United States General Accounting Office

GAO Briefing Report to the Chairman,

Committee on National Security, House

of Representatives

March 1996 MILITARY

READINESS

Data and Trends for

January 1990 to

March 1995

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-271209 

March 4, 1996

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman, Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you requested, this report is an unclassified version of our earlier

classified report on military readiness. We analyzed military readiness data

contained in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Status of Resources and

Training System (SORTS) to determine if the data showed significant

changes in readiness since 1990—a year of peak readiness. This report

provides readiness information for the four military services. Specifically,

it (1) summarizes the reported overall readiness status of all military units

from January 1, 1990, to March 31, 1995; (2) assesses readiness trends of

selected units from each service for the same period, and, where

applicable, discusses reported readiness problems experienced

throughout a service and by the selected units; and (3) explains significant

changes in reported readiness of the selected units.

On August 31, 1995, we briefed the Subcommittee on Military Readiness,

House Committee on National Security, staff on the results of our work.

This report summarizes the information we presented in that briefing.

Background SORTS is DOD’s automated reporting system that identifies the current level

of selected resources and training status of a unit—that is, its ability to

undertake its wartime mission. Units report their overall readiness status

as well as the status of four resource areas (personnel, equipment and

supplies on hand, equipment condition, and training).1

 Overall readiness

status is generally reported at a level consistent with the lowest rated

resource level, but commanders are allowed to subjectively upgrade or

downgrade the overall rating. SORTS is an internal management tool used

by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, services, and combatant commands. It

provides the Chairman with the necessary unit information to achieve an

adequate and feasible military response to crisis situations and participate

in the joint planning and execution process.

1

Readiness status of a unit is reported by assigning “C” levels that are defined as follows: C-1—Unit can

undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized or designed. C-2—Unit can undertake the

bulk of its wartime mission. C-3—Unit can undertake major portions of its wartime mission. C-4—Unit

requires additional resources and/or training to undertake its wartime mission, but if the situation

dictates, it may be required to undertake portions of the mission with resources on hand. C-5—Unit is

undergoing a service-directed resource change and is not prepared to undertake its wartime mission.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
B-271209 

In viewing SORTS information, it should be noted that there are significant

differences in the way each service manages readiness. For example, the

Air Force’s goal is to maintain all units at the C-2 level or better. In

contrast, the Army uses a tiered resourcing system that maintains

contingency units at the C-1 or C-2 level but allows later-deploying units to

fall to the C-2 or C-3 level. The Navy and the Marine Corps manage

readiness so that deployed units are C-1 or C-2. Units deployed or

preparing for deployment have higher resource allocation priority than

nondeployed units. Therefore, reported readiness fluctuates with

deployment and maintenance cycles.

Results in Brief DOD-wide, the percentage of military units with the ability to undertake all

or major portions of assigned missions remained generally stable from

January 1, 1990, to March 31, 1995.

Of the 94 units we reviewed, readiness remained at levels consistent with

service goals in 75 (80 percent) of the units. However, readiness declined

below the goals in 19 (20 percent) of the units. In five of these units, the

readiness reductions were for fairly short periods of time due to the units’

participation in contingency operations. In the remaining units, readiness

reductions were caused primarily by personnel shortages, equipment

shortages, and difficulty in obtaining training for personnel in certain

military occupations.

In the Navy units we analyzed, ships maintained the desired readiness

levels when periods of planned maintenance and training were excluded.

However, the readiness of Navy aviation squadrons declined in the training

area—a problem we found was Navy-wide. The reduction was caused by

personnel shortages related to the Navy’s decision to increase the number

of aircraft authorized in some squadrons and a shortage of funds to pay for

the flying hours needed to keep pilots qualified. As a result, from April

1994 through March 1995, the number of naval aviation units reporting the

desired readiness levels declined by 27 percent. Although the funding

problem was alleviated at the beginning of fiscal year 1995, the Navy has

been unable to raise the readiness to previous levels.

