Present: All the Justices 

DAVID STEPHENS, JR. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 061228 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

 June 8, 2007 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY 

W. Allan Sharrett, Judge 

 This appeal challenges a circuit court order denying a 

petition for change of name filed pursuant to Code § 8.01-217 by 

an inmate in a correctional facility. 

BACKGROUND 

 On November 23, 2005, David Stephens, Jr., an inmate at the 

Greensville Correctional Center, filed a petition in the Circuit 

Court of Greensville County to change his name pursuant to Code 

§ 8.01-217. In the petition, Stephens stated under oath that he 

sought to change his name to Yâ-sin ibn Dâwûd Stephens “for 

religious purposes” and that Stephens was “practicing Islam and 

the change of name is sought in furtherance of the exercise of 

his religious freedom.” In accord with the requirements of Code 

§ 8.01-217(B), the petition indicated that Stephens had not 

previously changed his name and contained Stephens’ place of 

residence, date and place of birth, felony conviction record, 

parents’ names, and recited the fact that he was incarcerated. 

 The circuit court denied Stephens’ petition by order dated 

February 15, 2006. The circuit court’s order stated that 
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“[u]pon review of the file, the [circuit court] finds the 

proposed name does not appear to have any religious meaning or 

significance contrary to its general and accepted meaning. 

Accordingly, the [c]ourt denies the petition for name change.” 

This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION 

 Stephens asserts two arguments to support his contention 

that the circuit court erred in denying his petition for change 

of name. First, Stephens maintains that the circuit court 

failed to comply with the statutory provisions set forth in Code 

§ 8.01-217 governing the consideration of such petitions. 

Second, Stephens maintains that the circuit court’s denial of 

his petition infringed on his right to the free exercise of his 

religion in violation of both the United States and Virginia 

constitutions. Because we find the statutory issue to be 

dispositive, we will not address the constitutional issue. See

Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 516, 352 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1987) 

(“constitutional questions should not be decided if the record 

permits final disposition of a cause on non-constitutional 

grounds”). 

 Code § 8.01-217 sets forth the process governing the 

filing, consideration, and disposition of petitions for change 

of name. Code § 8.01-217 provides, in relevant part: 
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A. Any person desiring to change his own name . . . 

may apply therefor to the circuit court of the 

county or city in which the person whose name is 

to be changed resides, or if no place of abode 

exists, such person may apply to any circuit 

court which shall consider such application if 

it finds that good cause exists therefor under 

the circumstances alleged. Applications of 

probationers and incarcerated persons may be 

accepted if the court finds that good cause 

exists for such application. An incarcerated 

person may apply to the circuit court of the 

county or city in which such person is 

incarcerated . . . . 

B. Every application shall be under oath and shall 

include the place of residence of the applicant, 

the names of both parents, including the maiden 

name of his mother, the date and place of birth 

of the applicant, the applicant’s felony 

conviction record, if any, whether the applicant 

is presently incarcerated or a probationer with 

any court, and if the applicant has previously 

changed his name, his former name or names. 

C. On any such application and hearing, if such be 

demanded, the court . . . shall, unless the 

evidence shows that the change of name is sought 

for a fraudulent purpose or would otherwise 

infringe upon the rights of others . . . order a 

change of name. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 Stephens’ petition is an “application[]” for change of name 

by an “incarcerated person[].” Therefore, it is subject to the 

provision in Code § 8.01-217(A) whereby such a petition “may be 

accepted if the [circuit] court finds that good cause exists” 

for the proposed name change. Furthermore, Stephens’ petition, 

like all applications for change of name, is subject to the 
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provision in Code § 8.01-217(C) mandating a circuit court to 

order a requested change of name “unless the evidence shows that 

the change of name is sought for a fraudulent purpose or would 

otherwise infringe upon the rights of others.” 

 Here, the circuit court order denying Stephens’ petition 

did not specifically reference a finding with regard to “good 

cause” under Code § 8.01-217(A), nor did it reference a finding 

with regard to the “fraudulent purpose or . . . infringe upon 

the rights of others” provision of Code § 8.01-217(C). Instead, 

the circuit court denied the petition upon finding that “the 

proposed name does not appear to have any religious meaning or 

significance contrary to its general and accepted meaning.” 

