### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT NASHVILLE June 28, 200 6 S es sio n CLA UD IA HE NN EBER RY and hu sband, SC OTT HE NN EBER RY v. JOHN (RANDY) SIMO NEAUX and w ife , MRS. JOH N (RANDY) SIMONE AUX

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Willi am son Coun ty No. 04402 Hon. Russ H eldm an, Circuit Judge

No. M2005- 02032-COA-R 3-CV - F iled: August 22, 2006

Plaintiffs su e d p ar e n ts o f mi n o r c h il d f o r d a ma g e s f

o r in ju r ie s c a u s e d b y

mi n o r c h il d

. T h e T rial Cou rt g rante d s umm ary

jud g me nt. We a ff

ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined.

Ni le s S. I mmo , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or Ap pe lla nts

. Willi a m B . Jak e s, I I I ., Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or Ap pe lle e s.

OP IN ION

I n this act i o n ag ainst the pare nts of a minor child, plaintiff pre sented two c ommon law theories for the defe ndants’ liability : that the defe ndants wer e neg l i gen t i n t he supervision of their child, and that they

wer e neg lige nt in entrusting their child with a bicy cle.
Th e Tria l Co urt g rante d s umm ary jud g me nt t o d e fe nd a nts

.-2- Bac kgr ound
On July 4, 20 03 , Joh n a ndMa

rs ha Simo ne a ux a ndthe ir

tw o d a ug hte rs pl ann ed to participate in an annua l neig hborho o d p ar ad e. This para de consists of a f ire truc k leading the neig hborhood childre n and their pare nts as t hey ride their bicy cles a round the ne ighbor

hood. The Simo ne a ux famil y

a sse mbl e d a t a pa

rking lot ne ar the ne ig hb or ho od ’s c lub ho us e , a ndthe re wa s a small downward g rade fro m t h e parking lot toward Waterstone B oulevar d wher e the pa rade was org anizing. Two- y ear -old Nata lie Simoneaux rode her tra ining bicy cle a s it coasted down the inc line toward the para de. Mr. Simoneaux followed in an attempt to stop her, but he fell off of his bicy cle. After his fall, Mr. Simoneaux l ooked up to see his daug hter on her bicy cle, stopped near the par ade participa nts. He assumed that someone had c aug ht her.

Plaintiffs, in their Co m p l ai n t , aver red that Claudia was participating in the pa rade when she was struc k from behind by a training bicy cle ridden by Natalie Simoneaux, which re sulted in injuries to her lower

leg , as we ll as ag g ravating a pre- exis ting he alth condition.
T h e T ri al Court enter ed an O rder g ranting summary

judgme nt in favor of

the de fe nd a nts , w hic h s ta te d, “ Pla int if fs’ cla im l a c ks fo re se e abil ity a nd de fe nd a nts are e nti tle d to summary judgme nt as a matter

of law. ” On ap p ea l , plaintiffs’ issue is whethe r the Trial Court pr op e rl y g rante d s umm ary

jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f the de fe nd a nts

.

“ Th e sta nd ardof re vie w on app e a l of a su mma ry jud g me nt d e te rm inatio n is de novo without any

presumption of cor

rec tnes s ac co rd ed the tria l court' s judgme nt.” Guy v . Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. , 79 S.W .3d 528, 534 (Tenn. 2002)

.

Both the origina l Compl aint and the Ame nded Complaint asserted a cause of ac tion based upon the Def

endants’ a lleg edly

negl i gent s upervision of their da ug hter. The Tenne ssee Supreme Court f

irst r ecog nized the common law tort of neg lige nt supe rvision and control of c hildren in Bo c oc k v . R os e , 3 73 S.W. 2d44 1, 44 5 (T e nn
. 19 63 ). Th e Sup re me Cou rt de sc ri be d th e e le me nts of thi s to rt a s f oll ow s:
We f in d a n d s o h o l d p ar e n t s m a y b e h e l d l i ab l e f o r t h e d a n g e r o u s h ab i t s of the ir minor children c ausing injuries and dama g es to others, whe n, (1 ) t h e p arent has op po rtun ity