In the Marine Corps units we analyzed, the readiness for ground combat

units remained at desired levels throughout the period, whereas the

readiness of support and aviation units fluctuated or remained stable at a

lower level. This happened because these units continuously provided

detachments to deploying ships and Marine Expeditionary Units. Although

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
B-271209 

a constant drain of personnel and equipment depressed the reported

readiness of parent units, Marine Corps officials said that this practice

reflected normal operations and that they considered the readiness of

these units to be adequate, albeit at a level lower than desired. Officials

attributed this situation to Marine Corps-wide problems in training

personnel for certain occupational specialties. Since the Corps does not

have its own training capability for skilled specialties, it must rely on the

other military services to provide it. Officials expect it will take about 

2 years to resolve this problem.

Readiness for most active Army infantry, armor, and artillery units we

analyzed remained high for contingency units and generally stable for later

deploying units. There were, however, significant changes or fluctuations

in the readiness of five active Army units due to contingency operations.

These units were used to support operations such as Somalia, thereby

decreasing their availability to the parent units or inhibiting the deployed

units’ ability to train its personnel. Also, Army National Guard combat

units experienced readiness reductions. Officials attributed the reductions

to comprehensive readiness reporting criteria that provide a more

accurate portrayal of personnel availability and to the difficulty of getting

guardsmen trained in occupational skills. National Guard units also

overstated their readiness by understating the number of training days

required to achieve a C-1 status. Lastly, some commanders subjectively

upgraded their units’ overall status. Officials told us they could not

determine in retrospect whether the upgrades were justified.

Readiness for Air Force units we analyzed generally remained at desired

levels. However, there was some reduction or fluctuation in the readiness

of airlift and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) units. Air

Force officials said this condition occurred because aircraft have been

continuously committed to the operations in Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and

Bosnia. Officials said heavy usage of airlift aircraft have strained the

supply of spare parts and engines. The constant use of AWACS aircraft for

contingency and counterdrug operations affected the Air Force’s ability to

train crews and maintain required skills. We also noted that commanders

sometimes reported overall readiness levels higher than the measured

resource areas. Air Force officials said they consider this SORTS feature to

be a strength of the system. They believe that a commander is in the best

position to accurately assess the readiness of a unit on the basis of a wide

range of information available to make this judgment.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
B-271209 

Scope and

Methodology

DOD has over 10,000 units that report readiness status under SORTS. We

analyzed the overall readiness reported for all units since January 1, 1990.

In addition, we performed a detailed analysis of all readiness data reported

for a cross-section of units2

 in each service. To ensure that we obtained

adequate coverage, we asked service officials to help us select specific

units that would represent the various types of units within the service.

The units selected are not a statistical sample, and the results of our

analyses cannot be projected to the entire service. The units included in

our review are shown in appendix II.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff established the requirements for specific data that

each service must report. In addition, the Army, the Navy, and the Air

Force identified a number of service-unique indicators that their units are

required to report. We selected indicators from this universe that we

believe are most relevant to identifying readiness trends. In general, these

indicators comprised the overall C-rating for the unit, the C-rating for each

of the four measured resource areas, and data elements that are used to

determine the C-rating in each measured area. (See app. II.)

For the selected units, we graphed the data elements and identified trends.

Where we noted changes in historical trends or in units that dropped

below C-2 for extended periods, we compared the readiness data with

operational scheduling and maintenance data and discussed these

conditions with readiness officers from the respective services. Briefing

sections I-IV of this report contain summary data for each service.

With the exception that we did not assess the reliability of SORTS data

provided by the services, our review followed generally accepted

government auditing standards and was conducted from November 1994

through July 1995.

In written comments on a draft of our report, DOD agreed with the

information presented. (See app. I.) We are sending copies of this report to

the Chairmen, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations; the

Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services; and the Secretaries of

Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Copies will also be made

available to others upon request.

2

For our analyses, we selected the following reporting organizations: Navy ships, submarines, and

aircraft squadrons; Marine Corps and Army battalions, support groups, and squadrons; and Air Force

wings and squadrons.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
B-271209 

The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. If you or

your staff have questions about this report, please call me on

(202) 512-5140.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Contents

Letter 1

Briefing Section I 

Navy Readiness

Trends: January

1990-March 1995

8

Briefing Section II 

Marine Corps

Readiness Trends:

January 1990-March

1995

10

Briefing Section III 

Army Readiness

Trends: January

1990-March 1995

12

Briefing Section IV 

Air Force Readiness

Trends: January

1990-March 1995

14

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 16

Appendix II: Units Included in Our Readiness Assessment 17

Appendix III: Readiness Indicators Included in Our Analysis 21

Appendix IV: Major Contributors to This Report 23

Abbreviations

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

DOD Department of Defense

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Briefing Section I 

Navy Readiness Trends: January 1990-March

1995

GAO Summary of Navy Readiness Trends

Percentage of units that reported C-1 to 

C-3 for overall readiness was stable.

