Exploring the Moon and Mars: Choices for

the Nation

July 1991

OTA-ISC-502

NTIS order #PB91-220046
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology AssessmenT Exploring the Moon andMars: Choices for

the Nation, OTA-ISC-502 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991).

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing 0ffice, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form can be found in the back of this report)
Foreword

The United States has always been at the forefront of exploring the planets. U.S. spacecraft have now journeyed near every planet in the solar system but Pluto, the most distant one.

Its probes have also landed on the Moon and Mars. Magellan, the most recent of U.S. interplanetary voyagers, has been returning thought-provoking, high-resolution radar images of the surface of Venus.

Scientifically, the prospect of returning to the Moon and exploring Mars in greater detail is

an exciting one. President George Bush’s proposal to establish a permanent lunar base and to

send human crews to explore Mars is ambitious and would engage both scientists and engineers in challenging tasks. Yet it also raises a host of issues regarding the appropriate mix of

humans and machines, timeliness, and costs of space exploration. This Nation faces a sobering

variety of economic, environmental, and technological challenges over the next few decades, all

of which will make major demands on the Federal budget and other national assets. Within this

context, Congress will have to decide the appropriate pace and direction for the President’s

space exploration proposal.

This report, the result of an assessment of the potential for automation and robotics technology to assist in the exploration of the Moon and Mars, raises a number of issues related to

the goals of the U.S. civilian space program. Among other things, the report discusses how

greater attention to automation and robotics technologies could contribute to U.S. space exploration efforts.

In undertaking this report, OTA sought the contributions of a broad spectrum of knowledgeable individuals and organizations. Some provided information, others reviewed drafts.

OTA gratefully acknowledges their contributions of time and intellectual effort.

/J’f

&# AM--+- 2

JOHN H. GIBBONS

Director

. . .

111
Workshop on the Robotic Exploration of the Moon and Mars, Feb. 20,1991

Alan Shaw, Chair

Manager

International Security and Commerce Program

Office of Technology Assessment

Ronald Brunner

Professor

Department of Political Science

University of Colorado

Boulder, CO

Michael H. Carr

Geologist

United States Geological Survey

Branch of Astrogeology

Menlo Park, CA

Ben Clark

Technical Director

Martin Marietta Corp.

Denver, CO

Lynn Conway

Associate Dean

College of Engineering

University of Michigan

Ann Arbor, MI

Michael Duke

Deputy for Science Lunar and

Mars Exploration Program Office

NASA Johnson Space Center

Houston, TX

Matthew P. Golombek

Research Scientist

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Pasadena, CA

Noel Hinners

Vice President and Chief Scientist

Civil Space and Communications

Martin Marietta Corp.

Bethesda, MD

Eugene Levy

Chairman

Department of Planetary Science

Lunar and Planetary Laboratory

University of Arizona

Tucson, AZ

Henry Lum

Chief

Information Sciences Division

NASA Ames Research Laboratory

Moffett Field, CA

Carle Pieters

Associate Professor

Department of Geosciences

Brown University

Providence, RI

Paul Spudis

Staff Scientist

Lunar and Planetary Institute

Houston, TX

Alan Stem

Research Scientist

Center for Astrophysics and Space Astronomy

University of Colorado

Boulder, CO

Carol Stoker

Research Scientist

NASA Ames Research Center

Moffett Field, CA

Giulio Varsi

Manager

Space Automation and Robotics program

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Pasadena, CA

William L. Whittaker

Director

Field Robotics Laboratory

Carnegie Mellon University

Pittsburgh, PA

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the workshop participants. The

participants do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the

report and the accuracy of its contents.

iv
OTA Project Staff – Exploring the Moon and Mars

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director OTA

Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Alan Shaw, International Security and Commerce Program Manager

Ray A. Williamson, Project Director

Conttibutor

Victoria Garshnek, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University

Administrative Staff

Jacqueline R. Boykin

Madeline Gross

Louise Staley
Acknowledgments

This report has benefited from the advice of many individuals from the government and the private sector. OTA especially would like to thank the following individuals for their assistance and support. The views expressed in this report, however, are the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology

Assessment.

Arnold D. Aldrich

NASA Headquarters

Washington, DC

Dale Andersen

Lockheed Corp.

Washington, DC

Phillip Ballou

Deep Ocean Engineering

San Leandro, CA

Roger Bedard

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Pasadena, CA

Geoffrey Briggs

Center for Earth and Planetary Studies

National Air and Space Museum

Smithsonian Institution

Washington, DC

Robert Cannon

Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Stanford University

Stanford, CA

Leonard David

Space Data Resources and Information

Washington, DC

Kevin Dowling

Robotics Institute

Carnegie Mellon University

Pittsburgh, PA

Terry Finn

NASA Headquarters

Washington, DC

Herbert Frey

NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

Greenbelt, MD

Peter Friedland

Intelligent Systems Research Division

NASA Ames Research Center

Moffett Field, CA

Louis D. Friedman

The Planetary Society

Pasadena, CA

Stephen J. Hoffman

Science Applications International Corp.

Houston, TX

G. Scott Hubbard

NASA Ames Research Center

Moffett Field, CA

Eric Krotkov

The Robotics Institute

Carnegie Mellon University

Pittsburgh, PA

Louis J. Lanzerotti

AT&T Bell Laboratories

Murray Hill, NJ

Paul Lowman

NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

Greenbelt, MD

Michael Malin

Arizona State University

Tempe, AZ

Harry McCai.n

NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

Greenbelt, MD

Wallace A. McClure

Westminster, CA

Chris McKay

NASA Ames Research Center

Moffett Field, CA

John Menkins

NASA Headquarters

Washington, DC

Lt. Col. Eric Mettala

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

U.S. Department of Defense

Washington, DC

David Moore

Congressional Budget Office

Washington, DC

Douglas B. Nash

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Pasadena, CA

vi
Acknowledgments (continued)

Carl B. Pilcher

NASA Headquarters

Washington, DC

Donna Pivirotto

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Pasadena, CA

Ian Pryke

European Space Agency

Washington, DC

Don Rea

Mitre Corp.

McLean, VA

Eberhardt Rechtin

University of Southern California

Los Angeles, CA

Sally Ride

California Space Institute

La Jolla, CA

Carl Ruoff

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Pasadena, CA

Jeffery Rosendahl

NASA Headquarters

Washington, DC

Harrison Schmitt

Albuquerque, NM

David R. Scott

Scott Science and Technology

Los Angeles, CA

Steven Squyres

Cornell University

Ithaca, NY

Delbert Tesar

University of Texas at Austin

Austin, TX

Paul Uhlir

National Research Council

Washington, DC

Jannelle Warren-Findley

Falls Church, VA

Jerry Wasserburg

California Institute of Technology

Pasadena, CA

Dietmar Wurzel

German Aerospace Research Establishment

and German Space Agency

Washington, DC

Maria Zuber

NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

Greenbelt, MD

vii
Contents

Page

Chapter 1. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

WHAT IS ROBOTICS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE HUMAN-ROBOTICS PARTNERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

EXPLORATION TIMETABLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

MANAGEMENT OF A MISSION FROM PLANET EARTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

EXPLORING AND EXPLOITING THE MOON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. ... ... .......4

EXPLORING MARS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

AUTOMATION AND ROBOTICS (A&R) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

COST ESTIMATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ........5

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COMPETITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......6

Chapter 2. Policy and Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

PLANETARY EXPLORATION POLICY AND NATIONAL GOALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

THE "MIX" OF HUMAN CREWS AND ROBOTICS FOR EXPLORATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

MANAGEMENT OF EXPLORATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

RETURNING TO THE MOON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

EXPLORING MARS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

A&R RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

COST ESTIMATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ......24

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COMPETITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Chapter 3. Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

RATIONALE FOR HUMAN EXPLORATION OF THE SOLAR SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

RISKS TO HUMAN LIFE IN SPACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... ... ......35

THE HUMAN-ROBOTIC PARTNERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... ... ......35

ROBOTICS SUPPORT OF LUNAR EXPLORATION AND UTILIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

ROBOTICS SUPPORT OF MARS EXPLORATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... ... .....38

STRATEGY F ORE XPLORATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

MANAGING THE MISSION FROM PLANET EARTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .......41

Chapter 4. Scientific Exploration and Utilization of the Moon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

UNDERSTANDING THE MOON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

THE APOLLO PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

THE SOVIET LUNAR PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..55

FUTURE ROBOTICS MISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

WORKING ON THE LUNAR SURFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .....61

Chapter 5. Scientific Exploration of Mars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

UNDERSTANDING MARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....65

CURRENT SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

PLANNED AND POTENTIAL ROBOTICS MISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .......72

Chapter 6.Automation and Robotics Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

AUTOMATION AND ROBOTICS APPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

SPACE AUTOMATION AND ROBOTICS TECHNOLOGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ....84

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR A&R RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Chapter 7. Costs of the Mission From Planet Earth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

COST ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

PAYING FOR THE MISSION FROM PLANET EARTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ......95

Chapter 8. International Competition and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

COMPETITIVE CONCERNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98

COOPERATIVE OPPORTUNITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

. . . Vlll
Contents

Box

1-A

2-A

4-A

4-B

4-c

4-D

5-A

5-B

5-c

8-A

Boxes

Page

Automation and Robotics for Applications in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Flight Telerobotics Servicer (FTS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Scientific Accomplishments of the APO11O program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Return to the Moon With Robotic Advanced Sensors: Lessons From Galileo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Lunar Observer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Advantages and Drawbacks of Using the Moon for Astronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Findings of Mariner9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........”G””.o.”.0”””- ““””””” 66

Findings From the Viking Mars Landers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Mars Observer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

The Inter-Agency Consultative Group (IACG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Figures

Figure Page

3-1

5-1

6-1

6-2

Table

2-l

2-2

2-3

3-1

3-2

3-3

3-4

3-5

4-1

4-2

4-3

4-4

6-1

Summary of Possible Exploration Technology Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

A View From the Martian North Pole Shows the Location of the TwoViking Sites .. .. ... ... .....71

. . . . . . .

Potential Areas for the Application of Advanced Robotics Primary Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Potential Areas for the Application of Advanced Robotics Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Tables

Page

Spending on Civilian Space Activities by the World’s Major Industrialized Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

NASA's Budget for Space Automation and Telerobotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

NASA's Exploration Technology Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Medical Consequences From Exposure To Space Flight Factors (’Earth Orbit Scenario) . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Medical Consequences From Exposure lb Space Flight Factors

(Lunar Outpost Mission) (3-day O-G transits, l/6-G surface stay) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Medical Consequences From Exposure To Space Flight Factors

(Mars Mission) (O-G transits, l/3-G surface stay scenario) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Medical Consequences From Exposure To Space Flight Factors

(Mars Mission) (Artificial-G transits, l/3-G surface stay scenario) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Medical Consequences From Exposure To Space Flight Factors

(Mars Mission) (O-G and artificial-G abort scenarios) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Successful Soviet Lunar Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Summary of Ranger Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Summary of Surveyor Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Summary of Lunar Orbiter Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Technological Challenges for Intelligent Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

ix
Chapter 1

Summary

INTRODUCTION

On July 20, 1989, two decades after the first

Apollo landing on the Moon, President George

Bush proposed “a long-range, continuing commitment” l that would take the United States

“back to the Moon...back to stay,”2 and then on to

Mars. The President elaborated further on his

vision in May 1990, when he stated, “I am pleased

to... announce anew Age of Exploration, with not

only a goal but also a timetable: I believe that

before Apollo celebrates the 50th anniversary of

its landing on the Moon [2019]—the American

flag should be planted on Mars.”3

In response to the President’s proposals, the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA), the Department of Defense (DoD), and

the Department of Energy (DOE) have begun

work on the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI),4

an endeavor to plan and implement the human

exploration of the Moon and Mars. NASA is the

principal implementing agency. The National

Science Foundation will participate in a limited

way through a joint Antarctic Program, testing

5 technologies and methods for Mars exploration.

Although the SEI is devoted principally to developing and analyzing the steps required for human exploration of the Moon and Mars, NASA’s

plans for SEI also include robotic science missions: first to gather scientific data6 prior to a

landing by humans, and later as adjuncts to human exploration on the surface.7 Data from the

first set of robotic spacecraft would further scientific studies and assist planners to select the best

sites for landing and erecting base camps. The

appropriate mix of human and robotic exploration is currently under study by NASA, and by

several internal and external advisory groups.8

As a result of their concern over the extent and

scope of science objectives that can be accomplished within potential NASA appropriations

over the next three decades, the Subcommittees

on Veterans Administration, Housing and Urban

Development, and Independent Agencies of the

House and Senate Appropriations Committees

asked OTA to examine ‘Whether an unmanned,

robotic mission or missions might not be a viable

option for us to consider” for scientific study of

the Moon and Mars, and in the utilization of

physical resources on the two celestial bodies.9

This report focuses primarily on the possible

roles of automation and robotics (A&R) technologies in the exploration and utilization of the

Moon and Mars. More generally, it examines issues related to the decisions Congress faces in

IGeorge Bu~h, 1~Remarksbythe fiesident at 20th Anniversawof Apollo Moon Landing, ’’The white HOUW Office of ~ess Secretay) JulY 20~

1989, p. 3.

21bid.

sGeorge Bush, q+~ of Remarks by the president in ‘has A&I University Commencement Address,” ne white HOUW Office of ‘he ‘es

Secretary, May 11, 1990, p. 5.

ds~cific ~liq ~uidan~e is cited in: Memorandum t. Nationa] Space Council from Mark Albrecht, “Presidential Decision on the SPace fiploration Initiative,” Feb. 21, 1990.

s~old D. Aldfich, N~A Office of Aeronautic, @lOration, and ~chno]oU, “me space &ploration Initiative,” presented tO the Alllerican Association for the Advancement of Science Symposium on the Human Exploration of Space, Feb. 17, 1990, p. 4.

%ese efforts would extend NASA’s planetary exploration program, which hasa histo~of more than 30 years of scientific missions to the solar

system.

7~dnch, op. Cit., footnote 51 p“ 4“

8For emmple, the space studies ward of the National Academy of Science and the Synthesis Group, a committee chartered bY the ‘ite

House and NASA to examine alternative ways to establish a lunar base and reach Mars. See America at the ThreshoZd (Washington, DC: The

White House, June 1991).

9~tter t. John H. Gibbons from senator Barbara Mikulski, congressman Bob ~~er, and congressman Bill Green, Ju& 24, 1990.

-1-
2 ● Exploring the Moon and Man

acting on administration funding requests for the

SEI. This report derives in part from a workshop

on the robotic exploration of the Moon and Mars

held at OTA on February 20,1991. The workshop

dealt with issues in robotic and human exploration, the state of A&R research and development

(R&D), and the potential for international cooperation. In preparing the report, OTA gathered

information from numerous articles and reports.

It also conducted personal interviews with a wide

variety of individuals familiar with the assessment’s issues.

WHAT IS ROBOTICS?

The term “robotics,” which generally comprises a significant proportion of automation

technologies as well, has within the space program and elsewhere come to connote a wide variety of activities involving humans and machines

in partnership. In today’s parlance (box l-A) robotics may be applied to machines entirely under

direct human control at short or long distance,

but with no automated capability; 2) or it may

refer to completely automated devices that carry

out preprogrammed tasks on command, but with

essentially no capacity to make decisions. Alternatively, 3) the term may apply to machines with a

relatively high decisionmaking capacity, capable

of operating for extended periods between commands. Finally, 4) robots may continually interact

with humans, sometimes acting at a high or low

level of autonomy; the human maybe nearby or at

some distance, even very far away. It is in this last

context that future human/robot teams hold particular promise for space activities.

Most applications within NASA have involved

robotic devices in category 4, in which the device

has always had at least a low capacity for autonomous decisionmaking. Thus, what have previously been termed “unmanned missions” or “planetary spacecraft” are now often called robotic

missions. The robotic devices on these missions

can be considered telerobots because they receive

Box l-A–Automation and Robotics for

Applications in Space

A central mission of automation and robotics

(A&R) technology is to provide a high level of

autonomy, or decisionmaking capability, to robotic devices that will enable more effective

management of spacecraft, landers, rovers, and

other instruments of discovery. Human team

members can then guide at any level, and from

both small and large distances, because the robot members will have increased capacity for

making decisions, as well as increased mobility

and manipulative skill. More effective robotics

would leave humans free to reason and to control at the most effective level for discovery.

Such autonomous robots will largely replace

purely “automated” ones that carry out a specified set of preprogrammed functions. Robots

with a high degree of autonomy would be capable of responding to new situations with little or

no additional guidance from mission control.

From time to time these robots maybe teleoperated – guided by a human on a continuing

basis — at low or high level, and from some

distance with possible time lag.

Thus, two of the most important areas of robotics research are to provide humans with

greater capability by giving robots: 1) more autonomy, and 2) greater mobility and capacity for

manipulation.

SOURCE: Robert Cannon, Stanford University and the

Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

commands over telecommunication links. In addition, NASA has provided their planetary exploration spacecraft a small but growing capacity for

autonomous action. For example, they are capable of going to a fail-safe mode by automatically

recognizing, for example, a loss of navigation lock

on guide stars and instituting procedures for recovering to a 3-axis inertially stabilized mode and

automatically pointing the communications antenna toward Earth.l0

1OWM= of this capabili~, in IWO the Jfqy//~ spacecraft, which is providing U.S. scientists with a detailed radar map of Venus, was able

with the help of mission controllers to recover from a loss of navigation lock. It was the lack of just such an autonomous capability that doomed

the 1990 Soviet spacecraft while on its way to Phobos, one of the moons of Mars.
chapter 1–Summary- ● 3

Thus, future efforts in robotics are expected to

use advanced techniques, including artificial intelligence,ll to impart greater capability to humans by giving machines greater autonomy. Robotics research will also involve imparting

mobility and a higher capacity for manipulation

to robotic devices. In this report, OTA generally

uses the term automation and robotics (A&R) to

indicate these two major thrusts.

THE HUMAN-ROBOTICS

PARTNERSHIP

Both humans and machines can contribute as

partners in a Mission from Planet Earth. This

partnership raises the following question: what is

the appropriate mix of humans and robotic machines on the surface of the Moon and Mars? The

answer to this question will shape the program

and necessary funding over decades.

Atone extreme, the United States could mount

Apollo-like expeditions to the Moon and Mars, in

which the United States would place maximum

emphasis on science and technology to support

humans in transit and on the surface, but put relatively little emphasis on A&R. In the Apollo era,

because the available A&R technologies were

quite primitive, the United States sent men to the

Moon with very little robotic support. Most of the

control remained on Earth where thousands of

support personnel followed every detail of the

crew’s progress and controlled most of their

actions.