a ndabil ity

to c on tr ol the c hil d, a nd (2 ) the pa re nt ha s kn ow le dg e , o r i n the exercise of

due ca re should have knowledg e, of the child’s habit, prope nsityor te nd e nc y to c omm it sp e c if ic wr on g fu l a c ts, a nd(3 ) the sp e c if ic a c ts w ou ld n orma lly be e xpe c te d to c a us e inj ury to o the rs , a nd(4 ) the pa

re nt fails to e xer c ise re a so na ble means of c ontrolling or r estraining the child.
Id.
I n 1981 and 19 8 5 , t h ese e lements g uided the Te nnessee Gene ral Asse mbly ’sThe pa renta l l i ab i l i ty

statute consists of §§ 37-10-101 throug h -103. Section 37-10- 101 1 provides, Any municipal corpor ation, county , t o wn , village , school district or depa rtment of this state, or any person , or any relig ious org anizat i o n , whether incorporated or unincorporated, sha ll be e nt it le d t o r e c ov e r dam ag e s in an ac ti on in as sum psit in an a m ount

not to e xc e e d t e n t hous and do lla r s ( $1 0, 00 0) in a c our t o f co m pe te nt jurisdiction f

romthe parents orguardian of th e p er s o n of any m inor un der e igh te e n ( 18 ) y e ar s of ag e, livin g wit h t he par e nt s o rgua r dia n of t he pe r so n, wh o m aliciousl y or wi llf ully causes personal injury to such person or destr oys pr ope r ty , r e al, pe r so nal orm ixe d, be lon gin g t o s uc h municipal corpor ation, c o u n ty , to w n , v il la g e , s c h o o l d is tric t o r d e p ar tm e n t o f

th is s tate o r p ersons or relig ious org anizations. (Emphasis supplied).
Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 7- 10 -1 01 (2 00 5) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . Se c tio n 3 7- 10 -1 02 lim its re c ov e ra ble da ma g e s to “ the a c tua l dama g e s in a n a mou nt n ot t o e xce e d te n th ou sa nddo lla rs ($1 0, 00 0) , in addition to tax able c ourt costs.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 37-10- 102 (2005).
-3- amendment of the pa

renta l liabilit y

statute. Lavin v. Jordon , 16 S.W.3 d 362 , 368 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; see

1 also 19 81 Te nn . Pu b. Ac ts c h. 16 1, § 3 ; 19 85 Te nn
. P ub . A c ts c h. 43 9, § 2 . F oll ow ing the se a me nd me nts , § 37 -1 0- 10 3 n ow pr ov ide s,

(a) A par ent or g uardia n shall be liable for the tortious a ctivities of a minor child that c a us e inj urie s to pe rs on s o r p ro pe rt y wh e re the pa

re nt o r g ua

rd ia n kno ws , o r s ho uld kn ow , o f the c hil d’ s te nd e nc y to c omm it w ro ng fu l a c ts that c a n b e e xpe c te d to c aus e inj ury to p e rs on s o r p ro pe rt y a nd wh e re the pa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n h a s a n o pp ortun ity

to control the c hild but fails to ex erc ise rea sonable means to restrain the tortious conduct. (b ) Apa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n s ha ll b e pr e su me d to know of a c hil d’ s te nd e nc y to c omm it w r o n g f u l a c ts , if th e c h il d h a s p r e v io u s ly b e e n c h ar g e d a n d f o u n d r e s p onsible for such ac tions.
Be cause the Gene ral Asse mbly used lang uag e nea

rly identical to t h at u s ed in t he Bococ k elements, the Supre me Court later c oncluded in 2000 that “the common law tort of ne g lige nt c o n tr o l a n d s u p e r v i s i o n o f c h i l d r e n , a s r e c o g n i z e d b y [ Bococ k ], has been super seded by section 37-10-103 when the damag e cause d by the child was intentional or ma licious.” Lav in , 16 S.W .3d at 363.
Def

endants a ssert that they

had no knowledg e of any “tende ncy to c ommit wrongf ul acts” on the part of t heir daug hter; there fore , § 37-10-103 shields them fr om liabilit y for ne g lige nt supervision. Plaintiffs arg ue that the pa renta l liabilit y

statute does n o t apply

beca use the c hild’s conduct wa s neither intentional nor malicious. This a rg ument is ba sed upon lang uag e in § 37- 10-101-4-

which states, “ any

person . . . sha ll be entitled to rec over damag es . . . from the pa rents or g uardia n . . . of any minor

