/

PB98-917003

NTSB/SIR-98/02

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY

BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT

POSTACCIDENT TESTING FOR ALCOHOL AND

OTHER DRUGS IN THE MARINE INDUSTRY AND

THE RAMMING OF THE PORTLAND-SOUTH

PORTLAND (MILLION DOLLAR) BRIDGE AT

PORTLAND, MAINE, BY THE LIBERIAN TANKSHIP

JULIE N ON SEPTEMBER 27,1996

-----

6773A
Abstract: The 560-foot-long Liberian tankship Julie N, carrying a cargo of heating oil, collided

with the south bascule pier of the Portland-South Portland (Million Dollar) Bridge in Portland,

Maine, about 1105 on September 27, 1996. There were no injuries, but the collision resulted in a

33-foot-long hole in the vessel’s hull beneath the waterline. About 4,000 barrels of oil spilled into

the harbor. The vessel sustained about $660,000 in damage, and the cost for cleanup of the oil was

approximately $43 million. Repairs to the Million Dollar Bridge were about $232,000. Because of

the continuing problems encountered in conducting postaccident testing for alcohol and drugs, this

report contains additional sections devoted to the discussion and analysis of postaccident testing.

The safety issues discussed in this report are postaccident testing for alcohol and other drugs

and port safety.

As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issued

recommendations to the U.S. Coast Guard, Maine Department of Transportation, Federal Highway

Administration, and American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting

aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967,

the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to

investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety

recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of

government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions and

decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety

recommendations, and statistical reviews.

Information about available publications may be obtained by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(703) 605-6000
	
	




	
	
	

	



	



	

	

	

	



			

SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT

Adopted: May 5, 1998

Notation 6773A



	




 !"#$%&'$(()*+

iii

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.........................................................................................................................v

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................................1

INVESTIGATION ......................................................................................................................................2

The Accident .................................................................................................................................................2

Injuries...........................................................................................................................................................7

Vessel Damage............................................................................................................................................11

Bridge Damage............................................................................................................................................10

History of the Portland-South Portland (Million Dollar) Bridge................................................................12

Bridge Fender System (Past and Present and Repairs) .......................................................................12

Casco Bay Bridge................................................................................................................................17

Fender System for the New Bridge .....................................................................................................18

Crew Information ........................................................................................................................................18

Master..................................................................................................................................................18

Third Mate...........................................................................................................................................19

Pilot .....................................................................................................................................................19

Pilot’s Accident History......................................................................................................................19

Pilot’s Preaccident Activities ..............................................................................................................20

Vessel Information......................................................................................................................................21

Waterway Information ................................................................................................................................21

Meteorological Information ........................................................................................................................22

Medical and Pathological Information........................................................................................................22

Drug and Alcohol Testing of the Julie N’s Pilot.................................................................................22

Drug and Alcohol Testing of the Julie N’s Crew................................................................................24

Accidents Involving Postaccident Testing Issues ...............................................................................25

Postaccident Testing Regulations and Programs ........................................................................................25

Coast Guard Regulations.....................................................................................................................25

Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 ...................................................................31

Coast Guard Actions on Postaccident Testing.................................................................................... 32

Drug and Alcohol Program Inspector..................................................................................................33

Marine Safety Office Portland, Maine................................................................................................33

Coast Guard Enforcement of Intoxication Regulations ......................................................................33

Board of Harbor Commissioners Testing Program.............................................................................34

Tests and Research......................................................................................................................................34

Other Information........................................................................................................................................35

Pilot’s Description of His Actions ......................................................................................................35

Human Error........................................................................................................................................35

Port Safety...........................................................................................................................................36

Million Dollar Bridge’s Navigational Opening Dimensions ..............Error! Bookmark not defined.
iv

ANALYSIS.................................................................................................................................................37

General ........................................................................................................................................................37

The Accident ...............................................................................................................................................37

Maneuver by the Pilot .........................................................................................................................37

Human Performance............................................................................................................................38

Bridge Resource Management ............................................................................................................39

Transiting the Million Dollar Bridge ..........................................................................................................39

Port Safety...................................................................................................................................................41

Postaccident Testing ...................................................................................................................................41

Testing of the Julie N’s Pilot and Crew ..............................................................................................41

Coast Guard Role in Postaccident Testing..........................................................................................43

Coast Guard Regulations for Postaccident Testing ....................................................................................46

Lack of Uniformity in Regulations .....................................................................................................46

Priority for Testing..............................................................................................................................48

Need to Consolidate Postaccident Testing Regulations......................................................................49

Regulations of Other Modes Pursuant to the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act

 of 1991 ....................................................................................................................................................50

CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................................................52

Findings.......................................................................................................................................................52

Probable Cause............................................................................................................................................53

RECOMMENDATIONS..........................................................................................................................54

APPENDIXES

Appendix A—Investigation ........................................................................................................................57

Appendix B—Coast Guard Drug and Alcohol Testing Regulations ..........................................................59

Appendix C—Postaccident Testing Policy for the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office,

 Portland, Maine.......................................................................................................................................85

Appendix D—Portland Board of Harbor Commissioners Drug And Alcohol Policy................................91

Appendix E—Across-Agency Summary of Federal Postaccident Testing Regulations...........................103
v

The 560-foot-long Liberian tankship Julie N,

carrying a cargo of heating oil, collided with the

south bascule pier of the Portland-South Portland

(Million Dollar) Bridge in Portland, Maine, about

1105 on September 27, 1996. The vessel had

passed between the piers of the new PortlandSouth Portland bridge (Casco Bay Bridge) and

was en route to the Rolling Mills terminal about

1.2 miles beyond the Million Dollar Bridge. The

vessel was under the direction of a State-licensed

docking master (pilot). After the collision, the

pilot stated that as the vessel approached the

bridge, he had issued three orders for port rudder

to swing the bow to the left and then intended to

order the rudder to hard starboard and to increase

the engine speed from slow to half ahead to stop

the swing and align the vessel for passage

through the drawspan. However, the pilot

inadvertently ordered the rudder to hard port

instead of hard starboard. He recognized his error

within seconds and ordered the rudder to hard

starboard; given the narrowness of the bridge

span, however, the shifting of the rudder occurred

too late to avoid the collision.

There were no injuries, but the collision

resulted in a 33-foot-long hole in the vessel’s hull

beneath the waterline. About 4,000 barrels of oil

spilled into the harbor. The vessel sustained about

$660,000 in damage, and the cost for cleanup of

the oil was approximately $43 million. Repairs to

the Million Dollar Bridge were about $232,000.

After the accident, the pilot reported to a

clinic for postaccident testing. However, he did

not have his breath or blood tested for alcohol.

The urine specimen collected for drug testing

indicated that no drugs were present. The pilot

stated that he was unaware that postaccident

testing required a test of breath or blood for

alcohol and that urine collection was solely for

drug testing.

Over the course of 28 major accident

investigations, the National Transportation Safety

Board has observed confusion and a lack of

understanding on the part of marine employers

and employees regarding postaccident testing

requirements and responsibilities. In many of

these accidents, including that involving the Julie

N, the Safety Board has been unable to

definitively rule out alcohol or drug use as a

causal factor because of serious deficiencies in

the testing process.

Because of the continuing problems

encountered in conducting postaccident testing

for alcohol and drugs, this report contains

additional sections devoted to the discussion and

analysis of postaccident testing.

The National Transportation Safety Board

determines that the probable cause of the

collision with the Portland-South Portland

(Million Dollar) Bridge was the pilot’s

inadvertent order port (left) rudder instead of

starboard (right) rudder. Contributing to the

accident was the narrow horizontal clearance of

the bridge drawspan, which afforded little leeway

for human error. Contributing to the severity of

the damage to the vessel and to the amount of

oil spilled was a corner of the bridge pier that

was not adequately shielded by the timber

fender system.

The safety issues discussed in this report

include:

• Postaccident testing for alcohol

and other drugs, and

• Port safety.

As a result of its investigation, the Safety

Board made recommendations addressing these

issues to the U.S. Coast Guard, Maine

Department of Transportation, Federal Highway

Administration, and American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1

The 560-foot-long Liberian tankship, Julie N,

collided with the south bascule pier1

 of the

Portland-South Portland (Million Dollar) Bridge

in Portland, Maine, about 1105 on September 27,

1996. The vessel was under the direction of a

State-licensed docking master (pilot). After the

collision, the pilot stated that as the vessel

approached the bridge, he had issued three orders

for port rudder to swing the bow to the left and

then intended to order the rudder to hard

starboard to stop the swing and align the vessel

for passage through the drawspan. However, the

pilot inadvertently ordered the rudder to hard port

instead of hard starboard. He recognized his error

within seconds and ordered the rudder to hard

starboard; given the narrowness of the bridge

span, however, the shifting of the rudder occurred

too late to avoid the collision. Since then, the

State of Maine has replaced the bridge with one

that has more horizontal clearance and an

improved fender system more capable of

buffering ship contact.

After the accident, the pilot reported to a

clinic for postaccident testing. He submitted a

urine specimen but did not have his breath or

blood tested for alcohol. The pilot stated that he

was unaware that postaccident testing required a

test of breath or blood for alcohol and that urine

collection was solely for drug testing.

The National Transportation Safety Board did

not find evidence that drug or alcohol use was a

causal factor in this accident or in the other major

marine accidents that it has investigated since the

Exxon Valdez in 1989. However, in many of these

accidents, including that involving the Julie N, the

 

1

Pier supporting a leaf (roadway), counterbalance

weight, and machinery of a bascule bridge. The term

bascule, derived from the French word for seesaw, is a type

of bridge that lifts at one end to a near-vertical position to

permit vessels to move past the bridge.

Safety Board has been unable to definitively rule

out alcohol or drug use as a causal factor because

of serious deficiencies in the testing process.

Over the course of 28 major marine accident

investigations, the Safety Board has observed

confusion and a lack of understanding on the part

of marine employers and employees regarding

postaccident testing requirements and responsibilities. Testing has been delayed as long as 42

hours or never even been conducted. On

occasion, employers have been unsure of what

samples to collect, preventing a complete or

meaningful toxicological analysis.

The Safety Board does not plan to wait for a

drug- or alcohol-related marine accident to

address the problems associated with

postaccident testing. Therefore, in addition to the

port safety issues cited as contributing factors to

the Julie N accident, this special investigation

report will focus on the following postaccident

testing issues:

• Timeliness of and accountability

for testing,

• Testing and enforcement

responsibilities, and

• Consistency of U.S. Coast

Guard regulations with one

another and with the regulations

in other transportation modes.

As a result of this special investigation, the

Safety Board is making recommendations to the

Coast Guard to improve the postaccident

testing process and its enforcement.

INTRODUCTION
______________________________________________________________________________ 2

INVESTIGATION

The Accident

The 560-foot-long Liberian tankship Julie N

loaded a cargo of heating oil at Amuay Bay,

Venezuela, and then departed Amuay Bay on

September 21, 1996. The vessel proceeded directly

to Portland, Maine, arriving at the Portland Sea

Buoy on September 26 at 2200. All prearrival tests

of the vessel’s navigation equipment were

conducted as required by Coast Guard regulations

at 33 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 164.25

and found satisfactory. About 2215, a Portland bar

pilot boarded the vessel near the sea buoy and

brought it to the Diamond Island Roads General

Anchorage B. The starboard anchor was let go at

2240 and the vessel was secure at 2248, awaiting

high tide for docking the next morning. Shortly

afterwards, the bar pilot departed the vessel. The

draft upon arrival Diamond Island Roads

anchorage was 34 feet, 11 inches (salt water), even

keel.

The next morning, September 27, the crew

completed the predeparture tests of the vessel’s

steering, propulsion, and navigation equipment

required by Coast Guard regulations (33 CFR

164.25). All equipment was found in satisfactory

condition. About 0930, the State-licensed

docking master (pilot), who was to pilot the Julie

N, boarded the tugboat Captain Bill at the Bath

Iron Works (BIW) shipyard for the trip to the

anchorage. The other tugboat that would be

assisting in docking the vessel, Fournier Boys,

was also present and proceeded with the Captain

Bill en route to the anchorage.

About 1010, the tugs arrived in the

anchorage; the pilot boarded the Julie N about

1015. Upon arriving on the vessel’s bridge, the

pilot met with the master and described the

mooring arrangement and mooring lines needed

at Rolling Mills Terminal, the vessel’s

destination in the inner harbor. The master had

been to the Rolling Mills Terminal before with

another pilot, and he also had a diagram of the

berth and the mooring line arrangement. The

master advised the pilot that the vessel was on

an even keel and that the draft was 34 feet 11

inches. The draft was confirmed by the master

of the tug Captain Bill. The master stated that a

pilot card listing the vessel’s dimensions and

maneuvering characteristics was posted in the

wheelhouse. The pilot did not review the pilot

card because he had piloted the vessel on one

other occasion under a different master and

recalled that the vessel handled well. The pilot

said that for future reference, he regularly

recorded the pilot card information of vessels

that he had piloted, and he had referred to that

information regarding the Julie N before

boarding the vessel.

When the discussion about the mooring was

completed, the pilot asked the master to raise the

anchor and at about 1025 the crew began to do

so. At the time, the Julie N was heading in a

southerly direction due to the flood tide. The pilot

had the tug Captain Bill take a position along the

ship’s port bow.

At 1030, the anchor was aweigh (clear of the

bottom), and the pilot ordered the Julie N’s rudder

to hard starboard and had the Captain Bill come

full ahead pushing on the ship’s port bow. With the

ship’s engines at stop, the pilot used the tug to swing

the ship’s bow toward the Portland Pipeline Pier

terminal, a heading of approximately 220°. At

1036, the pilot ordered slow ahead on the Julie N’s

engines and proceeded out of the anchorage with the

Captain Bill continuing to push full ahead on the

port bow. (See figure 1.) The third mate was

operating the engine order telegraph and supervising

the helmsman. When the pilot was out on the wings

of the bridge, the master, who had accompanied the

pilot, used a portable radio to relay the pilot’s orders

to the third mate and helmsman. The third mate

received and acknowledged the orders from the

______________________________________________________________________________ 4

master on another portable radio. The deck cadet

maintained the bell book.2

As the vessel proceeded out of the anchorage,

the pilot made his first call on channel 13

VHF/FM radio to the bridge tenders (two

operators on duty) at the Million Dollar Bridge to

advise them that the Julie N was proceeding

inbound and that a bridge opening would be

needed. He said that he would call again when the

ship passed the BIW drydock.

The last 30 minutes of flood tide (current)3

was still running when the ship entered the

channel adjacent to Diamond Island anchorage.

At 1040, when the Julie N was passing channel

buoy G1, the pilot ordered the Julie N’s rudder

amidships, stopped the Captain Bill, and ordered

the tug to come along the ship’s starboard bow

and put up one assist line. The pilot also directed

the Fournier Boys to take a position

approximately 50 feet off the Julie N’s port bow.

At 1043, the pilot reduced the vessel’s engine

speed to dead slow ahead. At 1044, the vessel

passed channel buoy G3, and at 1048, it passed

buoy G5. Shortly after passing buoy G5, the pilot

commenced a slow port swing and steadied the

vessel on a heading toward the end of the BIW

drydock. As the vessel approached the BIW

drydock, the pilot, using various rudder

commands, put the vessel in another slow turn to

the left. The pilot stated that after leaving the

anchorage he used different rudder commands to

get a feel for how the vessel handled at slow

speeds. According to the pilot, the vessel handled

well. The pilot also later stated that the crew

responded promptly and correctly to his orders.

When the Julie N passed the BIW drydock, the

pilot made his second radio call to the Portland

bridge tenders. He advised them that the ship was

passing the BIW drydock and that he would be

asking for a maximum standard opening because of

 

2

A record of engine orders transmitted to the

engineroom. A similar record of orders received from the

bridge, the engineroom bell book, was kept in the

engineroom.

3

The flood (rising) tide produced a northerly current in

the vicinity of Spring Point and Diamond Island

Anchorage.

the ship’s high antennas. At this time, the pilot,

using what he described as his “customary

reference points” on shore, directed the vessel

onto a southwesterly course favoring the Portland

(north) side of the channel.4

 The pilot kept the

vessel at dead slow ahead, about 4.5 knots. Later,

as the vessel passed a floating restaurant

approximately 2,500 feet from the bridge, the

pilot called the bridge tenders on VHF radio and

asked for the opening of the bridge.

The pilot and one other pilot stated that while

approaching the bridge, they determined the

vessel’s lateral position in the channel by

observing the relative positions of a cargo manifold

and a walkway at the Star Enterprise Terminal and

a tree ahead on the bank of the river, as well as the

north bridge fender system and lights on the fender

system at night.

The pilot later explained that he normally

conned5

 an inbound ship from a position near the

outboard side of the starboard bridge wing, which

enabled him to judge the distance between the

starboard side of the ship and the north fender

system of the bridge. He stated that he normally

tried to place the vessel so that there would be

about 1 foot between the vessel’s starboard side

and the fender system protecting the bridge. The

pilot and two other pilots later explained that the

water between the forward part of the vessel and

the pier acts as a cushion that tends to hold a vessel

off of the pier.6

 The pilot explained that at some

point, about 1,000 feet from the bridge, he

normally altered the vessel’s heading to the left and

then back to the right to approach the north fender

system at a slight angle. The pilot stated that in this

case, however, he was concerned with the Julie N’s

antennas clearing the leafs of the open bascule

span, which he stated provide a minimum

clearance at the top of the leafs of about 85 feet.

The pilot stated that he was also concerned about

 

4

For an excerpt from the pilot’s sworn testimony

describing his piloting of the vessel, see page 35 of this

report.

5

To conduct or direct movements of a vessel by

issuing steering and engine orders.

6

The Julie N is 86.3 feet wide; the horizontal clearance

in the drawspan of the Million Dollar Bridge was 98 feet.
5

the 11.2-foot high tide, which was 2 feet above

normal, because it increased the possibility that the

antennas could contact the bridge leafs. He stated

that because of his concern about the antennas

clearing the bridge, he had decided to place the

vessel on the centerline of the bridge drawspan

instead of passing very close to the fender system

protecting the north bascule pier. The pilot noted

that in November 1995, the north (Portland side)

bascule leaf did not raise fully and that the bridge

wing of the ship Overseas New Orleans had struck

the leaf, causing damage to the vessel and bridge.

The Overseas New Orleans was being piloted by

another pilot at that time. With the Julie N on the

centerline of the drawspan, there would be about 6

feet of clearance on each side of the vessel.

At the time, a new bridge (Casco Bay Bridge)

located immediately downstream (east) of the

Portland-South Portland (Million Dollar) Bridge

was under construction, making it necessary for

pilots to release the tug normally made fast

(connected by a line to the larger vessel) on the

starboard bow before passing the piers of the new

bridge. (See figure 2.) The pilot stated that

releasing the tug earlier rather than closer to the old

bridge had no effect on how he piloted vessels

through the drawspan of the old bridge. Also, a

portion of the approach fender system for the south

bascule pier had been removed to facilitate locating

a construction barge near the pier. The pilot stated

that the work barge did not encroach into the

channel and had no effect on piloting ships through

the bridge. Other pilots also stated that releasing

the tug earlier and the bridge construction, such as

the location of the work barge, had little effect on

piloting vessels through the old bridge draw.

After making another minor heading

adjustment and subsequently passing Deake’s

Wharf, approximately 1,000 feet from the

Million Dollar Bridge, at approximately 1100,

the pilot determined that the vessel was slightly

more to the right than normal, but he was

satisfied with the approach. An expanded

trackline developed by the Safety Board based

on the course recorder indicated that the

starboard side of the vessel was nearly in line with

the north fender system as the pilot desired. (See

figure 3.) The pilot stated that the last of the flood

tide, that was flowing up river, may have moved

the vessel a little to the right. The pilot later stated

that he preferred a slight following current7

 when

proceeding through the bridge. At this time, the

pilot released the Captain Bill, which was made up

on the starboard bow and instructed the tug to back

clear and take a position off the Julie N’s starboard

quarter. The pilot, following customary practice,

ordered the tug Fournier Boys to proceed ahead

through the Million Dollar Bridge to await the

vessel on the other side of the bridge.

The pilot started the normal port swing to

bring the ship away from the Portland (north) side

of the channel for final approach to the bridge. To

start the turn, the pilot initially ordered port 5° and

then port 10° of rudder. When the vessel did not

start to swing to the left in response to the port 10°,

the pilot ordered the rudder increased to port 20°.

Moments later, the vessel’s bow began to swing

slowly to the left.

At 1104, the pilot ordered slow ahead on the

vessel’s engines. The Julie N was now slowly

swinging to the left with port 20° of rudder. The

pilot said he had intended to order the rudder to

hard starboard and increase engine speed to half

ahead when the bow of the vessel was almost on

the center axis of the bridge opening. The pilot

stated that the approach to the bridge was

progressing correctly and that all he needed to do

was order hard starboard rudder. He stated that,

following the planned hard to starboard order, he

had intended to reduce the rudder, possibly to

starboard 20° or 10°, then amidships, and then

possibly order port rudder.

About 1105, the pilot ordered hard port rudder

instead of hard starboard. According to the pilot, he

ordered half ahead immediately after the rudder

command. When the Julie N’s master, who was

passing the pilot’s orders to the helmsman, repeated

the order “hard to port,” the pilot stated that he

heard the repeated order and realized that he had

 

7

A current flowing in approximately the same

direction that the vessel is moving.
Figure 2—Aerial photograph of old and new bridgess.

______________________________________________________________________________ 8

said port instead of starboard. The pilot said that

he immediately yelled “hard to starboard.” (See

figure 4.)

The master recalled that the vessel was

approaching the bridge in a normal manner and

that when the vessel was about three ships’ lengths

from the bridge, the pilot ordered the rudder to port

10°; a few moments later, the pilot ordered the

rudder to port 20°. According to the master, when

the vessel was about one ship’s length from the

bridge, the pilot ordered hard port rudder. This was

quickly corrected by the pilot by an order for hard

starboard.

According to the pilot, the vessel’s engines had

already come up to half ahead rpm (60 rpm for 8.3

knots) and the rudder had gone over to hard port

before he gave the correct order for hard to

starboard. The pilot stated that issuing the incorrect

order had allowed the vessel to overshoot the range.

(Tests later revealed that the rudder would swing

from port 20° to hard port 35° in about 6 seconds.)

According to the pilot, the Julie N started to swing

slowly to starboard in response to the hard

starboard order, but moments later the port bow

impacted the timber fendering extending from the

south bascule pier and then struck the masonry pier

and steel superstructure of the bridge. The pilot and

crew estimated the time of collision at shortly past

1105. (See figure 5.)

After striking the South Portland pier, the

vessel’s bow swung right and struck the fendering

on the Portland (north) side of the bridge. At 1109,

the pilot ordered the rudder to amidships and the

engines to slow astern. At 1110, the pilot ordered

engines stopped. The Julie N, due to its forward

momentum, drifted through the drawspan. The

master of the Captain Bill informed the pilot that

the vessel’s antennas were passing clear of the

bascule leafs of the bridge span, and the pilot

acknowledged.

At the time, the extent of vessel damage was

unknown, but the vessel was rapidly leaking oil

into the water and settling noticeably by the bow. The

pilot requested the master of the tug Captain Bill to

call the Star Enterprise Terminal in South Portland

on his cellular telephone and inquire whether Star

Enterprise could receive the Julie N at its terminal.

The Star Enterprise terminal was the closest pier,

being 1,200 feet away. The pilot believed that

docking at that terminal would enable the vessel to

be surrounded with oil containment booms about

20 to 30 minutes sooner than possible by

proceeding to Rolling Mills. The pilot believed that

mooring at the Star Enterprise terminal, besides

reducing pollution, would prevent the vessel from

possibly grounding and blocking the channel.8

Meanwhile, the pilot used dead slow ahead, stop,

and slow astern engine orders to hold the ship in

position, and he ordered the tug Captain Bill made

fast on the starboard quarter and Fournier Boys

made fast on the starboard bow. A few minutes

later, about 1120, the master of the Captain Bill

called back and informed the pilot that the Star

Enterprise Terminal could not receive the Julie N

because the cargo was not blended properly (not

compatible with product in the Star Enterprise

storage tanks). The pilot then ordered the Julie N to

half ahead and proceeded toward the Rolling Mills

Terminal.

The pilot stated that the vessel handled poorly

because of the increased draft at the bow. The pilot

continued upriver on various engine speeds until

arriving in the turning basin. The two tugs assisted

the ship into the Rolling Mills Terminal, where the

line handlers were waiting, and the vessel’s lines

were quickly put over to the dock. The first line was

over to the dock at 1145. At 1210, the pilot released

the tugs and oil containment booms were put in

place around the vessel. The vessel was secure in its

berth at the Rolling Mills Terminal at 1220. About

1230, the pilot left the vessel and went aboard the

Captain Bill, which was moored nearby.

Injuries

No injuries occurred as a result of this

accident.

 

8

The channel depth listed on the chart varied from 35

to 36 feet mean low water but was somewhat less due to a

lack of maintenance dredging. The high tide of 11.2 feet

would increase the channel depth to approximately 45 feet

at the bridge.

______________________________________________________________________________

10

Figure 5—Accident site (photograph by Mr. Bill Jewel, Portland, Maine).
11

Vessel Damage

From October 17 to 19, 1996, Lloyd’s Register

of Shipping surveyors and Coast Guard marine

inspectors examined the damage to the bow,

forward port-side hull plating, and the associated

internal steel structure and piping. Overall damage

to the port bow consisted of welded steel plating that

was set-in (pushed inward into the hull), buckled,

and torn, above and below the waterline. (See

figure 6.) The collision penetrated the tankship’s

single hull (0.5-inch thick) and opened it to the sea

from the forepeak ballast tank aft through the port

heavy-fuel-oil deep tank, a void space, and the No. 1

port cargo oil tank.

The lowest tear in the steel hull plating,

between longitudinal Nos. 17 through 21 near the

turn of the bilge, extended aft horizontally about 33

feet overall and was approximately 13 feet wide.

The tear began near the bottom of the forepeak

ballast tank, just aft of the bulbous bow at frame

No. 82, and ended in the No. 1 port cargo tank, at

frame No. 72 1⁄2. This large tear opened the heavyfuel-oil tank, the void space, and the No. 1 port

cargo oil tank to the sea. About midway between

the upper and lower damage, the hull plating was

set-in deeply and torn between frame Nos. 78 and

72 1⁄2 and from longitudinal Nos. 26 through 31.

The damage to the upper bow plating, from frame

Nos. 72 through 81 between longitudinal Nos. 34

through 39, opened the forecastle compartment, the

uppermost section of the fuel oil tank, and a void

space to the atmosphere.

About 2,000 barrels of bunker (fuel) oil was

spilled from the forward fuel oil tank and slightly

more than 2,000 barrels of the cargo of heating oil

was spilled from No. 1 port cargo tank.

Before the Julie N arrived at Rolling Mills

Terminal, Maritime Overseas Corporation (MOC)

instructed the Marine Spill Response Corporation

(MSRC)9

 oil spill response vessel Maine

Responder and OSRO Clean Harbors, Inc., to

initiate the cleanup operation. The Coast Guard

Captain of the Port Zone secured vessel traffic in

Portland Harbor and established a marine safety

 

9

MSRC is a company formed by the major oil and

shipping companies to respond to major oil spills.

zone. The Million Dollar Bridge remained in the

open position, pending inspection and repairs.

The cleanup was conducted by Amity

Products Carriers as the owner of the Julie N and

the “responsible party” under the Oil Pollution Act

of 1990 (OPA 90). The cleanup lasted until

November 14, 1997, and cost approximately $43

million. This figure does not include claims for

property or other damage. The cleanup operation

resulted in the recovery of 78 percent of the spilled

oil.

After the cargo was discharged, the vessel’s

ballast was adjusted to raise the bow and to list the

vessel to starboard to facilitate temporary repairs at

the Rolling Mills berth by BIW. When BIW

completed the temporary repairs, the Julie N was

examined again by Lloyd’s surveyors and Coast

Guard inspectors. Following the examination, the

tankship was permitted to sail directly from

Portland on October 19, 1996, to a shipyard in

Europe, on a southerly course, at reduced speed,

and ballasted as agreed with Lloyd’s Register of

Shipping and the Coast Guard. The Julie N arrived

at the shipyard at Astano, Spain, on November 8,

1996, and departed on December 7, 1996, with all

permanent repairs completed to the satisfaction of

Lloyd’s Register of Shipping.

The total cost of repairs was about $660,000.

This cost does not include the lost revenue, tank

cleaning, or transit to the shipyard.

Bridge Damage

The Maine Department of Transportation

(MDOT) conducted a postaccident condition

survey on September 28, 1996, to ascertain the

damage to the bridge. (See figure 7.) The survey

indicated that pier 18 (South Portland side) had

temporarily shifted over 4 inches horizontally and

came to rest with a permanent horizontal set of 1 3⁄4

inches. The pier had also apparently moved

upstream by a distance of 1 1⁄4 inches. The MDOT

also inspected the underwater portions of the pier

18 channel face and initially found no
______________________________________________________________________________ 12

Figure 6—Vessel damage (left).

Figure 7—Bridge damage (below).
13

evidence of distress or disturbance of the marine

growth covering the masonry.

