loose business 

networks; many are based in countries allied with the United States in the global war 

against Islamist terrorists.134 Cracking down on these accomplices of terrorists thus 

appears to be not only practical from a law enforcement perspective but also a way to 

impede a wide range of terrorist activities, including planning, communicating, 

conducting surveillance, and carrying out attacks. If terrorists’ travel options are reduced, 

they may be forced to rely on means of interaction which can be more easily monitored, 

and to resort to travel documents which are more readily detectable.135

Travel Documents. For the first time in more than a decade, in 2003 an effort was made 

to systematically study terrorist travel tactics. This study, as well as our earlier plot-byplot analysis of terrorist travel tactics, clearly demonstrates that terrorist operatives 

employed certain repetitive travel practices that were ripe for disruption. In addition to 

their use of facilitators, numerous other patterns were identified. For example, operatives 
60

carefully selected the passports they used for operational travel, often using fraudulent 

ones. They also regularly used fraudulent travel stamps, especially to cover up travel to 

Afghanistan or Pakistan.136 They studied visa and entry requirements for countries they 

transited or traveled to and structured their travel to avoid appearing suspicious.137 Al 

Qaeda also adopted several techniques designed to mask travel and identity, including 

traveling under an alias.138 Terrorists appeared to exercise particular caution with regard 

to Western travel. Their main purposes in so doing were to eliminate the possibility of 

being detained on fraudulent document charges, a goal that became especially important 

when an operative was traveling to participate in an attack, and to avoid the suspicions 

raised by indicators of travel to Afghanistan. Terrorists, including al Qaeda, clearly 

expended considerable effort thinking about travel and engaging in methods intended to 

facilitate their movement around the globe. 

Reliance on Saudi Passports. Al Qaeda favored Saudi passports. KSM estimated that 70 

percent of the mujahideen in the al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan before 9/11 

were Saudi. Irregularities in the Saudi passport issuance system made Saudi passports 

more readily available.139 As many as 10,000 Saudi passports may have been lost or 

stolen in recent years.140 Saudis also enjoyed visa waiver status as visitors to most Middle 

Eastern countries and, until September 2002, to Canada.141 An added attraction of Saudi 

passports was that reporting a Saudi passport stolen that later turned up in someone else’s 

possession was not a crime.142 Moreover, several document forgers specialized in altering 

Saudi passports.143

Furthermore, blank Saudi passports lacked a document control number to track their 

disposition before they were issued.144 In practical terms, this meant that a blank passport 

that was stolen lacked any number to put on a watchlist that might catch a person trying 

to use it. In late 2001, Saudi Arabia began issuing new passports that incorporated 

enhanced security features. Problems in the issuance regime persist, however.145

Types of Passport Alteration. There are four main ways in which al Qaeda altered 

passports: substituting photos, adding false cachets and visas, removing visas and 

bleaching stamps, and counterfeiting passports and substituting pages.146 The 

organization used advanced computer graphics programs, such as Paintshop Pro, Adobe 

Photoshop, and Adobe Printshop to copy and alter passports. Skilled members also used 

software to scan and make copies of travel stamps, visas, and passport security features. 

Raids in 2002 and 2003 indicate that fraudulent material was shared among terrorists.147

But not all counterfeiting efforts were high quality. For example, terrorists often cleaned 

and reused Pakistani sticker visas, sometimes leaving tell-tale evidence of fraud.148 Other 

attempts at forgery resulted in obvious fakes. Thus, officials who know what to look for 

can identify terrorists who present travel documents with these suspicious indicators.
61

Exploring the Link between Human Smugglers and Terrorists 

In July 2001, the CIA warned of a possible link between human smugglers and terrorist 

groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Egyptian Islamic Jihad.149 Indeed, there is 

evidence to suggest that since 1999 human smugglers have facilitated the travel of 

terrorists associated with more than a dozen extremist groups.150 With their global reach 

and connections to fraudulent document vendors and corrupt government officials, 

human smugglers clearly have the “credentials” necessary to aid terrorist travel. 

We have already seen that documents are critical to terrorists—they are needed by those 

wishing to plan and carry out attacks. Documents are similarly critical to human 

smugglers, who have access to document vendors able to obtain genuine passports and 

visas from corrupt government officials.151 Corrupt officials are also paid off to allow 

illegal migrants to pass through travel and security checkpoints.152

These connections combine with lax immigration and border security in many countries 

to make human smuggling an attractive avenue for terrorists in need of travel 

facilitation.153 Following the September 11 attacks, additional information surfaced 

linking al Qaeda to human smugglers. Following the coalition attack on Tora Bora, 

human smugglers assisted fighters fleeing Afghanistan and Pakistan. In January 2002, 

smugglers helped about 400 fighters in Taftan, Pakistan, to escape to Iran.154 Finally, 

there are uncorroborated law enforcement reports suggesting that associates of al Qaeda 

used smugglers in Latin America to travel through the region in 2002 before traveling 

onward to the United States.155

To date, only one human smuggler with suspected links to terrorists has been convicted 

in the United States.156

1

 CIA document, Redbook, 1992 ed. 

2

 Ibid. 

3

 The CIA claimed that they did not receive new data to analyze. The FBI did not share what they gathered 

from their law enforcement investigations with the CIA. Commission interview, Feb. 25, 2004. 

4

 Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, who planned to destroy the Atlantic Avenue subway in Brooklyn with 

explosives in 1997, was arrested on his third attempt to illegally enter the United States along the northwest 

border with Canada. He was arrested by the New York City police on July 31, 1997. Bombs were found in 

his apartment. Abdel Hakim Tizegha claimed to have entered the United States in Boston as a stowaway on 

the Mustapha Ben Boulaid, a tanker owned by an Algerian energy company used to transport liquefied 

natural gas. 

5

 CIA analytic report, “A Reference Guide for Terrorist Passports,” Apr. 14, 2003. 

6 United States v Mohammed A. Salameh, et al., No. 94-1312(L), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, p. 21. 

7

 His application was later denied. Abohalima was indicted as an accessory after the fact for assisting the 

WTC1 attackers.

8

 Center for Immigration Studies, The Open Door: How Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained 

in the United States, 1993 to 2001, Stephen A. Camarota, p. 25. 9

 Although there is no evidence that any of these marriages were fraudulent, Abu Zubaydah said that some 

al Qaeda operatives married American women to obtain U.S. visas. Usama Bin Ladin reportedly did not 

approve of this tactic, saying it violated the sanctity of marriage. KSM, however, allegedly believed it was 
62

a fantastic mechanism for operatives to acquire valid documents, Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu 

Zubaydah, Oct. 7, 2002. 

10 United States v Mohammed A. Salameh, et al., No. 94-1312(L), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, p. 21. 

11 Ibid., p. 22. 

12 Ibid., p. 24. 

13 Ibid., pp. 23, 26. 

14 DOJ document, handwritten memo to file from Immigration Inspector at JFK, Sept. 2, 1992. 

15 Trial testimony of Brian Parr re interview with Yousef, Oct. 22, 1997, United States of America v. Ramzi 

Ahmed Yousef and Eyad Ismoil (S.D.N.Y). 16 United States v Mohammed A. Salameh, et al., No. 94-1312(L), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, p. 25. 

17 An examination of Yousef’s passport by the Forensic Document Lab at INS later reveals that the date of 

birth has been overwritten and the passport binding has been cut and un-stitched, but no other alterations 

were detected. 

18 United States v. Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj aka Khurram Khan, Brief, p. 178. 28 Ibid. 

29 Center for Immigration Studies, The Open Door, p. 27. 30 Alkaisi plead guilty in connection with the WTC1 plot. 

31 Saleh was convicted of conspiracy for the bombing plot and subsequently deported to Egypt, his home 

country, on Nov. 19, 1996. 

32 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 2 before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 

Government Reform, Aug. 1, 2002 (regarding an interview the officer conducted of the Sheikh before they 

began service as a State Department employee). 

33 DOS OIG, Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding 

the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Mar. 1994, p. 1. 

34 DHS document, immigration file A29 753 750. 

35 Although it has long been suggested that the Sheikh was issued visas because of his assistance with 

Afghan Mujahadeen fighters who were then allies of the U.S., the Inspectors General of both the CIA and 

State Departments found “no evidence . . . that any of these visas were granted to the Sheikh to serve CIA 

operational purposes.” Talking Points prepared for the DCI by CIA OIG Frederick Hitz; Report of Audit, 

Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh 

Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Mar. 1994, p. 19 (“What we did find, rather, was evidence of: sloppiness; 

poor performance by some American officers and Foreign Service Nationals (or local employees) involved; 

inadequate systems of control; and inadequate implementation of immigration laws, regulations, and 

guidelines.”). 

36 DOS OIG, Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding 

the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Mar. 1994, p. 20. 

37 CIA document, Revised Chronology of Events Regarding Issuance of Visas to the “Blind Sheikh.” 

38 DOS OIG, Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding 

the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Mar. 1994, p. 22. 

39 Ibid, p. 25. 

40 Ibid., p. 22. 

41 Ibid., p. 25. 

42 Ibid., p. 27. 

43 Ibid., p. 31. 

44 DOS OIG, Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding 

the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Mar. 1994, p. 29. 

45 DOS OIG, Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding 

the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Mar. 1994, p. 2, 17. According to 

documents produced by the Sheikh himself in connection with his asylum claim, he was arrested by 

Egyptian authorities for charges related to his preaching five times from October 1970 to April 1989. In 

April 1990, after his last incarceration and an extended period of house arrest, he was escorted to the airport 

where he made his way to the Sudan. Affidavit of Omar Ahmed Ali, A29-753-750, dated Aug. 11, 1992. 
63

46 DOS OIG, Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding 

the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Mar. 1994, p. 35. 

47 DHS document, In the Matter of Omar Ahmed Ali, File No. A29-753-750 (In Exclusion Proceedings), 

Mar. 16, 1993 (Meisner, J.), p. 3. 

48 Ibid., p. 20. 

49 He was arrested by the New York City police on July 31, 1997. Bombs were found in his apartment. 

50 DHS document, immigration file A74 101 910. 

51 Center for Immigration Studies, The Open Door, p. 31. 52 Seattle Times, “It Takes a Thief,” June 23, July 7, 2002. Fateh Kamel would pay Ressam for stolen 

passports, credit cards and other identity documents. Kamel is now serving eight years in prison in France 

for his “activities related to association with terrorist enterprises.” Time, Sept. 24, 2001. Ressam testified 

that he also sold stolen documents to Mohktar Haouari. U.S. v. Mokhtar Haouari, S4-00 Cr. 15, Testimony 

of Ahmed Ressam before United States District Court of the Southern District of New York, July 3, 2001. 

53 Leo Nkounga was a document broker and an illegal alien in Canada from Cameron who failed to 

surrender himself for deportation in 1993. Canadian Deportation Order, Adjudication file no. AOT93-0077, 

Sept. 15, 1993. He said he obtained two genuine Canadian passports for Ressam, in both instances by 

submitting fake baptismal certificates to Canadian authorities CBC News, Disclosure, “Target Terrorism,” 

Mar. 26, 2002. According to a senior al Qaeda detainee, an Algerian friend of Ressam “set up” the 

Canadian passport for him. 

54 FBI letterhead memorandum, Ressam investigation, May 15, 2001, p. 7. Ressam told border officials that 

he did not have a visa for Pakistan because he was only transiting on his way to India. 

55 PBS Frontline, “Trail of a Terrorist, The Ahmed Ressam Case and Passport Fraud,” Oct. 25, 2001. 

56 FBI case profile provided to Dale Watson, “Abdelghani Meskini,” Feb. 8, 2000. Meskini, who spoke 

English, was to drive Ressam and to give him money, but Ressam never showed since he was arrested at 

the border. Meskini was arrested on Dec. 30, 1999, and charged with material support and interstate fraud. 

See Testimony of Dale Watson before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 9, 2000, pp. 11-

12. On passports and visas provided by Haouari, see United States v. Haouari, 319 F. 3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 

2000). 

57 There is no record of his entry into the United States; he claimed he entered in Miami in an unknown 

way.

58 Tizegha now claimed to have entered the United States in Boston as a stowaway on the Mustapha Ben 

Boulaid, a tanker owned by the Algerian energy company used to transport liquefied natural gas. 59 DHS document, immigration file A73603119. 

60 FBI Communication Form, Re: Borderbom, July 26, 2001. 

61 FBI letterhead memorandum, Ressam investigation, May 15, 2001. 

62 FBI Communication Form, Re: Borderbom, July 26, 2001. 

63 FBI documents, Jan. 17, 1999; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ali Abdelseoud Mohamed, 

March 8, 1999; FBI report of investigation, Re: Aman Gul, Mar. 21, 2000; FBI report of investigation, 

interview of Ahmed Ressam, May 16, 2001; Case file of Ramzi Yousef, convicted in WTC1 bombing in 

1993.

64 FBI report of investigation, Re: UBL/al Qaeda, Jan. 16, 2001; FBI letterhead memorandum, Ressam 

investigation, May 15, 2001; Trial brief, United States v. Ahmed Ressam, CR99-666C, Mar. 2001. 65 FBI report of investigation, interview of protected source, Mar. 22, 2001. 

66 FBI report of investigation, Re: UBL/al Qaeda, Jan. 16, 2001, pp. 30-31 FBI letterhead memorandum, 

Ressam investigation, May 15, 2001. 

67 In 1995, Italian authorities in Milan cracked down on the ICI, an Islamic radical group that was 

facilitating Islamic militants going to fight in Bosnia. Its leaders were members of the Egyptian Islamic 

Jihad. When authorities raided the ICI office, two copies of the Redbook were found in Arabic, along with 

several seals, rubber stamps, blank and counterfeit documents and other tools used to forge documents; FBI 

report of investigation, “Pakistani visa information pertaining to Kenbom/Tanbom subjects,” May 13, 

1999; Intelligence report, “Terrorism: Documents Associated with Apprehended Egyptian Islamic Jihad 

Member,” Apr. 13, 1999. In addition. documents seized in the home of an Egyptian Islamic Jihad member 

included extensive evidence of passport fraud. 
64

68 FBI report of investigation, UBL database, Jan. 19, 1999; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ali 

Abdelseoud Mohamed, Mar. 8, 1999; FBI communication, investigative summary re: the Islamic Army, 

Mar. 27, 2000; FBI report of investigation, Re: UBL/al Qaeda, Jan. 16, 2001, pp. 8, 14-15, 17, 18, 30-31. 

69 FBI report of investigation, Re: UBL/al Qaeda, Jan. 16, 2001, p. 27; FBI letterhead memorandum, 

Ressam investigation, May 15, 2001. 

70 FBI report of investigation, analysis of source reporting, June 16, 2000; FBI report of investigation, 

UBL database, Jan. 19, 1999, pp. 4, 11, 29 71 FBI report of investigation, interview of Ali Abdelseoud Mohamed, Mar. 12, 1999. 

72 FBI report of investigation, interview of unidentified source, Oct. 2, 2000. 

73 FBI report of investigation, Initial 90 day letterhead memorandum, July 24, 2000. 

74 FBI report of investigation, request for evidence comparison, Jan. 26, 2000. 75 FBI document, Jan. 17, 1999; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ali Abdelseoud Mohamed, Mar. 

8, 1999; FBI letterhead memorandum, Ressam investigation, May 15, 2001. 

76 FBI report of investigation, interview of Abdul Rauf Chaudhry, Oct. 2, 1998; FBI report of 

investigation, interview of Ali Abouelsaud Mohamed, Oct. 3, 1999; FBI report of investigation “Pakistani 

visa information pertaining to Kenbom/Tanbom subjects,” May 13, 1999; FBI report of investigation, 

“Possible visa fraud,” April 20, 2001; FBI letterhead memorandum, Ressam investigation, May 15, 2001. 

77 FBI report of investigation, UBL database, Jan. 19, 1999. 

78 FBI Communication, investigation summary re: the Islamic Army, Mar. 27, 2000. Trial brief, United

States v. Ahmed Ressam, CR99-666C, Mar. 2001. 79 CIA analytic report, “Clandestine Travel Facilitators: Key Enablers of Terrorism,” Dec. 31, 2002. 

80 Intelligence Report, interrogation of a detainee, Nov. 22, 2002. 

81 Intelligence Report, interrogation of a detainee, Sept. 11, 2002. 

82 CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, p. 1; Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Nov. 20, 

2002.

83 Intelligence Report, interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, Oct.11, 2002. Malaysia was also desirable 

because of its proximity to Afghanistan and Pakistan and its majority-Muslim population. 

84 Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 9, 2003; CIA analytic report, “Al Qaeda Travel Issues,” 

Jan. 2004, p.1. On the role of KSM, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 11, 2002. 

On the role of Abu Zubaydah, see, e.g., Intelligence report, biographical information on Abu Zubaydah, 

Feb. 25, 2002. 

85 Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Sept. 9, 2003; and Intelligence Report, interrogation of 

Abu Zubaydah, Apr. 12, 2003. The committee moved to Zormat, Paktia province in late 2001 and then to 

Karachi after the fall of Kandahar in late 2001. 

86 On passport collection schemes, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 9, 2003. On 

recycled passports, see Intelligence report, Collection of Passports, June 7, 2002. 

87 CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, p. 1, 3. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Nov. 12, 

2003; and Intelligence Report, Information on travel, training and indoctrination in training camps in 

Afghanistan, Nov. 19, 2001. A detainee said that he attended several security and specialized courses 

including counterfeiting and seal removal; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainees, Apr. 11, 2002. 

88 CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, p. 19. 

89 Intelligence report, information from Saudi detainees on mujahedin travel to Afghanistan via Iran, Mar. 

13, 2002. 

90 CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, p. 3. Mohamed Atta reportedly learned these techniques in 

Afghanistan, and used them to clean Ramzi Binalshibh’s passport of its Pakistani visa and travel cachets. 

91 Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, June 20, 2002. Hassan Ghul was an important al 

Qaeda travel facilitator who worked with Abu Zubaydah assisting Arab fighters traveling to Afghanistan. 

In 1999, Ghul and Zubaydah opened a safe house under the cover of an import/export business in 

Islamabad. In addition, at Zubaydah’s request, Ghul also successfully raised money in Saudi Arabia for the 

Khaldan camp; in exchange Zubaydah paid for Ghul’s trips there so he could renew his residency. 

92 Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Mar. 31, 2003. For example, a detainee identified a person 

who made false documents. The detainee said he would supply this person with passport photos and the 

facilitator would turn them into false documents, including drivers’ licenses, but not passports. The person 

could make false documents on computers, but he also had a contact who could get official documents 
65

from a government office, by either creating an actual file in a false name or by putting a supplied photo 

onto the biographical information from a legitimate file. Ibid.

93 Intelligence report, information on Abu Zubaydah, Aug. 24, 2000; Intelligence report, interrogation of a 

detainee, Feb. 25, 2002. 

94 Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, June 7, 2002. Abu Zubaydah claims he applied for a 

U.S. student visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, sometime between 1987 and 1989, but claims he was denied. 

The State Department, however, was unable to locate a record of this. After one year in India, he claims he 

arranged to visit a computer programming school in Missouri with the help of a Palestinian friend in Saudi 

Arabia. As a Palestinian, he did not have a passport, but rather a refugee travel document so he said he 

borrowed the Kuwaiti passport of a friend to make the trip. Although he did not formally meet with anyone 

at the school and never enrolled, he said he walked around the campus and picked up some brochures. 

95 Intelligence report, information on Abu Zubaydah, Aug. 24, 2000. 

96 Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Feb. 25, 2002. 

97 Ibid. 

98 Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, July 10, 2002. In January 1999, Ahmed Ressam 

reportedly stayed at the Khaldan safehouse, where Abu Zubaydah bought his plane ticket to Canada and 

doctored the visa in Ressam’s Canadian passport. 

99 Intelligence report, profile of Abu Zubaydah, June 14, 2000. 

100 Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 23, 2002. Zubaydah claims that members of 

the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, various Algerian groups and others came to him to learn his techniques. 

101 Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 23, 2002. Zubaydah also strictly limited the 

movement of travelers, almost never allowing them to leave the safehouse for any reason. Instead, 

individuals who blended into the local community were used to get clothes, food and whatever else was 

needed. 

102 Intelligence reports, interrogations of Abu Zubaydah, May 23, 2002, Oct. 29, 2002, and Nov. 7, 2002. 103 Intelligence reports, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Sept. 25 and Dec. 4, 2002. 104 Ibid. 105 Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Apr. 24, 2003. 106 Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Dec. 4, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of a 

detainee, Apr. 24, 2003. 

107 Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Dec. 4, 2002. 108 Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Sept. 25, 2002. 109 Intelligence reports, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Sept. 25, 2002, Dec. 4, 2002, Apr. 2, 2003, and 

Apr. 21, 2003. According to Abu Zubaydah, The African Facilitator procured construction and other 

necessary supplies in Pakistan and delivered them to Afghanistan, and although he operated openly in 

Afghanistan, he was more cautious in Pakistan..

110 Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, June 9, 2003. 111 Intelligence reports, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Sept. 25, 2002, Dec. 4, 2002, and Apr. 2, 2003. 

“Ordinary” mujahid who needed help with their documents were required to report to The African 

Facilitator who would prioritize the work for the Kenyan forgers. Senior al Qaeda members could take a 

passport directly to the Kenyans. 

112 Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Dec. 4, 2002. 113 Intelligence report, “Collection of 400 Passports of Dead Mujahidin,” June 7, 2002. 114 Intelligence report, information on Riyadh, Jan. 26, 2002; Intellience report, interrogation of Abu 

Zubaydah, Aug. 26, 2002. 115 Intelligence report, interrogation of Riyadh, Jan. 28, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of a 

detainee, Sept. 15, 2003. 

116 Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Sept. 15, 2003. 117 Intelligence report, information on Riyadh, Jan. 26, 2002.. 118 Intelligence report, interrogation of Riyadh, Jan. 28, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of a 

detainee, Sept. 15, 2003. . 

119 Intelligence report, interrogation of Riyadh, Jan. 28, 2004; Intelligence report, Analysis of detainee 

interviews, Sept. 12, 2002. Many detainees mention Riyadh as a facilitator in Karachi, Pakistan. From 

Karachi, many were directed to another facilitator in Quetta, Pakistan, who arranged transportation over the 
66

border into Afghanistan. The large number of detainees who took the Karachi-Quetta-Kandahar route 

suggests that the facilitators were coordinating their activities. 

120 Intelligence report, Interrogation of Riyadh, Jan. 28, 2004. For more on Riyadh’s post 9/11 role as 

money facilitator see Intelligence report, interrogation of Riyadh, Apr. 6, 2004. 

121 CIA analytic reports, “Clandestine Travel Facilitators: Key Enablers of Terrorism,” Dec. 31, 2002 and 

Analysis of Passports, Jan. 2004. 

122 CIA analytic report, “Clandestine Travel Facilitators,” p. 3. According to Abu Zubaydah, in Turkey an 

Iraqi or a Kurd was a reliable forger. For $5,500 he would provide documents to travel to Europe. A Saudibased forger from Chad bought real passports from foreign drug addicts and re-sold them. Zubaydah also 

claims that real Pakistani passports could be bought by anyone with money. See also Intelligence report, 

interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Nov. 1, 2002, and Intelligence report, “Acquisition of Libyan passports by 

an Abu Zubaydah operative in the Netherlands,” Dec. 6, 2000. 

123 CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, pp. 11-12 124 Testimony of Brian Parr re interview with Yousef, Oct. 22, 1997, United States of America v. Ramzi 

Ahmed Yousef and Eyad Ismoil (S.D.N.Y.). 125 CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, p. 12. 126 Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Sept. 9, 2003. 127 FBI documents, Oct. 3, 1999; Intelligence reports, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Dec. 4, 2002 and 

Apr. 10, 2003.

128 Ibid. A travel agency arranged an Australian visa for Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (KSM), al Qaeda’s chief 

operational planner and the mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks. The agency submitted his visa application 

on Aug. 13, 2001, the same day they submitted an application for another al Qaeda operative. The same 

address and employer were listed on both applications. KSM received his visa, although there is no 

evidence he ever used it FBI case file, June 21, 2002 

129 Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Oct. 10, 2002. Abu Zubaydah discusses smuggling 

routes from Afghanistan into Pakistan and Iran, and assessed that Yemen was the easiest place to conduct 

smuggling operations. Intelligence report, “International organized crime: overview of Pakistani ‘Mafia’ 

activities in Azerbaijan,” June 18, 2002. 

130 CIA analytic report, “Clandestine Travel Facilitators,” p. 3. 131 Intelligence report, “Information from Saudi detainees on Mujahedin travel to Afghanistan via Iran,” 

Mar. 13, 2002. 

132 CIA analytic report, “Clandestine Travel Facilitators,” p. 1. 133 DHS email from Dan C. to Commission staff, “CODEL Brief,” Apr. 16, 2004. 134 CIA analytic report, “Clandestine Travel Facilitators,” p. 6. 135 Ibid. 136 Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Sept. 9, 2003. KSM used an alias Saudi passport, adding 

entry and exit stamps to “age it.” See Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Nov. 20, 2002, in 

which a detainee maintains that the immigration stamps in his passport are false and were put in his 

passport by Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri’s support network in Karachi to cover up the detainee’s time in 

Afghanistan. See also, FBI document, Feb. 9, 2003, reporting a detainee’s claim that he went to Kandahar 

to pick up his passport after it had been modified with forged stamps showing him visiting Malaysia, 

Thailand, Egypt and Pakistan. 

137 CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, p. 1. 138 Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Sept. 9, 2003. KSM said that Usama Bin Ladin approved 

the use of all alias passports. In Intelligence report, Nov. 23, 2002 it is reported that a detainee said all 

Saudi jihadists in Pakistan used fake Saudi passports to prevent their true identity from being discovered by 

Pakistani authorities at the airports. See also, CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, p. 25, stating that 

terrorists also have used false supporting documents, including credit cards and video rental cards to 

support the alias under which they are traveling. 139 Intelligence reports, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 27, 2002 and Nov. 1, 2002. According to Abu 

Zubaydah, it cost $400-$1,000 for a Saudi passport. 140 CIA analytic report, “Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passports,” p. 1. 141 Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 27, 2002. According to Abu Zubaydah, KSM 

preferred to use Saudi Arabia as a transit point because it was easy for Saudi passport holders to acquire 

tourist and student visas to the United States. 
67

142 Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Sept. 9, 2003. 143 Intelligence reports, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Aug. 26, 2002 and Nov. 1, 2002. According to 

Abu Zubaydah, he had access to a number of forgers who, for a relatively small amount of money, would 

alter the passports of many countries. 

144 CIA analytic report, “Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passports,” p. 1. 145 CIA analytic report, “Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passports,” p. 2. 146 CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, p. 13; Intelligence report, interrogation of a detainee, Sept. 9, 

2003. KSM photo-substituted an alias Saudi passport with his own picture in proper Saudi attire. 

147 CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, p. 15. 148 CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, p. 19. 149 CIA analytic report, “Expanding Links Between Human Smugglers and Extremists: Threats to the 

United States,” July 6, 2001, p. ii. 

150 CIA analytic report, “Expanding Links,” p. 1. 151 One smuggler, Salim Boughader-Mucharrafille, smuggled Lebanese nationals sympathetic to Hamas 

and Hizbollah into the United States and relied on corrupt Mexican officials in Beirut, Mexico City and 

Tijuana to facilitate their travel. Specifically, Boughader obtained Mexican tourist visas from an official at 

the Mexican embassy in Beirut to facilitate the travel of humans to Mexico. DOJ, INS Background or 

briefing paper on Operation Tabouli, Nov. 14, 2002; CIA analytic report, “Expanding Links,” p. ii. 152 CIA analytic report, “Expanding Links,” p. ii. 153 Human smugglers are also logistical experts, arranging for lodging and travel. CIA analytic report, 

“Expanding Links,” p. ii. 154 CIA analytic report, “Clandestine Travel Facilitators: Key Enablers of Terrorism,” Dec. 2002, p3. 155 Ibid. 156 Boughader was charged with human smuggling and sentenced to 11 months in prison. After serving his 

sentence he was deported to Mexico where he was arrested along with several other members of his 

smuggling ring. They face criminal charges and if convicted could serve lengthy jail times. 
68

4

Immigration and Border Security Evolve, 1993 to 2001 

4.1 The Intelligence Community 

As we have seen in chapter 3, prior to September 11, 2001, the intelligence community 

did not organize to disrupt terrorist travel except when targeting individual terrorists. It 

also failed to fully use the one tool it supported to prevent terrorist entry—the terrorist 

watchlist.

Overall, intelligence community guidance about terrorist travel was limited. Recognizing 

the importance of freedom of movement to international terrorist groups, the Annual 

Strategic Intelligence Review for Counterterrorism, issued in October 1995, called for 

additional intelligence information on terrorist “travel procedures,” 

“surveillance/targeting capability regarding modes of transportation and facilities,” and 

“training.”1

 The same review released two and a half years later, in April 1998, pointed to 

the need for more information on terrorist “travel procedures” and “operational tactics 

and tradecraft capabilities.”2

Such calls for additional intelligence regarding terrorist travel in its broader context seem 

to have had no result. A likely explanation for this inaction is that in the context of the 

Lockerbie experience, “travel procedures” were interpreted to mean access to 

transportation and reservation systems. But the previous existence of the Redbook, whose 

purpose was to assist frontline border officials in disruption and law enforcement 

operations, suggests that the phrase might have been more broadly understood. In any 

case, as we noted earlier, there was certainly no lack of raw data concerning terrorist 

travel methods. During the 1990s, the FBI’s numerous terrorist law enforcement 

investigations provided a cache of information, obtained in part from raids and seized 

hard drives, on the travel tactics of terrorists as they moved around the globe—planning, 

surveilling targets, and carrying out attacks.3

This information apparently remained stovepiped at the FBI, drawn on only when needed 

for a particular law enforcement case. It was not shared with the CIA unit that published 

the Redbook. The CIA as a whole simply did not engage in analysis of terrorist travel 

information at this time.4

 The closest it came to doing so was through a program called 

the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System, or PISCES, 

started by the CIA in 1997.5

PISCES initially assisted foreign countries in improving their watchlisting capabilities. It 

provided a mainframe computer system to facilitate immigration processing in half a 

dozen countries. Foreign authorities used the technology to watchlist and share 

information with the CIA about terrorists appearing at their borders. The CIA used the 

information to track and apprehend individual terrorists, not for wide-ranging analysis of 

terrorist travel methods.6
69

Thus, despite some intelligence community guidance and the availability of considerable 

information from investigations, as well as work done in producing the Redbook, no 

agency of the U.S. government undertook what was so desperately needed: a 

comprehensive analysis of how terrorists exploit weaknesses in travel documents and 

international travel channels to commit deadly attacks. In practical terms, this meant the 

United States denied itself the ability to disrupt terrorist operations and prevent 

undetected terrorist entries by disrupting operatives’ ability to travel. 

Meanwhile, as we have already noted, al Qaeda had established a passport office under 

the leadership of one of Usama Bin Ladin’s deputies, Mohammed Atef. It also was 

training operatives in document forgery and expanding its links with a wide variety of 

travel facilitators, corrupt government officials, and document forgers to enhance its 

ability to travel throughout the world undetected. 

4.2 The State Department 

Beyond playing a critical role in maintaining the terrorist watchlist, the State Department 

also administered U.S. immigration laws abroad; it therefore handled applications for 

both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.7

 Nonimmigrant visas are issued to temporary 

visitors to the United States; immigrant visas are for those who intend to become 

permanent residents. For the State Department, visa policy was a powerful tool to achieve 

larger U.S. foreign policy goals.8

Background

U.S. national security interests depend not just on military and intelligence personnel 

overseas but also on diplomats. Most of them are members of the Foreign Service, 

serving at American overseas diplomatic and consular posts and at the Department of 

State in Washington. One of the duties these overseas diplomats perform with support 

from Washington is to adjudicate the issuance of visas to foreign citizens seeking to come 

to the United States.

Congress first charged consular officers with the responsibility of issuing visas to certain 

aliens in 1884.9

 In 1917, all aliens seeking to enter the United States were required to 

obtain visas. This requirement has been continued since that time under successive 

immigration laws.10 With certain exceptions, therefore, aliens wanting to come to the 

United States before September 11, 2001, needed to obtain appropriate visas from U.S. 

consular officers stationed at one of the 230 visa-issuing diplomatic posts around the 

world.11

From October 1, 2000, through September 31, 2001, the State Department adjudicated 

approximately 10 million nonimmigrant visa applications worldwide, approved 7.5 

million. An integral part of this process was a “name check,” which involved checking 

the name and other biographical identifiers of an applicant against existing records—

including lists of known or suspected terrorists—to see if the he or she should be given 
70

additional scrutiny or be denied a visa.

What Is a Visa and Who Needs One? 

Because there are many common misunderstandings about the role of the State 

Department in border security, it is useful to review basic facts about visas. 

A visa does not authorize entry to the United States.12 It simply indicates that an 

application has been reviewed by a U.S. consular officer at an American embassy or 

consulate overseas, and that the officer determined the applicant’s eligibility to travel to 

the United States for a specific purpose. Only a U.S. immigration officer has the authority 

to permit entry into the United States.13 That decision is made at the port of entry, when 

the immigration officer also decides how long any given stay can last.

Prior to September 11, 2001, a visa was not required of every one of the approximately 

500 million people seeking to enter the United States each year. Indeed, most who 

crossed U.S. borders did not need a visa to present themselves at a U.S. port of entry. 

These “visa waiver” entrants included U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, 

citizens of Canada, and citizens of 27 other countries, most in Europe. 

As might be obvious, U.S. citizens need not obtain visas to travel to the United States 

from abroad.14 In addition, U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents (LPRs) are not 

required to have a passport to enter or depart the United States when traveling between 

the United States and Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean.15 These two groups—citizens 

and LPRs—constitute more than half the total number of people seeking to enter the 

United States. 

Citizens of Canada also are not required to present a Canadian passport or a visa if they 

are visiting the United States from Canada.16 In fiscal year 2001, about 13 million 

Canadians presented themselves at U.S. ports of entry. 

Similarly, citizens of the 27 countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program can 

simply board an aircraft or drive to a land border and ask permission to enter the United 

States without a visa.17 They are screened by an immigration inspector at a port of entry 

before admission. In 2000, about 17 million individuals entered the United States under 

the Visa Waiver Program, which applies only to temporary visitors traveling to the 

United States for business or pleasure who are staying 90 days or less.18 Persons traveling 

to the United States from these countries for other purposes—for example, to study or to 

work—must have a visa. 

The remaining approximately 203 million people seeking entry to the United States in 

2000 needed some form of a visa. Of these, approximately 117 million were Mexican 

citizens who used visa/border crossing cards (BCCs). These special visas in the form of 

cards include both a fingerprint and a photograph. Thus, out of the approximately 500 

million people seeking entry in the year before 9/11, only approximately 86 million, or 17 

percent, were required to have visas and were from countries other than Mexico. 
71

As noted above, there are two types of visas: immigrant and nonimmigrant. The number 

of immigrant visas available each year to citizens of a particular country, and in particular 

categories, is strictly controlled by statute, and the number of prospective applicants for 

U.S. immigrant visas often exceed these caps. People applying from an oversubscribed 

country are registered on waiting lists. In 2000, the State Department issued about 

400,000 immigrant visas worldwide.19

By contrast, the availability of nonimmigrant visas available is controlled not limited by a 

quota system rather by the qualifications of the individual applicant for the particular type 

of visa being sought. It is also influenced by the resources the State Department is able to 

allocate to visa processing. In 2000, about 1,000 State consular officers processed 10 

million applications for nonimmigrant visas, issuing about 7 million.20

There are several categories of nonimmigrant visa. Most common are B or 

business/tourist visas, 3.5 million of which were issued in 2000.21 Next, with 1.5 million 

issued that year, are the BCCs used by Mexicans seeking to cross the border temporarily 

(for example, to commute every day to the United States). Some 300,000 F visas were 

issued to foreign students, and 290,000 H visas to temporary workers or trainees.22

All 19 of the 9/11 hijackers entered the United States on nonimmigrant visas. Eighteen 

entered on B visas, and one—Hani Hanjour—entered on an F visa.23

Visas are governed by reciprocal agreements with other countries regarding their duration 

and cost. Prior to September 11, although it was not mandatory, nonimmigrant visas were 

issued “incorporating the most liberal provisions possible with respect to validity period 

and fees on the basis of reciprocity, that is, the treatment accorded by the applicant’s 

country to U.S. citizens.”24 In other words, if a given country granted U.S. citizens 

seeking to travel there a visa valid for five years—as did Egypt, Mohamed Atta’s 

country—then the United States ordinarily reciprocated and provided its citizens a fiveyear visa.

A visa can be single entry, allowing its holder to enter the United States only once, or 

multiple entry. The length of time during which the visa holder could apply for entry to 

the United States was also determined by negotiation on a country-by-country basis. 

Before 9/11, Saudi citizens received multiple-entry B visas valid for two years; citizens 

of the United Arab Emirates, multiple-entry ten-year B visas; and citizens of Egypt and 

Lebanon, multiple-entry five-year B visas. 

Obtaining a U.S. Visa 

Prior to September 11, 2001, the basic process for applying for a U.S. visa was the same 

worldwide, but the precise guidelines followed at each visa-issuing embassy or consulate 

were often different. Though the law was uniform, the State Department gave individual 

visa-issuing posts broad latitude in establishing procedures for visa application and 

processing.25
72

On matters of border security, the State Department derives its authority from the 

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), the primary body of law governing 

immigration and visa operations.26 Among other functions, the INA defines the powers in 

this area given to the attorney general, the secretary of state, immigration officers, and 

consular officers.27 It delineates categories of and qualifications for immigrant and 

nonimmigrant visas, and it provides a framework of operations through which foreign 

citizens are allowed to enter and immigrate to the United States. It defines the terms used 

in immigration law, including alien, which means “any person not a citizen or national of 

the United States.”28 It also sets forth the grounds for refusing someone a visa. 

Consistent with the INA, aliens began the visa process by presenting a valid passport and 

completed visa application, along with a photograph, to a State Department consular, or 

visa, section at an embassy or consulate abroad.29 Visa applicants paid a nonrefundable 

application fee of $65 and submitted their application either in person, indirectly (by mail 

or by drop box at the embassy where applicants could leave their completed 

applications), or through a third party such as a travel agent.

After the application and passport arrived at the consular section, it was reviewed by a 

consular officer who decided whether or not to issue a visa. Many of these adjudicators 

were in their first overseas tours as Foreign Service officers, and many moved on to other 

kinds of work within the State Department after fulfilling their consular rotation. The 

consular section reports to the ambassador in that country and to the Bureau of Consular 

Affairs within the State Department.30 The consular officer’s decision to grant or deny the 

visa cannot be challenged or reviewed in court.31

Three aspects of this adjudication process are particularly noteworthy. First, there was a 

mandatory computerized name check done of every visa applicant. This requirement had 

been in place since 1995, when all visa-issuing posts worldwide gained access to a 

centralized, computerized name-check database.32 Specifically, the applicant’s essential 

information was checked against a large database called the Consular Lookout and 

Automated Support System (CLASS), which included a number of databases containing 

such derogatory information on individuals as prior visa refusals and federal arrest 

warrants, before the visa was physically issued. One of the databases in CLASS was a 

watchlist of known and suspected terrorists called TIPOFF. When a check of the CLASS 

database revealed derogatory information on the applicant, the consular officer could 

refuse the visa if there were sufficient legal grounds to do so.33 A consular officer who 

received a response of “00” when querying CLASS—an indication of a potential, serious 

ineligibility, including terrorism—was required to request a security advisory opinion 

from the State Department before considering the case further.34

Second, the law required all applicants for nonimmigrant visas to appear for a personal 

interview.35 However, the law also provided for a waiver of this requirement if it was 

deemed to be in the “national interest.” Prior to September 11, 2001, State Department 

policy encouraged waiving the interview.36 Understanding why personal appearances 

were so routinely waived in the pre-9/11 era is critical to understanding the State’s 
73

Department’s view of its role in border security; this issue will be discussed in greater 

depth below, particularly with regard to visa policy in Saudi Arabia at the time the 

hijackers received their visas. 

The third point worth noting concerns the grounds for denying a visa. In the year 2000, 

there were more than 50 different grounds to refuse someone a nonimmigrant visa under 

the INA.37 Three that are of particular importance to understanding the visa applications 

of the 9/11 hijackers and their co-conspirators are discussed below. 

Section 214(b)—The Intending Immigrant Presumption. Under immigration law 

before 9/11, all foreigners applying for a nonimmigrant visa were presumed to be 

intending immigrants.38 Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act 

provided that “Every alien . . . shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes 

to the satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time of application for a visa, and the 

immigration officers, at the time of application for admission, that he is entitled to a 

nonimmigrant status[.]” Thus, Thus, the law placed the burden of proof squarely on the 

applicant to demonstrate that he or she had no desire to reside in the United States. A 

finding that the applicant had not met this burden under section 214(b) was “the basic and 

most frequent reason for an NIV [nonimmigrant visa] denial.”39 In fiscal year 2001, these 

were the grounds on which about 2.2 million applicants were refused a nonimmigrant 

visa, totaling about 80 percent of all nonimmigrant visa denials.40

Section 221(g)—Lack of Documentation. Under section 221(g) of the INA, consular 

officers were obligated to deny a visa if the alien failed to comply with the application 

requirements or was otherwise legally ineligible for a visa. This catchall provision, in 

effect before September 11, prohibits the issuance of a visa to an applicant if it appears 

from the application or its supporting documents that he or she is not entitled to a visa or 

if the consular officer “knows or has reason to know” the applicant is ineligible to receive 

a visa.41 For example, this section was used to deny a visa to hijacker Hani Hanjour in 

September 2000 when he failed to attach to his application documentation supporting his 

request for a student visa. 

In fiscal year 2001, about 600,000, or about 20 percent of all nonimmigrant visa denials, 

fell under this provision. Thus, almost all visas that were denied before 9/11 were denied 

under either 214(b) or 221(g).42

Denial on Grounds of Terrorism. The INA in effect before September 11 also allowed 

a consular officer to deny a visa to a foreigner who engaged in, or was deemed likely to 

engage in, terrorist activity after entry.43 This included an individual acting alone or as a 

member of a group who committed an act of terrorism, or who provided material support 

to any individual, organization, or government conducting a terrorist action.44 These 

provisions, explicitly providing for the exclusion of foreign visa applicants based on their 

involvement in terrorism, were added to the law in 1991.45 Prior to that time, foreigners 

could be excluded if there was a more general conclusion that they might endanger the 

security of the United States.46
74

Few aliens were ever denied a nonimmigrant visa on grounds of on terrorism in the pre9/11 era—only 83 in fiscal year 200147

Issuing the Visa

If the application was approved, then a visa—a piece of paper or “foil” with various 

security features on it, including a digitized photograph of the applicant—was printed out 

and affixed to the applicant’s passport. By the mid 1990s, this visa could be read by a 

machine at a U.S. port of entry (the so-called machine-readable visa), enabling the 

immigration inspector to input the visa data quickly into the immigration database.48

If the application was refused, then the passport was returned to the applicant. The fact of 

and reasons for the refusal were noted in the State Department’s computerized CLASS 

database used by consular officers. If the person reapplied using the same or similar 

biographical information—name, date of birth, place of birth, passport number—the 

earlier refusal would automatically pop up as part of the name-check process. However, 

if the applicant’s visa was approved, the record of the prior approval would not 

automatically be brought to the attention of the consular officer. Similarly, as discussed 

earlier, consular officers had no access to the immigration records of a particular visa 

applicant when evaluating his or her case. 

The Bureau of Consular Affairs 

In order to understand how consular officers working for the State Department handled 

the visa applications of the 19 September 11 hijackers and their co-conspirators, it is 

necessary to understand how the branch of the department overseeing those officers—the 

Bureau of Consular Affairs—worked.49 Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs 

Mary Ryan has told the Commission that she always viewed Consular Affairs (CA) as the 

“outer ring of border security.”50 Under Ryan’s leadership in the 1990s, CA increased its 

focus on border security by providing greater resources to the development of secure 

passport and visa technology, improving computer name-check capability, and creating a 

worldwide real-time consular communication system.51

Visas were not the only responsibility of Consular Affairs during the 1990s, but rather 

were a subset of one of its three primary strategic goals: 

 protecting the safety and security of Americans who travel abroad, by means that 

included issuing travel warnings; 

 meeting the demands of American travelers in a timely and professional manner, 

by means that included issuing passports to U.S. citizens; and 

 facilitating travel to the United States by foreign visitors and immigrants, while 

enhancing border security to deter entry by those who abuse or threaten our 

system.52

As discussed above, before the Department of Homeland Security was created, consular 

officials administered the immigration law abroad in partnership with the Immigration 
75

and Naturalization Service (INS). Recall that INS inspectors made an independent 

determination at a port of entry regarding the admissibility of a person who presented a 

visa. If the visa holder was admitted, INS inspectors also decided the length of his or her 

stay.53 Perhaps surprisingly, State officials overseas had very limited contact with the INS 

before 9/11, and most consular officials never spoke to an INS officer in the ordinary 

course of their duties.54 In general, consular officials received little feedback from the 

INS about their visa-issuing decisions. The INS did not collect or disseminate 

information to consular officials about either the rejection rate of visa holders at ports of 

entry or the rates at which citizens from particular countries overstayed their time of 

admission granted by the INS. Thus, although consular officers made some efforts on 

their own to validate their visa decisions—for example, they called visa recipients to see 

whether they had returned from their trips and not remained in the United States—the 

lack of accurate data from the INS left them little to go on.55

The State Department Budget in the 1990s

The State Department, like much of the federal government in the early 1990s, made do 

with fewer resources. As the department itself described the situation, “The years of the 

Clinton administration coincided with a decline in the Department of State’s resources, 

leading to cuts and streamlining throughout the agency.”56 This seems an accurate 

assessment. Both the Clinton White House and the Congress—particularly after the 

Republican takeover in 1994—were determined to hold the line on the federal 

government’s growth.57 The under secretary of state for management during this time, 

Richard Moose, recalled, “We were in a very tight bind in our operating accounts.”58

Compounding these tough budget conditions were what Moose termed “some serious 

unfunded mandates” associated with the State Department’s decision—made in the 

administration of President George H. W. Bush—to build new embassies and consulates 

in the countries of the former Soviet Union without an additional revenue stream.59 As 

part of a broad reevaluation of its overseas presence during this time, the State 

Department identified 42 diplomatic posts that could be closed. Many of these were small 

consulates, while many of the 40 new overseas posts were new embassies, including 14 

embassies in the newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union, 4 in the new 

states of the former Yugoslavia, 2 in Southeast Asia, and 2 in Africa.60 The net increased 

cost of these buildings was in the hundreds of millions of dollars.61

Embassy security also received greater resources during this time. The bombings of three 

U.S. facilities in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983 awakened the United States to the destructive 

power of explosive-laden trucks and car bombs. Following the attacks, Secretary of State 

George Shultz formed a commission—the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security—headed 

by retired admiral Bobby Inman.62 The Inman Commission recommended $3.5 billion to 

meet security needs overseas, and Congress appropriated $5 billion for security from 

fiscal year 1987 to fiscal year 1998.63 However, progress in improving embassy security 

was slow. When al Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and 

Nairobi, Kenya, on August 7, 1998, neither embassy met Inman standards, and their 

threat levels were considered medium to low.64
76

The Accountability Review Boards tasked with gathering lessons learned from the 

August 1998 embassy bombings—chaired by retired admiral William Crowe—

recommended in January 1999 that $1.4 billion be spent annually over the next ten years 

to improve embassy security.65

In response to these renewed concerns about embassy security, Congress appropriated 

additional funds. In all, the United States spent about $2.4 billion to upgrade security at 

our overseas posts before the attacks of September 11, 2001.66 But these vast sums were 

not directed at increasing State’s workforce, already strained by personnel cuts, nor were 

they used to upgrade the ability of consular officers to combat terrorism. In its proposed 

fiscal year 1995 budget, the State Department requested 366 fewer positions than in the 

previous year.67 Position cuts were recommended under every heading in diplomatic and 

consular programs.68 Downsizing proceeded in 1995 with the implementation of five 

buyout programs. Encouraged by delayed buyouts approved for 1996 and 1997, more 

than 600 employees voluntarily left the Department of State.69 The number of Foreign 

Service personnel thus fell from 5,071 in 1993 to 4,061 in 1996. Civil service positions at 

State showed a similar decline.70

These shrinking budgetary resources disproportionately affected the Bureau of Consular 

Affairs because of The State Department’s organizational structure, employee hiring, and 

the deployment scheme in the 1990s. Traditionally, many Foreign Service officers spend 

their first overseas tour of duty performing consular work. With the State Department 

budget crunch, the Bureau of Consular Affairs could not hire replacements for officials 

lost to attrition; it was forced to extend the length of tours for consular officers and was 

unable to promote qualified personnel to more senior consular positions.71 The result was 

a high burnout rate for consular officials, and a flight of senior qualified personnel to 

other portions of the State Department or to the private sector. According to Assistant 

Secretary of State for CA Mary Ryan, “The slogan was to do more with less, to the point 

where we were doing everything with nothing.”72

The Visa Waiver Program 

One recent innovation that initially helped CA adjust to its budget crunch during this 

period was the Visa Waiver Program. Its growth led to a drop in demand for 

nonimmigrant visas, because citizens of the participating countries were no longer 

required to obtain a U.S. visa for short-term visits.73 Established in 1986, the Visa Waiver 

Program enabled citizens of participating countries to travel to the United States for 

tourism or business for 90 or fewer days without first obtaining a visa.74 Criteria for 

inclusion in the program included a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate (below 2 percent) 

for nationals of the country, a high volume of visa applications for nationals of the 

country, and the offer of reciprocal treatment for U.S. citizens.75 The departments of State 

and Justice established processes intended to determine a country’s eligibility for the 

program under the statutory criteria. They also evaluated the country’s political and 

economic stability. By 9/11, about 17 million travelers per year were admitted to the 

United States under this program, which played a significant role in 1990s’ border 
77

security policymaking at the State Department. Most important, in participating countries 

it significantly reduced the workload (and thus the staffing needs) of consular personnel, 

who would otherwise have been tasked with processing visas.

The Visa Waiver Program 

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provided for the establishment of a 

nonimmigrant visa waiver pilot program for nationals of up to eight countries.76 Its two 

main objectives were to save U.S. government resources for higher-priority activities and 

to encourage travel to the United States.77 State was eager to implement the system in 

part because it wished to reallocate resources then devoted to visa processing in countries 

eligible for the program.78

The statute required the secretary of state and the attorney general to certify that an 

automated data arrival and departure system was in place before the program was 

implemented.79 State expressed concern that the INS could not meet this requirement 

since its inspectors lacked the necessary equipment to “allow for a real time electronic 

name check of all incoming passengers.”80 State also noted that because the forms filled 

out by departing visitors to record their departures (the I-94) were still being collected by 

the airlines, not government officials, it was very difficult to collect accurate, automated 

exit data.81

Notwithstanding these initial worries, the program was certified by Attorney General Ed 

Meese in 1988 and commenced operation for passengers traveling from the United 

Kingdom over the July Fourth weekend.82 It was expanded to include Japan in December 

1988; by July 30, 1989, Germany, Switzerland, France, Sweden, Italy, and the 

Netherlands were participating.83 Justice Department concerns about entry to the United 

States by Mafia members, terrorists, and drug traffickers from the six additional countries 

were allayed when State provided to the INS (for use by their inspectors at ports of entry) 

“all information on nationals of participating countries found in the visa lookout 

system”84 by sharing the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist. 

The State Department realized an immediate benefit from the Visa Waiver Program. 

Instead of an expected 20–25 percent increase in applications at posts in countries that 

otherwise would have been subject to the visa requirement, there were reductions “of up 

to 80 percent.”85 However, this reduced demand for nonimmigrant visas meant that a 

higher percentage of visas were being adjudicated and issued in posts where rates of 

fraud were higher.86 In addition, these savings could not be fully realized—and CA 

resources reprogrammed—unless the pilot program were made permanent.87

The State Department lost no time in urging that such action be taken.88 On October 30, 

2000, the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act was signed into law (P.L. 106-396). 