. . . who maliciously or willfully cause s persona l injury to suc h person.” Thus, the Pla int if fs arg ue that the ir c a us e of a c tio n is go ve rn e d by the c omm on la w, no t th e pa re nta l li abil ity statute. I t is the Defenda nts’ position that the parental l iability statute “is not limit ed to those ca ses wh ic h o nly

inv olv e ma lic iou s o r w ill fu l in jury ; rathe r, the statue by

its ow n lang ua g e app lie s to a ll ‘tortious activities’ of a

minor child.” This arg ument is based upon § 37-10- 103 which uses the phrase “tortious activities” instead of “malicious or willful.” § 37- 10-103. Although § 37- 10-103 uses broade r lang uag e than § 37-10-101, the purpose of § 37- 10-103 is to describe the circumstances in which a pare nt could be liable unde r § 37-10- 101. Lav in , 16 S.W. 3da t 36 7- 68 . Thu s, § 37- 10 -1 03 do e s not g ov e rnpa re nta l li abil ity

in g e ne ra l, b ut o nly

vis a vis § 37 -1 0- 10 1. Se c tio n 37 -1 0- 10 1 c re a te s the c a us e of a c tio n, no t § 37 -1 0- 10 3; a c c or din g ly , if § 37-10-101 doe s not apply to a case, neither does § 37-10-103. See I d. Section 37-10-101 pr ovides a cause of action to individuals “maliciously or willfully ” injured by

a minor. § 37-10- 101. There is no sugg estion in this rec ord t hat the De fendants’ daug hter a cted maliciously or willfully ; theref

ore, the pa re nta l li abil ity statut e do e s n ot a pp ly to the se c ir c ums ta nc e s a ndthe de fe nd a nts ma y no t r e ly upon § 37-10-103.

B e c a us e the pa

re nta l lia bil ity statut e do e s n ot c ov e r the fa c ts o f this c a se , th e statut e leave s the application of common law unaffe cted. Monk v . Ramsey , 443 S.W .2d 653, 655 (Tenn. 1969) (“ Rules of common law a re not re peale d by

implication, and if a st atute does not include and c ov e r s uc h a

c a se , it le a ve s th e la w a s it

wa s bef or e its e na c tme nt. ” ), c ite d w ith app ro va l in Lav in , 16 S.W. 3da t 36 8. Al tho ug h the Sup re me Cou rt he ld that th e pa

re nta l li abil ity

statut e ha s a su pe rs e din g e ff

e c t on the c omm on la w, thi s e ff e c t is na rr ow ly c on fi ne d. Th e Sup re me Cou rt he ld that “the common law tort of neg lige nt c ontrol and supervision of children, as re co gn i z ed by [ Bococ k ], has been super seded by section 37-10- 103 when the damag e ca used by the child was intentional or malicious.” Lavin, 16 S.W. 3d a t 36 3. Ac c or din g to thi s la ng ua g e , the stat ute s u p e r s e d e s t h e c o m m o n l a w t o r t o f n e g l i g e n t c o n tr o l a n d s u p e r v i s i o n “ a s r e c o g n i z e d b y [ Bococ k ].” Id. The Bococ k analy sis, howe ver, did not involve non-intentional, non-malicious conduct; rather, it involved a n as s au l t and battery committed by

the def endant’ s minor sons. Bo c oc k v . R os e , 373 S.W. 2d44 1, 442 ( Te nn . 1 96 3) . T his e xpla ins the Sup re me Cou rt ’s state me nt that th e statut e superse des the c ommon law tort “whe n the damag e ca u s ed b y the child was intentional or malicious.” Lav in , 16 S.W .3d at 363. The Lav in court’s r easoning w as t hat both the Bococ k decision and the pare ntal liabilitystatute attempted to g overn the same c ircumstance s (i

. e., inj ury cause d by a mi nor’s int entional, m alicious conduct) and there was a conflict betwee n the two (i.e., the statute place d a cap on damag es and the common law did not) ; the ref ore, the statute prevailed. Id. a t 36 8- 69 . T his re a so nin g do e s n ot a pply to this c a se be c a us e the pa re nta l li abil ity

statut e is inapplicable to the c ircumstance s here

.