Further underwater surveying on September

30, 1996, between piers 18 and 19 found “definite

scraping and a section loss of concrete on the shaft

[lower pier] below waterline exposing No. 9 [1 1/8

inch in diameter] reinforcing bar in outer corner

[northeast corner] approximately 6 inches below

stone course.” The spalled (chipped) concrete

measured about 6 inches by 6 inches.

(Superimposing of the frame of the vessel revealed

that this corner of the pier had contacted the vessel,

resulting in the approximately 33-foot-long tear in

the vessel’s underwater hull. In addition, a section

of granite pier cap was broken off the easterly end,

channel side, of pier 18.) (See figures 8 through 10.)

Damage was also sustained by the

superstructure. On pier 18, the live-load shoe was

displaced several feet, along with the live-load

girder and the pedestal-shaped shoe underneath the

girder, which had rested on the concrete pedestal

on the pier. (The live-load girder frames back into

the transverse floor beam at the next panel point on

the outside truss. The girder is stabilized by a brace

attached to the end point of the truss. The end of

the truss also bears on the concrete pedestal). In

addition, the truss experienced movement of 1 to 2

inches, and the center lock of the leafs at the

channel centerline was misaligned about 3 inches.

The MDOT hired the contractor building the

new bridge to make the repairs, and the bridge was

functioning again on September 29, 1996.

The cost of repairs to restore the bridge to

normal operation was approximately $32,000. In

October 1996, the MDOT replaced the damaged

wooden fender system at pier 18 with a steel

structure that provided extra shielding for the

corner of the pier that the vessel’s hull contacted to

create the long underwater opening. The cost of the

new fender system was about $200,000, for a total

cost of $232,000.

History of the Portland-South Portland

(Million Dollar) Bridge

The permit for the Portland-South Portland

(Million Dollar) Bridge, issued by the Secretary

of War in 1893, approved a bascule span

providing a horizontal clearance of 100 feet.

The bridge was designed in 1914 and opened to

traffic in 1916. It replaced a swing-span bridge,

and the south bascule pier (pier 18) of the new

bridge incorporated the pivot pier of the old

bridge. The bridge was originally owned by

Cumberland County but was transferred to the

MDOT in 1959.

The bridge consisted of 33 approach spans

and a double-leaf bascule span over the channel.

The bascule span was supported by piers 18

(south pier) and 19 (north pier).

According to the October 1986 MDOT

report10 to the Coast Guard Marine Safety Office,

Portland, Maine, 46 cases of bridge damage by

various vessels occurred between January 1976

and May 1986. Two more cases were recorded in

1987 and one more in 1988. And, from 1989 to

1996, 22 collisions with the bridge or fender

system were recorded. Over half of the collisions

involved barges, usually empty barges, and the

remainder involved ships.

Bridge Fender System (Past and Present

and Repairs)—The original fender system

protecting piers 18 and 19 consisted of wooden

timber construction and afforded 100 feet of

horizontal clearance. The original fendering

system consisted of vertical oak buffer piles,

about 43 feet long, placed from just below the

mean low water line to about 5 feet below the top

of the pier, with 5- by 12-inch horizontal timbers

(wales). The bottoms of the piles were wedged

into 10-inch-diameter round holes formed in the

concrete footing.

A review of the MDOT’s bridge files

indicated that the fendering system has been

 

10Portland Bridge Fender Damage Summary of

Bridge Operator Reports, October 1986.



17

changed many times since the initial construction.

A major change occurred in 1949, following a

change in channel alignment. The purpose of the

1949 alteration was to make the face of the

fenders parallel to the revised channel axis. This

resulted in decreasing the horizontal clearance to

97 feet 4 inches. MDOT records show that from

1949 to 1992, changes were made in the design of

the structure, but the faces of the fender system

remained parallel to the channel. No channel

width data were given with the changes.

An underwater survey conducted by the

MDOT after the Julie N accident indicated that

the vertical piles along pier 18 were not in the

sockets in the footing and that the fender system

along the pier did not reach the bottom. Instead,

the verticals of the fender system went below low

tide while the bottommost wale remained above

the mean low water line. It could not be

determined when the full vertical timbers had

been removed. According to a 1992 plan, the

corner of the rectangular plinth (lower section of

the pier) extends a short distance in front of the

fender. (This was the corner which the vessel’s

hull contacted to initiate the 33-foot-long tear.)

(See figure 10.) The 1992 plan shows the

approach fender system flaring away from the

piers; it consisted of a series of “bents,”11 with a

cluster of “dolphins”12 at the end of six bents. An

additional four bents increased the flare. Some of

these bents had been removed before the accident

to provide room for a barge being used for the

construction work on the new bridge.

The new (temporary) steel fender system

constructed soon after the accident and attached

to pier 18 was designed to be stronger and stiffer

than the wood fender system that had been in

place at the time of the accident. The design was

intended to provide better buffering of the corner

that had pierced the hull of the Julie N.

 

11A bent is a structure composed of vertical,

horizontal, and/or diagonal members designed to distribute

an imposed load into the bottom.

12A dolphin is formed by driving pilings into the

bottom and bundling them together with a line, normally a

steel rope.

Casco Bay Bridge—A new crossing of the

Fore River between Portland and South Portland

had been discussed since the early 1950s. In

1953, consultants conducted a study of a

replacement bridge for the Cumberland County

commissioners, the first of many such studies.

The new bridge became a “project”13 in 1981. A

draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was

issued in 1986; the final EIS was issued in 1988.

Construction of the bridge was to have begun

in 1991. However, because of concern for

approximately 3.1 acres of wetland, the

Environmental Protection Agency did not issue

an environmental permit until 1991. To reduce

the use of wetland, the proposed bridge span was

lengthened by 900 feet to move the span leading

to the bridge closer to land. Approximately 2.5

acres of wetland were saved as a result. The

redesign delayed the final design of the bridge

until 1992 and construction until 1993, which

increased the project’s cost by about $20 million.

In 1989, the Coast Guard issued a decision

regarding a new bridge. Of the several alternate

crossing sites considered, the “Modified

Downstream Broadway (DS/B) Alternative” was

selected for further project advancement to

replace the Million Dollar Bridge. The new

structure crosses the Fore River in a curvilinear

line and incorporates a mid-level double-leaf

bascule span over the navigation channel.

According to the Coast Guard decision, the

bridge—

• Provides greater structural

integrity than the existing bridge

and reduces maintenance costs,

• Increases the efficiency of both

motor vehicle and shipping

operations,

 

13MDOT designation signifying that funds and

employee time would be allocated.
______________________________________________________________________________ 18

• Provides adequate safety for

vehicular, ship, bicycle, and

pedestrian traffic,

• Complements the transportation

and community plan for the

region, and

• Accomplishes these needs in the

most cost-effective manner.

The bridge permit was issued by the Coast

Guard in 1992 and called for the following

dimensions of the navigational opening:

• Horizontal clearance: 196.85

feet,

• Vertical clearance: minimum 55

feet above mean high water in

the closed position with the

center 100 feet of the span

providing a minimum 65 feet

vertical clearance, and

• Unlimited vertical clearance in

the open position.

Most of bascule pier 18 of the Million Dollar

Bridge was removed in September 1997, although

some rubble remains, and old pier 19 was

removed in mid-March 1998. The new Casco Bay

Bridge, which is approximately 100 feet

downstream of the Million Dollar Bridge’s

former location, was completed and opened to

highway traffic on September 1, 1997.

Fender System for the New Bridge—The

designers of the fender system protecting the new

bridge elected to use an independent steel pilesupported system and rubber fenders mounted on

the bridge piers. The design also included four

60-foot-diameter steel cells filled with gravel,

located upstream and downstream of each bascule

pier. The independent pile-supported system

prevents contact with the piers for most

collisions, while the rubber fender system on the

piers is designed in anticipation of more serious

events, in which a vessel would penetrate and

likely demolish part of the pile-supported system.

The pile-supported fender system consists of

nine horizontal steel I beams (wales) attached to

36-inch-diameter steel piles spaced 9 feet apart

along each pier face. The I beams are faced with

protective timber strips. The fender system flares

away from the channel alignment at an angle of

20° on the upstream and downstream side of each

pier, passing directly in front of each of the 60-

foot-diameter cells.

The pile-supported fender at each pier face

was designed to absorb the energy caused by the

collision of a 25,000-deadweight-ton14 vessel

moving at 5 knots at an impact angle of 7°. The

substructure and piers supporting the rubber

fender system are designed to absorb the energy

caused by a collision with a 50,000-deadweightton vessel moving at 5 knots and impacting at a

15° angle.

The fenders were designed to allow for up to

13.25 feet of flare (overhang) at the bow of a

vessel. Thus, the superstructure of the bridge

would not be contacted unless the flare of a

passing vessel exceeded 13.25 feet. Vessels can

have as much as 20 feet of flare at the bow,

making contact with the superstructure inevitable

for such vessels.

Crew Information

The Julie N was manned by a crew of 27

Korean nationals, all properly licensed or

certificated by the Liberian government.

Master—The master, age 48, graduated from

the Korean Merchant Marine Academy at

Mogpo, Korea, in 1971 after a 5-year course of

study in marine transportation. He had held a

Korean master’s license for 6 years. He also held

a master’s license issued by the Republic of

Liberia in April 1992 and was qualified as a

radar observer on oceangoing vessels of any

gross tonnage. MOC records indicate that he had

 

14The Julie N had a deadweight tonnage (carrying

capacity in long or in metric tons) of 29,994 tons.
19

been sailing for 17 years. He had been master of

the Julie N for approximately 30 months and

had served as master of the oceangoing ships

Canopus, Eliane, Pacific Hunter, Suzanne, and

Allegre. The master had attended various safety

courses including Bridge Team Management,

Tanker Safety and Crude Oil Washing, and a

course outlining the hazards of drug and alcohol

use.

Third Mate—The third mate, age 23,

graduated from the Korean Merchant Marine

Academy at Mogpo in 1995. He holds a second

officer’s license issued by the Republic of

Liberia. He joined the MOC on March 18, 1995,

and had sailed as a third officer for

approximately 11⁄2 years. The third mate had

attended Bridge Team Management and other

training.

Pilot—The pilot, age 54, has been the

docking master pilot for Portland Tugboat and

Ship Docking Company since September 1993.

When a ship requests docking services from

Portland Tugboat and Ship Docking Company,

the company dispatches two of its tugboats and

this pilot. Although self-employed when

piloting, the pilot was still covered by Portland

Tugboat and Ship Docking Company’s drug

testing program.

The pilot started his maritime career in 1968

as a deckhand aboard a 50-foot, 300-hp tug, the

Morania No. 4, at a sand plant on Long Island,

New York. In 1972, he obtained a license as an

Operator of Uninspected Towing Vessels and

became the master of the Morania No. 4. His

duties involved towing sand scows15 throughout

New York harbor.

During the 1970s, the pilot was promoted to

master of several larger tugs. At that time, he

sailed upon the waters of New York HarborHudson River, all of the Erie Barge Canal, the

 

15Barges used for transporting sand, garbage, and

miscellaneous bulk cargo are sometimes referred to as

scows.

Great Lakes, and the St. Lawrence River as far

as Ogdensburg, New York.

In 1980, he was transferred to the 3,600-hp

tug, Morania No. 20, and worked as a mate for 6

months before assuming the position of master.

In 1992, he served as master of the 4,200-hp tug

Morania No. 1. While master of the Morania

No. 20 and Morania No. 1, he entered numerous

ports along the Gulf of Mexico, the East Coast

of the United States, and Puerto Rico, towing

barges that ranged in size from 3,324 to 7,297

gross tons.

In late 1992, he was accepted by Portland

Tugboat and Ship Docking Company as a

docking master and entered an apprenticeship

program that required him to ride as an observer

on ships calling at Portland. Over the following

12 months, according to the pilot’s records, he

rode on more than 350 ships and 100 tugs and

barges. During that period, he obtained an

Unlimited First Class Pilot’s license for

Portland Harbor.

In September 1993, upon completion of his

apprenticeship, he assumed the duties of fulltime docking master pilot for Portland Harbor.

Since that time, according to the pilot, he had

piloted 1,028 vessels into and out of Portland

Harbor; 655 of those vessels, ranging up to 93

feet in width, were piloted through the Million

Dollar Bridge. These transits occurred during

the day and the night and in all weather

conditions common to the Portland area.

Pilot’s Accident History—The pilot had

been involved in two collisions with the

bridge while piloting tugs and barges through

it. The first accident occurred on May 2,

1986, while he was employed by Morania. He

was piloting the tug Morania No. 20, towing

barge No. 420. The barge collided with the

steel of the bridge, putting the bridge out of

service for 2 days for repairs costing about

$60,000. The second accident occurred

December 13, 1995, while he was serving as

the pilot directing the movement of the

tugboat Frederick Bouchard and barge No.

120 during an outbound transit. During the
______________________________________________________________________________ 20

transit, the barge collided with the fendering

system of the bridge.

The pilot testified at the Safety Board’s March

1997 public hearing in Portland that the December

1995 accident with the Frederick Bouchard

occurred between 2300 and 2400. The pilot stated

that after the collision with the South Portland

Bridge, the barge was taken to anchorage and that

he understood that the captain planned to notify the

Coast Guard of the accident. The pilot said that

since he had another job in about 2 1⁄2 hours, he

took a tugboat back to the dock and walked to his

apartment nearby. He said that he left a message

with the Coast Guard by voice mail between 0200

and 0300 that he would return home about 0800.

He stated that he completed the piloting job about

0600 and returned home. He further stated that he

arrived at the Coast Guard office about 0800, met

with two lieutenants, and gave them his report

about the Frederick Bouchard accident.

Although the accident was not a serious

marine incident, he said that at that time the

officers asked him to take a “drug test.” The pilot

said that he called his secretary and asked her to set

up a drug test and that he reported to a local

occupational health clinic in the “late morning,

early afternoon” for testing. After the test, he said

that he forwarded the results to the Coast Guard.

He said that he was not asked by the Coast Guard

to take an alcohol test. Furthermore, he said that no

one specified the type of samples (blood, breath, or

urine) that he was to provide. He stated that he

believed that the lab technicians would know

which specimens to ask for.

Following an investigation of the collision, the

Coast Guard issued a letter of warning to the pilot

on November 20, 1996. This warning will be

considered at any future proceedings involving the

pilot’s Merchant Mariner’s credentials.

The Safety Board is aware of two instances

where the pilot refused to submit to alcohol testing

in connection with traffic violations. In 1990,

while living in Florida, the pilot refused to be

tested for alcohol after being stopped in Boca

Raton for speeding. The pilot told Safety Board

investigators that he refused to be tested for

alcohol in that instance because the officer who

had stopped him was excessively rude. He was

subsequently arrested, and his driver’s license

was administratively suspended. Later, the initial

charges were dropped, and the police department

sent the pilot a letter of apology. In 1993, the pilot

was stopped in South Portland for speeding and

was asked by the police to take a test for alcohol,

which he declined. He was convicted of “driving

to endanger” (a lesser charge than “operating

under the influence”), and his driver’s license was

suspended for 1 month (November 16 through

December 16, 1993).

Pilot’s Preaccident Activities—According

to the pilot’s testimony to Safety Board

investigators in October 1996, the pilot recalled

sailing the Irving Arctic at the Mobile Terminal

about midnight September 24, departing the ship

about 0100 the morning of September 25. His

drive home from the dock only took about 15

minutes.

On September 26 at 0630, the pilot sailed the

Panther, a PanaMax ship at the Gulf Terminal,

South Portland, ending that activity about 0700.

Later, he continued his daily routine, picking up

his mail and returning to his house to familiarize

himself with a computer that he had just bought.

On the day of the accident, September 27, the

pilot stated that he arose at 0700, his normal time.

He made a pot of coffee, had a bowl of cereal,

walked the dog, and then returned home to prepare

for an 0800 meeting of the bridge contractors in

South Portland. He attended the meeting to provide

input on the new bridge construction. At the

meeting, he engaged others in conversation about

the new bridge and drank some orange juice. Two

individuals at the meeting who were later contacted

by the Safety Board stated that the pilot appeared

to be rested and completely sober. He left the

meeting at about 0930 to drive to BIW. There, he

boarded the tugboat Captain Bill to take him to the

Julie N.
21

Vessel Information

The Julie N was registered in Liberia,

owned by Amity Products Carriers, Inc.,

Wilmington, Delaware, and operated by MOC,

New York, New York. The vessel was built by

Naikai Shipbuilding and Engineering Company,

Ltd., Setoda, Japan, in 1982 and classified by

Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, London, England.

The vessel met the construction and

equipment requirements of the Safety of Life at

Sea Convention (SOLAS) 74, as amended, and

of the International Convention for the

Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as

modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL

73/78).

The vessel was of all-welded, steel

construction, had a single, continuous main

deck, a straight raked stem, and a bulbous bow.

The deckhouse, containing the crew

accommodations and the navigation bridge, was

located aft over the engineroom.

Navigation bridge equipment included two

radars with automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA)

capability (one 3 cm and one 10 cm), depth

sounder, radio direction finder, gyro compass,

course recorder, global positioning system

(GPS), Loran, and transit satellite navigation.

The navigation equipment was examined and

found to be in good working order. All charts

and publications were found to be correct and

up to date.

Because of the pollution cleanup efforts and

containment booms around the vessel, an

operational test of the vessel’s steering was

deferred for a few days. The Coast Guard

conducted the test for the Safety Board when the

booms were clear and the Julie N’s steering was

found to be satisfactory. The tests revealed that

the rudder could be shifted from port 20° to hard

port 35° in 6 seconds and that the rudder could

be moved from hard port to hard starboard in

about 28 seconds.

The principal characteristics of the Julie N

are:

Length overall 560 feet (170.69 m)

Beam 86.3 feet (26.29 m)

Depth 48.9 feet (14.9 m)

Gross tonnage 18,477

Deadweight tonnage 29,994

Horsepower 11,200

Waterway Information

Portland Harbor is ice-free and offers secure

anchorage to deep-draft vessels in all weather. It

is the Atlantic terminus for pipeline shipments of

petroleum products to Canada and handles

considerable domestic and foreign commerce in

petroleum products, wood pulp, paper, seafood

products, and general cargo.

The outer harbor includes three deepwater

general anchorages and the crude oil discharging

berth for Portland Pipeline, which is dedicated to

shipping crude oil to Canada. Diamond Island

Roads, having a depth of 34 to 45 feet, is the

principal deepwater anchorage in the outer

harbor.

The main harbor consists of two areas: the

outer part of the main harbor, which extends from

the entrance of the Fore River to the Million

Dollar Bridge, and the inner harbor, which

extends from the Million Dollar Bridge to the

head of deepwater navigation at the fixed railroad

and highway bridges. Nearly all petroleum

shipments entering Portland for distribution to the

Northeast are received by terminals in the inner

harbor. Some land and terminals are available in

the inner harbor for expanded container

operations.

The Federal project16 provides for a 45-footdeep channel from the sea to Fort George, and 35

feet in the inner harbor and Fore River to the

turning basin at the head of deepwater navigation.

 

16Federal project refers to the channel width and depth

that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers must maintain

through regular dredging. In recent years, environmental

concerns have limited the disposal of dredging spoils;

hence, some maintenance dredging is behind schedule.
______________________________________________________________________________ 22

The mean range of the tide for Portland

Harbor is 9.1 feet. The velocity of the tidal

current in the outer harbor southwest of Diamond

Island Ledge is about 1 knot; within the harbor,

the current is about 0.5 knot along the general

axis of the harbor (southwest-northeast). At the

time of the accident, the tide was 11.2 feet, about

2 feet higher than normal, resulting in a slight

flood current flowing upriver through the bridge.

The 11.2 feet would be added to the channel

depth of 35 to 36 feet to give a channel depth of

approximately 45 feet. It is customary for

tankships to enter the inner harbor at high water

to discharge as the tide goes out.

Meteorological Information

At the time of the accident, the winds were

light and variable, the visibility was good, and

the tide was nearly high water slack. The

temperature was about 60°F.

Medical and Pathological Information

Drug and Alcohol Testing of the Julie N’s

Pilot—The master and deckhand of the tugboat

Captain Bill and the master of the Julie N stated

that the pilot appeared to be completely sober,

alert, and well-rested.

Shortly before 1230, after the accident and

after the vessel was moored at Rolling Mills

Terminal and the tugs had been released and the

vessel was being boomed,17 the pilot left the

ship. As the pilot proceeded down the gangway,

he met the vessel’s agent, who informed him

that his (the pilot’s) attorney was on board the

tug Captain Bill at the end of the pier. The pilot

then walked to the end of the pier and went

aboard the tug to meet with his attorney.

About 1235, the pilot called the secretary at

Portland Tugboat and Ship Docking Company

from the tug to inform her of the accident. He

requested that she call the Center for Health

Promotion (CHP) and schedule a “drug” test for

him. The secretary was already aware of the

collision through a previous phone conversation

 

17Deployment of floating barriers to contain or prevent

the movement of oil floating on the water.

with one of the tugboat masters assisting in

moving the Julie N. The secretary contacted the

CHP scheduling department and said that the

company would like to send one of its

employees “for a drug test.” (The CHP

receptionist stated that the tugboat company

secretary requested a “random drug screen.”)

An appointment was made for the pilot to report

to the CHP at 1415 that day for drug testing. (A

CHP representative later stated that an

appointment is not necessary for postaccident

testing and that the CHP would have offered to

conduct the testing immediately if it had been

aware that the testing was related to an

accident.) The secretary then informed the pilot

by cellular phone of his appointment time. The

secretary was accustomed to making

appointments for random drug testing and was

unaware that postaccident testing was different

or required any additional testing.

About 1215, about 1 hour and 10 minutes

after the accident occurred, the first Coast

Guard officer to board the Julie N arrived at

Rolling Mills Terminal, while the Julie N was

being moored. About 1230, either shortly before

or after boarding the vessel, the officer was

handed the pilot’s attorney’s business card and

was told that the pilot and his attorney were on

board the tugboat moored nearby. At

approximately 1245, the officer briefed the

Coast Guard Marine Safety Office on the overall

situation. At this time, he mentioned that the

pilot and his attorney were not on board the

Julie N and that he had not made contact with

nor spoken to them. The officer later stated that

at the time, his first concern was controlling the

oil spill rather than interviewing the pilot and

crew about the accident.

The attorney for the pilot later stated that he

had given his card to the Coast Guard officer on

the vessel soon after the vessel docked and had

informed the officer that he was the pilot’s

attorney and that the pilot was available for an

interview. The attorney stated that he informed

the officer that the pilot had a 1415 appointment

for testing. Later, about 1345, the attorney said

he informed the Coast Guard officer that it was

necessary for the pilot to leave the area to make
23

his 1415 appointment. According to the

attorney, the Coast Guard officer agreed that the

pilot should leave for the appointment.

Shortly after 1345, the pilot’s attorney drove

the pilot to the CHP for his scheduled testing,

arriving at approximately 1350.

Meanwhile, about 1320, the Coast Guard

Marine Safety Office called the Portland

Tugboat and Ship Docking Company and asked

the secretary whether postaccident testing was

being done for the pilot. The secretary informed

the Coast Guard that an appointment for testing

the pilot had been made with the CHP.

When the pilot arrived at the CHP, he

checked in at the reception desk in the lobby. He

identified himself, though he did not mention

that he had just been involved in an accident. At

the time, film footage of the accident was being

shown on the television set in the lobby, and the

pilot stated that he did not want to acknowledge

that he was associated with the accident. There

was no discussion as to the type of testing to be

done, and according to the pilot, he “assumed at

all times that the Center would do whatever

testing was necessary, including alcohol

testing.” The pilot provided a picture

identification card as requested by the

technician and signed a “Drug /Alcohol

Consent and Release Form.” He then received a

urine specimen cup and was requested to

provide a specimen. About 1429, the pilot

provided a urine specimen in the collection area,

as requested by the technician, and then returned

and gave the specimen to the technician. At this

time, he signed a second form, which he stated

he did not read at the time. This form, later

determined to be the “Federal Drug Testing and

Control Form,” had the box for “Random”

checked as the reason for the test.

The technician later stated that the pilot

appeared to be sober and did not display any

indication of alcohol impairment.

“Random” testing was checked by the CHP

technician on the form because random testing

had been ordered by the Portland Tugboat and

Ship Docking Company. Random testing in the

marine industry is solely for testing for the five

drugs specified in U.S. Department of

Transportation (DOT) and Coast Guard

regulations18 and does not include random

testing for alcohol. Personnel at the CHP were

unaware that the pilot had been in an accident

and therefore needed to provide an additional

blood or breath sample for alcohol testing to

comply with the requirements of postaccident

testing. The pilot stated that he did not review

his copy of the form until the issue of alcohol

testing surfaced in press reports a few days later.

The pilot later stated that he believed the

testing would include testing for alcohol and it

was his belief that urine was the only specimen

needed for both alcohol and drug testing. He

also stated that he was unaware that the

regulations required the testing of breath or

blood to determine the presence of alcohol and

that urine was not tested for alcohol. When

asked what could be done to inform mariners of

postaccident testing requirements, the pilot

responded that posting signs in the urine sample

collection area would have alerted him that

urine alone was insufficient and that breath or

blood testing was also required. The pilot stated

that he would have complied with postaccident

testing regulations had he known what to do.

The principal owner of the Portland Tugboat

and Ship Docking Company, the company whose

drug and alcohol testing program covered the

pilot, also testified that he was unaware that a

urine specimen was insufficient for postaccident

testing. He said he thought that the urine

specimen would be used for alcohol as well as

drug testing. He stated that it was only because of

the press coverage following the accident about

the failure to test the pilot for alcohol that he

 

18The five drugs listed in DOT regulations at 49 CFR

40.21 and the Coast Guard regulations at 46 CFR 16.350

are marijuana, cocaine, opiates, phencyclidines (PCPs), and

amphetamines. Random testing in the marine industry is

solely for testing for the five drugs specified in the DOT

and Coast Guard regulations. Coast Guard regulations do

not include random testing for alcohol; however, DOT

alcohol testing regulations provide for random testing for

employees in other modes of transportation.
______________________________________________________________________________ 24

learned breath or blood testing was required to

determine alcohol use.

One split of the original urine specimen was

made, and the two split samples were sent to

Roche CompuChem Labs in Research Triangle

Park, North Carolina, by Airborne Express at

approximately 1620 on September 27.

One urine sample was subjected to the

prescribed 5-panel drug screen for marijuana,

cocaine, opiates, phencyclidines (PCPs), and

amphetamines as required by Coast Guard

regulations at 46 CFR 16 and DOT regulations

at 49 CFR 40. Written, negative test results were

received by the CHP on September 30, 1996.

The remaining urine sample was discarded by

Roche CompuChem Labs on October 4, the

prescribed 5 days following negative test results.

Drug and Alcohol Testing of the Julie N’s

Crew—The MOC has a program of random

testing for both alcohol and drugs on its vessels.

Each vessel is equipped with breath-testing

equipment for alcohol testing, and the master

and deck officers are trained to use the

equipment. Urine collection and shipping

containers are also carried on all MOC vessels.

 Since 1994, the MOC has had a contract

with an independent firm, Anderson/Kelly

Associates, Inc., owners of International

Collection for Substance Abuse Screening

(ICSAS), to provide toxicology testing of crews

on MOC vessels. The contract includes the

testing of pilots if they are still on board, with

testing costs to be paid by the MOC.

At 1207, on the day of the accident, the MOC

requested the ICSAS to test all personnel on

board the Julie N. The ICSAS then made

arrangements with the CHP in Portland to

conduct the breath testing and for Comprehensive

Drug Testing Services in Portland to collect urine

specimens. At 1240, the ICSAS advised the MOC

that technicians were en route to the vessel.

About 2 1⁄2 hours after the accident, which

included a few minutes’ wait on the pier, two

technicians were escorted aboard the Julie N to

start the testing, which began at 1330. The

technicians elected to collect urine specimens

first and conduct breath testing later. The breath

testing did not commence until about 1620,

more than 5 hours after the accident, and was

not completed until nearly 1800. The master

was among the last to be breath-tested.

About 1300, 2 hours after the accident, the

Coast Guard Marine Safety Office in Portland

called the MOC and informed them that “post

serious marine incident testing” was required for

all crewmembers involved in the incident. The

MOC advised that efforts were underway to

accomplish the testing.

All breath samples tested negative for

alcohol, and all urine specimens tested negative

for drugs.

A representative of the MOC stated that

although the testing equipment was on board the

Julie N and that the officers were trained in its

use, the MOC elected to have the testing

performed by its contractor. MOC policy is to

have an independent testing agency conduct the

testing when such an agency is readily available.

According to the MOC,

independent agencies are experienced in

both sample collection and

chain of custody procedures, thereby

guaranteeing valid test results.

Employment of an independent agency

also avoids any question of the propriety

of self-testing.

However, the MOC stated that if

circumstances preclude prompt independent

testing, the breath-testing devices and urine

collection kits carried on board would be

employed by vessel personnel trained in their

use.

The MOC also prefers using independent

agencies for postaccident testing because “it

avoids removing vessel personnel from critical

postaccident duties for the considerable time

required to complete the testing process.” The

MOC pointed out that the Julie N’s officers

were “totally engaged in stabilizing the vessel’s
25

condition and seeking to minimize the outflow

of oil” following the accident.

Accidents Involving Postaccident Testing

Issues—The Safety Board has investigated a

number of accidents where postaccident testing

for alcohol and other drugs was not conducted

properly. In many marine accidents investigated

by the Safety Board, considerable time was

required to collect breath or blood for alcohol

testing or samples were never collected, as

illustrated in table 1.