Consular Affairs—Technology and Watchlists 
78

Although Consular Affairs saw itself and its administration of the visa function as the 

“outer ring of border security” during the 1990s, State’s technology in the early 1990s 

was anything but state-of-the-art.102

Indeed, the State Department began the 1990s with a patchwork of information 

technology systems serving about 230 diplomatic posts worldwide.103 The development 

in early 1990 of a machine-readable visa (MRV)—containing a laser-printed digital 

photograph of the visa applicant that could be read by a machine used by INS inspectors 

at ports of entry, thereby making possible an automatic download of visa information into 

the INS database—seemed to promise a brighter future.104 But by the time of the World 

Trade Center attack three years later, the MRV system was not installed worldwide 

because it had not been funded.105

In the early 1990s, State’s watchlisting efforts were similarly stymied by a lack of 

modern technology. In 1993, visa applicants were screened using one of three systems: a 

real-time interface with the State Department in Washington (where the TIPOFF 

watchlist was maintained—see text box), a check against the watchlist contained on a 

computer disk distributed to posts every two months or so, or a check against the 

watchlist on a microfiche distributed to posts approximately every six months. Almost 

half of all diplomatic posts received these updates by microfiche, which was cumbersome 

and time-consuming to use.106

Fortunately, State’s main counterterrorism tool, the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist, did 

receive much-needed funds to improve its capabilities. Beginning in 1990, State received 

funding from the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to hire a computer 

consultant to design a robust computer architecture for TIPOFF.107 However, TIPOFF, 

and State’s system of identifying ineligible visa applicants generally, was only as 

effective as the system used to access it, and the system in 1993 was antiquated. 

In 1991, on the eve of the Gulf War, State was asked by the White House to use TIPOFF 

to help prevent the infiltration into the United States of Iraqi intelligence agents. This 

request provided the impetus to broaden access to the TIPOFF system to include 

immigration inspectors at U.S. ports of entry. The expansion made sense, since 

immigration inspectors determined the admissibility of all individuals seeking entry to 

the United States, including those who came from countries where no visa was required. 

By design, the database of names available to inspectors at ports of entry was smaller 

than that available to consular officials. Because the INS needed to process travelers 

quickly, it used only that portion of the TIPOFF database containing specific information 

on a person, such as date of birth. The State Department, which had more time to 

evaluate a visa applicant’s papers submitted at an embassy or consulate, could call an 

applicant back in for an interview to clarify data needed for positive identification. Thus, 

the INS sought access to only about two-thirds of all TIPOFF entries at ports of entry. 

By September 11, 2001, the consular database, CLASS, contained the TIPOFF terrorist 

watchlist, which then contained about 60,000 names. It also included some 10 million 
79

records of individuals denied visas previously, individuals wanted by federal authorities, 

and individuals who for some other reason should not be issued a visa.

The Terrorist Watchlist 

Before 1987, there was no automated terrorist watchlist systematically used by border 

security officials. Instead, hardbound books created and used by intelligence agencies 

contained names of known or suspected terrorists. 

After a Palestinian terrorist acquired a U.S. visa in 1987, an enterprising State 

Department employee named John Arriza was asked by his supervisor to “do something” 

about terrorism. Arriza created TIPOFF, an interagency data-sharing program designed to 

prevent known or suspected terrorists from entering the United States. The State 

Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), where Arriza worked, would 

collect information on suspected terrorists from all sources, including other members of 

the intelligence community and the media, and enter it into a searchable database.108

Arriza persuaded intelligence community agencies to allow the declassification of four 

data fields pulled from a classified document with terrorist identity information: the 

individual’s name, date of birth, country of birth, and passport number. This limited 

declassification enabled consular and immigration officials, who operated in an 

unclassified environment and who daily scrutinized travel documents containing 

applicants’ biographical information, to check applicants against a larger classified list of 

terrorists. On June 18, 1991, State signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 

the INS and the U.S. Customs Service making the four unclassified data fields in TIPOFF 

available to them. The data would be entered into the National Automated Immigrant 

Lookout System (NAILS) maintained by the INS and available to officials working at 

ports of entry. The MOU also provided a mechanism for State/INR to pass classified 

information about an individual to an INS duty officer, using secure communications 

lines. The INS duty officer would then communicate an admissibility determination to 

the INS officer at the port of entry without divulging to that officer the classified 

information supporting it. 

The MOU gave State/INR eight hours to provide information to be used by INS in 

making its decision to permit or deny an applicant admission to the United States. Under 

this first MOU, Customs officials used the INS as their point of access to TIPOFF. 

In 1997, State signed an agreement to share the TIPOFF watchlist with Canada (TIPOFF 

U.S.-Canada, or TUSCAN). Like the MOU with U.S. immigration officials, the Canada 

MOU required State/INR to respond to Canadian inquiries within a set period of time—

10 to 15 working days for a visa application hit, and one hour for a hit at a port of 

entry.109

In March 1999, State signed a new MOU with the INS and U.S. Customs Service that 

broadened access to TIPOFF data by Customs and added a database that included 

individuals watchlisted because of their connection to organized crime syndicates. 
80

The FBI and Watchlisting 

Prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI did not provide written guidance to its employees 

on how to collect and disseminate information on terrorists’ identities for inclusion in 

watchlists.

The FBI’s focus was on investigating and prosecuting particular cases. It was not oriented 

toward producing finished intelligence products, or culling identifying information out of 

case files for inclusion in terrorist watchlists. Indeed, an FBI employee who was not 

working on a particular case—even a counterterrorism analyst at headquarters—would 

generally not have been able to gain access to data gathered in other investigations, 

though his or her purpose might be to collect information for inclusion in a watchlist. 

While some employees working in the FBI’s counterterrorism sections, such as the 

Usama Bin Ladin and Radical Fundamentalists units, did routinely submit names to the 

State Department for inclusion in the TIPOFF watchlist—and participated in State’s 

efforts to clarify the nature of any derogatory information after a lookout hit—this 

cooperation was ad hoc, and not the result written FBI policy. FBI watchlisting policy 

also reflected the pre-9/11 view of the division of labor between the FBI and CIA: 

terrorists out of the country were the CIA’s problem, and there was no reason to 

watchlists any terrorists who were already in the country.

The statistics are telling. In 2001, the CIA provided 1,527 source documents to TIPOFF; 

the State Department, 2,013; the INS, 173. The FBI, during this same year, provided 63 

documents to TIPOFF—fewer than were obtained from the public media, and about the 

same number as were provided by the Australian Intelligence Agency (52). 

The Effect of the World Trade Center Bombing on the State Department

The bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, was a tipping point for 

change at the State Department, particularly within Consular Affairs. Shortly after that 

attack, it was learned that a participant in the plot who was the spiritual leader of the 

group that carried it out—Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman—had obtained a visa to enter the 

United States at the U.S. embassy in Khartoum, Sudan. As we discussed in the previous 

chapter, this blind cleric’s application was successful even though he was a known 

Islamic extremist in Egypt whose name was on a watchlist—on microfiche—at the 

Khartoum embassy. A subsequent investigation revealed a series of problems, spanning 

several years, involving visas issued to Rahman. In the case of his last application, the 

State Department local employee tasked with checking the microfiche to see if Rahman’s 

was watchlisted had not done so, because he believed that the aged cleric was unlikely to 

present a risk. He told the consular officer who issued the visa that he had performed the 

name check. The “Blind Sheikh episode”—notorious in the minds of State Department 

policymakers in the 1990s—led to a reexamination of visa-processing procedures. 
81

One change in policy was the Visas Viper program, created in August 1993.110 The Viper 

program, managed by State, was designed to improve interagency communication about 

terrorists whose names should be on a watchlist. The State Department directed all 

diplomatic and consular posts to form committees, to meet quarterly, that included 

members from State, as well as representatives from law enforcement and intelligence 

agencies.111 Agencies were asked to supply terrorist identity information directly to State 

personnel at the post or, if there were concerns about classified or sensitive information, 

to State INR from their respective headquarters. Yet the Viper program was hampered by 

a lack of cooperation from intelligence and law enforcement agencies, which were 

reluctant to provide sensitive information to consular officials for fear that doing so 

would compromise sources and methods of collection.112 Thus, while Viper submissions 

accounted for a significant percentage of the records added to TIPOFF during the period 

from 1993 through 2001, not all the information on terrorists’ identities made its way into 

TIPOFF, because not all was shared with the State Department.113

Another significant outcome of this reexamination was the passage of a bill enabling the 

State Department to retain funds received from the issuance of nonimmigrant machinereadable visas.114 Beginning in 1994, when MRV fees totaled less than $10 million, the 

amount collected grew steadily; by 1999, it exceeded $300 million annually. State used 

these funds to automate its consular visa-issuing systems, develop secure passport and 

visa technology, improve computer name-check capability, and create a worldwide realtime consular communications system. By April 1995, State had spent $32 million dollars 

upgrading its computer systems.115

The results were impressive. Whereas in February 1993, 111 State visa-issuing posts 

relied on microfiche for their name checks, by the end of 1995 none did. Instead, all visaissuing posts had direct telecommunications access to the Department’s CLASS lookout 

system, with a backup name-check system available on CD-ROM in case the automated 

system went down. This meant that TIPOFF, which existed as a file within CLASS, was 

always available to consular officers performing name checks. State also implemented 

Congress’s statutory requirement that no visa be issued unless the consular officer first 

performed the CLASS name check. 

Furthermore, State developed language algorithms to improve CLASS’s name-check 

capability. The first language algorithm State developed, for Arabic, was implemented in 

December 1998. This enabled the system would search its records for all variant spellings 

of, for example, the name “Mohammed.” A second algorithm, for Russian/Slavic names, 

was added in December 2000.116

Another technological advance funded by MRV revenue was the creation of a worldwide, 

real-time database, known as the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). The CCD for 

the first time allowed visa data entered in any embassy or consulate to be transferred 

automatically and immediately to a central location in the United States. For example, if 

an individual applied for a visa in Athens, Greece, a consular officer in Seoul, South 

Korea, could see the record of that application within minutes. The CCD also contained 

all aspects of the visa application, including the digitized photograph of the applicant.117
82

Nonimmigrant visa records were loaded into the CCD beginning in 1999 in Frankfurt, 

Germany.118 All other posts were phased in between February 1999 and January 2001. 

By January 2001, every visa-issuing post sent its data to the CCD in real time.119 On 

September 11, 2001, the State Department’s CLASS contained the TIPOFF terrorist 

watchlist as well as 10 million records of individuals denied visas previously (with the 

grounds for their denial), individuals wanted by federal authorities, and individuals who 

for some other reason should not be given a visa.

Visa Policy Generally in the 1990s 

While new technology helped prevent the issuance of visas to terrorists during the 1990s, 

aspects of State’s approach to visa policy during the 1990s had a more mixed effect on its 

ability to counter terrorism. 

During the period from 1993 to 2001, the State Department’s visa operations focused 

primarily on screening applicants to determine whether they were intending immigrants: 

that is, intending to work or reside illegally in the United States.120 Although visa and 

passport fraud have long been an integral part of terrorist travel practices, terrorists were 

not a major concern of consular officers. They were not trained in how to interview visa 

applicants to ascertain whether they had terrorist connections—or even criminal ones—

nor were they supplied with the training or technology needed to detect an applicant’s use 

of fraudulent travel document practices long associated with terrorism. In fact, consular 

officers were discouraged from using either section 214(b) or section 221(g) of INA to 

deny a visa to an applicant suspected of being a terrorist. Instead, to prevent terrorists 

from obtaining visas, consular officers were instructed to rely on the name-check 

function—including the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist check—and evaluation of potential 

terrorists’ cases by officials in Washington. 

The State Department’s policy guidance to visa officers prior to September 11 

concentrated on facilitating travel. This guidance consisted of the Foreign Affairs Manual

(FAM), instruction telegrams sent to posts, informal communications such as email and 

oral history provided to officers arriving at posts, the Consular Management Handbook,

and the Consular Best Practices Handbook.

121

The FAM contained regulations, policies, and procedures for the department’s operations 

and provided interpretive guidance to visa officers on the sections of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act and the Code of Federal Regulations related to the visa process. A 

confidential appendix to the FAM focused on security checks and individuals suspected 

of membership in terrorist groups. 

Before 9/11, the FAM encouraged consular officers to expedite visa processing as a 

means of promoting travel to the United States. In the section dealing with the most 

common type of visa—issued to temporary visitors for business and pleasure—the FAM 

stated that it was the U.S. government’s policy to facilitate and promote travel and the 

free movement of people of all nationalities to the United States.122 The FAM called for 

consular officers to speed applications for the issuance of visitor visas, so long as the 
83

consular officer was satisfied that the issuance was in accordance with U.S. immigration 

law and the applicant had overcome the presumption of intending immigration. For while 

the law placed the burden of proof on the applicants to establish that they are eligible to 

receive a visa, “it is the policy of the U.S. government to give the applicant every 

reasonable opportunity to establish eligibility.”123

Although always a priority for reasons of commerce and foreign policy, the streamlining 

of the visa process increased steadily during this period. CA focused extensively on 

“reinventing consular functions” to make them “work better, cost less, and get 

meaningful results by putting customers first, cutting red tape, empowering employees, 

and cutting back to basics.”124 Two additional factors helped drive this change. First, 

Consular Affairs became a “reinvention lab” in April 1993 as part of Vice President 

Gore’s initiative to reinvent government.125 Second, while resources devoted to the 

consular function remained flat or decreased, as discussed above, visa demand was rising. 

The number of U.S. visa applications worldwide grew from about 7.7 million in fiscal 

year 1998 to 10.6 million in fiscal year 2001, an increase of 37 percent. Staffing did not 

keep pace with visa demand, leading to gaps in coverage at posts that lacked a consular 

officer to adjudicate visas, unusually long work hours for consular staff, and “staff 

burnout.”126 Something had to give. 

The result was the Consular Best Practices Handbook,

127 a collection of business process 

improvements gathered from a series of 49 cables sent to posts between 1997 and 2000 

that were intended to help “improve customer satisfaction, improve decision-making, and 

increase efficiency.”128 The Handbook urged improvement of processes to “support the 

three key goals that every consular manager should strive to achieve: high quality 

decision making, more efficient processes, and improved customer service.” By 

introducing new processes that improved efficiency, and outsourcing activities that “do 

not have to be performed by government employees,” the consular managers were 

directed by officials in Washington to “focus the majority of your . . . decision-making 

resources on the most difficult cases.”129

Best Practices cable number 6 listed “the four top goals of the visa process as efficient 

processing, high quality decisions, people-friendly services and sharing of all pertinent 

information within the US Government.”130 The cable acknowledged that the first two 

goals—efficient processing and high-quality decisions—“express a basic conflict in our 

traditional approach to visa processing. Quality decisions can make the process less 

efficient, and, in the context of declining staff, posts have often been forced to choose 

efficiency over quality.”131

This cable also provided an excellent synopsis of the rationale underlying the push to 

save resources in the late 1990s and the environment in which the hijackers received their 

visas, under the title “Reconciling Efficiency and Quality”: 

For many years growing work and static personnel resources 

have led us to search for areas we can eliminate or place last in 

our scale of priorities. But, with a few minor exceptions, 
84

everything we do in consular work is too important to cut, either 

because of its impact on the public or because of its impact on 

quality. For example, postponing or slowing down NIV (NonImmigrant Visa) services is like squeezing a balloon—the 

demand pops up someplace else, either at another post, through 

the referral system or through pleas for exceptions. Similarly, 

cutting out anti-fraud work harms our entire effort and leads to 

poor decision-making. Giving inadequate information results in 

applicants arriving for an interview without necessary 

documentation. 

The consequences of cutting out or slowing down any discrete 

function are unacceptable. But viable alternatives exist, namely 

to cut out the parts of all of our processes that contribute the least 

to good decision making and to outsource or automate the parts 

that don’t need to be done by government employees. Several 

cables in this series have offered suggestions on how to replace 

certain functions with automated or contracted-out approaches. 

Where feasible, these approaches work and posts should adopt 

them. 

Although much of our approach to visa work can be streamlined, 

the most pertinent example of a part of the process that can be 

cut back successfully is the nonimmigrant visa interview. This 

doesn’t mean that interviews should be shorter; it means that 

interviews should be fewer.132

Finally, because these practices were considered by CA to be “integral to effective 

consular operations,” implementing best practices was “a mandate, not an option.”133

In chapter 5 we explore how this aggressive effort to cut back on resources devoted to 

screening individual visa applicants, a reduction in interviews, and a heavy reliance on a 

Washington-based watchlist system played out as the 9/11 hijackers began applying for 

their visas in April 1999. First, we examine the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s 

activities before September 11.

4.3 The Immigration and Naturalization Service 

Those who should get in, get in; those who should be kept out, are kept out; and 

those who should not be here will be required to leave. 

—Barbara Jordan, chair, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 

February 24, 1995 
85

The Immigration and Naturalization Service has the statutory responsibility under the 

Immigration and Nationality Act to determine who may enter, who may stay, and who 

must be removed from the United States.134 Thus, U.S. border inspectors and Border 

Patrol agents remain the last physical barrier between terrorists and their entry into the 

United States. This section discusses INS functions and provides an analysis of how well 

the agency operated prior to September 11 in the context of counterterrorism. 

Background

The Constitution gave Congress plenary power over immigration, and the first federal 

laws addressing immigration issues were passed in 1790.135 Not until the 1880s, however, 

did Congress make the “supervision over the business of immigration to the United 

States” a federal responsibility.136 In 1891, Congress created an immigration office in the 

Treasury Department and in 1895 assigned its most senior post the title of 

commissioner.137 Part of the Bureau of Immigration’s purpose was to administer and 

create the rules necessary to facilitate land border inspections for “ordinary” travelers, 

including the classes of persons to be denied entry.138

Although the nation’s growth depended on successive waves of immigrants, the Bureau 

of Immigration never seemed quite important enough to become its own department, with 

its own secretary reporting directly to the president of the United States. In fact, the 

bureau was something of an administrative orphan. Over the century its name and 

bureaucratic home changed repeatedly, and increasing numbers of confusing statutes 

created conflicting jurisdictions in both immigration services and enforcement.139

In addition, the agency never received adequate support from its parent department, 

Justice, the Congress, the White House, or the intelligence community. It is therefore not 

surprising that the INS entered the 1990s as a badly organized agency with a poor selfimage and a troubled public reputation. Despite its mandate to secure America’s borders, 

it was not held in high enough regard to be given an active role in counterterrorism 

efforts. Thus, a few creative INS employees struggled to keep our borders safe from 

terrorists while the rest of the agency, and the government in general, remained mostly 

oblivious to this mission. As we will see, the INS was a border security agency without a 

recognized role in counterterrorism and without the vision and resources to enforce its 

own laws.

The INS Structure 

The INS was charged with welcoming U.S. citizens, immigrants, visitors, students, and 

others deemed beneficial to the nation while denying entry to those judged undesirable. 

Its employees performed three different functions. Immigration inspectors at land, air, 

and sea ports of entry processed applicants for admission to the United States, 

determining who should be admitted and who should not. The Border Patrol and special 
86

agents enforced immigration law at the border and within the United States against those 

who violated it.140 Immigration services officers adjudicated benefits for temporary 

visitors, immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. In 2000, all three of these functions 

reported to two separate chains of command, one for headquarters and one for the field.

The field was renowned for its independence from Washington and for the range of 

leadership skills found there. As one former employee told the Commission, “the 

mountains were high and the emperor far.”141 Indeed, the budget and policy planning 

offices were literally far away in Washington. Together, they were responsible for all INS 

budget decisions, including those supporting field operations, as well as a significant part 

of the policy that guided work in the field. But they reported to an executive office 

different from the regional field offices.142 As former deputy commissioner Mary Ann 

Wyrsch told the Commission, this structure helped ensure that people were confused 

about their job descriptions, operating without communication or direction and often 

duplicating efforts at more senior levels.143 The result was low morale, unclear goals, 

inefficiency, and difficulty moving forward on the policies and programs needed. 

Compounding the management problem, the INS commissioner reported to the deputy 

attorney general (DAG) in the Justice Department. The DAG managed the Criminal 

Division, the United States Attorneys, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the 

INS.144 Although the INS was closely scrutinized on those issues important to the 

attorney general, which recently had included naturalization, the Southwest border, and 

Cuban migration, it was largely ignored on other issues such as interior immigration 

enforcement and systematic development of technology.145 The INS commissioner also 

had to answer to Congress, in its oversight role, and the White House, which set policy. 

Thus, the commissioner spent much time dealing with institutional actors who often had 

different agendas and only in rare instances envisioned a role for the INS in 

counterterrorism.146

The multiple demands, lack of oversight focused on counterterrorism from the Justice 

Department, growing demands to stem the tide of illegal immigration, an overburdened 

immigration benefits system, and growing number of visitors to the United States at ports 

of entry were weaknesses and pressures that left the INS wholly unprepared to fulfill its 

statutory obligations. It is therefore not surprising that when Doris Meissner, who had 

served in the INS from 1981 to 1986, returned as Commissioner in 1993, she found an 

agency in disarray.147 Border Patrol agents were still using manual typewriters,148

inspectors at ports of entry were using a paper watchlist, the asylum system did not detect 

or deter fraudulent applicants, and policy development was inadequate.149 The explosive 

growth that followed congressional appropriations to upgrade INS technology and human 

resources to respond to illegal entries over the Southwest border—the agency grew 40 

percent overall from 1997 to 1998, as Border Patrol and inspection resources increased 

94 percent and the immigration services budget increased an astounding 150 percent 

between 1996 and 1998150—represented a major new administrative challenge. Only a 

small group of forward-thinking midlevel employees quietly worked counterterrorism 

issues. These employees were scattered throughout the agency in investigations, the Joint 
87

Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), intelligence, legal counsel, inspections, and budget; 

others worked on one of the many technology initiatives such as student tracking.151

The INS, clearly, was struggling.

The Many Facets of the INS Mission 

The INS was responsible for enforcing the immigration and nationality law in three 

general areas: inspecting applicants and adjudicating admissions at the ports of entry; 

enforcing immigration law by patrolling the border to prevent and detect illegal entry and 

investigating, detaining, and removing illegal and criminal aliens already in the country; 

and adjudicating applications to change a person’s immigration status. While each of 

these roles is critical, the immigration inspection and adjudication function and the 

adjudication of immigration benefits are most relevant to the 9/11 story. 

Inspections at Ports of Entry. INS immigration inspectors are located at ports of entry 

along the land and sea borders and at international airports. They are responsible for 

determining who may legally enter the United States.152 They also set the conditions for 

temporary stays in the United States. 

Indeed, the stated mission of immigration inspectors is to “control and guard the 

boundaries and border of the United States against the illegal entry of aliens.”153 In 

practical terms, this means determining the admissibility and length of stay of aliens 

applying for admission into the United States at ports of entry. As discussed in the 

previous chapter, some of these aliens must have visas issued by State Department 

consular officers at U.S. embassies and consulates abroad. Tourists from countries that 

require a visa to enter the United States receive a mandatory six-month length of stay. All 

of the 19 September 11 hijackers presented visas (18 of 19 were tourist visas) in their 33 

successful entries, as none was from a visa waiver country.154

Those aliens from visa waiver countries who seek to visit for pleasure or business must 

only present a passport and a departure ticket to an immigration inspector upon their 

arrival in the United States.155 These “visa waiver” passport holders are granted a 

mandatory three-month stay. 

Screening at Airports. Prior to September 11, all persons seeking admission to the 

United States through any of the 354 international U.S. airports had to submit to an initial 

or “primary” screening by immigration inspectors.156 Many airports required the 

screening to take place in an average of 45 seconds—30 seconds for U.S. citizens and 

one minute for foreign citizens—during which immigration inspectors had to sort the 

bona fide from the mala fide travelers. This brevity was forced on inspectors by a 1991 

congressional mandate that each flight be processed within 45 minutes.157

In primary immigration inspection the traveler was asked a series of questions in order to 

learn the identity, purpose, and duration of his or her visit and the validity of the visa. 

Travel documents—the passport and visa—were reviewed for potential fraud. When 
88

visitors had machine-readable passports, like those issued by Saudi Arabia, the lookout 

checks were automatically performed as the document was optically scanned. For others, 

the inspector would enter the information manually. He or she would check the security 

features of the document, relying on fraud training and on specialized equipment, 

including ultraviolet lights and magnifying glasses. Arrival and customs forms were 

reviewed for completeness. A name check was conducted along with a passport number 

search to determine if the traveler was on a watchlist or if the passport had been reported 

lost or stolen.158

A primary inspector was also trained to use behavioral cues to determine whether the 

traveler might be mala fide. In such instances, the inspector could ask to see travel 

itineraries, looking for a last-minute ticket purchase, a one-way ticket, or unusual routing. 

Such indicators, along with a visitor’s limited English, insufficient funds for travel, or 

questionable behavior, could also be the basis for a referral to a secondary immigration 

inspector.

If documents, database checks, interviews, and demeanor raised no questions, the visitor 

was admitted into the United States. If the immigration inspector was suspicious about 

the visitor, he or she had the discretion to make a referral to a secondary immigration 

inspection for further scrutiny. Such suspicions led to the secondary referral of Mohamed 

Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, and Saeed al Ghamdi and to the removal of Mohamed al 

Kahtani.

When a primary inspector received a hit against the watchlist, the inspector was required 

to escort the visitor to a secondary immigration inspection area for an interview.159 At 

that time, travel documents were again reviewed for potential fraud. “Pocket litter”160

might be inspected. Unlike the case with the primary immigration inspection, the 

secondary inspection had no time constraints. Multiple investigative resources were 

available to the inspector, who might check one of a couple of dozen INS databases, call 

the FBI or a translator, review travel document fraud alerts and manuals produced by the 

INS Forensic Document Lab, and access a biometric system called IDENT, which 

contained digital fingerprints and photos. Only in Kahtani’s case were any of these tools 

used.161

Only a single INS employee at INS headquarters was permitted to liaise with the State 

Department, which managed the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist, when there was a watchlist 

hit. This liaison officer would attempt to get the supporting documentation and then relay 

what unclassified information he or she could to the inspector determining 

admissibility.162 Denials required supervisory approval.163 Before 9/11, local members of 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces, composed of individuals in federal, state, and local law 

enforcement, would occasionally assist in the interview of a suspect individual. 

If an arriving traveler was sent back to his or her home country, then a photograph and 

fingerprints were taken and added to an electronic file opened on the individual. This file 

was part of a database called IDENT (Automated Biometric Identification System), 

which was initially implemented on the Southwest land border to try to reduce the 

recidivism of those violating immigration law.164
89

Inspection Practices Specific to Counterterrorism. As the one successful exclusion of 

a potential September 11 hijacker, Kahtani, makes clear, the screening tools, training, and 

procedures available to immigration officials are critical to making admissions decisions. 

Generally the inspectors at the ports of entry were not asked and were not trained to look 

for terrorists. Indeed, most inspectors interviewed by the Commission were not even 

aware that the automated watchlist against which they checked the names of incoming 

passengers was a terrorist watchlist. Their ignorance was largely a function of a 

technological approach to terrorist screening that relied almost exclusively on a 

mechanical, computerized name check at the primary immigration inspection.165

Behavior was also a substantial consideration in referring a traveler to secondary 

inspection. Yet no inspector interviewed by the Commission received any operational 

training in the types of behavior that might be exhibited by terrorists. Nor were they 

instructed on the types of travel documents known to be carried by terrorists. As noted in 

chapter 3, the CIA’s Redbook, which contained information on terrorist travel 

documents, was discontinued in 1992; inspectors were thus left without specific 

information on terrorist travel practices. Few inspectors were aware of the existence of its 

successor, the Passport Examination Manual, which treated generic fraudulent documents 

and travel stamps.166 Today, there is still on electronic version of such a manual. 

At headquarters and in the field, the INS did organize a few scattered offices and 

programs to aid its inspectors in identifying suspect individuals, especially terrorists. 

The INS Terrorist Watchlist. The National Automated Immigration Lookouts System 

contained the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist and was the most valuable tool for identifying 

terrorists that INS and Customs inspectors had until September 11, 2001.167 TIPOFF first 

became available to the INS in 1991 by way of a Memorandum of Understanding 

between the State Department, Customs Service, and INS.168 This name-based system 

provided key unclassified biographical information about aliens reasonably suspected to 

be involved or closely associated with terrorist activity. The database was checked by the 

inspector at the primary immigration inspection as he or she was determining 

admissibility. 

By September 11, TIPOFF contained about 80,000 records on terrorists and terrorismrelated criminals. The State Department’s criteria for creating a file in the database 

included reasonable suspicion that the alien engaged in or might engage in terrorism, 

otherwise known as “derogatory information” and sufficient biographical information for 

positive identification.169 Because the INS had a slightly higher standard for including 

information in NAILS, not all State Department TIPOFF records made it into the INS 

database.170 If the INS considered the State Department’s supporting intelligence 

insufficient, the referral would be stricken from consideration, at least until further 

information was provided by State.171

Thus, the INS was wholly dependent on the State Department for both the referrals to 

TIPOFF and the supporting intelligence for the nomination. The INS did not seek 
90

intelligence to support the referrals from elsewhere in the agency or from any outside 

intelligence agency.172

In 1998, the INS excluded three people as a result of TIPOFF watchlist hits. The State 

Department claimed there were 97 such exclusions or arrests. This inconsistency was due 

to poor INS recordkeeping and the inclusion of arrest data in State Department but not 

INS statistics.173 By 2003, the ports with the largest number of TIPOFF hits corresponded 

to the ports through which the hijackers entered: JFK in New York, Miami, Atlanta, 

Dulles near Washington, D.C., Orlando, Los Angeles, Newark, Tampa, and Cincinnati. 

The nationalities of those excluded also corresponded to the nationalities of the 

hijackers—Saudi, Emirati, Egyptian, and Lebanese—though they did not constitute the 

greatest number of those flagged by TIPOFF.174

The INS Lookout Unit. The INS tried to support primary and secondary immigration 

inspectors in their search for terrorists through its Lookout Unit. Initially created to liaise 

with the State Department in order to share terrorist information with those at ports of 

entry, it took on more duties, which included working with the airlines to detect improper 

travel documents. 

The Carrier Consultant Program, initiated under 1996 changes to immigration law, 

trained foreign airlines to recognize fraudulent documents used by those seeking 

admission to the United States. The purpose of the program was to prevent aliens with 

improper documents from boarding airplanes in the first place.175 If an airline failed to 

detect such mala fide travelers, it was subject to fines from the INS National Fines 

Office.176

 Terrorist Watchlisting at U.S. border ports of entry 

Intel community submits 

derogatory information and 

alien biographical data to 

State Dept. 

State inputs data into 

TIPOFF and sends a 

weekly CD of 

“referrals” to INS 

Lookout Unit. 

Lookout Unit reviews 

referrals for sufficient (1) 

derogatory information 

and (2) biographical 

identifiers.

Referrals with sufficient 

derogatory information 

entered into INS 

terrorist lookout 

database. 

 Applicant applies 

for admission at 

U.S. port of entry.

Terrorist lookout database 

automatically queried. If a 

“00” hit, mandatory referral to 

secondary inspection. 

At secondary, inspector works 

with INS Lookout Unit to 

determine admissibility, 

copies all pocket litter, and 

photographs and fingerprints 

alien.

Inspector has discretion to 

notify FBI of hit and has 

final discretion to admit or 

exclude. 

 Intel community 

receives a copy of 

alien’s pocket litter, 

photograph, and 

fingerprints. 

`
91

The Lookout Unit also tried to ease the burden on primary inspectors by reviewing the 

incoming passenger manifests every morning and notifying the port of entry if a 

suspected terrorist was scheduled to arrive there.177 Although Customs had access to the 

airline carriers’ reservation system, these manifests were not required to be submitted to 

INS by law; most airlines provided them voluntarily, however. 

Forensic Document Lab. Immigration inspectors also relied on the considerable 

expertise of forensic document examiners at the INS to help them detect fraudulent travel 

documents. Indeed, beginning in the early 1980s, the use of such documents was a 

growing problem. The INS responded by creating the Forensic Document Laboratory. 

The lab supported officers in the field, primarily immigration inspectors and benefits 

adjudicators, with training and manuals on legitimate and illegitimate travel and 

identification documents.178 The laboratory was the only federal crime lab dedicated 

almost entirely to the forensic examination of documents, and its archives contained more 

than 20 years’ worth of identification and travel documents.179 Its extensive scientific 

expertise and reference library enabled the lab to provide authoritative analysis of all 

types of identification and travel documents— counterfeit, altered, and impostor. The lab 

also supported the FBI and CIA.180

But in the decade prior to September 11, the Forensic Document Laboratory did not focus 

on terrorists. Nor did it have access to terrorist travel intelligence. Therefore, although 

terrorist organizations dedicated significant resources to producing and acquiring 

passports, visas, cachets, and secondary identification, the lab was unaware of their 

efforts.181

Office of International Affairs. The Office of International Affairs considered itself an 

office of international law enforcement, “a critically important, cost-effective, and 

integral part of the Administration’s comprehensive strategy to deter illegal 

immigration.”182 The INS began placing officers overseas in the 1950s; their work 

focused on bringing those displaced by World War II to the United States from Europe 

and the Pacific. As immigration law changed in the 1960s, INS overseas officers shifted 

into U.S. consulates, mainly to process immigrant visa and refugee applications and to 

troubleshoot issues arising abroad concerning U.S. citizens and their relatives. This work 

was focused in the Near East, Mexico, and Europe, with management responsibilities in 

district offices in Rome, Beijing, Mexico City, and Ottawa. Asylum applications filed 

domestically also were housed in the Office of International Affairs. These functions 

continued through September 11, 2001.183

By the 1990s, the emphasis turned to two areas of enforcement, deterring illegal entry 

and combating alien smuggling. In 1995, with fewer than 100 INS employees overseas, 

“Operation Global Reach” was coordinated with the State Department and the Justice 

Department’s Office of National Security to train nearly 12,000 host-country law 

enforcement officials, airline personnel, and foreign consular officers to detect fraudulent 

travel documents. The training was aimed at intercepting alien smugglers, and it 

succeeded beyond anyone’s expectations. Statistics provided by the INS indicate that 
92

there was a 5,500 percent jump in fraudulent document intercepts by INS officers and 

their trainees from 1994 to 1995.184 Regrettably, none of the document training was 

intended to catch terrorists. The International Affairs Office also never developed leads 

or investigated cases with foreign governments or U.S. Attorneys offices for the purpose 

of pursuing counterterrorism cases, although they did so for alien smuggling. 

Although the Lookout Units, the Forensic Document Laboratory, and the International 

Affairs Office were doing important work, the INS initiated but failed to bring to 

completion two efforts that would have provided inspectors with information relevant to 

counterterrorism—a proposed system to track foreign student visa compliance and a 

program to establish a way of tracking travelers’ entry to and exit from the United States. 

These programs would have been substantially helpful to inspectors in accurately 

determining the admissibility of travelers, including the September 11 terrorists.

A system to monitor foreign student compliance. As early as 1972, the INS was 

concerned that some foreign students could pose a threat to national security. They were 

particularly worried about student sympathizers to Yasir Arafat’s Palestinian terrorist 

organization; in 1974, INS agents found 154 students associated with the organization 

were in the United States.185 The issue of foreign students as security risks reemerged 

during the 1984 Libyan crisis when intelligence indicated that Libyan leader Muammar 

Qadhafi might have planted assassins in the United States under student cover. Thus 

began the first national foreign student registration program. Libyan students were 

registered and fingerprinted, and regulations were put in place to “immediately terminate 

the studies of Libyan nationals engaged in flight training and nuclear-related 

education.”186

The INS first established a comprehensive national system to keep track of students in the 

late 1980s— the Student/School System—but its information was routinely out of date or 

lacking.187 In 1994, the Department of Justice, pointing out that a key conspirator in the 

first World Trade Center bombing had been a student who had overstayed his visa, asked 

Commissioner Meissner how the INS could better track students.188 The following year, 

an interagency task force led by a former General Accounting Office investigator 

recommended that the INS start over with a new system built around a biometric student 

identification card that could be issued at the time of the visa application and used for the 

duration of his or her studies in the United States.189 With real-time technologies and 

biometrics, the task force believed that the new systems would act as a true compliance 

mechanism for both students and schools.190 FBI Director Louis Freeh’s concerns about 

foreign students seeking U.S. studies not necessarily being in the national security 

interests of the United States were also not lost on the task force. Interest in tracking 

students “linked to student visas” was stated as a guiding principle of the task force.191

In 1996, Congress required the creation of a system to track students from countries 

designated as state sponsors of terrorism.192 Although the deadline for the system’s 

implementation was just two years away, Congress did not appropriate specific funds for 

the program.193 The INS scraped together $10 million in seed money and launched a 

successful pilot program in June 1997.194 The program enrolled 21 schools of different 

types and sizes (including Duke, Clemson, and Auburn), technical schools, two-year 

community colleges, and a flight school. It was the test case for the development of a 
93

national student tracking system and included the latest biometric smart card and 

scanners available.195 The project drew the interest of White House Counterterrorism 

Coordinator Richard Clarke, who held meetings with both the INS Commissioner and its 

project managers.196 He successfully proposed including the completion of the project in 

a 1998 presidential directive.197 There was congressional interest as well.198 By August 

1998, managers of the project deemed it ready for national development.199 It was 

considered a success.200

These initial successes were achieved despite the orders the program manager received in 

early 1998 to stop work.201 Providing education for foreign students is a multi-billiondollar business, and the higher education community vigorously resisted the system. 

They argued that the program was unduly burdensome and costly.202 The 1996 law was 

strictly interpreted by INS management to require educational institutions, not the 

government, to collect the government fee that was to fund the program.203 These groups 

then argued that this fee-based method of funding was unfair to the schools and would 

deter foreign students from U.S. study.204 In August 1998, a senior group of policy 

managers at the INS decided to defer the testing of the biometric student card. Within a 

year, they fired the project manager over concerns that he had gone outside of his chain 

of command in soliciting support for the project.205 A new manager, unfamiliar with the 

project, was brought in. Progress stalled.206

By 2000, powerful members of the Senate were pressuring the INS to stop the fee-based 

funding approach, thereby jeopardizing its existence.207 The Senate appropriations 

committee chairman apparently sought repeal of the law authorizing the program.208

Although the law stayed on the books, there was still no congressional funding for the 

student tracking program, and INS management was growing increasing reluctant to 

continue internal funding.209 Although the program’s supervisor found other money to 

keep minimal development alive, these efforts were insufficient to complete the 

system.210

Thus, when the September 11 hijackers began entering the United States in 2000 to 

attend flight school, there was no student tracking system available. If there had been, 

immigration authorities might well have been alerted to the fact that Mohamed Atta, the 

plan’s ringleader, had made false statements about his student status and therefore could 

have been denied entry into the United States.

An Entry-Exit System. The INS also was unable to enforce the rules regarding the terms 

of admission of visitors to the United States because there was no national tracking 

system designed to match a person’s entry with that person’s exit. Inspectors were 

similarly unaware of whether a visitor had overstayed a previous visit.

In 1996, expressing frustration at the apparent number of overstays in the United States 

and the inability of INS to enforce the law, Congress took action. It passed a law 

requiring the attorney general to develop an automated entry-exit program to collect 

records on every arriving and departing visitor.211 Congress provided about $40 million 

over four years to fund the development of such a system.212 By contrast, Congress 

provided nearly $1 billion to increase the Border Patrol’s presence in the Southwest in 

order to stem the flow of illegal immigration from Mexico.213 Countering terrorist entry 

was not a rationale for the system. 
94

Leaders of border communities along the Canadian and Mexican borders, where more 

than a million people move back and forth daily, denounced the system. They argued that 

it would inhibit border trade.214 Some members of Congress, along with senior INS 

managers, agreed and decided to automate only the entry process.215 Prior to September 

11, even these efforts were unsuccessful.216 Thus, while the hijackers were preparing for 

the planes operation in the United States, immigration authorities had no way to 

determine whether any of them had overstayed their visas or traveled in and out of the 

country. The lack of an entry-exit system was especially significant for Satam al Suqami 

and Nawaf al Hazmi, as we saw in chapter 2. 

The INS Intelligence Unit. Further hampering the ability of the INS to track terrorists 

was the unfortunate state of its intelligence unit.217 The quality of its work was 

considered so poor by Commissioner Meissner that she never requested the daily 

intelligence brief common in other federal agencies.218 In fact, only once in her eight-year 

tenure did she receive a briefing on the threat posed by radical fundamentalist 

terrorists.219 In her interview with us, Meissner did not recall that 1995 briefing.220 She 

also told us she never heard of Usama Bin Ladin until August 2001, nearly 10 months 

after she left the INS.221

In reality, the INS operated in a virtual intelligence vacuum. The intelligence unit was 

wholly dependent on the CIA, the National Security Agency, the FBI, and the State 

Department’s Intelligence and Research section for terrorist information.222 In stark 

contrast, its parent, the Justice Department, routinely received intelligence information on 

terrorism cases and surveillance intercepts, mostly from investigations conducted from 

the FBI.223 In 1996, there were only five analysts at INS headquarters and none in the 

field.224 By 1998, fewer than 100 part-time intelligence officers in the field were 

providing the bulk of information used by the unit, but the apparent increase in personnel 

is misleading. All of the part-time officers were special agents whose main responsibility 

was enforcement of immigration law; they would also write up “intelligence” reports to 

forward to headquarters, but doing so was optional. Neither they nor any of the 2,000 

special agents, 4,500 inspectors, and 9,000 Border Patrol agents had a mandate to report 

information gathered in the field back to the intelligence unit in Washington.225 Instead, 

the unit was dependent on reporting voluntarily forwarded by supervisors in the field, 

where lookouts could be posted without the knowledge of the intelligence unit.226

Indeed, the unit was unable even to regularly gather information on terrorists from its 

own employees assigned to work as liaisons to other government agencies. A total of 24 

intelligence unit employees were assigned to Interpol (the international law enforcement 

agency), the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, the FBI Counterterrorism Center, and the 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces throughout the country. All potentially had access to 

counterterrorism information. The intelligence unit was not interested, and chose instead 

to remain focused on its primary assignment from INS leadership: alien smuggling.227

However, some of these detailees did prove valuable. For example, the INS detailee to 

the CIA helped streamline the declassification process for the INS so that the intelligence 

unit could receive intelligence from the intelligence community and make it available to 
95

the field more quickly. He also helped create the 1980s counterterrorism training film for 

border inspectors, “The Threat Is Real,” and designed and implemented CIA-based 

counterterrorism training classes for law enforcement personnel.228

Enforcement of Immigration Law within the United States 

We know that in the terrorist plots of the 1990s, terrorists exploited the U.S. immigration 

system to enter and stay in the United States. The public prosecutions of the conspirators 

in the World Trade Center and Landmark cases in the early 1990s often brought to light 

violations of immigration law. The INS therefore had the potential to play a significant 

law enforcement role in counterterrorism. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

immigration attorneys, special agents, immigration inspectors, and Border Patrol agents 

were all capable of enforcing the law. However, the INS and the government institutions 

that controlled much of its agenda—Congress, the Justice Department and the White 

House—acknowledged only a small role for the agency in counterterrorism. They failed 

to connect the facts of terrorist exploitation of immigration border and benefits policies 

and the need for the INS to act to prevent terrorist abuse of the immigration system. The 

prevailing view was that the INS was valuable in counterterrorism only insofar as it 

supported the FBI in its Joint Terrorism Task Force investigations.

Nevertheless, a few midlevel INS employees took counterterrorism seriously. They often 

had difficulty getting things done.

The Special Agents in the Field. The first problem encountered by those concerned 

about terrorists was an almost complete lack of enforcement resources. Neither the White 

House, the Congress, the Department of Justice, nor the INS leadership ever provided the 

support needed for INS enforcement agents to find, detain, and remove illegal aliens, 

including those with terrorist associations. Throughout the 1990s, about 2,000 

immigration special agents were responsible for dealing with the millions of illegal aliens 

and related immigration crimes in the United States.229 Because of these resource 

constraints, they focused on aliens involved in criminal activity. 

Enforcement of U.S. immigration law violations inside the country is referred to as 

“interior enforcement.” It is governed by a set of extraordinarily complex laws, rules, and 

regulations that are adjudicated in its own administrative court system. The law and 

procedures governing these courts were geared toward giving the benefit of doubt to the 

alien. Appearance bonds were low and often not required. Aliens were granted multiple 

hearings, often resulting in lengthy delays. This system was easy to exploit. Because the 

immigration attorneys representing the INS in cases against aliens worked solely from 

paper files, they were often unable to properly track cases or access the necessary files to 

present their cases efficiently and knowledgeably. For much of the 1990s, case backlogs 

were considerable. Terrorists knew they could beat the system—and, as we have seen, 

they often did. 

Recognizing the deficiencies in the system, in April 1997 Congress directed the INS to 

devise an interior enforcement strategy. The plan was delivered nearly two years later and 
96

only after much congressional prodding. Meanwhile, three national counterterrorism 

strategies had been produced—in 1986, 1995, and 1997. They called for the addition of 

more JTTF positions, the creation of a robust intelligence network within the intelligence 

community, and acceptance of a role for the INS and its immigration authority in 

counterterrorism efforts.230 These recommendations were not implemented by INS senior 

management. 

The Creation of the National Security Unit. The INS did take one important step to 

enhance its counterterrorism enforcement capability. In 1997, it established a National 

Security Unit to oversee national security work in the field, including that of the JTTF 

representatives. In addition, the unit produced security alerts for ports of entry and 

worked with the Justice Department on national security issues; this collaboration 

included case referrals to the newly created Alien Terrorist Removal Court, discussed 

below.

Here as in much of the INS, key employees worked long hours with inadequate 

resources.231 The unit’s manager produced a comprehensive strategy, which called for 

increased interagency cooperation on watchlisting and a more active role for enforcement 

in counterterrorism cases.232 The unit began to determine which immigration laws could 

be used as counterterrorism tools. For instance, it sought unsuccessfully to require that 

the CIA complete its security checks before naturalization benefit applications were 

adjudicated. According to the NSU manager, these efforts were not supported by INS 

senior management, who believed such checks would be prohibitively time-consuming 

and add to an already immense backlog of applications.233

For the reasons discussed above, the National Security Unit relied not on the in-house 

Intelligence Unit but on INS personnel at the FBI and the CIA for its understanding of the 

terrorist threat.234 However, when Usama Bin Ladin was indicted for the August 1998 

bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the two INS units did cooperate. 

Drawing on information supplied by the Justice Department, they directed inspectors in 

the field to be on a heightened security alert. Inspectors were also instructed to give extra 

scrutiny to travelers born or residing in certain Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi 

Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates.235 These national-security-related 

cases came to be known within the INS as “special interest” cases.236 All of the hijackers’ 

countries of citizenship were named in this 1998 alert. 

In 2001, the National Security Unit had four staffers at headquarters, and three at the FBI, 

as well as about 50 INS special agent detailees at the JTTFs.237 It generally did not 

receive information on the heightened threat in the summer of 2001 from the INS 

intelligence unit, the intelligence community in general, or from the JTTFs. However, 

two staffers were sent to the White House on July 5 for a briefing by the CIA at the 

request of the Richard Clarke, but both felt that it was “over their heads.” One staffer 

wrote a memo noting the main points raised at the meeting, but the other apparently took 

no action, returning to his job as the manager of the JTTF detailees. The acting INS 

Commissioner never learned of the meeting or the threat.238
97

INS Detailees to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces. In the absence of other efforts, the

Joint Terrorism Task Forces became the focus of INS counterterrorism enforcement 

activity. Interest in bringing INS agents into the JTTFs grew as the FBI, with INS agents’ 

help, began investigating the conspirators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and 

revealing that they were aliens who had used travel document fraud to enter the United 

States and immigration benefit fraud to stay here. When a criminal case on terrorism 

grounds could not be brought, a charge relating to visas or admission might be available. 

Therefore, the FBI soon learned how important the INS could be in developing a case. 

An alien terrorist’s immigration violation was easily proved, while the evidence relating 

to terrorist acts was often classified or arguably insufficient.239

The INS did not initially embrace a role in these counterterrorism investigations.240 In 

1993, its Investigations Division asked for five positions in the newly created Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces. The INS did not approve this modest budget request. The 

highest-ranking official for field operations argued that he was “unable to concur” that 

INS would “benefit” from participation in the JTTFs.241 Four years later, Investigations 

tried again, this time asking for 29 positions in the JTTFs. Commissioner Meissner wrote 

in support to the Department of Justice, citing the value of INS agents to the World Trade 

Center prosecutions and the agency’s commitment to the JTTFs.242 The Justice 

Department did not approve Meissner’s request. Congress split the difference and added 

18 positions.243

New Legal Tools against Terrorism. In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act also 

provided new immigration enforcement tools relevant to counterterrorism. One of them 

was expedited removal. For the first time, border authorities were permitted to deny 

entry, without a hearing, to those failing to qualify for admission.244 This provision could 

be used to deny suspected terrorists the opportunity to enter the United States and stay.245

In the first months of 1997, 1,200 travelers a week were subject to expedited removal, 

mostly over the Southwest border.246 Despite this success, the INS never expanded 

expedited removal to include persons attempting to enter illegally across the expansive 

physical borders between ports of entry.247 As a result, it was not used against Gazi 

Ibrahim Abu Mezer, who was able to stay in the United States despite being apprehended 

three times for illegal entries along the Canadian border. He later became known as the 

“Brooklyn Bomber” for his plan to blow up the Atlantic Avenue subway in Brooklyn.248

The INS never did seek to expand expedited removal to illegal entries along U.S. 

borders.249

The 1996 Antiterrorism Act also created the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, expressly 

designed to remove alien terrorists by using classified evidence to support a terrorist 

allegation and by staffed by counsel possessing the security clearances necessary to 

review classified evidence. Although the Justice Department considered the creation of 

the court one of its top counterterrorism legislative priorities in the mid-1990s, the court 

still has never been used.250 Judges were appointed and rules made,251 but by 1998, 

Justice attorneys in the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section had led a department review 
98

of 50 cases for possible application to the ATRC, but they were all rejected.252 Over the 

following two years, another 50 cases were rejected.253

A major reason for the lack of use of the ATRC was that new immigration laws permitted 

the use of classified evidence in traditional deportation hearings, making recourse to a 

special court unnecessary.254 Moreover, many “special interest” cases became stalled by 

internal Justice Department deliberations regarding sharing of information, alien rights, 

and sufficiency of evidence.255 At times, differences of opinions arose between INS 

Commissioner Meissner, who wanted to proceed with these cases, and the Attorney 

General, who resisted.256 Conflicts also arose between the INS, which had the expertise 

and legal authority to bring the cases, and the FBI, which possessed the classified 

information but did not always make it available to the INS. Thus cases stagnated or, in 

some cases, were never brought at all.257

A National Security Law Division was established in the INS to try to handle the 

procedural complexities that soon overwhelmed these terrorist cases. By 1998, a handful 

of the aliens affiliated with terrorist activity that were known to the INS and the Justice 

Department were successfully removed by the INS using both traditional immigration 

law and classified evidence.258 None was known to be affiliated with al Qaeda. 

Immigration Benefits 

Terrorists in the 1990s, as well as the September 11 hijackers, needed to find a way to 

stay in or embed themselves in the United States if their operational plans were to come 

to fruition. As already discussed, this could be accomplished legally by marrying an 

American citizen, achieving temporary worker status, or applying for asylum after 

entering. In many cases, the act of filing for an immigration benefit sufficed to permit the 

alien to remain in the country until the petition was adjudicated. Terrorists were free to 

conduct surveillance, coordinate operations, obtain and receive funding, go to school and 

learn English, make contacts in the United States, acquire necessary materials, and 

execute an attack. 

We thus come to the third significant function of the INS relevant to the September 11 

story: immigration benefits. They are a vast system of laws and regulations that control 

the status both of aliens within the United States and of those outside the United States 

who wish to come and stay in the country. Every immigration benefit has its own set of 

rules, regulations, and procedures. Many are complex and time-consuming to adjudicate. 

