An Assessment of Alternatives for a National

Computerized Criminal History System

October 1982

NTIS order #PB83-166678
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 82-600643

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
-.. . ———

Foreword

This report addresses four major areas: 1) the status of criminal history record

systems in the United States; 2) the alternatives for a national computerized criminal history (CCH) system; 3) the possible impacts of such a system; and 4) the

relevant policy issues that warrant congressional attention to ensure that the beneficial impacts of a national CCH system are maximized and the possible adverse

impacts controlled or minimized.

Conducted at the request of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, this study is the last of four components of the OTA assessment of Societal

Impacts of National Information Systems. The other components include a

September 1981 OTA report on Computer-Based National Information Systems:

Technology and Public Policy Issues; a March 1982 background paper on Selected

Electronic Funds Transfer Issues: Privacy, Security, and Equity; and an August

1982 OTA report on Implications of Electronic Mail and Message Systems for

the U.S. Postal Service.

In preparing this CCH report, OTA has drawn on working papers developed

by OTA staff and contractors, extensive related research on criminal history record

systems carried out by SEARCH Group, Inc., and others, and operating data and

descriptive information provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and various States. The final draft of this report was reviewed by the OTA project advisory panel and by a broad spectrum of interested individuals and organizations

from the criminal justice community.

OTA appreciates the participation of the advisory panelists, external reviewers,

and others who helped bring this study to fruition. It is, however, solely the responsibility of OTA, not of those who so ably advised and assisted us in its preparation.

Director

. . . ///
Computerized Criminal History Systems Advisory Panel

Arthur S. Miller, Chairman

Professor of Law Emeritus

The George Washington University

Joe Armstrong

Armstrong Associates

Jerry Berman

Legislative Counsel

American Civil Liberties Union

Robert Gallati

Professor of Criminal Justice

Northeastern University

Lance Hoffman

Professor of Electrical Engineering

The George Washington University

Gerald Caplan*

Professor of Law

The George Washington University

John Kennedy

Director, Rodino Institute of Criminal

Justice

Jersey City State College

Steve Kolodney

Executive Director

SEARCH Group, Inc.

Barry Mahoney

Director of Research

Institute for Court Management

Jeffrey A. Meldman

Professor of Management Science

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Arthur R. Miller

Professor of Law

Harvard University

J. Francis Pohlhaus**

Former Counsel

National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People

Christopher Pyle

Professor of Political Science

Mount Holyoke College

James Rule

Professor of Sociology

State University of New York at

Stony Brook

Richard M. Schmidt

General Counsel

American Society of Newspaper Editors

Carl Vorlander

Executive Director

National Association of State

Information Systems

Iram Weinstein

System Planning Corp.

Elyce Zenoff

Professor of Law

The George Washington University

*Resigned in 1980. * *~eCea~ed,

iv
OTA Computerized Criminal History Systems Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA

Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Sam Hale, Interim Program Manager

Communication and Information Technologies*

Fred B. Wood, Project Director**

Jean E. Smith, Study Coordinator***

Zalman A. Shaven, Senior Analyst

Fred W. Weingarten, Senior Analyst*

Elizabeth A. Emanuel, Administrative Assistant

Shirley A. Gayheart, Secretary

Jeanette Contee, Wordprocessor

Contractors

Kenneth C. Laudon, John Jay School of Criminal Justice,

City University of New York

Donald A. Marchand, Bureau of Governmental Research and

Service, University of South Carolina

Myron Uretsky, Business Experience International, Inc.

Renee G. Ford, Tifford Producers, Inc.

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

*March 1981 through February 1982; Stephen E. Doyle served as Program Manager through February 1981; Fred W. Weingarten was appointed

Program Manager effective March 1982. * ● Ruann E, pengov Ser},d a9 ~oject Director from C)ctober 1978 to June 1979; Marcia J. Mc,Naughton served as Study Director from October

1978 to July 1980.

● **Since March 1981.
Acknowledgments

The following individuals served as subcontractors or reviewers. However, the report is solely the responsibility of OTA.

Subcontractors

Under the direction of Donald A. Marchand:

Eva G. Bogan, Steven W. Hays, Sena H. Black,

Lynne Eickholt Cooper, and Mark E. Tompkins

of the Bureau of Governmental Research and Services, University of South Carolina.

Under the direction of Kenneth C. Laudon: Abbe

Mowshowitz, Michael B. Brink, Karl Kindig, Alan

Mitchell, Marcy Block, Celeste Norris, Michael

Cheek, Richard Rahm, George Wright, Marian

Stevens, Steven Ruth, Thomas Carrillo, Donald

Betzold, Mark Robin, Sharon Weber (City University of New York), and Richard Faust (Calculogic

Corp.).

Reviewers

Hon. Sidney P. Abramson, Minnesota State Court

H. A. Albert, Texas Department of Public Safety

S. S. Ashton, Jr., U.S. Department of Justice

Conrad Banner, FBI Identification Division

Louise Becker, Congressional Research Service

Dwight E. Bee, Illinois Department of Law Enforcement

Howard G. Bjorklund, Wisconsin Division of Law

Enforcement Services

Robert J. Bradley, Missouri State Highway Patrol

W. Gray Buckley, Colorado Bureau of Investigation

William G. Connelie, New York State Police

William J. Corbett, Ann Arbor (Michigan) Police

Department

William C. Corley, North Carolina Police Information Network

Adam F. D’Alessandro, New York Division of

Criminal Justice Services

Thomas Dalton, Seattle University

Norman Darwick, International Association of

Chiefs of Police

Richard L. DeHahn, U.S. Department of Justice

Richard W. Delaplain, Alaska Court System

Robert L. Edwards, Florida Department of Law

Enforcement

Stuart A. Elliot, Kansas Highway Patrol

L. G. Finn, Louisiana State Police

Harry Garmat, Connecticut State Police

Larry Goldman, International Association of

Chiefs of Police

Carl Gray, Jr., Kansas Highway Patrol

David G. Hall, Wyoming Division of Criminal

Identification

Margaret J. Horvath, Florida Department of Law

Enforcement

Gerald L. Hough, Michigan State Police

Donald G. Ingraham, Alameda County (California)

District Attorney’s Office

Benjamin R. Jones, Pennsylvania State Police

Julie Jones, U.S. Department of Justice

Paul H. Kusuda, Wisconsin Division of

Corrections

E. W. Manseau, Georgia Bureau of Investigation

David F. Nemecek, FBI National Crime Information Center

Ronald L. Nolfe, American University

A. Lawrence Peterson, Montana Board of Crime

Control

Thomas Poch, Ramsey County (Minnesota)

District Attorney’s Office

Larry P. Polansky, District of Columbia Courts

James R. Rebo, Minnesota Supreme Court Information Systems Office

J. Randolph Riley, Tenth Prosecutorial District

(Raleigh, N. C.) District Attorney

Louis H. Sakin, Massachusetts Criminal History

Systems Board

Duane A. Sciford, Alameda County (California)

Public Defender’s Office

Jack J. Schmerling, National Legal Aid and Defender’s Association

Jan M. Schultz, Alabama Administrative Office

of Courts

P. H. Schultz, Washington State Patrol

Charles J. Shuster, District of Columbia Police

Department

Terril Steichen, National Telecommunications and

Information Administration, U.S. Department

of Commerce

Walter E. Stone, Rhode Island State Police

Timothy P. Sweeney, National Law Enforcement

Telecommunications System

Ray L. Turner, Memphis (Tennessee) Police

Department

W. R. Wagner, Jr., Virginia State Police

Frederic Withington, Arthur D. Little, Inc.

Fred Wynbrandt, California Department of

Justice

Raymond Young, FBI Consultant

vi
Contents

Chapter Page

Overview . . ix

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

Summary . . . . . . . . . . 3

Nature and Origins of Criminal History Records 21

Evolution to Computerized Criminal History Records . 31

Description of the National Crime Information Center in Context 39

NCIC Technology and Costs ... . . 51

Legal/Regulatory Framework for NCIC, Ident, and State CCH Systems 61

Use and Users of NCIC/CCH, Ident, and State CCH Systems . . . 77

Record Quality in Federal and State Criminal History Information Systems. 89

State and Local Management of Criminal History Information Systems 99

Major Structural Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal

History System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Possible Impacts of a National CCH System on the Criminal Justice

Process . . . . . . 125

Other Impact Areas Relevant to a National CCH System: Employment and

Licensure, Minority Groups, Federalism, Monitoring or Surveillance

Potential, and Constitutional Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Congressional Policy Considerations, Part I . . . . 153

Congressional Policy Considerations, Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Appendixes Page

A. Status of NCIC Hot Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

B. State Officials Responding to OTA 50-State Survey Conducted in 1979-80 . . . 193

C. State Repository Officials Responding to OTA User Survey Conducted

in 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

D. State Officials Contacted in OTA Followup Survey Conducted in

August 1982 . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

vii
Overview

The United States already has a national

criminal history system. It is partly manual

and partly computerized, and includes criminal record and fingerprint card repositories

maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) criminal identification file

(known as Ident) and 49 State identification

bureaus. The national system also includes the

computerized criminal history (CCH) files in

the FBI’s National Crime Information Center

(NCIC) and in 27 States. Seven other States

have a computerized name index to their manual files, and 10 more States are in the process of implementing a computerized index. As

of October 1981, Ident held about 6 million

automated criminal history records, NCIC/

CCH held about 1.9 million, and the 27 State

CCH files collectively held about 11.5 million

records. For the interstate exchange of criminal history records, the national system uses

the U.S. Mail, the NCIC communication network, and the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS). The many

local and metropolitan criminal history record

systems, either manual or automated, are also

part of this national system.

Thus, most of the building blocks for a national computerized criminal history record

system are already in place. Technically, there

are many ways that a national CCH system

could be designed. At one end of the spectrum,

criminal history records for all offenders could

be stored in a central national repository. At

the other end, a national repository could be

limited to records of Federal offenders, with

records of State offenders stored only in the

respective State repositories. The emerging

consensus among Federal and State criminal

record repository and law enforcement officials

favors the latter, with only Federal offender

records and an index to State offenders (known

as the Interstate Identification Index or “III”)

maintained at the national level along with a

national fingerprint file on serious criminal

offenders.

Criminal history records are used at all levels of government, by all sectors of the criminal justice community, and increasingly by

the noncriminal justice community as well. To

the extent that a national CCH system provides information that is more complete, timely, and verifiable (based on positive identification) than is presently available, the system

would improve the functioning of the criminal

justice process. The most significant improvements are likely to be in the areas of criminal

investigations, police booking and intake, pretrial release and bail decisions, and presentence investigation reports. For example, the

impact could be particularly significant in pretrial release and bail decisions, which typically must be made within 36 to 72 hours after

arrest. If accurate and complete, CCH records

could help prosecutors and judges better balance the need to protect the public from harm

by defendants out on bail versus the need to

minimize the detention of defendants on

charges for which they have not been tried

under due process of law. The potential contribution of a national CCH system becomes

even more important in view of State bail and

sentencing reforms that place greater reliance

on criminal history information, and the many

recommendations of the U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime that involve criminal history records.

Depending on how a national CCH system

is controlled and used, the quality of the CCH

records exchanged, and the standards set for

access and operation, the system could have

important implications for employment and

licensure, Federal-State relationships, and civil

and constitutional rights, as well as for public

safety and the administration of justice. Full

implementation of III (or any other national

CCH system) raises a number of issues that

warrant congressional attention to ensure that

beneficial impacts are maximized and potentially adverse impacts are controlled or minimized.

Policy Control.—Considerable debate has

focused on which agency or organization(s)

should have direct policy control over a national CCH system. Suggestions include a consortium of States, a broadened and strengthened

NCIC Advisory Policy Board (APB), an independent board, and/or the FBI. For example,

a strengthened APB could include greater repix
———

resentation from the prosecutorial, judicial,

correctional, and public defender sectors than

at present, and could include an “advise and

consent” role, at least with respect to State

and local participation in a national system.

There are many other possibilities, but the key

issue is how to devise a mechanism that will

effectively represent the interests of the diverse users of a national system, and afford

them a strong and possibly controlling role.

Record Quality .-Since 1970, Congress has

expressed its concern about the completeness

and accuracy of criminal history records.

Based on the results of record quality research

conducted by OTA and others, the quality of

criminal history records at the State level has

improved; however, significant problems remain, especially with respect to court disposition reporting. The average nationwide disposition reporting level increased from 52 percent in 1970 to 65 percent in 1979, but has

changed little since then (to 66 percent in

1982). Fourteen of 41 States in 1979 and 13

of 47 States in 1982 indicated that disposition

reporting to the State repositories was less

than 50 percent. In both 1979 and 1982, eight

States indicated a reporting level of less than

25 percent.

With a national index, the FBI would no

longer maintain non-Federal records, and the

problems of record quality in Ident and NCIC/

CCH would be reduced. However, the quality

of records maintained by the States, as well

as the quality of any index based on those records, would still be a matter of concern. The

progress made by many States in recent years

indicates that continued improvement in disposition reporting is possible but would require a significant further commitment measured in manpower, dollars, and system improvements at the State and local levels. As

of August 1982, 49 of 50 States maintain

transaction logs of criminal history records

disseminated, 35 of 46 routinely employ quality control checks on the accuracy of input

data, 30 of 49 have automated or manual procedures for the regular review of court disposition reporting, and only 13 of 49 States have

conducted a record quality audit.

File Size and Content.—Under the III concept, the national index would include only

names and identifying information. Index size

would depend on what limitations are placed

on entries (e.g., with respect to types of offenses and the handling of juvenile offender

records), how long entries are kept in the index (e.g., limited retention period for some

types of entries), and how the index is initially established and then maintained and updated. The index could have as many as 21 million entries if all persons with arrests for serious or significant offenses were included.

Noncriminal Justice Access.—Significant

noncriminal justice use of Federal and State

criminal history record systems, coupled with

widely varying State statutes defining authorized users and State policies on sealing and

purging, has generated concern about control

of access to criminal history records. As of

fiscal year 1981, about 53 percent of requests

to Ident were from noncriminal justice users

(30 percent Federal and 23 percent State/local).

As of 1982, roughly 15 percent of requests to

State CCH systems were for noncriminal justice purposes.

Noncriminal justice access to a national index could be prohibited entirely, or could be

permitted only under stronger Federal guidelines than presently exist. A dual index could

be established, one for criminal justice use and

a second for noncriminal justice use, perhaps

with the latter based on disposition or conviction information only. Even under the status

quo, access to a national index would require

complicated safeguards (which are technically

feasible with a computer-based system) to be

consistent with a wide variety of existing

State laws and regulations, and would require

some means to resolve conflicts among State

laws, and between Federal statutes and Executive orders and State laws.

Oversight and Audit.–Oversight mechanisms would help assure Congress, the public,

and others that a national index (or any other

national CCH system) is operating within the

boundaries of law and regulation, and to help

identify any problems that might emerge. Congress could require an annual report and periodic audits of Federal and State CCH files to

help ensure compliance with whatever system

standards may be established.

x
Federal Funding.–Throughout the 1970’s,

it was Federal Government policy to support

the development of State CCH systems and

the implementation of Federal privacy and security regulations. However, Federal support

has been phased out. The following three areas

are possible priorities for further Federal funding: 1) improving court disposition reporting

on a nationwide basis; 2) upgrading criminal

history record systems in States that are operating manually, or assisting those in the process of automating their name index and/or file;

and 3) improving procedures in all States

where necessary to assure the accuracy and

completeness of criminal history information,

to conduct audits of local users, to maintain

and periodically review transaction logs, and

to train employees and users.

Message Switching.—Unless all criminal

history records were stored in one place (e.g.,

a national CCH repository), a national CCH

system would require some electronic means

to transfer criminal history records (and inquiries for such records) among and between

the various State and Federal repositories and

participating agencies. The transfer or switching of messages from one State to another

through the NCIC computer has been a point

of controversy with respect to the impact on

Federal-State relations and the potential for

monitoring and surveillance use. There are

several message switching alternatives for III.

First, inquiries could be switched via NCIC,

with records returned via the NLETS message

switching system. This approach has been

used in pilot tests of III. Second, both inquiries and records could be switched via

NCIC. Third, both inquiries and records could

be switched via NLETS. Fourth, records could

be switched via NLETS and inquiries via

NCIC or NLETS. Fifth, the use of NCIC or

NLETS could be optional for switching of both

inquiries and records. Any Department of Justice or FBI message switching role in a fully

operational III (or other national CCH system)

would probably require congressional approval.

Federal Direction and Legislation.—In the

7 years since Congress last considered legislation on criminal history record systems, both

the States and the FBI have made significant

progress in improving the interstate exchange

of criminal history information and in implementing State and Federal privacy and security regulations. Substantial consensus has developed around III, and pilot tests indicate

that III is technically feasible. Nonetheless,

absent Federal direction and probably some

modest Federal funding, full implementation

of III is likely to take many years. Also, further improvement in nationwide record quality and some kind of national standards on

record access and use are needed. Resolution

of conflicts between and among State and Federal laws is a necessity.

Legislation represents one of the strongest

measures to provide Federal direction and ensure accountability and control. Legislation

could provide explicit authority for a national

index or other national CCH system, and include statutory guidelines for its operation and

use. In addition to the areas listed above, legislation could address access, review, and challenge procedures; criminal penalties; privacy

standards; and possibly a prohibition on unauthorized intelligence or surveillance use of

a national CCH system. In sum, legislation appears to be the most appropriate vehicle for

guiding the full implementation of a national

CCH system in a way that will enhance the

efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice process, protect civil and constitutional

rights, and properly balance the roles and responsibilities of the Federal and State Governments.

xi
Chapter 1

Summary
.-. — — . —

Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Current Status of Criminal History Record Systems.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Criminal History Record Repositories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Interstate Exchange of Criminal History Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Use of Criminal History Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Multi-State Offenders.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Fingerprint Identification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Record Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Significance of Record Quality Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Privacy and Security Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Alternatives for a National CCH System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Improving Response Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Improving Record Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Shifting Preferences on System Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Possible Impacts of a National CCH System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Criminal Justice Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Employment and Licensure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Minority Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Surveillance Potential . . . .. . . $ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Message Switching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Congressional Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Policy Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

File Size and Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Record Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Noncriminal Justice Access . . + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Oversight and Audit.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Public Participation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Comprehensive Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

III Development Plan... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

AIDS/CCH Consolidation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Chapter 1

Summary

Introduction

This report addresses four major areas:

●

●

●

●

the status of criminal history record systems in the United States;

the alternatives for a national computerized criminal history (CCH) system;

the possible impacts of any such system;

and

relevant policy issues that warrant congressional attention to ensure that the

beneficial impacts of a national CCH system are maximized and the possible adverse impacts controlled or minimized.

These areas are of concern because:

criminal history records are a vital part

of the criminal justice process;

advances in computer and communication

technologies can help to improve the completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of

such records; and

the use of criminal history records, particularly when exchanged-via a national

system, can have important implications

for public safety and the administration

of justice, employment and licensure, Federal-State relationships, and civil and constitutional rights.

Until the 1850’s, criminal history records in

the United States were largely informal notes

maintained by local police officers. Since that

time, however, such records have become more

formalized, centralized, widely used, and technology-based. Originally, criminal history records were known as “rap sheets. ” They contained information ranging from personal identifiers (e.g., height, weight, eye color, fingerprints, and/or identification numbers) to arrests (date, jurisdiction, and charges). The information contained in criminal history records also may include court disposition of

charges, sentencing, incarceration, and the

like.

While police were the earliest users of criminal history records, such records are now used

to varying degrees at all stages of the criminal

justice process by police, prosecutors, public

defenders, judges, and probation officials,

among others. They are also used for noncriminal justice purposes such as employment and

licensing decisions and security checks.

Current Status of Criminal History

Record Systems

Criminal History Record The use of computers is already widespread.

Repositories

Ident has made progress in automating its

own operations through the Automated IdenCriminal history records are stored at the

local, State, and Federal levels. Since 1924, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has

maintained a national repository of fingerprint

cards and rap sheets in its Identification Division (known as Ident). Forty-nine of the fifty

States now have their own criminal history

record repositories.

tification System (AIDS). As of October 1981,

almost 6 million of Ident’s criminal records

had been automated (representing more than

one-fourth of the individuals in the criminal

file) and fingerprints for about 70 percent of

the individuals in the file had been converted

to a machine-readable (automated) format.

Since 1971, the FBI has also maintained a

3
4 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

CCH file in its National Crime Information

Center (NCIC), although only eight States currently keep records in this file. As of October

1981, it contained about 1.9 million records,

including approximately 0.5 million Federal offender records.

At the State level, as of August 1982, 27

States had CCH files, 7 had an automated

name index, and 16 had a completely manual

system. Ten of the sixteen manual States are

in the process of implementing an automated

index, and two are implementing a CCH file.

Also, the 27 States with CCH files accounted

for about 85 percent of all criminal fingerprint

card activity, and collectively maintained

about 11.5 million CCH records as of September 1981. At the local level, most major metropolitan police departments use computerbased systems (19 have direct lines to NCIC).

For those 12 States in the process of implementing an automated name index and/or

CCH file, the estimated time to completion

ranged from 1 month, to 1 year, to an indefinite time period, due largely to variations and/

or uncertainties in staffing and funding. With

full implementation, all but four States would

have at least an automated name index, and

two of the four remaining manual States do

have plans to automate.

Interstate Exchange of

Criminal History Records

The exchange of criminal history records

among the States and between the States and

Federal Government can be accomplished in

several ways. The exchange of records with

Ident is almost entirely by mail, since Ident

does not have direct communication lines to

the States. Exchange with NCIC/CCH is almost entirely electronic, since NCIC has direct

communication lines to all 50 States (49 of

which are authorized to access the NCIC/CCH

file) and to several Federal agencies. Use of the

CCH file involves about 4.4 million transactions annually, but only about 3.5 percent of

total NCIC traffic. Only eight States keep records in the CCH file. Of the 10 files maintained

in NCIC, the bulk of traffic involves the eight

so-called “hot files, ” which furnish an electronic bulletin board capability used by law

enforcement agencies to list wanted or missing persons or stolen properties (e.g., vehicles,

guns, and securities). NCIC is currently testing the concept of an Interstate Identification

Index (III) in which the NCIC/CCH file includes only records for Federal offenders plus

a national index of State offenders, and the

participating States maintain both single and

multi-State offender records.

The exchange of criminal history records can

also be accomplished via the National Law

Enforcement Telecommunications System

(NLETS), a computerized message switching

network linking local, State, and Federal agencies. Operated by a nonprofit corporation controlled by the States, NLETS does not hold

or manage record files, but provides the capability to switch Crimin al history records among

49 of the 50 States. Some Federal agencies,

notably the Treasury and Justice Departments, can exchange criminal history records

over their own nationwide communication networks that interface with NCIC/CCH.

Use of Criminal

History Records

Criminal history records are used at all levels of government, by all sectors of the criminal justice community, and increasingly by the

noncriminal justice community as well. During fiscal year 1981, about 18 percent of Ident

use was by law enforcement agencies, 29 percent by other criminal justice agencies (e.g.,

prosecutors, courts, and corrections), and 53

percent by noncriminal justice agencies (primarily for employment and licensing and security checks). About 33 percent of Ident use

was by Federal agencies and 67 percent by

State/local agencies.

Based on 1979 and 1982 OTA surveys, the

use of State CCH repositories was roughly 56

percent by law enforcement agencies, 29 percent by other criminal justice, and 15 percent

by noncriminal justice. Data from the 1981 III
— . — -. —————-—

Ch. l—Summary ● 5 ———. -

pilot test suggest that NCIC/CCH is used almost entirely by criminal justice agencies—

about 86 percent by law enforcement and 14

percent by other criminal justice (about 12 percent by Federal agencies and 88 percent by

State/local agencies).

The widespread use of criminal history information throughout the criminal justice

process has been confirmed by other user

surveys conducted by OTA, the Department

of Justice, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and dozens of independent researchers. The use of criminal history records

becomes even more important in view of State

bail and sentencing reforms that place greater

reliance on criminal history information, and

the many recommendations of the U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime

that involve criminal history records. For example, in April 1982, the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary approved legislation,

recommended by the Task Force, requiring

handgun purchasers to wait 14 days to pick

up their weapons so that police departments

will have time to conduct a criminal record

check.

The picture is a little less clear with respect

to noncriminal justice use. As noted above, the

use of Ident is already greater for noncriminal

justice than for criminal justice purposes, and

as of August 1982, 7 of 45 States reported that

noncriminal justice use of criminal history records accounted for more than 40 percent of

total use. At least 14 States have recently enacted (since 1979) or have pending State legislation or regulations that further broaden noncriminal justice access. Delays resulting from

the noncriminal justice workload reached the

point where Ident suspended most State and

local applicant services (for licensing and

employment checks) for fiscal year 1982. These

will be reinstated on October 1, 1982, but on

a fee-for-service basis.

Multi-State Offenders

Based on 1979 research, OTA found that

about 30.4 percent of individuals in the FBI

Ident criminal file had arrests in more than

one State, which closely approximated a 1974

FBI estimate of 30 percent and a 1981 FBI

estimate of 33 percent. Based on 1981 data

available to OTA for eight States, multi-State

offenders ranged from a low of about 3 percent to a high of 36 percent, with Federal offenders excluded. The average was about 12

percent, and only one State was above 16 percent. Nonetheless, the percentage of multiState offenders appears to be significant.

Whether the crimes coremitted by multi-State

offenders tend to be more or less serious than

those of single-State offenders could not be

positively determined from information available to OTA. This is an area of possible further study.

Fingerprint Identification

Criminal justice practitioners believe that,

at present, fingerprints are the only reliable

and consistent basis for positive identification.

The exchange of records based on names alone

results in a high percentage of errors due to

the frequent use of aliases and similarities

among many common surnames. In a 1982 III

pilot test, the FBI found that almost one-third

of the matches between individuals and records were in error when based on name-searching techniques alone. Both Ident and State

identification bureaus process fingerprint

cards received from criminal justice agencies,

but manual fingerprint processing is extremely time-consuming and labor-intensive, and

therefore costly, especially at the high volumes

presently experienced. A 1981 FBI survey estimated that 4.16 million criminal fingerprint

cards were received annually by State identification bureaus, and 2.91 million criminal fingerprint cards by Ident.

Ident’s experience exemplifies the enormity

of the problem. As of October 1981, there were

’78 million criminal fingerprint cards representing 21 million individuals in the Ident criminal

file. During fiscal year 1981, Ident received an

average of 12,684 criminal fingerprint cards

daily. Surveys conducted for the FBI in 1979

and 1980 indicated that the average Ident response time for processing fingerprint cards

was about 36 workdays. As of July and Octo-
6 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System —

ber 1981, the FBI estimated that Ident internal processing time (excluding mailing time)

was averaging 27 and 25 workdays, respectively, for all categories of inquiries (both

fingerprint checks and name checks). As of

July 1982, processing time had improved, at

least temporarily, to about 13 days, due to

Ident’s l-year suspension of record checks for

federally chartered or insured banking institutions and State and local employment and licensing authorities.

There is general agreement that improvement in fingerprint processing time is necessary, particularly to meet needs that arise

early in the criminal justice process where decisions must be made very quickly, for example, in bringing charges and setting bail. OTA

did not assess specific alternatives for improvement, but major studies have recently

been completed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and the International Association

for Identification. However, it seems clear that

fingerprint identification is properly viewed as

an integral part of any national CCH system

and that automated fingerprint classification

and search technology offers substantial

promise for improvement.

Record Quality

Since 1970, Congress has expressed its concern about the completeness and accuracy of

criminal history records. Section 524(b) of the

Crime Control Act of 1973 required the Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration

(LEAA) to promulgate regulations to provide

safeguards for the privacy and security of

criminal history records, including their completeness and accuracy. The 1975 regulations

(known as title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, pt. 20) apply to the Federal Government

and to all States whose criminal history record

systems were federally funded in whole or in

part. Federal courts have also ruled on record

quality issues. For example, in Tarlton v. Saxbe (1974) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia ruled that the FBI had

a duty to prevent dissemination of inaccurate

arrest and conviction records, and had to take

reasonable precautions to prevent inaccuracy

and incompleteness. Most States now have

statutes or regulations requiring agencies to

ensure reasonably complete and accurate criminal history information, including timely reporting of court dispositions. The number of

States with statutes or regulations on record

quality increased from 14 in 1974 to 45 in

1979, and to 49 in 1981.

Based on the results of record quality research conducted by OTA and others, the

quality of criminal history records has improved since 1970; however, significant problems remain. For Ident, OTA record quality

research found that, based on a 1979 sample

of arrest events, about 30 percent of the Ident

records that could be verified lacked a court

disposition that had occurred and was confirmed by the district attorney in the local area

responsible for prosecution. A 1980 study by

JPL found that Ident receives dispositions for

about 45 percent of the arrests reported. OTA

also found that about one-fifth of the Ident arrest events sampled were inaccurate when

compared with charging, disposition, and/or

sentencing information in local records.

With respect to NCIC/CCH, OTA record

quality research found that, based on a 1979

sample of arrest events, about 27 percent of

the CCH records that could be verified lacked

a court disposition that had occurred. About

one-fifth of the arrest events sampled were inaccurate with respect to charging, disposition,

and/or sentencing information. While it is possible that NCIC/CCH and Ident record quality

has improved since 1979, OTA is not aware

of any comparable research conducted by the

FBI or others to document such improvements.

At the State level, a comparison between a

1979 OTA 50-State survey and a 1973 General

Accounting Office (GAO) study (based on a

1970 50-State survey conducted by LEAA)

shows some improvement in the average level

of disposition reporting. The GAO study

found the average level to be about 52 percent

for the 49 States responding; the OTA study

showed an average level of about 65 percent

for the 41 States responding. However, the
Ch. l—Summary ● 7 ——.———— — - — . ———— .——— -— —-—

 1979 average for computerized States (with a

CCH file and/or automated name index) as opposed to manual States was even higher (about

71 percent compared to 50 percent for manual

States). Given that in 1970 only one State

(New York) had a CCH system, the results indicated that most of the improvement in disposition reporting over the 1970-79 period was

in States with CCH systems. OTA also sampled State records in one major urban jurisdiction in each of three States. For the three urban jurisdictions, disposition reporting was

58, 60, and 85 percent. Several States contacted by OTA have achieved further improvement in disposition reporting since 1979. However, between 1979 and 1982, average disposition reporting levels for all States responding

improved only marginally, to about 66 percent. In the OTA 50-State survey, 14 of 41

States responding in 1979 and 13 of 47 States

in 1982 indicated that disposition reporting to

the State repository was less than 50 percent.

In both 1979 and 1982, eight States indicated

a reporting level of less than 25 percent.

Significance of Record

Quality Problems

On the one hand, Federal and State law emphasizes the importance of complete and accurate criminal history records, but on the other,

the law authorizes the dissemination of records, whether or not they are accurate and

complete, for a variety of purposes. For example, Federal regulations and FBI operating

procedures assign agencies that enter records

into Ident or NCIC the responsibility “to

assure that information on individuals is kept

complete, accurate, and current. ” The FBI

helps to maintain the integrity of the NCIC

files through automatic computer edits and

purges, quality control checks, and periodic

record validations by originating agencies.

Similar procedures are possible in Ident

through the use of AIDS. Yet, with few exceptions, Federal and State law authorizes the

dissemination of criminal history records–

with or without dispositions—to the criminal

justice community. Law enforcement and

prosecuting agencies, in particular, find that

an incomplete and/or inaccurate record can be

useful as a “pointer’ to the location of complete and accurate information, even though

an arrest-only record is not admissible in

criminal trial proceedings under the laws of

criminal evidence in most jurisdictions.

With respect to noncriminal justice use, Federal regulations permit dissemination of Ident

and NCIC/CCH records without dispositions

to Federal noncriminal justice agencies if

authorized by Federal statute or Executive

order. Dissemination is also permitted to State

and local noncriminal justice agencies if authorized by Federal or State statutes and approved by the U.S. Attorney General, except

for records without dispositions where the arrest charge is more than 1 year old and is not

under active prosecution. At the State level,

as of mid-1981, 37 States authorized dissemination of arrest-only records to a variety of

State and local noncriminal justice agencies

(primarily for employment and licensing purposes), and 27 States authorized such dissemination to private sector organizations and individuals. The disclosure of such records to

private parties frequently “depends upon factors other than State law, such as local law,

local agency policy, or the impact of the

State’s public record or freedom of information law.’”

In most court cases where the completeness

or accuracy of criminal records has been

challenged, the balancing of individual rights

of privacy and due process versus the maintenance of public safety and welfare has

proven a difficult challenge to the courts. Yet

the Federal courts have found violations of

civil and constitutional rights, particularly

when arrest-only information is used in minority employment decisions (see Gregory v. Litton Systems, 1970) and when arrest information without otherwise available disposition

information is used in criminal justice decisions such as setting bail (see Tatum v.

Rogers, 1979).

ISEARCli Group, Inc., 7Fends in State Securit~r and Pri\’acI’

Z~gislation, Sacramento, Calif., November 1981, p. 10.
8 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Privacy and Security

Protection

While very important, record quality (accuracy and completeness) is only one aspect of

privacy and security protection. In enacting

section 524(b) of the 1973 Crime Control Act,

Congress also stressed the importance of protecting individual privacy by limiting record

dissemination to lawful purposes, by permitting individuals to access, review, and challenge their records, and by ensuring the security of criminal history record systems. Title 28

of the Federal regulations required States accepting Federal funding to develop specific

policies and procedures in these and other

areas.

Since 1974, when statistics were first compiled, the States have made substantial progress. For example, as of mid-1981, over twothirds of the States had statutes ardor regulations that:

●

●

●

establish a State regulatory authority for

privacy and security of criminal justice

information systems (46 States in 1981

compared with 7 in 1974);

place some restrictions on the dissemination of criminal history information (all

States and the District of Columbia in

1981 compared with 12 in 1974);

establish the rights of individuals to inspect their criminal history records (43

States compared with 12);

provide criminal sanctions for violation of

privacy and security laws (39 States compared with 12); and

establish the rights of individuals to challenge the accuracy and completeness of

record information pertaining to them (35

States in 1981 compared with 10 in 1974).

Nonetheless, even where States have enacted

laws or regulations, wide diversity remains in

the specific provisions—for example, in sealing and purging procedures, in statutory limitations on criminal history file content, and

in the definition of authorized users.

Also, States vary widely in their implementation of privacy and security measures such

as record quality audits, court disposition

monitoring, quality control checks, and routine review of transaction logs. Based on a

1982 50-State survey, OTA found that only

13 of 49 States responding had ever conducted

a record quality audit. Thirty of 49 had automated or manual procedures for the regular

review of court disposition reporting, and 35

of 46 routinely employ quality control checks

on the accuracy of input data. Forty-nine of

fifty States maintained transaction logs of

criminal history records disseminated, although most indicated that the logs were reviewed only when a specific abuse was indicated.

Alternatives for a National CCH System

The United States already has a “national itan criminal history record systems, either

criminal history system. ” It is partly manual

and partly computerized, and includes criminal record and fingerprint card repositories

maintained by Ident and 49 State identification bureaus. The national system also includes the CCH files in NCIC and 27 States.

For the interstate exchange of criminal history

records, the national system uses the U.S.

Mail, the NCIC and NLETS communication

networks, and, to a lesser extent, the communication networks of the Justice and Treasury

Departments. The many local and metropolmanual or automated, are also a part of this

national system.

Thus, many but not all of the building

blocks for a national computerized criminal

history record system are already in place.

Technically, there are several ways that a national CCH system could be designed. At one

end of the spectrum, criminal history records

for all offenders could be stored in a central

national repository such as Ident. The full development of AIDS or the NCIC/CCH file
Ch, l—Summary ● 9

-.

could constitute a national CCH repository

when hooked up to the NCIC (or other) communication lines to permit nationwide electronic access. The repository would include

records on roughly 21 million persons with arrests for serious or significant offenses. At the

other end of the spectrum, a central national

repository could be limited to records of Federal offenders (approximately 0.5 million), and

records of State offenders would be stored only

in the respective State repositories. An intermediate alternative (known as the single-State/

multi-State approach) would be for a national

repository to maintain records of all multiState as well as Federal offenders, with singleState offender records stored by the States.

Given the constitutional prerogatives of the

States with respect to criminal justice, and the

fact that 49 of the 50 States now maintain

their own State repositories, records on State

offenders will continue to be maintained by the

States whether or not a national CCH system

is implemented. Therefore, any State records

maintained in a national repository will incur

extra costs (to the Federal Government for

storing the records and to the States for updating the records). Cost control has thus been

one of the driving forces behind efforts to keep

the recordkeeping function decentralized so

that duplication between the Federal and

State Governments is minimal.

For any alternative where all records are not

maintained in a central repository, two other

capabilities are necessary-an index to records

not stored centrally, and a means to exchange

or transfer records stored in 50 or more locations. There are several technical options here.

For example, a national index could be maintained centrally at one location, such as Ident

or NCIC in Washington, D.C. or NLETS in

Phoenix, Ariz. Records could be exchanged via

the NLETS or NCIC communication networks

or both.

Regional systems have also been proposed.

However, OTA found little evidence to support the feasibility of regional systems. On the

contrary, NLETS traffic logs indicate that

criminal history traffic between the States

does not conform to regional patterns. During the 1981 III pilot test, almost three-quarters of the hits on Florida records (matches

between an inquiry and a record) originated

from the Midwest and West. In addition, the

1979 OTA record quality research found that

a high percentage (about 75 percent for Ident)

of multi-State offenders had arrests in at least

one noncontiguous State.

A so-called “ask-the-network” system is also

a technical possibility. In the ask-the-network

approach, there would be no central index. Instead, each State would, in effect, poll any or

all of the other 49 States plus the FBI when

seeking CCH information. OTA found that a

significant percentage of multi-State offenders

(about 43 percent for Ident, again based on

1979 data) had arrests in three or more States.

Considered together with the high percentage

of multi-State arrests in noncontiguous States,

it appears that all States and the FBI would

have to be polled every time in order to make

sure arrests were not missed, but the inquiryto-hit ratio would then be very low. Under similar circumstances, NLETS found that many

States began to ignore the inquiries. Also, the

FBI and various State criminal justice officials

believe that an ask-the-network approach

would not be cost effective, and would be harder to secure against unauthorized access.

Nonetheless, ask-the-network systems are

used successfully in the defense intelligence

community and in the private sector, and their

potential use in a national CCH system is an

area of possible further research.

Improving Response Time

The operating experience of the Ident AIDS

program and several State identification bureaus has documented that a much shorter

turnaround time is possible with automated

systems than with manual. The JPL study of

AIDS concluded that full automation could

reduce the overall Ident processing time for

fingerprint checks from about 36 workdays to

about 3 hours. Further improvements could

result from the use of high quality facsimile
10 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History Sy. stf?m

— — — ——

electronic transmission. For example, New

York State already makes relatively extensive

use of this technology. New York responds to

fingerprint inquiries submitted via facsimile

within an average of 1 hour and 50 minutes,

and within 3 hours 90 percent of the time.

The response times for computerized criminal history record checks could be even faster.

In theory, the response time for a national

CCH repository would be measured in seconds. Indeed, as of April 1982, NCIC/CCH

processing time was averaging less than onehalf second per inquiry, with very few inquiries

taking more than 5 seconds. The III pilot test

has demonstrated that even for a national index alternative, response times of less than an

hour are possible. During a February-March

1982 test, response time was less than 1 hour

96 percent of the time, less than 5 minutes 76

percent of the time, and less than 1 minute 48

percent of the time. Thus, it appears that the

III response time could approach the response

time achieved by individual States with online

CCH files, which is frequently in the range of

5 to 20 seconds. Response times for States

with manual files would be considerably longer.

Improving Record Quality

While computerization can improve the response time of fingerprint and criminal record

checks, improvements in record quality are

more difficult to achieve. This is because high

record quality depends on timely and accurate

submissions from a large number of criminal

justice agencies. Court disposition reporting

appears to be a significant problem in many

States.

Available evidence indicates that strengthening State and local criminal history systems

and court disposition reporting systems is a

prerequisite to further improving CCH record

quality, regardless of the national CCH system structure. Particularly important are efforts to upgrade court administration, establish standardized (and perhaps even codified)

court reporting procedures, improve the coordination between judicial and other criminal

justice agencies (especially law enforcement)

responsible for timely record update actions,

strengthen field audits of reporting procedures

and record quality, and increase funding and

technical assistance to implement computerbased systems where appropriate.

Shifting Preferences on

System Structure

An OTA survey of State repository officials

found that, as of 1979, officials from 24 States

out of 42 responding preferred the national index alternative, known as III. Officials from

11 States preferred the single-State/multiState alternative. Since that time, many other

Federal and State officials have shifted their

support to III. The NCIC’s Advisory Policy

Board, NLETS Board of Directors, and

SEARCH Group, Inc., have all endorsed III

which, if fully implemented, would mean that

all State records would be maintained by the

States themselves. Only Federal offender records and an identification index would be

maintained at the national level.

In a 1982 OTA followup survey, officials

from about two-thirds of the States indicated

a clear preference for the III concept, with officials from most of the other States either actively considering III or seeking further information on which to base a decision. However,

many States, even some of those strongly supporting III, noted a variety of implementation

problems which might preclude their participation, in some cases for years.

Many of these officials also support the concept of a National Fingerprint File (NFF), considered to be an integral part of III. The NFF

would be limited to fingerprint cards and related personal descriptors on each criminal offender. The NFF would contain no arrest or

disposition data. It would perform the technical fingerprint search to establish positive

identification or nonidentification based on

fingerprint cards received from State identification bureaus or Federal agencies. It would

also assign FBI identification numbers, and

could enter identification data into III. The

NFF concept is predicated on single-source
—.-.

Ch. 1—Summary Ž11

submission policies. That is, only one agency

per State would be authorized to submit fingerprint cards. Submission of only one fingerprint card per subject per State would be permitted.

OTA surveyed the States with respect to

single-source fingerprint card submission and

found that, as of August 1982, 18 States had

implemented single-source submission (compared with 17 in a September 1981 FBI survey) and four more had scheduled a late 1982

implementation, for a total of 22 States. Officials from about one-third of the other States

indicated that implementing single-source submission could be difficult due to a potential

work overload, staff and funding shortages,

local agency resistance, and/or privacy concerns.

Possible Impacts of a National CCH System

Criminal Justice Process

To the extent that a national CCH system

provides information that is more complete,

timely, and verifiable (based on positive identification) than is presently available, the

system would improve the functioning of the

criminal justice process. The most significant

improvements are likely to be in the areas of

criminal investigations, police booking and intake, pretrial release and bail decisions, and

presentence investigation reports.

For example, after an arrest, police make or

participate in decisions concerning whether to

release or how long to hold the suspect,

whether to fingerprint, and the level of charges

to be placed. Each of these decisions clearly

affects the creation of a criminal history

record, and conversely, criminal history records (and thus a national CCH system) may

potentially influence these decisions. Since

postarrest police decisions often must be made

quickly, a national CCH system could make

criminal history records more readily available, thus increasing their use.

The impact of a national CCH system could

be particularly significant in pretrial release

and bail decisions, which typically must be

made within 36 to 72 hours after arrest. If accurate and complete, CCH records could help

prosecutors and judges to better balance the

need to protect the public from harm by defendants out on bail, versus the need to protect

the constitutional rights of defendants. Many

States have laws or rules requiring judges to

consider prior convictions in determining pretrial release conditions. It is important, however, that CCH records be complete and accurate. In Tatum v. Rogers (1979), a U.S. district

court found a violation of constitutional (sixth,

eighth, and 14th amendment) rights when arrest information without otherwise available

disposition information was used in setting

bail.

Criminal history information is also used in

the preparation of presentence investigation

reports. These are used by judges in arriving

at a sentence suited to offenders, and are subsequently used by the courts and corrections

departments in assigning offenders to appropriate institutions. Problems that arise in the

preparation of presentencing reports include

incomplete disposition data and insufficient

resources (time and money) for verification. It

would appear that a national CCH system

would be advantageous if based on accurate

and complete records that could be obtained

quickly and easily.

A national CCH system could also affect

other aspects of the criminal justice process.

For example, criminal history records are very

important to specialized programs (e. g., prior

felon, career crime, and violent felon programs)

that assign police investigators and special

prosecutors to individuals who have prior felony convictions. Also, an arrestee’s criminal

history record can affect the prosecutor’s decisions concerning whether to bring or drop

charges, the level and number of charges, and
12 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

whether to negotiate at trial for lower charges

through plea bargaining. An offender’s criminal history is also an important factor in

determining initial correctional custody rating

(level of supervision needed) and institutional

placement (e.g., maximum, medium, or minimum security), and is one of many factors considered in parole decisions.

Employment and Licensure

To the extent that a national CCH system

is accessible for noncriminal justice purposes,

the system would be very likely to have a significant impact on a large number of employment and licensing decisions.

Criminal history information is used in employment and licensing decisions to protect

the public or the employer from harm. Criminal records may be used to screen individuals

out of positions where they might easily cause

harm to other citizens or coworkers or present

an excessive risk to the protection of valuable

assets (e.g., money, securities, precious jewelry, and other property).

However, limiting job opportunities on the

basis of a criminal record in effect involves an

additional punishment for crime, that is, a

“civil disability, “ in addition to the punishment administered by the court. This civil disability may in turn hinder the rehabilitation

of offenders and prevent them from becoming

useful and productive members of society,

even if they want to do so and are otherwise

capable. Former offenders who cannot find

suitable employment may become dependent

on public welfare or return to crime.

Federal and State legislatures must balance

these considerations when requiring criminal

history checks or character evaluations (which

frequently include record checks) for literally

millions of public sector jobs or publicly licensed private sector jobs. The private sector

also frequently seeks criminal history information in making employment decisions.

The impact of a national CCH system for

noncriminal justice use is complicated by several factors. First, States (as well as the Federal Government) vary widely in their noncriminal justice access and dissemination policies. As noted earlier, a significant portion of

State and Federal criminal history record

repository use is for noncriminal justice purposes. Thus, without some kind of national

standards on access, a national CCH system

is likely to be heavily used for noncriminal justice purposes and in ways that heighten the

already existing conflicts-of-law among and

between various States and the Federal Government.

Second, noncriminal justice use is even more

sensitive to record quality than is criminal

justice use. There is no doubt that the use of

criminal history information affects employment and licensing decisions. The results of

research, case studies of employers, surveys

of employer attitudes, as well as the experience

of Federal and State parole officers, all suggest that any formal contact between an individual and the criminal justice process is

likely to influence an employer’s decisions on

job applicants. A record of arrest and conviction will have the greatest influence, but even

a record of arrest and acquittal will frequently work to the disadvantage of the applicant.

This problem is aggravated because criminal

history records are designed for use by those

who are familiar with the criminal justice process and who understand the limitations of a

record. At best, a criminal history record provides a snapshot or series of snapshots of a

person’s contact with the criminal justice process at various points in time. Much of the contextual and background information necessary

to properly interpret the record is not included.

A record is more likely to be misinterpreted

when used by someone outside the criminal

justice system, particularly when a significant

percentage of criminal history records contain

inaccurate, incomplete, or ambiguous information.

Third, there is considerable disagreement

over the extent to which criminal history records can predict future employment behavior,

except in particular cases such as repeat violent offenders. Other factors such as education, prior work experience, length of time in
Ch. 1—Summary ● 1 3

the community, and personal references may

be more predictive. On the other hand, the

high recidivism rates suggest that once a person is arrested or convicted, he or she is much

more likely to be convicted of a subsequent

crime within a few years than those without

a prior criminal record. Whether or not this

is relevant to or predictive of employment behavior is a matter of debate. States such as

New York have required by statute that any

agency seeking criminal history information

establish a strong relationship between the

nature of the job and specific kinds of criminal

offenses. Florida, with its open records policy,

is at the other extreme.

Fourth, criminal history records involve a

sizable proportion of all persons in the labor

force. After a careful review of existing research, OTA estimated that as of 1979 about

36 million living U.S. citizens had criminal

history records held by Federal, State, and/or

local repositories. Of these, OTA estimated

that about 26 million persons were in the labor

force (representing, conservatively, 28 to 30

percent of the total labor force), and thus were

potentially exposed to employment disqualifications because of an arrest record. Of the 36

million, OTA estimated that about 35 percent

had no arrests for serious crime and one arrest for a minor crime, and about 24 percent

had more than one minor arrest but no major

arrests. The remaining 41 percent (roughly 15

million persons) had at least one arrest for a

serious crime.

These aspects of noncriminal justice use

warrant congressional consideration in formulating policy on any national CCH system.

Minority Groups

Some minority groups account for a disproportionate percentage of arrest records. For

example, various studies have estimated the

percentage of blacks with arrest records as

ranging from 30 percent nationwide to over

50 percent in certain cities such as Philadelphia. As of February 21, 1980, blacks accounted for about 29 percent of all records in

the NCIC/CCH file, which is almost triple the

percentage of blacks in the total U.S. population. Statistics of 1981 on felony arrests in

California indicated that, at least in that State,

blacks also accounted for a disproportionately

high percentage of law enforcement releases

and complaints denied (37.7 and 38.7 percent,

respectively, compared with 30.6 percent of

felony arrests).* Releases and complaints denied may occur for a variety of reasons, such

as insufficient evidence, refusal of the victim

to prosecute, lack of probable cause, unavailable witness, or illegal search.

As discussed earlier, a criminal arrest record, even without convictions, can have an adverse effect on employment and licensing applicants. Indeed, the courts have found that

a policy of refusing employment to blacks with

an arrest record without convictions “had a

racially discriminatory impact because blacks

are arrested substantially more frequently

than whites in proportion to their numbers”

(see Gregory v. Litton Systems, 1970). Similar

judicial reasoning has been extended to black

applicants refused employment due to criminal convictions where the offense “does not

significantly bear upon the particular job requirements” (see Green v. Missouri Pacific

RR, 1975).

In this context, any discriminatory impacts

from the use of national CCH information

would depend on whether and under what conditions noncrimina1 justice access is permitted.

The potential for discriminatory impacts could

be minimized if records or index entries based

on arrest-only information, as well as information on arrests not leading to conviction, were

actively sealed or otherwise effectively removed from the file, at least for noncriminal

justice purposes. Some States, such as New

York, do this for their own files, but many

States do not. California has struck a middle

ground. Felony arrests that result in detention

only are retained in the California State criminal history record repository for 5 years, and

*A law enforcement release occurs when police detain and

arrest a person, obtain fingerprints, and report the arrest to

the State record system, but subsequently release the person

and do not present the case to the district attorney. A complaint is denied when the police arrest and present a person to

the district attorney, but the district attorney decides not to

prosecute the case.
74 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

felony arrests that otherwise do not result in

a conviction are retained for 7 years.

Federalism

The balance of authority and power between

Federal, State, and local governments has

been a central issue in the debate over a national CCH system. Because of the decentralized nature of the U.S. criminal justice process

and because the generation and use of criminal

history information occurs mostly at the State

and local levels of government, most States

seek a primary role in any national CCH system. State governments have basic jurisdiction over law enforcement and criminal justice

within their borders under their constitutionally reserved powers, and many have been reluctant to share this jurisdiction with the Federal Government, except with respect to Federal offenders. Most States have appreciated

other kinds of support from the Federal Government, such as FBI fingerprint identification services and LEAA funding for State

CCH system development, as long as this support was provided on a voluntary basis and

the States retained control over the operation

and use of their own criminal history record

systems.

The Federal Government has a legitimate

interest in: 1) the enforcement of Federal criminal law, 2) the prosecution of Federal offenders, whether intrastate or interstate, and 3) assisting with the apprehension of interstate and

international criminal offenders who cross

State and/or national borders. To the extent

that crime is perceived as a national problem

deserving national attention, the Federal Government also has a defined role in the provision of voluntary support to State and local

law enforcement and criminal justice activities.

Many of the proposed alternatives for a national CCH system encounter difficulties resulting from the historic constitutional division of powers and duties in the U.S. Federal

system. Since the standards of the States vary

so widely (e.g., with respect to dissemination,

record quality, and sealing and purging of

criminal history records), any national standards for a CCH system could easily conflict

with those of at least some States.

From the perspective of many States, a national CCH system like III would have a minimal impact on Federal-State relationships assuming that it retained State policy control

over the CCH records, avoided any significant

conflict with State laws and practices on the

collection and use of criminal history information, and kept State costs at an affordable level. Nevertheless, III (or any other national

CCH system) would have interstate and national as well as intrastate impacts. A strong

argument can be made that, regardless of the

specific system structure, the Federal Government has the responsibility and authority to

establish some kind of system standards.

From a legal standpoint, Federal action

could be based on: 1) the criminal record information needs of Federal agencies as established by various Federal statutes and Executive orders (e.g., Executive Order Nos. 10450,

12065, and 10865); 2) the implementation of

Federal regulations for State and local criminal justice information systems that have used

Federal funding (title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, pt. 20); 3) the interstate commerce

clause of the U.S. Constitution; and/or 4) the

constitutional provisions (including the first,

fourth, fifth, sixth, ninth, and 14th amendments) guaranteeing individual rights of privacy and due process.

cos t

Throughout the 1970’s, it was Federal Government policy to support the development of

State CCH systems and the implementation

of the Federal regulations. From 1970 to 1981,

LEAA provided a cumulative total of about

$207 million in categorical grants to the States

for comprehensive data systems and statistical programs. About $39 million was for 145

CCH-related grants awarded to 35 different

States. These grants peaked in 1976 and ended

in 1981. In addition, some portion of LEAA

block grants to the States was used for

criminal justice information systems. This

avenue of Federal support has also been

phased out.
—

Ch. 1—Summary ● 1 5

Thus, at present the States and localities

would have to bear most of the cost of any national CCH system. The difficulty of finding

‘‘new money’ or cutting back other expenses

could discourage State participation. Financing could be particularly difficult for States

whose criminal history record systems are not

yet well developed, whose need for a national

CCH system is not perceived to be great, and

whose ability to pay is limited.

OTA did not independently estimate the

cost of a national CCH system. The Federal

share would presumably include some portion

of the cost of Ident (which totaled about $58.7

million in fiscal year 1980 and whose full automation has been estimated at $50 million by

JPL) and NCIC ($6.1 million in fiscal year

1981), plus the costs of Federal agencies participating in the system. The actual Federal

share would depend on the specific alternative

implemented, and whether or not further Federal support were provided to the States.

LEAA grants made a significant contribution to the relatively rapid development of

State CCH systems during the last 12 years.

OTA research has identified the following

three areas as possible priorities for further

funding: 1) improving court disposition reporting systems on a nationwide basis; 2) upgrading criminal history record systems in the

States that are operating manually or assisting those in the process of automating their

name index and/or file; and 3) improving procedures in all States where necessary to assure

the accuracy and completeness of criminal history information, to conduct audits of local

users, to maintain and periodically review

transaction logs, and to train employees and

users.

Surveillance Potential

The “flagging” of criminal records is a common monitoring or surveillance practice and

an accepted law enforcement tool. Placing a

flag on a file helps law enforcement personnel

to keep track of the location and activity of

a suspect whenever there is a police contact.

At the State level, both manual and automated files are used for flagging. Although

this practice differs from State to State, the

most frequent application seems to be for parole violators and wanted persons. At the Federal level, Ident records are usually flagged by

using a wanted notice for persons with an outstanding arrest warrant or a flash notice for

persons placed on probation or parole. With

respect to NCIC, since hot files are flags by

definition, all wanted or missing persons and

stolen property records included in NCIC represent flags to law enforcement and criminal

justice users.

Concern has been expressed about the possible use of a national CCH system by Federal

agencies—and particularly the FBI—for monitoring or surveillance of the lawful activities

of individuals or organizations. To understand

this concern, one must remember that the debate over a national CCH system began in the

late 1960’s and early 1970’s, a time when the

FBI was engaged in domestic political intelligence and surveillance activities with respect

to, for example, civil rights and anti-Vietnam

War leaders and groups. Also during the early 1970’s, the FBI made very limited use of

NCIC for intelligence purposes which, although strictly law enforcement in nature, had

not been authorized by Congress.

Since that time, the FBI has rejected all requests or proposals for intelligence use of

NCIC.* During the course of the OTA study,

FBI officials have repeatedly stated to Congress and to OTA that they will not permit

Ident or NCIC to be used for unauthorized

purposes of any kind. FBI officials believe

that a national CCH would not have any significant surveillance potential and would represent little, if any, danger to law-abiding citizens. Strong and independent policy control

over a national CCH system and tight restrictions on noncriminal justice access, coupled

with outside audit and explicit statutory

guidelines for operations, would help protect

against the possibility-however remote–that

As of september 1982, the Department of Justice and the

FBI had approved but not yet implemented a U.S. Secret Service proposal to establish an NCIC file on persons judged to

represent a potential threat to protectees, including the President. This could involve the use of NCIC to gather intelligence

data on or track individuals not formally charged with a criminal

offense.
16 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a Nationa/ Computerized Crimina/ History System

———

a national CCH system could be used at some

point in the future in violation of first amendment or other constitutional rights. In comments to OTA, various criminal justice officials have suggested a statutory prohibition

on intelligence use of III or any other national

CCH system. On the other hand, some State

officials have noted that there may be legitimate intelligence and surveillance applications, and that these possibilities should not

be abandoned solely because of their sensitivity.

Message Switching

As noted earlier, unless all criminal history

records were stored in one place (e.g., a national CCH repository) a national CCH system

would require some electronic means to transfer records (and inquiries for such records)

among and between the various State and

Federal repositories and participating agencies. The transfer or switching of messages

from one State to another through the NCIC

computer has been a point of controversy over

the last 12 years. Some message switching alternatives have raised questions about the impact on Federal-State relations and the potential for monitoring and surveillance. For example, in 1973, the FBI proposed to have

NCIC assume all law enforcement message

switching (not just NCIC/CCH traffic), including messages sent over NLETS. As a result,

Congress has denied the FBI authority to perform message switching, defined as “the technique of receiving a message, storing it in a

computer until the proper line is available, and

then retransmitting, with no direct connection

between the incoming and outgoing lines. ”2

‘Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act of

1980.

More specifically, the Department of Justice

(DOJ) was prohibited, without explicit approval of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees of Congress, from “utilizing equipment

to create a message switching system linking

State and local law enforcement data banks

through equipment under the control of DOJ

or the FBI.”3 In addition, congressional approvals in 1979 and 1980 of the FBI’s requests

to upgrade NCIC computer technology were

conditioned on the FBI’s commitment not to

use such technology for message switching.

There are several message switching alternatives for III. First, inquiries could be switched

via NCIC, with records returned via the

NLETS message switching system. This approach was used in the III pilot and Phase 1

tests. The routing of inquiries through NCIC

has been termed “automatic inquiry referral”

and is a form of partial message switching.

Second, both inquiries and records could be

switched via NCIC. Third, both inquiries and

records could be switched via NLETS. Fourth,

records could be switched via NLETS and inquiries via NCIC or NLETS. Fifth, the use of

NCIC or NLETS could be optional for switching of both inquiries and records. OTA has not

evaluated these alternatives in detail, although all appear to be technically feasible.

In making a complete evaluation, message formats and purpose codes, costs to the States

and the Federal Government, response time,

and message privacy and security all need to

be considered. In any event, any DOJ or FBI

message switching role in a fully operational

III (or other national CCH system) would

probably require congressional approval.

‘Ibid.

Congressional Policy Considerations

As noted earlier, the emerging consensus to ensure that beneficial impacts are maxiamong Federal and State law enforcement and mized and adverse impacts are controlled or

criminal history record repository officials sup- minimized.

ports the national index concept known as III.

However, full implementation of III (or any Policy Control

other national CCH system) raises a number Considerable debate has focused on which

of issues that warrant congressional attention agency or organization should have direct
Ch. 1—Summary ● 1 7

— .

policy control over a national CCH system.

Suggestions include a consortium of States,

a broadened and strengthened NCIC’S Advisory Policy Board, an independent board, and/

or the FBI. For example, a broadened and

strengthened Advisory Policy Board could include greater representation from the prosecutorial, judicial, correctional, and public defender sectors of the criminal justice community

than at present, and could include an “advise

and consent” role, at least with respect to

State and local participation in a national system. There are many other possibilities, but

the key issue is how to devise a mechanism

that will effectively represent the interests of

the diverse users of a national system, and afford them a strong and possibly controlling

policy role.

File Size and Content

Under the 111 concept, the national index

would include only names and identifying information (e.g., height, weight, social security

number, and State and Federal criminal identification numbers). Proposals have been made

to limit the index to entries on violent or very

serious offenders, that is, for crimes included

in the FBI Crime Index. However, this would

exclude entries for drug, weapons, drunk driving, and other offenses generally considered

to be serious but not included in the FBI

Crime Index. At the other extreme, a totally

unrestricted index could include entries on as

many as 36 million persons. Other national index issues include the need for policies on

limited retention periods for some entries and

on the handling of juvenile offender records.

Record Quality

With a national index, the FBI would no

longer maintain non-Federal records, and the

problems of record quality in Ident and

NCIC/CCH would be reduced. However, the

quality of records maintained by the States,

as well as the quality of any index based on

those records, would still be a matter of concern. Record quality could be strengthened by

tightening the disposition reporting requirements and/or requiring confirmation of records

lacking disposition data with the originating

agency prior to any dissemination. In the opinion of some, the latter requirement would be

costly and impractical. The progress made by

many States in recent years indicates that improved disposition reporting is possible, but

continued improvement would require a significant further commitment measured in manpower, dollars, and system improvements at

the State and local levels.

Noncriminal Justice Access

Significant noncriminal justice use of Federal and State criminal history record systems,

coupled with widely varying State statutes

defining authorized users and State policies

on sealing and purging, has generated concern

about control of access to criminal history records. Noncriminal justice access to a national

index could be prohibited, although this would

conflict with many Federal and State laws.

Noncriminal justice access could be permitted,

but only under stronger Federal guidelines

than presently exist. A dual index could be

established, one for criminal justice use and

a second for noncriminal justice use, perhaps

with the latter based on disposition or conviction information only. Even under the status

quo, access to a national index would require

complicated safeguards (which are technically

feasible with a computer-based system) to be

consistent with the wide variety of existing

State laws and regulations, and would require

some means to resolve conflicts between State

laws, and between Federal statutes and Executive orders and State laws.

Oversight and Audit

The purposes of new oversight mechanisms

would be to help assure Congress, the public,

and others that a national index (or any other

national CCH system) is operating within the

boundaries of law and regulation, and to help

identify any problems that may emerge. Oversight is closely linked to system audit. Several

possibilities have been suggested. First, Congress could require an annual management report on the operation of a national CCH system. Second, Congress could require periodic
18 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History system

audits of Federal and State CCH files to help

ensure compliance with whatever system

standards may be established. To keep costs

down, the audits would presumably be conducted by sampling Federal and State files on

a rotating and perhaps unannounced schedule.

Any Federal audit authority, whether by GAO

or some other body, would appear to require

new Federal legislation and/or regulations.

Public Participation

NCIC’S APB is the only direct avenue of

public participation in the governance of the

existing NCIC/CCH system. However, at present APB does not include representation from

the general public or from public defenders.

Public defenders feel strongly that they should

be represented on any policy board established

for a national CCH system and that defense

interests should have access to that system.

The experience of Alameda County, Calif.,

where public defenders are considered to be

part of the criminal justice community, has

been that public participation in oversight can

help ensure accountability of criminal justice

record systems and can be beneficial in terms

of system performance.