In some cases, marine employers failed to

conduct postaccident testing because of their

lack of understanding of the testing

requirements set forth in Coast Guard

regulations. For instance, the pilot of the Julie N

and his tugboat company reportedly believed

that urine was the sole specimen required and

that it was tested for alcohol as well as drugs. In

many instances, the Coast Guard had to initiate

the postaccident testing process through

informing or reminding the marine employer

that the responsibility for testing resides with

the employer and by providing information

about how and where to obtain the services of a

testing firm and or how to obtain the needed

equipment.

Postaccident drinking can affect sample

results and has been a factor in some accidents.

In one case involving an explosion and fire on a

tankship19 that had been undergoing welding

repairs, it was necessary for the crew to abandon

the vessel. Upon arrival ashore, some

crewmembers began consuming alcohol at a

local bar. No regulation currently prohibits

postaccident drinking. In this accident, it was

also necessary for the Coast Guard to explain to

the marine employer’s representative that testing

 

19Marine Accident Report—Investigation of the

Explosion and Fire on Board the U.S. Tankship Omi

Charger at Galveston, Texas, on October 9, 1993

(NTSB/MAR-94/04).

is the responsibility of the marine employer and

to provide information about obtaining the

services of a testing agency.

Other investigations have been impeded

because crewmembers or pilots were not

available for testing, such as in the

Jupiter/Buffalo accident, in which many

crewmembers had gone ashore without being

tested. On one occasion, most of the crew of an

oceangoing ship was transported out of the

country and consequently never available to

investigators.20 (For more information on the

Jupiter/Buffalo accident and other accidents

involving postaccident testing issues, see table

1.)

Postaccident Testing Regulations and

Programs

Coast Guard Regulations—Coast Guard

regulations governing postaccident testing for

alcohol and “dangerous drugs”21 (marijuana,

cocaine, opiates, phencyclidines (PCPs); and

amphetamines) are found at 33 CFR 95

(Operating a Vessel While Intoxicated) and 46

CFR 4.06 (Mandatory Chemical Testing

Following Serious Marine Incidents Involving

Vessels in Commercial Service). Regulations for

testing for dangerous drugs in the workplace for

personnel on board U.S. commercial vessels are

at 46 CFR 16. (See appendix B for these

regulations.)

 

20Marine Accident Report—Investigation of the Fire

on Board the Cypriot Bulk Carrier Protector Alpha at

Kalama, Washington, on February 14, 1982 (NTSB-MAR83-01).

21The term “dangerous drug” is used in the report to

be consistent with terminology used in Coast Guard

regulations at 46 CFR 4.06 and 46 CFR 16. The basis for

the term “dangerous drug” is found at 46 U.S.C. 7702

(c)(2), which states: “...The Secretary shall require the

testing of the holder of a license, certificate of registry, or

merchant mariner’s document for use of alcohol and

dangerous drugs in violation of law or Federal regulations.

The testing may include preemployment (with respect to

dangerous drugs only), periodic, random, reasonable cause,

and postaccident testing.” In some parts of this report, the

word “drug” may be used for brevity and means these five

drugs.
______________________________________________________________________________ 26

Table 1—Time elapsed before postaccident testing performed and types of testing performed after

major marine accidents investigated by the Safety Board

Vessel Breath/blood testing

(hours)

Urine testing

(hours)

Remarks

Exxon Valdez

March 24, 1989

—/10.5 10.5  Testing delayed because of time

necessary Coast Guard investigators

to arrive at the scene and the several

hours it took to locate a collector.

 Alcohol was a causal factor.

World Prodigy

June 23, 1989

—/22 22 None.

Aleutian Enterprise

March 22, 1990

—/— 42  Remote location. Lack of knowledge

by the marine employer about

postaccident testing. Urine specimen

from master tested negative.

Shinousa/

Chandy N

Hellespont Faith

July 28, 1990

—/— 8  Coast Guard investigators on board

soon after accident to interview

crews observed no evidence of

intoxication or drug use. Pilot of

Shinousa gave urine specimen in

about 8 hours. All other urine

collected over 24 hours later.

Mandan

August 15, 1990

5.5/— 5.5  Pilot and master tested.

 Test results were negative for alcohol

and drugs.

Jupiter/Buffalo

September 16, 1990

—/— Unknown/9.5  Coast Guard investigators reminded

Buffalo of need for alcohol and drug

testing about 6 hours after accident.

Some crewmembers had gone ashore

already; thus, no alcohol testing

attempted of Buffalo crew. No one

thought to test Jupiter injured that

were hospitalized. Deceased Jupiter

crewman tested negative for drugs.

Sea King

January 11, 1991

—/— —  Owner refused to test. Lack of

authority at time to impose penalty

against the owner for failure to test.

Master rescued by Coast Guard soon

after accident.

 Unknown whether alcohol or drugs

involved.

Queen Elizabeth 2

August 7, 1992

—/39 16–39  Remote location. Marine employer’s

instructions were to cooperate with

Coast Guard in postaccident testing.

 Test results were negative for drugs.

Fremont/

Juraj Dalmatinac

December 21, 1992

—/—

—/—

18

14–16

None.
27

Vessel Breath/blood testing

(hours)

Urine testing

(hours)

Remarks

Chris

May 28, 1993

—/7–7.5 7–7.5  Coast Guard on scene a few minutes

after the accident.

Yorktown Clipper

August 18, 1993

—/— 18.5  Remote location.

Mauvilla

September 22, 1993

—/— 8  Remote location.

Omi Charger

October 9, 1993

—/— 5–18  Postaccident drinking. Lack of

knowledge by marine employer.

Testing initiated by Coast Guard by

informing marine employer of need

for testing and how to obtain testing

assistance.

Noordam/

Mount Ymitos

November 6, 1993

7/—

Yes/—

7–26

29–30

 No authority to conduct testing

of foreign vessels in international

waters. However, watchstanders

volunteered for testing.

El Toro

December 5, 1993

—/3–6 —  Test results were negative for alcohol

and drugs.

All Alaskan

July 24, 1994

—/— 28  Master not tested. Master boarded

Coast Guard cutter about 3 hours

after fire started but was not tested

during the 3 days on board. Health

clinic closed; thus, urine collection of

crew delayed until next day.

Seal Island

October 8, 1994

—/— —  In port at St. Croix, Virgin Islands.

Lack of knowledge by the marine

employer of testing requirements.

Alaska Spirit

May 27, 1995

—/Postmortem Not

applicable

None.

Royal Majesty

June 10, 1995

—/25–28 25–28  No authority to conduct testing of

foreign vessel in international waters.

Remote location. Crew volunteered

to be tested.

Star Princess

June 23, 1995

Pilot 4/—

Crew 8.5/—

4

8.5

 Test results were negative for alcohol

and drugs (pilot).

Scandia

January 19, 1996

9/— 15.7  Remote location. Crew fighting fire

and attempting to salvage barge.

Coast Guard performed breath testing

of crew for alcohol.

 Test results were negative for alcohol

and drugs.

Universe Explorer

July 27, 1996

—/— 34 None.
______________________________________________________________________________ 28

Vessel Breath/blood testing

(hours)

Urine testing

(hours)

Remarks

Julie N

September 27, 1996

Pilot —/—

Crew 3–7/—

3

3–7

 Lack of knowledge by the marine

employer.

 Test results of pilot were negative for

drugs.

 Breath testing of Julie N crew

delayed by technicians who elected to

collect urine specimens first.

 Test results were negative for alcohol

and drugs.

Dave Blackburn

October 23, 1996

9/— 9 None.

Sundowner

December 7, 1996

—/16–17 16–17  No breath testing conducted because

owner reported to Coast Guard that

he had permitted the crew to engage

in postaccident drinking. Testing

consortium under contract not open

after hours and on weekends, thus

delaying specimen collection.

 Unknown whether alcohol or drugs

involved.

Bright Field

December 7, 1996

Pilot 1.5/—

Crew 6.5–8.5/—

1.5

6.5–8.5

 Coast Guard on board soon after

accident; reminded owner of need for

testing. Directly involved personnel

were tested last.

 Test results were negative for alcohol

and drugs.

Cowslip/

Evergrade

May 14, 1997

Cowslip —/8.6–10

Pilot —/—

Evergrade —/17.5–

 18.5

8.6–10

12.7

17.5–18.5

 Cowslip is a Coast Guard cutter.

Alaska 1/

Hanjin Barcelona

February 11, 1998

6/—

—/—

6

—

 Saliva collected instead of breath for

alcohol testing.

 No authority to test crew of Hanjin

Barcelona because ship was a foreign

vessel in international waters.

 Unknown whether alcohol or drugs

involved.
29

As shown in table 2, 33 CFR 95 applies to

all U.S. vessels (recreational and commercial)

and to all foreign vessels (recreational and

commercial) on the navigable waters of the

United States. The applicability to foreign

vessels is clearly stated at 33 CFR 95. Also,

these regulations apply to U.S. vessels on

international waters.

The regulations at 33 CFR 95 establish

specific thresholds for alcohol intoxication: .04

percent blood alcohol concentration (BAC) for

operators of commercial vessels and .10 percent

BAC for operators of recreational vessels. In

addition, 33 CFR 95 recognizes the following as

evidence of intoxication: “(a) Personal

observation of an individual’s manner,

disposition, speech, muscular movement,

general appearance or behavior, or (b) A

chemical test.” Under 33 CFR 95, a law

enforcement officer (including Coast Guard

officers, warrant officers, or petty officers) or a

marine employer may direct an individual to

undergo the tests noted in table 2 when

“reasonable cause” exists. Reasonable cause,

according to 33 CFR 95, exists when the

individual is directly involved in a marine

accident meeting the criteria of Chapter 61 of

Title 46, United States Code (46 U.S.C. 6101)

(see table 2), or when the individual is suspected

of being intoxicated.

The regulations at 33 CFR 95 formerly

specified punitive measures against a marine

employee for being intoxicated when operating

a vessel22 but do not specify sanctions against

the individual who fails or refuses to be tested

or against the marine employer that fails to

require crewmember testing. However, 33 CFR

95.040 does provide that if an individual refuses

to submit or cooperate in the administration of

timely testing when directed by a law

enforcement officer based on reasonable cause,

the individual shall be assumed to be

intoxicated. Further, if the test is directed by the

marine employer, then an individual’s refusal is

 

22The punitive measures formerly at 33 CFR 95.055

have been removed from the 1997 Code of Federal

Regulations.

admissible as evidence in an administrative

proceeding, which could result in the revocation

or suspension of the license, certification, or

document held by a U.S. seaman or the

imposition of a civil penalty. The lack of

authority to prescribe a penalty against the

marine employer that fails to conduct testing

was corrected in late 1996 by the Coast Guard

Authorization Act of 1997 (46 U.S.C. 2115):

Civil penalty to enforce alcohol and

dangerous drug testing

Any person who fails to implement or

conduct, or who otherwise fails to

comply with the requirements

prescribed by the Secretary for chemical

testing for dangerous drugs or for

evidence of alcohol use, as prescribed

under this subtitle or a regulation

prescribed by the Secretary to carry out

the provisions of this subtitle, is liable

to the United States Government for a

civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for

each violation. Each day of a continuing

violation shall constitute a separate

violation.

As noted in table 2, 46 CFR 4.06

applies to U.S. commercial vessels and to

foreign commercial vessels on U.S. waters.

U.S. commercial vessels include uninspected

commercial vessels, such as most fishing and

towing vessels, as well as inspected vessels.

The regulations at 46 CFR 4.06-1 require the

marine employer owning or operating a vessel

involved in a serious marine incident as defined

in table 2 to “take all practicable steps to have

each individual engaged or employed on board

the vessel who is directly involved in the incident

chemically tested for evidence of drug and

alcohol use.” A law enforcement officer may

determine that additional individuals are directly

involved in the serious marine incident. In such

cases, 46 CFR 4.06-1 requires the marine

employer to take all practicable steps to have

these individuals submit urine specimens and

breath or blood specimens or both breath and

blood specimens for chemical testing. In other

words, testing for alcohol as well as for drugs is
30

Table 2—Coast Guard regulations governing postaccident testing

33 CFR 95 46 CFR 4.06

Applicability  Commercial vessels–U.S. and foreign

flag

 Recreational vessels–U.S. and foreign

flag

 U.S. commercial vessels

 Foreign-flag commercial vessels

on U.S. waters

Intoxication standards

for alcohol

 Commercial vessels–.04 percent blood

alcohol concentration (BAC)

 Recreational vessels–.10 percent BAC or

State Standard

None

Testing samples General—

 Breath

 Blood

 Urine

 Saliva or other bodily fluids or tissues

 Urine

 Breath or blood or both

Criteria for testing Accident meeting the criteria of

46 U.S.C. 6101:

 Death or serious injury to individual

 Material loss of property

 Material damage affecting seaworthiness

or efficiency of vessel

 Significant harm to the environment

-ORIndividual suspected of being intoxicated

Accident meeting the “serious

marine incident” criteria of

46 CFR 4.03-2:

 One or more deaths

 Injury to passenger or

crewmember requiring medical

treatment beyond first aid or

injury rendering crewmember

unfit for routine vessel duties

 Property damage exceeding

$100,000

 Loss of inspected vessel

 Loss of self-propelled vessel of

100 gross tons

 Discharge of 10,000 gallons of

oil into navigable waters of the

United States or reportable

quantity of hazardous substance

into navigable waters or

atmosphere of the United States.

Penalties for refusal

to test*

Suspension or revocation of employee’s

license; none against marine employer

Suspension or revocation of

employee’s license; none against

marine employer

Testing responsibility

and timeliness

Marine employer—as soon as practical Marine employer—as soon as

practical

Postaccident drinking No prohibition No prohibition

Testing equipment

required

Not specified  Breath testing devices

(oceangoing vessels)

 Urine specimen collection and

shipping kits (only required on

board if not obtainable in 24

hours)

*The Coast Guard received authority in late 1996, after the Julie N accident, to impose civil penalties on

marine employers or anyone else failing to comply with the regulations for postaccident testing.
31

required when a serious marine incident occurs

under the jurisdiction of 46 CFR 4.06. Title

46 CFR 4.06 does not specify intoxication

standards in terms of BAC.

Unlike 33 CFR 95, the regulations at 46

CFR 4.06-1 require U.S.-inspected vessels

certified for unrestricted ocean routes and

inspected vessels certified for restricted

overseas routes to carry breath-testing devices

that are capable of determining the presence of

alcohol in a person’s system. Also, U.S. vessels

are required to carry urine specimen collection

and shipping kits, unless such kits can be

obtained within 24 hours of the serious marine

incident. Neither 46 CFR 4.06 nor 33 CFR 95

specifies for what substances urine is to be

tested. However, 46 CFR 4.06-1 does reference

drugs detected by urinalysis cited at 46 CFR

4.06-50, a section of the regulations relating to

duties of the medical review officer, and also

references 46 CFR 16, which covers workplace

testing and urine specimen collection and

handling procedures for personnel on

commercial vessels. (See appendix B.)

An employee’s refusal to provide specimens

is considered a violation of 46 CFR 4.06-1 and

could subject a mariner [on a U.S. vessel] to

suspension and revocation procedures against the

mariner’s Coast-Guard issued license, certificate,

or document for service on board a commercial

vessel. Also, such an individual can be removed

from duties directly affecting the safety of a

vessel’s navigation or operations. The regulations

at 46 CFR 4.06-1 do not list sanctions or punitive

actions for marine employers that fail to comply

with the regulations or for foreign vessel

employees or state-licensed pilots who refuse to

provide the required specimens for testing.

However, as noted earlier in this section, the

1997 Coast Guard Authorization Act provides

authority for the Coast Guard to impose civil

penalties on anyone failing to comply with the

requirements for postaccident testing.

Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing

Act of 1991—Because of its concerns about the

time sensitivity of toxicological sampling, in 1989,

the Safety Board recommended23 to the DOT that

both blood and urine samples be collected within 4

hours of a transportation accident. Subsequent

Congressional concern about the possible use of

alcohol by transportation workers resulted in the

passage of the Omnibus Transportation Employee

Testing Act of 1991 (the Act). The Act addresses

transportation workers in the industries regulated

by the DOT’s operating administrations: the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal

Highway Administration (FHWA), Federal

Railroad Administration (FRA), and Federal

Transit Administration (FTA).

The Act does not address the marine industry

or the Coast Guard. At the time the Act became

effective, the Coast Guard already had

regulations24 on alcohol misuse, including

mandatory postaccident alcohol testing. The

pipeline industry and its regulatory administration,

the Research and Special Programs Administration

(RSPA), were also excluded from the Act because

it was reasoned that pipeline safety risks differ

somewhat from risks experienced by forms of

public transportation that carry people.

On February 15, 1994, the DOT operating

administrations issued rules to implement the Act.

At the same time, RSPA joined the other DOT

operating administrations in issuing regulations to

implement limited programs to prevent alcohol

misuse by pipeline industry employees who

perform safety-sensitive functions.

The rules implementing the Act establish

priority provisions for postaccident alcohol testing.

 

23Safety Recommendation I-89-006 was issued in a

December 5, 1989, letter to the DOT and was classified

“Closed—Unacceptable Action,” on May 15, 1995.

24Regulations at 33 CFR 95, 46 CFR 4.06, and 46

CFR 16.
______________________________________________________________________________ 32

The common preamble25 to the rules of all five

operating administrations states that:

as soon as practicable during the 8 hours

following an accident, each employer

shall test each surviving covered

employee for alcohol, if that employee’s

performance of a safety sensitive

function either contributed to an

accident or cannot be discounted as a

contributing factor to the accident.

The preamble also establishes the

requirement to justify in writing testing delays of

over 2 hours (4 hours in FRA regulations) and to

cease attempts to test after 8 hours. Further, the

preamble states, “After eight (8) hours have

passed, the employer then shall cease attempts to

administer the test and record why the employer

was unable to administer a test.” The preamble

notes that after 8 hours, “...there is little

likelihood of finding a meaningful alcohol

concentration resulting from use preceding the

accident.”

Current Coast Guard regulations do not

conform to the 1989 recommendation by the

Safety Board to collect blood and urine samples

within 4 hours or to the DOT’s requirement to

collect blood or breath samples for alcohol testing

within 2 hours. Both Coast Guard regulations

addressing postaccident sampling (33 CFR 95

and 46 CFR 4.06) call for testing “as soon as

practicable,” rather than requiring specific

sampling times.

The regulations for the other DOT

administrations implementing the Act also mandate

random testing for alcohol, make it illegal to assume

duty in safety-sensitive positions unless the BAC is

below .02 percent, and require an individual

involved in an accident to refrain from consuming

alcohol for 8 hours. None of these provisions are

contained in Coast Guard regulations. Regarding the

provision on fitness to assume duty, the DOT

selected the .02 level rather than .00, “because it

represents the lowest level at which a scientifically

accurate alcohol concentration” could “be measured

 

25Federal Register, Vol. 59, No.31, February 15,

1994, pp. 7302–7338.

given the limitations of [then] any current

technology (e.g., blood, breath).”26

Coast Guard Actions on Postaccident

Testing—Coast Guard officers, warrant

officers, and petty officers assigned to the

merchant marine safety program receive training

in alcohol and drug testing regulations during

the Coast Guard’s 2-week accident investigation

course (120 to 144 students trained per year).

The curriculum includes 1.5 hours devoted to

the requirements for alcohol and drug testing,

and each student receives a handout containing a

detailed discussion of the drug and alcohol

testing regulations.

On November 15, 1994, the Coast Guard

issued ALDIST 179/94 (COMDTNOTE

16722),27 which provided additional guidance

for postaccident testing. This directive stressed

the importance of timeliness in postaccident

testing for alcohol and other drugs and that the

timeliness of alcohol testing is especially

 

26Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 31, February 15,

1994, p. 7319.

27An ALDIST (short for All Districts) is a message to

all Coast Guard activities and personnel that transmits

information or guidance. A COMDTNOTE (short for

Commandant Notice) provides information or guidance to

Coast Guard activities and personnel. A COMDTNOTE

normally applies for a specified time and may be

disseminated by an ALDIST when rapid transmission is

warranted. The ALDIST resulted from the Safety Board

investigation of the grounding of the RMS Queen Elizabeth

2 and resulting Safety Recommendation M-93-24, that the

Coast Guard provide guidelines to Coast Guard boarding

officers about informing marine employers of the

employer’s responsibility to conduct toxicological testing

as soon as practicable and about providing assistance to the

marine employer when necessary. Safety Recommendation

M-93-24 was superseded by Safety Recommendation M94-11, issued as a result of the Safety Board investigation

of the collision of the U.S. Towboat Chris with the Judge

Seeber Bridge in New Orleans, Louisiana. When ALDIST

179/94 was issued, Safety Recommendation M-94-11 was

classified “Closed—Acceptable Action.” For more

information see Marine Accident Report—Grounding of

the RMS Queen Elizabeth 2, Vineyard Sound,

Massachusetts, August 7, 1992 (NTSB/MAR-93/01) and

Highway Accident Report—Collision of the U.S. Towboat

Chris With the Judge Seeber Bridge in New Orleans,

Louisiana, May 28, 1993 (NTSB/HAR-94/03).
33

important because alcohol is eliminated rapidly

from the body.28

ALDIST 179/94 requires Coast Guard

investigators to alert marine employers of “their

responsibility” for postaccident testing. The

directive clearly states that Coast Guard

personnel shall not provide urine collection

material or perform as collection site personnel.

The directive does allow appropriately qualified

Coast Guard personnel or other local law

enforcement personnel to conduct breath testing

for alcohol if such testing would be more timely

than the testing arranged by the marine

employer or if there is any concern that testing

would not otherwise be accomplished.

Drug and Alcohol Program Inspector—In

1995, the Coast Guard created the Drug and

Alcohol Program Inspector (DAPI) program to

educate U.S. commercial vessel owners and

operators and pilot associations about the Coast

Guard’s drug testing program requirements

(preemployment, periodic, random, serious

marine incident, and reasonable cause testing)

and related recordkeeping and reporting.

The program is now staffed by 11

inspectors, 1 for each Coast Guard District and

1 at Coast Guard headquarters. Currently, all are

commissioned officers. The DAPIs visit

companies to review records and explain the

regulations. Discrepancies noted are normally

provided to the operator in writing and followed

up as necessary to ensure that compliance is

 

28Alcohol is eliminated quickly from the body at an

average rate of about .015 to .018 percent by weight per

hour. In an 8-hour period, as much as .12 to .14 percent can

be eliminated from the bloodstream. Cocaine is eliminated

very quickly from the blood (in as little as 2 hours),

although metabolites of the drug remain in the body much

longer. Many other drugs, including over-the-counter and

prescription medications, are eliminated much more slowly;

a number of drugs with central nervous system effects can

be detected in the blood and urine for days or weeks

following ingestion.

carried out. One function of the DAPI is to

assist small operators in joining together to

participate in a consortium.29 The DAPIs also

inspect testing clinics where specimens are

taken to ensure such activities meet Coast Guard

criteria.

While the DAPIs are primarily concerned

with informing U.S. operating companies about

their drug testing responsibilities under the

regulations, they are available to provide

technical advice on the Coast Guard drug and

alcohol testing regulations to other Coast Guard

personnel, and to respond to any inquiries from

the public, including foreign operators whose

vessels call at U.S. ports.

Marine Safety Office, Portland, Maine—

Additional guidance on drug and alcohol testing

following a serious marine incident for Coast

Guard investigating officers and field office

personnel of the Portland, Maine, Inspection

Zone/Captain of the Port Zone (COTP),30 can be

found in Commanding Officer Instruction

16722.2. (See appendix C.) The instruction

summarizes postaccident testing requirements

and provides necessary information for marine

employers, such as contact information for

postaccident testing firms and for Coast Guard

stations in the COTP Portland area.

Coast Guard Enforcement of Intoxication

Regulations—The Coast Guard’s “Boating

While Intoxicated” (BWI) program was

established in 1989 to curb operation of

recreational vessels by intoxicated

 

29A consortium is usually formed by an independent

firm that will contract with vessel owners or operators to

conduct the testing required by Coast Guard regulations

(46 CFR 16 and 46 CFR 4.06) and to perform other

services required by the regulations, including acquiring

the services of a certified laboratory to perform the testing

and of a medical review officer to review test results. For

random testing, a consortium combines the marine

employees of all vessel owners or operators into a single

group or pool.

30Coastal area from the Massachusetts-New

Hampshire border to the Canadian border (see 33 CFR

3.05-15).
______________________________________________________________________________ 34

individuals. In June 1991, the program became

Coast Guard-wide. The BWI program’s

enforcement objectives are to:

• Ensure an intoxicated operator

does not operate a vessel, in

order to reduce the threat of

harm to self and to others, and

• Educate the recreational boating

public regarding existing BWI

regulations and safe boating

requirements.

Boarding officers involved in the program

must undergo an 8-hour training course that

includes instruction in calibrating and using the

ALCO Sensor III breath-testing device and in

administering a field sobriety test. Boarding

officers must repeat this training every 2 years.

Boarding officers are authorized to direct

recreational boaters to submit to a field sobriety

test or breath test or both when “reasonable

suspicion” of operator intoxication exists or

when an accident meeting the criteria of 46

U.S.C. 61 has occurred. Boarding officers work

closely with State law enforcement agencies and

personnel. If a State has an established

intoxication level, boarding officers will test

individuals for exceeding the State-established

level rather than the .10 percent BAC standard

contained in 33 CFR 95.

Board of Harbor Commissioners Testing

Program—Following the Julie N accident, the

Board of Harbor Commissioners for the Harbor

of Portland established a drug and alcohol

testing program for State-licensed bar pilots and

the State-licensed docking masters serving

Portland harbor. (See appendix D.) The drug

testing portion of the program is modeled on

Coast Guard regulations and includes

preemployment, random, and postaccident

testing for drugs. The drug testing programs,

consistent with Coast Guard regulations, targets

the five drugs listed in 49 CFR 40 and 46 CFR

16.350. The Harbor

Commissioners’ program allows testing for

other drugs that may be causal factors in an

accident. The alcohol testing program specifies

that breath testing will be used to test for

alcohol. In addition to postaccident testing for

alcohol, the program also establishes a

procedure for random testing for alcohol, which

exceeds Coast Guard requirements. This

program became effective in December 1996.

Tests and Research

On November 7, 1996, Safety Board

investigators rode the Bermudan-flag tankship

Kiowa on an inbound transit of the bridge under

similar conditions to the transit of the Julie N.

The Kiowa, owned by the Koch Oil Company of

Wichita, Kansas, was nearly the same length,

breadth, and tonnage as the Julie N. The pilot on

board had approximately 30 years of experience

as a docking master in Portland Harbor and

stated that he had never damaged the bridge.

The pilot conned the vessel along the starboard

side of the channel at slow ahead from a

position on the outside of the starboard bridge

wing. He explained that this location enabled

him to best estimate the distance between the

starboard side of the vessel and the fender

system. At about 11⁄2 ships’ lengths from the

bridge, the pilot used port 5° of rudder to move

the vessel slightly to the left, and at about one

ship’s length, he ordered the rudder to starboard

5° to place the vessel on a very slight angle of a

few degrees toward the right fender system. The

pilot had previously explained that approaching

the fender system at a slight angle enabled the

vessel to be cushioned by the water between the

bow and bridge pier. Once in the bridge

drawspan, there was approximately 2 feet of

clearance between the starboard side of vessel

and the fender system. As the vessel passed

through the drawspan, the pilot used starboard

5° to 10° of rudder to compensate for the

cushioning effect between the forward starboard

side of the vessel and the bridge pier. When the

vessel’s bridge, which was located aft over the

engineroom, entered the bridge drawspan, the

pilot ordered hard starboard rudder and full

ahead to start the vessel turning right as soon as

it exited the drawspan.
35

Other Information

Pilot’s Description of His Actions—The

pilot made the following statements regarding

his actions:

I proceeded down past the State Pier at a

dead slow, giving different rudder

commands, picking out the ranges that I

normally steer on. There was nothing

wrong with that ship. She handled very

well. Came down to Vessel Services. I

made another correction. Came down to

Deake’s Wharf, which is approximately

1,000 feet from the bridge, and the ship

is now committed. I bring the ship out

towards the South Portland side and felt

that I was a little too far to starboard,

whether it was just the last of the flood

current that was on my port quarter, and

everything seemed to be fine. The ship

was handling fine. I had asked for port

rudder to get over a little more to the

left. I asked for port 5, port 10, and at

port 20 she started to swing, which I

wanted her to. I wanted her to come

onto the center line.... Not only did I

have to concern myself about getting the

hull through the bridge, but I was more

thinking about the antennas because we

had just had a problem here in

December of last year with the Overseas

New Orleans. The Portland side of the

bridge came down, and there was—took

the bridge wing off the Overseas New

Orleans. So with that in mind, I picked

the middle of the channel, and when I

felt I was in the shape that I wanted to

be, I wanted to come hard to starboard,

half ahead. It came out hard to port.

When the captain repeated hard to port,

it took me I don’t know how long, I said

to myself, ‘I don’t want that.’ Then I

realized...calling for ‘port, port, port,

port,’ I said ‘hard to port’ instead of

‘hard to starboard.’