Some are so difficult to process that specialists must handle them. The Immigration and 

Nationality Act, which is in fact a miscellaneous collection of federal laws, is the 

controlling authority concerning aliens and the benefits available to them.

Before 9/11, immigration benefits allowed tourists, for example, to extend their length of 

stay or to change their immigration status from tourist to student after arriving in the 

United States. Visitors who married Americans could petition for legal permanent 

residency status. Other classes of persons who could ask for a benefit from the INS were 

aliens seeking permanent legal residency, immigrants wishing to be naturalized, asylum 
99

seekers (“asylees”), and refugees.259 A number of terrorists discussed in chapter 3 abused 

the asylum system. Commissioner Meissner spent much of her time in the 1990s honing 

it, creating what was considered a model program that balanced humanitarian and 

security interests. 

But the benefits process overall was vulnerable to fraud and poorly managed. Each of the 

five immigration benefit service centers had its own computer system. It was therefore 

not uncommon for one alien to have multiple benefits files, sometimes as a result of a 

fraudulent attempt to win approval from one office after an application was denied by 

another. As early as 1991, terrorists exploited this deficiency. Mir Amal Kansi, who in 

1993 fatally shot two CIA employees and wounded three others, had already legally 

entered the United States when he applied for legalization as an illegal alien as part of a 

class action lawsuit; he falsely claimed that he had entered the United States through 

Mexico in 1981.260 Mohamed and Mahmud Abouhalima, conspirators in the 1993 World 

Trade Center bombing, were granted green cards (i.e., legal permanent resident status) 

under the Special Agricultural Program (SAW) program.261 SAW was an amnesty 

program created under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.262 In 1999, the 

INS general counsel, Paul Virtue, testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 

Immigration that amnesty programs were “subject to widespread abuse.”263

In fact, INS benefits adjudicators did not have a recognized counterterrorism role. As the 

INS struggled, its inability to adjudicate applications quickly or with adequate security 

checks made it easier for terrorists to wrongfully enter and remain in the United States 

throughout the 1990s.

The Border Patrol and Illegal Entry into the United States

The INS Border Patrol monitors the 9,500 miles of shared borders with Canada and 

Mexico that exist between ports of entry.264 Throughout the 1990s, the priority was to 

control the vast illegal immigration from Mexico along the Southwest border.265 About 

1.6 million illegal aliens a year were being apprehended from Texas to California.266 In 

San Diego alone, there were 2,000–3,000 arrests daily. The Border Patrol clearly lacked 

the resources to stem the tide. In the early 1990s, they were still using manual 

typewriters.267

Nevertheless, the Border Patrol received the most attention from Congress and Attorney 

General Reno of any INS section.268 Congressionally approved budget requests between 

1994 and 1998 doubled the number of agents on the Southwest, from 4,000 to 8,000. By 

2000, there were 9,000 Border Patrol agents.269

Even after the arrests in Washington state of Abu Mezer (who was plotting to blow up the 

Brooklyn subway) in August 1997 and Ahmed Ressam (the “millennium bomber”) in 

December 1999, the patrol’s attention remained on the Southwest border. Neither the 

Border Patrol, the Commissioner, nor the Justice Department considered revising its 

strategy to include counterterrorism initiatives. Only the White House, through Richard 
100

Clarke, seemed interested in pursuing a more aggressive strategy on the Northwest border 

after Ressam’s attempted entry. 

While Congress and the Clinton administration required the Border Patrol’s coverage 

along the border with Mexico to double to one agent every quarter mile by 1999, the 

Canadian border had only one agent for every 13.25 miles.270 Despite examples of 

terrorists’ entering from Canada, awareness of terrorist activity in Canada and its more 

lenient immigration laws, and an Inspector General’s report recommending that the 

Border Patrol develop a northern border strategy, the only positive step was that the 

number of Border Patrol agents was not cut any further.271

The failure of the Border Patrol to make any significant efforts in counterterrorism was 

predictable. Because the INS’s relationship with the intelligence community was 

minimal, any valuable information these agencies might have gleaned on migrant flows 

or alien smuggling did not routinely reach Border Patrol agents. They also lacked access 

to the terrorist watchlist databases, TIPOFF and NAILS. And lookouts with terrorist 

watchlist information available at border stations were not routinely used or checked by 

the patrol.272

Another factor hampering any unified counterterrorism effort by the Border Patrol was 

that it lacked a direct chain of command from its chief, based in Washington, to the field. 

The chief therefore had no control over the field, as well as limited input on policy and 

budget within the INS. As agents were rotated and the Border Patrol reacted to the everchanging locations at which aliens attempted to enter the United States illegally, regional 

directors were in constant competition with each other for human and technical 

assistance.273

State and Local Law Enforcement Support 

Both administration regulations and criminal statutes apply to immigration enforcement. 

The majority of alien offenders are handled through the immigration administrative court 

system, which consists of judges, attorneys, and immigration detention facilities.274

Criminal violations are handled by the U.S. Attorney’s office and the federal court 

system.275 In most cases, an alien committing an administrative violation is at the same 

time violating federal law. The federal government deports most immigration violators 

from the United States rather than prosecuting them as criminal defendants. 

Many state and local law enforcement agencies worked closely with federal immigration 

authorities before 9/11. They contacted INS when they arrested aliens on criminal 

charges and assisted in the investigation, arrest, and detention of illegal aliens. In return, 

INS special agents, with their specialized training and resources, assisted other law 

enforcement agencies fighting violent crime and drug trafficking.276 Their cooperation—

and their knowledge of aliens’ languages, cultures, and religions—was particularly 

valuable in ethnic communities. However, these state and local enforcement agencies 

never had access to terrorist watchlists. 
101

Friction also existed in these relationships. It mainly arose from the INS’s inability to 

respond to all requests for assistance, ambiguity regarding the role of state and local law 

officers in enforcing immigration regulations, and the discomfort many various 

immigrant advocacy groups had with local enforcement of immigration law. Despite 

these difficulties, many police officers continued officially and sometimes unofficially to 

work with the INS by identifying criminal aliens and turning them over to the INS. Many 

county officials sought to prevent criminal aliens from returning to the streets, and 

frequently pressured their congressional representatives to force local INS offices to 

deport them. 

Still, the problem of getting in contact with INS enforcement persisted. While the 

understaffed INS investigations offices kept bankers’ hours, the police operated around 

the clock and often needed assistance when the INS offices were closed.277 Many INS 

investigations offices did not even have a computer link to their state’s Criminal Justice 

Information System, making it was difficult for the police simply to communicate with 

them. 

Recognizing the problem Congress attempted to get the INS to address it. The Law 

Enforcement Support Center (LESC) evolved out of the1988 antidrug law that required 

the INS to maintain a 24/7 hotline to identify individuals arrested as aggravated felons.278

The initial objective was to assist state and local law enforcement in identifying criminal 

aliens, to locate and prosecute criminal aliens who had been deported after being 

convicted of felonies, and to act as a control point for INS arrest warrants. The LESC was 

not established until 1994.

The center was available to all state and local law enforcement officials who encountered 

a suspected alien during routine police work.279 The LESC provided timely information 

regarding the status and identities of aliens suspected of, arrested for, or convicted of 

criminal activity, but it offered no specific information on aliens associated with 

terrorism.280

In 1996, a new law enabled the INS to enter into agreements with state and local law 

enforcement agencies through which the INS would provide training and the local 

agencies would exercise immigration enforcement authority.281 Terrorist watchlists 

would not be made available to them. Such agreements were voluntary, and only Salt 

Lake City—unsuccessfully—attempted to take advantage of the law. Moreover, in prior 

years mayors of cities with large immigrant populations sometimes imposed limits on 

city employee cooperation with federal immigration agents.282

. . . 

Prior to September 11, immigration inspectors were focused on facilitating the entry of 

travelers to the United States. Special agents were focused on criminal aliens and alien 

smuggling, and those handling immigration benefits were inundated with millions of 

applications. Thus, on the eve of the 9/11 attacks, the INS found itself in a state of 

disarray. Although a few offices were attempting to carry out counterterrorism initiatives, 
102

their efforts were severely limited by a lack of recognition, both national and local, of the 

connection between border security and national security. As we will see in chapter 5, the 

failure to link available information with government action unwittingly facilitated the 

entry of the September 11 hijackers. 

1

 Annual Strategic Intelligence Review for Counterterrorism, Oct. 1995, p8. Terrorist surveillance 

capabilities were directly linked to their ability to travel unimpeded around the world, which is why 

training in document forgery was a part of al Qaeda’s terrorist instruction. 

2

 Annual Strategic Intelligence Review for Counterterrorism, Apr.1998, p. 13. 

3

 For example, in June 1998 a joint USG-Albanian operation acted on information that a forgery operation 

was producing passports, visas and other documents to support the travel of al Qaeda operatives. A raid 

turned up visa stamps, blank Egyptian birth certificates, and a forged passport; CIA took exemplars of all 

stamps. FBI CART Report, Aug. 14, 1998. In another case, the arrest of a suspected operative turned up a 

photo-substituted Italian passport and a British passport previously reported stolen and various other 

passports, photographs and identity cards, FBI CART Report, July 16, 2002. 

4

 The Terrorist Mobility Unit was created in October 2001. 

5

 Memorandum for the Record, Keith M. 

6

 Ibid. 

7

 DOS report, 1990 Report of the Visa Office, released Oct. 1991.The INS shared with State the authority 

for administering immigrant visa and refugee applications, inspecting all travelers arriving at ports of entry, 

adjudicating applications for change of status, and (through its Border Patrol component) interdicting aliens 

attempting to enter without inspection. INS Special Agents were responsible for enforcement of 

immigration laws in the interior of the United States. On an average day, INS inspectors at ports of entry 

collectively handled the admission to the United States of over one million individuals, 85 percent of whom 

entered through the land borders with Canada and Mexico. Agencies playing a lesser role in the 

immigration system were the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which participated in the screening of 

visa applicants for certain domestic national security-related concerns; the CIA and other intelligence 

agencies, which participated in screening visa applicants for counter-intelligence and counterterrorism 

concerns and which participated in overseas anti-smuggling efforts, and the Coast Guard, which addressed 

significant episodes of migration by sea. 

8

 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform transcript, “Telephone Interview of 

Consular Officer 1,” Aug. 1, 2002 (Consular officer in Saudi Arabia discussing visa policy as supportive of 

other U.S. policy goals in the country). 

9

 DOS report, Bureau of Consular Affairs, “1990 Report of the Visa Office,” Oct. 1991. 

10 Ibid. 

11 Ibid. 

12 INA § 221(h), “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to entitle any alien, to whom a visa or other 

documentation has been issued, to be admitted [to] the United States, if, upon arrival at a port of entry in 

the United States, he is found to be inadmissible under this Act, or any other provision of law.”

13 Immigration officers today work within the Department of Homeland Security. 

14 In fiscal year 2001, approximately 175 million U.S. citizens were inspected at U.S. ports of entry. 

15 22 C.F.R. § 53.2(b). According to the Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border 

Protection, a U.S. citizen entering from Canada “may use” a certified copy of their birth certificate to 

reenter the United States under this regulation. However, the regulation itself contains no such requirement. 

16 22 C.F.R. § 41.2(a). 

17 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-603) created the Visa Waiver Program as a 

pilot. It became a permanent program in 2000 under the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (P.L. 106-

396, Oct. 30. 2000). The countries in the program at the time of the September 11 attacks were: Andorra, 

Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
103

Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, 

Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Uruguay. 18 GAO report, “Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program,” GAO-03-38, Nov. 2002. 

19 DOS report, Bureau of Consular Affairs, “2000 Report of the Visa Office,” June 2002. 

20 Ibid. 

21 Ibid. 

22 Ibid. 

23 In addition, Zacarias Moussaoui, an al Qaeda operative suspected of being primed as a possible pilot in 

the 9/11 plot, entered the United States February 23, 2001, from London England using a French, “visa 

waiver” passport. He overstayed his term of admission under that program, and was arrested by the INS 

for this immigration violation on August 16, 2001. 

24 DOS report, Bureau of Consular Affairs, “2000 Report of the Visa Office,” June 2002. 25 Mary Ryan interview (Sept. 29, 2003). 

26 The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (P.L. 82-414; 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101 et seq.) has been amended 

several times since 1952, more recently by the Immigration Act of 1990, the Illegal Immigration Reform 

and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-208), the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56), 

the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173), and the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296). 

27 Before 9/11, neither the Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security nor the Department of Homeland 

Security existed. Under the Homeland Security Act, the INS was transferred to the Department of 

Homeland Security (Section 402), and control over the policy governing the issuance and denial of visas to 

enter the United States was also transferred to DHS (Section 403). 

28 INA section 101(a)(3). 

29 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as Amended; Title 8 Code of Federal Regulations—Aliens 

and Nationality; Title 22 Code of Federal Regulations—State Department (Parts 40-53). 22 CFR Sections 

41.103 (Filing an Application and Form OF-156), 41.104 (Passport requirements), 41.105 (Supporting 

documents and fingerprinting). 

30 The assistant secretary for consular affairs reports to the under secretary of state for management, who, in 

turn, reports to the deputy secretary of state. Richard Moose interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 31 See, e.g., Centeno v. Schultz, 817 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988). 32 Before this time, a name check was mandatory but it was performed with a number of systems, including 

scanning microfiche for the names of potential terrorists. This weakness in the name-check system was laid 

bare in the Blind Sheik episode, referred to in chapter 3, and was corrected by the mid-1990s. 

33 22 C.F.R. §41.121(a)–(c). 

34 22 CFR § 41.121(d). 

35 INA § 222e, 22 CFR § 41.102. 

36 This aspect of State Department policy is described in the next chapter. 

37 DOS report, Bureau of Consular Affairs, “2000 Report of the Visa Office,” June 2002. 

38 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (2002). 

39 DOS Office of Inspector General report, “Review of Nonimmigrant Visa Issuance Policy and 

Procedures,” Dec. 2002. 

40 DOS report, Bureau of Consular Affairs, “2000 Report of the Visa Office,” June 2002. 

41 The statutory language reads: “No visa or other documentation shall be issued to an alien if (1) it appears 

to the consular officer, from statements in the application, or in the papers submitted therewith, that such 

alien is ineligible to receive a visa or such other documentation under section 212, or any other provision of 

law, (2) the application fails to comply with the provisions of this Act, or the regulations issued thereunder, 

or (3) the consular officer knows or has reason to believe that such alien is ineligible to receive a visa or 

such other documentation under section 212, or any other provision of law.” 

42 A denial under 221(g) was considered a “soft” refusal because the applicant could overcome the denial 

and obtain a visa fairly easily by reapplying with the necessary documentation. Hanjour did this and 

acquired his student visa on September 25, 2000. By contrast, a 214(b) refusal was considered a “hard” 

refusal: it was much more difficult to overcome and had far more lasting consequences. In the pre-9/11 era, 

many posts used section 221(g) as a workload-processing tool. They would deny a visa application using 

221(g) by sending a letter to the applicant and without interviewing the applicant. If the applicant persisted 
104

and was unable to overcome this initial denial—after a personal interview—then they would deny the 

applicant under 214(b). 

43 Terrorist activity means any of the following acts if illegal where committed or unlawful in the United 

States: (1) the hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance (regardless of type); (2) the seizing or detaining, 

and the threat to kill, injure, or continue to detain, any person in order to compel an action by a third party 

as a condition for releasing the detained individual; (3) a violent attack on an internationally protected 

person or on his or her liberty; (4) an assassination; (5) the use of any biological or chemical agent, nuclear 

weapon or device, or explosive or firearm (other than for mere personal monetary gain) to endanger the 

safety of another individual or to cause substantial property damage; or (6) a threat, attempt, or conspiracy 

to commit any of the above actions. INA § 212(a)(3)(B); 9 FAM 40.32 (note N2.1). 

44 Under the INA, such acts include (1) preparing or planning a terrorist activity, (2) gathering information 

on potential targets for terrorist activity, (3) providing any type of material support to any individual or 

entity that the alien knows or has reason to believe has committed or plans to commit a terrorist act, (4) 

soliciting funds or other things of value for terrorist activity or for any terrorist organization, and (5) 

recruiting any individual to engage in terrorist activity for membership in any terrorist organization or 

government. INA § 212(a)(3)(B); 9 FAM § 40.32 (Note N2.2). 

45 Section 601 of the Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649). This Section amended and renumbered the 

grounds for immigrant and non-immigrant visa refusal under section 212(a) of the INA, effective June 1, 

1991.

46 INA § 212(a)(27). 

47 Below are the number of aliens found ineligible for a non-immigrant visa on grounds of terrorism for the 

fiscal years 1992, when the grounds for denial explicitly included terrorism, through 2001. 

 Year # Ineligible on Terrorism Grounds Year # Ineligible on Terrorism Grounds

 1992 28 1997 35 

 1993 73 1998 63 

 1994 38 1999 101 

 1995 79 2000 99 

 1996 41 2001 83 

48 DOS memo, “Machine Readable Visa Program,” Mar. 9, 1990. Although the machine-readable visa 

(MRV) took State officials an additional one minute and 48 seconds to process, the MRV program helped 

State to resolve problems stemming from internal control weaknesses in the visa issuance process and the 

physical weakness of the then-current U.S. visa. Ibid. These weaknesses included inaccurate counting of 

visas issued by the old Burroughs visa-issuing machines, relative ease of counterfeiting the old visa, and a 

lack of biographical data included in the old visa. Ibid. 

49 Other bureaus who work closely with CA in fulfilling its mission are the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 

the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), and the various regional bureaus within whose regions 

consular officers work. 

50 Mary Ryan interview (Oct. 9, 2003). 

51 DOS record, “History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001),” Chapter 

9, The Consular Function, www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs. 

52 DOS Congressional Presentation Document, Fiscal Year 2003, Bureau of Consular Affairs “Strategic 

Goals,” Oct. 31, 2000, p. 369. 

53 INA § 222 (h) states, “Nonadmission upon arrival. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to entitle any 

alien, to whom a visa or other documentation has been issued, to be admitted [to] the United States, if, upon 

arrival at a port of entry in the United States, he is found to be inadmissible under this Act, or any other 

provision of law. The substance of this subsection shall appear upon every visa application.” 

54 By July 2001, INS officials were posted at approximately 40 of the 230 visa-issuing posts. 

55 As discussed later, State and INS did cooperate on the creation and operation of the terrorist watch list. 

Beginning in 1991, State provided the INS with a subset of the information in its TIPOFF watch list which 

the INS used to scan visitors at ports of entry. This was a subset because TIPOFF included information on 

potential terrorists that was not specific enough to use when screening passengers quickly at a port of entry. 

For example, TIPOFF might include a data file on an Egyptian terrorist named “Ahmad” reported to have 

participated in a meeting of other terrorists at a certain date and time. This information, while important to 
105

keep and build upon, almost certainly would not be sufficient to justify an INS decision to stop all 

Egyptians using the name “Ahmad” attempting to enter the United States upon suspicion of involvement in 

terrorism unless extraordinary circumstances warranted. 

56 DOS record, “History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001),” Chapter 

17, Personnel and Professional Development, www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs. 

57 Richard Moose interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 

58 Ibid. 

59 Ibid. 

60 DOS record, “Program Performance Report FY 2001,” at www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/perfpt/2001/pdf. 

61 Richard Moose interview (Jan. 14, 2004). 

62 The Inman Commission’s recommendations in June 1985 continue to be the standards for the State 

Department’s overseas security measures to this date. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 

“Embassy Security: Background, Funding and the Budget,” updated Oct. 4, 2001. 

63 Ibid. 

64 Ibid. 

65 It recommended spending in three basic categories: (1) enhancement of work place security, (2) 

improvement of crisis management systems and procedure, and (3) improvement of intelligence and 

information sharing and assessment. “Embassy Security: Background, Funding and the Budget,” 

Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated October 4, 2001. State’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security proposed a Global Security Enhancement Strategy to improve security at all U.S. 

embassies, especially those formerly considered “low risk.” DOS record, “History of the Department of 

State During the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001),” Chapter 3, Security Policies, 

www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs. 

66 During this same time period, State also increased funding from machine-readable visa (MRV) fees to 

the Diplomatic Security (DS) section for increased personnel, antiterrorism and crime programs, and visa 

fraud investigations. “Embassy Security: Background, Funding and the Budget,” Congressional Research 

Service Report for Congress, updated October 4, 2001. MRV funding of DS increased from $13.3 million 

in FY 1997 to $18.5 million in FY 2001. 

67 DOS record, “History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001),” Chapter 

17, Personnel and Professional Development, www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs. 

68 Ibid. 

69 Ibid. 

70 Ibid. 

71 It was not until fiscal year 2001, that State began to hire above the attrition rate. See DOS record, 

“Program Performance Report FY 2001,” at www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/perfpt/2001/pdf (“After years of 

downsizing, we began to hire above attrition in FY [Fiscal Year] ‘01”). 

72 It was not until fiscal year 2001, that State began to hire above the attrition rate. Mary Ryan interview 

(Sept. 29, 2003). 

73 Because of the Visa Waiver Program, nonimmigrant visa demand shrank from a high of 8,769,709 visas 

issued in 1988 to a low of 5,359,620 visas issued in 1993. After 1993, nonimmigrant visa demand rose 

again through the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In FY 2001, State issued 10,569,194 nonimmigrant visas. 

74 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-603) created the Visa Waiver Program as a 

pilot in 1986. It became a permanent program in 2000 under the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (P.L. 

106-396, October 30, 2000). Persons traveling to the United States for other purposes, for example to study 

or work, are required to have a visa. 

75 The Departments of State and Justice also evaluate the country’s political and economic stability. DOS 

memo, “Creating a Permanent Visa Waiver Program,” Mar. 15, 1990, listing the four criteria for inclusion 

as 1) average visa refusal rate of 2% or less in the previous two fiscal years, 2) visa refusal rate of no more 

than 2.5% in each of those years, 3) reciprocal waiver of visa requirements for U.S. citizens, 4) no 

detriment to U.S. national security, and 5) a program to develop a machine-readable passport. Based on the 

first two of these criteria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar all qualified 

for inclusion in the visa waiver program. DOS letter, Eagleburger to Thornburgh, Jan. 28, 1991, with 

attachment stating “Countries meeting the statistical criterion whose inclusion in the VWPP is not 

recommended: Saudi Arabia,“ and stating as the reason: “The government does not extend reciprocal visa 
106

waiver privileges to American nationals. We do not believe it would be useful to again approach them on 

this matter.” 

76 8 U.S.C. § 217(c)(1) (1986). 

77 DOS memo, “Continuation of a Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Program,” Jan. 11, 1990; DOS memo, 

“Creating a Permanent Visa Waiver Program,” Mar. 15, 1990. 

78 DOS memo, “NIV Waiver Pilot Program,” Jan. 20, 1988. However, State believed there would be very 

few permanent position savings. Rather, the savings would come from not having to hire employees in the 

future to handle projected increases in demand for nonimmigrant visas from the affected countries. 

Initially, the Justice Department, at the urging of the INS -- and based on security concerns -- sought to 

require any potential participating country to “consent to the presence of an INS pre-inspection operation at 

that country’s principal international airport,” DOS memo, “Implementation of the NIV Waiver Pilot 

Program,” Dec. 11, 1987. However, this desire was quelled by the substantial objections of the State 

Department, which feared such an expansion of U.S. personnel abroad would result in demand for 

increased resources, raise host country sovereignty concerns, and prove infeasible because of “airport 

facility constraints.” Ibid. 

79 Ibid. 

80 Ibid. 

81 DOJ memo for William Bradford Reynolds, Aug. 8, 1987. 

82 DOS memo, “The nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Pilot Program, July 28, 1988. 

83 DOS memo, “Continuation of a Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Program, Jan. 11, 1990. 

84 Ibid. 

85 Ibid. 

86 Because of the Visa Waiver Program, nonimmigrant visa demand shrank from a high of 8,769,709 visas 

issued in 1988 to a low of 5,359,620 visas issued in 1993. After 1993, nonimmigrant visa demand rose 

again through the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In FY 2001, State issued 10,569,194 nonimmigrant visas. 

DOS congressional presentation document, Bureau of Consular Affairs “Strategic Goals,” Oct. 31, 2000 

(“Most visas now issued at high visa risk posts.”) 

87 Ibid. 

88 DOS memo, “Creating a Permanent Visa Waiver Program,” Mar. 15, 1990; DOS memo, “Draft Report to 

Congress on the Visa Waiver Pilot Program,” Apr. 6, 1990. 

102 Mary Ryan interview (Oct.9, 2003). 103 Not all U.S. diplomatic posts issue visas. 104 DOS record, Presentation to the Consular Systems Information Resources Management Program Board, 

Apr. 25, 1995. The MRV was mandated by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of September 1988, and installation 

began in September 1989 in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. Although the MRV took an additional 

one minute and 48 seconds to process, the MRV program helped State to resolve problems stemming from 

internal control weaknesses in the visa issuance process and the physical weakness of the then-current U.S. 

visa. These weaknesses included inaccurate counting of visas issued by the old Burroughs visa-issuing 

machines, relative ease of counterfeiting the old visa, and a lack of biographical data included in the old 

visa. Ibid. State also developed a Machine Readable Passport at the same time, pursuant to the same Act. 

DOS memo, “Machine Readable Visa Program,” Mar. 9. 1990. 

105 GAO report, “Passports and Visa: Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud,” GAO/NSIAD-96-99, May 1996. 106 DOS record, Presentation to the Consular Systems Information Resources Management Program Board, 

Apr. 25, 1995. By February 1993—when the World Trade Center was bombed—104 posts were on the 

real-time network, 17 used the distributed name check system, and 111 posts were still relying on 

microfiche to perform name checks. In general, posts in the so-called “first world” were more automated, 

while posts in remote and undeveloped locations tended to be the ones using the more archaic technology. 107 Chaired by State and funded by the Defense Department. 108 The TIPOFF database was searchable using a sophisticated language algorithm that allowed a searcher 

to identify multiple variations on a name, for example, transliterated from Arabic to English. For example, 

the Blind Sheik, Sheik Omar Ali Abdal Rahman would produce 486 “hits” in State’s name check system. 

DOS record, Presentation to the Consular Systems Information Resources Management Program Board, 

Apr. 25, 1995. 
107

109 The agreement with Canada, while signed by the State Department, required a separate memorandum of 

agreement among the intelligence community members in which they agreed to supply their TIPOFF data 

with Canada. 

110 DOS record, TIPOFF power point presentation, “History of the Visas Viper Program,” Nov. 1, 2003. 111 The criteria for inclusion were that there was reasonable suspicion that the subject has or might engage 

in terrorism, and that there was sufficient biographic data for positive identification of the individual. Ibid. 

112 GAO report, “Passports and Visa: Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud,” GAO/NSIAD-96-99, May 1996. 113 Following the 9/11 attacks, CA Assistant Secretary Mary Ryan met with CIA Director George Tenet, 

and expressed her frustration with the CIA’s failure to provide State with the names of two 9/11 hijackers: 

Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, whose names were in the possession of the CIA as early as 

January 2000. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and this meeting between Ryan and Tenet, Visas Viper 

experienced a “dramatic” increase in submissions. Mary Ryan interview (Sept. 29, 2003). 

114 On April 30, 1994, President Clinton signed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which authorized 

the Secretary of State to charge and retain a fee for processing MRVs. P.L. 103-236 (1994). 

115 History of the Department of State during the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001), Chapter 9, The Consular 

Function.

116DOS record, Supplementary Information provided in connection with interview of Travis Farris, Nov. 

26, 2003. A Hispanic algorithm was implemented beginning in September 2002. Ibid. 

117 Travis Farris interview (Sept. 29, 2003). 118 DOS record, Supplementary Information provided in connection with interview of Travis Farris, Nov. 

26, 2003. 

119 Ibid. 120 GAO report, “Border Security: Visa Process Should be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool,” GAO03-132NI, Oct. 2002. 

121 Mary Ryan interview (Sept. 29, 2003). According to the State Department, each post received a single 

hard copy of the Best Practices Handbook (an edition dated February 19980, which included a series of 14 

cables. Over time, additional cables were added to the Handbook by posting them to the Consular Affairs 

Web site. The last cable (No. 49) was dated April 1999. DOS record, Consular Best Practices Handbook, 

2000 edition. 

122 General Accounting Office, “Border Security: Visa Process Should be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism 

Tool,” GAO-03-132NI, Oct. 2002. 

123 Ibid. 124 DOS record, “History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001),” Chapter 

9, The Consular Function. 

125 Ibid. 126 GAO report, “Border Security: Visa Process Should be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool,” GAO03-132NI, Oct. 2002; Mary Ryan interview (Sept. 29, 2003)(“They were telling us they were burned out.”) 127 See DOS record, Consular Best Practices Handbook, 2000 edition, Section 1.1 Overview which states 

“One reason best practices have been developed in consular work is to help those sections with growing 

workloads and static resources to ‘get the job done.’” 

128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 DOS record, Consular Best Practices Handbook, 2000 edition, Cable No. 6: The Context for Best 

Practices, Oct. 1997. 

131 Ibid. 132 Cable No. 6: The Context for Best Practices, State 185823, October 1997; RDOS03004151. 133 Id. at p.2, Letter of Assistant Secretary Mary Ryan introducing the Handbook addressed “Dear Consular 

Colleagues.” 

134 As of March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was reorganized, renamed and 

removed from the Justice Department and housed in the Department of Homeland Security. 

135 The Naturalization Act of 1790 was the first immigration law passed that set federal standards for 

naturalization, permitting citizenship within two years of residency. Article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the 

Constitution gives Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 

states and with the Indian tribes.” 
108

136 By Acts passed Aug. 3, 1882, 47 Cong. Chap. 376, §§ 2, 3; 22 Stat. 214, and Feb. 23, 1887, 49 Cong. 

Chap. 220, 24 Stat. 415, charging the Secretary of the Treasury with “supervision over the business of 

immigration to the United States.” States were required to process, deny entry, and care for passengers 

arriving within their state from abroad. 

137 By Acts passed March 3, 1891, 51 Cong. chap. 551, § 7 and March 2, 1895, 53 Cong. Chap. 177. 138 By Act passed March 3, 1891. This act set out some of the basic parameters of federal immigration 

authority, including the list of persons to be excluded from entry, see § 1; the discretion of border 

inspectors to determine admissibility; the requirement that incoming vessels provide lists of incoming 

passengers including the “name, nationality, last residence, and destination of every such alien, before any 

of them have landed” and for pre-landing inspections by U.S. border officials; the authority to remove 

“unlawful” aliens and create rules to facilitate travel over the land borders, see § 8. 

139 In 1895, the Bureau of Immigration was created and placed under the Secretary of the Treasury. In 

1903, the bureau moved to the newly created Department of Commerce and Labor, taking the name the 

Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization in 1906. When the Department of Labor was created in 1913, the 

bureau moved with it. In 1933, these functions were consolidated to form the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service under a commissioner. In 1940, the Service was transferred to the Department of 

Justice where it remained until March 2003. See “History of Immigration and Naturalization Agencies,” 8 

U.S.C. § 1551. In addition, there are at least 150 statutes providing the legislative history of immigration. 

140 An example of the interdependence of the enforcement and services sectors of INS is a 1984 memo 

addressing the priorities of INS interior enforcement: “More broadly, interior enforcement capabilities were 

to have a significant effect on the deterrence of illegal immigration through the prosecution of fraud 

facilitators, removal of criminal aliens, reduction of employment opportunities for illegal aliens and 

prevention of alien access to entitlement benefits.” INS memo, “Control of Nonimmigrant Students” Dec. 

13, 1984. 

141 George Regan interview (Oct. 21, 2003), former Assistant Commissioner for Intelligence (1989-Nov. 

1996) and subsequently Acting Associate Commissioner for Enforcement through Aug. 1997. 

142 INS records, INS organizational charts signed by Attorney General Reno, 1998 and 2000. 143 Mary Ann Wyrsch interview (Oct. 10, 2003), Deputy Commissioner, March 1998-October 2000 and 

Acting Commissioner, November 2000–March 2001. 

144 Jamie Gorelick interview (Jan. 13, 2004); Eric Holder interview (Jan. 28, 2004). Budget and national 

security issues pertaining to the INS were handled out of separate offices at main Justice, including the 

Terrorism and Violent Crime Section, the Office of Immigration Litigation, and the Justice Management 

Division.

145 When James Ziglar became INS Commissioner on Aug. 4, 2001, he found an agency he described as 

severely lacking enforcement agents- he estimated that to address the illegal population in the United 

States, INS would need 46,000 agents as opposed to the 2,000 of the previous decade, see Ziglar power 

point to Attorney General Ashcroft, Nov. 2001. In addition, Ziglar also noted that technology development 

had been ad hoc, and there were no systems interconnecting INS. Development of a technology platform 

became a priority. James Ziglar interview, Nov. 14, 2003. 

146 Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003); DOJ records, INS Weekly agendas 1997-1998; Janet Reno 

interview (Dec. 16, 2003); Jamie Gorelick interview (Jan. 13, 2004); Eric Holder interview (Jan. 28, 2004). 

For example, when the White House Counterterrorism Security Group sought INS information on special 

interest cases and student tracking, or when FBI director Louis Freeh sought help from Deputy Attorney 

General Gorelick on the same subject. 

147 She had previously served as an Acting INS Commissioner. 148 Gustavo de la Vina interview (Nov. 19, 2003). 149 Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). 150 House Appropriations Committee Report 105-636 (1999) and Congressional Appropriations Conference 

Reports (1996-1998). 

151 See Dan Cadman interview (Oct. 7, 2003), of the INS National Security Unit; Bill West interview (Oct. 

3, 2003), INS supervisory special agent in South Florida; Harvey Adler interview (Apr.16, 2004), INS 

detailee to the CIA; George Regan interview (Oct. 21, 2004), of the INS Intelligence Unit; Laura Baxter 

interview (Feb. 26, 2004), of the INS National Security Law Unit; Sarah Kendall (Mar.15, 2004), of the 

INS National Security Law Unit; Tim Goyer interview (Oct. 1, 2003), of the INS Lookout Unit, which also 

discusses the TIPOFF liaison, Bob Neighbors of the INS Lookout Unit; Greg Bednarz interview (Oct. 9, 
109

2003), an Acting Assistant Commissioner for INS investigations policy and budget); Morrie Berez 

interview (Oct. 2, 2003), of the INS Student Tracking Task Force and its first coordinator. 

152 The 9/11 hijackers only used international airports to gain entry to the United States. 153 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) power point record, Sept. 12, 2003, stating the legacy INS 

mission. 

154 Zacarias Moussaoui, an al Qaeda operative suspected of being primed as a possible pilot in the 9/11 

operation, used a French, “visa waiver” passport to come into the United States and attend flight school. 

155 Although visitors from a Visa Waiver country could only stay in the United States for 90 days, they 

were not required to show a return airplane ticket out of the United States valid within those 90 days. 

Rather, the ticket could be valid for up to one year. 

156 At the international airports the immigration inspectors worked the immigration lines, determining 

aliens’ admissibility, prior to a selective review of the luggage and currency accompanying those same 

aliens by the Customs Service. At many land border ports of entry INS and Customs officials worked in 

tandem processing U.S. citizens and aliens. On the northern border, this included 86 land ports of entry and 

124 crossings, which were smaller stations with limited working hours. On the southern border it included 

24 land border ports of entry and 43 crossings.

157 INA § 286. INS News, October, 1997, Service Reaching 45-Minute Flight Inspection Goal, “The 

Service is close to reaching the 45-minute flight-inspection time mandated by Congress in Section 286 of 

the INA on most flights...” See also 8 USCS § 1752, which altered the law, requiring adequate staffing so 

as not “compromise the safety and security of the United States.” To put the atmosphere in which the 

inspectors worked in context, in 2001, 90 percent of aliens entering the United States were visitors for 

pleasure (tourists). Total nonimmigrant visitors in 2000 were over 30 million, nearly a doubling in entries 

from the 17 million in 1995, see Annual INS Statistical Report, 2001. 158 Many of the inspectors interviewed by the Commission complained these lights were often broken. 

Inspectors had the option of conducting an “Accelerated Citizen Examination” of U.S. citizens, called 

“ACE,” consisting only of a document check but not a watchlist name check. The watchlist also contained 

information on lost or stolen passports. The INS was wholly dependent for this information on the State 

Department and the intelligence community. Prior to 2004, the real-time Interpol database of lost and stolen 

passport numbers was not available to immigration inspectors. On details of how travelers are processed at 

airports of entry, see JFK International briefing (July 28, 2003); Dulles International site visit (Feb. 27, 

2004). See also Commission work product, Results of interviews of border inspectors with 9/11 hijacker 

contacts: Answers regarding Primary Inspections prior to 9/11, May 20, 2004. 159 If the traveler was a hit on any of the watchlists, specific instructions appeared on the computer monitor 

visible only to the inspector. Instructions varied depending on the type of record. An outstanding arrest 

warrant could result in an immediate arrest. On the other hand, the inspector could be told to admit the 

individual for operational reasons, such as to gather intelligence on the individual’s contacts and activities 

while in the United States. 

160 “Pocket litter” consists of paper, documents, receipts, photos, etc. carried on the person or in the 

baggage of the traveler. 

161 A translator and IDENT were used to screen Kahtani. The photographing and fingerprinting of Kahtani 

on August 4, 2001, at Orlando International Airport would later help federal authorities identify him as the 

same individual captured in Afghanistan subsequent to September 11. 

162 The State Department was consistently responsive to TIPOFF hits at ports of entry, according to the INS 

Lookout Unit manager. 

163 Prior to September 11, the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which usually had INS detailees, would 

be called in occasionally on watchlist hits. On these occasions, sometimes the JTTFs would show up at the 

port for more information or to interview the individual. 

164 Danny Chu interview (May 28, 2003). 165 INS Commissioner Meissner responded to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by providing funds to 

the State Department’s Consular Affairs bureau to automate its paper terrorist watchlist, known as TIPOFF, 

for use by consular and border inspectors. (Meissner MFR) 

166 Commission work product, Results of interviews of border inspectors with 9/11 hijacker contacts: 

Answers regarding Primary Inspections prior to 9/11, May 20, 2004. 167 Only one inspector out of 26 interviewed had heard of TIPOFF prior to September 11. 
110

168 This agreement gave only the INS, not Customs, the authority to deny entry to visitors reasonably 

suspected of terrorist activity. 

169 The standard of “reasonable suspicion” was taken from a confidential task force report written in the 

early 1980s. The report suggested a border watchlist be created to improve national security. The task force 

suggested that the watchlist database hold names of those who may seek admission for criminal purposes. 

The reasoning was that since the database only compiled names of those who may seek admission, the 

higher standard of excludability need not be met. 

170 According to the INS Lookout Unit manager, beginning in 1997, the INS would receive new TIPOFF 

referrals for entry into the INS database in weekly batches on a compact disc, along with supporting 

intelligence. The six person staff of the INS Lookout Unit would then review the materials for entry into 

the lookout database, NAILS, which was available to primary inspectors at ports of entry. 171 Tim Goyer interview (Oct. 2, 2003). 172 Ibid. 173 The initial hits totaled 327 at all U.S. ports of entry out of a total 40,000 records, but many of these were 

mismatches or lacking sufficient information to deny entry. These numbers do not contain terrorist 

exclusions that were based on reasons other than terrorism, such as Kahtani, who, as we shall see, was 

excluded for suspicious behavior. DOS report, DOS power point presentation, 1998. 

174 Ibid. Total TIPOFF exclusions included 36 Saudis, 53 Egyptians, 125 Lebanese, and 1 Emirati. The 

largest number of exclusions came from the United Kingdom, a visa waiver country, with 328. 175 The program operated out of Rome, Italy; Jakarta, Indonesia; Thailand, and countries in Europe. The 

INS Forensic Document Lab provided expert advice in training carriers on the most common types of 

fraudulent travel documents. Taxes applied to airline tickets helped pay for the program. Airlines selected 

for the program were those who tended to bring a higher quantity of improperly documented, and thus 

inadmissible, aliens to the United States. Tim Goyer interview (Oct.2, 2003). 

176 In 2000 Saudia, the Saudi airline, requested training due to its concern about improperly documented 

non-Saudis traveling on their airline. Saudi Arabia was a popular transit point for travel in the Middle East. 

Neither the State Department, nor INS, nor Saudia expressed concerned about Saudi nationals themselves 

or the possibility that they might carry fraudulent documents. Only one 9/11 hijacker used Saudia airlines 

on a return flight through JFK International Airport on July 4, 2001. Tim Goyer interview (Oct. 2, 2003). 177 Passenger Analytic Units (PAUs) used inspector expertise at large airports of entry to replicate the work 

of the Lookout Unit, which also conducted checks on selected flights prior to their arrival at ports of entry. 

The purpose of the PAUs was to prepare for travelers identified through lookouts that were arriving on an 

incoming flight. This included information gathering, paperwork, and escorting the traveler directly from 

the plane to the secondary inspection area. 

178 What started out as a handful of experts grew to approximately 20 experts by September 11, including 

five fingerprint specialists, twelve document examiners, and a half dozen intelligence analysts producing 

fraud alerts for the field. Forensic Document Lab briefing (July 18, 2003). 179 Forensic Document Laboratory briefing (July 18, 2003). DHS document, “Tripwire,” Dec.2003. 180 Forensic Document Laboratory briefing (July 18, 2003). 181 When the Forensic Document Laboratory was asked to analyze the surviving hijacker travel documents, 

they did not note the fraudulent stamps now associated with al Qaeda. See INS reports, Forensic Document 

Lab analyses of passports of Satam al Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari, Nov. 2, 2001 and Sept. 19, 2001. 

182 Testimony of Phyllis Coven, INS Director, Office of International Affairs, before the House 

Appropriations Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 

Related Agencies, May 1, 1996. 

183 Dan Cadman interview (Nov. 21, 2003). 184 Testimony of Phyllis Coven, INS Director, Office of International Affairs, before the House 

Appropriations Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 

Related Agencies, May 1, 1996. 

185 INS memo, Investigations Assistant Commissioner to Deputy Commissioner, “Discontinuance of Arab 

Nonimmigrant Overstay Program,” May 21, 1974. 

186 INS memo, Enforcement Associate Commissioner to Regional Commissioners, Sept. 26, 1994; INS 

memo, Deputy Commissioner Chris Sales to Special Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General Amy 

Jeffress, “Policy Instructions regarding Locating and Processing Certain Libyan Students in the United 

States,” July 11, 1983. 
111

187 On the quality of this student/school compliance database, see Morrie Berez interview (Oct. 2, 2003). 188 Memorandum from FBI Director Louis Freeh to Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, “Improving 

DOJ’s law enforcement capabilities re: aliens entry and departures from the U.S.,” (“Status Report on 

Foreign Student Controls Task Force,” (September 26, 1995) see also DOJ memo, Meissner to Gorelick, 

“Immigration Controls on Foreign Students,” May 11 1995, stating that a “top-down review of the current 

process of scrutinizing, admitting, and monitoring foreign students in the Untied States, and assessing risks 

and vulnerabilities relative to issues of security.” The memo notes that the FBI, U.S. Information Agency, 

and the State Department will be part of the review team. 

189 INS report, INS Final report by the Task Force on Foreign Student Controls: Controls Governing 

Foreign Students and Schools that Admit Them, Dec. 22, 1995. 190 Ibid. 191 Ibid. INS Final report by the Task Force on Foreign Student Controls: Controls Governing Foreign 

Students and Schools that Admit Them, Dec. 22, 1995.The Introduction states: “Americans have a 

fundamental, basic expectation that their Government is effectively monitoring and controlling foreign 

students. While the extent of any individual student being involved in a terrorist or major criminal activity 

is unknown, history tells us it does occur. Because there have been high profile instances where terrorists 

and criminal aliens have been linked to student visas, there is a growing degree of public concern about this 

issue. The American people need to have some basic level of comfort in the knowledge that its government 

is guarding against this danger. Americans deserve and expect it. Although there is no quantitative way to 

measure the intangible benefits gained through Americans having confidence and trust in their 

Government, it is fundamental to the mission and role of government. Without it, our nation’s stability can 

be adversely impacted. This guiding principle was fundamental to the Task Force’s effort.” The reference 

to terrorist use of student visas here is a reference to Eyad Ismoil, the Jordanian who had driven the 

truckload of explosives into the parking garage at the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993. Ismoil had 

entered the United States in 1989 on a student visa, attending Wichita state University in Kansas for three 

semesters. He then dropped out of school and continued living in the United States illegally. See also, DOS 

letter, Frank Moss to Nancy Sambaiew, “Systems Priorities-Coordinated Interagency Partnership 

Regulating International Students,” Feb. 5, 1999, stating at p. 3, “Development of a fully deployed CIPRIS 

is considered to be an important and valuable tool for countering both fraud and terrorism.” 

192 P.L. 104-208 § 641 (1996). The legislation states that the first foreign students to come into the new 

tracking system should be those from state sponsors of terror. 

193 Congressional appropriation conference reports for the INS (1996-2000). 194 Morrie Berez interview (Oct. 2, 2003). The INS received $800 million in technology monies between 

1995 and 1997, but examiners were generally critical of its technology efforts, see GAO Report 01-046, 

Information Technology: INS Needs to Strengthen its Investment Management Capability, Dec.2000. DOJ 

OIG Audit Report 99-19, Follow Up Review Immigration and Naturalization Service Management of 

Automation Program, July 1999. 

195 See INS report, CIPRIS Information Packet, 1998. The success of the biometric student card was 

acknowledged by senior management at an INS Policy Council meeting in August 1998. The minutes read: 

“The CIPRIS pilot is in operation and appears to be working well. Current plans for the pilot call for the 

introduction of a new card that would replace the [paper forms now required of schools and students]. 

Advantages of proceeding to introduce the card as planned include the desire of the stakeholders, especially 

the participating schools. The card would replace some of the workload on schools with respect to entries 

and exits. It would also be more durable and more counterfeit-resistant than the current paper documents 

carried by students. Concerns about the card include the fact that it is... not a travel document. The Policy 

Council decided that issuance of the student cards should be deferred to allow time to explore other 

options.” INS record, INS Policy Council Meeting minutes, Aug. 28, 1998. The Commission also spoke to 

John Smith, a former IBM vice president who helped develop the project. He stated the “biometrics were 

feasible at the time,” see electronic communication to Commission staff, Oct. 21, 2003. The biometric 

scanners were linked between the Atlanta airport, the Texas Service Center and the United States 

Information Agency.

196 Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003); Mary Ann Wyrsch interview (Oct. 20, 2003), Dan Cadman 

interview (Oct. 7, 2003); Tom Cook interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Morrie Berez interview (Oct. 2, 2003). See 

also Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, “A Problem of Distance” in The Age of Sacred Terror (Random 

House, 2002), pp. 307-311. 
112

197 See Presidential Decision Directive 62, 1998. 198 INS letter, Rep. Chuck Schumer to Attorney General Reno, “Student Visas and the implementation of 

CIPRIS,” Feb. 19, 1998; INS letter, Senators Jon Kyl and Rick Santorum to Commissioner Meissner, 

“Implementation of CIPRIS,” Mar.31, 1998. 

199 Testimony of Tom Fischer before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, 

and Claims re Immigration Student Tracking: Implementation and Proposed Modifications, (Sept. 18, 

2002). 

200 INS record, INS Senior Leadership Policy Council meeting, Aug. 26, 1998. 201 INS electronic communications, “CIPRIS Stop Work, Task 402,” Feb. 4-9, 1998. 202 The National Association of International Educators supported an amendment that would have repealed 

the 1996 legislation mandating the program. Website of NAFSA: Association of International Educators, 

“NAFSA Endorses CIPRIS Repeal Legislation, Issues Action Alert,”2000. 203 Mary Ann Wyrsch interview (Oct. 20, 2003) and Tom Cook interview (Jan. 14, 2003). 204 Tom Cook interview (Jan. 14, 2003). See also Doug Pasternak, “American Colleges are Weapons U. for 

Iraq,” U.S. News and World Report, Mar. 9, 1998; American Council of Education (ACE) letter to its 

members, “CIPRIS Foreign Student Fee Collection System Issue Summary,” Jan. 10, 2000; ACE letter, 

Terry Hartle, Senior Vice President to Kevin Rooney, Acting INS Commissioner, April 4, 2001, 

“Implementation of the Student and Exchange Visa Program/Coordinated Interagency Partnership 

Regulating International Students (SEVP/CIPRIS);” and Bob Bach interview (May 14, 2004), Executive 

Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning, 1994-2000. 205 INS record, INS Senior Leadership Policy Council meeting, Aug. 26, 1998. 206 Tom Cook interview (Jan. 14, 2003). See also Bob Bach interview (May 14, 2004). Mary Ann Wyrsch, 

however, states she removed the project manager because he did not have a “good technology plan.” Mary 

Ann Wyrsch interview (Oct. 20, 2003). John Smith, the technology consultant on the program, states he 

never did brief Wyrsch, but did brief the research group that reported to her. Smith to Commission staff 

email,, Oct. 21, 2003. 

207 INS letter, Senator Spencer Abraham and 20 other senators to Meissner, “INS Student Tracking,” Feb. 

22, 2000. 

208 American Camping Association website, “CIPRIS,” Nov. 1, 2000, states: “Appropriation language 

introduced by Senator Judd Gregg, Chairman of the Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations 

Subcommittee, would essentially eliminate CIPRIS altogether.” 

209 Mary Ann Wyrsch interview (Oct. 20, 2003) 210 Tom Cook interview (Jan. 14, 2003). 211 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) § 110, 1996. 212 Congressional appropriations conference reports, 1996–2000. 213 Ibid. 214 Doris Meissner interview (Jan. 12, 2004). See also INS record, contemporaneous notes on conversations 

between Meissner, Bach, and the Canadian government regarding the implementation of (IIRIRA) § 110, 

June 1999. See Canadian/American Border Trade Alliance record, notes on a presentation from 

Commissioner Meissner: “[Commissioner Meissner] thanked CAN/AM BTA for its pivotal role in 

educating Congress on the realities and needs of the northern Border and especially in its involvement in 

convincing Congress to delay the implementation of Section 110;” INS electronic communication, Jackie 

Bednarz to senior management, stating that Governor Howard Dean of Vermont said that entry-exit would 

be a “disaster” for Vermont, 1998. 

215 See Congressional bill, S. 1217 § 102: “Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 

Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000 (Placed on Calendar in Senate),” at. It reads, “Section 110 of 

Public Law 104-208 is repealed.” See also Doris Meissner interview (Jan. 12, 2004). 

216 Ibid. 217 The INS website at the time stated that the intelligence unit “collects, evaluates, analyzes, and 

disseminates information relating to all INS mission, both enforcement and examination. Intelligence also 

directs the Headquarters Command Center, which maintains communications with other offices and 

agencies 24 hours a day.” 

218 Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). 
113

219 That briefing was by the CIA in 1995 with the goal of pulling INS detailees to the CIA. INS email, 

Bednarz to Meissner, “CIA Briefing of INS Top Management—current Threat Assessment of Islamic 

Fundamentalist groups and Impact upon INS” (Oct.16, 1995). 

220 Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003); Gregory Bednarz statement (Oct. 9, 2003). 221 Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). 222 Cliff Landsman interview (Oct. 27, 2003). Landsman ran the intelligence unit from 1998-2003, when 

the INS was abolished. See also George Regan interview (Oct. 21, 2003). 

223 Janet Reno interview (Dec. 16, 2003). 224 Cliff Landsman interview (Oct. 27, 2003). 225 See Majority Staff Report, Hearing on “Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years after the World Trade 

Center,” Feb. 24, 1998, p. 138-139. On the 2,000 special agents, see Gregory Bednarz statement, (Oct. 9, 

2003). On the 4,500 inspectors, see Immigration and Naturalization News Release, “INS to Hire More 

Than 800 Immigration Inspectors Nationwide,” Jan. 12, 2001: “The new inspectors will join the ranks of a 

current staff of more than 4,500 who perform more than 500 million inspections of people entering the 

United States each year.” See also, INS Communique, Vol. 23. No. 1, “INS Commissioner Doris Meissner 

Announces Departure,” Jan. 2001: “The Service is significantly bigger, with a workforce of 18,000 to now 

32,000 employees. The Border Patrol alone has doubled in size, from 4,036 to 9,100 in the past seven 

years.”