This finding does not comport with the provisions of either of 

the pertinent subsections of Code § 8.01-217. 

 The Commonwealth appropriately concedes that the circuit 

court’s denial of Stephens’ petition was in error. Nonetheless, 

the parties disagree as to the proper disposition of this 

appeal. 

 Stephens asserts that the circuit court “accepted” his 

petition, as the term is used in Code § 8.01-217(A), by 

reviewing the file and considering the petition on its merits. 

Reasoning that Code § 8.01-217(A) requires a finding of good 

cause prior to acceptance of a petition for a name change by an 
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incarcerated person, Stephens asserts that the circuit court’s 

acceptance of his petition necessarily reflects that it 

determined good cause to exist. Accordingly, Stephens maintains 

that the circuit court must have denied the petition under Code 

§ 8.01-217(C) and the circuit court erred in that regard because 

Code § 8.01-217(C) does not authorize a circuit court to deny a 

petition due to a proposed name’s perceived lack of “religious 

meaning or significance.” Because the record contains no 

evidence that his change of name was sought for a fraudulent 

purpose or would infringe on the rights of others as specified 

in Code § 8.01-217(C), Stephens asserts that this subsection of 

Code § 8.01-217 requires that the petition be granted. Thus, 

Stephens maintains that the proper disposition of this appeal is 

a remand directing the circuit court to grant Stephens’ 

petition. 

 In response, the Commonwealth asserts that the circuit 

court did not make a determination pursuant to Code § 8.01-

217(A) as to whether good cause existed for the requested name 

change by an incarcerated person and the circuit court’s initial 

error was in failing to make such a determination. Thus, the 

Commonwealth maintains that this Court should remand for a 

determination of whether good cause exists for Stephens’ name 
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change and, if good cause is found to exist, for further 

proceedings to be conducted under Code § 8.01-217(C). 

 Upon the limited record before us, the nature of the 

inquiry by which the circuit court determined that the “proposed 

name change does not appear to have any religious meaning or 

significance contrary to its general and accepted meaning” and 

the factual basis for that determination is difficult to 

discern. However, implicit in the circuit court’s denial of 

Stephens’ petition was a finding of lack of good cause for the 

requested change of name under Code § 8.01-217(A). 

 Code § 8.01-217(A) does not define what constitutes good 

cause for an application for change of name. Certainly, the 

inclusion of a good cause requirement in this subsection for 

applications for change of name filed by incarcerated persons 

contemplates a different determination than the one under the 

requirements of subsection (C) of the statute. And we are of 

opinion that the good cause requirement reflects a legislative 

intent to invest circuit courts with discretion regarding the 

summary disposition of, for example, frivolous applications. 

However, to be a proper exercise of discretion to determine 

under subsection (A) that an application lacks good cause, a 

circuit court’s determination to that effect must be supported 

by evidence in the record. 
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 In this case, the facts contained in the record are limited 

to those asserted in Stephens’ petition. The petition was filed 

under oath and complied with all of the other requirements set 

forth in Code § 8.01-217(B). The facts stated in the petition 

did not in any way suggest that the name change was sought with 

frivolous intentions. To the contrary, the petition 

unequivocally asserted that Stephens sought to change his name 

for “religious purposes” in furtherance of his faith in the 

Islamic religion. Accordingly, based on the record before us, 

the circuit court’s implicit denial of Stephens’ petition for 

lack of good cause was clearly an abuse of discretion requiring 

reversal and remand without further consideration of the good 

cause issue by the circuit court. 

 Turning to the posture of the case on remand, since there 

is no basis for the denial of Stephens’ petition for lack of 

good cause under Code § 8.01-217(A) and the circuit court 

apparently did not consider Stephens’ petition under Code 

§ 8.01-217(C), the circuit court should resume its review and 

consideration of the petition in accord with the requirements of 

Code § 8.01-217(C). 

CONCLUSION 

 For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s 

judgment denying Stephens’ application for change of name and 
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remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with the 

principles stated herein. 

Reversed and remanded.