For the cross-section of units:

Ship readiness remained stable.

Aviation readiness was reduced.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Briefing Section I 

Navy Readiness Trends: January 1990-March

1995

The percentage of units that reported an overall readiness status of C-1 to

C-3 was stable. The readiness reported for 15 of the 16 ships included in

our analysis fluctuated cyclically between when they were deployed and

not deployed or undergoing maintenance. Five of eight aviation units

showed a similar readiness trend. In the remaining units, we identified

significant reductions in readiness levels.

Only one Navy ship experienced a reduction in readiness, as compared to

several aviation units. In explaining the reduced readiness in aviation

units, Navy officials said that during the past year, the training readiness of

aviation squadrons Navy-wide declined significantly.

Officials attributed the reduction to two major factors. First, contingency

operations caused a shortage of flying hour funding in late 1994, which

significantly reduced training readiness. We did not verify the funding

shortage. Second, personnel shortages were caused by force structure

changes that increased the number of authorized aircraft in some

squadrons. In August 1994, the number of squadrons that reported C-1 or

C-2 in training declined by 15 percent from only 3 months earlier. The

funding shortage was alleviated at the beginning of fiscal year 1995, but

training readiness has not yet reached previous levels.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Briefing Section II 

Marine Corps Readiness Trends: January

1990-March 1995

GAO Summary of Marine Corps Readiness 

Trends

Percentage of units that reported C-1 to C-3 

for overall readiness was stable. However, 

the percentage that reported C-1 or C-2 

declined.

For the cross-section of units: 

Ground combat forces were stable at high 

levels.

Continuous deployment of people and 

equipment caused cyclical changes in 

support units.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Briefing Section II 

Marine Corps Readiness Trends: January

1990-March 1995

Although the percentage of units that reported C-1 to C-3 for overall

readiness was stable, the percentage that reported C-1 or C-2 declined.

Readiness in the seven Marine Corps ground combat units we reviewed

was stable at desired levels. Likewise, readiness in 7 of the 13 aviation and

support units remained stable at desired levels. However, we noted

significant fluctuations or changes in the reported readiness of five

aviation, maintenance, and support units and one instance in which a

squadron’s training rating dropped due to insufficient flying hours late in

fiscal year 1994.

Marine Corps officials contended that these changes generally reflect

normal variations due to the way the Corps organizes and deploys its

forces. For example, many Marine Corps aviation and support units are

not deployed as a single entity that reports readiness. Instead, the units

provide detachments, comprised of mission-ready personnel and

equipment, to a deploying Marine Expeditionary Unit. This necessarily

degrades the readiness status of the parent unit, which then begins to

build toward its next commitment. This continuous cycle of deploying the

best-trained personnel and mission-ready equipment may cause changes in

the reported status of the unit or cause it to remain at a low level over

time.

Officials said that although readiness for many of the units was stable, it

was not at the desired level. They said that there are Corps-wide problems

in providing sufficient personnel trained in many of the low-density, highly

skilled military occupational specialties. Officials attributed this largely to

the planned force-structure reduction designed to reduce the Corps to

159,000 personnel. Although this level was subsequently changed to

174,000, the Corps meanwhile had lost many of its skilled personnel and

forfeited future training opportunities. Since the Corps does not have its

own facilities to train personnel for these skills, it relies on the other

services to provide training. Officials expect it will take about 2 years to

correct this deficiency.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Briefing Section III 

Army Readiness Trends: January

1990-March 1995

GAO Summary of Army Readiness Trends

Percentage of units that reported C-1 to C-3 for 

overall readiness was stable.

For the cross-section of units:

Readiness for most units was stable.

Readiness for some units was affected by 

contingency operations.

Readiness of National Guard combat units 

declined and units consistently overstated 

readiness.