226 Majority Staff Report, Hearing on “Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years after the World Trade 

Center,” Feb. 24, 1998, p. 152. 

227 Cliff Landsman interview (Oct. 27, 2003). 228 Harvey Adler interview (Apr. 16, 2004) and Cliff Landsman interview (Oct. 27, 2003). 229 INS records, INS enforcement personnel statistics, 1990-2000. 230 On the 1986 plan, see INS report, Investigations Division, “Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A 

Contingency Plan,” May 1986; Daniel Cadman interview (Oct. 17, 2003). On the 1995 plan, see INS 

memo, Bramhall to Bednarz and Hurst, “Draft Counter-Terrorism Strategy Outline,” Aug. 11, 1995. On 

the 1997 plan, see INS email from Cadman, “EAC briefing document,” Dec. 5, 1997, with attachment 

entitled “Counterterrorism/national Security Strategy and Casework Oversight”. 

231 Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003) and Dan Cadman (Oct.17, 2003). The manager of the unit put 

together a report for the INS investigations division in 1986 titled, “Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A 

Contingency Plan,” which recognized the INS as “the agency charged with manning those borders and 

screening potential entrants to ensure that they are not entering with the intent to commit acts of terror 

either against our own government and people, or those of any other nation.” 232 INS report, “National Security Unit Strategy proposal,” 1997. 233 Dan Cadman interview (Oct. 17, 2003). 234 Ibid. 235 INS memo, Ken Elwood to the field, “Advisement to all offices and employees of the indictment of 

Usama bin Laden, international terrorist, and direct heightened security measures,” (Nov. 4, 1998). 

236 Dan Cadman interview (Oct. 17, 2003) and Laura Baxter interview (Feb. 26, 2004). 237 Rocky Concepcion interview (June 15, 2001). 238 Veronica Cates interview (May 25), Rocky Concepcion interview (June 15, 2004), DHS email, Cadman 

to Commission staff and subsequent phone conversation (June 14 and 16, 2004), and Kevin Rooney 

interview (Jan. 8, 2004). See also, INS report, Cates to Cadman, “White House briefing,” July 5, 2001. 

239 Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). 240 A supervisory special agent in Florida wrote memos to headquarters beginning before the first World 

Trade Center bombing in 1993 urging the INS and the Department of Justice to take on counterterrorism 

investigations under its broad immigration authority. He also suggested using classified evidence to help 

remove terrorist aliens. The memos never received a response. See INS memos, Bill West to Bill Yates and 

headquarters, 1993-1995.

241 INS Memo, William Slattery, INS Field Operations Executive Associate Commissioner, to Alexander 

Alienikoff, Program Executive Associate Commissioner, “INS Task Force Report,” Oct. 29, 1996. 

242 INS Memo, Meissner to John Keeney, DOJ Acting Assistant Attorney General, Feb. 7, 1997. 243 Ibid. It took until 1999 for the Justice Department, White House and Congress to establish a baseline for 

INS commitment to supporting JTTFs and until 1999, after the African embassy bombings, for Congress to 

specifically fund INS “participation in joint task forces on terrorism, to assist in the identification and 
114

apprehension of alien terrorists.” By 2000, Congress allotted more than 900 new positions to interior 

enforcement, for a total of 3,024 available positions, and INS detailees were considered integral to the Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces. See Congressional Conference Committee Report 105-825, 1999. 

244 Individuals still could claim political asylum and receive a hearing to determine if the fear of 

persecution was credible. Resolution of such a claim cold delay the expedited removal charge. See 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act §§ 422, 403; IIRIRA § 302. 

245 Ibid. 246 INS Fact Sheet, “Update on Expedited Removals,” July 9, 1997. 247 INS record, INS Policy Council Meeting Minutes, June 4, 1997 and Laura Baxter interview (Feb. 26, 

2004). 

248 INS record, Immigration “A” (Alien) file of Abu Mezer. 249 INS record, INS Policy Council Meeting Minutes, June 4, 1997 and Laura Baxter interview (Feb. 26, 

2004). 

250 Testimony of Seth Waxman before the Senate Judiciary Committee during consideration of the 

proposed Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, quoted in Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing record 

105-703, p. 149. 

251 See Rules for the Alien Terrorist Removal Court of the United States, May 28, 1997. 252 Majority Staff Report, Hearing on “Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years after the World Trade 

Center,” Feb. 24, 1998, p. 152. 

253 James Reynolds interview (Mar.31, 2004). 254 8 U.S.C. section 1534 (e)(1)(A), INA § 504. 255 Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003); Dan Cadman interview (Oct. 7, 2003); Laura Baxter 

interview (Feb. 26, 2003); and James Castello (Nov. 7, 2003). See also, DOJ memo, Laura Baxter memo, 

“The Use of Classified Evidence in Immigration Proceedings: Background Information and Legislation,” 

Feb. 16, 2001. One example of the difficulties in pursuing a suspected terrorist through immigration 

violations is the case of Sami al Arian, which was initiated in 1994 and was repeatedly reviewed by the 

Justice Department for possible prosecution or initiation of removal proceedings prior to September 11. See 

Bill West interview (Oct. 3, 2003) and testimony of Steven Emerson before the Senate Judiciary 

Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, Feb. 24, 1998, p. 101. The Justice 

Department brought charges after September 11. 

256 Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). 257 James Castello interview (Nov. 7, 2003) and Laura Baxter interview (Feb. 26, 2003). 258 Dan Cadman interview (Oct. 17, 2003) and Rocky Concepcion interview (June 15, 2004). 259 Those in the latter two groups sought U.S. residency on the basis of fear of persecution in their home 

country: asylees made their claim after entering the United States or at the border, and refugees made it 

from abroad. 

260 INS record, “A” file of Aimal Kansi. 261 INS record, “A” files of Mohamed and Mahmud Abouhalima. 262 The SAW applicants had to provide evidence that they had worked on perishable crops for at least “90 

days” between May 1, 1985, and May 1, 1986; their residence did not have to be “continuous” or 

“unlawful.” Nearly 1 million illegal aliens had received legal permanent residence under SAW, twice the 

number of foreigners normally employed in agriculture. 

263 Testimony of Paul Virtue before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, 1999. 264 The Patrol’s official mission statement read as follows: “To detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens 

into the United States. The Border Patrol helps maintain borders that work- facilitating the flow of legal 

immigration and goods- while preventing the illegal trafficking of people and contraband.” See CBP power 

point record, Sept. 12, 2003. 

265 Gus de la Vina interview (Nov. 19, 2003), a 31-year Border Patrol veteran and its Chief, 1999- 2003. 266 The primary entry points were San Diego, California followed by El Paso, Texas. 267 Gus de la Vina interview (Nov. 19, 2003) 268 Where the Patrol did receive outside federal help and support was from the Defense Department in three 

areas: (1) military personnel who, until the mid 1990s, worked at listening posts as “eyes and ears” on land 

and water; (2) National Guard units constructed such things as fences, gates, and towers; and (3) 

technological “leftovers” such as binoculars, infrared glasses, and sensors. The Defense Department no 

longer supplied military personnel at listening posts after a mistaken shooting of a civilian by military 
115

personnel. Known as the Redford incident, its ramifications were to be felt in the aftermath of September 

11, as the Patrol’s request to DOD for military personnel help at listening posts was denied, and the Patrol 

received instead technology and intelligence analysts. 

269 INS newsletter, “INS Commissioner Meissner Announces Departure,” Jan. 2001. 270 Numbers derived from statistics set forth in DOJ OIG report, Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern 

Border, Apr.2000. 271 For numbers of agents on the Canadian border, the Canadian situation generally, and the Inspector 

General’s recommendations, see DOJ OIG Follow-up Review of the Border Patrol Efforts Along the 

Northern Border, Apr.2000. On terrorists entering the U.S. via Canada, see e.g. INS report, Record of 

Deportable Alien Abu Mezer, June 24, 1996. Mezer was able to stay in the United States despite three 

apprehensions for illegal entries along the northern border. In regard to the detailing of northern border 

patrol agents to the southern border, Doris Meissner stated in a memo to Mary Demory, Assistant Inspector 

General for Inspections at DOJ, that the INS would stop detailing border patrol agents to the southern 

border, p. 5 of above-mentioned report. 

272 Gus de la Vina interview (Nov. 19, 2003). 273 Gus de la Vina interview (Nov. 19, 2003). 274 DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Statistical Year Book 2000, p. D-1, 214; 982 

immigration hearings were held for deportation, exclusion and removal. 

275 BJA, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2000, p. 1. Immigration offenses for FY 2000 totaled 

16,495.

276 INS has assigned special agents to the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces since 1987. 277 There was also the problem that the paper “Alien” files that were located throughout the U.S. were not 

available for review after hours. 

278 The term “aggravated felon” refers to aliens who have been convicted of serious felony crimes such as 

illicit trafficking in drugs or firearms, money laundering, and alien smuggling. 8 USC § 1101(a)(43). 

279 Access to the center was available through an existing dedicated law enforcement telecommunication 

system, the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS). The first state to have 

access to the LESC was Arizona. To obtain immigration information on a possible criminal alien suspect, a 

simple query screen on the NLETS system was completed. Basic biographical information was required 

with optional fields available to better define the search. The query screen was available to all law 

enforcement agencies in the state. The INS attempted to answer all queries and returned any information 

within 20 minutes. The LESC conducted extensive training to officers in the state on immigration law and 

the new system. 

280 The LESC was also used to locate criminal aliens who were detained in county jails for criminal 

activity. The Maricopa County Jail in Phoenix was the first detention facility to program an automated 

interface with the LESC so that all foreign-born inmates who were booked into the jail on criminal charges 

were checked for immigration status. 

281 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1996). 282 This “sanctuary” policy was first published by Mayor Edward Koch on August 7, 1989, and directed 

city “line workers” who had contact with the public to not transmit information respecting any alien to 

federal immigration authorities. However, it exempted the police and the Department of Corrections and 

directed them to continue to work with federal authorities “in investigating and apprehending aliens 

suspected of criminal activity.” Koch, executive order, Aug. 7, 1989. 
116

5

Planning and Executing Entry for the 9/11 Plot 

5.1. The State Department 

Overview 

After the 9/11 attacks, as the country struggled to comprehend the enormity of the 

tragedy, one question was asked over and over: “How did these people get in?” In the 

search for government officials potentially responsible for failing to prevent the attacks 

or, worse, enabling them, the spotlight turned on the State Department. The hijackers 

needed visas to apply for entry to the United States, and it was the State Department that 

supplied the hijackers with those visas: 15 in Saudi Arabia, 2 in the United Arab 

Emirates, and 2 in Germany. But for State’s actions, critics argued, the 9/11 attacks could 

not have taken place. When the visa applications of the hijackers were scrutinized, and 

some were disseminated in the media, State drew fire for approving incomplete 

applications, particularly for the 15 Saudi hijackers. The department’s officials were also 

criticized for speeding the process of issuing visas and interviewing few if any applicants 

in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where 17 of the 19 hijackers acquired their visas. With its 

reputation as a friend of foreigners, State was an easy target. 

Our investigation has determined that some of the criticism leveled against the State 

Department was warranted. State officials did approve incomplete visa applications and 

did expedite the issuance of visas, requiring few interviews of Saudi and Emirati 

applicants during a time of rising extremism in Saudi Arabia and, during the summer of 

2001, heightened threat reporting in the Middle East generally. However, the reasons for 

the State Department’s adoption of these visa policies in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and 

Germany have never been adequately explained. More specifically, no one has discussed 

the differences in visa policy between the Jeddah and Riyadh visa posts in Saudi Arabia, 

the extent to which individual consular officers in were actually aware of the extremist 

threat, and the true effect on visa issuance of the ill-named Visa Express Program. We 

explore these topics in this section. 

As noted in the previous chapter, the basis for immigration law applied by the State and 

Justice Departments before 9/11 was the Immigration and the Nationality Act (INA) and 

its accompanying regulations. To comply with the portions of these laws regarding visa 

applications, the Department of State created a form to be completed by all applicants. 

Form OF-156 consisted of 35 questions covering each applicant’s biography, visa and 

travel history, purpose for visiting the United States, intended destination, means of 

financial support, and occupation. Applicants were also asked if they fell within certain 

categories of persons who are inadmissible to the United States, including those afflicted 

with a communicable disease “of public health significance” and those who “seek to 

enter the United States to engage in export violations, subversive or terrorist activities, or 

any unlawful purpose.” 

Visa Policy in Berlin 
117

September 11 hijacker, ringleader, and pilot Mohamed Atta and his fellow pilot hijacker 

Ziad Jarrah received their visas in Berlin, Germany, in May 2000.1

 Conspirator Ramzi 

Binalshibh tried and failed to obtain a visa in Berlin around the same time. German 

citizens do not need a visa to come to the United States for business or pleasure, because 

they qualify for the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). All three 9/11 conspirators, however, 

were so-called third country nationals (TCNs)—that is, persons living in a country other 

than their own. Thus, because they did not hold passports from another VWP country, 

they were required to apply for a visa to come to the United States. 

With rare exceptions, TCNs applied for a U.S. visa by mail or through a drop box at the 

embassy in Berlin. In addition to the application, they were required to submit their 

passport, some proof of residence status from the local German police district where they 

lived, and documents indicating their source of income. This was more documentation 

than was typically required of Emirati or Saudi Arabian citizens applying in their home 

countries, as the discussion of those countries, below, will make clear. The application 

papers would be reviewed by a State local employee who would categorize them 

according to their qualifications for a visa. 

Consular officers working in Berlin at that time told us that if the papers indicated that 

the applicant “might be an intending immigrant we would interview that person. Our 

focus was on stopping intending immigrants.”2

 The basic criteria used to screen out 

intending immigrants centered on the applicant’s ties to Germany. In general, all TCNs 

with “less than 18 months to two years of residence were interviewed,” a consular officer 

told us. If they met this threshold, then the consular officer would look to additional 

factors—including nationality, family, job, and school status—to see whether applicants 

presented a good visa risk.3 These criteria were not put in writing but rather were 

conveyed to officers orally in training when they arrived at the Berlin post to perform 

consular work. 

Individuals who clearly demonstrated they were qualified for a visa were put into a 

“routine processing” pile. Applicants who clearly did not qualify were put into a “highrisk” pile.4

 The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS)—State’s automated 

lookout and watchlist system—was checked early in the process as part of the data input 

for each applicant, and any derogatory information was taken into account.5

 For example, 

a prior refusal for a visa would “kick someone out instantly.”6

Applicants in the high-risk pile were sent a letter alerting them of the need to schedule an 

interview. If the interview confirmed the officer’s initial suspicion, then they were denied 

a visa, and that denial was recorded in the CLASS system. Applications considered 

routine were processed in a number of ways. As a consular officer described it to us, if 

the application was strong—that is, if the applicant had submitted all the necessary 

paperwork and had overcome the presumption of being an intending immigrant—then he 

or she was issued a visa. If, however, the application was in some way incomplete, 

consular staff would do one of two things. Sometimes, they would call up the applicant to 

get the missing data.7

 In other cases, when they believed the applicant had not yet met the 
118

INA’s statutory burdens, they would send the applicant a letter stating that the application 

had been denied under INA section 221(g) and inviting the submission of additional 

supporting information. 

A consular officer we interviewed told us that by putting the ball back into the court of 

the visa applicant, they reduced their workload. They described the technique as a “quasirefusal in order to avoid interviewing” some visa applicants.8

 An applicant who wanted to 

continue the visa application had one year within which to submit additional 

documentation and seek an interview. If this supplemental material succeeded in 

persuading the officer that the original 221(g) denial was in error, then this denial could 

be “overcome” and a visa issued. 

If, on the other hand, the applicant’s interview failed to demonstrate to the officer that he 

or she qualified for a visa, then the applicant could be denied a visa as an intending 

immigrant under INA section 214(b), a denial with far greater significance. Although 

such a denial could be overcome, its presence in an applicant’s electronic records made 

consular officers adjudicating future applications regard them more closely. A denial 

under the more general 221(g) did not carry the same weight, since it could be based 

merely on an applicant’s failure to submit necessary paperwork. Because of the way they 

used 221(g)—as a delaying tactic when applications were questionable—Berlin consular 

officials considered it “one case” when an applicant applied, received an initial denial on 

221(g) grounds, and then pursued his or her application through to an interview followed 

by a denial under 214(b).

Citizens of countries that were relatively advanced economically stood a better chance of 

obtaining a visa. Conversely, applicants whose home countries were more impoverished 

were more likely to be seen as potential economic immigrants to the United States. In this 

respect, Berlin visa policy toward third country nationals mirrored the policy toward 

citizens of those countries in their own countries.9

But TCNs who were long-term German residents were basically treated like German 

citizens. As participants in the Visa Waiver Program, German citizens did not fill out visa 

applications or apply for visas to travel to the United States. All they needed was a 

passport. Berlin considered third country nationals who were successful students in 

Germany to be good visa risks.10 Their view was that German was a difficult language 

and matriculation in a German university was a major accomplishment, both factors that 

provided TCNs with an incentive to return to Germany.11

Visa Policy in the United Arab Emirates 

Two of the 9/11 hijackers—Marwan al Shehhi, the pilot of United Airlines 175, and 

Fayez Banihammad, a hijacker on the same flight—acquired their visas in the United 

Arab Emirates. 

Beyond the visa law contained in the INA and Department of State regulations, visa 

policy in the UAE was not codified in writing; rather, it was conveyed to incoming 
119

consular officers by their colleagues and supervisor.12 Like their colleagues serving in 

other posts around the world, consular officers in the UAE were not trained to use the 

visa application to screen for terrorists or to conduct visa application interviews to 

discover terrorists. They were also not familiar with al Qaeda.13

There had never been a terrorist attack in the UAE, nor had any UAE national been a 

terrorist before 9/11, one consular officer told us.14 Consequently, consular officials did 

not consider UAE nationals to be security risks before 9/11, although there were some 

concerns with their passport issuance regime.15 UAE passports, while of “excellent 

quality,” often contained inaccurate information.16 For example, the year of birth often 

reflected the person’s vanity rather than reality, and before 1970 births in the country 

were not recorded. In addition, people were issued UAE passports that falsely listed the 

UAE as their birthplace.17 Passports also were issued through patronage from tribal 

sheikhs.18

Nevertheless, UAE nationals generally enjoyed a high standard of living and were not 

considered likely economic immigrants. One consular officer told us that Emiratis were 

considered “low-risk applicants who had lots of money, left the UAE to escape the 

summers, and were Western-oriented [people] who simply wanted to visit the U.S. There 

was little fear of Emiratis overstaying their visits.”19 Emirati nationals had “an incredibly 

low refusal rate.”20 Indeed, before 9/11, consular officials in the UAE had tried on at least 

two occasions to have the UAE included in the Visa Waiver Program, pointing to the 

applicants’ strong economic status and low refusal rate. Officials believed the only reason 

these attempts failed was that the UAE was unwilling to reciprocate and allow Americans 

to enter it without a visa, one of the program’s requirements.21 The INS provided no 

negative feedback about Emiratis from encounters with them at ports of entry.22 State 

thus considered the UAE a de facto visa waiver country, and concentrated on facilitating 

the issuance of visas to them.23

One result of this attitude was a very low interview rate before 9/11. One consular officer 

observed, “I would guess that about 95 percent of the Emiratis . . . were not interviewed”; 

they were “almost never interviewed unless we got a ‘hit’ on the CLASS lookout system 

indicating derogatory information about the applicant.”24 Said another, “Virtually all 

UAE nationals were the beneficiaries of personal appearance waivers.”25 This officer, 

who served in the consular section for more than a year before 9/11, told us that they “did 

not do one interview of an Emirati during my time.”26 UAE nationals submitted their 

applications through a travel agency referral program akin to Saudi Arabia’s Visa 

Express Program (discussed below) or through a drop box at the embassy. Their 

applications were almost always approved.27

Another result was consular officers’ lack of interest in carefully scrutinizing all aspects 

of the visa application. In the view of a number of officers, questions regarding 

occupation, financial support, address in the United States, and purpose of visit “shed 

little light on the applicant’s intentions,” and were “not important” because “the UAE 

looks after the financial needs of its nationals.”28
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Visa Policy in Saudi Arabia 

This place really is Wonderland. 

—Tom Furey, consul general in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, June 2001 

Fifteen of the 9/11 hijackers acquired their visas in Saudi Arabia at either the U.S. 

consulate in Jeddah or the U.S. embassy in Riyadh, the only two visa-issuing posts in 

Saudi Arabia. Because visa policy in Saudi Arabia has been the focus of much 

controversy and criticism since the 9/11 attacks, we explore it as some length. Though 

visa policy in Saudi Arabia is in many ways similar to that in other Persian Gulf 

countries, including the UAE, Saudi policy and practices also exhibit some unique 

aspects.

Visa policy in Saudi Arabia derived from several sources. The law—the INA and its 

accompanying regulations—applied in every foreign post. In addition, each country’s 

policy was shaped by larger U.S. foreign policy interests. One high-ranking U.S. 

diplomat who served in Riyadh described the U.S-Saudi relationship as having “very 

deep roots; it was a close relationship rooted in common interests.” Pertinent facts 

included Saudi Arabia’s status as the world’s largest oil producer and the largest market 

for U.S. goods and services in the Middle East, as well as the U.S. and Saudi interest in a 

stable Middle East.29

These common interests resulted in what one senior consular official serving in Saudi 

Arabia described as “a culture in our mission in Saudi Arabia to be as accommodating as 

we possibly could.”30 Another explained that the “liberal visa policy” supported U.S. 

policy goals, such as encouraging good relations with wealthy future leaders of Saudi 

Arabia.31 When we asked consular officials whether they felt pressure from their 

superiors or others to issue visas, they answered that pressure was applied from several 

sources, including the U.S. ambassador, Saudi government officials or businesspeople, 

and members of the U.S. Congress.32 Some officials told us, however, that this pressure 

was no different from what they experienced at other posts and did not affect them. 

Visa applicants in Saudi Arabia fell into two distinct groups who applied in roughly equal 

numbers: Saudi citizens and third country nationals.33 Because the socioeconomic 

profiles of these groups were perceived differently by State consular personnel, visa 

policies for the groups differed.34 Although none of the September 11 hijackers were 

third country nationals, the TCN policy is relevant for understanding visa policy applied 

to Saudi citizens. 

Third Country Nationals. TCN visa applicants were considered a high risk of becoming 

intending immigrants. Prior to June 2001, they were generally required to apply for their 

visas in person, and about 75 percent were interviewed.35 Indeed, consular officials we 

interviewed uniformly said that they interviewed most TCN nonimmigrant visa 

applicants, who sought to come to the United States for pleasure, business, or school. 

Officers said this policy was due to TCNs’ low social and economic status in Saudi 

Arabia.36 TCN applicants were often servants of Saudi citizens—maids, butlers, or “tea 
121

boys” whom the Saudis sought to bring with them to the United States.37 Much of the 

work in Saudi Arabia was performed by third country nationals brought to Saudi Arabia 

specifically for that purpose, who needed a Saudi sponsor to enter or leave the country.38

If TCNs did not present letters from their Saudi employer in support of their application, 

then they were, in the words of a consular officer, a “clear refusal.”39 Consular officials 

also requested that TCNs supply proof of ties to their home country, bank statements, and 

clear evidence of their intended destination in the United States.40 Consular officials 

described attempts by Saudi citizens to help their servants acquire visas in order to aid 

their illegal immigration to the United States.41

In fact, some of the most egregious examples of consular officials being pressured to 

issue visas concerned the applications of TCNs who were servants of the Saudi royal 

family or of Saudi diplomats. In one case, U.S. Ambassador Wyche Fowler ordered a 

consular officer to issue a visa to a diplomat’s servant even though the diplomat refused 

to provide proof he was paying his servants minimum wage as required by U.S. law. The 

diplomat was “a Saudi . . . a Saudi!” Fowler said, adding, “they never pay them what they 

say anyway.”42 In a more serious incident, Fowler, frustrated with the consul general’s 

insistence that servants of the Saudi royal family come in for visa interviews, ordered him 

to leave Saudi Arabia within 24 hours. Fowler then gave him a poor performance rating, 

on the grounds that he was not cooperating with embassy policies.43 The consul general 

apparently retired to avoid having the negative performance rating made a permanent part 

of his record.44

Generally, TCNs would apply for a U.S. visa using a passport from their birth country; 

but during the 1990s, evidence of fraud by TCNs in the visa process grew. Non-Saudis 

who are not employed have no lawful permanent residence status in the Kingdom, and 

the Saudi government’s stated policy was to replace foreign workers with Saudi 

nationals.45 In addition, the government began a campaign in 1997 to expel millions of 

illegal aliens living within its borders.46 As a result, TCNs began fraudulently applying 

for U.S. nonimmigrant visas to avoid being sent back to their countries of origin. 

According to memos and cables prepared by consular officers in the year 2000, 

Some Saudi businessmen have provided assistance to illegal 

employees in the form of false employment letters or even passports. 

Saudi VIPs have included unqualified TCNs in their entourage when 

applying for visas. Fraudulent Saudi passports have become a 

concern. Saudi Arabia issues Saudi travel documents to non-citizens 

with the only difference being an Arabic notation on page six of the 

passport. In addition, it appears that Saudi citizens have sold their 

passports containing valid NIVs [nonimmigrant visas]. Several have 

been detected being used as far afield as Mali. Both Jeddah and 

Riyadh have detected photo-substituted Saudi passports being 

submitted by TCNs with NIV applications.47

When a TCN was detected using a Saudi passport, one consular official said, “we’d cull 

those out” and give them greater scrutiny.48
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These cases in which TCNs were involved in passport and visa fraud demonstrated that 

the TCNs were significant risks for becoming intending immigrants. However, more 

systematic attempts by consular officials to investigate whether a representative sample 

of TCN visitor visa applicants stayed in compliance and returned to Saudi Arabia were 

unsuccessful, “since most employers did not cooperate with consulate survey efforts.”49

One official described an “informal tickler system, though, especially for servants of 

Saudis,” to make sure they did, in fact, return as their visas required.50

Evidence that we reviewed suggests that the concerns expressed above about the 

fraudulent use of Saudi passports did not significantly influence degree the visa policy 

applied to Saudi citizens. 

Saudi Citizens. Prior to September 11, 2001, it was State Department policy that Saudi 

citizens, as a group, had overcome the presumption under section 214(b) of the INA that 

every alien is to be considered an immigrant “until he establishes to the satisfaction of the 

consular officer, at the time of application for a visa . . . that he is entitled to 

nonimmigrant status.”51 This presumption applied to any concern that Saudi citizens were 

at risk of becoming economic immigrants to the United States. One consular officer who 

issued a visa to a 9/11 hijacker said, “It was factual, as far as our statistics showed, that 

they just weren’t economic immigrants, they went, they spent a lot of money, they went 

on their vacations, they loved to go to Florida and then they came back.”52

Consular officers were not given written guidance that the 214(b) presumption had been 

overcome,53 although the policy was recognized in written materials about consular work 

produced in Saudi Arabia before September 11.54 Consular officers in Saudi Arabia were 

advised of this policy orally when they arrived at the post.55 They were told that Saudi 

Arabia met the criteria for inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program because of its citizens’ 

low visa refusal rates and that the country had applied for inclusion in the program. But, 

like the UAE, the Saudis refused to reciprocate and allow U.S. citizens to travel to Saudi 

Arabia without a visa.56 Thus, although Saudi Arabia was not technically a part of the 

VWP, consular officers were told it was unwritten State Department policy to consider 

Saudi Arabia a “virtual visa waiver” country.57

This virtual visa waiver policy led to a number of outcomes. First, since most Saudi 

applicants were presumed to be eligible for a visa, consular officers did not generally 

demand that they fully complete their visa application forms.58 Second, unlike applicants 

from Middle Eastern countries who applied in Germany, Saudis generally were not 

required to present supporting documentation such as proof of financial means, proof of 

academic standing, or proof of home address. Third, most Saudi citizens were not 

required to appear for a personal interview.

According to one high-ranking consular official in Riyadh, the State Department’s 

Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) and the Visa Office leadership within CA were well 

aware of this policy and tacitly agreed that personal appearances generally could be 

waived for Saudi citizens.59 As discussed earlier, consular officers relied on a check of 
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the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist to prevent terrorists from obtaining visas. Thus, under this 

policy, a Saudi citizen who was a terrorist not included in the TIPOFF watchlist stood a 

very good chance of acquiring a U.S. visa without ever having a face-to-face encounter 

with a U.S. consular official and without presenting a fully completed visa application or 

any supporting documentation. 

Implicit within the policy decision to consider Saudi Arabia a virtual visa waiver country 

was an assumption that Saudi citizens were not security risks. Inclusion in the actual Visa

Waiver Program before 9/11 required that both the State and Justice department weigh 

not only visa overstay and refusal rates but also the security risks posed by citizens of the 

particular country being considered for inclusion in the program. By treating Saudi 

Arabia as if it were in the Visa Waiver Program, State arguably had arrogated to itself 

that portion of the visa waiver calculation. And even before 9/11, evidence was 

accumulating that this assumption was in error. The CIA had analyzed and reported on 

Saudi Arabia’s Islamic awakening as early as 1993.60

Beyond this judgment that Saudis were not security risks was a determination that they 

were not economic risks either. INS records show little evidence that Saudi citizens 

overstayed their visas or tried to work illegally in the United States. For example, out of a 

total of 1,387,486 deportable aliens located by the INS in fiscal year 2001, only 36 were 

Saudi nationals.61 Nevertheless, there were significant signs of economic stagnation in 

Saudi Arabia before September 11, 2001. As early as 1991, consular officers noted that 

“while many Saudis are well off[,] . . . a surprising number of the younger generation 

[are] scraping by on incomes which cannot support the large families and high prices 

typical of Riyadh.”62 Indeed, studies indicate that Saudi per capita income peaked at 

$16,700 in 1981 (when U.S. per capita income was $13,960), and had dropped to around 

$8,000 by 2000.63 Furthermore, the Saudis had a “youth bulge,” with a significant 

percentage of their population under 30 years of age and unemployed.64

Consular officers who adjudicated the visas of the 9/11 hijackers said they were aware of 

these strains. One testified that there was a growing concern about Saudis “because, with 

the economic problems of Saudi Arabia and the population explosion, you’ve got the 

potential . . . that . . . people . . . might not, you know, want to stay in Saudi Arabia. . . . 

We realized that Saudi Arabia has big economic problems, it’s getting worse, because 

they’ve got an unbelievable population growth. And so, therefore, we need to keep that in 

mind as we’re looking at Saudi applicants.”65

Nevertheless, most consular officials in Saudi Arabia did not regard unemployment as an 

impediment to getting a visa, since “they have a terrible unemployment problem in Saudi 

Arabia, and a lot of people have money but they don’t have jobs.”66 At other posts, an 

applicant’s lack of employment would have been significant; but according to consular 

officials in Saudi Arabia, there it was not, because Saudis were not actually looking for 

jobs. Said one consular officer, “It’s their choice to be unemployed.”67 Another was more 

blunt: “The Saudis do not work.”68 Though this viewpoint was widespread it was not 

universal. One consular officer in Saudi Arabia before September 11, concerned about 

issuing visas to people with no apparent economic prospects, recalled, “We were issuing 
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visas to people who, if you just covered the ‘nationality’ block on the application form 

with your thumb, we would deny in any other country.”69

Saudis were not completely excused from visa interviews. Formal communications 

between the Riyadh embassy and the Department of State described the policy as one of 

“interview by exception.”70 This term was borrowed from the title of a cable in the 

Consular Best Practices Handbook, which urged visa-issuing posts to calibrate visa 

policy so as to interview only those applicants who truly needed to be interviewed.71

In general, “interview by exception” meant that Saudi citizens were interviewed only if 

their applications contained something out of the ordinary or an indication of visa 

ineligibility, such as an applicant failing to include the necessary INS form (I-20) to 

support a request for a student visa. An interview might also be triggered by an applicant 

indicating a desire to stay beyond the ordinary six-month period authorized by the INS 

for tourists, or, as in one instance described to the Commission, an applicant stating on 

his application that the purpose of his visit was “terrorism” when he meant “tourism.”72

In the specifics of this approach, there were some significant differences between the two 

visa-issuing posts, Riyadh and Jeddah.

The Difference between Jeddah and Riyadh. Our investigation has revealed a lack of 

uniformity in Saudi interview policy. It changed over time according to personnel 

changes at Jeddah and Riyadh, security threats to the embassy and consulate, and 

difference in consular management. We also found that some consular officers serving in 

Jeddah believed before 9/11 that Saudi citizens posed potential security risks to the 

United States and that they therefore more carefully scrutinized Saudi visa applicants. 

Despite the disparities in the accounts of consular officers, there is strong evidence that 

for several years prior to September 11 a more aggressive policy of interviewing visa 

applicants was in place at the consulate in Jeddah than at the embassy in Riyadh. Many 

pilgrims arrived and passed through Jeddah, sometimes called “Gateway to the Hajj,” on 

their way to the Muslim holy sites; a rich assortment of individuals entered the consulate, 

some of whom applied for visas. Partly for these reasons, consular officers serving in 

Jeddah were particularly sensitized to the possibility that Saudis could be security threats 

to the United States. This sensitivity in turn led to a policy—more or less in evidence at 

various times—under which Jeddah consular officers were “tougher” than those in 

Riyadh on Saudi applicants.73

A consular officer who served in Jeddah in 1996 estimated that they interviewed 50–60 

percent of Saudi visa applicants.74 A consular officer in Jeddah two years later told us 

that they interviewed “a majority” of male Saudi visa applicants between the ages of 16 

and 40. When we asked why, the latter officer said that they knew who Usama Bin Ladin 

was, they knew that he was dangerous, and they were concerned about the possibility that 

Saudi visa applicants might be intending to go to the United States to participate in 

terrorist attacks.75 When we asked this consular officer if State Department personnel in 

Saudi Arabia lacked any reason to believe that Saudi citizens were security threats to the 

United States, he responded, “That’s absurd; that’s patently ridiculous.”76 He pointed out 
125

that the U.S. embassies in East Africa had been attacked days before his arrival in Jeddah. 

Security concerns were high.77

Their practice, according to this officer, was to look for potential extremists: Saudi 

applicants who had long beards, a short robe, or other indicators of fundamentalism and 

fundamentalist Muslim clerics who were seeking a visa to chant the Qur’an in a U.S. 

mosque around the time of Ramadan would receive greater scrutiny. In addition, even an 

applicant who did not look like an extremist who was from a location known to have 

produced extremists, such as al Qassim Province, “and he doesn’t have a good 

explanation, and he wants to go to the U.S. for an extended stay, that person didn’t get a 

visa.”78 Though these individuals would be denied visas for security reasons, the officer 

told us he would use 214(b)79—that is, the section of the INA that states, “Every alien . . . 

shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the 

consular officer, at the time of application for a visa, and the immigration officers, at the 

time of application for admission, that he is entitled to a nonimmigrant status[.]” 

Another officer corroborated the existence of an interview policy in Jeddah in 1998 that 

focused on potential Muslim extremists. He said it was instituted “in about August 1998, 

a month after I arrived,” and described the policy somewhat differently. He said they 

would interview 100 percent of Saudi citizens who were first-time student visa 

applicants, 80 percent of all students, and 5 percent of all other Saudi applicants.80

By contrast, officers in Riyadh at that time seem not to have displayed the same level of 

concern about Saudi visa applicants posing a potential security risk. As discussed earlier, 

Saudis were generally seen as good visa risks, exempt from the presumption of intending 

immigrants under INA section 214(b). Riyadh consular officers, including those who 

issued visas to the September 11 hijackers, said that they reviewed the visa applications 

of Saudi citizens and interviewed them “if something was unusual or indicated that we 

had a concern,”81 such as an applicant answering “yes” rather than “no” to one of the 

ineligibilities on the visa form.82 Another officer said they would interview the applicant 

if the application “looked odd” or “funny,” or the applicant “hadn’t been clear about 

where he was going.”83

Although officers in both posts appear to have scrupulously used the State Department’s 

CLASS name-check system to screen visa applicants for any connections to terrorism, 

the evidence suggests that consular officers in Riyadh apparently did not pursue potential 

terrorists beyond that system as assiduously as did the officers in Jeddah. Their approach 

may have contributed to the creation of the Visa Express Program, discussed below. 

The 1998 interview policy in Jeddah apparently continued, though somewhat less 

aggressively, into the early fall of 2000. According to one officer, whom we will call 

“Tom,” when he arrived in August 2000 they were interviewing a significant percentage 

of Saudi citizen visa applicants and all first-time students.84 “Tom” told us that they were 

suspicious of Saudi citizens who were from locations where they knew extremists lived 

and who had only a vague notion of where they were headed in the United States.85 They 

further believed that previous assumptions about the eligibility of Saudis for visas needed 
126

to be rethought because of the downturn in the Saudi economy.86 For these reasons, this 

officer who processed visa applications on a part-time basis in Jeddah turned down a 

significant percentage of Saudi visa applicants as well as third country applicants.87

The other consular officer at Jeddah during this time period, whom we will call “Steve,” 

took a different approach to adjudicating visa applicants. “Steve”—who worked full-time 

and processed most of the approximately 30,000 applications handled in Jeddah every 

year—told us he was “never really afraid of Saudis.” Moreover, they never made the 

connection between the known presence of al Qaeda members in Saudi Arabia and the 

possibility that the Saudis applying for visas were terrorists.88 “Steve” sought to adhere to 

the “tougher” Jeddah visa policy, and he interviewed all first-time student visa 

applicants.89 However, he believed that “Tom”—whose approach led to large numbers of 

rejections—was denying Saudi applicants “for the wrong reasons.”90

Documents supplied to us by the State Department corroborate “Tom’s” contention that 

his refusal rate for Saudi citizens was higher than “Steve’s” while they served together in 

Jeddah.91 Apparently because, as ”Steve” put it, some of “Tom’s” denials to visa 

applicants were made “for the wrong reasons,” “Tom” was rebuked by the Consul 

General in Jeddah for denying too many Saudi visa applicants.92 “Tom” and his 

supervisor told us that notwithstanding this criticism, “Tom” did not alter his approach to 

visa adjudication during his time in Jeddah, and that his approach was “validated” by the 

events of September 11.93 “Steve” issued visas to 11 of the 9/11 hijackers. 

This disagreement between consular officers in Jeddah reflected a disagreement we 

observed in a number of locations about the proper use of INA section 214(b)—the 

intending immigrant provision. “Tom”—and other consular officers stationed in Jeddah 

whose views were discussed earlier—believed that suspicions about an applicant that 

caused the officer to view the individual as a security concern were sufficient under INA 

section 214(b) to deny him or her a visa. “Steve” and others, in contrast, were 

uncomfortable with this approach and believed it was inconsistent with the proper 

interpretation of INA section 214(b). This lack of clarity about the proper interpretation 

of section 214(b) was noted as well by the General Accounting Office in their study of 

visa issuance to the 9/11 hijackers.94

Thus, although Saudi visa policy before 9/11 was that Saudi citizens as a group had 

overcome the presumption of Section 214(b) that all visa applicants they were economic

immigrants, some consular officers in Jeddah nevertheless sought to give Saudi citizens 

greater scrutiny because of security concerns, which arose from their knowledge of 

extremist activity in Saudi Arabia and the connections between Saudi citizens and the al 

Qaeda terrorist organization. 

Such was the situation when Thomas Furey arrived in late 2000 to take over management 

of all consular functions in Saudi Arabia as Consul General in Riyadh. As will become 

clear, the opinions of consular officers who were concerned about Saudi citizens as 

terrorists did not reach Furey’s ears before the 9/11 attacks. 
127

Visa Express. When Thomas Furey became the Consul General on September 11, 2000, 

his initial impressions were that the Riyadh visa operation was “chaotic”95 and 

“dysfunctional.”96 Morale was low. Because visa applications were increasing by about 5 

percent per year, consular officers were overworked, often processing applications until 8 

P.M. The waiting room could not hold the masses of applicants who came each day; 

sometimes there were fistfights between Saudi citizens and third country nationals.97

Meanwhile, large crowds caused problems for the Saudi and U.S. guards both inside and 

outside the embassy compound.

A consular officer serving in Riyadh at that time agreed with Furey’s general 

observations, describing the atmosphere as “total chaos, which you cannot imagine.”98

“The crowds were unbelievable,” he said.99 The consular operation in Jeddah was 

similarly overworked. One officer and one part-time officer received about 30,000 visa 

applications a year. During the busy summer season, the section routinely processed 450 

applicants every day.100

At the same time that Furey made these observations about the state of visa processing in 

Riyadh, he also came to several other conclusions based on his discussions with other 

embassy personnel: 

 Saudis, and all other citizens of the countries who form the Gulf Cooperation 

Council, had overcome the presumption of INA section 214(b) because they did 

not overstay their visas, did not work in the United States, were not deported by 

the INS, and did not commit crimes in the United States.101

 Saudis often did not submit their applications in person. 

 Saudis had a very low interview rate. 

 Saudis had a very low refusal rate (below 2 percent). 

 There were many security threats to the embassy and consulates in Saudi Arabia. 

 Saudis were not security risks.102

Furey was adamant in his interview with the Commission that he did not think Saudis 

were security risks when he arrived in Riyadh, or at any time before 9/11.103 It is difficult 

to understand how the strong views of consular officers in Jeddah about the security risk 

posed by Saudi citizens—views informed by growing intelligence supporting their 

outlook and by commonsense conclusions from recent events, such as the East Africa 

bombings—could apparently be unknown to the most senior State Department official 

making visa policy in Saudi Arabia. A number of factors seem to have been at work.

First, Consul General Furey believed, as did Assistant Secretary of State for Consular 

Affairs Mary Ryan, that if there was intelligence information he needed to know about 

possible terrorism threats, he would have received it. However, he apparently did not 

receive any such information from either intelligence or consular officials. Furey told the 

Commission that had he been told Saudis were a security risk—something he said he 

learned on September 11, 2001—he would not have established the Visa Express 

Program. Second, Furey, like most others in the State Department, apparently believed 

that border security should be addressed primarily through improved automated consular 
128

systems and reliance on the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist. And third, Furey seems not to 

have solicited the views of his consular staff on this topic. 

Before serving in Riyadh, Furey had been Ministerial Counselor for Consular Affairs 

(1997–2000). In Mexico City, Furey supervised the largest consular operation in the 

world: 150 consular officers and 350 Foreign Service nationals, or local staff, handling 2 

million nonimmigrant visa applications in 2000. 

Furey discussed the problems he observed in Riyadh with officials in the Bureau of 

Consular Affairs in Washington. His superiors made clear to him that his troubles did not 

justify having more consular officers; rather, the difficulties were caused by a lack of 

efficiency.104 Furey, determined to address the problems he was observing, consulted 

with embassy staff and his predecessor in the Riyadh post. He also turned to the Consular

Best Practices Handbook for guidance..105 In seeking ways to improve

visa processing in Saudi Arabia, Furey drew heavily on the “mandate” contained in cable 

number 6 of the handbook to use “waiver of personal appearance programs, drop boxes 

and prescreening approaches to cut down on the number of applicants who have a full 

interview.”106

As an initial matter, Furey sought to set up an appointment system for Saudi visa 

applicants as directed by cable 10.107 Unfortunately, Furey said, the appointment system 

outlined there relied on a “900 number”—a fee-for-service phone reservation system—

whose use was illegal in Saudi Arabia. Furey examined the possibility of accepting visa 

applications through the Saudi postal system, but learned that it was considered too 

unreliable for transporting passports.108

Furey then pursued the recommendation in cable 7 of the Best Practices Handbook:

“Drop Box and Personal Appearance Waiver (PAW) Programs.” This cable addressed the 

core advice of handbook—reducing resources consumed by reducing the number of 

interviews: “Elimination of the personal interview clearly saves time and resources and 

spares applicants the inconvenience of appearing in person.”109 Although the cable refers 

to a “drop box,” the term is clearly used loosely. For example, two approved forms of 

“drop boxes” discussed were “mail-in applications” and “third-party screening,” which 

included travel agency referral of visa applications.110

First, in the fall of 2000 Furey installed a literal drop box on the Riyadh embassy wall 

through which people could submit their visa applications. This alone could not address 

all the inefficiencies associated with visa adjudication in Saudi Arabia. For example, 

information still had to be entered into a computer by consular personnel after the 

applications and passports were dropped off at the embassy.111

Furey then worked to develop a program combining several “best practices.” He 

combined a form of drop box with the personal appearance waiver for certain classes of 

applicants, third-party screening by travel agencies who would receive the applications, 

“interviews by exception,” remote data entry, and off-site fee collections.112
129

The concept was simple. Instead of going to the U.S. consulate to apply for a U.S. visa, 

the person would fill out an application at one of ten approved travel agencies. The travel 

agency would collect the application, the visa application fee, and the applicant’s 

passport and deliver these documents to the embassy in Riyadh or to the consulate in 

Jeddah; it would then pick up the package of documents on the following day. If the 

application was approved, the agency would be responsible for returning the passport, 

now containing a visa, to the applicant. If the consular officials determined that an 

interview was necessary, the travel agency would be responsible for providing the 

applicant with a letter of notification from the consular section. Applicants were rejected 

only after an in-person interview. 

The consular officers developing Visa Express solicited proposals from more than 20 

travel agencies seeking to participate in the program.113 Consular officials screened them 

in ten major categories, including experience, computer capability, commitment to 

advertising, office security, geographic breadth of branch networks, and general 

reputation nationally or regionally.114 According to the official overseeing the program’s 

development, the prospective participants were vetted by “all elements of the 

embassy.”115 The agencies selected signed memoranda of understanding with the U.S. 

government.116 Once the ten agencies were chosen, consular officials spent seven months 

developing and implementing a training program for them.117 Visa Express was mandated 

to begin Kingdom-wide on June 1, 2001, for all Saudis and for TCNs who had previously 

traveled to the United States. 

The cable heralding its arrival described why this program was adopted in Saudi Arabia: 

Embassy Riyadh, in coordination with consulates general in Jeddah 

and Dahran, has launched a new, mandatory service for processing 

nonimmigrant visas. Naming the new program “U.S. Visa Express,” 

Embassy Riyadh established the service to reduce the number of 

public visitors entering the posts. The program draws on CA Best 

Practices—travel agencies as NIV reception agents, remote data entry, 

and interview by exception. As a result, the workload on the consular 

sections’ staff has been made manageable, customer service to NIV 

applicants has improved, and general post security has improved. The 

program has transformed the U.S. consular scene throughout Saudi 

Arabia.118

The cable makes clear that security concerns played a significant role in the creation of 

the Visa Express Program. However, these concerns were connected not to Saudi citizens 

with terrorist ties. but to the physical security of posts in Saudi Arabia and the Middle 

East generally. Nor were they entirely new. The drive to alter visa policy had grown 

significantly following the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998.119

As we mentioned in chapter 4, after the 1998 embassy attacks, Accountability Review 

Boards were established by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to examine the facts 

and circumstances surrounding the bombings.120 One of their recommendations was that 
130

the Department of State should increase the number of posts with full-time regional 

security officers (RSOs), who should be trained in “terrorist methods of operation” and 

provided “with the ability to examine their areas of responsibility from the offensive 

point of view, to look for vulnerabilities as seen through the eyes of the attacker.”121

From August 2000 through the summer of 2001, the RSO in Riyadh looked at the 

embassy and saw the large crowds congregating outside and inside as a security threat. 

He was “very much in favor of ideas to minimize people coming into the embassy 

unnecessarily.” One RSO in Riyadh during this time told the Commission that “people 

were very sensitive to the fact that we were the most targeted embassy on Earth.” During 

the height of the travel season, as 800 people a day came into the embassy in Riyadh to 

apply for visas. When Furey suggested there might be a way to significantly lower this 

number through the Visa Express Program, the RSO said he “jump[ed] at the opportunity 

to lower it to 50 [a day].”122

On June 26, 2001, Furey wrote to Mary Ryan touting the security virtues of the 

program: 

The number of people on the street and coming through the gates 

should be only 15 percent of what it was last summer. The RSO is 

happy, the guard force is happy, the public loves the service (no more 

long lines and they can go to the travel agencies in the evening and not 

take time off from work), we love it (no more crowd control stress and 

reduced work for the FSNs) and now this afternoon [we] discovered 

the most amazing thing—the Saudi Government loves it.123

Thus, in late June 2001, when intelligence indicated that al Qaeda was planning a major 

attack against U.S. interests in the near future, the Visa Express Program in Saudi Arabia 

was expanded to include all applicants in Saudi Arabia.124

This extension generated some controversy in Jeddah. The consular officer processing 

most applications believed it created havoc with the visa workflow in the busy summer 

months of 2001.125 It also established uniform procedures in the two visa issuing posts. In 

so doing, the program largely ended the differences in visa and interview policy between 

Jeddah and Riyadh.126

At the same time, Visa Express eliminated an important aspect of visa work that had 

existed before its creation: the ability of consular officers and staff to eyeball visa 

applicants when they presented their applications. It also became impossible for the 

consular officer to select an individual for an interview on the basis of some concern—

including one related to security—without drawing attention to the decision. In other 

words, the Visa Express Program removed the element of surprise from visa interviews. 

Whereas previously a consular officer could decide to interview an applicant for any 

reason, or—as one said they sometimes did—for no reason, after the program’s 

implementation, the consular officer was required to send formal notice to the applicant 

via a travel agency that an interview was requested.127
131

Visa Express required those making visa decisions to rely heavily on paper. One consular 

officer in Jeddah in the summer of 2001 worried that the program created a built-in bias 

to issue a visa to an applicant whose documents looked good and even to someone whose 

application was borderline.128 He worried that applying this program, with its over 

reliance on the paper application, to third country nationals—as was mandated in late 

June 2001—would allow someone who should be denied a visa under 214(b), the 

intending immigrant provision, to slip through.129

Although Visa Express did lessen the intelligence that might be gleaned from the 

physical presence of particular applicants in the embassy or consulate, Saudi citizens 

often did not submit their applications in person even before the program began. The 

precise percentage who formerly submitted their applications via third parties before the 

implementation of Visa Express cannot be determined, because the State Department did 

not collect the relevant data. Consul General Furey said he believed that a “majority” of 

Saudis submitted their applications through third parties before Visa Express.130 A 

consular officer in Jeddah believed that a “significant percentage” of Saudis did not 

submit their applications in person.131 This officer also pointed out that some groups had 

expediters who worked for them. For example, one individual routinely came into the 

Jeddah consulate to expedite visas for all members of the air crews of Saudi Arabian 

Airlines. In addition, “all 15,000” members of the Saudi royal family used a designated 

expediter.132

Officials involved in adjudicating visas in Saudi Arabia during and after the 

implementation of Visa Express have stated emphatically that the program did not change 

the frequency with which people were interviewed or the approval rates of Saudi 

applicants.133 One officer in Riyadh stated that they interviewed “the same people that we 

were looking at before.”134 The General Accounting Office similarly concluded that the 

Visa Express Program “did not affect the likelihood that Saudi applicants would be 

interviewed.”135 Others, however, including one officer who served in Jeddah and who 

saw Saudi citizens as potential security threats, told the Commission that drop box 

programs were a “bad idea” because they removed most Saudi visa applicants from the 

view of consular officers evaluating their cases. 

We have not found any evidence that the Visa Express program increased the approval 

rates for either Saudi or TCN visa applicants in Saudi Arabia between June 2001 and 

September 11, 2001. In general, it lengthened by at least one day the time needed to 

process visa applications.136

While Visa Express may not changed the quantity or quality of the interviews conducted 

in Riyadh, the same was not true in Jeddah. Specifically, it eliminated the program to 

interview first-time student visa applicants; more generally, the Jeddah consulate’s more 

aggressive interview policy came to an end. 