At the other extreme, the United States could

focus on the development of advanced A&R

technologies for exploration and indefinitely defer sending humans to the Moon and Mars.

In the most effective exploration program,

people and machines would function as interactive partners, with people on Earth or perhaps on

the surface of the Moon or Mars, as need and

funding allow. A&R experts believe that it will

soon be possible to develop machines, guided by

controllers on Earth where appropriate, but acting autonomously most of the time, to carry out

many exploration duties. On the Moon, robots

controlled from Earth could be used to explore

for lunar resources, to conduct scientific observations, and to carry out a variety of simple construction tasks. On Mars, robots could be

employed to survey the planet’s composition and

structure, monitor its weather, and return samples for analysis on Earth.

However, experts infield research methods believe that, even with advances in A&R, human explorers would be needed to carry out geological

field studies on the Moon or Mars, or search for

signs of indigenous life on Mars — tasks that require a broad experiential database and the ability to link disparate, unexpected observations in

the field. Nevertheless, robotic devices would be

needed to assist human explorers in a wide variety of tasks as they work on either planetary body.

In the past, A&R technologies have received

relatively little emphasis, in part because they

have lacked capability. In the future, giving A&R

technologies a more central role in exploration

activities could greatly enhance scientific understanding and contribute to increased human

productivity in other parts of the economy. Congress can play an important part in assuring that

the partnership between humans and machines

evolves as productively as possible. It could, e.g.,

encourage NASA to:

● devote greater and more consistent effort to

A&R research and development; and

● include far more A&R technologies in future projects involving space exploration

and humans in space than is the practice

today.

EXPLORATION TIMETABLE

Congress also faces a decision regarding the

timetable of a Mission from Planet Earth. Given

the existing Federal budget crisis and chronic

shortages of public capital, acceptance of the

llMachine techniques that mimic human intelligence, e.g., perception, COgnitiOII, and reasoning.
4 . Exploring the Moon and Mars

President% timetable (2019) for landing humans

on Mars might require a major emphasis on the

development of technologies to support human

crews and thus greatly constrain the options for

developing A&R technologies.

Some argue that the United States should demonstrate its leadership in advanced technology to

the rest of the world by embarking on the human

exploration of Mars as soon as possible. However, it is far from clear what the United States

would gain from demonstrating leadership in human exploration. For the next decade or even two,

the United States has no effective competitors in

sending human missions to the Moon or Mars. If

the United States emphasized human exploration and failed to fund the development of A&R

technologies directly related to the U.S. economy,

it might slip in economic competition with other

nations. A U.S.-led Mission from Planet Earth

could assist in boosting international leadership

in space activities, but only if it were part of a balanced space program that rested on a solid foundation of space science and technology development.

In the near term, Congress could:

1.

2.

3.

4,

defer decisions on a Mission from Planet

Earth indefinitely and fired the scientific

exploration of the Moon and Mars within

the existing planetary exploration program;

or

agree in principle with the goals of a Mission from Planet Earth, but emphasize the

development and use of A&R technologies

to accomplish them; or

agree in principle with the long-term goals

of a Missionfiom Planet Earth, but wish to

focus on measured efforts to develop technologies supporting human exploration; or

accept the President’s timetable of people

reaching Mars by 2019.

Options 1 through 3 would tend to extend the

timetable for humans to reach Mars beyond 2019.

MANAGEMENT OF A MISSION

FROM PLANET EARTH

U.S. experience with large science and technology projects having long-range goals suggest that

program planners need to maintain considerable

planning flexibility and a broad set of intermediate objectives within the general program plan.

Operational success in each successive phase

should be favored over forcing a fit to a detailed

long-term plan.

The scientific success of missions to the Moon

and Mars will depend directly on the quality of

the scientific advice NASA receives and the relative influence of engineers and designing robotic

missions to the Moon and Mars. If the Nation

wishes to maximize the quality of its scientific

returns, planetary scientists should have a major

role in the decision process about the exploration

program.

EXPLORING AND EXPLOITING

THE MOON

Despite U.S. and Soviet successes during the

1960s and early 1970s in studying the Moon, scientists still have a relatively rudimentary understanding of its structure and evolution. A detailed

scientific study of the Moon would assist in understanding the geological and climatological history of the Earth. Most of this work could be carried out robotically with a variety of instruments.

The United States may in time wish to establish

a permanent lunar base in order to study the

Moon more intensively and to exploit its unique

properties for scientific observations and experiments. For example, the Moon would provide an

excellent site for astronomical observatories operating at all wavelengths. However, the costs of

lunar observatories would have to be balanced

against the costs of placing observatories in competing locations, e.g., geostationary orbit, or on

the Earth.

Exploitation of the Moon’s material resources

might eventually prove cost-effective, for example, in constructing surface or orbital infrastructure, or in providing additional sources of energy.
Chapter l–Summary .5

Robotic devices would provide human explorers

with support for field studies, emergencies, surveys, and construction.

EXPLORING MARS

It is too early to plan a detailed, integrated program of robotics and human exploration of Mars.

However, it is not too early to begin a series of

projects to continue the scientific investigation of

Mars, and to study human physiology in space in

order to reduce the uncertainties facing human

exploration of the planet.

Robotic exploratory missions will first be

needed to explore Mars, whether or not the

United States decides to land humans on Mars

by 2019. These missions could provide important

geological and atmospheric data about Mars,

help refine planning for human missions, and assist in choosing potential landing sites.

If the United States ultimately decides that it is

important to send human crews to Mars, A&R

technologies could provide crucial assistance to

these crews while on the Martian surface. A&R

could provide support for field studies; assistance in surveying prior to human exploration, especially over dangerous terrain; and emergency

support.

A trip to and from Mars would experience

much higher risk than a return to the Moon, but

would also provide greater challenge and adventure. If the United States decides to send human

crews to Mars, it must accept the potential for

loss of life, either from human error or mechanical failure.

A&R RESEARCH AND

DEVELOPMENT

Robotics exploration will be needed as a prerequisite to human exploration. The United

States has many promising A&R technologies,

but to date it has not spent sufficient time or

funds to incorporate them into devices for exploring the Moon and Mars. Yet, aggressive pursuit of

robotic devices would assist exploration efforts

and make humans much more capable on the

Moon and Mars than they could otherwise be.

However, at present NASA lacks the A&R capability to carry out a vigorous exploration program using advanced robotics. Since the development of robotic technologies does not receive

high priority within NASA, there is little evidence to suggest this will change.

A number of reports, including the recent report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of

the U.S. Space Program, have urged increased attention to, and funding for, developing the requisite U.S. technology base. Congress could assist

the development of A&R technologies by funding

a set of A&R projects that culminated in a variety

of scientific capabilities for missions to the Moon

and Mars.

The potential applications for A&R technologies extend far beyond the space program and include manufacturing and service industries, as

well as the defense community. Yet because the

A&R discipline derives from a widely splintered

set of subfields, only in weak contact with one

another, NASA has a relatively thin technology

base upon which to draw for its own needs. An integrated A&R program to serve government

needs and assist industry will require the collaborative efforts of the universities, government

laboratories, and industry.

COSTS

Sending humans back to the Moon and/or on

to Mars would be extremely expensive. According

to experts OTA consulted, because of the need to

support human life in extremely harsh environments, exploration by human crews could cost

more than ten times the costs of robotics exploration (see ch. 7). Yet, because cost estimates depend critically on the range of planned activities,

schedule, and new information developed in the

course of the program, it is too early to judge the

total costs of a Mission from Planet Earth. As

more information is gained from robotic missions e.g., Mars Observer, and from technology
6 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

research and development, it will eventually be

possible to develop more credible cost estimates.

A comprehensive search for cost-reducing

methods and techniques and for alternative approaches will be of high priority. Congress

should ask NASA how it plans to control costs.

NASA’s plans should also include plans for controlling operational costs. As experience with the

Space Shuttle has demonstrated, operational

costs for crew-carrying systems can constitute an

extremely high percentage of total system costs.

A return to the Moon and the exploration of

Mars would have a major impact on NASA’s yearly budget, and, in times of constrained budgets,

pursuit of these goals would almost certainly adversely affect the funding of NASA’s other activities, e.g., space science, and the Mission to Planet

Earth (NASA’S program to address environmental and other Earth-bound problems). Hence, it

will be important for Congress and the administration to test continually whether the President’s

aspirations for human activity in space can be accommodated within NASA’s likely budget, and

adjust its projects accordingly.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

AND COMPETITION

Issues of international competition and cooperation will continue to play important roles in

the development of U.S. space policy. The United

States is part of a rapidly changing world in which

the political and military challenge from the Soviet Union has substantially decreased but the

technological and marketing capabilities of Europe and Japan have markedly increased. How

the United States invests in its space program

could deeply affect other segments of the economy. The experience gained in applying A&R technologies to tasks in space could assist their development in other parts of U.S. industry and help

the United States to compete in this important

arena of the world economy. It is less clear how

investments to support human exploration of

space would benefit U.S. industry.

Politically and technologically, the United

States could gain from leading an international

cooperative program to advance in space exploration. But for such a space program we will have

to learn how to pursue shared goals, which would

give the United States less latitude in setting the

program objectives. Cooperative activities with

other countries also could reduce U.S. costs and

increase the return on investment for exploration by bringing foreign expertise and capital to

bear on the challenge. The Soviet Union has far

more experience with supporting humans in

space than any other country. More extensive cooperation with the Soviet Union could markedly

reduce U.S. expenditures for life sciences research, and lead to much better understanding of

the risks of extended spaceflight and how to reduce them.

Japan, Europe, and the Soviet Union have

made significant progress in applying A&R to

space activities. Cooperative scientific programs

that would incorporate robotic devices contributed by several countries might significantly advance U.S. experience in this important area. For

example, nations might cooperate in sending

small rovers to the Moon or to Mars to do reconnaissance and simple chemical analysis, and to

return samples to Earth.
Chapter 2

Policy and Findings

President Bush has set forth two major goals

for the U.S. space program — developing a permanent human presence on the Moon, and landing a human crew on Mars — under the broad

principle of extending “human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system.”l

These are two of many goals for civilian space

activities the U.S. Government could pursue.2

The Advisory Committee on the Future of the

U.S. Space Program3 has recommended that “the

‘mission-oriented’ portion of the program

[NASA’S] be designed to support two major undertakings: a Mission to Planet Earth and a Mission from Planet Earth.’’4As seen by the Committee, the Mission to Planet Earth emphasizes using

robotic space technology to tackle environmental

and other Earth-bound problems. The Mission

from Planet Earth would focus on the exploration

of space, using human crews as well as robotic

systems. In the Committee’s view, both mission

foci should rest on the foundation of space science and an enabling technology infrastructure.5

During this decade, Congress will be faced

with a series of decisions concerning whether or

not to invest public dollars to send human crews

back to the Moon and/or on to Mars,6 decisions

that cannot be reduced to scientific and technological considerations alone. Experience suggests

that management, politics, and budgets — as they

interact with technical factors — will shape the

success or failure of any initiative to explore

space, whether solely with robotic devices, or using both robots and humans. Mission from P1anet Earth will be very complex, requiring new

technologies and taking many years. It will therefore be shaped by a continuous decision process

extending over numerous budget cycles. The

funding and political support for an initiative to

explore the Moon and Mars must be provided

over many Presidencies and Congresses. Therefore, projects should be defined with an eye to

returning nearterm benefits. Because the cast of

participants will change over time (in 2-,4-, and

6-year intervals), funding commitments to Mission from Planet Earth will have to be renewed on

the basis of performance by NASA and the other

agencies, and the standards of performance will

change as new information is gained.

Both humans and robotic spacecraft will contribute to solar system exploration whether or not

humans set foot on the Moon or Mars within the

next three decades. The Congress must decide the

appropriate mix of humans and robotic technologies to fund within the set of projects that make

up a Mission from Planet Earth.7 The timing of its

decisions will depend upon Congress’ view of the

President’s proposed timetable of enabling human crews to reach the surface of Mars by 2019.

Given the imperative to reduce Federal spending, acceptance of the President’s timetable

might greatly circumscribe the options for using

automation and robotic (A&R) technologies to

l~e white H~~se, “National Space Policy,” NOV. 2, 1989) P. 1“

Zse., e.g., the list in U.S. Congew, Office of~chnolou Assessment, civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Fuwre in space, OTA-s~-242

(W%hington, DC: U.S. Government Printing (Mfke, November 1984), pp. 15-16.

3-WV committee on the Future of the U.S. SPce program, Repofl Of fie A&~O~ COmmi#ee on tie FUZUR Of the us. Space Rogam

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1990). The National Space Council and NASA appointed the AdvisoiyCommittee to examine the goals and managment of the U.S. space program. Norman Augustine, CEO of Martin Marietta Corp., served as its chair.

41bid, p. 5.

51bid, p. vi and 5.

6Although the Mmn>s Sufiaw would pro~de human crem~th e~nence in living and working in space, the Nation could decide to proceed

directly to Mars.

~is report entered the publishing process before the Synthesis Group report on alternative technologies and exploration architectures was

released. Hence, it was unable to consider the Synthesis Group’s findings.

-7-

Chapter 2–Policy and Findings .9

support planetary exploration, and require a major emphasis on technologies and systems to support human crews. Taking a broader view of the

many possible paths for the Mission from Planet

Earth permits consideration of a wider range of

technological options and timetables. For example, Congress could:

1.

2.

Defer decisions on a Mission from Planet

Earth indefinitely and fund the scientific exploration of the Moon and Mars within the

existing planetary exploration program.

If Congress chose to defer decisions on

human exploration of the Moon and Mars,

it could continue to fund the scientific exploration of these two celestial bodies within the existing planetary exploration program. This approach would place the

exploration of the Moon and Mars within

the context of other space science priorities.

However, unless Congress appropriated a

higher proportion of funding for space science than the customary 20 percent of

NASA’s total budget,8 or sharply reduced

funding for other space science missions,

this choice would allow only modest exploration efforts.

Agree in principle with the goals of a Mission

from Planet Earth, but emphasize the development and use of A&R technologies to accomplish them.

Alternatively, if Congress supported the

long-term goal of human exploration of the

solar system, and felt that robotic technologies should receive greater emphasis, it

could endorse the President’s goals in principle but defer funding of systems to support human exploration until better information on risks and costs becomes

available. It could in the meantime direct

NASA to enhance its efforts in robotic exploration of the Moon and Mars. As scien3.

tists learn more about these celestial bodies,

and develop more capable robotics technologies, Congress could then decide whether

or not to fund the development of technologies necessary for supporting human exploration. This option would have the effect of

emphasizing the scientific exploration of the

Moon and Mars compared to the rest of the

space science effort. It would also extend the

President’s proposed timetable for humans

to set foot on Mars by several years and

allow NASA to gather additional scientific

information to support a later congressional

funding decision on human exploration.

This option would require additional funding for exploration over current allocations.

Agree in principle with the long-term goals of

a Mission from Planet Earth, but with to

focus on measured efforts to develop technologies supporting human exploration.

If Congress agreed with the long-term

goal of human exploration of the solar system, but felt that the United States should

proceed cautiously with human exploration,

as well as learn much more about the conditions on Mars, the risks to human life, and

the predicted total costs of a Mission from

Planet Earth, it could endorse the President’s goals and fund selected technologies

required for human exploration, while also

funding the development of robotic technologies to aid human explorers. For example,

Congress could ask NASA and the Department of Defense (DoD) to proceed with the

development of propulsion and other space

transportation technologies for a new

launch system, but defer development of

in-space nuclear propulsion, or technologies to provide artificial gravity in flight until more is known about the space environmental risks humans face. In order to assist

a~e space ~ience and app]imtions budget has equaled about 20 percent of NASA’s total budget since the mid-1970s. Ronald M. KonkeL

“Space Science in the Budget: An Analysis of Budgets and Resource Allocation the NASA, FY 1961 1989,” Center for Space and Geosciences

Policy, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, May 1990.
10 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

4.

its later decisions on funding a permanent

lunar base, or human exploration of Mars,

Congress could ask NASA to study key

scientific and technological issues and report back to Congress at predetermined intervals.

Accept the President timetable of reaching

Mars by 2019.

Finally, Congress could accept the President’s timetable of reaching Mars by 2019

and decide to fund projects designed to

achieve that goal. This option would require

NASA, DoD, and the Department of Energy (DOE) to begin a range of studies detailing the technical options for meeting the

President’s goal. It would also require the

near-term development of a heavy-lift

launch system, life-support systems, and

other technologies necessary to transport

humans to the Moon and Mars and support

them on the surface. Finally, this option

would also require development of A&R

technologies to gather early scientific

knowledge of Mars and to improve human

productivity on both the Moon and Mars.

In its report, the Advisory Committee on the

Future of the U.S. Space Program shares “the

view of the President that the long term magnet

for the manned space program is the planet

Mars.” However, it suggested that “a program

with the ultimate, Zong-term objective of human

exploration of Mars should be tailored to respond

to the availability of funding, rather than to adhering to a rigid schedule.”9 Options 2 and 3 fit

within the Committee’s recommendations, but

emphasize somewhat different approaches to

technologies and schedule.

PLANETARY EXPLORATION

POLICY AND NATIONAL GOALS

In recent debate, the space program’s close

connection to broad national concerns has manifested itself in the propositions that human exploration of the Moon and Mars would help reestablish U.S. leadership in space,10 further the

development of U.S. science and technology,ll

and assist its economic competitiveness

abroad. 12 In 1986, the National Commission on

Space advanced the additional view that the solar

system is “humanity’s extended home” and that

the United States should use its economic

strength to lead the rest of the world in exploring,

and eventually settling, the Moon and Mars.13

According to this view, the technological challenge of returning to the Moon and sending

humans to explore Mars would create strong pubIic interest, nationally and internationally, and

enhance attention to science and technology.14

These varied perspectives — destiny, world

leadership, economic expansion — raise several

overarching issues for Congress to consider in

authorizing and funding the U.S. civilian space

program of the 1990s. The roles of A&R in space

exploration are embedded in each of them:

In the 1960s, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and Congress explicitly designed the Apollo program to establish U.S.

preeminence in science and technology.

Would demonstrating preeminence in the

next century through planetary exploration

by robots or human crews serve U.S. political and economic goals?

Over the years, the United States has used

the civilian space program to support both

gAdviso~ Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, op. cit., footnote 3, P. 6.