Subjective upgrades were used.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Briefing Section III 

Army Readiness Trends: January

1990-March 1995

The percentage of units that reported C-1 to C-3 for overall readiness was

stable. We noted significant changes or fluctuations in reported readiness

for active Army units due to contingency operations and equipment

maintenance problems, a general reduction in readiness reported by

National Guard units and, in some cases, commanders’ subjective

upgrades of overall readiness ratings.

Five of the units included in our analysis were used to respond to

contingency situations, which affected readiness for fairly short periods of

time. Officials said that such use of units may affect readiness in two ways.

First, if only part of the reporting unit is deployed, certain resources

available to the unit are depleted, thereby degrading readiness in such

areas as personnel and equipment on hand. Second, if a unit is engaged in

one role, such as peacekeeping or security operations, it may be unable to

train personnel in the full range of military skills or to maintain its

equipment in mission-ready condition.

We noted a reduction in readiness for National Guard combat units, which

Army officials attributed to more stringent reporting requirements and the

difficulty of getting personnel trained in the needed occupational skills.

Moreover, our analyses disclosed that two of the four National Guard

combat units we analyzed appear to have understated the number of

training days required to achieve C-1 status.

In several instances, Army unit commanders subjectively upgraded their

units’ overall status. Army officials told us there was no way of

determining in retrospect whether the upgrades were justified. They said

many commanders view the SORTS reports as “report cards” on their

performance and will therefore make every effort to present the unit in the

best light. Officials also explained that a commander’s subjective

assessment to upgrade or downgrade readiness is a standard, deliberate

part of the process that provides a more complete assessment of a unit’s

readiness.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Briefing Section IV 

Air Force Readiness Trends: January

1990-March 1995

GAO Summary of Air Force Readiness 

Trends

Percentage of units that reported C-1 to 

C-3 for overall readiness was stable.

For the cross-section of units:

Readiness for most units was stable, 

with reserve units noticeably more 

stable.

Continuous commitments affected 

readiness of airlift and specialty units.

Subjective upgrades were used.

The percentage of units that reported C-1 to C-3 for overall readiness was

stable. Readiness remained generally stable in most of the units we

reviewed. Guard and reserve units were the most stable. In three of the

units, there was some reduction or fluctuation in reported readiness,

primarily among airlift and specialty aircraft units. Air Force officials

generally attributed the changes to continuous use of the aircraft for

contingency operations and the resulting strain on the supply of spare

parts and engines. We also noted that Air Force commanders sometimes

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Briefing Section IV 

Air Force Readiness Trends: January

1990-March 1995

upgraded their units’ overall readiness status above the level indicated by

the four measured resource areas.

Included in our sample were four Air Force Reserve and four Air National

Guard units—two fighter squadrons and two airlift squadrons from each.

Reported readiness in these units remained at high levels throughout the

period. Air Force officials attributed this condition to the Air Force policy

of viewing reserve components as an integral part of the total force. They

said that the reserve units had equal access to the supply system in

obtaining spare parts, were usually staffed with experienced pilots and

maintenance personnel, and were generally not used as heavily as active

component units.

Continuously using the aircraft to support Desert Storm, Somalia, and

Bosnia operations, along with counterdrug operations, affected the

reported readiness of Air Force units during this period. Particularly

affected were the airlift units required to transport personnel, equipment,

and supplies. For example, in fiscal year 1991, the C-141 fleet flew

58 percent over the planned flying hour program, and the C-5 fleet flew

over by 175 percent. Heavy use of the C-141 and C-5 aircraft created a

greater demand for spare parts and engines and accelerated the rate at

which the aircraft required major repairs. Units with specialty aircraft,

such as the E-3B Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), were also

affected. These aircraft are an integral part of air operations and are in

constant demand by the commanders in chief.

Finally, Air Force commanders sometimes upgraded the overall readiness

status of their units. In some units we analyzed, commanders subjectively

upgraded the overall readiness reported for extended periods of time 

(5 consecutive months or longer). Air Force officials said that they do not

consider upgrades to be a problem. In fact, they consider the capability to

do this to be a strength of the Status of Resources and Training System

(SORTS) rather than a weakness. They believe that a commander is in the

best position to accurately assess the readiness of a unit, on the basis of a

wide range of information available to make this judgment. Commanders

have the prerogative to upgrade or downgrade their unit’s overall

readiness status.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Appendix II 

Units Included in Our Readiness Assessment

Major command Unit name Major equipment Home station

Air Force

Air Combat Command

96th Wing 28th Bomb Squadron B-1B aircraft Dyess Air Force Base, Tex.

