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##  Incentives for Accountability. ERIC Digest.                                  

One of the first lessons learned in school is that good work will               lead to gold stars, stickers, or smiley-faces. Generations of                   teachers have routinely -- and sometimes simplistically -- assumed              that the right incentive will boost student motivation and                      performance. 
Ironically, teachers have resisted attempts to link              rewards or sanctions to their own performance. Although policymakers            have often advocated pay for performance, classroom practitioners               have argued that judging performance is inherently subjective and               that teachers do not completely control student learning. Instead,              they have favored a uniform salary schedule while defining                      accountability in terms of dedication and hard work. 
Today, both              policymakers and educators are taking a new look at incentives.                 State accountability systems usually include a role for rewards or              sanctions, though actual implementation has been slow. Twenty states            offer teachers some form of reward when achievement rises, but only             one considers student performance data in teacher evaluation. In                addition, fourteen states provide for the takeover or reconstitution            of low-performing schools, though few have acted on this                        option (Ulrich Boser 2001). For their part, some teacher unions have            signaled a willingness to consider adding performance factors to                compensation systems (Jeff Archer 2001). 
This Digest examines the             role of rewards and sanctions in school reform and identifies key               issues in implementing incentive systems. WHAT ROLE DO INCENTIVES             PLAY IN TODAY'S ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS?The new accountability is            based on five linked components (James Watts and others 1998).                  First, carefully designed standards set the targets for achievement,            and assessments aligned to the standards determine how well the                 standards are being met. Incentives provide rewards or sanctions                based on success in achieving the standards, while results are                  publicly reported. Finally, professional development enhances                   practitioner skills to meet program goals. 
In this system,                    incentives provide the motivational fuel for change. Drawing on a               behaviorist view that is controversial among educators but that many            Americans view as common sense, accountability theorists argue that             rewards and sanctions give practitioners a personal stake in the                success of their students, leading them to focus their energies on              that goal. Moreover, incentives give credibility to standards by                backing the organization's rhetoric with tangible                               consequences (Larry Lashway 2001). 
In practice, however,                      implementation has often been snagged by political resistance or                practical details, and the motivational effects of incentives remain            unclear, with virtually no evidence that simply dangling a few                  carrots or sticks in front of teachers will galvanize them into the             enthusiastic pursuit of standards. In a study of North Carolina's               performance-compensation system, Henry Johnson and colleagues (1999)            concluded that bonuses had a positive effect as one element in a                coprehensive accountability system, but were not viewed by teachers             as major incentives. HOW ARE REWARDS PROVIDED TO TEACHERS?The             idea of paying teachers for performance has a long and not very                 successful history. Despite the persistent public appeal of "merit              pay," teachers continue to be paid mostly by the uniform salary                 schedule that recognizes only education and experience. Where merit             pay has been tried, it has usually failed because of inadequate                 funding or because the criteria were vague or unrelated to                      performance (Allan Odden and Carolyn Kelley 1997). 
However,                   advocates of standards-based accountability have argued that an                 information-age economy requires compensation based on demonstrated             skills rather than narrowly defined jobs. Odden and Kelley note that            today's teachers have to perform a variety of tasks, each of which              requires special expertise, such as teaching, facilitating meetings,            coaching, and assessment. Why not compensate them for their                     expertise in these areas? 
Odden and Kelley identify two major                 alternatives to the traditional salary schedule. The first is                   competency-based pay, which rewards teachers for demonstrated skills            in teaching, curriculum, and leadership. Some districts and states              are already beginning to provide bonuses to teachers who pass the               rigorous assessment of the National Board of Professional Teaching              Standards. Other assessments could be based on standards set by the             Interstate New Teacher Assessment and Support                                   Consortium (INTASC). 
The other alternative is pay for performance,            which compensates teachers according to the achievement of their                pupils. Pay for performance is controversial in theory and                      exceedingly rare in practice because it raises a host of practical              and philosophical problems. A seemingly basic step such as                      defining "achievement" turns out to have multiple pathways, and it              is even less clear how (or if) performance can be adjusted for                  socioeconomic factors (Charles Clotfelter and Helen Ladd                        1996). 