IOsal& K Ride, ~adenhip ~d~nca~ Fu~re in space (wa~hington, Dc: Nationa] Aeronautics and space Administration, August 1987).

ll~old D. ~dnch, 1~M~h and Rea\i~: NASA and the space &p]oration Initiative,” pap pre~nted at & space Exploration !)() COllftXence, Oct. 30, 1990.

l~harl= ~lker, ctRemark~ t. the scientists> Hearing on Human Mission to Ma~,” Jou~a[ Of he Fe&ratiOn Of&riCan scientists (FAS),

vol. 44, No. 1, January/Febuary 1991, p. 14.

l~National commission on Space, Pioneering&e Space Frontier: The Repoti Of tie National CO rnm&”on on Space (New York, NY: Ballantine,

1986), pp. 3-4.

l~Wthesis Group, ~~ca at tie ~shofd (Washington, DC: The White HOU% June 1991), PP. 104-111.
Chapter 2-Policy and Findings .11

●

competitive and cooperative ends. Should it

view space exploration primarily as a vehicle for international competition or as an

instrument for cooperation? Or can it effectively pursue both objectives?

Would public investments in space A&R, or

in technologies for supporting humans in

space, contribute to overall science and

technology goals, including education?

Another issue emerges from consideration of the

organization and management of the Mission

from Planet Earth:

. The United States has funded the civilian

space program in part to enhance America’s skills in science and technology. The

Mission from Planet Earth would employ

both people and machines in locations

ranging from the surface of Earth to the

surfaces of the Moon and Mars. What is the

proper mix of capabilities, locations, and

timing, given U.S. economic, political,

scientific, and technological goals and constraints? These judgments must be made

within the context of competing national

priorities and should include estimates of

the costs and risks.

A detailed examination and resolution of these

issues is beyond the scope of this report. The

following discussion outlines the considerations

that policymakers face in reaching decisions on

them.

From its inception, the U.S. civilian space program has been an instrument of U.S. domestic

and foreign policy,;I5 its structure and early direction resulted directly from the tensions of the cold

war.

16 Because most spending on space activities

still flows from the public purse,17 overall domestic and foreign policy will continue to dominate

decisions regarding these activities.18

In 1%1 when President Kennedy urged Congress to support the Apollo program the United

States was in midst of the cold war. Policymakers

then felt that it was particularly important to

demonstrate U.S. technological competence in an

arena in which our chief political and military

competitor had taken the lead. The United States

and the Soviet Union were clearly in a space

race.

19 The U.S. economy was strong and growing, and the Federal Government experienced

modest budget surpluses.

Today, the political, military, and economic

character of the world is radically different than it

was even on July 20, 1989, when President Bush

outlined his plan for human exploration of the

solar system. Relations between the Soviet Union

and the United States have moved from implacable opposition to guarded cooperation. The Soviet Union is experiencing considerable internal

political and economic stress, the Warsaw Pact

has dissolved, and central Eastern Europe is undergoing radical and trying political and economic change. U.S. and NATO policies are increasingly tending toward cooperation with the Soviet

Union, to help it move toward democracy and a

modem economy, and deemphasizing political

competition.20 During the recent crisis in the Persian Gulf, e.g., the United States sought cooperation with the Soviet Union, as well as with our

traditional allies.

ls~]ter McDougall, me Hemens and the EanA (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1985).

lbvemon Van Dyke, ~-de ~~wer: The Rationale of tie Space program (Urbana, IL University of Illinois Prex, 1964); John M. mgsdw

~ Decision To Go to the Moon (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 1970).

17A small ~fiion of total ci~]ian e~nditums on space derive from private investment. Most of these depend on Government contracts:

Henry Hertzfeld, “1’kends in International Space Activity.” In l%e U.S. Aerospace Industry in the 1990’s:A Global Perspective, Research Center,

Aerospace Industries Association of America, forthcoming, September 1991.

l~e Bush Administrations 1989 s~tement of sPW @iq refem explicitly to broader objectives in stating that the objectives of the spce

program “require United States preeminence in the key areas of space activity critical to achieving our national security, scientific, technical,

economic, and foreign policy goals.”

l~e FebmaV 1991 NOVA sPcia] d~umenta~ series on the Soviet space program reveals that Soviet officials also ~w them~~es in a

race with the United States for supremacy in space.

zOManfred Womer, “me Atlantic Alliance in the New Era,” NATO Review, VO1. 39, No. 1, pp. 3-10.
12. Exploring the Moon and Mars

Unlike 30 years ago, our allies are now our

strong economic competitors, particularly in defense and other high technology industries.21

How the U.S. Government chooses to invest in

R&D will have profound implications for economic competition. Although demonstrating

U.S. technological prowess with a major space

initiative involving human spaceflight would

probably strengthen U.S. leadership in space, it

is not clear what message that feat would send to

the rest of the world. Neither the Europeans nor

the Japanese have placed the same emphasis on

putting humans into space as have the United

States and the Soviet Union. The European

Space Agency has expressed an interest in exploring Mars robotically,22 and the Japanese have

announced plans to send robotic craft to the

Moon.23 The Soviet Union has reduced its funding for supporting a human presence in space,24

and, given its current fiscal and political problems, it appears to lack the financial and technological resources to mount a human mission to

Mars on its own. Hence, for the next decade or

two, the United States has no effective competitors in sending human missions to the Moon or

Mars. Therefore, although a U.S. initiative to

send human explorers to the Moon or Mars

would be an accomplishment, it would not be a

race with other nations. Would the United States

be better or worse off than nations that spent

R&D funds to realize more prosaic goals?

Although Japan and the countries of Europe

combined spend much less on space activities

than the United States (table 2-l), Japanese and

European technological capabilities in space and

in larger areas of the economy have grown substantially over the last two decades. Europe’s relative emphasis on space science, space applications, 25 and space transportation has enabled it

to pose a formidable competitive challenge to

U.S. space industries.26 Both the Japanese and

the Europeans have generally sought autonomy

in these areas, using cooperative ventures with

the United States to help achieve it. Japan and the

European countries tend to enter into technology

development that they perceive relates directly to

their economies over the near and long term. The

space A&R programs of Canada, Japan, and

Europe, e.g., are relatively well integrated in content; represent a common thrust within industry,

academia, and government; and focus on goals of

interest to the nation’s economy and competitiveTable 2-1 -Spending on Civilian Space Activities by

the World’s Major Industrialized Nations

Country Space budget (fiscal year)

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

European Space Agency

(ESA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$285 million (4/90-3/91)

$2.2 billion (1/90-12/90)

$1.7 billion (1/90-12/90)

[$601 million to ESA]

$911 million (1/90-12/90)

[$507 million to ESA]

$976 million (1/90-12/90)

[$375 miiiion to ESA]

$1.2 billion (4/90-3/91)

$296 million (4/89-3/90)

[$134.6 million to ESA]

$4.8 billion (FY 1990)a

$12.5 billion (FY 1990)

ami$omcl~ ~tlmatelsllke~to&much lo~rthanactualex~ndltur~, Whencom.

pared to U.S. dollars.

SOURCE: George D. Ojalehto and Richard R. Vondrak, “A Look atthe Growing CMI

Space Club, -Aamnwties and Asfroneufies, February 1991, pp. 12-16,

21u.s. congress, Office of ~chnolo~ Assessment, h“ng Our Allies: Coopemtion and Competition in Defense TechnOtw, OTA-ISC-4’W

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1990).

zzEuro~an Space Agenqr, Mission to Mazs: Report of the Mars 13-ploration Study Team (Pans, France: European Space Agency, JanUaV

1990).

~. Iwata, “NASA’s Unmanned LUNAR Exploration,” IAF 90-438, presented at the International Astronautical Federation Annual Meeting, Dresden, Germany, October 1990.

zdNicholas L Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1990 (Colorado Springs, CO: l’kledyne Brown Engineering, Februq 1991), PP. 98-122.

%%at is, communications, meteorological observations, and land and ocean remote sensing.

2~u.s. congress, office of~chnologykwment, International Coopemtion and Competition in U.S. Civilian Space Activities, ~A-ISC-239

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1985).
Chapter 2-Policy and Findings ● 13

ness.

27 Because of their relative emphasis on

achieving autonomy especially in commercially

viable areas of the space enterprise, and their

interest in using the space program to foster

long-term economic growth, neither Japan nor

the countries of Europe are likely to attempt

competing with the United States in activities

involving human crews in space for a decade or

more.28

As a recent study by the Congressional Budget

Office has noted, NASA’s attempts to increase

private investment in space activities based on

NASA’s efforts to support humans in space have

produced limited results29 in part because, compared to satellite communications or space remote sensing,30 the technologies involved have

relatively few direct applications to U.S. industry.

Hence, although a large publicly supported program to establish a lunar base or send humans to

Mars would probably create new jobs in the aerospace industry, unless carefully structured, it

might not contribute significantly to U.S. economic competitiveness. If it diverted scarce resources (funding and people) away from projects

having a closer connection to the U.S. economy, a

major initiative involving human crews might actually undercut the U.S. international position in

commercially competitive technologies.

If the experience of the Apollo program provides an appropriate guide to the future, sending

human crews to explore Mars would likely create

public interest in the space program and encourage some young people to enter careers in engineering, mathematics, or science. It might provide jobs for scientists and engineers faced with

layoffs in the declining defense industry. However, the experience with Apollo also demonstrated that the public’s primary interest was with

the novelty and challenge of human spaceflight

and a desire to beat the Soviet Union to the

Moon. Soon after the first Apollo landing, interest waned as concern about social equity and the

Vietnam War increased. Funding for the space

program peaked in 1%5 and reached a low point

in 1974. Although some percentage of the public

maintains deep interest in human spaceflight, the

government cannot take for granted continuing

public support for large expenditures on the

space program in competition with other pressing societal needs, in the absence of clear evidence that they would directly benefit society.31

THE “MIX” OF HUMAN CREWS

AND ROBOTICS FOR

EXPLORATION

Exploration of the solar system will require a

complex mix of humans and robotic systems —

as some have put it, "a partnership between humans and machines."32 The placement of robotic

devices and humans at different stages of the

exploration process would depend on available

funding and the relative advantages of humans

and machines for the projected task at hand. For

example, current plans call for the use of robots

on Mars to carry out initial reconnaissance of the

Martian surface. Among other things, robots

27NASA Advanced ~chnolog Adviso~ Committee, ‘Advancing Automation and Robotics lkchnolgy for the Space Station Freedom and

for the U.S. Economy,” lkchnical Memorandum 103851 (Washington, DC: Ames Research Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 1991).

MFor budgetaV reasons, Europe is now rea=ssing its spending for the Columbus Program to build a crew-tended free flYer, and has slowed

its development of the Hermes piloted space plane.

~Congrewional Budget Office, Encourag-ngfi-vate Investment in Space Activities (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing office, February 1991).

3~e attempts t. commercial~ sWce remote ~nsing in the United States have met with considerable frustratim. yet a small) and growing

commercial market exists, particularly in providing value-added services. See U.S. Congress, Office of ‘Ikchnology Assessment, Remote Sensing

and the Private Sector, OTA-TM-ISC-20 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984).

3~1~~enV Yearn after ~enm fimt put men on the mmn, the public shows only a limited commitment to the U.S. space program. This lukewarm attitude about future space exploration is a consequence of increased awareness of domestic problems, coupled with decreased concern

for the U.S.-Soviet rivalry that propelled the space race during the 1960s.” George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Public Opinion 1989,1990, p. 172.

32~uis J. ~merotti and Marc S. Nlen, “Space Science Payoffs in an Era of Human-Machine Partnership, paper presented at the American

Association for the Advancement of Science, Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, February 1991.
14. Exploring the Moon and Mars

would explore and define the local environment

and clarify the risk for humans. The human role

in the partnership would be to oversee the robot’s

operation on the surface. Later, humans might

visit the surface of Mars to explore it firsthand,

using A&R technologies to support their efforts.

Nearly all the advocates of space exploration

that OTA interviewed for this assessment expressed the view that humans would one day

return to the Moon and set foot on the surface of

Mars. They differed widely in their predictions

about why and when those events would take

place. Opinions regarding the most appropriate

schedule differed even more widely. Some ardently support the establishment of a lunar outpost

and/or the human exploration of Mars as soon as

possible (by 2019 or sooner); others expressed the

view that the United States should approach such

projects with caution and suggested that a later

date for a Mars landing would be more prudent.

All supported continued robotic exploration.33

Several opined that from a scientific standpoint,

advances in A&R technologies might make the

goal of landing humans on the surface of Mars

superfluous, but noted that other objectives could

still draw the United States to support a human

expedition to the planet.

Most scientific objectives for the exploration

of the Moon and Mars can be met with A&R

technologies. On the Moon, robots controlled

from Earth can be used to explore for lunar

resources, to conduct scientific observations,

and to carry out a variety of construction tasks.

However, experts in field research methods believe that even with advances in automation and

research, human explorers are likely to be most

effective in carrying out geological field studies

on the Moon and Mars, or searching for signs of

indigenous existing or fossil life on Mars. These

tasks involve complex skills, including recognition of subtle clues, and detailed assessment and

analysis.

Both humans and machines would be involved

in any program aimed at returning to the Moon or

exploring Mars. For a given set of scientific objectives, the appropriate mix of duties and locations

is a technical decision that should be determined

by the relative advantages of each. A&R technologies provide powerful tools for studying the

planets either at a distance or on the surface.

Except for human reconnaissance on the lunar

surface in the Apollo program, all other scientific

studies of the planets and their associated moons

and other satellites have been carried out with

marked success using automated and robotic systems. 34 A&R experts forecast that continuing developments in using artificial intelligence and advanced control and manipulation would give

A&R systems the capability to carry out advanced surface studies of the Moon and Mars,

guided by humans either in situ, in nearby orbit,

or on Earth. Advanced sensors, similar in many

respects to those being developed for the Mission

to Planet Earth, would make detailed multispectral observations from orbit much more effective

than previously possible.35

Field geologists36 and biologists37contend that

imparting their skills, knowledge, and experience

of fieldwork to robotic systems, acting alone, may

never be possible. Although A&R experts forecast significant improvements in A&R over the

next three decades, A&R devices are likely to fall

short in areas in which humans excel — those that

require a broad experiential database and the

sJSee also ~WV Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, op. cit. footnote 3, p. 6: “such an endeavor must be preceded by

further unmanned visits...”

SdSpace eWloration, whether by humans or robotic devices, also carries a high degree of technical risk. AS the Soviet e%rience fith ‘heir

Phobos spacecraft reminds us, robotic devices sometimes fail, causing loss of mission or reduced effectiveness.

JSRecent observations of the Moon by the imaging system on the Galileo Jupiter space probe illustrates how such obsemations can advance

scientific knowledge of the planets.

3Gpaul D. Spudis and G. Jeffery ~ylor, “me Roles of Humans and Robots as Field Geologists on the Moon,” in ~ceedin~ of * 2nd~n@

Buse Symposium (San Diego, CA: Univelt, 1990).

JTChnstopher ~ Mc~y and Carol R. Stoker, ~t~e fir~ Environment and ]~ Evolution on Mars: Impli~tions for Ufe,” Reviews of Geophysics, vol. 27, No. 2, 1989, pp. 189-214.
Chapter 2--Policy and Findings ● 15

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

An experimental planetary rover undergoing tests in a dry river

bed. Nicknamed “Robby,” this rover was developed by Jet

Propulsion Laboratory, under contract to NASA. Robby is

a six-wheel, three-body articulated vehicle that offers superior

mobility compared to four-wheel, single-body vehicles.

Robby has an arm to grasp soil and rock samples. Stereo

cameras mounted atop the middle body allow Robby to

construct a map of its local environment and navigate

autonomously around obstacles to reach a

predetermined goal.

ability to link disparate, unexpected observations

in the field. Reconnaissance on the Moon by

Apollo astronauts, e.g., provided the basis for

interpreting data acquired remotely. Field scientists point out that as A&R technologies grow

more sophisticated, their ability to assist fieldwork will make human explorers, whether located

on-site or at great distances, much more capable

than they are today. Hence, according to their

view, humans, using advanced A&R technologies

for support and field analysis, are likely to advance our scientific knowledge of the Moon and

Mars significantly. By observing geological formations in the field, trained field geologists could

provide important data on the formation and

evolution of the Moon and Mars. Biologists and

geologists trained in the specialized methods of

exobiology would be able to search for signs of

past or present life on the Martian surface.38

However, scientists would need to remain on

the Martian surface long enough to accomplish

worthwhile research and other tasks. They would

also have to be relatively safe and reasonably

comfortable. Soviet experience on Mir suggests

that human productivity in space might be relatively low.39 U.S. experience on the Apollo flights

and on Skylab indicates the potential for higher

productivity, especially if assisted by modern

A&R technologies, designed to reduce the burden of routine tasks.

MANAGEMENT OF

EXPLORATION

U.S. experience with large science and technology projects and long-range goals suggest that

program planners need to maintain considerable

planning flexibility and abroad set of intermediate goals within the general direction. Operational success in each successive phase should be

favored over forcing a fit to a long-term plan.

Lessons based on experience with the space

shuttle40 and with space station Freedom41 imply

that “success-oriented” planning, which leaves

little room for the vagaries of the political process

or technical setbacks, may lead to much higher

than expected costs, and long delays in accomplishing major technical goals. A successful strategy for exploring the Moon and utilizing its re-

 robotic devices to Lake Hoare, Antarctica, demonstrates that they provide 

services. That experience suggests that scientists might wish to make extensive use of A&R techniques to extend human perception

into a hostile environment before attempting human presence. Learning as much as possible about the hostile environment enables the safest

and most efficient use of human resources in conducting scientific research. Steven Squyres, Cornell University, personal communication, 1991.

 personal communication, March 

 Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?” Science, V O1. 232, pp. 

41 and “The Space Station Programmed,” Space vol. 6, No. 2, May 1990, pp. 131-145; Thomas J. Lwein and Narayanan, Keeping the Dream Alive: Space Station Program, 1982-1986, NASA Contractor Report 4272, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, July 1990; Howard E. The Space Station Decision: Incremental Politics and Choice

(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).
16 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

sources and exploring Mars would include

allowance for the unexpected. These lessons suggest that these goals could be met most effectively

by developing an integrated strategy that includes

both large and small projects, each of which contributes to the larger goal. They also suggest that a

successful evolutionary strategy would include

the following characteristics:

●

●

●

Flexibility — Planners should not attempt to

“freeze” or “lock-in” a large-scale, longterm plan tightly coupled to expected funding. A balanced, flexible plan would allow

investigators to learn from experience, and

give them room for changes in scope and

project direction depending on information

received and funding available. However,

because a very flexible plan could also lead

to stretchouts, reorganizations, and loss of

project momentum, the areas of project

flexibility need to be carefully structured.

A set of intermediate, phased goals structured

around a common theme — Planners should

resist the tendency to design a large-scale

project in order to include every objective

under the aegis of a large program. Instead

they should disaggregate the often incompatible goals of multiple constituencies, approaching the goals through multiple projects, executed either in parallel or in series.