Four of the 9/11 hijackers were issued their visas in June 2001, during the Visa Express 

program, and all applied in Jeddah: Saeed al Ghamdi, Khalid al Mihdhar, Abdul Aziz al 
132

Omari, and Salem al Hazmi. In addition, 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 

acquired a visa in Jeddah in July 2001 using an alias.

Armed with their visas, all that stood between the hijackers and the United States was an 

immigration inspection. 

5.2 The Immigration and Naturalization Service 

Overview 

A review of the entries and immigration benefits sought by the hijackers paints a picture 

of conspirators who put the ability to exploit U.S. border security while not raising 

suspicion about their terrorist activities high on their operational priorities. Evidence 

indicates that Mohamed Atta, the September 11 ringleader, was acutely aware of his 

immigration status, tried to remain in the United States legally, and aggressively pursued 

enhanced immigration status for himself and others. 

Despite their careful efforts to understand and operate within the legal requirements, 

however, the hijackers were not always “clean and legal.” For example, they utilized 

fraudulent documents and alias names as necessary. And when the hijackers could, they 

skirted the requirements of immigration law. Ziad Jarrah, for example, failed to apply to 

change his immigration status from tourist to student, and Satam al Suqami failed to 

leave the country when his length of stay expired. They thus were vulnerable to exclusion 

at ports of entry and susceptible to immigration law enforcement action. In this section, 

we explore how the hijackers succeeded in making it through U.S. airports of entry in 33 

of 34 attempts, drawing on interviews of the immigration and customs inspectors who 

had contact with the hijackers, immigration law, port of entry policy, training, and 

resources available to inspectors in primary and secondary inspections. 

Commission Interviews 

To more fully understand how and why the hijackers were permitted entry on 33 

occasions and refused entry only once, the Commission interviewed 26 of the 38 

inspectors involved in 28 of the attempted entries.137

One inspector told the Commission that the FBI interviewed her in regard to her deferred 

inspection of Atta on May 2, 2001, but never followed up with a promised second 

interview, which might have provided the FBI with an identification of at least one of 

Atta’s companions that day.138

Eight of the 11 inspectors who had contact with Atta and Shehhi in their seven entries 

and one deferred inspection, including the one mentioned above, were interviewed 

previously by the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) 

during late 2001 and early 2002 in preparation for Justice’s May 2002 report, “The 

Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Contacts with Two September 11 Hijackers.” 

A few of the inspectors were interviewed by the inspector general’s office multiple times. 

The Commission has copies of these DOJ OIG interviews. 

To our surprise, many of the inspectors we interviewed, almost two and a half years after 

September 11, had never been interviewed by the FBI or the DOJ OIG and were often 
133

unaware that they had admitted a hijacker. Thus, except in a few cases, memories were 

lost. Nevertheless, it is possible to note some common themes. 

In general, these interviews underscored a critical lack of counterterrorism training, a lack 

of standard operating procedures at airports, and wide variations in inspectors’ 

understanding and application of immigration law to travelers seeking entry. 

Hijacker Immigration 

Inspections in Context. Prior to 9/11, immigration inspections were not considered a 

counterterrorism tool. Rather, they were viewed in the context of travel facilitation. As a 

result, inspectors often did not have the tools, training, or clear guidance in immigration 

law that they required in order to properly do their jobs. They were unable, for example, 

to verify that the identity of the person seeking admission was the same as that of the 

person who acquired a U.S. visa, because they did not have access to the photo each 

visitor was required to submit along with his or her visa application at a U.S. embassy or 

consulate overseas.139

Nor were immigration inspectors given any information about terrorist indicators in 

documents that could have enabled them to recognize the anomalies we know existed in 

some of the hijackers’ passports. After the early 1990s, inspectors, senior INS 

management, and the intelligence community collectively did not associate terrorists with 

fraudulent documents.140 As a result, inspectors looked for generic document fraud about 

which they had information, while they remained oblivious to some fairly obvious 

terrorist alterations and indicators.

Inspectors were mainly concerned about three types of travelers: intending immigrants, 

criminals, and drug couriers, all of whom were known to present fraudulent documents. 

Most inspectors interviewed by the Commission said that they relied on equipment such 

as black lights to help them detect certain types of passport fraud, but it was often broken. 

One inspector said he was so frustrated with equipment being out of order that he bought 

his own to use on the job. Travel stamps were reviewed merely to determine whether a 

prior visitor had overstayed or was intending to overstay the terms of the visa. Marwan al 

Shehhi, for example, was referred to a secondary immigration inspection out of concern 

that he was an intending immigrant. 

Equally problematic was the immigration inspectors’ lack of discretion in determining a 

tourist’s length of stay. Tourists in the United States on visas, such as the hijackers, were 

automatically allowed to stay in the country for six months and were not required to 

present a return ticket. Even if a tourist asked for only a two-week stay, the inspector was 

legally required to grant six months. Indeed, it was this six-month stay rule that enabled 

13 muscle hijackers to legally remain in the United States in the spring and early summer 

of 2001.

In contrast, an inspector had complete discretion to determine the length of stay for a 

business traveler. Individual airports, and even inspectors at those airports, had different 

standards for allotting time to these business visitors. For example, most but not all of the 

inspectors from JFK in New York and Miami International thought that one month was 

the standard length of stay for a business visitor. At Newark, however, one inspector gave 

business travelers one month, another 90 days, and another up to six months. Most 
134

thought that these policies were port-specific, but some believed them to be national.141

These local variations explain why on January 10, 2001, Atta was initially granted a onemonth business stay by an inspector at the Miami airport, but on February 25, 2001, 

Jarrah was granted a six-month business stay by an inspector at Newark.142

The four pilots, who went into and out of the United States 17 times, were admitted on 

business four times. Only one muscle hijacker, Suqami, was given a one-month stay as a 

business traveler when he entered at Orlando on April 23, 2001, with Waleed al Shehri. 

Both hijackers had filled out their Customs declarations stating that they intended a 20-

day stay. The immigration arrival record did not require information about the length of 

stay, however; and since immigration inspectors checked the Customs declarations only 

for completeness and not for substance, the 20-day stay request was ignored—to their 

advantage, in fact.

Indeed, the 30-year INS veteran inspector who admitted both hijackers told the 

Commission that the Customs declaration had no bearing on the length of stay he gave 

Suqami, which was based solely on Suqami’s answer regarding the purpose of his 

visit.143 That Suqami was limited to a business instead of a tourist stay meant that he and 

Nawaf al Hazmi (who overstayed his tourist visa despite filing for an extension of his 

stay in July 2000) were the only operatives who had overstayed their authorized lengths 

of stay as of September 11. 

Particularly significant for the 9/11 story is the lack of secondary training for inspectors. 

As we detailed in the chronology, the hijackers (and Kahtani) were referred to a total of 

six secondary inspections, four by immigration and two by Customs. Inspectors 

interviewed by the Commission all said they learned the criteria for secondary 

inspections at their assigned airport. Because of the lack of standardized training and 

guidance in this area, each inspector looked for different red flags for referrals to 

secondary. For example, some inspectors were adamant that a traveler’s apparent lack of 

adequate funding for a certain length of stay was a “bread-and-butter” case of referral to 

secondary; others did not consider this set of facts to be noteworthy. Insufficient funding 

was part of the basis of referral for Saeed al Ghamdi, but was not seen as significant by 

the inspector who admitted him. 

Most, however, agreed that a pattern of entries and exits from the United States that 

looked like the traveler was actually living in the United States would be cause for a more 

in-depth interview. Such a pattern was exhibited by Atta on his last entry into the United 

States on July 19, 2001. The inspector that admitted him told us that upon reviewing 

Atta’s travel history, he likely would have asked Atta more questions to determine if he 

was in fact living in the United States.144 Assuming that these questions were asked, 

Atta’s answers must have satisfied the inspector that he was admissible, since he was not 

referred to secondary.

All of the inspectors agreed that failure to have the proper visa for the stated purpose was 

a solid basis for referral to secondary. Thus, when Atta entered on January 10, 2001, and 

told the immigration inspector that he was still a student while he was traveling on a 

tourist visa, he was referred to secondary. Some inspectors added that in the preSeptember 11 atmosphere of facilitation at the ports, Atta most likely would have been 

admitted with a waiver for a fee or a deferred inspection, even if he did not technically 
135

qualify for the admission. Admitting Atta as a tourist, however, should not have been an 

option for the secondary inspector. In addition, every inspector said that giving a tourist a 

stay of more than six months required a supervisor’s approval. Atta was given an eightmonth length of stay without such approval.

Immigration inspectors also agreed that forms—the immigration arrival record called an 

I-94 and the customs declaration—were always checked for completeness. Immigration 

inspectors checked the I-94 but not the Customs declaration for substance: the latter was 

the responsibility of the customs inspectors. The forms were also not always compared 

for consistency. Thus, Fayez Banihammad got away with using two completely different 

names on his I-94 (“Fayez Rashid Ahmed Hassan”) and his customs declaration 

(“Banihammad”). In addition, inspectors differed significantly on constituted a 

“complete” I-94 form. Some wanted a full address. Others accepted “Hotel Orlando FL,” 

which was used by Saeed al Ghamdi in a secondary inspection; it satisfied the inspector, 

who admitted him. 

Customs Inspections of the Hijackers. At airports, about 5 percent of travelers were 

subject to a customs inspection of their personal effects, which occurred only after their 

admission through the immigration inspection line. The customs inspectors were required 

to report declared amounts of currency greater than $10,000. Majid Moqed and Ahmed al 

Ghamdi, who arrived together at Washington Dulles International Airport on May 2, 

2001, were the only hijackers whose surviving customs declarations145 reported an 

amount in excess of $10,000.146 There is no record of the required electronic report that 

should have been generated about Ghamdi’s declaration. On 4 of the 13 hijacker Customs 

declarations available to the Commission, the question was left blank. While our focus is 

on the admission of the hijackers through immigration, this evidence suggests that 

Customs inspections of the hijackers were, at best, incomplete. 

Customs, unlike INS, had access to advanced passenger manifests before a flight arrived. 

They reviewed these for criminal indicators, mostly with an eye to preventing narcotics 

trafficking. Five different hijackers’ names were on advanced passenger manifests 

voluntarily provided by the airlines and reviewed by Customs prior to the hijackers’ 

reaching U.S. soil.147 None of these hijackers was on a watchlist, so their names did not 

set off any alarm bells. 

Pressures to Facilitate Travel 

It is important to note that the hijackers’ entries occurred in an environment of “travel 

facilitation.” Much pressure was placed on immigration inspectors to process travelers 

rapidly. Individuals were refused entry only rarely, with many airports permitting 

“waivers” or “deferrals” of documents normally required for admission. In some cases, 

such as entries by Atta on January 10, 2001, at Miami International Airport and Shehhi 

on January 18 at Newark International Airport, the inspectors did not recall nor did 

records indicate that they asked either hijacker to provide any documentation to support 

their stories about attending school and acquiring additional pilot training.148

Pressure was applied by embassies and by members of Congress who wrote letters 

requiring INS to justify decisions to deny entry in specific cases. The travel industry—

and, according to inspectors, the airlines in particular—loudly insisted on efficient 

passenger processing. Most inspectors said that their supervisors would monitor 
136

processing times and “remind” inspectors to keep within 45 seconds for each passenger. 

One inspector stated that if processing times were not kept to a minimum, a supervisor 

would threaten to send the inspector back to training. Indeed, immigration inspectors 

were graded on how fast airline passengers were processed and how many “nonfrivolous” 

referrals to secondary immigration inspections they made.149

Driving this emphasis on speed was a 1990 congressional guideline that limited the total 

amount of time for a visitor to disembark from a plane and be processed through 

immigration inspection to 45 minutes, regardless of the number of passengers on the 

flight.150 Supervisors were expected to calibrate the number of staff to the number of 

arriving passengers. The practical effect of this guideline was that inspectors, depending 

on the port of entry, generally had between 30 seconds and one minute to decide whether 

a visitor was admissible, and if so, how long that visitor was legally allowed to stay in the 

country. Both determinations by the inspector were important, as a violation either of the 

terms of admission or of length of stay would render the visitor’s status in the United 

States illegal. 

The prevailing view at the time was that the role of immigration was to facilitate the rapid 

entry of visitors to the United States. With few exceptions, speed was everything. Neither 

the INS nor others in government ever viewed the agency as having a pivotal role in 

preventing terrorist entry into the United States. 

Inspector Training

The problems of the environment of facilitation in which the inspectors worked were 

compounded by a weak training regime. Indeed, the deficiencies in the immigration 

inspection process that we have discussed stem largely from inadequate training. 

Throughout the 1990s, immigration inspectors such as those the Commission interviewed 

were often hired on a temporary basis. They worked long hours for a year and more 

without any formal training in immigration law or policy and received no information 

about terrorists.151 Only when an inspector was hired as a full-time INS employee did he 

or she receive the standard four-month immigration inspector training at the Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glenco, Georgia. A few inspectors received 

further training when promoted or given special operations assignment. 

These inspectors all similarly characterized their training, which occurred from the 1970s 

through 2000. The inspectors did not recall substantial differences in training as the 

1990s progressed, although information had become available that terrorists had entered, 

stayed, and committed violent acts in the United States. The focus was on passing tests. 

One inspector who received his training in 2000 said that “at FLETC, it is not about how 

much you learn—it was learn this now and pass the test, and then get rid of it. It was 

expected you would learn what you needed to at the port.”152

Counterterrorism Training. The counterterrorism mission that seems so obvious today 

was barely acknowledged then. For example, although non-Spanish speaking inspectors 

received five weeks of Spanish-language instruction—which was important—there were 

only a few hours devoted to terrorism; these focused on Usama Bin Ladin after the 1998 

bombings of the American embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.153

Indeed, no inspector interviewed by the Commission, whether a 30-year veteran or a 

student of multiple trainings, ever recalled receiving any operational guidance on the role 
137

of the immigration inspector in counterterrorism. None recalled seeing “The Threat Is 

Real,” a film intended to educate border inspectors on the travel document tactics of 

terrorists, which was produced by the CIA in the early 1980s.154 The film, as noted 

above, was based on the Redbook, the terrorist document manual last published in 1992 

(discussed in chapter 3). Three inspectors were aware of the Redbook’s existence, but 

only one had ever seen it.155

Primary and Secondary Inspection Training. Significantly, only about a half-day over 

the four-month course was devoted to conducting mock primary inspections. Inspectors 

did not receive any training in secondary inspections until they reached their assigned 

airport. All received training in land border inspections. The lack of training in 

conducting primary immigration inspections is somewhat surprising, for it is this initial 

inspection that identifies potentially inadmissible travelers. 

Document Fraud Training. Course materials were offered on document fraud generally, 

including training from the Forensic Document Lab on anomalies and security features to 

look for in travel documents. None of this training was specific to known terrorist 

document fraud. Most inspectors thought this limited training was valuable, but the 

critical continuing education on document fraud was rare. Instead, most ports left it up to 

the inspectors to review the binders of fraudulent document alerts issued by the Forensic 

Document Lab on an as-needed basis. The task was so cumbersome and the numbers of 

passengers awaiting processing so great that the inspectors rarely had a free moment to 

assimilate new information on fraud, let alone review binders of fraud alerts that 

contained information on passports and visas in every language in the world.

The Commission did learn that a dedicated Arabic-speaking inspector at JFK Airport in 

New York in the mid-1990s produced a “bluebook” that translated into English 

commonly used Arabic, Farsi, Yemeni, and Saudi travel documents and stamps.156 This 

bluebook was never disseminated outside of JFK, however, although it was appreciated 

by the inspectors we interviewed who were familiar with it. 

Database Training. Similarly, although there was training in the existence of the 20-plus 

databases available in primary and secondary immigration and customs inspection, 

immigration inspectors were not taught the content and value of these databases. Thus 

most inspectors who had contact with the hijackers did not know that suspected terrorists 

were included in these databases and that they should be looking for them. All the 

inspectors said INS databases, including lookouts, were learned on the job,. There was 

also only limited behavioral training and no cultural training to help inspectors better 

discriminate between legitimate and mala fide travelers. 

The Preferential treatment of Saudis157

Inspectors from Orlando, Los Angeles, and Dulles International airports all recalled an 

unwritten policy of preferential treatment enjoyed by Saudis prior to September 11. In 

these airports, which admitted eight hijackers and refused one, Saudi travelers generally 

received less scrutiny. They were often escorted to the front of the immigration lines by 

airline personnel.
138

In Orlando, one inspector recalled being presented with the travel documents of an entire 

Saudi family by his supervisor and asked to process them all even if he personally 

interviewed only one or two of the family members. This, he said, happened on multiple 

occasions. Another inspector remembered being told he had “better be careful” in seeking 

to refuse entry to Saudis, since the pressure from the port, the Saudi embassy, and 

Congress was strongly in favor of facilitating their admission. Upon request, female 

Saudis would be interviewed by female inspectors, in deference to Saudi culture. Another 

inspector from Los Angeles International Airport recalled an incident prior to September 

11 when he was required to board an arriving private Saudi 727 jet and process all the 

travel documents in the back of the jet, and to do so quickly and without a thorough 

examination of the travelers. He reluctantly complied. 

At other ports that admitted hijackers, inspectors reported no preferential treatment of 

Saudis. No inspector considered Saudis a threat to national security. Almost all the 

Saudis they screened could speak English. In fact, most shared the common perception 

that Saudis were U.S. allies, spent a lot of money in the United States, did not overstay 

their visas, did not work here, and were generally good travelers to admit. The only 

problem that might have occurred was an occasional overstay of a student visa, for which 

waivers would be given “95 percent of the time.”

Immigration Violations Committed by the Hijackers in the United States

Once a non-U.S. citizen is admitted to the United States, he or she remains subject to 

U.S. immigration laws and may be deported if any are violated. The hijackers violated 

many laws while gaining entry to, or remaining in, the United States. 

• Every hijacker submitted a visa application falsely stating that he was not 

seeking to enter the United States to engage in terrorism. This was a felony, punishable 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1546 by 25 years in prison and under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by 5 years in 

prison, and was a violation of immigration law rendering each one inadmissible under 8 

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(c). 

• The hijackers, when they presented themselves at U.S. ports of entry, were 

terrorists trained in Afghan camps who had prepared for and planned terrorist activity to 

further the aims of a terrorist organization—al Qaeda—making every hijacker 

inadmissible to enter the United States under 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(3)(b). 

• At least two (Satam al Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari) and possibly as many 

as seven of the hijackers (Suqami, Omari, Mohand al Shehri, Hamza and Saeed al 

Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmad al Haznawi) presented to State Department 

consular officers passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner, a felony punishable 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1543 by 25 years in prison and a violation of immigration law 

rendering them inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(c). 

• At least two hijackers (Suqami and Omari) and as many as eleven of the 

hijackers (Suqami; Omari; Waleed, Wail, and Mohand al Shehri; Hani Hanjour;

Majed Moqed; Nawaf al Hazmi; Haznawi; and Hamza and Ahmed al Ghamdi)

presented to INS inspectors at ports of entry passports manipulated in a fraudulent 

manner, a felony punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 1543 by 25 years in prison and a violation 
139

of immigration law rendering them inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(c). 

• Ziad Jarrah attended flight school in June 2000 without properly adjusting his 

immigration status, thereby violating his immigration status and rendering him 

inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(B) each of the subsequent six times he 

reentered the United States between June 2000 and August 5, 2001. 

• Hanjour did not attend school after entering on a student visa in December 2000, 

thereby violating his immigration status and making him deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 

1227(a)(1)(B).

• Mohamed Atta failed to present a proper M-1 (vocational school) visa when he 

entered the United States in January 2001. He had previously overstayed his tourist visa 

and therefore was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(B).

• Nawaf al Hazmi and Suqami overstayed the terms of their admission, a violation 

of immigration laws rendering them both deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).

Were the Hijackers’ Legal Violations Detectable? 

As the accompanying text box clearly indicates, all of the hijackers violated some aspect 

of immigration U.S. law. The key question is whether these violations could have been 

detected by U.S. border security officials at the time the hijackers presented themselves 

for review and inspection. We know the following: 

• At least three of the hijackers (Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf and Salem al 

Hazmi) were in the information systems of the intelligence community and thus 

potentially able to be watchlisted. Had they been watchlisted, their terrorist 

affiliation could have been exposed at the time they applied for a visa (in the case 

of Mihdhar and Salem al Hazmi) and applied for admission at a port of entry (in 

the case of all three) a decision could have been made to deny them entry or to 

track them in the United States. 

• At least two of the hijackers, and possibly as many as seven, presented travel 

documents to the State Department manipulated in a fraudulent manner that 

indicated possible association with al Qaeda. We do not believe that the consular 

officers who reviewed these documents were aware of this manipulation or were 

told to be on the lookout for evidence of it. 

• Three of the hijackers had passports that contained an indicator of Islamist 

extremism and thus were worthy of additional scrutiny. We do not believe that the 

consular officers who reviewed these documents were aware of this indicator of 

extremism or were told to be on the lookout for it. 

• Two of the hijackers made false statements about prior visa and travel history on 

their visa applications during the course of the plot. These lies were potentially 

detectable. The State Department did have the ability to determine whether an 

applicant had applied previously for a nonimmigrant visa. However, prior to 

September 11, because its computer system did not automatically display this 

information in connection with a visa application, the consular officer would have 

had to specifically look for it. 
140

5. 3 Fair Verdicts

The State Department 

The State Department began the 1990s with a consular corps largely untrained to address 

the threat of transnational terrorism. It used outdated and insecure technology to produce 

visas, with a patchwork of name-check technology systems at 230 visa-issuing posts 

overseas, and with an innovative but funding- and information-starved terrorist watchlist 

known as TIPOFF. Moreover, the budget picture was bleak, as resources declined and 

demand for visas was expected to grow. State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs suffered 

disproportionately from these budget cuts because many consular positions were 

customarily filled by junior Foreign Service officers—and they simply were not being 

hired. The only positive news was the temporary decline in visa demand in the early 

1990s caused by growth of the Visa Waiver Program. 

The State Department received a wake-up call when it was discovered that it had issued 

visas to come to the United States to the terrorists involved in the World Trade Center 

bombing in 1993, and that the spiritual leader of the group—Sheikh Omar Abdel 

Rahman—obtained a visa despite being on a watchlist. State’s outdated technology and 

poor controls over watchlist screening had allowed the visa to be issued.

In response to the shock of that attack, the State Department took some significant steps 

during the 1990s to improve its ability to counter terrorism. Specifically, the department 

 established the Visas Viper Program to force better interagency information 

sharing on known or suspected terrorists; 

 improved the security of its visa technology; 

 Modernized its name-check technology by establishing a real-time connection to 

the watchlist located in Washington and by creating several language algorithms; 

and

 made available TIPOFF terrorist data to the INS—for use at the ports of entry—

and to foreign partners Canada and Australia. 

Many of these changes were accomplished because of the 1994 law that allowed State to 

fund its border security initiatives with fees collected from applicants for the machinereadable visa (MRV). For example, State used MRV fees to fund antifraud programs in 

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Unfortunately, these funds did not arrive quickly 

enough to prevent damage to State’s counterterrorism capabilities from the continued 

budget shortfalls. 

In response to the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, State spent more than $3 billion 

to improve overseas embassy security. And while overseas embassy security had been in 

desperate need of improvement—a fact well-known since the Beirut bombings a decade 

earlier—the $3 billion spent after the 1998 bombings and before 9/11 to improve U.S. 

facilities appears in hindsight to demonstrate that we were fighting the last war. While 
141

embassy security was being improved, State took steps to streamline its work processes 

in ways that cut back on the scrutiny given individual visa applicants. Posts were 

encouraged to reduce interviews and speed processing of applications. Reducing face-toface contact with visa applicants through programs such as Visa Express was even seen 

as enhancing security by reducing the crowds tat potentially threatened our overseas 

facilities.

Despite its acknowledgment that consular officers were the “outer ring” of border 

security, during the 1990s State strongly resisted the notion that consular officers were 

responsible for ferreting out terrorists in visa interviews. State never sought to increase 

the training for consular officers to identify terrorists or unravel their travel trails by 

carefully examining their often-fraudulent documents. State also refused to give consular 

officers the latitude to deny visas to individuals they suspected might be terrorists, fearing 

that this discretion would be abused. Instead, consular officers were trained to spot 

intending economic immigrants, not terrorists, and to leave decisionmaking about 

potential terrorists to officials in Washington. 

Faced with increasing demand for visas and pressure to improve customer service, State 

began to rely too much on technology and a terrorist watchlist name check to prevent 

terrorists from obtaining visas. Senior State officials trusted intelligence community 

agencies to provide data on terrorist identities for inclusion in the watchlist, but no law 

required that this information be given to State. Assistant Secretary of State for Consular 

Affairs Mary Ryan was naïve about the willingness of the intelligence community to 

supply this critical information, believing that it was being provided to State when in fact, 

for at least three hijackers, it was not. 

Citizens of wealthy Persian Gulf nations or third country nationals from the Middle East 

with established lives in Germany were seen by State as good visa risks because they 

rarely overstayed their terms of admission or sought to work in the United States. The 

U.S. foreign policy interest in stable relations with the oil-rich Gulf countries also played 

a role. Even though al Qaeda leader Usama Bin Ladin had held Saudi citizenship, Saudi 

funding for terrorism was well established, and CIA personnel working shoulder to 

shoulder with State consular officials were well aware of the presence of Saudi extremists 

in Saudi Arabia, State Department personnel in Saudi Arabia and in Washington never 

acted to increase the scrutiny given Saudi visa applicants. 

Indeed, it was not until July 2002 that the State Department reversed course and ordered 

that all visa applicants be interviewed. Today, consular training for interviewing 

techniques to spot terrorists is still in its infancy, and State still has not fully 

operationalized knowledge of terrorist travel practices.

Ultimately, the individual consular officers who adjudicated visas for the 9/11 hijackers 

were following State Department policy. They were not trained to spot terrorists. They 

were told not to give great scrutiny to applicants with the hijackers’ socioeconomic 

backgrounds. They believed their job was to deny visas to intending immigrants and to 

check all applicants against the terrorist watchlist, and they did these tasks scrupulously. 
142

It is difficult to blame them for acting according to and within the discretion of policies 

provided them by their superiors. However, it is striking that they and their superiors—

senior consular officials in Washington and in Saudi Arabia—did not recognize the 

yawning disconnect between the increasing terror threat in Saudi Arabia, which reached a 

peak in the summer of 2001, and their actions in response to that threat, which reduced 

the number of face-to-face encounters with Saudi visa applicants. 

In all aspects of State’s approach to counterterrorism—its successes and its failures, its 

improvements and its lapses—Congress was directly complicit. State officials told us that 

prior to 9/11, members of Congress rarely if ever questioned consular officers’ decisions 

to issue visas. In fact, they told us, consular officers’ most frequent correspondents were 

members of Congress advocating on behalf of constituents seeking the issuance of visas. 

It was Congress (with White House support) that, starved the State Department of 

resources and that, persuaded that border security deserved greater attention, provided the 

lifeline of MRV fee collection. 

In any case, though the decisions to issue visas now seem questionable, in every case 

State consular officers followed their standard operating procedures and adhered to the 

visa policy as they understood it. For the five conspirators and would-be hijackers who 

were denied visas, in every case those denials appear to have been grounded in concerns 

other than terrorism—usually the fear that they were intending immigrants. Those 9/11 

hijackers and co-conspirators not pulled from the stream of visa applicants and 

interviewed were spared because consular officers believed they satisfied the legal 

requirements for obtaining a visa. In each case, consular officials performed a name 

check using their lookout database, including the TIPOFF watchlist. At the time these 

people applied for visas, none of them—or at least none of the identities given in their 

passports—was in the database.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service 

The INS has no articulated counterterrorism policy. 

—Senate Judiciary Committee report (1998) 

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the INS has always had the statutory 

responsibility to determine who may enter, who may remain, and who must be removed 

from the United States. However, neither INS leadership nor any other entity in 

government ever fully recognized that within INS’s overall responsibility to determine 

admission for all travelers was an important responsibility to exclude and remove 

terrorists, a task that no other agency could perform.

The failure of the INS to recognize the value of its immigration authority in identifying 

and removing terrorists was manifested throughout the agency. It stemmed from a 

general lack of a counterterrorism strategy. As we have seen, the fledgling INS 

counterterrorism activities of the late 1990s were carried out by a handful of dedicated 

employees in middle management whose resources were minimal and whose strategies 

and recommendations were mostly ignored. But the INS was not alone in failing to 
143

identify a counterterrorism role for itself. The White House was concerned in the 1990s 

with human smuggling and trafficking, illegal entries, naturalization backlogs, refugee 

crises, employer sanctions, criminal alien deportations and detention space, and INS 

restructuring. Even when presidential decision directives assigned a role to the INS in 

countering terrorism, the INS was not sent those directives. Attorney General Reno and 

her deputies, along with Congress, made their highest priorities shoring up the Southwest 

border to prevent the migration of illegal aliens and selectively upgrading technology 

systems. And while some parts of the Justice Department were preoccupied with 

counterterrorism investigations, its leadership never saw a significant role for INS in 

counterterrorism other than to support the FBI. 

Programs initiated by Congress with a counterterrorism capability, notably foreign 

student tracking and an entry-exit system at the ports of entry, never received adequate 

support from the Congress or the INS leadership and so never materialized. Financial and 

human resources were also lacking. The budget for interior enforcement remained static 

in the face of an overwhelming number of immigrants outside the legal framework. 

Many INS agents were overwhelmed and disheartened. 

Immigration benefits applications were backlogged for months and even years. 

Technology moneys were spent, but often for stand-alone computer systems that lacked 

essential information. As a result, the officers adjudicating these applications did not have 

access to immigration or law enforcement histories of applicants requesting extended 

stays or naturalization or to intelligence information. Thus, immigration benefits were 

obtained by many terrorists in the 1990s even when they were being investigated or 

prosecuted as terrorists by other personnel in the Justice Department. 

These immigration cases against suspected terrorists were often mired for years in 

bureaucratic struggles over alien rights and the adequacy of evidence. The quality of 

intelligence within the agency was low; Commissioner Meissner had never heard of 

Usama Bin Ladin until after she left government service. 

The verdict for the INS as an institution is that a poorly organized agency with a poor 

public image and low self-esteem never received adequate support from within its own 

leadership, its parent Justice Department, the Congress, or the White House to take itself 

seriously or be taken seriously as having a key role in counterterrorism. Thus no one at 

the White House or in the Justice Department noticed that INS leadership was unaware of 

the White House after-action work on the northern border in 2000 or of the July 5, 2001, 

White House meeting of enforcement agencies to discuss the heightened state of threat 

under which the rest of the government was operating. Meanwhile, the hijackers were 

seeking entry into the United States—and succeeding in an atmosphere in which the 

priority was neither enforcement nor counterterrorism. 

Given the lack of a defined counterterrorism role for the INS, it should not be surprising 

that training for inspectors at ports of entry lacked a counterterrorism component. That 

training did not, for example, include information on terrorists’ use of fraudulent travel 

documents, which forensic specialists stopped examining in the early 1990s, or the 
144

critical role of the inspector in preventing terrorists’ entry. Our study also suggests that 

training in immigration law, procedures, and regulations was similarly insufficient. 

Indeed, immigration law was, and remains, so intricate and confusing that some 

inspectors lacked a clear understanding of issues of admissibility, and therefore 

mistakenly admitted some hijackers into the country. Other inspectors were simply worn 

down by the culture of facilitation, in which travelers with questionable admissibility 

were almost inevitably given the benefit of the doubt and admitted. 

Different conclusions can be drawn regarding a few of the immigration inspections of 

some of the hijackers. Most immigration inspectors, operating under severe time 

constraints and an expectation of facilitation, and lacking standard operating procedures 

and basic visitor information, conducted fair adjudications. The primary immigration 

inspectors who referred Atta, Shehhi, Saeed al Ghamdi, and Kahtani to secondary 

inspection to be questioned further used the tools available to them and their training to 

make good decisions. 

But the secondary inspectors for the first three men failed to ask the kinds of questions 

that might have elicited information that the hijackers could not substantiate. For 

example, Atta’s secondary inspector misjudged him as a tourist, even though Atta 

presented him with a student/school form as a basis for entry. Rather than admit him as a 

tourist, which he did, this inspector could have given Atta a deferred inspection to gather 

his school papers and return to an INS district office in 30 days to verify his status. Atta 

would have been unable to do so, since he had received his pilot’s license a month earlier. 

The inspector also violated length of stay requirements by giving Atta an eight-month 

stay without a supervisor’s approval. It took an astute inspector at the Miami INS District 

Office to roll back his length of stay to July 9, 2004, after Atta unwittingly made a 

mistake in seeking a longer length of stay for a fellow hijacker. When Kahtani was 

refused entry, the secondary inspector had a weaker legal basis for denial than existed for 

Atta. But he took the time to determine mala fide intent and, basing his decision on 

evidence Kahtani intended to immigrate to the United States, he denied him entry, 

thereby preventing at least one hijacker from participating in the plot. 

1

 Atta is believed to have piloted Flight 11 and Jarrah Flight 93. 

2

 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 9, Feb. 5, 2003. The names of consular officers, immigration 

inspectors, and intelligence officials have been changed or omitted, in accordance with Commission policy 

and agreements. 

3

 Consular Officer No. 9 interview (Feb. 20, 2004). 

4

 Ibid. 

5

 Consular Officer No. 9 interview (Feb. 20, 2004). 

6

 Ibid. 

7

 Ibid. 

8

 Ibid. 

9

 Ibid. 

10 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Section Chief Levy and ACS Officer Wolfson, Jan. 27, 2003. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Consular Officer No. 10 interview (Mar. 1, 2004); DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 7, Feb. 11, 

2003; DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 10, Jan. 19, 2003. 

13 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 10, Jan. 19, 2003; Consular Officer No. 10 interview (Mar. 1, 

2004).
145

14 Consular Officer No. 10 interview (Mar. 1, 2004). 

15 Ibid., stating “From a security standpoint, we viewed them as safe bets.” 

16 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 10, Jan. 19, 2003. 

17 Ibid. 

18 Consular Officer No. 10 interview (Mar. 1, 2004). 

19 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 7, Feb. 11, 2003. 

20 Ibid. 

21 Consular Officer No. 10 interview (Mar. 1, 2004); DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 10, Jan. 19, 

2003.

22 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 7, Feb. 11, 2003. 

23 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 10, Jan. 19, 2003. 

24 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 7, Feb. 11, 2003. 

25 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 10, Jan. 19, 2003. 

26 Consular Officer No. 10 interview (Mar. 1, 2004). 

27 Ibid., estimating that 70% used the drop box and 30% the travel agency. 

28 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 7, Feb. 11, 2003; DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 10, Jan. 

19, 2003. 

29 Albert A. Thibault, Jr. interview (Nov. 5, 2003). 

30 Arthur M. interview (Oct. 14, 2003). 

31 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 1 before the U.S. House of Representatives, Aug. 1, 2002. 

32 Carl C. interview (Oct. 29, 2003). Consular officials in Saudi Arabia and in Washington uniformly told 

the Commission that they could not recall receiving any letters from Congress urging them to deny visas 

before 9/11. Rather, consular officials told the Commission that members of Congress were their most 

faithful correspondents and were constantly urging them to issue visas to individuals in Saudi Arabia who 

were constituents’ family members or other individuals with connections to their legislative districts. 

33 Consular Officer No. 6 interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Consular Officer No. 11 interview (Dec. 30, 2003). 

34 Ibid. 

35 This statistic is an estimate prepared by consular officials in Saudi Arabia at the request of the General 

Accounting Office and memorialized in GAO workpapers. The difficulty in measuring this more precisely 

is that the State Department electronic record-keeping system did not record whether a visa applicant was 

interviewed prior to September 11, 2001. Travis Farris interview (Sept. 29, 2003). 

36 Carl C. interview (Oct. 29, 2003).

37 Consular Officer No. 11 interview (Dec. 30, 2003). 

38 Ibid. 

39 Ibid. 

40 Ibid. 

41 Carl C. interview (Oct. 29, 2003). 

42 DOS memo to Riyadh Consul General Allen K., May 7, 2000. 

43 GAO record, telephone interview of Allen K., July 10, 2002. 44 Ibid. 

45 DOS cable, Jeddah 001185, Dec. 10, 2001. 46 DOS cable, “Riyadh Fraud Issues,” Aug. 4, 2000. 

47 Ibid. (emphasis added). 

48 Carl C. interview (Oct. 29, 2003). 

49 DOS cable, Jeddah 001225, Nov. 9, 1999. 

50 DOS email, from Allen K. to Judith McCloskey, Aug. 5, 2002. 

51 INA sec. 214(b), 8 U.S.C. sec. 1184(b); testimony of Consular Officer No. 1 before U.S. House of 

Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Aug. 1, 2002. 

52 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 3 before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government 

Reform, Aug. 1, 2002. 

53 Tom Furey interview (Dec. 5, 2003); testimony of Consular Officer No. 2 before U.S. House of 

Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Aug. 1, 2002. 

54 See DOS cable, Riyadh Fraud Issues, Aug. 2000, stating “Saudis are generally good visa risks, and most 

Saudi applicants are processed without interview.” 
146

55 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 11, Jan. 20, 2003; testimony of Consular Officer No. 3 before 

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Aug. 1, 2002. 

56 Consular Officer No. 11 interview (Dec. 30, 2003); DOS OIG MOC, Tom Furey, Jan. 28, 2003. 

57 Consular Officer No. 11 interview (Dec. 30, 2003); DOS OIG MOC, Consular Section Chief Miguel O., 

Jan. 23, 2003; testimony of Consular Officer No. 3 before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 

Government Reform, Aug. 1, 2002, stating “It was the same way that that’s the presumption for many 

Europeans;” Tom Furey interview (Dec. 5, 2003), stating Saudis were treated like citizens of countries in 

the Visa Waiver Program and for the same reasons. 

58 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 11, Jan. 28, 2003. 

59 DOS OIG MOC, Tom Furey, Jan. 28, 2003; DOS OIG MOC, Catherine Barry, Dec. 13, 2002, quoting 

Ms. Barry as saying that both Saudi Arabia and the UAE were “de facto visa waiver countries.” 

60 CIA research paper, “Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Awakening,” Feb. 1993. 

61 INS record, 2001 Statistical Yearbook, Table 58 (Deportable Aliens Located by Status at Entry and 

Region and Country of Nationality Fiscal Year 2001). This was fewer than from Liechtenstein (42) and 

Norway (49), and contrasts with the 1,315,678 from Mexico. 62 DOS cable, Riyadh 10070, Nov. 25, 1991. 

63 GAO analysis of economic data on Saudi Arabia, prepared by Bruce Kutnick, July 16, 2002. 

64 (S) CIA research paper, “Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Awakening,” Feb. 1993. 65 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 2 before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government 

Reform, Aug. 1, 2002. 

66 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 3, before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government 

Reform, August 1, 2002. 

67 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 2, before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government 

Reform, Aug. 1, 2002; testimony of Consular Officer No. 3 before U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Government Reform, Aug. 1, 2002, stating “they weren’t looking for jobs even though they 

were unemployed.” 

68 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 4 before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government 

Reform, Aug. 1, 2002. 

69 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 13, Jan. 23, 2003. 

70 DOS memo, Tasker #252, prepared in the summer of 2000, “Best Practices already in effect at post 

include... interview by exception for applicants from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and the 

United Arab Emirates;” Consular Officer No. 11 interview (Dec. 30, 2003). 

71 DOS cable, “Interviews by Exception,” 98 State 160236. 

72 Consular Officer No. 11 interview (Dec. 30, 2003) 

73 This view is supported by findings of the General Accounting Office which compiled statistics on the 

refusal rates for Riyadh and Jeddah during the year before September 11, 2001. According to the GAO, 

consular officers in Riyadh refused .15 percent of Saudi citizen visa applicants during the period from 

September 11, 2000 to April 30, 2001, while consular officers in Jeddah refused approximately 1.07 

percent of Saudi citizen applicants in the same time period. For reasons discussed, infra, the interview rate 

for Saudi citizens applying in Jeddah probably dropped beginning in September 2000, so the difference 

may have been greater before that date. 

74 Consular Officer No.5 interview (Mar. 2, 2004); DOS Office of Inspector General Memorandum of 

Conversation, Consular Officer No. 5, Feb. 5, 2003. 

75 Consular Officer No. 12 interview (Feb. 24, 2004). 

76 Ibid. 

77 Ibid. 

78 Ibid. 

79 Ibid. 

80 Consular Officer No. 6 interview (Oct. 14, 2003). 

81 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 1 before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government 

Reform, Aug. 1, 2002. 

82 Ibid. 

83 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 2 before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government 

Reform, Aug. 1, 2002. 

84 Consular Officer No. 13 interview (Feb. 24, 2004). 
147

85 Ibid. 

86 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 13, Oct. 9, 2002. 

87 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 11, Jan. 20, 2003. 

88 Consular Officer No. 11 interview (Dec. 30, 2003). 

89 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 11, Jan. 20, 2003. 

90 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 11, Jan. 20, 2003. 

91 Consular Officer No. 14 interview (Feb. 2, 2004). 

92 DOS OIG MOC, Consular Officer No. 13, Jan. 23, 2003; Consular Officer No. 14 interview (Feb. 2, 

2004). Consular Officer No. 13’s supervisor said that he had taken “a lot of flack” about Consular Officer 

No. 13’s high refusal rate. He said there had been “overt hostility” to Consular Officer No. 13’s high 

refusal rate before 9/11. 

93 Consular Officer No. 14 interview (Feb. 2, 2004); Consular Officer No. 13 interview (Feb. 24, 2004). 

94 GAO report, “Visa Process Should be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool,” GAO-03-132NI, Oct. 

2002, stating “For example, consular officers held different opinions about whether they should use INA 

section 214(b) to refuse visas to questionable applicants, that is, those who either did not appear credible or 

who could not convince them of the purpose of their visit, regardless of the applicant’s income or ties to a 

residence abroad. Many consular officers told us they were using the provision for this purpose. Consular 

managers and individual consular officers whom we interviewed differed on whether consular officers 

should be using INA section 214(b) to screen applicants in this manner.” 

95 DOS OIG MOC, Tom Furey, Jan. 28, 2003. 

96 Tom Furey interview (Dec. 5, 2003); DOS OIG MOC, Tom Furey, Jan. 28, 2003. 

97 Tom Furey interview (Dec. 5, 2003). 

98 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 2 before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 

Government Reform, Aug. 1, 2002. 

99 Ibid. 

100 DOS OIG MOC Consular Officer No. 11, Jan. 20, 2003. 101 The Gulf Cooperation Council countries are: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the 

United Arab Emirates. 

102 Tom Furey interview (Dec. 5, 2003). 

104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 DOS cable no. 6, The Context for Best Practices, Oct. 1997. 107 DOS cable no. 10, Non-Immigrant Visa Appointment Systems, State 227586, Nov. 1997. 108 Tom Furey interview (Dec. 5, 2003). 109 DOS cable no. 7, Drop Box and Personal Appearance Waiver (PAW) Programs, Nov. 1997. 110 Ibid. 111 Testimony of Consular Officer 2 before the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform 

Committee, Aug. 1, 2002. 

112 DOS cable no. 19, Interviews By Exception, 98 State 160236, Aug. 1998; DOS cable no. 9, Remote 

Data Entry, State 223398, Nov. 1998; DOS cable no. 4, Off-Site Fee Collection, State 059404, Apr. 1997. 113 DOS cable, “U.S. Visa Express Program Transforms NIV Scene in Saudi Arabia,” Riyadh 02326 (Aug. 

19, 2001). 

114 Ibid. 115 Tom Furey interview (Dec. 5, 2003); testimony of Consular Officer No. 2 before the U.S. House of 

Representatives Government Reform Committee, Aug. 1, 2002. 

116 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between Kanoo Holidays Travel Company in Saudi Arabia 

and the United States Embassy in Riyadh and U.S. Consulate General in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Concerning 

U.S. Visa Express (Nonimmigrant Visa Service). 

117 DOS cable, “U.S. Visa Express Program Transforms NIV Scene in Saudi Arabia,” Riyadh 02326 (Aug. 

19, 2001); testimony of Consular Officer No. 2 before the U.S. House of Representatives Government 

Reform Committee, Aug. 1, 2002. 

118 DOS report, “U.S. Visa Express Program Transforms NIV Scene in Saudi Arabia,” Riyadh 02326, Aug. 

19, 2001. 
148

119 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 2 before the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform 

Committee, Aug. 1, 2002. 

120 DOS Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es 

Salaam, Jan. 1999. In his introduction to the Report, Review Boards Chairman Admiral William J. Crowe 

said the following: “In our investigation of the bombings, The Boards were struck by how similar the 

lessons were to those drawn by the Inman Commission over 14 years ago. What is most troubling is the 

failure of the U.S. Government to take the necessary steps to prevent such tragedies through an 

unwillingness to give sustained priority and funding to security improvements.” 

121 Ibid., Recommendations 7 and 8. 122 Kevin O. interview (Feb. 12, 2004). 123 DOS email from Tom Furey to Mary Ryan, dated “Tuesday, June 26, 2001, 8:06 a.m.” 124 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 2 before the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform 

Committee, Aug. 1, 2002. 

125 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 3 before the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform 

Committee, Aug. 1, 2002. In a cable this officer drafted but did not send during this time period, the officer 

stated, “requiring all applicants to apply through travel agents has gummed-up the process in Jeddah. The 

NIV officer must now review the applications of those who were previously ineligible for Visa Express 

twice, once on paper and then again several days later at the window.” The officer recommended returning 

Visa Express to the “original guidelines (Saudi nationals and TCNs with prior visas).” Visa Express in 

Jeddah—Suggested Modifications (undated). 

126 Consular Officer No. 11 interview (Dec. 30, 2003); State OIG MOC with Consular Officer No. 11, Jan. 

20, 2003, “The program also eliminated the need for interviews of first time student visa applicants.” 

127 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 3 before the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform 

Committee, Aug. 1, 2002. 

128 Consular Officer No. 11 interview (Dec. 30, 2003). 129 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 3 before the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform 

Committee, Aug. 1, 2002; Visa Express in Jeddah—Suggested Modifications (undated), “It also created 

incentives to issue ‘borderline’ cases in order to decrease interview workload.” 

130 Tom Furey interview (Dec. 5, 2003). 131 Consular Officer No. 11 interview (Dec. 30, 2003). 132 Ibid. 133 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 4 before the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform 

Committee, Aug. 1, 2002, p. 10, “Nothing changed. Only the way the applications were coming to me,” 

Tom Furey interview (Dec. 5, 2003), Visa Express did not change Saudi interview policy since “[t]hey 

were already not being interviewed.” 

134 Testimony of Consular Officer No. 4 before the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform 

Committee, Aug. 1, 2002. 

135 GAO report, “Border Security: Visa Process Should be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool,” GAO03-132NI (Oct. 2002), p. 19, fn. 29. Although the State Department’s Inspector General concluded that “the 

consular officers who issued visas to the terrorist hijackers . . . acted in accordance with policies that 

prevailed at their missions at the time the visas were issued,” the State OIG did not specifically address 

whether the Visa Express Program affected the quality or quantity of interviews in Saudi Arabia. DOS OIG 

report, “Review of the Issuance of Visas to the September 11, 2001, Terrorists,” ISP-CA-03-27 Mar. 2003. 

136 All the Memoranda of Understanding between the U.S. Government and the Visa Express travel agencies 

contained language mandating that “the American embassy and consulate agree to return the processed visas 

(barring any need for personal interview of applicant) the following day.” 

137 Commission work product, results of interviews with 26 border inspectors who had contact with the 

9/11 hijackers, “Answers Regarding Primary Inspections Prior to 9/11” (May 20, 2004); Commission work 

product, results of interviews with 26 border inspectors who had contact with the 9/11 hijackers, “Answers 

Regarding Red Flags Resulting in Secondary Inspections” (May 20, 2004). The remaining 12 inspectors 

were no longer employed by the INS (now in the Department of Homeland Security) and were unavailable 

to the Commission. Our interviews were conducted between March and June 2004. 

138 The inspector told us she is “75 percent sure” his companion was Adnan Shuhkrijumah, now on the 

FBI’s most wanted list of terrorists. Immigration inspector of Mohamed Atta on May 2, 2001 interview 

(Mar. 25, 2004). 
149

139 Because none of the hijackers was from a visa waiver country, they all had to obtain visas. 140 Despite the well-known information about the use of fraudulent travel documents in the prosecutions of 

the Blind Sheikh and the World Trade Center conspirators, the Department of Justice failed to make 

systematic use of this information as a counterterrorism tool. 

141 Commission work product, results of interviews with 26 border inspectors who had contact with the 

9/11 hijackers, “Answers Regarding Primary Inspections Prior to 9/11” (May 20, 2004). 

142 The inspector subsequently changed his mind and sent Atta to secondary where he—incorrectly—

received an eight-month tourist stay. 

143 Commission interview of immigration inspector for Suqami and al Shehri’s April 23 inspection (May 

19, 2004). Other inspectors verified that the I-94 arrival record and customs declaration had little to no 

bearing on the length of stay determination. Sometimes a return ticket would be requested as well, but this 

was not a consistent request by inspectors since return tickets are not required by law as they are, for 

example, in the United Kingdom. 

144 Commission interview of immigration inspector for Atta’s July 19 inspection (May 17, 2004). Atta 

came to the United States first in June 2000 and was admitted for six months. He overstayed his six month 

length of stay by five weeks, and left again in early January 2001, returning January 10, 2001. Atta left 

again after six months in early July 2001, and returned July 19, 2001, staying until the execution of the plot. 

145 Of 34 attempted hijacker entries, only 13 of these declarations were available for Commission review. 

This is because Customs’ declarations are all paper and destroyed every six months. None of the 

information is made a permanent electronic record, which is what the INS does with I-94 arrival records, 

manually downloading them into an entry database. 

146 The answers to questions about how much currency the hijackers were carrying did not result in 

secondary inspections. Seven hijackers declared less than $10,000. The currency amounts on the 

declarations of Majid Moqed and Ahmed Al Ghamdi, was initially left blank and then later apparently 

completed by an inspector, who circled that both Moqed and al Ghamdi possessed more than $10,000 in 

cash.

147 This information was provided by a DHS intelligence office to the Commission. 148 In general, the information contained in this section is derived from Commission work product, results 

of interviews with 26 border inspectors who had contact with the 9/11 hijackers, “Answers Regarding 

General Questions” (May 20, 2004). 

149 Indeed, no inspector interviewed by the Commission could read Arabic, or ever checked the authenticity 

of travel stamps in passports. Arabic speakers were rare at ports of entry in general and if an inspector 

could not communicate with a visitor, the inspector would either reluctantly rely on an airline 

representative for translation, if someone was even available, or refer the traveler to a secondary 

immigration inspection where an interpreter was available by phone. A lack of communication skills was 

the basis of the referral of Kahtani. 

150 Immigration and Nationality Act § 286. 151 In general, information in this section is derived from Commission work product, results of interviews 

with 26 border inspectors who had contact with the 9/11 hijackers, “Answers Regarding Training Prior to 

9/11” (May 20, 2004). 

152 Primary inspector of Saeed al Ghamdi interview (Mar. 25, 2004). 153 Inspectors also received extensive firearms training. However, no inspector interviewed was ever 

permitted to carry a firearm while conducting airport line inspections. Firearms were carried in secondary 

inspection areas, general aviation and sea cargo inspections. 

154 This was the only version ever produced. 155 Two were familiar with the later version of the book, the Passport Examination Manual, which focused 

on generic document fraud, not documents used by terrorists. 

156 Secondary inspector of Marwan al Shehhi on Jan. 18, 2001 interview (Mar. 22, 2004). The Commission 

obtained a copy of this bluebook from JFK airport immigration officials. 

157 Information in this section is derived from Commission work product, results of interviews with 26 

border inspectors who had contact with the 9/11 hijackers, “Answers Regarding General Questions” (May 

20, 2004). 
150

6

Crisis Management and Response Post-September 11 

6.1 The Intelligence Community 

The main thing now is security, do you understand? We must be most careful 

above all with documents and identities, because without them . . . we’re lost. 