De fendan ts arg ue that r e g ard le ss o f w he the r the pa re nta l li abil ity

statut e app lie s, “ther e is no a u th o r it y

o r b a s is f o r p ar e n ta l l ia

b il it y f o r th e a c ts o f

a mi n o r c h il d w h ic h ar e n e ithe r willful nor malicious.” Thus, t he issue bec omes whethe r the c ommon law provides a c ause of action fo r n e g lig e nt p are nta l supe rv isi on wh e n the inj urie s a t is su e are c a us e d b y a min or ’s no n- int e nti on a l,As discussed above , Bo c oc k v . R os e , 3 7 3 S

. W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1963) doe s not supplysuch 2
a ca use of a ction beca

use the minors in that ca se committed assault and battery

. Id. at 442.
-5- non-malicious conduc t. The we ll settled commo n l aw ru l e is that the pare nt-child relationship, 2 alone, is insufficient to hold pare nts liable for the torts of their minor c hildren. King v. Smythe , 204 S.W. 29 6, 29 7 ( Te nn . 1 91 8) ; Nic ho ls v . A tni p , 844 S.W. 2d 65 5, 65 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ; Highsaw v. Creec h , 6 9 S.W .2d 249, 254 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933). A lthough this rule pr events vica rious liability , it does not prevent pa rents fr om being held liable for their own ne g lige nce. [I ]n order for

there to be a cause of ac tion for common law ne g lige nce, the following elements must be esta

blished: (1) a duty

of ca re ow ed by

the def endan t to the plaintiff; (2) c onduct fa lling below the applicable standard of car e am o u n ting to a brea ch of that duty ; ( 3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and ( 5) proximate, or leg al, cause. McClenahan v . Cooley , 806 S.W .2d 767, 774 (Tenn. 1991)

.

The c oncept of

leg al duty

is “an e ssential element in neglig ence case s.” Bradshaw v. Daniel , 854 S.W .2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1993) . “The exis tence or nonexistence of a duty owed to the plaintiff by

the def endant is entire ly

a question of law for the court.” Id. “ Pr op e rl y de fi ne d, du ty

is the leg al obligation owed by defe ndant to plaintiff to conform to a rea sonable pe rson standar d of ca re for the pr otection ag ainst unrea son ab l e ri s k s o f harm.” McCall v. W ilder , 913 S.W .2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995). This duty , howeve r, “does not e x tend to the protec tion of others from the da ng erous conduct of

third persons unless the de fendant ‘stands i n some specia l relationship to either the pe rson who is the source of the da ng er, or to the person who is for esee ably at ri s k fr o m the dang er.’ ” Turner v. Jordan , 9 5 7 S

. W

. 2 d 8 1 5 , 8 1 8 (T en n
. 1 9 9 7 ) ( q u o t i n g Bradshaw , 854 S.W .2d at 871).

The c ourts of this state have adopted § 315 of the Re sta te me nt ( Se c on d) of Tort s. Le tt v. Collis Foods, Inc. , 6 0 S. W.3 d 9 5, 99 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; Newton v. Tinsl ey , 970 S.W .2d 490, 49 2 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) ; se e als o B isc an v . B ro wn , 1 6 0 S

. W

. 3 d 4 6 2 , 4 7 9 (T en n
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g § 31 5) ; Bradshaw , 8 54 S.W. 2da t 87 1 ( c iti ng § 3 15 ); Nic ho ls v . A tni p , 844 S.W .2d 655, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing § 315). Section 315 provides,