4th Wing 744th Air Refueling Squadron KC-10A aircraft Seymour Johnson Air Force

Base, N.C.

1st Fighter Wing 71st Air Rescue Squadron HC-130P aircraft Patrick Air Force Base, Fla.

27th Fighter Squadron F-15C/D aircraft Langley Air Force Base, Va.

2nd Bomb Wing 20th Bomb Squadron B-52H aircraft Barksdale Air Force Base, La.

355th Wing 354th Fighter Squadron OA-10A aircraft Davis-Monthan Air Force Base,

Ariz.

23rd Wing 41st Airlift Squadron C-130E aircraft Pope Air Force Base, N.C.

U.S. Air Forces, Europe

52nd Fighter Wing 23rd Fighter Squadron F-16C aircraft Spangdahlem Air Base,

Germany

Pacific Air Forces

18th Wing 961st Airborne Warning and

Control Squadron

E-3B aircraft Kadena Air Force Base, Japan

3rd Wing 90th Fighter Squadron F-15E aircraft Elmendorf Air Force Base,

Alaska

Air Mobility Command

60th Airlift Wing C-5B aircraft Travis Air Force Base, Calif.

437th Airlift Wing C-141B aircraft Charleston Air Force Base, S.C.

22nd Air Refueling Wing KC-135A aircraft McConnell Air Force Base,

Kans.

Air Force Special Operations Command

353rd Special Operations

Group

1st Special Operations

Squadron

MC-130E aircraft Kadena Air Base, Japan

Air National Guard

135th Airlift Group 104th Fighter Squadron A-10A aircraft Martin Air National Guard

Station, Md.

172nd Airlift Group 183rd Airlift Squadron C-141B aircraft Jackson Air National Guard

Station, Miss.

136th Airlift Wing 181st Airlift Squadron C-130H aircraft Dallas Naval Air Station, Tex.

149th Fighter Group 182nd Fighter Squadron F-16A/B aircraft Kelly Air Force Base, Tex.

Air Force Reserve

914th Airlift Group 328th Airlift Squadron C-130H aircraft Niagra Falls, N.Y.

459th Airlift Wing C-141B aircraft Andrews Air Force Base, Md.

442nd Fighter Wing 303rd Fighter Squadron OA-10A aircraft Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.

301st Fighter Wing 457th Fighter Squadron F-16A aircraft Ft. Worth Naval Air Station, Tex.

(continued)

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Appendix II 

Units Included in Our Readiness Assessment

Major command Unit name Major equipment Home station

Army

3rd Infantry Division (mechanized) 2nd Battalion, 1st Aviation

Regiment

AH64A; OH58C helicopters Katerbach, Germany

1st Battalion, 6th Infantry

Regiment

Bradley fighting vehicles Vilseck, Germany

3rd Battalion, 1st Field Artillery

Regiment

155mm self-propelled howitzers Bamberg, Germany

2nd Battalion, 64th Armor

Regiment

M1A2 main battle tanks Schweinft, Germany

82nd Combat Engineering

Battalion

Combat engineer vehicles;

personnel carriers

Bamberg, Germany

703rd Combat Support Battalion Recovery vehicles; medical

equipment

Kitzingen, Germany

4th Infantry Division (mechanized) 1st Battalion, 4th Aviation

Regiment

AH64 attack helicopters Fort Carson, Colo.

1st Battalion, 148th Field

Artillery Regiment

155mm self-propelled howitzers Pocatello, Idaho

2nd Battalion, 77th Armor

Regiment

M1A1 main battle tanks Fort Carson, Colo.

1st Battalion, 8th Infantry

Regiment

Armored personnel carriers Fort Carson, Colo.

4th Combat Support Battalion Personnel carriers Fort Carson, Colo.

299th Engineering Battalion Personnel carriers Fort Carson, Colo.

24th Infantry Division

(mechanized)

1st Battalion, 24th Aviation

Regiment

AH64 attack helicopters Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.

4th Battalion, 41st Field Artillery

Regiment

155mm self-propelled howitzers Fort Benning, Ga.

1st Battalion, 64th Armor

Regiment

M1A1 main battle tanks Fort Stewart, Ga.