—al Qaeda operative 

The attacks of 9/11 did what policy guidance and evidence had failed to do: it focused at 

least one intelligence agency, the CIA, on the critical need for terrorist travel information. 

CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology set up a Passport Analysis Program. Its 

mission is to identify terrorists according to the documents they use. The program looks 

for individuals whose passports incorporate indicators of terrorist affiliation; develops 

automated detection tools that identify in near real-time the bearers of fraudulent foreign 

passports, and helps to verify the citizenship of individuals attempting to enter the United 

States.

Integration of the Passport Analysis Program’s proven methods is languishing. No 

government component responsible for interdicting illegal travelers has incorporated the 

automated detection tools at the front end of its screening process where the tools would 

have the greatest utility for consular officers and immigration inspectors. 

A second program was created in October 2001, when most of the CIA’s Office of 

Transnational Issues (OTI) moved to the Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA) of the 

Counterterrorism Center (CTC) to form a new Terrorist Transportation and Travel 

Branch. The unit was later renamed the Terrorist Mobility Branch.1

 Before its creation 

there was no programmatic effort at CTC—or anywhere else in government—that 

focused on broad trends and methodologies of terrorist travel.

The goal of the Terrorist Mobility Branch has been to identify key groups and individuals 

that facilitate terrorist travel, such as travel agencies, corrupt government officials, 

fraudulent document vendors, and document forgers, as well as patterns of document 

fraud and other travel tactics associated with al Qaeda and other terrorists.2

 In order to 

“operationalize” the intelligence produced by the Terrorist Mobility Branch, in the fall of 

2002 a new branch was formed in the Directorate of Operations.3

 Since January 2002, 17 

facilitators have been disrupted in coordinated CTC-law enforcement efforts.4

Yet anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the analysis being generated by the 

Terrorist Mobility Branch is failing to reach critical audiences whom it would greatly 

benefit. An informal survey indicates that border inspectors at primary immigration 

stations at ports of entry do not receive it systematically because of classification and 

security issues.5

 It is not hard to see why. There is no electronic dissemination system 

capable of sending highly classified reports to field units who need them. The clearances 
151

of INS officers are insufficient to allow the transfer of important and relevant information 

to them. And some agencies are culturally opposed to sharing information.6

For its part, the FBI did not endeavor to analyze terrorist travel information and does not 

include such analysis as a terrorist disruption technique. Generally speaking, there is no 

systematic and centrally directed collection and analysis of suspect travel documents. 

6.2 The Department of State 

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the State Department responded to requests for 

information from the FBI and other law enforcement agencies investigating the 9/11 

attacks.7

 When it was discovered that two of the 9/11 hijackers were known to the CIA in 

1999 but this information had not been passed to State for watchlisting purposes, 

Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs Mary Ryan requested a meeting with CIA 

Director George Tenet at which she expressed her outrage over this failure to share 

information.8

 Tenet promised Ryan there would be changes; shortly thereafter, CIA 

contributions to the TIPOFF watch list increased dramatically.9

Initially, the State Department did not begin to reevaluate its visa-issuing processes. 

Instead, investigations of visa-issuing policies and how they related to the 9/11 attacks 

were launched by the General Accounting Office (GAO), Congress in its oversight 

capacity, and the State Department Inspector General. Consular officers in the field 

became frustrated by the lack of direction on visa policy from Washington. 

Dissatisfaction ran especially high in Saudi Arabia, where 15 of the 19 hijackers had 

acquired their visas. Consular officials in Jeddah believed that it was “business as usual,” 

with the consulate continuing “to waive interviews for the vast majority of Saudi 

applicants.”10 They were chastised by the State Department for publicly stating this 

view.11

The period from 9/11 to 2003 was spent responding to law enforcement needs regarding 

the 9/11 attacks, tightening up visa issuance procedures at the margins, and implementing 

a number of programs in cooperation with the Justice Department and other agencies. 

These included the 20-day hold and Condor name-check programs developed in the 

interagency process, the NSEERS (National Security Exit and Entry Registration System) 

program, and the relevant provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Enhanced Border 

Security Act, and the Homeland Security Act, discussed in the next section. 

Following 9/11, State also expanded its Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) to include 

60 priority countries. This foreign assistance program is designed to enhance border 

security around the globe by providing state-of-the-art border control technology to 

specific nations.12 The system has been installed in approximately ten countries. 

By 2003, State’s approach for the future was coming into focus. It included making 

dramatic changes in visa processing, retooling consular work for counterterrorism, 

supporting the development of U.S. and international biometric border and travel 

document standards, and enhancing the security of the U.S. passport system.
152

State established the Vulnerability Assessment Unit to systematically review issued visas 

for patterns that might indicate malfeasance, and began checking the database of issued 

visas against any new terrorist watch list information. 

On August 1, 2003, State issued new regulations that limited the waiver of personal 

appearances for nonimmigrant visa (NIV) applicants to only a few categories of 

exceptions, among whom were diplomats, children, and the elderly.13 This was a major 

change from the era before 9/11, when State policies encouraged consular managers to 

decrease the frequency of visa interviews in order to save resources. Beginning on 

October 17, 2003, State also lengthened its basic consular course, also known as ConGen, 

from 26 to 31 days, in order to add material on visa security, counterterrorism awareness, 

and interviewing techniques. The new training included a two-day course on ways to 

identify deception by applicants, a half-day program on counterterrorism at CIA 

headquarters, and a module on terrorist travel patterns. State also expanded intranet 

resources for consular officers to assist them in reading and verifying entry/exit cachets 

in Arabic or Persian script.14

On September 22, 2003, State began the worldwide deployment of biometric 

nonimmigrant visa (NIV) software that provided for the collection of fingerprints in the 

NIV application process.15 State is on schedule to have all visa-issuing posts collecting 

biometrics for all applicants by October 26, 2004, the statutory deadline. A few months 

later, on December 1, 2003, the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist, created by State in 1987, was 

transferred to the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) for integration with other government 

watchlists. The TSC maintains watchlist information—including intelligence on foreign 

persons and information from FBI terrorism investigations into U.S. persons—from all 

sources, and through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) it provides a link to 

state and local law enforcement. 

State is working with countries eligible for the Visa Waiver Program and with the 

International Civil Aviation Authority to meet the requirement that those countries 

incorporate biometric identifiers in their passports by October 2004, as mandated by the 

Enhanced Border Security Act. State recently asked for an extension to November 30, 

2006.

With the passage of the Homeland Security Act—which transferred the task of setting 

visa policy from State and to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—State 

entered into a memorandum of understanding with DHS formalizing the division of 

responsibility on visa policy. State now coordinates visa determinations with DHS’s 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers in some overseas posts, including Saudi 

Arabia.

6.3 The Department of Justice 

Immediately after September 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft developed an 

antiterrorism plan with two strategic goals: to develop intelligence to identify and 
153

apprehend terrorists, and to undertake law enforcement operations to disrupt terrorist 

planning and operations.16 Thereafter, the Department of Justice, on its own and through 

the interagency process, created a number of programs that singled out for greater 

scrutiny aliens from predominantly Muslim or Arab countries, both those inside the 

United States and those outside the United States who were seeking visas.

These programs—in roughly chronological order—were the Interview Project, the 20-day 

hold, the Absconder Apprehension Initiative, Visas Condor, and NSEERS. In addition, 

beginning on September 11 throughout this period, the Justice Department directed its 

subcomponents, the FBI and the INS, in actions that led to the detention of 768 

individuals, mostly Muslims and Arabs, considered by Justice to be of investigative 

interest following the September 11 attacks.17

The Interview Project 

On November 9, 2001, the Attorney General announced that the Department of Justice 

would interview several thousand nonimmigrant aliens from countries with an al Qaeda 

terrorist presence about their knowledge of terrorist elements within the United States,18

an undertaking known as the Interview Project. Ashcroft described the purposes of the 

project as threefold: (1) the department wanted to have law enforcement presence in the 

community, (2) it wanted the agents “off their duffs,” and (3) it was hoping to get some 

investigative leads.19 The interviews were voluntary, although in some cases interviewees 

may have felt they had no choice but to participate. Between November 9 and February 

26, 2002, law enforcement officers under the direction of U.S. Attorneys conducted 2,261 

interviews; out FBI and INS database searches had identified 4,793 potential 

interviewees.20

In March 2002, the Attorney General started a second phase of interviews of 3,189 

nonimmigrant aliens from 26 countries—the same as the Condor countries (discussed 

below)—and from a broader age range than was represented in the first phase.21 Although 

data from all the interviews conducted were entered into a database maintained by the 

Justice Management Division, they were never analyzed by the Justice Department. We 

asked Justice to provide us with documents summarizing the origin, mission, and results 

of the Interview Project, including the “intelligence, counterterrorism, and law 

enforcement benefits which resulted from the program,” but we received no documents 

prepared after February 2002, shortly before the second phase began.22

Justice asserts that the project met its two goals, intelligence gathering and disruption, a 

judgment based mostly on anecdotal reporting and speculation.23 However, as the GAO 

pointed out, there has been no analysis of the value of the law enforcement leads it 

yielded, and law enforcement officials differed on whether the interview project helped 

build ties to the communities involved or created greater hostility within them. The GAO 

concluded that without such analysis, it was difficult to draw lessons from the project. 

We agree, and add that the system was never designed to allow its results to be analyzed. 

Under guidance provided to officers conducting interviews, any valuable 

counterterrorism leads from interviews in the field were to be forwarded directly to FBI 
154

agents in the field for follow up.24 Thus, the centralized database simply served the 

interests of management and oversight and aided little in assessing the program’s benefit 

to counterterrorism. 

Twenty-Day Hold 

Effective November 14, 2001, the State Department—at the urging of Justice—issued a 

blanket 20-day hold before any visa could be issued to males 16 to 45 years old from 26 

countries in the Middle East and North Africa, plus Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 

This program was discontinued on October 18, 2002. Records we have reviewed suggest 

it yielded no useful antiterrorist information and led to no visa denials.25

The Absconder Apprehension Initiative (AAI)

Under U.S. immigration law, absconders are noncitizens who willfully fail to depart the 

United States after receiving a final order of deportation from an immigration judge. 

They may be prosecuted for a federal felony.26 After September 11, INS Commissioner 

James Ziglar proposed that the names of 314,000 absconders be placed in the Wanted 

Persons file in the National Crime Information Center database accessible by state and 

local law enforcement.27 To meet NCIC standards, every absconder entry had to be 

supported by a full set of fingerprints and a photograph so that the INS Law Enforcement 

Support Center (LESC) could electronically transmit those identifiers to the querying law 

enforcement official within ten minutes.28 If the absconder’s identity was confirmed, then 

the INS could place a federal detainer—requiring that the alien already in custody only be 

released into federal custody--or arrange for an INS agent to take the individual into 

custody and proceed with removal. Finding terrorists was not a focus of the program.29

Attorney General Ashcroft liked the idea, and Commissioner Ziglar announced it on 

December 5, 2001.30 Shortly thereafter, the initiative was recast as a counterterrorism 

program.31

Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson on January 25, 2002, provided guidance for 

the newly renamed Absconder Apprehension Initiative (AAI). He explained that the 

object of the initiative was to deport the 314,000 alien fugitives in two phases. The first 

phase would focus on several thousand priority absconders “who come from countries in 

which there has been al Qaeda terrorist presence or activity . . . because some of them 

have information that could assist our campaign against terrorism.”32 The second phase 

would locate and deport the remaining absconders.33 The Deputy Attorney General 

directed the FBI’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to remove any names that were 

subjects of active terrorist investigations.34

At the INS, the National Security Unit (NSU) was tasked with the project.35 The AAI 

effort was a massive undertaking for this small unit, which was the INS’s primary 

counterterrorism unit.36 The NSU developed a special project staff of its own agents and 

INS intelligence analysts from the Office of Intelligence, and it detailed agents from the 

INS field offices, as many as ten at a time, to develop the project.37 For each absconder 

case in which a last known address could be found, the NSU created a work file and sent 
155

it to a designated supervisory special agent in the INS field office located in that 

geographic area for follow-up. The administrative tasks associated with the AAI priority 

cases required that many field officers be assigned to the NSU headquarters unit, leaving 

fewer special agents available to investigate the AAI priority cases in the field.38

Phase 1 of the AAI covered 5,932 cases.39 In order to help immigration authorities locate 

these absconders, some of their records were entered into the National Crime Information 

Center database.40 In addition, criminal record checks were conducted on all AAI cases.41

A total of 863 absconders had a criminal history, but in many cases the final disposition 

of these criminal cases was not recorded in the NCIC database. As a result, case agents 

had to obtain additional court documents to determine what action was appropriate in 

each of these cases.

NCIC hits resulting from routine record checks conducted by law enforcement agencies 

led to the location of 95 absconders.42 In these cases, the LESC placed a detainer on the 

alien and referred the case to the local Immigration and Customs Enforcement field office 

for follow-up.43

A total of 191 absconders turned out to be U.S. legal permanent residents. Another 80 

had been naturalized and were now U.S. citizens. Together, these groups accounted for 5 

percent of priority absconders. Naturally, this statistic raises the question of how an alien 

absconder could be granted either legal residency or citizenship. The reasons for this 

error are many. Foremost is the problem of INS recordkeeping, which has always been 

unreliable. Individual immigration files are actually paper files. Each is created from an 

alien’s name and is not linked to a biometric identifier, such as a photograph or a 

fingerprint. Thus one person could easily have multiple immigration files, enabling him 

or her to apply for various immigration benefits at the same time.44 Aliens so inclined 

could use a variety of name variations or an alias to commit immigration fraud or to 

avoid deportation. In some cases, the final order of deportation had been issued years 

previously. Because of the overall poor state of INS recordkeeping, some aliens were 

able to return to the United States without being arrested on the deportation order at the 

port of entry.

Ultimately, 4,074 cases were closed.45 The 1,858 remaining cases either were still under 

investigation or lacked a final report. The total number of absconder cases that were 

actually closed because the subject was determined to be no longer an absconder was 

2,267, or approximately 38 percent of the original number. 
156

By early 2003, 1,139 of the designated absconders had been apprehended, 704 had 

removed from the country, and 224 were in custody and awaiting removal. In addition, 

U.S. Attorneys had criminally prosecuted 45 individuals, 41 of whom for criminal 

immigration violations.46 Although the INS had referred 14 cases to the FBI on the 

grounds of their possible links to terrorism, no absconders who were removed as part of 

phase 1 were deported under a terrorism statute or prosecuted for terrorism-related 

crimes. 

 Thus, even though extensive investigative resources were committed to the effort, only 

38 percent of the priority absconders could be located or their immigration status verified. 

The immigration records system was so poor that approximately 5 percent of the 

absconders had, in fact, become legal residents or naturalized citizens of the United 

States. The INS’s difficulty in locating absconders is consistent with the difficulty 

generally faced by immigration authorities attempting to locate aliens inside our country, 

whether they came in legally through a port of entry or illegally across an unguarded 

border. It is very difficult to find alien absconders without extraordinary effort or pure 

luck.

The Commission believes the remaining absconders who were not apprehended in the 

first phase of the program no longer receive special attention from immigration 

enforcement personnel. Indeed, DHS has absorbed phase 2 of the AAI into its current 

fugitive operations unit. 

The Visas Condor Program 

The Visas Condor Program was initiated on January 26, 2002. It mandated additional 

security screening by the FBI and other agencies for certain visa applicants from 26 

predominantly Muslim countries. However, neither the FBI nor the CIA was able to 

process these visa applicants in a timely fashion, because their other responsibilities 

burgeoned after the September 11 attacks. In July 2002, the FBI acknowledged it could 

not meet the agreed-on 30-day target for name checks, and on July 20, 2002, the State 

Department agreed to place these visa applicants on indefinite hold until the FBI 

responded. In September 2002, the CIA withdrew from the program because it had 

uncovered no significant information from these visa applicants. The CIA was already 

AAI Phase 1

5,932 Total initial cases 

2,267 Cases closed after investigation verified departure or immigration status 

1,807 Cases closed after investigation, unable to locate or verify immigration status 

704 Absconders located and removed from U.S. during Phase 1 

1,858 Cases remain open 

14 Cases referred to FBI for further investigation relating to possible terrorist links 

0 Cases prosecuted or removed on terrorism grounds 
157

placing all important information into the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist, used by the State 

Department to screen these same visa applicants when they submitted their applications. 

On October 2, 2003, the Condor criteria were changed and more narrowly focused.47 As 

of April 2004, approximately 130,000 Condor name checks had been completed.48 No 

individual subject to a Visas Condor name check has had his or her visa application 

turned down on grounds of being a terrorist.

NSEERS

In May 2002, the Attorney General directed the INS to develop an entry-exit registration 

system at selected ports of entry, and on September 11, 2002, the INS implemented the 

National Security Exit and Entry Registration System.49 The program had a number of 

components. It mandated the photographing, fingerprinting, and interviewing of certain 

individuals from certain predominantly Arab and Muslim countries upon their arrival in 

the United States, and required the same kind of registration for such individuals already 

inside the United States. It also mandated that these individuals be reinterviewed 30 days 

after their entry to the United States, that they notify the INS if they changed their 

address, that they present themselves for an annual interview if they remained inside the 

United States, and that they have an interview when they departed the United States. 

Finally, the program provided for enforcement measures against those who were found to 

be in violation of immigration or other laws when they sought to register or who violated 

program rules by, for example, failing to register at all.50

NSEERS was imposed in phases. Beginning on September 11, 2002, inspectors of the 

INS (now Customs and Border Protection, or CBP) were required to register 

nonimmigrant aliens applying for admission to the United States who were citizens or 

nationals of the state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, and Syria.51

Beginning October 1, 2002, when all ports of entry were to have the new alien 

registration database and equipment installed,52 inspectors were also required to register 

nonimmigrant males between the ages of 16 and 45 years of age who were citizens of 

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.53 A discretionary component allowed State 

Department consular officials and INS inspectors to order the registration of aliens from 

any country if they determined such action to be in the interests of national security.54

The registration at ports of entry worked as follows. All aliens applying for admission to 

the United States were screened against the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) 

by inspectors at ports of entry. If an alien applying for entry was identified in IBIS as 

being subject to NSEERS registration, the alien was referred to secondary inspection for 

enrollment in NSEERS. In the secondary inspection area, the registrant was placed under 

oath and asked predefined questions that covered, among other things, biography, 

employment, school, intended address in the United States, points of contact, and credit 

card information.55 The registrant’s photograph and two index fingerprints were captured 

digitally. The applicant’s biometric and textual data were then stored in a database 

administered by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).56
158

The biometric data were checked against four databases containing information on 

convicted aggravated felons, known or suspected terrorists, people wanted on criminal 

warrants, and criminal alien recidivists.57 If there was a hit from one of these database 

checks, or if another immigration law violation was uncovered as part of the routine 

border screening, the person could be denied entry. If there was no derogatory 

information discovered, then the alien was enrolled in NSEERS and admitted to the 

United States.58

As of May 2, 2004, there had been 352,385 NSEERS registrations at ports of entry 

involving 141,168 individuals,59 and 1,352 enforcement actions taken at ports of entry.60

These actions often involved denial of entry, because, for example, the alien had failed to 

comply with NSEERS requirements when previously in the United States. Some denials 

related to more serious conduct involved such violations of criminal law as document 

fraud, espionage, crimes involving moral turpitude, and willful misrepresentations of 

fact.61

Once admitted into the United States, NSEERS registrants were required to report to an 

INS/DHS field office for a 30-day interview between the 30th and 40th day of their 

admission and within 10 days of the one-year anniversary of that admission. As of May 

2, 2004, a total of 30,490 30-day and 172 annual interviews had been conducted.62 DHS 

has estimated that 400 to 2,000 individuals were referred to ICE for investigation 

following the 30-day interview.63

Registrants also were directed to report to designated ports of departure for an interview 

on the date they left the United States.64 As of May 22, 2003, there had been 34,439 

departure interviews.65 However, the departure interviews were conducted at an 

immigration office and not at the airport terminal, so it is “quite possible that a registrant 

could be given a departure interview by CBP, and then fail[] to depart.”66 Significant 

changes in the infrastructure of airports would be required for NSEERS exit procedures 

to occur at the actual point of departure.67

NSEERS domestic call-in registration began on November 15, 2002, and ended on April 

25, 2003. Four call-in notices were announced through publication in the Federal

Register setting forth the countries and conditions under which certain nonimmigrants 

were required to register. Male citizens or nationals 16 years of age or older from Iran, 

Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, 

North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, 

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and Kuwait who were 

admitted as nonimmigrants on or before September 30, 2002, were directed to register in 

NSEERS at their local immigration offices.68 The registration process was the same as 

that at the ports of entry, described above. As of May 2, 2004, a total of 83,909 

individuals were registered pursuant to call-in registration.69 If the domestic registrant 

was not in violation of any law and there was no hit in any of the four databases, he was 

told to report for an annual interview, but not for a 30-day interview.70
159

A significant number of domestic registrants were in violation of some law. According to 

DHS records, about 13,000 call-in registrants, or 16 percent, were found to be in violation 

of immigration laws when they appeared; they were registered, arrested, and processed 

for removal from the United States.71 The call-in registration process had considerable 

problems, caused by a flood of applicants in the last week of the call-in period, the failure 

to provide sufficient computer terminals to quickly handle the processing, and the INS’s 

lack of preparation for handling the approximately 13,000 individuals who were 

arrested.72

Estimates of the number of NSEERS violators—individuals who failed to register 

initially, failed to show up for the 30-day or annual interview, or failed to register their 

departure through a designated port of departure—vary, in part because the database used 

to produce this information has been error-prone and unreliable.73 As of May 22, 2003, 

the Department of Homeland Security put the figure at 12,670 “potential NSEERS 

violators.”74 By May 2, 2004, DHS reported it had begun 1,883 investigations: 132 

NSEERS violators were arrested, 372 were determined to have left the country, and 457 

were found to be in compliance with NSEERS regulations.75

There was significant opposition to the NSEERS program from some U.S. government 

officials, who feared the program would offend countries that were U.S. allies in the 

global war on terror.76 State personnel we interviewed said that NSEERS did harm our 

relations with foreign countries whose citizens were subject to its registration 

requirements. FBI Director Mueller said it came at a cost.77 Documents we reviewed, 

including correspondence from foreign countries’ representatives, indicate that some 

foreign governments were strongly opposed to having their nationals subject to NSEERS 

registration.78

On March 31, 2003, apparently in response to these concerns, the White House sent out a 

“global message” on NSEERS from the Homeland Security Council to the executive 

secretaries of State, Justice, Homeland Security, the National Security Council, the Office 

of Management and Budget, the White House Domestic Policy Council, the Office of the 

Vice President, and the President’s Chief of Staff. The purpose of this message was “to 

explain responsibilities and ramifications of NSEERS to foreign governments” and avoid 

misunderstandings with foreign partners.79

As of May 5, 2004, individuals from 170 countries had been registered in NSEERS.80

The country with the largest number of NSEERS registrants—38,000—was Indonesia, 

followed by Pakistan with 29,000, and Iran with 15,000.81

According to the Department of Homeland Security, the US VISIT (Visitor and 

Information Status Indication Technology) program—which captures the fingerprints and 

photographs of nonimmigrant visa holders upon entry and exit—“will ultimately 

subsume the functions of the NSEERS program.”82

DHS asserts that 11 persons out of approximately 140,000 registrants have been shown to 

have a connection to terrorism.83 Of these, six were NSEERS call-in registrants, though it 

is not clear from information we have received whether the registration process led to 
160

their arrest; two were denied entry at the port of entry following a hit in the TIPOFF 

watchlist, and thus their identifications were not attributable, in other words, to the 

NSEERS program; one failed to appear for a call-in registration and was encountered and 

arrested in the field on grounds that are not clear to us; one was arrested, and we have no 

information whether he was required to participate in the NSEERS program; and one is 

currently “at large.”84

The counterterrorism benefits from the NSEERS program are unclear. The Department of 

Homeland Security asserts that arresting and processing for removal the approximately 

12,000 individuals “who appeared for call-in registration and were found to be illegally in 

the U.S.” had a deterrent effect because it “signaled a clear message to those ‘sleeper’ 

terrorists embedded in U.S. communities, that U.S. immigration law would be 

enforced.”85 DHS also claims that NSEERS had a disruptive effect because it “forc[ed] 

would be terrorists to comply with the terms and conditions of their admission to the 

United States or run the risk of being removed from the United States. This additional 

pressure may make the job of carrying out a terrorist mission much more difficult, 

therefore disrupting the mission.”86 But one witness who testified before the Commission 

maintained that the call-in registration component of NSEERS may have diminished the 

willingness of immigrant communities to supply the government with intelligence.87

It is difficult to gauge the counterterrorism benefit from these programs because 

information on how they have affected terrorists is not always easy to come by. Our 

analysis of the 9/11 plot and the actions taken by the hijackers while inside the United 

States suggests that the conspirators worked diligently to manipulate the U.S. 

immigration system to enable them to remain inside the United States long enough to 

commit the attack. They appear to have been aware of U.S. immigration laws and 

regulations, and to have structured their travel and entries to the United States with those 

constraints in mind. As we have noted, the enforcement of immigration laws might have 

disrupted the plot if it had led, for example, to the removal of Mohamed Atta from the 

United States when he attempted to enter in January 2001 with the wrong visa. Likewise, 

the lack of an entry-exit system hampered the efforts of intelligence and law enforcement 

officials to locate Nawaf al Hazmi when he was finally placed on the watchlist in August 

2001. Thus, the proposition that these programs had the potential to disrupt and perhaps 

to deter terrorist plots forming inside the United States after 9/11 certainly has some 

support. Ultimately, it is difficult to measure the success of operations whose goals 

included deterrence. However, our research demonstrates that terrorists often need to 

break laws in order to successfully complete their operations, undertaken in the United 

States and elsewhere. They routinely commit immigration and document fraud, and often 

sustain their operations with petty crime. The routine enforcement of laws, including 

those not specifically related to terrorism, can therefore raise obstacles for and in some 

cases have a deterrent effect on individuals intending to commit terrorist attacks. 

Perhaps significantly, a senior al Qaeda detainee has stated that after the 9/11 attacks, 

U.S. government efforts to more closely monitor the American homeland through such 

actions as, as he termed it, reviewing Muslims’ immigration files and deporting 

nonpermanent residents made al Qaeda operations more difficult.88 The detainee cited 
161

problems in obtaining tourist visas without interviews and instances in which visa 

applications were turned down even when the visa documents and passport 

documentation were complete.89 If this detainee’s account is credible, these programs 

may have had some deterrent effect on al Qaeda planning and operations in the United 

States and may have required terrorists to consider other tactics for entering and 

remaining inside the United States or to attack elsewhere. 

6.4 Response at the Borders, September 11–20, 2001 

In the days immediately following the attacks, the immigration and customs services 

undertook a number of measures, independently and in cooperation with one another and 

other agencies in the government, to better secure America’s borders. The 

counterterrorism role so long ignored was finally getting the attention it deserved, 

although these measures taxed the limited human resources and technology then in place 

on U.S. borders.

“Level One” Border Security Measures

At about 10:00 on the morning of the attack, the new INS commissioner, Jim Ziglar, 

received a call from the acting commissioner of the Customs Service, Chuck Winwood.90

He recommended that the two services implement their most stringent “Level One” 

inspections of travelers and goods seeking admission into the United States at land, sea, 

and air ports of entry.91 No one knew if a second wave of attacks was coming. Ziglar 

agreed, and an order was issued throughout both the Customs and INS system.92

In addition, both INS and Customs immediately activated their command and control 

centers to monitor and provide directives for border operations. For both services, these 

centers collected the incoming information that by the evening of September 11 helped 

identify most of the hijackers and retrieve their arrival/departure records,93 information 

that was immediately provided to the FBI. As the week wore on, the centers also 

processed information concerning security and trade at the borders, lists of visitors who 

were not permitted to leave the United States, and the arrests of possible terrorists who 

had immigration violations, and they helped review international airline passenger 

manifests for arriving travelers.94

Airport Inspections. On the morning of September 11, airports across the country 

initially were preoccupied with devising ways to clear out passengers from airport 

terminals, while the FAA diverted incoming international flights to Canada and Mexico. 

As a no-fly ban was put into effect, some airport immigration inspectors were temporarily 

reassigned to help with the mounting traveler backups at the land borders. On the 

following day, airport immigration inspectors, many of whom were still conducting 

security at their assigned airports, were given permission to carry a firearm.95

By the time the flight ban was lifted on September 13, the INS had deployed 318 Border 

Patrol agents to nine airports—about as many agents as were working the entire northern 
162

border.96 The INS had suggested this deployment to the Attorney General, and Ashcroft 

had relayed the request to President Bush, who approved it.97

On September 13, both airspace and airports reopened under tight security. However, 

“Level One” procedures did not affect admission procedures or wait times at airports as 

dramatically as they had those at land borders, which technically never shut down. The 

difference between the two was that airports always had processed all international 

travelers, whereas land ports of entry scrutinized travelers and vehicles randomly. The 

heightened threat alert placed a tremendous strain on their human and technological 

resources.

Land borders. Given the tremendous volume of people and commerce that cross U.S. 

land borders every day, a shift from random to comprehensive and thorough immigration 

and customs inspections caused an urgent problem. Land borders process about four 

times as many travelers as airports, and have about three times as many immigrant 

entries.98 In addition, the United States and Canada have the largest trading relationship 

in the world, worth hundreds of billions of dollars per year.99

Under Level One, nearly every commercial or passenger vehicle was to be thoroughly 

checked—under the car, under the hood, in trunks, and in glove compartments. People 

also were checked more carefully. Dedicated cross-border commuter programs and 

remote inspection reporting systems were suspended.100 Ambassador Bridge in Detroit 

saw its normal 20-minute wait grind to a 12-hour crawl on September 12. The bridge 

normally handles 6,000 trucks per day, and 25 percent of the total trade from Canada. 

Commercial traffic was paralyzed. Automobile plants in Detroit dependent on just-intime deliveries shut down.101 The Customs and INS commissioners were inundated with 

phone calls from distressed business leaders whose financial lifeblood was free 

interchange with trading partners on the other side of the border.102 All this occurred 

despite inspectors working 12 to 16 hours a day, sometimes seven days a week.103

With the pressure building on the borders and repercussions being felt in the private 

sector, it became critical to border authorities to minimize wait times with Level One 

procedures in place. Additional primary inspection lanes were opened where the 

infrastructure of the port permitted. While in line, arriving cargo vehicles were 

prescreened by roving inspectors, nonintrusive technologies, and canine enforcement 

teams.104 In full cooperation with each other, the INS and Customs, along with additional 

support from airport inspectors temporarily reassigned to help at the land borders, the 

National Guard, the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency, local law enforcement, and 

the private sector, reduced wait times almost to pre–September 11 norms by September 

17, although the heightened alert was never lifted.105

Support to the FBI. On the afternoon of September 11, Jim Ziglar participated in a 

meeting called by the Attorney General and attended by Deputy Attorney General 

Thompson and the new FBI director, Robert Mueller, among others. Its purpose was to 

discuss the Justice Department’s strategy to prevent a second wave of attacks while 

investigating the September 11 attack itself. Ziglar was told that the FBI was in charge of 
163

the investigation and that the INS was expected to support them. Ziglar quickly 

reassigned 1,000—or nearly half—of his special agents to the FBI, which dramatically 

diminished the ability of the INS to exercise its immigration enforcement mission. This 

meeting also laid the foundation for the Attorney General’s subsequent use of INS 

immigration authority as a tool in the war on terror.106

Transit without Visa Suspended. Within days of September 11, the INS and Customs 

suspended “in-transit” processing for air passengers.107 Traditionally, in-transit 

processing allowed passengers whose final destination was in the United States to enter 

the country and catch a connecting flight to that destination before undergoing 

immigration and customs inspections. The suspension of the program required all flights 

from abroad to be inspected at their first arriving port of entry.108 The same procedures 

were to apply at technical stops for refueling.109 All passengers and crew had to exit the 

aircraft with all carry-on baggage and then be escorted by airline personnel to the INS, 

Customs, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service for full inspection.110

Defense Department Assistance. On September 12, Customs leadership placed a call to 

Michigan Governor John Engler requesting the help of Michigan’s National Guard at 

land ports of entry.111 During this time, the President also asked state governors to 

provide extra security at airports with National Guard personnel. As a result, 7,000 

National Guard members were activated to supplement security at 421 airports.112 Six 

months later, the INS and Department of Defense signed an agreement lending National 

Guard personnel for six months for specific duties at land borders.113

6.5 The Department of Homeland Security 

September 11 brought border security to the forefront of the President’s counterterrorism 

agenda. One result was to sweep the Immigration and Naturalization Service and U.S. 

Customs into the Department of Homeland Security, where they were reconfigured in a 

manner that hinted of past debates about restructuring the INS into its immigration 

services and immigration enforcement functions. Approximately 60,000 employees 

working at U.S. borders, interior enforcement, and immigration benefit services were 

divided into separate agencies for the purpose of “minimizing duplication of efforts, 

improving coordination, and combining functions that are currently fragmented and 

inefficient.”114 In addition, about 40,000 Coast Guard officials, who interdict about 5,000 

illegal aliens at sea per year, were also moved into DHS. While the President initially 

sought to pull the State Department’s Consular Affairs visa issuance function into DHS, 

in the end DHS was given responsibility only for determining visa issuance policy.115

In his message of support to Congress in 2002, the President articulated a strategic 

purpose for the Department’s Border and Transportation Directorate, which has 

responsibility for immigration: “Terrorism is a global threat and we must 

improve our border security to help keep out those who mean to do us harm. We 

closely monitor who is coming into and out of our country to help prevent foreign 

terrorists from entering our country and bringing instruments of terror. At the 
164

same time, we must expedite the legal flow of people and goods on which our 

economy depends.”116

The directorate is working hard to develop policies and programs that will create the 

foundations of the vigorous information network necessary to prevent terrorist entry. For 

example, DHS is attempting to incorporate new elements of enforcement into overseas 

operations at consulates and in airports with U.S.-bound air carriers. The first phase of 

the new border screening and entry-exit system, USVISIT, although based on an 

antiquated technology platform, is working now to capture a photograph and two 

fingerprints from travelers originating in countries where visas are issued, and it has had 

some success in catching fraud. Verification systems such as the Student and Exchange 

Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and the lost and stolen passport database housed by 

Interpol are now available to inspectors who refer travelers to a secondary inspection; to 

be truly helpful, these systems must be integrated into USVISIT in the primary lines. And 

the National Targeting Center, assisted by the new Terrorist Screening Center, provides 

information support to inspectors at ports of entry so that they can make more informed 

decisions about potential terrorists and harmful cargo attempting to enter the United 

States.

. . . 

But while the rhetoric continues to focus on the critical mission of preventing terrorist 

entry, virtually no attention is being given to the most recent information available about 

terrorist travel and to the mission, at least equally important, of preventing terrorists who 

get in from staying in. All elements of terrorist border activity—travel facilitation, border 

inspections, compliance issues, and immigration benefits—are part of a continuum of 

terrorist planning and activity on both sides of the U.S. border, requiring a coordinated 

response within the national counterterrorism strategy. This has yet to be fully recognized 

and implemented. 

The merging of immigration and customs border functions within the Department of 

Homeland Security, together with the initial construction of a biometric entry-exit system 

at the airports, has addressed some of the glaring deficiencies highlighted by the 

September 11 attacks. However, border inspectors today still do not have basic 

intelligence and operational training to aid them in detecting and preventing terrorist 

entry, or adequate access to databases important to determining admissibility, or even 

viable options to prevent documents known to be fraudulent from being returned to 

travelers denied entry into the United States. There is no programmatic effort to focus on 

terrorist travel facilitators, and special agents lack the resources and authority to pursue 

visitors for immigration violations associated with terrorist activity. Similarly, 

immigration benefits adjudicators do not have effective and efficient tools to conduct 

background security checks on applicants. Each immigration encounter with an alien 

should be treated as both an opportunity and an obligation to verify the individual’s 

identity and legitimate purpose in seeking to enter or to stay in the United States. Yet 

border officials still do not have access at every contact, whether overseas or within the 

United States, to a visitor’s full U.S. travel and immigration history 
165

Finally, immigration law remains immensely complex. This unnecessary complexity 

affects inspectors, special agents, prosecutors, and immigration benefit adjudicators alike 

who struggle to interpret and implement it every day. 

1

 Timothy S., Chief of the Terrorist Mobility Branch, interview (Oct. 30, 2003). 

2 Examples of finished intelligence produced by the Terrorist Mobility Branch include: A Reference Guide 

for Terrorist Passports, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, Oct. 21, 2002; Clandestine Travel Facilitators: 

Key Enablers of Terrorism, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Dec. 31, 2002; and Analysis of Passports, CIA, 

Directorate of Intelligence, Jan. 2004. 

3

 Timothy S. interview (Oct. 30, 2003). 

4

 Ibid. 

5

 Ibid. 

6

 For example, CIA Director George Tenet wrote to Dale Watson, the Assistant Director of the FBI’s 

Counterterrorism Division, on Nov. 15, 2001 requesting FBI assistance in obtaining the passports and 

supporting documents of the 9/11 hijackers that were under FBI control for the purpose of developing 

actionable intelligence. There was no response to this request.

7

 DOS designated Regional Security Officers employed by State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security to be the 

liaison at foreign posts with the FBI in the collection of evidence. Through this process, the FBI collected 

from State the visa applications of the September 11 hijackers once their identities were established. 

8

 Mary Ryan interview (Sept. 29, Oct. 3, Oct. 9, 2003). 

9

 Ibid. 

10 DOS cable, “Muslims Need Not Apply: Fear and Rumors Lead Hejazis to Cancel U.S. Travel,” Oct. 3, 

2001. 11 Investigators from the State Office of Inspector General who visited Saudi Arabia in 2002 described “a 

feeling of lack of support, almost betrayal by CA and the Department” among consular personnel in 

Jeddah. DOS OIG record, “Findings in Jeddah,” undated. 

12 Included in the border security equipment provided to each host nation are passport readers, cameras, a 

flatbed scanner and fingerprint reader. The United States government pays for installment and maintenance. 

13 DOS document, “Follow-up to A/S Harty’s Meeting on 11/21, 9/11 Commission,” Dec. 31, 2003. 

14 Ibid. 

15 Ibid. 

16 DOJ document, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Final Report on Interview Project, Feb. 26, 

2002.

17 We addressed the matter of the “special interest” detainees in the Final Commission Report, and so do 

not do so here. 

18 DOJ document, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Final Report on Interview Project, Feb. 26, 

2002.

19 John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003). 

20 DOJ document, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Final Report on Interview Project, Feb. 26, 

2002, fn 2. 681 had left the United States; 1,097 of the individuals in the country could not be located; 785 

were determined to have moved, complicating the effort to locate and interview them. Fewer than 20 were 

arrested in connection with the interviews, most charged with immigration violations. Three individuals 

were arrested on criminal charges, none related to terrorism. At least 10 individuals refused to be 

interviewed.

21 GAO report, Justice Department’s Project to Interview Aliens after September 11, 2001, GAO-03-459, 

April 2003. In March 2003, when the Interview Project was the subject of a GAO investigation and report, 

law enforcement officers had interviewed 3,216 aliens, or about 42 percent of the 7,602 non-duplicate 

names on the original interview list. Because of uncertainty with the identity, address, and entry-exit 

information regarding the 7,602 potential interview subjects, it was not possible to state with certainty how 

many of the names represented unique individuals, and how many of those individuals were in the United 

States and, therefore, eligible to be interviewed. 

22 Commission document, Department of Justice Document Request Number 9, Question 12 (Oct. 20, 

2003). 
166

23 In addition, DOJ asserts that it strengthened the bonds between federal, state and local law enforcement 

and improved relations between the law enforcement officers and the Muslim communities involved. 

24 Ken Wainstain interview (May 5, 2004). 

25 DOS document, “Follow-up to A/S Harty’s Meeting on 11/21, 9/11 Commission,” Dec. 31, 2003. 

26 8 USC § 1253 (failure to depart, imprisonment up to four years, 10 years if a criminal); 8 USC § 1324d 

(failure to depart, civil fine of $500 a day); 8 USC § 1326 (reentry after deportation, imprisonment from 

two to 20 years). 

27 James Ziglar interview (Nov. 24, 2003). 

28 FBI document, National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 2000 Operating Manual Section 5.6, 

“Operator’s Lesson Plan,” Jan. 2004. 

29 James Ziglar interview (Nov. 13, 2003). The directive from the Attorney General did not define what was 

meant by “from countries . . . .” Under the immigration law, this could apply to citizens of a country or 

persons who were born in one of these countries. 30 Ibid. 

31 Ibid. 

32 DAG Thompson said that the first group to be investigated would be “a group of fewer than a thousand, 

many of whom appear to be convicted felons.” These “special interest countries” were Afghanistan, 

Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, 

Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, 

Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen, 

Territories of Gaza and the West bank. DHS document, Closing Report for AAI Project when it was 

transferred from Investigations, National Security Unit to Detention and Removal Office prepared by 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, July 10, 2003. 

33 DOJ document, Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General to Commissioner, Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation, Director, U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. 

Attorneys, Subject: Guidance for Absconder Apprehension Initiative, Jan. 25, 2002. 

34 The Commission believes that the FTTTF did remove some subjects from the list; we have not yet 

learned how many and whether these subjects remained of interest to the FBI on terrorism grounds. Lou 

Nardi interview (Oct. 20, 2003). 

35 Ibid. See also, Testimony of Joe Green, INS Assistant Commissioner for Investigations before the House 

Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, June 19, 2002. 

36 To meet the terrorist-related reporting requirements imposed by the Department of Justice, the NSU 

developed special reporting requirements to ensure that all encounters with designated absconders were 

treated as a “significant incident” and therefore reported within 24 hours. In the usual course of 

immigration enforcement activity, significant incidents are those that involve death or injury of an officer, 

significant public and media interest, or an unusual event, such as the apprehension of large numbers of 

smuggled aliens. 

37 James Ziglar interview (Nov. 13, 2003). These additional officers organized leads, made copies of the 

documents in the file, created working files, and kept track of the case assignment. 

38 Lou Nardi interview (Oct. 20, 2003). 

39 DHS document, Closing Report for AAI Project when it was transferred from Investigations, National 

Security Unit to Detention and Removal Office prepared by Immigration and Customs Enforcement, July 

10, 2003. 

40 Not all records were entered into the NCIC because immigration files do not always provide the 

documents required by NCIC to support entry into the system. For example, INS files frequently do not 

have fingerprints, photographs or final deportation orders. 

41 A continuing problem is the failure to have a compatible fingerprint system between the FBI and 

immigration. The FBI standard uses 10 fingerprints, as does the criminal database used by state and local 

law enforcement, NCIC. Immigration, however, continues to use the two index finger prints that can be 

matched in their watchlist database. In other words, if a terrorist enters the country and is fingerprinted on 

entry, as the U.S. VISIT system now requires of some travelers, these fingerprints cannot be checked 

against the databases used by the FBI or state and local law enforcement. The joining of the two systems 

has been under development for many years but is behind schedule. DOJ OIG, “IDENT/IAFIS: The Batres 

Case and the Status of the Integration Project,” Mar. 2004. 
167

42 The Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) confirmed all NCIC hits on immigration absconders in the 

NCIC Immigration Violators File. Not all law enforcement agencies arrest immigration absconders even 

after they have received a “hit” from NCIC. Some agencies believe that they cannot legally arrest or detain 

an alien unless a criminal arrest warrant has been issued. 

43 Craig E. Ferrell, International Association of Chiefs of Police, “The War on Terror’s ‘Absconder 

Initiative,’” found at www.theiacp.org/documents, stating, “The NCIC database has always been used to 

aid law enforcement officers in identifying persons wanted criminally. The FBI and the Department of 

Justice should take steps to immediately remove those individuals from the database who only have civil 

absconder warrants.” 

44 Some multiple immigration files were created when the alien applied for immigration benefits and the 

original immigration file was not located or known, resulting in the alien having more than one file. One 

permanent file may be on the enforcement side of INS and another “A” file on the service side of INS. With 

over a million aliens arrested each year and over a million aliens applying for benefits in most years, the 

INS was overwhelmed. As discussed earlier, Sheikh Omar Ali Abdel Rahman who was convicted of 

terrorism, had two immigration files at the same time. He did this by changing his name slightly and filing 

for immigration benefits at New York City and Newark, New Jersey. See also, GAO Report I-2003-004, 

“The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Removal of Aliens Issued Final Orders,” Feb. 2003. 

45 BREAKDOWN OF 4,074 AAI CLOSED CASES 

Administrative closing 55 

Asylee/Refugee 14 

Board of Immigration Appeals 42 

Convention Against Torture 3 

Deceased 24 

Duplicate 12 

Identified as Females45 55 

In State or Federal Custody 45 

In Legal Non-Immigrant Status 11 

LIFE Act Applicant 8 

Legal Permanent Resident 191 

Motion to Reopen Deportation Hearing 64 

No Final Deportation Order 99 

Under Order of Supervision 72 

Other45 56 

Pending Application for Immigration Benefits 47 

Prior Removal 99 

Refused Entry 7 

Released on Bond 122 

Removed from the U.S. 704 

Released on Order of Recognizance 25 

Self-deported45 390 

Stay of Deportation or Removal45 10 

Temporary Protected Status (TPS)45 18 

Unable to Locate or Leads Exhausted 1807 

United States Citizen 80 

Waiver Approved 5 

Withholding 9 

Total 4,074 46 Testimony of Mike Dougherty, Director of Operations, Bureau of Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), Department of Homeland Security, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 

Immigration, May 8, 2003. A total of 41 were charged with criminal immigration violations. 47 DOS document, “Follow-up to A/S Harty’s Meeting on 11/21, 9/11 Commission,” Dec. 31, 2003. 

48 DOS document, Letter from Karl Hoffman to Daniel Marcus, Apr.5, 2004. 

49 DHS document, “National Security Entry-Exit Registration System: Program Overview and Analysis of 

Effectiveness as a Law Enforcement Tool,” Prepared by Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
168

NSEERS Project Coordinator, May 22, 2003. The Attorney General’s authority to mandate this program is 

spelled out in 8 CFR 2§ 64.1. 

50 Ibid. 

51 Ibid. 

52 A total of 750 NSEERS terminals were deployed to 270 legacy INS offices nationwide and 4,633 INS 

personnel were trained in NSEERS. DHS document, “National Security Entry-Exit Registration System: 

Program Overview and Analysis of Effectiveness as a Law Enforcement Tool,” Prepared by Bureau of 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, NSEERS Project Coordinator, May 22, 2003. 

53 DOJ document, Memo from Johnny Williams, Executive Associate Commissioner of Field Operations to 

the field, “Summary of NSEERS,” Sept. 9, 2002. 

54 DHS document, “National Security Entry-Exit Registration System: Program Overview and Analysis of 

Effectiveness as a Law Enforcement Tool,” Prepared by Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

NSEERS Project Coordinator, May 22, 2003. For example, if the nonimmigrant made unexplained trips to 

Afghanistan or the nonimmigrant met characteristics established by current intelligence updates and 

advisories. Ibid. 

55 Ibid. 

56 Ibid. 

57 After the initial registration, usually within two weeks of the registration, NSEERS registration 

information also was checked against databases of derogatory information—the TIPOFF terrorist watch list 

and the FBI’s Violent Gang Terrorist Organization Files (VGTOF)—by the FBI’s Foreign Terrorist 

Tracking Task Force (FTTTF). Any potential matches to records were sent to the INS National Security 

Unit (NSU) for investigation. DHS document, “National Security Entry-Exit Registration System: Program 

Overview and Analysis of Effectiveness as a Law Enforcement Tool,” Prepared by Bureau of Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, NSEERS Project Coordinator, May 22, 2003. 

58 Ibid. 

59 A person is subject to NSEERS registration each time they enter. 

60 DHS document, “Compliance Enforcement Summary,” May 4, 2004, NSEERS Statistics. 

61 DOJ document, “NSEERS Statistics September 11, 2002 through January 29, 2003,” undated. 

62 DHS document, “Compliance Enforcement Summary,” May 4, 2004. 

63 DHS document, “National Security Entry-Exit Registration System: Program Overview and Analysis of 

Effectiveness as a Law Enforcement Tool,” Prepared by Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

NSEERS Project Coordinator, May 22, 2003. 64 Ibid. INS officers were permitted to grant NSEERS waivers for aliens who crossed the border frequently 

and for aliens who sought to depart from an undesignated port. Memo from Johnny Williams, Executive 

Associate Commissioner for Field Operations to the field, “Guidance for Special Registration, or NSEERS 

Waivers,” Sept. 30, 2002. 

65 Ibid. We did not receive data for departure interviews conducted as of May 4, 2004. 

66 Ibid. 

67 Ibid. 

68 Ibid. 

69 DHS document, “Compliance Enforcement Summary,” May 4, 2004. 

70 DHS document, “National Security Entry-Exit Registration System: Program Overview and Analysis of 

Effectiveness as a Law Enforcement Tool,” Prepared by Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

NSEERS Project Coordinator, May 22, 2003. 71 The precise number of NSEERS domestic registrants who were arrested and processed for removal is 

unclear. One document, the “National Security Entry-Exit Registration System: Program Overview and 

Analysis of Effectiveness as a Law Enforcement Tool,” Prepared by Bureau of Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, NSEERS Project Coordinator, May 22, 2003, states variously that “over 13,000” call-in 

registrants were arrested and that “10,000 to 12,000 individuals who appeared for call-in registration and 

were found to be illegally in the U.S. were arrested.” In other words, the document appears to not take a 

consistent position, let alone attempt to precisely quantify the number arrested. A May 2, 2004 summary of 

NSEERS statistics lists the number of Notices to Appear issued as 10,037. DHS document, “Compliance 

Enforcement Summary,” May 4, 2004. It is not clear to us how this number could be lower than the 13,000 

figure contained in the May 22, 2003, summary since the Notice to Appear is the standard form used to 

begin an immigration removal proceeding. 
169

72 DHS document, “National Security Entry-Exit Registration System: Program Overview and Analysis of 

Effectiveness as a Law Enforcement Tool,” Prepared by Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

NSEERS Project Coordinator, May 22, 2003. 73 Ibid. “The discrepancy between the high number of NSEERS violators and the relatively low number of 

target folders is due to data integrity issues. . . . Since the release of version 5.4, FIELD OPS has seen a 

dramatic decrease in the numbers of possible NSEERS violators being reported in error.” 

74 Ibid. 

75 DHS document, “Compliance Enforcement Summary,” May 4, 2004. 

76 James Ziglar interview (Nov. 13, 2003). 

77 Robert Mueller interview (Jan. 13, 2004). 

78 For example, on September 27, 2002, the Canadians wrote Secretary of State Powell expressing 

“considerable disappointment” that NSEERS applies to Canadians born outside Canada. Letter to Secretary 

of State Colin Powell from Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham, Sept. 27, 2002; in 2003, 

representatives of the affected countries began having meetings with the Attorney General and Homeland 

Security Secretary Ridge. Ambassadors from Pakistan and Indonesia expressed concern to the White House 

and the Secretaries of State and Defense about the detentions and removals of their nationals from the 

United States. The ambassador of Pakistan said that inclusion in NSEERS had the “potential to weaken the 

government and President Musharraf.” DOJ record, “Aide Memoire,” Jan. 29, 2002; Pakistan’s foreign 

minister met with the Attorney General, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the National Security 

Advisor. DOJ record, “Meeting Between the Attorney General and Milan Khurshid Mahmoud Kasuri, 

Foreign Minister of Pakistan,” Jan. 28, 2003; In a Department of State cable of January 3, 2004, the 

American Ambassador in Islamabad concluded a seething description of NSEERS, stating, “To a large 

extent, the U.S. cannot win here on NSEERS, regardless of the facts (35 percent of Pakistanis in the US are 

out of status.) There are few things that Benazir Bhutto and President Musharraf agree on, but NSEERS is 

one of them.” DOS cable, “Sharp Pakistani Criticism of NSEERS,” Jan. 3, 2003. 