There is no dutyso t o control t he conduc t of a third per son as to preve nt him from c a us ing ph y sic a l ha

rm to ano the r u nle ss (a ) a sp e c ia l r e la tio n e xists be tw e e n th e a c tor a nd the thi rd pe rs on wh ic h imp os e s a duty upon the ac tor to control the third per son’s conduc t, or (b) a specia l relation exists betwee n the actor and the othe r which g ives to the other a rig ht to protection.
Re sta te me nt ( Se c on d) of T or ts § 315 (1965).Re sta te me nt ( Se c on d) of T or ts § 316 (1965). 3
Re sta te me nt ( Se c on d) of T or ts § 317 (1965). 4
Re sta te me nt ( Se c on d) of T or ts § 319 (1965). 5
Th e c omm e nts to § 31 6 s he d f urthe r l ig ht o n th e pr e re qu isi te s o f p are nta l li abil ity : 6

I n order that the par ent may

be liable u n d er t he rule stated in this Section, it i s not nece ssary that the ac t i o n s o f the child which he fails to preve nt or control ar e such as to make the child himself subject to liability . The c hild may be so y oung as to be incapa ble of ne g lige nce, but this does not absolve the pare nt from the performanc e of his duty

to exerci s e re as o n able care to control the child’s c onduct. I ndeed, the ve ry y ou th o f the c hil d is lik e ly to g ive the pa

re nt m or e e ff

e c tiv e abil ity

to c on tr ol i ts actions and to make it more often ne cessa ry to exercise it.
Re sta te me nt ( Se c on d) of T or ts § 316 cmt. c (1965)

. The De fenda nts’ Statement of Undisputed F acts a sserts that “Natalie Simoneaux had neve r 7 committed any wrong ful acts causing injury to pe rson or prope rty and def endants we re not a war e of any propensity

of [their daug hter] to do any thing whic h would l i k elycause injury to person or
-6- T h e s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s e n v i s i o n e d b y Re sta te me nt ( Se c on d) of T or ts § 315(a) include “those be tween pa

rents and the ir minor children,[ ] m asters and their serva nts,[ ] and persons having 3 4 custody of persons with dang erous pr opensities.[ ]” Nichols, 8 4 4 S

. W

. 2 d at 6 6 2 (c i t i n g Restateme nt 5 ( Se c on d) of T

or ts §§ 31 6, 31 7, & 31 9) ; se e als o Le tt , 60 S.W .3d at 100 (citing §§ 316 throug h 319). Th e princ ipl e s g ov e rn ing the sp e c ia l r e la tio ns hip be tw e e n a pa re nt andmin or

c hil d a re a s f oll ow s: A p are nt i s un der a

du ty to e xer c ise re a so na

ble c are so to c on tr ol h is m ino r c hil d a s to preve nt it from intentionallyharming others or fr o m s o conducting itself as to cre ate a n unrea sonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the pa

rent (a) knows or has r eason to know that he has the a bilityto control his child, and (b) knows or

should know of the nec essity and opportunity

for e x erc ising such c ontrol.
R e s ta t e m e n t

( S e c o n d ) o f Tor ts § 316 (1965). The state’ s adoption of § 315 forms the ba sis for 6 pare ntal liability for the acts of a minor child which are neither intentional norm alicious.

Plaintiffs, however , cannot suc cessf ully assert such a c ause of action beca use there is no dispute that the defe ndants’ child disp l ay ed n o t endenc y or prope nsityto eng ag e in conduc t simil ar to that causing the i njury in this case
. The Reporter’s Notes discussing § 316 emphasize that 7property .” The Plaintiffs’ Answer to Def endants’ Statement of Undisput ed F acts a dmitted this fac t “for purposes of r

uling on summary

judgme nt only .”
Th e c omm e nts to § 39 0 p ro vid e the fo llo wi ng app lic able ill us tr a tio ns : 8

1. A g ive s a loa de d g un to B , a fe e ble -m ind e d g ir l of

te n, to b e c arrie d b y

he r t o C. Whil e B is car

ry ing the g un she t amper s with the t rig g er and discharg es it, harming C. A is subject to liabili ty to C. 2. A permits B, a boy of ten, who has ne ver pr eviously driven a motor car , to drive his mot or c ar o n a n e rr a ndof