These steps would allow planners to learn

from the successes or failures of early projects and factor these lessons into subsequent projects.

A management structure that favors operational experience over planning — Experience and a judgment about what works best

should be the primary test of the succeeding

stages in the exploratory process, rather

than a plan developed prior to the results of

the first stage.

. Streamlined management and procurement

– Wherever possible, contract for specified

capabilities rather than specified hardware.

In other words, allow industry to determine

the technologies and approaches to providing the required capabilities rather than

having government laboratories decide.

The scientific success of exploratory missions

to the Moon and Mars will depend closely on the

quality of the scientific advice NASA receives,

funding stability for a long-term program, and

the relative influence of scientists in designing

the missions. If the Nation wishes to maximize

the quality of its scientific returns,42 scientists

should have a major role in the process of deciding how exploration resources are spent. The

Space Science Board of the National Academy of

Sciences and other advisory groups could play a

useful part in the decision process.

A number of scientists interviewed by OTA

expressed serious concern that scientific objectives would soon be lost in the drive to gather only

the data necessary to support a human exploratory mission to Mars. Several cited the case of the

Ranger and Surveyor series of lunar probes, which

prior to the Apollo program had been planned for

studying the Moon. The Ranger probes were designed to photograph the lunar surface in detail.

Surveyor spacecraft were to make soft landings

and gather information about the chemical and

physical makeup of lunar soil. The advent of the

Apollo program in 1%1, “forced Ranger and Surveyor into supporting roles for the manned spaceflight program, to the intense chagrin of the space

scientists.” 43 Reorientation of the roles of these

spacecraft forced the scientists, if they wished to

continue working on lunar science, to pursue

scientific questions that were possible within the

constraints of the Apollo program rather than

pursuing questions of highest scientific interest.44 The two objectives may coincide, but only

accidentally. Hence, the non-scientific objectives

A~e Adviso~ Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program noted that science activi~ is “the fulcrum of the entire civil .SPace effoti.”

Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space ~ogram, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 5. -

AsWi]liam David Compton, Mere NO MM Has Gone Before @/Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, 1989), P. 15.

441bid., chs. 2 and 3.
Chapter 2–Policy and Findings ● 17

of the Mission from Planet Earth should not

dominate the scientific objectives.

RETURNING TO THE MOON

Despite U.S. and Soviet efforts during the

1960s and early 1970s to study the Moon, scientists still have a rudimentary understanding of

its structure and evolution. A detailed robotic

study of the Moon would assist in understanding

the geological and climatological history of the

Earth.

Only about 40 percent of the lunar surface has

been mapped in high resolution. Scientists have

studied very little of the surface with multispectral instruments, which would provide detailed

insights into the structure and composition of the

Moon. Scientific exploration of the Moon could

assist in resolving questions related to:45

●

●

●

●

●

Formation of the Earth-Moon system — Did

the Moon form from the impact of a giant

body with Earth or directly from accretion

out of the primordial material?

Thermal and magmatic evolution of the

Moon — What is the Moon’s internal structure and thermal evolution?

Bombardment history of the Earth-Moon system – What can the composition and other

properties of the lunar craters tell us about

the bombardment history of Earth, the evolution of Earth’s climate, and the evolution

of life?

Nature of impact processes — How do craters form and evolve?

Regolith formation and evolution of the

Sun – What can studies of the regolith, the

blanket of broken rock and soil that covers

●

the Moon, tell us about the evolution of the

Sun? How can regolith be used for building

lunar structures?

Nature of the lunar atmosphere – What is

the nature of the extremely tenuous lunar

atmosphere?

Detailed answers to these questions would require intensive lunar survey and additional samples from the Moon.

The Moon possesses several advantages as a

site for astronomical observatories operating at

all wavelengths. However, the costs of lunar observatories would have to be balanced against

the costs of placing observatories in competing

locations, e.g., geostationary orbit. The environmental advantages of making astronomical observations from the Moon have interested many

astronomers in analyzing the scientific benefits of

such sites.46 The Moon provides a nearly atmosphere-free environment; a large, solid platform;

a cold, dark sky; and the absence of wind. Specialized telescopes operating in a wide variety of

wavelengths could possibly be placed on the lunar

surface robotically and operated from Earth.47 If

the United States decides to establish a permanent lunar base, human crews could construct

and maintain larger observatories. The lunar far

side offers attractive sites for making sensitive

radio observations free from radio interference

emanating from Earth stations.

The lunar surface also poses several environmental challenges—among which are the constant bombardment of cosmic rays and micrometeoroids, and the effects of clinging lunar dust.

The costs of building and operating lunar observatories have not been well studied in comparison

to other possible sites, e.g., geostationary orbit or

on Earth.48 As astronomers continue to examine

the option of placing observatories on the Moon,

as~nar ~loration Science Working Group, A P[aneta~ Science Strategy for the Moon, draft, Sept. 28, 1990.

a~e ~tronomy and ~troph~im SuWey Committee of the National Research Council recently recommended that “an appropriate fraction

of the funding for a lunar initiative be devoted to fundamental scientific projects, which can have a wide appeal to the U.S. public; to support

of scientific missions as they progress from small ground-based instruments, to modest orbital experiments; and finally, to the placement of

facilities on the Moon.” The Decade of Discovery in Astronomy and Astrophysics (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), p. 7.

aTRussell M. Genet, “small Robotic Wlescopes on the Moon,” a workshop summary, ‘hcson, =, NOV. 4-5, 1990.

4SNew technologies may vmt~ emend the ob~~ational capabilities of Earth-based obwmatoties for optical wavelengths.
18 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

they should also calculate the costs (for equivalent capability) relative to other options.

A lunar base could assist human crews in studying and responding to the risks of long-term

space exploration. Human crews engaged in

long-term exposure to the space environment face

a variety of physiological and psychological risks

to their health. In order to provide adequate margins of safety for human crews, scientists must

learn how to avoid cosmic rays and excessive

radiation from solar flares and to offset the physiological effects of weightlessness, and extraterrestrial fractional gravity.49 Human crews also face

psychological risks from extended confinement in

small quarters in an extremely hostile exterior

environment. Extended stays on the lunar surface

could provide scientists and crews with useful

information on many of these effects, leading to

reduced risks for human crews in the exploration

of Mars.so

Exploration of the Moon using a robotic roving

vehicle and other robotic devices would provide

additional scientific and engineering data and

give mission planners extra confidence in designing similar devices for use on Mars. They might

find it fruitful to establish a robotics lunar base.

Although lunar gravity is one-half that of Mars,

and the lunar surface has different properties,

testing robotic devices on the Moon would not

only provide scientists with data of considerable

scientific interest but also help reduce the risk of

failure for similar devices on the surface of Mars.

Because the Moon is much closer than Mars it

is possible to operate robotic devices in near real

time. Communications time delays are only about

3 seconds compared to delays of 6 to 40 minutes

between Earth and Mars. Tests would also allow

engineers to try out alternative methods for including varying degrees of autonomy in robotic

systems while exploring the Moon.51 Because

transportation and other costs are much lower

than for reaching Mars, the lunar surface would

provide tests of competing robotic designs. For

example, recent cost estimates suggest that small

rovers could be tested on the lunar surface relatively cheaply and also provide useful scientific

knowledge about the Moon.52

Minerals and other materials extracted from

the lunar surface could provide most of the material needed for a lunar base. They could also be

used for building infrastructure near the Moon.

If the United States were to establish a permanently inhabited lunar base, it could construct the

base from the regolith. Future activities might

include mining minerals for use on the Moon or in

near-lunar space, or using the Moon as an energy

source.

53

EXPLORING MARS

Scientists do not sufficiently understand the

Mars environment and the risks to human life to

ensure relatively safe human exploration of the

planet. Hence, it is too early to plan a detailed,

integrated, long-term program that presupposes

human exploration of Mars. However, it is not

too early to begin planning a sequence of projects

that would: 1) make a detailed scientific investigation of Mars, and 2) study human physiology in

space to reduce the uncertainties facing human

exploration.

The uncertainties facing human exploration of

Mars are currently extremely large. The Mars

Observer spacecraft, which NASA plans to

launch in 1992 and place in Mars polar orbit in

late 1993, will provide important new data that

would affect planning for further exploration,

dgvictona Garshnek, ‘L~]oration of Mars: The Human &pect,” Journal of the British Znte@anetary Society, VO1. 43, 1990, pp. 475-488.

SoInitial information on psychological risks could be obtained from relatively inexpensive experiments on J%rth in inhospitable geographical

regions.

SIMany of these tests could also be done on Earth. Antarctica and many desert environments provide excellent testbeds.

szDavid Scott, Scott Science and lkchnology, personal communication 1991.

53J.F. santa~us and G. ~ Kulcinski, ~(~trofuel: ~ Enerw Source for the 21st Century,” WUcom&~fessiona/En&eez September/October

1989, pp. 14-18.

.
Chapter 2-Policy and Findings .19

whether it be robotic or crew-carrying missions.

Additional robotic missions that returned rock

samples and surveyed more local aspects of Mars

would allow mission planners to determine appropriate decision points for undertaking human

missions, thereby increasing the probability of

mission success.

Scientists who specialize in the reaction of humans to the space environment also lack basic

knowledge of the human reaction to long-term

exposure to low and near-zero gravity,54 as well as

the long-term effects of radiation from cosmic

rays and solar flares.55 Information gained by life

sciences experiments on space station Freedom

and Mir, or on the lunar surface, could reduce

those uncertainties.

Robotics missions will be needed to explore

Mars, whether or not the United States decides

to land humans on Mars by 2019.

Photo credit: California Institute of Technology

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Artist’s conception of a rover exploring Mars. Overhead, an

orbiting satellite relays information from the rover to Earth.

All previous Mars exploration has been carried

out by robotic missions. Robotic spacecraft and

Mars landers will improve our ability to assess

the utility of sending human explorers to Mars,

compared to continued exploration by teleoperated means. If the United States decides to send

humans to Mars either before or after 2019, robotic missions would be needed to:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

advance our knowledge of the structure and

evolution of Mars by studying its geology,

weather, climate, and other physical and

chemical characteristics — scientists also

need to improve their knowledge of Mars in

order to determine what role humans

should play when they reach the planet;

reduce the risks and costs of human exploration by improving our knowledge of the

planet;

resolve issues of soil toxicity;

resolve issues of possible contamination of

Mars by Earth organisms and Earth by any

organisms from Mars;

refine the planning and design of human

missions – how long people should stay on

the surface and what tools and robotic support they might need; and

identify and characterize a selection of

potential landing sites.

If the United States decides to send human

crews to Mars, A&R technologies are likely to

provide valuable assistance to those crews while

on the Martian surface. A&R technologies could

provide:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

support for field studies;

detailed survey before, during, and after

human travel;

emergency support;

surveys of particularly difficult or dangerous regions; and

routine data collection.

 development vehicles to reduce the amount time in traveling to and from 

 Factor: Extending the Human Presence in August 
20. Exploring the Moon and Mars

‘a”’ \ k

bnder ’”’ a

” h 

two-way radio link k / ● Lander science data \ /

. Engineering telemetry

. Doppler and range signals

! r

Lander to Orbiter

one-way relay radio link ● Commands ● Lander science data

\ / Lander on Mars ~ ● Engineering telemetry

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Viking orbiting spacecraft and lander, illustrating the use

of robotics technology on Mars. Viking 1 and 2 spacecraft

reached Mars orbit in 1975. Each sent a lander to the surface

to analyze the soil and report conditions at two Iocations. The

orbiter served to relay information back to Earth.

Although additional information regarding

surface conditions on Mars and the tolerance of

human systems to microgravity, low gravity and

cosmic radiation would reduce the risks to human life, a round trip to Mars would still carry

considerable risk

Explorers traveling to and from Mars would

suffer much higher risk than in returning to the

Moon, but would experience greater challenge

and adventure. A successful exploratory journey

would require the functioning of many different

space systems. The United States has relatively

little experience in operating and maintaining human habitats in space for long periods. The Soviet Union, in contrast, has supported human

crews in low-Earth orbit for periods as long as a

year.56 The United States gained valuable experience in operating the Apollo spacecraft in lunar

orbit and on the Moon, at distances of 250,000

miles from Earth. U.S. scientists also gathered

information concerning the effects of the space

environment on humans during three stays in

Skylab in 1973 and 1974, the longest of which

lasted 84 days.57

However, depending on its relative position

with respect to Earth, the distance to Mars varies

from 35 to 240 million miles. Round-trip communications delays vary between about 6 to 40 minutes. Depending on the propulsion technology,58

fuel consumption, and trajectory, a round trip to

Mars could take from 1 to 3 years, including stay

time on the planet. Neither the United States nor

the Soviet Union has supported crew-carrying

missions for such long distances and length of

time in space. Reducing the risk of an exploratory

journey to an acceptable level will require much

more data about the planet and human physiology than we now possess, and greater experience

 and “Medical Support on Space, vol. 7, No. 2, April/May 1991, pp. 27-29.

 and D. in Space: the History of Skylab, NASA SP-4208 (Washington, National

Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1983).

 the technology currently available, would require about a to an 

to Mars. Engineers are exploring the use of nuclear propulsion in order to reduce this time markedly. Synthesis Group, America the Threshold

(Washington, DC: The White House, June 1991).
Chapter 2-Policy and findings ● 21

living and working in space.59 The United States

and the Soviet Union could both benefit from

cooperating on life sciences R&D on risk-reducing technologies.

Public reaction to the 1986 loss of Challenger

demonstrated that there are important qualitative differences between public attitudes toward

launching people and launching machines into

space. Although human spaceflight helps create

interest in space activities, the loss of life in space

causes considerable public anguish. If the United

States decides to send a human crew to Mars, it

will at the same time have to accept the potential

for loss of life, either from human error or mechanical failure and increased costs to recover

from that loss.60

A&R RESEARCH AND

DEVELOPMENT

The United States has many promising A&R

technologies for use in exploring the Moon and

Mars, but to date it has not sufficiently exploited

them. At present NASA lacks the robotics capability to carry out a vigorous exploration program using advanced robotics.

Although the sophistication of existing technology is sufficient to carry out moderately sophisticated reconnaissance missions, in many respects, robotic technology is still in its infancy.

Hence, using today’s projection of future A&R

capabilities for space projects two or three decades in the future might aim too low or expect too

much.

For example, existing robots show great limitations in their ability to perform mechanically dexterous and flexible tasks. Yet the Japanese have

recently demonstrated improvements in the dexterity, flexibility, and compliance of robotic manipulators. 61 U.S. engineers have made important gains in applying the techniques of artificial

intelligence to robotic applications.62 If an integrated A&R program were given sufficient funding, attention, and a common focus, the robotic

devices of the early 21st century could be much

more capable than those available today.

Despite numerous references in speeches and

testimony to the need for robotic technologies in

carrying out the exploration of the Moon and

Mars, the development of robotic technologies

does not receive high priority within NASA.

NASA spends about $25 million yearly on

applied research in artificial intelligence and robotics as part of its Space Research and Technology program (table 2-2). Yet it devotes relatively

little support to A&R development in its ExploTable 2-2-NASA’s Budget for Space Automation and Telerobotics (thousands of dollars)

1991 1991 1992

1990 Budget Current Budget

Actual estimate estimate estimate

Flight Telerobotics Servicer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79,400 108,300 106,300 55,000

Telerobotics b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,064 13,400 11,045 14,800

Artificial intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,069 11,800 11,189 13,100

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101,533 131,300 128,534 82,900

at=rs IS tinded under space station Freedom in fiscal year’s 1990 and 1~1.

bFunded under CMI Space Technology Inltlatlve In fiscal Yearn 1990 and 1*1.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon, 1991,

5’@a&nek, op. cit,. footnote 54, pp. 201-216.

%e recovery from the loss of Challenger cost the Nation in excess of $15 billion: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Access

to Space: The Future of the U.S. Space Transportation System, OTA-ISC-415 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1990).

blwi]liam L Wittaker and Wkeo finade, Space Robotics in Japan (Baltimore, MD: Japanese lkchnology Evaluation Center, 1991), ch. 6.

bzJames Hendler, Austin ~te, and Mark Drummond, “AI Planning: Systems and ltchniques,” AZ Mag=ine, summer 1990, PP. 61-77.
22. Exploring the Moon and Mars

ration Technology Program (table 2-3).63 Prior to

fiscal year 1991, NASA spent about $160 million

to develop the Flight Telerobotics Services (FTS)

for space station Freedom (box 2-A), previously

NASA’s showcase robotics program. However, in

January 1991 NASA downgraded the FTS project

-$i- Ku-Band Antenna

Color

Cameras

“ i p*mI--Re Telerobot

End~of-Arm Control

Power

Module

(Batteries,

Battery

Charger/

Regulator)

Tooling / // Computers

Stabilizer 4

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) device originally planned for

use on space station Freedom to service and maintain the

structure. Technolcgies planned for the FTS will now be

developed and demonstrated by NASA for a variety of

space-based uses.

to a technology demonstration project within the

Office of Aeronautics, Exploration, and Technology. Its future is uncertain, but FTS will no longer

support space station operations and maintenance. 64 

NASA could improve its A&R capabilities and gather useful scientific information by

carrying out modest robotics experiments on the

Moon.

Improving the U.S. approach to A&R technologies will require the collaborative and integrated efforts of industry, academia, and government.

The United States has the capability and the

resources to implement a highly competitive

A&R program. However, it currently lacks the

institutional structure to carry one out. In part

this may result from the fact that A&R technologies were oversold in the 1980s. The technologies

seemed more simple, tractable, and mature than

they were. Continued technology development,

and experience with successful systems, could

raise public awareness of the utility of A&R systems and create a setting in which A&R engineers

can be more innovative in applying them to space

and Earth-bound applications.

The potential applications for A&R technologies extend far beyond the space program and

include manufacturing and service industries, as

well as the defense community. Three conditions

Table 2-3–NASA’s Exploration Technology Program (thousands of dollars)

1991 1991 1992

1990 Budget Current Budget

Actual estimate estimate estimate

Space transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In-space operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Surface operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Human support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lunar and Mars science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Information systems and automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nuclear propulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Innovative technologies systems analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mission studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4,145

1,690

13,533

2,330

570

5,000

36,000

23,000

62,000

25,400

4,500

10,500

11,000

5,000

6,000

2,000

13,600

3,500

700

1,000

9,000

20,000

16,000

7,000

—

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon, 1991.