2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry

Regiment

Bradley fighting vehicles;

Dragon anti-tank missiles

Fort Benning, Ga.

24th Combat Support Battalion Recovery vehicles; personnel

carriers

Fort Stewart, Ga.

317th Engineering Battalion Combat engineer vehicles;

personnel carriers

Fort Benning, Ga.

1st Battalion, 263rd Armor

Regiment

M1A1 main battle tanks Mullins, S.C.

1st Battalion, 108th Armor

Regiment

M1A1 main battle tanks Calhoun, Ga.

148th Combat Support Battalion 5,000-gallon trailers;

10,000-gallon collapsible tanks

Forsyth, Ga.

648th Engineering Battalion Tank launch recovery vehicles;

combat engineer vehicles

Statesboro, Ga.

10th Infantry Division (light) 3rd Battalion, 14th Infantry

Regiment

Infantry equipment Fort Drum, N.Y.

(continued)

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Appendix II 

Units Included in Our Readiness Assessment

Major command Unit name Major equipment Home station

3rd Battalion, 108th Infantry

Regiment

TOW anti-tank missiles Utica, N.Y.

2nd Battalion, 25th Aviation

Regiment

OH58A helicopters Fort Drum, N.Y.

2nd Battalion, 7th Field Artillery

Regiment

105mm towed howitzers Fort Drum, N.Y.

10th Combat Support Battalion Medical equipment Fort Drum, N.Y.

41st Engineering Battalion Track and wheeled engineering

vehicles

Fort Drum, N.Y.

Marine Corps

1st Marine Air Wing Marine Wing Support Squadron

172

Mobile airfield equipment Okinawa, Japan

2nd Marine Air Wing Attack Squadron 231 AV8B aircraft Cherry Point Marine Corps Air

Station, N.C.

Electronic Countermeasures

Squadron 1

EA6B aircraft Cherry Point Marine Corps Air

Station, N.C.

Light Attack Helicopter

Squadron 269

UH1N; AH1W helicopters New River Marine Corps Air

Station, N.C.

Fighter/Attack

(all weather) Squadron 533

F/A18D aircraft Beaufort Marine Corps Air

Station, S.C.

3rd Marine Air Wing Marine Air Control Group 38 Radios; vans El Toro Marine Corps Air

Station, Calif.

Fighter/Attack

(all weather) Squadron 121

F/A18D aircraft Miramar Naval Air Station, Calif.

Attack Squadron 214 AV8B aircraft Yuma Marine Corps Air Station,

Ariz.

1st Division 1st Battalion, 7th Marine

Regiment

Infantry equipment Twenty Nine Palms, Calif.

1st Light Armor

Reconnaissance Battalion

Light armor vehicles Camp Pendleton, Calif.

2nd Division 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine

Regiment

Infantry equipment Camp Lejeune, N.C.

1st Battalion, 6th Marine

Regiment

Infantry equipment Camp Lejeune, N.C.

2nd Light Armor

Reconnaissance Battalion

Light armor vehicles Camp Lejeune, N.C.

2nd Surveillance,

Reconnaissance, and

Intelligence Group

2nd Radio Battalion Radios Camp Lejeune, N.C.

3rd Division 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine

Regiment

Infantry equipment Kaneohe Bay Marine Corps Air

Station, Hawaii

U.S. Marine Corps Reserves 1st Battalion, 24th Marine

Regiment

Infantry equipment Detroit, Mich.

4th Combat Engineering

Battalion

Engineer equipment Baltimore, Md.

(continued)

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Appendix II 

Units Included in Our Readiness Assessment

Major command Unit name Major equipment Home station

1st Force Service Support Group 1st Maintenance Battalion Repair equipment Camp Pendleton, Calif.

2nd Force Service Support Group 8th Engineering Support

Battalion

Engineer equipment Camp Lejeune, N.C.

3rd Force Service Support Group 3rd Support Battalion Logistics support equipment Okinawa, Japan

Navy

Atlantic Fleet USS Puget Sound Destroyer tender Norfolk, Va.

USS Simon Lake Submarine tender La Maddalena, Italy

USS Monterey Guided-missile cruiser Mayport, Fla.

USS Eisenhower Nuclear aircraft carrier Norfolk, Va.

USS Connolly Destroyer Norfolk, Va.