B ’s ow n. B drive s th e c ar c are le ssl y , to the inj ury of C.
-7- “[t] here must, however , be some spec ific prope nsityof the c hild, of which the pa rent ha s notice.” Restat e me nt ( Se c on d) of T or ts § 316 & reporte r’s notes ( 1965). § 37-10- 103(a) , B o cock , and the R e s ta t e m e n t

( S e c o n d ) o f T o rts § 316, rec og nize the rule that par ents ca nnot be held liable f or neg lige nt supervision and control unless the child had a spe cific te ndency to eng ag e in conduc t sim ila r t o th a t c a us ing the inj ury a t iss ue
. Ac c or din g ly , we c on c lud e that un de r the un dis pu te d f a c ts of this case , the defendants are not liable for neg lige nt supervision and control of their minor child.

The Plaintiffs’ Ame nded Complaint also asserte d a common law cause of ac tion for neg lige n ten tru s t m en t

. T h e A m en d ed C o m p l ai n ts t at es , “t h e D ef en d an t s we re n egl i gent i n entrusting th e ir d a u g h te r w ith a b ic y c le w h e n th e y k n e w , o r r e a s o n ab ly s h o u ld h a v e k n o w n , th at she wa s incompetent to ride the bi cy cle in a safe manner under the ex isting circumstance s
. . . .” A c laim of ne g lig e nt e ntr

us tme nt “ ‘r e qu ir e s p ro of

that a c hatte l w a s e ntr

us te d to on e inc omp e te nt to u se it w ith kn ow le dg e of

the inc omp e te nc e , a ndthat it s u se wa s th e pr oximate c a us e of inj ury or da ma g e to another .’” W

est v. E. Tenn. Pione er Oil Co. , 1 7 2 S

. W

. 3 d 5 4 5 , 5 5 4 (T en n
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( q u o t i n g W oodson v. Porter Brown Limestone Co. , 916 S.W .2d 896, 907 (Tenn. 1996)). The Restate ment provides the fo llo wi ng : One who supplies directly or throug h a third per son a chattel for the use of anothe r whom the supplier kn ows or has r eason to know to be likely beca use of his y outh, inexperience , or otherw ise, to use it in a manner involvi n g u n reasonable risk of phy sical harm to hims elf a nd others whom the supplier s hould expect to share in or be e nd a ng e re d b y

its us e , is subj e c t to lia

bil ity fo r phy sic a l harm re su lti ng to the m.

Re sta te me nt ( Se c on d) of T or ts § 390 (1965), qu ote d wi th a pp ro v al i n W

e st , 172 S.W. 3d a t 55 4; see also Ali v. Fisher , 145 S.W. 3d 55 7, 56 2 (T e nn . 200 4) (c iti ng § 3 90 ); W oodson , 916 S.W .2d at 907 (citing § 390). A neg lige nt entrustment case does not involve entrusting a mino r with a toy . The comments to § 390 illust rate situations invol ving minors, but these illust rations addr ess minors entrusted with fire ar m s an d m o t o r v eh i cl es
. S i m i l ar l y , n egl i gen ten tru s t m en tca s es i n volving minors 8A is subject to liabilityto C.

Re sta te me nt ( Se c on d) of T or ts § 390 cmt. b, illus. 1-2 (1965).
Shorter v. Mc

Manus , No. 03A01-9704- CV-00132, 1997 WL 718972 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9 13 , 199 7) (“ str e e t le g a l” mot or sc oo te r) ; Prater v. Burns , 5 2 5 S. W. 2 d 8 4 6 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A pp. 1975) (shotg un) ; Barrett v. Re ed, 327 S.W .2d 68 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959) (automobile) ; S mi th v. Salvag g io, 4 Tenn. Civ. App. (Hig .) 727 (1914) (.22 ca liber rifle ).
A BB shot fr om this air rife injure d the plaintiff’s e y e while the minor and plaintiff wer e 10 play ing. Highsaw , 69 S.W .2d at 250, 254.
-8- ha ve tr a dit ion a lly

inv olv e d f

ir e arm s a ndmot or

ve hic le s, no t c hil dr e n’ s to y s. I n o ne Te nn e sse e c a se 9 involving a minor’s toy , we held that the pare nts of a nine- y ear -old child wer e not neg lige nt in giving their child an a ir rifle. Highsaw v. Creech , 69 S.W .2d 249, 250-52 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1933). 10