Comprehensive Legislation

Legislation represents one of the strongest

measures to provide Federal direction and ensure accountability and control. It could provide explicit authority for a national index or

other national CCH system, and include statutory guidelines for its operation and use. In

addition to the areas listed above, legislation

could establish access, review, and challenge

procedures; criminal penalties; privacy standards; funding for computer-based user audits

and disposition monitoring procedures; and

uniform crime codes and criminal history record formats. Legislation could also cover areas

discussed earlier such as intelligence use, message switching, and funding for development

of court disposition reporting and State

criminal history record systems.

III Development Plan

In order to develop important additional

data from the III test now under way, Congress may wish to consider whether the plan

should be revised so that: 1) some or all of the

participating States can be tested with no

NCIC message switching as well as with partial message switching (known as automatic

inquiry referral); and 2) record quality research

can be conducted.

AIDS/CCH Consolidation

At present, the Ident/AIDS and NCIC/CCH

files duplicate each other to a significant and

growing extent. Any AIDS/CCH consolidation is likely to have a significant impact on

the cost of FBI criminal history and identification services and could be an integral part of

a national CCH system. Congress may wish

to request the preparation of several alternative consolidation plans, including the possible creation of a new National Criminal Information and Identification Division of the FBI

which would combine Ident, NCIC, and related activities. Congress may also wish to

examine the pros and cons of shifting management of a national CCH system to a new bureau within DOJ or elsewhere.
Chapter 2

Nature and Origins of Criminal

History Records
— —

Contents

Page

Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Nature of Criminal History Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Origins of Criminal History Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

1.

2.

30

4.

50

Overview

Facsimile

Facsimile

Summary

Facsimile

of

of

of

FIGURES

Criminal History Records System . . .

Manual Ident Rap Sheet . . . . . . . . . . .

CCH Record and Explanation Sample

Record Response .. ... . . . . . . . . . . ...

of AIDS Record. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bertillon Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Response CCH

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

23

24

25

26

27

.

I

. .
. ——

Chapter 2

Nature and Origins of Criminal

History Records

Chapter

Until the 1850’s, criminal history records in

the United States consisted largely of informal notes maintained by local police officers.

Since that time, however, such records have

become more formalized, centralized, widely

used, and technology-based.

Originally, criminal history records were

known as “rap sheets. ” The information they

contained about subject individuals ranged

from personal identifiers (e.g., height, weight,

eye color, and/or identification numbers) to arrests (date, jurisdiction, and charges). Information contained in criminal history records

also may include court disposition of charges,

sentencing, incarceration, and the like. The actual content of criminal history files varies

widely. The applicable laws, traditions, and

management practices in a particular jurisdiction—as well as disparities in the completeness, timeliness, and/or accuracy of criminal

history information submitted to State and

Federal repositories— all contribute to variation in record content.

Summary

These records are still maintained in local

police departments, as well as in central repositories established by the Federal Government

and 49 of the 50 States. Since 1924, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has maintained a national criminal history record repository in its Identification Division (known as

Ident).

While police were the earliest users of criminal history records, such records now are used

to varying degrees at all stages of the criminal

justice process by prosecutors, public defenders, judges, probation officials, and the like.

The technology of criminal records has

evolved from paper-and-pencil, to manual filing, to computerized information systems; and

from rogues’ galleries and daguerreotypes, to

fingerprinting, to automated fingerprint classification and search systems.

Nature of Criminal History Records

Criminal history records exist on several levels. Criminal history information generally

originates with criminal justice agencies directly involved with the processing of specific

persons. For example, the police maintain records (known as blotters) on individuals arrested and the date, time, charges, and related

information. Fingerprints are normally taken

when a suspect is booked in order to establish

positive identification. Police blotters are usually compiled chronologically. Likewise, the

courts maintain records of the results of judicial proceedings compiled chronologically by

case or docket number, including the disposition and, if applicable, the charges of conviction and sentence imposed. Correctional agencies maintain records on individuals incarcerated, including intake information, facility

assignment, and the like.

This study does not focus on the original records of law enforcement, judicial, correctional,

and other criminal justice agencies (e.g., prosecutional, parole/probation); rather it concentrates on the consolidation of this information

in criminal history records organized by name

21

J 1, _ : “{ J - ~ - 4
22 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Crimina/ History System

(and/or identification number) and maintained

at the State and Federal levels. As will be discussed later, the Federal Government and all

but one State maintain central criminal history record repositories. These repositories include both record information and related fingerprint data that are used (along with other

personal descriptors) to make positive identification. The various levels of criminal history

records are illustrated in figure 1.

These criminal history records originally

were known as “rap sheets” and included primarily the subject’s personal identifiers and

arrest information. However, a broader definition of criminal history records has emerged.

As currently defined in the Code of Federal

Regulations, criminal history records include

“information collected by criminal justice

agencies on individuals consisting of identifiable descriptions and notations of arrest,

detentions, indictments, information, or other

formal criminal charges, and any disposition

arising therefrom, sentencing, correctional supervision, and release.’”

Thus, the definition of criminal history records (although still frequently referred to as

rap sheets) used in this study includes information concerning an individual’s arrests for

violation of criminal laws and the disposition

of charges (including charges dropped, dismissed, or of which the subject is acquitted).

For convicted individuals, criminal history records include information on sentencing, correctional supervision, and release. They also note

the arresting jurisdiction and, where applicable, the correctional institution. Finally, these

records include local, State, and/or Federal

criminal identification numbers assigned to

the individual involved, along with other personal identifiers (e.g., height, weight, and eye

color). The records of repeat offenders contain

criminal history information for each violation.

———

‘Title 28 Code of Federal Regulations, pt. 20, subpt. A.

The actual content of criminal history files

varies widely, depending on the applicable

laws, tradition, and management practices in

a particular jurisdiction. For example, some

States seal or purge information concerning

arrests that do not result in a conviction. z

Other States maintain such nonconviction information as a permanent part of the criminal

history record.’ The many variations in State

law that affect the content of criminal history

records are reviewed in chapter 6. Also, as discussed in chapters 8 and 9, disposition reporting levels vary widely among the States.

At the Federal level, the FBI has developed

a standard format for criminal history records

in Ident and in the computerized criminal history (CCH) file of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). The Ident and CCH

criminal history record formats are illustrated

in figures 2 and 3. The I dent manual records

currently are being converted to an automated

format called the Automated Identification

Division System, illustrated in figure 4. The

content of the Ident and CCH records also varies widely, largely due to disparities in the

completeness, timeliness, and/or accuracy of

criminal history information provided to the

FBI by Federal, State, and local criminal justice agencies.

“’The South Carolina statute is an example of an especially

strong automatic purging procedure. The South Carolina Code

(S. Carolina Code sec. 17-1-40) requires agencies to automatically purge arrest records upon notification that charges were

dropped or that the subject was acquitted. ” SEARCH Group,

Inc. Sealing and Purging of Criminal History Record Information, technical report No. 27, Sacramento, Calif., April 1981,

p. 13.

‘As defined in 28 CFR 20.3(k), nonconviction information

means “arrest information without disposition if an interval

of one year has elapsed from the date of arrest and no active

prosecution of the charge is pending; or information disclosing that the police have elected not to refer a matter to a prosecutor, or that a prosecutor has elected not to commence criminal proceedings, or that proceedings have been indefinitely postponed, as well as all acquittals and all dismissals. ”

‘See SEARCH, Sealing and Purging, op. cit., pp. 13-16, for

discussion of variations in State law on sealing and purging.
Ch. 2—Nature and Origins of Criminal History Records Ž 23 —

Figure 1 .—Overview of Criminal History Records System

Federal

Other Other

level Federal systems Federal users and

(e.g., TECSa

) interstate users

State

level

Local

level

Other In-State

State systems users

(e.g., NLETSd)

49 State identification bureaus,

of which 27 have a CCHe file

and 7 have an automated name

Other Local

Local systems users

(e.g., REGISf)

“Street”

levelg

index

Type of

{

Date Disposition Initial assignment

criminal Name Charges Release date

history Arrest Sentence

information Charges

generated Fingerprints

(illustrative)

NOTES:

a

TECS = Treasury Enforcement Communication System.

bldent/AIDS = Manual and Automated Identification Division System records (including fingerprints) maintained by the FBI’s Identification Division.

cNcIc/ccH = FBI'S National Crime Information Center computerized criminal history records.

dNLETS = National Law Enforcement Telecommunications SyStem.

eCCH = Computerized Criminal History.

f REGIS = Regional governmental information systems which frequently transmit criminal history information (as in the St. Louis, Missouri region).

gMay also include prosecution files and records maintained by pretrial diversion and probationparole agencies.

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment adapted from Sarwar A Kashmerl, “REJIS-A New Concept for Regional Criminal Justice Agencies !n LEAA, Pro

ceedings of the Second International Symposium on Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Systems, Washington, D C , 1974, p 380
24 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

.

Figure 2.—FacsimiIe of Manual Ident Rap Sheet

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 3-15-79 125

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531

Use of the following FBI record, NUMBER 000 000 A , IS REGULATED BY LAW. It is furnished FOR

OFFICIAL USE ONLY and should ONLY BE USED FOR PURPOSE REQUESTED. When further explanation of arrest charge or

disposition is needed, communicate directly with the agency that contributed the fingerprint.

PD

Peoria IL

PD

Daytona Beach FL

s o

Ore Con IL

Rec & Class Ctr

Joliet IL

PD

Peoria IL

Rec & Class Ctr

Joliet IL

(Source : Provided

July 1979

Name And Number

John Lee Doe

34653

John Doe

ID- 104200

SID FL4261893

John L Doe

John Lee Doe

C61778

John L Doe

34653

John Doe

C61778

Arrested OR

Received

8-12-74

4-21-75

5-2-76

‘- 1-76

8-3-78

9-29-78

Division, Federal

I

CHARGE

OMVWI

shopliftin g

burglar y

2 count s

burglar y

the f t

the f t

SUBJECTS CRIMINAL

ALSO RECORDED IN

FILE

a 1 Bureau of investigation

DISPOSiTION

charge dism

12-18-74

4-29-7 5

Sent susp

30 days

6-10-7 6

1 yr IL

Dept o f

Correction s

1 y r

9-1-78

1 yr 6 mos

to 4 yr. 6 mos

guilty IL

Dept of

Corrction s

1 yr 6 mos

to 4 yr 6 mos

HISTORY

NCIC-CCH

SOURCE Provided by Identification Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 1979
Ch. 2—Nature and Origins of Criminal History Records ● 2 5 ——. —.—.—— — --————--.—.

Figure 3.— Facsimile of CCH Record and Explanation

Sample Response CCH Summary Record (QH)

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

4001HEADERXXXXO1234

MD10126OO

NCIC SUMMARY MULTIPLE STATE FBI/835172Kll 03/01/77

EH DOE, JOHN M W NH DoB/120345 HGT/511

WGT/165 EYE/BRO HAI/BLK SKN/LBR SMT/TAT L ARM

SOC/375125249 MNU/AS-375125249 FPC/121011C0141159TTCI13

Comment / E p I L EPTI S TAT Is ARROW THRU HEART

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFIERS -

4002 HEADERXXXX01234

MD10126OO

SID/MD34567812

DOB/0ll147 031147 031149

SMT/CRIP L HND CON LENSES DENT UP LO

SOC/421381928 382411221 120551394

MNU/MC-1428316 VA-C1234567

AKA/DOE, JOHN J/HENRY, JOHN/JOHN, HENRY

DLU/602876

TOTAL ARRESTS - 2

4003HEADE RXXXX01234

MD10126OO

CHARGES CONVICTIONS OFFENSE

1 1 ASSAULT

1 1 DANGEROUS DRUGS

1 0 ATTEMPT SEX OFFENSES

LAST ARREST STATUS (INCLUDED ABOVE) -

012074 MDBPDOOOO BALTIMORE CITY PD MD

COURT STATUS (INCLUDED ABOVE)-

32 MD SUP CT NO 1 BALTIMORE

400HEADE RXXXX01234

MD10126OO

01 3603 ATTEMPTED HOMOSEXUAL ACT WITH Boy--

CONVICTED

DISP DATE/020274 CONFINE/6M

02 1314 AGGRAV ASSLT-GUN--CONVICTED

DISP DATE/020274 CONFINE/6M

cc

APPEAL DATE030274

SUPP COURT STATUS01 ACQUITTED

CUSTODY STATUS

4L05HEADE RXXX X0123 4

MD10126OO

MDO02035C HOUSE OF CORRECTION JESSUP MD 030374

RECEIVED

MDO02035C HOUSE OF CORRECTION JESSUP MD 090374

DISCHARGED

END

BASED ON NAME CHECK

4b

SOURCE” Provided by the National Crime lnformation Center, Federal Bureau of investigation, October 1978
26 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Figure 4.— Facsimile of AIDS Record

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

Use of the following FBI record, NUMBER 000 000 N 1 is REGULATED BY LAW. It Is furnished for

OFFICIAL USE ONLY and should ONLY BE USED FOR PURPOSE REQUESTED. When further explanation of arrest charge ,

or disposition is needed, communicate directlv with the aqencv that contributed the fingerprints. -—”- —

Contributor of

Identificr (0RI)

Name

Case Numher (OCA)

— - – . —

NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION

ILO72O70 0

PD PEORIA , I L

3465 3

11064010 0

PO DAYTONA BEACH, FL

1D-104 200

IL071 0000

SO OREGON , I L

IL0990 15 c

RECLASS CTR JOL I ET

C61 770

ILO7207 0 0

PD PEORIA,I L

3465 3

IL 09901 5C

REC LCLASS CTR JOL I ET

C61778

— — - .

Subject :

Name

State Number (SID)

CENTER FGPT .

DOE ,

JOHN LE E

DOE ,

JOH N

FL426189 3

DOE ,

JOHN L

DOE ,

JOHN LE E

DOE ,

JOHN L

DOE ,

JOHN

4C

CLASS ,

08/ 1 2/7 4

04/2 1 /7 5

O 5/0 2/7 6

0 7/0 1/7 6

O 8/0 3/7 8

09/2 9/7 0

- .

- .-

C . Charge

D - DISPOsition

C-O MVW I

D-CHARGE D I S M I SSE D- I 2 / 1 8 /7

C - SHOPL I F T I NG

D- CON V I C T ED -04 / 29 / 75

SENT SUSP-30 D

C-BURGLARY- 2 COUNTS

D-CONV I C TE D 06 / 10 / 76

CONFINEMENT- 1 Y

IL DEPT OF CORRECTI0N S

C- BURGLARY

D-CONVICTED –

CONFINEMENT 1Y

C - THEFT

D- CONVICTED- 09/01/7 S

CONF I N EMENT -1 Y 6M-4 Y 6M

GUILT Y

IL DEPT OF CORRECTI0N S

C-T HEFT

D- CON V I CTED -

CONF I N EM EN T -1 Y 6 M- 4 Y 6 M

SOURCE. Provided by the Identificatlon Division Federal Bureau of Investlgation, July 1979

Origins of Criminal History Records

Until the mid-1850’s, criminal history rec- city police began to centralize records—priords in the United States consisted largely of marily rap sheets—and establish more consisinformal, anecdotal notes maintained by local tent reporting formats.

police officers. However, as the larger cities

in the Northeast such as Boston and New At the same time, city police needed more

York created formal police departments, the reliable ways to identify suspects and crimi-
Ch. 2—Nature and Origins of Criminal History Records ● 2 7

nals. In the mid-19th century, the police first

established rogues’ galleries and used daguerreotypes to identify criminals. In the 1880’s,

these methods were supplemented by the Bertillon system of identification, which used

body measurements, standardized photographs, notations of skin color and markings,

and thumbline impressions, as shown in figure 5. In the early 1900’s, fingerprinting

evolved as the most reliable identification system; it remains the basic underpinningg of criminal history records at all levels of government.

Also in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the increased mobility of criminals fostered by the railroad and automobile expanded

the need for sharing of criminal history records

among different jurisdictions. The National

Chiefs of Police Union, later to become the International Association of Chiefs of Police

(IACP), was among the first to support a more

formal institutionalized means for exchanging

records. Partly because the States had not yet

developed a statewide role in criminal justice

recordkeeping, IACP supported a national bureau of criminal identification, and even maintained a prototype bureau itself for several

years. In 1923, at the urging of IACP among

others, IACP bureau files, along with the Federal criminal identification files (maintained at

the Federal prison in Leavenworth, Kans.),

were transferred to the U.S. Department of

Justice (DOJ). Congress created the Identification Division in 1924, and passed legislation

in 1929 making Ident a permanent part of the

FBI within DOJ.

By the 1940’s, most of the States had developed State bureaus of identification, and the

basic framework for State and Federal repositories of criminal identification and arrest records had taken shape. By 1949, 32 States had

established identification bureaus, and as of

September 1981, 49 of the 50 States had a

Figure 5.— Bertillon Equipment

Bertillon Equipment

(’An

I

,

.

The Bertillon System of Identification

is now used by the principal cldes of the U-ited States -

and foreign countries. The descriptive pamphlet mailed upon request

Eat. 1544 SHARP & SMITH lnc. 1904

92 Wabash Avenue (Two doors North of Washington Street) Chicago, Ill.

SOURCE Reproduced from Identification Wanted” Development of the American Criminal ldentification System 1893193, International Association of Chiefs of Pollee, Police Management and

Operations Divisions, Gaithersburg, Md , 1977
28 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

State identification bureau established by

law.5

While the early use of rap sheets was primarily by the police, by the 1960’s and 1970’s

criminal history records were increasingly

viewed as important at all stages of the criminal justice process. Thus, the needs of prosecutors, public defenders, judges, magistrates,

‘Nevada is the one State without a State identification bureau. Based on September 1981 survey conducted by NCIC

staff. See NCIC staff paper prepared for the Nov. 3-4, 1981,

meeting of the NCIC Advisory Policy Board Subcommittee on

the Interstate Identification Index, Topic #6, pp. 1-2.

and probation and correctional officials were

all considered along with those of police and

investigatory officers.6

c

For a detailed discussion of the criminal identification system, see Donald C. Dilworth, Identification Wanted: Development of the American Criminal Identification System 1893-

1943, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaithersburg, Md., 1977. Also see Donald A. Marchand, et al., A History and Background Assessment of the National Crime Information Center and Computerized Criminal History Program,

Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of

South Carolina, June 1979, Section I, “Law Enforcement

Record-Keeping in the United States: 1850’ s-1950’ s,” pp. 6-37.
.—.—

Chapter 3

Evolution to Computerized

Criminal History Records
Contents

Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Problems With Manual Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Concern Over Multi-State Offenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

criminal Justice Reform and Computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Birth of the National Crime Information Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Origins of the Computerized Criminal History Program.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

TABLES

Table No.

l. Percent Multi-State Offenders unselected Criminal History

Record Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

2. Initial Participating Agencies for the National Crime Information

Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Chapter 3

Evolution to Computerized Criminal

History Records

—

Chapter

Until the 1960’s, criminal history records

were maintained on paper in manual files. The

evolution to computerized recordkeeping reflects several factors, including growing problems with manual files, concern over multiState offenders, a rising crime rate, efforts to

reform the criminal justice process, and the

availability of new technology.

Manual files have grown so large and cumbersome that response time has become a

serious problem. For example, the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Identification

Division’s (Ident) file has grown from 2 million

fingerprint cards in 1924 to about 175 million

in 1981, with an average of 27,392 cards received each day. The typical Ident response

time during 1981 was in the range of 27 workdays for all criminal record inquiries (including

fingerprint and name checks).

Another justification for centralized, computerized files is the mobility of criminals.

Computer-based information systems can help

speed the exchange of criminal history records

among the States. OTA verified that multiState offenders account for about 30 percent

of the Ident criminal record file and 33 percent

of the National Crime Information Center/

Computerized Criminal History (NCIC/CCH)

file. With Federal offenders excluded, about

12 percent of the records in the NCIC/CCH file

are for multi-State offenders.

Summary

Several study commissions established in

response to rising crime rates have emphasized the role of computers in the reform of the

criminal justice process. One result was the

enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and

Safe Streets Act of 1968, which established

the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). One priority of LEAA was the

development of CCH systems in the States.

At the Federal level, the FBI had wanted

for years to automate criminal records. The

computer technology of the 1960’s provided

the first practical opportunity. Thus, 1963

marked the initial FBI use of computer technology to process individual criminal records

for Federal offenders, and led eventually to the

establishment of NCIC. This center began operations on January 27, 1967, to create automated files of wanted persons and stolen vehicles.

Automating criminal history records proved

to be much more difficult. Questions immediately arose about who should operate a

CCH system and what information should be

maintained at the Federal and State levels of

government. In 1970, after Project SEARCH

(System for Electronic Analysis and Retrieval

of Criminal Histories) began development of

a national CCH system with LEAA funding,

the U.S. Attorney General assigned management responsibilities for CCH to the FBI

rather than to LEAA, a joint LEAA/FBI entity, or a consortium of States.

Problems With Manual Files

Until the 1960’s, criminal history records

were maintained on paper, and were created

and updated manually (typewriter or handwriting). While this approach appeared to be

satisfactory for many years, the increasing

number of records eventually created a severe

31
32 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a Nationa/ Computerized Crimina/ History System

——.—

problem. Manual processing of paper records

is extremely time-consuming and labor-intensive, thus costly. As staffing and funding

limits were reached, delays in obtaining and

updating records increased significantly.

Ident’s experience exemplifies the immensity of the problem. Starting with about 2

million fingerprint cards in 1924, the number

grew to about 76 million in 1943, and to 170

million in 1979. As of October 1981, Ident held

about 175 million fingerprint cards representing records on about 65 million persons. Of

this total, 78 million cards representing 21

million individuals were in the Ident criminal

file. During fiscal year 1981, Ident received an

average of 27,392 fingerprint cards daily, of

which about 12,684 involved criminal offenders. 1

Each card has to be recorded, examined for

data completeness, searched against the master criminal file to locate any previous record,

classified by fingerprint characteristics if a

new print, and entered into an existing criminal history record (or a new record if the individual has no previous record). A copy of the

record is then forwarded by mail (or occasionally by teletype or facsimile in case of urgent

need) to the requesting agency.

‘Based on data supplied by letter to OTA dated Oct. 30, 1981,

from the Deputy Assistant Director, FBI Identification Division. During fiscal year 1981, I dent received a total of 6,848,043

fingerprint cards, of which 3,171,102 were from Federal, State,

and local criminal justice agencies. Thus, based on 250 workdays, an average of 27,392 cards were received daily. Of these,

a daily average of 12,684 were from criminal justice agencies.

Reports from the field indicate that when

an arresting agency forwards a fingerprint

card to the FBI, it typically takes several

weeks to receive a response. z Surveys conducted for the FBI in 1979 and 1980 indicated

that the average Ident response time for processing of fingerprint cards was in the range

of 36 workdays.3 As of July and October 1981,

the FBI estimated that Ident internal processing time (excluding mailing time) was averaging 27 and 25 workdays, respectively, for all

categories of inquiries (both fingerprint checks

and name checks). As of July 1982, processing time had improved, at least temporarily,

to about 13 days, due to Ident’s suspension

of record checks for federally chartered or insured banking institutions and State and local

employment and licensing authorities.4 The

problem of slow response from manual systems is a key factor supporting the evolution

to computerized systems.

‘See “Excerpts From Representative Viewpoints of State

Criminal Justice Officials Regarding the Need for a Nationwide

Interchange Facility, March 6, 1978, ” reprinted as app. B to

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Preliminary

Assessment of the National Crime Information Center and Computerized Criminal History System, Washington, D. C., December 1978, p. 71.

3Jet Propulsion Laboratory, FBI Fingerprint Identification

Automation Study: AIDS III Evaluation Report, Volume I,

California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Calif., Nov. 15,

1980, pp. 1-1 to 1-3; prepared for U.S. Department of Justice,

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

‘Oct. 1, 1981, letter to all I dent fingerprint contributors from

Nick F. Stames of the FBI, p. 2. Mar. 26, 1982, letter to OTA

from Conrad Banner of the FBI; personal communication with

Conrad Banner, July 30, 1982. Ident plans to restore these services on Oct. 1, 1982.

Concern Over Multi-State Offenders

The problem of multi-State offenders has in the United States have multi-State records

been recognized for decades. It was one reason (that is, have been arrested in more than one

for the initial establishment of a national re- State during their criminal careers). More repository of criminal history records in the FBI cently, based on the composition of the NCIC/

to facilitate the exchange of records among dif- CCH file as of August 1, 1981, the FBI estiferent States. mated that 33 percent of all offenders have

However, until relatively recently the actual multi-State records.5 An OTA study of crimipercentage of multi-State offenders was not ‘See NCIC staff paper prepared for the Nov. 3-4, 1981, meetknown. In 1974, based on a sample of Ident ing of the NCIC Advisory Panel Board Subcommittee on th e

Interstate Identification Index, Topic #3, p. 7. As of Aug. 1, records, the FBI concluded that approximate- 1981, 610,502 of the 1,841,776 total records in the NCIC/CCH

ly 30 percent of the persons arrested annually file (or 33.15 percent) were multi-State.
Ch. 3—Evo/ution to Computerized Crimina/ History Records ● 3 3

nal history files provides a confirmation and

interpretation of the 1974 and 1981 FBI estimates.

As summarized in table 1 based on a 1979

survey, OTA found that about 30.4 percent of

individuals in the FBI’s Ident file have arrests

in more than one State, which agrees very

closely with the earlier FBI figure of 30 percent. However, all Federal offenders are included in both the Ident and NCIC/CCH files.

If Federal multi-State offenders are excluded,

the percentage of multi-State records in the

NCIC/CCH file drops from 33 to 12 percent.6

As of August 1, 1981, the percentage of NCIC/

CCH multi-State records for the eight States

with records in the NCIC/CCH file fell within

the 3-to 36-percent range, as shown in table 1.

Thus, multi-State offenders represent a significant part of the total criminal population.

Whether this multi-State population is com6Ibid. Excluding the 448,860 Federal offender records counted

as multi-State, the remaining 161,642 multi-State records repre

sent 11.6 percent of the 1,392,916 State records in the NCICi

CCH file.

Table 1 .—Percent Multistate Offenders in

Selected Criminal History Record Files

Percent multi-State

Selected criminal history record files offenders

FBI Identification Division Fileb 

. . . . . 30.4 ”/0

FBI NCIC/CCH Filec 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33.2

FBI NCIC/CCH File Excluding

Federal Offendersc 

. . . . . . . . . . . . 11. 6

States with records in the

NCIC/CCH filec

Nebraska. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.1 0/0

Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.4

North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.1

Florida. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.8

lowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.0

Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4

South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6

Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5

apercent of offenders in the file with arrests in two or more States

bbased on a 1979 OTA Survey of record quality For the 168 Ident records With

verifiable arrest events (see ch. 8), the number of different States i n which arrests occurred was distributed as follows. 1 State (117 records out of 168), 2

States (29 records), 3 States (8 records), 4 States (7 records), 5 States (3 records),

6 States (1 record), 7 States (2 records), 8 States (1 record)

cBased on NCIC/CCH file size and composition as Of Aug. 1, 1981.

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment and Federal Bureau of Investigation

posed of criminals whose crimes are more serious or less serious than those of the general

criminal population could not be determined

from information available to OTA.

Criminal Justice Reform and Computers

In the mid-1960’s, the continuous rise in the

incidence of crime, coupled with political and

social tensions (e.g., over civil rights, urban

renewal, and the Vietnam War), led to renewed

efforts to reform the criminal justice process.

In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson established a President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice to

probe the causes of crime and recommend

ways to improve its prevention and control.

Two years later, in its 1967 report, the commission found serious deficiencies in criminal

justice information in general and criminal history record systems in particular. The commission suggested that “criminal justice could

benefit dramatically from computer-based information systems. ”7

‘President Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society

(Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p.

266.

The commission also concluded that the

criminal justice process: 1) suffered from extreme decentralization, fragmentation, and a

general lack of coordination of the agencies involved, and 2) was seriously overburdened

partly owing to a general tendency in the

United States toward overcriminalization, i.e.,

to prescribe criminal justice solutions to what

were essentially social and moral problems.

Nevertheless, the commission’s emphasis on

the use of computer and communication technology in the criminal justice process helped

set the agenda for subsequent legislative and

administrative initiatives with respect to computerized criminal history records.

Foremost among these initiatives was the

passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and

Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the establishment of LEAA. Title I of this act represented

the Federal Government’s first comprehensive
34 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

grant-in-aid program for reform and modernization of the criminal justice process. The act

provided for a “block grant” approach to Federal funding, recognizing that prevention and

control of crime was basically a State and local

responsibility. LEAA was established to administer the block grant program and to work

closely with the States and localities in improving the administration of criminal justice

at every level.

Following the recommendations of the President’s Commission, LEAA gave relatively

high priority to grants for the development of

computerized criminal justice information and

statistical systems in the States, including

computerized criminal history record systems.

From 1970 to 1980, LEAA awarded about

$207 million in categorical grants to the States

for criminal justice information systems, although only about $39 million was earmarked

specifically for CCH-related systems.8 An additional $200 million to $400 million in LEAA

block grants to the States is estimated to have

been spent on information systems.9 These

grant programs ended in fiscal year 1981.

8Based on data from the Office of Justice Assistance Research

and Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice. See ch. 5 for discussion.

‘Based on data and analysis provided in a Sept. 9, 1981, letter to OTA from Tom Dalton of Seattle University. See ch. 5

for discussion.

Birth of the National Crime Information Center

Almost from its inception, Ident has experimented with new techniques to process fingerprints and rap sheets more efficiently. For example, as early as 1934 the FBI tried a punchcard and sorting system for searching fingerprints, but the technology at that time could

not handle the large number of records in the

Ident files. It was not until the development

of third generation computer technology in the

early 1960’s that the FBI’s goals of automating criminal records became feasible. For the

first time computer technology made it possible to electronically store hundreds of thousands or even millions of records, and to process record requests and updates almost instantaneously.

The FBI first used computer technology to

process individual criminal records in 1963. In

a “Careers in Crime” study, the criminal identification records of 194,000 Federal offenders

were computerized and regularly updated as

new information came into the FBI on arrests,

convictions, and other criminal justice transactions. The study found that criminal activity

increasingly was spilling over local government boundaries. It also concluded that the

existing mechanisms for the exchange between local and State jurisdictions of wanted

persons and stolen vehicle information, as well

as rap sheets, were too slow and incomplete.l0

As a consequence, the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) section of the FBI Criminal Records Division recognized a need to initiate the

use of new computer technology. Computers

could automate criminal records, allowing

remote access to States and localities through

appropriate communication lines.

In 1965, the UCR section sought approval

to proceed with the development of a national

crime information system. Initially, it would

be used for the rapid exchange of wanted person and stolen property information, with

criminal history information to be added later.

On January 20, 1966, the Attorney General

approved the development of a national crime

information center in the FBI. In his memorandum to FBI Director Hoover, the Attorney

General cited the FBI’s collection and exchange of criminal records with local police

organizations as sufficient authority to establish the center.11

10 Alan F. Westin and Michael A. Baker, Data Banks in a Free

Society (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972), p. 51.

‘

] Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Attorney General of the United

States, Memorandum for J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal

Bureau of Investigation, “National Crime Information Center, ”

Jan. 20, 1966.
Ch. 3—Evolution to Computerized Criminal History Records ● 3 5

Subsequent to the Attorney General’s approval, several planning meetings were held

in which the FBI, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, local police departments and other law enforcement agencies

(primarily State police) participated. The planning process helped determine the files to be

initially included, criteria for entry of records

into those files, and operational procedures to

ensure that participating local and State information systems would be technically compatible with the national center.

On January 27, 1967, NCIC began operation

with approximately 23,000 records of wanted

persons and stolen property in its computer

files. The 15 initial participating agencies are

listed in table 2.

By September 1967, the FBI reported that

over 260,000 records were on file on stolen veTable 2.—initial Participating Agencies for

the National Crime Information Center

Washington, D. C., Police Department

Maryland State Police, Pikesville

Pennsylvania State Police, Harrisburg

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Police Department

New York State Police Department

New York City Police Department

Boston, Mass. Police Department

Chicago, Ill. Police Department

St. Louis, Mo. Police Department

Denver Field Division of the FBI

California Highway Patrol, Sacramento

Texas Department of Public Safety, Austin

New Orleans, La, Police Department

Georgia State Patrol, Atlanta

Virginia State Police, Richmond

SOURCE” Off Ice of Technology Assessment

hicles and license plates, stolen guns, stolen

articles, and wanted persons. NCIC was operating 7 days a week and 22 hours a day, averaging 10,000 entries and inquiries daily.

Origins of the Computerized

Criminal History Program

The way was now prepared for the development of a national computerized criminal history program. In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice strongly endorsed the use of

computers in the criminal justice process. In

1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime

Control and Safe Streets Act, which established LEAA to help the States improve their

administration of criminal justice. Priority

was to be placed on upgrading criminal justice

information systems at the State and local levels. In 1967, when the FBI began operating

NCIC, the first computerized national criminal

justice information system, criminal history

files were initially excluded. This was a deliberate decision in order to hold off until the

stolen property and wanted person files were

implemented. The feasibility of automating

criminal history records had already been demonstrated and was never doubted.

As it turned out, implementation of the

CCH file proved to be much more difficult–

for a variety of reasons, including disagreements within the FBI and between the FBI

and LEAA.

In 1968 and 1969, the FBI established a

working group made up of NCIC and Ident

staff to begin developing plans for automating

criminal history records in the FBI. As a result

of disagreements over the impact of a CCH file

on the maintenance of rap sheets in Ident, the

FBI planning effort was temporarily halted.

The initiative then moved to LEAA.

LEAA was already receiving a number of

grant applications from States seeking funds

to develop computerized criminal justice information systems. LEAA agreed there was a

need for such systems, but was concerned that

“each State might go off in its own direction,

leaving us with a bewildering complex of independent and incompatible programs.”2 In ad-

‘

z

Project SEARCH, National symposium on CriminaJ Justice

Information and Statistics Systems, Sacramento, Calif., 1970,

p. 10.
36 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

dition, the total funds requested far exceeded

LEAA’s budget for this purpose.

LEAA therefore decided to fund a new organization called Project SEARCH to ‘develop

and demonstrate that a computerized criminal

offender file, containing data from all segments of criminal justice, can be standardized

and exchanged between States on a timely basis. "13 States originally participating in Project SEARCH included Arizona, California,

Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Michigan,

Minnesota, New York, Texas, and Washington.

Within 14 months, working with LEAA

grants, Project SEARCH developed a computerized rap sheet format and completed an online demonstration of the interstate exchange

of Criminal history records. The demonstration

linked six States with a central computer in

Michigan’s State Police headquarters. In this

way, Project SEARCH and LEAA proved

that it was technically feasible not only to

automate manual history records, but to use

a computerized system for the interstate exchange of criminal histories.

However, questions arose about who should

operate the system and what computerized

criminal history information should be maintained at the Federal and State levels. During

1970, the pros and cons of different alternatives were analyzed and debated by the Attorney General, the FBI, and LEAA, and later

the Office of Management and Budget.14

——— —

“project SEARCH Newsletter, Sacramento, Calif., 1969, vol.

1, issue 1.

14See DonaId A. Marchand, et al., A Histury and Background

Assessment of the National Crime Information Gmter and

On December 10, 1970, the Attorney General decided that the FBI would take over

management responsibility for the CCH system, rather than LEAA, a joint LEAA/FBI

entity, or a consortium of States. The FBI

named the system the Computerized Criminal

History (CCH) program and operated it as

part of NCIC, using NCIC computers and

communication lines.

The CCH program began operations on November 29, 1971, joining wanted persons and

stolen property files maintained in the NCIC.

On an interim basis, the CCH file was to contain the detailed criminal history of each offender whose record was entered by the States

into the system. Eventually, under the singleState/multi-State plan adopted by the FBI,

NCIC/CCH would maintain only summary

data in the form of an index of single-State offenders, while the States would maintain detailed records. For multi-State offenders and

Federal offenders, NCIC/CCH would maintain

the detailed records.

Due to a variety of issues addressed later

in this report, neither the single-State/multiState plan nor any other NCIC/CCH alternative has been fully implemented.ls

Computerized Criminal History Program, Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of South Carolina,

June 1979, sec. III, “The Computerized Criminal History Program: Its Origins and Initial Implementation, ” especially pp.

78-86, for details of this debate.

‘sFor a complete discussion of the history and background

of NCIC/CCH, see Ibid. and Donald A. Marchand, The PoL”tics

of Privacy, C.bmputers and Criminal Justice R&or& (Arlington,

Va.: Information Resources Press, 1980), especially chs. 4 and 6.
—

Chapter 4

Description of the National

Crime Information Center

in Context
.—— ——

Content s

Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

NCIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Related Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

What NCIC Is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

NCIC Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Volume of NCIC Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

CCH Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Related Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Identification Division System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System. . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Treasury Enforcement Communication System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Justice Telecommunications System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

State and Local Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

TABLES

Table No.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Number of Records Included in NCIC, by File. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

States With Full Participation in the NCIC/CCH Program . . . . . . . . . .

Number of States With On-Line Computerized Criminal History

Information Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Status of State CriminalHistorySystems ,

FIGURE

-Figure No.

6. NCIC Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

August

. . . . . . .

.............

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

42

43

47

48

Page

41
.

Chapter 4

Description of the National Crime

Information Center in Context

Chapter

The National Crime Information Center

(NCIC) uses computer and telecommunication

technology for collecting, storing, retrieving,

transmitting, and disseminating criminal justice information. NCIC interfaces with and

complements many other criminal justice information systems at the Federal, State, and

local levels. Thus, NCIC maybe viewed as one

member of a family of systems.

NCI C

NCIC contains 10 files. Eight of these, the

so-called “hot files, ” furnish an electronic bulletin board capability used by law enforcement

agencies to list persons or properties (e.g., vehicles, guns, and securities) that are wanted,

missing, or stolen. The ninth file is the computerized criminal history (CCH); the tenth is the

Criminalistics Laboratory Information System (CLIS) file which contains no information

about individuals.

As of October 1981, NCIC included about

9.3 million records—7.4 million hot file records

and 1.9 million CCH file records. However,

about 90 percent of NCIC traffic is for use of

the stolen vehicles/plates and wanted/missing

persons files. CCH use involves about 4.4 millions transactions annually, or about 3.5 percent of total NCIC traffic.

The low level of CCH use compared with hot

file use is due in part to the small number of

States that are fully participating in the CCH

program. Whereas all 50 States can both enter

data into and retrieve data from the hot files,

as of December 1981 only 8 are authorized to

enter data into the CCH file. Only 15 States

have ever fully participated in CCH, with never more than 13 at any one time. However, in

addition to the 8 fully participating States, 41

Summary

others participate in CCH on a limited basis

(retrieve data entered by others) and have

signed a management control terminal agreement with NCIC.

NCIC has 137 direct communication lines

to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, including 79 State and Federal agencies,

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

headquarters, 27 FBI field offices, and 2 FBI

metropolitan resident agents. An estimated

64,000 other Federal, State, and local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies are entitled to access NCIC over these lines. Depending on the State, these agencies may include,

for example, local police departments, U.S.

magistrates, district attorneys, courts, county jails, State hospitals, and parole boards.

Related Systems

NCIC interfaces with a large number of other criminal justice information systems. The

following are particularly important:

. The FBI Identification Division (Ident)

fingerprint record repository is integral

to NCIC/CCH, since every CCH entry

must reference an FBI identification number initially assigned by Ident based on

positive fingerprint identification. The

Automated Identification Division System (AIDS) is the FBI’s effort to automate Ident, and in October 1981 included

about 5.8 million criminal history records.

All first offender records are entered into

AIDS. Ident is not maintaining manual

rap sheets on any individual who is in the

AIDS file. When a criminal history record

is needed it is generated by computer. As

of October 1981, 58 percent of the records

39
40 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System -. -—

in the NCIC/CCH file were also maintained in AIDS.

● National La w Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) is a computerized message switching network linking

local, State, and Federal law enforcement

agencies. Operated by a nonprofit corporation controlled by the States, NLETS

does not hold or manage record files. It

is a principal means by which user agencies verify data from the NCIC hot files.

NLETS can also be used to transfer records from the NCIC/CCH file and between State CCH files.

● Treasury Enforcement t Communication

System (TECS) is a large communication

network and computerized data base

managed by the Customs Service in the

Treasury Department. TECS supports

over 1,400 terminals in, for example, the

50 States, Puerto Rico, and Canada,

and serves various Federal agencies and

Interpol (the International Police Organization). TECS users can access the NCIC/

CCH file to obtain summary records online. Full records can be produced offline

and delivered to TECS users who are authorized to receive them.

Justice Telecommunications System

(JUST) provides computerized administrative message service to Department of

Justice (DOJ) offices in Washington,

D. C., and to 329 department offices in 169

cities nationwide. JUST has a direct link

to NCIC and offline linkages to the Department of Defense AUTODIN network

and the Department of State Diplomatic

Network.

State and local systems are also highly

automated. As of August 1982, 27 States

had CCH files, and another 7 had an automated name index. At the local level,

most major metropolitan police departments use computer-based systems (19

such departments have direct lines to

NCIC).

Thus, automated systems are clearly prevalent at the local as well as State and Federal

levels, and NCIC is only one of a rather large

family of computer-based criminal justice information systems.

What NCIC I s

System Description

NCIC is a computer-based national information system whose principal function is to support law enforcement and criminal justice activities. Managed and operated by the FBI,

NCIC uses computers and telecommunication

technology for collecting, storing, retrieving,

transmitting, and disseminating criminal justice information among government agencies

at the Federal, State, and local levels, and

among some private organizations. The center

is located in the FBI’s computer facility in

Washington, D. C., and includes a telecommunication network that reaches automated

or manual teletype terminals in all of the 50

States, the District of Columbia, Canada,

Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, as shown

in figure 6.

As of October 1981, the NCIC network had

137 direct communication lines to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, including

79 State and Federal agencies, FBI headquarters, 27 FBI field offices, and 2 FBI metropolitan resident agents.1 As shown in figure 6,

State agencies with direct lines include primarily State police or highway patrols or departments of public safety, justice, or criminal

identification. Nine Federal agencies (listed in

fig. 6) have a direct line to NCIC.

Although only 79 State and Federal agencies have a direct line to NCIC, an estimated

64,000 other Federal, State, and local law en-

‘Federal Bureau of Investigation, Interstate Identification

Index (III): Background and Findings for July-September 1981

Phase I Pilot l?rojec~ Dec. 4, 1981, p. 22.
Ch. 4—Description of the /Vationa/ Crime Information Center in Context ● 4 1

I

z

————.—.— 5 Y

. . . .

o ●

—— -——— . -—.— ——— . . .————— —-—— —— —— .— — ---——

c0

z

0

z

al

>

E

-5

c0

%

z
42 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

forcement and criminal justice agencies are entitled to access NCIC over these lines.2

NCIC users may retrieve data from the files,

modify existing records, and/or add new data

to the files in accordance with the relationship

each has established with NCIC. Not all users

are permitted to perform all functions. The

rules for participating are described in the

NCIC operating manual.3

The NCIC system interfaces with and complements other systems for processing and disseminating law enforcement and criminal justice data. Some are operated by other Federal

agencies, and many have been implemented

at the State and local levels. The degree to

which each is automated varies from system

to system.

NCIC Files

The NCIC system provides access to data

contained in 10 files. Eight of these files, the

so-called “hot files, ” furnish a “bulletin board”

capability that is used by law enforcement

agencies to list people or properties that are

wanted, missing, or stolen. The ninth file, the

CCH file, contains archival criminal history

data most often used for criminal justice ac2

FBI estimate, NCIC operating hfiwIud pt. 10. P. 13.

‘Federal Bureau of Investigation, Technical Services Division,

National Crime Information Center Section, NCIC Operating

ManuaL updated periodically.

tivities subsequent to apprehension of an individual.

A tenth file, CLIS, provides access to a data

base of laboratory information. Although

maintained on and accessed through the NCIC

system, in most respects CLIS is a separate

information system, except that it shares

NCIC computer and telecommunication facilities. CLIS contains no information about

individuals.

The number of records included in the various NCIC files (except for CLIS) is shown in

table 3. These files contained over 9 million

records as of October 1, 1981. The CCH file

is the second largest (exceeded only by the

stolen securities file), even though at present

only eight States are authorized to enter criminal history record information into the CCH

file.

Most inquiries of the hot files are made by

law enforcement and investigative personnel

seeking to determine whether a specific person or item of property is wanted. Such an inquiry may occur, for example, when a traffic

officer stops a vehicle and seeks to determine

whether it has been reported stolen or whether

the driver is wanted for possible involvement

in criminal activity. In all cases, NCIC operating procedures require that information obtained from a hot file be verified with the agency that originated the record before police take

any action based on it.

Table 3.—Number of Records Included in NCIC, by File

— —

Number of records as of Percent of total

File 6/1/79 12/31/79 12/31/80 10/1/81 NCIC records

“Hot Files:”

1. Stolen Vehiclesa 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,714 1,108,574 1,174,639 1,163,771 12.50/o

2. Stolen Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,091,461 1,502,209 1,562,284 1,427,535 15.4

3. Stolen Guns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,337,310 1,426,008 1,574,959 1,674,814 18.0

4. Stolen License Plates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397,706 499,868 551,373 543,173 5.8

5. Wanted Personsb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148,644 162,128 179,044 190,159 2.1

6. Stolen Securities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,998,778 2,189,594 2,303,716 2,361,971 25.4

7. Stolen Boats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,615 21,277 24,707 22,807 0.2

8. Missing Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,535 22,722 23,406 24,640 0.3

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,983,763 6,932,380 7,394,128 7,408,870 79.7 ”/0

Computerized Criminal Histories File:

9. CCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,482,017 1,606,837 1,706,955 1,885,457 20.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ——— 7,465,780 8,539,217 9,101,083 9,294,327 100.0 ”/0

‘Includes vehicle parts, felony vehicles, airplanes, and trailers

bDoeS not {rlclude Carladlan warrants, which totaled 183 as of Oct 1, 1981

SOURCE Federal Bureau of Invest lgatton
Ch. 4—Description of the Nationa/ Crime Informafion Center in Context ● 4 3

Most inquiries of the CCH files are generated by criminal investigations or by criminal

justice actions following an individual’s detention. In these cases, data pertaining to a specific individual are requested. The data obtained are then used in conjunction with steps

in the criminal justice process such as arraignment, determination of sentence, and the decision to grant parole. To obtain a CCH summary record, an agency must provide its own

identifier plus a valid basis for searching the

file. A search may be based solely on a State

or FBI identification number, on a name and

social security or other identification number,

or on name, sex, race, and date of birth information. To obtain a full record, the requesting

agency must provide a State or Federal identification number for the subject.

Volume of NCIC Transactions

In terms of number of transactions, the bulk

of the traffic processed by the NCIC system

is concerned with processing data in and for

the hot files. Use of the hot files is dominated

by law enforcement and criminal justice personnel engaged in tactical operations. Information from the hot files is used primarily to

guide actions taken prior to the arrest of an

individual or the seizure of a piece of property. For the month of September 1981, NCIC

transactions totaled 10,270,500, averaging

342,350 daily.’ This represents a traffic growth

of about 28 percent over the last 2 1/2 years. *

Transactions for the stolen vehicles/plates and

wanted/missing persons files account for

roughly 90 percent of the total NCIC traffic.

The CCH file is used primarily in postarrest

situations and represents a very small part of

total NCIC traffic. In September 1981, CCH

traffic accounted for about 3.5 percent of the

NCIC monthly total. At this rate, CCH use

would involve about 4.4 million transactions

annually. The low level of CCH traffic compared with hot file traffic is also due in part

to the small number of States fully participating in the CCH program.

CCH Participation

There are two levels of participation in the

CCH program. Full participation permits the

organization to add data to the file as well as

\

‘FBI, NCIC ,Section, NCIC Newsletter, October 1981, p. 2.

*The averaw d~y NCIC traffic totaled 266,479 tmsactions

in April 1979. Thus, the daily average increased 28.5 percent

by September 1981.

retrieve data from it. Such users are responsible for entering data into the files and maintaining the records they have entered. This can

require considerable resources from the participant. Generally, States have been hesitant to

participate fully in the CCH program. The

maximum number of fully participating States

that has been reached is 13. As of December

1981, only eight States were full participants,

as listed in table 4.

Less than full participation allows the user

to access the data in the CCH file, but not to

contribute to it. Users at this level are still required to meet the basic criteria established

for participation and to execute a management

control agreement that the rules of NCIC will

Table 4.—States With Full Participation

in the NCICICCH Program

Currently active (as of December 1981)

Florida

Iowa

Michigan

Nebraska

North Carolina

South Carolina

Texas

Virginia

Previously active (withdrew from full participation prior

to December 1981)

Arizona

California

Illinois

Minnesota

New York

Ohio

Pennsylvania

SOURCE Federal Bureau of Inves; tgatlon ”
44 An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

be followed. For example, the agreement includes provisions requiring the user to safeguard the data and limit its distribution to

those authorized to receive it. (See ch. 6 for further details.) As of December 1981, only KanRelated

NCIC interfaces with a large number of

criminal justice information systems operated

by State, local, and Federal agencies. A selected sample of such systems is discussed

below to illustrate mutual dependencies

among systems designed to support criminal

justice and law enforcement activities.

Identification Division System

As of December 1981, Ident maintained files

containing approximately 175 million fingerprint cards representing 65 million individuals.

Of the total number of cards, 78 million representing 21 million individuals were in Ident’s

criminal file, and 96 million representing 44

million people were in Ident’s civil file. In addition, Ident maintains files of criminal history

data (in the form of rap sheets) on individuals

who are included in the criminal fingerprint

file.

The criminal fingerprint file operated by

Ident is key to the operation of the automated

NCIC/CCH file. It is this file that is searched

when an FBI identification number is required

for entering a record in the NCIC/CCH file.

Ident maintains manual criminal history records in parallel with the computerized records

in the NCIC/CCH file.

Ident also initiates the process of creating

NCIC/CCH records for all Federal offenders.

In addition, when Ident receives a fingerprint

card from a State that is not a full participant

in the NCIC/CCH program on a subject who

already has a record in NCIC/CCH, Ident initiates the procedures to update the CCH record.

Thus, Ident’s operations are integral to the

NCIC/CCH system.

sas had no agreement and therefore was not

allowed access to the CCH file.5

‘FBI, III: Background and Findings, op. cit., p. 24.

Systems

In an effort to automate Ident record processing, the FBI has been developing, since the

early 1970’s, a three-phased system called

AIDS (Automated Identification Division

System). The first phase, AIDS-I, was implemented in August 1973 and supports a computerized data base containing the records of

first offenders arrested since that time.

This automated file has grown at the rate

of approximately 750,000 records per year or

3,000 records per workday, and in October

1981 totaled about 5.8 million records.6 Ident

is not maintaining manual rap sheets on any

individual who is in the AIDS file. When a rap

sheet is needed, it is generated by computer.

The second phase, AIDS-II, became operational in October 1979 and added the capability

for automated name searching of the computerized arrest record file (AIDS-I). It is already

handling roughly 45 percent of Ident’s name

searching operations.

In AIDS-III, not yet implemented, fingerprint readers will be used to automate the

matching of fingerprint cards submitted to

Ident against the criminal fingerprint file. As

of October 1981, the prints of 14.6 million individuals born in 1929 or later had been converted, representing about 70 percent of the

criminal file. However, automated fingerprint

searches were run on only about 17 percent of

the file due to equipment and staffing limitations. Automated processing of low-quality

prints, such as latent prints found at the scene

of a crime, is expected to be possible through

the use of semiautomatic fingerprint reader

equipment.

8NCIC Staff Paper prepared for the Nov. 3-4, 1981, meeting

of the NCIC Advisory Policy Board Subcommittee on the Interstate Identification Index, Topic #7, p. 5.
Ch. 4—Description of the National Crime Information Center in Context ● 4 5

The development of AIDS is intended as a

means to automate Ident operations, not to

replace or overlap the functions that are performed by NCIC/CCH. However, as presently structured the operation of the NCIC/CCH

file will depend on the operation of AIDS to

establish the identity of subjects before an

NCIC/CCH record can be entered or updated.

For example, the process of creating a record

in the NCIC/CCH file for individuals who have

committed their first Federal offense has been

automated. An interface between AIDS and

NCIC/CCH creates a copy of the AIDS record

for the NCIC/CCH file. Similarly, whenever a

record in AIDS for a Federal offender is updated, the related record in the NCIC/CCH file

is automatically updated also. As of June

1979,647,990 records in AIDS had been duplicated in NCIC/CCH, which at that time represented 44 percent of total CCH records. As of

October 1981, the percentage of NCIC/CCH

records also in AIDS had increased to about

58 percent.7 Thus, at least in the short run, the

FBI is operating two systems—Ident/AIDS

and NCIC/CCH—that maintain criminal history records on individuals, although alternatives for consolidation of these systems are

being considered.*

National Law Enforcement

Telecommunications System

(NLETS)

NLETS is a computerized message switching network linking local, State, and Federal

law enforcement agencies for the purpose of

information exchange. Operated by a nonprofit corporation controlled by the States,

NLETS does not hold or manage data files.

It is a communication network functioning in

much the same way as the public switched

Telex network to carry messages between various users.

NLETS plays an important role in the operation of the NCIC hot files. NCIC operating

‘Ibid., p. 6. As of October 1981, about 1.085 million (or 57.6

percent) of the 1.885 million total NC IC/CCH records were also

in AIDS.

** di9cu99ion in ch. 10.

procedures require verification of data obtained from its hot files before action is taken

based on that data. NLETS is a principal

means by which such verification is accomplished. In such cases, NLETS is used to

query directly the agency that would have information confirming whether an individual or

item of property listed in the NCIC hot files

is wanted or stolen.

NLETS could be used to transmit criminal

history information in the absence of NCIC/

CCH or any other system designed expressly

for this purpose. There is no easy way to be

certain of the contents of the messages moving over NLETS, although NLETS use statistics indicate that 2 percent of messages relate

to criminal records. However, it is possible

that some criminal history information is also

being transmitted in the form of administrative messages, which account for about 17 percent of NLETS use. Florida and the FBI completed a pilot project in 1981 using both

NLETS and CCH, as described in chapter 10.

And NLETS is an integral part of the ongoing test of the Interstate Identification Index

(III) concept.

Treasury Enforcement

Communication System

(TECS)

TECS is a large communication network and

data base that supports over 1,400 terminals

in, for example, the 50 States, Puerto Rico, and

Canada. Managed by the Customs Service, it

serves a variety of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, including the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the Internal

Revenue Service; and the National Central

Bureau of the International Police Organization (Interpol); as well as the Bureau of Customs.TECS also serves the Drug Enforcement

Administration, the Immigration and Natural

ization Service, the U.S. Department of State,

and the U.S. Coast Guard.

TECS is used by customs officers and other

officials to ascertain whether or not certain individuals or items of property are of interest

to or wanted by law enforcement, criminal jus-
46 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

tice, or related agencies. One of the main uses

of the system is the checking of vehicles at border crossings to see if they are stolen, have

been used in the commission of a crime, or are

associated with an individual who is wanted.

The TECS data base is also used to determine

if there is any reason to detain an individual

at a port of entry or exit, including airports

with international arrival service, or to prevent

someone from crossing the border.

Among the data available to TECS are

pointers to the NCIC hot files. The indices

maintained on TECS and the corresponding

files of NCIC are maintained in real-time and

coordinated on a regular basis. Records in the

TECS index but not in NCIC files are deleted

from the TECS index, while entries that are

in NCIC files but not in the TECS index are

added to TECS. A “lookout” file of persons

and property of interest to Customs and the

other users of TECS is maintained independently and is not coordinated with NCIC files.

Items in this file may not be included in NCIC

files.

Users of TECS can access the NCIC/CCH

file, but with certain restrictions. Only the

NCIC/CCH summary record will be printed

out at a TECS terminal. If the complete record

is required, the TECS user must arrange to

have it printed out at a primary NCIC/CCH

user terminal and forwarded through the

mails. Foreign inquiry by Interpol to the

NCIC/CCH data must pass through a human

operator who is an American law enforcement

agent resident in the National Central Bureau

(Washington, D. C.) office before it can be processed by the CCH system.

The future configuration of TECS is under

review by the current administration.

Justice Telecommunications

System (JUST)

The DOJ’s JUST provides computerized administrative message service to department

offices in Washington, D. C., and to approximately 329 DOJ offices in 169 cities nationwide. JUST provides a direct linkage to NCIC,

enabling DOJ offices (such as the U.S. Marshals Service) to make inquiries against the

NCIC data base.

Under this arrangement, department offices

first make inquiries against their own data

bases at the DOJ computer facility and then,

if necessary, route additional inquiries through

the JUST facility to NCIC. JUST also has offline linkages to the Department of Defense

AUTODIN network and the Department of

State Diplomatic Network in support of international law enforcement activities.

State and Local Systems

The capabilities of criminal justice information systems at the State and local levels range

from handwritten manual files that are kept

in the desks of local police departments to

computerized systems that are considerably

more comprehensive in terms of information

content than those operated by the FBI.

In September 1981, the FBI conducted a

survey of all State criminal justice record repositories. Selected results, summarized in

table 5, indicate that about one-half of the

States have online computerized criminal history files and roughly another one-quarter

have an automated name index. However, the

25 States with an online CCH file account for

about 80 percent of all fingerprint cards submitted to State and Federal repositories. The

12 States with completely manual systems account for only 5 percent of the total.

As of September 1981, the 25 States with

an online CCH file maintained collectively a

total of about 10.9 million full CCH records,

compared with 5.8 million CCH records in the

AIDS file and 1.9 million in the NCIC/CCH

file. The States also maintain a large number

of manual criminal history records, estimated

at roughly 25 million to 30 million records in

1979. Available evidence suggests that the

rate of dissemination for computerized records

is significantly higher than for manual records.

In 1979, while CCH and manual record disseminations were about equal in absolute numbers
Ch. 4—Description of the /Vationa Crime /nfomnation Center in Context . 47

Table 5.—Number of States With On-Line Computerized Criminal History Information Systems

On-line CCH filea Automated name index Manual file only Total

Number of Statesb 

., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 (50°/0) 13 (260/o) 12 (24%) 50 (100°/0)

Number of fingerprint cards received

by Statesc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.37 million (81 0

/0) 0.57 million (14°/0) 0.22 million (5°/0) 4.16 million (100°/0)

Number of fingerprint cards

submitted to FBld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.35 million (81 %) 0.40 million (14°/0) 0.16 million (5%) 2.91 million (100°/0)

‘EXCIUde~ s~ate~ ~lth ~ff.llne CCH flier , ~,, wa~hlngton and MaWland, Including these t~~ States, the 27 states accounted for about 85 percent of all criminal fingerprint cards submitted to State and Federal repositories

bBased on septernber 1961 survey of State crlmlnal history record repositories

ccrlmlnal fingerprint cards received annually by State reposltorles, State estimates

dcriminal fingerprint cards submitted by States to the FBI dur!ng fiscal year 1981; FBI estimates

SOURCE Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 1981 survey of State crlmlnal record repositories

(roughly 5 million each), these disseminations

accounted for more than half of all CCH records maintained but less than one-fifth of all

manual records.8 This is due in part to the record automation policies of many States (21

States as of September 19819

) which require

that the records of current offenders be converted first. Most States do not convert existing manual files until an “activity” (e.g., arrest) occurs. Also, records can be updated

more easily and disseminated more quickly

once they are computerized.

At the local level, most major metropolitan

police departments use computer-based criminal justice information systems. Nineteen

such departments have direct lines to NCIC.

Literally hundreds of other police departments

have access to NCIC through metropolitan or

State agency terminals. The exact number of

police departments with computerized information systems is not known. However, as

early as 1974, a survey of police departments

in cities with populations exceeding 50,000

found that 56 percent (193 of the 326 departments responding) were using computers.

Criminal justice recordkeeping was reported

as the second most important use of computers, followed closely by police patrol and

inquiry systems based on hot files of wanted

persons and stolen property.’”

“OTA 50-State Survey conducted in 1979-80. See appendix

B for list of State officials responding.

‘NCIC Staff Paper prepared for the Nov. 3-4, 1981, meeting

of the NCIC APB Subcommittee on II 1, Topic 46, p.3.

‘°Kent W. Colton, “The Use and Impact of Police Computer

Technology, ‘‘ in Kenneth Kraemer and John King, Cbmputers

in Local Government: Police and Fire (Pennsauken, N. J.:

Auerbach, 1981), pp. 2-4.

In a 1979 OTA survey of the 50 States,11

OTA found that 34 States reported a total of

about 9,000 terminals at the State and local

levels with direct access to criminal history information in State repositories. Several States

contacted in a 1982 followup survey indicated

that the number of terminals had increased

since 1979; for example, from 244 to 700 terminals in Massachusetts, 70 to 206 in New

Jersey, 80 to 102 in South Carolina, and 225

to 250 in Virginia. In 37 of 49 States reporting, law enforcement officers on patrol duty

can gain access to criminal history information in State files through local police and patrol inquiry systems. Thus, the clear implication is that automated systems are prevalent

at the local as well as at State and Federal

levels.

In a followup survey, OTA found that as of

August 1982,27 States had a CCH file (including an automated name index), 7 States had

an automated index, and 16 States were operating manually. The discrepancies when compared with the results of the September 1981

FBI survey are explained as follows. Two

States (Washington and Maryland) with CCH

files were counted by the FBI as automated

index States since the CCH files did not permit online interstate access. Five States (Idaho, Maine, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and

South Dakota) counted as automated index

States by the FBI were still in the process of

implementation as of August 1982. One State

(Massachusetts) counted by the FBI as manual actually has an operational automated

name index. The OTA results are summarized

“OTA 50-State Survey.
48 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

in table 6. For those 12 States in the process and/or uncertainties in staffing and funding.

of implementing an automated name index With full implementation, all but four States

and/or CCH file, the estimated time to com- would have at least an automated name index;

pletion ranged from 1 month, to 1 year, to an two of these four remaining manual States do

indefinite time period, due largely to variations have plans to automate.

Table 6.–Status of State Criminal History Systems, August 1982

Automated Manual file

CCH file name index only Totals

Operational

Number of States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 (54°/0) 7 (14%) 16 (320/o) 50 (100%)

Under implementation

Number of States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2a

1Ob

Totals after implementation

Number of States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 (580/o) 17 (34%) 4 (8°/0) 50 (100°/0)

aEstimated time to complete implementation: 1 month (1 State), and 6 months (1 State).

Estimated time to complete implementation: 3 months (1 State), 6 months (2 States), 9 months (1 State), 1 year (1 State), indefinite (3 States), and unknown (2 States).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment 50-State survey, 1982 followup.
Chapter 5

NCIC Technology. and Costs

‘-%
— —

-- --

,.)

Contents

Technology . . . . .

costs . . . . . . . . .

NCIC Technology

Chapter Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hardware Previously Used by NCIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hardware Upgrade and Message Switching . . . . . .......?. . . . . . . .

Status of Hardware and Software

,,

NCIC Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

costs

costs

to the FBI..... . . . . . . . . .

Upgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

to the States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TABLES

Page

51

51

51

52

52

52

54

55

55

56

TableNo. Page

7. NCIC Direct Costs, Fiscal Years 1972-81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

8. LEAA Grants to States for Comprehensive Data Systems and

Statistical Programs, Total by Fiscal Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

9. LEAA Grants to States for CCH-Related Systems, Total by Fiscal

Year and by State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

IO. CCH/OBTS Operational Costs for 1978 by State.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Chapter 5

NCIC Technology and Costs

Chapter Summary

Technology

The computer and communication technologies used by the National Crime Information

Center (NCIC) have been the subject of considerable controversy in recent years. Part of the

controversy relates to fundamental concerns

about the need for and impacts of NCIC, and

particularly the computerized criminal history

(CCH) file–concerns that have been intertwined with technology issues. Another aspect

relates to operational problems experienced

with the NCIC system, such as unscheduled

downtime and slow response to inquiries, owing in part to the use of old equipment.

The need for updated equipment conflicted

with the concern that new computer technology would make it easier for NCIC to engage

in unauthorized functions such as message

switching (i.e., the transfer or switching of

messages from one State to another through

the NCIC computer).

Late in 1979, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) received authority from Congress

to upgrade the NCIC communications controller (a device that controls and manages the

flow of messages into and out of the computer). While any new controller has the potential to be programed for message switching,

the congressional authorization strictly prohibited any message switching applications

and required a periodic General Accounting

Office (GAO) audit to ensure FBI compliance.

Early in 1980, the FBI, with congressional

concurrence, took action to upgrade the main

computer, subject to the same conditions.

These hardware upgrades, combined with

operating system software enhancements that

have now been implemented, have improved

the quality of NCIC service and reduced downtime. The FBI recognizes that NCIC applications software also needs to be upgraded.

While there are no firm plans as yet, the FBI

has initiated a review of NCIC system needs

for the next 5 years, including the possibility

of a major system redesign with further hardware as well as software improvements. In

July 1982, the FBI announced a major computer procurement to, among other things, further upgrade the NCIC computers.

cost s

The total financial cost to the Nation of operating NCIC is shared by the FBI and the

users. The FBI pays for the central computer

facilities (including administrative, operational, and programing costs) and the communication links, while the users pay for the terminals and the costs of gathering, inputting, and

processing the data. The Federal budget covers the costs to the FBI and to the Federal

agencies that use NCIC. State and local budgets cover most of the remaining costs, although in the past these have been partially

underwritten by the Federal Government

through grants from the Law Enforcement

Assistance Administration (LEAA) and

others.

Although NCIC cost components can be

identified, quantifying them is very difficult.

NCIC direct costs have increased from $2.9

million in fiscal year 1972 to an estimated $6.1

million in fiscal year 1981. Because the FBI

Identification Division (Ident) is indispensable

to the operation of the CCH file, a portion of

Ident’s costs for criminal file activities should

also be allocated as an NCIC cost. The FBI

has not estimated what this allocation might

be.

Since fiscal year 1970, the Federal Government through LEAA has provided about $207

million in categorical grants to the States for

comprehensive data systems and statistical

51
52 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

programs. About $39 million of this total was Federal grants cover only part of the costs

for CCH-related systems. However, these of implementing and operating State CCH sysgrants peaked in 1976 and ended in fiscal year terns. Estimates of the full costs vary widely

1981. In addition, some portion of LEAA and have not been independently verified by

block grants to the States were used for crim- OTA.

inal information, telecommunications, and record systems.

NCIC Technology

Hardware Previously

Used by NCIC

Until 1980, the FBI leased two IBM 360/65

computers, first marketed in 1965, from the

Itel Corp. for use by NCIC. Each 360/65 had

2 million characters of memory. The second

computer was normally used by the FBI to

meet internal requirements for batch processing and by NCIC as a backup for the first computer.

NCIC peripheral equipment included a number of tape and disc memory storage devices

leased from various vendors and two IBM

2703 nonprogramable communication controllers. These controllers managed the NCIC

communication lines. Only one was active at

any one time, with the second serving as a

backup.

The age of the main computers and the peripheral devices, the technology on which they

were based, and the design limitations of this

equipment all had implications for the operation of NCIC.

Age: Significant hardware difficulties experienced by NCIC suggested that the

central computers were reaching the point

where maintaining the units was no longer cost effective. The vendor offered to replace the installed 360/65 equipment at no

cost to the FBI because the cost of maintaining these obsolete computers had become excessive.

Technology: The IBM 360/65 used core

memory, which is an obsolete technology.

Although core memories are still used by

computers with useful life remaining, the

memories in modern machines are based

on solid-state technology and are cheaper,

require less power, and are more reliable.

Design: An IBM 360/65 is not particularly efficient when used for applications

that require the data bases to be accessed

randomly, as is the case with NCIC. In

addition, this computer was not designed

to support NCIC teleprocessing needs.

Because the communication controller

was not programmable, it could not continue operation if the main computer failed.

Thus, the match between the NCIC applications and the 360/65 computers was not

a good one.

Hardware Upgrade and

Message Switching

The computer and communication technologies used by NCIC have been the subject of

considerable controversy in recent years. Part

of the controversy relates to fundamental concerns about the need for and impacts of NCIC,

and particularly the CCH file—concerns that

have been intertwined with technology issues.

Operational problems experienced with the

NCIC system, such as unscheduled computer

downtime and delayed response to inquiries,

had been increasing due to the use of relatively

old equipment. But the need for updated

equipment conflicted with concerns expressed

in Congress and elsewhere that new computer

technology would make it easier for NCIC to

engage in such unauthorized functions as message switching (i.e., the transfer or switching

of messages from one State to another through

the NCIC computer).
Ch. 5—NCIC Technology and Costs ● 5 3

To a significant extent, the message switching controversy has served as a technological

focal point for several of the policy issues discussed later in this report. Among these issues

are whether an NCIC message switching function would place the FBI in an inappropriate

(and perhaps illegal) role with respect to State

and local criminal justice activities; and

whether NCIC message switching would make

it at least technically possible for the FBI to

monitor and perhaps control criminal justice

communications among the States. Over the

last decade, the question of NCIC message

switching has involved strong differences of

opinion among the FBI, LEAA, the Attorney

General’s office, the Office of Management

and Budget, various congressional committees, a number of States, and other groups

such as SEARCH Group, Inc., and the American Civil Liberties Union.1

As a result, Congress denied to the FBI the

authority for NCIC to perform message

switching. A restriction placed in the Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization

Act prohibited the use of funds for message

switching. In this context, message switching

was defined as “the technique of receiving a

message, storing it in a computer until the

proper outgoing line is available, and then retransmitting, with no direct connection between the incoming and outgoing lines.”2 More

specifically, the Department of Justice (DOJ),

including the FBI, was prohibited, absent approval of the House and Senate Judiciary

Committees of Congress, from “utilizing

equipment to create a message switching system linking State and local law enforcement

data banks through equipment under the control of DOJ or the FBI. ”3

1For a detailed discussion of the message switching controversy, see Donald A. Marchand, et al., A History and Background

Assessment of the National Crime Information Center and Computerized Criminal History Program, Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of South Carolina, June

1979, sec. IV, “The Message-Switching Issue and the Recent

Policy Debate Over the CCH Program, ” pp. 122-167.

2

See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, House Report

96-628, 96th Cong., NO\’. 16, 1979.

3

Ibid.

In mid-1979, the FBI sought approval from

Congress for acquisition of a new front-end

processor (also known as a communications

controller), a device that controls and manages

the flow of messages into and out of the computer. In order to evaluate this request, the

Senate Judiciary Committee asked both the

Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and

the Institute for Law and Social Research

(INSLAW) for an outside analysis.4 OTA and

INSLAW agreed that the existing NCIC communications controller was obsolete and that

upgraded equipment would improve NCIC

performance. However, both OTA and

INSLAW noted that the capability for

message switching is inherent in a state-of-theart communications controller and message

switching could be implemented at any time

through software modification. Therefore, the

use of the new controller would need to be

governed by management, procedural, and

perhaps legal means.5

In September 1979, the FBI received authority from the Senate Judiciary Committee

to proceed with the acquisition of a new NCIC

communications controller. However, the authorization was conditioned on the FBI’s commitment: 1) to lease (for a period no longer

than 2 years) rather than buy the controller;

2) not to acquire a message switching option

with the controller or to message switch data

between States; 3) to program the system to

assign requests for data from the NCIC/CCH

file the very lowest priority; and 4) to permit

biannual GAO audits to ensure compliance.’

Later in 1979, the FBI requested authority

to upgrade the NCIC host computer. An OTA

analysis found that “(t)he central processor

(host computer) used for NCIC is the IBM

360/65, an early third generation machine that

‘June 26, 1979, letter from the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to the OTA Director.

‘See Aug. 10, 1979, letter and attachment from the OTA Director to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary; and July 30, 1979, letter and enclosure from the INSLAW

President to the Chairman of the Senate Committeeon the Judiciary.

6

Sept. 12, 1979, letter from the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to the Director of the FBI.
54 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System — .-—

was first marketed in 1965 and is now obsolete

. . . Operating statistics indicate that the processor is approaching the end of its useful life

and may soon have to be replaced, even if no

change is permitted in the character of its applications. Early in 1980, based in part on

the OTA findings and with congressional concurrence, the FBI took action to upgrade the

host computer, subject to the same conditions

stipulated for the communications controller.8

Status of Hardware and

Software Upgrade

In May 1980, the two obsolete computers

were replaced with two National Advanced

Systems (NAS)9 AS/5000 computers. Each of

the new computers has 4 million characters of

memory, double that of the 360/65. Also, the

disc drives have been upgraded and now provide more cost-effective storage of online data.

In May 1981, new operating system software

(multiple virtual storage) was installed. Finally, in October 1981, the two obsolete communication controllers were replaced with two CC I

Model CC80 controllers.

The upgrading of the host computers, disc

drives, operating system, and the communication controllers substantially increased the

computer power available to NCIC. These

changes have improved the quality of service

and minimized downtime. Unscheduled monthly downtime averaged about 1.6 percent for

the 12-month period ending October 1981.10

With respect to applications software, the

FBI recognizes that NCIC application programs will also need to be upgraded at some

future time. The use of a higher level programing language would enhance the maintainabil-

‘U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, draft paper

on NCIC Technology, Sec. 1.2.1.1, “Description of the System:

Central Processor and Memory, ” January 1980.

‘Jan. 11, 1980, letter from the FBI Director to the Senate

Judiciary Committee Chairman.

‘National Advanced Systems (NAS) acquired Itel, the previous vendor.

‘°For the months of November 1980 through October 1981,

unscheduled downtime (in percent of hours in the month) was

1.1, 1.0, 0.5, 3.0, 1.1, 1.5, 1.5, 2.0, 2,4, 1.2, 1.6, and 1.7 percent.

Data from NCIC Newsletters.

ity of NCIC application programs and make

it easier to recruit the necessary programing

personnel. In addition, upgraded applications

software would help reduce the substantial

programing backlog that presently exists. As

of December 1981, the NCIC staff listed 14

non-CCH and 11 CCH programing priorities,

many of which are not scheduled for implementation until 1983 and beyond.11 While

there are no firm plans as yet to reprogram

the NCIC applications software, the FBI has

initiated a review of NCIC system needs for

the next 5 years, including the possibility of

a major system redesign with further hardware as well as software improvements.12

By comparison, the Ident Automated Identification Division System (AIDS) uses hardware similar to that used by NCIC. However,

the AIDS host computer (an NAS AS/5-3) is

accessible only within the FBI headquarters

building through 10 minicomputers (IV-Phase

Model 4-70), whereas the NCIC host computer

is accessible via 137 communication lines to

Federal, State, and local criminal justice agencies. NCIC and AIDS peripheral equipment

is generally comparable, except for equipment

associated with the AIDS automated fingerprint reader systems. An AIDS operating system software upgrade to multiple virtual storage (already implemented by NCIC) is scheduled to be completed in the near future.13 In

July 1982, the FBI announced a major computer procurement. The two AS/5000 computers used by NCIC will be replaced with two

IBM 3033S computers, and the AS/5-3 used

by AIDS will be replaced with an IBM 3033N.

In addition, the operating system will be upgraded to MVS/SPl.3.14

1lNCIC staff paper prepared for the Dec. 9-10, 1981, meeting

of the NCIC Advisory Policy Board, Topic #8, pp. 1-3.

‘2’’NCIC System Report” presented by Kier Boyd of the FBI

at the June 17-18, 1981, meeting of the NCIC Advisory Policy

Board.

“For a more detailed technical description of AIDS and NCIC,

see FBI, Interstate Identification Index: BackgrourId and Findings for July-September 1981 Phase I Pilot Project, Dec. 4,

1981, pp. 18-25.

‘Telephone conversations with Kier Boyd and Gordon Zacrep

of the FBI, July 30, 1982.
Ch. 5—NCIC Technology and Costs ● 5 5

NCI C

The total cost to the Nation of operating

NCIC is shared by the FBI and the users. The

FBI pays for the central computer facilities

(including administrative, operational, and

programing costs) and the communication

links, while the users pay for the terminals and

the costs of gathering, inputting, and processing the data at the Federal, State, and local

levels. The Federal budget covers the costs to

the FBI and to the Federal agencies that use

NCIC. State and local budgets cover most of

the remaining costs, although in the past the

Federal Government has partially underwritten the costs to States and localities through

grants from LEAA and others. The total cost

of NCIC includes the indirect costs incurred

by supporting activities and systems, as well

as those costs directly chargeable. For example, the CCH file is heavily dependent on support from various State, local, and Federal

agencies for its operation. Records can be entered into the CCH file only after an FBI number has been obtained, and only Ident can assign that number. Records can be entered solely by authorized criminal justice agencies, and

State and local criminal history systems are

major sources of entries.

The costs of operating NCIC that are common to both the hot files and CCH file include:

●

●

●

●

an allocated portion of the costs of the

FBI computer facility and communication lines, including both hardware (on a

lease or purchase basis) and operating

personnel;

the FBI’s cost of developing and maintaining the NCIC software;

the cost to State and local governments

and Federal user agencies for terminal

equipment and operators; and

the cost of personnel in user agencies who

record and format the data for NCIC input and processing.

The following additional costs are incurred

by the CCH file:

●

●

●

A portion of the FBI’s cost of operating

I dent.

A portion of the costs incurred by State

and local governments for operating their

own criminal history record systems.

Many of these systems are automated

and include costs that are similar to those

of the FBI computer center.

A portion of the cost of the activities of

the courts, correctional authorities, and

other criminal justice agencies to support

criminal history record systems on which

NCIC depends.

Although the components of NCIC costs

can be identified, it is very difficult to quantify them. For example, the costs to the FBI

of operating computer and communication facilities are broken down by organizational unit,

not by function or programmatic activity.

Thus, while OTA has been able to identify the

direct costs of NCIC (i.e., the costs of the

NCIC section and related technical support

within the FBI Technical Services Division),

indirect costs such as those incurred by Ident

to support the CCH file are not readily identifiable. Similarly, at the State level the funding

for operating criminal justice information systems comes from a variety of sources and is

not broken down by function. While OTA has

documented the level of Federal funding to the

States through LEAA categorical grants for

CCH and related activities, the portion of

State revenues and Federal block grants

devoted to hot files or CCH files is not known.

OTA has not attempted to quantify costs at

either State or local levels.

Costs to the FBI

The costs of the NCIC section and related

automated data processing (ADP) and telecommunications support are shown in table

7. Over the 10-year period from fiscal year

1972 through fiscal year 1981, NCIC costs

have increased about 110 percent at an aver-
56 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Table 7.—NCIC Direct Costs, Fiscal Years 1972.81 (thousands of dollars)

FY ’72 FY ’73 FY ’74 FY ’75 FY ’76 FY ’77 FY ’78 FY ’79 FY ’80 FY ’81

Personnel (manpower):

NCIC section

Agent work yearsa

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 10 11 14 15 12 9 9 8 8

Support work years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 42 39 106 102 111 96 99 99 99

Total work years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 52 50 120 117 123 105 108 107 107

ADP and telecommunications support

Operations work years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N/A N/A N/A 17 17 19 19 19 20 20

System maintenance work years . . . . . . . N/A N/A N/A 5 5 6 6 7 8 8

System development work years . . . . . . . N/A N/A N/A – – — — 7 8 8

Total work years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 22 25 25 33 36 36

Personnel (costs):

NCIC section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $360 $684 $735 $1,476 $1,556 $1,713 $1,624 $1,757 $1,644 $1,800

ADP and telecommunications support . . . . N/A N/A N/A 396 418 475 500 660 800 900

Nonpersonnel costs:

NCIC section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N/A N/A N/A 155 143 165 163 169 170 180

ADP and telecommunications Supportb

NCIC telecommunications network

services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 900 940 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000

FBI NC!C terminals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 130 130 140 140 140 110 100 100 100

Computer center space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N/A N/A N/A 140 180 180 200 200 225 200

ADPE rental and maintenance . . . . . . . . . 1,100 1,100 1,200 1,300 1,400 1,500 1,610 1,610 1,543 1,960

Equipment purchase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — — — — — 750 c — —

Estimated costsd 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439 479 530 — — — — — — –

Total NCIC costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

— —

——— $2,929 $3,193 $3,535 $4,607 $4,837 $5,173 $5,207 6,246 $5,482 6,140

aA work year is defined as an equivalent full-year employee.

bADP and telecommunication .SUppOrt~ resources are estimated as a prorated portion of FBI Computer Center resources. Except for the $750,000 for purchase of replacement telecommunications control equipment In FY 1979, all ADP/telecommunication funding for NCIC is implicitly included in the FBI’s centralized ADP/telecommunt.

cation budget.

cFunds allocated for the replacement of telecommunication control equipment, but never spent

d Estimates of costs for Which data were not available. Computed by dividing the sum of the costs for which data were available for each of the Years estimated by

0.85, a factor derived from the data that were available for fiscal years 1975 through 1979.

SOURCE” Office of Technology Assessment and Federal Bureau of Investigation

age rate of about 9 percent annually. However,

personnel costs for the NCIC section have increased almost 400 percent. There has also

been a sizable, although not as large, increase

in personnel costs for ADP and telecommunications support. Other costs have increased

at or below the rate of inflation.

Since Ident is indispensable to the operation

of the CCH file, a portion of Ident’s costs for

criminal justice activities (which totaled about

$58.7 million in fiscal year 1980) should be allocated as an NCIC cost. The FBI has not estimated what this allocation might be.

Costs to the States

Some portion of the expenditures of State

agencies for hot files and CCH use should be

included in the overall costs of NCIC. However, there is really no sound basis on which

to identify this portion. First, as noted in chapter 4, there is wide variation in the levels of

State participation in NCIC. While all States

can contribute to the hot files, only eight are

currently permitted to contribute records to

the CCH file. Some States make relatively

heavy use of NCIC, while others use it only

minimally. Thus, the exact basis for allocating

costs to NCIC—even if known —would be difficult to determine. Second, the level of automation of State criminal justice information

systems also varies widely. Therefore, the

costs to the States are also likely to be highly

variable, depending on the type of system.

Third, some portion of State funding has been

provided by the Federal Government, primarily through LEAA.

Since fiscal year 1970, LEAA has provided

about $207 million in categorical grants to the

States for comprehensive data systems and

statistical programs, as shown in table 8.
Ch. 5—NCIC Technology and Costs ● 5 7

———— — —

Table 8.—LEAA Grants to States for Comprehensive

Data Systems and Statistical Programs,

Total by Fiscal Year

Fiscal year—— Total amount

1969 ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . $ -

0

1970 ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000,000

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,000,000

1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,700,000

1973 21,200,000

1974 . ....:::::::::::: :::::::::: : 24,000,000

1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26,000,000

1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31,622,000’

1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,152,000

1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16,000,000

1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,290,000

1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,000,000

1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16,275,000

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $207,239,000

a

Includes transition quarter grants totaling $6 mllllon

SOURCE Office of Justice Assistance Research and Statlstlcs, U S Department

of JustIce

About $39 million of this amount has been for

CCH-related systems, including offenderbased transaction systems (OBTS) to record

key events about individuals as they pass

through the criminal justice process. As indicated in table 9, CCH grants peaked in 1976

and ended in 1981. From 1970 to 1980, 145

CCH-related grants were awarded to 35 different States. However, 10 States receiving 57

grants accounted for about two-thirds of the

total funds awarded to all States.

In addition, some portion of LEAA block

grants to the States was used for criminal justice systems. While OTA did not attempt to

estimate this amount, an independent analysis provided to OTA suggests that an additional $200 million to $400 million of block

grants funds were spent on law enforcement

telecommunications systems, criminal justice

agency record systems, and criminal justice

information systems.15

Federal grants account for only part of the

cost of implementing and operating a State’s

CCH files. Estimates of the full costs vary

widely and have not been independently verified by OTA.A 1975 study by lNSLAWestimated the total cost of a fully developed CCH

(in which all States were full participants) to

be $361 million in current dollars (adjusted for

inflation over the 10-year development period

1975-84). Of this total, the State share was es-

- — . . . .

“Data and analysis provided to OTA by Sept. 9, 1981, letter

and enclosures from Tom Dalton of Seattle University,

Table 9. —LEAA Grants to States for CCH-Related

Systems, aTotal by Fiscal Year and by State

Fiscal year Number of grants Total amount

1969 .., . . . . . . ... , 0 $ 0

1970 ......., . . . . . . 2 123,975

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0

1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2,714,105

1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1,379,531

1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5,875,968

1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7,068,913

1976 ......, . . . . . . . 36 9,931,835

1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4,545,147

1978 ....., . . . . . . . . . 15 4,726,194

1979 ...., . . . . . . . . . . 12 2,650,308

1980 ..., . . ... ... 3 274,756

1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 $39,290,732

aIncludirlg offender-based transaction statistics and computerized crlmlnal

history systems

SOURCE Office of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statlstics, US Department of Justice

timated at $274 million ($44 million for development and $230 million for operation) and the

Federal share at $87 million (for FBI/Ident and

NCIC/CCH). 16

A 1979 study by the National Center for

State Courts (NCSC) attempted to determine

development and operational costs for State

CCH systems. The results were fragmentary,

but provided a basis for concluding that the

1975 estimates were probably low. For example, INSLAW projected that 15 States would

be full CCH participants in 1978, with a combined CCH/OBTS operational cost in that year

of $17.7 million in 1978 dollars. ’7 By comparison, NCSC found that the actual 1978 CCH/

OBTS operational costs for the 15 States

listed in table 10 were reported to total about

$42 million,18 more than double the INSLAW

projection. Some of the difference may be attributable to assumptions about the rate of inflation (assumed by INSLAW to be 26 percent

over the 3-year period 1975 to 1978).19 However, the comparison does suggest that operating costs in 1978 were significantly higher

than projected by INSLAW.

.——— —.. .-

“Institute for Law and Social Research, Costs and Benefits

of the Comprehensive Data Svstem Program, prepared for

I.EAA, June 1975, vol. 1: Summary, pp. 12, 26.

“Ibid., pp. 12, 25, 26,

‘“National Center for State Courts, A Re\iew of OB7’S and

C(7H Program Requirements in the Judiciarjr, Williamsburg,

\’a., 1979, pp. 86, 131.

“]nstitute for I,aw and Social Research, Costs and Benefits

of the Comprehensi\’e Data System Program, prepared for

I. I? AA, June 1975, vol. I: Summary.
58 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Table 10.—CCH/OBTS Operational Costsa for 1978 by

State (in 1978 dollars)

State Operating cost ———

Alabama. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 480,000

Arizona. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . 5,000,000

California. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,826,000

Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . 1,241,000

District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . 1,500,000

Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000,000

Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,000,000

Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,731,000

Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,250,000

Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600,000

New York..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,000,000

North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,500,000

Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200,000

Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,097,000

Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195,000

15-State total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —.

$41,620,000

a

includes combined costs for Computerized Criminal History Systems and

Offender-Based Transaction Systems (OBTS)

SOURCE National Center for State Courts, A Review of OBTS and CCH Prograrn

Requirements in the Judiciary, 1979, pp 06, 131

In general, NCSC encountered great difficulty in obtaining reliable cost data for the study.

State operating personnel were frequently

unable to reconstruct the requested data from

available records. The operation of CCH and

OBTS systems was often so intertwined with

that of other criminal justice systems that the

proper allocation of costs was almost impossible. In addition, some portion of State identification bureau costs (estimated at $60 million

for fiscal year 198020) should be allocated as

an NCIC cost. Finally, no systematic data

were available on the costs to the various localities of preparing and submitting CCH/OBTS

information for use by State systems.

~International Association for Identification, RmctionalRe

quirements and Systems Development Plan for State Identification Bureaus: Executive Summary of Findings and Recommendations, Utica, NY., October 1980, p. 1.
Chapter 6

Legal/Regulatory Framework

for NCIC, Ident, and State

CCH Systems
—

Contents

Chapter Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Federal Statutes and Regulations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Authority to Operate Ident and NCIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Record Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Record Updating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Record Dissemination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Freedom of Information and Privacy Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NCIC Operating Policies and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Selected NCIC Hot File Operating Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Selected CCH File Operating Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Federal Agency Orders or Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Federal and State Court Rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

State Statutes and Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Early Efforts of Project SEARCH and LEAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Implementing LEAA Privacy and Security Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . .

State Statutes and Regulations as of June 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Initiatives to Enact Comprehensive Federal Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

61

62

62

62

63

64

65

66

66

66

67

67

69

69

70

71

73

TABLES

Table No. Page

11. Federal Agency Orders or Procedures for NCIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

12. Illustrative Federal/State Court Rulings on Criminal Records . . . . . . . 68

13. Categories of State Statutes and Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

14. Survey Comparison of Changes in State Statutes/Regulations by

Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Chapter 6

Legal/Regulatory Framework for

NCIC, Ident, and State CCH Systems

Chapter

The management and use of criminal justice

information in the United States are governed

by a variety of Federal, State, and local statutes, regulations, and executive (or agency)

orders, and Federal and State court rulings.

Overall, Federal statutes and regulations

have:

●

●

●

●

granted basic authority to the Attorney

General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for operating its Identification Division (Ident) and the National

Crime Information Center (NCIC);

established standards for use of the various FBI criminal justice information systems.

defined a range of authorized users of Federal systems (e.g., the Office of Personnel

Management for Federal employee background checks by authority of Executive

Order No. 10450); and

established standards for use of State

criminal history systems funded in whole

or in part by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).

During the 1970’s, LEAA funding and the

pioneering research of Project SEARCH (System for Electronic Analysis and Retrieval of

Criminal Histories) played a significant role

in stimulating substantial progress in development of State statutes and regulations for use

of State criminal record systems. However, direct LEAA funding has now ended, and with

it the option of terminating Federal funds for

noncompliance (the primary penalty authorized by Congress).

In general, Congress has provided broad discretion to the FBI and LEAA in defining

standards for the interstate collection, mainteSummary

nance, and dissemination of criminal history

information. Until the 1970’s, title 28, United

States Code (USC), sec. 534 provided the sole

legislative direction at the Federal level. Congressional initiatives to pass comprehensive

criminal justice information legislation in the

early 1970’s were not successful, but led to the

enactment of an amendment to the Crime Control Act of 1973 requiring LEAA to issue detailed privacy and security regulations for

State and local criminal history information

systems (which appear as title 28, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), pt. 20, subpt. B). Regulations for Federal systems (Ident and NCIC/

CCH) and the interstate exchange of criminal

history record information are set forth in title

28, CFR, part 20, subpart C.

The responsibility for enforcing management and use standards for criminal justice

information is left largely up to the States,

localities, and other users. For example, while

LEAA regulations established standards for

record quality and security, LEAA conducted

little actual monitoring of State compliance,

but did engage in an active program of publishing guidelines, model State codes, and the

like.

While the FBI is authorized to terminate

Ident and/or NCIC services to users who violate regulations, compliance is largely voluntary. At present, the FBI program to monitor

compliance includes computer edits and quality checks of information from contributing

agencies that is maintained in FBI files, but

does not include direct audits of State or user

files and record disseminations. Indeed, the

FBI has never had the authority to conduct

such audits.

61
62 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

In the early 1970’s, efforts to enact comprehensive legislation, such as the “Criminal Justice Information Systems Security and Privacy Act of 1971” or the “Criminal Justice InAct of 1974, ” were not successful; nor were

initiatives in the late 1970’s to include criminal

justice information system standards as part

of the proposed FBI charter legislation.

formation Control and Protection of Privacy

Federal Statutes and Regulations

Authority to Operate

Ident and NCIC

The FBI has statutory authority to establish and maintain criminal history files in

Ident and NCIC. (28 USC § 534 (1968)). In

part, this statute authorizes the Attorney

General to acquire, collect, classify, and preserve criminal identification, crime, and other

records, and to exchange them with authorized officials of Federal, State, and local law

enforcement agencies, and with penal and

other institutions. The Attorney General has

delegated this authority to the Director of the

FBI in title 28, CFR, section 0.85. In addition,

a 1973 amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Public Law

No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 200 (1968), adding a section 524 (42 USC § 3771), directs the executive

branch to assure the adequate provision of privacy and security of criminal history information (reorganized by Public Law No. 96-157,

 § 818,93 Stat. 1212 (1979) as 42 USC § 3789g

(Supp. 1980)). The privacy and security regulations in 28 CFR part 20 (1975) were issued pursuant to this congressional directive.

Record Content

The information that may be stored in criminal history records maintained by Ident and

NCIC is described in 28 CFR § 20.2 (1975), and

includes identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests, detentions, indictments, informations, or other formal criminal charges, and

‘This section is based on app. A to Jet Propulsion Laboratory,

FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Study: AIDS III

Evaluation Report Volume VI: Environmental Analysis, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Nov. 15, 1980, prepared for the L-

. S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

any disposition arising therefrom, and details

as to sentencing, correctional supervision, and

release. Only information on serious and/or significant offenses may be stored in these records (28 CFR § 20.32, 1975). Specifically excluded are the nonserious offenses of drunkenness, vagrancy, disturbing the peace, curfew

violation, loitering, false fire alarm, nonspecific

charges of suspicion or investigation, and traffic violations (other than manslaughter, driving under the influence of drugs or liquor, and

hit and run). Offenses committed by juvenile

offenders are also specifically excluded unless

the juvenile is tried in court as an adult.

Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (1974) resulted in judicial examination of the content

of the FBI’s criminal history files. It involved

a suit against the FBI for expungement of a

State (California) arrest record retained by the

FBI. It had been established at the State level

that there was no probable cause for the arrest, and the status of the proceeding was

changed from “arrest” to “detention.” The

FBI had been so notified, and had amended

its record to show that the subject encounter

with the police was not considered to be an arrest under California law, and that no formal

proceedings had been brought. The court determined that once the FBI was notified that

the subject was not involved in the criminal

justice process, it had no authority to retain

the record in the criminal files, even though

the record accurately portrayed the events as

they had occurred. The controlling statute (28

USC § 534) only authorizes the storage of information about formal criminal proceedings

in the criminal files. The court stated that the

FBI has a responsibility to assure that it does

not disseminate criminal records containing

inappropriate information. The decision was
Ch. 6—Legal/Regulatory Framework for NCIC, Ident, and State CCH Systems ● 63

carefully grounded on statutory considerations, but the court left as an open question

the extent to which this decision is mandated

by the U.S. Constitution.

One unresolved problem that arises from

this decision is what to do with the fingerprints of suspects who undergo pretrial diversion. This alternative to the usual judicial

process is sometimes used when the U.S. Attorney determines that the suspect’s infraction of the law was due to an unfortunate set

of circumstances and is not likely to be repeated. Sometimes the suspect is formally arrested, sometimes not. Instead of going

through the usual criminal process, the suspect agrees to a set of conditions, which usually involve some type of restitution to the victim and a period of probation. If these obligations are successfully fulfilled, the charges are

either dismissed or never brought. The unresolved question is whether pretrial diversion

qualifies as a formal criminal process under 28

USC § 534 when the suspect is not actually

arrested. The FBI retains such records now,

but its authority to do so is uncertain after the

Menard decision. The FBI has requested legislative direction in this matter, but so far

none has been forthcoming.

Record Updating

On May 20, 1975, the Department of Justice

(DOJ) issued a regulation prohibiting dissemination of arrest information more than a year

old unless accompanied by a disposition when

no active prosecution of the charge is known

to be pending (28 CFR § 20.33, 1975). The prohibition does not apply to records released for

criminal justice purposes or to authorized Federal agencies. It came in the wake of Tarleton

v. Saxbe 507 F.2d 1116 (1974) in which the

court expressed concern about the impairment

of an individual’s liberty that results when

that person stands accused of a crime. It noted

that the reason for the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is to mitigate this restriction of the accused’s liberty, and the court suggested that the lower court inquire into what

justifications, if any, exist for the FBI’s failure to indicate dispositions within a reasonable

time after arrest. Two years later, the district

court order in Tarleton v. Saxbe 407 F. Supp.

1083 (1976) directed the FBI to conduct a feasibility study of system procedures that would

enable it to keep disposition entries in its criminal records reasonably current. By the time

the study was conducted, the FBI had solved

the immediate problem by promulgating 28

CFR § 20.33 (1975). Most of the systems and

procedures suggested by the study for keeping the disposition data more current were designed for use in a computerized system.

Regulation 28 CFR § 20.37 (1975) makes it

the responsibility of each criminal justice

agency contributing data to FBI criminal history record information systems to assure that

information is kept complete, accurate, and

current. It calls for a disposition to be submitted within 120 days after it has occurred.

However, the only sanction available for

enforcing this policy is regulation 28 CFR §

20.38 (1975) that permits DOJ to cancel its

criminal record services to any agency that

fails to comply with its regulations.

Pursuant to 28 CFR § 20.32 (1975), Ident

and NCIC do not record minor and juvenile

offenses. Although this regulation went into

effect in June 1975, NCIC has had such a policy since November 29, 1971, and Ident since

February 9, 1973. The regulation itself does

not require the FBI to expunge information

on minor offenses previously compiled. However, the district court’s order in Tarleton v.

Saxbe 407 F. Supp. 1083 (1976) required the

FBI to delete from the record, prior to dissemination, all information relating to nonserious

offenses. The FBI is deleting these offenses

from requested records as they are sent out.

The FBI currently expunges and seals records pursuant to State and Federal court

orders. The authority for sealing the record of

a person who has been found guilty of unlawful

possession of a controlled substance is found

in 21 USC § 844(b)(1) (1972). If the subject individual has not previously been convicted of

violating any Federal narcotics laws, the court

may, after trial or entry of a guilty plea, place

the person on probation without entering a
64 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

judgment of guilty. If the person does not violate any conditions of the probation, the court

may dismiss the proceedings. DOJ retains a

record solely to determine first offender status.

As of July 1981, 35 States provide procedures whereby subjects can have nonconvictions purged from their records, and 24 provide a procedure for purging records of convictions. Twenty States provide for sealing of records of nonconviction and 22 provide for sealing of convictions.2 For example, Arkansas

provides for purging “all records . . . relating

to a crime wherein the person has been acquitted or the charges dismissed” (Ark. Stat.

Ann. § 5-1109, 1975). This State also provides

for the sequestering of records of first offenders so that they are available only to law enforcement and judicial officials (Ark. Stat.

Ann. § 43-1231, 1975). When either procedure

takes place, the court sends a copy of the order

to the Arkansas State Identification Division

and the FBI Identification Division. In comparison, the California Penal Code allows a defendant who has been acquitted to file a motion to seal rather than purge the record of arrest and acquittal (Cal. Penal Code § 851.8,

Deering Supp., 1980). As in Arkansas, a copy

of the judge’s order sealing the record is forwarded to law enforcement agencies, including

the FBI.

On September 24, 1973, DOJ instituted (by

DOJ Order 556-73) a procedure by which individuals, upon request and verification of identity, may review the criminal history information maintained on them. Individuals may apply to the contributor of the information to

make any changes in the record. If the contributor corrects the record it must notify the

FBI, and the FBI will make any changes necessary in accordance with the corrections (28

CFR § 20.34, 1975).

Record Dissemination

Recipients of criminal history information

are limited by 28 USC § 534 (1968) to law en2

SEARCH Group, Inc., !fkds in State Security and Privacy

Legislation, Sacramento, Calif., November 1981, p. 5, prepared

for the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

forcement agencies, penal, and other institutions. In 1971, the district court for the District of Columbia, in deciding Menard v.

Mitchell 328 F. Supp. 718 (1971), held that

“other institutions” refer to other official criminal justice and law enforcement institutions

only. Prior to this decision, the FBI had been

providing criminal history records to States

for employment and licensing checks. Immediately after this decision, Congress responded

by passing the Departments of State, Justice,

and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related

Agencies Appropriation Act, 1973, Public Law

No. 92-544, § 2, 86 Stat. 1109 (1972) allowing

the FBI to disseminate criminal history information to officials of federally chartered or insured banking institutions. Public Law No.

92-544 also permits dissemination to State and

local government agencies for purposes of employment and licensing if the check is authorized by a Federal or State statute and approved by the Attorney General.

Then, in 1975 Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act, § 17 (15 USC 78q(F)(2))

to require every member of a national securities exchange, and every broker, dealer, registered transfer agent, and registered clearinghouse agency to undergo an FBI criminal history check.

The dissemination of criminal histories to

authorized Federal agencies is permitted pursuant to Federal statute or Executive order,

28 CFR § 20.33(2) (1975). For example, Executive order 10450 requires a national security

investigation of prospective civilian officers or

employees in any department or agency of the

Federal Government. In most cases the investigation includes at least a national agency

check (including a check of FBI files) and written inquiries to local law enforcement agencies.

In effect, the order authorizes dissemination

of criminal history record information to Federal agencies for use in background investigations, whether national agency checks or full

field investigations. This authority has also

been established for military employees or applicants (Executive order 12065) and for certain employees of defense contractors (Executive order 10865).
Ch. 6— Legal/Regulatory Framework for NCIC, Ident, and State CCH Systems ● 65

As a consequence of Menard v. Mitchell,

DOJ has strictly construed the statutes governing dissemination of criminal history files.

It has revised its earlier position under 28 USC

§ 534 (1968) and now refuses to allow access,

directly or through State law enforcement

agencies, to railroad police and campus police.

Even though these groups may be authorized

by State statute to investigate crimes or apprehend criminals, DOJ does not find them to

be authorized Government officials under the

meaning of 28 USC § 534. It has also refused,

under Public Law 92-544, to provide criminal

history records to State boards of bar examiners when the board is established by rule of

the State supreme court rather than by a statute.

Once the criminal history records leave the

FBI’s control, one sanction available to enforce FBI dissemination policies is 28 CFR §

20.33 (b)(1975). This regulation provides that

the exchange of criminal history record information with authorized recipients is subject

to cancellation if dissemination is made outside the receiving department or related agencies. Also, certain civil and criminal penalties

are provided under the Privacy Act of 1974.

Freedom of Information

and Privacy Act

Under the Freedom of Information Act,

Public Law No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified

at 5 USC § 552, 1977), all Government agencies are required to supply copies of their records to any member of the public who requests

them (5 USC § 552(a)(3)). It has been established that this act applies to computer tapes

to the same extent that it applies to other records (Long v. U.S. IRS 596 F.2d 362, 1979).

However, the act provides several categories

of exemptions: 1) matters that are exempt under another statute, if the statute leaves the

agency no discretion or supplies particular criteria for applying the exemption, may be withheld from the public (5 USC § 552(b)(3)); 2) if

disclosure of a file would constitute “a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”

it need not be disclosed (5 USC § 552(b)(6)); and

3) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes are exempt if release

would constitute “an unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy” (5 USC § 552( b)(6C). Note

that the privacy standard for these records is

less strict than the privacy standard for other

records. There are other exemptions covering

law enforcement records, but they are of limited application (see 5 USC § 552(b)(7)). If the

agency invokes any one of these exceptions,

it must release any reasonably separable portion after deleting the exempt portions.

Regulations promulgated pursuant to this

statute allow the Attorney General to exempt

the whole system of FBI criminal records from

public disclosure. This exemption, which is

noted in DOJ regulations (28 CFR § 16.10,

1973), is uniformly applied to exempt all criminal histories from disclosure.

The Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579

codified in part at 5 USC § 552a, 1977) was

passed shortly after the Freedom of Information Act. Its purpose is to protect the privacy

interests of individuals by regulating the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination

of personal information by Federal agencies.

The Privacy Act requirements apply to all

Federal agency systems including Ident and

NCIC, except where the head of an agency (in

this case the Attorney General) may exercise

certain exemptions for systems of records

maintained for the enforcement of criminal

laws. The Attorney General has exercised specific exemptions, particularly for access and

challenge procedures. However, alternate procedures are provided in 28 CFR § 20.34, which

establishes the right of individuals to have access to and review their own criminal history

record information maintained by Ident or

NCIC, and to seek correction by the source

agency if the information is believed to be incorrect or incomplete. Individuals may also

direct a record challenge to the FBI, who will

then forward the challenge to the source agency. The FBI will make any changes necessary

in the Ident or NCIC files if proper notification is received from the source agency.
66 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized criminal History System

NCIC Operating Policies and Procedures

The FBI Director has approved a set of

NCIC operating policies and procedures; these

embody the statutory-regulatory framework

discussed above, but go considerably further

in some areas. The policies and procedures are

based in part on recommendations from the

NCIC Advisory Policy Board, and are included in the NCIC Operating Manual distributed to NCIC terminal operators. The manual

is updated and revised periodically as needed.

Selected NCIC Hot File

Operating Procedures

Each record in an NCIC file is identified

with the originating agency. The NCIC Operating Manual emphasizes repeatedly that

“agencies that enter records into NCIC are

responsible for record accuracy, timeliness,

and completeness.”3

The FBI does assume responsibility for

those records entered by the FBI. In addition,

“the FBI—as system manager—helps maintain the integrity of the system through: 1)

automatic computer edits that reject certain

types of errors in data; 2) automatic purging

of records after they are on file for a prescribed

period of time; 3) quality control checks by

FBI personnel; and 4) periodically furnishing

lists of all records on file for validation by the

originating agencies.”4

The manual also emphasizes that “an NCIC

‘hit’ may not be probable cause for arrest. ”

NCIC only provides one more piece of information to be evaluated by the officer along with

other facts in determining if there is sufficient

legal basis for probable cause to arrest a person or seize property.5 An immediate confirmation with the originating agency “is necessary

to ensure the validity of the hit before an arrest or seizure is made. ” The manual points

out that “NCIC is an informational tool. It is

no substitute for professional judgment. ”

3NCIC Operating Manual “Introduction, p. 7.

‘Ibid.

5

1 bid., p. 2.

NCIC information must be evaluated along

with other facts known to the criminal justice

official. Finally, NCIC procedures place some

limitations on what can be entered into files.

For example, before entering a record into the

wanted persons file, the entering agency is required to determine, to the maximum extent

possible, if extradition will be authorized. If

not, the record should not be entered.G

The manual further provides detailed procedures for correcting errors and for sending and

receiving messages with the various hot files.

Selected CCH File

Operating Procedures

As with the NCIC hot files, each criminal

justice agency contributing data to CCH is

responsible for assuring that information on

individuals is kept complete, accurate, and current. For all arrest data included in such records, disposition data should also be included

“to the maximum extent feasible” and submitted to CCH within 120 days after the disposition has occurred.7

Unlike the hot files, CCH operating procedures require that all criminal justice agencies

seeking direct access to CCH execute a written agreement with the FBI Director. This

agreement commits the agency to abide by all

CCH rules, policies, and procedures.8 These

procedures were approved by the NCIC Advisory Panel Board and adopted by the FBI

Director.

The CCH operating procedures specify the

kinds of criminal history information that may

be entered into the CCH file, require continuous checks by the FBI and States on the accuracy of records in the file, and define the right

of an individual with a record in the CCH file

to review that record and seek correction if the

information is believed to be inaccurate or in-

. —

‘Ibid., p. 7.

7

Ibid., pt. 10, p. 7, same as 28 CFR § 20.37.

‘Ibid., same as 28 CFR § 20.36.
Ch. 6—Legal/Regulatory Framework for NCIC, /dent, and State CCH Systems ● 67

complete. In addition, they also define who

may have direct access to CCH records and

the limitations on the use of such records.

With respect to system security, systems

that interface directly with NCIC are required

to be under the management control of criminal justice agencies. The procedures also establish a set of physical, technical, and personnel security measures required of all agencies

having access to CCH. These measures include

logging all transactions against the CCH file,

screening and verifying all CCH inquiries,

placing all terminals in secure locations, and

screening all terminal operators.

Finally, the procedures define the role of the

NCIC Advisory Policy Board, particularly

with regard to establishing criteria for purging records, for secondary access to CCH, and

for the organization and administration of

CCH. With respect to the last, all rules govemTable 11 .—Federal Agency

ing direct terminal access to the CCH file apply equally to Federal and State agencies. In

addition, such agencies must permit an Advisory Board-appointed inspection team to conduct inquiries concerning any alleged security violations.9

Federal Agency Orders

or Procedures

In addition to the NCIC operating policies

and procedures, some Federal agencies have

their own orders or procedures for using

NCIC. OTA conducted a partial survey of Federal users to identify the range of operating

policies and procedures that govern the use of

NCIC. Illustrative results of this survey are

summarized in table 11.

‘For further details, see Ibid., pp. 15-27.

Orders or Procedures for NCIC

Agency Policy/procedure

Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)

U.S. Department of the lnteriora

Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

U.S. Department of the Treasuryb

Postal Inspection Service

U.S. Postal Servicec

Federal Prison System (FPS)

U.S. Department of Justiced

United States Marshals Service

U.S. Department of Justicee

None. Adheres to policies and procedures of agency operating terminal.

Both Criminal Investigative Division (CID) and Internal Security Division (IS)

have detailed operating procedures, e.g., CID procedures require NCIC be

queried when evaluating possible tax fraud. NCIC entries are limited to IRS

fugitives, and permitted only at the CID National Office terminal in

Washington, D.C. Fugitives are purged from NCIC when apprehended or when

matter is dismissed by Federal courts.

Part 11, ch. 1, sec. 18 of Confidential/ Field Manual. Authority provided by 39

USC § 404(a)(7) and 18 USC § 3061. NCIC access by written agreement with

FBI.

FPS program statements 1070.1 and 1231.1 and NCIC operating manual.

USM Order 2423.1, ch. 3; e.g., arrest warrants issued to U.S. Marshal by a

Federal court are to be screened to determine if the USMS retains the primary

responsibility for their entry into NCIC. Warrant information will be forwarded

via Justice Telecommunication System (JUST) within 48 hours to the USMS

Communications Center for entry into NCIC according to the NCIC operating

manual,

a oct 16, 1979, memorandum ICI OT A from Dlvtslon of Law Enforcement Services, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U S Department of the Interior

b Oct 2, 1979, letter tO OTA from Deputy commissioner, Interna[ Revenue Service, U S Department of the Treasury

c Dec 24, 1979, letter to OTA from the Chief Postal Inspector, U S postal Semlce

d Sept 18, 1979, memorandum to OTA from the D!rector, Federal Prison Service, U.S Depafiment of Just Ice

e Sept 18, 1979, memorandum to O TA from Director, U S Marshals Serwce, U S Department of Justice

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Federal and State Court Rulings

State and Federal courts have focused pri- of identification and arrest records by police

marily on the collection, use, and maintenance at the local and State levels. As discussed ear-
68 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

lier, some more recent cases (e.g., Menard v.

Saxbe, Tarleton v. Saxbe, Menard v. Mitchell)

have begun to focus on the recordkeeping policies and practices of the FBI.

ing. Judicial rulings have lacked a consistent

direction, as illustrated in table 12. ’0 This is

1O For further discussion of judicial rulings, see Donald A Mmchand, et al., Histnry and Background Assessment of the National Crime Information Cknter and Computerized Criminal

History Program, Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of South Carolina, June 1979, sec. V, “Regulating the Use of Criminal History Records in the United States:

Overview of Activities, ” pp. 168-175.

In general, however, the activity of the State

and Federal courts has been infrequent and uncertain throughout the 100-year history of law

enforcement and criminal justice recordkeepTable 12.—lllustrative Federal/State Court Rulings on Criminal Records

Individual Public safety

Year court Cas e Ruling rights and welfare ———

1906

1941

1944

1945

1946

1966

1967

1967

1968-72

1970

1971

1974

1974

1976

1979

Supreme Court

Louisiana

Itzkovitch

v. Whitaker

Ruled for the defendant. Police could not post picture in x

rogues’ gallery since it violated defendant’s personal

rights because he had never been convicted.

Kansas City Police restrained from disseminating photo- X

graphs and fingerprints of defendent within State

and nationwide.

In absence of controlling statute, police had discretion

to destroy fingerprints, photographs, and measurements

of those accused but not convicted,

No justification for taking identification records in

advance of conviction, except to identify person charged

or to recapture a fugitive.

Absent a statute, police had discretion to maintain and

operate record systems for identification, even for those

acquitted of misdemeanors.

Absent State statute, police could retain arrest records

whether accused was acquitted, discharged, or released.

County officials should return fines and expunge police

and court records connected with arrests and prosecutions intended to intimidate black citizens who wished

to vote.

Ordered fingerprints and photographs destroyed that

were taken when defendant was arrested for refusing to

submit to military induction.

Decisions generally favored defendants involved in

illegal and mass arrests or arrests not leading to conviction. Generally aimed at local or State police

departments, not Ident.

Arrest alone did not justify maintenance of fingerprints

or record by State or Ident.

Where probable cause for arrest exists, court would not

order expungement by FBI, but would limit disclosure to

nonlaw enforcement officials for employment purposes.

FBI had no authority to retain record since “arrest” was

changed to “detention, ” FBI could retain “neutral

identification records. ”

FBI had duty to prevent dissemination of inaccurate

arrest and conviction records, and had to take reason.

able precautions to prevent inaccuracy and

incompleteness of records,

Court held that the police had a right to publicize a

record of an official act, such as an arrest, without

exposing State or Federal officials to lawsuits for civil

rights invasion.

Court found a violation of sixth, eight, and 14th x

amendment rights when arrest information without otherwise available disposition was used in setting bail.

Supreme Court

Missouri

State v.

Harris

court of x

Chancery

New Jersey

Court of

Chancery

New Jersey

Supreme Court

Indiana

Fernicola

v. Keenan

McGovern v.

Van Riper

State v.

Tyndall

x

U.S. Court of Appeals Herschel x

v. Dyra

U.S. v.

McLeod

US. Court of Appeals

Alabama

US. District Court

Puerto Rico

U.S. v

Kalish

(a)

U.S. Court of Appeals

District of Columbia

U.S. District Court

District of Columbia

Menard v.

Mitchell

Menard v,

Mitchell

x

U.S. Court of Appeals

District of Columbia

Menard v,

Saxbe

U.S. Court of Appeals

District of Columbia

Tar/ton

v. Saxbe

U.S. Supreme Court Paul v,

Davis

x

U.S. District Court

New York

Tatum v.

Rogers

See, for example, Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F Supp. 881 (1968), Morrow v District of Columbia, 417 F 2nd 728 (1989), Wheeler v Goodman, 306 F Supp 58 (1969)

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment.
Ch. 6—Legal/Regulatory Framework for NCIC, /dent, and State CCH Systems ● 69

due in part to the limited involvement of the

U.S. Supreme Court in this area. Most of the

significant decisions have been made in State

and lower Federal courts, and have varied

widely in different States. Any trends in

judicial decisionmaking have been more a

product of the larger social and political movement toward expanding due process and other

individual rights over the last 40 to 50 years,

rather than the result of changes in judicial

perspectives on criminal justice recordkeeping

per se.

In most criminal record cases, the balancing of individual rights of privacy and due

process versus the maintenance of public safety and welfare has proven to be a difficult challenge to the courts. The tools that the courts

have had at their disposal, such as injunctive

relief and court orders to seal and expunge

specific records, have been of limited effectiveness and used reluctantly. The courts have

frequently sought legislative guidance.

State Statutes and Regulations

The last 10 years have seen a dramatic increase in State statutes and regulations on

criminal justice information systems. This is

partly owing to the development of LEAA regulations (title 20, CFR, pt. 20) and State efforts to implement them.

Early Efforts of Project

SEARCH and LEA A

In 1970, Project SEARCH (originally the

System for Electronic Analysis and Retrieval

of Criminal Histories) with LEAA funding developed a series of guidelines, model State

statutes, and model administrative regulations for State and local CCH systems.11 This

effort was premised on the view that a nationally integrated CCH should be federated in

nature; i.e., fundamentally dependent on State

and local systems as opposed to one uniform

national system. However, Project SEARCH

recognized that such an approach would necessitate privacy and security standards at the

State and local as well as Federal levels to uniformly protect individual rights and mitigate

potential adverse social impacts.

These early voluntary efforts produced some

results. For example, four States—Alaska,

California, Iowa, and Massachusetts–adopted

the model State act and/or regulations in

whole or in part. At the local and regional level, codes of ethics and self-imposed guidelines

were adopted by some systems, such as the

Santa Clara County (California) criminal justice information system and the Kansas City

(Kansas) Alert II regional system.”

However, in 1971, concerned about the still

limited acceptance of the Project SEARCH

standards, LEAA required State plans to include provisions for privacy and security. In

1972, LEAA established the Comprehensive

Data System (CDS) program that provided

Federal dollars for CCH development, but

made privacy and security plans a condition

of funding.

The CDS program was the primary means

for LEAA to tie the development of local and

State criminal justice information systems to

a set of minimum standards for system development, privacy, and security. In July 1973,

the LEAA-sponsored National Advisory Com-

“See Project SEARCH, Security and Privacy Considerations

in (Mmimd History Information Systems, California Crime

Technological Foundation, Sacramento, 1970; and A Model

State Act for Criminal Offender Record Information, California

Crime Technological Foundation, Sacramento, 1971. Also see

Project SEARCH Committee on Security and Privacy, Model

Adrninistrative Regulations for Criminal Offender Record Information, March 1972.

“See Donald Marchand, Criminal Justice Records and Civil

Liberties: The State of Cd”fornia Department of Justice, State

of California, Sacramento, 1973, pp. 136-138, 358-366; and

Melvin F, Bockelman, “ALERT II–Progress Toward a Computerized Criminal Justice System, ” in Project SEARCH, Pro

ceedings of the International Symposium on Criminal Justice

Information and Statistics Systems, California Crime Technological Foundation, Sacramento, Calif., 1974, pp. 126, 131-2.
70 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

mission on Criminal Justice Standards and

Goals adopted privacy and security standards

that largely reflected Project SEARCH reports.’ 3 By March 1974, 33 States had indicated their desire to participate in the CDS

program by submitting plans. ”

Implementing LEAA Privacy

and Security Regulations

In 1973, an amendment was added to the

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act

of 1968 by Sen. Edward Kennedy requiring

LEAA to promulgate regulations to provide

safeguards for the privacy and security of

criminal history record information. The Kennedy amendment followed a period of frustrating efforts by both the House and the Senate

to pass legislation controlling the use of arrest

records nationwide.

During July 1973, Senator Kennedy “tacked

on” his amendment to the primary piece of

legislation supporting the LEAA program.

While the measure was considered temporary

by Congress in the light of anticipated efforts

to pass more comprehensive legislation, it had

considerable impact on LEAA and its relations with State and local criminal justice

agencies.

Section 524(b) of the Crime Control Act of

1973, as amended, provided that:

All criminal history information collected,

stored, or disseminated through support under this title shall contain, to the maximum

extent feasible, disposition as well as arrest

data where arrest data is included therein.

The collection, storage and dissemination of

such information shall take place under procedures reasonably designed to insure that all

such information is kept current therein; the

Admini stration shall assure that the security

and privacy of all information shall only be

——-—.—

‘

gNational Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report on the Criminal Justice System, U.S.

Government Printing Office, Washington, D, C., 1973.

1

4 Richard W. Velde, LEAA Deputy Administrator for Policy

Development, prepared statement in U.S. Congress, Senate

Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional

Rights, Criminal Justice Data Banks, Hearings, vol. I, 93d

Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 301.

used for law enforcement and criminal justice

and other lawful purposes. In addition, an individual who believes that criminal history information concerning him contained in an

automated system is inaccurate, incomplete,

or maintained in violation of this title, shall,

upon satisfactory verification of his identity,

be entitled to review such information and to

obtain a copy of it for the purpose of challenge

or correction.15

Following passage of the act with the Kennedy amendment, LEAA issued draft regulations in 1974 and held hearings in different

parts of the country. On May 20, 1975, LEAA

published its regulations, which required

States accepting Federal funding to develop

specific policies and procedures in five areas:

1) completeness and accuracy of records, 2)

audit, 3) individual access and review, 4) limits

on dissemination of records, and 5) security.16

LEAA issued final regulations on March 19,

1976. The States experienced a number of

problems in implementing the regulations including lack of resources, confusion in interpretation of the regulations, and lack of a

State legislative mandate.” More specifically,

the following impediments to State implementation were identified in each of the five areas

covered by the regulations:

●

●

●

Completeness and Accuracy: the lack of

a clear and effective mandate, funds and/

or technical ability needed to introduce or

improve an arrest and disposition reporting system, and sufficient time in which

to do SO.

Individual Access and Review: the lack

of standardized, comprehensive policies,

applicable to all impacted agencies in a

State, which are supported by formalized

procedures and the force of State law.

Limitations on Dissemination: the lack of

a statewide policy supported by formal-

“Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Public

Law 90-351,82 Stat. 200 (1968), adding sec. 524 (42 USC $ 3771).

Carried forward by Justice Systems Improvement Act of 1979,

Public Law 96-157, $ 818, 93 Stat. 1212 (1979) as 42 USC

j 3789g (&lpp. 1980).

“Codified in 28 CFR 20, subpt. B.

“See Mitre Corp., Implementing the Federal Privacy and

Security Regulations, McLean, Va., December 1977.
Ch. 6—Legal/Regulatory Framework for NCIC, Idenf, and State CCH Systems . 71

ized mechanisms and procedures, that is

promulgated, pursued and enforced by

some responsible agency.

• Security: the lack of specific, statewide

security standards and the resources required for the full implementation of these

standards.

● Audit: the lack of both a legislative mandate to conduct audits and the resources

these audits will require. ’8

In 1978, LEAA issued two publications to

assist the States in adopting information management policies for local and State criminal

justice information systems. The first surveyed in detail the existing privacy and security statutes and administrative policies.19 The

second assessed the issues and difficulties that

the States have confronted in 25 areas of information policy, and highlighted 4 State approaches to developing regulations.20 In addition, LEAA and SEARCH Group, Inc. (a nonprofit corporation formed in 1975 with broader

membership and interests than the original

Project SEARCH) continued to provide policy, management, and technical assistance to

State and local agencies. However, by 1980

almost all LEAA funding for State implementation had been phased out. LEAA itself was

reorganized by the Justice Systems Improvement Act of 1979, with most prior functions

terminated or transferred to other agencies by

spring 1982. SEARCH Group, Inc. continues

to receive research funds from DOJ Bureau

of Justice Statistics.

—— —

“Ibid., Volume 1: Findings and Recommendations of an

Eighteen State Assessment, p. ix.

191,F,AA, us,Department of Justice, Privacy and ~c~ritY

of Criminal IIistory Information: A Compendium of State I&gislation, 1978.

‘“LEAA, U.S. Department of Justice, Privacy and Security

of Criminal History Information: An Analysis of Privacy Issues,

1979.

State Statutes and Regulations

as of June 1981

The latest comprehensive survey of State

statutes and regulations, conducted by

SEARCH Group, Inc., and funded by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, documents substantial progress between 1974 and mid-1981.2

’

State statutes and regulations are classified

into 28 different categories described in table

13.22 The methodology used to conduct this

and similar prior surveys “included library

research and extensive contact with both the

legislative information offices and record repositories of many States. Once the laws were

collected, each State’s Attorney General was

sent a copy of his State’s laws and attested

to their completeness and accuracy. Responses

served to correct any omissions or inaccuracies

in the initial survey. ”23

The survey results are summarized in table

14. They indicate that by 1981 over two-thirds

of the States had statutes and/or regulations:

1) establishing a State regulatory authority (46

States in 1981 compared with 7 States in

1974); 2) placing some kind of restrictions on

dissemination of criminal history information

(51 States compared with 12 States); 3) establishing the rights of individuals to inspect their

criminal history records (43 States compared

with 12); 4) requiring agencies to ensure reasonably complete and accurate criminal history information, including timely disposition

reporting (49 States compared with 14); 5) providing criminal sanctions for violation of

privacy and security laws (39 States compared

with 18); and 6) stipulating what criminal history records are to be open to the public (52

States in 1981 compared with 9 in 1974).

“SEARCH Group, Inc., Trends in State Skcurity and l+ivacy

Legkdation, Sacramento, Calif., November 1981. The full results

of the survey are available from the Bureau of Justice Statistics,

U.S. Department of Justice.

“These are the same 27 categories used in the 1978 LEAA

Compendium of Stat.e Legislation and a 1979 Supplement, with

the addition of category 28, “Establishment of a Central State

Repository. ”

“LEAA, Ibid., 1979 Supplement, p. vii.
72 Ž An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Table 13.—Categories of State Statutes and Regulations

——

1. State Regulatory Authority. —A grant of power to a State

agency to promulgate Statewide security and privacy

regulations for criminal justice information systems.

2. Privacy and Security Council. —A State board, committee, commission, or council whose primary statutory function is monitoring, evaluating, or supervising the confidentiality and security of criminal justice information.

3. Regulation of Dissemination. —Restrictions on dissemination of criminal history information.

4. Right To Inspect. —The right of an individual to examine

his criminal history records.

5. Right To Challenge. —The right to an administrative proceeding in which an individual may contest the accuracy

or completeness of information pertaining to him.

6. Judicial Review of Challenged Information. —The right of

an individual to appeal an adverse agency decision concerning challenged information to a State court.

7. Purging.’ Nonconviction Information.—The destruction or

return to the individual of criminal justice information

where no conviction has resulted from the event triggering the collection of the information.

8. Purging: Conviction /n formation. —The destruction or

return to an individual of criminal history information indicating a conviction.

9. Sealing: Nonconviction Information. —The removal of

criminal history information from active files where no

conviction has resulted from the event triggering the collection of information.

10. Sealing: Conviction Information. —The removal from active files of individual criminal history information indicating a conviction.

11. Removal of Disqualifications. —The restoration of rights

and privileges such as public employment to persons who

have had criminal history records purged or sealed.

12. Right To State Nonexistence of a Record. —The right to

indicate in response to public or private inquiries the

absence of criminal history in cases of arrest not leading

to conviction or where an arrest or conviction record has

been purged.

13. Research Access. —The provision for and regulation of

access to criminal justice information by outside researchers.

14. Accuracy and Completeness.—A requirement that agencies institute procedures to ensure reasonably complete

and accurate criminal history information, including the

setting of deadlines for the reporting of prosecutorial and

court dispositions.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

Dedication. The requirement that computer configurations

be assigned exclusively to the criminal justice function.

Civil Remedies. —Statutory actions for damages or other

relief resulting from violations of various privacy and

security laws.

Criminal Penalties.—Criminal sanctions for a violation of

various privacy and security laws.

Public Records. —Requirements that certain criminal history records maintained by the police or courts be open

to the public.

Separation of Files. —Requirements that criminal history

information be stored separate from investigative and intelligence information.

Regulation of Intelligence Collection, —Restrictions on

the kind of intelligence information that may be collected

and retained and/or prohibition on its storage in computerized systems.

Regulation of Intelligence Dissemination. —Restrictions

on dissemination of intelligence information.

Security. —Requirements that criminal justice agencies

institute procedures to protect their information systems

from unauthorized disclosure, sabotage, and accidents.

Transaction Logs. —Records that must be maintained by

criminal justice agencies indicating when and to whom

criminal justice information is disseminated.

Training of Employees. —Security and privacy instruction

that must be provided to employees handling criminal justice information.