Human Error—In the past, accidents

involving human error31 were determined to have

 

31“An error occurs when a planned action fails to

achieve its desired consequences.” From Reason, James,

and Mycielska, Klara, Absent-Minded? The Psychology of

Mental Lapses and Everyday Errors, Prentice-Hall,

Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, p. 12.

been caused by human error, with their

explanation simply left at that. Today, much

more can be said about how humans make

errors. To learn about this behavior, researchers

have found it necessary to agree upon a

definition of human error and to classify the

types of human error that occur based upon

analysis of factors related to human error in

accidents. Once an error has been categorized,

countermeasures based upon what is known

about that type of error can be suggested to

reduce the likelihood of its reoccurring.

One example of a type of human error is a

“slip,” which is defined as an action not in

accord with the actor’s intention, the result of a

good plan but a poor execution.32

Reason’s and Mycielska’s research (1982)33

addressing commonly experienced errors and

mental lapses helps to clarify what is known

about the nature of slips:

Slips occur during the largely automatic

execution of some well-established or

routine sequence of actions; that is, one

in which the demands upon continuous

attention for moment-to-moment control

are relatively small.

Slips appear to be associated with

distraction or preoccupation. Or more

precisely, they seem likely to occur when

the limited attentional resource34 is

 

32Senders, John, and Moray, Neville, Human Error:

Cause, Prediction, and Reduction, Lawrence Erlbaum

Associates, Publishers, Hillsdale, New Jersey, 1982, p. 27.

33Reason and Mycielska , p. 21.

34According to Christopher Wickens’ book on human

performance, “Emphasis on the quantitative properties of

attention owes much to an important paper published by

[Neville] Moray in 1967. Moray proposed that attention is

like the limited processing capacity of a general-purpose

computer. This capacity could be allocated in graded

amounts to various activities depending on their difficulty

or demand for that capacity. The capacity concept

emphasizes both the flexible and the sharable nature of

attention or processing resources. Tasks demand more of

these hypothetical resources (attention or mental effort) as

they become more difficult or their desired level of

performance increases. With fewer resources available for

other tasks, performance will deteriorate.” For more

information, see Wickens, Christopher D., Engineering
______________________________________________________________________________ 36

allocated to some external or internal

matter that is unrelated to the ongoing

activity.

Absent-mindedness appears to flourish

in relatively familiar environments

where there are few departures from the

expected, and hence requires little in the

way of outward vigilance.

Reason’s and Mycielska’s conclusions

about human error yield general guidance for

trying to understand the nature of the pilot’s

error, although it is difficult to correlate their

conclusions about slips perfectly with the

circumstances and events of the Julie N

accident.

Port Safety—In 1990, the COTP

established a Port Safety Forum consisting of

pilots, vessel operators, shipping agents,

terminal operators, environmentalists, oil spill

response companies, and others having an

interest in port safety, to consider how to avoid

oil spills and how to respond in the event of a

spill. The MDOT, which owns and is

responsible for the Portland bridges, has not

been a member of the Forum. The first meeting

of the Forum was on June 18, 1990. The

chairman was the COTP and the vice chairman

was from the Office of Spill Response in the

Maine Department of Environmental Protection.

Soon the Forum started to explore other safety

issues besides oil spill prevention and response.

In some cases, advisory guidance, known as port

safety protocols, were prepared once consensus

had been achieved. Safety issues addressed by

the Forum have included visibility requirements

for vessel movements in the harbor and through

the bridge, vessel moorings, under-keel

clearance, tug and barge operations, abandoned

vessel derelicts, maintenance dredging, heavy

weather checklists for terminals, and pilot

fatigue. During construction of the new bridge,

Forum members met weekly with the

 

Psychology and Human Performance, 2nd. ed.,

HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., New York, New York,

1992, p. 366.

contractors building the bridge to coordinate

vessel transits with critical construction phases

that limited or prevented vessel movements to

ensure that petroleum stocks were sufficient to

last through the closure periods.

Million Dollar Bridge's Navigational

Opening Dimensions—The minimum horizontal clearance between the fender faces of

piers 18 (South Portland side) and 19 (north, or

Portland, side) was 98.24 feet (measured by

MDOT after the accident). In Bridges Over the

Navigable Waters of the United States, a Coast

Guard publication, the horizontal clearance is

listed as 100 feet.

MDOT correspondence, dated June 6, 1985,

lists the horizontal clearance as 96 feet +/-; a

diagram prepared by the MDOT, dated

November 19, 1985, indicates a horizontal

clearance of 99.6 feet; and an internal MDOT

memo, dated January 1991, suggests that 96 feet

be used because of the many irregularities in the

fender system. The pilot of the Julie N and a

bridge tender on duty at the time of the accident

stated that the horizontal clearance was 96 feet.

Because the bascule leafs in the fully open

position overhang the channel, vertical

clearance was limited for approximately 5 feet

horizontally from each fender system. Thus,

unlimited vertical clearance was confined to the

central portion of the bridge span. According to

a 1985 MDOT survey, there was a 5-foot

overhang at pier 19 and a 3.9-foot overhang at

pier 18, making unlimited vertical clearance

available throughout approximately 90 feet of

the central portion of the drawspan. This

number differed depending on the reference.

The Julie N pilot stated that unlimited vertical

clearance was available for 85 feet of the

channel width, which was also the width

indicated on a August 11, 1985, MDOT sketch

and endorsed in a January 1991 memo.
37

General

The pilot and members of the bridge watch

were found by the Safety Board to be trained,

experienced, and qualified to operate the Julie

N.

The pilot of the Julie N was well-rested and

the crew of the ship responded correctly to his

commands; therefore, the Safety Board did not

find fatigue or pilot-crew interaction to be

factors in this accident. Also, all equipment on

the vessel was operating satisfactorily, and the

pilot testified to the good handling

characteristics of the vessel. At the time of the

accident, visibility was good, winds were light,

and there was only a slight following current,

which the pilot preferred.

Results of alcohol breath tests for the crew

of the Julie N and results of drug testing

performed on urine samples provided by the

pilot and the crew were negative. Because the

pilot was not tested, the Safety Board concludes

that it cannot conclusively eliminate alcohol use

as a causal factor in this accident. However, the

statements of personnel closely associated with

the pilot support that alcohol was not a factor

affecting the pilot’s performance. Accordingly,

the Safety Board concludes that the human

factors of fatigue, training, drug use, and pilotcrew interaction were not causal or contributing

factors in the accident.

The Accident

Maneuver by the Pilot—The pilot stated

that because of his concern that the bascule leaf

might make contact with the vessel’s starboard

antenna, he had elected to maneuver the vessel

to pass through the center of the drawspan rather

than pass very close to the north fender system,

his normal method of transiting the bridge. The

pilot had issued three consecutive orders for

port rudder to swing the vessel to the left. The

pilot would most likely have altered the vessel’s

heading to the left even if he had intended to

pass close to the north fender system, since it

was customary to swing the bow first away and

then back toward the north fender system and

take advantage of a cushioning effect of the

displacement of the water between the north

pier and the forward, starboard side of the

vessel. The pilot’s intended maneuver would

have resulted in the vessel being only about 5 or

6 feet farther to the left than usual.

The pilot stated that he was satisfied that the

approach to the bridge was progressing well and

that all he had to do was to order hard starboard

rudder to align the vessel on the centerline of

the drawspan. The pilot characterized the effect

of the inadvertent hard port rudder as causing

his vessel, in effect, to overshoot the range.

Overshooting a range usually means to turn too

late and to proceed across a line of bearing

through two known landmarks rather than to

steady the vessel on the line of bearing. In this

case, the center axis of the drawspan was the

line of bearing on which the pilot desired to

steady his vessel, an axis that the pilot had to

visualize because it was not defined by any

established range of objects.

The maneuver elected for piloting the Julie N

through the bridge was a departure, albeit a small

one, from the pilot’s usual well-tested practice

and involved some peculiarities not associated

with his usual method. First, the ranges that the

pilot viewed from the extreme end of the

starboard bridge wing would appear differently as

the vessel moved away from the north fender

system. Also, the vessel was heading toward the

left for a longer period of time, and the vessel’s

heading was continually swinging to the left.

These peculiarities made the maneuver more

complicated than usual and consequently

required more judgment and evaluation by the

pilot. Finally, successful execution of the

maneuver heavily depended upon the application

of a substantial amount of starboard rudder at a

ANALYSIS
______________________________________________________________________________ 38

fairly precise point to stop the left swing and

align the vessel on the centerline axis of the

drawspan for passage through the bridge.

The most critical factor in this maneuver

was timing, probably a matter of 10 to 15

seconds, because the heading was swinging left

and the bow was pointing toward the south pier;

hence, a collision with the south pier would

occur unless sufficient right rudder was applied

in a timely manner. The combined effect of the

left rudder, probably 20 to 30 seconds longer

than desired, and the increase in propeller speed

caused the bow to swing so far to the left that it

was not possible to avoid a collision. Thus, the

delay in applying right rudder because of the

inadvertent order for hard port rudder allowed

the collision to occur.

Human Performance—The pilot of the

Julie N may have committed a mental error, or

“slip,” when he unintentionally ordered “hard

port” instead of “hard starboard” during the

final lineup for passage through the bridge. A

slip is an action not in accord with the actor’s

intention, the result of a good plan but poor

execution.35 Reason and Mycielska offer three

principles concerning slip that appear relevant to

the pilot’s error. The first principle states:

Slips occur during the largely automatic

execution of some well-established or

routine sequence of actions; that is, one

in which the demands upon continuous

attention for moment-to-moment control

are relatively small.

The pilot had made this passage hundreds of

times during his 3-year tenure in Portland, thus

qualifying the passage as routine. During each

passage, the same landmarks were used for

lineup and as cues for the next step in

maneuvering, and the general plan of passage

was always the same.

Slips ordinarily occur during routine actions

that demand little of attentional resources.

However, contrary to the first principle, this

 

35Senders and Moray, p. 27.

particular piloting situation demanded a great

deal of continuous attention because every

action was critical. The second principle states:

Slips appear to be associated with

distraction or preoccupation. Or more

precisely, they seem likely to occur

when the limited attentional resource36

is allocated to some external or internal

matter that is unrelated to the ongoing

activity.

In this accident, the pilot appeared to be

preoccupied with the height of the ship’s

antennas located aft of the ship’s bridge. This

concern was expressed in the pilot’s testimony

in which the Overseas New Orleans incident

was recalled.

Rarely in a ship’s operational environment

are tasks one-dimensional. Ship conning

requires that the pilot pay attention to several

tasks at once. Tasks associated with

maneuvering the ship—such as control of speed

and heading, awareness of distances to objects,

and radio calls—compete for a pilot’s attention.

In this accident, navigating the ship in an

unforgiving environment that required very

precise ship movements made every element of

the task that much more critical. The close

tolerances for maneuvering made the pilot’s

performance more sensitive to influencing

factors such as fatigue or distraction,

consequently making the job more susceptible to

error. The third and final principle states:

Absent-mindedness appears to flourish

in relatively familiar environments

where there are few departures from the

expected, and hence requires little in the

way of outward vigilance.

Although “absent-minded” may be too

strong a term to use in this case, it is unlikely

that anyone would believe that the pilot was

unfamiliar with the operating environment in

and around the Portland harbor; thus, he should

have been neither overly anxious nor overly

vigilant.

 

36Wickens, p. 366.
39

Systems and, similarly, jobs requiring

human attention, must take into consideration

the limitations of human abilities, as well as

equipment, and be designed so that if human

errors occur, they may be recognized quickly

and recovered from without major catastrophes.

In this case, the risk of hitting the bridge needed

to be reduced by altering the environment. This

risk reduction has been accomplished since the

accident by replacing the old, narrow bridge

with a new bridge having an opening roughly

twice that of the beam of any vessel that has

previously visited Portland. The extra room to

maneuver greatly enhances a pilot’s ability to

recover the ship from an error such as the one

the Julie N pilot admitted. The bridge’s history

of vessel contact shows that the error-causing

potential of the environment had to be

addressed.

In this case, countermeasures to reduce the

likelihood and mitigate the consequences of a

navigation error may have included improved

bridge fender systems, permanent and agreedupon navigation aids in the channel, or the

construction of a much wider bridge and

dredging of a deeper channel for improved

maneuvering.

Generally, human errors such as slips,

mistakes, and word-substitution occur

frequently and ordinarily have only minor

consequences. However, making an error during

the transit of the Million Dollar Bridge resulted

in a serious consequence, a collision with the

bridge causing serious damage. The transit

environment needed to be improved and was by

virtue of installing the new bridge and fender

system.

The Safety Board concludes that the pilot of

the Julie N misspoke when he unintentionally

ordered “hard port” instead of “hard starboard”

during the final lineup for passage through the

bridge.

Bridge Resource Management—Bridge

Resource Management (BRM),37 in the classic

 

37For more information on BRM, see Marine Accident

or broad sense, had no role in the accident.

However, team coordination, a component of

BRM was very important. Due to the extremely

short duration of the transit through the bridge,

with time and space only for very minute changes

in course, the coordination of bridge personnel

and equipment was essential. Because lineup for

passage through the Million Dollar bridge had to

be precise, only the pilot’s commands could be

adhered to; thus, the master’s role in the context

of BRM was limited to maintaining a wellcoordinated bridge crew so that the pilot’s

commands were carried out promptly and

correctly. Even if during the transit the master

believed that the ship was not making passage

according to plan, the tight spaces for

maneuvering and the short duration of the transit

would have prevented him from intervening.

Transiting the Million Dollar Bridge

Evidence that navigating through the Million

Dollar Bridge was a demanding task is apparent

upon examination of the 20-year history of

bridge contacts made by various ships and barges

under the control of various ships’ captains and

pilots. According to the October 1986 MDOT

Portland Bridge Fender Damage Summary of

Bridge Operator Reports to the Coast Guard

MSO in Portland, Maine, 46 cases of bridge

damage caused by vessels occurred between

January 1976 and May 1986. Two more cases

were recorded in 1987 and one in 1988. From

1989 through 1996, 22 collisions with the bridge

or fender system were recorded. The bridge

tenders logged only those contacts in which

 

Reports—Collision of the Netherlands Antilles Passenger

Ship Noordam and the Maltese Bulk Carrier Mount

Ymitos in the Gulf of Mexico, November 6, 1993

(NTSB/MAR-95/01); Grounding of the United Kingdom

Passenger Vessel RMS Queen Elizabeth 2 Near Cuttyhunk

Island, Vineyard Sound, Massachusetts, August 7, 1992

(NTSB/MAR-93/01); Grounding of the U.S. Tankship Star

Connecticut, Pacific Ocean, near Barbers Point, Hawaii,

November 6, 1990 (NTSB/MAR-92/01); Collision Between

the Greek Tankship Shinoussa and the U.S. Towboat

Chandy N and Tow Near Red Fish Island, Galveston Bay,

Texas, July 28, 1990 (NTSB/MAR-91/03); Ramming of the

Spanish Bulk Carrier Urduliz by the USS Dwight D.

Eisenhower (CVN69), Hampton Roads, Virginia, August

29, 1988 (NTSB/MAR-90/01); and Grounding of the

Greek Tankship World Prodigy Off the Coast of Rhode

Island, June 23, 1989 (NTSB/MAR-92/01).
______________________________________________________________________________ 40

damage to the bridge or fender system occurred.

Frequent contact was a strong indication that the

passage through the bridge was too narrow for

modern shipping traffic.

The east corner of the south bridge pier,

which the vessel struck to produce the 33-footlong tear in the underwater hull, could have

been better shielded by fendering, as it was

following the accident. However, the corner had

never been a problem before because large

inbound and outbound vessels normally

maneuver so as to pass very close to the north

fender system, a procedure that kept large

vessels away from the south pier. Hence, the

potential risk to tank vessels posed by the corner

was not recognized. However, large vessels

proceeding outbound have occasionally made

contact with the fender system around the west

corner of the north bascule pier. Although

occasional damage has occurred to the fender

system, there is no record of any vessel being

holed.

The bridge’s fender system was not

designed to protect the bridge from the types of

vessels, which have steadily increased in size,

that routinely navigate its draw. In addition, the

fender system was insufficient to prevent

damage to bridge elements from severe impacts.

The Safety Board concludes that the bridge’s

fender system did not provide adequate

protection for the bridge or for vessels

navigating through its draw. The Safety Board

believes that the Federal Highway

Administration and the American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials

(AASHTO) should act together to inform State

highway departments of the circumstances of this

accident and recommend that the States evaluate

the adequacy of fendering systems at bridge piers

where the systems were not designed for the type

and size of vessel currently using the waterway

and may not be adequate to protect the bridge and

take corrective action as necessary.

Improving the chances of successfully

navigating the bridge would require altering the

procedures, vessels, or environment so that the

job is made easier. The Casco Bay Bridge,

completed in 1997, accomplished this by

doubling the width of the opening for vessel

traffic from 98 to 196 feet, which should reduce

the number of bridge contacts by relaxing

tolerances for passage and allowing pilots to

recover from minor errors during lineup. This

added space will give pilots a considerably

larger margin for correcting an improper lineup.

Also, it is possible to design systems that

are more error-tolerant. For example, fender

systems can be designed to offer protection to

the vessel as well as the bridge in case of an

error in lineup or in conning the vessel. The

much improved fender system at the new bridge

is far more capable of buffering contact than the

former timber fender system. The Safety Board

concludes that the increased horizontal

clearance and the improved fender system at the

new bridge have greatly improved safety for the

class of vessels that normally would have

transited the old bridge and should reduce the

likelihood of the bridge being struck by similar

class vessels.

Assuming that those piloting the vessels

through the bridge are not going to be able to

align ships perfectly every time, plenty of

clearance should be allowed (as the new bridge

will provide for the class of vessels that transited

the old bridge). Care in designing systems and

processes should, when possible, also explore

avenues or means for readily observing when an

error is being made in time to make a correction.

For example, the establishment of permanent

ranges would provide an easily observable means

for checking alignment for passage through the

drawspan and would make it easier to detect

errors in alignment and correct them. Also, a

fixed set of range markers would enable the

vessel’s master to monitor the vessel’s progress

as it approaches and passes through the

drawspan under the conn of the pilot. The ranges

used for transiting the old bridge may be

adequate for pilots experienced in conning the

type and size of vessels that have traditionally

called at Portland, particularly through the new

wider bridge with its wider opening. However,

impermanent landmarks used for ranges such as a

tree or a catwalk at one of the terminals would
41

not be something that a master of a vessel

calling at Portland could use or even know

about. Further, a well-established range might

prove to be very valuable to experienced pilots

should wider vessels or vessels with greater

freeboard, such as container vessels, start to call

at Portland. When used, such ranges would give

immediate feedback to pilots and masters about

their precise position for lineup. In addition to

more immediate feedback, these ranges should

be much more accurate than the naturally

occurring landmarks currently used by pilots.

The Safety Board concludes that establishing a

range of navigation marks and lights would

contribute to safe navigation in the area where

the accident occurred. The Safety Board

believes that the Coast Guard should evaluate

the benefit of a permanent set of ranges for

vessel pilots and masters to use for navigating

through the Casco Bay Bridge and establish

such ranges if justified.

Port Safety

Since any navigational improvement, such

as a wider bridge opening, can result in

increased vessel traffic, often by larger and

different types of vessels, new safety problems

are likely to be encountered in the accident area.

As the character of marine traffic changes over

time, the margin of safety initially attributable to

the greater clearance of the new bridge may

decrease as increasingly larger vessels transit

the bridge. Larger tankships are already

operating and could start to call in Portland.

Also, land area is available upstream of the

bridge; therefore, port development (such as

container ship operations) above the bridge is

possible. Container ships with extensive sail

areas may introduce problems in piloting and

ship control that differ significantly from any

associated with piloting tankships of the size

that have historically called at Portland. Thus,

the introduction of the different classes of

vessels that can now transit the new bridge may

require changes in the piloting methods used to

conn some vessels through the bridge. Also,

new operational guidelines may be needed to

meet changes in the character of navigation.

The Port Safety Forum, by bringing together

those having various interests in the port,

appears to offer an appropriate means to assess

the needs of navigation safety on a continuing

basis and to help develop operational guidance

for vessels calling at various ports in the COTP

Zone. In Portland, any future operational

guidance for vessels would likely involve

guidance on how and when to transit the new

bridge. To ensure that the Port Safety Forum is

regularly apprised of any problems associated

with navigation through the bridge or with the

bridge itself, including observations by the

bridge tenders, the Safety Board concludes that

participation in the Port Safety Forum by a

representative of the MDOT who is familiar

with bridge design or bridge maintenance would

apprise the Port Safety Forum of problems

involving the Casco Bay Bridge. Therefore, the

Safety Board believes that the MDOT should

nominate a representative familiar with bridge

design or bridge maintenance to participate on

the Portland Port Safety Forum. The Safety

Board also concludes that in order to be

recognized and used by vessel masters and

pilots, operational guidance developed by the

COPT or the Port Safety Forum should be

published in a readily available publication such

as the U.S. Coast Pilot. Therefore, the Safety

Board believes the Coast Guard should ensure

that operational guidance for vessels navigating

Portland Harbor developed by the Port Safety

Forum or by the COPT is published in a source

readily available to vessel masters and pilots,

such as the U.S. Coast Pilot.

Postaccident Testing

Testing of the Julie N’s Pilot and Crew—

The failure of the pilot to be tested for alcohol

demonstrates that there continues to be a lack of

understanding of Coast Guard regulations,

particularly by marine employers. The pilot’s

understanding that only urine was required for

postaccident testing was not unique; the belief

was also shared by the principal owner of the

tugboat company with which the pilot was

associated. Further, the fact that urine is usually

collected but that breath or blood is frequently

not tested suggests there may be a prevalent
______________________________________________________________________________ 42

belief that urine is the sole specimen required

for postaccident testing. Also, the Safety Board

has observed in its marine investigations that

where any attempt to conduct postaccident

testing for alcohol and other drugs is made, it is

usual for only urine specimens to be collected,

and that breath testing is rarely accomplished. If

breath testing is done, it nearly always is

conducted too late to achieve meaningful

results.

It is possible that the requirement for U.S.

companies and vessels to conduct urine collection

for the required preemployment, periodic, and

random drug testing may inadvertently cause

marine employers to believe that urine is the sole

specimen needed. Because there are no

requirements for random alcohol testing on U.S.

and most foreign vessels, mariners and shipping

companies are unlikely to be familiar with

alcohol testing and may never experience breath

or blood testing for alcohol unless involved in a

marine accident. In this accident, the secretary at

the pilot’s tugboat company was accustomed to

making appointments for random testing, the type

of testing normally done by the testing clinic.

The pilot knew that the secretary for the

tugboat company was aware of the accident, and

he stated that he believed the secretary

understood that he was to be tested because of his

involvement in the accident. Hence, he believed

that the secretary knew the purpose of the testing

and had communicated the proper instructions to

the testing clinic. The pilot stated that when he

was asked to sign a form provided by the

receptionist (which had the box for random

testing checked) certifying that the sample was

his, he merely signed without reading or

questioning it as he considered that signing was

simply a required step in the process. Again, this

appears to be a likely action by someone who had

not adequately informed himself about

postaccident testing requirements in the Coast

Guard regulations, an obligation of a licensed

officer. This was not an isolated example of

unfamiliarity with postaccident testing

requirements. The continuing, lack of

understanding of these regulations over their

nearly 10 years of existence suggests that past

efforts by the Coast Guard to educate the marine

industry about postaccident testing have not

achieved the desired results. The Safety Board

concludes that the pilot was not tested for

alcohol because of the failure of the Coast

Guard to adequately address the industry-wide

problem of postaccident alcohol and drug

testing.

The operator of the Julie N had a contract

with a firm specializing in toxicology testing.

The Julie N operator informed the contractor a

few minutes after the accident and directed the

contractor to test all personnel on board the

Julie N. About 1330, some 21⁄2 hours after the

accident, which included a few minutes wait on

the pier, two technicians were escorted on board

to start the testing. The technicians elected to

collect urine specimens first and conduct breath

testing later. Thus, breath testing did not

commence until about 1620, more than 5 hours

after the accident, and was not completed until

nearly 1800. Moreover, the master, the

crewmember most directly involved in the

accident, was among the last to be tested. In this

case, the vessel operator had made a proper

effort to be prepared by having a testing firm

under contract and by notifying that firm in a

timely manner to begin the testing. However, the

decision by the testing technicians to delay

breath testing until the urine specimens were

collected greatly diminished the possibility of

detecting alcohol. Nothing in the regulations

stated or indicated that testing for alcohol

should be conducted first and urine specimen

collection should be conducted afterwards;

hence, the testing technicians did not violate any

regulations. This demonstrates that despite

preparations by the vessel operator and timely

orders to the testing contractor to conduct the

testing, it is possible to conduct less than

adequate testing and not be in violation of the

regulations. Consequently, the Safety Board

concludes that Coast Guard regulations for

postaccident testing do not communicate clearly

that alcohol testing is more time-sensitive and

should be conducted as early as possible and

before collecting urine specimens. The Safety

Board believes that the Coast Guard should

incorporate language into the postaccident testing
43

regulations that clearly states alcohol testing is

more time-sensitive and therefore should be

conducted ahead of drug testing.

In this case, an accident investigator in the

Coast Guard MSO called the tugboat company

and the operator of the Julie N to remind both

companies that post-serious-marine-incident

testing was needed. Both companies assured the

Coast Guard caller that testing was already

being arranged. The Coast Guard caller did not

explain the requirements for such testing. The

positive responses from the two companies that

testing had already been arranged would not

have suggested that the Coast Guard

representative needed to provide further

explanation. However, a brief explanation to the

pilot’s tugboat company that post-seriousmarine-incident testing involved the testing of

breath or blood as well as urine might have been

sufficient to alert the testing clinic that the

testing was for postaccident purposes.

Coast Guard Role in Postaccident

Testing—Not since the Exxon Valdez accident in

1989, in which alcohol use was found to be a

causal factor, has the Safety Board found alcohol

or drug use to be a casual factor in any marine

accident it has investigated. However, alcohol or

other drugs could not be ruled out in numerous

accidents investigated by the Safety Board, as

indicated in table 1, because the postaccident

testing was either not done or was delayed so

long as to make the testing meaningless. An

effective postaccident testing program is needed

so that any use of alcohol or other drugs by any

person in a safety-sensitive position can either be

detected or scientifically eliminated as a casual

factor. An effective program also may serve as a

deterrent to the use of alcohol or dangerous drugs

by personnel performing safety-sensitive duties,

such as watchstanding. The Julie N and five

subsequent accidents (see table 1) illustrate that

postaccident testing is not yet a reliable process

for examining the factors of probable cause or for

accurately assessing influences on safety

attributable to alcohol or drugs.

The regulations at 33 CFR 95 and 46 CFR 4.06

both place the responsibility for testing on the

marine employer, but neither set of regulations

contain any enforcement provisions that could

be applied to the marine employer. Lacking

enforcement, the Coast Guard had to rely upon

education and persuasion to get marine

employers to recognize and carry out their

responsibilities under the regulations for

postaccident testing. The Coast Guard’s efforts

to acquire compliance voluntarily have

produced positive results, as evidenced by the

fact that the MOC, the operator of the Julie N,

had a standing contract for drug and alcohol

testing and also had breath-testing devices and

urine collection kits on its foreign vessels and

had trained personnel on its vessels to use the

equipment. Even in accidents involving foreign

vessels in international waters near the United

States, such as the Noordam, Mount Ymitos, and

Royal Majesty accidents,38 vessel crews

voluntarily complied with Coast Guard requests

that postaccident testing be conducted.

However, persuasion, which may be adequate

in the case of conscientious marine employers,

has its limitations. It appears that one of the

missing factors in postaccident testing has been a

lack of enforcement capability. The recently

acquired authority in 46 U.S.C. 2115 to impose

civil penalties on marine employers, as well as

others, for failing to comply with the postaccident

testing regulations is a valuable new tool for the

Coast Guard. The fact that the Coast Guard now

has this authority should be conveyed to all Coast

Guard personnel involved in enforcing the

postaccident testing regulations, to include

providing guidance on how this authority should

be used. The Coast Guard can convey

information on this new authority in its ongoing

educational efforts designed to inform marine

 

38For more information, see Marine Accident

Reports—Collision of the Netherlands Antilles Passenger

Ship Noordam and the Maltese Bulk Carrier Mount

Ymitos in the Gulf of Mexico, November 6, 1993

(NTSB/MAR-95/01) and Grounding of the Panamanian

Passenger Ship Royal Majesty on Rose and Crown Shoal

Near Nantucket, Massachusetts, June 10, 1995

(NTSB/MAR-97/01).
______________________________________________________________________________ 44

employers about their responsibilities for

postaccident testing. Knowledge that

enforcement authority now exists may persuade

more marine employers to place a higher

priority on postaccident testing and to make

preparations to conduct testing, such as

acquiring contracts with independent testing

firms or consortia, which could improve

postaccident testing. (For additional information

on civil penalties applicable to marine

postaccident testing regulations and

postaccident testing regulations in other

transportation modes, see appendix E.)

The Safety Board concludes that because

the Coast Guard now has the needed authority to

enforce its postaccident testing regulations, it

should make enforcing these regulations a high

priority and should develop a Service-wide

program with procedures and guidance to ensure

that postaccident testing is an effective, reliable

process for accident investigation and

enforcement. The Safety Board believes that the

Coast Guard should institute a task force that

will evaluate deficiencies in past postaccident

alcohol and drug testing performance and use

“lessons learned” to implement a program that

ensures testing is performed in a manner that

will produce meaningful results.