79 White House memo, “National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS) Global Message,” 

Mar. 31, 2003. 

80 DHS document, “Compliance Enforcement Summary,” May 4, 2004, NSEERS Statistics, Country or 

Citizenship and Birth Records. 

81 Ibid. 

82 DHS document, “National Security Entry-Exit Registration System: Program Overview and Analysis of 

Effectiveness as a Law Enforcement Tool,” Prepared by Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

NSEERS Project Coordinator, May 22, 2003. 83 DOJ document, NSEERS Violator List, Analysis Target Folder List given to HQINV, Dec. 17, 2002. 

84 DHS document, “National Security Entry-Exit Registration System: Program Overview and Analysis of 

Effectiveness as a Law Enforcement Tool,” Prepared by Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

NSEERS Project Coordinator, May 22, 2003. 85 Ibid. 

86 Ibid. 

87 Prepared testimony of David Martin before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States hearing, Dec. 8, 2003. 

88 Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 10, 2003. 

89 Ibid. 

90 Ziglar was sworn into office on Aug. 6, 2001. He would remain Commissioner until Dec. 2002, until the 

announcement of the abolition of the INS and the recreation of immigration functions in the Department of 

Homeland Security. James Ziglar interview (Nov. 14, 2003). Chuck Winwood was stranded in Canada on 

September 11. The person acting in his place that day was John Varrone, the head of investigations, who 

also told the Commission he spoke to Ziglar that morning.regarding the tightened security measures. John 

Varrone interview (April 29, 2004). 

91 Both Ziglar and Robert Bonner, who was sworn in as Customs Commissioner within days of 9/11, used 

this phrase to describe the highest level of inspection guidelines provided at the borders, see James Ziglar 

interview (Nov. 14, 2003), and Robert Bonner interview (Dec. 18, 2003). 92 James Ziglar interview (Nov. 14, 2003); John Varrone interview (April 29, 2004). 93 The initial identity of the hijackers was completed within about 24 hours of the attack by both Customs 

and INS. Determining the immigration histories of the hijackers, without biometric identifiers 
170

accompanying their files or the ability to share data between INS facilities or databases, would take 

months. See drafts of INS record, Texas Service Center Enforcement Operations Division 9/11 Terrorist 

Review, Sept. 2001-June 2002. 94 James Ziglar testimony, Jan. 26, 2004; and James Ziglar interview (Nov. 14, 2003). 95 INS Memo, Michael Pearson, Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations, to Regional 

Directors, “Authority to Carry a Firearm Performing Inspections at Air Ports of Entry,” Sept. 12, 2001. 

96 INS power point record, “INS Request for Military Support,” autumn 2001. The Border Patrol soon 

thereafter requested 480 military personnel to help shore up the porous northern border. 97 James Ziglar testimony, Jan. 26, 2004. 

98 INS Statistics, PAS G-22.1, 2000. 

99 U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (online at www.bts.gov). 100 Customs memo, Director of Field Operations to Executive Director of Trade Programs, re “Blocking 

Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons who Commit, or Support, Terrorism,” Sept. 28, 2001. 

101 Robert C. Bonner testimony, Jan. 26, 2004. 102 James W. Ziglar interview (Nov. 14, 2003); and Robert Bonner interview (Dec. 18, 2003). 103 Robert C. Bonner testimony, Jan. 26, 2004. 104 Customs memo, Director of Field Operations to Executive Director of Trade Programs, re “Blocking 

Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons who Commit, or Support, Terrorism,” Sept. 28, 2001. 

105 Robert C. Bonner testimony, Jan. 26, 2004. 106 Ibid. 107 INS Memo, Michael Pearson to Regional Directors, “Progressive and In-transit Clearance,” Sept. 18, 

2001 with addendum “Emergency Guidance re: TWOV and unable to depart due to FAA grounding,” Sept. 

11, 2001. 

108 Customs memo, Executive Director of Passenger Programs, Field Operations, to all Directors of Field 

Operations, “Suspension of Progressive and In-transit Processing,” Sept. 12, 2001. 109 Customs memo, Director of Field Operations to Executive Director of Trade Programs, re “Blocking 

Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons who Commit, or Support, Terrorism,” Sept. 28, 2001. 

110 Customs memo, Executive Director of Passenger Programs, Field Operations to all Directors of Field 

Operations, “Clarification of Suspension of Progressive and In-transit Processing,” Sept. 17, 2001. 111 Robert C. Bonner testimony, Jan. 26, 2004. 112 Peter F. Verga testimony, Jan. 26, 2004. 113 INS Memo, Michael Pearson to Regional Directors, “Guidance on Department of Defense title 10 (AntiTerrorism) Support,” Mar. 8, 2002. 114 Message to the Congress of the United States re the Department of Homeland Security, George W. 

Bush, June 18, 2002. 

115 This change was mandated by section 428 of the Homeland Security Act. 116 Ibid. 
171

APPENDIX A 

Mohamed Atta’s U.S. visa issued in Berlin, Germany on May 18, 2000, 10 days after he 

acquired a new passport.
172

Ramzi Binalshibh’s May 17, 2000 visa application with handwritten notes of U.S. 

consular officials. This visa application was denied July 18, 2000 under INA section 

214(b), the “intending immigrant” provision. 
173

A partly-burned copy of Ziad Jarrah’s U.S. visa recovered from the Flight 93 crash site in 

Somerset County, Pennsylvania. 
174

First page of Hani Hanjour’s Sept. 10, 2000 visa application. The handwritten notes of a 

U.S. consular official (top right) indicate concern about Hanjour’s desire to stay in the 

United States for three years. This application was incomplete; Hanjour did not specify 

the name and address of the school he claimed to be attending. 
175

Second page of Hanjour’s visa application.
176

Marwan al Shehhi’s Sept. 15, 2000 application to change his immigration status (I-539) 

from tourist to vocational student in order to enroll in flight training school. The 

application was approved on August 9, 2001.
177

Page 2 of al Shehhi’s I-539.
178

Mohand al Shehri’s Oct. 23, 2000 visa application. This application was incomplete. He 

claimed to be a student (#24), but failed to clearly state the name and address of his 

school (#10). He also claimed to be supporting himself during his proposed 6-month visit 

to the United States. This application was approved.
179

Page 2 of Mohand al Shehri’s visa application. 
180

Ahmad al Haznawi’s Nov. 12, 2000 visa application. Although he claimed to be a student 

(#24), he left blank the name and address of his school (#10). He also claimed to be 

supporting himself while in the United States. This application was approved.
181

Page 2 of Haznawi’s visa application. 
182

Nov. 13, 2000 visa application for Saeed al Ghamdi (not the hijacker of the same name). 

Handwritten notes (upper right) of a consular officer indicate that his visa was denied 

because he was unemployed, lacked sufficient finances to support his trip and told 

officials that he planned to stay one year in the United States. 
183

Page 2 of al Ghamdi’s denied visa application. To our knowledge he was the only 

potential Saudi hijacker denied a U.S. visa.
184

Ahmed al Nami’s April 23, 2001 visa application. The presence of notes in the upper 

right suggests that he was briefly questioned by consular officials. This was his second 

visa application even though his previous visa had not expired. Nami submitted this 

application with a new passport perhaps in order to hide travel to Afghanistan in the old 

passport.
185

Page 2 of Nami’s visa application. 
186

Mohamed Atta’s revised immigration arrival record (I-94) created on May 2, 2001 at the 

Miami INS district office. Atta had gone to the office seeking a length of stay equal to the 

8-months he received for a colleague—possibly Ziad Jarrah. Tourists were not normally 

granted a length of stay of more than 6 months. The INS officer in Miami refused to grant 

8 months to Jarrah and instead rolled-back Atta’s length of stay to the standard six 

months, until July 9, 2001. He departed the United States on July 7 and returned on July 

19, at which time he was granted another 6-month length of stay. 
187

Handwritten notes of the immigration official at the Miami district office who rolled-back 

Atta’s length of stay.
188

Copy of Mohamed Atta’s Florida state driver’s license. Several other hijackers obtained 

Florida state identification including Hani Hanjour, Marwan al Shehhi, Nawaf al Hazmi, 

Ziad Jarrah, Waleed al Shehri, Hamza al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami, Ahmed al Haznawi, 

Saeed al Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, and Fayez Banihammad. 
189

Immigration arrival record (I-94) for Saeed al Ghamdi. 
190

Saeed al Ghamdi’s Customs Declaration presented at arrival. 
191

Identification obtained by Salem al Hazmi. In addition, Ahmed al Ghamdi, Nawaf al 

Hazmi, Majed Moqed, and Abdul Aziz al Omari obtained similar USA identification 

cards.
192

Identification obtained by Khalid al Mihdhar. The address listed is for a hotel.
193

Visa application submitted on behalf of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Although KSM was 

on a terrorist watchlist, this application was submitted under an alias name. The 
194

application was approved but there is no evidence that KSM used this visa to enter the 

United States.

Page 2 of KSM’s visa application. He is pictured at the lower right.
195

Ahmed al Ghamdi’s photo as it appeared on his state of Virginia identification card. Ziad 

Jarrah, Abdul Aziz al Omari and Salem al Hazmi also obtained Virginia state 

identification cards. The hijackers used false affidavits to obtain their identification.
1

Apendix B

The Saudi Flights

At 9:45 A.M. on September 11, 2001, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air 

Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) issued verbal direction for all 

airborne aircraft to land at the nearest destination or as soon as practical.1

 A notice to all 

airmen (NOTAM) was issued at 10:39 closing all operations at all airports; at 11:06, 

ATCSCC suspended operations in the national airspace.2

While the national airspace was closed, decisions to allow aircraft to fly were made 

collaboratively with the departments of Defense and State, the U.S. Secret Service, the 

FBI, and the FAA.3

 The Department of Transportation reopened the national airspace to 

commercial flights effective 11 A.M. on September 13, 2001, provided the airport had 

implemented the new security measures dictated by the FAA Civil Aviation Security 

Office.4 The reopening for commercial flights included hired charter flights, but so-called 

general aviation flights by individuals flying for pleasure continued to be restricted at 

some airports.5

A number of flights with Saudi nationals departed the United States for domestic and 

international destinations after airspace was reopened. Our investigation revealed 11 such 

flights between September 13 and September 24, 2001. 

We have determined that the airports involved in these 11 Saudi flights were open when 

the flights departed.6 We have found no credible evidence that any of these flights of 

Saudi nationals flew within the United States or departed from the United States before 

the reopening of the national airspace.

Although the airspace and airports were open when these flights left, we have 

investigated the process by which these individuals were able to leave the United States. 

It began with a phone call around September 13, 2001. Fearing reprisals against Saudi 

nationals, Rihab Massoud, deputy chief of mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 

Washington, D.C., called Dale Watson, the FBI’s assistant director for counterterrorism, 

shortly after the attack and asked for help in getting some of the Kingdom’s citizens out 

of the country.7

At about the same time, Michael Rolince, the FBI section chief of the International 

Terrorism Operations Section (ITOS), learned about a proposed flight of Saudi nationals 

intending to depart the country from Newark, New Jersey.8

 Rolince told FBI officials in 

the field that the Saudis should not be allowed to leave until the names on their passports 

had been matched to their faces, and their names had been run through various 

databases—including some watchlists—to see whether the FBI had derogatory 

information on them.9 The next morning, Watson and Rolince briefed FBI Director 

Robert Mueller about the issue.10

The Saudi government was advised of the requirements the FBI wanted met before the 

flights could leave: identification and name check. The Saudi government agreed to this 
2

policy, and in most cases provided a flight manifest to the FBI in advance of the flight’s 

proposed departure.11 In the FBI Special Intelligence and Operations Center (SIOC), 

Rolince took on responding to matters related to the Saudi flights as part of his duties.12

Other U.S. government agencies played a role as well—often by video teleconference. 

The FAA had a representative assigned to the FBI SIOC who worked to ensure that the 

FBI was aware of flights of Saudi nationals and was able to screen the passengers before 

they were allowed to depart.13 The State Department was involved in flights involving 

Saudi royalty and diplomats because in some circumstances diplomatic flights are 

accorded special privileges.14

At the White House, Counterterrorism Security Coordinator Richard Clarke participated 

through the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) process.15 Clarke told the 

Commission that he approved the release of these flights subject to the FBI’s approval. 

So, I was told that the Saudi embassy wanted to get people out 

of the country who were royal family members, and who were 

Bin Ladin family members. I asked the FBI, Dale Watson, who 

was the senior number two, I think person at the FBI at the 

time, to handle that, to check to see if that was all right with 

them, to see if they wanted access to any of these people, and 

to get back to me. And if they had no objections, it would be 

fine with me. . . . 

Now your next question is going to be, who in the White 

House did I clear it with, or did I clear it with anybody in the 

White House. And I have no recollection of clearing it with 

anybody in the White House. I may have. But it’s more than 

likely, when the FBI said it was all right with them, I told 

whoever had asked me that it was all right with me. And again, 

I don’t, I have no idea who asked me. 

Contextually here, this is coming at a time when we were being 

hit with information and requests for decisions on matters that 

normally we would take weeks to decide, and we’re deciding 

them in about two minutes. And this was one in a flow of 

hundreds, if not thousands, of decisions that we made during 

the course of those first 72 hours. . . . 

This is the kind of thing that I have done many, many times on 

the other side of the request. It is very frequently the case that 

when there is an emergency situation in another country, we 

approach that country and ask for extraordinary help in 

evacuating our people. And I’ve done that a lot. And so I had 

sympathy with their request.16
3

Clarke appears to be the highest-ranking official in the White House involved with the 

decision to approve the departure of the Saudi flights. There is no evidence of 

involvement by senior political officials. 

President Bush and Vice President Cheney told the Commission that they did not speak 

with Saudi government officials about the flights before their departure. The President 

told the Commission that the first he knew about the issue was when he read about it in 

the newspaper. Although White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card remembered someone 

telling him about the Saudi request shortly after 9/11, he said he had not talked to the 

Saudis and did not ask anyone to do anything about it.17

Thus, decisions about these flights—including how much screening of the passengers 

should be done and whether they should be allowed to depart—appear to have been 

delegated from more senior officials at the FBI and by Richard Clarke at the White 

House to midlevel officials of the FBI, FAA, and State Department participating in the 

interagency decisionmaking process centered in the FBI SIOC.18

We pause to caution against overemphasizing the issue of authorizing the flights’ 

departure, because such a focus reveals ignorance of two key facts: first, prior to 9/11, 

there was virtually no screening of individuals seeking to leave the United States;19 and 

second, under U.S. law, the legal authority to prevent the departure of someone wishing 

to leave the United States is unusual and, we believe, seldom utilized. The first point is 

important because it answers people who have assumed, incorrectly, that some kind of 

authorization was required before the Saudi flights, or any others, could depart the United 

States in the wake of 9/11. The second underscores that assumptions about the FBI’s 

ability to detain all Saudis on these flights are misplaced as well. Unless the FBI 

developed facts justifying a detention, such as reason to believe the individual was in 

violation of their immigration status,20 had committed a crime, or was a material witness 

to a crime, it is not clear that actions to prevent any individual’s departure would have 

had a lawful basis.21

The more important question is, Did any terrorists escape from the U.S. on one of these 

flights? Our research to date leads us to believe the answer is no. Screening for flights, 

including the “Bin Ladin” flight carrying members of Usama Bin Ladin’s extended 

family, was done by FBI officials in the field according to a policy set by FBI 

headquarters personnel and in a process coordinated among agencies. The purpose of this 

screening was to ensure that the people on these flights did not pose a threat to national 

security and that no one of interest to the FBI in connection with the 9/11 investigation 

was allowed to leave the country. We believe that the FBI interviewed all persons of 

interest on these flights prior to their departures. The FBI has concluded that none of the 

passengers was connected specifically to the 9/11 attacks or to terrorism generally. 

Because it was not clear to the Commission whether all departing passengers’ names 

were checked against the definitive source for terrorist identity information—the TIPOFF 

terrorist watchlist—at our request, prior to our hearing in April 2004, the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC) checked the names of individuals on the flight manifests of these 
4

six Saudi flights against the current TIPOFF watchlist. There were no matches.22 Also at 

our request, drawing on additional information—including information collected by 

journalists researching this issue—the TSC in June and July 2004 rechecked the names of 

individuals believed to be on these six flights and on four more flights identified by 9/11 

Commission staff since our April hearing as having one or more Saudi nationals as 

passengers.23 Again, there were no matches. Finally, we asked the TSC to check the 

names of 160 Saudi nationals listed on a Web site as having left the United States 

between September 11 and September 15, 2001.24 There were no matches. 

It is our view that the FBI handled the screening of these flights in a professional manner 

consistent with the other pressing duties they faced after September 11, particularly the 

need to prevent the future terrorist attacks that many then feared were imminent. 

The Flights 

In April 2004, we reported that after U.S. airspace reopened, six chartered flights with 

142 people, mostly Saudi nationals, departed from the United States between September 

14 and 24. Since our initial report, we have found evidence of four more flights between 

September 14 and 23 containing two or more Saudi nationals. We also researched one 

flight that flew within the United States on September 13, 2001, a topic we were in the 

process of researching in April. Finally, we looked into departures of Saudi nationals on 

commercial flights after 9/11 that journalists had described as suspicious. We have 

identified the following flights: 

1. The Phantom flight. A Hop-A-Jet flight with three Saudis, including a Saudi 

prince, that flew from Tampa, Florida, to Lexington, Kentucky, on September 13, 

2001.

2. The Providence flight. A Northstar Aviation flight with four Saudis, including a 

Saudi sheikh, that departed from Providence, Rhode Island, for Paris, France, on 

September 14, 2001; 

3. The Newark flight. A Saudi Arabian Airlines flight with 116 individuals, 

including the Saudi deputy defense minister, that departed from Newark Airport 

on September 14, 2001. 

4. The Lexington flight. A Jetlease chartered luxury Boeing 727 with 14 people, 

including a Saudi prince, that departed from Lexington, Kentucky, for an 

unknown city in England during the evening hours on September 16, 2001.

5. The Universal Weather flight. A Universal Weather & Av iation, Inc., flight with 

four Saudi nationals that departed from Boston’s Logan Airport for Gander, 

Newfoundland, at 12:30 P.M. on September 18, 2001 

6. The First Las Vegas flight” Flight DC-8-73, a chartered Republic of Gabon 

airplane with 46 people, including several members of the Saudi royal family, that 

departed from Las Vegas, Nevada, for Geneva, Switzerland, on September 19, 

2001.

7. The “Bin Ladin” flight. Ryan International Flight 441, a Boeing 727 with 26 

passengers, most of them relatives of Saudi fugitive Usama Bin Ladin, that 

departed the United States from Boston, Massachusetts, for Goose Bay, 
5

Newfoundland, at 2:05 A.M. on September 20, 2001 (after making stops in Los 

Angeles, Orlando, Washington Dulles, and Boston). 

8. The Second Las Vegas flight. Chartered Flight B 727-21, with 18 people, 

members of a single Saudi royal party, that departed from Las Vegas, Nevada, for 

Stanstead, England, on September 20, 2001.25

9. The VIP flight. A flight from New York’s JFK Airport with four members of the 

Saudi royal family that departed from New York for Paris, France, on September 

22, 2001.

10. The Hanscom flight. A Gulfstream 3, jet tail number N706JA, with two Saudi 

nationals that departed from Hanscom Airfield in Bedford, Massachusetts, on 

September 23, 2001.26

11. The Third Las Vegas flight. American Trans Air Flight L-1011, with 34 members 

of the party of Saudi Prince Turki, that departed from Las Vegas, Nevada, for 

Paris, France on September 24, 2001. 

We address each flight in the order they flew, and then turn to the departures of Saudis on 

commercial flights. 

The “Phantom Flight.”27 Much has been made of the Tampa flight, nicknamed the 

“Phantom flight” because of claims in media accounts, attributed to government officials 

at the FAA and FBI, that the flight had not in fact taken place. Our conclusion is that the 

flight definitely took place, and that there was nothing improper or unusual about it. 

On September 13, 2001, Tampa police officers were providing security to three young 

Saudi nationals at an apartment in Tampa, Florida.28 One of the three was Prince Sultan 

Fahad bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, whose father, Prince Ahmed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, 

was in Lexington, Kentucky, attending a horse auction. The Tampa Police Department 

was in contact with the Lexington Police Department about this security because the 

elder Prince Salman was concerned about his son’s safety and had contacted the 

Lexington police.29 At approximately 11 A.M., the Tampa police were told by the Saudis 

they were protecting that a plane had become available to fly them to Lexington.30 Tampa 

police were asked to provide two officers who could act as security guards for the three 

by accompanying them on the plane scheduled to leave the afternoon of September 13, 

2001.31 The Tampa police chief declined to let his officers fly on the plane.32

The Tampa sergeant handling the security arrangements then contacted Dan Grossi, a 

recently retired Tampa police detective and private investigator, and asked if he was 

interested in providing security services by flying to Lexington with the Saudis.33 Grossi 

agreed, and called another private investigator—Manuel Perez, a retired FBI agent—to 

accompany him on the flight.34 Tampa police officers drove the three Saudi nationals to 

the Tampa International Airport in unmarked police vehicles.35 The Tampa officers, 

accompanied by the three Saudi nationals, met Dan Grossi in the lobby of Raytheon 

Aircraft Services, a separate terminal at the Tampa airport.36 A Tampa police officer 

described seeing a plane that looked like a “cream-colored Learjet” on the tarmac outside 

the Raytheon facility.37 The Tampa officers waited with Grossi and the three young 

Saudis until Manuel Perez arrived, and then they left.38
6

Grossi, Perez, the three Saudi nationals, and the two pilots then boarded the chartered 

plane, a Learjet model LJ35.39 The pilot of the Learjet was Christopher Steele, an 

employee of the plane’s owner, Hop-A-Jet, Inc.40 The plane’s unique identification 

number, based on the name of the company, was “HPJ32.”41 For Steele, there was 

“nothing unusual whatsoever” about the flight other than that there were few planes 

flying that day.42 Barry Ellis, Hop-A-Jet’s president and director of operations agreed, 

saying that “it was just a routine little trip for us” and that he would have heard if there 

had been anything unusual about it.43 Steele said he followed standard procedures and 

filed his flight plan with the FAA prior to the flight, noting, “I was never questioned 

about it.”44

FAA records show Steele filed his flight plan at 3:30 P.M. on September 13, 2001, 

indicating the plane was flying from Tampa to Lexington, and then back to Tampa.45

According to FAA records, the plane took off from Tampa bound for Lexington at 4:38 

P.M. on September 13, 2001.46 Witnesses, including security guards Grossi and Perez, 

recall the flight leaving at around 4:30.47 Tampa airport’s aircraft flight tracking system, 

which captures the jet noise made by arriving and departing aircraft, recorded the plane’s 

departure at 4:37.48 At the time this charter flight took off, both the national airspace and 

Tampa Airport were open.49 In fact, Tampa records show that 10 aircraft arrived at 

Tampa and 12 departed before Steele’s plane left.50 The FAA has stated they have “no 

record” of any special authorization for this flight.51

At approximately 6 P.M., the plane landed at Lexington Blue Grass Airport and taxied to 

the Truman Arnold Corporation or TAC Air facility, separate from the main airport 

terminal.52 Lexington Blue Grass Airport had been open since 12:50 P.M. that day.53 The 

three Saudi nationals disembarked from the plane and were met by Captain Mark Barnard 

of the Lexington, Kentucky, Police Department, the same person who had been in contact 

with Tampa police officers earlier in the day.54 Grossi and Perez were paid for their work 

by the Saudis, and were given money with which to pay the off-duty Tampa police 

officers.55 Barnard escorted the three Saudi nationals to a hotel where the prince joined 

his father.56 The plane refueled at the TAC Air facility and, according to FAA records, 

departed Lexington for Tampa at 6:43 P.M.

57 On board were the two pilots, Dan Grossi, 

and Manuel Perez.58 The three Saudis on the Tampa–Lexington flight stayed in 

Lexington until September 16, 2001, when they departed the United States on a flight 

described below. 

Thus, there does not appear to be anything unusual about the so-called Phantom Flight 

other than that it was one of the earlier charter flights flown after airspace reopened.59

The Providence Flight. On September 14, 2001, a Northstar Aviation flight to Paris, 

France, departed from Providence, Rhode Island. 

 There were four Saudi nationals on board. 

 According to the FBI, all four passengers “were interviewed and their identity 

confirmed.” 
7

 The FBI made copies of the passengers’ passports.60

 According to the FBI, the FBI and INS checked the four individual’s names 

against FBI and INS databases “with negative results.”

 The FBI also reported that the U.S. Customs Service and Rhode Island State 

Police searched their luggage “with negative results.”61

 It is not clear whether these individuals were checked against the State 

Department’s TIPOFF terrorist watch list prior to their departure, but a check of 

their names in April 2004 produced no matches. 

 According to the Transportation Security Administration, Providence Airport was 

open when this flight departed.62

The Newark Flight. A Saudi Arabian Airlines flight with 116 individuals, including the 

Saudi deputy defense minister, Prince Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Aziz, departed from 

Newark International Airport on September 14, 2001, at approximately 9:25 P.M. We do 

not know its immediate destination.63

 FBI agents received a flight manifest for this flight containing the names, dates of 

birth, and country of citizenship or residency of all passengers in advance of its 

departure.

 FBI records indicate that these individuals were checked against four databases: 

IIIA (containing FBI analysts’ reports), TECS (the U.S. Customs Service 

watchlist system), ACS (the FBI’s Automated Case System), and Rapid Start 

(containing FBI leads, including those related to the 9/11 investigation, known as 

PENTTBOM).64

 Based on these checks, at least one of the crew members was interviewed 

extensively. His answers apparently satisfied the FBI and he was allowed to 

depart.65

 At our request, the Terrorist Screening Center in July 2004 checked the names of 

the passengers on this flight against the TIPOFF watchlist; there were no matches. 

 At the time this flight departed, Newark Airport was open.66

The Lexington, Kentucky, Flight. On September 16, 2001, a chartered luxury Boeing 

727 departed from Lexington, Kentucky, for England. 

 There were 14 individuals on board, the majority of whom were Saudi nationals, 

including Saudi Prince Ahmed Bin Salman Bin Abdulaziz and his son Prince 

Sultan Bin Fahad Bin Salman Abdulaziz; the latter had flown to Lexington from 

Tampa, Florida, on September 13, 2001.67

 The FBI copied the passports of all 14 passengers prior to their departure and 

made sure that those who boarded the plane were the same individuals whose 

passports they had collected.68

 The FBI and U.S. Customs Service inspected the plane before it departed. 

 Although they did speak with one passenger prior to the plane’s departure, and 

records show the passengers were checked against the Security Directive List (an 

FBI watchlist created shortly after 9/11), there is no evidence that the FBI 
8

interviewed these 14 individuals or checked their names against other terrorist 

watchlists prior to their departure.69

 Lexington Blue Grass Airport was open at the time this flight took off.70

 One individual on this flight—Ahmad A. M. al Hazmi—has the same last name 

as hijackers Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi. However, the FBI determined that he 

was not on any watchlists associated with the 9/11 attacks.71

 The Terrorist Screening Center checked the names of the passengers on this flight 

in April 2004 with no matches. 

 We found no evidence to support the allegation that Prince Ahmed Bin Salman, a 

passenger on the flight, had ties to al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah and may 

have had advanced knowledge of the 9/11 attacks. This claim was allegedly made 

by Zubaydah after his capture when he was interrogated by the CIA.72 We have 

seen no evidence of any such statement, and the CIA has stated they have “no 

intelligence reporting to support” this assertion.73

The Universal Weather Flight. A Universal Weather & Aviati on, Inc., flight with four 

Saudi nationals departed from Boston’s Logan International Airport at 12:30 P.M. on 

September 18, 2001. 

 We learned of this flight while reviewing FBI documents in preparation for our 

April 13, 2004, hearing. 

 We were not able to determine the destination of this flight from the documents 

we reviewed. 

 FBI records of this flight included a flight manifest with the names and other 

biographical information of four Saudi nationals. 

 Because we were not able to determine whether the names of these four 

individuals had been checked against TIPOFF, at our request in April the 

Terrorist Screening Center checked these four individuals against TIPOFF with 

negative results. 

 Boston’s Logan Airport was open when this flight departed.74

The Las Vegas Flights. The FBI reports that it “conducted extensive investigation prior 

to the departure” of the three Las Vegas flights based on a lead it received about the 

presence of Saudis in Las Vegas on September 11, 2001.75 Two of these flights, one 

September 19, 2001 and one on September 20, 2001, contained members of the entourage 

of Saudi Prince Abdulmajeed Bin Abdulaziz.76

o Republic of Gabon–Flagged DC-8-73 

On September 19, 2001, Flight DC-8-73, tail number TR-LTZ, a chartered Republic 

of Gabon airplane, departed Las Vegas, Nevada, for Geneva, Switzerland. This flight 

contained members of the party of Prince Abdulmajeed bin Abdulaziz.77

 There were 69 people aboard this flight, 46 of whom were Saudi nationals, 

according to the FBI.78
9

 Before the flight took off, the FBI acquired the name, date or year of birth, 

passport numbers, and copies of passports for all 69 people scheduled to board.

 The FBI checked their names against “the current FBI Watch List and ran for IIIA 

reports. No Watch List matches were discovered.”79

 FBI records state that agents interviewed three of the passengers based on 

nonderogatory information in its IIIA database, but found nothing suspicious.80

 The FBI also reported that “Additional interviews were conducted by INS and 

USCS [the U.S. Customs Service].”81

 Before the flight was allowed to leave, the plane was searched and FBI agents and 

agents of the U.S. Customs Service matched all passengers to the flight manifest 

and to photocopies of their passports.82

 Although FBI records indicate that Customs personnel assisted in the 

investigation of this flight, it is not clear from FBI records whether the names of 

passengers on this flight were checked against the Customs-TECS database, 

which included the TIPOFF terrorist database, prior to its departure. 

 The Terrorist Screening Center ran the names of all passengers on this flight 

against TIPOFF in April 2004; there were no matches. 

 Las Vegas Airport was open when this flight departed.83

o Chartered Flight B 727-21, Tail Number N727PX

On September 20, 2001, 18 members of the party of Saudi Prince Abdulmajeed Bin 

Abdulaziz departed from Las Vegas, Nevada, for Stanstead, England.84 They 

underwent the same vetting process as the 69 people on the flight the day before. 

 The FBI checked the 18 names against “the current FBI Watch List and ran for 

IIIA reports. No Watch List matches were discovered.”85

 FBI records state that agents interviewed one passenger based on nonderogatory 

information in its IIIA database, but found nothing suspicious.86

 Before the flight was allowed to leave, the plane was searched and FBI agents and 

agents of the U.S. Customs Service matched all passengers to the flight manifest 

and to photocopies of their passports.87

 Although FBI records indicate that Customs personnel assisted in the 

investigation of this flight, it is not clear from FBI records whether the names of 

passengers on this flight were run against the Customs-TECS database, which 

included the TIPOFF terrorist database, prior to its departure. 

 At our request, the Terrorist Screening Center ran the names of all passengers on 

this flight against TIPOFF in April 2004; there were no matches. 

 Las Vegas Airport was open when this flight departed.88

Ryan International Flight 441 (the “Bin Ladin Family Flight”). On September 20, 

2001, at 2:05 A.M., Ryan International Flight 441, a Boeing 727 contracted by the Saudi 

embassy, departed the United States from Boston, Massachusetts, for Newfoundland. 

 The screening of this flight was directed by an FBI agent in the Baltimore Field 

Office who was also a pilot.89 This agent, coordinating with FBI headquarters, 
10

sent an electronic communication to each of the field offices within whose 

jurisdiction the Bin Ladin flight was scheduled to land; it including the proposed 

flight manifest and directions regarding what screening should occur.90 The 

communication directed agents in those offices to verify the identities of the 

passengers and ensure “that the flight did not pose a threat to US security.”91 The 

Baltimore agent monitored the flight as it moved around the country—from St. 

Louis to Los Angeles to Orlando to Washington Dulles and to Boston Logan—

correcting for any changes in itinerary to make sure there was no lapse in FBI 

screening.92

 The flight manifest indicates that when the flight departed the United States, there 

were 26 individuals on board other than the flight crew: 23 passengers and 3 

security guards.93

 Most of the 23 passengers were Saudi nationals. Most of the Saudis were relatives 

of Usama Bin Ladin, and 12 had the last name Bin Ladin.94

 The FBI interviewed 19 of the 23 passengers on Flight 441, some of them more 

than once.95 The interviews took place in a number of locations, including the 

passengers’ homes, in automobiles, and at the airport; some were done over the 

telephone. FBI agents also spoke with the flight crew of Flight 441 and the three 

security guards who accompanied the passengers prior to the flight’s departure.

 Records of the interviews the FBI conducted of Bin Laden Flight passengers—

which amount to 39 single-spaced typed pages—indicate that the FBI interviewed 

many of these individuals at some length.96 They were questioned, for example, 

about their personal biographical information; where they lived; which of their 

relatives lived in the United States and where; what relationship, if any, they had 

with Usama Bin Ladin; when, if ever, they had seen Usama Bin Ladin; their 

knowledge of terrorist groups or activity; whether they had ever traveled to 

Afghanistan or Pakistan; whether they knew any of the 9/11 hijackers; and 

whether they had any information about the attacks. Many family members told 

the FBI that they had lived or traveled in the West for years. Some of the Bin 

Ladins declared that they were U.S. citizens. None of the passengers claimed to 

have had any recent contact with Usama Bin Ladin or any knowledge about 

terrorist activity. 

 Two of the passengers on the Bin Ladin flight had been the subjects of 

preliminary investigations by the FBI; both their cases had been closed, in 1999 

and March 2001, respectively, because the FBI had uncovered no derogatory 

information on either person linking him to terrorist activity. Their cases remained 

closed as of September 11, 2001; they were not reopened before they departed the 

country on this flight and have not been reopened since.97

 The flight originated in St. Louis on September 18, 2001. It acquired its 

passengers as follows: in Los Angeles, one passenger embarked, and the flight 

departed on September 19, 2001; in Orlando, Florida, three passengers embarked, 

and the flight departed September 19, 2001; in Washington, D.C., five passengers 

embarked, and the flight departed September 19, 2001; in Boston, fourteen 

passengers embarked and the flight departed at 2:05 A.M. on September 20, 

2001.98
11

 FBI agents verified the names of passengers on Flight 441 in Los Angeles, 

Orlando, and Boston.99

 FBI agents searched the airplane and luggage in Los Angeles and Orlando. The 

FBI searched the plane prior to its departure in Boston.100

 “At each airport, passengers were processed through immigration and customs as 

well as security checks.”101

 In Boston, the FBI photographed all 14 individuals boarding the aircraft. 

 “Record checks were conducted” of the passengers. 

 One claim that has been made is that the FBI helped shuttle Bin Ladin family 

members to this flight. We found that in two cases, when the FBI called members 

of the Bin Ladin family in connection with their plans to depart the country, the 

Bin Ladins asked the FBI agents to accompany them to the airport because they 

were afraid for their and their family’s safety.102 In one instance, the FBI agent 

agreed that there was the potential for danger to someone with the last name “Bin 

Ladin.”103 That agent, in Florida, provided an escort to the airport for three Bin 

Ladin family members because of their fears and took the opportunity to 

interview one of the family members during the drive.104 In a second case, Usama 

Bin Ladin’s sister, who lived in Los Angeles, requested an escort on September 

19, 2001 to the airport in Los Angeles because she was concerned about her 

safety. An FBI agent agreed to and did accompany her to the airport.105

 The four Ryan Air flight 441 passengers who were not interviewed were Maria 

Bayma, apparently the sister-in-law of Khalil Bin Laden, Usama Bin Ladin’s 

brother; Sultan Bin Ladin, the “17- to 18”-year-old son of Khalil Bin Ladin; a 

female Saudi national who embarked in Boston; and an Indonesian maid who 

worked for one of the Saudi passengers.106 There is strong evidence that the first 

three individuals, although they were not interviewed separately, “were present 

during interviews” of others.107

 The FBI has stated, on the basis of their investigation of the individuals on the 

Ryan Air Flight, that there were “no siblings of UBL’s with ties to Militant 

Islamic Fundamentalists aboard the flight.”108

 The FBI maintains that “no persons received FBI approval to depart the US 

without being determined to be of no investigative interest to the PENTTBOM 

investigation.”109

 At our request, in April 2004 the Terrorist Screening Center ran the names of all 

the passengers on the Bin Ladin flight against the TIPOFF list; there were no 

matches. 

 Each of the airports through which the Bin Ladin flight passed was open and no 

special restrictions applied that were lifted to accommodate its passage. 

The VIP Flight. A flight from New York’s JFK Airport with 12 people, including four 

members of the Saudi royal family, apparently departed for Paris on September 22, 2001. 

 From a story that surfaced in the media, we learned of a flight that apparently 

departed from New York’s JFK Airport on September 22, 2001.110

 We obtained a copy of the alleged flight manifest from an Internet Web site.111

 Although we found evidence of a VIP flight that involved FBI screening, we have 

not been able to determine definitively whether this is the flight involved.112
12

 Because it was not clear to us whether the individuals on this flight had been 

checked against terrorist watchlists, we asked the Terrorist Screening Center in 

June 2004 to run the names of all passengers against the TIPOFF terrorist 

watchlist; there were no matches. 

 New York’s JFK Airport was open when this flight departed.113

The Hanscom Flight. A Gulfstream 3, jet tail number N706JA, with two Saudi nationals 

departed from Hanscom Airfield in Bedford, Massachusetts, on September 23, 2001. 

 We learned of this flight while reviewing FBI documents in preparation for our 

April 13, 2004, hearing. 

 FBI records of this flight included a flight manifest with the names of two Saudi 

nationals and other biographical information. 

 Because we were not able to determine whether the names of these two 

individuals had been checked against TIPOFF, at our request in June 2004 the 

Terrorist Screening Center checked these two individuals against TIPOFF; there 

were no matches. 

 Hanscom Airfield was open when this flight departed.114

American Trans Air Flight ATA L-1011. On September 24, 2001, 34 members of the 

party of Saudi Prince Turki departed on Flight American Trans Air (ATA) L-1011 from 

Las Vegas, Nevada, to Paris, France.115

 These 34 individuals underwent the same vetting process as the Saudis on flights 

that had left Las Vegas earlier. The FBI checked the 34 names against “the 

current FBI Watch List and ran for potential IIIA reports. Both checks met with 

negative results.”116

 There were 19 Saudi citizens on board.117

 The plane was searched before the flight was allowed to leave. 

 FBI agents and agents of the U.S. Customs Service matched all passengers to the 

flight manifest and to photocopies of their passports.118

 From our review of FBI records, it appears that none of the 34 people on this 

flight was interviewed. 

 FBI records indicate that U.S. Customs Service personnel assisted in the 

investigation of this flight; however, it is not clear from FBI records whether the 

names of passengers on this flight were run against the Customs-TECS database, 

which included the TIPOFF terrorist database, prior to its departure. 

 The Terrorist Screening Center ran the names of all passengers on this flight 

against TIPOFF in April 2004; there were no matches. 

 Las Vegas Airport was open when this flight departed.119

Commercial flights of Saudi Nationals out of the United States. In February 2004, the 

advocacy group Judicial Watch obtained through a Freedom of Information Act Request 

documents showing that 160 Saudi nationals departed the United States on 55 flights on 

September 11, 2001, and from September 13 to September 15, 2001.120 These documents, 

released by the Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border 
13

Protection, do not include the names of the individuals. They do include each person’s 

country of citizenship, class of admission, date of departure, port of departure, and flight 

number. The records indicate that these 160 individuals departed from Atlanta, 

Washington Dulles, JFK Airport, Boston, Houston, Chicago, and many other airports. 

The FBI subsequently obtained from DHS the complete biographical information—

including name and passport number—of the individuals dealt with in this FOIA 

request.121 At our request, in June 2004 the Terrorist Screening Center checked the names 

of these individuals against the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist. There were no matches.122

The fact that 160 Saudi nationals departed our country on commercial flights on 

September 11, 2001 and after airspace reopened on September 13, 2001, is not 

particularly remarkable. After the 13th, thousands of individuals departed on flights from 

the United States, as they do every day that our airspace is open. As we noted above, the 

United States did not have departure controls in the period immediately before and after 

the 9/11 attacks. 

1

 FAA record, Response to Questions for the Record (QFR) No. 1, June 8, 2004. 

2

 Ibid. 

3

 Ibid. 

4

 Ibid. 

5

 See, e.g., Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Response to QFR, July 9, 2004, stating, “There 

were restrictions for GA flights that lasted until early October.” 

6

 The following airports met FAA’s new security requirements and reopened on September 13, 2001 at the 

times listed: Tampa International (11 a.m.), Tampa International Airport record, Response to QFR, June 7, 

2004; Lexington-Blue Grass (12:50 p.m.), Lexington Blue Grass Airport record, Response to QFR, June 8, 

2004; Lambert-St. Louis International (11 a.m.), Lambert-St. Louis International Airport record, Response 

to QFR, May 27, 2004; Los Angeles International (12 p.m.), Los Angeles International Airport record, 

Response to QFR, June 2, 2004; Orlando International (11 a.m.), Orlando International Airport record, 

Response to QFR, June 8, 2004; Washington-Dulles (11 a.m.), Washington-Dulles Airport record, 

Response to QFR, June 8, 2004; New York-JFK (11:04 a.m.), Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 

record, “Review of JFK Operations Chrono for 9/11 Incident,” attachment to Response to QFR, June 4, 

2004. Boston-Logan International Airport reopened to commercial activity at 5 a.m. on September 15, 

2001. Massachusetts Port Authority, Responses to the Logan International Airport Questions for the 

Record, June 17, 2004. The Transportation Security Administration has confirmed that the following 

airports were open when the Saudi flights arrived or departed from them: Tampa, Lexington, Providence, 

St. Louis, Los Angeles, Orlando, Washington-Dulles, Boston-Logan, Las Vegas, New York-JFK, and 

Hanscom. Christine Beyer interview (July 14, 2004). 

7

 Rihab Massoud, Deputy Chief of Mission, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, interview (May 11, 2004); Dale 

Watson interview (June 3, 2004). Watson recalls that Massoud called late at night and told him that they 

were having a problem getting a plane released that carried “just family members.” Ibid. Massoud recalls 

making clear that the plan was to gather all members of the Bin Ladin family on one flight, making several 

stops, before departing the United States. Rihab Massoud, Deputy Chief of Mission, Kingdom of Saudi 

Arabia, interview (May 11, 2004). Minister Massoud told the Commission that he worked to secure the 

departure of three flights with Saudi nationals sponsored in some fashion by the Saudi government; one 

flight with the Saudi Deputy Defense Minister on Saudi Airlines departing from Newark, New Jersey on 

September 14, 2001; one flight from California by the Governor of Mecca on a plane registered to the 

Republic of Gabon that departed from Las Vegas on September 19, 2001; and the flight of Bin Ladin 

family members that departed Boston-Logan Airport on September 20, 2001. All three flights took place 
14

after the national airspace had reopened. It appears from these records that State coordinated with the FBI 

and FAA to allow screening by the FBI of flights with Saudi nationals on board. 

8

 Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004). 

9

 Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004); Massoud corroborates this account. He said the FBI required 

the names and personal information of all departing passengers sponsored for departure by the Saudi 

Embassy. Rihab Massoud, Deputy Chief of Mission, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia interview (May 11, 2004). 

10 Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004). Mueller responded by telling Rollince that this was the first he 

had heard of the Saudi flights issue. Ibid. 

11 Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004); Massoud corroborates this account. He said the FBI required 

the names and personal information of all departing passengers sponsored for departure by the Saudi 

Embassy. Rihab Massoud, Deputy Chief of Mission, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, interview (May 11, 2004). 

12 Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004). 

13 Jack Salata interview (June 14, 2004). The FAA representative put the FBI in direct communication with 

FAA air traffic control, which would not clear any flights to depart until the FBI gave their clearance. Ibid. 

14 See DOS record, “State Terrorist Attack Task Force Log,” June 3, 2004, stating in a log entry dated 

September 19, 2001, 8:34 p.m., “FAA requested DOS clearance for Saudi Registered aircraft to depart Las 

Vegas bound for Geneva, I checked with the FBI Las Vegas office. They confirmed that they had 

completed their interviews and had no objections to their departure. I then cleared their departure.” Records 

of State’s Terrorist Attack Task Force established after 9/11 contain 13 references to U.S. government 

coordination regarding flights of Saudi nationals, the earliest of which—involving the Saudi Deputy 

Defense Minister--occurred after the reopening of national airspace on September 13, 2001. Ibid. One entry 

on September 15, 2001 regarding a proposed flight of Saudi royalty states “there is no issue of whether the 

Saudis may or may not depart the country, the only issue is whether they qualify for diplomatic clearance 

which would expedite their departure vs. waiting in backlogged airport for routine clearances.” Ibid. In 

other words, diplomatic clearance expedited departure once the decision whether a person was allowed to 

depart had already been made. There is no evidence from these records or elsewhere that State worked to 

limit the FBI’s ability to screen passengers on the departing Saudi flights. See Jack Salata interview (June 

14, 2004), stating that the State Department did not press the FBI to take any shortcuts in checking out 

passengers on the Saudi flights. 

15 Richard Clarke Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Technology and Homeland Security, Sept. 3, 2003, stating that the week of September 11, the State 

Department asked if the Saudis could evacuate some of their citizens; that he (Clarke) directed that the 

flight manifests for all the flights be vetted by the FBI and that the FBI “sign off” on the concept of Saudis 

being allowed to leave. “And as I recall, all of that was done.” 

16 Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004). 

17 President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); Condolezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 

2004); Prince Bandar interview (May 5, 2004); Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Richard Clarke 

testimony, Mar. 24, 2004 (“I would love to be able to tell you who did it, who brought this proposal to me, 

but I don’t know”). Andrew Card, the White House Chief of Staff has told us that neither he, nor anyone 

else in the Chief of Staff’s Office, to his knowledge, got any call from the Saudis or told Clarke to do 

anything. Andrew Card interview (Mar. 31, 2004). However, he recalls “being aware” of the request or the 

issue as early as September 11 or September 12. Ibid. This appears to be the highest level within the U.S. 

government to which the matter rose. 

18 See, e.g., FBI record, Information on “Bin Ladin” Family Flights that Departed the United States in 

September 2001, May 28, 2004, stating “Contacts with an SSA at FBIHQ (whose name was not recalled) 

coordinated this departure to occur as soon as the FAA had authorized air traffic. SSA Foster further noted 

that during the hectic days following 9/11/2001, he spoke with several supervisors at FBIHQ concerning 

these issues, but did not keep specific records.” FBI Assistant Director Tom Pickard recalled being in the 

SIOC on September 13 or 14, and being told by one of three people—Dale Watson, Mike Rolince, and 

Steve Jennings, who has told us he had no involvement in the Saudi flights issue (Steve Jennings interview 

(June 9, 2004)--that the issue of a UBL family flight had come up on a secure video teleconference. Both 

Pickard and Watson told us that they did not participate in SVTC communications with Dick Clarke, and 

that the person frequently involved in those conferences in the SIOC was Mike Rolince. Tom Pickard 

interview (June 3, 2004); Dale Watson interview (June 3, 2004). Pickard was not able to recall who—he 

was told--had raised the issue on the SVTC, and said to us that he thought it had come from Richard Clarke 
15

or the State Department. He understood that the issue was that they wanted to leave the country. But, he 

told us, there was no information suggesting that they were “here illegally or clandestinely.” Tom Pickard 

interview (June 3, 2004). Pickard said that he knew prior to 9/11--when Usama Bin Ladin had been placed 

onto the FBI’s Most Wanted List--that UBL had family members inside the U.S., that the FBI had “looked 

at them,” and that the FBI had found “no connections” between these family members and UBL himself. 

“Now we had this extended family who wanted permission to leave,” Pickard said. At the time, he said that 

he viewed the issue as a “low priority,” given what he had been told and what he already knew about the 

Bin Ladin family members. Pickard said that his approach was to tell his subordinate to handle the matter. 

He told us that he did not believe he conveyed the need to come back to him about it. In the scheme of 

things, Pickard said, he did not see anything to raise an alarm. Pickard did not recall discussing any other 

flights beyond this one Saudi flight. Ibid. Similarly, Dale Watson recalls that at about the same time he 

received the call from Rihab Massoud, the Deputy Chief of Mission of the Saudi Embassy in Washington, 

the issue “came up to him” from within the FBI, possibly raised by Mike Rolince. Watson recalled being 

told in this discussion that all the individuals on the flight had been identified and there was no one of 

interest on the flight. Watson said he recalled telling whoever it was who raised it with him words to the 

effect of “that’s fine.” Dale Watson interview (June 3, 2004). 

19 See 8 CFR § 231.2 (Requiring that air carriers submit “a departure manifest” to an immigration officer 

“at the port of departure . . . within 48 hours of the departure.”) 20 For example, as the Commission has previously reported, the 768 so-called ”Special Interest” Aliens 

detained after 9/11 by the INS in conjunction with the FBI were detained lawfully on immigration 

violations.

21 United States law provides that no alien may depart the United States “if his departure would be 

prejudicial to the interests of the United States,” 8 C.F.R § 15.2(a)(implementing INA § 215 --Travel 

control of citizens and aliens), and includes within that category any alien “who is needed in the United 

States as a witness in, or as a party to, any criminal case under investigation.” 8 CFR § 215.3(g). However, 

the power to prevent departure under this law is vested in “departure control officers” that, prior to the 

creation of the Department of Homeland Security, were employees of the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service, not the FBI. 8 CFR § 215.1(i) (“The term departure-control officer means any immigration officer 

as defined in the regulations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service”). In addition, persons 

prevented from departing under this provision of law are provided with a hearing before a “special inquiry” 

officer and the law sets out the procedures and evidentiary requirements for such a hearing. 8 CFR § 215.4 

(Procedure in case of alien prevented from departing from the United States), § 215.5 (Hearing procedure 

before special inquiry officer). Thus, before an individual on one of these flights could have been prevented 

from departing, the FBI would have needed some evidence that they had information about either the 9/11 

attacks or some other terrorist activity. By insisting that they be able to identify all persons on these flights, 

and by checking the biographical information of these persons against databases with derogatory 

information, such as terrorist watchlists, the FBI took the logical steps necessary to develop such evidence. 

22 According to FBI Special Agent Tim D., the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) found one name match, 

but the TIPOFF record was for an individual born in 1980, and the “Bin Ladin flight” passenger was listed 

on the manifest as born in 1962. Tim D. interview (March 30, 2004). 

23 In order to be as comprehensive as possible, the TSC checked the names on the manifests listed on the 

House of Bush/House of Saud website using the biographical information contained on those manifests. 

With minor exceptions, the website contained data previously checked by the TSC prior to our April 

hearing. 

24 This information was reported on the House of Bush/House of Saud Web site as having been obtained by 

the Judicial Watch organization from DHS pursuant to a FOIA request. However, the materials produced to 

Judicial Watch did not have complete biographical information such as the name and passport number of 

the individuals on these flights. The FBI obtained the complete records from DHS, and, at our request, ran 

the complete list of names and other biographical data against the TIPOFF Terrorist watchlist. There were 

no matches. Tim D. interview (June 30, 2004). 

25 Although the FBI states that “a total of 18 Saudi passengers [were] aboard this flight,” that does not 

seem possible since at least two of the names of the passengers – Gualberto Simpao Glore and Gilles 

Gerard -- do not have Arabic names, and their passport numbers are not consistent with Saudi issuance. 

26 We do not know the destination of this flight. 
16

27 Kathy Steele, “Phantom Flight From Florida,” Tampa Tribune, Oct. 5, 2001. It was featured prominently 

in an article in Vanity Fair magazine and in articles and op-ed pieces in major newspapers and magazines. 

It has been discussed on television news shows. A U.S. Senator requested that the Justice Department 

Inspector General investigate it. Letter from United States Senator Charles Schumer to DOJ Inspector 

General Glenn Fine, June 16, 2004, stating “I am troubled that such a flight could have been allowed to 

take place just two days after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.” 