Listing of /formation Systems. —A mandatory disclosure

of the existence of all criminal justice information systems describing the information contained in such systems.

Freedom of Information (Including Criminal Justice Information). —Provisions for public access to government

records that apply to criminal justice records.

Freedom of information (Excluding Criminal Justice information). —Provisions for public access to government

records from which criminal justice records are specifically excluded.

Central State Repository. Establishment of a bureau, agency, or other entity to collect and maintain criminal history

records or criminal identification data for all criminal justice agencies in the State.

SOURCE SEARCH Group, Inc , LEAA, and Bureau of Just Ice Statistics
Ch. 6—.Lega/Regatoryry Framework for NCIC, Ident, and State CC/-/ Systems . 73

Table 14.—Survey Comparison of Changes in State Statutes/Regulations by Categorya

— Item 1974 1977 1979 1981 Hem 1974 1977 1979 1981

1. State regulatory authority ... 7 38 42 46

2. Privacy and security council 2 10 13 21

3 Regulation of dissemination . 24 40 44 51

4 Right to Inspect . . . . . . . 12 40 43 43

5. Right to challenge . . . . . . . 10 30 36 35

6. Judicial review of challenged

information 10 20 22 18

7 Purging nonconviction information 20 23 28 35

8. Purg!ng conviction Information 7 13 19 24

9 Sealing nonconviction information 8 15 16 20

10 Sealing conviction information 7 20 21 22

11 Removal of dlsqualifications 6 22 22 27

12 Right to state nonexistence of

a record . 6 13 17 22

13 Researcher access. ... ., ., 6 12 14 21

14, Accuracy and completeness 14 41 45 49

15 Dedication ... ... ... . . . . . . . 2 3 3 2

16. Civil remedies ., . . ... . . . 6 22 25 33

17. Criminal penalties . . . . . . . 18 35 39 39

18, Public records . . . . . 9 43 42 52

19 Separation of files ... ., 5 10 10 7

20. Regulation of intelligence

collection. . . 3 10 10 13

21. Regulation of intelligence

dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . 7 24 25 19

22, Security ... . . . ... . . . . . 12 26 31 32

23. Transaction logs . . . . . . . . . ., 6 11 27 29

24. Training of employees. . . . ., 4 18 23 16

25. Listing of Information systems . . . . . . 1 8 8 8

26. Freedom of Information Including

Criminal Justic e (b) (b) 18 27

27. Freedom of Information excluding

Criminal Justice . . . . . . . . . . (b) (b) 22

28. Central State repository . . (b) (b) (’; 52

aThe flgure~ Presented are ~umulatlve and may Include statutes or regula !Ions previously enacted but excluded from prior su~eys

b Data unavailable for these years

SOURCE SEARCH Group, Inc , Bureau of Justice Statistics and LEAA, U.S Department of JustIce

Initiatives to Enact Comprehensive

Federal Legislation

2 4

As noted earlier, the Kennedy amendment

to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe

Streets Act of 1973, and more recently the restrictions on NCIC hardware procurements

and prohibitions on FBI message switching

included in DOJ Appropriations Acts, have

been interim actions aimed at dealing with spe

cific problems until more comprehensive legislation could be enacted. During the decadelong debate, congressional initiatives and executive branch proposals for comprehensive legislation on criminal justice information systems have not produced such legislation.

As early as 1970, Congress approved an

amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control

and Safe Streets Act, sponsored by Sen.

Charles Mathias, which required LEAA to

submit legislation to ensure the integrity and

accuracy of criminal justice information systems funded in whole or in part by the Federal

Government, and protecting the constitutional rights of all persons covered or affected by

the act. In 1971, Sen. Roman Hruska intro-

—.—— ZJFO~ ~ det~fled discussion, SEW Marchand, et al., ~isto~.}’ and

Background Assessment, op. cit., pp. 192-202, and, more

generally, pp. 72-167.

duced S. 2546, “The Criminal Justice Information Systems Security and Privacy Act of

1971” for DOJ in response to the Mathias

amendment. This bill essentially would have

codified the NCIC privacy and security policies and afforded substantial discretion to the

Attorney General with respect to implementation. In 1972, Sen. Hruska introduced a similar

bill, except that it provided for reversal of the

Menard v. Mitchell decision. Both bills were

referred to committee with no further action

taken.

In 1972 and 1973, Cong. Don Edwards introduced bills to establish privacy and security

standards for the dissemination and use of

criminal arrest records, and to regulate all

State and local as well as Federal criminal justice information systems receiving Federal

funds. Both bills were referred to committee

and hearings were held,25 but no further action

was taken.

_-_-___ ...-’

~~see, for example, U.S. congress, House commitk~ on the

Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 4, Securit.}’ and Pri}rac.}’ of Criminal Arrest Records, Hearings, 92d Cong., 2d sess.. N1 ar. 16,

22, 23, and Apr. 13 and 26, 1972.
74 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

———— — .

In February 1974, Sen. Hruska introduced

S. 2964, “The Criminal Justice Information

Systems Act of 1974, ” on behalf of DOJ, and

Sen. Sam Ervin, Jr. introduced S. 2963, “The

Criminal Justice Information Control and Protection of Privacy Act of 1974, ” on behalf of

the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of

the Senate Judiciary Committee. Both bills refleeted much of the work of Project SEARCH,

the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, and the

NCIC privacy and security policies. However,

the Ervin bill took a more restrictive approach

that would have limited all record disseminations to conviction information only and severely constrained noncriminal justice access.

Also, the Ervin bill would have created a Federal Information Systems Board to be responsible for administration and enforcement,

whereas the Hruska bill would have vested

such authority in the Attorney General. Extensive hearings were held on both bills.26 The

result was a compromise bill introduced by

Sen. Ervin in December 1974. No further action was taken that year.

In 1975, Sen. John Tunney, then Chairman

of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Con -

stitutional Rights, and Cong. Don Edwards,

Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, reintroduced the original 1974 Ervin and Hruska bills

and the Ervin compromise bill. Hearings were

held in both the House and Senate.27 Because

2’% U.S. Congress, Senate Commit@ on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Criminal Justice 13ata

Banks, Hearings 1974, vol. I, hearings, vol. II, app., 93d Cong.,

2d sess., March 1974.

“see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Crimtial Justice Information and Prohwtion of fiivacy Act of 1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess.,

of continuing disagreements among DOJ, the

International Association of Chiefs of Police,

Project SEARCH, various State officials (e.g.,

the Attorney General of Massachusetts), and

the American Civil Liberties Union, among

others, no further action was taken on these

bills or on a new compromise bill introduced

by Sen. Tunney.28

Since 1975, there have been no new congressional or executive branch initiatives for comprehensive legislation. The proposed FBI

Charter legislation did make some limited reference to criminal justice information systems;

and Senate Judiciary Committee hearings

were held in late 1979 on sections 535(c),

536(d), and 536(e), the provisions of the Senate

version (S. 1612) that related to the collection

and dissemination of criminal history information. However, FBI Charter legislation was

not enacted by the 96th Congress and is not

under consideration by the 97th. Also, in 1980

and 1981, the Senate passed amendments to

the DOJ Appropriations Authorization Act to

mandate a new, comprehensive study of DOJ

criminal justice information systems, and to

reaffirm the congressional prohibition on message switching unless and until a message

switching plan has been approved by the appropriate committees of Congress.29

July 15 and 16, 1975; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on

the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights,

Criminal Justice Information Llmtrol and Protection of Privacy

Act of 1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess., July 14, 17, and Sept. 5, 1978.

2RFor further discussion of the legislative and policy history,

see Marchand, et al., History and Background Assessmen& op.

cit., and also Donald A. Marchand, The Poh”tics of Privacy, Cbmputers, and Criminal Justice Records, Information Resources

Press, Arlington, Va., 1980.

‘

g

See S. 2377, sec. 113, 96th Cong., 2d sess.; and H.R. 4169,

97th Cong., 1st sess., and Senate Amendment No. 612 passed

by Senate rollcall vote of 85-O on Nov. 12, 1981.
Chapter 7

Use and Users of NCIC/CCH,

Ident, and State CCH Systems
Contents

Chapter Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Federal Government Users. . . . . . . . . . . . .

State and Local Users. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private Users.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Federal Government Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NCIC/CCH File Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ident: Criminal Justice Use..... . . . . . . .

Ident: Noncriminal Justice Use..... . . . .

State CCH Systems Use. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

State and Local Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NCIC/CCH Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ident: Criminal Justice Use..... . . . . . . .

Ident: Noncriminal Justice Use..... . . . .

State CCH Systems Use. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Users. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private Users.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TABLES

Table No.

15.

16.

Pattern of Use and Users: NCIC/CCH, Ident, and State CCH

Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........4 .. .. .., .. . $ . . . . . . . . .

Noncriminal Justice Use of Ident by Federal Agencies, Fiscal

Year 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

77

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78

78

78

79

79

80

80

81

82

82

82

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84

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77

81
Chapter 7

Use and Users of NCIC/CCH,

Ident, and State CCH Systems

Chapter

The two primary categories of criminal justice information system users are Federal Government agencies and State and local agencies.

Foreign countries represent a third category,

and private organizations a fourth. For each

of these categories, OTA reviewed available

data on the uses of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computerized criminal

history (CCH), Identification Division (Ident),

and State CCH systems. Patterns of use are

summarized in table 15.

Federal Government Users

NCIC/CCH: Federal agencies collectively

represent about 12 percent of total CCH trafTable 15.—Patterns of Use and Users:

Summary

fic. The relatively high Federal usage rate in

part reflects the fact that all Federal offenders

are included in the CCH file. Federal agencies

use CCH information primarily for criminal

justice purposes.

Ident: All Federal agencies have access to

Ident and account for one-third of Ident’s total

traffic—about 3 percent by Federal law enforcement and criminal justice agencies and

30 percent by Federal noncriminal justice

users.

The large volume of Federal noncriminal justice use of Ident is attributed to several factors. First, Ident has a much more complete

file than does CCH. Second, applicants for

NCIC/CCH, Ident, and State CCH Systems

— 15A —Criminal justice v. noncriminal justice use

—— NC IC/CCH Ident State CCH .-

User

agencies CJ a Non-CJ b

Totals CJ Non-CJ Totals CJ Non-CJ Totals

Federal

State

Local

12“/0

22 ”/0

66 ”/0

(c)

(c)

(c)

12“/0 3%

22%

66% 440/0

30 ”/0

23 0/0

33 ”/0 (d)

670/o 85 0/0

3 %

1 2 %

3 0/0

97%

Totals 100”/0 (c) 100 ”/0

— .

47 ”/0 53 ”/0 1 00% 850/o 15“/0 100 “/0

15B. — Law enforcement v. other criminal justice use .

NC IC/CCH Ident State CCH

User

agencies LEe Other CJf

Totals LE Other CJ Totals LE Other CJ Totals

Federal 800/0 – 20 0/0 100 ”/0 80/0 920/o 100% (9) (9) —

State

Local

480/o

100”/0

520/o 1 00%

0% h1 oo% 40% 600/0 100% 6670 34%

— —. —

~CJ - Cnmlnal Justice use (e g , polIca, courts, corrections)

Non.CJ = Noncrlmlnal justice use (e g , employment and licensing, security checks)

c

= Negl!g!ble d

= Precise data unavailable, but percentage estimated to be very small

@LE Law enforcement use (e 9 Pollee sherlff~

‘Other CJ = Other crlmlnal justice user (e g , prosecuting attorney, courts, probation parole)

‘Not known

‘County agency use Included with State agency use

100 0/0

SOURCES NCIC)CCH use percentages based on data from the July-September 1981 pilot test of the Interstate Iden!lf{catlon Index, data collected by FBI and Florlda

Department of Law Enforcement, analysis and calculations by OTA

Ident use percentages based on fiscal year 198f data collected by the FBI w!th the except!on of State/local law enforcement v other Crlmlnal Just Ice use

data which are from U S Comptroller General F/ow Cr/rn/na/ Jusf/ce Agenc/es Use Crfrn~na/ F/(story /nformaf/err, U S General Accounting Office, Washington,

D C Aug J974, p 34

State CCH use percentages based on data from 1979 OTA 50 State survey, and 1982 followup

77
78 • An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Federal positions, Federal contractors, military recruits, and national security personnel

are routinely subjected to background investigations. Third, background investigations normally include fingerprint checks, which only

Ident is equipped to process. The Department

of Defense (DOD) and Office of Personnel

Management (OPM) conduct over 95 percent

of all background investigations.

State CCH: Federal agency access to State

CCH systems varies widely depending on the

interpretation of State statutes. Federal requests account for about 23 percent of State

CCH noncriminal justice traffic (about 3 percent of total State CCH traffic).

State and Local Users

NCIC/CCH: CCH file traffic from State and

local agencies accounts for about 88 percent

of total CCH traffic. In general, the probability

of State and local users achieving a hit is not

high because such a small fraction of current

criminal records are contained in the CCH file.

States that are fully participating in CCH use

it most frequently. During July-September

1981, most State and local messages (about

67 percent) were from the eight States fully

participating in CCH. Fifteen States had no

CCH message traffic at all, and with few exceptions the remaining 27 had very little.

ldent: State and local use accounts for about

two-thirds of the total Ident workload—about

44 percent by State and local law enforcement

and criminal justice agencies, and about 23

percent by State and local noncriminal justice

users. In order to reduce the current backlog

and response time, Ident has suspended services to most State and local employment and

licensing authorities until October 1, 1982, at

which time user fees will be instituted.

Ident does not maintain use statistics by

originating agency. Interview results suggest,

however, that criminal justice use is almost

entirely in postarrest situations and that noncriminal justice use is primarily for employment and licensing purposes. Users are cautioned that Ident information is provided “for

official use only” and “should only be used for

the purposes requested. ” The number and

types of agencies that can access Ident vary

greatly from State to State.

State CCH: OTA found that about 85 percent of record requests were from criminal justice agencies and about 15 percent from noncriminal justice agencies. Of the 15 percent of

CCH requests for noncriminal justice purposes, most were for State/local license applications, State/local employment checks, and

Federal security checks.

International Users

NCIC: Canada is the only country permitted

direct access to the NCIC hot files under a

reciprocal assistance agreement between the

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and

NCIC. However, the RCMP cannot access the

CCH file. Other foreign countries wishing to

access NCIC must do so through the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the official

U.S. liaison with the International Police Organization (Interpol). The volume of international NCIC traffic apparently is quite small.

Ident: Foreign use of Ident is also very limited. During fiscal year 1981, 2,556 fingerprint

cards were submitted to Ident through the National Central Bureau of Interpol and by foreign police agencies. Almost all foreign users

of Ident involve individuals (U.S. citizens

abroad or foreign nationals giving a U.S. address) who have been arrested for narcotics or

smuggling violations. Ident information is provided for criminal offenses only, not for political, religious, and social violations or complaints.

Private Users

With the exception of federally chartered or

insured banking institutions and the securities

industry, private organizations are not authorized access to criminal history information

contained in Ident or NCIC. But in a majority of States, private organizations can lawfully obtain conviction information (and frequently arrest information as well) from State

criminal history record files.
Ch. 7—Use and Users of NC/C/CCH, /dent, and State CCH Systems w 79 —————— — .—— —

Federal Government Users

NCIC/CCH File Us e

Federal agencies, like all other agencies,

must meet the following criteria used by the —— . . . . . FB1

1.

2.

3.

m authorizing access:

The agency must be a Government agency as required by title 28, U.S. Code, section 534.

The agency must meet the definition of

a criminal justice agency as contained in

the Department of Justice regulations on

Criminal Justice Information Systems

(title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, pt.

20, subpt. A). Section 20.3 of these regulations defines a criminal justice agency

as: “courts, a government agency or any

subunit thereof which performs the administration of criminal justice pursuant

to a statute or executive order, and which

allocates a substantial part of its annual

budget to the administration of criminal

justice. The administration of criminal

justice means performance of any of the

following activities: detection, apprehension, detention, correctional supervision,

or rehabilitation of accused persons or

criminal offenders. The administration of

criminal justice shall include criminal

identification activities and the collection, storage and dissemination of criminal history record information. ”

An agency not meeting the qualifications

set out in (2) above must meet the definition of an agency under management

control of a criminal justice agency as

contained in the CCH program background, concept, and policy as approved

by the NCIC Advisory Policy Board.

Management control includes the authority to set and enforce priorities; standards for the selection, supervision, and

termination of personnel; and policy governing the operation of computers used

to process criminal history record information. Management control includes,

but is not limited to, the supervision of

equipment, systems design, programing,

and operating procedures. A noncriminal

justice user agency must have a written

agreement with the criminal justice agency that has management control.

Federal agencies must execute a CCH agreement with the FBI in order to access CCH.

Federal users account for about 12 percent of

the CCH file’s message traffic, based on data

from the July-September 1981 pilot test of the

Interstate Identification Index (111). ’ Federal

agencies directly accessing CCH during the

test period included the U.S. Secret Service,

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Customs (which provides an interconnection with

Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS)), U.S. Postal Service, and FBI.

Since all active Federal offenders are ultimately recorded in CCH, the file contains a

disproportionate number of Federal as opposed to State offenders. For example, on

August 31, 1981, Federal offenders accounted

for 24.4 percent of the total records in the CCH

file.’ The relatively high usage rate for Federal

agencies is thus not surprising.

Judging from CCH purpose codes entered

by users for each message, essentially all Federal user requests for CCH information are for

criminal justice purposes. Secondary dissemination for other uses beyond the terminal

agency has not been measured and identified

by OTA, except through anecdotal references.

CCH purpose codes provide little insight into

the actual recipients and end users of CCH information. All law enforcement and criminal

justice use is grouped under the “C” Code

‘Federal Bureau of Investigation, Interstate Identification

Index: Background and Findings for Jul+v-September 1981

Phase I Pilot Project, Dec. 4, 1981, pp. 146, 153, 158, 159. The

percent of Federal use was calculated by adding the 407 matching inquiries (“hits,” where an inquiry matched an Index entry)

for Federal agencies without NLETS access to the approximate

982 matching inquiries (8.6 percent of 11,415) for Federal

agencies with NLETS access, and dividing total Federal agency matching inquiries (1389) by total matching inquiries

(11,415 + 410 = 11,825).

2NCIC staff paper prepared for Nov. 3-4, 1981, meeting of

the NCIC Advisory Policy Board Subcommittee on the Interstate Identification Index, Topic x3, p. 7.
80 • An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System — —

(Criminal Justice); thus, prosecutors, courts,

probation, parole, and correctional institutions

are included, along with police and law enforcement, within one general term. However, agencies requesting CCH information are identified

by an Originating Agency Identifier. Statistics on type of requesting agency were maintained during the III pilot test. The results

suggest that Federal law enforcement agencies accounted for about 80 percent of total

Federal traffic on NCIC/CCH.3

The CCH file also serves some Federal agencies for noncriminal justice purposes (i.e., employment and security screening), but the volume of transactions for such purposes is very

small. The bulk of Federal agency inquiries for

noncriminal justice uses is directed to Ident.

Ident: Criminal Justice Use

While direct NCIC/CCH access is limited to

a small number of Federal agencies, Ident may

be used by all Federal agencies for either

criminal justice or employment screening purposes. During fiscal year 1981, approximately

172,000 fingerprint cards were submitted to

Ident by Federal law enforcement and criminal

justice agencies, compared with 3.0 million

cards from State and local criminal justice

agencies and a total of about 6.8 million cards

received by Ident from all sources.

Rap sheets are provided by Ident to Federal

agencies “for the official use of” the receiving

agency only. Section 534 of title 28 (U. S. C.)

provides that the exchange of identification

records is subject to cancellation if dissemination is made outside of the receiving department or related agencies. Each identification

record contains a caveat stating that it is furnished “for official use only” and that it

“should only be used for the purpose

requested.

‘FBI, 111 Background and Findings, op. cit. The percent of

Federal law enforcement agency use was calculated by adding

the 401 hits for Federal law enforcement agencies without

NLETS access to the approximate 696 inquiries (6.1 percent

of 11,415) for Federal law enforcement agencies with NLETS

access, and dividing by total Federal agency hits as above.

A General Accounting Office (GAO) report

on criminal history information provides one

indicator of actual rap sheet use. According

to the report, almost 95 percent of all fingerprint card submissions are intended to be used

for postarrest purposes.4 This is entirely logical, since fingerprints are seldom obtained

from individuals who are not already in custody. Moreover, the Ident “turnaround time”

of several weeks precludes most prearrest and

arrest uses of rap sheets, except in atypical

situations (ongoing investigations, etc.).

Ident: Noncriminal Justice Use

In 1981, Ident processed a monthly average

of 175,000 fingerprint requests for Federal employment, contractors, and security clearances. Noncriminal justice Federal users rely

on Ident for several reasons: 1) direct access

NCIC terminals are located only in law enforcement or criminal justice agencies, so noncriminal justice users cannot easily access

NC IC/CCH files; 2) NCIC policy requires that

any response to an employment or licensing

inquiry be furnished only through a criminal

justice agency; 3) employment background investigations are normally conducted through

fingerprint checks, which only I dent is equipped to process; and 4) Ident has a much more

complete file than does CCH.

During fiscal year 1981, Ident received

about 2.1 million fingerprint card inquiries

from Federal noncriminal justice users. This

accounts for roughly 30 percent of all of

Ident’s traffic. The large volume of Federal

noncriminal justice use may be attributed to

several factors. All applicants for Federal positions, as well as many persons who are employed under Federal contracts, are routinely

subjected to background investigations. Likewise, DOD uses Ident services when conducting security investigations related to personnel occupying “sensitive positions, ” and for

background checks of all military recruits. The

—.—. .—

‘U.S. Comptroller General, How Criminal Justice Agencies

Use Criminal History Information, U.S. General Accounting

Office, Washington, D. C., August 1974, p. 34.
Ch. 7—Use and Users of NCIC/CCH, /dent, and State CCH Systems . 81

Immigration and Naturalization Service also

accounts for a significant volume of traffic to

Ident. Table 16 summarizes the volume of fingerprint card submissions to Ident by all Federal noncriminal justice users in fiscal 1981.

The largest type of noncriminal justice use

among Federal agencies involves background

and security investigations of Federal applicants, employees, and contractors. Although

DOD and OPM account for over 95 percent

of all background investigations, a few other

agencies operate internal suitability and security programs. The FBI, Treasury Department, Department of State (DOS), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are the most

notable. The FBI is responsible for investigating the background of its own employees, as

well as White House personnel, Presidential

appointees, employees of the U.S. Attorney’s

Office, and certain applicants of the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission. DOS conducts background investigations of Foreign Service and

Office of the Secretary of State employees and

applicants. Additionally, DOS performs overseas investigations for OPM and DOD, and

Table 16.— Noncriminal Justice Use of Ident by

Federal Agencies, Fiscal Year 1981

Flngerprint cards

Purpose of use submitte d

Federal employment

Army ., ., ., ., ., 210,145

Air Force ... ., 105,791

Navy, . , . . . .,, 111,924

Marine Corps ., ............ 52,066

Coast Guard...................... ... 19,557

Off Ice of Personnel Management 334,941

Miscellaneous Federal agencies . , 38,605

Subtotal . . . . . . . ... ... 873,029 (41 .4%)

Federally related employment (contractors, security clearances)

Department of Energy . . 5,605

Defense Investigative Service ., 331,641

Department of Transportatio n 1,105

Other Federal agencies ., . . . 73,450

Subtotal . . . . . ... ., ., 411,801 (19.60/, )

Nonemployment users

Veterans Admlnlstratlon (establishing

entitlements to benefits) ., . , 1,269

Immlgratlon and Naturalization Service

(persons applylng for naturalizatlon,

cltlzens applylng for adoption of

foreign-born children, etc ) 820,742

Subtotal ., 822,011 (39%)

Total Federal noncrimlnal justice

fingerprint cards submltted 2,106,84 1

SOURCE Federal Bureau of Investlgatlon

conducts limited checks of visa and passport

applicants. The Treasury Department conducts suitability and security investigations

for many of its own employees, especially

those working for the Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Secret Service, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. CIA conducts special background investigations of all its own

employees.

State CCH Systems Use

Executive Order No. 10450 specifically

states that the processing of all applicants for

Federal jobs must include “written inquiries

to local law enforcement agencies. ” Pursuant

to this requirement, all employment-related investigations conducted by Federal agencies include written and/or personal contacts with

State and/or local law enforcement authorities.

In each of these investigations, Federal investigators must attempt to access criminal history record information contained in State and

local files. Moreover, military recruiters routinely verify or investigate the background information provided by applicants for military

service.

Despite the obvious importance of State and

local criminal history information to Federal

suitability investigations, Federal agencies fre

quently encounter difficulties in accessing nonFederal files. Access to State and local criminal history records is governed by many varying (and conflicting) statutes, procedures, and

interpretations that make it virtually impossible for Federal agencies to obtain certain records. Federal officials cite the Privacy Act of

1974 and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) regulations as two

causes of the inconsistent practices and procedures that govern Federal agency access to

State and local criminal history files. In addition, access policies in some States do not specifically apply to local criminal history records.

Furthermore, in States that have enacted statutes governing access, the interpretation is frequently left to local jurisdictions. One consequence has been a tendency for access to be

harder for OPM and easier for DOD. Many

jurisdictions deny OPM access on the basis
82 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a Nationa/ Computerized Crimina/ History System

that State laws (or LEAA regulations) only

permit access for criminal justice agencies, and

OPM is not a criminal justice agency. On the

other hand, many jurisdictions have used their

discretion to define certain DOD units as criminal justice agencies, thus permitting access.5

The 1979 OTA survey of 50 States indicated

that Federal security checks (including mili-

‘See SEARCH Group, Inc., Federal Access to State and Imcai

Criminal Justice information, Sacramento, Calif., March 1979.

State and

NCIC/CCH Us e

The possibility of State and local users

achieving a hit on NCIC/CCH files is generally low because such a small fraction of current

criminal records are contained in the CCH file.

For fiscal year 1981, the eight States fully participating in (submitting records to) NCIC/

CCH accounted for only about 24 percent of

all criminal fingerprint cards submitted to

Ident in that year.7 Based on data from the

III pilot test, State agency users account for

about 22 percent of CCH message traffic and

local agencies about 66 percent. Most of these

State and local messages (about 67 percent)

were from the eight States fully participating

in CCH at that time. Fifteen States had no

CCH messages at all during the test period,

and most of the remaining 27 States (with the

notable exceptions of Oregon, Illinois, and California) had very few.8

Most requests (about 94 percent during the

test period9

) were for summary online criminal

history records. Summary records were provided within 30 minutes 77 percent of the time

and within 15 minutes 64 percent of the time.l0

‘Ident received 2,914,911 criminal fingerprint cards from

States in fiscal year 1981. Of that total, 708,149 cards (or 24.3

percent) were received from the eight States fully participating

in NCICICCH: Florida (272,400 fingerprint cards); 1owa (18,730); Michigan (55,727); Nebraska (8,259); North Carolina (48,800);

South Carolina (83,560); Texas (156,804); and Virginia (63,869). Data from FBI, 111 Background and Findings, op. cit.

‘I bid.,

‘Ibid., p. 145.

‘“ Ibid., p. 162.

tary) accounted for about 23 percent of noncriminal justice requests in States with CCH

systems, and about 35 percent in those with

manual systems.6 Federal noncriminal justice

use accounts for about 3 percent of total State

CCH use.*

6OTA 50-State Survey conducted in 1979-80. See appendix

B for list of State officials responding.

*C~culated by multiplying the Federal percentage of State

CCH noncriminal justice use (23 percent) by the noncriminal

justice percentage of total State CCH use (15 percent).

Local Users

Statistics maintained for the III pilot test indicated that State agency requests were split

about evenly between law enforcement and

other criminal justice agencies (prosecuting attorneys, courts, corrections), but that local inquiries were almost entirely from law enforcement agencies.11

Like their Federal counterparts, and essentially for the same reasons, State and local

noncriminal justice users rely almost entirely on Ident to provide centralized criminal history record information for licensing and employment purposes.

Ident: Criminal Justice Use

For States lacking a well-developed centralized criminal history file, Ident provides a central repository and clearinghouse for criminal

history record information. Even for States

with a more sophisticated central repository,

Ident provides a national repository for the

criminal history records of multi-State and

Federal offenders.

During fiscal year 1981, about 3 million

criminal fingerprint cards submitted by State

and local agencies were processed. Ident does

not maintain use statistics by originating

agency because of the vast number (over

20,000) of organizations authorized to submit

fingerprints and other criminal history infor-

] i I bid, p. 158, However, county level agencies were counted

as State rather than local users.
Ch. 7—Use and Users of NCIC/CCH, /dent, and State CCH Systems ● 83

mation. Results of interviews conducted for

this study tended to confirm the earlier GAO

findings that about 94 percent of fingerprint

record use by State and local criminal justice

agencies is for postarrest purposes, and about

40 percent of criminal justice use is by law enforcement agencies—with the other 60 percent

accounted for by prosecutorial, judicial, probation-parole, and correctional agencies. ’2

Ident: Noncriminal Justice Use

Noncriminal justice use of Ident by State

and local agencies and other authorized users*

accounted for about 23 percent of its total

workload during fiscal year 1981, when about

1.6 million fingerprint cards were received

from these sources. On October 1, 1981, due

to a large backlog of unprocessed cards

(400,000 as of September 1981) and increasing processing time (up to 27 workdays in September 1981), Ident suspended services to federally chartered or insured banking institutions and State and local employment and licensing authorities. Ident plans to restore

these services on October 1, 1982, charging a

user fee of$12 per fingerprint card processed

to cover costs.13

Ident does not maintain separate figures for

licensing and employment fingerprint card

submissions because both types of record

checks are performed pursuant to the same

authority (Public Law 92-544). In addition,

since 1957, the division has not retained the

fingerprint cards submitted by State and local

employment and licensing users.

Unlike NCIC/CCH, Ident provides criminal

history information directly to noncriminal

justice users; previously approved mailing addresses are used to furnish responses. Such

users are cautioned that the information is

provided “for official use only” and “should

only be used for purposes requested. ” Redis-

‘2U. S. Comptroller General, Criminal History Znforrnation,

op. cit., pp. 12-14.

*other authorized users include primarily federally chm~red

or insured banking institutions and the securities industry.

“See Sept. 1 and Oct. 1, 1981, letters to all fingerprint contributors from Nick Stames, Assistant Director, FBI Identification Division. The suspension does not apply to employment

in criminal justice agencies or to the securities industry.

semination of criminal records provided by

Ident is not permitted unless the requesting

agency is already authorized to receive such

records. However, once information becomes

part of a State or local file it can be difficult

to identify the information as having originally been provided by Ident, and limitations on

dissemination are difficult to enforce.

The number and types of State or local agencies permitted access to criminal history data

vary greatly from State to State. 14 Some

States permit a wide variety of licensing authorities to use criminal history records (e.g.,

real estate commissions, alcoholic beverage

boards, parimutuel racing commissions, licensing boards for such occupational groups as

barbers, cosmetologists, psychologists, insurance agents, polygraph examiners, and adoption authorities). Other States forbid access

to all agencies except those authorized by Federal statute (banking and securities industries). Also, State laws control the classification of “peace officers, ” not all of whom are

directly involved in conventional law enforcement duties.

State CCH Systems Use

The extent to which in-State criminal histories satisfy the needs of State criminal justice agencies varies from one State to another.

For example, some States do not require centralized reporting of fingerprint cards on criminal offenders. In ‘addition, local police agencies in the State are not always consistent in

notifying the State repository of arrests and

dispositions. Consequently, some State criminal history files contain only a fraction of all

known criminal offenders in the State. Given

these constraints, law enforcement and criminal justice users in these States depend to a

greater extent on the FBI even for in-State

criminal history information.15

“See in general Steven W. Hays, et al., An Assessment of

the Uses of Information in the National Crime Information

Center and Computerized Criminal History Program, Bureau

of Governmental Research and Service, University of South

Carolina, October 1979, sees. 11, III, and IV, and especially app.

B, “State Repository Site Visits, ” pp. 172-322, which included

California, Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas.

“ibid.
84 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

————— — ..-. . —.. —. —

In contrast, California’s criminal history file

is estimated to be approximately 78-99 percent

‘‘complete; “ i.e., about 78 percent of all reportable arrests and about 99 percent of all adult

arrests in the State are included in the State’s

repository. Thus, California users of criminal

history records rely on the FBI primarily for

out-of-State information. 16

The 1982 OTA 50-State survey followup

found that about 85 percent of all requests to

State CCH repositories were from criminal justice agencies, and about 15 percent were from

noncriminal justice agencies. Based on 1979

— . —

“Ibid., California site visit, pp. 272-282; personal communication with Nell Hutchinson, California Department of Justice,

Aug. 30, 1982.

data, about 66 percent of requests from criminal justice agencies were from law enforcement agencies and about 34 percent from

other criminal justice agencies (primarily

courts, prosecutors, probation-parole, and corrections). Of the requests from noncriminal

justice agencies, about 49 percent were for

license applications, 24 percent for employment checks, and 4 percent for State and local

security checks. As noted earlier, about 23 percent of the requests from State CCH systems

were for Federal security checks, whereas the

comparable figure for manual systems was

about 35 percent.17

— —.

170TA 50-State Survey conducted in 1979-80.

International Users

Under certain conditions, information from

NCIC hot files and from Ident is made available to government authorities in foreign countries. Canada is the only foreign country permitted to access the NCIC data base directly.

Under a reciprocal assistance agreement, the

RCMP have a terminal in their central headquarters and NCIC has access to the Canadian

Police Information Center in Ottawa. The

RCMP cannot access the CCH file.

Other foreign countries wishing to access

NCIC must do so through DEA, which is the

official U.S. liaison with Interpol. DEA is

responsible for determining whether or not

Interpol requests are consistent with existing

treaties and Federal legislation. Since Interpol

inquiries are lumped together with Department of Justice message traffic, it is not possible to identify the exact volume of international NCIC traffic. However, FBI officials note

that the volume of traffic is very low.

Interpol receives significant criminal information assistance through TECS. However,

Interpol’s interface with TECS does not allow

it to access NCIC indirectly nor to access

State and local criminal information files

through the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS).

The use of Ident data base by foreign countries is also very limited. During fiscal year

1981, 2,556 fingerprint cards were submitted

to Ident under the International Exchange

Program. The largest number of fingerprint

card submissions (952) was received from foreign contributors through the National Central Bureau of Interpol. The largest number

of direct submissions from foreign police agencies came from Canada (1,160) and Great Britain (355). In 1981, 47 different countries submitted fingerprints to Ident and an additional

30 countries were entitled to do so.

Ident notes that in almost every case the fingerprint cards that are submitted involve U.S.

citizens arrested in a foreign country, or foreign nationals arrested in a foreign country

who, in the judgment of the contributing agency, would be of interest to U.S. authorities,

usually because they give an address in the

United States at the time of arrest. Almost

all of these cases involve individuals who have

been arrested for narcotics or smuggling violations. Records provided to international users

are manually reviewed before distribution, and

carry the caveat that the record is provided

“for official use only” and “should only be

used for purpose requested. ” Information is
Ch. 7—Use and Users of NCIC/CCH, Ident, and State CCH Systems ● 85

provided only if there is a legitimate criminal try is not a member of the International Exoffense involved. Political, religious, or other change Program, DOS is asked to make a final

social violations or complaints are not honored determination as to whether or not criminal

by Ident. In cases where the requesting coun- history information should be released.

Private Users

With the exception of federally chartered or

insured banking institutions and the securities

industry, private organizations are not authorized access to criminal history information

contained in I dent or NCIC. * But in a majority of States, private organizations can lawfully obtain conviction information (and frequently arrest information as well) from State criminal history record files. For example, as of

mid-1981, 10 States plus the Virgin Islands

provided statutory authority for private employers to obtain both conviction and nonconviction arrest data.l8 In addition, many State

statutes regulate only the central State repository or records disseminated by the repository.

A recent SEARCH study concluded that “in

most States, even some of those with comprehensive criminal record statutes, local police

agencies are still free-absent a local ordinance

—to release to private employers whatever arrest or conviction data they choose to. ”l9

In Florida, the State’s Public Records Statute permits private access to criminal history

files. As of June 1979, the following private

organizations were among those listed as secondary users of the Florida Crime Information

Center: Commercial Carrier Corp.; General Telephone Co.; Jack’s Cookie Co.; Ryder Truck

Lines, Inc.; United Parcel Service; Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.; Rinker Materials Corp.; and

. .—

*See ch. 6.

‘“SEARCH Group, Inc., Privacy and the Private Ernplo}’er,

September 1981 draft, p. 33.

‘

g Ibid., pp. 34-35.

Hughes Refrigerated Express, Inc.20 This list

did not include “ad hoc” requests from private

individuals and organizations. According to

Florida officials, the list of private sector

secondary users has grown substantially in recent years. During fiscal year 1981, about

37,000 private sector record checks were processed. This represented about 25 percent of all

applicant record checks for that year. 21

In South Carolina, the State’s Freedom of

Information Act permits private access to conviction information. As of mid-1979, officials

of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) estimated that the primary noncriminal justice users of conviction information were large companies for the purpose of

employment screening. There was no easy way

for SLED to determine specifically who had

access to such information once it was released

to local agencies.”

In Florida, NCIC/CCH out-of-State information is exempted from the Public Records Statute and disseminated only in accordance with

laws of the State originating the information.

In South Carolina, NCIC/CCH out-of-State information is not maintained in the State CCH

file, other than to note that such information

is available from Ident.

‘OHays, Assessment of Uses, op. cit., Florida Site Visit, p.

290-291; site visit conducted June 26, 1979.

“Ibid., p. 293. Fiscal year 1981 data from FE31, III

Background and Findings, op. cit., p. 77.

“Hays, Assessment of Uses, op. cit., South Carolina site ~risit,

p. 310; site visit conducted May 28 and June 4 and 12, 1979.

‘1 – – . –
Chapter 8

Record Quality in Federal

and State Criminal History

Information Systems
Contents

Page

Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Methodology of Record Quality Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Methodology Used for Federal Files + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Accuracy of Federal Record Quality Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Methodology Used for State CCH Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Findings of Record Quality Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

FBI Criminal History Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

State Criminal History Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....93

Significance of Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

TABLES

Table No. Page

17. Record Quality of FBI Identification Division Criminal History

File Disseminations, Based on 1979 Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

18. Record Quality of FBI NCIC/CCH File Disseminations, Based

on 1979 Sample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Chapter 8

Record Quality in Federal

and State Criminal History

Information Systems

Chapter Summary

As discussed in chapter 6, Federal and many

State laws and regulations emphasize the importance of complete, accurate, and current

criminal history information. The results of

record quality research conducted by OTA and

others indicate that while the quality of criminal history records has improved since 1970,

significant problems remain. The results for

the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI)

Identification Division (Ident) file, the National Crime Information Center/Computerized Criminal History (NCIC/CCH) file, and

State files are summarized below.*

Ident: Based on a 1979 sample of arrest

events, OTA record quality research found

that about 30 percent of the Ident records that

could be verified lacked a court disposition

that had occurred and was confirmed by the

district attorney in the local area responsible

for prosecution. A 1980 study conducted by

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory found that

Ident receives dispositions for about 45 percent of the arrests reported. OTA found that

about one fifth of the I dent arrest events sampled were inaccurate when compared with

charging, disposition, and/or sentencing information in local records.

*OTA a]so conducted record quality research on the NCIC

Wanted Persons File. Although outside the primary focus of

this report, the results are summarized in app. A.

NCIC/CCH: OTA record quality research

based on a 1979 sample of arrest events found

that about 27 percent of the CCH records that

could be verified lacked a court disposition

that had occurred. About one-fifth of the arrest events were inaccurate with respect to

charging, disposition, and/or sentencing information in local records. While it is possible

that NCIC/CCH (and Ident) record quality has

improved since 1979, OTA is not aware of any

comparable research conducted by the FBI or

others to document such improvements.

States: Based on 1979 and 1982 50-State

surveys and a 1979 sample of records selected

from one major urban jurisdiction in each of

three States, OTA record quality research

found that the most significant problem involved the lack of disposition information. Survey results indicated a 65 percent average disposition reporting level for the 41 States responding in 1979. For the three urban jurisdictions sampled, disposition reporting was 58,

60, and 85 percent. In general, a comparison

between 1970 and 1979 survey data shows

some improvement in disposition reporting for

all States and significant improvement for

States with computerized (as opposed to manual) systems. Several States contacted by

OTA have achieved further improvement in

disposition reporting since 1979, but the overall average increased only marginally to 66

percent in 1982.

Methodology of Record Quality Research

The research reported here is the first sys- both Federal and State criminal history infortematic effort to measure record quality in mation systems. The State CCH systems were

89
90 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

included in this study because any future national CCH system will depend on criminal history information generated initially, and in

some designs maintained, by the States.

Therefore, it is important to obtain an estimate of the levels of record quality in State

systems.

Methodology Used for

Federal Files

The research reported here on record quality of the Ident criminal history file was based

on a stratified proportional sample of criminal

history records selected from the outgoing

mailroom of the FBI during late July and early

August 1979. A random sampling procedure

could not be carried out on this file because

no log or list of recent disseminations existed.

The selection of records was weighted by the

only known population parameter-the proportion of records requested by various States.

Within States, records were selected in rough

proportion to the number of requests made by

local agencies during the week of selection.

One recent arrest event was chosen from each

of 400 criminal history records selected for intensive examination. The criminal history information for each arrest event selected was

then sent to the district attorney in the local

area responsible for prosecution of the case for

full and complete verification of arrest, court

disposition, sentencing, and correctional information. Information returned by local district

attorneys was then compared with information recorded on the Ident criminal history

record, and record accuracy, completeness,

and ambiguity were evaluated.

The statistical estimates of record quality

in Ident’s manual criminal history files are

technically generalizable to the population of

Ident disseminations that took place in 1979.

The results are not technically generalizable

to the entire Ident criminal file. Thus, this research measured the quality of information

being disseminated by Ident, not the quality

of records that are stored but not disseminated.

The research on record quality of the NCIC/

CCH file was based on a systematic sample

of the NCIC/CCH transaction log, with a random start for the period January 1 to June 1,

1979. Four hundred recently disseminated

criminal history records were selected as of

August 12, 1979, and from each a recent arrest event was chosen for verification. The

process used for verification of NCIC/CCH

records was the same as for Ident. The results

of this research are technically generalizable

to the population of CCH disseminations that

took place during 1979. They are not, however,

technically generalizable to the entire NCIC/

CCH file.

Accuracy of Federal Record

Quality Estimates

The ability to estimate population parameters using randomly drawn samples is a function of sample size as well as the underlying

distribution of the variable being estimated.

In this research, the sample sizes were restricted due to limited resources. Moreover,

the response rate of local authorities who verified information varied. For the NCIC/CCH

and the Ident criminal history samples, the

statistical estimates of the record quality features are generally accurate to within 6 percent (plus or minus 6 percent). That is, there

is 95 percent confidence that the true population parameters of record quality lie within

plus or minus 6 percent of the estimates given

in the tables.

Methodology Used for

State CCH Files

Record quality of State criminal history files

was estimated through use of surveys of all

States and through a sampling of State CCH

use in three major urban jurisdictions. For the

former, a written questionnaire was sent by

OTA in 1979 to the Governors of all 50 States,

the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

Forty-eight States and Puerto Rico responded.

The questionnaires were filled out by the State

officials listed in Appendix B. A followup telephone survey of all 50 States was conducted

in August 1982, with update information provided by the officials listed in Appendix D. For
.

Ch. 8—Record Quality in Federal and State Criminal History Information Systems ● 9 1

urban areas, since resources limited the size

and location of sampling, one major urban

jurisdiction in each of the three States was

selected. All three States maintain CCH systems that are among the more advanced in

operation. Within each jurisdiction, information contained in approximately 500 CCH records used in recent prosecutions was compared

with information in local court and district attorney manual records. It was found that district attorneys did not have a list of recently

prosecuted cases in which a State CCH record

was used, and could provide only rough

guesses about the annual number of such

cases. The research team was therefore required to work backwards in the manual files

of the district attorney until 500 cases were

found in

F B I

which a State CCH record had been

used. This meant looking at cases prosecuted

between 1975 and 1979 in one jurisdiction,

while in two others the cases spanned a l-year

period.

The State record quality sampling studies

are technically generalizable to the population

of criminal cases prosecuted using a State

criminal history record in the jurisdiction examined for the time period specified; they are

not actually samples from a larger population,

at least not in any systematic sense of the

word “sample.” In addition, they are not technically generalizable to the entire population

of recently prosecuted criminal cases in the

States as a whole. There are differences in the

completeness and accuracy among jurisdictions within a State largely owing to variations in local court reporting procedures.

Findings of Record Quality Research

Criminal History Files

The results of the OTA record quality studies of the I dent and NCIC/CCH files are summarized in tables 17 and 18. For both files, the

major record quality problems were: 1) no disposition information, and 2) inaccurate disposition, charging, or sentencing information,

when compared with information in local records. For each arrest event, the evaluation was

based on a direct comparison between the information in the Federal record and the information in local records. No disposition meant

that a court disposition was shown in the local

record, but not in the Federal record. Inaccurate meant that the disposition, charges, or

sentence shown in the Federal record did not

agree with the disposition, charges, or sentence shown in the local record.

Thus, for 49 (or 29.6 percent) of the 168 verifiable Ident arrest events and 45 (or 27.2 percent) of the 165 verifiable NCIC/CCH arrest

events, no disposition was reported even

though the disposition had occurred at least

120 days earlier. For 34 (or 20.2 percent) of the

168 Ident arrest events and 32 (or 19.4 percent) of the 165 NCIC/CCH arrest events, information on disposition, charges, or sentence

was inaccurate.

Tables 17 and 18 count only one record quality problem per record, although many records

exhibited more than one. For example, counting multiple problems, 20 (or 11.9 percent) of

the 168 Ident arrest events and 11 (or 6.7 percent) of the 165 NCIC/CCH arrest events

showed more dispositions than charges or

more charges than dispositions, when compared with local records.

Other studies on record quality have tended

to confirm the OTA findings with respect to

disposition reporting. For example, an FBI

analysis found that, as of August 13, 1979,

39.4 percent of arrests in the NCIC/CCH file

were without dispositions. A 1980 study conducted by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory

found that Ident receives dispositions for

about 45 percent of the arrests reported.1 The

differences are partially explained by the OTA

‘Jet Propulsion Laboratory, FBI Fingerprint Identification

Automation Study: AIDS 111 Evaluation Report, Volume Vl:

Environmental Analysis, California Institute of Technology,

Pasadena, Nov. 15, 1980, p. A-3, prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
92 • An Assessment of Alternatives for a National computerized criminal History Syste m

——

Table 17.—Record Quality of FBI Identification

Division Criminal History File Disseminations,

Based on 1979 Sample

Arrests in sample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400

Local agency responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

Arrests not verifiable because . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Pending or sealed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

No record locatable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

No prosecution of arrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Fugitive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Total arrest cases verified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Results:

Actual disposition not recorded on Ident record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Disposition occurred more than 120 days prior to 7124/79a . . .......49

Disposition occurred less than 120 days prior to 7/24/79b . . . . . . . . . . 11

Disposition occurred after 7/24/79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Disposition data unknown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Ident record otherwise incomplete when compared to local record. . . . 12

Shows sentence but no conviction information.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Shows conviction but not correctional information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Ident record inaccurate when compared to local record . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Disposition information does not agree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Charging information does not agree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Sentencing information does not agree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Ident record ambiguous when compared to local record . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Shows more dispositions than charges or vice versa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Other ambiguities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

——.— Complete, accurate, unambiguous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 43

NOTE: Although many records exhibited more than one record quality problem, only one per record iscounted

above Earhest dateof samphng was 7/24/79

aDisposltion dates were as follows2/14/7g, 1/IEi/79,1/10/79, I/16/79,12/20/78,12/12/78, 12/4/78,11/7/789/1/78,

7127178, 7117178, 617t78< 5130178, 3J2W78,311178, Z17178, 1117178, 1~21177, 11114177, WW77,5/2W77, 4115177,4111177,

3/14/77,2/22/77,11/29/76, 7/23/76, 6/25/76,6/14/76,4/12/76, 219176,1112176,12123175, 8/29/75(2),8/8/75,5/15/75,

4/16175, 3/5/75, 1/30/75, 1212174, 3118174, 5111173, 11/6/72, 9128172, 6/16/68, 12/20/67, 7/1/65, and 12/11/64

bDispos!tion dates were as follows6 /29/79, 6/26/79,6/5/79,6/3/79, 5/21/79,5/10/79,5/7/79, 4/30/79, 4/27/79(2~

and 413179

SOURCE. OffIce of Technology Assessment

methodology which removed arrest events

from further consideration if they were found

to be pending (case still active and no disposition had occurred) or sealed (disposition had

occurred but was sealed for legal reasons); if

there had been no prosecution of the arrest;

or if no record (or docket) was locatable. This

latter category was significant since 16 percent of the NCIC/CCH sample (55 0ut of 257)

were not verifiable due to no record (or docket)

locatable. No record locatable generally refleeted a police disposition; that is, the charges

were dismissed after arrest but prior to arraignment. For some of the arrests, the dismissal of charges was not noted in the Federal

record, and thus would have been included as

“no disposition reported” had those arrests

not been removed from further analysis. Thus,

the OTA analysis tends to understate the true

level of arrests without dispositions.

With respect to the importance of the record

quality problems, there is general agreement

that lack of dispositions is a—and perhaps the

–problem. The FBI points out, however, that,

except for Federal offenders, the responsibility for submitting dispositions lies with State

and local Criminal justice agencies. Both NCIC

and Ident encourage prompt submission of

dispositions, and, indeed, Federal regulations

require that dispositions be reported to the

central State repository within 90 days after

the disposition has occurred,2 and to the FBI

criminal history record systems within 120

days.3 However, these regulations are difficult

to enforce and few sanctions are available.

With respect to incorrect or ambiguous information, the FBI believes that this is largely

’28 CFR j 20.21(a)(l).

328 CFR f 20.37.
Ch. 8—Record Quality in Federal and State Criminal History Information Systems ● 9 3

Table 18.—Record Quality of FBI NCIC/CCH File Disseminations,

Based on 1979 Sample

Arrests in sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400

Local agency responses . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Arrests not verifiable because

Pending or sealed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

No record locatable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

No prosecution of arrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Fugitive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

No arrest data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Total arrest cases verified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

Results:

Actual disposition not recorded on NCIC/CCH record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Disposition occurred more than 120 days prior to 8/12/79a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Disposition occurred less than 120 days prior to 8/12/79b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Disposition date unknown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

NCIC/CCH record otherwise incomplete when compared to local record. . . . . . . . . . 7

Shows sentence but no conviction information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Shows conviction but no correctional information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

NCIC/CCH record inaccurate when compared to local record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Disposition information does not agree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Charging information does not agree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Sentencing information does not agree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

NCIC/CCH record ambiguous when compared to local record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Complete, accurate, unambiguous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

NOTE Although many records exhibited more than one record quality problem, only one per record ls counted above Date

of sampling was 9/12/79

aDlsposltion dates were as follows 4/5/79,3/21/79, 11/15J78, 9/lEY78, 7/27/78,7/3/78, 6/29/78, 6/8178,6/2/78,5/11/78, 4/27/78,4/21/78,

4/4/78,2/15/78, 12/2/77, 11/10/77, 10/26/77, 10/25/77, 10/19/77, 10/18/77,9/16/77, 6/8/77,4/8/77,4/4/77, 1/7/77, 12/22/76, 10/19/76,

9/30/76,10/21/75, 10/13/75,3/24/75,10/8/74, 7/16/74, 3/9{74,1/29/74, 11/26/73,8/28/73,10/5/72, 9126172,818/72,7124/72, 5/6/71,7/15/70,

6/23/70, and 4/13/70

bThedlsposttlon date was 5/3/79

SOURCE Offlceof Technology Assessment.

attributable to the realities of the criminal justice process. For example, arrest charges

(based on probable cause standards) may differ significantly from prosecutor charges

(based on the necessity of proving a case

beyond a reasonable doubt), which in turn may

differ from final charges (frequently reflecting

the results of plea bargaining). Thus, charges

may change as a person moves through the

criminal justice process, but these changes

may not always be reported to the FBI. Also,

people whose familiarity with the criminal justice process is limited may have particular difficulty in understanding and interpreting criminal history records. Nonetheless, based on the

OTA research, a significant portion of Ident

and NCIC/CCH records disseminated in 1979

appear to be incomplete, inaccurate, and/or

ambiguous when compared with information

in local records.

State Criminal History Files

A comparison between the 1979 0TA 50-

State survey and a 1973 General Accounting

Office (GAO) study (based on a 197050-State

survey conducted by the Law Enforcement

Assistance Administration (LEAA)) shows

some improvement in the average disposition

reporting level over that 9-year period. Using

bracketed averages, the GAO study found the

average disposition reporting level to be about

52 percent for the 49 States responding.’ In

comparison, the OTA study found the average

‘Use of bracketed averages was necessary since OTA did not

have access to the original 1970 LEAA State-by-State survey

data. Based on 1970 data, the number of States and disposition reporting levels were as follows: 31 States (less than 65

percent); 11 States (65 to 90 percent); 7 States (more than 90

percent). From U.S. Comptroller General, Development ofa Nation wide Criminal Data Exchange S’ystem-,lleed to Determine

Cost and Improve Reporting, General Accounting Office, January 1973, p. 10.
94 • An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

disposition reporting level to be about 65 percent for the 41 States responding.5 However,

the 1979 average for computerized States

(with a CCH file and/or automated name index) as opposed to manual States was even

higher (about 71 percent compared to 50 percent for manual States). Given that in 1970

only one State (New York) had a CCH system,

the results indicate that most of the improvement in disposition reporting over the 1970-79

period was in States with computerized systems.

For the three major urban jurisdictions

studied with respect to use of their State CCH

files, when compared to the results of the OTA

50-State survey, the disposition levels for two

of the jurisdictions (about 58 and 61 percent

of arrests with dispositions, respectively,

based on the OTA record quality research)

were below the 71 percent average reported by

29 States with computerized systems in 1979.

The disposition level for one urban jurisdiction (about 85 percent) was considerably above

the average. All three were above the 50 percent reported by 12 States with manual criminal history systems in 1979.

Several States contacted by OTA have

achieved further improvement in disposition

reporting since 1978. For example, in North

Carolina, a mandatory disposition reporting

requirement has gone into effect and some efforts to correct incomplete records from the

largest jurisdictions have been initiated. The

North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation

computerized in 1976 and has since improved

disposition reporting from 26 percent (1976)

to 56 percent (1981). As of 1981, this State’s

computerized police information system indicated a disposition reporting rate of about 75

percent. In California, strengthened field efforts over the last 3 years have increased the

disposition reporting level for felonies from

66.6 percent in 1978 to 70.8 percent in 1980.

However, between 1979 and 1982, average disposition reporting levels for all States responding improved only marginally, to about 66

percent.

bFrom OTA 50-State survey.

With respect to other aspects of record quality (e.g., inaccuracy, ambiguity), research results available to OTA were not adequate to

draw any statewide or nationwide conclusions.

The State criminal history records sampled by

OTA in three urban jurisdictions and by

Richard Faust (Tatum v. Rogers, S. D. N. Y., 75

Civ. 2782) in one urban jurisdiction, given the

nature and size of the samples, cannot be considered as representative even of urban jurisdictions within the four individual States, and

do not provide a valid basis for comparison of

Federal, State, and local record quality.

Significance of Findings

The significance of a given level of record

quality depends in part on the applicable legal/

regulatory framework and how specific criminal history record information is actually used.

On the one hand, Federal law as expressed in

the Crime Control Act of 1973 (carried forward

by the Justice Systems Improvement Act of

1979) and the resultant Federal regulations (28

CFR 20) make clear that all dispositions of

criminal charges should be reported, as noted

earlier, and that all records should be complete, current, and accurate. The FBI operating procedures emphasize that agencies that

enter records into Ident or NCIC have the responsibility “to assure that information on individuals is kept complete, accurate, and current.’” The FBI helps to maintain the integrity of the NCIC files through automatic computer edits and purges, quality control checks,

and periodic record validations by originating

agencies. 7 Similar procedures are possible in

Ident through use of the Automated Identification Division System (AIDS), but have not

yet been implemented. Ident is also considering the use of a disposition followup form for

arrest events more than a year old with no

disposition reported, and a possible interconnection with State and local automated systems to speed up disposition reporting.

628 CFR j 20.37.

‘See NCIC Operating Manual; also see statement of William

A. Bayse of the FBI before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Oct.

22, 1981.
Ch. 8—Record Quality in Federal and state Criminal History Information Systems • 95

In addition, in December 1981, the NCIC

Advisory Policy Board (APB) created a subcommittee on NCIC record quality. This subcommittee is empowered to study and report

back to the APB on possible new approaches

to improving record quality. At the State level,

as of mid-1981, 46 States had “some statutory

provision requiring the reporting of dispositions, although not all of them set out reporting deadlines and relatively few of these statutes contain sanctions to make them mandatory.”8 These requirements in part reflect the

importance attached to accurate and complete

criminal history information in the protection

of individual rights of privacy, due process,

and equal protection of the laws.

Despite these Federal and State requirements, disposition reporting is still far from

complete in Ident and NCIC/CCH and in a significant number of States. In the OTA 50-

State survey, 14 of 41 States responding in

1979 and 13 of 47 States in 1982 indicated that

disposition reporting to the State repository

was less than 50 percent. In both 1979 and

1982, eight States indicated a reporting rate

of less than 25 percent.

The significance of the use of criminal history record information with record quality

problems such as lack of disposition data depends on who is using the information and for

what specific purpose. With few exceptions,

Federal and State law authorizes the dissemination of criminal history information—with

or without dispositions, whether accurate and

complete or not— to the criminal justice community.’ Law enforcement and prosecuting

agencies, in particular, note that it is recognized that criminal history records are frequently incomplete and/or inaccurate, but that

these records are very useful as a “pointer”

to the location of complete and accurate information. In a variety of situations, such as setting conditions for pretrial release, arrest-only

records are useful to judicial officials. However, in criminal trial proceedings, the laws of

‘SEARCH Group, Inc., fiends in State Security& Privacy

Legislation, Sacramento, Calif., November 1981, p. 12.

‘SEARCH, Security & Privacy, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

criminal evidence in most jurisdictions preclude the admission or even consideration of

uncertified criminal history records, and most

certainly arrest-only records.

On the other hand, Federal regulations permit dissemination of Ident and NCIC/CCH

records without dispositions to Federal noncriminal justice agencies if authorized by Federal statute or Executive order. Dissemination

is also permitted to State and local noncriminal justice agencies if authorized by Federal

or State statutes and approved by the U.S. Attorney General. Dissemination of records without dispositions is prohibited only if the arrest charge is more than 1 year old and is not

under active prosecution.l0 At the State level,

as of mid-1981, 37 States authorized dissemination of arrest-only records to a variety of

State and local noncriminal justice agencies

(primarily for employment and licensing purposes), and 27 States authorized such dissemination to private sector organizations and individuals. In a large number of States, the disclosure of such records to private parties “depends upon factors other than State law, such

as local law, local agency policy, or the impact

of the State’s public record or freedom of information law. "11

The wide dissemination of criminal history

records with known record quality problems,

especially missing or inaccurate disposition information, raises legitimate questions about:

1) the efficiency of law enforcement and criminal justice programs that use or rely on such

records, notwithstanding their value as a

“pointer” to more complete and accurate information; 2) the protection of constitutional

rights (especially due process and equal protection of the laws) where such records are

used in criminal justice decisionmaking; and

3) the protection of rights to privacy as well

as due process and equal protection where

such records are used for noncriminal justice

purposes, as in employment and licensing decisions. These questions become even more important in light of many of the recommenda-

’

028 CFR j 20.33.

“SEARCH, Security & Privacy, op. cit., p. 10.
96 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

——

tions of the Attorney General’s Task Force on convicted)lz which are intended to protect the

Violent Crime (e.g., with respect to denial of public safety, but which depend in turn on

bail to a person accused of a serious crime who high quality criminal history records.

had previously committed, while in a pretrial

release status, a serious crime for which he was ‘*Attorney General’s Task Force, op. cit., p. xi.
Chapter 9

State and Local Management

of Criminal History

Information Systems
. —-.—.

Contents

Summary. o.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Locus of Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Arrest and Court Disposition Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

File Content. . . . . . .

Access, Review, and

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Challenge Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Dissemination of Criminal History Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Institutional Basis for Dissemination

Applicability of Dissemination Policy

Sealing and Purging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Variation Among States . . . . . . . . . . .

Record Accuracy and Completeness . . .

Court Disposition Monitoring . . . . . . . .

Transaction Logs and local Audits. . .

Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TABLES

Table No.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

,..,, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

Arrest and Court Disposition Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . .

Institutional Basis for Court

Court Disposition Reporting:

OTA Findings.. . . . . . . . . . .

Disposition Reporting . .

Comparison of GAO and

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

Review, and Challenge of Criminal

Criminal History Dissemination Policy

Statutory Limitations on the Content of Criminal History Files . . . .

State Procedures for Access,

History Records . . . . . . . . . .

Institutional Basis for State

Applicability of State Policies on Dissemination of Criminal

Justice Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

State Agencies That Have Conducted Record Quality Audits

Criminal History Information Stored in State Repositories . . . . . . . .

Procedures Used by State Agencies to Monitor Court Dispositions .

Information Contained in Dissemination Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Procedures Used to Review Dissemination Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -

. . . . . .

of

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Page

99

100

100

102

102

103

103

103

103

103

104

104

104

105

Page

101

101

102

102

102

103

103

104

105

105

105
Chapter 9

State and Local Management

of Criminal History

Information Systems — —.

Chapter

State and local agencies are the largest users

of the National Crime Information Center

(NCIC) and Identification Division (Ident)

criminal history files. These files in turn largely rely on information generated by States and

localities. Thus, it is important to assess the

extent to which Federal and State statutes

and regulations governing the management of

criminal history information are in fact being

implemented at the State and local levels.

In 1979-80, OTA conducted a 50-State survey of management policies and practices (to

which 48 States and 1 territory responded). ’

A written questionnaire was sent by OTA to

the State Governors and completed by State

criminal record repository personnel. * In 1982,

OTA conducted a follow up telephone survey

(to which 50 States and 1 territory responded)

to determine if changes had occurred in key

areas. **

Locus of Authority: In 40 States, there was

a single State agency responsible for the development of a statewide privacy and security

plan for criminal history information, but the

nature of this authority appeared to be highly

variable.

‘C)ffice of Technology Assessment 50-State Survey conducted

in 1978-80. W’ritten questionnaires were sent to the Governors

of all 50 States and Puerto Rico and the Mayor of the District

of Columbia. As of March 1980, the final extended deadline,

responses had been received from 48 States and Puerto Rico.

For purposes of analysis, Puerto Rico was treated as a State.

*see app, B for a list of the State officials who completed

written questionnaires for the 1979 OTA 50-State survey.

* *The OTA followup survev was conducted by telephone dUring August 1982. See appu D for a list of State officials

contacted.

Summary

Arrest and Disposition Reporting: As of

1979, about 78 percent of arrests and 65 percent of court dispositions were reported to

State repositories, on an average. The reporting rates of computerized States were significantly higher than States with manual criminal history systems. As of 1982, reporting

rates had improved marginally to 82 percent

for arrests and 66 percent for dispositions.

File Content: In more than one-third of the

States, there were no statutory limitations on

criminal history file content. In another third,

all offenses which are fingerprintable or result

in incarceration were reported.