In past accidents, it has been necessary for

the Coast Guard to explain in detail and

persuasively that postaccident testing is the

responsibility of the marine employer. In

addition, the Coast Guard has often furnished

the marine employer with the addresses of

clinics that can conduct the testing, a procedure

that probably has resulted in some improvement

in drug testing but has not resulted in timely

testing for alcohol. The Safety Board recognizes

that testing for alcohol is solely a postaccident

requirement and that different individuals are

normally involved in each accident; thus, it

appears likely that an employer whose vessel

experiences its first accident may be uninformed

about testing requirements for such an event.

This means that testing may be delayed until the

employer is informed by the Coast Guard. This

procedure may not enable an employer that is

unprepared or unfamiliar with postaccident

testing requirements to arrange for timely

alcohol testing. Even a well-informed vessel

operator may have other responsibilities

following an accident that may require a higher

priority than postaccident testing and thus result

in delayed testing for alcohol. Accordingly, it

appears that the present procedure for testing

will continue to result in unacceptable delays in

alcohol testing, unless the Coast Guard becomes

more actively involved in ensuring that marine

employers make reasonable efforts to conduct

timely testing.

The Coast Guard routinely performs breath

testing for alcohol of operators of recreational

vessels when such operators are involved in

incidents or appear to be operating improperly.

It would appear feasible for Coast Guard

personnel currently performing breath testing of

recreational vessel operators to conduct breath

testing for alcohol of the individuals on

commercial vessels that are directly involved in

serious marine incidents. Coast Guard personnel

who are assigned to perform law enforcement or

port safety functions normally would be able to

be on scene to conduct breath testing for alcohol

much sooner than the owner/operator or the

owner/operator’s testing contractor. In the Julie

N accident, a Coast Guard representative was

able to board the vessel about 1230; hence, it

would have been possible to initiate breath

testing of the few individuals directly involved

in the accident at that time, less than 2 hours

after the accident.

Requiring trained Coast Guard personnel to

perform testing of individuals on commercial

vessels that are involved in serious marine

incidents would not appear to represent a

significant increase in workload, and such a

procedure would most likely result in timely

testing for alcohol. Also, ALDIST 179/94,

issued in 1994, allowed for breath testing for

alcohol to be conducted by appropriately trained

Coast Guard personnel if such testing would be

more timely than that arranged by the marine

employer.

The primary responsibility for postaccident

testing for alcohol and other drugs in the marine
45

industry should remain with the employer, as in

all other transportation modes. It is the marine

employer’s responsibility to crew the vessel with

well-qualified personnel and to ensure proper

performance and conduct by crewmembers on

board the vessel, to include ensuring that

crewmembers are not impaired by alcohol or

other drugs. An extension of the marine

employer’s responsibilities in this area occurs

when an accident takes place in a remote location

well away from Coast Guard units. In such cases,

postaccident testing must be performed by the

vessel’s crew or by technicians provided by the

owner. However, the Safety Board concludes that

although the primary responsibility for

postaccident testing for alcohol and other drugs

should remain with the marine employer, the

timeliness of postaccident alcohol testing on

commercial vessels could be greatly improved by

having Coast Guard personnel conduct breath

testing of crewmembers involved in an accident.

Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the

Coast Guard should implement a procedure for

Coast Guard personnel to conduct breath testing

of mariners who are involved in a serious marine

incident, as defined by 46 CFR 4.03-2, when

testing by the marine employer will not or can not

take place within 2 hours of the accident.

In the Julie N accident, the pilot left the

vessel before the first Coast Guard representative

arrived. The vessel’s agent was aware of the

pilot’s location. Also, the pilot’s attorney stated

that he had informed the Coast Guard officer on

scene that the pilot was standing by and that the

pilot had an appointment for postaccident testing.

Later, he reminded the officer when it was time

for the pilot to depart the area for the scheduled

testing and that the officer had concurred. Thus, it

appears that the pilot had good reason to believe

that he was free to leave the area for testing. Also,

the pilot was readily available for interview the

next day and participated in the Safety Board’s

deposition proceedings.

However, in some other accidents, marine

pilots and crewmembers have not been

available. Unless the crew is placed under

subpoena, nothing prevents the crew of a

foreign vessel from being transported out of the

country. Accordingly, it should be required,

when feasible, that the entire crew, including the

marine pilot, remain with the vessel for breath

testing by the Coast Guard or until given

permission by the Coast Guard to leave the

vessel. The Safety Board concludes that

requiring the crewmembers and pilot involved in

a marine accident to remain with the vessel,

when it is safe to do so, for breath testing by the

Coast Guard would help to ensure that these

individuals are tested for alcohol in a timely

manner. Therefore, the Safety Board believes

that the Coast Guard should establish a

requirement in the postaccident testing

regulations that the crew and pilot of a vessel

involved in a serious marine incident will

remain with the vessel, when it is safe to do, for

breath testing for alcohol, until permitted by the

Coast Guard to leave the vessel.

The regulations at 46 CFR 4.06 require U.S.

oceangoing ships to carry breath-testing devices

and to have urine specimen collection and

shipping kits readily available.39 The Safety

Board considers the intent of this requirement to

be a reasonable effort to enable postaccident

testing to be carried out expeditiously.

Unfortunately, the option allowing vessels to

forgo carrying the urine collection and shipping

kits if they can be obtained in 24 hours can defeat

the intent of the regulation and lead to

unacceptable delays in testing. Eliminating the

24-hour option and requiring the equipment to be

on board would eliminate the need to acquire this

equipment on a time-consuming case-by-case

basis and then transport the equipment to the

vessel. Having the equipment on board would

also make it possible for the vessel’s officers to

conduct testing when Coast Guard or shoreside

technicians cannot reach the vessel in a timely

manner. Because most oceangoing ships entering

 

39The Julie N had such equipment on board, but

MOC, the operator of the vessel, elected to have an

independent contractor perform the testing. MOC only

allows crewmembers to perform postaccident testing when

an independent testing agency is not readily available.
______________________________________________________________________________ 46

U.S. ports are foreign vessels,40 it appears likely

that marine casualties will probably involve such

vessels as frequently as U.S. vessels. This is

borne out by the data in table 1, which show that

over half of these accidents on U.S navigable

waters investigated by the Safety Board involved

foreign vessels. Accordingly, the Safety Board

concludes that foreign, as well as U.S. vessels,

should be required to carry breath-testing devices

and urine specimen collection and shipping kits

on board so that postaccident testing can be

carried out in a timely manner. Therefore, the

Safety Board believes that the Coast Guard

should establish a requirement in the postaccident

testing regulations that foreign commercial

vessels on the navigable waters of the United

States, as well as U.S. oceangoing vessels, must

have on board breath-testing devices capable of

determining the presence of alcohol in a person’s

system and urine specimen collection and

shipping kits.

Having the breath-testing and urine collection

and shipping kits on board is important for timely

testing, but knowledge about how to use the

devices is also crucial. Accordingly, the Safety

Board concludes that a vessel plan for conducting

postaccident testing would ensure that the marine

employer and vessel personnel would be aware of

the requirements for postaccident testing, trained

to use the testing and collection equipment on

board, and informed about where to send urine

specimens for analysis. Therefore, the Safety

Board believes that the Coast Guard should

establish a requirement in the postaccident testing

regulations that foreign vessels on the navigable

waters of the United States and oceangoing U.S.

vessels have a postaccident testing plan that:

• Identifies the crewmembers

who will conduct the testing,

 

40According to data collected by the U.S. Customs

Service and collated by the Bureau of the Census, there

were 85,330 port calls (arrival of vessels) in U.S. ports in

1996 by foreign vessels and 10,170 by U.S vessels. Some

port calls were made by the same vessel, as it is common

for a vessel to visit more than one U.S. port during a

voyage to the United States.

• Sets forth the qualifications

for crewmembers assigned to

conduct the testing,

• Establishes procedures for the

care of specimens, including

chain of custody,

• Lists the records to be prepared,

and

• Provides identification and 

addresses for testing

laboratories that can process

urine specimens or testing firms

that may assist or conduct

postaccident testing for vessels

in U.S. ports.

Coast Guard Regulations for

Postaccident Testing

Lack of Uniformity in Regulations—The

lack of uniformity between 33 CFR 95

(Operating a Vessel While Intoxicated) and 46

CFR 4.06 (Mandatory Chemical Testing

Following Serious Marine Incidents Involving

Vessels in Commercial Service) regarding when

to test and what specimens to collect for what

purpose probably contributed to the

misunderstanding expressed by the pilot of the

Julie N and the principal owner of the tugboat

company that only urine was needed for

postaccident testing.

A review of the postaccident testing

regulations revealed that they are difficult to

comprehend due in part to being located in two

different places in the CFR (33 CFR 95 and

46 CFR 4.06) and because the regulations state

different things. In fact, it appears that no

relationship exists between the two bodies of

regulations. For example, a statement in

33 CFR 95 clearly states that it applies to foreign

vessels on U.S. waters, as well as to U.S. vessels

anywhere. The rules at 46 CFR 4.06 do not

clearly state that they are applicable to foreign

vessels. Further, the location of the rules in Title

46, normally considered as being intended for

U.S. vessels; the references to 46 CFR 16, the
47

drug testing program for U.S. vessels; the

requirements for breath-testing devices and

collection kits for U.S. vessels; and the

reference to administrative procedures against

the license or certification of (U.S.) mariners all

convey that 46 CFR 4.06 was written to apply

solely to U.S. vessels.

Differing requirements and definitions were

also noted that could be the root cause for much

of the confusion about postaccident testing.

While 33 CFR 95 clearly establishes the legal

levels of intoxication for commercial vessel

operators, 46 CFR 4.06 does not provide

standards for alcohol intoxication. For testing

purposes, 33 CFR 95 lists several specimens

including breath, blood, urine, saliva, or other

bodily fluids. However, the regulations at 46

CFR 4.06 add some clarity and narrow the

choices by requiring urine and breath or blood

specimens.

Neither of the sets of regulations clearly

identifies the purpose—drugs or alcohol—for

which the specimens will be tested. It is possible

to deduce that breath will be used for alcohol

testing because of a requirement for U.S. vessels

to carry breath-testing devices capable of

detecting alcohol in a person’s system.

Similarly, it can be deduced that urine will be

used for detecting drugs because of a reference

to the “urinalysis report indicating the presence

of a dangerous drug or drug metabolite” a few

sections later in the regulations. A reference to

alcohol detected through analysis of blood

suggests that blood is used for alcohol testing.

The Safety Board continues to find that

mariners and marine employers are not

accurately informed about what to do for testing

following an accident. This situation could be

improved readily by inserting a minimal amount

of text to explain that:

• Breath or blood is required for

alcohol testing, and

• Urine is required solely for

determining the use of

dangerous drugs.

A simple, clear explanation of the purposes

of the two categories of specimens would help

eliminate confusion and misconceptions about

postaccident testing and would assist the Coast

Guard in its continuing effort to inform the

public about testing requirements. Accordingly,

the Safety Board concludes that including text

in the regulations to clarify that breath or blood

specimens are for alcohol testing and that urine

specimens are for determining the presence of

dangerous drugs would help to inform the

marine industry that both urine and breath or

blood specimens are required for postaccident

testing. Therefore, the Safety Board believes

that the Coast Guard should incorporate

language into the postaccident testing

regulations that clearly states that breath or

blood specimens are for determining the

presence of alcohol and that urine specimens are

used to determine the presence of dangerous

drugs.

The two sets of rules also have different

thresholds for initiating postaccident testing. In

33 CFR 95, testing is required when an individual

is involved in a marine accident as defined

somewhat generally at 46 U.S.C. 6101, using

broad language such as “material loss of

property” and “material damage affecting

seaworthiness or efficiency,” whereas in 46 CFR

4.06, the threshold is a “serious marine incident,”

as defined very specifically at 46 CFR 4.03-2.

The definition of “serious marine incident,”

which includes discharges of oil of 10,000

gallons or more, appears to be well-crafted to

provide a reasonable threshold for accidents

involving commercial vessels that are serious

enough to warrant testing and to exclude lesser

accidents where the consequences would not be

severe. The Safety Board concludes that adopting

the “serious marine incident” criteria described in

46 CFR 4.03-2 as the criteria for initiating

postaccident testing involving commercial vessels

would provide uniform, easily understood

conditions for initiating testing. To provide

uniformity, the Safety Board believes that the

Coast Guard should adopt the criteria for “serious

marine incident” described at 46 CFR 4.03-2 as

the criteria for initiating postaccident
______________________________________________________________________________ 48

testing for commercial vessels in the regulations

at 33 CFR 95 and in any future combined

regulations.

Priority for Testing—The Julie N’s crew

did not commence alcohol testing until more

than 5 hours after the accident because the

testing technicians elected to collect urine

specimens first. These actions complied with the

current regulations. The regulations at 33 CFR

95 and 46 CFR 4.06 do not specify a time limit

for postaccident testing or set a priority for

alcohol testing. The regulations at 33 CFR 95

are rather equivocal and state that when an

individual must undergo testing, the individual

will be directed to undergo testing “as soon as

practical.” The regulations at 46 CFR 4.06 are

somewhat more definitive, stating that an

individual who must undergo testing “shall

provide the specimens as soon as practical.”

The term “as soon as practical,” common to

both sets of regulations, is the sole admonition

for expediting postaccident testing and the

meaning of this phrase is left to be determined

by the marine employer. However, the

regulations at 46 CFR 4.06 also direct the

marine employer to take “all practical steps to

have individuals tested as soon as the marine

employer determines that a accident is likely to

become a serious marine incident.” The Safety

Board recognizes the prudence in this particular

requirement because it is the marine employer

who likely will be first to determine the extent

of damages or amount of oil spilled or expected

to be spilled.

However, the provision in the regulations at

46 CFR 4.06-20, which requires the marine

employer to ensure that urine specimen collection

and shipping kits are readily available, but does

not require the equipment to be maintained on

board each vessel if it can be obtained within 24

hours, seems to convey an undesirable meaning

to the term “readily available.” This 24-hour

waiver clearly sends a disquieting message that

“readily available” can be construed to mean

available within 24 hours and that it is acceptable

to delay the start of testing by a full day. In short,

it conveys the impression that the regulations

require little priority for postaccident testing.

Clearly, this is not desirable for drug testing and

is unsatisfactory for alcohol testing, when the

purpose of such testing is to ascertain if drugs or

alcohol were causal factors in an accident. In

this regard, the Safety Board recommended to

the DOT in 1989 that both blood and urine

samples be collected within 4 hours of a

transportation accident.

The preamble to the testing regulations

adopted in other DOT administrations41 pursuant

to the Omnibus Transportation Employee

Testing Act of 1991 sets a 2-hour time period

for alcohol testing. It is recognized that

circumstances may delay testing and, to account

for such circumstances, the regulations for all

other transportation modes require the

employer, when alcohol testing is not carried

out within 2 hours,42 to prepare and maintain a

written record stating why the testing was not

accomplished within 2 hours. The regulations

recognize that testing for alcohol is unlikely to

provide meaningful results after 8 hours and

thus require the employer to cease attempts to

test for alcohol after 8 hours and to record why

testing was not accomplished. The written

record explaining why testing was not

accomplished in accordance with the regulations

must be made available to the appropriate

administration for review. Because alcohol is

eliminated very quickly from the body and

because the rate of elimination can vary among

people, testing very soon after an accident

affords the best opportunity to ascertain whether

alcohol could be a casual factor in the accident.

Furthermore, testing within 2 hours appears to be

feasible in many marine accidents occurring on

U.S. navigable waters. Adopting the requirement

of most of the other DOT administrations to

conduct alcohol testing within 2 hours and

adopting a requirement for the marine employer

to prepare and maintain a written record

 

41Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Railroad

Administration, Federal Highway Administration, Federal

Transit Administration, and Research and Special Programs

Administration.

42The regulations for railroad employees ultimately

settled on a 4-hour limit for alcohol testing, with efforts to

test for alcohol ceasing after 8 hours. Any testing delays

must be documented.
49

explaining why testing for alcohol was not

accomplished within 2 hours, in addition to a

requirement to document why testing was not

accomplished in 8 hours, when attempts to test

would cease, offers a plan for timely postaccident

alcohol testing and a means for the Coast Guard

to improve oversight of such testing. The

requirement for a written record of failure to test

will emphasize to the marine employers that

timely testing for alcohol is needed and is

expected to raise the priority for testing in

relation to other postaccident responsibilities and

concerns. The information in the written record

will enable the Coast Guard to ascertain how

closely the various marine employers are

complying, determine whether adjustments in the

program are needed, and decide whether

enforcement action is called for. Accordingly, the

Safety Board concludes that adopting a

requirement that marine employees be tested

within 4 hours of an accident for drugs and within

2 hours of an accident for alcohol, with attempts

to test for alcohol ceasing after 8 hours, and

adopting a requirement for documenting testing

delays or failures would result in more timely

testing and facilitate effective oversight by the

Coast Guard. Therefore, the Safety Board

believes that the Coast Guard should establish a

requirement that postaccident testing for drugs

begin within 4 hours of a serious marine incident

and postaccident testing for alcohol begin within

2 hours of a serious marine incident, with

attempts to test ceasing for alcohol after 8 hours,

and establish a requirement that the marine

employer document any testing delays or failures.

Need to Consolidate Postaccident

Testing Regulations—Some editing and

rewriting of 46 CFR 4.06 would be sufficient to

eliminate gaps and make the regulations easier

to comprehend; a greater amount of changing

would be necessary to make 33 CFR 95 more

comprehensive for commercial vessels.

Confusion regarding postaccident testing

requirements and procedures will persist as long

as two different sets of regulations exist on

postaccident testing that say different things. To

address this problem, two options appear

feasible: (1) Rewrite and consolidate both sets of

regulations to make them identical, or (2)

Locate the consolidated regulations solely in

either Title 33 (33 CFR 95) or Title 46 (46 CFR

4.06).

Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters,

covers numerous operational topics,43 the

majority of which pertain to all vessels

transiting U.S. waters or visiting U.S. ports. For

example, information and requirements

concerning aids to navigation, vessel traffic

service, navigation equipment and publications

required for all vessels on U.S. waters, vessel

equipment testing requirements before entering

or departing U.S. ports, and oil spill equipment

and pollution plans for all vessels transporting

petroleum products to U.S. ports are all found in

Title 33 of the regulations. Because the majority

of the Title 33 regulations pertain to foreign

vessels operating on U.S. waters, as well as U.S.

vessels, Title 33 is a logical location for the

regulations concerning Operating a Vessel

While Intoxicated (33 CFR 95). Moreover, the

standards for intoxication are guidance for safe

navigation and are consistent with Title 33. The

regulations at 33 CFR 95 establish alcohol

intoxication standards for recreational vessel

operators, and this is a logical location,

considering that the regulations pertaining to

marine parades and regattas and boating safety

are all part of Title 33. Hence, Title 33 is a

logical place in the Coast Guard regulations for

commercial vessel operators and mariners, as

well as the recreational boating public, to seek

information on alcohol and drug abuse.

Unlike the regulations at Title 33, the Coast

Guard regulations at Title 46 are almost

exclusively concerned with U.S. commercial

vessels and U.S. mariners and are directed at

marine employers. The first part of Title 46,

Subchapter A, Procedures Applicable To The

Public, and Part 4 of Subchapter A, Marine

Casualties Investigations, are widely recognized

as applicable to foreign vessels that experience a

marine accident on U.S. waters as well as to U.S.

 

43Of the 16 subchapters in Title 33 relating to Coast

Guard functions, 12 are of interest to all vessels, including

foreign vessels.
______________________________________________________________________________ 50

vessels anywhere. Accordingly, the location of

regulations for Mandatory Chemical Testing

Following Serious Marine Incidents Involving

Vessels in Commercial Service at 46 CFR 4.06

is logical. However, Title 46, because it is

largely devoted to U.S. mariners and vessels,

does not invite or attract the attention of foreign

vessel operators until they become involved in a

marine accident.

The Safety Board concludes that the

guidance to conduct testing following marine

accidents, being operational in nature and

applicable to all vessels, would fit best in Title

33 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Because

one of the purposes of postaccident testing is to

determine intoxication from alcohol, the

standards for intoxication should be a part of the

testing regulations to avoid the need to refer to

other parts of the regulations which can be timeconsuming and result in confusion. The Safety

Board further concludes that renaming and

expanding 33 CFR 95, Operating a Vessel While

Intoxicated, by incorporating the present

regulations at 46 CFR 4.06, Mandatory

Chemical Testing Following Serious Marine

Incidents Involving Vessels in Commercial

Service, into 33 CFR 95 would eliminate the

confusion caused by two sets of regulations,

contribute to better understanding of the intent

of the regulations, achieve improved

postaccident testing, and demonstrate that

postaccident testing applies to all vessels

experiencing a serious marine incident on U.S.

waters.

In combining the two sets of rules, every

effort should be made to make them complete in

themselves to eliminate the need for crossreferencing to other regulations, and especially

to U.S. law (as is done in 33 CFR 95.001(a)),

which is open to wider interpretation than

regulations. The Safety Board appreciates the

language currently at 33 CFR 95.005(a) that

clearly states that postaccident testing

regulations are applicable to all vessels on the

navigable waters of the United States, including

foreign vessels. Retaining such, or similar,

language in any combined regulations would

eliminate any misconception and clarify that all

commercial vessels experiencing a serious

marine incident on U.S. waters must conduct

postaccident testing for alcohol and other drugs.

Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the

Coast Guard should expand the regulations at 33

CFR 95 to incorporate the provisions for

postaccident testing currently found at 46 CFR

4.06 with a minimum of cross-referencing to

other regulations, so that postaccident testing

requirements are easy to read and comprehend

and are found in one part of the regulations.

Regulations of Other Modes Pursuant to

the Omnibus Transportation Employee

Testing Act of 1991

The preamble to the testing regulations

adopted in other DOT administrations pursuant

to the Omnibus Transportation Employee

Testing Act of 1991 established an additional

requirement concerning postaccident drinking

that appears appropriate to commercial marine

vessels. This requirement prohibits anyone

involved in an accident from consuming alcohol

for 8 hours following the accident.

In one recent accident involving an

explosion on a tankship that was undergoing

welding repairs, it was necessary to evacuate the

crew. Once ashore, some crewmembers

involved began drinking in a local bar. The

crewmembers claimed ignorance of any

postaccident testing requirement, and there was

no regulation to prohibit postaccident drinking.

While the need for individuals involved in a

serious accident to refrain from consuming

alcohol may be obvious, there is little reason to

believe that individuals involved will

automatically avoid alcohol. Further, someone

who regularly consumes alcohol may be

disposed to do so following the stress that can

be associated with an accident. Thus, there is a

need for a regulation against postaccident

drinking.

A clear regulation applicable to commercial

vessels, including foreign vessels on U.S.

waters, would probably be sufficient to obtain

compliance in most cases. Also, it would enable

the Coast Guard to take enforcement action when
51

warranted. Accordingly, the Safety Board

concludes that adopting a requirement prohibiting

individuals involved in a marine accident from

consuming alcohol within 8 hours of the accident

would help to ensure that such individuals can be

tested to determine their blood alcohol

concentration at the time of the accident. The

Safety Board believes that the Coast Guard

should establish a provision in the postaccident

testing regulations that prohibits mariners

involved in an accident from consuming alcohol

for 8 hours afterwards, or until breath or blood

and urine specimens are collected, or until

released by the Coast Guard.
______________________________________________________________________________ 52

Findings

1. Because the pilot was not tested, the Safety

Board cannot conclusively eliminate alcohol

use as a causal factor in this accident.

2. The human factors of fatigue, training, drug

use, and pilot-crew interaction were not

causal or contributing factors in the

accident.

3. The pilot of the Julie N misspoke when he

unintentionally ordered “hard port” instead

of “hard starboard” during the final lineup

for passage through the bridge.

4. The bridge’s fender system did not provide

adequate protection for the bridge or for

vessels navigating through its draw.

5. The increased horizontal clearance and the

improved fender system at the new bridge

have greatly improved safety for the class of

vessels that normally would have transited

the old bridge and should reduce the

likelihood of the bridge being struck by

similar class vessels.

6. Establishing a range of navigation marks and

lights would contribute to safe navigation in

the area where the accident occurred.

7. Participation in the Port Safety Forum by a

representative of the Maine Department of

Transportation who is familiar with bridge

design or bridge maintenance would apprise

the Port Safety Forum of problems

involving the Casco Bay Bridge.

8. In order to be recognized and used by vessel

masters and pilots, operational guidance

developed by the Captain of the Port or the

Port Safety Forum should be published in a

readily available publication such as the

U.S. Coast Pilot.

9. The pilot was not tested for alcohol because

of the failure of the Coast Guard to

adequately address the industry-wide

problem of postaccident alcohol and drug

testing.

10. Coast Guard regulations for postaccident

testing do not communicate clearly that

alcohol testing is more time-sensitive and

should be conducted as early as possible and

before collecting urine specimens.

11. Because the Coast Guard now has the

needed authority to enforce its postaccident

testing regulations, it should make enforcing

these regulations a high priority and should

develop a Service-wide program with

procedures and guidance to ensure that

postaccident testing is an effective, reliable

process for accident investigation and

enforcement.

12. Although the primary responsibility for

postaccident testing for alcohol and other

drugs should remain with the marine

employer, the timeliness of postaccident

alcohol testing on commercial vessels could

be greatly improved by having Coast Guard

personnel conduct breath testing of

crewmembers involved in an accident.

13. Requiring the crewmembers and pilot

involved in a marine accident to remain with

the vessel, when it is safe to do so, for

breath testing by the Coast Guard would

help to ensure that individuals involved are

tested for alcohol in a timely manner.

14. Foreign, as well as U.S. vessels, should be

required to carry breath-testing devices and

urine specimen collection and shipping kits

on board so that postaccident testing can be

carried out in a timely manner.

CONCLUSIONS
53

15. A vessel plan for conducting postaccident

testing would ensure that the marine

employer and vessel personnel would be

aware of the requirements for postaccident

testing, trained to use the testing and

collection equipment on board, and

informed about where to send urine

specimens for analysis.

16. Including text in the regulations to clarify

that breath or blood specimens are for

alcohol testing and that urine specimens are

for determining the presence of dangerous

drugs would help to inform the marine

industry that both urine and breath or blood

specimens are required for postaccident

testing.

17. Adopting the “serious marine incident”

criteria described in 46 CFR 4.03-2 as the

criteria for initiating postaccident testing

involving commercial vessels would provide

uniform, easily understood conditions for

initiating testing.

18. Adopting a requirement that marine

employees be tested within 4 hours of an

accident for drugs and within 2 hours of an

accident for alcohol, with attempts to test

ceasing for alcohol after 8 hours, and

adopting a requirement for documenting

testing delays or failures would result in

more timely testing and facilitate effective

oversight by the Coast Guard.

19. The guidance to conduct testing following

serious marine incidents, being operational

in nature and applicable to all vessels,

would fit best in Title 33 of the Code of

Federal Regulations.

20. Renaming and expanding 33 CFR 95,

Operating a Vessel While Intoxicated, by

incorporating the present regulations at 46

CFR 4.06, Mandatory Chemical Testing

Following Serious Marine Incidents

Involving Vessels in Commercial Service,

into 33 CFR 95 would eliminate the

confusion caused by two sets of regulations,

contribute to better understanding of the

intent of the regulations, achieve improved

postaccident testing, and demonstrate that

postaccident testing applies to all vessels

experiencing a serious marine incident on

U.S. waters.

21. Adopting a requirement prohibiting

individuals involved in a marine accident

from consuming alcohol within 8 hours of the

accident would help to ensure that such

individuals can be tested to determine their

blood alcohol concentration at the time of the

accident.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board

determines that the probable cause of the collision

with the Portland-South Portland (Million Dollar)

Bridge was the pilot’s inadvertent order to port

(left) rudder instead of starboard (right) rudder.

Contributing to the accident was the narrow

horizontal clearance of the bridge drawspan,

which afforded little leeway for human error.

Contributing to the severity of the damage to the

vessel and to the amount of oil spilled was a

corner of the bridge pier that was not adequately

shielded by the timber fender system.
54

As a result of its investigation of this

accident, the National Transportation Safety

Board makes the following recommendations:

--to the U.S. Coast Guard:

Evaluate the benefit of a permanent set

of ranges for vessel pilots and masters

to use for navigating through the Casco

Bay Bridge and establish such ranges if

justified. (M-98-69)

Ensure that operational guidance for

vessels navigating Portland harbor

developed by the Port Safety Forum or

by the Captain of the Port is published

in a source readily available to vessel

masters and pilots, such as the U.S.

Coast Pilot. (M-98-70)

Incorporate language into the

postaccident testing regulations that

clearly states alcohol testing is more

time-sensitive and therefore should be

conducted ahead of drug testing.

(M-98-71)

Institute a task force that will evaluate

deficiencies in past postaccident alcohol

and drug testing performance and use

“lessons learned” to implement a

program that ensures testing is

performed in a manner that will produce

meaningful results. (M-98-72)

Implement a procedure for Coast Guard

personnel to conduct breath testing of

mariners who are involved in a serious

marine incident, as defined by 46 CFR

4.03-2, when testing by the marine

employer will not or can not take place

within 2 hours of the accident.