Teachers worry about fairness, arguing that achievement is             affected not only by the quality of instruction but by student                  motivation, family support, class size, and availability of                     instructional resources. Therefore, pay-for-performance systems                 almost invariably offer money as special bonuses added to existing              compensation. In addition, states typically offer rewards to schools            rather than individual teachers (Boser). WHAT INCENTIVES ARE                  APPLIED TO SCHOOLS?Teaching is a collective enterprise; student             performance on a fourth-grade assessment depends not just on how                well the fourth-grade teacher has done, but on what has happened the            three prior years. For that reason, many accountability systems                 focus on schools rather than individual teachers. In Kentucky, for              example, schools exceeding state targets for improved performance               are awarded money that can be spent as the faculty determines (Tom              Willis and colleagues 1999). 
Another strategy applies sanctions to            schools that consistently perform at a low level, replacing the                 existing management team with state appointees, or reconstituting               the schools by transferring practitioners or requiring them to                  reapply for their positions. The U.S Department of Education                    concluded in 1998 that "there are no conclusive data demonstrating              that the threat of reconstitution is an effective motivator for                 change" (Kathryn Doherty and Sarah Abernathy 1998). Low-performing              schools may have such a long legacy of failure that simply changing             the staff is inadequate. 
The American Federation of                           Teachers (1998) has supported reconstitution when done as part of a             comprehensive reform effort. The AFT cited cases such as Corpus                 Christi, Texas, where two-thirds of the staff in low-performing                 schools were transferred out (the other third had to reapply), but              the schools were then given extra resources and attention. By the               time of the report, nine of eleven reconstituted schools were                   performing at or above the statewide rate of improvement. HOW                 EFFECTIVE ARE INCENTIVE SYSTEMS?Are incentives effective? Reward            systems are new enough and scarce enough that evidence is very                  limited. Certainly few data point to a clear cause-and-effect                   relationship between teacher incentives and student performance.                However, incentives may be one piece of the school-reform                       puzzle. 
A study by the Consortium for Policy Research in Education            concluded that teachers involved in some form of pay for performance            appeared to have a better understanding of accountability goals and             greater commitment to them than to other reform efforts (Carolyn                Kelley and colleagues). In other words, incentives focused attention            on the goals. 
The study also found, however, that                             performance-based programs were less effective when the goals                   conflicted with other organizational values, when the bonus was too             small ($600 or less), or when teachers didn't believe the money                 would really be forthcoming or didn't believe they could help                   students achieve the standards. 
Others have noted that even if                incentives are motivational, the effects may be perverse. For                   example, offering rewards to individual teachers may lead to                    competition at a time when schools are encouraging teachers to                  collaborate (Clotfelter and Ladd). Another unintended effect may be             narrow teaching to the test. 
Finally, while rewards undeniably                influence behavior, human motivation is complex. "Expectancy"                   theorists point out that the actual incentive may be less important             than the way people perceive it. No matter how enticing the reward,             it will not motivate teachers who believe they are unable to reach              the desired goal (Kelley and colleagues 2000). And while teachers               certainly appreciate money, there is little evidence that it drives             their behavior in the classroom. They seem more likely to be                    gratified by "psychic rewards" such as small but unmeasurable signs             of individual student progress (Lashway). WHAT ARE THE FEATURES OF            WELL-DESIGNED INCENTIVE SYSTEMS?With some unions now willing to             explore alternative compensation systems, schools may have a rare               opportunity to add performance elements to their accountability                 systems. Many teachers still view incentives with suspicion,                    however, and districts should move forward cautiously. Three                    guidelines are of particular importance. 
First, there must be                 clear agreement on the desired results and how they will be                     measured (Clotfelter and Ladd). The goal is not to increase                     motivation generally but to focus energy and effort on specific                 outcomes (typically state-mandated standards). 
Second, there are              many ways of applying incentives, and districts should consider                 which options would work best in their situation. For example, it               may be easier to begin with competency-based pay than with true                 performance-based compensation. Similarly, most researchers strongly            recommend basing performance rewards on school rather than                      individual performance (Odden and Kelley; Clotfelter and Ladd). The             Consortium for Policy Research in Education at the University of                Wisconsin offers online resources on compensation systems that                  districts may find                                                              helpful (www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre/tcomp). 