 $3.s from this budget supports A&R development in Year 

 both and Japan are pursuing A&R systems for on ‘reed *m”
Chapter 2-Policy and Findings ● 23

Box 2-A–The Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS)

In the late 1980s, NASA began a program to develop a robotic device to assist in operating, maintaining,

and servicing space station Freedom. NASA’s goals were to:

● reduce space Station dependence on crew extravehicular activity;

● improve crew safety;

● enhance crew utilization; and

. provide maintenance and servicing capability for free-flying platforms.

NASA’s plans called for two test flights on the space shuttle, with delivery of the final, flight-ready

article in 1995. The first test flight would test components of an FTS and would:

● evaluate telerobotic and workstation design approaches;

● correlate engineering measures of performance in space with ground simulation and with analytic

predictions;

● evaluate the human-machine interface and operator fatigue; and

● demonstrate telerobotic capabilities.

The second test flight would verify the full ITS for space station work:

● demonstrate capability to perform space station tasks;

. test performance of dual arm manipulator and the attachment, stabilizing, and positioning subsystem;

. test performance of space station FTS orbiter workstation design; and

● develop and verify operational procedures and techniques.

During the congressionally mandated Freedom redesign in 1990 and early 1991, the FTS program was

transfered from the space station project and is now being reconstituted as a more broadly based technology

demonstration project.

NASA expects that much of the technology developed could be applied to applications in manufacturing, hazardous environments, the military, underwater, agriculture, and construction, as well as develop

some basic components necessary for lunar and planetary exploration.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1991

constrain the movement of R&D results into terdisciplinary interactions, artificial inapplications: telligence and robotics are generally

1.

2.

A&R R&D is spread among a number of

university, industrial, and government

laboratories, which by and large communicate poorly with each other about their

research progress.

Robotics draws on the specialized knowltreated as separate disciplines rather

than as one overall discipline that focuses

on the development of intelligent systems

to carry out a variety of well-defined

tasks.

3. Existing A&R technologies currently

edge of a wide variety of engineering find application only in relatively narrow

fields; practitioners in each field are often industrial and government “niches,”

unaware of the approaches and capabili- which have relatively constrained notions

ties of another. Hence, they may not work of what automation or robotics is. For

well together. Despite some significant example, manufacturing concerns make

improvements in A&R as a result of in- use of robots, but only of the fried-base

292-888 - 91 - 2 : QL 3
24 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

manipulator variety, and in a narrow

range of structured tasks. Such robots

cannot accommodate unstructured environments.

Because A&R derives from a widely splintered

set of subfields, only in weak contact with one

another, NASA has a relatively thin technology

base upon which to draw for its own needs. Yet

OTA's workshop participants expressed the belief that A&R technologies have high potential to

make rapid advances if appropriate integrating

structures or institutional mechanisms were developed. An integrated A&R program to serve

government needs for planetary exploration and

assist industry should engage the capabilities of

the universities, government laboratories, and

industry. Such a program might include:

preferentially funding projects that demonstrate an emphasis on integrating the subdiscipline;

holding workshops and conferences65 that

stress interdisciplinary sharing, especially

between the science and engineering communities, as well as among the various engineering disciplines; and

developing testbeds to demonstrate prototype technologies and making them available to a wide variety of potential users.

addition, basic research efforts could be

efficiently conducted at the universities. The universities and appropriate government laboratories could refine and demonstrate candidate

technologies. Promising systems could then be

handed over to development centers and various

industries for final development, validation, and

implementation. Such an institutional arrangement would create a relatively tight coupling between government laboratories and industry and

lead to more efficient transfer into industrial

applications and commercial ventures.

COST ESTIMATES

Cost estimates depend critically on the range

of planned activities, their schedule, and new

information developed in the course of the program. It also depends on knowing what you want

to do, when you want to do it, what tools or

building blocks are necessary, and what these

individual components would cost. Most of these

components do not exist today. Hence, it is too

early to judge the total costs of an extensive program of Mars exploration that uses either robotic spacecraft or humans.

Very preliminary estimates of returning humans to the Moon and mounting crew-carrying

missions to Mars suggest that costs could reach

between $300 and $550 billion over a 35-year period, depending on the capabilities desired and the

exploration schedule66 Because the need to support human life in extremely harsh environments

leads to large-scale technology development, exploration by human crews may cost as much as 10

to 100 times the costs of robotic exploration.67

However, comparisons of the costs of carrying

out fully robotic or crew-carrying missions can be

deceiving because the two kinds of missions

would likely accomplish different objectives.

Costs depend critically on the range and scale

of planned activities, their schedule, and on a

multitude of other factors — some well known,

some only dimly perceived, and some as yet totally unrecognized. The ability to predict costs will

therefore depend heavily on new information developed in the course of the program. It will also

depend on the costs of developing new technologies and manufacturing new systems critical to

the success of the various projects within the

~~For enmple, see Donna S. pi~rotto, “site Charactetition Rover Missions,” presented at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Space Programs and ‘lkchnologies Conference and Exhibit, Huntsville, AL, Sept. 25-27, 1990.

66General ~ami~ Space Systems Division, “Lunar/Mars Initiative program OPtions – A General Dynamics Perspective,” Briefing Report, March 1990; unpublished estimates developed by NASA for its study entitled, Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon

and Mars (Washington, DC: NASA, November 1989).

bTSeveral pa~icipants in the OTA workshop, who have experience with space systems, provided this estimate.
Chapter 2-Policy and Findings ● 25

overall plan. Hence, OTA regards any current

estimates as extremely uncertain. Actual costs

could be higher or lower depending on progress

made in resolving technological hurdles and in

reducing the costs of developing new technologies, e.g., a heavy-lift launch system, aerobraking

for capture in Mars orbit, space nuclear power,

and planetary rovers.

Because the costs for any intensive program to

return to the Moon and explore Mars will be

high, a comprehensive search for cost-reducing

methods and techniques will be of high priority.

New technologies may help to reduce the costs

of exploring the Moon and Mars. For example, if

miniaturized robots were able to provide sufficient capability to carry out scientific studies of

Mars, they might make it possible to mount a

sample return mission at relatively little

cost.68 Small robots can probably be launched

on Delta or Atlas launch vehicles, which are available today from commercial launch service companies. Because many small robots could be sent

to several different locations, they could potentially sample wider regions than a single rover

collecting samples from the surface.

However, reducing costs is not just a matter of

hardware, but of overall approach and management. 69 For example, where possible, it may be

prudent to test major components on lunar missions in order to increase confidence in a Mars

flight. Project managers of the Strategic Defense

Initiative Organization Delta 180 Project, completed in 1987, found that “decreasing the burden

of oversight and review, and delegating authority

to those closest to the technical problems, resulted in meeting a tight launch schedule and

reducing overall costs.”7° Whether these or similar techniques could lead to reduced costs in a

high cost robotic or crew-carrying mission would

require careful study. Nevertheless, a number of

new technologies and methods, developed for use

in manufacturing, may apply to the Mission from

Planet Earth.71

The operational costs for sending human

crews back to the Moon or on to Mars could be

very high. As planning for the Mission from Planet Earth proceeds, it will be important for planners to examine carefully the operational costs of

each project within the overall plan and determine how best to hold down operational costs.

Operational costs are notoriously hard to

judge, as they depend heavily on the success engineers have in developing systems that need relatively little continuing oversight. Experience with

the space shuttle72 and with early design versions

of space station Freedom73 suggest that operations costs for crew-carrying spacecraft can be

extremely high. For the shuttle, operations costs

grew in part because increases in estimated costs

and decreases in appropriated funds caused

project planners to cutback on spending for subsystems and facilities that would have controlled

long-term operations costs by simplifying and

automating operational tasks. The shuttle experience demonstrates that near-term cost reductions in some technologies and facilities may lead

to higher long-term costs. It also suggests that

operations costs can be controlled if the administration and Congress are willing to avoid the

temptation to defer expenditures on facilities and

new technologies in order to reduce near-term

costs. By its nature, however, the development of

new technologies carries with it a high degree of

~David R Miller, “MiniRovers for Mars Exploration,” Proceedings of the Viion-21 Symposium, Cleveland, OH, April 1990.

@u.s. Congress, Office of TechnoloW Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Cos&r: New Technolo~”es and fiachces, OTA-T’M-ISC-28

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988).

701bid., p. 14.

711bid, p. 4.

TZU.S. Congress, Office of Wchnolow ~=ment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-TM-ISC-28

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988.

TsW1lliam F Fisher and Charles R. fice, Space Station Freedom IZctemal Maintenance Tmk Team, FinalRepoti (Houston, ~: NASA JOhnSOn

Space Center: July 1990).
26 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

technological and financial risk. Therefore, new

technologies may well cost more to develop than

expected.

A return to the Moon and the exploration of

Mars would have a major impact on NASA’s

yearly budget, and could adversely affect the

funding of NASA’s other activities.

Expenditures of $300 to $450 billion even

spread over the next 30 years ($10 to $15 billion

per year) would require a substantial addition to

NASA’s yearly space budget, which in fiscal year

1991 equals about $13.4 billion. Over 30 years, a

low estimate of $300 billion would average $10

billion (in 1991 dollars), requiring an average

75-percent increase in NASA’s fiscal year 1991

budget. Because yearly costs would not generally

equal average costs, in some years the costs for

the Mission from Planet Earth could ‘be much

larger than the rest of NASA’s budget, and small

perturbations in this funding caused by program

delays or technological barriers could overwhelm

other, smaller programs.74 Hence, it maybe necessary, e.g., to scale back ambitious plans for a

Mission from Planet Earth, or greatly extend the

timescale for landing on Mars.

To support the Mission from Planet Earth, as

well as the Mission to Planet Earth, the Advisory

Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program recommended 10-percent annual real

growth in NASA’s overall budget.75 Yet, significant pressures on the discretionary portion of the

Federal budget would make obtaining a growth

rate of 10 percent extremely difficult.76

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

AND COMPETITION

Both international cooperation and competition are important components of a healthy,

growing modern economy. As noted earlier, the

United States faces a rapidly changing world in

which the political and military challenge from

the Soviet Union has substantially decreased but

the technological and marketing capabilities of

Europe and Japan have markedly increased.

How the United States invests in its space program could deeply affect other segments of the

economy. During the 1990s and perhaps for the

first decade of the 21st century, the United States

is unlikely to have any competitors in sending

human crews to the Moon and Mars. However,

we can expect other nations to have a strong

interest in developing the technologies required

for robotic spacecraft and probes, because these

technologies are basic to all space activities.

Many of these technologies also have a close relationship with increasing productivity in the manufacturing and service sectors and would greatly

enhance later human exploration.

U.S. pursuit of an integrated program of A&R

technology would contribute directly to U.S. industrial competitiveness.

Although the United States invented robots

and still leads in many areas of research, in other

countries robotic technologies have assumed a

greater role in the economy. Canada, France,

Germany, Italy, and Japan have targeted A&R

technologies for development. In some areas,

their efforts already exceed U.S. capabilities. The

experience gained in applying A&R tasks in

space could assist the development of A&R technologies in other parts of U.S. industry and help it

to compete in this important arena of the world

economy.

Cooperative activities with other countries, if

properly structured, could reduce the costs to

each participant and increase the return on investment for exploration.

The U.S. space program has a long history of

encouraging cooperative activities in space. As

noted in an earlier OTA report, “U.S. cooperative

T~e ongoing debate over funding space station Freedom illustrates the potential effeCtS on smaller programs of funding a single! ‘e~ *arge

project in NASA’s constrained budget.

TSAdViSOry Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, op.cit., footnote 3, P. 4.

v6Da~d Mwre, statement before the Committee on Space, Science, and ~chnoloW, U.S. Hou~ of Repre~ntatives, Jan. 31, 1991. Note

that 10 percent per year takes 6 years to reach 75-percent overall increase.
Chapter 2-Policy and Findings ● 27

space projects continue to serve important political goals of supporting global economic growth

and open access to information, and increasing

U.S. prestige by expanding the visibility of U.S.

technological accomplishments.”77 Cooperative

projects also require significant coordination

among member nations and cost more overall.

Although many cooperative projects have

achieved significant scientific success, some, e.g.,

Ulysses 78 and the international space station

Freedom, have demonstrated that the management of large cooperative projects may encounter

significant financial and other hurdles.79

A return to the Moon and an exploration of

Mars present a range of possible cooperative activities with other nations. Because the costs for

intensive planetary exploration are likely to be

very high, even for projects that do not require

human crews on the Moon or Mars, international

cooperative activities could reduce costs to each

participant and increase the overall return on

investment for exploration. Total program costs

are likely to be higher, however, because of the

increased cost burden from coordination and

management. Yet, except for the Soviet Union,

other countries have demonstrated relatively

little interest in sending human crews to the

Moon or Mars.80 Based on demonstrated international interest, robotic missions present the

strongest opportunities for the United States to

initiate cooperative missions, for at least the next

decade. All three major space-faring entities —

ESA, Japan, and the Soviet Union — might be

interested in participating. The Soviet Union has

already offered to contribute to a joint project.

Just as competition with the Soviet Union to

reach the Moon served U.S. cold war goals, cooperation with the Soviet Union today is consistent

with our current policy of including them in the

family of nations. If the Soviet Union can survive

its current economic and political crises, during

the early part of the next century, cooperation

with the Soviet Union on sending human crews to

and from Mars might be attractive.

For example, the Soviet Union has much greater experience than the United States with supporting crews for long periods in space and has

conducted numerous experiments in life sciences.

Cooperation with the Soviet Union could markedly reduce U.S. expenditures for life sciences

research, which would be extremely important in

understanding and reducing the risks of extended spaceflight.

Japan81 and Canada82 have made significant

advances in certain areas of A&R germane to

space activities. Entering into a cooperative program to study some of the basic issues of robotics

could enhance U.S. progress in developing robotic systems for our space program and for other

areas of U.S. industry. By cooperating on basic

and preapplication research issues,83 all partners could advance their own abilities to apply

this research to areas of specialized interest,

both within the space program and beyond.

The benefits of international cooperation are

closely tied to the methods of implementation.

77u.s. congress, C)ffice of ~chnolog~ssment, znternationaICooperahon and Competition in U.S. Civilian Space Activities, ~A-ISC-239

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 7.

78u*s, a project t. emmine the magnetic fields and other aspects of the solar system far above and below the Plane Of the Solar sYsternY

was to have involved two spacecraft, one supplied by the United States and one supplied by the European Space Agency. The project nearly

failed in February 1981 when the United States unilaterally withdrew funding for its spacecraft.

~See Joan Johnson FreeSe, Changing patterns Of Zntwwaticmd Cooperation in Space (Malabar, FL Orbit Book CO., 1990), Chs. 7 and 13.

80some Japanese space officials have e~ressed interest in sending human crews to the Moon, but this interest has not Yet been translated

into substantial funding support.

alwilliam L Wittaker and ~keo ~nade, Space Robotics in Japan (Baltimore, MD: Japanese lkchnology Evaluation Center, 1991).

82N~A A&anced ~chnolow Ad~soV Committee, ~tAdvancing Automation and Robotics Wchnolgy for the Space Station Freedom and

for the U.S. Economy,” ‘lkchnical Memorandum 103851 (Washington, DC: Ames Research Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 1991), app. C.

83& new technologies find their way into industrial or ~onsumer applications, fewer firms wish to share information, as it has a direct bearing

on the firm’s competitive position.
28 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

Experience with other cooperative ventures in

space show that to keep costs under control, the

planning and engineering interfaces must be kept

as simple as possible.84 The cooperative efforts to

study Comet Halley in the mid 1980s worked well,

in large part, because the cooperating entities85

contributed individual projects that each would

have pursued even without a cooperative program. Some cooperative projects might require

joint development or much closer working relationships than were necessary in studying Comet

Halley. Nevertheless, efforts to keep project management as simple as possible should result in

more cost-effective results.

The following examples present a few potential

cooperative ventures that might contribute to increased U.S. competitiveness and/or U.S. leadership in science and engineering. They represent

only a small sample of the range of activities that

are possible:

Life sciences research — Cooperating on life

sciences work with the Soviets could be

highly fruitful for both parties. Soviet scientists are now willing to share more of their

data on weightlessness and other life

sciences issues and NASA is cooperating

with the Soviet Union in a variety of life

sciences research, including taking standardized measurements with U.S. equipment

onboard Mir, and exchanging biological

specimens. However, the two countries

could extend their opportunities to collect

high-quality human data. For example, the

United States and the Soviet Union could

fly joint long-term missions on the Mirspace

station, using U.S. life sciences and datarecording technology.

Astronomy from the Moon – Making astronomical observations from the Moon might

be an especially fruitful area in which to

cooperate, at several levels. The major

●

●

●

space-faring nations also have strong programs in astronomy and would likely have

an interest in cooperating on designing and

placing observatories of various sizes on the

Moon. Such a program could even involve

countries that lack an independent means

to reach the Moon.

Small rovers on the Moon or Mars — Rovers

are roving instrumental platforms that can

extend vision and other human capabilities

to distant places. Several small rovers86

could be developed and then launched on a

single booster. Each cooperating entity

could build its own small rover, specialized

to gather specific data. The redundancy

provided by having several robotic devices,

independently designed and manufactured,

could increase mission success. Here again,

each country could contribute according to

its own capabilities.

Use of Soviet Energia — The Soviet Union

possesses the world’s only heavy-lift launch

vehicle, capable of lifting about 250,000

pounds to low-Earth orbit. It has offered to

make Energia available to the United States

for launching large payloads. In the near

term, the Soviet offer could assist in developing U.S. plans to launch large, heavy payloads, e.g., fuel or other noncritical components of a Moon or Mars expedition. If these

cooperative ventures succeeded, they could

be extended to include the use of Energia to

launch other payloads.

Cooperative efforts in network projects —

Europe and the United States are both

exploring the use of instrumental networks

on Mars to conduct scientific exploration.

Each cooperating entity could contribute

science payloads, landers, or orbiting satellites to gather data for a joint network

project.

BQJoan Johnson.Freese, Chqjng Panem of Zntemahona/ Cooperation in Space (Malabar, FIJ orbit Book CO., 1990), Ch. 15.

8~e EUrowan SPau Agenq, Japan’s Institute of Space and Astronautical Sciences, NASA, and the Soviet Union’s SPace Research

Institute.

8~e terns ~inirover or microrover are often used to denote robotic rovers that range from about a meter do~ to several centimeters

in overall length. Neither term has a precise definition and are often used interchangeably. This report uses the general term small rover.
Chapter 3

Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars

RATIONALE FOR HUMAN

EXPLORATION OF THE

SOLAR SYSTEM

Should the United States spend public dollars

to return to the Moon? Should it consider sending

humans to explore Mars? Throughout the latter

20th century, various individuals and groups have

urged the establishment of programs to explore

the Moon and Marsl or other solar system components. They have based their arguments on one

or more of the following propositions:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

10

establishment of a permanent lunar base or

human exploration of Mars would return

the United States to a preeminent position

in space activities;

humans have a fundamental desire to explore the unknown;

exploration of Mars would improve U.S.

competitiveness;

exploration of Mars would vastly improve

scientific understanding of the solar system

and the Earth; and

human exploration of Mars would return

other indirect benefits to U.S. society.