(M-98-73)

Establish a requirement in the

postaccident testing regulations that the

crew and pilot of a vessel involved in a

serious marine incident will remain with

the vessel, when it is safe to do so, for

breath testing for alcohol, until permitted

by the Coast Guard to leave the vessel.

(M-98-74)

Establish a requirement in the

postaccident testing regulations that

foreign commercial vessels on the

navigable waters of the United States, as

well as U.S. oceangoing vessels, must

have on board breath-testing devices

capable of determining the presence of

alcohol in a person’s system and urine

specimen collection and shipping kits.

(M-98-75)

Establish a requirement in the

postaccident testing regulations that

foreign vessels on the navigable waters

of the United States and oceangoing U.S.

vessels have a postaccident testing plan

that identifies crewmembers who will

conduct the testing; sets forth the

qualifications for crewmembers assigned

to conduct the testing; establishes

procedures for the care of specimens,

including chain of custody; lists the

records to be prepared; and provides

identification and addresses for testing

laboratories that can process urine

specimens or testing firms that may assist

or conduct postaccident testing for

vessels in U.S. ports. (M-98-76)

Incorporate language into the

postaccident testing regulations that

clearly states that breath or blood

specimens are for determining the

presence of alcohol and that urine

specimens are used to determine the

presence of dangerous drugs. (M-98-77)

RECOMMENDATIONS
55

To provide uniformity, adopt the criteria

for “serious marine incident” described

at 46 CFR 4.03-2 as the criteria for

initiating postaccident testing for

commercial vessels in the regulations at

33 CFR 95 and in any future combined

regulations. (M-98-78)

Establish a requirement that

postaccident testing for drugs begin

within 4 hours of a serious marine

incident and postaccident testing for

alcohol begin within 2 hours of a

serious marine incident, with attempts

to test for alcohol ceasing after 8 hours,

and establish a requirement that the

marine employer document any testing

delays or failures. (M-98-79)

Expand the regulations at 33 CFR 95 to

incorporate the provisions for

postaccident testing currently found at

46 CFR 4.06 with a minimum of crossreferencing to other regulations, so that

postaccident testing requirements are

easy to read and comprehend and are

found in one part of the regulations.

(M-98-80)

Establish a provision in the postaccident

testing regulations that prohibits

mariners involved in an accident from

consuming alcohol for 8 hours

afterwards, or until breath or blood and

urine specimens are collected, or until

released by the Coast Guard. (M-98-81)

--to the Maine Department of

Transportation:

Nominate a representative familiar with

bridge design or bridge maintenance to

participate on the Portland Port Safety

Forum. (M-98-82)

--to the Federal Highway Administration:

Inform, in cooperation with the American

Association of State Highway and

Transportation Officials, State highway

departments of the circumstances of this

accident and recommend that the States

evaluate the adequacy of fendering

systems at bridge piers where the systems

were not designed for the type and size of

vessel currently using the waterway and

may not be adequate to protect the bridge

and take corrective action as necessary.

(M-98-83)

--to the American Association of State

Highway and Transportation Officials

(AASHTO):

Inform, in cooperation with the Federal

Highway Administration, State highway

departments of the circumstances of this

accident and recommend that the States

evaluate the adequacy of fendering

systems at bridge piers where the systems

were not designed for the type and size of

vessel currently using the waterway and

may not be adequate to protect the bridge

and take corrective action as necessary.

(M-98-84)
56

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JAMES E. HALL

Chairman

ROBERT T. FRANCIS II

Vice Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

May 5, 1998
57

APPENDIX A

INVESTIGATION

The National Transportation Safety Board

was informed by the U.S. Coast Guard of the

accident about 1500, during the afternoon of

September 27, 1996, and at 1800, launched a

team of investigators that arrived in Portland,

Maine, shortly before midnight. The Safety

Board team comprised an

Investigator-in-Charge, an operations

investigator, a marine engineer, a human

performance investigator, and a civil engineer

with expertise in bridge construction.

On September 28, Safety Board and Coast

Guard investigators from the Marine Safety

Office in Portland interviewed key

crewmembers of the Julie N and the pilot on

board the vessel. The crewmembers included the

master, third mate, deck cadet, helmsman, chief

mate, boson, second mate, and the engineering

officers.

At the start of his interview, the pilot

provided investigators with a signed statement

describing the maneuvering of the vessel in

which he clearly stated that he had inadvertently

called for hard port rudder instead of hard

starboard rudder immediately before the

accident. Two days later, the pilot voluntarily

joined investigators aboard a Coast Guard cutter

to proceed through the port and the bridge to

describe in detail the various navigation marks

that he used in piloting large ships in and out of

Portland harbor and to explain in detail the

events leading to the accident.

During the next few days, other witnesses

were interviewed, including a local professional

photographer who had been in a small boat

upstream of the bridge photographing the

approach of the Julie N to the collision and

afterwards. The investigation benefited greatly

from the fine quality photographs taken by the

photographer. Two other State-licensed docking

masters, who had regularly piloted vessels

through the Million Dollar Bridge, were

interviewed. Also interviewed were the master

of the Captain Bill, one of the tugboats standing

by to assist in the docking of the Julie N, two

bridge tenders on duty, and a Cianbro

construction worker on the new bridge, who

witnessed the accident. By Tuesday afternoon,

October 1, 17 witnesses had been interviewed.

On Wednesday and Thursday, October 2

and 3, 1996, sworn testimony was taken from 12

of the witnesses interviewed. Parties

participating in the proceedings included the

Coast Guard; the Maritime Overseas

Corporation, the operator of the vessel; the

Board of Harbor Commissioners for Portland

Harbor; the Maine Department of

Transportation; and the American Pilots

Association.

The Safety Board conducted a public

hearing in Portland on March 13 and 14, 1997,

to acquire additional information about

(1) postaccident testing regulations and

practices for determining the presence of alcohol

and other drugs and (2) port risk assessment

pertaining to navigation of large tankships in

Portland harbor. Parties at the public hearing

were the Coast Guard, the Maritime Overseas

Corporation, the Board of Harbor

Commissioners for Portland Harbor, and the

Maine Department of Transportation.

59

APPENDIX B

COAST GUARD DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING REGULATIONS

Title 33, Part 95 (33 CFR 95)—Operating a Vessel While Intoxicated

Title 46, Subpart 4.03-2 (46 CFR 4.03-2)—Serious Marine Incident

Title 46, Subpart 4.03-4 (46 CFR 4.03-4)—Individual Directly Involved in a Serious Marine Incident

Title 46, Subpart 4.03-5 (46 CFR 4.03-5)—Medical Facility

Title 46, Subpart 4.03-6 (46 CFR 4.03-6)—Qualified Medical Personnel

Title 46, Subpart 4.03-7 (46 CFR 4.03-7)—Chemical Test

Title 46, Subpart 4.05 (46 CFR 4.05)—Notice of Marine Casualty and Voyage Records

Title 46, Subpart 4.06 (46 CFR 4.06)—Mandatory Chemical Testing Following Serious Marine Incidents

Involving Vessels in Commercial Service

Title 46, Part 16 (46 CFR 16)—Chemical Testing
60

CoastGuard, DOT 595.010

SUBCHAPTERF–VESSEL OPERATING REGULATIONS

PART95-OPERATING A VESSEL

WHILEINTOXICATED

Sec.

95.001 Purpose.

95.035 Applicability.

95.010 Definition of terms as used in this

part.

95.015 Operating a vessel.

95.020 Standard of intoxication.

95.025 Adoption of State standards,

95.030 Evidence of intoxication.

95.035 Reasonable cause for directing a

chemical test.

95.040 Refusal to submit to testing.

95.045 General operating rules for vessels inspected. or subject to inspection, under

Chapter 33of Title 46 United Stares Code.

95.050 Responsibility for compliance.

95.055 Penalties.

AUTHORITY: 46 U.S.C. 2302,3206.and 7701:49

CFR 1.46.

SOURCE:CGD 84+99, L2 FR 4?532,Dec. 14,

1967,unless otherwise noted.

$95.001 Purpose.

(a) The purpose of this part is to establish intoxication standards under 46

U.S.C. 2302and to prescribe restrictions

and responsibilities for personnel on

vessels inspected, or subject to inspection, under Chapter 33 of Title 46 United States Code. This part does not preempt enforcement by a State of its applicable laws and regulations concerning operating a recreational vessel

while intoxicated.

(b) Nothing in this part shall be construed as limiting the authority of a

vessel’s marine employer to limit or

prohibit the use or possession of alcohol on board a vessel.

$95.005 Applicability.

(a) This part is applicable to a vessel

(except those excluded by 46 U.S.C.

2109) operated on waters subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States, and

to a vessel owned in the United States

on the high seas. This includes a foreign vessel operated on waters subject

to the jurisdiction of the United

states.

(b) This part is also applicable at all

times to vessels inspected, or subject

to inspection. under Chapter 33 of Title

46 United States Code.

[CGD S4-099.52 FR 47532.Dec. 14, 1967;CGD

S4-009.53FR 13117,Apr. 21,19661

S95.~)111pD&finitionof terms as used in

.

Alcohol means any form or derivative

of ethyl alcohol (ethanol).

Alcohol concentration means either

grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of

blood. or grams of alcohol per 210 liters

of breath.

Chemical test means a test which analyzes an individual’s breath, blood,

urine, saliva and/or other bodily fluids

or tissues for evidence of drug or alcohol use.

Controlled substance has the same

meaning assigned by 21 U.S.C. 802 and

includes all substances listed on Schedules I through V as they may be revised from time to time (21 CFR Part

1306).

Drug means any substance (other

than alcohol) that has known mind or

function-altering effects on a person,

specifically including any psychoactive

substance, and including, but not limited to, controlled substances.

Moricant means any form of alcohol,

drug or combination thereof.

Law enforcement oflicer means a Coast

Guard commissioned. warrant. or petty

officer; or any other law enforcement

officer authorized to obtain a chemical

test under Federal, State, or 1ocal law.

Marine employer means the owner,

managing operator, charterer. agent.

master, or person in charge of a vessel

other than a recreational vessel.

Recreational vessel means a vessel

meeting the definition in 46 U.S.C.

2101(25) that is then being used only for

pleasure.

Underway means that a vessel is not

at anchor, or made fast to the shore, or

aground.

Vessel includes every description of

watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as

a means of transportation on water.

Vessel owned in the United States

means any vessel documented or numbered under the laws of the United

199
S95.015

States; and, any vessel owned by a citizen of the United States that is not

documented or numbered by any nation.

[CGD S4-099.52 FR 47532,Dec. i4. 19S7;CGD

84-089,53FR 13117,April 21.19881

$95.015 Operating a vessel.

For purposes of this part, an individual is considered to be operating a vessel when:

(a) The individual has an essential

role in the operation of a recreational

vessel underway, including but not limited to navigation of the vessel or control of the vessel’s propulsion system.

(b) The individual is a crewmember

(including a licensed individual). pilot,

or watchstander not a regular member

of the crew, of a vessel other than a

recreational vessel.

$95.020 Standard of intoxication.

An individual is intoxicated when:

(a) The individual is operating a recreational vessel and haa an alcohol

co~centration of .10 percent by weight

or more in their blood:

(b) The individual is operating a vessel other than a recreational vessel and

has an alcohol concentration of .04 percent by weight or more in their blood;

or,

(c) Thea$divphyl is operating any

vessel effect of the

intoxicant(s) consumed by the individual on the person’s manner, disposition, speech, muscular movement, general appearance or behavior is apparent

by observation.

[CGD 84-099,52 FR 47532,Dec. 14, 1887:CGD

84-099,53FR 13117,April 21.19881

495.025 Adoption of State standards.

(a) This section applies to recreational vessels on waters within the

geographical boundaries of a State having a statute defining a percentage of

alcohol in the blood for the purposes of

establishing that a person operating a

vessel is intoxicated or impaired due to

alcohol.

(b) H the applicable State statute establishing a standard for determining

impairment due to alcohol uses the

terms “under the influence,” “operating while impaired,” or equivalent terminology and does not separately de33CFRCh. I (7-l-96 Edition)

fine a percentage of alcohol in the

blood for the purpose of establishing

“intoxication,” the standard containing the highest defined percentage of

alcohol m the blood applies in lieu of

the standard in $95.020(a). If the applicable State statute contains a standard

specifically applicable to establishing

intoxication, in addition to standards

applicable to other degrees of impairment, the standard specifically applicable to establishing intoxication ap

plies in lieu of the standard in

fj95.020(a).

(c) For the purposes of this part, a

standard established by State statute

and adopted under this section is applicable to the operation of any recreational vessel on waters within the

geographical boundaries of the State.

+95.030 Evidence of intoxication.

Acceptable evidence of intoxication

includes, but is not limited to:

(a) PerSOnal observation of an individual’s manner, disposition, speech,

muscular movement. general appearance, or behavior: or.

(b) A chemical test.

[CGD 84-C%?53 FR 13117,April 21. 19SS:CGD

84-009,53FR 13117.Apr. 21,19SS]

$95.035 Reasonable cause for directing a chemical test.

(a) Only a law enforcement officer or

a marine employer may direct an individual operating a vessel to undergo a

chemical test when reasonable cause

exists. Reasonable cause exists when:

(1) The Individual was directly involved in the occurrence of a marine

casualty as defined in Chapter 61 of

Title 46, United States Code, or

(2) The individual is suspected of

being in violation of the standards in

5S95.020or 95.025.

(b) When an individual is directed to

undergo a chemical test, the individual

to be tested must be informed of that

fact and directed to undergo a test as

soon as is practicable.

(c) When practicable, a marine employer should bane a determination of

the existence of reasonable cause,

under paragraph (a)(2) of this section.

on observation by two persons.

[CGD 84-099,FR 47532,Dec. 14, 1987;CGD 84-

089.53FR 13117,Apr. 1, 18881
CoastGwrd, DOT

s95.040 Refiuml to submit to @sting.

(a) If an individual refuses to submit

to or cooperate in the administration

of a timely chemical test when directed by a law enforcement officer

based on reasonable cause. evidence of

the refusal is admissible in evidence in

any administrative proceeding and the

individual will be presumed to be intoxicated.

(b) If an individual refuses to submit

to or cooperate in the administration

of a timely chemical test when directed by the marine employer based

on reasonable cause. evidence of the refusal is admissible in evidence in. any

administrative proceeding.

$95.045 General operating rules for

vessels kspeeteh or subject to inspection, under Chapter 33 of Title

46 United States Code.

While on board a vessel inspected. or

subject to inspection, under Chapter 33

of Title 46 United States Code, a crewmember (including a licensed individual), pilot, or watchstander not a regular member of the crew:

(a) Shall not perform or attempt to

perform any scheduled duties within

four hours of consuming any alcohol:

S95.055

(b) Shall not be intoxicated at any

time:

(c) Shall not consume any intoxicant

while on watch or duty; and

(d) May consume a legal non-prescription or prescription drug provided

the drug does not cause the individual

to be intoxicated.

$95.050 Responsibility for compliance.

(a) The marine employer shall exercise due diligence to assure compliance

“with the applicable provisions of this

part.

(b) If the marine employer has reason

to believe that an individual is intoxicated, the marine employer shall not

allow that individual to stand watch or

perform other duties.

$95.055 Penalties.

An individual who is Intoxicated

when operating a vessel in t“lolation of

46 U.S.C. 2302(c)-

(a) Is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not more

than $1,000: or

(b) Commits a class A misdemeanor,

as described in 18 L’.S.C. 3551 ?t seq.

[CGD 92-007.57FR 33261,July 27. 1992]
W08-2 Serioue marine incidenk

The term serious marine incident inoludes the following events involving a

vessel in commercial service:

(a) AIIY marine caaualty or aooident

as defined in $4.(KH which is required

by $4.O&l to be reported to the Coaat

Chmrd and which results in any of the

following

(1) One or more deaths;

(2) An injury to a crewmember, paeeenger, or other person which requires

professional medical treatment beyond

first aid, and, in the caee of a person

employed on board a vessel in commercial service, which renders the individual unfit to perform routine vessel dutiee;

(3) Damage to property, as defined in

S4.06-1(0 of this part, in excess of

S1OO,OOO;

(4) Actual or conetmctive total 10SS

of anY vessel subject to inspection

under 46 U.S.C. 2201: or

(5) ActW or conkt%ctive tow 10=

of any self-propelled vessel, not subject

to inspection under 46 U.S.C. 3301, of

100 gross tons or more.

(b) A discharge of oil of lf),~ @lon8

or more Into the navigable watirs of

the United States, as defined in 22

U.S.C. 1321. whether or not resulting

from a marine casualty.

(c) A dischame of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance into the

navigable waters of the United States.

or a release of a reportable quantity of

a _dous substance into the environment of the United States, whether

or not resulting from a marine casualty.

[CGD8&067,63FR 47077,Nov. 21,1968]

54.03-4 Individual directly involved in

a eerioua marine incidenu

The term individual directb involved

in a se?ious marine incident is an individual whose order, action or failure to

aot is determined to be, or cannot be

ruled out as, a causative factor in the

events leading to or causing a serious

marine incident.

[CGD8$467,53 FR 47(777.NOV.2L 19881

$4.02-6 Medieal facility.

The t%rm medical facility means an

American hospital, clinic, physician’s

office, or laboratory, where blood and

urine specimens can be collected according to recognized professional

standards.

[CGDS&OS7,M FR 47077,NOV.21.19881

54.0S-6 Qualified medieal pemoxmeL

The temn qualified medical personnel

means a physician, physician’s aeeistant, nurse, emergency medical technician, or other person authorized under

State or Federal law or regulation to

collect blood and urine specimens.

[CGDSS-067,52FR 47077,NOV.21,19S81

440%7 Chemical teet.

The term chemical tmt means a scientifically recognized test which analyzes an individual’s breath, blood,

urine, saliva, bodily fluids, or tissues

for evidence of dangerous drug or alcohol use.

[C(3DM, 52FR 47077,NOV.21,19881
Subpart 4.05–Notice of Marine

Casualty and Voyage Records

$4.06-1 Notice of marine casualty.

(a) Immediately after the addressing

of resultant safety concerns, the

owner, agent, master, operator, or person in charge, shall notify the nearest

Marine Safety OffIce, Marine Inspection Office or Coast Guard Group Office

whenever a vessel is involved in a marine osaualty consisting in—

(1) An unintended grounding, or an

unintended strike of (allison with) a

bridge;

(2) An intended grounding, or an intended strike of a bridge, that creates

a tid to navigation, the environment, or the eafet y of a vessel, or that

meets any criterion of paragraphs (a)

(3) through (’7);

(3) A lose of main propulsion, primary stee~ng, or anY associated component or control system that reduces

the maneuverability of the vessel;

(4) An occurrence materially and adversely affecting the vessel’s seaworthiness or fitness for service or

route, including but not limited to fire,

flooding, or failure of or damage to

fixed fire-extinguishing systems, lifesaving equipment, auxiliary power-generating equipment, or bilge-pumping

Systems;

(5) A 10SSof life;

(6) An in.iurY that requires mofessional medical treatment (treatment

beyond first aid) and, if the person is

engaged or employed on board a vessel

in commercial service, that rendera the

individual unfit to perform his or her

routine duties: or

(7) b occurrence causing propertydamage in excess of $25,000,this damage including the cost of labor and material to restore the property to its

condition before the occurrence, but

not including the cost of salvage,

cleaning, gas-freeing, drydocking, or

demurrage.

(b) Notice given as required by 33

CFR 160.215satisfies the requirement of

thissection if the marine caeualty involves a hazardous condition aa defined

by 33CFR 160.203.

[CGD94-WO,59FR 39471,Aug. 3, 1994]
65

Subpart 4.06—Mandatory Chemical Testing Foilowin

7

serious

Marine Incidents nvohfing

&e3sels in Commercial Serv-

&XUICE: CGD-, 53FR 47W6,NOV. U,

1968,unless otherwise noted.

#4.06-1 Responeibilitiee of the marine

employer.

(a) At the time of occurrence of a marine casualty, a discharge of oil into

the navigable watera of the United

States, a discharge of a hazardous substance into the navigable waters of the

United States, or a release of a hazardous substance into the environment of

the United States, the marine employer shall make a timely, good faith

determination as to whether the occurrence currently is, or is likely to become, a serious marine incident.

(b) When a marine employer determines that a casualty or incident is, or

is likely to become, a serious marine

incident. the marine employer shall

take all practicable steps to have each

individual eneaged or employed on

board the vessel who is directly involved in the incident chemically tested for evidence of drug and alcohol use.

(c) The determination of which individuals are directly involved in a serlous marine incident is to be made by

the marine employer. A law enforcement officer may determine that additional individuals are directly involved

in the serious marine incident. In such

cases, the marine employer shall take

all practicable steps to have these individuals tested in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section.

(d) The requirements of this subpart

shall not prevent vessel personnel who

are required to be tested from performing duties in the aftermath of a serious

marine incident when their performance is necessary for the preservation

of life or property or the protection of

the environment.

(e) The marine employer shall ensure

that all individuals engaged or employed on board a vessel are fully indoctrinated in the requirements of this

subpart, and that appropriate W@

personnel are trained as necessary in

the Practical applications of these requirements.

(f) Each marine employer shall implement the teeting requirements of

this subpart in accordance with the implementation schedule provided in 46

CFR 16.205and 16.207.

$4.06-6

T

nsibilitiea of ImUvidusda

~~k volved in serious marine

(a) AW individual engaged or employed on board a vessel who is determined to be directly involved in a serious marine incident shall provide

blood, breath or urine specimene for

chemical tests required by %4.W1O

when directed to do so by the marine

employer or a law enforcement officer.
CoastGuard, DOT

(b) If the individual refuses to provide blood, breath or urine specimens,

this refusal shall be noted on Form C&

2692B and in the vessel’s official log

book, if one is required.

(c) No individual may be forcibly

compelled to provide specimens for

chemical tests requir~d by this part:

however, refusal is considered a violation of regulation and could subject the

individual to suspension and revocation proceedings under part 5 of this

chapter and removal from any duties

which directly affect the safety of the

vessel’s navigation or operations.

s4.06-10 Required specimens.

Each individual required to submit to

ohemical testing shall, aa soon as Practicable, provide the following specimens for chemical testing

(a) Urine specimens, collected in accordance with 34.06-20 and part 16 of

this chapter.

(b) Blood or breath specimens, or

both, collected in accordance with

~4.06-20.

s4,06#0=Specimen collection require-

(a) All inspected vessels certificated

for unrestricted ocean routes, and all

inspected vessels certificated for restricted overseas routes, are required

to have on board at all times a breath

testing device capable of determining

the presence of alcohol in a person’s

system. The breath testing device shall

be used in accordance with procedures

specified by the manufacturer.

(b) The marine employer shall ensure

that urine specimen collection and

shipping kits meeting the requirements

of 516.220of this part are readily available for use following serious marine

incidents. The specimen collection and

shipping kite need not be maintained

aboard each vessel if they can otherwise be readily obtained within 24

hours from the time of the occurrence

of the serious marine incident.

(c) The marine employer shall ensure

that specimens required by %4.06-10are

collected as soon as practicable following the occurrence of a serious marine

incident.

(d) When obtaining blood, breath, and

urine specimens, the marine employer

shall ensure that the collection process

S4.06+0

is supervised by either qualified collection personnel, the marine employer, a

law enforcement officer, or the marine

employer’s representative.

(e) Chemical tests of an individual’s

breath for the presence of alcohol using

a breath testing device may be conducted by any individual trained to

conduct such tests. Blood specimens

shall be taken only by qualified medical personnel.

$4.0W30 Specimen collection in hlcidemti involving fatalities.

(a) When an individual engaged or

employed on board a vessel dies aa a result of a serious marine incident, blood

and urine specimens must be obtained

from the remains of the individual for

chemical testing, if practicable to do

so. The marine employer shall notify

the appropriate local authority, such

as the coroner or medical examiner, as

soon aa possible, of the fatality and of

the requirements of this subpart. The

marine employer shall provide the

specimen collection and shipping kit

and request that the local authority

assist in obtaining the necessary specimens. When the custodian of the remains is a person other than the local

authority, the marine employer shall

request the custodian to cooperate in

obtaining the specimens required under

this part.

(b) If the local authority or custodian

of the remains declines to cooperate in

obtaining the necessary specimens, the

marine employer shall provide an explanation of the circumstances on

Form CG2692B (Report of Required

Chemical Drug and Alcohol Testing

Following a Serious Marine Incident).

$4.~g Specimen handling and ship-

.

(a) The marine employer shall ensure

that blood specimens collected in accordance with K 4.06-20 and 4.06-20are

promptly shipped to a testing laboratory qualified to conduct tests on such

specimens. A proper chain of custody

must be maintained for each specimen

from the time of collection through the

authorized disposition of the specimen.

Blood specimens must be shipped to

the laboratory in a cooled condition by

any means adequate to ensure delivery
67

54.06+0

within twenty-four (24) hours of receipt

by the carrier.

(b) The marine employer shall ensure

that the urine specimen collection procedures of 516.310of this part and the

chain of custody requirements of

316.320are complied with. The marine

employer shall ensure that urine specimens required by M4.06-20and 4. 06-30

are promptly shipped to a laboratory

complying with the requirements of 49

CFR part 40. Urine specimens must be

shipped by an expeditious means, but

need not be shipped in a cooled condition for overnight delivery.

54.4%60 Speeimen ansiyBis and follow-up procedures.

(a) Each laboratory will provide

prompt analysis of specimens collected

‘under this subpart, consistent with the

need to develop all relevant information and to produce a complete analysis report.

(b) Reports shall be sent to the Medical Review Officer meeting the requirements of 43 CFR 40.33,as designated by

the marine employer submitting the

specimen for testing. Wherever a urinalysis report indicates the presence of

a dangerous drug or drug metabolize,

the Medioal Review Officer shall review

the report aa required by 49 CFR 40.33

and submit his or her findings to the

marine employer. Blood test reports indicating the presence of alcohol shall

be similarly reviewed to determine if

there is a legitimate medical explanation.

(c) Analysis resulta which indicate

the presence of alcohol, dangerous

drugs, or drug metabolizes shall not be

construed by themselves aa constituting a finding that use of drugs or alcohol waa the probable oause of a serious

marine incident.

[CGD ~, 53 FR 47078,hIov. 21. 193S, as

amended by CGD 90-053,58FR 31107,May 2S,

1993]

%4.~~S~btiuission of reports ad

.

(a) Whenever an individual engaged

or employed on a vessel is identified as

being directly involved in a serious marine incident, the marine employer

shall complete Form CG-2692B (Report

of Required Chemioal Drug and Alcohol

46 CFRCh. I (1*1-96 Edtion)

Testing Following a Serous Marine incident ).

(b) When the serious marine incident

requires the submission of Form CG2692(Report of Marine Caaualty, Injury

or Death) to the Coast Guard in accordance with $4.05-10, the report required

by paragraph (a) of this section shall be

appended to Form CG-2692.

(c) In incidents involving discharges

of oil or hazardous substances as deeoribed in S4.03-2 (b) and (c) of this

Pt. when Form CG-2632 is not required ta be submitted, the report required by paragraph (a) of this section

shall be submitted to the Coast Guard

Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection.

having jurisdiction over the location

where the discharge occurred or nearest the port of first arrival following

the diso~e.

(d) Uwn receipt of the report of

chemioal test results, the marine employer shall submit a copy of the test

resultx! for each person listed on the

CG-2@2B to the Coast Guard Officer in

Charge, Marine Inspection to whom the

CG-X92B waasubmitted.

46
PART16-CHEMICAL TESTING

BubporiA-General

Sec.

16.101 Purposeof regulations.

16.105 Definitions of terms usedin this part.

Subparl B-Roquirod Chomlcal Tedlng

16.Zil Application.

16.205 Implementation of ohemiosl testing

16.#%%& with foreignlawe.

16.2i0 Pre-employment teiking requiramentd.

16.= Periodic testing requirement.

16.290 Randomtesting requirements.

16.240 Serious marine inoident testing requirements.

16,2S0Reaeonsble cause testing re@remente.

16.260 ~001’de.

- c-~ ror C?lornlcal Wstlng

formguouamga

16.201 Procedures for Transportation WorkrdaosDruKTestinirProumms.

16.2i0

16.WI

16.WO

16.240

16.250

16.MO

Qeneril. - -

chain of Oustody.

Specimenhsndlingsndchipping.

Test Moratory requirements.

Specimenanalyeeao

Specimenanalysis reports.

S 16.1~

16.6’70Wdioal ReviewOfnoer.

L&m Rehaesof information.

SubPa?D+mP10YC0A8McmC 0Rowan8

16.401 EmployeeAesistsnoe Program (EAP).

W E-V 1~~

16.S00 Aknagement Infornmtion System *

quirements.

APPENDIX A rRESERVED]

APPENDIX B DIWOAND AMOEOLTESTINO

hfANAOEMENTINFORMATIONSYSTEM(=)

DATA 00UECRON FoaM

AUTROIUTY:46U.S.C. 2102,2606,?lOl, 7601,

snd ?701;49CYR1.46.

80tlRClECGD66-067,H Y’R47W8,NoV. 21,

106S,unless otherwisenoted.

Subpart A-General

~16.101 Purpose of regulations.

(a) The regulations in this part provide a means to minimize the use of intoxicants by merchant marine personnel and to promote a drug free and tie

work environment.