28 This security detail began when one of the Saudis contacted a Tampa police officer and requested 

security fearing they would be attacked. Tampa police officers were then hired off-duty and were paid to 

provide security. John Solomon interview (June 4, 2004); Mike Fendle interview (June 4, 2004). We have 

reviewed documents provided by the Tampa Police Department regarding “extra-duty pay” provided for six 

hours by Detective Mike Fendle to “Sultan Bin Fahad” on September 13, 2001. 

29 John Solomon interview (June 4, 2004). 

30 Ibid. 

31 Ibid. 

32 Ibid. 

33 Ibid. 

34 Dan Grossi interview (May 24, 2004); Manuel Perez interview (May 27, 2004). 35 John Solomon interview (June 4, 2004); Mike Fendle interview (June 4, 2004). 

36 Mike Fendle interview (June 4, 2004); Dan Grossi interview (May 24, 2004). 

37 Mike Fendle interview (June 4, 2004). 

38 The Tampa officers were paid through the Tampa Police Department according to routine procedures. 

Mike Fendle interview (June 4, 2004); John Solomon interview (June 4, 2004). Dan Grossi reimbursed the 

Tampa Police Department with money he obtained in Lexington, Kentucky later on September 13. John 

Solomon interview (June 4, 2004); Dan Grossi interview (May 24, 2004).

39 Dan Grossi interview (May 24, 2004); Manuel Perez interview (May 27, 2004); Christopher Steele 

interview (June 14, 2004). 

40 Christopher Steele interview (June 14, 2004); Barry Ellis interview (June 14, 2004). 

41 Christopher Steele interview (June 14, 2004); FAA record, Supplemental Response to QFR No. 1, June 

16, 2004. 

42 Christopher Steele interview (June 14, 2004); Barry Ellis interview (June 14, 2004). 

43 Barry Ellis interview (June 14, 2004). 

44 Christopher Steele interview (June 14, 2004). 

45 FAA record, Supplemental Response to QFR No. 1, June 16, 2004. 

46 FAA record, Response to QFR No. 1, June 8, 2004. 

47 Dan Grossi interview (May 24, 2004); Manuel Perez interview (May 27, 2004). 48 Tampa’s system captures the noise made by planes taking off and landing at the airport and attaches that 

information to the aircraft type and flight identification number. Gigi Skipper interview (June 4, 2004). 

Tampa’s system recorded HPJ32, model LJ35 arriving at 3:34 p.m., departing at 4:37 p.m., arriving back in 

Tampa at 8:23 p.m. and departing for the last time at 8:48 p.m. Tampa International Airport record, 

Responses to QFRs, June 7, 2004. 

49 FAA records show 30 flights departing Tampa Airport on September 13, including commercial flights 

departing as early as 12:43 p.m. FAA record, Response to Questions for the Record (QFR) No. 1, June 8, 

2004.

50 The aircraft which arrived before this flight took off included: two general aviation flights, four 

“passenger” flights that included commercial airlines and four flights categorized as “other.” The aircraft 

that departed before this flight included one general aviation, eight passenger flights that included 

commercial airlines, and three flights categorized as “other.” Tampa International Airport record, responses 

to QFRs, June 7, 2004. 

51 FAA record, Supplemental Response to QFRs, June 18, 2004. 

52 Daniel Walsh interview (June 14, 2004); Dan Grossi interview (May 24, 2004); Manuel Perez interview 

(May 27, 2004); Christopher Steele interview (June 14, 2004); FAA record, Supplemental Response to 

QFR No. 1, June 16, 2004, indicating that this flight took off heading back to Tampa at 6:43 p.m.. 

53 Lexington-Blue Grass Airport record, Response to QFRs, June 8, 2004. 

54 Mark Barnard interview (June 7, 2004), in which Barnard commented, “It happened. They flew from 

Tampa to Lexington,” and “Trust me. It landed. I was there.” See also, TAC Air record, Response to QFR, 
17

June 9, 2004, Statement of Daniel Walsh, General Counsel that “I am aware of a trip that did arrive with 

persons of Arab descent. If my memory served me correctly, this aircraft was a Learjet.” Dan Grossi 

interview (May 24, 2004); Manuel Perez interview (May 27, 2004). 

55 Dan Grossi interview (May 24, 2004); Manuel Perez interview (May 27, 2004). 56 Mark Barnard interview (June 7, 2004). These three individuals departed the United States days on a 

separate flight on September 16, 2001. Their departure is discussed below. 

57 TAC Air record, Response to QFRs, June 9, 2004, with attachment TAC Air Daily Fuel Disbursement 

Report for “9/13/01” indicating a “Lear” with Tail “32HJ” received fuel at approximately 6:45 p.m.—the 

time on the log is unclear; FAA record, Supplemental Response to QFR No. 1, June 16, 2004. 

58 Dan Grossi interview (May 24, 2004); Manuel Perez interview (May 27, 2004); Christopher Steele 

interview (June 14, 2004). 

59 The FBI agrees that this flight occurred. James M. interview (June 18, 2004). Special Agent M. told the 

Commission that approximately one week after the 9/13/01 flight, he spoke with a Lexington Police officer 

who had provided security to the Saudi nationals on this flight. M. asked how the three young Saudis on the 

Tampa-Lexington flight arrived in Lexington and, when informed that they had flown, he questioned 

whether this was possible. M. says the officer “hemmed and hawed,” and then suggested that the three 

young Saudis actually drove to Lexington and said they had flown to avoid the displeasure of their elder 

male relative in Lexington. Special Agent M. told the Commission he now believes based on his own 

independent investigation that this flight in fact took place. Ibid. 

60 FBI record, “All Passports Obtained by the FBI of Individuals on Northstar Aviation Flight from 

Providence, Rhode Island (Departing on or about September 14, 2001),” June 15, 2004. We have reviewed 

the copies of these passports collected by the FBI, and have not found anything unusual. 

61 FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin Laden Family 

Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003. 

62 Christine Beyer interview (July 14, 2004). 63 According to the FBI, airport accounting records and log sheets prepared by airport personnel indicate 

the plane departed the airport at this time. Tim D. interview (July 14, 2004). 

64 FBI record, “Documents related to Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight from Newark Airport,” June 2004. 

65 Ibid. 

66 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey record, Responses to QFRs, July 9, 2004. 

67 The FBI has provided us with a copy of the manifest for this flight. FBI record, “All Passports Obtained 

by the FBI of Individuals on a Chartered Boeing 727 flight from Lexington, Kentucky (Departing on or 

about September 16, 2001),” June 15, 2004. 

68 We have reviewed copies of those passports and found nothing unusual. 

69 FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin Laden Family 

Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003; FBI record, Summary of “Information Regarding Flights 

Taken by Saudi Citizens, Including Members of the Binladen Family, Out of the United States Shortly 

After September 11, 2001,” Oct. 29, 2003. 

70 Lexington-Blue Grass Airport record, Response to QFR, June 8, 2004. 

71 FBI record, “All Passports Obtained by the FBI of Individuals on a Chartered Boeing 727 flight from 

Lexington, Kentucky (Departing on or about September 16, 2001),” June 15, 2004. 

72 Craig Unger, “Questions,” Boston Globe, April 11, 2004, citing Gerald Posner, “While America Slept.” 

73 CIA record, Response to QFR, June 23, 2004. We found no evidence for this assertion in the 

interrogation reports of Abu Zubaydah we reviewed. 

74 Boston-Logan Airport reopened to commercial air traffic at 5 a.m. on September 15, 2001. 

Massachusetts Port Authority record, Response to the Logan International Airport QFRs, June 17, 2004.

75 FBI record, Report of Leads Covered from FBI Las Vegas Office, Sept. 25, 2001. 

76 Ibid. 

77 Ibid. 

78 FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin Laden Family 

Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003; FBI record, Flight manifest for Republic of Gabon Flight, 

Feb. 26, 2004. 

79 FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin Laden Family 

Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003. 

80 Ibid. 
18

81 FBI record, Report of Leads Covered from FBI Las Vegas Office, Sept. 25, 2001. 

82 FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin Laden Family 

Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003. 

83 Las Vegas-McCarran International Airport reopened at 5 a.m., PST, on September 14, 2001. McCarran 

International Airport record, Responses to QFRs, June 17, 2004. 

84 FBI record, Report of Leads Covered from FBI Las Vegas Office, Sept. 25, 2001; FBI record, Flight 

Manifest, Sept. 24, 2001. Although the FBI states that “a total of 18 Saudi passengers [were] aboard this 

flight,” that does not seem possible since at least two of the names of the passengers – Gualberto Simpao 

Glore and Gilles Gerard -- do not have Arabic names, and their passport numbers are not consistent with 

Saudi issuance. 

85 FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin Laden Family 

Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003; FBI record, Flight manifest for Republic of Gabon Flight, 

Feb. 26, 2004. 

86 Ibid. 

87 Ibid. 

88 Las Vegas-McCarran International Airport reopened at 5 a.m., PST, on September 14, 2001. McCarran 

International Airport record, Responses to QFRs, June 17, 2004. 

89 James C. interview (June 3, 2004). 

90 Ibid. 

91 FBI record, Report of Leads Covered from FBI Las Vegas Office, Sept. 25, 2001. 

92 James C. interview (June 3, 2004). 

93 There is conflicting evidence on which one of two individuals were actually on the flight. In its summary 

of these flights, the FBI lists “Maria Bayma” as a passenger on the flight manifest. However, another FBI 

record of this flight indicates that Khalil Bin Laden “and his wife and son” boarded in Orlando, Florida. 

FBI record, Report of Leads Covered from FBI Los Angeles Office, Sept. 25, 2001. An analyst comment 

then states: “Khalil Bin Laden’s wife’s name is Isabel Bayma.” Ibid. Thus, it is unclear whether Isabel or 

Maria Bayma were on Flight 441. The FBI’s records indicate that Maria Bayma “appears to be a relative of 

Khalil Bin Laden’s wife, Isabel Bayma.” Ibid. 

94 FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin Laden Family 

Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003. Although the Vanity Fair Article states Abdullah Bin Laden 

was on this flight, there is no evidence that Abdullah Bin Laden was on Ryan Air Flight 441. 

95 In total, the FBI conducted 22 interviews of the 23 passengers on Ryan Air Flight 441. FBI record, “Final 

Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin Laden Family Departures after 9/11/2001),” 

Sept. 24, 2003. 

96 FBI record, “All Interview Reports for Any Passengers on the Flights,” containing reports dated Sept. 13 

through Sept. 26, 2001. 

97 FBI record, Summary of “Information Regarding Flights Taken by Saudi Citizens, Including Members of 

the Binladen Family, Out of the United States Shortly After September 11, 2001,” Oct. 29, 2003. 

98 According to FBI records, in Boston, 17 people got onto this flight in Boston, and one person – a security 

guard -- got off the plane. FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: 

Bin Laden Family Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003. 99 Ibid. 

100 Ibid. 101 FBI record, Report of Leads Covered from FBI Los Angeles Office, Sept. 25, 2001. 102 FBI record, “All Interview Reports for Any Passengers on the Flights,” containing reports dated Sept. 13 

through Sept. 26, 2001; FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin 

Laden Family Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003. 

103 FBI record, “All Interview Reports for Any Passengers on the Flights,” containing reports dated Sept. 13 

through Sept. 26, 2001. 

104 FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin Laden Family 

Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003. The FBI agent reported that this flight was delayed two hours 

because flight crew members refused to fly upon learning “the identities of the passengers.” According to 

the agent, “The matter was resolved after the charter company agreed to pay each flight crew member an 

additional five thousand dollars.” FBI record, “All Interview Reports for Any Passengers on the Flights,” 

containing reports dated Sept. 13 through Sept. 26, 2001. 
19

105 FBI record, “All Interview Reports for Any Passengers on the Flights,” containing reports dated Sept. 13 

through Sept. 26, 2001. 

106 FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin Laden Family 

Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003. 

107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 FBI record, Report of Leads Covered from FBI Los Angeles Office, Sept. 25, 2001. 110 We say apparently because New York-JFK Airport informed us that they have no information on this 

“VIP” flight. James Begley email, June 10, 2004. 

111 The website is www.houseofbush.com. 112 State Department logs contain a number of references to “VIPs” and “Saudi royals” in connection with 

proposed flights out of the country prior to this flight. In each case it is clear that the FAA and/or the FBI 

was involved in clearance for the flight. DOS record, “Terrorist Attack Task Force log,” September 16 and 

17, 2001. 

113 New York-JFK Airport reopened on September 14, 2001, at 10:58 a.m. Port Authority of New York and 

New Jersey record, facsimile from the Law Department, June 4, 2004. 

114 Hanscom Airfield reopened to commercial air traffic at 5 a.m. on September 15, 2001. Massachusetts 

Port Authority record, Response to the Hanscom Airfield QFRs, June 17, 2004. 

115 FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin Laden Family 

Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003.. 

116 Ibid. 117 FBI record, Flight Manifest, Sept. 19, 2001. 118 FBI record, “Final Draft of Response to October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (re: Bin Laden Family 

Departures after 9/11/2001),” Sept. 24, 2003. 

119 Las Vegas-McCarran International Airport reopened at 5 a.m., PST, on September 14, 2001. McCarran 

International Airport, Responses to Questions for the Record, June 17, 2004. 

120 Letter from Christopher Farrell of Judicial Watch to 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip 

Zelikow, June 1, 2004. 

121 Kelly B. interview (April 27, 2004). 122 Tim D. interview (June 30, 2004). 
215

APPENDIX C 

Immigration Histories of Certain Individuals with Terrorist Connections 

The following analysis is based on information obtained primarily from reviewing 

immigration files, court documents and government reports. Individual INS immigration 

files were reviewed unless otherwise noted. The individuals whose immigration histories 

are discussed here are either known terrorists, or individuals with connections to 

terrorist attacks, including the 9/11 attacks, whose backgrounds are not discussed 

extensively in either the 9/11 Commission Report or Chapter 3 of this Staff Report. 

x CIA Attack January 25, 1993

Mir Aimal Kansi aka Kasi1

Place of birth: Pakistan 

Date of birth: February 10, 1964 

12/4/90 Using the alias of Mir Aimal Kasi, Kansi was issued a B-1 business visa at the U.S. 

Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan.

2/27/91 Kansi, still using the name Kasi, arrived in New York on Pakistani passport G399099. He 

was permitted to stay for one month, but remained in the country for a year without the 

permission of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in violation of INA 

237(a)(1)(A). This was grounds for deportation. 

3/19/91 He was issued a new Pakistani passport at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C. in 

the name of Kansi.2

 The new passport had a notation that it replaced Pakistani passport 

D398086, which was not the number of the passport he used to enter the U.S. a month 

earlier.

2/7/92 Kansi filed a claim for political asylum, claiming he illegally entered the United States on 

March 3, 1991 at New York City without inspection by the INS. He received permission 

from the INS to work in the United States while his application was pending. He obtained 

a Virginia driver’s license and began working for a courier service in the Washington, 

D.C. area. This political asylum claim was denied. 

Kansi didn’t give up. He applied for legalization under the Immigration Reform and 

Control Act of 1986. One of the requirements of this amnesty program was that the 

applicant must have entered the United States illegally prior to January 1, 1982.3

 Kansi 

claimed he entered the United States from Mexico and had lived here illegally from April 

1981 to June 1987, a contradiction to his assertions in his political asylum petition. To 

support this claim, Kansi presented two leases, four letters of employment and one letter 

from a friend in Pakistan verifying a visit to that country. An examination of copies of 

these documents indicated that they all were typed on the same typewriter.4

Kansi, however, missed the statutory filing deadline for this program. He then joined a 

class action lawsuit, Catholic Social Services v INS, involving aliens who also missed the 
216

filing deadline or who had left the United States for a brief period of time.5 With his 

application pending, Kansi again applied for and received authorization to work in the 

United States. 

4/15/92 The INS renewed Kansi’s work authorization.6

1/25/93 Armed with an AK-47 assault rifle, Kansi opened fire on five male CIA employees while 

they sat in their cars at a stoplight in front of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, 

killing Frank Darling and Lansing Bennett and seriously injuring three others. The 

following day Kansi fled to Pakistan.

2/16/93 The State of Virginia charged Kansi with murder, malicious wounding and five counts of 

using a firearm in the commission of a felony.7

6/15/97 The FBI, working with Pakistani intelligence, arrested Kansi in a hotel.8

11/10/97 After trial in Fairfax County, Virginia, Kansi was guilty of all counts, and sentenced to 

death for capital murder, life in prison for first degree murder, 20 years on each of the 

five counts of malicious wounding, two years in prison on one firearms charge and four 

years in prison on each of the other four firearms charges. Kansi was executed in 1998. 
217

x World Trade Center Bombing, February 26, 1993 

Eyad Mahmoud Ismail aka Ismoil9

Place of birth: Kuwait 

Country of citizenship: Jordan 

Date of birth: January 26, 1964 

10/3/89 The U.S. consulate in Kuwait issued Ismail an F-1 student visa to study English in the 

United States.

10/9/89 He entered the United States at Honolulu and enrolled at Wichita State University in 

Kansas where he attended the English language program. 

11/21/90 Ismail received approval from the INS to work part-time for one year while he was in 

school. He dropped out and eventually made his way to Texas. Because he was no longer 

a student, Ismail was in violation of the terms of his visa. 

2/21/93 Ismail flew from Texas to New York City. 

2/26/93 The World Trade Center was bombed. Ismail drove the van containing the bomb. That 

night he fled to Jordan. 

9/12/94 Ismail was indicted on 10 counts for his role in the World Trade Center bombing.10

8/3/95 Ismail was extradited from Jordan for prosecution in the United States. 

11/13/97 Ismail was convicted and sentenced to 240 years in federal prison and ordered to pay 

restitution of $10 million. 

Mohammed Abouhalima aka Abo Halima11

Place of Birth: Egypt 

Date of Birth: 2/23/64

7/22/85 Abouhalima entered the United States at New York on a B-2 tourist visa and was granted 

permission to remain in the country until Aug. 15, 1985. 

11/6/85 Abouhalima asked the INS to extend his length of stay but his request was denied. He 

was ordered to voluntary depart the country before Dec. 5, 1995. He failed to comply and 

became in violation of immigration laws, subject to deportation. 

9/30/87 Abouhalima filed for and received temporary residence under the Seasonal Agricultural 

Worker (SAW) program claiming to have picked beans in Florida. This program 

involved 1.3 million applications from aliens claiming to have worked for at least 90 days 

in agriculture from 1985 to 1986. 
218

7/15/92 His application was denied after it was determined that he had never worked in 

agriculture.12

2/26/93 After the World Trade Center attack, Abouhalima was indicted as an accessory after the 

fact under 18 USC § 3, for his assistance to the first World Trade Center bombing 

terrorists. The indictment charged that he drove his brother, Mahmoud Abouhalima, to 

the airport knowing that he was involved in the bombing plot. 

11/24/98 He was found guilty at trial and sentenced to 96 months in prison. 

4/23/02 Based on his felony conviction Abouhalima was ordered deported following the service 

of his sentence. Abouhalima is in federal prison and scheduled for release on August 25, 

2005.13

Biblal A. Alkaisi aka Bibal Elqisi

Place of Birth: Jordan14

11/5/90 Alkaisi attended a rally held by Rabbi Meir Kahane. He accompanied El Sayyid Nosair, 

who shot and killed Kahane at the event. Alkaisi was questioned about the shooting but 

released by the police.

8/20/91 The Islamic Brotherhood, Inc. in Brooklyn, New York wrote a letter in support of Bilal 

El Qisi’s application for temporary protected status. In their letter they used the same 

address as the Al-Farouq Mosque and the Alkifah Refugee Center, both locations since 

linked Islamist extremist activity.15

9/21/91 Still using the name of Bilal El Qisi, Alkaisi filed an application for temporary protected 

status (TPS) at the Cleveland, Ohio INS office.16 He stated that he was born in Lebanon 

on September 6, 1965 and that he entered the United States at New York City on 

September 25, 1988.17 He supported these claims with a Lebanese birth certificate and an 

INS Form I-94 (Arrival and Departure Record), which was later determined to have been 

altered to show a different country of birth.

3/11/92 The Cleveland INS office initiated an investigation into a number of suspected fraudulent 

TPS applications, including Alkaisi’s.

3/19/92 The INS Forensic Document Laboratory completed an examination of Alkaisi’s Lebanese 

birth certificate and concluded it was produced by a color copier. The English translation 

of the Arabic document was also incorrect. In addition, the INS I-94 Record of Entry and 

Departure that Alkaisi submitted with his application was altered to change the country of 

birth.

5/22/92 Bibal El Qisi filed a request for political asylum, now claiming he was born in Jordan on 

December 20, 1965 and had entered the United States on October 10, 1987 in New York 

via Jordan Airlines. He claimed he was not inspected by the INS and said that he lived in 
219

Brooklyn, New York. The INS assigned him a new case file. INS recordkeeping did not 

connect this application with his previous one.

7/13/92 El Qisi failed to appear for his political asylum interview. 

7/28/92 As a result of his failure to appear the INS terminated action on his political asylum 

claim. 

2/26/93 The World Trade Center was bombed. 

3/25/93 A known associate of the conspirators, El Qisi was arrested by the FBI office in Newark, 

New Jersey. He told the agents that his name was Bilal Salem Alkaisi and that he was 

born on December 25, 1965 in Jordan. The ensuing investigation revealed that all of the 

residences and employments that Alkaisi had listed on his political asylum claim were 

false.

8/8/93 Under the name El Qisi, Alkaisi was indicted with five other co-conspirators for his part 

in the bombing. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York later severed 

Alkaisi from the indictment due to a lack of evidence. 

5/9/94 Alkaisi plead guilty to making false statements to the INS.18

5/19/94 The INS certified that there was no record of an entry of Alkaisi under that name or any 

of his other aliases. 

7/123/94 Alkaisi was sentenced to 20 months in prison for making false statements in his political 

asylum claim. 

11/7/94 He was released from Federal prison and deported to Jordan the following day. 

Nidal Abderrahman Ayyad 

Place of birth: Kuwait

Country of citizenship: Jordan 

Date of birth: July 17, 1967 

7/15/85 Abderrahman Yousif Ayyad, a legal permanent resident, petitioned the INS to bring his 

son Nidal to the United States. 

10/10/85 His petition was granted and Nidal Ayyad entered the United States at New York City as 

the unmarried son of a lawful permanent resident. 

2/21/91 Nidal applied for naturalization at the INS office in Newark, and swore allegiance to the 

United States.

3/7/91 Nidal became a naturalized citizen in a ceremony in Newark. 
220

2/26/93 The World Trade center was bombed. The following day Nidal called the New York 

Times, proclaiming the bombing to be the work of the “Liberation Army.” 

5/24/94 Nidal was charged and convicted as part of the World Trade Center plot, and was 

sentenced to 240 years in prison for conspiracy to destroy buildings with an explosive 

device, explosive destruction of property, destruction of a motor vehicle, assault of a 

federal officer and using or carrying a destructive device during a crime of violence. 

5/28/96 The INS Newark office recommended that Nidal’s citizenship be revoked based on his 

membership in a terrorist group before and after his naturalization. The recommendation 

is based on INA 340 (a)(2) “withholding of a material fact,” section 340(c) “reopening of 

naturalization proceedings” and 313(3) “membership in groups advocating the violent 

overthrow of the government of the United States.”19 It does not appear that action was 

taken to formally revoke his citizenship. The Commission was not provided access to his 

immigration file, and the Department of Homeland Security advised that his file was 

protected by the Privacy Act, which covers citizens, legal permanent residents and 

naturalized citizens. Ayyad is scheduled for release on April 3, 2095. 
221

Mohammed Salameh20

Place of birth: Jordan 

Date of birth: September 1, 1967 

4/8/84 The Jordanian Passport office in Amman issued passport #B468365 to Mohammad Amin 

Abdel-Rahim Salameh. Ramzi Yousef’s fingerprints were later found on this passport.21

11/5/90 Rabbi Meir Kahane was shot to death by El Sayyid Nosair. Salameh was arrested that 

night at one of Nosair’s addresses and admitted that he was with Nosair at the shooting. 

However, the next day Salameh was released for lack of evidence. 

9/22/92 Salameh submitted a fraudulent Seasonal Agricultural Worker (SAW) application in an 

attempt to become a legal permanent resident. He claimed that he planted tomatoes, and 

weeded and picked green beans for Oak Valley Farms in Crawford, Texas. 

2/26/93 Salameh drove a rented Ryder van containing a bomb into the World Trade Center. 

3/4/93 Salameh was arrested trying to obtain a $400 refund on the rented truck. He was later 

charged with criminal violations of the immigration laws and prosecuted on charges 

related to the bombing. 

3/4/94 Salameh was convicted in Federal court of all charges including 8 USC § 1546(a) (“fraud 

and misuse of visas, permits and other documents”) and was sentenced to 240 months in 

Federal prison. His projected release date is January 2, 2024. 

Mahmud Abouhalima aka “Mahmud the Red”22

Place of birth: Egypt 

Date of birth: November17, 1959 

1985 Abouhalima and his German wife, Marianne Weber, entered the United States on tourist 

visas. They were admitted for six months but overstayed their authorized length of stay. 

1987 Abouhalima applied for amnesty under the Special Agricultural Program (SAW) program 

claiming that he worked seven months on a South Carolina farm. There were indications 

that this claim was fraudulent, namely that Abouhalima was in New York and never 

worked on a farm. Nevertheless, he received his legal permanent resident alien status 

(green card). 

11/5/90 Abouhalima was supposed to drive the getaway taxi from the Marriott Eastside Hotel 

after Nosair’s assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane. While he waited for Nosair, an 

employee at the hotel ordered him to move his car, which was blocking the hotel 

entrance. That night Abouhalim was arrested along with Mohammed Salameh and others. 

However, like Salameh, he was released for lack of evidence. 
222

2/23/93 Abouhalima filed Form I-131, Application for a Travel Document, listing an expected 

departure on March 6, 1993 for Egypt. This allowed him to remain abroad for more than 

one year without losing his legal resident status.

2/26/93 The World Trade Center was bombed. Abouhalima drove behind the Ryder rental truck 

carrying the bomb. He then drove the group away from the scene. 

3/2/93 Abouhalima fled to Sudan via Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 

6/93 One of Abouhalima’s fingerprints was found in one of the bomb-making manuals seized 

from another bombing conspirator, Ahmad Ajaj, when Ajaj had entered the United States 

at JFK airport in New York on September 1, 1992. Another fingerprint belonging to 

Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the plot, was found on the same manual. After a 

worldwide search, he was arrested by FBI agents in Egypt and returned to the United 

States where he was tried on terrorism charges. He was convicted and sentenced to 1,300 

months in prison. His is scheduled for release on September 2, 2087. 

x Plot to Destroy New York City Landmarks June 24, 1993 

Matarawy Mohammed Said Saleh23

Place of birth: Egypt 

Date of birth: March 4, 1956 

1/31/86 Using the alias Wahid Mohamed Ahmed, Saleh married Evelyn Cortez, a United States 

citizen.24 Based on this marriage, Cortez filed INS form I-130, Petition to Classify Status 

of Alien Relative in INS New York City.25 This application started the process of 

acquiring legal permanent residency for Saleh. In the petition, Saleh claimed to be a selfemployed scuba diver. It also claimed both he and his wife lived at the same address in 

the Bronx.

5/14/86 The INS denied the petition on the ground that Cortez failed to submit a divorce decree 

from her previous marriage. The denial was sent by certified mail but was returned 

marked “unclaimed.” 

10/4/87 Still married to Cortez, Saleh married Leslie Sonkin, also a United States citizen, in a 

ceremony in Egypt. They then filed an immigrant visa petition for Saleh claiming Saleh 

had never been previously married. 

12/12/87 Saleh entered the United States at New York City as a conditional resident alien based on 

his marriage to Sonkin. This status allowed him to remain in the United States legally for 

two years after which time he could file to permanently remain in the United States.26

8/11/88 Saleh was convicted in federal court for selling heroin in Detroit and sentenced to five 

years’ imprisonment.27 He was paroled after two and a half years and turned over to the 

INS for deportation on the basis of his conviction.
223

12/18/90 The INS initiated deportation proceedings while Saleh was detained in Oakdale, 

Louisiana. One month later, Sultan El Gawly posted an $8,000 bail with the INS to 

secure Saleh’s release. The deportation order was still pending.

3/31/93 Saleh’s conditional residence status was terminated by the INS. 

7/16/93 The FBI interviewed Saleh’s wife Evelyn Cortez, who claimed she had re-married to 

Ashraf Mohammed. She claimed that she had a son by Saleh six years earlier.

7/22/93 Saleh was arrested by a joint INS-FBI team in Wildwood, New Jersey. 

12/15/95 Saleh was convicted of conspiracy to bomb various targets in New York City.28 He was 

sentenced to time served and placed on supervised release for three years despite his 

outstanding deportation order, despite his illegal immigration status, heroin conviction, 

violation of probation, assault of his ex-wife Cortez, assaults on his current wife, and

involvement in credit card fraud and theft.29

6/4/96 The INS Philadelphia office issued an arrest warrant for Saleh for his violation of 

immigration laws. Shortly thereafter he was arrested by INS Special Agents at the 

Federal Probation office in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and placed in INS custody. 

6/27/96 Based on his terrorism conviction, Saleh was placed in administrative deportation 

proceedings as an aggravated felon. This procedure did not involve a deportation 

hearing.30

9/25/96 Saleh was served with a final notice of deportation. Egypt issued a temporary travel 

document allowing Saleh to travel only to Egypt. 

11/19/96 Saleh was released from prison and deported to Egypt. 

El Sayyid Nosair31

Place of birth: Egypt

1981 Nosair entered the United States at an unknown time and place. He obtained legal 

permanent residence status based on his marriage to a United States citizen. 

1985 Nosair moved to New Jersey and became a regular visitor at the Alkifah Refugee Center 

in Brooklyn where he contacted Sheik Rahman, an Egyptian radical cleric also known as 

the Blind Sheik. 

9/27/89 Nosair was naturalized in Newark, New Jersey. Prior to his naturalization he was 

observed, while under surveillance by the FBI, shooting a variety of weapons with other 

suspected Muslim militants at a firing range. The INS was not aware of this fact. 

11/5/90 Nosair shot and killed radical Jewish Rabbi Meir Kahane in front of a crowd of followers 

at the Marriott Eastside Hotel in New York City. He also shot an elderly man who tried to 
224

stop him. He accidentally got into the wrong taxi, believing it was the getaway car driven 

by Mahmud Abouhalima. Realizing his mistake, he jumped out of the taxi with his gun 

still in his hand. He was confronted by an off-duty postal inspector. Both were shot in the 

ensuing gun fight.

11/8/90 The FBI raided Nosair’s apartment. They found numerous military documents from Ft. 

Bragg, North Carolina. The documents were traced to Ali Mohammed, a sergeant in the 

Army Special Forces. Mohammed, an FBI informant, was later convicted for his role in 

the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. 

12/21/91 At trial, Nosair was found not guilty of murder and attempted murder. He was convicted 

of carrying a weapon and of assault. He was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. 

2/26/93 The World Trade Center was bombed. 

3/4/93 FBI agents obtained a search warrant for Ibrahim el Gabrowny’s apartment in connection 

with the bombing investigation. There, FBI agents found Nosair’s U.S. passport, five 

Nicaraguan passports issued in July 1991 and five Nicaraguan birth certificates for 

Nosair, his wife and his three children as well as Nicaraguan drivers’ licenses. The 

foreign documents were in alias names.32

 5/8/96 The INS recommended revoking Nosair’s naturalization based on his lack of “good moral 

character,” required for naturalization. He was also subject to a violation of 18 USC § 

1425 for having unlawfully obtained naturalization.33 We have found no evidence that 

further action has been taken with regard to this recommendation. Nosair is currently 

serving a life sentence in Federal prison. His projected release date is September 2, 2087. 

Abdel Rahman Yasin 

Yasin was born in Indiana to Iraqi parents. His father was a graduate student. Yasin left 

the United States and grew up in Baghdad. Later he returned to the United States to live 

with his mother in Jersey City, New Jersey. 

6/21/92 Yasin applied for a new U.S. passport in Amman, Jordan, to replace one he claimed to 

have lost.34

Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, stayed at 

Yasin’s apartment before the bombing. They also mixed the chemicals for the bomb. 

During this process, Yasin’s leg was burned by chemicals. 

2/26/93 The World Trade Center was bombed. As part of the investigation the FBI questioned 

Yasin whom they encountered while executing a search warrant. He provided 

information on Ramzi Yousef, who had fled the United States. He also took the agents to 

the apartment where the bomb chemicals were mixed. Yasin appeared helpful and open 

and was released by the FBI. He immediately disappeared. 
225

5/23/02 CBS news reporter Lesley Stahl located Yasin, then living in Baghdad, and interviewed 

him. Yasin remains a fugitive, his whereabouts unknown. 

Begin Text Box 

The Landmarks Conspirators 

A number of conspirators in the June 1993 plot to blow up the Federal building, the FBI 

office, the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, and the George Washington Bridge, obtained 

legal permanent residency or were naturalized citizens. The Privacy Act prevented our 

review of their files.35 They are: 

 Amir Abdelghani. Currently in Federal prison, projected release date of August 

13, 2019.36

 Fadil Abdelghani. Currently in Federal prison, projected release date of April 5, 

2015.37

 Tarig El Hassan. Currently in Federal prison, projected release date of December 

21, 2023.38

 Fares Khallafalla. He obtained legal permanent residency immigration status 

through the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) provision of the Immigration 

Reform and Control Act of 1986. Currently in Federal prison, projected release 

date of August 13, 2019.39

 Siddig Ibrahim Siddiq Ali.

End Text Box 

x Plot to Destroy the New York City Subway 

In this plot two illegal immigrants conspired to blow up the Atlantic Avenue subway in 

Brooklyn, New York. The plot was discovered shortly before five bombs were planted.

Mohamed Mustafa Khalil40

Place of birth: Amman, Jordan 

Date of birth: October 5, 1974 

7/6/96 Khalil was issued Jordanian passport E925402 in Amman, Jordan. He applied for and 

received a Canadian tourist visa. 

11/19/96 Khalil traveled to Toronto. He was permitted to study English in Canada. 

1/14/97 Khalil was arrested by INS Border Patrol officers at a Greyhound Bus station in 

Bellingham, Washington during routine patrol duties. Khalil told the Border Patrol that 

he had crossed the Canadian border with co-conspirator Abu Mezer (See chapter 3) in a 

taxi but was not inspected by the INS. Khalil had violated immigration law by failing to 

obtain a visa to visit the United States. He was detained without bond until his detention 

hearing.41
226

1/29/97 Immigration Judge Anna Ho set bail at $10,000.

2/27/97 At the deportation hearing, Khalil said he wanted to apply for political asylum. His bond 

was reduced to $5,000 It was posted by Kamal Hourani, an acquaintance. Khalil told the 

judge that upon release from INS custody he planned to live in Centreville, Virginia. 

7/4/97 Khalil told the INS that he had married Sofina Assaf, a United States citizen residing in 

Canada.

8/1/97 Khalil was arrested in New York City during the investigation of the New York subway 

bombing plot.42

11/12/97 Khalil was released from prison and deported to Jordan.43

x The Manila Air Plot 

In 1994, KSM accompanied Ramzi Yousef to the Philippines, and the two of them began 

planning what is now known as the Manila air or “Bojinka” plot—the intended bombing 

of 12 U.S. commercial jumbo jets over the Pacific during a two-day span.

Abdul Hakim Murad aka Ahmed Saeed

Place of birth: Pakistan; raised in Kuwait 

Date of birth: January 4, 1968 

Late in 1994, KSM sent $3,000 to Ramzi Yousef in the Philippines to fund the plot. 

Another conspirator, Murad, transported the money.44

1/6/95 Murad was arrested by the Philippine police in Manila after he returned to the scene of a 

small fire at the Dona Josefa Apartments where he had been building bombs with Ramzi 

Yousef. Murad had wanted to retrieve his laptop. Following 67 days of interrogation he 

disclosed the substance of the plot—planting bombs aboard U.S. airliners and a related 

plan to fly an explosives-laden plane into the CIA. At the time of his arrest, Murad used 

the alias of Ahmed Saeed. 

4/12/95 Murad was transported to the United States where he testified at the trial of Ramzi 

Yousef, who had been extradited from Pakistan. Murad was charged with terrorist acts in 

Federal court and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Murad is currently in federal 

prison serving a life sentence.45
227

x Other persons of interest 

Eyad Mohammed Mohammed Mustafa aka Eyad M. Mustafa al Rababah46

Place of birth: Jordan 

Date of birth: July 21, 1972 

3/21/99 Rababah entered the United States at New York City as a tourist and was admitted until 

September 20, 1999. He said he was going to Bridgeport, Connecticut.47

10/12/00 Rababah was arrested by the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles for assisting persons 

to illegally obtain Virginia driver’s licenses and Virginia identification cards. Rababah 

later pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense in connection with these charges. 

5/01 Rababah told the FBI that he met two Saudi males, “Nawaf” and “Hani,” at a 7-11 

convenience store in Falls Church, Virginia. Rababah told the pair that he could assist 

them in obtaining driver’s licenses. 

6/01 Rababah received a phone call from his former roommate in Virginia that the two men he 

met—Nawaf and Hani—had tried to contact him. Rababah spoke to Nawaf who said that 

he had two other friends who would like to “travel around.” Rababah, who had since 

moved to Connecticut, drove to Virginia to pick up the four men. The following day 

Rababah drove them to the Fairfield Motor Inn in Fairfield, Connecticut. They stayed for 

two nights.

9/28/01 Rababah voluntarily told the FBI in New Haven, Conn. that he may have known some of 

the 9/11 hijackers. The men were subsequently identified by Rababah as hijackers 

Ahmed al Ghamdi, Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed and Nawaf al Hamzi.48

The FBI contacted the INS Hartford office regarding Rababah’s immigration status. At 

11:30 p.m., two Hartford INS agents took Rababah into custody. The following day 

Rababah was charged with overstaying his tourist visa in violation of INA § 

237(a)(1)(B), and detained. 

9/30/01 A material witness warrant was issued against Rababah in connection with the 9/11 plot 

and he was transferred to the INS detention center in New York, and then to the 

Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC). The INS filed a detainer with the MCC and 

closed the immigration proceeding against him since he was no longer in INS custody. 

The detainer directed the MCC to turn Rababah over to the INS when he was released. 

11/16/01 A criminal complaint was filed against Rababah in the U.S. Court for the Eastern District 

of Virginia charging him with knowingly and without lawful authority producing an 

identity document, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 USC § 2 and 8 

USC § 1028(a)(1), § (b)(1)(A)(ii), and § (c)(3)(A). A federal arrest warrant was issued 

for Eyad M. Al Rababah for the document fraud charges. 
228

12/8/01 The INS filed a detainer with the U.S. Marshal for the Eastern District of Virginia where 

Rababah had been transferred to stand trial. 

5/20/02 Rababah was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment and ordered to pay a 

special assessment of $200. His sentence was conditioned on his cooperation with the 

INS and his agreement not to oppose any removal or deportation action. 

The deportation hearing was postponed a number of times at the request of Rababah’s 

attorney. Rababah sought to have his bail reduced so that he could be released in order to 

marry his American girlfriend. The INS legal counsel concluded that the special 

conditions included as part of the sentence were unenforceable because the federal court 

order involved matters of criminal law, but immigration hearings involved administrative 

law.

10/17/02 The INS received a letter from the FBI stating that Rababah was no longer of 

investigative interest to them. 

10/22/02 A deportation hearing was held. Rababah requested political asylum, protection under the 

convention against torture, and relief from deportation. The Immigration Judge ruled that 

Rababah did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims for relief and ordered 

him removed from the United States. 

11/4/02 Rababah lost the appeal of his removal order. 

7/10/03 Rababah was deported to Jordan via Paris. 

Anwar Nasser Aulaqi aka al Awalaki49

Place of birth: Yemen 

Date of birth: 1971 

Aulaqi entered the United States at an unknown place as a J-1 Exchange Visitor. He 

enrolled in the civil engineering program at Colorado State University. He later obtained 

legal permanent residence status in the United States; we were unable to determine on 

what basis this status was granted.

Aulaqi was a cleric who preached at the Dar al-Hijrah Islamic Center in Falls Church, 

Virginia and at a mosque in San Diego. He became a “spiritual adviser” to hijackers 

Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Midhar. Eyad al Rababah was also a member of the Falls 

Church mosque. Aulaqi’s telephone number was found when police raided Ramzi 

Binalshibh’s apartment in Hamburg, German. 

Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah50

Place of birth: Yemen 

Date of birth: May 8, 1978 
229

4/14/99 Abdullah requested and received political asylum based on his claim of religious 

persecution in Somalia. 

1/15/02 Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar arrived in Southern California. They eventually 

met Mohdar Abdullah who assisted them in their housing search and helped them with 

English translations.51

10/3/02 Abdullah received a “Notice of Intent to Terminate Asylum Status” before an 

immigration judge based on his fraudulent political asylum claim. The INS had 

determined that he was a citizen of Yemen, not Somalia, and had entered the United 

States as a temporary visitor on December 10, 1998, from Canada using a Yemeni 

passport. Abdullah had testified that he illegally entered the United States on December 

7, 1998, in New York on an Italian passport.

 Abdullah was indicted in the Southern District of California for violations of 18 USC § 

371 (Conspiracy), 18 USC § 1546 (False Statement in an Immigration Application), 18 

USC §1001 (False Statements) and 18 USC § 2 (Aiding and Abetting). 

7/19/02 Abdullah pleaded guilty to 18 USC § 1001 (False Statements) for submitting fraudulent 

documents in support of his political asylum claim. While in custody on these charges, 

Abdullah reportedly claimed that he knew about the 9/11 attack weeks before it 

happened.52

10/02/02 Abdullah was released from federal prison and transferred to the custody of the INS.53

5/21/04 Abdullah was deported to Yemen.54
230

x Los Angeles Airport murder on July 4, 200255

Hesham Mohamed Ali Hedayet aka Hadayet 

Date of birth: July 4, 1961 

Place of birth: Egypt 

11/14/87 Hadayet was issued Egyptian passport 69662. 

7/13/92 He received a multiple entry B-2 tourist visa from the U.S. Consulate in Cairo, Egypt. 

7/31/92 He entered the United States at Los Angeles as a tourist and was admitted until January 

25, 1993.

12/01/92 Hadayet filed an application for political asylum and permission to work. He claimed he 

would be persecuted for his religious beliefs if he returned to Egypt. Specifically, 

Hadayet claimed to be a member of “Assad Eben Furat Mosque Association,” which 

called for a strict Islamist government. Hadayet also claimed to have been arrested many 

times over the previous 14 years by the Egyptian secret police for his strong religious 

beliefs. Based on his asylum application, he was approved for an Employment 

Authorization Document (EAD) by the Los Angeles INS office. 

3/93 Hadayet’s wife arrived in the United States with their son, an Egyptian citizen. There was 

no immigration record of their arrival.56

3/8/93 Hadayet’s permission to work was approved for another year. 

3/30/93 Hadayet was interviewed about his political asylum claim. He lied about the presence of 

his wife and son in the United States. Concealment of this material fact was grounds for 

denial of his petition. 

3/7/95 After reviewing all the facts in the case, the INS issued a “Notice of Intent to Deny the 

Political Asylum Claim.” Hadayet was given thirty days to respond. He did not.

3/18/94 Hadayet received another one-year renewal of his employment authorization. He worked 

as a chauffeur, mainly at the Los Angeles airport. 

10/19/95 Deportation proceedings were initiated for his previous overstay in 1992. Hadayet’s 

permission to work was also terminated. His deportation hearing was scheduled for 

March 26, 1996. All case documents were sent to him via certified mail. 

The certified mail was returned “undeliverable.” Because he did not receive the official 

INS notification of his deportation hearing, under INS regulations he was not placed in 

the Deportable Alien Control System (DACS) system. Thus, no one at INS was tracking 

him or looking for him. 
231

3/29/96 Deportation proceedings against Hadayet were terminated because he could not be 

located.

6/96 Hadayet applied to renew his employment authorization. The DACS was checked but 

because Hadayet’s name was not entered, he received authorization to work another year. 

Meanwhile, his wife won one of the 50,000 “diversity immigrant visas” issued in an 

annual lottery, and was granted legal permanent residence status in the United States.

1/97 Hadayet’s wife filed an application for permanent residence for Hadayet based on her 

status as a legal resident.57

8/29/97 Hadayet was approved for permanent residence as an asylee. 

5/3/00 Hadayet was issued a second California driver’s license in the name Hesham Mohamed 

Hadayet. His previous driver’s license was in the name of Hesham Mohamed Ali. 

7/4/02 Hadayet drove to the Los Angeles Airport armed with a .45 caliber pistol, a 9-millimeter 

automatic handgun and a hunting knife. He approached the El Al ticket counter and shot 

and killed an El Al employee and a man waiting in line. He was shot and killed by a 

security officer.

1

 See DHS document, immigration file A72 415 284 and immigration file A93 249 086. 2

 The new passport contained a curious notation that the correct name on the passport should be “Kansi.” 

3

 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Eligibility for Temporary Resident Status Under the Main 

Legalization Program 

4

 He also provided a completed form requesting status in a class action lawsuit against the INS by the 

League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC). 

5

 DHS/CIS Press Release, Federal Courts Approve Settlements in CSS and LULAC Legalization Cases, 

Mar. 23, 2004. 

6

 See DHS document, immigration file A93 249 086. 

7

 Kansi’s roommate, Zahed Ahmad Mir, was visited by law enforcement authorities after the CIA attack 

and permitted the police to seize two handguns and magazines for the AK-47 believed to be used by Kansi 

in the shooting. Mir was later arrested and convicted of fraud for his application for amnesty under the 

Seasonal Agricultural Worker (SAW) provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. 

This provision permitted illegal aliens who had engaged in seasonal agricultural work for at least 90 days to 

apply for amnesty and receive legal residence in the United States. Mir falsely asserted on his SAW 

application that he entered the United States in 1985 and picked “watermelons, cantaloupe and assorted 

other crops” for a farm in Georgia. See DHS document, immigration file A93 001 385. 

8

 Mir Aimal Kasi v. Commonwealth of Virginia (Virginia Supreme Court), Circuit Court of Fairfax 

County, Record Numbers 980797 and 980798, Nov. 6, 1998. 9

 See DHS document, immigration file A73 140 727. 

10 Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, Press Release, 

Aug. 3, 1995. 

11 See DHS document, immigration file A 91 184 226. 

12 The petitioner on his behalf, Lee Artis Breedlove, a Florida farm owner, claimed to have employed 

Abouhalima and others. Breedlove pled guilty in federal court to issuing 260 fraudulent employment 

records used by aliens in their SAW applications. 

13 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons. 

14 See DHS documents, immigration files A71 495 857, A93 003 841 and A94 010 816. Only parts of these 

files were available for our review. 
232

15 The Cell, John Miller and Michael Stone, Hyperion, 2002, p.49. 16 Section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act grants temporary protected status (TPS) to eligible 

nationals of designated countries (or parts thereof) as determined by the Attorney General. TPS can be 

given to aliens in the United States who are temporarily unable to safely return to their home country 

because of ongoing armed conflict, the temporary effects of an environmental disaster, or other 

extraordinary and temporary conditions. 

17 Alkaisi could not get TPS as a citizen of Jordan. Lebanon was a designated Temporary Protected Status 

country.

18 18 USC § 1001 (False Statements). 

19 Memorandum of Record, “Request for Recommendation re: Revocation of Naturalization”, from Warren 

Louis, INS District Director, Newark, NJ to Carol D. Chasse, Regional Director, INS Eastern Region, May 

28, 1996. 

20 His INS immigration file (A 90 678 144) was not available for review. Although the Department of 

Homeland Security (Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement) stated that the file had been located 

in New York City, it was not provided to the Commission. They did state that the individual was not a legal 

permanent resident or naturalized citizen. 

21 Trial exhibit, WTC 1, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York. 

22 His INS immigration file (A 90 568 993) was not available for review. DHS informed us that the Privacy 

Act barred the Commission from obtaining immigration files on legal permanent residents and naturalized 

citizens, even those convicted of terrorism or related crimes. 

23 See DHS documents, immigration files A41 066 738 and A27 520 221. 

24 This was Cortez’s second marriage; her first husband, Jonathan Rivera Rosario, was also an alien. See 

DHS document, immigration file A27 520 221. 

25 The petition was for Wahid Mohamed Ahmed (alias for Saleh) with a date of birth of June 13, 1950. 

26 INA Section 213, Conditional Residence, states “this status, based on marriage, lasts for two years after 

entry if the marriage was less then two years prior to day you have received your permanent residence”. 

27 This was a violation of 21 USC § 841(a)(1) and 18 USC § 2. 

28 18 USC § 371, 18 USC § 844 (i) and 18 USC§ 842(a)(3)(A). 29 Under immigration law, because the INS had placed a detainer on him, Saleh ordinarily would have been 

turned over to them for deportation following his release. 

30 Relief from deportation is available to someone convicted of terrorism under immigration law if they can 

show “hardship,” which Saleh could not do based on his terrorism and drug convictions. 31 His Immigration file (A 23 406 577) was not available for review. The Privacy Act barred the 

Commission from obtaining this file. 

32 Many birth records were destroyed in an earthquake in Nicaragua on December 23, 1972. Applications 

for Nicaraguan passports do not require a personal visit. 

33 INS Memo to File from District Counsel, INS, Newark, New Jersey, undated. 

34 He also might have held an Iraqi passport M0887925 in the name of Abdul Rahman S. Taher. See FBI 

fugitive web site www.fbi.gov/mostwant/topten/fugitives/fugitives.

35 United States v Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, El Sayyid Nosair, Ibrahim A. El-Gabrowny, Siddig 

Ibrahim Siddiq Ali, Clement Hampton-El, Amir Abdelgani, Fares Khallafalla, Tarig Elhassan, Fadil 

Abdelgani, Mohammed Saleh, Victor Alvarez, Matarawy Mohammmed Said Saleh, US District Court, 

Southern District of New York. 

36 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons. 

37 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons. 

38 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons. 

39 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons. 

40 See DHS document, immigration file A73 442 758. 

41 A warrant of arrest was issued by Aaron Miller, Assistant Chief Patrol Agent, Bellingham, Washington 

for Khalil’s immigration violations. 

42 On August 11, 1997, the INS requested that Khalil be tried in New York, rather than in Arlington, 

Virginia since he was being held in New York City as a material witness in the attempted bombing. The 

judge agreed to move the case. 

43 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons. 

44 9/11 Commission Report, page 489, endnote 13. 
233

45 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons. 

46 See DHS document, immigration file A78 392 527. The A file contains poor quality copies of two 

passports belonging to Rababah. Jordanian passport E041890 was issued on March 3, 1994 and was valid 

until March 8, 1999. Jordanian passport G263860 was issued on March 1, 1999 and was valid until March 

12, 2004. 

47 He had entered the United States two times before on a B-2 multiple entry tourist visa. 

48 Testimony of Michael E. Rolince, Section Chief, International Terrorist Operations Section, 

Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation in Bond Proceedings before the Executive 

Office for Immigration Review, Oct. 23, 2001. 

49 His INS immigration file was not available for review. The Privacy Act barred the Commission from 

obtaining immigration files on legal permanent residents and naturalized citizens.

50 See DHS document, immigration file A75 628 802. 51 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 215-220. 52 9/11 Commission Report, p. 220. 

53 Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons. 

54 Man held as a material witness in 9/11 probe deported to Yemen, The San Diego Union-Tribune, May 

26, 2004. 

55 See DHS document, immigration file A70 640 955. 

56 Testimony by William Yates, Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner, Immigration Services 

Division before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, House Committee 

on the Judiciary, Oct. 9, 2002. 

57 Since she was a legal permanent resident alien, her immigration file is covered by the Privacy Act and 

the Commission was barred from reviewing it.