Access, Review, and Challenge Procedures:

While most States had these procedures, more

than half of the States did not maintain data

on the frequency of requests for access, review,

and challenge of criminal history records. Data

that were collected indicated infrequent requests.

Dissemination of Criminal History Information: Almost three-quarters of the States had

a dissemination policy that applied to all criminal justice and other agencies that use or

maintain criminal justice information. In more

than half the States, the policy was based on

specific statutes.

Sealing and Purging: State policies for sealing and purging vary significantly. Some

States (e.g., New York) seal arrest events that

do not result in conviction; other State systems maintain any police contact information

as a permanent part of a criminal history record.

99
100 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Record Accuracy and Completeness: As of

1982, about two-thirds of the States (35 out

of 46 States responding) indicated that they

did routinely employ a set of procedures to

assure the accuracy of criminal history information. This represented a significant improvement over 1979, when only 23 out of 46

States employed such procedures. About

three-quarters of the States had never conducted a record quality audit of either computerized or manual criminal history record systems, with no significant change between 1979

and 1982.

Court Disposition Monitoring: Only 17

States in 1979 and 19 States in 1982 had automated procedures for monitoring court dispositions to help ensure record completeness. All

but one of these States had computerized systems.

Transaction Logs and Local Audits: Almost

all States maintained logs of criminal history

information disseminated by the State agency,

although nearly two-thirds reviewed these

transaction logs only when a specific abuse

was indicated. Frequent systematic review

was more prevalent in States with computerized systems. Only 12 States reported systematic audits of user agencies, and here the procedures varied widely.

Locus of Authority

In 48 States (out of 49 responding), as of

1979, there was a single State agency responsible for developing a statewide privacy and

security plan for criminal history information,

but the nature of this authority appeared to

be highly variable. The authority was based

on State statutes in about one-half (26) of the

States; in another 20 the basis is executive

policy (13) or order (7). The authority was unofficial or nonexistent in three States. Other

structures, such as other State agencies and

commissions on privacy and security, shared

the authority with the designated agency in

over half of the States. The responsible State

agencies exercised considerable discretion in

the development of regulations and management practices to implement title 28.2

‘Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, pt. 20, “Criminal

Justice Information Systems, ” subpt. B, “State and Local

Criminal History Record Information Systems. ”

Arrest and Court Disposition Reporting

To a considerable extent, the accuracy and

completeness of criminal history information

depends on the ability of State CCH systems

to assure the reporting of arrests by local

police and the reporting of dispositions by

courts. State managers indicated that as of

1982, 82 percent of reportable arrests and 66

percent of all court dispositions were reported

to State repositories, as shown in table 19.

This represented a marginal improvement

over 1979 reporting levels. In 1979, only about

half of the States had statutes to support an

institutional basis for court disposition reporting; the other half operated by formal agreement or informally according to custom and

tradition, as indicated in table 20. Between

1979 and 1982, the number of States with

disposition reporting statutes increased from
Ch. 9—State and Loca/ Management of Criminal History Information Systems ● 101

Table 19.—Arrest and Court

Disposition Reporting

All States Computerized a Noncomputerized b

Arrest reporting

1979 (N = 43) (N = 30) (N = 13)

78 3“A 83.00/0 67.7 0/0

1982 (N = 47) (N = 32) (N = 15)

81 50/, 86.1 % 71 .80/0

Percent of arrest Number of States

Distribution of arrest reporting

1979 1982 1982

0- 25 2 1 1

26- 50 7 6 6

51- 75 4 5 5

76-100 30 31 35

.

43 47

All States Computerized Noncomputerized

Court disposition reporting -

1979 (N = 41) (N = 29) (N = 12)

64.80/o 70.9”/” 49. 7%

1982 (N = 47) (N = 33) (N = 14)

66.40/0 70 60/0 56.3 %

Percent of

disposition reporting Number of States

Distribution of court disposition reporting

1979 1982 1982

0- 25 8 7 8

26- 50 6 3 5

51- 75 7 10 12

76-100 20 21 22

41 –

47

.

a

computerized name Index and/or CCH file

bManual Index and file

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment 50-State Survey and 1982 followup

26 to 29. Both arrest and court disposition

reporting were significantly higher for States

with CCH systems (with an automated name

index and/or CCH file) compared with States

with manual systems.

When compared with the results of a 1973

General Accounting Office study (based on

1970 Law Enforcement Assistance Administration data), the OTA results indicate significant improvement over the 1970-79 period as

shown in table 21, but little improvement since

1979.

Table 20 .—Institutional Basis for Court Disposition Reporting

1979 Number of States 1982 Number of States

A formal system mandated by statute. . . . 26 (53.1 0

/0) 29 (59.20/o)

A formal system by agreement with

courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 (14.3%) 6 (1 2.2°/0)

An informal system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 (12.2°/0) 5 (10.20/0)

No system; depends on jurisdiction . . . . . 10 (20.40/o) 9 (18.40/o)

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 (100.0%) 49 (1 OO.0%)

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment 50-State Survey and 1982 followup
102 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

—

Table 21 .—Court Disposition Reporting: Comparison of GAO and OTA Findings

1973 1979 -

GAO studya OTA studyb

(1970 data) (1978-79 data) 1982 OTA study’

Disposition reporting rate N = 49 N = 41 N = 41 N = 47

Less than 65°/0:

Number of States . . . . . . . . . . . 31.0 19.0 17.0 22.0

Percent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63.30/o 46.30/o 41 .5% 46.80/o

65 to 90°/0:

Number of States . . . . . . . . . . . 11.0 10.0 11.0 12.0

Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.40/o 24.40/o 26.80/o 25.50/o

More than 90°/0:

Number of States . . . . . . . . . . . 7.0 12.0 13.0 13.0

Percent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.3”/0 29.30/o 31 .7% 27.70/,

‘US Comptroller General. Development ofa FhWonwide Cmnmal Dafa Exchange Sys/em–fVeed (o Determme Cosf and improve

Report/rig, General Accounting Off Ice, January 1973, p 10

bOTA 50-State Survey Dlsposltion reporting rates provided by State repository of flclals

COTA 50. State Survey, 1982 followup

SOURCE Off Ice of Technc,logy Assessment and General Accounting Office

File Content

A major finding of the OTA survey was the

considerable variability in the nature of crimes

reported to State systems. In more than a

third of the States there were no statutory limitations on criminal history file content, and

in another third all offenses that are fingerprinted or result in incarceration were reported

(table 22). In some States, misdemeanors were

considered to be fingerprintable offenses that

create a criminal record, but in others the vast

majority of misdemeanors were not so considTable 22.—Statutory Limitations on the Content

of Criminal History Files

Statutory limitations on file content — Number of States

.

Felony or NCIC criterion

felony only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ( 4.1 0

/0)

Felony and gross, indictable or

serious misdemeanors only . . . . . 12 (24,50/o)

For all adult offenses which are

fingerprintable or result in

incarceration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 (34.7%)

No statutory limitations on criminal

history file content . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 (36.70/o)

49 (100°/0)

ered.

Access ,

Most States had

review, challenge,

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment 50. State Survey

Review, and Challenge Procedures

procedures for access and =. ––.

appeal, and the like, as Table 23.—State Procedures for Access, Review,

outlined in table 23. There appeared to be no and Challenge of Criminal History Records

significant differences between computerized

and noncomputerized States in this regard.

However, data on the frequency of use of

these procedures, where collected, indicated infrequent use. During 1978, the number of access requests ranged from 110 in Delaware, to

44 in Oregon, 43 in Maine, 32 in Minnesota,

to 12 in Florida, 2 in Arizona, 1 in Vermont,

and none in Virginia.

Number of States

using procedures

Procedures (N = 49)

Individual access and review . . . . . . . . 45

Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Correcting information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Informing public of right to access

and review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

None . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment 50-State Survey
Ch. 9—State and Local Management of Criminal History Information Systems . 103

Dissemination of Criminal

History Information

Regulating the dissemination of criminal

history information is another strategy employed by the States to protect the privacy of

individuals, while at the same time retaining

the maximum amount of information deemed

necessary for their own needs. Nearly all

States include dissemination regulations in

their statutes, but the degree of detail varies.

Institutional Basis for

Dissemination Policy

Over half of the 49 States responding indicated that State statutes with specific reference to criminal history or criminal justice information formed the bases for their dissemination policies, as shown in table 24.

Applicability of

Dissemination Policy

Seventy-one percent of the States responded

that their dissemination policy applied to all

criminal justice and other agencies that use

or maintain criminal justice information, as

shown in table 25. The dissemination policy

applied only to the central State Repository

in 22 percent of the States responding.

Table 24.—institutional Basis for State

Criminal History Dissemination Policy

Number of States

Institutional basis (total 49)

State statutes with specific reference

to criminal history or criminal justice

information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

State repository enabling legislation . 16

Public or open records law . . . . . . . 8

State repository agency policy . . . . . 15

Executive order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Administrative procedure . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 1

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment-50-State Survey

Table 25.—Applicability of State Policies on

Dissemination of Criminal Justice Information

Central State repository only . . . . . . . 11 (22.40/o)

Central repository and some local

agencies . . . . . . . . 2 ( 4.1%)

All criminal justice and other

agencies that use or maintain

criminal justice information . . . . . . . 35 (71 .4%)

None . . . . . . ... . . ... ... . . . 1 ( 2.0%)

49 (1 OO%)

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 50 State Survey

Sealing and Purging

3

An important aspect of criminal history information policy is-the ability of a system to:

1) purge or seal records for selected persons

and/or offenses; 2) remove the punitive effects

of a criminal history record for selected persons (removal of disqualifications); and 3) permit individuals under selected circumstances

to freely state the nonexistence of a record.

The sealing and purging capabilities within a

system are important for the protection of in-

———— .— - ———

‘For a detailed discussion, see SEARCli Group, inc., Sealing and Purging of Criminaj Histor~’ Information, Sacramento. Calif., April ,1981.

Number of States

dividual rights, as well as for the efficient management of large record files.

Definition

State statutes on sealing and purging reveal

a rather confusing variety of terminology used

as well as the type of information that is sealed

or purged. Terms like “deleted,” “annulled,

“returned to the individual, ” and “expunged”

are used, sometimes interchangeably with

purging and sealing. Where the meaning is

clear, purging is generally defined as taking
104 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

place when records are physically destroyed

or returned to the individual; sealing is defined

as taking place when they are not destroyed,

but are not accessible to the public at large,

or perhaps even to the criminal justice community.

Variation Among States

States vary widely in terms of statutory and

management purge and seal policies. Some

States seal arrest events that do not result in

conviction (e.g., New York), whereas other

State systems maintain any police contact inRecord Accuracy

As noted in the research on record quality

in State and Federal systems, the level of

record quality varies enormously from one

State to another. In the 50-State survey, as

of 1982, about two-thirds of the States (35 out

of 46 responding), both computerized and noncomputerized, indicated that they did routinely employ a set of formal procedures (generally

known as quality control checks or validity

checks on input data) to assure the accuracy

of criminal history information. This represented a significant improvement over 1979,

when only 23 out of 46 employed such procedures on a routine basis. The 12 additional

States with quality control checks are all

either computerized (with an automated name

index and/or CCH file) or in the process of

computerizing.

While most State CCH repositories now

have procedures to assure the reliability of information as a permanent part of a criminal

history record.

As of mid-1981, 35 States had statutes or

regulations on purging nonconviction information, and 24 States had laws on purging conviction information. Statutes or regulations on

sealing nonconviction information had been

enacted in 20 States, and on sealing conviction information in 22 States.4

‘SEARCH Group, Inc., Trends in State fkxx.wity and Fkivacy

l~gislation, Sacramento, Calif., November 1981, p. 5.

and Completeness

formation put into the system, as of 1979

about three-quarters had never conducted an

audit of the quality and validity of information stored in CCH repositories, as indicated

in table 26. A 1982 followup indicated no significant change. States implementing a record

quality audit since 1979 were offset by States

cutting out or drastically reducing their existing audit function, primarily due to budget

and staff reductions.

Table 26.—State Agencies That Have Conducted

Record Quality Audits of Criminal

History Information Stored

in State Repositories

Number of States

Conducted quality audit . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 (26.50/o)

Never conducted quality audit . . . . . . . 36 (73.5°/0)

49 (1000/0)

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment 50-State Survey, and 1982 followup

Court Disposition Monitoring

The most significant record quality problem there were no statutes to support a formal sysin State systems, which is reflected in Federal tern of court disposition reporting. Seventeen

NCIC and Ident files, is record incompleteness of the States in 1979 and 19 States in 1982 in-

—the failure to capture court disposition infor- dicated that they had automated procedures

mation. for the routine review of disposition completeAs shown in table 20, in about two-fifths of ness, as shown in table 27. With the exception

the States responding to the survey, as of 1982 of one, all of these had computerized systems.
Ch. 9—State and Local Management of Criminal History Information Systems Ž 105

—— ———.

Table 27.– Procedures Used by State Agencies to Monitor Court Dispositions

1979 Number of States 1982 Number of States

Automated review of file . . . . . . . . . . . . ‘-

17 (34.7%) –

19 (38.80/o)

Manual review of file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 (16.30/o) 11 (22,40/o)

Sometimes inquire of courts before

dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 (10.2%) 4 ( 8.20/o)

No review of delinquent dispositions . 18 (36,80/o) 14 (28.60/o)

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ( 2.0%) 1 ( 2.00/0)

49 (100%) 49 (100°/0)

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 50. State Survey and 1982 followup

Transaction Logs and Local Audits

One intent of Federal and State regulations

is to ensure that the flow of CCH information

can be accounted for—who received what information, what was the purpose, what was

the type of information, and what happened

to the information after its use. Implementing

this intent of the regulations requires formal

transaction logging procedures and audits of

local users to ensure that the procedures are

being followed.

Only two of the 49 responding States reported that as of 1979 they did not maintain

dissemination logs, and one other indicated

that it was in the process of developing a dissemination log. Logs of most States contain

information on the name or identification number of the requesting agency and the type of

information disseminated, as shown in table

28. Logs in about two-thirds of the States also

contain information on the purpose of the request, the requestor’s terminal identification

number, and the name or identification number of the person requesting information.

While nearly all States maintained logs of

criminal history information disseminated by

the State agency (as of 1982 only one State

did not maintain a log), nearly two-thirds reported that they reviewed transaction logs only when a specific abuse was indicated, as

shown in table 29. Frequent systematic

monitoring of transaction logs was more prevTable 28.—information Contained in

Dissemination Logs

Number of States

Type of information (N == 49)

Name or I.D. of requesting agency 46

Purpose of request ., ... . . ... . . . 34

Requester’s terminal code I.D. . . . . . . 32

Type of information disseminated ... 43

User agreement or authority

base code, ... . . ... ... . . . 13

Name or I.D. of person requesting

information. . . . . . . . . . . 32

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 50-State Survey

Table 29.— Procedures Used to Review

Dissemination Logs

Number of States

Frequent, systematic monitoring of

user activity . . . . . . 12 (24.50/o)

Annual monitoring of user activity . 3 ( 6.1 ‘/o)

Review of logs generally only when

a specific abuse indicated . . . 29 (59.20/o)

None . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 (12.2°/0)

49 (100.0%)

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment 50 State Survey

alent in States with computerized systems

than in those with manual systems.

In the 12 States that reported systematic

audits of user agencies, these procedures varied from occasional visits by State audit teams

to, in some cases, the completion of questionnaires by local officials testifying to their compliance with State and Federal regulations.
Chapter 10

Major Structural

Alternatives for a National

Computerized Criminal

History System
— .

Contents

Page

Chapter Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

National Repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Single-State/Multi-State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Interstate Identification Index Pilot and Phase 1 Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

National Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Regional and ’’Ask-the-Network” Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

National Repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Single-State/Multi-State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Interstate Identification Index Pilot Phase I Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

National Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Regional and Ask-the-Network Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Regional CCH Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Ask-the-Network System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

FIGURES

Figure No. Page

7. National Repository CCH Altematives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

8. Single-State/Multi-State CCH Altemative With Message Switching. . 113

9. Interstate Identification Index Pilot Test as Proposed in 1980.. . . . . 115

10. Interstate Identification Index Pilot Test as Conducted in 1981 . . . . . 116

11. National Index CCH Alternative With No Message Switching . . . . . . 119

12. Decentralized “Ask-the-Network” CCH Altemative With a National

Switcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Chapter 10

Major Structural Alternatives for a

National Computerized Criminal

History System —

Chapter

Over the last 12 years, a wide range of structural alternatives have been proposed for a national computerized criminal history (CCH)

system. These alternatives can be grouped

into four categories: 1) national repository;

2) single-State/multi-State; 3) national index;

and 4) regional and “ask-the-network” systems. Each category has a number of possible variations.

From a technological systems perspective,

three significant changes have occurred since

the debate over CCH began. First, advances

in computer and communication technology

have reached the point where both centralized

and decentralized system structures are possible. Second, many States and localities and

several Federal agencies have developed their

own CCH capability, and 49 of the 50 States

now have their own criminal history record

repositories. Third, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Identification Division

(Ident) has made progress in automating its

own operations through the Automated Identification Division System (AIDS) program.

All of the CCH alternatives discussed below

assume that Ident (or its equivalent) will continue to provide a national fingerprint identification capability.

National Repository

Both Ident and NCICICCH are currently

structured as national repositories with

records of single-State, multi-State, and Federal offenders for criterion offenses. Ident is,

indeed, fully functioning as a national reposiSummary

tory since all 50 States submit fingerprints.

NCIC/CCH is operating much like a Federal

repository with national access rather than a

national repository, since all current Federal

offenders are included but only eight States

are contributing records. A national CCH repository could evolve from either the AIDS

file of Ident or the CCH file of NCIC. In actual practice, the repository would likely draw

on elements of both.

Single-State/Multi-State

The original FBI plan was eventually to implement the single-State/multi-State alternative with the switching of messages through

the NCIC computer for both the record inquiry

and the response. States would maintain single-State offender records. NCIC/CCH would

include records of multi-State and Federal offenders, plus an index of single-State offender

records. Inquiries against the index resulting

in a hit would be routed through the NCIC

computer and over the NCIC communication

lines from the requesting State or agency to

the originating State. The record of interest

would be transmitted to the requesting State

via the NCIC network. Some alternatives involving message switching have raised questions about the impact on Federal-State relations and the potential for monitoring and

surveillance use. The FBI has argued that

message switching would provide a legitimate

service to the States that would improve efficiency and provide a faster response time.

Nevertheless, Congress has continued to prohibit NCIC/CCH message switching.

109
110 Ž An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Interstate Identification Index

Pilot and Phase 1 Tests

In early 1980, the FBI advised Congress of

an Interstate Identification Index (III) pilot

project with Florida to demonstrate the functional equivalent of the single-State/multiState alternative with no message switching,

viewed as the first step toward implementing

III. However, owing to problems with handling widely varying message formats and in

verifying requests from the other States, a

plan was developed for routing all inquiries to

Florida through NCIC/CCH with records provided via NLETS. In December 1980, this inquiry referral plan was endorsed by the NCIC

Advisory Policy Board and the NLETS Board

of Directors. Thus, the pilot test conducted

during July through September 1981 (as well

as the Phase 1 test carried out in spring 1982)

involved a partial message switching technique known as automatic inquiry referral.

National Index

The current III development plan calls for

a national index. In a national index system,

States would maintain both single-State and

multi-State offender records. The NCIC/CCH

file would then include only Federal offender

records, plus a national index (sometimes

known as a pure pointer index, a national

criminal identification name index, and, more

recently, III) of single-State and multi-State

records. If implemented without any NCIC/

CCH message switching, States or agencies

making an inquiry would be advised only if the

subject were listed in the index as having a

record and, if so, in which State repository.

The requesting agency would then obtain the

record directly via NLETS or other means.

The national index alternative could also be

implemented with partial or complete message

switching via NCIC/CCH. A national index

would avoid the expense of duplicating records

at both State and Federal levels and would

preserve State control over in-State records.

Regional and

“Ask-the-Network’ System s

In the 1979 OTA survey, several States

listed decentralized regional systems between

contiguous States as a secondary preference

and “a better-than-nothing alternative. ”

However, most States contended that regional

systems were infeasible or impractical. An

analysis of NLETS and III pilot test traffic

patterns indicates that Florida is receiving

messages from distant States more often than

from contiguous States.

In a completely decentralized national askthe-network system, there would be no national index or repository. Instead, each State

could poll any or all of the other 49 States

when seeking CCH information. One option

would tie all 50 States and the FBI together

on a computerized “party line. ” A more likely option would be the use of a national switcher similar to the one operated by NLETS in

Phoenix, Ariz.

With its technology upgrade now complete,

NLETS is operating at about 7 to 10 percent

of capacity and could handle a substantial increase in CCH-related message traffic. However, the potential for use of NLETS in an askthe-network mode must be tempered by the

experience with ROIR (reply only if record)

messages. Here, inquiring States looking for

a record would send messages to all other

States (or a large number). NLETS found that

many States began to ignore messages when

the probability of a hit was low and the effort

(and cost) of checking out all inquiries was

high. Also, the FBI and various State officials

believe that an ask-the-network system would

not be cost effective and would be harder to

secure against unauthorized access.
Ch. 10—Major Structural Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System Ž 111

———— —

National

Both Ident and NCIC/CCH are currently

structured as national repositories. That is, the

criminal history files are designed to include

full records of all offenders–single-State,

multi-State, and Federal-for all criterion

offenses.* However, NCIC/CCH was intended

by the FBI to serve as a full record national

repository only until the single-State/multiState concept could be implemented.

In practice, Ident is fully functioning as a

national repository since all 50 States submit

fingerprints. The NCIC/CCH file falls far

short, however, since only eight States currently maintain criminal history records in

CCH. All Federal offenders are included in

NCIC/CCH, and 49 of the 50 States can directly access the CCH file. All NCIC/CCH entries

require an FBI identification number, which

in turn must be based on positive fingerprint

identification. Ident conducts the fingerprint

identification and assigns the identification

number.

Given the high rate of Federal agency participation in NCIC/CCH and the low rate of

State participation, NCIC/CCH is operating

much like a Federal repository with national

access rather than as a national repository.

About two-thirds of the non-Federal CCH traffic is with the eight fully participating States.

NCIC/CCH differs from Ident in three other

major ways. First, the NCIC/CCH file uses the

NCIC communication network for receiving

and sending messages and can respond to inquiries from the States in a matter of seconds.

Ident must depend primarily on the mails.

Even if AIDS were able to substantially reduce the internal turnaround time for Ident,

the total response time would still be measured in days (by mail) or hours (with facsimile

transmission) rather than seconds, since Ident

* Includes serious and)or significant offenses. Excludes the

offenses of drunkenness, vagrancy, disturbing the peace, curfew

violation, loitering, false fire alarm, nonspecific charges of suspicion or investigation, and traffic violations (other than manslaughter, driving under the influence of drugs or liquor, and

hit and run). See 28 CFR $20.32.

Repository

conducts fingerprint

NCIC/CCH involves only

name searches. Indeed,

searches whereas

online computerized

all records in the

NCIC/CCH file must be based on positive fingerprint identification.

Another difference between NCIC/CCH and

Ident is in record format. Ident rap sheets and

the automated AIDS rap sheets present criminal history information in chronological order,

limiting contents to the offender’s name, Federal and State identification numbers, arrest

dates, charges, and dispositions (with dates).

The NCIC/CCH format includes additional

personal descriptor information (height,

weight, identifying marks, etc.), presents

charges and dispositions in summary as well

as chronological order, and makes provision

for additional judicial and custody information

plus supplemental comments. Thus, the utility of a CCH record is presumed to be greater

than that of an Ident/AIDS record, but the

costs and difficulty associated with keeping

a CCH record up to date are also higher.

A third difference is in the area of privacy

and security requirements. While both Ident

and NCIC/CCH have the same statutory and

regulatory frameworks for the use and dissemination of criminal history records, NCIC/CCH

has developed a much more stringent set of

operating procedures to protect the privacy

and security of criminal history records, in

part because CCH is an on-line file.

It is possible for a national CCH repository

to evolve from either the AIDS file of Ident

or the CCH file of NCIC. In actual practice,

the repository would likely draw on elements

of both, as shown in figure 7. In theory, a national repository would not require message

switching. Since all States and agencies would

enter criminal history records into the repository and update these records on a continuous

basis, confirmation of hits (a match between

an inquiry and a record) with the originating

States or agencies would not be necessary. In

practice, unless disposition reporting were virtually instantaneous, confirmation via NLETS
112 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

or by some other means would be needed to are now), as illustrated in figure 7, there would

ensure record accuracy and completeness. As be no need for the national CCH repository to

long as the confirmations were carried out by conduct message switching.

the States and agencies themselves (as they

Figure 7.— National Repository CCH Alternative

nRequesting

agency

Criminal

history

record

f i lea

Computer b

I

r

P

Iinesc

Request for

confirmation

of record

Confirmation

reply

aeon [al”~all ~lngle.sta~e, ~” It ,. State, and FedeTal ~ffender~ Could us,e Al DSj data base when f u I Iy automated, and A IDS or CCH record fOrMaf Or some corn t)l nat Ion

bcould use NCIC- or AIDS computer

cCould use NCIC comm unlcat[on Ilnes

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Single-State/Multi-State

While the NCIC/CCH file currently serves native whereby States would maintain singleas a national repository for the records of eight State offender records. A central repository

States plus all Federal offenders, this arrange would include records of multi-State and Fedment was originally viewed by the FBI as eral offenders plus an index (composed of name

transitional. The plan was eventually to im- and identifiers only) of all single-State offender

plement the single-State/multi-State alter- records contained within the State repositor-
Ch. 10— Major Structural Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System ● 113 ——.—-

ies. When the NC IC/CCH program began 12

years ago, very few States had an in-State

CCH capability for their own records. Thus,

NCIC/CCH initially was to maintain singleState offender records (as well as multi-State

and Federal), but would return single-State

records to the States as they developed their

own CCH systems. The functional equivalent

of this concept was first tested in a 1981 pilot

project with the State of Florida.1 Approximately two-thirds of the 25 States that now

have their own on-line CCH systems are not

— — —

‘For a discussion of the results, see FBI, Interstate Zclentifi”caCion Index Background and Findings for Juibv-September 1981

Phase 1 Pilot Project, Dec. 4, 1981.

Figure 8.–Single-State/Multi. State CCH

CCH

filea

? v

I

—.——————- -— —-—— ——.——. — —

presently contributing records to NCIC/

CCH.*

Under the single-State/multi-State alternative proposed by the FBI in 1970, inquiries

against III resulting in a hit would be routed

through the NCIC computer and over the

NCIC communication lines from the requesting State or agency to the State where the

record originated. The record of interest would

then be sent back to the requesting State via

the NCIC computer for both the record inquiry

and the response, as illustrated in figure 8.

*As of Auwst 1981, ~Ven of the eight StateS flyParticipating in NC ICICCH had their own on-line State CCH file. Eighteen other States with on-line CCH files were not participating.

Alternative With Message Switching

r )

Requesting

agency

Record inquiry

k

Record provided

NCIC NCIC

computer lines

4. Record provided

If a hit on index,

Index b then record requested

u

Originating

agency

a For mu I t I Slate and Fed era I offender records

b For slng{e State offender records located In State rePosltorles

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
114 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

. — ——..—.—- ——————.—

In 1973, the FBI proposed to have NCIC

assume all law enforcement message switching

(not just NCIC/CCH traffic), including messages sent over NLETS. This alternative,

known as single-State/multi-State with full

message switching, has generated policy questions about the impact on Federal-State relations and the potential for monitoring and surveillance use.2 In the face of opposition, the

‘For a detailed review of the message switching controversy, see Donald A. Marchand, et al., A History and Background

Assessment of tbe National Crime Information ilmi%r and Computerized Criminal History Program, Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of South Carolina, June

1979, sec. IV, pp. 122-167. See also related discussion in ch.

5 for further discussion. The FBI prefers to use the term “limited message switching” to mean full message switching of

NCIC-related messages, and “full message switching” to refer

to full message switching of all inter-State criminal justice messages.

FBI proposed to limit its message switching

to NCIC/CCH-related traffic, and in 1975 circulated a “limited message switching implementation plan. ” The FBI has argued that

message switching is within FBI authority,

would provide a legitimate service to the

States, and would provide CCH records located in State systems faster and more efficiently. Nevertheless, Congress has continued

to prohibit NCIC/CCH message switching. In

1979 and 1980, Congress conditioned approval

of the NCIC technology upgrade (for the frontend processor and mainframe computer) on the

strict prohibition of any message switching

applications. *

*See ch. 5 for further discussion,

Interstate Identification Index

Pilot and Phase 1 Tests

In early 1980, the FBI officially advised

Congress of a III pilot project to demonstrate

the functional equivalent of the single-State/

multi-State alternative with no ‘message

switching, viewed as the first step toward implementing 111.3 The plan was for NCIC/CCH

to return all single-State offender records to

selected State repositories and establish an index to these records in NCIC/CCH. Thus,

when a request would come in for one of these

records, the NCIC/CCH index would indicate

that a CCH record existed in a particular State

and that the requesting agency should contact

that State directly (via telephone, mail, or

teletype), as illustrated in figure 9. It was

anticipated that most agencies would use

NLETS, which would perform the message

switching function for both inquiries and

record responses.

Florida was selected as the pilot State. However, early in the planning stage, Florida con3

. . —

See identical letters dated Jan. 7, 1980, from the FBI Director to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the

Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and

Constitutional Rights.

eluded that it would encounter a number of

problems in handling the incoming record inquiries from agencies in the other States

because the formats of the requests would

vary widely and verification of agency authorization would be difficult. Therefore, a plan

was developed for routing all inquiries to

Florida through NCIC/CCH. In this way,

NCIC/CCH would use a consistent message

format and verify agency requests. This, in effect, would give NCIC/CCH a partial message

switching role, in that inquiries (messages)

eliciting hits on the index would be switched

through the NCIC computer and over the

NCIC communication lines to Florida, which

in turn would provide the CCH record to the

requesting agency via mail and/or NLETS, as

shown in figure 10.

The single-State/multi-State pilot test with

partial message switching (known as “automatic inquiry referral” or AIR) was completed

during July through September 1981. The test

provided useful data on the number of inquiries, hits, and records provided, response

time, and perceived value of the records ulti-
Ch. 10—Major Structural Alternatives for a National Computerized Crimina/ History System . 115

— — ——

Figure 9.— Interstate Identification Index Pilot Test as Proposed in 1980

Index b

/

NCIC

computer

a For mu III State and Federal offender records

b For ~,ngle State offender records located n State rePOst~res

c VI a te Ie p h one rn al I or fe let y pe e q N L E TS

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

mately provided. Phase 1 of the III development plan extended the pilot test to include

five additional States—Michigan, North

Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia-and was conducted in February and

March 1982.

The FBI asserted that AIR does not involve

message switching since the inquiries from requesting agencies are reformatted by NCIC.

Some information is deleted and other information added before referring the inquiry to

the State of record in the case of a hit (or a

match between an inquiry and an index entry

indicating a single-State record). In addition,

Record inquiry

NCIC

communication Record

lines request c

Record

providedc

the FBI noted that both the NCIC Advisory

Policy Board and the NLETS Board of Directors had approved the use of AIR, and that

the appropriate congressional committees

were advised in advance of its use in the pilot

project.’

The FBI concluded that AIR notification “is

not message switching as defined by the DOJ

(appropriation) Authorization Act, inasmuch

as the notification message to be sent to

‘See identical letters dated Mar, 2, 1981, from the FBI Director to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the

Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and

Constitutional Rights.
116 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Figure IO.—Interstate Identification Index Pilot Test as Conducted in 1981

(Requestingn

CCH

file a

Index b

aFor mu It I. State and Federal offender records

b For ~lng[e. state offender records located In Slate rePOslf Orles

cV(a telephone mail or teletype, e g ,NLETS

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Florida (and, by inference, to the other States

in the III Phase I test) will be created from

the index record and transmitted in a set format. The inquiry will not be retransmitted or

switched to Florida. ”5 As defined in the act,

message switching is “the technique of receiving a message, storing it in a computer until

the proper outgoing line is available, and then

retransmitting, with no direct connection between the incoming and outgoing lines. ”6

Record inquiry

NCIC

Record providedc

lines

If a hit on Index,

then record requested

w

‘Ibid., p. 2.

‘Quoted in FBI, 111 Background and Findings, op. cit., p. 63.

The House Rqort 96-628, dated Nov. 16, 1979, emphasizes that

the conferees’ definition of message switching is that used by

the Office of Technology Assessment.

During the 3-month III pilot test, about

973,000 CCH inquiries were received by NCIC.

Of that total, 11,415 (or about 1.2 percent)

resulted in a match (or hit) between the subject of the inquiry and a Florida single-State

record. 7 For these matches, NCIC notified the

inquiring agency of a hit and forwarded an

AIR messages to Florida over the NCIC communication lines. Florida then provided a summary CCH record to the requesting agency via

NLETS. A full record was provided by mail

if requested. During the pilot test, agencies

—-———

‘Ibid., p. 144.

“Ibid., p. 143.
.——.

Ch. 10—Major Structural Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System ● 1 1 7

from 34 States (including Florida), 3 metropolitan agencies, and several Federal agencies

(e.g., U.S. Customs, U.S. Postal Service) made

record requests that resulted in hits on Florida

single-State records.9 During the 2-month III

Phase 1 test, 10,934 CCH inquiries resulted

in a hit. Agencies from 39 States made requests that resulted in hits on single-State

records of one or more of the six States with

entries in the index.l0

Examination of sample message formats indicates that the AIR notification message

does include some information that is different

from that contained in the initial inquiry

message. For example, AIR may include an

out-of-State identification number that was

not known by the inquiring agency but that

was added by NCIC based on the index record

match. However, some information is likely to

be the same in both the inquiry and AIR, such

as the name of the subject and the identifying number of the inquiring agency .11 Thus,

AIR does involve the switching of some key

information from the inquiring agency to the

State of record. FBI officials have argued that

only “housekeeping data, ” such as originating

case identifying number, purpose code, and

mailing address, are taken from the inquiry

message and included in the AIR message. According to the FBI, technically all “key information, such as the name of the subject and

other descriptive information, is taken from

the 111 record, even though such information

may be a part of the inquiry message.

In the pilot test, the inquiries were switched

from criminal justice agencies in 33 States, the

District of Columbia, and the Federal Government through NCIC to the State of Florida.

During the 111 Phase 1 test, inquiries were

switched from inquiring agencies to any of the

six States participating. However, since only

some of the information in the inquiry message is actually switched, and since the record

itself is transmitted via NLETS or the mail,

AIR is properly considered a form of partial

message switching.

AIR is clearly a change from the 1980 FBI

III proposal that involved no message switching. The justification for AIR advanced by the

FBI and the III Subcommittee of the NCIC

Advisory Policy Board included the ability of

NCIC to check inquiries to make sure that the

requesting agency identifier, control terminal

line, and purpose code were properly authorized. Also, NCIC already had developed standard inquiry message formats that could be

used during the pilot test. Finally, the use of

AIR would eliminate the need for inquiring

agencies to send two messages—one to NCIC/

CCH and, if a hit occurs, a second message via

NLETS to Florida to request the record.

The NLETS Board of Directors had initially declined to support AIR, in part because

of anticipated concerns over message switching. At that point the NCIC staff recommended against pursuing AIR further.12

However, on the recommendation of its III

Subcommittee, the NCIC Advisory Policy

Board endorsed AIR in December 1980, but

only if it “was (also) endorsed by the NLETS

Board of Directors and subsequently presented to the appropriate congressional representatives for their understanding and concurrence. In the event AIR proved to be

unacceptable, the NCIC Board endorsed a

pure pointer index with no NCIC message

switching as a fullback. ’3 The NLETS Board

then reversed itself and endorsed AIR on

December 17, 1980. On March 2, 1981, the

FBI Director advised the House and Senate

Judiciary Committees by letter of the plan to

use AIR.

‘I bid., pp. 158-159.

‘ONCIC Advisory Policy Board, Interstate Identification lrJdex Phase I Test: Report of III Evaluation Cbmmittee, June

1982, pp. 10, 12, 13.

‘

] Based on comparison of sample messages in Ibid., pp.

120-124.

“FBI, minutes of the Dec. 10-11, 1980, meeting of the NCIC

Advisory Policy Board, pp. 48-50. At its Oct. 22-23, 1980 meeting, the NLETS Board voted 4 to 3 against supporting AIR.

“Ibid., p. 50.

- ,- f I
118 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

— .—— —— —.. -—-.— . . —.— ——————. —

National Index

In its 1980 proposal, the FBI indicated that

the pilot project, if successful, might be extended to include the return to the States of

multi-State as well as single-State offender

records. The current III long-range development plan calls for the NCIC/CCH file to include only the records of Federal offenders,

plus a national index’4 of all single-State and

multi- State offender records. A National Fingerprint File (NFF) is considered to be an integral part of III. The NFF would contain no

arrest or disposition data, would perform the

technical fingerprint search and assign FBI

identification numbers, and would be predicated on single-source submission policies.

States or agencies making an inquiry would

receive either a hit or a no-hit response. If a

hit response were received (indicating that the

subject individual is listed in the national index as having a record in one or more State

repositories), the requesting agency would also

be provided with the name of the State (or

States) holding the records. The requesting

agency would contact the State repositories

directly to obtain the records, as shown in

figure 11. In this CCH alternative, NCIC/CCH

message switching would not be required. This

alternative is sometimes referred to as a “pure

pointer index” because all the index does is

point to the location of a record.

The national index also could be implemented with message switching. Nationwide

implementation of phases 2 and 3 of the III

development plan would be the equivalent of

a national index with partial message switching. With partial switching, such as the AIR

technique used in the III pilot test, NCIC/

CCH would route inquiries through the NCIC

computer to the States holding records. These

“Also known as a national criminal identification name file,

and more recently as an Interstate Identification Index. See

SEARCH Group, Inc., A Framework for Constructing an lmproved National Criminal History System (Sacramento, Calif.:

SEARCH Group, Inc., April 1978), p.6, and Essential Elements

and Actions for Implementing A Nationwide Criminal History

Program (Sacramento, Calif.: SEARCH Group, Inc., February

1979), p.7.

States would provide records directly to the

requesting State or agency. With complete

message switching, both inquiries and records

would be routed through NCIC/CCH. In effect, NCIC/CCH would query all States for

which a hit is indicated (a record is held on the

subject individual), collect all the records from

the various States into a consolidated record,

and provide it to the requesting agency.

In a 1979 survey, OTA found that State repository personnel favored the national index

CCH alternative (the single-State/multi-State

alternative was a distant second choice).’s A

national index would avoid the expense of duplicating records at both State and Federal

levels. In addition, a national index would

preserve State control over in-State records.

A national index might have a somewhat

slower total response time than the singleState/multi-State or national repository alternatives because in the case of a hit either the

inquiring State or the index would subsequently have to contact the State(s) of record. There

is a legitimate question as to how fast States

would respond to out-of-State requests. Some

States are not computerized (23 do not have

CCH files, and 16 of these do not have even

an automated name index); a few have no immediate plans to computerize. Even if computerized, out-of-State requests might be

given low priority. This has not been the case

to date with either the III pilot test or Phase

1 development. Florida (the pilot test State)

and five other States participating in Phase

1 are among the more advanced computerized

States, and have given both high priority and

quick turnaround to out-of-State requests for

records.

l6of 42 States responding, State repository personnel in 24

States favored the national index, 11 favored the single-State

multi-State, 1 each favored the national repository, a decentralized system, and a regional system, and 4 indicated no preference. Steven W. Hays, et al., An Assessment of the Uses of

Information in in National Crime Information Center and Computerized Criminal History Program, Bureau of Governmental

Research and Service, University of South Carolina, October

1979, Sec. IV, pp. 178-179.
Ch. 10—Major Structural Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System Ž 119

Figure 11.— National Index CCH Alternative With No Message Switching

nRequesting

agency

t

CCH Record inquiry

filea

●

Computed

re

t -

I

National

Index b

r

Iecord

ques t

c

Record

providedc

/ +

/

Originating \

u

agency

a For Federal offender records

b

For single State and multi State offender records

cVia telephone mall or teletype e g , NLETS

d

could use NCIC or AIDS computer.

e

could use NCIC communication Iines

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Regional and Ask-the-Network Systems

Regional CCH Systems

In the 1979 OTA survey of State repositories, 16 several States listed regional CCH

systems as a secondary preference, but most

contended that regional systems would be infeasible or impractical. The States that believed regional systems to be feasible viewed

them primarily as “a better-than-nothing alter-

+

native. ” Few appeared willing to endorse regional systems enthusiastically. However, several noted that regional systems inevitably

would develop if Congress does not decide on

some national CCH alternative. Other States

perceived regional systems as a possible transitional strategy until a more long-term solution is found.

Except for attitudinal data, few definitive 16Ibid., Sec. IV, pp. 176-177. indicators were found to support the feasibili-
120 • An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

ty of regional systems. Conversely, officials

in seven States regarded regional criminal history files as feasible for most informational

needs. NLETS traffic logs indicate that criminal history traffic between States does not

conform to regional patterns. For example,

Florida communicates most frequently with

Midwestern and Western States.17 These

trends were confirmed by the results of the III

pilot test. During the test period, excluding

Florida intrastate traffic, almost threequarters of the hits were on inquiries from the

Midwest and West.18

Regional CCH systems are feasible from a

technical perspective; however, the potential

problems could be significant. Without formal

coordination, jurisdictions on the borders between regions or adjacent to several regions

might find themselves participating in several

regional systems at a significantly higher total

cost. If common standards for message formats and the like were lacking, automated exchange of criminal history records could prove

to be difficult, if not impossible. The magnitude of the problem is illustrated by the decision in the single-State/multi-State pilot project to have all message inquiries pass through

the FBI to ensure a common message format,

based in part on the conclusion that it would

be too difficult (and costly) to accommodate

widely varying message formats.

Ask-the-Network System

Many of these technical problems could be

overcome if all States agreed and were

equipped to participate in a completely decentralized ask-the-network national CCH system. States would retain single-state offender

records and the FBI would retain Federal offender records, as in the national index alternative. In the ask-the-network version, however, there would be no index. Instead, each

State could poll any or all of the other 49

States plus the FBI when seeking CCH information.

“Ibid., p. 181.

ISFBI, ~~~ Bac&ound and F’inciings, op. cit., pp. 158-159.

There are several technical options for an

ask-the-network design. One option would tie

all 50 States and the FBI together on what

would be a computerized “party line. ” Messages could be sent to everyone on the line.

Another technical option would involve the

use of a national switcher or several interconnected regional switchers, as illustrated in

figure 12.

For example, State-to-State message traffic

could be routed through the upgraded NLETS

switcher in Phoenix, Ariz., and State-to-FBI

traffic could be routed to Washington, D. C.,

through the NCIC network. Alternatively, a

switcher located in Phoenix (or elsewhere)

could handle both State-to-State and State-toFBI traffic. For all practical purposes, NLETS

presently offers this capability.

As of September 1981, NLETS was operating at about 7 to 10 percent of capacity and

thus could handle a substantial increase in

CCH-related message traffic. The NLETS response time (to switch a message from the

sending State to the receiving State) is now

less than 5 seconds. Also, NLETS users can

send messages to any desired combination of

States; for example, all Western States, all

States contiguous with Colorado, or all 50

States plus the FBI (an “all points bulletin”).

The potential for use of NLETS must be

tempered by experience with ROIR messages,

where inquiring States send messages to all

other States (or a large number). Only those

States with a record on the subject individual

need reply. This is similar to an ask-thenetwork capability. However, NLETS found

that many States began to ignore the messages, especially where the probability of a hit

was very low. In many cases the effort (and

cost) of checking out all inquiries apparently

does not justify the results. This is particularly true for smaller States, those that are not

yet computerized, and those that, while computerized, still maintain a significant number

of manual records (and consequently have to

check both manual and computerized files).
Ch. 10—Major Structural Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System ● 121

Figure 12.— Decentralized “Ask-the-Network” CCH Alternative With a National Switcher

v *

CCH NCIC

Federal computer

offender

L

If a hit, State B

If a hit, NCIC provides record

provides record

National

switcher computer

State C ●

Record inquiry

provides

record

from State A

[

Records from NCIC,

States B and C

SOURCE: Off!ce of Technology Assessment

A major problem is that, based on 1979

OTA record quality research, a high percentage (about 75 percent for Ident)* of multiState offenders had arrests in at least one noncontiguous State; and about 43 percent of

multi-State offenders had arrests in three or

more States.** Thus, it appears that in an askthe-network system, all States and the FBI

would have to be polled every time in order

to make sure arrests were not missed. However, the inquiry-to-hit ratio would then be

very low. As noted above, under similar cir-

— — —

*Of the 168 Ident records with verifiable arrest events (See

ch. 8), 51 records showed arrests in multiple States, and 38 of

the 51 records showed arrests in at least one noncontiguous

State.

**Of the 51 Ident multi-state offender records, 22 showed

arrests in 3 or more States.

-nState

CCH

f i Ie

(B)

-5State

CCH

fil e

(c)

cumstances NLETS found that manv States

began to ignore the inquiries. Also, the FBI

and various State criminal justice officials

believe that an ask-the-network approach

would not be cost effective, due to the increased communications and processing requirements, and would be harder to secure

against unauthorized access. In addition, the

FBI has pointed out that the preparation and

mailing of fingerprint cards to all 50 States

would be costly and time-consuming and that,

furthermore, several State identification

bureaus do not have the capability to conduct

fingerprint searches. Nonetheless, ask-thenetwork systems are used successfully in the

defense intelligence community and in the

private sector, and their potential use in a national CCH system is an area of possible further research.
Chapter 11

Possible Impacts of a National

CCH System on the Criminal

Justice Process
Contents

Chapter Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Criminal Justice Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Impact on the Criminal Justice Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Police Use..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....4... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Prosecutorial Use.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Judicial Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Defense Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Probation Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Correctional and Parole Use. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

125

125

127

128

130

131

132

133

133
Chapter 11

Possible Impacts of a National CCH

System on the Criminal

Justice Process

Chapter Summary

During the 12-year debate over a national

computerized criminal history (CCH) system,

much of the attention has focused on the possible impacts of a national system in five key

areas: criminal justice process, employment

and licensing decisions, minority groups, federalism, and monitoring or surveillance potential. These areas are discussed in general terms

in this chapter and the next.

Criminal Justice Process

The primary purpose of a national CCH system would be to improve the functioning of

the criminal justice process. There is no question that criminal history information is used

throughout the criminal justice process. The

impacts of a national CCH system are more

difficult to assess, due in part to the absence

of generally accepted measures of effectiveness. Very few criminal justice agencies systematically keep track of how CCH information actually contributes to arrests, property

recoveries, charging decisions, successful investigations, and the like. Nonetheless, many

Federal, State, and local law enforcement and

criminal history record repository officials

believe that a national CCH system would

make a substantial contribution. However,

some local and State criminal justice officials

(especially district attorneys, judicial officials,

and public defenders) believe that, to be useful,

a national CCH system would have to be able

to provide information that is more accurate,

complete, and timely than is generally available from existing Federal and State criminal

history record systems.

Police Use: When the police are investigating a reported crime, they sometimes use criminal history records to search for characteristics of past offenders that might connect them

to the present crime.

When the police are patrolling, looking for

suspicious circumstances or individuals, they

frequently use criminal justice information in

deciding how to handle situations that arise;

e.g., whether to interrogate, detain, issue a

summons, or make an arrest. However, such

information comes primarily from hot files

(wanted persons, stolen property) rather than

criminal history files. Nonetheless, in the 1979

OTA 50-State survey, 37 States indicated that

on-duty law enforcement officers can gain access to criminal history information in both

State and local files through local police patrol

and inquiry systems. Since patrol decisions

often must be made quickly, a national CCH

system could make criminal history records

more readily available, thus increasing their

use.

After an arrest, police make or participate

in decisions about whether to release or how

long to hold the suspect, whether to fingerprint, and the level of charges to be placed.

Each of the decisions clearly affects the creation of a criminal history record, and conversely, criminal history records (and thus a national CCH system) may potentially influence

these decisions.

Prosecutorial Use: District attorneys use

criminal history information in arraignment

and bail hearings, plea bargaining, formal

125
126 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

charging, trial, and sentencing, as well as for

special pretrial release and career crime programs.

The frequent lack of court disposition information limits the usefulness of State and Federal criminal history records to district attorneys in cases where subjects have records from

outside of the local jurisdiction. In many jurisdictions, judges will not consider an arrestonly record as indicative of criminal propensity, or as a factor in considering whether or

not a subject might jump bail. Speedy arraignment rules adopted in most States point to the

need for rapid, accurate, certifiable rap sheet

or criminal history information.

The impact of a national CCH system could

be particularly significant in pretrial release

and bail decisions. If accurate and complete,

such CCH records could help prosecutors and

judges better balance the need to protect the

public from harm by defendants out on bail,

versus the need to minimize the detention of

defendants on charges for which they have not

been tried and convicted under due process of

the law. Such a system might also promote the

more consistent use of CCH records in charging decisions, and allow prosecutors to direct

police resources to the need for additional investigation in cases involving repeat serious

or violent offenders.

Judicial Use: Criminal court judges use

criminal history information in bail hearings,

trial proceedings, and sentencing. Research

suggests that a national CCH system probably would have limited impact on judicial sentencing behavior, since other factors (circumstances of the crime, police behavior, community expectations) play such a large role, but

could significantly enhance the quality of pretrial decisions. However, in States with mandatory sentencing guidelines for offenders

with prior convictions, information from a national CCH system could significantly affect

even sentencing decisions.

Public Defender and Defense Attorney Use:

Public defenders and criminal defense attorneys use criminal history information to support the credibility of their clients and witnesses, to interpret for the court their client’s

circumstances where the client has a past record, and to challenge the credibility of prosecution witnesses. Public defenders are critical of

existing Federal, State, and even local CCH

systems because of serious record quality

problems, their exclusion from equal access to

these systems, and what they believe to be the

discriminatory impacts of these systems, primarily on minority groups. Public defenders

give limited support to a national CCH system

if it provides equal access to defense interests,

is accurate and up to date, and is purged regularly.

Probation Use: The most common use of

criminal history information by probation officers is in the preparation of presentence investigation reports. Judges use these to determine sentences suited to offenders, and they

are subsequently used by courts and the corrections departments in assigning offenders

to appropriate institutions. A national CCH

system would appear to be helpful in preparing presentence reports (and in pretrial services) if it were based on accurate and complete

records that could be obtained quickly and easily.

Correctional and Parole Use: Correctional officials have noted that criminal history is an

important input to decisions on initial levels

of supervision and security. To the extent that

correctional decisions rely on presentence reports, a national CCH system could make a

difference if, as a result, these reports were

more accurate and complete. With respect to

parole decisions, the nature and seriousness

of any prior record can be important. However,

the impact of a national CCH system would

most likely be limited, since an inmate’s

behavior in prison and the seriousness of the

current offense can carry as much or more

weight than prior criminal history.
Ch. 11—Possible Impacts of a National CCH System on the Criminal Justice Process ● 127

Impact on the Criminal Justice Process

The impacts of a national CCH system are

difficult to assess. A 1980 survey by the Missouri State Highway Patron and an August

1981 survey by the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)2 found that historically it

has been difficult to describe or document the

effectiveness of computerized real-time criminal justice information systems. While perhaps half of the agencies responding indicated

that they measure the number of hits on a system (i.e., matches between an inquiry and a

record on file), very few keep track of how hit

information contributes to a law enforcement

action (e.g., arrest, summons, recovery, apprehension, successful investigation). None of the

agencies responding keeps track systematically of how such information contributes to

other criminal justice actions such as prosecutions, setting of bail, sentencing, and the like.

The NCIC Advisory Policy Board has established a subcommittee to study and develop

recommendations on how best to measure the

effectiveness of NCIC.

These surveys and others conducted by

OTA, the Department of Justice (DOJ),3 and

the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil

and Constitutional Rights4 have found strong

support for computerized hot files among Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials.

Of the dozens of State and local law enforcement officials surveyed, not one seriously

. -

1Robert J. Bradley, State-Level Criminal Justice Network

Systems Effectiveness Survey, prepared by the Information

Systems Division, Missouri State Highway Patrol, September

1980; summarizes the results of a brief questionnaire sent to

11 States.

‘NCIC Staff Paper on “Statistical Measurement of NCIC Benefits” prepared for the Dec. 9-10, 1981, meeting of the NCIC

Advisory Policy Board, Topic 410; summarizes the results of

a questionnaire sent to 97 Federal, State, and local NCIC users.

‘See U.S. Department of Justice, Representative Viewpoints

of State Criminal Justice Officials Regarding the Need for a

Nationwide Interchange Fac&”ty, Mar. 6, 1978, reprinted in U.S.

Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, A Preliminary

Assessment of the National Crime Information Center and the

Computerized Criminal History System, Washington, D. C.,

December 1978, p. 69.

‘The Subcommittee Chairman sent a brief questionnaire on

NCIC to the chiefs of police of 36 metropolitan areas. For a summary of the results, see May 18, 1981, letter to the FBI Director from the Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, House Committee on the Judiciary.

questioned the need for, or benefits of, the

NCIC hot files. Indeed, many noted that law

enforcement personnel “simply could not do

without” Federal hot files, and that the interstate transportation of stolen properties

and interstate mobility of wanted persons

necessitates a national system.

Likewise, many Federal, State, and local law

enforcement and criminal history record repository officials support the concept of a national

CCH system, although there is some disagreement over the specifics. However, some local

and State criminal justice decisionmakers (especially district attorneys, judicial officials,

and public defenders) emphasized that to be

useful such a system needs to provide information that is more accurate, complete, and

timely than is generally available from existing Federal and State criminal history

record systems. Some believe that a national

CCH system should be limited to certain kinds

of records (e.g., felony convictions) and purged

at periodic intervals. On the other hand, some

officials, especially in law enforcement, emphasize the importance of CCH records, however incomplete they may be, as a pointer to

sources of more complete information. Also,

no hit (or no record) information may, in some

situations, be just as useful to police as hit (or

record) information.

A survey conducted in September 1981 by

the Florida Department of Law Enforcement,

based on 269 responses from 529 criminal justice agencies, found that the Florida State

CCH summary record information met the

needs of about 85 percent of law enforcement

agencies responding, 64 percent of prosecuting

attorneys responding, and 49 percent of probation and parole agencies responding. The

survey also found that Florida State CCH full

record information met the needs of about 91

percent of law enforcement agencies, 96 percent of prosecuting attorneys, and 72 percent

of probation and parole agencies responding.5

— —

‘See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Interstate Identification Index: Background and Findings for Jul.y-Septemher 1981

Phase I Pilot Project, Dec. 4, 1981, p.89.
128 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

—

The most common intended uses of criminal

history records were for criminal investigations and booking and intake by law enforcement agencies, criminal investigations and bail

and bond determinations by prosecuting attorneys, and pretrial intervention and presentence investigations by probation and parole

agencies.’ State officials interviewed in the

1978 DOJ survey, which included the State

of Florida, also make the point that “the equal

treatment of offenders is in part dependent

upon the equal availability of appropriate and

relevant information at all stages of the criminal justice process.”7

Police Use

When the police are investigating a reported

crime, they sometimes use criminal history

records to search for characteristics of past offenders that might connect them to the present crime. Prior research indicates that relatively few crimes are solved as a result of investigation alone.8 One study found that the

vast majority of case clearances result from

patrol capture at the crime scene, complete

identification by victims or witnesses, or provision of uniquely linking evidence (such as

license plate numbers) by victims and witnesses. A small proportion of case clearances

were found to result from matching latent fingerprints to existing fingerprint files, matching offense modus operandi (MO) with those

of offenders on file, using information tips, or

having victims view mug shots.’

One area that seems directly relevant to a

national CCH system is the matching of a

crime MO, physical descriptions, or other evidence with information in existing criminal

history files. In the local jurisdictions surveyed by OTA in 1979, police used local files

primarily and State files to a lesser extent. In

investigating serious and violent crimes, on

‘Ibid., p~87.

7DOJ, Representative Viewpoints, Ibid., p. 69.

8Charles E. Silberman, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice

(New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 217-219.

‘Peter W. Greenwood, et al., The Criminal Investigative Process (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1977), pp. 125 and

135.

the other hand, the need for rapid retrieval of

criminal history information from State and

Federal systems was perceived as more

important.

When the police are patrolling, looking for

suspicious circumstances or individuals, they

frequently use criminal justice information in

deciding how to handle situations that arise,

e.g., whether to interrogate, detain, issue a

summons, or make an arrest.

The Coremission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals concisely described the police

need for information while on patrol:l10

In any citizen contact, the officer should

know if the citizen is wanted by police, is in

possession of any stolen property . . . or is

otherwise involved with criminal activity that

might indicate the person’s present intentions

or behavior upon police contact . . . The officer should have knowledge about the contact that serves either to protect the officer

or increase his chances of success.

This is one area of police operations where

computer and communication capabilities are

almost essential. To affect patrol decisions,

response times must be rapid. Radio calls to

the local police station or to a central State

repository for manual searches of criminal record files frequently would be too slow to be

very useful, especially in heavily populated

jurisdictions. As a consequence, computerized

recordkeeping and communication systems

have been used to increase the information

available to patrol officers, particularly with

respect to wanted persons, stolen vehicle and

other stolen property information, and, to a

lesser extent, criminal history information.

OTA found that police on patrol make relatively little use of criminal history information,

but rely quite heavily on hot files. However,

in the 1979 OTA 50-State survey, 37 States

indicated that on-duty law enforcement officers can gain access to criminal history information in the State as well as the local file

through local police patrol and inquiry systems.

‘“National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Criminal Justice System (Washington, D. C.:

U.S. Department of Justice, 1973), p. 39.
Ch. 11—Possible Impacts of a National CCH System on the Criminal Justice Process ● 129

Relatively little is known about the extent

to which police patrol decisions are based on

criminal history information when it is available and used. An observational study of arrest practices in three States by the American

Bar Foundation found that prior criminal record history did influence police arrest decisions, and noted that courts have held that

police indeed may use a past record as one of

several factors in making legal arrests.1] An

experimental study of situations where the

probable cause to arrest was ambiguous concluded that a prior criminal history record did

affect the decision to arrest. ]2

A prior criminal history record is also a factor in police decisions on whether to use an alternative to arrest. Growing concerns about

the number of petty cases clogging the courts

and the stigma of arrest have stimulated the

use of a summons or field citation in place of

arrest. Commonly used in traffic offenses and

some misdemeanors, the field citation orders

a person to appear in court on a given day for

violating a statute. A summons serves the

same purpose, but is used for all types of

charges. For example, in 1977, a summons was

issued to about 3 percent of persons charged

with murder, 14 percent of persons charged

with aggravated assault, 40 percent of persons

charged with fraud, and 61 percent of persons

charged with violating liquor laws.13

A person’s prior arrests and convictions time

considered in deciding whether to make an arrest or issue a summons. Some police departments require officers to use a point system

that takes into account information concerning identification, employment, residence, and

family ties, as well as criminal history. Since

the decision to summon or arrest often must

“Wayne R. LaFave, Arres& The Decision to Take A Suspect

IrIto Custody (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp.

150-354.

“R. C. Smith, et al., “Background Information: Does It Affect the Misdemeanor Arrest?” Journal of Police Science and

Administration, vol. 4, March 1976, pp. 111-113.

‘3Lynne Eickholt Cooper, et al., An Assessment of the social

Impacts of the National Crime Information Center and Cbnputerizeci Criminal History Program, Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of South Carolina, October

1979, sec. II, pp. 102-103.

be made quickly, a national CCH system could

make criminal history records more readily

available, thus increasing their use.

After an arrest, police make or participate

in decisions about whether to release or how

long to hold the suspect, whether to fingerprint, and the level of charges to be placed.

Each of these decisions clearly affects the creation of a criminal history record, and conversely, criminal history records may potentially influence the decisions. Police do not have exclusive control over these decisions; prosecutors

may also be involved. The division of authority

between police and prosecutors varies with

each jurisdiction. For example, in some areas

charges are placed against a suspect by the

police that are not reviewed by the prosecutor

until the preliminary hearing. In other areas,

police book suspects “on suspicion, ” and prosecutors place formal charges.

Police may decide to release an individual

for a variety of reasons–further investigation

reveals evidence is lacking, witnesses refuse

to cooperate, the offense was minor, or the arrest was made for reasons other than prosecution (e.g., to protect the person from harm).

Plausibly, knowledge of criminal history could

influence a police officer’s decision to release

a suspect, especially if the offense is minor.

On the other hand, a criminal history, especially one related to the current offense, may

give police additional evidence on which to

charge a suspect. The level or seriousness of

charges may also be affected by criminal history records. In some States, persons arrested

for a crime of which they were previously convicted may face a more serious charge that carries a stiffer penalty.

In order to provide adequate evidence to

charge, police may decide to hold arrested individuals if they are suspected of offenses requiring further investigation. A criminal history is likely to affect police suspicions, and

therefore will influence the decision to hold an

individual and whether to hold without booking or to proceed immediately to booking and

fingerprinting, even if the arrestee is subsequently released.
130 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Finally, criminal history records are used in

career criminal programs to identify arrestees

whose cases will receive priority for investigation and case preparation by police and prosecutors. Police may make an early determination that an arrestee qualifies as a career criminal (dangerous repeat offender) and intensify

investigatory efforts to provide adequate evidence for the highest possible charge.

Prosecutorial Use

Prosecuting attorneys use criminal history

information in arraignment and bail hearings,

for plea bargaining, formal charging, trial, and

sentencing, as well as for special pretrial release and career crime programs. ’4

Given the predominantly local nature of

crime in the urban areas investigated by OTA,

prosecuting attorneys generally opted for the

development of comprehensive local and State

criminal history systems that identify a large

percentage of local criminals who have records.

However, prosecuting attorneys also supported a national CCH system if it would provide information that is more complete, accurate, and timely than is presently available.

Aside from problems of verifying out-ofState records, prosecuting attorneys also

pointed out that in many jurisdictions judges

do not consider that a record of arrest necessarily indicates either a criminal propensity or

a tendency to jump bail. Here, prosecuting attorneys stressed that the frequent lack of

court disposition information on State and

Federal criminal history records was a major

impediment to using them in cases where subjects have records from outside of the local

jurisdiction where they are being processed.

Record quality and the ease with which

criminal history records can be interpreted are

even more important in specialized programs

that are developing in local areas, such as prior

felon, career crime, and violent felon programs.

These programs assign special prosecutors to

subjects who have prior felony convictions.

—.. ..--.— 14Ibid., sec. 11, pp. 111-150.

The lack of conviction information on many

criminal history records disseminated by existing Federal systems, and the use of valuable

time and resources to verify out-of-State felony arrests, can limit prosecutorial use of outof-State information in these specialized

programs.

Speedy arraignment rules adopted in most

States point to the need for rapid, accurate,

certifiable rap sheet or criminal history information. As a matter of law, the use of arrestonly information in bail decisions under some

circumstances has been found unconstitutional by the courts. In the case of Tatum v.

Rogers, the court ruled in 1979 that:15

Plaintiffs are clearly and systematically

being deprived of due process in violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment ..., and of the

right to effective assistance of counsel as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, whenever rap sheets containing erroneous, ambiguous, or incomplete data with respect to prior

arrests and dispositions are submitted to

courts at arraignment sessions for use in connection with bail determination. The Eighth

Amendment right to reasonable bail is also

thus denied.