(b) These regulations prescribe the

minimum standards, procedures, and

means to be used to test for the use of

dangerous drugs.

(c) As part of a reasonable oause drug

testing program established pursuant

to this part, employers may test for

drugs in addition to those specified in

this part only with approval granted by

the Coast Guard under 49 CFR part 40

and for substices for whioh the Department of Health and Human Servioes hae established an approved testing protocol and positive threshold.

Jlag JIX#rdtions of terms used in

Chemfcd test means a eoientifloally

recognized test which analyzes an individual’s breath, blood, urine, saliva,

bodily fluids, or tissues for evidence of

dangerous drug or alcohol use.

Creumsmbermeans an individual who

is:

(a) On board a vessel acting under the

authority of a license, cert~cate of

registry, or merchant mariner’s document issued under this subchapter,

whether or not the individual is a

member of the vessel’s crewqor

251
69

$16.1*

(b) Enmr’ed@ emploiedon‘boii’wa

Veeeel owned in tk United Statee that

is required by law or regulation to engage, employ, or”be operated by an individual holding a license, oertdfloate

of regieta’y, or merchant mariner’8 document iesued under thie subchapter,

except the follom

(1) Individual on fieh pxwmAng veeeelo who are pr4marUyemployed in the

Pm@eration of fish or fish products, or

in a support position, and who have no

duties that directly affect the cafe operation of the veeeel;

(2) Scientific personnel on an oceanomDhiC reeearch VOeOO~

(3) Individuals on industrial vessels

who are industrial pemonnel, as defined in this chapteE and -

(4) Individuals not required under

part 15of this subchapter who have no

duties that directly affect the safe op

eration of the vessel.

Dangerous drug means a narcotic

dnlg, a controlled substance, or a controlled-substance analog (as defined in

section 102of the Comprehensive Drug

Abuse and Control Act of 19’?0(21U.S.C.

602)).

Dangerow drug level means the

amount of traces of dangerous drugs or

drug metabolizes in an individual’s

breath, blood, urine, saliva, or body

fluids or tieaues.

Drug testmeans a chemical test of an

individual’s urine for evidence of dangeroue drug uee.

EnpfWer means a marine employer

or sponsoring organization.

Fails a chemical test for dangerous

drugs means that the reeu.ltof a ohemical test conducted in suwordance with

43CFR PM%40is reported as ‘.’~SitiVO”

for the presence of dangerous drugs or

drug metabolizes in an individual’s syetem by a Medical Review Ofncer in accordance with that part.

Zntczicantmeans any form of alcohol,

d#w’oue drug, or combination there-

.

Marine emphwer means the owner,

~K o~rator, chartarer, agent,

maeter, or pereon in charge of a veeeel,

other than a recreational veeeel. - -”

Mufical Review Ofti meane an individual designated by the employer to

CMTYout the duties specifiedin516.370

of thi8 part. -

,, :..

46 CFRCILI(10-1+7Q

““~ rneana to navigate,“Ctear,

direot, manage, ortiaveesel, orto

control, monitor, or maintain the veeeel’s main or auxllky e@pment or

eyetexns.Opemtion inclk

(a) Determining the vessel’e poeition,

piloting, directing the vessel along a

desired trackline, keeping account of

the veeael’s progress through tie

water, ordering or executing change8 in

course, rudder position, or speed, and

maintaining a lookout;

(b) Controlling, operating, monitoring, maintaining, or teeu the veeeel’s propulsion and steering systemw

electric power generators; bilge, ballast, fire, and cargo pumps; deck machinery including winches, windla8esa,

and lifting equipment; lifesaving equip

ment and appliances; firefighting eysteme and equipmenG and navigation

and communication equipment; and

(c) Mooring, anchoring, and line handling; loading cr discharging of cargo

or flael:aaeembling or disassembling of

tows and maintaining the veseel’s stability and watertight integrity.

Passes a chemical testfor dangsrow

drugs means the result of a chemical

test conducted in accordance with 43

CFR part 40 is reported as “negative”

by a Medical Review Officer in accordance with that part.

Positive rate means the number of

positive results for random drug teste

conducted under this part @ue the

number of refusale to take random

tests required by thiS WI%, divided by

the total number of random drug teste

conducted under this part plus the

number of refusals to take random

tests required by this ~.

Refwe to eubtntt meane that a crewmember fails to provide a urine eample

aa required by 43CFR PU% 40,without

a genuine inability to provide a specimen (ss determined by a medical evaluation), after he or she has received notice of the requirement to be tested in

accordance with the provieione of this

part, or engages in conduct that clearly obstructs the testing lmcees.

Sertous marfne tncfdent means an

event defined in 46CFR 4.0&2.

Sponsoring organieatfon is any company, consortium, corporation, aeaociation, union, or other omanization with

262
coa8tGwfcLDoT s 162aB

whioh individual eeming in the marine induetry, or their employem, are

aeeooiated.

Vml owned in w united St5tes

meane any veeeel documented or numbered under the laws of the United

StataI%and any veaeel owned by a citimn of the united states that is not

documented or numbered by any riatioll.

[(X3D=, ~ Y’R47079,NOV. 21.1-56 FR

4iW67,Nov. 30, 1966.as amendedby (X3D90-

014,M FR 61032,JdY 8, 1S91;CGD 9&052,56

YR 2x1w, May 26, 1S6%C(3D W-Ml, 59 FR

28792,June % 18M MlYR d2Z6, Dec. 2, 1994;

CGD91=. @YR4525,Jan. 22,1995]

Subpat B-Reqmu&d Chemical

f l&201 Applieatiom

(a) Chemical testing of personnel

must be conducted ae required by this

subpart.

(b) If an individual fails a chemical

test for dangerous drugs under this

part, the individual will be presumed to

be a user of dangerous drugs.

(c) If an individual holding a license,

certificate of registry,or merchant

mariner’s document fails a chemical

test for dangerous drugs, the individual’s employer or prospective employer

shall report the test results in writing

to the nearest Coaet Guard Ofilcer in

Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI). The

individual shall be denied employment

ea a crewmember or removed from duties which directly affect the safe operation of the vessel as soon as practicable and shall be subject to suspension and revocation proceedings

against his or her lioenae, certificate of

registry, or merchant mariner’s document under 46CFR part 5.

(d) If an individual who does not hold

a lfoenee, certificate of registry, or

merchant mtulner’s document fails a

chemical test for dangerous drugs, the

individual shall be denied employment

ae a crewmember or removed from dutiee which directly affect the safe operation of the vessel ee soon ae possible.

(e) h ind.ltidual who hae Wled a required chemical test for dangerous

~ U not be reemployed aboard a

veeeel until the requirements of

S16.970(d)of thie part and 46 CFR part

5, if applicable, have been eatiefled.

[OGD~, M YR 47049,November11, ~.

M amendedby (XD WkO14,56YR SW& July

8,1S)1]

s lw_I@amentation of Ohamtoel

(a) When a veesel owned in the Unit+

ed States 18 operating in watem that

are not subjeot to the jurisdiction of

the United States, the testing reqments of %16.210 and 16.?30 do not

apply to a citizen of a foreign oountrg

engaged or employed ae pilot in accordance with the laws or cuetome of that

foreign country.

(b) Upon mW.en request of an employer, Commandant (G-MOA) will mreviewthe employer’s ohemioal teeting

program to determine compliance with

the provisions of this part.

[CGDW14. 56 F’R60020,NOV. 20, 1901,u

amendedby 59Y%62226,Dec. 2, 1- (XI) W

V12,6CFR 50461,Sept. 29, 1-, (X3DWl, 61

FR 50726,*Pt. 27, 199&CGDS6-026,62 FR

51196,Sept. 20,1~

EFFirCrIVEDATENol’sx At 62 YR $11*,

Sept. 20,1997,J16.215wae amendedby removing paragraphs(a) through (e) and redesignating paragraphs(f) and (g) as (a) and (b),

effective Oct. 20,1997.For the convenience of

the user, the supersededtext 1s eat forth M

follows

516.90S Implemen*tioa of chemkal 4oetlag

(a) Each employerwho employs more than

tillemployees rewired to be tested underWe

part was requiredto implement the pre-employrnenttestingprogramrequiredbythte

mrt not lalm’than July 21.1969,and the eerious marine incident and reasonable oauea

testing programs rsciuiredby this put no

latar than December 21, 1969.‘l%emndom

t8StiIlgPrOgl’SmM@Md by thi8DUta 8hdi

be implementedno later thanOctober1,19W.

(b) Eachemployer who employsfrom 11to

50employees requiredto be matedunder this

part was requiredto implement the pre-emrdoyrnent,serious marine incident and reasonable cauae testing progmma required by

this XXWno later than Daoember 2L MO.

The randomtesting rrogramMQuiredby this

w shall be implementedno Mar thao Ootober 1, 1991.

(c) Each emdoyer who emkdoye10or fewer

employees requiredto be tested underW

~ was recuiredto implement the ~-

ployment. serious marine incident and reasonable canes testing DI’omWnaMQUII’06bY

this smrt no later than December 2L MO.

The randomtesting mogram reQuiredbYthis
71

g168207 46 m Ch I (10-147 MHOIO

Kllutllutlplllyimplementednot la@r thanoo-

(d)btied]

(e) ‘me periodic teetlng ra@rementd of

316.?20apply to rihysioal examinations perkmned afterDeoember21,W.

● ● ● ● ●

416S07 conflict with foredgn Iawao

(a) ‘f’hls xt applies to the testingof

all U.S. crewmembere onboard U.S.

vessels operating in waters that are

subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign

govermnent on and after January 2,

199’7:however, implementation maY be

delayed until July 1,1997.

(b) Employers for whom compliance

with this part would violate the domeetic laws or policies of another country

may request an exemption fkom the

d.nagtesting requirements of this part

by submitting a written request to

co mmandant (&MOA), at the address

listed in 316.500(a).

[CGD95-011.61FR ~13, MC. 16,1996]

*lS.2&2timployment testing rs-

.

(a) No marine employer shall engage

or employ any individual to serve as a

crewmember unless the individual

psmes a chemical test for dangerous

druga for that employer.

(b) An employer maY waive a pre-employment test required for a job applicant by paragraph (a) of this section if

the individual provides satisfactory

evidence that he or she has

(1) Passed a chemical test for dangerous drugs, required by this part,

within the previous six months with no

subsequent positive drug tests during

the remainder of the six-month perio~

or

(2) Dting the mevious 165days been

subject to a random testing program

required by $16.220for at least 60 days

and did not fail or retie to participate

in a chemical test for dangerous drugs

required by this part.

[CGD90-053,58 PI%311C7,hfSy 36, 1393,as

amendedby CC3D93-051,S9FR 36793,June 3,

1964]

gl&2241 Periodic testing requirement.

(a) Except M provided by paragraph

(c) of this section, and MIO.X19(h)and

12.02-9(f’)of this subchapter, an applicsmtfor andglnalimauceor am

newal of a. license’ or a certificate of

registry (COR), a miss in grade of a license, a higher grade of COR, an original issuaxw of a merchant mariner’s

document (MMD), the firara&a_~

ment as an able seaman,

qualified member of the engine department, or tankermam or a reieeuance of

an KMD with a new expiration date

shall be required to psaa a chemical

test for dangerous drugs. The applicant

shall provide the results of the test to

the Coast (Ward Regional Emmination

Center (REC) at the time of submittin6

an application. The test results mu9t

be completed and dated not more than

165daYs prior to submission of the a?

plioation.

(b) Unless excepted under parsgra

(c) of this section, each pilot require%

by this subchapter to receive an annual

physioal examination must peas a

chemical test for dangerous drugs aa a

part of that examination. The individual shall provide the results of each

test required by this section to the

REC when the pilot applies for a license renewal or when requested by the

Coast Guard.

(c) ~ aPPllcant need net submit e~.

dence of passing a chemical test for

dangerous drugs required by paragraph

(a) or (b) of this section if he or she

provides satisfactory etidence that he

or she b

(1) Passed a chemical test for dangerous drugs required by this part

within the previous six months with no

subsequent positive chemical tests during the remainder of the ~month period or

(2) D- the previous 165daYSbeen

subject ta a random testing program

required by f16.220for at lut 60 daYS

and did not fail or refuse to participate

in a chemioal test for dangerous drugs

required by thiS part.

(d) Exoept sa provided by paragra

(b) of this section, an applioant is %

quired to provide the results of only

one chemical test for dangerous drugs

when multiple transactions are covered

by or requested in a single application.

[C(3D91-223,60FR =, Jan.22.=1

s1S920 Random testing mqukmsmts.

(a) Marine employers shall establish

programs for the chemical fasting for

264
72

~uedruee onarandom badeof

CMwmOmbereOnMepected veeeele who:

(1) Occupy a poeltlon, or perform the

duties and functions of a pceltion, reQw by the VOOOO1’8certificate of Inmtion,

(2) Perform the duties and functions

of patrolmen or watchmen required by

W chap-, or,

(3) Am epeoiflcally aesigned the duties of warning, mueterlng, eeeembling,

aaaieting, or controlling the movement

of ~ngezn during emergenoiee.

(b) Marine employers shall eetablieh

Prcmams for the chemloal tooting for

dangercue drugs on a random bade of

crewmembera on uninepected veesels

who:

(1) Are required by law or regulation

to hold a license iesued by the Coaat

Guard in order to perform their duties

on the veeeel;

(2) perform duties and fUCtiOIM CU.

rectly related to the safe operation of

the veaeel;

(3) Perform the duties and functlona

of patrolmen or watchmen required by

this chapter; or,

(4) Are specifically aesigned the dutlee of warning, muetering, assembling,

Oaaisting,or controlling the movement

of paesengem during emergencies.

(c) The selection of crewmembera for

randcm drug teetlng ehall be made by a

ecientifkally valid method, ouch as a

random number table or a computerbaeed random number generator that is

matched with crewmembere’ SOOlalSecurity numbere, payroll identification

numbere, or other comparable identifying numbere. Under the testing frequency and eelection proceee used, each

covered crewmember ehall have an

equal chance of being tested each time

eelectiona are made and an employee’s

chance of eelection shall continue to

exist throughout his or her employment. As an alternative, random selection may be accomplished by periodically eelecting one or more veeeels and

testing all crewmembera covered by

this eection, provided that each veeeel

eubject to the marine employer’s test

~Utr remains equally subject to ee-

.

(d) ~ne employers may form or

otherwise uee epcneoring orgauizatione, or may uee contractors, to conduct the random chemlcd taeting prcE

m’amerequiredbythiepart.

(0) =W@ as provided in ~

(f) of thle section, the minimum annt5

percentage rate for random drug toot+

ti ehall be SOpercent of oovered crewrnembere.

(f) The annual rate for nandom drug

taethlg may be adju8ted in aoocrdance

With We ~m.

(1) The Commandant’s deci6ion to increase or decreaee the minimum annual percentage rata for random drug

testing 1s baaed on the reported mtndom positive rate for the entire induetry. All information ueed for thla determination is drawn from the drug

MIS reports required by W part. In

order to eneure reliabllim of the data,

the Commandant considers the quality

and completeneee of the reported data,

may obtain additional information or

reports from marine employers, and

may make approprlata modification

in calculating the industry random

positive rate. Each year, the Commandant till publish in the FmmrtAL

REGIOTER the minimum annual percentage rate for random drug bssting of

covered crewmembere. The new mlnlmum annual percentage rate for random drug testing will be applicable

starting January 1 of the calendar year

following publication.

(2) When the minlrnum annual ~rcentage rate for random drug testing is

SOpercent, the Commandant may lower

this rate to 25 percent of all covered

crewmembere if the Commandant determines that the data received under

the reporting requirements of 46 CFR

16.S00 for two consecutive oalendar

years indicate that the positive rate is

10s0than 1.0percent.

(3) When the minimum annual ~rcentage rate for random drug testing la

25 percent, and the data received under

the reporting requirements of 46 CFR

16.500for any calendar year indicate

that the poeltive rate is e~ual to or

greater than 1.0 percent, the Commandant will incrtwe the minimum

annual percentage rate for random

drug testing to 60percent of all covered

crewmembere.

(g) M=lne employem ehall randomly

eelect a sufficient number of covered

crewmembem for teetlng during each

calendar year to equal an annual rate

255
73

$ Mao

not 1sssthan the minimum annual peroentsge rate for readom drug testing

determined by the Commantit. If the

marine employer oonduota random

drug testing through a oaumrtium, the

number of orewmembere to be tested

may be oaloulated for eaoh individual

mmlne employer or may be based on

the total number of covered crewmembera oovered by the consortium

who are subject to random drug testing

at the same minimum annual percenp

agerate under thi8partor any DOT

drug testing rule.

(h) Each marine employer ehall ensure that random drug tests conducted

under this part are unannounced and

that the dates for administering random tests are spread reasonably

throughout the oalendar year.

(i) If a given covered crewmember is

subject to random drug testing under

the drug testing rules of more than one

DOT agency for the same marine employer, the crewmember shall be subject to random drug testing at the percentage rate established for the calendar year by the DOT agency regulating more than 50 percent of the crewmember’s function.

(j) If a marine employer is required

to conduct random drug testing under

the drug testing rules of more than one

DOT agency, the marine employer

w—

(1) Establish separate pools for random selection, with each pool containing the covered crewmembers who are

subject to testing at the same required

rate: or

(2) ~dotiy S4dOOt such cmwmembere for testing at the highest percentage rate established for the oalendar year by any DOT agency to

which the marine employer is subject.

(k) An individual may not be engaged

or employed, including eelf-employment, on a vessel In a position as maeter, operator, or person in charge for

which a license or merohant mm’iner’s

document is required by law or regulation unless all crewmembere covered

by this section ewe subject to the random testing requirements of this eection.

[CGD90-014,S8 YR 91094,July 8, 1891,ae

amendedby69FR@4!ZZl, Dec.Z 19041

46 CFR aL I..(1M47 Eaao

41U10b10~ ~ tak

The marine employer ehall ensure

that all pemons direotly involved in a

eerious marine incident are ohemioally

tested for evidence of dangerous drugs

and alcohol In aooordanoe with the requirements of 46(YFR4.(B.

i lUtO_yle Vam 4aeting m

(a) The marine employer ehall re-

@re any orewmember engaged or employed on board a veeeel owned in the

United StitOS that ie required by 18W

or regulation to engage, employ or be

operated by an individual holding a license, certlfloate of regietry, or merchant mariner’s dooument lseued under

this subchapter, who ie reasonably euepected of using a dangerous drug to be

chemically tested for dangerous drugs.

(b) The marine employer’s decision

to test must be baaed on a reasonable

and articulable belief that the indivldualhaeueed adangerous drug baeed on

direct observation of specific, contemporaneous physioal, behavioral, or performance indicators of probable uee.

Where practicable, this belief should be

baaed on the observation of the individual by two PSrSOnSin SUX*OI’Y Xtions.

(c) When the marine employer *

quires testing of an individual under

the provisions of this section, the individual must be informed of that faot

and direoted to provide a urine speoimen as coon aa praotioable. Thie -t

shall be entered in the veeeel’s offidal

log book, if one is required.

(d) If an individual refUseeto provide

a urine specimen when dlreoted to. do

so by the employer under tie provleiona of this eeotion, this faot shall be

entered in the veseel’e official log

book, lf one ie required.

S16J860I&oord&

(a) Employem shall maintain reoordn

of ohemloal tests which the Medioal

Itevlew Officer reports u positive for a

period of at leeat S years and shall

make these reoords available to (Meet

Guard Omcids upon request. Reoorde

of tiStS reported 88 IW#UtfVO~ be mretainedfor one year.

(b) The records shall be suf.tloient to:

256
74

(1) Sattafy the reuutrementa of

M16.210(b)and 16.*o) of this part.

(2) Identify the total number of individuals chemically tested annually for

dui?erous drugs in each of the categories of testing required by this part

Includlng the annual number of lndivlduale falling chemical tests and the

number and types of drugs for which

individuals tested positive.

[CGDM, 69 YR 47079.NOV. ~, 1986,S6

Emendedby Ct3D91-223,@ FR 45X, Jan. 23,

MM]

Subpart C-Standards for Chemlcai Testing for Dangerous

DsI&Sol Procedures for Transportation

Workplace Drug Testing Pro~

Drug testing programs subject to this

part shall be ccnducted in accordance

with 49 CFR part 40, Procedures for

Transportation Workplace Drug Testtig pI’C~aMS. l’hiS subpart SUM.Ma—

rises re~utrementafor drug testing prcfframa contained in those regulations.

Those regulations should be consulted

tc determine the specific procedures

which must be established and utillzed.

Drug testing prcgrsma required by this

part shall use only drug testing laboratories certified by the Department of

Health and Human Services (DHHS).

416910 General.

(a) CollectionWe. The employer shall

ensure that the collection site is adequate to provide for the collection, security, temporary storage, and shipping of specimens to a certlfled drug

testing laboratory.

(b) Securttu. Procedure shall provide

for the collection site tc be secure. Collection sites dedicated solely for specimen collection must be secure at all

times. Collection eltes which are not

dedicated solely for specimen collection must be secured during specimen

collection.

(c) Access to authorized personnel onlu.

No unauthorized p?u’eonnelshall be permitted in any part of a collection site

when specimens are collected nor ehall

unauthorised personnel be allowed access to stored epecimene.

(d) P?tuacy. procedures for collecting

urine speclmene shall allow for indivld-

:-316s40

ual pt4vacy unless there la reason to

believe -that a particular tndivldual

m .al*r or substitute the specimen

to be Provldcd

(e) Inteurftv of specimens. Collection

site personnel shall take precautions to

ensure that each speoimen la not adulterated or diluted during the collection

prooeea.

S16.SX) Cwofewtody.

(a)A chain of custody for each specimen to be chemically teeted ehall be

established and maintained from the

time of epecimen collection through

the testing of the epecimen.

(b) If a specimen la not immediately

Prepared for shipment, It shall be eafeguardti durix temporary storage.

(c) Every effort shall be made to minimize the number of persons handltng

specimens.

316S0S80specimen~ and chip

(a) The employer shall obtain a specimen collection and shipping kit to be

used to collect specimens and ship

them to the certified drug testing laboratory.

(b) The specimen collection and ship

ping kit, aa required by 49CFR part 40,

shall contain:

(1) Plastic urtne specimen bcttlesiin

a sufficient quantity to accommodate

the people to be teste@

(2) Means for eealing and Identifying

specimen bottlex

(3) chain of custody formx

(4) A eet of step-by-step instructions

which describe the proper procedures

to be followed during specimen collection, handling, and sbipp~ and

(5) Shipping materials.

(0) The martne employer aball ensure

that specimens are promptly shipped to

a certified testing laboratory meeting

the requirements of 616.340.Chain of

custody documents must accompany

each epectmen from the time of specimen collection through shipment to

and teatlng by the laboratory.

(d) Speclmene shall be shipped by an

expeditious means.

s16JM0 Tact laboratory mqufrem~

(a) The employer shall enmare that

all chemical testing for dangerous

257
75

$16CWD

~?efl_bYtiZticonduoted by a DHES oertifled laboratory.

0) The laboratory shall meet there-

@remente of 43 CFR part 40.

g16a60 Spedmsmanalysk

(8) Each specimen shall be ana13med

in acoordanoe with 49 CFR 40.39,which

reQuireetesting for-

:; y*u

(3) opiates!

(4) Phencyclidine (POP); and

(5) Amphetamines.

(b) A specimen which indicates the

presence of a dangerous drug at a level

equal to or exceeding the levels established in 43CFR 40.29is reported to the

Medical Review Officer as positive,

[CGD~, 88YR31NY7, May28,19931

S16960 Specimen analysis mportah

(a) The laboratory shall report all

test results aa required by 49 CFR

40.33(g). Reports are made within an

average of five days after receipt of a

specimen by the laboratory.

(b) The laboratory reports as negative all specimens which are negative

on the initial test or negative on the

confirmatory test. Only epecirnene confirmed positive are reported positive to

the Medical Review Officer for a speoiflc dmg or dmg metabollte.

[CGD~. ~ ~ 47079,NOV. ~, 1~, aS

amendedby CGD90-053,SEFR 311U?.May 28,

149YI

t 16970 Medloel Review of!ioer.

(a) The employer shall designate or

appoint a Medical Review Officer

(MRO) meet@ir the qualifications of o

CFR 40.33. If the employer does not

have a quallfled individual on staff to

serve as MRO, the employer may contractfor the provision of MM services

ae part of its drug testing program.

(b) The MRO shall review and interpret each confirmed positive test result

in accordance with 49 CFR 40.33.

(c) If the MRO verifies a laboratory

confhmed positive report, the MRO

shall report the positive test result to

the employer or the employer’s designated agent.

(d) Before an individual who has

failed a required chemical test for dangerous drugs may return to work

46 CFRm UIH-97 Q

aboard aveseel, the MROabaU *

mine that the individual is drag-he

and the rlek of subeeauent use of dangerous drugs by that person Is suUiciently low to just@ hle or her return

to work. In addition, the individual

eball agree to be subject to increaeed,

unannounced testing for a period es determined by the MRO of up to 60

months.

[C(3D86-067,63Y’R4’7079,NOV. 21,lw B FR

48367,Ncv. 30, 1988,as amendedby (2GD9&

053,68YRsllo7, May28,w]

#l&880 Release of infomnatiom

(a) Except &aprovided for in this part

and in \4.(&60 of this chapter, an employer shall not release individual test

results or other personal information

for anti-drug program records.

(b) Individual results from drug tests

required by thts part may be released if

the individual tested signs a epeciflc

authorization for the release of the results to an identified person.

(c) Nothing in this section shall PI’Svent an individual tested under this

part from obtaining the results of that

test.

Subparf D-\m!’lo’y@ Assktance

sMM’O#mployee Assistance Program

.

The employer shall provide an Employee Assistance Program (lZAP) for

all crewmembere. The employer may

establish the EAP as a part of its internal personnel services or the employer

may contract with an entity that will

provide EAP servicee to a crewmember.

Each EAP must include education and

training on drug use for cremnembers

and the employer’s supervisory personnel as provided below:

(a) EAP education program.’Each EAP

education program must include at

least the following elements: display

and distribution of informational material; display and distribution of a

ccmmunity service hot-line telephone

number for crewmember aeeiatanae,

and display and d.istrlbution of the employer’s IMlicy regarding drug and alcohol use In the workplace.

(b) EAP training program An ~

training program must be conducted

for the employer’s crewmembere and

258
% law

Supervisory pemonnel. The training

~gram must inolude at least the following elements: the effeots smd ooneequences of drug and alcohol use on

personal health, safety, and work environment: the manifestations and behavioral mea that may lndioate drug

and alcohol use and abuse; and documentation of training given to orewmembem and the employer’s supervisory personnel. Supervisory pemonnel must receive at least 60 minutes of

training.

Subpart E-Management

Information System

$l-k _-~rn=eJ Information Sye-

(a) All marine employers shall collect the drug and alcohol testing program data identified in this section for

eaeh calendar year, January 1 to December 31. Marine employers shall submit this data to the Coast Guard by

March 15 of the following year. The

data shall be submitted to Commandant (G-MOA), 2100 Second Street,

SW, Washington, DC, ‘2058WO01.

(b) All marine employers g~ll collect the following drug and alcohol

testing program data:

(1) Number of covered employees.

(2) Number of covered employees sub

ject to testing under the anti-drug

rules of more than one DOT agency because of the nature of their assigned

duties, identified by eaoh agenoy.

(3) Number of drug and alcohol tes~

by test type. The drug test types are

pre-employment, random, post-aooident and reasonable oauee. The alcohol

test types are post-aocident and reasonable oauee.

(4) Number of positive drug test results verified by a Medical Review Officer (MRO) by test type and type of

drug(s). Number of alcohol tests resulting in a blood alcohol concentration of

.04 percent by weight or more by test

type.

(5) Number of negatives reported by a

MRO by type of test.

(6) Number of applioanta denied employment based on a positive drug test

result verified by an MRO.

(7) Number of marine employees with

a positive drug test result verified by

an MRO, who were returned to duty in

a covered potaltion, having met the requirements of 516.370(d)and part 5 of

this ohapter.

(8) Number of marine employee drug

test results that MROS verify positive

for more than one drug or combination

of drugs.

(9) Number of covered employees who

refused to submit to a drug test required under this part.

(10) Marine empl~yee training and

education information.

(c) The data listed in mu%uzraph(b) of

this section must be submitted on

Form CG5573, which is reproduced in

appendix B to this part and may be obtained at any Officer in Charge, Marine

Inspection. All items on the form must

be completed. Data may be submitted

by consortia or other employer rep

resentatives on behalf of a marine employer. Reporta submitted in this manner may be on one form, but must also

be accompanied by a list of marine employers for whom the report is submitted. Unless submitting the report on

their own behalf, each marine employer must notify the Coast Guard

(Commandant (GMOA)) in writing of

the consortium or representative that

will submit the employer’s data, and

remains responsible for ensuring that

the data is submitted and is acourate.

(d) Marine employem that conduct

operations regulated by another Department of Transportation Operating

Administration must eubmit appropriate data to that Operating Administration for those employees oovered by

that Operating Administration’s regulations.

[CGD91-019,56 FR 682’77,MC. 23, 1293,m

amendedby CC3D95472. &lFR &)Ml.8ept. S,

189SCGD96-041,61FR ~. Sept. 27,1966]

APPENDIXA mE8mtmm]

2!59
77

“Pt.14 Aw, B 46 CFR ch,L(llM47.saho

.