Finally, rewards and                  sanctions do not provide the kind of silver bullet that will                    transform attitudes or jump-start a dysfunctional school.                       Ultimately, boosting student achievement requires a comprehensive               approach that includes teacher development, adequate resources, and             organizational support (Johnson and colleagues; American Federation             of Teachers). Done well, incentives can play a useful supporting                role; done carelessly, they can create dissension that diverts                  attention from the central goal of improving student                            achievement. RESOURCESAmerican Federation of                              Teachers. "Raising Student Achievement: An Internet Resource Guide              for Redesigning Low-Performing Schools." 1998. Available online at              www.aft.org/edissues/rsa/guide/index.htm 
Archer, Jeff. "AFT To                Urge Locals To Consider New Pay Strategies." Education Week 20,                 23 (February 21, 2001):3. 
Boser, Ulrich. "Pressure Without                    Support." Quality Counts 2001. A Better Balance: Standards, Tests,              and the Tools to Succeed. Education Week (January 10, 2001).                    http://www.edweek.org/sreports/qc01/articles/qc01story.cfm?slug=17po            licy.h20 
Clotfelter, Charles T., and Helen F. Ladd. "Recognizing              and Rewarding Success in Public Schools." In Holding Schools                    Accountable: Performance-Based Reform in Education, edited by Helen             F. Ladd. 23-63. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996.              ED 396 428. 
Doherty, Kathryn, and Sarah Abernathy. Turning Around             Low-Performing Schools: A Guide for State and Local Leaders.                    Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, May 1998. 90 pages.             ED 419 301. www.ed.gov/pubs/turning 
Johnson, Henry, and others. A             Case Study of the State of North Carolina's School-Based Performance            Award Program. Madison, Wisconsin: Consortium for Policy Research in            Education, 1999. Available online at                                            www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre 
Kelley, Carolyn; Allan Odden; Anthony                  Milanowski; and Herbert Heneman III. "The Motivational Effects of               School-Based Performance Awards." CPRE Policy Briefs.                           RB-29 (February 2000). 13 pages. ED 440 473. 
Lashway, Larry. The              New Standards and Accountability: Will Rewards and Sanctions                    Motivate America's Schools to Peak Performance? Eugene, Oregon: ERIC            Clearinghouse on Educational Management, 2001. 117 pages. 
Odden,              Allan, and Carolyn Kelley. Paying Teachers for What They Know and               Do: New and Smarter Compensation Strategies To Improve Schools.                 Thousand Oaks, California: Corwin Press, 1997. 204 pages. ED 414                312. 
Watts, James A.; Gale F. Gaines; and Joseph D. Creech.                   Getting Results: A Fresh Look at School Accountability. Atlanta:                Southern Regional Education Board, 1998. 31 pages. ED 426                       510. 
Willis, Tom; Kyna Koch; Gretchen Lampe; Robert Young; Eileen             Kellor; and Allan Odden. A Case Study of the State of Kentucky's                School-Based Performance Award Program. Madison, Wisconsin:                     Consortium for Policy Research in Education, 1999. Available online             at www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre 
A Product of the ERIC Clearinghouse on              Educational Management, College of Education, University of Oregon,             Eugene, Oregon 97403-5207. 
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This publication was prepared              with funding from the Office of Educational Research and                        Improvement, U.S. Department of Education, under contract No.                   ED-99-C0-0011.  The ideas and opinions expressed in this Digest do              not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of OERI, ED, or               the Clearinghouse. This Digest is in the public domain and may be               freely reproduced. The text of this Digest may be viewed                        electronically at http://eric.uoregon.edu                                    **Title:** Incentives for Accountability. ERIC Digest.                                  **Document Type:** Information Analyses---ERIC Information Analysis Products (IAPs) (071); Information Analyses---ERIC Digests (Selected) in Full Text (073); **Available From:** ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, 5207 University of                Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-5207. Tel: 800-438-8841 (Toll Free); Fax:              541-346-2334. For full text: http://eric.uoregon.edu.                        **Descriptors:**  Accountability, Elementary Secondary Education,  Incentives, Merit             Pay, Positive Reinforcement,  Rewards,  Sanctions                            **Identifiers:** ERIC Digests,  Reform Efforts                                                
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