Establishment of a permanent lunar base or

human exploration of Mars would return the

United States to a preeminent position in space

activities. Proponents of this proposition argue

for a return to the Apollo goal of U.S. preeminence in space activities across the board in order

to demonstrate to the rest of the world and to

ourselves that Americans have both the capacity

and the will to pursue ambitious technological

goals.2 In this view, demonstrating U.S technological prowess by pursuing a challenging, highly

visible goal would result in considerable global

geopolitical advantage for the Nation and a return to engineering excellence.

In calling for the United States, to “commit

itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is

out, of landing a man on the moon and returning

him safely to Earth,”3 President John F. Kennedy

in 1%1 explicitly sought to use the technological

capability of the Nation to establish supremacy in

space activities, thereby demonstrating the superiority of the U.S. political and economic system.4

Then America’s primary political and economic

competitor was the Soviet Union, which, in orbiting Sputnik in 1957 and cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin

in 1%1, revealed a surprising level of Soviet technological capability. The Apollo program was

successful in demonstrating to the rest of the

world that the United States was able to pursue

and meet demanding technical challenges.

The global setting for space activities has

changed considerably from the days of Apollo

when the United States won the race to reach the

Moon ahead of the Soviets. The Soviet Union

faces major economic and political challenges

from within; its allies in Eastern Europe are moving rapidly, if uncertainly, toward market economies and have cut back substantially on military

funding. In order to support the movement of the

lone of the earlier attempts t. ~pulafie the ewloration of Mars was contained in a series of articles in Cofliers in 1952. In that Sefies,

Wemher von Braun, who had helped design the German V-2 rocket and later became the director of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center,

proposed building a large, rotating space station in preparation for a journey to Mars. See also, Wemher von Braun, The Mans Project (Champaign, IL University of Illinois Press, 1991).

zNational commission on Space, fi”oneenng the Space Frontier: The Report of tie National co~ sion on Space (New York, NY: Ballantine,

1986), pp. 5-21.

3John F. Kennedy, speech to a joint session of Congress, May 25, 1961.

Au-s. congress, Office of Wchnolog ~wment, Civilian Space PoIiq andApplicatiow, OTA. STI-177 (Washington, Dc: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1982), pp. 35-36.

-29-
30. Exploring the Moon and Mars
Chapter 3–Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars ● 31

former Warsaw Pact allies toward economic stability and growth, the United States has adopted

a posture of cooperation in political and economic affairs. For example, during the recent Gulf

War, the United States took special care to include the Soviet Union in discussions and decisions regarding U.S. and United Nations intervention. In the recent past, the MidEast has been

more an arena for political competition than

cooperation with the Soviet Union.

These new events raise the question whether

the United States should demonstrate its leadership by human exploration. In the United States

other scientific and technical challenges in our

national and global agenda, e.g., that of protecting Earth’s atmosphere, oceans, and continents

from anthropogenic degradation, have assumed

greater importance than competing with the Soviet Union in space. It may be, for example, that

the United States could better demonstrate technological leadership by tackling and solving major environmental challenges, e.g., the deterioration of the global atmosphere. In recent years,

Congress has consistently funded a space program that supported study of the solar system

and the universe, Earth’s environment, and human exploration, in the belief that all these

thrusts, if appropriately balanced, could assist in

developing U.S. technological capabilities and

demonstrate to the world U.S. leadership in advanced technologies.5

2. Humans have a fundamental desire to explore the unknown. Some proponents of vigorous

exploration missions to Mars base their argument on a perception that sending humans to

Mars would satisfy a basic human desire to explore, to push beyond known boundaries,6 to satisfy our curiosity. These arguments appeal to the

imagination and are particularly strong in the

United States, where the westward expansion of

the last century provides ready metaphors.7

These metaphors speak to strongly held notions about the West, supported by the media and

popular literature. However, as some historians

and folklorists have noted, the use of these metaphors stems from an uncritical view of historical

events, and often fail when subjected to analytical

scrutiny. Settlement of the western frontier, while

contributing to the development of a strong Nation, was also fraught with failures and left many

unresolved issues that are still with the Nation.9

Furthermore, these metaphors are not necessarily shared by all societies. As the historian Stephan Pyne notes, “We explore not because it is in

our genetic makeup but because it is within our

cultural heritage.”10 In Europe and Japan human

exploration of the solar system receives proportionately much less support than in the United

States. Japan’s and Europe’s programs tend to

emphasize space science and applications pursued robotically.11

Japanese proponents of human spaceflight

have urged increased funding for human spaceflight, but with little success. Major attention to

human spaceflight would require a concomitant

increase in its yearly space budget to develop an

adequate launch system12 and other infrastructure elements for human spaceflight, yet its space

budget for both the National Space Development

ssal~ K Ride, ~ade~hip and~rica’s Fu~re in Space (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, August 1987),

pp. 11-14.

b~old D. ~drich, NASA Offjce of Aeronautics, Exploration and ‘lkchnology, “The Space Exploration Initiative,” presented to the Ameri-

can Awwiation for the Advancement of Science Symposium on the Human Exploration of Space, Feb. 17, 1990, pp.2-3.

TNational Commission on Space, fi-oneenng the Space Frontier: The Report of tie Nahonal Co mmi..wion on Space (New York, NY: Ballantine,

1986), pp. 3-4.

8~verly J. Stmltje, “Making the Frontier Myth: Folklore prOCeSS in a Modern Nation> “ Western Folklore, vol. 16, No. 4,1987, pp. 235-255.

9see, e.g., pat~cia ~mmenck, ~~~e Final Frontier’?” ficerpted in Btian Dippie, “he Winning of the West Reconsidered,” wi~on QuwedY)

summer 1990, pp. 82-83.

lostephen J. Pyne, “space: A Third Great Age of Discovery,” Space Miq VO1. 4, No. 3, 1988, P. 189.

ll~auw both entities are interested in Pumuing a balanced space program, they have also invested in programs tO #aCe humans in SpaCe,

most done in cooperation with the United States.

12Japan i5 ewlonng the possibili~ of developing a space plane, HOPE, but it k to be Un@Oted.
32 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

Agency and the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science has remained relatively flat as a

percentage of gross national product (GNP) over

the last 10 years. Japan, with the world’s second

largest economy, spends only 0.045 percent of its

GNP on space activities, compared to about 0.18

percent for the United States.13

The picture in Europe varies depending on the

country. Nevertheless, each country focuses most

of its space investment on space science, space

applications, and space transportation.14 The

same is true for the European Space Agency.

Although Europe has demonstrated its interest in

supporting a human presence in space by contributing to space station Freedom and to developing the piloted space plane Hermes, its investment in human spaceflight is much less than U.S.

investment, both in absolute dollars and as a

percentage of its total budget. Europe as a whole

spends about 0.11 percent of its GNP on space.

In the Soviet Union, the other nation with a

strong program involving human crews, the writings of Konstantin Tsiolkovsky about the colonization of the cosmos served as inspiration to the

space program. Tsiolkovsky, who wrote at the end

of the 19th century, argued that although Earth

provides humanity’s cradle, humans cannot live

in the cradle forever. Until recently, the accomplishments of the Soviet space program have

been used by a succession of Soviet politicians to

attempt to demonstrate the technological

strength of the Soviet state and the ultimate superiority of the Communist political system. Today,

with the failure of communism throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the allied

concern over imminent economic collapse, political and popular support for sending humans into

space has diminished significantly.15 Although

the Soviet Union plans to study Mars intensively

with robotic spacecraft (e.g., the Mars ’94 mission), its drive to send humans appears to have

subsided.

Nevertheless, whether because of the inherent

danger and challenge, or because of an age-old

need to create new heroes, human spaceflight

captures our interest and stimulates our imagination. For some, it provides inspiration and hope

for the future. Some are drawn by the prospect of

exploring, and eventually settling, new worlds.16

3. Exploration of Mars would improve U.S.

competitiveness. Some contend that the investment in technology required to return to the

Moon to stay and pursue human exploration of

Mars would increase U.S. competitiveness and 17 Today, the reinvigorate the U.S. economy.

United States faces commercial competition for

space markets from Japan and several European

countries. China and the Soviet Union have also

entered the launch vehicle market with capable

launchers. 18

However, it is not clear that investments in the

technologies to support human exploration,

which must be supported primarily by public

funds, would necessarily contribute to the U.S.

competitive position in advanced technologies.

Although some technologies developed in the

program would have some commercial potential,

or would contribute to technological advancement in other areas, many technologies regarded

as critical to the Mission from Planet Earth19

IsDamon R. wells and Daniel E. Hastings, “A Comparative Study of the U.S. and Japanese Space programs,” Space policy, in Press.

IQGeorge D. oja~eh~o and Richard R. Vondrak, “A Look at the Growing Civil Space Club,” Aeronautics andAstronautics, Februa~ 1991,

Pj). 12-16.

IsFor e=mp}e, the Sotiet Government has s]owed &VelOprnenl of the Soviet shuttle, Buran, and scaled back plans for a larger version of

the Soviet space station, Mir Personal communication, Roald Sagdeev, 1991; Nicholas L Johnson, The Soviet Xiwr in Space M90 (Colorado

Springs, CO: ‘l?4edyne Brown Engineering, Februa~ 1991), pp. 98-122.

l~ee the discussion in Donald 1? Hearth (cd.), W?zy Man Explores (Washington, DC: U.S. Government finting Office, 1977).

~TCharles Walker, t~Remarks t. the scientists) Hearing on Human Mission to Mars,” .Jouma/ o~~e Federation ofAmerican Sciendsts (FAS),

vol. 44, No. 1, January/February 1991, p. 14.

18u.s. Congress, Office of ~chnolow ~wment, Zntemationa[ Cwperation and Cowetition in civili~ space Activities, O’L4-ISC-239

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), ch. 4.

lgAdfisov Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space fio~am, Repofl of tie Adv&o~ co~”flee on tie Fu~re of the U.S. Space %~am

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofilce, December 1990), pp. 30-31.
Chapter 3–Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars .33

have little use outside it. For example, the heavy- market its heavy-lift launcher, Energia, for several

lift launch vehicle is one of the primary technolo- years

22 with no success.

gies needed to support human exploration of the

Moon and Mars.20 Yet a commercial market for Aerobraking, nuclear propulsion, space-based

heavy-lift launchers is unlikely for decades. Gov- engines, and space nuclear propulsion and powernment use would likely be limited to resupply of er, which might be critical to Mars exploration

a space station and sending people to the Moon (figure 3-1), and which would be costly to develop,

or Mars.21 The Soviet Union has been trying to have relatively few applications or market outside

Figure 3-1 –Summary of Possible Expiration Technology Needs (Including Robotic and Piloted, Lunar Mars

Missions, and Possible Secondary Applications to Other Space Science Missions)

technology

I

;--* -------------------- ------------------------- -

TECHNOLOGY

* # @ *

* Other Solar System

THRUST PROGRAM AREA ; ROBOTIC HUMAN

o

ROBOTIC HUMAN : Expiration Applications

●

Earth-To-Orbit I Propulsion~ Avionics, Manufacturing ~ ● 0 .! e

Space Aerobraking i

*

* ● 0 q e

Space-Based Engines * Transportation *#* ● e ● ; e

Autonomous Landing *

* e e e~ e

* Auto. Rendezvous & Docking ; e e e; e

Vehicle Structures & Cryo Tankage ~ e e @; e

Artificial Gravity *

*

* e;

I

; In-Space Cryogenic Fluid Systems * e @j

Operations In-Space Assembly & Construction \ e @; e

Vehicle Servicing & Processing : e e; e

.

Surface Space Nuclear Power ~e ● 0 ● j e

Operations in Situ Resource Processing * ● e ● f

Planetary Rover ;e e e @: e

Surface Solar Power ;e e e 0; e

Surface Habitats & Construction : e e:

Regenerative Life Support * Human

** ● ● ; *

support Radiation Protection *o ● ● ;

Extravehicular Activity Systems ~ e e;

Exploration Human Factors : e e :

Lunar & Mars I

Sample Acq. Analysis, & Preserv. ~ O e e et e

Probes & Penetrators o

Science *● e e; e

Astrophysical Observatories ? e

*

t

* e

Information High-Rate Communications ~e e e e; e

Systems Exploration Automation & Robotics : 0 e e 0; e

& Automation Planetary Photonics ~e e e e; e

Exploration Data Systems ;e e e @: e

Nuclear

I

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion ~ ● ! e

Propulsion Nuclear Electric Propulsion *

*e ● j e -------------------------------- ..--------....-.-

~ g High-Leverage Technolog y @ Enabling for Some Expiration System Options ● Critical Exploration Initiative Technology

NOTE: The symbols under eachtachnologyrepresent NASA’ sassessmentofthe relatlvelmportsnce of thetechnologyto thespaceexploratlon Inltlatlva. However, thatessessment

and the schedule of development depend critically on the particular exploration scensrlo chosen.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon, Space Exp/oration/n/tiatrve Tectrrro/ogyNeeds andP/ens:A ReporTtothe United States Sansta Committee onAPwoprL

ations Sutmrnmmae on ttre Veteran’s Admin@rstion, Housing and Urban Development, and lndeperrdentAgencies (V@shlngton, DO: NASA, summer 1990), p. 3-3.

Zooffice of ~chnology %essment, Access to Space: The Future of the U.S. Space Transportation System, OTA-ISC-415 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 24.

211bid.

Zzstephane Chenard, “Restructuring the Soviet Space Industry,” Space Mafifi, May 1990, PP. 231-236.
34 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

of the Mission from Planet Earth. Others, such as

avionics, regenerative life support, and radiation

protection would have applications either on

Earth or in low-Earth orbit, and could contribute

to U.S. competitiveness. Yet, investments in technologies for Mission to Planet Earth, or for robotics exploration, are likely to have much greater

relevance to the wider American economy, and

contribute to U.S. competitiveness with other

nations.

4. Exploration of Mars would vastly improve

scientific undemanding of the solar system and the

Earth. Many observers have noted that the scientific knowledge gained from a sustained exploration program would assist in understanding the

properties of Earth’s atmosphere, oceans, and

continents. 23 As explained elsewhere in this report, such exploration could help resolve questions regarding the presence of life past or present on Mars, and assist in understanding the

long-term evolution of Mars. Questions regarding the origins of life command particular interest, as they relate to the foundations of the human

condition.

5. Human exploration of Mars would return

other indirect benefits to U.S. society. Some argue

that the preparations required for sending human crews to and from Mars would capture public interest and spark a revival of interest in the

study of mathematics, science, and engineering.

They point out, for example, that the Smithsonian

National Air and Space Museum has the highest

visitation rate of any museum in the world. However, whether such curiosity translates to substantially greater interest among America’s

young people in pursuing the study of technical

subjects has not been demonstrated. As the experience with the Apollo program showed,24 

some

percentage of the population will be drawn to

devote their life’s work to science and technology

through encounters with the U.S. space program.

However, without accompanying major improvements, in the overall U.S. educational system including greater investment, such interests may

not be adequately supported.

The above discussion summarizes several

propositions concerning the human exploration

of the solar system, and raises questions about

the conclusions one could draw from their use.

Although proponents often cite one or more of

these propositions, they have not been sufficiently analyzed or tested in public or scholarly debate.

A survey of the literature on human exploration

of the solar system reveals that proponents of

expanding the presence of humans beyond Earth

orbit have generally relied on the sum of several

25 

arguments to support their case. Ultimately, the

argument for human exploration of the solar system rests heavily on the proposition that some

proportion of humans will eventually wish to establish a home elsewhere in the solar system.

Many proponents of a Mission from Planet Earth

suggest that such an effort would prepare us for

that eventuality.

Although these arguments carry weight in the

decisions to explore the solar system, ultimately

the broad political process will shape the course

of investment in exploration programs, here and

abroad, and will include other considerations,

e.g., competing demands on the Federal purse.

However, the political process is likely to be incapable of allocating resources appropriately if initial cost estimates are incorrect; commitments on

capability, schedule, and costs are ignored; and

no one is held accountable for cost and schedule

growth. In other words, enforcement of performance as promised is central to making the political process work efficiently.

~Carl Sagan and Richard ~rco, ~em NO Man Thou&t: Nuclear W?nter and the End of tie AJWL$ Race (New York NY: Random ‘ou~~

1991), App. C. They point out that research on the consequences to the world’s climate of a major nuclear war, the so-called nuclear winter,

came about in part because planetary researchers were attempting to understand the evolution of the atmospheres of Venus and Mars.

z~omas Die@ ~ura Lund, and Jeffrey D. Rosendhal, “On the Origins of Scientists and Engineers,” Publication of the Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, Washington, DC, April 1989.

Zsee, e.g., Hany ~ Shipman, ‘“mans in Space: 21s2 Century Frontiers (New York, NY: Plenum Press, 1989), part I.
Chapter 3–Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars ● 35

RISKS TO HUMAN LIFE

IN SPACE

Permanent habitation on the lunar surface or

the exploration of Mars would expose humans

and other living beings to a wide variety of risks,

including possible radiation damage from cosmic

rays and solar flare particles and atrophied

muscles and loss of bone calcium26 resulting from

27 These risks will have to extremely low gravity.

be understood and mitigation procedures and

technologies developed before it will be considered sufficiently safe to commit to such missions.

Tables 3-1 to 3-5 summarize the risks to health

that crews could experience under different

scenarios.

In addition to these physiological risks, crews

would also be subject to considerable psychological stress as a result of living for long periods of

time in highly controlled, artificial environments.

Explorers of earlier eras, though they may have

faced loneliness and even cramped traveling conditions, have nevertheless been able to breathe

the surrounding atmosphere and walk the Earth

or sail the seas in direct contact with their natural

environment. 28 Preparing for a Mars expedition

would require study of the effects of such environments on the human psyche. It would also require

extensive training in order to reduce or mitigate

negative psychological effects.

Launch into orbit, travel in space, and return to

Earth present additional risk to humans and robots. However, because robots are expendable

and can be replaced, their loss is of much less

concern than the loss of humans. If the United

States wishes to send people into space on a routine basis, it will have to acknowledge and accept

the risks of human spaceflight. NASA should

exert its best efforts to ensure flight safety but

also prepare the public for handling further

losses that will likely occur.