A!

R

c.

D.

MARINEEMPLOYERINFORMATION i 1

~D ~ i 1

MARINEEMPLOYEEDRUQTESTINGINFORMATION IMl 2

MARINEEMPLOYEEALCOH~ TESTUWlNFORMAllON Iv-v 2

Pagol

i

260
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81

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85

APPENDIX C

POSTACCIDENT TESTING POLICY FOR THE U.S. COAST GUARD

MARINE SAFETY OFFICE, PORTLAND, MAINE

U.S. Department

IH

Commandin Officer

of Transportation “ “ US. Coast uard 4

Marine Safety Office

United States

Coast Guard

P.O. Box 108

Portland, ME 04112-01 OS

Phone (207) 780-3251

~ I 01997

COMMANDING OFFICER INSTRUCTION 16722.2

Subj : SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENT CHEMICAL TESTING

Ref: (a) Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 4

(b) Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations. Part 95

(c) COMDT COGARD Washington DC 151917Z Nov 94, ALDIST

179/94 Post Casualty Chemical Testing

(d) COMDTINST 16000.10, MSM Vol V

1. PURPOSE. This instruction provides guidelines for

Investigating Officers and their Field Office Supervisors in

ensuring that alcohol and drug (chemical) testing be performed as

soon as practicable in a case of a serious marine incident.

2. DISCUSSION. When a marine casualty, discharge of oil, or

release of a hazardous substance occurs, the marine employer is

required to make a timely, good faith determination as to whether

the occurrence is, or is likely to become, a serious marine

incident. A marine employer shall require all persons (not

limited to crewmembers) onboard the vessel whom the employer

determines to be directly involved in a serious marine casualty

to be chemically tested for dangerous drugs and alcohol. It is

Coast Guard policy that serious marine incident chemical testing

be done as soon as practicable to provide useful results for

investigative purpose. However, the Coast Guard personnel will

not provide urine collection materials or perform as the

collection site person.

3 . ACTION. All Marine Safety Field Office Supervisors and

Investigating Officers shall ensure compliance with the

requirements of this instruction.

4 . RESPONSIBILITY

a. Field Office Supervisors and Investigating Officers must be

familiar with the requirements in references (a) through (d) and

carry them out accordingly.

b. Upon receiving a report of marine casualty, the Field Office

Supervisor and Investigating Officer must immediately evaluate

the casualty to determine if the case is a serious marine

incident or likely to become one. If the accident is or will

become a serious marine incident, the Investigating Officer must

inform the marine employer and the master of the vessel

immediately about the requirement of post casualty chemical

testing. The testing must be conducted “AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

AFTER ADDRESSING THE SAFETY CONCERNS OF THE VESSEL. ”
1

86

c. The Investigating Officer may provide a copy of Post-accident

Drug and Alcohol Testing Overview (enclosure 1) and a copy of

List of Suggested Collection Sites (enclosure 2) to assist the

marine employer if necessary in ensuring timely chemical testing.

d. The Investigating Officer shall follow up with the marine

employer to determine when and where the drug and alcohol test

will be performed.

e. If the Investigating Officer determines that alcohol testing

will be delayed, the nearest Coast Guard Station (enclosure 3)

shall be contacted immediately to conduct breath alcohol testing

per reference (c). CGDONE(m) Program Guidance states that the

Alto-sensor equipment may be better used by stations and other

law enforcement units to avoid creditability conflicts during

Suspension and Revocation Hearings. However, this testing does not relieve the employer from having the required chemical test

for dangerous drugs performed. The Investigating Officer must

emphasize to the marine employer that both drug and alcohol

testing must be performed as soon as practicable,

f. When responding to a marine incident, the Investigating

Officer shall quickly determine who is directly involved with the

accident and make observations for signs of alcohol or other

intoxicants. Normally, the physical symptoms of people under the

influence of alcohol include: the individual’s manner (furtive,

trying to avoid face to face), disposition (belligerent,

threatening) , speech (slurred) , muscular movement (jerky,

clumsy) , general appearance (disheveled, glassy eyed) , or

behavior (confrontational). The Investigating Officer shall also

be aware of the smell of alcoholic beverage

clothes or breath.

g. The Investigating Officer shall provide

Marine Accident Report Form (CG-2692) and a

2692B, Report of Required Chemical Drug and

Following a Serious Marine Incident.

on the individual’s

the marine employer a

Coast Guard form CGAlcohol Testing

h. In case of an accident involving a foreign vessel, the

shipping agent of the vessel must also be immediately notified of

the chemical testing requirement.

i. The Investigating Officer or any other Coast Guard personnel

shall not perform as collectio l f

testing.

@many

chemical

BURTON S. RUSSELL

Encl: (1) Post-accident Drug and Alcohol Testing Requirements

(2) List of Suggested Collection Site for Marine Employers

(3) List of Coast Guard Stations

copy to: CGDONE (m)

DAP I

GP Portland

GP Southwest Harbor

I
87

POST ACCIDENT DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING REQUIREMENTS

What do the regulations requu ire?

When a marine casualty, discharge of oil, or release of a

hazardous substance occurs, the marine employer needs to make a

timely, good faith determination as to whether the occurrence is

or likely to become a serious marine incident. A marine employer

shall require all persons (not limited to crewmembers) on board

the vessel(s) whom the employer determines to be directly

involved in a serious marine incident to be chemically tested for

dangerous drugs and alcohol. 46 CFR 4.06

Who is responsible for the testing?

The marine employer has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring

that the requirements of the federal requirements of postaccident testing be carried out. Employees must provide a urine

sample for drug testing, and a blood or breath sample for alcohol

testing, when directed by their marine employer or any law

enforcement officer. 46 CFR 4.06

What is a serious marine incident?

A serious marine incident, as defined by 46 CFR 4.03-2, includes

the following events:

1. A discharge of 10,000 gallons or more of oil into navigable

waters of the United States, whether or not resulting from a

marine casualty.

2. A discharge of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance

into navigable waters or into the environment of the United

States, whether or not resulting from a marine casualty.

3. A marine casualty or accident that is required by 46 CFR

4.05-1 to be reported to the Coast Guard which results in any of

the following:

a. One or more deaths;

b. An injury to any person (including passengers) which

requires medical treatment beyond first aid, and, in the

case of a person employed on board a commercial vessel,

which renders the person unable to perform routine vessel

duties;

c. Damage to property in excess of $100,000.00

d. Actual or constructive loss of any inspected vessel; or

e. Actual or constructive total loss of any uninspected, selfpropelled vessel of 100 gross tons or more.

How long do I have to collect the sample?

The regulations do not set a specific time limit but require

collections "as soon as practicable." They also state that the

regulations shall not prevent a person from performing duties in

the aftermath of an accident to protect lives, property, or the

environment. Each case will be different, however it should be

noted evidence of alcohol can leave the body quite quickly.
I

What if somethinga be comes a serious marine incident a week later ?

The marine employer must make a honest decision of whether or not

a certain incident is likely to become a serious marine incident.

Some information, such as the cost of property damage or the

amount of oil spilled, may not be available for days or months.

If the employer determines that something is likely to become a

serious marine incident, the employer shall determine who was

directly involved and order testing. The Coast Guard understands

that the employer can honestly fail to predict if an event could

become a serious marine incident. Also, an employee often will

report that he/she had an accident some time ago and now wants to

see a doctor. There is no precise time limit in the regulations

to guide an employer as to when it is “too late” to test.

Who is "DIRECTLY INVOLVED” in a serious marine incident?

An individual whose order, action or failure to act is determined

to have, or cannot be ruled out as, having caused or contributed

to a serious marine incident is “directly involved”. A law

enforcement officer, such as a Coast Guard officer or a state or

local police officer may also determine that a person was

directly involved in a serious marine incident. If this happens,

the marine employer shall then take all practicable steps to

collect the required samples.

Specimen Collection Equipment

Urine collection and shipping kits must be maintained aboard

vessels, unless they can be readily obtained within 24 hours of

an incident. Inspected vessels certificated for unrestricted

ocean routes must have a breath testing device on board to test

for alcohol.

Post-Accident Reporting Requ irements

A Coast Guard form CG-2692B, Report of Required Chemical Drug and

Alcohol Testing Following a Serious Marine Incident, must be

submitted to the appropriate Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection

following any serious marine incident. This form should be

submitted along with a form CG-2692, Report of Marine Incident,

Injury or Death, if a CG-2692 is required to be submitted. The

drug test results will not always be available when the CG-2692

and CG-2692B are submitted. The marine employer must report the

test results, positive or negative, when they receive them.

Acknowledged by: Date: Time:

Investigating Officer: Date: Time:
89

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90

LIST OF COAST GUARD STATIONS IN THE COTP PORTLAND AOR

USCG Station Boothbay Harbor, ME (207) 633-2664

(207) 633-2661 (SAR)

USCG SARDET Eastport, ME (207) 853-2845 (SAR)

USCG Station West Jonesport, ME (207) 497-2134

(207) 497-5700 (SAR)

USCG Station Portsmouth Harbor, NH (603) 436-4415

(603) 436-4414 (SAR)

USCG Station Rockland, ME (207) 596-6667

(207) 596-6666 (SAR)

USCG Station South Portland, ME (207) 767-0363

(207) 767-0364

ENCLOSURE (3)=
91

APPENDIX D

PORTLAND BOARD OF HARBOR COMMISSIONERS

DRUG AND ALCOHOL POLICY

BOARD OF HARBOR COMMISSIONERS

for the HARBOR of PORTLAND

Pilot Alcohol and Drug Policy Testing Procedures

Adopted December 12, 1996
1.0 POLICY STATEMENT

1.1 It is the intent of this policy to assure compliance with Federal and State

laws and regulations regarding drug and alcohol testing of pilots licensed by the

Board of Harbor Commissioners for the Harbor of Portland (the “Board”) to

operate or provide service to vessels in the Harbor of Portland (the “Harbor”).

1.2 The Board has a strong commitment to the health, safety and welfare of all

persons working, traveling or recreating in or near the Harbor. Therefore the

Board seeks to license pilots who are free of illegal and abused drugs and

alcohol, and protect pilots and the public from the adverse effects of alcohol and

drug abuse. The Board also seeks to protect the reputations of pilots against

unfounded allegations of substance abuse.

The Board requires applicants seeking pilot’s licenses to undergo an alcohol and

drug test to detect the presence of alcohol and drug abuse substances in the

body. Any applicant with a positive pre-license test maybe denied a license by

the Board by reason of the positive test.

1.3 Studies indicate that the use and misuse of alcohol or drugs, whether

prescribed or illegal, impairs the ability of a pilot to perform assigned duties,

particularly those involved in safety sensitive operations, and may endanger the pilot, co-workers, the public, and public and private property. The Board seeks to

prevent pilots from using alcohol and drugs when the use of such is illegal or in

any way endangers the public.

2.0 DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING

2.1 All applicants for pilot’s license shall be required to pass a drug and

alcohol test as a prerequisite to being granted a license

2.2 Pilots shall remain free from the abuse of alcohol and controlled

substances. A pilot maybe tested at any time while on duty, or immediately

before or after being on-duty, based on the following:

2.2.1 Reasonable suspicion that the pilot (see definition, reasonable

suspicion):

2.2.1.1 has unlawfully used illicit drugs and/or abused controlled

substances; or

2.2.1.2 has reported for work under the influence of or has illicitly

ingested controlled substances or alcohol during work hours.

2.2.2 Post-Accident following involvement in a piloting accident as

defined in section 5.10 below.

I

2.2.3 Random selection equivalent to that mandated under 49 CFR.

1
2.2.4 Returning to duty following a confirmed positive test. (see section

5.11 and 5.12)

3.0 RESPONSIBILITY

It is the responsibility of the Board to administer and enforce this policy and the

procedures as outlined. An offer of employment by the Board for a position

classifying as a “pilot” under this policy shall not be deemed to be final, nor shall

a prospective employee have the right to accept any offeror suggestion of an offer of employment until such time as a drug test evaluation has been received

and cleared by the Board. Any work performed by an individual for or in behalf of

the Board prior to such approval shall not involve the operation of any Board

vessel prior to testing. Any applicant for a pilot’s license issued by the Board

shall submit results of drug and alcohol tests as a prerequisite for issuance of a

license.

The Board will contract for specimen collection, medical review and testing. It is

the responsibility of the Board to see that employees and licensees have notice

of and are familiar with these drug and alcohol policies and procedures.

4.0 DEFINITION(S)

4.1 Alcohol and Drug Test - A generally accepted and proven test

methodology or methodologies as recommended by the Rules and Regulations

under CFR 49 Part 653, Prevention of Prohibited Drug Use in Transit Operations

and CFR 49 Part 382, Substances and Alcohol Use and Testing, and 49 CFR

Part 40, Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug Testing Programs. This

test method determines whether an individual has ingested or otherwise used the

substance in question within a period of time before the test.

4.2 Breath Alcohol Technician (BAT) - Professional trained and certified in the

use of an evidential breath testing device (EBT).

4.3 Applicant - A person who has applied to the Board for a pilot’s license,

including current pilots applying for re-licensing.

4.4 Medical Review Officer (MRO) - Physician responsible for reviewing all

test results for confirmation prior to communicating same to the Board. The MRO must protect the confidentiality of the individual involved.

4.5 NIDA - The National Institute on Drug Abuse (also known as Substance

Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, or SAM HSA), or other

successor agency.

2
I

94

4.6 Pilot - Any person licensed by the Board of Harbor Commissioners,

including State licensed bar pilots and State licensed docking masters, and also

including Board of Harbor Commissioners staff operating any Harbor

Commission patrol vessel

4.7 Positive Test - Alcohol and Drug tests results that meet or exceed the

standards outlined under 49 CFR.

4.8 Random Testing - A scientific method used to select pilots for testing at

random. This method will be performed throughout the year, and will involve the

annual testing of a minimum of 50% for drugs and 25% for alcohol of a pool that

includes all pilots, as that term is defined in this policy, with the individuals tested

being selected at random. The minimum percent to be tested may decrease in

subsequent years based upon the number of confirmed positive test results.

4.9 Reasonable suspicion - A belief based on specific facts and reasonable

inferences drawn from those facts that a pilot is under the influence of drugs or

alcohol to the extent that job performance maybe impaired or the ability to

perform the job safely may be reduced. Circumstances which constitute a basis

for determining “reasonable suspicion” may include, but are not limited to:

4.9.1 a pattern of abnormal or erratic behavior;

4.9.2 information provided by a reliable and credible source, and

confirmed by a second reliable and credible source;

4.9.3 direct observation of drug or alcohol use;

4.9.4 presence of the physical symptoms of drug or alcohol use (i.e.,

glassy or bloodshot eyes, alcohol odor on breath, slurred speech, poor

coordination and/or reflexes).

4.10 Substance Abuse - The use of alcohol, prescription or over the counter

drugs, any of which impairs the ability of a pilot to perform the job safely and

effectively, or the use of illegal drugs or other controlled substances without a

valid prescription.

5.0 PROCEDURE(S) FOR TESTING

5.1 Drugs to be Tested For:

When chemical drug and alcohol screening is required under the provisions of

this policy, a breath test and/or urinalysis test will be given to detect the presence

of the following drug groups:

5.1.1 Alcohol (ethyl)

5.1.2 Amphetamines

3

I
95

5.1.3 Cocaine

5.1.4 Opiates

5.1.5 Phencyclidine (PCP)

5.1.6 THC (Marijuana)

5.1.7 Other substances as required by applicable federal or state law

5.2 Testing Techniques

5.2.1 Drug Testing: Drug testing is accomplished by analyzing the pilot’s

urine specimen (urinalysis). Specimens will be collected at an off-site

facility selected by the Board. The testing facility must assure that

specimen collection be done in a dignified, professional and confidential

manner. Once the pilot provides a urine specimen, it is sealed and

labeled by a certified/authorized agent of the testing facility. A chain of

custody document is completed in the presence of the employee, and the

specimen is shipped to a SAMHSA certified laboratory.

All urinalysis procedures are required to include split-specimen

techniques. Each urine sample is subdivided into two containers and

labeled as primary and split specimens. Both specimens are forwarded to

the laboratory. Only the primary specimen is used in the urinalysis. In the

event of a confirmed positive test result, the split specimen may be used

for a second confirmation test if requested by the pilot.

During testing an initial screening testis performed. If the testis positive

for one or more drugs, a confirmation test will be performed for each

individual drug using gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS)

analysis. This test ensures that over the counter medications are not

reported as positive results.

If the analysis of the primary specimen results in a confirmed positive test,

the pilot may within 72 hours request that the split specimen also be tested

at the SAMHSA laboratory of his choice. The second test is at the pilot’s

expense unless the test results are negative, in which case the Board shall

reimburse the pilot.

All test results are reviewed by a physician Medical Review Officer (MRO)

prior to results being reported to the Board. In the event of a positive test

result, the MRO will first contact the pilot via telephone and conduct an

interview to determine if there are any alternative legitimate reasons for the positive result (such as over-the-counter or prescription medications).

If the MRO determines there is a legitimate medical explanation for the

presence of drugs, the result will be reported as negative.

4
5.2.2 Alcohol Testing: Alcohol testing will be conducted using an

evidential breath testing (EBT) device. The test breath must be performed

by a certified Breath Alcohol Technician (BAT) trained in the use of the

EBT and alcohol testing procedures. Post-accident tests conducted by

law enforcement personnel will be acceptable.

Two (2) breath tests are required to determine if an individual is over the

alcohol concentration limit permitted. Any result of less that 0.02

concentration is considered a negative result. Any result of greater that

0.02 requires a confirmation test. A confirmed test of 0.04 or greater is

considered a positive result.

5.3 Applicant Testing: General Standard

Applicants for pilot’s licenses will be required to undergo a chemical drug

and alcohol test before being licensed.

5.4 Current Pilot Testing: General Standard

5.4.1 The Board may require a currently licensed pilot to undergo drug

and alcohol testing if there is reasonable suspicion by the Board that the

pilot is under the influence of drugs or alcohol during work hours.

5.4.2 The Board is required to document the specific facts, symptoms, or

observations which formed the basis that reasonable suspicion existed or

did not exist to warrant the testing of a pilot.

5.4.3 The Board shall require a currently licensed pilot to undergo postaccident drug and alcohol testing if the pilot is involved in a work-related

serious marine incident as that term is defined in 45 CFR §4.03-2 and

applied to the United States Coast Guard.

5.4.4 All current and future pilots shall be subject to Random Testing,

5.4.5 Pilots having had a confirmed positive test will be subject to retesting at the time they return to work. After returning to work, they will be

subject to follow-up testing without notice for up to 60 months.

5.5 Prior Notice of Testing Policy

The Board shall provide written notice of its drug and alcohol testing policy

to all pilots who are subject to the policy and all applicants. The notice

shall contain the following information:

5.5.1 the need for drug and alcohol testing;

5.5.2 the circumstances under which testing may be required;

5.5.3 the procedure for confirming an initial positive drug test result;

5
97

5.6

5.7

5.8

5.9

5.10

5.5.4 the consequences of a confirmed positive test result and the appeal

procedures available;

5.5.5 the consequences of refusing to undergo a drug and alcohol test;

5.5.6 the right to explain a positive test result and the appeal procedures

available; and

5.5.7 the availability of drug abuse counseling and referral services.

Notice and Consent

Before a drug and alcohol testis administered, pilots and will be asked to

sign a consent form authorizing the test and permitting the release of test

results to the Board. The chemical screen consent form shall provide

space to indicate current or recent use of prescription and over-thecounter medication.

Applicant Testing

Before the Board may grant a pilot’s license, the applicant must show

proof of a negative drug test and a negative alcohol screening test.

Reasonable Suspicion Testing.

Any Board member, employee or pilot receiving information indicating a

reasonable suspicion of substance abuse by a pilot shall refer the

information to the United States Coast Guard. In the event the United

States Coast Guard performs reasonable suspicion testing of any pilot

required to comply with this Policy, the pilot shall cause the results of the

test to be provided to the MRO, who, after confirmation, will forward them

to the Board.

Random Testing

Random testing shall be performed quarterly or more frequently

throughout the year, and shall initially involve testing a minimum of 50%

for drugs and 25% for alcohol per year of a pool that includes all pilots.

The pilots tested shall be selected at random and the tests shall be

unannounced. Random testing of pilots shall be conducted only during

the onduty hours of the pilot being tested or immediately before or after

being on-duty.

Post-Accident Testing

Post-accident drug and alcohol testing will be conducted on any pilot

involved in a work-related serious marine incident as that term is defined

in 46 CFR $4.03-2 and applied to the United States Coast Guard. In the

event the United States Coast Guard performs post-accident testing of any

6
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5.11

5.12

5.13

5.14

5.15

pilot required to comply with this Policy, the pilot shall cause the results of the test be provided to the MRO, who, after confirmation, will forward them

to the Board. A police officer from the City of Portland or South Portland

may perform the test and provide the results to the MRO, who, after

confirmation, will forward them to the Board.

Return-To-Duty Testing

Any pilot returning to duty following a confirmed positive test must be

subjected to a return-to-duty test following the same guidelines described

in section 5.6. The test must show a verified negative result prior to the

employee returning to duty.

Follow-Up Testing

5.12.1 A pilot returning to work following a confirmed positive test shall be

subject to unannounced follow-up testing for a period of not less than 12

months and not more than 60 months. A mandatory minimum of six (6)

tests any time during the first twelve (12) months is required. Pilots

subject to follow-up testing must also remain in the random pool.

5.12.2 Follow-up tests may be used to determine whether or not the drug

is still being used.

Refusal to Consent: Applicants

An applicant who refuses to consent to a drug and alcohol screening test

will be denied a license.

Refusal to Consent: Pilots

A pilot who refuses to consent to a drug and alcohol screening test when

selected for random testing, or when reasonable suspicion of drug and

alcohol use has been identified, is subject to license suspension or

revocation The reason(s) for the refusal shall be considered in

determining the appropriate disciplinary action.

Confirmation of Chemical Test Results

5.15.1 A pilot or job applicant whose drug test yields a positive result,

confirmed by the MRO, will be given a second test. The second test will

use a portion of the same test sample withdrawn from the pilot for use in

the first test.

5.15.2 If the second test confirms the positive test result, the pilot will be

notified of the results by the MRO, who will offer the pilot an opportunity to

discuss the results. The MRO will then notify the Board of the results in

writing. The letter of notification shall identify the particular substance

found and its concentration level.

7
99

5.16 Consequences of a Confirmed Positive Test Result

5.16.1 Applicants: Applicants will be denied licenses if their initial positive

test results have been confirmed.

5.16.2 Pilots: If a pilot’s positive test result has been confirmed, the Board

shall suspend or revoke the license.

5.17 Confidentiality of Test Results

5.17.1 All information from a pilot’s or applicant’s drug and alcohol testis

strictly confidential. Disclosure of test results to any other person, agency

or organization is prohibited unless written authorization is obtained from

the pilot or applicant, or unless disclosure is required by a superseding law

or in accordance with the exceptions listed in 5.17.2 below. The results of

a positive drug test shall not be released by the MRO to the Board until

confirmed. The records of unconfirmed positive test results and negative

test results shall be destroyed by the testing laboratory. All positive test

results will be maintained by the MRO, and reported to the Board, where

they will be kept on file.

5.17.2 Exceptions to these confidentiality provisions are limited to a

decision maker in arbitration, litigation, or administrative proceedings

arising out of a positive drug or alcohol test or other violation of these

rules.

5.18 Privacy in Chemical Testing

5.18.1 Urine samples shall be provided in a private rest room stall or

similar enclosure so that pilots may not be viewed while providing the

sample. Street clothes, bags, briefcases, purses, and other containers

shall not be carried into the test area. The water in the commode, if any,

shall be colored with dye to protect against dilution of test samples.

5.18.2 An applicant or employee may waive the right to privacy and

provide the urine sample in the presence of a witness (of the same

gender) and not be required to disrobe and wear a hospital gown.

5.19 Laboratory Testing Requirements

5.19.1 All chemical drug and alcohol testing of pilots and applicants shall

be conducted at medical facilities or laboratories selected by the Board

pursuant to this Policy, with the exception of a breath test for alcohol

performed by a South Portland or Portland police officer, which maybe

conducted at a police station. To be considered as a testing site, a

medical facility or lab must submit in writing a description of the

procedures that will be used to maintain test samples. Factors to be

8
considered by the Board in selecting a testing facility include in addition to

NIDA (SAMHSA) certification:

5.19.1.1 Testing procedures which ensure privacy to pilots

consistent with the prevention of tampering;

5.19.1.2 Methods of analysis which ensure reliable test results,

including the use of gas chromatography/mass spectrometry to

confirm positive test results;

5.19.1.3 Chain-of-custody procedures which ensure proper

identification, labeling and handling of test samples; and I

5.19.1.4 Retention and storage procedures which ensure

reliable results on confirmatory tests of original samples.

5.20 Second Confirmation Test

5.20.1 The pilot may request from the MRO a second confirmation test of

the same sample within 72 hours of notice that the first test was positive.

5.20.2 The cost of the second confirmation test must be paid in advance

by the pilot. If the testis negative, the Board shall reimburse the pilot for

the cost of the test.

5.20.3 The second confirmation test will be performed by a NIDA

(SAMHSA) certified laboratory selected by the pilot. I
BOARD OF HARBOR COMISSIONER FOR THE HARBOR OF PORTLAND

Pilot Breath Teat &/or Urinalysis Consent Form

The Board of Harbor Commissioners for the Harbor of Portland (“Board”) has a

strong commitment to the health, safety and welfare of all persons in or near the Harbor.

Use and misuse of alcohol or drugs, whether prescribed or illegal, impairs the ability of a

pilot to perform necessary and essential duties related to the piloting of vessels, and may endanger the pilot, co-workers, the public, and public and private property. The

Board seeks to prevent pilots from using alcohol and drugs when the use of such is

illegal, or in any way endangers the public. The Board also seeks to protect the

reputations of pilots against unfounded allegations of substance abuse.

The Board may require a currently licensed pilot to undergo drug and alcohol testing consisting of: random testing; post-accident testing; reasonable suspicion

testing; and follow-up testing. Refusal to be tested may subject a pilot to license

suspension or revocation.

I CONSENT TO BREATH TESTS AND URINE SAMPLE COLLECTION AND

TESTING FOR ALCOHOL AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.

I UNDERSTAND THAT A POSITIVE TEST RESULT WILL RENDER ME

UNQUALIFIED TO OPERATE A VESSEL IN THE HARBOR AND MAY RESULT IN

SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF MY LICENSE.

THE MEDICAL REVIEW OFFICER CONTRACTED BY THE BOARD WILL

MAINTAIN THE RESULTS OF MY TEST. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE RESULTS WILL

BE REPORTED TO THE BOARD. IF THE RESULTS ARE POSITIVE, THE

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WILL BE IDENTIFIED. THE RESULTS WILL NOT BE

RELEASED TO OTHER PARTIES WITHOUT MY WRITTEN CONSENT.

I UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE CONDITIONS AND HEREBY AGREE TO

COMPLY WITH THEM.

Test(s) to be administered (check appropriate test(s)):

_ Urinalysis for drug use _ Breath test for alcohol use

Pilot’s name (please print)

Pilot’s signature

Date

Social security number

10

103

APPENDIX E

ACROSS-AGENCY SUMMARY OF FEDERAL POSTACCIDENT

TESTING REGULATIONS

Agency/applicable

CFR

Required specimens Responsible for test Timeliness

requirements

Penalties for noncompliance

USCG

 46 CFR 4

 46 CFR 16

Blood or breath or

both; urine

Employer or law

enforcement officer

A  $1,000 per violation, per day until

violation corrected.

 33 CFR 95 Breath, blood, urine,

and saliva or other

bodily fluids or

tissues

 FY 99 USCG reauthorization

proposes increase to $5,000.

FRA

 49 CFR 219 Blood and urine;

breath

Employer A, B, C  Schedule of penalties at

49 CFR 219, Appendix A.

 Fines range from $5,000 to $10,000

depending upon the offense.

FHWA

 49 CFR 382

 49 CFR 391

Breath and urine Employer A, D, E, F  Penalties applied according to

49 U.S.C. 521b.

RSPA

 49 CFR 199 Breath and urine Employer A, D, E, G  Civil penalties at 49 CFR 190.223.

Maximum fine of $25,000 per day,

per offense up to $500,000.

 Criminal penalties include $25,000

fine or imprisonment not to exceed

15 years or both.

FTA

 49 CFR 653

 49 CFR 654

Breath and urine Employer A, D, E ,G  Suspension of grantee’s eligibility

for Federal and State funding.

 Criminal violations applied

according to 18 U.S.C. 1001.

FAA

 14 CFR 121 Breath and urine Employer A, D, E, G  Revocation of employer certification.

Timeliness Requirements

A—As soon as practicable after accident, test for alcohol and drugs.

B—If no alcohol or drug testing performed within 4 hours, record why not promptly done.

C—If no alcohol or drug testing performed within 8 hours of notifying supervisor of the accident, cease attempts

 to test.

D—If no alcohol testing performed within 2 hours, record why not done.

E—If no alcohol testing performed within 8 hours, cease attempts to test and record why not done.

F—If no drug testing performed within 32 hours, cease attempts to test and record why not done.

 G—Obtain drug test no later than 32 hours after accident.