What dist inguishe s the fac ts at issue f rom those in the traditional ca ses is the absenc e of an unr easona

ble risk of phy sical harm.
A risk is u nr e a so na

ble a ndg ive s rise to a

du ty to a c t w ith du e c are if

the fo re se e able probability and g ravity of harm posed by defe ndant’s conduc t outweig h the burde n up on de fe nd a nt t o e ng a g e in a lte rn a tiv e c on du c t that w ou ld h a ve pr e ve nte d th e ha rm
. Se ve ra l fa c tor s mus t be c on sid e re d in d e te rm ini ng wh e the r a ri sk is an u nr e a so na

ble one. Those f

acto rs i nclude the f

orese eable probability

of the ha

rm or injury occur ring ; the possible m agn itude of the potential ha rm or injury ; the importance or social va lue of the a ctivity eng ag ed in by defe ndant; the usefulne ss of the conduc t to defe ndant; the fe asibilityof alternative, saf er c onduct and the relative costs and bu rden s ass ociat e d w iththat c on du c t; the re la tiv e us e fu lne ss o f the sa fe r c on du c t; a n d th e r e lati v e s a f

e ty o f a lt e r n a ti v e c o n d u c t. McCall v. W ilder , 913 S.W .2d 150, 1 5 3 (T en n
. 1 9 9 5 ) ( ci t at i o n s o m i t t ed ) ( ci t i n g Re statem ent ( Se c on d) of T or ts §§ 291 throug h 293 (1964))

. When this balancing test is applied to fac ts like those in the traditional case s, an unrea sonable risk of ha

rm clea rly exis ts.
Th e oc c ur

re nc e of an in ju ry is a hig hly fo re se e able pr ob abil ity

wh e n a c hil d is e ntr us te d w ith a

fi re arm , mo tor v ehicl e , o r s ome oth e r a g e -i na pp ro pria te c hatte l, andthe po ssi ble ma g nitud e of th a t po te nti a l in jury is g re a t. In a dd iti on , th e bu rd e n u po n a de fe nd a nt t o e ng a g e in alternative conduct that would pr event the pote ntial harm is light bec au s e t h er e is mini mal social value in entr

usting such c hattels to children. Thus, the fore seea ble proba bilityand mag nitude of the po te nti a l ha

rm g e ne ra lly ou tw e ig h the bu rd e n upo n the de fe nd a nt to en g a g e in a lte rn a tiv e c on du c t.-9- I n c on tr a st, the fa c ts o f thi s c a se do no t pr e se nt a c le arl y un re a so na ble ri sk of ha rm
. The oc curr ence of an injury is far le ss probable w hen a c hild is entrusted with an ag e-a ppropriate toy such as a training bicy cle, a nd the pos sible mag nitude of t hat injury is gr eatly diminis hed. Entrusting c hil dr e n wi th a g e -a

pp ro pria te toy s ha s g re a t so c ia l va lue , a ndis o f b e ne fi t to the pa re nts . G e ne ra lly such chattels are de signe d to be safe ly entrusted to childre n. To re q u i re parents to further re duce what little risk of harm r emains would most likely be futil e and would place an unre asonable burden on pare nts. This is especially true whe n, as in this case, the child has no history o f u s i n g t he toy ina pp ro pria te ly . B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g , th e de fe nd a nts ’ e ntr us tme nt o f a

tr a ini ng bic y c le to the ir two-y ear -old daug hter did not cre ate the unr easona ble risk of ha

rm requir ed to successfully assert a ca use of a ction for ne g lige nt entrustment.

We a ffirm the Trial Court’s g rant of summary judgme nt, and assess the c ost of the ap p e a l t o t h e p l a i n t i f

f s , C l a u d i a a n d S c o t tH e n n e b e rr y.

_________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.