THE HUMAN-ROBOTIC

PARTNERSHIP

The debate over the exploration of the Moon

and Mars is often framed as humans v. robots.

Some scientists fear that sending humans to these

two celestial bodies might preclude the pursuit of

high quality science. On the other hand, some

proponents of human exploration evince concern

that doing as much science as possible robotically

would diminish interest in sending humans. Nevertheless, humans will always be in command. At

question is, where would they most effectively

stand?

Most participants in OTA’s workshop, which

was composed of planetary scientists as well as

experts in robotics and other disciplines, felt that

humans would eventually return to the Moon and

reach Mars. Although participants reached varied conclusions regarding the desirability of

sending humans, they generally eschewed arguments presented in either/or terms. Rather, participants framed their discussion in terms of the

relative strengths of humans and robots in exploring the Moon and Mars. In their view, exploration

should be thought of as a partnership to which

robots and humans each contribute important

capabilities.

For example, robots are particularly good at

repetitive tasks. In general, robots excel in gathering large amounts of data and doing simple analyses. Hence, they can be designed for reconnaissance, which involves highly repetitive actions

and simple analysis. Although they are difficult to

reconfigure for new tasks, robots are also highly

predictable and can be directed to test hypotheses suggested by the data they gather. However,

robots are subject to mechanical failure, design

zbRe~archem believe that the body recovers fairly quickly from muscle atrophy, but are unsure about the recovery from 10SS of bone calcium.

z~eUw ofa~ificial gravi~ on the long journey to and from Mars, or the use of nuclear propulsion, which could significantly sho~en it)

might circumvent some problems with near zero gravity.

MA clear eXeption, of COU~, are the many undersea explorers who, for short periods, have lived in comparatively cram~d conditions in

artificial environments.
36 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

and manufacturing errors, and errors by human

operators.

People, on the other hand, are adept at integrating and analyzing diverse sensory inputs and

in seeing connections generally beyond the ability

of robots, particularly when responding to new

information. Humans can respond to new situations and adapt their strategies accordingly. Only

humans are adept at field science, which demands all of these properties. In the view of several workshop participants, humans would have a

clear role in doing geological field work on both

celestial bodies and in searching for life on Mars.

Humans are also less predictable than robots

and subject to illness, homesickness, stress from

confinement, hunger, thirst, and other human

qualities. They would need protective space suits

and pressurized habitats on both the lunar and

Martian surface. Hence, they require far greater

and more complicated support than robots.

Placing humans on Mars might lead to a contamination of the Mars environment,29 complicating the search for indigenous life that might

exist in special ecological niches.30 Conversely,

returning humans or soil and rock samples from

Mars might contaminate species on Earth, although scientists regard the possibility as extremely remote. Because of these possibilities,

however remote in practice, the United States

and other signatories to the Outer Space Treaty

agreed that “State Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon

and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction

of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary,

shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose.”31 The initial use of robotic devices, operated by humans on Earth, would make much less

impact on the planet than humans and their associated life-support infrastructure, and, as noted,

could provide advance information to lessen potential human impacts. In particular, robotic devices could return samples from Mars in such a

way that they could be carefully controlled and

prevented from contaminating Earth.

The workshop concluded that if humans travel

to Mars, their primary role should be to pursue

scientific studies. They also concluded that beyond noting the relative strengths and weaknesses of robots and humans in scientific studies,

it is too early to assign specific tasks to each

through the sequence of exploratory phases. The

workshop further concluded that scientists will

need to learn more about the planet to determine

what robots, and then humans with robots,

should do. The relationship between robots and

humans is a flexible one, that can shift substantially as more is learned. As robots become increasingly more capable, they can assume tasks

now thought too difficult. Improvements in robotic capacity would improve human output as

well.

The Moon presents a somewhat different case

because it is much closer than Mars. On the one

hand, because of the proximity of the Moon, automation and robotics (A&R) engineers can readily

overcome the time delay problems they would

face in attempting to operate robots at more distant locations. This fact could allow a much more

intensive use of teleoperated systems to explore,

prospect, experiment with building surface structures and instruments, and operate simple laboratories and observational instruments. Yet because the Moon is closer, it is also technically

easier and therefore cheaper to put human crews

on the lunar surface than on Mars. Hence, there

will remain a great interest in putting people back

on the Moon even if robotics engineers develop

very capable robotic devices, because some see a

permanent base on the Moon as a stepping stone

to Mars.

m~though machines can alW contaminate new environments, the space agencies make significant attempts to sterilize them before launch.

sOD.~ De Vinceti, C{planetaV ~otection Issues and the Future Exploration of Mars,” Advances in Space Research, December 1990.

Slunited Nations, Trea~ on ficip[es Governing tie Activities of States in the &p!OrUh071 and uSe Of tiler SPace, lncIud~S ‘ie ‘Wn ‘d

other Celestial Bodies, 18 UST 2410, Article IX.
Chapter 3–Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars .37

Because scientists already know more about

sending humans to the Moon than to Mars, the

amount of information required from science

missions before establishing a human base is far

less. However, as noted in the next chapter, the

additional data provided from further robotic

study of the Moon would reduce risks to humans,

and increase their productivity.

Contamination is an issue on the Moon, as

large-scale activities that include lunar bases and

possibly manufacturing could generate an atmosphere greater than the Moon’s existing atmosphere.32 Not on]y would such an artificial atmosphere adversely impact scientific study of the

Moon’s atmospheric sources and sinks, the generation of gases near astronomical observatories

could affect their operation.

ROBOTICS SUPPORT OF LUNAR

EXPLORATION AND

UTILIZATION

If the United States decides to establish a lunar

base, A&R technologies would provide critical

support to science both prior to sending human

crews and after they are on the surface. The partnership between humans and robots could accomplish much more on the surface than humans

alone could achieve. In both phases, the lunar

surface could provide an important testing

ground for A&R technologies that would be used

on Mars.

Robotic exploratory missions could:

1. Advance the basic scientific knowledge of the

structure and evolution of the Moon (composition, geology, geophysics, atmosphere) —

Although scientist have gathered significant

data about certain aspects of the Moon, the

recent lunar observations from the Galileo

spacecraft 33 have demonstrated scientists’

overall knowledge of the lunar surface is

2,

surface prior to sending humans.

surprisingly thin. Detailed survey from orbit with advanced sensors (unavailable in

the Apollo days) would enhance the scientific results from human crews should they

reach the surface. Robotics Lunar rovers

could, for example, explore areas of the

Moon that might contain trapped water in

advance of placing human crews on the lunar surface.

Assist in selecting landing sites for crews —

Considerable data on potential landing

sites on the lunar nearside already exist

from Apollo results, yet additional data on

the elemental and mineralogical content,

compositional diversity, and surface morr ● {

 “creation of an Artificial Atmosphere,” Nature, vol. 248, No. 5450, Apr. 19, 1974, pp. 657,659.

 the in 22, Lunar and Institute, Houston, 

et al., pp. 83-84; Head et al., pp. 547-548; et al., pp. 871-872; et al., pp. 1067-1068.
38 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

3.

4.

phology for a wide variety of potential sites

would be welcome to mission planners and

scientists.

Test technologies to be used by human crews

in working on the Moon — A number of

technologies, particularly for construction

of lunar habitats, could be tested on the

Moon prior to human arrival.

Construct habitats or observatories — Robotic technologies could be used to construct

either human habitats or even astronomical

observatories and other laboratories prior

to the arrival of human crews.

Robotic technologies could assist human crews on

the Moon by providing:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Support for field studies — Detailed exploration of the Moon would require the ability to

travel long distances. Robotic rovers could

be used to study a variety of locations far

from a lunar base. They could assist in detailed field studies using telepresence techniques to give the human operator the sense

of being at the site.34

Emergency and logistical support – During

an exploration mission, robot vehicles could

provide support in the form of emergency

assistance or even routine support for mundane tasks and logistics.

Survey of difficult or dangerous regions —

Some regions of the Moon are likely to be

particularly risky for human exploration. In

such circumstances, robots would essentially act as surrogates for human explorers,

and be controlled from a lunar base or from

Earth.

Construction support — Robots could assist

human crews in the construction of habitats, laboratories, astronomical observatories, and other structures.

ROBOTICS SUPPORT OF MARS

EXPLORATION

If Congress and the administration agree to

pursue the human exploration of Mars, robotic

technologies would serve two important functions: 1) in addition to supporting the collection

of scientific data, they would provide crucial advance information to increase the safety and feasibility of such exploratory missions; and 2) they

would support the mission while humans are on

the planet. Robotics missions would assist in

meeting a set of milestones implied in President

George Bush’s “long-range continuing commitment” to the exploration of Mars.35 As in the case

of the Moon, the human-machine partnership

would greatly extend human capabilities.

Robotic exploratory missions could:

1.

2

3.

Advance the basic scientific knowledge of the

structure and evolution of Mars (geology,

weather climate, etc.) — Mission planners

would need to know a lot more about Mars

in order to determine how to maximize the

effectiveness of humans when they reach the

planet. Robots are particularly adept at reconnaissance, and can be designed to make

moderately sophisticated analytical tests of

surface soils and rocks.

Reduce the risks and costs of human exploration by improving our detailed knowledge of

the planet — Scientists have relatively poor

knowledge of the surface details of Mars.

Porous dusts and fields strewn with large

blocks may be common.

Resolve issues of soil toxicity and other possible hazards to human safety – The soil of

Mars in the vicinity of the Viking landers

turned out to be much more reactive than

had been imagined. If breathed into the

lungs, Martian soil might adversely affect

human health and therefore requires more

study before sending humans to the planet.

sApaul D. Spudis and G. Jeffery ~ylor, “The Roles of Humans and Robots as Field Geologists on the Moon,” in fioceed@.r Of tie znd~nw

Base Symposium (San Diego, CA: Univelt, 1990).

sSGeorge Bush, “Remarks by the President at 20th Anniversary of Apollo Moon Landing,” The white House Office of press Secretary, Ju@

20, 1989.
Chapter 3–Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars ● 39

4.

5.

6.

7.

Determine possible contamination of Mars by

Earth organisms and Earth by any Mars organisms — If Mars does contain some forms

of life, the presence of humans could contaminate them, raising ethical questions regarding the intervention of life from Earth

and rendering future scientific study of

Mars life forms extremely difficult. Conversely, Mars life forms, if they exist, might

potentially harm life on Earth.

Refine planning for the design of human missions — Robotic technologies could help

provide the information necessary to determine what people should do on the surface

and what tools and additional robotic support they might need. If humans are to use

their capacities to the fullest while on Mars,

mission planners and scientists must learn

as much as possible about surface conditions on Mars.

Provide data for the selection of potential

landing sites 1– Many types of landing sites

exist. It would be important to select and

characterize not only relatively safe landing

sites, but also those of high scientific interest to maximize the special capacities of

humans. 36

Test technologies to be used by humans in

landing or working on the planet – Numerous technologies, from aerobraking to components of habitats, could be tested by robotic devices prior to the arrival of humans.

Robotic technologies could support human exploration on Mars by providing:

1. Support for field studies – Exploring Mars

insufficient detail to contribute substantially to the advancement of knowledge will

2.

3.

require the ability to roam far and wide.37

Robotic instruments could provide humans

with greater dexterity and strength, and the

ability to project their intellect far beyond

their base, thus increasing human productivity and safety. They can also be provided

with infrared, ultraviolet, or other sensors

beyond the range of the human eye. Although machines are subject to breakdown,

when operating properly they are not subject to fatigue and can carry out routine

and/or repetitive tasks. Teleoperated mobile robotics devices that could survey local

sites and return geological samples to a

Mars base for detailed study would be of

particular utility. Devices able to provide

the additional sense of being at the site (telepresence) might vastly improve human productivity in detailed field studies of the

Martian surface.38

A detailed survey before human travel –

Prior to sending humans to a region, robotic

reconnaissance vehicles could scout a path

and explore points of interest for detailed

human examination. These instruments

need not necessarily be on the surface to be

of considerable use. For example, a spacecraft orbiting Mars could be equipped to

make detailed, high-resolution images of

surface features of interest to scientists

prior to visits by human exploration

teams. 39

Maintenance, logistical, and emergency support — Robotic devices could sharply reduce the amount of routine, mundane tasks

human explorers would have to perform.

During an exploration mission, robot vehicles could also provide emergency assistance.

sbDonna S. pi~rotto, “Slte Charactetition Rover Missions,” presented at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Space

Programs and lkchnologies Conference and Exhibit, Huntsville, Alabama, Sept. 25-27, 1990.

STFor emmp]e, if it were lwated in North America, the Vanes Mannans would extend nearly from the Chesapeake Bay to San Francisco

Bay. In places, this “Grand Canyon of Mars” is 16 kilometers deep and 240 kilometers wide. The volcano Olympus Mons is wider at its base

than the State of Utah and over 27 kilometers high.

Sapaul D. Spudis and G. Jeffe~ ~ylor, “me Roles of Humans and Robots as Field Geologists on the Moon,” in ~ceedin~ f#~e znd~nar

Buse Symposium (San Diego, CA: Univelt, 1990); Michael W. McGreevy and Carol R. Stoker, “TAepresence for Planetary Exploration,” presented at the SPIE Annual Meeting, Opticon ‘90,” Boston, MA, Nov. 6-9, 1990.

3gIn this regard, such a spacecraft would Ovrate much like the u-s. ~ndwt or French S~T Image spacecraft, which carry sensors capable

of exploring Earth’s surface for minerals. Areas determined to be of particular interest can then be closely examined by field geologists.
40 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

4. A survey of particularly difficult or dangerous

regions – Some regions of Mars are likely to

be particularly risky for humans. In such

circumstances, robots would essentially act

as surrogates for human explorers.

If Congress and/or the administration decide

not to pursue the human exploration of Mars in

the near term, robotic exploration would nevertheless add to the growing body of scientific data

about Mars and prepare the way for any future

human exploratory missions. In all, it will be important to determine what is technically and

politically possible and what support technologies are needed to accomplish the exploration

goals. At present, scientists have only a glimmer

of what is possible. For example, although scientists have suggested that telerobotic devices capable of providing a sense of presence would be

highly useful,40 they are only beginning to study

how to design, build, and operate such devices

effectively .41

STRATEGY FOR EXPLORATION

A strategy for planetary exploration will be

constrained by scientific knowledge (do we know

enough to design a credible work statement?),

technological skills and capabilities (do we have

adequate space transportation and other supporting systems?), funding (are sufficient public

funds available, now and in the future, in competition with other societal needs?), and political

support. Workshop participants generally agreed

that the pursuit of scientific goals on Mars by

itself requires no set time schedule beyond that

suggested by resolution of these constraints,

available launch windows, and the desire to resolve scientific questions raised by earlier missions. Future missions can be planned as data

from missions already in progress are acquired

and analyzed. However, several noted that political and programmatic considerations might suggest or even dictate a particular schedule – especially if the political or economic climate changed

quickly. For example, when President Kennedy

proposed the goal of landing a man on the Moon

and returning him, he also selected a date for

achieving that goal,42 with the intention of mobilizing supportive sentiment within Congress, the

public, U.S. industry, and NASA.

President Bush also proposed a date, presumably for similar reasons, by suggesting that the

United States should plant the American flag on

Mars by the 50th anniversary of its landing on the

Moon — 2019. Many workshop participants were

cautious about the goal of 2019. Although none

disagreed that such a goal was technically feasible, at an unknown level of human, economic, and

technical risk, many, but not all, felt that given the

state of knowledge about Mars, the state of robotic technology, and our state of knowledge about

human physiology in space, a specific goal is

premature.

43 Scientists simply do not knO W

enough today to assure mission planners that a

crew on Mars in 2019 could accomplish a level of

useful science or derive other benefits commensurate with the required investment.

If the pursuit of scientific knowledge and insight is the primary reason to explore Mars, and

the most important goal of human presence on

Mars, then science goals should be optimized on

human missions. Proper uses of robotic technologies before and during human missions can accomplish that. A sustained program of robotics

missions through the first decade of the next century to set the stage for humans if the United

States decides to undertake such an enterprise.

40G. Geffrey Wylor and paul D. Spudis, ‘~~]eovrated Robotic Field Geologist,” proceedings of Space ‘90 Aerospace ASCE, ~buquerque~

NM, Apr. 22-26,1990.

dlMichael W. M@reevy and Carol R. Stoker, “lklepresence for Planetaxy Exploration,” presented at the SPIE Annual Meeting, OPticon

‘90,” Boston, MA, Nov. 6-9,1990.

dzN~A officials had pre~ous~ assured the president that such a goal, though ambitious, was achievable: Letter from James Webb to president Kennedy, May 1961.

dsseveral workshop pa~icipants pointed out that setting a challenging schedule, such as President Kennedy *t forth for the APOIIO Program,

might motivate the country to achieve difficult tasks, as it did in the 1960s. As noted earlier, however, the national and international political

climates are much different toda~ than they were 30 years ago.
Chapter 3–Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars .41

MANAGING THE MISSION FROM

PLANET EARTH

A program to send humans back to the Moon

or to explore Mars would present a formidable

challenge to NASA’s engineering, scientific, and

management capabilities. It would also challenge

the Nation’s political and fiscal ability to support

such a long-term, costly project.

The issue of whether to send humans to the

Moon and/or Mars cannot be reduced to scientific and technological considerations alone. The

funding and political support for this initiative

must be provided over many Presidencies and

Congresses. Experience with other large projects

in NASA and other agencies suggests that the

technical and managerial factors would interact

strongly with short- and long-term political and

budgetary concerns. These interactions will

shape the success or failure of any initiative to

explore space, whether carried out solely with

robots, or with both robots and humans.

Lessons based on experience with the space

shuttle 44 and with space station Freedom45 indicate that “success-oriented” planning and the

pursuit of incompatible technical goals,46 which

leaves little room for the vagaries of the political

process, may lead to much higher than expected

costs, and long delays in accomplishing major

technical objectives. For example, the space

shuttle, which was declared operational in 1982

after four successful flights, still cannot be

launched routinely.47

A successful strategy for exploring the Moon

and Mars would include allowance for the unexpected. The lessons of the space shuttle and space

station Freedom suggest that the goal of exploring

the Moon and Mars could be met most effectively

by developing a set of small and large projects,

each of which contributes to the larger goal. They

also suggest that a successful evolutionary strategy would include the following characteristics:

●

●

Flexibility — Planners should not attempt to

“freeze” or “lock-in” a large-scale, longterm plan tightly coupled to expected funding. In the case of space station Freedom,

each time the budget process resulted in

lower appropriated funds for the space station, the program fell into jeopardy. Fiscal

and other concerns, including engineering

concerns, have made it necessary to rescope

the project several times and reorganize its

management structure. A more flexible plan

would allow investigators to learn from experience, and give them room for changes in

scope and project direction, depending on

information received and funding available.