It is important to note that the court found

a violation of constitutional rights only when

arrest information without dispositions was

used, when disposition information was otherwise available, and when the incomplete information was used in setting bail.16

Thus, a national CCH system could have a

significant impact on pretrial release and bail

decisions by district attorneys and judges.*

A 1978 study in the District of Columbia confirmed that, with all other factors held constant, release conditions were made more

stringent for arrestees whose criminal histories were more extensive. 17 A 1979 study con15TatUm “. ~gers, 75 CiV. 2’7s2 (U.S. District court, South

District of New York), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

p. 20.

‘

e

Ibid., p. 24.

*In most cases, judges make the actual pretrial release and

bail decisions, but prosecutors play a significant role when making recommendations.

‘7Jeffrey A. Roth and Paul B. Wice, Pretrial Release and ll4isconduct irI the District of Columbia Executive Summary

(Washington, D. C.: Institute of Law and Social Research, 1978).
Ch. 11—Possible Impacts of a National CCH System on the Criminal Justice Process ● 131 —

ducted for the Tatm v. Rogers case in New

York showed similar results. This research

also highlighted the frequent lack of disposition data in early stages of the criminal justice

process and the reliance of prosecutors (and

judges) on incomplete rap sheets listing only

arrests. 18

While the value of conviction data in predicting pretrial rearrest (for another crime committed while out on bail or on personal recognizance) has not been established empirically,l9

the majority of States have legislation or rules

requiring judges to consider prior convictions

in determining pretrial release conditions.

Thus, a national CCH system, if accurate and

complete, presumably could assist prosecutors

and judges in better balancing the need to protect the public from harm by defendants while

out on bail, versus the need to minimize the

detention of defendants on charges for which

they have not been tried and convicted under

due process law.

With respect to charging and plea bargaining, the impact of a national CCH system is

less clear. Evidence suggests that the criminal

history record of an arrestee can affect the

prosecutor’s decisions to bring or drop

charges, the level and number of charges, and

whether to negotiate at trial for lower charges

through plea bargaining.’” To some extent,

prosecutors can delay a decision to dismiss a

case or to place final charges until they have

received criminal history information from existing files, whether manual or computerized.

The time factor is not as critical as it is in

pretrial release decisions.

However, some anecdotal evidence suggests

that prosecutors, under the crush of heavy

caseloads, may make quick decisions to dismiss or reduce charges without considering a

— — ]~~a~U~ “, ~gers, Op. cit., Affidavit of Richard Faust.

“Roth, op. cit., p. x; Wayne Thomas, Bail Reform in America

(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1976), pp.

234-240.

‘“Vera Institute of Justice, Felony Arrests: Their Prosecution and Disposition in New York Citys C@rts (New York: Vera

Institute of Justice, 1977); Arthur Rosett and Donald R.

Cressey, Justice by C.lmsent: Plea Bargains in the American

Courthouse (Philadelphia, Pa.: J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1976),

ch. 5.

defendant’s criminal history.” To the degree

that this occurs, the rapid response time of a

national CCH system may promote the more

consistent use of such records in charging decisions, thereby allowing prosecutors to direct

police resources to the need for additional investigation in cases involving repeat serious

or violent offenders.

Judicial Use

Criminal court judges use criminal history

information in bail hearings, trial proceedings,

and sentencing. Judges do not perceive their

role as simply to judge the accused, but also

to understand and consider the behavior of the

police and the prosecution in order to understand the circumstances of the accused. Criminal history information is one input to judicial

decisions.

Some judicial researchers believe that the

quality of justice administered in criminal

courts “could be significantly enhanced if relevant and reliable criminal history information

were to be available to key decisionmakers at

the courthouse—particularly the judge and the

district attorney–within a short time after arrest. Critical decisions about charge and pretrial custody are typically made very shortly

after arrest, and hard information about an arrestee’s prior record can be of great value. ’

However, these researchers also point out that

“such information is seldom available from existing CCH systems at the present time’ and

that “the lack of reliable information about

dispositions is a major problem in many criminal history records systems. ”22

With respect to sentencing, there are several

realities that limit the role of criminal history

information. For example:23

If there is no agreement on what causes

crime, there can be no agreement on how

zlHer~fi s. Miller, et al., Plea Bargaining iII the United S~teS

(Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), pp.

72-73.

“Sept. 15, 1981, letter tQ OTA from Barry Mahoney, Research

Director, Institute for Court Management.

zgAlexader B. Sfith and Harriet Pollack, Crimina] Justice:

An Overview (2d cd.) (New York: HoIt, Rinehart, & Winston,

1980).
132 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

criminals should be handled. If criminals are

sick they should be treated, but if they are

bad they should be punished. Judges, juries,

probation, parole, and corrections officials do

not handle all cases in a uniform manner but

vacillate, sometimes unpredictably, between

these two polar positions, One cause of sentence disparity, thus, is the lack of a consistent theory of crime causation and punishment.

In the absence of a consistent theory of punishment, other factors play a large role in judicial sentencing, such as the expectations of

a particular community or the personality and

philosophy of the judge. Sentencing decisions

are also affected by the overloaded conditions

that exist in many urban courts, prisons, and

other detention facilities.

Nevertheless, criminal history information

clearly has an influence on sentencing. For example, a study of sentencing practices in the

District of Columbia found that decisions to

incarcerate were influenced most strongly by

the prior criminal history of the offender, the

severity of the current offense, and the philosophy of the judge. Sentence length was influenced mainly by the seriousness of the offense,

community ties, type of plea, and prior convictions (to a lesser extent) .24 Many States now

have mandatory sentencing guidelines (especially for offenders with prior records).

Defense Use

Public defenders and criminal defense attorneys use criminal history information, where

available, to support the credibility of their clients and witnesses, to interpret any past record of their clients to the court, and to challenge the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Public defenders are critical of existing Federal, State, and even local CCH systems because of serious record quality problems, the

exclusion of defense interests from equal ac24Terence Durgworth, An Empirical Assessment of Sentencing Practices in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia

(Washington, D. C.: Institute for Law and Social Research,

1978), pp. VI-7 to VI-25.

cess to these systems, and what they believe

are discriminatory impacts of these systems,

particularly on minority groups. Public defenders are concerned that arrest-only information is used by prosecutors to characterize

their clients unfairly, and that such information is frequently included in the presentence

investigation report obtained from a probation

department, which also influences the court’s

behavior. In addition, public defenders are unhappy that they are excluded from access to

most local, State, and Federal criminal history

systems. Information from these systems can

be used by the prosecution to attack the credibility of defense witnesses without allowing

public defenders the same opportunity with

respect to prosecution witnesses.

Public defenders believe that the creation of

arrest records discriminates against minority

groups in their localities. Defenders believe

that local police are more likely to stop, search,

detain, and arrest members of minority

groups. Defense interests believe they can exercise a greater influence over the use of information in local CCH systems through both legal and political means, and therefore are more

supportive of local systems than of State and

Federal systems.

In general, public defenders give limited

support to a national CCH system that provides equal access to defense interests, is accurate and up to date, and is purged regularly.

In comments to OTA, the National Legal

Aid and Defender Association (NLADA)

noted that ‘one of the major problems public

defenders have with a CCH system is its lack

of ability to quickly and accurately expunge

incorrect information. Further, there need to

be legislative guidelines to insure such modifications can be made. These guidelines would

also be useful in insuring public defenders

equal access to this information. The only way

to insure such access is to require prosecutorial

employees to turn over, within 48 hours, all

CCH information (or lack thereof) on the accused. ” Defenders also need, according to the

NLADA, a means to get into the system “to

check on records of their own and government
Ch. 11—Possible Impacts of a National CCH System on the Criminal Justice Process ● 133

— — — ——————-. — — —

witnesses without the government bein g

aware of these checks. It is unrealistic in most

jurisdictions to merely suggest that defenders

be given access. Legislation must mandate

such access. “25

Probation Use

Probation officers use criminal history information in specialized pretrial services programs, such as pretrial release programs.

However, the most common use of such information is in the preparation of presentence investigation reports. These reports are made

available to the court for the purpose of evaluating the character of persons brought before

it. They are used by judges in arriving at a

sentence suited to an offender, and are subsequently used by courts and by corrections departments in assigning offenders to appropriate institutions.

Despite the intention of State legislation,

arrest-only information may influence the presentence investigation report and judicial sentencing. This influence stems from the concern

of the probation profession to include all the

information that may be helpful in explaining

the criminal conduct of an offender. For example, a presentence report may cover significant police contacts which could include arrests without dispositions.

Given the incomplete disposition reporting

in State and Federal record systems, probation agencies must spend considerable resources to verify records from such systems.

There is a tendency to ignore the verification

of Federal records because of the difficulty involved. It appears that a national CCH system

could be useful in pretrial services (principally in bail hearings, as noted earlier) where accurate and reliable information is needed within

72 hours of arrest. Time is not as important

in the preparation of presentencing reports.

Here the major problem is incomplete disposition data and the shortage of resources (time

and money) necessary for verification. A na25Mar. 16, 1982, letter to OTA from the Deputy Director, Defender Division, National Legal Aid & Defender Association.

tional CCH system would appear to offer an

advantage if based on accurate and complete

records, and if those records could be obtained

quickly and easily.

Correctional and Parole Use

The criminal history of an offender is considered significant in determining initial custody

rating (level of supervision needed) and institutional placement (e.g., maximum v. medium

security). Correctional officials have noted that

criminal history information is more important to these decisions than the results of inmate evaluation and testing. Career criminals

are more likely to be placed under closer supervision in more secure facilities. However, once

in prison the behavior of an inmate largely

determines the correctional program, e.g.,

assignment to educational, work, and rehabilitation activities.

Before an offender is imprisoned, criminal

justice officials have ample time to retrieve

criminal history information. Correctional

authorities have long relied on detailed presentence reports, which include criminal history

information, in making their decisions. There

is no reason to believe that a national CCH

system alone would alter this approach. A national CCH system could make a difference if,

as a result, presentence reports were more

accurate and complete.

With respect to parole decisions (to release

an inmate from prison, subject to supervision

by a parole officer), criminal history is one of

many factors considered. One study found

that, in the majority of cases decided by the

U.S. Parole Commission, parole decisions

could be predicted by the seriousness of the

current offense, the nature and seriousness of

any prior record, and the offender’s conduct

in prison.26

Thus, there is reason to believe that a national CCH system would have at least some

impact on parole decisions. However, any

“Leslie T. Wilkins, et al., sentencing Guidelines: Structuring Judicial Discretion, final report (Albany, N. Y.: Criminal

Justice Research Center, 1976), pp. 13-19.

- ,— j - -J. - :
134 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

major changes in the way in which criminal persons with extensive criminal histories

history information is used in parole decisions should be allowed parole, and whether the

will likely result from resolution of other degree of supervision after release should deissues. These include whether the parole func- pend on their criminal histories.

tion should continue at all and, if so, whether
Chapter 12

Other Impact Areas

Relevant to a National CCH

System:

Licensure,

Employment and

Minority Groups,

Federalism, Monitoring or

Surveillance Potential, and

Constitutional Rights
Contents

Page

Chapter Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Employment and Licensing Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Minority Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Surveillance Potential. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Constitutional Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Impact unemployment and Licensing Decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Impact on Minority Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Impact on Federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Impact on Monitoring or Surveillance Potential. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Impact on Constitutional Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

TABLE

Table No. Page

30.Noncriminal Justice Requests to State Criminal History Repositories 140
Chapter 12

Other Impact Areas Relevant to a

National CCH System:

Employment and Licensure,

Minority Groups, Federalism,

Monitoring or Surveillance

Potential, and Constitutional Rights

Chapter Summary

Employment and Licensing

Decisions

Criminal records may be used to screen individuals out of positions where they could pose

a threat to other citizens or coworkers or present an excessive risk to the protection of valuable assets. However, limiting job opportunities may hinder the rehabilitation of former

offenders who may become dependent on public welfare or return to crime if suitable employment is unavailable.

Federal, State, and local governments require criminal history checks or character evaluations (which frequently include record

checks) for literally millions of public sector

jobs or publicly licensed private sector jobs.

The private sector also frequently seeks criminal history information in making employment decisions. A national computerized criminal history (CCH) system might further increase the use of Federal and State criminal

history files for noncriminal justice purposes.

There is no doubt that the use of criminal

history information affects employment and

licensing decisions. Even a record of arrest and

acquittal will often work to the disadvantage

of the applicant. A problem here is that a noncriminal justice decisionmaker is more likely

to misinterpret a record, especially when criminal history records contain inaccurate, incomplete, or ambiguous information. Also, except

in particular cases such as repeat violent offenders, the ability of criminal history records

to predict future employment behavior is a

matter of debate. For some occupations, the

law is quite clear about what kinds of criminal

conduct are disqualifying. However, in most

cases substantial discretion is left to licensing boards and employers. In the OTA 50-

State survey, noncriminal justice use of criminal history records accounted for about onefifth of total use, and several States reported

that noncriminal justice use already constituted more than 40 percent of total use. Finally, a national CCH system could involve up

to 28 to 30 percent of all persons in the labor

force, many with arrest records showing no arrests for serious crime, arrests and convictions

for minor crime only, or arrests that were disposed in favor of the arrestee.

Minority Groups

Some minority groups have a higher probability of police contact and account for a disproportionate percentage of arrest statistics.

For example, the percentage of blacks with arrest records has been estimated at 30 percent

nationwide and over 50 percent in some cities.

In States like California, blacks are more likely

137
138 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

than are whites to be arrested, to have the arrest reported to the State repository, but then

to be released without formal charging. When

used in employment decisions, for example,

arrest-only criminal history information can

have a discriminatory effect. Indeed, the

courts have found that a policy of refusing

employment to blacks with an arrest record

without convictions “had a racially discriminatory impact because blacks are arrested substantially more frequently than whites in proportion to their numbers” (Gregory v. Litton

Systems, 1970). In this context, any discriminatory impacts from the use of national CCH

information would depend on whether and

under what conditions noncriminal justice access is permitted.

Federalism

Many of the proposed alternatives for a national CCH system would encounter difficulties resulting from the historic constitutional

division of powers and duties in the U.S. Federal system. State governments have basic jurisdiction over law enforcement and criminal

justice within their borders. At the same time,

the Federal Government has a legitimate role

in the enforcement of Federal criminal law and

prosecution of Federal offenders, both intrastate and interstate, and in assisting with the

apprehension of criminal offenders who cross

State and/or national borders. To the extent

that crime is perceived as a national problem,

the Federal Government has a defined role in

providing voluntary support to State and local

law enforcement activities.

A national CCH system could be used to circumvent State laws, especially with respect

to system access. Given the wide variation

among State laws and regulations, any national standards included in a CCH system could

easily conflict with the standards of at least

some States. In addition, with Federal funding

for State CCH development now ended, the

States and localities would have to bear most

of the cost of any national CCH system.

Surveillance Potential

The “flagging” of criminal records–both

hot files and criminal history files—is a common surveillance practice and an accepted law

enforcement tool. Placing a flagon a file helps

law enforcement personnel keep track of the

location and activity of a suspect, apprehend

wanted persons, and recover stolen property.

Concern has focused on the possible use of

a CCH system by Federal agencies—and particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI)–for surveillance of the lawful activities

of individual citizens or organizations. The

basis for this concern is largely the well-documented tendency of the FBI and other Federal

agencies, in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s,

to expand intelligence investigations into the

realm of political surveillance. FBI officials

have repeatedly stated that they will not permit the National Crime Information Center

(NCIC) or the Identification Division (Ident)

to be used for such purposes, and that a national CCH system would represent little, if

any, danger to law-abiding citizens.

Constitutional Rights

The enactment of national legislation that

includes statutory protections and mandates

specific accountability measures (especially

outside audit) was found to be very important

in protecting constitutional rights across the

board. First and fourth amendment rights

could be further protected through tight restrictions (or a prohibition) on noncriminal justice access and strong and independent policy

control. Mandatory record quality standards,

established by statute and backed up by the

necessary funding and technical assistance to

ensure implementation (and outside audit to

ensure compliance), appear to be the most effective mechanism for protecting fifth, sixth,

eighth, and 14th amendment rights.
. —

Ch. 12—Other Impact Areas Relevant to a National CCH System ● 139

Impact on Employment and

Licensing Decisions

Criminal history information is used in employment and licensing decisions ostensibly to

protect the public or the employer from harm.

Criminal records may be used to screen individuals out of positions where they might

cause harm to other citizens or coworkers or

present an excessive risk to the protection of

valuable assets (e.g., money, securities, precious jewelry, and other property).

However, limiting job opportunities on the

basis of a criminal record in effect involves an

additional punishment for crime, that is, a

“civil disability” in addition to the punishment administered by the court. This civil disability may in turn hinder the rehabilitation

of offenders and prevent them from becoming

useful and productive members of society,

even if they want to do so and are otherwise

capable. Former offenders who cannot find

suitable employment may become dependent

on public welfare or return to crime.

Federal and State legislatures must balance

these considerations when requiring criminal

history checks or evaluations of good moral

character as conditions of employment or licensing. Such requirements may result in employment or a license being denied to individuals with specified criminal offenses. For example, the Federal Government requires a

criminal history record check for all new employees, and many States have adopted similar requirements.

No recent systematic research has been done

on the number of occupations in the United

States that require a criminal history background check. A study conducted in 1974 by

the American Bar Association identified 1,948

separate statutory provisions that affected the

licensing of persons with an arrest or conviction record, averaging 39 provisions per State.1

——

‘James E. Hunt, James E. Bowers, and Neal Miller, Laws,

Licenses and the Offender’s Right to Work: A Study of State

Laws Restricting the Occupational Licensing of Former Offenders (Washington, D. C.: American Bar Association, 1974).

At that time, an estimated 7 million people

worked in licensed occupations. This is consistent with OTA’S findings in selected States.

For example, in California in 1979,47 different

licensing boards were authorized to use State

criminal history record information for screening applicants.

As it stands now, dissemination of Federal

criminal history records is permitted to officials of any State or local government for purposes of employment and licensing, if authorized by State statute and approved by the Attorney General. Dissemination of State and local criminal history records is governed by a

plethora of widely varying State laws, Executive orders, local ordinances, court orders, and

judicial rulings.*

Private sector use of criminal history records in employment decisions is even more difficult to document. Research conducted in

1976 found that between 40 and 80 percent of

private sector employers seek criminal history

information, frequently as part of information

requested on employment application forms.2

With the exception of federally insured or

chartered banking institutions and the securities industry, Federal law prohibits the dissemination of Federal criminal history records

to private employers.** But in a majority of

States, private organizations can lawfully obtain conviction information, and frequently arrest information as well, from State criminal

history record files.’ A 1981 SEARCH Group

study found that, in most States, local police

may lawfully release to private employers

whatever arrest or conviction data they choose

from local files.’

*% chs. 6, 7, 8, and 9.

‘Neal Miller, Employment Barriers to the Employment of Persons With Records of Arrest or Convictions, A Review and

Anaf’ysis (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1979),

pp. 20-23.

*** chs. 6 and 7.

‘SEARCH Group, Inc., Privacy and the Private Employer,

September 1981 draft, p. 33.

‘Ibid., pp. 34-35; see also ch. 7.
140 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System —. —. . — . —-——

A potential problem is that a national CCH

system might further increase the use of Federal and State criminal history files for noncriminal justice purposes in ways that might

be detrimental to former offenders seeking

legitimate employment, without necessarily

improving the protection of the public and

employers.

The problem has several dimensions. First,

there is no doubt that the use of criminal history information affects employment and licensing decisions. The results of research, case

studies of employers, surveys of employer attitudes, as well as the experience of Federal and

State parole officers, all suggest that any formal contact between an individual and the

criminal justice process will influence the employer’s decisions on job applicants. A record

of arrest and conviction will have the greatest

influence, but even a record of arrest and acquittal will frequently work to the disadvantage of the applicant.’ The problem is that

criminal history records are designed for use

by those who are familiar with the criminal

justice process and who understand the limitations of a record. At best, a criminal history

record provides a snapshot or series of snapshots of a person’s contact with the criminal

justice process at various points in time. Much

of the contextual and background information

necessary to properly interpret the record is

not included.

A record is more likely to be misinterpreted

when used by someone outside the criminal

justice system, particularly when criminal

history records contain inaccurate, incomplete,

or ambiguous information. For some occupations, the law is quite clear about what kinds

of criminal conduct are disqualifying. In most

cases, however, substantial discretion is left

to licensing boards and public employers (as

well as to private employers) in weighing the

applicant criminal record along with all other

factors.

‘See Lynne Eickholt Cooper, et al., An Assessment of the

Social Impacts of the National Crime information Center and

Computerized Criminal History Program, Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of South Carolina, October 1979, sec. III, pp. 213-268.

Second, little concrete evidence exists to

support the thesis that criminal history records have predictive value with respect to employment (i.e., can accurately predict future

employment behavior), except in particular

cases such as repeat violent offenders.G Other

factors such as education, prior work experience, length of time in the community, and personal references may be more predictive. Thus,

there is the added risk that individuals with

criminal records will be denied employment

solely because they have a record, not because

of a determination, based on all of the facts

available, that they represent an unacceptable

risk to the prospective employer. On the other

hand, the high recidivism rates suggest that

once a person is arrested or convicted, he or

she is much more likely to be convicted of a

subsequent crime within a few years than

those without a prior criminal record. Whether

or not this is relevant to or predictive of employment behavior is a matter of debate.

Third, despite the limited ability of criminal

history records alone to predict future employment behavior, noncriminal justice use has already reached significant levels. In the OTA

50-State survey, noncriminal justice use of

criminal history records accounted for about

one-fifth of total use, and several States reported that such use already constitutes more

than 40 percent of total use, as shown in table

30. Given the politics of State legislatures, in-

.—

‘Ibid.

Table 30.—Noncriminal Justice Requests to State

Criminal History Repositories

(as a percent of total requests)

Number of

Percent States Year

Overall average . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.9°/0 37 1979

18.70/o 37 1982

17.80/o 45 1982

Percent of noncriminal Number of States

justice requests 1979 1982 1982

Distribution of percent noncriminal justice requests

0- 9.90/0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 16 18

10-19.90/0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10 13

20-39.90/o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 7

40+ % . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7 7

37 45

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment 50-State Survey and 1982 followup
Ch. 12—Other Impact Areas Relevant to a National CCH System ● 141

terest groups can exert strong leverage to gain

access for noncriminal justice purposes. At

least 14 States have recently enacted (since

1979) or have pending State legislation or regulations that further broaden noncriminal justice access. Some States are now charging fees

(e.g., $6 to $14 per record in New York, about

$7 in California, $5 in West Virginia and

Nebraska, $3 in Maine, and $2 in Florida)

which may serve to restrain noncriminal justice use, although this has not been the case

in States like Florida. Between 1979 and 1982,

10 States reported an increase in noncriminal

justice use, 5 States reported a decrease, and

22 States indicated that such use remained approximately the same (as a percent of total

use).

Fourth, a national CCH system could involve a sizable proportion (perhaps 25 to 30

percent) of all persons in the overall labor

force. After a careful review of existing research, OTA estimated that as of 1979 about

36 million living citizens had criminal history

records held by Federal, State, and/or local

repositories.7 Of these, OTA estimated that

about 26 million persons were in the labor

force (representing, conservatively, 28 to 30

percent of the total labor force), and thus were

potentially exposed to employment disqualifications because of an arrest record. Of the 36

million, OTA estimated that 35 percent had

no arrests for serious crime and one arrest for

a minor crime, and that 24 percent had more

than one minor arrest but no major arrests.

The remaining 41 percent (15 million persons)

had at least one arrest for a serious crimes

‘See Cooper, et al., op. cit., sec. I, pp. 51-84 and especially p. 83.

‘Ibid., p. 83.

Impact on Minority Groups

The implications of a national CCH system

for employment and licensing decisions involving minority groups, particularly blacks, is a

subject of debate. Certain minority group

members do have a higher probability of police

contact, and account for a disproportionate

percentage of arrest records. Professional recordkeepers (CCH system managers) acknowledge this reality, but point out that criminal

history record systems simply reflect data created by local agencies.

Various studies have estimated the percentage of blacks with arrest records as ranging

from 30 percent nationwide to over 50 percent

in certain cities such as Philadelphia. The 30

percent nationwide estimate used FBI Uniform Crime Report data as a baseline, and corrected for double counting arising from multiple arrests. The Philadelphia study found that

one-half of all black males in the sample had

already been arrested at least once, as an

adult, by the time they were 30 years old.9 As

——.— .

‘Neal Miller, A Study of the Number of Persons With Records

of Arrestor Conviction in the Labor Force (Washington, D. C.:

U.S. Department of Labor, 1979).

of February 21, 1980, blacks accounted for

about 29 percent of all records in the NCIC/

CCH file, ]o which is almost triple the percentage of blacks in the total U.S. population.

Some further insight can be obtained by

looking at the disposition of adult felony arrests in California where information was

available to OTA. In 1981, although blacks accounted for 30.6 percent of arrests and about

7.7 percent of California’s total population,

they accounted for 37.7 percent of the law enforcement releases. In other words, blacks are

disproportionately released after arrest without being formally charged. Likewise, blacks

account for a disproportionate number (38.7

percent) of complaints denied. Whites, on the

other hand, account for 44.2 percent of the arrests but only 33.1 percent of the law enforcement releases and 36.2 percent of the complaints denied.11

‘“Minutes of the Dec. 10-11, 1980, NCIC Advisory Policy

Board meeting, Topic #13, “NCIC Race Categories and Codes

Used in the Wanted Persons, Missing Persons, and CCH Files, ”

P. 38.

“State of California Department of Justice, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, fiirniml ~~s~jce I+ofile, 1981.
142 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Thus, blacks in California are more likely to

have arrests that result in law enforcement

releases and complaints denied. A law enforce

ment release occurs when police detain and arrest a person, obtain fingerprints, report the

arrest to the State record system, but subsequently release the person and do not present

the case to the district attorney. A complaint

is denied when the police arrest and present

a person to the district attorney, but the district attorney decides not to prosecute the

case. Releases and complaints denied may occur for a variety of reasons, such as insufficient evidence, refusal of the victim to prosecute, lack of probable cause, unavailable witness, or illegal search. Despite the dismissal

of an arrest by the law enforcement agency or

the denial of a complaint by the district attorney, the arrest event is recorded in the

State criminal history record system. The evidence in California seems to indicate that

blacks are more likely to be arrested, to have

that information reported to the State repository, and then be released without any formal

charges being presented.

In this instance, the California recordkeeping system is operating precisely as it was designed to operate; it merely records and retains

information concerning a police contact when

it is submitted by the police, even if the arrest information does not lead to a formal

charge or a court disposition. Some States

have adopted stringent expungement rules regarding arrest-only information. For example,

in New York State, arrest events that do not

lead to conviction are sealed and the fingerImpact on

Federalism-the balance of authority and

power between Federal, State, and local governments—has been a central issue in the debate over a national CCH system.

Because of the decentralized nature of the

U.S. criminal justice process and because the

generation and use of criminal history information occurs mostly at the State and local levels

prints taken with such events are returned to

the originating agency. The New York law

states that it is the responsibility of the arresting agency, the prosecutor, or the judge to inform the State repository. In California, felony

arrests that result in detention only are retained in the State criminal history record for

5 years, and felony arrests that otherwise do

not result in a conviction are retained for 7

years.

As discussed earlier, a criminal arrest record, even without convictions, can have an adverse impact on employment and licensing decisions. Indeed, the courts have found that a

policy of refusing employment to blacks with

an arrest record without convictions “had a

racially discriminatory impact because blacks

are arrested substantially more frequently

than whites in proportion to their numbers.” 12

Similar judicial reasoning has been extended

to black applicants refused employment due

to criminal convictions where the offense

“does not significantly bear upon the particular job requirements.”13 In this context, any

discriminatory impacts from the use of national CCH information would depend on whether,

and under what conditions, noncriminal justice access is permitted.

‘

zAmerican Civil Liberties Union, Employment Discrimination Against Persons with Criminal Records, draft report, 1977,

p. 11, and Gregory v. Litton Systems, 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D.

Cal. 1970), modified on other grounds, 472 F. 2d 631 (9th Cir.

1972).

“Green v. Missouri Pacific RR 523 F. 2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975),

at 1298.

Federalism

of government, most States seek a primary

role in any national CCH system. State governments have basic jurisdiction over law enforcement and criminal justice within their

borders under their constitutionally reserved

powers, and many have been reluctant to

share this jurisdiction with the Federal Government except with respect to Federal offenders. Most States have appreciated other kinds
——

Ch. 12—Other Impact Areas Relevant to a National CCH System . 143

of support from the Federal Government, such

as the FBI fingerprint identification services

and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funding for State CCH system development, as long as this support was provided

on a voluntary basis and the States retained

control over the operation and use of their own

criminal history record systems.

The Federal Government has a legitimate

interest in the enforcement of Federal criminal

law; in the prosecution of Federal offenders,

whether intrastate or interstate; and in assisting with the apprehension of interstate and international criminal offenders who cross State

and/or national borders. To the extent that

crime is perceived as a national problem deserving national attention, the Federal Government also has a defined role in the provision of voluntary support to State and local

law enforcement activities.

Many of the proposed alternatives for a national CCH system encounter difficulties resulting from the historic constitutional division of powers and duties in our Federal system. Since the standards of the States vary

so widely, any national standards for a CCH

system could easily conflict with those of at

least some States.

Massachusetts and Florida illustrate the potential conflict with respect to system access.

Both States have developed their own CCH

systems, both have given considerable attention to the question of who should have access

to these systems, and each has adopted a very

different approach. Massachusetts has passed

a Criminal Offender Record Information Act

which defines the classes of agencies and individuals that are eligible for access. Criminal

justice agencies may receive criminal history

records after being certified by a Criminal History Systems Board. Noncriminal justice

agencies granted access by statute must also

be certified to receive criminal history records

to carry out statutory duties. Other agencies

and individuals may be certified to receive

criminal history record information only if

“the public interest in disseminating such information to these parties clearly outweighs

the interest in privacy and security.”14 Such

agencies and individuals must be certified by

both the Criminal History Systems Board and

the Security and Privacy Council. On the other

hand, Florida has passed a Public Records

Statute that makes its CCH records generally available for access by noncriminal justice

agencies and private citizens.15 For a $2 fee,

a number of private firms located in Florida

have CCH record access that would be denied

in many other States.

Massachusetts officials have stated in the

past that they would not contribute State records to a national CCH file unless they could

retain control over access to and dissemination of these records. Massachusetts has been

particularly concerned about indirect access

to criminal history records by agencies or individuals not authorized to receive such records

directly. As a hypothetical example, a private

firm with branch offices in both State A and

State B could conceivably be denied access to

CCH records in State A and permitted access

in State B. If State B CCH records were included in a national CCH file, the private firm

could circumvent State A law by gaining access to State A records via a request from its

State B branch office to the national CCH file

processed through the State B CCH system.

Information denied to the private firm in State

A therefore could be obtained indirectly

through access in other States to a national

CCH file. While Florida now requires that the

access policy of the donor State (State holding

the record) be respected, most States do not

require that donor State policy be followed.l6

The problem of secondary dissemination can

also occur with Federal agencies. For example, Massachusetts State and local police agencies provide arrest records to the FBI, which

is authorized to receive such information for

law enforcement purposes. Under Federal regulations, the FBI may disseminate arrest in-

— — —

“Massachusetts General Laws, ch. 6, sec. 172.

16 Florida Statute 119. Access is restricted for records sealed

pursuant to F,S. 893.14 (first offense possession of drugs) and

F.S. 901.33 (first offenders who are acquitted or released).

“SEARCH Group, Inc., The Interstate Exchange of Criminal

History Records, Sacramento, Calif., May 1981, pp. 5-7.
144 • An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

formation in its files to other Federal agencies

authorized by executive order, such as the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) pursuant to Executive Order No. 10450. 17 However,

under Massachusetts State law, OPM is authorized access only to Massachusetts offender records pert aining to Federal Riot Act

18 convictions within the last 15 years. Thus, what

OPM cannot get from Massachusetts directly,

it can get through the FBI indirectly. As a

consequence, Massachusetts has declined to

provide records to NCIC/CCH and has severely curtailed fingerprint submissions to Ident.

As discussed in chapter 9, in addition to different policies on access to and dissemination

of criminal history information, States also

vary widely in their statutes and regulations

on file content, access, review and challenge

procedures, sealing and purging, record accuracy and completeness, court disposition monitoring, and transaction logs and local audits.

Even States with similar policies may show

considerable variation in the level of resources

and management devoted to enforcement.

They also differ in their definition of crime; a

felony in one State may not be so considered

in another.

It was thought by some that the development of Federal regulations in the area of criminal history information systems (title 28,

Code of Federal Regulations, pt. 20) would provide the answer to overcoming many of the difficulties of sharing criminal history information among the States and between the States

and the Federal Government. Despite a dramatic increase in State statutes and regulations, many States have experienced a number

of problems in implementing the Federal regulations, including insufficient resources, confusion in interpreting the regulations, and the

lack of a State legislative mandate. In the

OTA 50-State survey, 30 out of 46 States indi1720 CFR $ 20.33(2).

185 Usc ‘j 7313.

cated that insufficient funds was the principal

constraint to fully implementing annual audits, unique record tracking numbers, 90-day

disposition reporting, and the like. Fourteen

States indicated that a lack of statutory or

policy mandate was the principal constraint.l9

States that are willing to fully implement

the Federal regulations face a significant problem in obtaining sufficient funds. Throughout

the 1970’s, it was Federal Government policy

to support the development of State CCH systems and the implementation of the Federal

regulations. However, this funding has now

ended. In any event, the major portion of the

long-term costs of a national CCH system

would be the operating costs incurred by participating State and local criminal justice

agencies, rather than development costs. Until recently, some of these costs could be recovered through Federal block grants, but this avenue of Federal support has also been phased

out.

Thus, at present, the States and localities

would have to bear most of the cost of any national CCH system. The only exceptions would

be the direct cost of any federally operated facilities (such as Ident and NCIC), and the costs

of Federal agencies participating in the system. The difficulty of finding “new money” or

reducing other expenses to pay for a national

CCH could discourage State participation.

Some States in the past have criticized what

they believe to be the excessive cost of national CCH alternatives that call for substantial

duplication of records at State and Federal levels. In any case, financing could be particularly

difficult for States with less well-developed

CCH systems, less need for a national CCH

system (e.g., relatively low levels of interstate

criminal movement), and/or less ability to pay

(e.g., smaller, poorer States).

‘Wfice of Technology Assessment 50-State Survey conducted

in 1979-80.
Ch. 12—Other Impact Areas Relevant to a National CCH System ● 145

Impact on Monitoring or

Surveillance Potential

Several alternatives for a national CCH system—particularly those involving large central files and/or extensive message switching—

have generated concern about their possible

use for monitoring or surveillance. The “flagging” of criminal records is a common monitoring or surveillance practice and an accepted

law enforcement tool. Placing a flagon a file

helps law enforcement personnel keep track of

the location and activity of a suspect, apprehend wanted persons, or recover stolen property whenever there is a police contact.

At the State level, both manual and automated files are used for flagging. This practice differs from State to State. The most frequent application seems to be for parole violators and wanted persons. Others include flagging for modus operandi, for individuals with

a history of violent acts, and for vehicle files.

Several States indicated that flagging is easier

with automated systems.

2 0

At the Federal level, the flagging of records

in Ident is usually through use of a wantedflash-cancellation notice for persons with an

outstanding arrest warrant (wanted notice) or

persons placed on probation or parole (flash

notice). A cancellation notice is posted when

the person is no longer wanted or under supervision .

21 With respect to NCIC, since hot files

are flags by definition, all wanted and missing persons and stolen property records included in NCIC represent flags to law enforcement and criminal justice users.

One concern expressed about a nationa l

CCH system focuses on its possible use for indiscriminate Government monitoring or surveillance of individual citizens or groups of

citizens. For instance, a national CCH system

could be used to run a criminal history record

—.——-.-—_

‘“Based on interviews with State criminal records repository

personnel.

*’Letter from Conrad S. Banner, Identification Division, FBI,

to Marcia MacNaughton, OTA, U.S. Congress, dated July 26,

1979.

check similar to the relatively common police

practice of running a warrant check on motorists stopped for traffic violations. Here, the

driver’s name and perhaps license number are

checked against the local, and sometimes

State and Federal, files. Also, the vehicle license plate number and description might be

checked against the stolen vehicle files. Even

this practice has been challenged in the courts,

especially where the police detain individuals

and conduct routine checks not based on ‘ ‘reasonable suspicion. ” The courts have found

that “a detention of an individual which is reasonable at its inception may exceed constitutional bounds when extended beyond what

is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. ’ ’22 If the computer check is conducted

during a detention, and the detaining officer

has no reason to consult the computer other

than curiosity, the resulting conviction may

be overturned.

23 Indiscriminate criminal history checks on individuals would appear to be

even more likely than hot file checks to conflict with the constitutional protections provided by the fourth, fifth, and 14th amendments.

Concern about a CCH system also has focused on its possible use by Federal agencies—

and particularly the FBI—for monitoring or

surveillance of the lawful activities of individual citizens or organizations. This concern is

based largely on the well-documented tendency of the FBI and other Federal agencies, in

the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, to expand intelligence investigations into the realm of political surveillance.24

ZzPeople v. Harris, 1975, 15 Cal. 3D, 384, 390.

‘

gPennsylvania v. Jones, U.S. Sup. Ct., No. 77-958 (Mar. 27,

1978).

“U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Inte}

Ligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, 94th

Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 26, 1976, p. 4. See also Seth Rosenfeld,

“The Berkeley Files: 17 Years of FBI Surveillance in Berkeley,”

The Daily Californian, May 28 and June 4, 1982.
146 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

. —— —

For example, the FBI’s COINTELPRO and

COMINFIL programs were designed to “disrupt” groups and to “neutralize” individuals

who were considered threats to domestic security, such as civil rights and anti-Vietnam War

leaders. Among the tactics employed was the

use of criminal arrest records to impede the

political careers of individuals who the FBI

deemed to be “threats.”25 Other intelligence

programs resulted in widespread invasions of

the privacy of American citizens through the

use of surveillance strategies ranging from

mail covers and openings to wiretapping and

surreptitious entry.26

Also during the early 1970’s, the FBI made

very limited use of NCIC for intelligence purposes which, although law enforcement in

nature, had not been authorized by Congress.

This was revealed in 1975 during hearings

before the Subcommittee on Constitutional

Rights of the U.S. Senate Committee on the

Judiciary. On July 15, 1975, the Subcommittee Chairman charged that the FBI was using

NCIC . . . “to keep track of individuals that

might be of interest to the FBI for whatever

purposes, including possibly political reasons .

The FBI conceded that a pilot flagging program using NCIC had been operational from

April 1971 to February 1974, but did not exceed 4,700 active “flags.” The FBI never advised either State and local officials, or apparently congressional officials, about the flagging program because it was “experimental”

in nature. According to the FBI, the flagging

practices were confined to “national security

intelligence investigations” and to the tracking of Selective Service delinquents, top jewel

thieves, and bank robbery suspects. The project’s objective was “to enable law enforcement

agencies to locate, through the NCIC, individuals being sought for law enforcement purposes who did not meet the criteria for inclusion in the NCIC wanted person file.”27 In

other words, NCIC was being used to track

“Ibid., p. 10.

“Ibid., p. 38.

zT~t@r from H~o]d R. Tyler, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gener~~

U.S. Department of Justice, to Senator John Tunney, Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on

the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Oct. 29, 1975.

individuals who had not been formally charged

with a crime and did not have an outstanding

warrant for a Federal offense or other extraditable felony or serious misdemeanor offense.

Since that time, the FBI has rejected all requests or proposals for intelligence use of

NCIC.* During the course of the OTA study,

FBI officials have repeatedly stated to Congress and to OTA that they will not permit Ident or NCIC to be used for unauthorized purposes of any kind.28 FBI officials believe that a national CCH system would not

have any significant surveillance potential

since “surveillance,” by definition, means a

close watch over someone. FBI officials assert

that a system such as NCIC which depends

primarily on chance contacts with law enforcement officers does not meet this definition and

certainly represents little, if any, danger to

law-abiding citizens. Strong and independent

policy control over a national CCH system and

tight restrictions on noncriminal justice access, coupled with outside audit and explicit

statutory guidelines for operations, would help

protect against the possibility-however remote—that a national CCH system could be

used at some point in the future in violation

of first amendment or other constitutional

rights. In comments to OTA, various criminal

justice officials have suggested a statutory

prohibition on intelligence use of the Interstate Identification Index or any other national CCH system. On the other hand, some State

officials have noted that there may be legitimate intelligence and surveillance applications

of a national CCH system, and that these

possibilities should not be abandoned solely

because of their sensitivity.

A final concern involves the intercomection

of FBI criminal record systems with other

Federal information systems that might collectively constitute a “de facto national data

bank” with even greater monitoring and surveillance potential. For example, the already

xA~ of septem~r 1982, the Department of Justice ~d FBI

had approved but not yet implemented a U.S. Secret Service

proposal to establish an NCIC file on persons judged to represent a potential threat to protectees.

28 See testimony of William Bayse, FBI, before the Oct. 22,

1981, hearing of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional

Rights, House Judiciary Committee.
Ch. 12—Other Impact Areas Relevanf to a National CCH System ● 147

authorized interconnection of NCIC with the

Treasury Enforcement Communication System and the Justice Telecommunication System means that the NCIC data base is accessible to dozens of Federal agencies, including

the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Bureau of

Customs, and Immigration and Naturalization

Service, among others.* Although these agencies are subject to Federal law and regulations

and NCIC operating procedures, the actual use

of NCIC data by Federal agencies does not ap-

*see Ch. 4.

pear to be subject to outside audit or oversight. Some agencies surveyed by OTA have

developed their own detailed procedures. For

example, IRS Criminal Investigative Division

procedures require that NCIC be queried when

evaluating possible tax fraud. * While such

Federal agency use is entirely legal, the interconnection of networks and information systems in effect extends the overall surveillance

potential.

*See ch. 6.

Impact on Constitutional Rights

The enactment of national legislation could

provide explicit guidelines for the operation

and use of a national CCH system and include

statutory protections against the use of CCH

information in ways that might violate constitutional rights. Such legislation could mandate

specific accountability alternatives such as access, review, and challenge procedures, criminal penalties, and privacy standards. Comprehensive legislation would help ensure a major

and continuing role for Congress in the development and oversight of a national CCH system. SEARCH Group, Inc., among others, has

concluded that enactment of Federal legislation “may be the single most important factor” in developing a national index or any

other national CCH system .

29 SEARC H

Group believes that in addition to protecting

constitutional rights,

3 0

legislation is necessary

in order to: 1) provide a clear mandate for a

national CCH system; 2) establish a strong national commitment in terms of political and

financial support; and 3) specify which organi2

’SEARCH Group, Inc., Essential Elements and Actions for

Implementing a Nationwide Criminal History Program,

Sacramento, Calif., February 1979, p. 4.

30 SEARCH Group, Inc., Standards for Security and Privacy

of Criminal Justice Information, Sacramento, Calif., January

1978, pp. 18-19. This report covers many other areas, such as

sealing and purging standards, that might be covered in comprc+

hensive legislation.

zations or entities shall have policy and/or

management responsibility .31

In the absence of comprehensive Federal legislation, a national CCH system could be established through user agreements among the

50 States or by an interstate compact. In the

former arrangement, each State would have

to execute user agreements with all othe r

States. To create an interstate compact, each

State legislature would have to ratify the compact which would then be signed by the Governor. Congress would need to enact legislation

consenting to the compact, followed by the signature of the President. 32 Whether or not establishing user agreements or an interstate

compact would be less cumbersome and more

feasible than enactment of comprehensive

Federal legislation is an open question. However, it seems likely that the legislative route

would provide stronger and more direct protection of constitutional rights.

Outside audit is another accountability

measure found to be very important in protecting constitutional rights and was recom3’SEARCH Group, Inc., Essential Elements and Actions for

Implementing a Nationwide Chlninal History Program, Sacramento, Calif., February 1979, p. 4.

“SEARCH Group, Inc., The I’easibfi”ty of an Interstate Gbmpact for Exchanging Criminal History Information, Sacramento, Calif., April 1980, pp. 3-4.
148 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

mended by SEARCH Group.33 Outside audit

would be necessary to ensure that a national

CCH system was being operated and used for

authorized purposes and in accordance with

any guidelines established by Congress. The

General Accounting Office and/or an independent national board could conduct audits of

Federal and State agencies, and State CCH

repositories (or possibly independent State

boards) could conduct audits of user agencies

within the State. *

The first amendment provides that “Congress shall make no laws . . . abridging the

freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right

of the people peaceably to assemble, and to

petition the Government for redress of grievances. ” First amendment rights could be violated to the extent a national CCH system was

used to monitor the lawful and peaceful activities or associations of citizens or to discourage

such activities or associations through the dissemination of criminal history information.

The dissemination of arrest-only information

for noncriminal justice purposes could violate

an individual’s freedom of speech and association.34 Strong and independent policy control

over a national CCH system and tight restrictions (or a prohibition) on noncriminal justice

access, coupled with outside audit and compre

hensive legislation, would help minimize the

possibility that a national CCH system could

be used at some point in the future in violation of first amendment rights.

The “right to privacy” is embodied principally in the fourth amendment, which guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures. ”

The courts have generally taken a middle

ground here in recognizing that the individual’s “fundamental right to privacy . . . and the

potential economic and personal harm that results if his arrest becomes known to employ-

“Ibid., p. 49.

*SW ch. 14 for further discussion.

34 See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico,

353 U.S. 252, 1957, where the court held that a State cannot

refuse to permit a law graduate to take a bar exam where such

refusal was based on arrests for offenses for which the applicant was not tried or convicted.

ers, credit agencies, or even neighbors”35 must

be balanced against the importance of arrest

records to law enforcement officials.36 Tight

restrictions on noncriminal justice access and

mandatory quality standards (especially with

respect to disposition reporting) for those records that are disseminated outside the criminal justice community would help minimize

the possibility that information from a national CCH system could be used in violation

of individual privacy.

The fifth amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ” The 14th

amendment extends this due process protection to the States. The presumption of innocence has been construed as falling within the

concept of liberty. Furthermore, the courts

have held, under certain circumstances, that

the dissemination and/or use of incomplete

and/or inaccurate arrest and conviction records violates due process.37 This is especially

the case when the complete and accurate criminal history information was otherwise available but was not used as a basis for criminal

justice decisions. The fifth amendment guarantees “the right to a speedy and public trial,

by an impartial jury ... , and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense, ” among

other criminal process rights. The eighth

amendment provides that no person shall be

subjected to “excessive bail . . . or fines, nor

cruel and unusual punishments. ” In the leading case of Tatum v. Rogers (1979), the court

found that the use of “rap sheets containing

erroneous, ambiguous, or incomplete data with

respect to prior arrests and dispositions” in

setting bail constituted violation of the 14th

(due process), sixth (right to effective assistance of counsel), and eighth (right to reasonable bail) amendments. * Mandatory record

3S% State v. Pinkney, 290 NE2d 923,924 (C.D. Ohio, 1972).

‘

a

See Ibid.; Houston Chronicle Publishing Cbmpany v. City

of Houston, 531 SW2d 177, 187 (Court of Civil Appeals of

Texas, 14 Dist. 1975); William Rehnquist, “Is an Expanded

Right of Privacy Consistent With Effective Law Enforcement,”

Kansas Law Review, vol. 23, fall 1974, pp. 1-22; and Menard

v. Mitchell 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

“see ch. 6 for discussion of Tarkzm v. Saxbe (1974) and Tatum

v. Rogers (1979).

*SW further discussion in chs. 6 ad 11’
— . —

Ch. 12—Other Impact Areas Relevant to a National CCH System ● 149 — —

quality standards established by statute and

backed up by the necessary funding and technical assistance to ensure implementation (and

outside audit to ensure compliance) appear to

be the most effective ways to minimize the

possibility that national CCH information

could lead to fifth, sixth, eighth, and 14th

amendment violations.

The 14th amendment also guarantees “the

equal protection of the laws” to any person

within the jurisdiction of a given State. It is

also arguable that “any act by the Federal

Government which would in effect be a denial

of equal protection of law would constitute a

‘deprivation of liberty’ prohibited by the fifth

amendment due process clause.”38 Thus, for

example, it can be argued that the use of incomplete criminal history records (especially

when lacking information on dispositions that

have already occurred) violates equal protection of the law by “merging the distinction

between innocence and guilt.’’”

‘

aWilliam A. Ratter, C2msitutiona] Law, Gilbert Law Summaries, Gardena, Calif., 1970, p. 87. See I?oMng v. Sharp, 347 U.S.

497, 1954.

“SEARCH, Standards for Security and Privacy, op. cit., p. 5.
Chapter 13

Congressional Policy

Considerations, Part I
--

Contents

Page

Chapter Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Action or No Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Further Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Strengthen State/Local CCH Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

Select a National CCH System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

Action or No Action.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Further Study.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Local Level Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Use of Out-of-State Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Record Quality.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Strengthen State/Local CCH Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

Improving Management of Already Existing CCH Systems. . . . . . . . . . 158

Developing New Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

Clarifying Title 28 Privacy and Security Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Improving Court Disposition Reporting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Range of Possible National CCH System Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Select a National CCH System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Possible Impacts on the Criminal Justice Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Importance of Complete, Timely, and Verifiable Information . . . . . . . . . 161

Improving Record Quality-Difficult But Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Shifting Preference on system Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

TABLES

Table No. Page

31. Comparison of Possible National CCH System Alternatives . . . . . . . . 160

32. Shifting Preferences of Federal and State Criminal Justice Officials

for a National CCH System. ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Chapter 13

Congressional Policy

Considerations, Part I

Chapter Summary

A wide range of policy options are available

to Congress relative to a national computerized criminal history (CCH) system. The choice

of an option or set of options will depend in

large part on congressional judgments regarding the importance of a national CCH system

relative to other priorities, and which national

CCH system alternative offers the most acceptable balance

verse impacts.

Action

Arguments for

. . .

between beneficial and ador No Action

No Action. Criminal history

lnformatlon is only one element in the criminal

justice process. There are competing priorities

for congressional attention and funding, such

as expanded prison facilities or revision of the

criminal code. Also, it might be argued that

criminal justice decisionmakers are aware of

the current deficiencies in criminal history information and take them into account, and

that effective control over a national CCH system would be difficult to achieve. The benefits

of a national CCH system are further constrained by the local nature of most crime, and

the diversity and constitutional prerogatives

of the States.

Arguments for Action. The National Law

Enforcement Telecommunications System

(NLETS) and the National Crime Information

Center (NCIC) hot files are two examples of

successful State cooperation in national systems. The lack of Federal direction has been

a major barrier to a national CCH system,

even though a Federal role could be justified

on several grounds. Many believe that a clear

decision on the future of NCIC/CCH is needed

and that this requires major congressional

involvement.

Perhaps the strongest argument for congressional action is that criminal history information is vital to and used at virtually every stage of the criminal justice process, and

that several surveys have identified a need for

more timely and complete criminal history information. This need becomes even more important in view of recent and proposed criminal justice reforms that place greater reliance

on criminal history information.

Some argue that the time is ripe for a decision on a national CCH system owing to new

alternatives now feasible with advanced computer and communication technology; the dramatic progress by many States in automating

their own systems and enacting State statutes

on criminal justice information systems; the

progress of the Identification Division (Ident)

in automating its own operations through the

Automated Identification Division System

(AIDS) program; and the early results of the

Interstate Identification Index (III) pilot test

and Phase I development.

Further Study

Additional study could be carried out on the

use of criminal history information at the local

level, the use of out-of-State criminal history

information, and record quality. For example,

while the OTA record quality research documented problems with record quality. Congress may wish to commission additional record quality studies to provide further statistical confirmation.

OTA did not attempt to make an independently verified estimate of the total cost of a

153
154 Ž An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System ——— - . —

national CCH system. Congress may wish to

commission a detailed cost analysis of any system alternatives selected for serious consideration.

Strengthen State/Local

CCH System s

Congress may wish to focus initially or solely on actions to strengthen State and local

CCH systems or to strengthen such systems

in parallel with the development of a national

CCH system.

OTA research identified four possible priorities for strengthening State and local CCH

systems. The first is funding and technical

assistance to improve the management of already existing CCH systems. A second is

funding and technical assistance for the

development of automated systems in States

that are still using a manual system. Should

Congress wish to pursue these two priorities,

budget action will be required since CCH-related grants previously provided through the

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

(LEAA) were eliminated in fiscal year 1981.

A third priority is the clarification of title

28 regulations on privacy and security of criminal history information systems. These regulations have now been in effect for about 7

years. The time may be ripe for Congress to

initiate a review of title 28. The results of this

review could be reflected in a title 28 revision

to be promulgated through normal rulemaking procedures or in comprehensive legislation,

should Congress choose to move in this direction.

A fourth priority is the improvement of

court disposition reporting. Some criminal justice decisionmakers see this as a key prerequisite for a national CCH system. Given the constitutional separation of powers, Congress is

limited in what it can do to encourage reform

and reorganization in the judicial branch.

However, Congress could authorize financial

and technical support to the States for use in

developing court disposition reporting systems, and could commission a survey of the

current status and needs of the judiciary with

respect to disposition reporting systems.

Select a National CCH System

Should Congress wish to select a national

CCH system, OTA found that three of the

many possible alternative systems could most

readily evolve from current systems: 1) a national CCH repository on serious offenders;

2) a single-State/multi-State CCH system with

partial message switching; and 3) a national

index (III) with partial or no message switching.

To the extent that a national CCH system

provides more complete, timely, and verifiable

(based on positive identification) information

than is presently available, the system would

improve the functioning of the criminal justice

process. The most significant improvements

are likely to be in the areas of criminal investigation, police booking and intake, pretrial release and bail decisions, and presentence investigation reports. Better information is also

important to sentencing, correctional, and, to

a lesser extent, probation and parole decisions.

Available evidence indicates that improvement in criminal identification and criminal

history exchange by the Federal Government

and most States is facilitated through computerization. Response times of 5 to 10 hours for

fingerprint identification checks and a few seconds to several hours for criminal history

checks are technically feasible. However, actual response times will depend on the priority assigned by the States and Federal Government, staffing and resource (including computer) limitations, and policies on record dissemination and use.

While computerization can improve response time, improvements in record quality

are more difficult to achieve. Untimely or incomplete disposition reporting is a significant

problem in many States. Nonetheless, the experience of three States with online CCH files

—California, Minnesota, and North Carolina–

shows that improvement is possible. Available

evidence indicates that strengthening State
Ch. 13—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part 1 ● 155

and local criminal history systems and court

disposition reporting systems is a prerequisite

to improving record quality, regardless of the

national CCH system structure.

Despite movement among many State and

Federal criminal justice officials toward agreeAction or

Congress always has the option of taking no

action. Criminal history information is only

one element of the criminal justice process.

There are, of course, competing priorities for

congressional attention and funding. These include, for example, additional trained police

investigators, new or expanded prison facilities, better local community support (e.g.,

“neighborhood watch” programs), or revision

of the criminal code.

It might be argued, furthermore, that currently available criminal history information,

however imperfect (e.g., incomplete with respect to disposition reporting), is good enough

since most criminal justice decisionmakers are

aware of these deficiencies and take them into

account. The potential benefits of a national

CCH system are further constrained by the

local nature of most crime.

It also might be argued that effective control over the contents and use of any national

CCH system would be difficult to achieve, given the very large number of potential users

and access points. Some technology experts

believe that the time for a decision is not ripe

because new technologies, such as small, lowcost computers with flexible programing capability and improved data security techniques,

will soon offer alternatives that are inherently easier to control.

Finally, some argue that since the States,

under the constitution, have basic jurisdiction

over law enforcement and criminal justice

within their borders, any efforts to implement

a national CCH system should be undertaken

by the States, not by Congress or the Federal

Government in general. There is also the concern that perhaps the States are too diverse

ment on a national index (III) concept (along

with a national fingerprint repository), questions raised with respect to policy control, noncriminal justice access, and record quality,

among other issue areas discussed in the following chapter, have yet to be resolved.

No Action

in their criminal justice laws and practices for

a national CCH system ever to be feasible.

On the other hand, NLETS is an example

of successful State cooperation in the operation of a national communication system.

Also, the success of the NCIC hot files is evidence that Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies can work together effectively. Some State and local criminal justice

officials claim that the major barrier to a national CCH system has been the lack of clear

direction at the Federal level, although in the

last 2 years there has been some movement

toward a consensus on the national index (III)

as a system structure.

A Federal role in a national CCH system

could be justified to the extent that the system

assisted in the enforcement of Federal criminal

law and prosecution of Federal offenders,

whether intrastate or interstate, and in the apprehension of criminal offenders who cross

State and/or national borders. To the extent

that crime is perceived as a national problem,

the Federal Government could define its role

in a national CCH system as simply another

way to provide voluntary support to State and

local law enforcement and criminal justice activities. From a legal standpoint, a Federal role

could be based on the criminal record information needs of Federal agencies as established

by various Federal statutes and executive orders, * implementation of title 28 regulations

for State and local criminal justice information systems that have used Federal funding,** the interstate commerce clause of the

U.S. Constitution, and the constitutional pro-

*See ch. 6.

**sW chg. 5 and 6.
156 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

visions (including the first, fourth, fifth, sixth,

eighth, ninth, and 14th amendments) guaranteeing individual rights of privacy and due

process. ’

Perhaps the strongest argument for congressional action is that criminal history information is vital to and used at virtually every

stage of the criminal justice process, and that

surveys conducted by OTA, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement identified a need for

more timely and complete criminal history information.*

This need becomes even more important in

view of State bail and sentencing reforms that

place greater reliance on criminal history information, and the many recommendations of

the U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on

Violent Crime that involve criminal history

records. For example, the task force recommended action to establish an NCIC file on

firearms violators, to require a mandatory

criminal records check on handgun purchasers,

and to deny bail to persons with prior convictions for serious crimes committed while in

pretrial release status.2

Incomplete disposition data is perceived as

a major problem in Federal and some State

criminal record systems, and this was confirmed by the OTA record quality research.**

An additional problem with Ident is the slow

response time, due in large part to the manual

processing of fingerprint cards. These problems were noted by the Attorney General’s

Task Force that recommended, among other

things, “swift completion” of the Ident automation program.3

Another argument in favor of action is the

12-year debate over the NCIC/CCH program.

‘See SEARCH-Group, inc., S~azI&r&- for Security and Privacy of Criminal Justice Information, Sacramento, Calif.,

January 1978, p. 18.

*See ch. 11.

‘Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime, Final Re

por~ U.S. Department of Justice, Aug. 17, 1981, pp. 13,29,50.

**See ch. 8

‘Task Force, Final fipor~ op. cit., pp. 11-12, 18-19, 67-69.

A number of criminal justice decisionmakers

interviewed by OTA and DOJ noted the substantial time and money already expended on

the NCIC/CCH debate with no real resolution

of several underlying issues. Many believe

that a clear decision on the future of NCIC/

CCH is needed, and that this decision would

require a major, if not dominant, congressional

involvement.

Finally, four key trends are cited to support

congressional action. First, computer and communication technology has advanced to the

point where both centralized and decentralized

system structures are possible. Computer

hardware is less expensive than either the software or the communication links, and decentralized systems can be cost effective.* Second, many States and localities and several

Federal agencies have developed their own

CCH capability.** At the State level, CCH

systems (when compared to manual) obtain

relatively higher arrest and court disposition

reporting rates and have shown significantly

greater improvement.*** Many States have

made dramatic progress in automating their

own systems and in enacting State statutes

and regulations on criminal justice information systems.**** Third, Ident has made progress in automating its own operations through

AIDS. † Ident could become part of a national

CCH system and could compete with, duplicate, and/or supersede the existing NCIC/CCH

file. Congressional action may be necessary to

determine the most cost-effective role for

Ident/AIDS and NCIC/CCH as separate systems and, perhaps, as part of a national CCH

system. Fourth, the early results of the III

pilot test and Phase I development suggest

that it is operationally as well as technically

feasible. Some point to these developments as

evidence that this is a propitious time for a

decision on a national CCH system.

*see Chs. 5 and 10.

**See ch. 4.

***See ch. 9.

****See ch. 6.

TSee ch. 4.
Ch. 13—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part 1 ● 157

Further Study

In the course of the OTA research, a number

of areas for possible further study were identified, including the following:

Local Level Use

One possible area is the use of criminal history information at the local level. The flow

of criminal history information in the United

States resembles an enormous pyramid. OTA

was able to identify the flow of information

at the Federal and State levels in a fairly systematic way through analysis of Ident and

NCIC/CCH use statistics, interviews with

Federal user agencies, the comprehensive

50-State survey and telephone or written interviews with State repository personnel in 44

States (including site visits to 5 States).

However, at the local level, given the vast size

of the user population, OTA had to depend on

the results of limited interviewing and comments received on the draft report. Should

Congress seek additional information on the

needs and perspectives of local criminal justice

decisionmakers, a written survey could be

used to cover a large number of local areas,

as was done at the State level with the OTA

50-State survey.’

Use of Out-of-State

Information

A second area of possible further study is

the use of out-of-State criminal history information. A major justification for a national

CCH system is the perceived need to exchange

out-of-State criminal history information.

However, OTA found that the usefulness of

out-of-State criminal history information can

be limited due to difficulties in interpreting the

records, variations from State to State in the

definition of many criminal offenses, wide discrepancies in local police behavior and criminal

justice practices, and the substantial time and

effort required to validate incomplete and/or

ambiguous records. It could be advantageous

to determine more precisely the nature and ex4For suggestions on a research methodology, see working

paper B, sec. VII, pp. 236-240.

tent of these and other constraining factors

and how they might best be overcome.

Record Quality

A third area in need of further study is record quality. The results of the OTA record

quality research documented various record

quality problems. Congress may wish to commission additional studies to provide statistical confirmation of present levels of record

quality. In order to establish the exact imprecations of record quality, a sample of cases could

be followed through a single jurisdiction for

a period of time, with close attention given to

how the records are used and interpreted.

cost s

A fourth area needing further study is costs.

As noted in chapter 5, quantifying the costs

of a national CCH system is very difficult

mainly due to the absence of systematic cost

data at the State and local levels. OTA did not

attempt to make an independently verified estimate of the total costs. Congress may wish

to commission a detailed cost analysis of any

system alternatives selected for serious consideration.

Whether or not further study in some or all

of the areas discussed above is necessary at

this time is a judgment best left to Congress.

The U.S. Senate was concerned enough about

the lack of information and analysis to have

included a new study effort in the DOJ Appropriation Authorization Acts for fiscal years

1981 and 1982. Provisions of these acts called

for the Attorney General, after consultation

with the Committees on the Judiciary of the

Senate and the House of Representatives, to

arrange for “an appropriate independent entity” to prepare a report and recommendation

on a national CCH system. 5 This OTA report

should provide one basis for determinin g

whether a further comprehensive study is

needed.

‘See sec. 113 of the Department of Justice Appropriations

Act of 1981 and Amendment 612 to the Department of Justice

Appropriations Act of 1982 (Congressional Record Nov. 12,

1981, Pp. S13290-91.
158 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Strengthen State/Local CCH Systems

Congress may wish to focus initially or solely on actions to strengthen State and local

CCH systems or to strengthen such systems

in parallel with the development of a national

CCH system. In effect, the latter was the option exercised by Congress during the 1970’s.