USS Nassau Amphibious assault ship Norfolk, Va.

USS Gladiator Mine counter-measures ship Ingleside, Tex.

USS Nebraska Ballistic missile submarine Kings Bay, Ga.

USS Saturn Combat stores ship Norfolk, Va.

Helicopter Support Squadron 4 CH53E helicopters Norfolk Naval Air Station, Va.

Electronic Warfare Squadron

120

EA6B aircraft Oceana Naval Air Station, Va.

Fighter Squadron 102 F14 aircraft Oceana Naval Air Station, Va.

Anti-Submarine Squadron 32 S3 aircraft Cecil Field Naval Air Station, Fla.

USS America Conventional aircraft carrier Norfolk, Va.

Pacific Fleet USS Willamette Fleet oiler Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

USS Sacramento Combat support ship Bremerton, Wash.

USS Callaghan Guided-missile destroyer San Diego, Calif.

USS Ingraham Guided-missile frigate Everett, Wash.

Anti-Submarine Helicopter

Squadron 14

SH60F; HH60H helicopters North Island Naval Air Station,

Calif.

USS New Orleans Amphibious assault ship San Diego, Calif.

USS Honolulu Fast-attack submarine Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

Attack Squadron 196 A6 aircraft Whidbey Island Naval Air

Station, Wash.

Fighter/Attack Squadron 94 F/A18 aircraft Lemoore Naval Air Station, Calif.

Tactical Support Squadron 50 C130; T39; C2 aircraft Guam, U.S. territory

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Appendix III 

Readiness Indicators Included in Our

Analysis

Air Force

Air Force SORTS Data • Overall C-rating

• Personnel C-rating

• Equipment and supplies on-hand C-rating

• Major equipment condition C-rating

• Training C-rating

Air Force-Unique

Indicators

• Percentage of authorized personnel available

• Percentage of critical authorized personnel available

• Percentage of authorized crews formed, mission-ready, and available

• Percentage of authorized combat-essential equipment and supplies on

hand

• Percentage of authorized support equipment and supplies on hand

• Percentage of possessed combat-essential equipment that was

mission-ready and available within unit’s response time

• Percentage of possessed support equipment mission-ready and available

within unit’s response time

GAO Calculations Using Air

Force SORTS Data

• Percentage of total authorized personnel assigned

• Percentage of total authorized critical personnel assigned

• Percentage of total authorized crews formed, mission-ready, and available

• Percentage of total authorized crews formed from assigned individual

personnel

• Percentage of authorized combat-essential equipment assigned

• Percentage of authorized combat-essential equipment on hand

• Percentage of authorized combat-essential equipment mission-ready and

available

• Percentage of assigned combat-essential equipment mission-ready and

available

• Percentage of possessed combat-essential equipment mission-ready and

available

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Appendix III 

Readiness Indicators Included in Our

Analysis

Army

Army SORTS Data • Overall C-rating

• Personnel C-rating

• Equipment and supplies on-hand C-rating

• Major equipment condition C-rating

• Training C-rating

• Assigned personnel ratings

• Percentage of total authorized personnel assigned

• Available personnel rating

• Percentage of total authorized personnel available

• Percentage of total senior grade authorized personnel available

• Military occupational specialty-qualified personnel ratings

• Percentage of total authorized personnel qualified in military occupational

specialty

• Senior grade personnel ratings

• Percentage of personnel turnover

• Pacing items fill rating

• Condition rating for all on-hand equipment items

• Percentage of all on-hand equipment that is mission-capable

• Condition rating for all on-hand pacing items

• Percentage of on-hand pacing equipment items that are mission-capable

• Training days required to achieve C-1

GAO Calculations Using

Army SORTS Data

• Percentage of equipment and supplies on hand

Marine Corps and

Navy

• Overall C-rating

• Personnel C-rating

• Equipment and supplies on hand C-rating

• Major equipment condition C-rating

• Training C-rating

• GAO-calculated percentage of total authorized crews mission ready (Marine

Corps only)

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Sharon A. Cekala

Charles Bonanno

Waverly Sykes

Jai Eun Lee

James Ungvarsky

Norfolk Regional

Office

Ray S. Carroll, Jr.

James Lewis

James Mahaffey

Lester L. Ward

(703130) Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR Military Readiness
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