In the absence of a clear-cut congressional

decision on a national CCH system, Congress

did authorize and fund both NCIC/CCH and

Ident/AIDS at the national level (through the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) budget), and the development and strengthening

of State and local CCH systems (through the

LEAA budget).* Partially as a result, the

States have made substantial progress and are

in a much better position technically to support a national CCH system than they were

12 years ago. Nonetheless, further improvements in many States and localities appear to

be necessary. The record quality problems of

Ident and NCIC/CCH reflect in part underlying deficiencies at the State and local levels.

OTA research identified the following possible priorities for strengthening State and local

CCH systems:

Improving Management of

Already Existing

CCH System s

States vary widely in their management

practices.** Federal funding and technical assistance could be focused in those States most

in need of improved procedures to assure the

accuracy and completeness of criminal history

information, to conduct audits of local users,

to maintain and periodically review transaction logs, and to train CCH system employees

and users.

Developing New Systems

Funding and technical assistance could be

provided for the development of automated

*See ch. 5.

**See ch. 9.

systems in States that are still using a manual

system. The purpose would be to help each

State determine what kind of system would

be best suited to its needs. Some States simply

may not be able to justify a completely automated system. For example, several of the

smaller States believe that an automated

name index would be sufficient to permit their

effective participation in a national system,

and that computerizing the full records would

not be necessary or cost effective.

Should Congress wish to pursue these two

priorities, budget action would be required

since CCH-related grants previously provided

through LEAA were eliminated in fiscal year

1981. The termination of the CCH funding pro

gram resulted more from severe criticism leveled at LEAA as a whole than from specific

problems with CCH-related grants.* Indeed,

it can be argued that LEAA CCH-related

grants made a significant contribution to the

relatively rapid development of State CCH

systems during the last 12 years.** Congress

may wish to fund this grant program again,

establish a new categorical grant program

with a focus on the priorities outlined above,6

or assign a priority to CCH system management and development as part of a larger

block grant for State and local law enforcement.

Congress could authorize States to fund

their own CCH technical assistance out of Federal categorical or block grant money and/or

retain a small technical assistance team in

DOJ. In the past, LEAA has provided both

direct technical assistance and funding for

technical assistance efforts by SEARCH

Group, Inc., and others. With the demise of

*D~g the ]a~ 1970’s LEAA was criticized for, among other

things, subsidizing the operating budgets of local police departments, underwriting the purchase of expensive and unnecessary

equipment, and in general spending tax dollars in ways that

did not result in significant progress in the “war against crime.”

**See chs. 4, 5, and 6.

‘The Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime has

recommended legislation to authorize and fund a new categorical grant program. See Final Report, op. cit., pp. 67-69.
Ch. 13—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part / ● 159

LEAA, Congress may wish to assign responsibility for technical assistance to the Attorney

General, leaving to him the decision about

which DOJ entity should carry out this function. Alternatively, Congress could explicitly

provide that a technical assistance team shall

be located within, for example, an existing

DOJ office, the FBI, or perhaps a new Bureau

of Criminal Justice Information (or the equivalent), should one be established to operate a

national CCH system.

Clarifying Title 28 Privacy

and Security Regulations’

Title 28 regulations have now been in effect

for about 7 years. Many States and localities

have accumulated several years of experience

in attempting to interpret and implement the

regulations. The time may be ripe for Congress

to initiate a review of title 28. One aspect of

the review might be to commission a survey

of the implementation of title 28 by States as

of 1982. The results could then be compared

with the OTA survey conducted in 1979* to

see to what extent States are still making

progress toward its full implementation. The

results of this review could be reflected either

in a title 28 revision to be promulgated by

DOJ through normal rulemaking procedures,

or in comprehensive legislation should Congress choose to move in this direction. Presumably the results would also serve as a valuable

input to setting priorities for any funding and

technical assistance that may be authorized

by Congress.

Improving Court Disposition

Reporting

The OTA research has documented incomplete disposition reporting at the State and

Federal levels.** Some criminal justice deci-

’28 CFR 20; see ch. 6.

*See ch. 9.

**sW chs. 8 and 9.

sionmakers see an improvement in court disposition reporting as a key prerequisite for a

national CCH system. The improvement of

court disposition reporting is closely tied to

court reorganization. Minnesota is one of the

States that have made the most progress in

court reform. The State has implemented a

State Judicial Information System that is

achieving close to 100 percent court reporting.

The system will track clients through the entire State court system, automatically record

court dispositions, and feed them directly into

the State repository. According to a Minnesota court official:8

In Minnesota we’ve got three things going

for us: (1) money; (2) the power of the (State)

Supreme Court backed up by the funding and

political support of the State legislature; and

(3) the technical know-how to put together an

adequate system.

Given the constitutional separation of powers, Congress is limited in what it can do to

encourage reform and reorganization in the

judicial branch. However, as in the past, Congress could again authorize financial support

and technical assistance to the States for use

in developing court disposition reporting systems.* In addition, Congress could itself commission, or direct the Attorney General to

commission, a survey of the current status and

needs of the judiciary with respect to disposition reporting systems.’ The survey could attempt to identify on a State-by-State basis exactly what additional judicial information systems development would be necessary to support a national CCH system.

‘Interview in 1979 with a Minnesota court official; reaffirmed

in 1982.

*During the 1970’s, a portion of LEAA grant funds was Provided to the States for development of offender-based transaction systems intended to include court disposition reporting and

provide input to CCH systems.

‘See a related study by the National Center for States Courts,

A Review of OBTS and CCH Program Requirements in the Judiciary, Williamsburg, Va., 1979.
160 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Range of Possible National

CCH System Structures

Select a National CCH System

Should Congress wish to select a national

CCH system, the five summarized in table 31

are representative of the entire range of possible structures.* All five could evolve from current systems. For example, full development

of the AIDS file of Ident would constitute a

national CCH repository when hooked up to

NCIC (or other) communication lines to permit nationwide electronic access. The repository would include records on the roughly 21

million persons with arrests for serious offenses. If the repository was limited to records

on violent and very serious offenders (FBI index crimes), then full development of AIDS

with NCIC interconnection would be the

equivalent of a national full record CCH

system with a file size of about 9 million records.

On the other hand, nationwide implementation of Phase I of the III development plan10

would constitute a single-State/multi-State

*see ch. 10 for detailed discussion.

‘°For a discussion of the Interstate Identification Index (111)

development plan, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, 111

Background and Findings for July-Sept. 1981 Phase I Pilot

l?rojec~ Dec. 4, 1981, pp. 111-135. Phase I of the plan involves

decentralization of single-State offender records of six of the

eight States currently fully participating in NC IC/CCH. Ibid.,

p. 116.

CCH system with partial message switching.

The index could also be implemented with no

message switching. The central file would include records on Federal and multi-State serious offenders (about 6 million) and index entries (names and personal identifiers only; no

criminal history information) on single-State

serious offenders (about 15 million). Nationwide implementation of the second and third

phases of the III development plan11 would be

the equivalent of a national index with partial

message switching. The central file would

include only records on Federal offenders

(0.5 million), plus index entries on single- and

multi-State offenders (20.5 million).

Finally, an ask-the-network CCH system

could result if both the AIDS and III programs were not implemented due to some combination of technical, fiscal, administrative,

and/or political factors. In this case, an alternative would be to use only the existing

NLETS network (or a privately offered network) to exchange criminal history information between and among the States and the

Federal Government.

“Phases 11 and III of the plan would include index entries

for single-State offender records from States not currently participating in NCICICCH, and decentralization of multi-State

offender records of the fully participating States. Ibid.

Table 31 .—Comparison of Possible National CCH System Alternatives

Single-State/

National full multi-State CCH National Index (Ill)

National CCH record CCH system system with partial with partial or no Ask-the-network

repository

.

(FBI index crimes) message switching message switching system

Central file size:

Records . . . . . . . . . 21 million 8.6 million 6 million 0.5 million 0.5 million

Index entries . . . . . — — 15 million 20.5 million

Central file content:

—

Records . . . . . . . . . All serious offenders Violent and very Federal and Federal offenders Federal

(Federal, single- and serious offenders multi-State serious offenders

multi-State) offenders

Index entries . . . . . — — Single-State serious Single- and —

offenders multi-State serious

— offenders.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment
Ch. 13—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part I ● 161 ——— — .—— —

Since 49 of the 50 States maintain a State driving forces behind efforts to keep the reidentification bureau and 45 of 50 States re- ordkeeping function decentralized so that duquire fingerprint submissions to this bureau plication between the Federal and State Govon arrest,12 records on almost all offenders will ernments is minimal. OTA did not conduct the

continue to be maintained by the States. detailed cost studies needed to provide specific

Therefore, any records maintained in a nation- cost estimates for the various alternatives.

al repository will incur extra operational costs

to the Federal Government for storing the rec- From an operational point of view, OTA

found that three alternative systems could orals and to the States for updating the records. Cost control has thus been one of the most readily evolve from current systems:

1) a national repository; 2) a single-State/multi- ——. — State system with partial message switching; 12FB 1, ~cl c staff paper prepared for the NOV. 3-A, 1981 i meeting of the NCIC Advisory Policy Board Subcommittee on and 3) a national index with partial or no mesthe Interstate identification Index, Topic #6, p. 2. sage switching.

Possible Impacts on the

Criminal Justice Process

Importance of Complete,

Timely, and Verifiable

Information

The results of OTA research indicate that

the more complete, timely, and verifiable (i.e.,

backed up by positive identification) the CCH

information, the more useful it would be.

While even incomplete information has some

value as a “pointer” to the sources of additional information, many criminal justice decisionmakers noted the problems caused when

criminal history records lack important data

(e.g., on dispositions and charges), arrive too

late to be useful, and/or are not based on

positive identification (i.e., fingerprints or

State or Federal identification numbers which

are in turn based on a fingerprint check).

Available evidence indicates that improvement in criminal identification and criminal

history information exchange by the Federal

Government and most States is facilitated

through computerization. During the period

1970-79, States with CCH record systems

achieved significant increases in disposition

reporting, while States with manual systems

showed very little improvement. * The operating experience of the Ident AIDS program and

*See ch. 9.

several State identification bureaus has documented the much shorter turnaround time possible with automated as compared to manual

systems. ’3 A recently completed comprehensive Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) study

of AIDS concluded that full automation could

reduce the overall Ident processing time for

fingerprint checks from about 36 work days

to about 3 hours.14 In addition, the cost per

fingerprint search would drop by about 50

percent.15

Turnaround time could be further improved

through the use of high-quality facsimile electronic transmission. Two States, New York

and Illinois, already make relatively extensive

use of this technology.l6 The JPL study suggested that the five States with the largest

volumes of fingerprint card submissions (and

collectively accounting for about half of all

submissions) could have facsimile interconneclsln~mation~ ASSmiatiOn for Identification, FUrJc~iOnd ~

quirement.s and Systems Development Plan for State Identification Bureaus: Executive Summary of FinaYngs and Recommendations, Utica, N. Y., October 1980, pp. 9-11. 14Jet propulsion Laboratory, FBI Ftigt?rprtit ~dentification

Automation Study: AIDS 111 Evaluation llepor~ California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Nov. 15, 1980, pp. 1-2 and 1-3;

prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau

of Investigation.

‘

K Ibid.

“International Association for Identification, State Identification Bureaus, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

- !.- 4 -
162 • An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

tion with AIDS. JPL projects a 3-hour internal processing time for AIDS if fully implemented, and 8 hours for the residual manual

files. 17 Thus, use of facsimile transmission

could conceivably further reduce the total response time for fingerprint checks to the range

of 5 to 10 hours. New York State responds to

fingerprint inquiries submitted via facsimile

within an average of 1 hour and 50 minutes,

and within 3 hours 90 percent of the time.

Response time for criminal history record

checks could be even faster. In theory, response time for a full record CCH system

would approach the 5-second or less range of

the NCIC hot files. However, in order for the

records disseminated to be complete and accurate the States would have to update the records in the central file on an almost continuous

basis. One reason many States support a national index system is that they are unable

and/or unwilling to update full records maintained in a central national CCH repository.

Response time for a national index CCH alternative would likely be in the range of several

hours or less. However, this will vary depending on the capability of individual States.

The III pilot test with the State of Florida

has demonstrated that response times of less

than an hour are possible. In the 3-month pilot

test (July-September 1981), the response time

was less than 1 hour 86 percent of the time

and under 15 minutes 64 percent of the time.18

However, Florida is fully committed to the III

concept, has an advanced online State CCH

system, and operates under a State “open records” law that simplifies record dissemination

decisions. Thus, the average response time for

all States could be longer. Nonetheless, for the

38 States with an online CCH file or automated name index (collectively representing

about 95 percent of all criminal history record

activity as measured by fingerprint card submissions), * a response time Of several hours

or less seems technically feasible. Actual response time will also depend on the priority

“Jet Propulsion Laboratory, ~111 ~tigerprti~ Identification,

op. cit., p. 1-2.

ISFBI, ~11 llackaou~d and Findings, op. cit., P. 162.

*% table 5, ch. 4.

assigned by participating States, staffing and

resource (including computer) limitations, and

State policies on record dissemination and use.

In the III Phase I test (February-April 1982),

the response time was less than 15 minutes

85 percent of the time and under 1 minute 48

percent of the time.19 Thus, it appears that the

III response time could approach the response

time achieved by individual States with on-line

CCH files.

In the OTA 50-State survey, for example,

California, Colorado, Delaware, Minnesota,

New Jersey, Ohio, and South Carolina reported CCH response times of, respectively,

5, 3, 15, 20, 10, 9, and 5 seconds. Response

time was considerably longer for States with

manual files. For example, New Hampshire,

New Mexico, Pennsylvania, West Virginia,

and Wyoming reported manual response times

of, respectively, 4, 10, 3, 14, and 2 days. 2o The

FBI and OTA used slightly different definitions of response time. OTA defined response

time as the total time from receipt of a request

for criminal history information by the State

repository to receipt of the CCH record

(response) by the requesting agency. The FBI

defined response time as the time from inquiry

by the requesting agency to the time of receipt

of the summary CCH record by the requesting

agency.

Improving Record Quality—

Difficult But Possible

While computerization can improve the response time of fingerprint and criminal record

checks, improvements in record quality are

more difficult to achieve. This is because high

record quality depends on timely (and accurate) submissions from a large number of criminal justice agencies. Court disposition reporting is particularly important. The OTA 50-

State survey found that the average record

update time for courts was about 64 days compared with 20 days for law enforcement agencies, 47 days for prosecutors, 24 days for pro-

‘9FB1, III Preliminary Findings for February-March 1982

Test, April 1982, p. 17.

2’)OTA 50-State Survey conducted in 1979-80.
Ch. 13—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part 1 • 163

bation/parole agencies, and 16 days for correctional agencies.21 Update time refers to the

total time that elapses from the occurrence of

a criminal history event (e.g., arrest or court

disposition) to the updating of the subject’s

criminal history record. The average update

time for the courts ranged as high as 1 year.

Many States did not know what the average

time was.

Nonetheless, the experience of three States

with online CCH files—California, Minnesota,

and North Carolina-shows that improvement

is possible. In California, partly as a result of

field audits and local training efforts, the

statewide felony disposition reporting rate has

increased from 66.6 percent in 1978 to 70.8

percent in 1980. The statewide superior court

disposition reporting rate has increased from

69.1 percent in 1978 to 79.3 percent in 1980.22

In Minnesota, a State Judicial Information

System was implemented on July 1, 1980.

This, coupled with mandatory reporting forms

and followup from the office of the State Supreme Court administrator, has resulted in

essentially 100 percent final disposition reporting.23 Roughly 80 percent of all final dispositions are reported within 1 to 2 days after the

disposition occurs, and almost all are reported

within 5 days. The dispositions are checked

for accuracy and completeness and then forwarded to the State CCH repository. However, due in part to problems in establishing

positive identification, the actual disposition

level in the State CCH file is about 85 percent

and has remained essentially constant over the

last 3 years.24 The State repository can update

records only if the update information is based

on positive identification.

In North Carolina, the State identification

bureau criminal history file was automated in

1976. Since that time, the disposition report-

“ibid.

“Based on data in Feb. 2, 1982, letter and enclosures from

Fred H. Wynbrandt, Assistant Director, Criminal Identification and information Branch, California Department of Justice.

“Feb. 12, 1982, conversation with James Rebo, office of the

Minnesota State Supreme court Administrator, 24Feb. 11, 1982, conversation with Clayton Mellem, Criminal

Justice information System, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Minnesota State Department of Public Safety.

ing rate has increased from 26 percent in

1975-76 to 48 percent in 1978-79, and is projected at 61 percent for 1981-82. As of December 31, 1981, the North Carolina Police Information Network showed a court disposition

for about 75 percent of the 206,683 arrest

events included in the system at that time.

This improvement reflects considerable effort

to update records, including the use of interns

in the three largest North Carolina court districts (Wake, Guilford, and Mecklenberg) to

assist in the submission of dispositions.25 On

January 1, 1982, a new State law went into

effect requiring submission of felony arrest fingerprints and dispositions to the State identification bureau.26 This will presumably contribute to further improvement in disposition

reporting.

Thus, available evidence indicates that

strengthening State/local criminal history systems and court disposition reporting systems

is a prerequisite to further improving record

quality, regardless of the national CCH system structure. Particularly important are efforts to: 1) upgrade court administration;

2) establish standardized (and perhaps even

codified*) court reporting procedures; 3) improve the coordination between judicial and

other criminal justice agencies (especially law

enforcement) responsible for timely record update actions; 4) strengthen field audits of reporting procedures and record quality; and

5) increase funding and technical assistance

to implement computer-based systems where

appropriate.

To the extent that a national CCH system

provides more complete, timely, and verifiable

information than is presently available, the

system would improve the functioning of the

criminal justice process. Based on the surveys

and research reviewed in chapter 11, the most

“Based on data in Jan. 29, 1982, letter from WiUiarn C. Corley,

Director, Police Information Network, State of North Carolina

Department of Justice.

‘

sGeneral Assembly of North Carolina, House Bill 118, “An

Act to Require the Reporting of Complete and Accurate Criminal Histories to the State Bureau of Investigation, ” July 8,

1981.

*Minnesota has promulgated a standard criminal complaint

form which must be used by prosecuting attorneys and court

clerks.
164 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

significant improvements are likely to be in

the areas of criminal investigations, police

booking and intake, pretrial release and bail

decisions, and presentence investigation reports. Since criminal history information is

used throughout the criminal justice process,

better information is also important to sentencing, correctional, and, to a lesser extent,

probation and parole decisions.

Shifting Preferences on

System Structure

In general, over the last 3 to 4 years many

State and Federal criminal justice officials

have shifted their support from the singleState/multi-State alternative to the national

index (or III) concept. This shift is illustrated

in table 32.

In the 1982 OTA follow-up survey, officials

from about two-thirds of the States indicated

a clear preference for the III concept, with officials from most of the other States either actively considering III or seeking further information on which to base a decision. However,

many States, even some of those strongly supporting III, noted a variety of implementation

problems that might preclude their participation, in some cases for years.

Many of these officials also support the concept of a National Fingerprint File (NFF), considered to be an integral part of III and which

would be limited to fingerprint cards and related personal descriptors on each criminal offender. The NFF would contain no arrest or

disposition data. It would perform the technical fingerprint search to establish positive

identification or nonidentification based on fingerprint cards received from State identification bureaus or Federal agencies. It would also

assign FBI identification numbers, and could

enter identification data into III. The NFF

concept is predicated on single-source submission policies. That is, only one agency per

State would be authorized to submit fingerprint cards, and submission of only one fingerprint card per subject per State would be permitted. 27

OTA surveyed the States with respect to

single-source fingerprint card submission and

found that, as of August 1982, 18 States had

implemented single-source submission (compared to 17 in a September 1981 FBI survey)

and 4 more States had scheduled a late 1982

implementation for a total of 22 States. Officials from about one third of the other States

indicated that implementing single-source submission could be difficult due to a potential

work overload, staff and funding shortages,

local agency resistance, and/or privacy concerns. Nonetheless, despite the movement towards agreement on III and NFF as the basic

national CCH system concept, questions

raised with respect to, for example, policy control, noncriminal justice access, record quality, and system accountability, have yet to be

resolved. These and other issues are discussed

in the next chapter.

27 See SEARCH Group, Inc., Essential Elements and ActiorIs

for Implementing a Nationwide Criminal History Program,

Sacramento, Calif., February 1979; and NCIC Advisory Policy

Board, A Proposed Chcept for a Decentralized Criminal History Record System, Apr. 12, 1978. See also NCIC Advisory

Policy Board, Phase I Test Interstate Identification Index:

Report of the III Evaluation Ckmnnittee, June 1982, p. 4.

Table 32.—Shifting Preferences of Federal and State

Criminal Justice Officials for a National CCH System

System alternative

Single-State/multi-State National Index (Ill)

FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (throughout 1970’s) (since 1980)

NCIC Advisory Policy Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (early mid-1970’s) (since 1978)

States (DOJ survey of 10 States) . . . . . . . . . . . . (1978)

States (OTA surveya) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 States (1979) 24 States (1979)

SEARCH Group, Inc.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1970-78) (1979 to present)

NLETS, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1981)

U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on

Violent Crime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1981)

aT~O states preferred ask.the.network; one preferred a national repository; and four indicated no preference. Forty-two

States responding.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, SEARCH Group, Inc ,

and National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System
Chapter 14

Congressional Policy

Considerations, Part II
 . . . . . _ .

Contents

Page

Chapter Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Policy Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

File Size and Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Record Quality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Noncriminal Justice Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Oversight and Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Public Participation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Comprehensive Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

III Development Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

AIDS/CCH Consolidation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Private Carrier Role in a National CCH System.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Policy Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

File Size and Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Record Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

Noncriminal Justice Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Oversight and Audit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Public Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Comprehensive Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

Access, Review, and Challenge Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

Criminal Penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

Privacy Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

Technical Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Uniform Crime Codes and Record Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

III Development Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

AIDSICCH Consolidation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

Private Carrier Rolein NationaI CCH System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

TABLES

Table No. Page

33. 1979 Preferences of State Repository Personnel for CCH System

Structure and Policy Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

34. File Size Options for a National CCH System Based on Composition

of Ident File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

35.Subject Areas Relevant to Comprehensive Legislation on Criminal

Justice Information Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

36. Possible File Structure of a Reorganized National Crime Information

Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Chapter 14

Congressional Policy

Considerations, Part II

Chapter

As noted in chapter 13, the emerging consensus among Federal and State law enforcement and criminal history record repository

officials supports the national index concept

known as the Interstate Identification Index

(III). However, full implementation of III (or

any other national computerized criminal history (CCH) system) would require resolution

of a number of issues that warrant congressional attention to ensure that beneficial impacts are maximized and adverse impacts are

controlled or minimized.

Policy Control

Considerable debate has focused on which

agency or organization should have direct policy control over a national CCH system. Suggestions include a consortium of States, a

broadened and strengthened National Crime

Information Center (NCIC) Advisory Policy

Board (APB), an independent board, and/or

the FBI. For example, a broadened and

strengthened APB could include greater representation from the prosecutorial, judicial, correctional, and public defender sectors of the

criminal justice community that at present,

and could include an “advise and consent”

role, at least with respect to State and local

participation in a national system. There are

many other possibilities, but the key issue is

how to devise a mechanism that will effectively represent the interests of the diverse users

of a national system, and afford them a strong

and possibly controlling policy role.

File Size and Content

Under the III concept, the national index

would include only names and identifying inSummary

formation (e.g., height, weight, social security number, and State and Federal criminal

identification numbers). Proposals have been

made to limit the index to entries on violent

or very serious offenders, that is, for crimes

included in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) crime index. However, this would

exclude entries for drug, weapons, drunk driving, and other offenses generally considered

to be serious but not included in the FBI crime

index. At the other extreme, a totally unrestricted index could include entries on as many

as 36 million persons. Other national index

issues include the need for policies on limited

retention periods for some entries, and on the

handling of juvenile offender records.

Record Quality

With a national index, the FBI would no

longer maintain non-Federal records, and the

problems of record quality in Ident and NCIC/

CCH would be reduced. However, the quality

of records maintained by the States, as well

as the quality of any index based on those

records, would still be a matter of concern.

Record quality could be strengthened by tightening the disposition reporting requirements

and/or requiring confirmation of records lacking disposition data with the originating agency prior to any dissemination. In the opinion

of some, the latter requirement would be costly and impractical. The progress made by

many States in recent years indicates that improved disposition reporting is possible, but

continued record quality improvement would

require a significant further commitment

measured in manpower, dollars, and system

improvements at the State and local levels.

167
168 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Noncriminal Justice Access

Significant noncriminal justice use of Federal and State criminal history record systems,

coupled with widely varying State statutes

defining authorized users and State policies

on sealing and purging, has generated concern

about control of access to criminal history records. Noncriminal justice access to a national

index could be prohibited, although this would

conflict with many Federal and State laws.

Noncriminal justice access could be permitted,

but only under stronger Federal guidelines

than presently exist. A dual index could be established, one for criminal justice use and a

second for noncriminal justice use, perhaps

with the latter based on disposition or conviction information only. Even under the status

quo, access to a national index would require

complicated safeguards (which are technically feasible with a computer-based system) to

be consistent with the wide variety of existing

State laws and regulations, and would require

some means to resolve conflicts among State

laws, and between Federal statutes and Executive orders and State laws.

Oversight and Audit

The purposes of new oversight mechanisms

would be to help assure Congress, the public,

and others that a national index (or any other

national CCH system) is operating within the

boundaries of law and regulation, and to help

identify any problems that may emerge. Oversight is closely linked to system audit. Several

possibilities have been suggested. First, Congress could require an annual management report on the operation of a national CCH system. Second, Congress could require periodic

audits of Federal and State CCH files to help

ensure compliance with whatever system

standards may be established. To keep costs

down, the audits would presumably be conducted by sampling Federal and State files on

a rotating and perhaps unannounced schedule.

Any Federal audit authority, whether by the

General Accounting Office (GAO) or some

other body, would appear to require new Federal legislation and/or regulations.

Public Participation

NCIC’S APB is the only direct avenue of

public participation in the governance of the

existing NCIC/CCH system. However, at present the APB does not include representation

from the general public or from public defenders. Public defenders feel strongly that they

should be represented on any policy board established for a national CCH system and that

defense interests should have access to that

system. The experience of Alameda County,

Calif., where public defenders are considered

to be part of the criminal justice community,

has been that public participation in oversight

can help ensure accountability of criminal justice record systems and can be beneficial in

terms of system performance.

Comprehensive Legislation

Legislation represents one of the strongest

measures to provide Federal direction and ensure accountability and control. It could provide explicit authority for a national index or

other national CCH system, and include statutory guidelines for its operation and use. In

addition to the areas discussed above, legislation could establish access, review, and challenge procedures; criminal penalties; privacy

standards; funding for computer-based user

audits and court disposition monitoring procedures; and uniform crime codes and criminal

history record formats.

III Development Plan

In order to develop important additional

data from the III test now underway, Congress may wish to consider whether the plan

should be revised so that: 1) some or all of the

participating States can be tested with no

NCIC message switching as well as with partial message switching (known as automatic

inquiry referral); and 2) record quality research

can be conducted.

AIDS/CCH Consolidation

At present, the Ident/Automated Identification Division System (AIDS) and NCIC/CCH
— .

Ch. 14—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part II ● 1 6 9

files duplicate each other to a significant and

growing extent. Any AIDS/CCH consolidation is likely to have a significant impact on

the cost of FBI criminal history and identification services and could be an integral part of

a national CCH system. Congress may wish

to request the preparation of several alternative consolidation plans, including the possible creation of a new National Criminal Information and Identification Division of the FBI,

which would combine Ident, NCIC, and related activities. Congress may also wish to examine the pros and cons of shifting management of a national CCH system to a new bureau within the Department of Justice (DOJ)

or elsewhere.

Private Carrier Role in a

National CCH System

Congress may wish to review the role of private communication carriers in a national

CCH system. Privately offered nationwide

data communication networks using satellite

as well as landline transmission, and providing

security measures such as data encryption,

may offer significant benefits over lines currently used by NCIC and the National Law

Enforcement Telecommunications System

(NLETS).

Policy Control

Considerable debate has focused on which

agency or organization should have direct policy control over a national index (or other national CCH system). There is general agreement that any national CCH system would require some degree of policy control to ensure

that compatible message formats, operating

protocols, and the like would be used. This

would be essential even for an “ask-the-network” system resembling NLETS. The policy

control requirements would be correspondingly greater for systems with a centralized file

or index. Over the years, various proposals

have suggested that a national CCH system

be controlled by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), by a single

State, by a consortium of States, by NCIC, by

Ident, by a new division within the FBI, by

a new bureau within DOJ, or by a new independent Federal agency or board.

For example, SEARCH Group, Inc., has in

the past advocated that policy control be

vested in a consortium of States. SEARCH

believed that a policy advisory board, similar

to the current NCIC/APB, would not be sufficient even if broadened to give greater representation to the States. At the same time,

SEARCH supported the role of the FBI in creating and maintaining III, and also recognizes

that Federal agencies would be participating

as well. In light of the constitutional and practical difficulties of State control over Federal

agencies, SEARCH has recommended a policy

advisory role for the States with respect to

Federal participation in a national CCH system, but has maintained that States must

have policy control over State participation in

such a system. “What is necessary is a consortium of all the States whose members are

responsible to the Governors.”1

Another policy control alternative is to

strengthen and possibly broaden the NCIC/

APB. Officially, the role of NCIC/APB is limited to reviewing NCIC issues and making appropriate recommendations to the FBI Director.2 In practice, at least on some issues,

NCIC/APB has had a significant influence on

FBI decisions. Nonetheless, as early as 1978

NCIC/APB has sought to modify its charter

to include a formal “advise and consent” relaISee SEARCH Group, Inc., A Framework for Constructing

an Improved National Criminal History System, Sacramento,

Calif., April 1978; and SEARCH Group, Inc., Essential Ele

ments and Actions for Implementing a IVationwide Crirninaf

History Program, Sacramento, Calif., February 1979.

2

FB 1, Bylaws for the NCIC Advisory Poh”cy Board and Regional Working Groups, Dec. 11, 1980, p. 2.
170 • An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

——————-———-————— —.. —

tionship to the FBI Director on matters relating to NCIC and especially 111.3 NCIC/APB

in the past has agreed with SEARCH that

policy control over State participation in III

should be vested directly in the States, but apparently has disagreed on what should be the

instrument of control.

NCIC/APB is currently composed of 20

elected and 6 appointed members. The 20

elected members all represent State and local

law enforcement–16 State (9 from State police

or patrols and 7 from State bureaus of identification or the equivalent) and 4 local (all city

or county chiefs of police). The six appointed

members are designated by the FBI Director

and must include two members each from the

judicial, prosecutorial, and correctional sectors. Thus, at present, NCIC/APB is composed

of about three-quarters law enforcement and

one-quarter other criminal justice representatives. If a more even balance between law enforcement and other criminal justice sectors

is desired, the size of NCIC/APB could be expanded, for example to 40 with 20 members

elected from law enforcement and 20 from

other criminal justice sectors. Alternatively,

the current size could be maintained, but with

13 law enforcement members and 13 other

criminal justice members. A 1978 DOJ survey

of 10 States found that “many, although not

all State officials, were critical of the composition of the NCIC/APB. . . . Indeed, some State

law enforcement officials acknowledged that

CCH was of primary interest to prosecutors,

judges, . . . correction officials, etc., and was

of only limited interest to law enforcement

agencies per se. ”4

Yet another alternative is to have two policy

control groups-NCIC/APB and an independent board (or a consortium of States). NCIC/

APB could have an advise and consent role

with respect to the NCIC hot files that are — — —-

3Minutes of the Apr. 12, 1978, meeting of NCIC’S APB, “A

Proposed Concept for a Decentralized Criminal History Record

System, ” p. 19.

‘U.S. Department of Justice, “Representative Viewpoints of

State Criminal Justice Officials Regarding the Need for a Nationwide Criminal Justice Information Interchange Facility, ”

March 6, 1978, reprinted in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology

Assessment, A Preliminary Assessment of the National Crime

Information Cknter and Computerized Criminal History l?r~

gram, Washington, D. C., December 1978, p. 71.

used primarily by law enforcement agencies,

and an independent board could have a similar

role with respect to a national index or other

national CCH system. The role of NCIC/APB

or an independent board could be extended to

include a national fingerprint repository,

which is generally viewed as an integral component of the national index (III) concept.

Various representatives of the judicial and

prosecutorial communities have forcefully argued that any viable national CCH system

must have their active involvement and cooperation, since judges and prosecutors would

be major users of the system and central to

achieving improved disposition reporting. This

may require a much larger role (and representation) for judges and prosecutors on the

NCIC/APB and/or an independent policy

board than has historically been the case at

either the Federal or State levels. The public

defender community also believes that it has

a legitimate stake in any national CCH system

and deserves some representation on any policy board.

Several times over the last 12 years proposals have been advanced to vest policy control

in an independent board. As early as September 1970, the Office of Management and Budget recommended the establishment of a strong

“policy control board” that would report

directly to the U.S. Attorney General. The

board was to include officials from the FBI,

LEAA, and the States and represent all elements of the criminal justice community. The

Board was to be structured so that the States

would have an equal voice with the Federal

Government. This proposal grew out of a conflict between LEAA and the FBI over control

of the original CCH program (then known as

Project SEARCH (System for Electronic

Analysis and Retrieval of Criminal Histories)

and funded by LEAA). In December 1970, the

Attorney General assigned management responsibility for the CCH program to the FBI.5

‘See Donald A. Marchand, et al., A History and Backround

Assessment of the National (lime In fonnati;n C%nter n> Computerized Criminal History System, Bureau of Governmental

Research and Service, University of South Carolina, June 1979,

sec. III, “The CCH Program: Its Origin and History, ” pp. 78-86.
Continuing conflict between LEAA (and

various States) and the FBI in part led to comprehensive legislative proposals in 1974 that

included an independent Federal Information

Systems Board. The board was to be responsible for the operation of a national CCH system

and for promulgation and enforcement of regulations on the use of such a system. In addition, the board was to have an advisory committee with one representative from each

State who would serve at the pleasure of the

Governor. 6 In 1974 congressional hearings,

LEAA and Project SEARCH supported the

independent board approach, while the FBI

opposed placing policy control in either an independent board or LEAA. The FBI testified

that the single-State/multi-State alternative

advocated by NCIC was preferable to the national index (pointer index) and that NCIC was

best equipped to manage and operate a national CCH system.7 As discussed in chapter 6, in

large part because of these conflicts, efforts

to enact comprehensive legislation were not

successful.

The 1978 DOJ survey of selected States

(conducted from November 1977 through February 1978) found that “many State officials

expressly or implicitly recognized that in the

longer term a Federal agency other than the

FBI could provide the services” expected of

a national CCH system, although ‘‘there was

a clear consensus that the FBI should continue to provide such services in the foreseeable

future. ” State officials were critical of the

fragmented responsibility for criminal history

records within the FBI and the organizational

separation between Ident and NCIC/CCH.

8

Coincidentally, on June 1, 1978, a presidential

decision memorandum (PRM) was prepared

for President Jimmy Carter by the President

Reorganization Project on Federal Law Enforcement. Among other things, the PRM rec-

‘S. 2963, “The Criminal Justice Information and Control and

Protection of Privacy Act of 1974. ” Ibid., pp. 97-100.

‘Ibid., pp. 101-104.

‘DOJ, “Representative Viewpoints, ” op. cit., p. 70.

Ch. 14—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part II ● 171

ommended that Ident and NCIC (as well as

statistical programs such as the Uniform

Crime Reports) be combined into a ne w

Bureau of Information and Statistics tha t

would be organizationally separate from the

FBI, although still a part of DOJ. The reorganization plan was never enacted.

9

In mid-1979, OTA conducted a survey of

State repository personnel in 42 States. ’” At

that time, repository officials from 22 States

felt that the FBI was the logical place to locate

management responsibility for a national system. However, seven conditioned their support

for the FBI on increased State and user participation in system policymaking. The present NCIC/APB was not regarded as being sufficiently representative or authoritative, at

least with respect to the CCH program. Thus,

these officials proposed that the board be reconstituted with participants from all States

and be given policymaking (as opposed to solely advisory) authority.

Officials from seven States indicated a preference for vesting CCH policymaking authority in an independent board or council. Some

noted that there is no compelling necessity to

locate a national index within the FBI. Rather,

the participating States could again follow the

NLETS model and create their own management and policymaking machinery outside of

the Federal Government.

Four States indicated no preference, one expressed an equal preference for the FBI or

NLETS, another indicated an equal preference

for SEARCH Group or NLETS, and seven did

not respond to the question on policy control.

Table 33 illustrates the division of opinion

that existed in 1979 among State repository

‘Marchand, et al., History and Background op. cit., pp.

151-153.

‘“Steven W. Hays, et al., An Assessment of the Uses of Information in the National Crime Information Center and G)mputerized Criminal History Program, Bureau of Governmental

Research and Service, University of South Carolina, October

1979, sec. IV, Inter-State and Intra-State Uses of NCIC and

Identification Information, ” pp. 177-180.
172 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

Table 33.—1979 Preferences of State Repository Personnel for CCH System Structure and Policy Controla

——— Policy Control

FBI with Independent No FBI or SEARCH No

System structure FBI revised board board preference NLETS or NLETS response Totals

National repository . . . . . . . 1 1

Single-State/multi-State . . . . 8 1 1 1 11

National index . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6 6 1 1 4 24

Regional systems. . . . . . . . . 1 1

Total decentralization . . . . . 1 1

No preference . . . . . . . . . . . . ——— 4 4

Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7 7 4 1 1 7 42

a

Forty-two states responding by telephone and/or mail to an OTA survey conducted in mid-1979. See app. C for a list Of State repository officials responding.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

personnel with regard to policy control and

system structure for a national CCH. As of

mid-1979, officials from States that had contributed records to NCIC/CCH were split between those preferring a national index versus a single-State/multi-State system, and between those preferring control by the FBI versus an independent board. Officials from

States preferring a national index were almost

evenly split among those favoring policy control by the FBI, by the FBI only if the APB

is broadened and strengthened, and by an independent board.

There also appeared to be a growing belief

on the part of some State repository personnel that the FBI should not maintain any nonFederal criminal records, either automated or

manual. They expressed the view that the FBI

only needs to keep one fingerprint card for

each offender, not a rap sheet. Some repository

personnel also expressed a sense of frustration

over the absence of a clear direction at the Federal level, as evidenced by the inability of the

Federal Government to formulate a clear and

consistent position on a national CCH system,

at least up to that time.

During 1980 and 1981, consensus on a system structure was substantially reached, at

least among those segments of the law enforce

ment and criminal justice community that are

involved most directly. NCIC/APB, NLETS

Board of Directors, and SEARCH Group have

all endorsed the national index concept which,

if fully implemented, would mean that all

State records would be maintained by the

States themselves. Only Federal records and

an identification index, known as III, would

be maintained at the national level, along with

a national fingerprint repository. The results

of the III pilot project (as well as the Phase

1 test) suggest that a national index is feasible. The December 1981 NCIC/APB action to

accelerate the testing of the III on the recommendation of NCIC staff and the III Subcommittee, confirms the strength of that consensus.ll In June 1982, NCIC/APB endorsed

plans to proceed with Phase 2 of III. However,

the question of policy control has yet to be

resolved. Further, while the U.S. Attorney

General’s Task Force on Violent Crime has endorsed III, the task force also supported renewed consideration of a national repository

and/or full message switching if III does not

prove to be feasible.12

“At the Dec. 9-1o, 1981, meeting of the NCIC’S APB, they

voted Unanirnously to combine Phases 2 and 3 of the Interstate

Identification Index development plan. This means that if

decentralization of single-State records of current CCH participating States proves successful, the next step would include

testing of full decentralization in at least some States.

‘*Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime, Final

Repor6 U.S. Department of Justice, Aug. 17, 1981, pp. viii and

67-69.
Ch. 14—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part II ● 173

— . — — ——-

File Size and Content

As noted earlier, both the FBI and NCIC/

APB (as well as SEARCH Group, Inc.) are

now proposing that a centralized national index be created containing names and other

identifying information such as personal identifiers (height, weight, race, etc.), social security numbers, State identification numbers, and

Federal FBI identification numbers.

There are essentially four options in terms

of the number and types of persons that could

be listed in the index file. The first option is

a so-called “narrowband” index, which would

include entries for only certain types of offenders; for example, multi-State violent offenders.

The estimated size of such a narrowband index would range from about 1 million to at

most 2 million or 3 million entries, as shown

in table 34. For example, the OTA record quality research on the Ident criminal history file

found that 30.4 percent of individuals arrested

were multi-State offenders (counting Federal

offenders as multi-State), and about 11 percent

of arrests were for violent crimes.

13 Thus ,

multi-State violent offenders would tota l

about 0.7 million persons (i.e., 11 percent violent offenders of the 30.4 percent multi-State

offenders in the 21 million person Iden t

criminal file; or O.11 X 0.304 X 21 million

persons).

A second option is a so-called “mediumband” index that would include very serious

property crimes as well as violent crimes such

as are included in the FBI crime index. * For

example, multi-State FBI index offenders

(which include violent offenders) would total

about 2.6 million persons (41 percent FBI

crime index offenders 14 of the 30.4 percent multi-State offenders in the Ident criminal file; 1 5

or 0.41 X 0.304 X 21 million persons). One

13 Based on 1979 OTA record quality research.

* [ncludes murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.

Ii]ncludes 11 percent violent crimes and 30.1 percent ProPerty crimes. Of the 168 records sampled from the Ident file and

subsequently verified, violent crimes accounted for 113 arrests

out of a total of 1,029 and property crimes accounted for 310

arrests out of 1,029.

“See ch. 3, table 1.

Table 34.— File Size Options for a National CCH

System Based on Composition of Ident File

Number of records in index’

Single-State and

Only multi-State multi-State

Index size option —- —..— offenders offenders

.— —

Narrowband (violent

offenders) . . . . 0.7 million 2.3 million

Mediumband (FBI

Crime Index

offenders) . . . . 2.6 million 8.6 million

Restricted broadband

(serious and

significant

offenders) . . . . . 6.4 million 210 million

Unrestricted

broadband (all

———offenders) . . . . . . . 10.9 million 36.0 million

aAll Numbers approximate. Based on arrests, not convictions, and includes

Federal as well as State offenders Assumes 304 percent multl-State offenders

SOURCE Off!ce of Technology Assessment

serious problem with a mediumband index is

that it would exclude entries for drug, weapons, financial (e.g., bribery or fraud), escape

or unlawful flight, drunk driving, and other offenses generally considered to be serious but

not included in the FBI crime index.

A third option has been termed a “restricted

broadband” index that would include entries

for all persons arrested and/or convicted of one

or more serious and/or significant crimes. The

current Ident criminal file, with criminal records on 21 million individuals, is a good example of a restricted broadband file. The Ident

file is restricted in the sense that nonserious

offenses (e.g., disturbing the peace, drunkenness) are excluded.16

Finally, an unrestricted broadband index in

theory could include entries on as many as 36

million persons —the estimated number of people with criminal offenses ranging from minor

misdemeanors to serious felonies.17

“The current Ident file probably contains 5 to 10 percent

nonserious arrests entered prior to 1975 when 28 CFR $20.32

went into effect.

“See Lynne Eickholt Cooper, et al., An Assessment of the

Social Impacts of the National Crime Information Cknter and

Computerized Criminal History Program, Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of South Carolina, October 1979, sec. I, “Background on the Criminal Justice Process and Criminal History Records, ” pp. 52-77 and especially

p. 63 and 76.
174 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

File size also depends on record retention

policies. For example, at present NCIC/CCH

maintains records indefinitely, with the exception of court-ordered deletions and expungements and records for individuals over 80

years of age. By comparison, the California

State CCH system has established a 5-year retention period for records of misdemeanor arrests not resulting in a conviction or for which

no disposition was received, and a 7-year retention period for misdemeanor convictions and

felony arrests not resulting in a conviction or

for which no disposition was received. Also,

felony convictions are purged for individuals

over age 70 with no arrests since age 60.

Through these policies, California is able to

keep the file size under better control, remove

criminal record information that has become

outdated and has little value to the criminal

justice community, and protect individual privacy rights. Retention policies for entries in

a national index may need to be considered for

similar reasons.

One other file content question relates to

juvenile offenders. States vary in their handling of criminal history records on juvenile

offenders. In the OTA 50-State survey, 11

States indicated that criminal history information on juvenile offenders is maintained in

the State repository, while 38 States reported

that juvenile offender information is not maintained (except, in some States, when juvenile

offenders are tried as adults). Policies for entry and retention of juvenile offenders in a

national index need to be established to prevent index use that might conflict with State

laws on juvenile offenders.

Record Quality

Record quality is one of the most important

aspects of any CCH alternative, yet it is one

of the most difficult to achieve since all alternatives depend largely on information (whether name and identifiers, summary criminal history record, or full record) originating at the

State and local levels. As discussed in chapter

8, a major problem with State CCH files is a

lack of court disposition information. The implementation of procedures to ensure reporting of dispositions was found, not surprisingly, to be highly variable at the State level, as

summarized in chapter 9.

Ident currently requires disposition reporting within 120 days (after the disposition has

occurred), 18 but Ident has found it very difficult if not impossible to enforce this requirement. OTA found that, as of mid-1979, about

30 percent of the arrest events in records disseminated from the Ident manual file lacked

information on dispositions that had taken

place and were listed in local records. Indeed,

there is no easy way even to determine how

many rap sheets in the Ident manual file lack

disposition data, other than by a special audit

as was conducted by OTA. AIDS is developing the capability to determine what percentage of records lack disposition data.

NCIC/CCH also requires disposition reporting within 120 days.19 Based on the OTA sample, however, as of mid-1979 about 27 percent

of the arrest events in records disseminated

from the CCH file lacked a court disposition

that was recorded at the local level. NCIC/

CCH does conduct 418 computer edits to

check for routine errors, periodic quality

checks (including comparison with manual

and/or automated Ident records), and automatic computer listing of criminal history records containing an arrest without a disposition if the arrest is 1 year old or more. These

listings are used by participating States in followup actions to obtain the final dispositions.

At the request of a participating State, NCIC/

CCH will prepare a computer tape of all records entered by that State, and will conduct

offline searches to identify missing disposition

“28 CFR \ 20.37. ‘

g

Ibid.
Ch. 14—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part II ● 175

data.2o However, the only sanction available

to the FBI for noncompliance with the 120-day

reporting requirement is a cutoff of NCIC/

CCH service,21 which the FBI finds to be counterproductive and therefore does not exercise.

Current NCIC/CCH operating procedures

also require State control terminal agencies to

conduct systematic audits of record quality

“to insure that files have been regularly and

accurately updated. Where errors or points of

incompleteness are detected, the control terminal shall take immediate action to correct or

complete the NCIC/CCH record as well as its

own State record.”22 However, the OTA 50-

State survey found that as of 1979 about

three-quarters of the States had never conducted a record quality audit of either computerized or manual criminal history record

systems. The existing NCIC/CCH standard

might be further refined to require that systematic audits be conducted at regular intervals as a condition of participation. States

could be required to provide documented and

independently verified certification that record

quality audits were indeed being conducted,

and that appropriate followup actions were

being taken.

With a national index, the FBI would no

longer maintain non-Federal records, and the

problems of record quality in Ident and NCIC/

CCH would be reduced. But the quality of records maintained by the States would still be

a matter of concern, as would be the quality

of any index based on those records.

Current Federal regulations hold agencies

contributing records responsible for keeping

the information complete, accurate, and current. * Source agencies are required to submit

dispositions to their State criminal history record repository within 90 days after the disposition has occurred.”

20 See Oct. 22, 1981, statement by William A. Bayse, FBI

Assistant Director, before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, House Judiciary Committee, pp. 6-13.

2

’28 CFR $20.38.

“FBI, IVCIC Operating kfanua~ pt. 10, p. 15.

*See ch. 6.

2328 CFR $ 20.21(a)(l).

Thus, there is a 90-day period during which

individuals may be subject to criminal justice

decisions based on incomplete records that are,

nonetheless, in compliance with Federal regulations. The regulations do require criminal

justice agencies to query their State repository

for the most up-to-date disposition data prior

to dissemination of a record, except in cases

where the State repository is technically incapable of responding within the necessary time

period. 24

The record quality of a national CCH system

could be strengthened by tightening the disposition reporting requirements and/or requiring

confirmation of CCH records lacking disposition data with the originating agency prior to

dissemination of the record. For example, the

basic disposition reporting requirement could

be reduced from 90 days to perhaps 30 days

or even less. Some States with fully computerized State CCH systems and effective centralized reporting (where local agencies report all

data to the central State repository) could

probably comply with a tightened standard.

In the OTA 50-State survey, computerized

States such as Florida, Kansas, Minnesota,

Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington indicated that an average update time

(time from occurrence of a criminal history

event, e.g., arrest or disposition, to the updating of the criminal history file) of 30 days

or less had already been achieved. For example, Minnesota indicated an average update

time of 2 to 5 days, Virginia 7 to 21 days, and

Washington 2 to 10 days. States with manual

or semiautomatic CCH systems that lack effective centralized reporting might have considerable difficulty. Substantial system development, and in some cases enactment or revision of State law, would be required to bring

these States into compliance with a tighter

disposition reporting standard. Nonetheless,

in the OTA 50-State survey, noncomputerized

States such as New Hampshire, Vermont,

Wisconsin, and Wyoming indicated that they

too had achieved an average update time of

30 days or less.

“Ibid.
176 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

.

The OTA 50-State survey update found that

as of 1982, 13 States indicated that less than

half of all dispositions were ever reported, regardless of the time period.” Computerized

States indicated a significantly higher disposition reporting rate overall (70.6 percent) than

did the noncomputerized States (56.3 percent).26 It seems evident that a tighter disposition reporting standard could be established

by law or regulation, but its full implementation would require a significant further commitment measured in manpower, dollars, and

system improvements at the State and local

“Office of Technology Assessment, 50-State survey conducted in 1979-80. See ch. 9, table 19.

“Ibid.

levels. The progress made by many States in

recent years indicates that improved disposition reporting is possible.

On the other hand, requiring confirmation

of a CCH record lacking disposition (or other

important) data prior to dissemination would

be feasible but could be very time-consuming,

to the point, in the opinion of some, of strangling the system. Confirming an out-of-State

record-whether manual or computaized-ap -

parently can be an onerous task. However,

NCIC/CCH already performs a large number

of automated quality checks. And it is possible that disposition checks could also be automated, particularly with originating agencies

in States with an online CCH file. Confirmation of CCH records could be required by law

or regulation.

Noncriminal Justice Access

OTA has found that there is a significant

amount of noncriminal justice use of criminal

history record systems at both the State and

Federal levels. For example, as of 1982, roughly 15 percent of all requests to State CCH systems were for noncriminal justice purposes. As

of 1981, about 53 percent of requests to Ident

were from noncriminal justice users (30 percent from Federal noncriminal justice agencies

and 23 percent from State and local noncriminal justice users). Most of the noncriminal

justice use is for employment or licensing purposes. At the Federal level (for Ident and

NCIC/CCH) such use must be authorized by

Federal statute or Executive order or by State

statute if approved by the U.S. Attorney General.27

A major problem is that State statutes vary

widely in terms of defining authorized users

of criminal history records. Some State and

local officials are concerned about the possibility that CCH information might be provided

to users in other States who would be denied

access in their own State. The definition of

.——-——

’

7

28 CFR j 20.33(a)(3).

criminal justice users also varies from State

to State, although not so widely as the definition of authorized employment and licensing

users. The problem of noncriminal justice access is further aggravated by the wide variation in State policies on sealing and purging.

Some States purge or seal records of all arrest

events that do not result in a conviction,

whereas other States maintain all police contact information.

Assuming that State laws on sealing and

purging and noncriminal justice access to

State files will continue to vary widely, four

major options have been proposed for dealing

with noncriminal justice access to a national

index. First, it could simply be prohibited, as

was the case for the III pilot and Phase 1

tests. Second, it could be permitted, but only

under considerably stronger Federal guidelines than presently exist. Third, a separate

index for such use could be established; and

fourth, the status quo could be maintained.

Prohibiting noncriminal justice access to a

national index would conflict with the many

Federal and State laws that grant a variety
Ch. 14—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part II ● 177

of noncriminal justice users access to existing

criminal history record systems. Given that

such access serves many lawful and legitimate

purposes, such as screening convicted violent

or serious offenders from positions of public

employment, a total prohibition is probably

not realistic.

The development of stronger guidelines for

noncriminal justice access seems more reasonable. In New York, for instance, existing State

statutes mandate that public agencies seeking access to the State CCH file must establish

a probable connection between an occupation

and criminal activities of potential job applicants. This approach could be mandated for

all States by Federal statute or regulation, and

might involve the establishment of oversight

committees at the Federal and State levels to

develop occupation-crime matrices.

A third possibility is the establishment of

a dual index—one for criminal justice use and

one for noncriminal justice use. The criminal

justice index would be based on arrest information. The noncriminal justice index could

be based on disposition or conviction information only. Thus, persons such as public and private employers would have access only to index entries based on dispositions or convictions. Noncriminal justice inquiries that

matched index entries based on arrest-only information would receive a “no record” response. No new data collection would be required since, in effect, the noncriminal justice

file would be a subset of the criminal justice

file. A dual index approach is technically feasible and straightforward in a computerized–

as opposed to manual-system. The FBI already has, in effect, a partial dual file, since

arrest data over 1 year old without a disposition are not disseminated to State or local licensing and employment agencies, unless the

arrest is known to be still under active prosecution.28 An intermediate approach would permit noncriminal justice access to a national index for entries based on disposition or conviction information or on arrest information subject to confirmation that the arrest is still active (and that a disposition has not occurred).

Under the status quo, noncriminal justice

access to a national index would be permitted,

presumably subject to existing Federal and

State laws and regulations. However, this

would require the programing of the index so

that access would be consistent with the wide

variety of State laws and regulations, and an

agreement would be needed on whether the

laws of the donor or recipient States, or of the

Federal Government or States (for Federal

noncriminal justice inquiries), will take precedence where the laws conflict.

28When requests come in to NCIC/CCH for State and local

employment or licensing purposes, the computer automatically

checks to determine if all arrest information has a corresponding final disposition. If not, and the arrest is more than 1 year

old, the arrest is deleted from the record prior to dissemination. See Bayse, op. cit., p. 8.

Oversight and Audit

The purposes of new oversight mechanisms

would be to help assure Congress, political executives, managers, courts, and the public that

the national index (or any other national CCH

system) is operating within the boundaries defined by law and regulation, and to help identify any system problems that might emerge

in the course of operation. Oversight is closely linked to system audit, since audit is one

of the strongest mechanisms for monitoring

system performance.

Several possibilities have been suggested.

First, Congress could require an annual management report on the operation of a national

CCH system. Such a report could include tallies of routine system activity, e.g., participation levels by State and number of inquiries

by purpose, as well as statistics on any system

irregularities, errors, and problems.

Second, Congress could require periodic au-

— dits to help ensure compliance with whatever

. 1+ - , -. < — , . — . ,
178 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

— —

record quality and system access standards

might be established. For example, periodic

record quality checks of both Federal and

State files, along the lines of those conducted

by OTA for the purposes of this study,* would

be necessary to accurately measure the level

of compliance with system standards. These

audits could check not only the content of

records in Federal files against those in State

files, but also the Federal and State records

against local police arrest and court disposition data in order to determine the extent to

which records are inaccurate, incomplete, and/

or ambiguous. In order to keep costs at a reasonable level, the audits would presumably be

conducted by sampling Federal and State files

on a rotating and perhaps unannounced schedule. Presumably audits would also extend to

the use as well as the content of Federal and

State files.

OTA estimates that a two-person audit

team could conduct about 12 reasonably comprehensive audits per year. Thus, five two-person teams would be required to audit each

State once a year (50 States plus the District

of Columbia and Puerto Rico, for a total of 52

audits per year), the national index and the

Federal offender CCH file twice a year, and up

to three other Federal CCH files (e.g., Treasury

Enforcement and Communication System),

plus the national fingerprint repository, once

a year. Thus, the 10-person audit staff could

be expected to conduct a total of 60 audits per

year. Audit priorities could, of course, be adjusted to focus on files with significant irregularities, errors, and problems as identified by

operating statistics and/or by the system manager (or, for that matter, by congressional or

policy board oversight).

The FBI has already agreed in principle to

a GAO audit requested by Congress to ensure

that the upgraded NCIC communications controllers (front-end processors) and host computers are not used for message switching.**

*See ch. 8.

**See ch. 5.

However, Federal legislation may be necessary

to provide GAO with adequate authority to

carry out an audit involving direct access to

criminal history records. In a 1975 letter to

the Senate Judiciary Committee commenting

on proposals for comprehensive criminal justice information systems legislation, the

Comptroller General advised that:

. . . we believe explicit access to the necessary

criminal history data should be provided to

our office in this legislation because of the

sensitive nature of the data involved. We also

need access to the records of all non-Federal

criminal justice information systems subject

to the legislation for the purpose of evaluating the Attorney General’s or the Federal Information System Board’s operations under

the legislation. An explicit statement of congressional intent regarding this matter

should preclude future executive agency reluctance to allow us access to documents we

believe we must review to properly discharge

our responsibilities.29

Third, Congress could establish a hybrid audit structure. There are several possibilities.

For example, GAO could audit just the national index and Federal offender file, independent

State auditing agencies could audit State and

local CCH files, and GAO (or some other outside organization) could compare the results

of these audits for consistency.

The existing Federal law and regulations

place the responsibility for annual audit of

State CCH systems with each State. Thus,

any Federal audit authority, whether granted

to GAO or some other body, would appear to

require new legislation and/or regulations.

Considerable support for such audit authority was expressed in numerous congressional

hearings held in the mid-1970’s and was reflected in several bills. None of these, however,

was enacted.

‘

e

Letter from Comptroller General of the United States to

Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Senate

Committee on the Judiciary, Apr. 14, 1975.
Ch. 14—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part II ● 179

Public Participation

At present, NCIC’S APB is the mechanism

designed to facilitate public participation in

the existing NCIC/CCH system. APB is intended to serve as the formal liaison between

system users and the system manager (currently the FBI). However, users are defined

as those involved in the creation of the data

base and who ultimately use it. This confines

the definition of users to the criminal justice

community. Within that community, it is

largely law enforcement agencies that are

represented on APB. As discussed earlier,

APB could be substantially broadened and

strengthened with increased representation

from the States and from the rest of the criminal justice community, perhaps along the

lines of SEARCH Group, Inc. When compared

with NCIC/APB, SEARCH has roughly double the representation from nonlaw enforcement criminal justice agencies (as a percentage

of total membership) and has representatives

from all 50 States. As of December 1981,

NCIC/APB members came from 19 different

States. However, NCIC/APB does have a

regional structure that includes representatives from all 50 States.

Participation from outside the criminal justice community would also help ensure accountability. Alameda County, California, has

a model of public participation in a CCH system known as CORPUS (Criminal Oriented

Records Production Unified System). Designed and implemented by a local district attorney in cooperation with a broadly based

representation of criminal justice and public

decisionmakers, CORPUS integrates the information needs of the police, sheriffs, district attorneys, public defenders, courts and probation departments.

The CORPUS system is unusual, partly because of the degree of information-sharing

among criminal justice agencies that traditionally have not cooperated and that have been

excluded from the design of criminal history

systems. CORPUS is also unusual in terms of

its governance. It is governed by a countywide Alameda County Committee on Criminal

Justice and Data Processing (the Parent Committee). This committee includes a broad

representation from the criminal justice agencies, as well as the public defender, probation

officers, court administrators, five public

members, and a member of the county Board

of Supervisors. The five public members are

appointed by the Board of Supervisors and

represent a range of political points of view

in Alameda County. The committee has 19

members and conducts monthly meetings that

are open to the public. The governing or parent

committee is supported by a staff composed

of CORPUS administrators. It has regular

standing subcommittees on security and privacy and a CORPUS operations committee

that reports on day-to-day operations.

The presence of public members as well as

nonlaw enforcement personnel on the parent

committee of CORPUS has resulted in broadly

based concern and effort at understanding the

privacy and due process implications of criminal justice information. It has also yielded

highly developed auditing procedures and significant efforts to ensure the quality and security of information in the system. The parent

committee also has the power to hire external

auditors to conduct routine audits on the

CORPUS system. One local Alameda County

assistant district attorney commented:30

The system of public governance which we

have established here in Alameda County

takes law enforcement and criminal justice information recordkeeping out of the closet and

into the public light. 1‘m sure most criminal

justice agencies around the country will resist

this, but so do most other organizations. It

all comes down to developing public confidence in the operation of these important information systems. Without participation,

without independent insights and external

auditors just as in financial institutions, there

really can be no public confidence or trust in

the operation of systems like this.

‘

0

1979 interview with Alameda County, Calif., assistant district attorney; reaffirmed in 1982.
180 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

The CORPUS experience has been that inclusion of outside (noncriminal justice) individuals and groups is initially uncomfortable,

in that issues or perspectives that might

otherwise be avoided are forced onto the Parent Committee’s agenda. However, generally acceptable solutions have apparently been

found that have stood the test of the inevitable public scrutiny.

In many jurisdictions, public defenders do

not have direct access to criminal history record systems, and are not considered part of

the criminal justice community. CORPUS

does permit public defender access. As noted

by an Alameda County assistant public defender:31

One of the reasons that (we are) so supportive of the system is that from the very beginning, we were considered a necessary member

of the Alameda County criminal justice community . . . For a multi-State or national system to work effectively, the public and private defender organizations must be accepted

as part of the criminal justice communities in

which they reside. We were given membership on the (CORPUS) planning and implementation boards and committees and input

into the design of the system. As a result, the

public defender is a user agency.

3’Sept. 22, 1981, letter from Alameda County Assistant Public

Defender Duane A. Sciford.

Comprehensi

Perhaps one of the strongest measures to

provide Federal direction and ensure accountability and control would be the enactment of

comprehensive national criminal justice information system legislation. As noted in chapter

6, criminal justice information systems currently operate at the Federal level under the

very general statutory authority provided by

title 28, United States Code, section 534. Although more detailed regulations have been

promulgated (and appear as title 28, Code of

Federal Regulations, pt. 20), initiatives in the

v

The National Legal Aid and Defender Association believes that legislation is needed to

mandate public defender access to a national

CCH system so that defenders can check on

the criminal history records of defendants and

witnesses for both the defense and the prosecution. “No legitimate policy reason exists as

to why the defense should not receive all available CCH information, if truth-seeking and

honesty are part of the criminal justice process. “32

As for public participation, the III Evaluation Committee established by NCIC/APB is

another example. Here, in addition to representatives of Federal, State, and local law enforcement, the courts, corrections, and prosecutors, the committee includes public members from such groups as the American Civil

Liberties Union and the National Association

for the Advancement of Colored People. The

intent is to help ensure that a wider range of

perspectives and affected interests are reflected in the NCIC/APB evaluation of and

decisions concerning III.

32Mmm 16, 1982, letter from Jack J. Schmerling, Deputy Director, Defender Division, National Legal Aid and Defender Association.

e Legislation

early and mid-1970’s to enact comprehensive

legislation were not successful.*

Comprehensive legislation could provide explicit authority for a national index or other

national CCH system and include statutory

guidelines for the operation and use of the system that are much more detailed than those

currently available. Eleven areas that could

be covered by comprehensive legislation are

listed in table 35. Several have been discussed

*%di9cu9gion in ch. 6.
Ch. 14—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part 11 ● 181

Table 35.—Subject Areas Relevant to Comprehensive Legislation on Criminal Justice Information Systems

1.

2.

3.

4,

5

6

Applicability:

Federal, State, local

Police, courts, corrections, other criminal justice

Secondary users (private, public)

Information covered:

Arrest records (rap sheets)

Conviction

Correctional

Investigative

Intelligence

Want/warrant

Stolen property

Collection:

Content of records

Restrictions on particular types of data elements

Restrictions on method of collection

Maintenance:

Record quality (accuracy, completeness, timeliness)

Security (data, people, physical)

Separation of files

Dedication (complete, partial)

Transaction logs

Listing of information systems (public notice)

Retention:

Purging by type of Information

Sealing by type of information (e. g., conviction v.

nonconviction, juvenile offender)

Removal of disqualifications

Right to state nonexistence of record

Access:

Individual (method of review/inspection, challenge—

judicial or administrative review of challenged

information)

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

earlier, and several others are discussed below.

Many of these are quite controversial, as evidenced by the last 12 years of debate. However, even in the early 1970’s some members

of Congress believed that such legislation was

a prerequisite for any effective national CCH

system. For example, in introducing his own

bill in 1974, Senator Sam Ervin noted that:

. . . the bill is quite detailed and attempts a

resolution of all the major privacy and security issues which have arisen in the development of law enforcement data banks. It endeavors to balance the legitimate needs of law

enforcement with the requirements of individual liberty and privacy. It would for the first

time give firm statutory authority for criminal justice data banks, a major obstacle in the

development of such systems. It would impose upon the data banks strict but manageable privacy limitations. Not the least important, the bill also attempts to solve fundamentally important questions of Federal-State reResearcher (method of use, challenge—judicial or

administrative)

Media

7. Training:

Data processing and recordkeeping personnel

Primary users (use, interpretation)

Secondary users (use, interpretation)

8. Dissemination by type of information:

Primary users

Secondary users

9. Penalties:

Civil

Criminal

Administrative sanctions

10. Auditing/evaluation of:

Use (primary, secondary)

Record quality

Operations

Management

Social impacts (privacy, confidentiality, and security)

11. Regulatory authority:

Type (operating agency, special council/board,

advisory group

Responsibilities (consultation, study and advise,

establish policy and procedures, oversight, audit)

Membership (stakeholders included)

Duration (permanent, temporary)

Resources (executive director, staff, general

appropriation/specific allocation)

Powers (subpoena, hold hearings, mandate binding

policies and procedures, audit, mandate reporting

requirements)

lationships in these comprehensive national

information systems. 33

Given the vagaries of the criminal justice

process, it would be a difficult challenge to ensure the accountability and control of a national index or other national CCH system in

the absence of national legislation. Criminal

law and the customs and traditions of the

criminal justice process vary widely among

the States and localities. * Criminal justice

agencies are under increasing pressure to apprehend, process, and dispose of persons suspected of committing a crime as expeditiously as possible. This is done through the use of

strategies such as pretrial diversion, plea bargaining, presentencing negotiations, and career criminal programs designed presumably

to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of

an already overburdened and underfunded

“Congressional Record Senate, Feb. 5, 1974.

*See ch. 9.
182 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

criminal justice process. As a consequence of

all these factors, the process by which criminal

history records are generated also varies

widely.

In addition to policy control, file size and

content, record quality, and noncriminal justice access, national legislation could enhance

the accountability and control of a national

CCH system by addressing the following other

areas.

Access, Review, and

Challenge Procedures

At present, any individual has the right to

access and review his/her criminal history record maintained by NCIC/CCH or Ident. However, if the record is believed to be incorrect

or incomplete, the individual must seek correction by the source agency. Individuals may

also direct a record challenge to the FBI,

which will then forward the challenge to the

source agency. The FBI will make any changes

necessary only upon proper notification by the

source agency .34

An alternative approach would be to: 1) hold

the national index or other national CCH system manager fully accountable for the accuracy and completeness of records referenced

in the index; and 2) give the national index

manager the responsibility and legal authority

to require the State repository to verify with

the source agency—and correct if necessary—

any index entries and underlying records challenged by properly identified individuals.

While this might appear to be potentially quite

costly and burdensome, the experience of the

many States with access, review, and challenge statutes has been that challengers are

few in number.* It appears that individuals

with records in criminal justice information

systems are not very likely to exercise their

rights of access, review, and challenge. While

many of these individuals may have strong incentives to conceal their records, some may

not know how to exercise their “rights” or

may not even be aware of them.

3428 CFR j 20.34, and 28 CFR $ 16.34.

*See ch. 9.

Criminal Penalties

Under current Federal law and regulation

there are no civil or criminal penalties for violation of NCIC/CCH system standards, except

as provided by the Privacy Act of 1974; for

example, for willful unauthorized disclosure of

records that contain individually identifiable

information. Any agency or individual violating Federal regulations on State and local

criminal history information systems is subject to a fine not to exceed $10,000 and possible cutoff of LEAA funds.35 As a practical

matter, LEAA no longer exists and LEAA

funding for CCH-related systems ended in fiscal year 1981. Any agency or entity failing to

comply with regulations on the Federal systems and interstate exchange of criminal history information is subject to cancellation of

NCIC/CCH and Ident services.36

Accountability of a national CCH system

could be strengthened by establishing criminal

penalties, or at the minimum strong civil penalties, for violation of national system standards. Many States already have enacted both

civil and criminal penalties, particularly for

violation of various privacy and security statutes and regulations applicable to criminal history record information systems.

Privacy Standards

Legal accountability of a national CCH system could be strengthened by bringing such

a system more fully under the requirements

of the Privacy Act of 1974. For example, this

act requires each Federal agency with a records system to keep an accurate accounting

of the disclosure of a record (including the

date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure

and the name and address of the recipient),37

and to retain this accounting for at least 5

years or the life of the record, whichever is

longer.38 These two provisions are mandatory

and have been implemented by the FBI. The

Privacy Act also requires each agency to make

‘S28 CFR $ 20.25.

3

’28 CFR j 20.38.

375 USC $552a(c)(l), Privacy Act of 1974, public Law 93-579.

3“5 USC $552a(c)(2).
Ch. 14—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part II . 183

the accounting available to the person named

in the record at that person’s request.39 However, the act provides that law enforcement

and criminal justice record systems can be exempted from this requirement,40 as is the case

with the FBI.

As another example, the Privacy Act requires agencies maintaining a record system

to publish a notice in the Federal Register, at

least annually, that includes “the agency procedures whereby an individual can be notified

at his request if the system of records contains

a record pertaining to him.”41 Here, too, the

act provides a legal exemption for law enforcement systems, although both Ident and NCIC/

CCH do publish such notices.

In sum, Federal law enforcement and criminal justice record systems, including Federal

criminal history record systems, may exempt

themselves from a number of the legal accountability measures in the Privacy Act. For

example, should Congress wish to make it easier for individuals to request corrections in

criminal history information contained in a national index or other national CCH system, the

Privacy Act could be amended to remove certain exemptions now exercised by NCIC/

CCH.42 Alternatively, provisions of the Privacy Act could be incorporated in new legislation to ensure that privacy standards are applicable to a national index, and that such

standards also extend to the records maintained in Federal and State repositories on

which index entries would be based.

Technical Accountability

Measures to provide technical accountability include, for example, comprehensive transaction logs, systematic audits of local user

agencies, and training of employees in the im-

—

’95 USC $552a(c)(3).

405 USC $552a(j)(2).

4’5 USC $552a(e)(4)(G).

425 USC $552a(d) places responsibility for correcting records

in the Federal agency maintainingg the record system. Moreover,

law enforcement agencies can exempt themselves from this requirement and Ident and NCIC/CCH have done so by placing

primary responsibility for record accuracy and completeness

with the agencies originating the records.

plementation of applicable State and Federal

regulations. As discussed in chapter 9, as of

1979, the transaction logging, local auditing,

and training procedures varied widely and frequently fell short of fully accounting for the

flow of criminal history information within the

States.* In the OTA 50-State survey, to which

49 States responded, dissemination logs maintained by State repositories contained the following information: name or identification

number of requesting agencies (46 States);

type of information disseminated (43 States);

purpose of request (34 States); requestor’s terminal identification number (32 States); name

or identification number of person requesting

information (32 States); and user agreement

or authority (13 States). Major problems included lack of funding, wide variations in the

interpretation of State and Federal regulations, and absence of the necessary statutory

or policy mandate. In addition, there are inherent difficulties in implementing logs and

audits at the local level.

Some States, such as Minnesota and New

York, have implemented detailed logging procedures. Minnesota has added to its State repository transaction log the name of the police

or other officer making the request for criminal

history information. This automated personal

identifier will assure the central State repository the capability to at least identify who it

was in a local agency who requested and used

the information. This method should be much

more accurate than the maintenance of manual

logs alone. New York State has implemented

a central State repository transaction log that

includes, in addition to the typical agency

identifiers and purpose code requests, the personal identifier for the officer making the request, and in addition, a case number for which

the request was made. Systematic review of

transaction log books is accomplished by randomly selecting requests for criminal history

information from the log, going to local agencies that received the information and from

*J$’~e nearly ~ States maintain transaction logs, asof1979

nearly two-thirds review the logs ordy when a specific abuse

is indicated. Only a few States conduct systematic audits of

user agencies. See ch. 9.
184 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

there directly to the person who made the request, and reviewing the files in which the information was used.

Additional problems are raised when considering audit trails for local criminal history systems. There may be hundreds of police agencies in a large State, each with different local

criminal history rap sheets that often may be

simply recorded on 3 X 5 cards. An examination in California showed how difficult it was

to develop audit trails for such card systems.

Thus, technical accountability would appear

to be possible but difficult to achieve in a national CCH system. Because the records or entries in such a system would originate largely from and be used by State and local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, audit

trails and transaction logs would be needed at

the State and local agency levels. Congress

could mandate and fund the development of

computer-based user audits, transaction logging procedures, and the required training programs through enactment of comprehensive

legislation establishing a national index or

other national CCH system.

Uniform Crime Codes and

Record Formats

Another problem with the interstate exchange of criminal history records is the wide

variability in the classification and coding of

crimes and in criminal history record formats.

The more complex and variable the crime

codes and record formats, the more difficult

the records are to understand, particularly for

out-of-State users. Comprehensive legislation

could establish a national crime coding standard along the lines presently used by NCIC,

and could promulgate guidelines for criminal

history record formats. Surveys conducted by

the State of Florida and NCIC have found that

summary records are frequently too abbreviated to be fully useful, while the full records

may have more details than are really needed.

NCIC is developing a new record format that

might strike a better balance.

III Development Plan

The III pilot test with the State of Florida

was completed during July through September 1981. Based on the generally favorable

results, Phase 1 of the III development plan

was completed during February and March

1982 with the addition of five other fully participating States.* In December 1981, NCIC/

APB concurred in the NCIC staff recommendation to combine Phases 2 and 3 of the

original III plan. In June 1982, NCIC/APB

recommended that the FBI proceed to implement the consolidated Phase 2. As revised, in

Phase 2, already participating States will be

tested on a fully decentralized basis (multiState as well as single-State records decentralized) and currently nonparticipating States

will be added to III on a decentralized basis.

This revised plan will provide a more clear-cut

test of the national index concept, more vivid-

*These states included Michigan, North Carolina, South

Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, in addition to Florida.

ly demonstrate the FBI’s commitment to a national index CCH alternative, and eliminate

the need for the nonparticipating States to join

III first on a single-State/multi-State basis

before shifting to a national index basis at a

later date. In Phase 3 of the revised plan

(Phase 4 of the original plan), the III concept

would be fully implemented.

One unresolved question concerns whether

Phase 2 should include a test of III with no

message switching as well as with partial message switching. As discussed in chapter 10, III

was originally proposed to involve no message

switching. For a variety of reasons, the III

pilot test with the State of Florida and Phase

1 with Florida plus five other States were conducted using a form of partial message switching known as automatic inquiry referral (AIR).

While there may be significant advantages

to AIR, several of the advantages that are
Ch. 14—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part II • 185

claimed cannot be effectively substantiated

without a test that would compare operational

results with and without AIR. For example,

the State of Florida (and other members of the

III Subcommittee of NCIC/APB) believes that

AIR would improve the overall III response

time, reduce the burden on inquiring States

by eliminating the need to send a second round

of messages to States holding the desired records, simplify the verification of authorized

users, standardize the format of inquiry messages, and provide greater security for messages than would be available over NLETS.

NLETS has disputed the concern over security, noting that even with AIR, the actual summary records are transmitted over NLETS. In

addition, NLETS is clearly capable of handling

both the inquiry and record traffic. Use of

NLETS might avoid any possible overload of

NCIC, and might encourage greater participation of States without an automated interface.

An operational test could perhaps resolve

some of these concerns. The NCIC staff,

NCIC/APB, and NLETS have initiated discussions of whether and how such a test might

be carried out.

In view of the high percentage of name hits

during the III Phase 1 test that did not match

the subject individual,43 NCIC is proposing a

two-step inquiry when unique identifying

numbers are not available. Thus, in case of a

name hit, NCIC would return only the identification segment to the inquiring agency to confirm the hit prior to referring the inquiry on

to the State or States of record. The inquiring State could then exercise the option of

using NLETS rather than NCIC to contact the

State or States holding the record, and thus

obviate part of the need for AIR.

The second unresolved question concerns

the quality of III, especially during Phases 2

and 3. One plan is to establish the index initially by extracting names and identifiers

from the 5.8 million AIDS records and the 0.8

million CCH records not in AIDS. This would

result in an initial III containing 6.6 million

43 NCIC, Draft Report-Preliminary Findings of the FebruaryMarch 1982 III test, April 1982, p. 18.

entries.” Additional entries would be provided

by participating States. Another plan would

be for States to either enter their own index

records or have AIDS make the entries on

their behalf.

In any event, III quality would ultimately

depend on the quality of the records in the

Ident/AIDS and NCIC/CCH files for Federal

offenders and on the quality of the State criminal history files, on which the index is based.

OTA research presented in chapter 8 found

that, as of mid-1979, more than a quarter (27

percent) of the records disseminated from the

NCIC/CCH file were missing a court disposition, and about one-fifth contained inaccurate

information. OTA also found that, as of

mid-1979, over 30 percent of the records disseminated from the Ident file lacked a court

disposition and about one-fifth percent contained inaccurate information. At the State

level, OTA found that on the average about

35 percent of dispositions were not reported.

Assuming that these figures are still reasonably valid, roughly one-third of the III entries

on the average would be expected to be based

on arrest data where a disposition had occurred and was recorded at the local level, but

had not been reported to the State repository

or to the FBI.

This potential record quality problem highlights the role of III as an index to arrests,

not to dispositions or convictions. A hit on the

index would simply mean that the subject was

arrested at some time for something in the

State indicated. A hit would not say anything

about whether the individual had charges

dropped or dismissed or was acquitted, convicted, incarcerated, or served time and was

released.

In view of these concerns, Congress may

wish to direct that record quality research be

conducted as part of Phase 2 of the III development plan. This would help to determine

where III currently stands with respect to

44 See NCIC staff paper prepared for the Nov. 3-4, 1981, meeting of the Interstate Identification Index Subcommittee of the

NCIC Advisory Policy Board, Topic *7, p. 6.

*SW chs. 8 and 9.
186 • An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

—

record quality and the extent to which prob- ensure a higher index quality. For example,

lems exist in the records on which the index one possibility would be to create the index

is based. No such research was included in the from scratch based on current and updated in111 pilot test or Phase 1. Congress may also formation submitted directly from the States

wish to request the development of alternative and meeting some set of minimum record qualplans for establishing III in ways that would ity standards.

AIDS/CCH Consolidation Plan

As noted in chapter 4, the FBI is currently

operating two files—AIDS and NCIC/CCH—

that maintain computerized criminal history

records. 45 Between 1979 and 1981, the percentage of NCIC/CCH records also held in AIDS

increased from about 44 to 58 percent. Thus,

the two files duplicate each other to a significant and growing extent. This duplication reflects the unique need of Ident to develop a

capability for automated fingerprint identification, the low level of State participation in the

NCIC/CCH file, and the absence of a clear and

agreed on long-range plan. AIDS and NCIC/

CCH have now developed to the point where

the U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on

Violent Crime recommended that the FBI prepare plans to reduce duplication between

AIDS and NCIC/CCH and that such plans

take into account the results of phase 1 of the

III development plan.46

Any AIDS/CCH consolidation is likely to

have a significant impact on the cost of FBI

criminal history and identification services

and could be an integral part of a national

CCH system. Therefore, Congress may wish

to request the preparation of plans for AIDS/

CCH consolidation that would be consistent

with the national index and other national

CCH system alternatives under consideration,

and that would provide a clear basis for com-

“See U.S. Comptroller General, The FBI Operates Two Clnnputerized Criminal History Information System% U.S. General

Accounting Office, Washington, D. C., 1979.

“U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime, Final

liepor~ U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Aug.

17, 1981, pp. 67, 69.

paring costs of the various alternatives at least

with respect to the Federal share.

Should Congress make a decision on a specific national CCH system, DOJ could be directed to prepare a plan to consolidate AIDS

and CCH in a way that is consistent with costeffective implementation of the alternative selected. For example, from a technical viewpoint, a national index plan could:

●

●

●

●

●

●

establish a national index on serious offenders as a new NCIC file;

provide initial inputs (screened to meet

quality standards) to the index from the

NCIC/CCH file and Ident/AIDS;

subsequently return all NCIC/CCH records to the States, except for records on

Federal offenders;

phase out the AIDS automated rap sheet

function;

include the AIDS automated fingerprint

identification service as another new

NCIC file; and

seek further inputs to the index from the

States (this could be in the form of computer tapes). The inputs would have to be

screened to remove any that did not meet

applicable quality standards.

NCIC could be restructured as shown in table 36. These functions could be located in a

new National Criminal Information and Identification Division of the FBI that would combine the existing Ident Division and NCIC

Section and perhaps other related activities.

After reorganization, the FBI would maintain

full records on Federal offenders only. The

only other criminal information available

would be hot file information, index informa-
Ch. 14—Congressional Policy Considerations, Part II ● 187

Table 36.—Possible File Structure of a Reorganized

National Crime Information Center

File Nos. File content

1-8 Existing NCIC hot files’

9 CCH full record file limited to Federal

offenders

10 Existing CLISb file

11 AIDS fingerprint file with interface to

residual manual filec

12 National index filed

‘lncludlrlg stolen vehicles, stolen guns, stolen Ilcense plates. wanted Persons,

stolen securities, stolen boats, and mlss!ng persons

bcomputerlzed Laboratory Information SYstem

CAf So known as the Nat!onal F[ngerprlnt File

dAlso known as the Interstate Identlflcatton Index

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

tion, and fingerprint identification information.

Congress could authorize this reorganization

through new legislation that could also, for

example:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

establish statutory guidelines for operation and use of the system;

require periodic outside audit by GAO

and/or an independent board;

broaden and strengthen the NCIC’S APB

or establish an independent board to exercise policy control;

specify limits on file and index size and

content (e.g., CCH full record file limited

to Federal offenders);

mandate record and index quality and

system access standards (e.g., with respect to disposition reporting and noncriminal justice access);

authorize Federal funding and technical

assistance to strengthen State and local

CCH systems, field audits, and court disposition reporting;

reiterate and revise the title 28 privacy

and security regulations where necessary;

codify NCIC/CCH operating procedures

where appropriate; and

specify message switching authority and

responsibilities.

Finally, when considering AIDS/CCH consolidation plans, Congress may also wish to

examine the pros and cons of shifting management of a national CCH system out of the FBI

to a new bureau within DOJ, to an independent Federal agency, or to a consortium of

States. It has been argued that the FBI is burdened with too many contradictory–or at

least conflicting-responsibilities. The FBI is

primarily an investigatory and law enforcement agency, but also bears a heavy responsibility for the maintenance of criminal records

and the production of criminal statistics. In

addition, it offers training programs for State

police officials, maintains an extensive forensic laboratory, and provides a considerable

amount of technical assistance to State and

local (as well as Federal) law enforcement agencies.

Since any national index or other national

CCH system would still depend on AIDS to

a large extent for fingerprint identification and

presumably on NCIC for computer and communication support, adequate management

and technical coordination might prove to be

difficult unless AIDS and NCIC were also

moved to another agency. But this could possibly weaken the commitment and cooperation

of State and local law enforcement agencies,

which have been based in part on their longstanding involvement and rapport with the

FBI. On the other hand, judicial and correctional agencies, for example, might be more

inclined to actively participate in a national

CCH system if it were managed by someone

other than the Nation’s preeminent law enforcement agency. However, judicial and other

nonlaw enforcement criminal justice agencies

could be given a substantial role in a broadened and strengthened NCIC’S APB or an independent board established to exercise policy

control over a national CCH system.

Alternatively, the current NCIC APB could

be left as is with its jurisdiction limited to the

NCIC hot files. A new and separate APB, with

substantial representation from prosecuting

attorneys, judges, defense attorneys, correctional and probation/parole officials, and the

general public, could be given jurisdiction over

a national CCH system. Under either of these

conditions, and with strong legislative guidance and congressional oversight, the FBI

might be in the best position to enforce system

standards and operating procedures and man-
188 Ž An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

age the Federal component of a national sys- nal justice services agency, as opposed to a

tern. Nonetheless, the experience of the several police or law enforcement agency, should be

States (e.g., New York) that have successful- examined for relevance to control and managely located their State CCH system in a crimi- ment of a national CCH system.

Private Carrier Role in

National CCH System

Congress may wish to review the role of private communication carriers in a national

CCH system. At present, the NCIC communication lines are leased from private carriers;

and NLETS is a private nonprofit corporation

funded and controlled by the States that also

uses dialup or leased lines from private carriers.

Two questions have arisen. First, for the national index alternative, would new technical

equipment and systems available horn private

vendors eliminate any need for partial message switching (automatic inquiry referral)? It

may be that new computer technology alone,

or in combination with new communication

technology, could substantially reduce or eliminate problems with inquiry formatting, verification, and followup, and simultaneously provide greater security. The growing availability of small, inexpensive, easily programmable,

yet powerful computers means that States

with manual criminal history files will be able

to automate more easily and at less cost than

previously thought, and will be better able to

fully participate in a national index or ask-thenetwork CCH system. Second, would the national index or ask-the-network alternative be

more cost-effective using a privately offered

communication network? For example, several

private carriers now offer nationwide data

communication networks, both packet switched

and message switched, broadcast as well as

narrowcast, using satellite as well as landline

transmission links and providing security

measures such as data encryption.

The possible benefits from the greater use

of privately offered new technology and services are significant enough to warrant further

consideration. Congress may wish to commission more detailed research on the private sector role in a national CCH system.
Appendixes
Appendix A

Status of NCIC Hot Files

The National Crime Information Center (NCIC)

hot files (e.g., on wanted persons, missing persons,

and stolen vehicles, articles, guns, license plates,

securities, and boats) are heavily used by Federal,

State, and local law enforcement agencies. As of

September 1981, hot file transactions were exceeding 300,000 daily and approaching 10 million

monthly. * No one has conducted a systematic

measurement of the benefits of the hot files. However, the consensus of opinion among law enforcement officers interviewed by or expressing an opinion to OTA was that these files represent an invaluable tool in the apprehension of wanted persons

and the recovery of stolen property. Anecdotal evidence on NCIC hot file hits supports this view, as

do the results of other surveys cited in chapter 11.

The status of the NCIC hot files warrants consideration in three important areas. First, various

parties (including Federal agencies and individual

Members of Congress) periodically ask the Federal

Bureau of investigation (FBI) to establish new hot

files, for example, on violent offenders, missing

children, parolees, and dangerous persons. Most

recently, in November 1981, the U.S. Secret Service asked the FBI to establish a file on persons

judged to represent a potential threat to protectees, including the President. This file would

help the Secret Service “monitor the movements

of or keep aware of the location of dangerous

persons.’” Whatever the merits of these proposals,

such proposals could involve the use of NCIC to

gather intelligence data on or track individuals not

formally charged with a current criminal offense.’

Such use of NCIC might lead to unwarranted invasions of privacy and improper detentions or

arrests. 3 A review of the entire process by which

such proposals are made and evaluated could be

useful. If new legislation were developed for a national CCH, consideration might be given to including a specific statutory framework for the

NCIC hot files. The quality of these files (discussed

below) and criteria for accessing them might also

be addressed. At present, there apparently are no

legal or policy prohibitions on the indirect dissemi-

*See ch. 4.

‘See Nov. 24, 1981, letter from the Secret Service Director to the FBI

Director.

‘See May 19, 1981, letter from William A. Bayse, FBI Assistant Director, to Jerry Morgan, Chief U.S. Probation Officer, Southern District

of Georgia.

‘Ibid.

nation of hot file information to noncriminal justice agencies or private individuals. 4

Second, even with the upgrade of the NCIC host

computer and front-end processor,* the FBI is concerned about the ability of NCIC to handle the

growing volume of transactions and programing

requirements. The NCIC Section and the NCIC

APB have initiated a long-range planning effort

on the future technology and operational needs of

NCIC. In addition to a full range of technical options, it would be important to ensure that the

needs of the entire criminal justice community, as

well as any congressional decisions on a CCH system, are factored into the planning effort.

Third, NCIC continues to experience some problems with the quality of the hot files. For example, during a short period in 1981, FBI’s Identification Division (Ident) collected (on a nonrandom,

unsystematic basis) FBI identification numbers

for about 75 fugitives who had been apprehended

and cleared from the Ident file but had not yet

been canceled from NCIC. 5 NCIC notes that there

could be several reasons for this; for example, a

different name might have been used by the fugitive, extradition limitations might warrant retention of the record, or the apprehending agency

might have failed to check NCIC.5 NCIC repeatedly urges users “to cancel their records from NCIC

when a fugitive is no longer wanted. Promptly canceling these records will protect the rights of the

citizen and eliminate the possibility of false

arrest.” 6 NCIC operating procedures require confirmation of all hits on the hot files. Despite a

policy mandating immediate (within 10 minutes)

response to a request for confirmation, complaints

of untimely responses have been received by the

FBI, NCIC has advised users that “(d)elay in responding to such a request could subject the agency to a lawsuit (and damage awards for false arrest) or result in the release of wanted and missing persons or stolen property not being returned.’” Delays in entering records into the hot

files, sometimes up to several months after a warrant is issued or stolen property reported, have

‘See FBI, minutes of the June 17-18, 1981, meeting of the NCIC Advisory Policy Board, Topic +12, pp. 35-36.

*See ch. 5.

‘Mar. 26, 1982, telephone discussion with Conrad Banner of the FBI.

aN”CIC Newsletter. September 1981.

“A’CIC Newsletter, February 1981.

191
192 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

also been experienced. Again, NCIC has advised

users that delayed entry “reduces or eliminates the

possibility of apprehending wanted persons, locating missing persons, and recovering stolen property,” as well as unnecessarily endangering law enforcement officers,8

The only NCIC hot file examined in detail by

OTA was the wanted persons file. OTA found that

of the 394 warrants that could be verified (out of

a random sample of 405 selected on Aug. 4, 1979),

5.8 percent (23 warrants) had been cleared or vacated at the local level prior to August 4, 1979. As

shown in table A-1, 12 of the 23 warrants had been

cleared or vacated more than a month prior to

August 4, and 7 of these 12 more than 6 months

prior to August 4.

In recent years, the FBI has taken actions to improve the currency and accuracy of the wanted

persons file. It routinely conducts a large number

of record quality checks, and repeatedly urges

users to enter, update, and cancel records on a

timely basis. It systematically requests originating agencies at the State and local levels to verify

the warrants they have placed in the file.

Still, OTA found that as of August 4, 1979, a

possibly significant percentage of warrants in the

file (5.6 percent, or approximately 7,400, ± 4 percent) were cleared or vacated. To the extent these

individuals were at risk of being improperly detained and perhaps arrested, or detained and perhaps arrested but subsequently neither extradited

nor prosecuted, both effective law enforcement

and constitutional rights could have been compromised.

Further improvements in the quality of the

wanted persons file (and perhaps the other NCIC

hot files) may be warranted. Possible actions include:

●

●

●

●

establishing standards for retention of outstanding warrants;

establishing tighter standards for retention of

cleared or vacated warrants;

requiring more frequent certification of warrants as still valid by originating agencies;

and

conducting periodic random audits of the

wanted persons file to monitor record quality

(currency and accuracy) and to verify that

originating agencies are fully complying with

certification requirements.

At present, to the best knowledge of OTA, NCIC

does not conduct any record quality audits of

either the wanted persons file or the other hot files.

Perhaps the most important potential action

would be to initiate periodic audits to establish

benchmarks, to identify problem areas, and to

‘,VCIC ,\”ewsletLer, August 1981,

Table A-l .—NCIC Wanted Persons File:

Record Quality as of Aug. 4, 1979

Number of warrants in general warrant file

Aug. 4, 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........127,500

Sample size (random sample, Aug. 4, 1979 . . . . . . . 405

Originating agency responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394

Status of warrants in file

Warrant cleared or vacated prior to

Aug. 4, 1979a

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8% ( 23)

Agency had no record of warrantb 

. . . . . . . 4.1 0/0 ( 1 6 )

Wanted but no warrant locatable . . . . . . . . 0.80/0 ( 3)

Warrant cleared or vacated but date of

clearance unknown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 % ( 20)

Warrant cleared or vacated after

Aug. 4, 1979C 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.80/o ( 11)

Warrant outstanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 .50/0 (321)

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.1 “/0 (394)

aClearance dates for the 23 warrants were as follows 12/9/71, 12/30/76, 10/1 7/77.

6/13/78, 8/31/78, 12/7/78, 1/27/79, 4/5/79, 5/1/79, 6/1/79. 6/6/79, 7/2/79, 7/14/79,

7/19/79. 7/23/79, 7/26/79 (2), 7/30/79, 8/1/79 (5)

bThe FBI has noted that use of the originating case agency number might have

helped in further verifying these warrants

CWarrants cleared or vacated after the date of the Sample were not considered

in determining record quallty, s!nce the status of the warrants in the NCIC file

might have changed between the date of sample and the date of verification

Note on Methodology

The sampling procedure for the NCIC Wanted Persons file was a random sample of the population of general warrants, a Iist of which is produced weekly by

the FBI The population of warrants used in this research was produced Aug

4, 1979 A series of random numbers was used to select 405 warrants for verification Each of the warrants was verified by telephoning and/or writing the originating local agency as listed on the records selected from the NCIC Wanted Persons file

The statistical estimates of record quality produced in this research were tech.

nically generalizable to the population of warrants contained in the NCIC fiIe as

of Aug 4, 1979 The ability to estimate population parameters using randomly

drawn samples IS a function of sample size as well as the underlying distribution

of the variable being estimated. For the Wanted Persons file sample, the 95 per

cent confidence interval for the true population parameters IS plus or minus 4

percent That Is, there is 95 percent confidence that the true population param

eters of record quality Iie within plus or minus 4 percent of the estimates given

in the table

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

determine whether or not record quality is improving. Record quality audit is defined here as a

systematic comparison of a random sample of records in the NCIC file with the corresponding records held by the originating agency. At present,

NCIC sends a list of warrants every 6 months to

each State terminal control agency, which in turn

is responsible for obtaining certification by originating agencies within 75 days, Warrants that are

not certified or certified as vacated or cleared are

removed from the file. One possible problem is that

vacated or cleared or otherwise invalid warrants

may be maintained in the file for as long as 81/2

months (6 months plus 75 days) prior to the next

certification. Another is that some originating

agencies may not be fully complying with the certification requirements. Periodic random audits,

such as are currently conducted by the State of

California, 9 should help to encourage full and complete certification.

‘Per Feb. 16, 1982, telephone discussion with Fred Wynbrandt, California Department of Justice.
Appendix B

State Officials Responding to OTA

50-%ate Survey Conducted in

1979-80

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Delaware

The following individuals were listed as responsible for completing the written survey questionnaire for the States responding:

State Name and/or agency

Alabama Name not provided.

Alabama Criminal Justice

1nformation Center

Alaska Susan E. Knighton,

SAC Director

Criminal Justice Planning

Agency

Robert J. Edgren,

Coordinator

Arizona Criminal Justice

Information System

David Eberdt, Director

Arkansas Crime

information Center

Barbara G. Myers/victor J.

Paradis

California Department of

Justice

Lt. Jay R. Brackin,

Colorado

Connecticut

Florida

Georgia

Supervisor

State Bureau of

Identification

W. G. Buckley

Colorado Bureau

Investigation

Lt. Robert Hull,

of

Commanding Officer

Connecticut State Police

Peggy Horvath,

Deputy Director

Division of Criminal

Justice Information

Systems

Florida Department of

Law Enforcement

E. W. Manseau,

Deputy Director

Georgia Crime information

Center

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

State Name and/or agency

Hawaii Frederick R. Witte,

Systems Analyst

Hawaii Criminal Justice

Statistical Analysis

Cente r

Illinois John T, Loverude,

Assistant Bureau Chief

Illinois Bureau of

identification

Indiana Capt. James S. Kinder

Criminal Justice Data

Section

Iowa G. W. Shanahan, Chief

Division of Criminal

Investigation

Kansas Michael E. Boyer, Director

Statistical Analysis Center

J. Carey Brown,

Administrative Officer

Kansas Bureau of

investigation

J. Bruce Lee,

Administrative Supervisor

Criminal Justice

information Bureau of

State Police

Lt. Leon Millet, Supervisor

Criminal Records

Louisiana Bureau of

Criminal Identification

Robert E. Wagner, Jr.,

Director

Maine Bureau of

Identification

Earl L. Gillespie,

Coordinator

Criminal Justice

Information System

Maryland Department of

Public Safety and

Correctional Services

193

I
194 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

State

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Name and/or agency

Louis Sakin,

Executive Director

criminal History Systems

Board

Dallas G. Piper,

Administrator

Identification Section

Michigan State Police

Don Love, Director

Criminal Justice

Information System

Gordon W. Skelton,

Systems Analyst

Statistical Analysis Center

Criminal Justice Planning

Commission

Bob Winslow,

Deputy Director

Missouri Department of

Public Safety

Herb Bruning, Chief

Identification Bureau

Lt. Wayne Rowe

Identification Division

Nebraska State Patrol

Richard S. Staub

Criminal Justice Specialist

No name provided.

Wallace P. Miller

Bureau of Identification

New Jersey State Police

Sheila A. Cooper, Manager

Statistical Analysis and

Evaluation Center

Capt. David Kingsbury

New Mexico State Police

Adam F. D’Alessandro

Deputy Commissioner

New York State Division of

Criminal Justice Services

William C. Corley, Director

North Carolina Police

Information Network

Richard S. Milde,

Chief Agent

State Bureau of Criminal

Investigation

J. R. Wogaman,

Project Director

Criminal Justice

Information System

Office of Criminal Justice

Services

Marlin Dowler, Chief

Bureau of Identification

State

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Puerto Rico

South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Vermont

Virginia

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Washington

Wyoming

Name and/or agency

Jim Wilson,

Acting Director

Research and Evaluation

Oklahoma Crime

Commission

W. H. Freele, Director

Bureau of Criminal

Identification

Oregon State Police

Joseph Riggione, Director

Governor’s Task Force on

Criminal Justice

Information Systems

Edgar E. Perez Bracelty,

Director

Criminal Justice

Information System

Lee M. Thomas, Director

Division of Public Safety

Programs

Don Licht, Director

Division of Criminal

Investigation

Capt. Tony Hansberry

Archie Harem

Willis Whatley,

General Counsel

Criminal Justice Division

Governor’s Office (with

assistance from Texas

Department of Public

Safety)

Del Mortensen, Director

Bureau of Criminal

Identification

Billy J. Chilton, Director

Vermont Crime

Information Center

Capt. W. R. Wagner, Jr.

Records and Statistics

Officer

Virginia State Police

M. Sgt. R. E. Yost,

Records Officer

Capt. Armstrong,

Communications Division

Department of Public

Safety

Larry Quamme, Director

Wisconsin Crime

Information Bureau

Officer Wayne Harsh

Identification Section

Washington State Patrol

David G. Hall, Director

Division of Criminal

Identification
Appendix C

.

State Repository Officials

Responding to OTA User Survey

Conducted in 1979

The following individuals responded by letter

and/or telephone interview to the OTA user

survey:

State Name and agency

Alabama Eugene J. Akers, Manager

Systems Development

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Delaware

District of Columbia

Division

Alabama Criminal Justice

Information Center

Sgt. Michael S. Radisch

CJIS Security Officer

Alaska State Troopers

Department of Public

Safety

Capt. W. Woodard

Arizona Department of

Public Safety

David Eberdt,

Administrator

Arkansas Criminal Justice

and Highway Safety

Information System

Maj. Buren Jackson

Arkansas State Police

F. W. Johnston and

Roy T. Iwata

Bureau of Identification

California Department of

Justice

W. Gray Buckley,

Agent in Charge

Crime Information Section

Colorado Bureau of

Investigation

Benjamin M. Miller, Chief

Communications Center

Delaware State Police

Charles J. Corcoran,

Deputy Chief

Communications and Data

Processing Division

Metropolitan Police

Department

State

Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Name and agency

Robert L. Edwards,

Director

Peggy Horvath,

Deputy Director

Division of Criminal

Justice Information

Systems

Florida Department of

Law Enforcement

E. W. Manseau,

Deputy Director

Georgia Crime Information

Center

Jack Piper

Honolulu City and County

Police Department

Dwight E. Bee

Illinois Department of Law

Enforcement

Robert J. Stanton

Indiana State Police

Gary L. Stevens

Iowa Department of Public

Safety

Maj. Stuart A. Elliot

Kansas Highway Patrol

Mr. Kraing

Kentucky State Police

Lt. L. G. Finn

Louisiana State Police

Sgt. John H. Parkin, Jr.

Maine State Police

Louis Sakin

Maryland Department of

Public Safety and

Correctional Services

Emile Thibault

Massachusetts State Police

Henry Sedmak,

Exective Secretary

Law Enforcement

Information Network

Policy Council

Michigan State Police

195
196 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

State

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Nebraska

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

North Carolina

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Name and agency

Don M. Love, Director

Criminal Justice

Information Section

Bureau of Criminal

Apprehension

Lt. Art Richardson,

Director

Mississippi Justice

Information Center

Capt. J. M. Luker,

Assistant Director

Criminal Division

Missouri State Highway

Patrol

Capt. D. W. Schamp

Nebraska State Patrol

Capt. David Dempsey

New Hampshire State

Police

Sgt. Donald Menzel, et al.

Division of State Police

Capt. Monroe K.

Alexander, et al.

New Mexico State Police

William C. Corley, Director

Police Information

Network

North Carolina

Department of Justice

Lt. Col. C. C. Hayth

Ohio State Highway Patrol

Steve D. Tires

Oklahoma Law

Enforcement

Telecommunication

Systems

Department of Public

Safety

Lloyd A. Smith, Manager

Law Enforcement Data

System

State of Oregon Executive

Division

State

Pennsylvania

South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

Wisconsin

Wyoming

Name and agency

Benjamin R. Jones

Pennsylvania State Police

Lt. Carl Stokes, et al.

South Carolina Law

Enforcement Division

Donald G. Licht

Division of Criminal

Investigation

Capt. Tony Hansberry,

et al.

Criminal Justice

Information System

Tennessee Department of

Safety

H. A. Albert, et al.

Texas Department of

Public Safety

Del Mortensen, et al.

Bureau of Criminal

Identification

Utah Department of Public

Safety

Sgt. Billy J. Chilton,

Director

Vermont Crime

Information Center

Capt. W. R. Wagner, Jr.

Virginia State Police

Capt. George B. Tellevik,

et al.

Washington State Patrol

Larry J. Quamme, Director

Crime Information Bureau

Division of Law

Enforcement Services

Wisconsin Department of

Justice

Robert E. Olsen

Criminal Identification

Division

Office of the Attorney

General
Appendix D

State Officials Contacted in

OTA Followup Survey

Conducted in August 1982

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

Florida

Georgia

The following individuals were contacted by telephone:

State Name and agency

Alabama Ron Cunningham, CCH

Project Leader

Alabama Bureau of

Investigation

Alaska Dick Carpenter

Alaska Justice Information

System

Marilyn Crenshaw

Records and Identification

Section

Alaska Department of

Public Safety

D. C. Britt, Manager

Arizona Criminal Justice

Information System

David Eberdt, Director

Arkansas Crime Justice

Information System

Vic Paradis and

Nell Hutchinson

California Department of

Justice

W. Gray Buckley

Colorado Bureau of

Investigation

Connecticut State Police

Joseph Halloran,

Supervisor

Bureau of Identification

Lt. Neal Tilghman,

Systems Analyst

Bureau of Identification

Delaware State Police

Richie Grant

Criminal Justice

Information Systems

Florida Department of Law

Enforcement

E. W. Manseau,

Deputy Director

Georgia Crime Information

Center

State

Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Name and agency

Liane Moriyama,

Systems Analyst

Criminal Justice Data

Center

Hawaii Attorney General’s

Office

Richard Burns, Chief

Criminal Identification

Bureau

Idaho Department of Law

Enforcement

John T. Loverude,

Assistant Chief

Bureau of Identification

Illinois Department of Law

Enforcement

Stella Hanley,

Program Coordinator

Central Records

Indiana State Police

G. W. Shanahan, Chief

Criminal Investigation

Division

Iowa Department of Public

Safety

Michael E. Boyer

Kansas Bureau of

Investigation

Gary Bush

Criminal Justice

Information Section

Kentucky State Police

Elizabeth Fahl

Criminal Records Section

Louisiana Bureau of

Criminal Identification

Bob Wagner, Director

Maine Bureau of

Identification

Lamar Edwards, Director

CriminaI Records Central

Repository

Maryland State Police

197
198 • An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

State

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

Name and agency

Louis Sakin,

Executive Director

Criminal History Systems

Board

Dallas G. Piper,

Administrator

Identification Division

Michigan State Police

Kenneth Bentfield,

Director

Criminal Justice

Information Systems

Section

Bureau of Criminal

Apprehension

Minnesota Department of

Public Safety

Dewey Weems, Director

Records and Identification

Criminal Investigative

Bureau

Mississippi Department of

Public Safety

Robert Bradley, Director

Information Systems

Division

Missouri State Highway

Patrol

Herb Bruning, Chief

Identification Bureau

Montana Department of

Justice

Lt. Greg Schnasse

Identification and Records

Section

Nebraska State Patrol

Frank Adams

Division of Investigation

Nevada Department of

Motor Vehicles

Lt. Lynn Presby

New Hampshire State

Police

Wallace P. Miller

Records and Identification

Section

New Jersey State Police

Capt. M. K. Alexander,

Commander

Records Division

New Mexico State Police

State

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Puerto Rico

Rhode Island

South Carolina

Name and agency

Adam D’Alessandro

Deputy Commissioner

New York State Division of

Criminal Justice Services

William C. Corley, Director

Police Information

Network

North Carolina

Department of Justice

Richard S. Hilde,

Chief Agent

Bureau of Criminal

Identification

North Dakota Attorney

General’s Office

Marlin Dowler, Chief

Identification Bureau

Ohio Attorney General’s

Office

Paul Boyd, Chief

Identification Division

Oklahoma State Bureau of

Investigation

W. H. Freele, Director

Bureau of Criminal

Identification

Oregon State Police

Lt. Terry Clemens

Records and Identification

Division

Pennsylvania State Police

Luis M. Gonzalez, Acting

Administrative Director

Sgt. Rivera

Criminal Justice

Information System

Puerto Rico Department of

Justice

Jack Craven, Chief

Criminal Identification

Bureau

Rhode Island Attorney

General’s Department

Shelby Cote

Systems and Program

Manager

South Carolina Division of

Law Enforcement

Ernest Euler

Office of the Governor

South Carolina Division of

Public Safety
.

App. D—State Officials Contacted in OTA Fe/low-Up Survey Conducted in August 1982 ● 199

Texas

Utah

Vermont

State Name and agency

South Dakota Donald G. Licht, Director

Division of Criminal

Investigation

South Dakota Attorney

General’s Office

Tennessee Arso Carson, Director

Douglas Woodlee, Special

Agent in Charge

Criminal Records Unit

Tennessee Bureau of

Investigation

Steve Elliot, Manager

Fingerprint Records

Bureau

Texas Department of

Public Safety

Del Mortensen, Deputy

Commissioner

Dan Taylor, Acting Chief

Bureau of Criminal

Identification

Utah Department of Public

Safety

Billy J. Chilton, Director

Vermont Criminal

Information Center

State Name and agency

Virginia Capt. W. R. Wagner,

Virginia State Police

Washington George B. Televik,

Commander

Jr.

Criminal Records Division

Washington State Patrol

West Virginia Lt. Flanagan,

Communications

Division

Lt. Atkinson,

Records Officer

Bureau of Criminal

Identification

West Virginia Department

of Public Safety

Wisconsin Bob McGrath, Director

Crime Information Bureau

Division of Law

Enforcement Services

Wisconsin Department of

Justice

Wyoming David G. Hall, Director

Division of Criminal

Identification

Wyoming Attorney

General’s Office
Index
Index

Alameda County (California)

Criminal Oriented Records Production Unified

System (CORPUS), 179-180

American Bar Association, 139

American Bar Foundation, 129

American Civil Liberties Union, 53, 180

Arkansas, 64

Arizona, 36, 102

Attorney General (U.S.), 31, 34, 35, 61, 74, 95

authority to operate Ident and NCIC, 61, 62

and message switching controversy, 53

Task Force on Violent Crime, 5, 96

AUTODIN network (see Department of Defense)

Automated Identification Division System (AIDS),

8, 94

advantages of automation, 9

computer hardware used by, 54

development phases of, 44

as effort to automate the FBI Ident system,

39, 109

format of records in, 22, 26

Jet Propulsion Laboratory study of, 9-10, 161-162

number of records in, 3

proposed consolidation with National Crime

Information Center, 18, 45, 168-169, 186-188

Bertillon system, 27

California, 36, 62, 82, 84, 154

case disposition reporting in, 94

fees for noncriminal justice access to

CCH files, 141

improvements in on-line CCH files, 163

licensing boards authorized to use State criminal

history information, 139

rate of arrest of minority group members, 137-138,

141, 142

response time on CCH inquiries, 162

retention period for CCH records, 174

Canada, 40, 82

CCH (see computerized criminal history systems)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 81

Coast Guard, 45

Colorado, 120, 162

Commercial Carrier Corp., 85

Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and

Goals, 128

Comptroller General, 178

computerized criminal history (CCH) systems

current status of, 3-8

evolution of, 31-36

Federal access to State systems, 78, 81-82

at the Federal level, 3-4

at the non-Federal level, 4, 46-48

Federal and State court rulings on, 67-69

Federal statutes and regulations, 62-65

legal and regulatory framework for, 61-74

national index for, 9

national system (see national CCH system)

noncriminal justice access to, 17-18

origins of the national program, 35-36

oversight and audit of, 18

police departments with, 47

policy control over, 16-17

preferences of State repository officials, 10-11

public participation in governance of, 18

response time of, 9-10

record quality of, 10

recommendation of the President’s Commission on

Law Enforcement and Administration of

Justice, 33

record quality of, 17, 89-96

repositories for, 46-47

State statutes and regulations on, 69-73

State and local management of, 99-105

users of, 77-85

Congress

acts of (see legislation)

hearings on privacy and security legislation, 73-74

House Judiciary Committee, 16, 53, 157

House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and

Constitutional Rights, 127

policy options for (see policy considerations)

prohibition against message switching, 51, 53

Senate Judiciary Committee, 5, 16, 53, 74, 157

Connecticut, 36

Constitution (U.S.), 14, 63, 148, 149

court rulings (see litigation)

criminal history records

access, review, and challenge procedures for State

and local, 99, 102

arrest and court disposition reporting in State and

local, 99, 100-102

correctional and parole use of, 126, 133-134

court disposition monitoring in State, 104-105, 154

criminal justice use of, 4-5

noncriminal justice use of, 5, 17-18

defense use of, 126, 132-133

dissemination of information in State and local,

99, 103

Federal statutes and regulations on, 62-65

file content of State and local, 99, 102

interstate exchange of, 4, 16

judicial use of, 131-132

locus of authority for State and local, 99, 100

nature of, 21-26

origins of, 3, 26-28

police use of, 125, 128-130

privacy and security protection, 8

private users of State systems, 85

probation use of, 126, 133

problems with manual files, 31-33

prosecutorial use of, 125-126, 130-131

quality of, 6-8, 104

203
204 . An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System — — — — —

recommendations of the President’s Commission

on Law Enforcement and Administration of

Justice, 33

repositories for, 3-4, 8-9, 23, 46

sealing and purging of State and local, 64, 99,

103-104

transaction logs and local audits, 105

criminal justice agency, 79

Delaware

frequency of file access requests in, 102

response time on CCH inquiries, 162

Department of Defense

AUTODIN network, 46

use of Ident services by, 80, 81

use of State criminal history information by, 82

Department of Justice, 8, 18, 27, 65, 74, 79

Bureau of Justice Statistics, 71

Justice Telecommunications System (JUST), 40,

46, 147

prohibited from engaging in message switching,

16, 53

regulations on Criminal Justice Information

Systems, 79

Department of State

Diplomatic Network, 46

use of Ident services by, 81

Department of Treasury, 8

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 45, 81

Bureau of Customs, 45, 79

Secret Service, 79, 81

Treasury Enforcement Communication System, 40,

45, 79, 147

use of Ident services by, 81

use of NCIC services by, 147

Diplomatic Network (see Department of State)

District of Columbia, 40, 64, 90, 117, 130, 132

Edwards. Rep. Don, 74

Ervin, Sen. Sam, Jr., 74, 181

Executive Orders

No. 10450, 14, 61, 64, 81

No. 10865, 14, 64

No. 12065, 14, 64

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 3, 6, 9, 51,

79, 81

assistance to States, 14

authority to upgrade NCIC communications

controller, 51

authority to operate Ident and NCIC, 61, 62

challenges to records of, 65

COINTELPRO program, 146

COMINFIL program, 146

computerization of criminal records, 31

Computerized Criminal History Program (CCH), 36

contribution to NCIC operating costs, 55-56

Crime Index, 17

criminal history dissemination by, 64-65

exemption of criminal records from public

disclosure under the Privacy Act, 65

expunging and sealing of records by, 63

first use of computer technology by, 34

Identification Division (see Ident)

and message switching controversy, 53

National Crime Information Center (see NCIC)

position on automatic inquiry referral (AIR),

115-116

role in fingerprint identification, 5

standards for use of criminal justice information

systems, 61

surveillance activities of, 15-16

survey of State criminal justice record

repositories, 46-48

Technical Services Division, 55

Uniform Criminal Records (UCR) Division, 34

use of Ident services by, 81

fingerprints, 5-6

disposition in pretrial diversion cases, 63

facsimile electronic transmission of, 9-10

Ident files, 5, 31, 83, 109, 111

National Fingerprint File (NFF) proposal,

10, 155, 164

processing time for, 5, 9-19, 32, 162

reliability of, 5

State contributions to record repositories for, 46

Florida, 36, 116, 117, 118, 184

Crime Information Center, 85

Department of Law Enforcement, 5, 127

fees for noncriminal justice access to CCH files,

141, 143

frequency of file access requests in, 102

Public Records Statute, 85, 143

response time on CCH inquiries, 162

test of single-State-multi-State concept in, 113

update time on CCH system, 175

General Accounting Office (GAO), 6, 80

audits to ensure compliance with prohibition

against message switching, 51, 53

audits of Federal and State agencies, 148

study of State criminal history files, 93

General Telephone Co., 85

handguns, 5

Hoover, J. Edgar, 34

Hruska, Sen. Roman, 73, 74

Hughes Refrigerated Express, Inc., 85

IBM, 52, 54

Idaho, 47

Ident (FBI Identification Division), 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,

21, 22, 55

authority to operate, 61, 62

background and security checks, 81

content of records, 62-63

creation by Congress, 27

criminal justice use of, 80
— ———

Index ● 2 0 5

noncriminal justice use of, 80-81

differences between NCIC and, 111

Federal Government users of, 77-78, 80-81

fingerprint file, 4-5, 44, 80, 109

format of records in, 22, 24

interconnection with NCIC files, 39-40, 44-45

international users of, 78, 84-85

Jet Propulsion Laboratory study of, 89

multi-State offenders in criminal file, 31

as a national repository, 109, 110, 111-112

percentage of multi-State offenders in files of, 33

private users of, 78, 85

processing time for fingerprints, 9-10

record quality, 89

record updating, 63-64

right of individuals to review and challenge

records, 65

State and local users of, 78, 82-83, 99

III (see Interstate Identification Index)

Illinois, 82, 161

Immigration and Naturalization Service, 45, 81

Internal Revenue Service, 45

Criminal Investigative Division, 147

use of Ident services by, 81

use of NCIC services by, 147

International Association for Identification, 6

International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP),

27, 35

International Police Association (Interpol), 45, 84

Interstate Identification Index (III), 4, 5, 45

development plan, 18

file size and content, 17

officials’ preferences regarding, 10, 17, 110, 118

National Fingerprint File (NFF) proposal for,

10-11, 118, 164

national index system, 110, 118-119

pilot and Phase 1 test of, 110, 114-117

potential response times of, 10

regional and ask-the-network systems, 110,

119-121

Institute for Law and Social Research (INSLAW),

53, 57

Itel Corp., 52

Jack’s Cookie Co., 85

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 6

study of Automated Identification Division

System (AIDS), 9-10, 161-162

study of Ident record quality, 89

Johnson, President Lyndon B., 33

Justice Telecommunications System (JUST), 40, 46

Kansas, 44, 175

Kansas City (Kansas) Alert 11 regional system, 69

Kennedy, Sen. Edward, 70, 73

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

(LEAA), 6

assistance for State computerized systems, 14-15,

31, 34, 51-52, 55, 56-57, 154, 158

demonstration project on interstate exchange of

criminal offender files, 36

establishment of, 31, 33-34

and message switching controversy, 53

regulation of State and local CCH systems, 61,

69-71, 81-82

legislation

Crime Control Act, 6, 8, 61

Criminal Justice Information Control and

Protection of Privacy Act, 62, 74

Criminal Justice Information Systems Act, 74

Criminal Justice Information Systems Security

and Privacy Act, 62, 73

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the

Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation

Act, 64

Department of Justice Appropriation

Authorization Act, 53, 74, 115, 157

Florida State Public Records Statute, 85

Freedom of Information Act, 65

Justice Systems Improvement Act, 94

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 31,

33, 35, 62, 70, 73

need for, 18

Privacy Act, 65, 81, 182, 183

Securities Exchange Act, 64

South Carolina Freedom of Information Act, 85

Title 28, United States Code, sec. 534, 61

litigation

Green v. Missouri Pacific RR 1 3

Gregory v. Litton Systems, 7, 13, 138

illustrative Federal/State rulings on criminal

records (table), 68

Long v. U.S. IRS 65

Menard v. Mitchell 64, 65, 68, 73

Menard v. Saxbe, 62-63, 68

primary focus of State and Federal rulings, 67

Tarleton v. Saxbe, 6, 63

Tatum v. Rogers, 7, 11, 94, 130, 131, 148

Maine, 47, 141

Maryland, 36, 47

Massachusetts, 47, 143

Mathias, Sen. Charles McC., Jr., 73

message switching

alternatives for, 16

American Civil Liberties Union and controversy

over, 53

Attorney General (U. S.) and controversy over, 53

automatic inquiry referral (AIR) and, 114-117

Department of Justice prohibited from engaging

in, 16, 53

Congress and controversy over, 51, 53

definition of, 16

FBI and controversy over, 53, 109

GAO audits to ensure compliance with prohibition

against, 51, 53

LEAA and controversy over, 53

opportunity for, provided by modern computers,

51, 52-54
206 ● An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

prohibition against, 16, 51, 53, 109

Michigan, 115

Minnesota, 36, 154

frequency of file access requests in, 102

improvements on on-line CCH files, 163

progress in court reform, 159

response time on CCH inquiries, 162

update time for CCH files, 176

multi-State offenders, 31, 33

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice

Standards and Goals, 69-70, 74

National Association for the Advancement of

Colored People, 180

National Center for State Courts (NCSC), 57

National Chiefs of Police Union (see International

Association of Chiefs of Police)

National CCH system

alternatives for, 108, 109-121

cost of, 14-15

impact on constitutional rights, 138, 147-149

impact on the criminal justice process, 11-12,

125-134

impact on employment and licensure decisions,

12-13, 137, 139-141

impact on Federal-State relations, 14, 16, 138,

142-144

impact on minority groups, 13-14, 137-138,

141-142

Interstate Identification Index pilot tests, 110,

114-117

national index for, 110, 118-119

national repository for, 109, 111

policy considerations (see policy considerations)

possible impacts on the criminal justice process,

125-134

regional and ask-the-network systems, 110,

119-121

single-State/multi-State alternative, 109, 112-114

support for, 127-128

surveillance potential of, 15-16, 138, 145-147

National Crime Information Center (NCIC),

4, 6, 8, 22

Advisory Policy Board, 66, 67, 79, 95, 115, 168

communications controller, 51, 53

Comprehensive Data System program, 69, 70

computer hardware previously used by, 52

computer hardware upgrade, 52-54

computerized criminal history file, 31, 39, 42, 43,

66-67

content of records, 62-63

contextual description of, 39-48

costs to States, 56-58

costs of operation, 51-52, 55-58

Criminalistics Laboratory Information System

(CLIS) file, 42, 39

establishment of, 34-35

Federal agency orders and procedures for using,

67-69

FBI authority to operate, 61, 62

FBI use for intelligence purposes, 146

Federal Government users of, 77, 79-80

as a Federal repository with national access, 109,

111-112

hot files of, 39, 42, 43, 56, 66, 127, 153, 191-192

information exchange via, 9

initial participating agencies for (table), 35

interconnections with other criminal justice

information systems, 39-40, 42, 44-48, 146-147

international users of, 78

Interstate Identification Index (III), 4

and message switching controversy, 52-53

number of records in files of (table), 42

operating policies and procedures, 66-67

percentage of multi-State offenders in files of, 33

position on automatic inquiry referral (AIR), 117

private users of, 85

processing time for inquiries, 10

proposed consolidation of files with Automated

Identification Division System, 18

quality of records, 89

record updating, 63-64

right of individuals to review and challenge

records, 65

State and Federal agencies linked to (figure), 41

State and local users of, 78, 82, 99

system description, 40-42

system security, 67

technology used by, 51, 52-54

volume of transactions, 43-44

National Criminal Information and Identification

Division, 18

National Law Enforcement Telecommunications

System (NLETS), 4, 8, 84

Board of Directors, 115, 117

capacity of, 120

general description of, 40

information exchange via, 9

interconnection with NCIC files, 40, 45

and Interstate Identification Index (III) concept,

45

position on automatic inquiry referral (AIR), 117

National Legal Aid and Defender Association

(NLADA), 132-133

NCIC (see National Crime Information Center)

NCSC (see National Center for State Courts)

Nebraska, 141

New Hampshire

noncomputerized criminal history system, 175

response time on CCH inquiries, 162

New Jersey, 162

New Mexico, 47, 162

New York City, 26

New York State, 7, 36

fees for noncriminal justice access to

CCH system, 141

purge and seal policies of, 104

rate of arrest of minority group members, 141

response time on CCH inquiries, 162

use of high-quality facsimile electronic

transmission, 161
Index ● 2 0 7

NLETS (see National Law Enforcement

Telecommunications System)

North Carolina, 154

case disposition reporting in, 94

improvements in on-line CCH files, 163

Police Information Network, 163

test of Interstate Identification Index concept

in, 115

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 81

offender-based transaction systems, 57-58

operation costs by State (table), 58

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 36, 53

Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 61, 81

Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 5, 6, 10, 31

estimate of number of U.S. citizens with criminal

records, 13

findings on multi-State offenders, 5

research on record quality, 8, 9, 89-96, 121, 153

survey on Federal agency policies on using

NCIC, 67

survey on fingerprint card submission, 11

survey of officials’ preferences, 10-11, 119

survey on multi-State offenders, 33

survey on State and local CCH systems, 47-48, 84,

99-105, 128, 140-141, 193-194, 197-199

survey of State repository officials, 195-196

evaluation of NCIC request for new

communications controller, 53

Ohio, 162

Oregon, 82

frequency of file access requests in, 102

update time for CCH files, 176

OTA (see Office of Technology Assessment)

overcriminalization, 33

Pennsylvania, 47, 162

Philadelphia, 141

Phoenix, 120

police blotters (see Criminal history records)

policy considerations, 17-18, 153-188

arguments for action or no action, 153, 155-156

comprehensive legislation, 18, 168, 180-184

consolidation of Automated Identification Division

System (AIDS) and National Crime Information

Center (NCIC), 18-19, 168-169, 186-188

file size and content, 17, 167, 173-174

further study on use, quality, and cost of criminal

history information, 153-154, 157

importance of complete, timely, and verifiable

information, 161-162

improving record quality, 162-164

Interstate Identification Index (III) development

plan, 18, 168, 184-186

noncriminal justice access, 17-18, 168, 176-177

oversight and audit, 18, 168, 177-178

policy control, 17, 167, 169-172

possible impacts on the criminal justice process,

161-164

private carrier role in national CCH system, 188

public participation, 18, 168, 179-180

record quality, 17, 167, 174-176

select a national CCH system, 154-155, 160-161

shifting preferences on a national CCH

system, 164

strengthen State/local CCH systems, 154, 158-159

Postal Service, 79

President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and

Administration of Justice, 33

Pretrial diversion, 63

Privacy and security

Criminal Justice Information Systems Security

and Privacy Act, 62, 73

development of standards for, 69-70

implementation of standards for, 70-71

Project SEARCH (System for Electronic Analysis

and Retrieval of Criminal Histories), 31

early efforts to develop guideline for State and

local CCH systems, 69-70

States originally participating in, 36

role in development of State statutes and

regulations on State criminal record systems,

61, 74

Puerto Rico, 40, 90

rap sheets (see criminal history records)

record quality research

methodology, 89-91

findings, 91-96

Rinker Materials Corp., 85

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 84

Ryder Truck Lines, 85

Santa Clara County (California), 69

SEARCH Group, Inc., 10, 147, 148

findings on release of arrest and conviction data to

private employers, 139

and message switching controversy, 53

technical assistance by, 158

security (see privacy and security)

South Carolina

response time on CCH inquiries, 162

State Freedom of Information Act, 85

test of Interstate Identification Index concept

in, 115

South Dakota, 47

Supreme Court (U.S.), 69

Texas, 36

test of Interstate Identification Index concept

in, 115

update time for CCH files, 176

Treasury Enforcement Communications System

(TECS)

agencies served by, 45-46

interconnection with NCIC fries, 40, 45

use by Interpol, 84

Tunney, Sen. John, 74
208 • An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System

United Parcel Service, 85

U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 6

U.S. Parole Commission, 133

Utah, 176

Vermont

frequency of file access requests in, 102

noncomputerized criminal history system in, 175

Virginia

frequency of file access requests in, 102

test of Interstate Identification Index concept

in, 115

update time for CCH files, 176

Virgin Islands, 40

Washington, D. C., 120

Washington (State), 36, 47, 176

West Virginia

fees for noncriminal justice access to CCH

files, 141

response time on CCH inquiries, 162

Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 85

Wisconsin, 176

Wyoming, 162, 176