A set of intermediate, phased goals structured

around a common theme — Previous largescale civilian space projects have had a

highly structured plan with multiple and

often incompatible goals.48 The scale of the

Mission from Planet Earth suggests the possibility of generating a set of interim goals

with different schedules and measures of

success. These interim goals would take into

account the rate at which A&R technologies, as well as human capabilities, advance.

Planners should resist the tendency to design a large-scale project in order to include

every potential user under the aegis of a

large program. Instead they should disaggregate the often incompatible goals of mul44JOhn M- @@On, ~’~e space shuttle program: A Policy Failure,” Science, vol. 232, May 30, 1986, PP. 1099-1105.

‘lsRonald D. Brunner and Radford Byerly, Jr., “The Space Station Programmed,” Space Policy, vol. 6, No. 2, May 1990, pp. 131-145; Thomas

J. Lwein andVK Narayanan,Keeping the Dream Alive: Managing the Space Station Program, 1982-1986, NASA Contractor Report 4272, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, July 1990; Howard E. McCurdy, The Space Station Decision: Incrementa[Politics and Technical Choice

(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).

46For enmple, in designing and promoting the space shuttle, NASA attempted to achieve the incompatible goals of piloted sPaceflight and

inexpensive launches in one vehicle design.

QTAlthough all launch ~tems e%nence ~me delam as a result of mechaniul failure and weather, the highly complex shuttle has proved

to be much more prone to delay, in part because it carries humans. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Access to Space: The Future

of the U.S. Space Transportation System, OTA-ISC-415 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990).

4SC-itim of the planned space station Freedom suUest that bemuse it was designed to be “all things to al] People,” it serves 110 COXIStitUell~

well.
42 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

●

A

tiple constituencies, approaching the goals

through multiple small programs, executed

either in parallel or in series. Each project

or step in the process should provide a useful product independent of the long-term

goal. These steps would allow planners to

learn from the successes or failures of early

projects and factor these lessons into subsequent projects. The knowledge and experience gained in the early stages would allow

mission planners to design a far more efficient and safe plan for human exploration

than any that could be put forth today or in

the near future.

A management structure that favors operational experience over planning — Experience and a judgment about what works best

should be the primary test of the succeeding

stages in the exploratory process, rather

than a plan developed prior to the results of

the first stage.

strategy that had these characteristics would

further benefit from the following approaches:

Optimize each project within the overall

goal to achieve a single, highly focused

objective.

Where possible, make each project small

enough to locate within a single NASA center in order to give it financial control of the

●

●

●

project and to simplify management interfaces. The Exploration Office could play a

coordinating role in assuring the relevance

of each project to the overall goal. Robotics

missions make excellent small projects because they are useful in their own right,

demonstrate technology, and give project

teams significant operational experience.

Where possible, make the project’s period

short enough to provide results before external events undermine its rationale or

support. 49

Decouple each project from parallel research and development projects insofar as

possible within the context of achieving the

overall goal, in order to provide a clean test

and to clarify responsibility for success or

failure.

Select each project for its centrality to the

overall mission through competition with

other possible projects.

Successful management of a Mission from

Planet Earth will also require stable, consistent

funding, and enough of a political commitment

from the administration and Congress to carry

projects through the inevitable failures as well as

through the successes. Congress might wish to

consider multiyear funding for certain key projects of the Mission to Planet Earth in order to

provide that stability and commitment.

Q~e many technical and funding challenges to be met in designing and launching large planetaw probes make these ProJects e~remelY

long in scope.
Table 3-1 -Medical Consequences From Exposure to Space Flight Factors (Earth Orbit Scenario)

1 2 3 4 5 e

Short-Term, O-G Long-Term, O-G

(1-14 days)

Artlficlal Gravity, 1-G

(more than 2 weeks) (with some level of exercise)

lnflight Problems Postflight Problems Inflight Problems Posttflight Problems Inflight Problems Postflight Problems

Mainly O-O/Reduced-Cl

Effects

Muscle Muscle strength decreased ln- Muscle strength decreased (reChanges fllght. Some muscle mass loss turning to normal In 1-2 wks).

Indicated Has not affected Lower extremities show lnmlsslon performance. creased susceptlblllty to fatigue and reduced muscular efficiency Arm muscles show no

change,

Cardiovascular Heart rate normal to slightly In- Heart rate Increased postfllght,

Deconditioning creased Inflight. Isolated cases returning to normal by one wk.

of nodal tachycardla, ecfoplc Resting blood pressure debeats, and supraventricular bi- creased, Orthostatic lntolergemlny. ance (susceptibility to fainting)

Increased after flights longer

than 5 hrs, returning to normal

In 3-14 days.

Muscle strength decreases.

Fatigue noted during EVA.

Muscle mass shows Indications

of decrease but Is partially preserved depending on exercise

regimen Inflight exercise reduces strength loss regardless

of flight duration.

Increased susceptibility to No data Theoretically muscle No data. Theoretically, postmuscle fatigue. Decreased leg strength and mass should be flight muscle fatigue and loss

muscle strength. Arm strength preserved of strength should not occur.

normal or slightly decreased.

Loss of “muscle pump” contributes to orthostatlc Intolerance

Heart rate normal to slightly In- Heart rate Increased (normal No data, Theoretically, normal No data. Theoretically, postcreased Inflight. Diastolic by 3 wks), Decreased mean ar- cardiovascular function should flight cardiovascular problems,

blood pressure reduced. Pre- terlal pressure. Decreased ex- be preserved Including orthostatic lntolermature ventricular beats ercise capacity Recovery time ance, should not occur.

(PVBs) and occasional prema- related to Inflight exercise,

ture atrial beats (PABs). rather than flight duration

Orthostatlc tolerance returning

to normal by 3 wks. Unifocal

PABs and PVBs.

Bone Loss, Increasing negative calcium 0s Calcls (heel bone) density Increased potential for kidney Decreased density of weight- No data. Theoretically, bone In- No data. Theoretically, postHypercalclurta balance Inflight. decreased Little or no loss stones, Hypercalcluria plateaus bearing bones. Recovery time tegrity should be preserved. flight skeletal problems should

from non-weightbearing after 1 mo. Calcium balance approx. same as flight time. Hypercalciuria should not oc- not occur

bones, becomes more negative Neg. calcium balance (recov- cur. Potentlal for kidney stones

throughout flight, ery several wks, should decrease.

Fluid Shifts, Body fluids shift headward Low body fluid volume contrib- Body fluids shift headward Marked orthostatlc Intolerance No data With artiflcial G, major No data Marked orthostatic lnDecreased Fluid/ causing facial fullness, feeling utes to orthostatic Intolerance. causing facial fullness, feeling from decreased blood/fluid vol. fluid shifts would not occur. tolerance from decreased

Electrolyte Levels of head/sinus congestion. Loss Conservation of fluid and elec- of head/sinus congestion. Loss ume. Recovery of fluid/elec- Theoretically, fluid volume bloodfluid volume should not

of electrolytes persists through- trolytes begins Immediately of electrolytes persists through- trolytes begins Immediately

out flight. 3% decrease In total

would be preserved. Loss of occur.

upon reaching gravity. out flight 3% decrease In total upon reaching gravity

body fluid.

electrolytes should not occur.

body fluld. (see short term)

Decreased fled RBC mass begins to decrease RBC mass decreased. Recov- RBC mass decreases approx. RBC mass decreased. Recov- No data. Theoretically RBC No data. Theoretically, postBlood Cell (RBC) MaSS Inflight. ery requires approx. 2 wks 15% during first 2-3 wks. Par- ery requires approx. 2 wks. to 3 mass should not be affected, flight problems should not

tlal Inflight recovery after 60 mos following Ianding. Possl- However, effects of space fac- occur.

days Independent of flight du- bility of more acute response tore such as radiation In this

ration. Possiblilty of more to Injury and blood loss. scenario are unknown.

acute response to Injury blood

loss.

Neurological Motion sickness symptoms Postflight difficulties In main- Motion sickness symptoms ap- Changes In gait, postural disaffects may appear early In flight and taining postural equilibrium pear early In flight and subside equilibrium especially marked

subside/disappear In 2–7 with eyes closed. Various ves- or disappear In 2–7 days. Pos- with eyes closed. Observations

days. Postural Illusions, sensa- tibular disturbances maybe tural/vestibular Illusions may suggest severity proportional to

tilons of movement, dizziness, experienced. Initially occur. Reappearance of flight duration and counteror vertigo may Initially occur. Illuslins during long missions measure use. Additional vesmay occur. tibular disturbances (dizziness,

nausea vomiting) may occur.

Leaming to walk and orient In a Transition from rotating to nonrotating environment maybe rotating environments may rechallenging, Corlolls force may sult In vestibular and bioproduce disorientation In cer- mechanical readjustment

tain situations. severity of problems Initially. Motor/

problems decrease with ln- coordination patterns may

creasing radius of rotation. need time to readjust to a nonrotating environment.
Table 3-1 -Medical Consequences From Exposure to Space Flight Factors (Earth Orbit Scenario) (continued)

1 2 3 4 5 6

Short-Term, O-G Long-Term, O-G Artificial Gravity, 1-G

(1-14 days) (more than 2 weeks) (with some level of exercise)

Inflight Problems postflight problems lnflight Problems Postflight Problems Inflight Problems postflight problems

Combined O-G-Reduced,

Confinement Effects?

Immune Changes Although Immune system Increased number of neutrochanges do occur (see post- phlls, lymphocyte numbers deflight problems), no serious 111- creased, returning to normal In

nesses have been reported 1-2 days. Decreased ablilty of

In flight. lymphocytes to respond to

challenge

Decrease In T-lymphocyte

numbers with diminished

reactivity and capacity for

proliferation. Neutrophlls

Increased Clinical significance

unknown but changes may

represent potential for

contracting viruses, etc. from

visiting crews

Recovery to normal requires No data. No data

3-7 days. Clinical significance

of changes unknown but may

represent potential for increased susceptibility to lnfections, possibly a decreased

ability to respond to ImmunoIogical challenge inherent on

Earth.

Isolation, Confinement,

Remoteness Effects

Psychological/ No consistent sociological Some stress may occur as a With Increasing duration mls- Some stress may occur as a Some psychological stress

Sociological

Some stress may occur In tranproblems noted Some stress result of postural/vestibular sions, potential exists for result of postural/Vestibular dis- may occur In Iearning to live In sitloning from a rotating to a

may occur as a result of motion disturbances decreased motivation and pro- turbances and general recov- a rotating environment. non-rotating environment (vessickness or vestibular distur- ductivity, compromised crew ery timeeurse of various tibular and biomechanlcal

bances. relations and coordination, and body systems. readjustments)

compromised crew/ground

relations

Radiation Light flashes In eye observed

Exposure (radiation striking the retina),

but do not Interfere with mlssion performance or crew

health. Primary radiation

source. inner radiation belt

(mainly protons),

No postflight problems noted Possible combined effects with

as a result of short-duration O-G on physiological systems

flight radiation exposure Light flashes in eye observed

Possible tissue damage depending on dose and type of

radiation encountered, Primary

radiation source Inner radiation belt (mainly protons).

Increased potential for cancer Artificial G has no effect on

Induction, cataract formation dose of radiation encountered

later In Iife depending on dose Possibility would still exist for

and type of radiation encoun- tissue damage depending on

tered throughout mission dose, duration, and type of radiation encountered

Artificial G has no effect on

dose of radiation encountered

Increased potential would still

exist for cancer induction, cataract formation later in Iife.

SOURCE Prepared by Victoria Garshnek, References A.E. Nicogossian, CL Huntoon, and S.L Pool (ads ), Space Physiology and Medicine, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, PA. Lea and Febiger, 1989).

References for Ufe Sckmcee -s

A Strategy (or Space Bio/ogyar?d Med/ce/ Sc/ence forfhe 7980s and 1990s. Oommlttee on Space Biology and Medlclne, Space Science Board, Oommlsslon on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources, National Research

Council, Washington, DC, 1987.

Blorr?edG?/ Resu/ts of Ape//o. R.S. Johnston, S F Dletleln, and C A Berry (ads.), NASA SP-368 (Washington, DC US Government Prlntlng Offfce, 1975).

f3/ornedica/Resu/fa rhrrr Shy/ab. R S Johnston and L F Dletleln (ads ), NASA SP-377 (Washington, DC. U.S Government Prlntlng Offtce, 1977).

R J.M. Fry and D S. Nachtwey, “Radlatlon ProtectIon Guldellnes for Space Mlsslons,” /+ea/fh Pfrystcs, VOI 55, No. 2, pp 159-t 64, 1988.

Life Sciences Report OffIce of Space Science and Appllcatlons, Life sciences Dlvlslon, National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon, Washington, DC, December 1987

A Nlcogosslan, F. Sulzman, M Radtke, and M. Bungo, “Assessment of the Efficacy of Medical Countermeasures In Space Fllght,4’ Acfa Asfronsutics, vol. 17, No 2, pp 195-198, 1988.

A Nlcogosslan, L Harrfs, L Couch, F Sulzman, and K Galser, “Medical and Technology Requlrementsfor Human Solar System Exploration Mlsslons, ” paper prasentedto the40th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation,

Malaga, SpaIn, October 1989.

Repor?offhe 90-dsy Sfudy on Human Exploration of fhe Moon and Mars (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon, 1989)

K Sakahee, S Nlgam, P Snell, M Chue Hsu, and C YC Pak, ‘Assessment of the Pathogenetlc Role of Physkal Exerclee In Renal Stone ~matlon, ’’Joum/dC/)n/ti/Endaffno/~andMefabo/isrn, VOI 65, No 5, pp 974-979,1987

Space /Wysio/ogyandWd icine, 2d ad. A,E. Nlcogossian, C.L Huntoon, and S L. Pool (ads.) (Phlladelphla, PA: Lea and Feblger, 1989).

R.W Stone, Jr., “An Overview of Artlflclal Gravity” In Fir?h $rrrposium on ftre Ro/e oftbe Vestibu/ar Ofgarrs in Space f@orafiorr (Washington, DC U.S. Government Prtntlng OfflCe, 1971).
Table 3-2- Medical Consequences From Exposure to Space Flight Factors (Lunar Outpost Mission)

(3-day O-G transits, l/6-G surface stay)

Short-Term

(3-day, O-G transit) Long-Duration Surface stay

Inflight Problems

(Readaptation to 1-G of Earth)

(More than 2 wks at l/&-G) Postflight Problems

Mainly 0-Reduced -Q Effects

Muscle See column 1 No data. Unknown to what degree 1/6-G would enhance No data Unknown If 1/6-G combined with exercise will

Changes table 3-1 exercise benefits and muscle mass/strength decrease severity of postflight muscle weakness/loss of

preservation. efficiency and strength.

Cardiovascular See column 1, No data Unknown to what degree 1/6-G would influence

Deconditioning

No data Unknown how much 1/6-G with exercise would

table 3-1 cardiovascular conditioning when combined with decrease severity of Postflight cardiovascular status and

exercise. severity of orthostatic Intolerance (fainting).

Bone Loss, See column 1, No data. Unknown to what degree l/6-G would enhance No data Unknown to what degree l&G combined with

Hypercalciuria table 3-1 exercise benefits for maintaining skeletal Integrity and exercise would preserve skeletal Integrity and decrease

control of hypercalciuria the potential for postflight problems (fractures, etc.)

Fluid Shifts, See column 1, No data. Unknown to what degree l/6-G would Influence No data Unknown If 1/6G combined with exercise

Decreased Fluid/ table 3-1 f!uld/electrolyte balance.

Electrolyte Levels

would decrease severity of fluid and electrolytes loss and

severity of postflight orthostatic Intolerance.

Decreased Red See column 1, No data Unknown to what degree 1/6-G would Influence No data Unknown if 1/6-G would influence the time reBlood Cell Mass table 3-1 the partial recovery of RBC mass. quired for full recovery Postflight of RBC mass at l-G.

Neurological See column 1, No data Unknown to what degree Iong-duration l/6-G No data Unknown to what degree changes In locomoEffects table 3-1 would Influence locomotion/mowment patterns and tlon/movement patterns and equlilibrium would occur

Coordination and the amount of time needed to readjust to 1-G

conditions.

Combined o-G/Reduced-0,

Confinement Effectse?

Immune Changes See column 1, No data Unknown whether Iong-duration 1/6 would No data

table 3-1 significantly Influence the Immune system.

Isolation, Confinement,

Remoteness Effects

Psychological/ See column 1, No data Unknown to what degree long-term remoteness No data

Sociological table 3-1 from Earth combined with a hostile/dangerous environment would Influence psychological well-being and

sociological behavior.

Space Environment

Radiation Radiation of free space (beyond Earth’s protective radi- No data on long-term effects of free space radiation on No data Increased potential for cancer Induction, genetExposure ation belts) encountered. No problems noted previously humans. Galactic cosmic radiation and possibility of Io mutations, and cataract formation later In Iife, dependwith Apollo astronauts although Solar Particle Events periodic solar particle events may expose crews to high ing on dose and type of radiation encountered.

(SPE) are of concern for future missions (countermeas- energy heavy ion particles, protons, electrons, neutrons,

urea and/or shielding needed). x-rays. Effective shielding/shelter and SPE monitoring

would need to be provided.

SOURCE: See table 3-1 for reference list.
Table 3-3–Medical Consequences From Exposure to Space Flight Factors (Mars Mission)

(O-G transits, l/3-G surface stay scenario)

Long-Term, Approx. 1 yr Long-Term, Approx. 6 mos.

(Conventional Propulsion) (Advanced nuclear propulsion) Long-Duration Surface Stay

Inflight Problems Inflight Problems

(Readaptation to 1-G of Earth)

(More than 2 wks at l/3-G) Postflight Problems

Mainly O-G/Reduced-Cl Effects

Muscle See column 3, See column 3, No data. Unknown to what degree l/3-G

Changes

No data. Severity of postflight muscle

table 3-1 table 3-1 would enhance exercise benefits and weakness/loss of efficiency and strength

muscle mass/strength preservation and/or after 2 years of O–G unknown Beneficial

conditloning after 1-year weightless flight. effect of l/3-G exposure unknown

Cardiovascular See column 3, See column 3,

Deconditioning

No data. Unknown to what degree l/3-G No data Severity of postflight cardiovastable 3-1 table 3-1 would Influence cardiovascular condition- cular status and severity of orthostatic lning when combined with exercise after a tolerance (faintling) after 2 years of O-G unl-year weightless flight known Beneficial effect of l/3-G exposure

unknown.

Bone Loss, See column 3, See column 3, No data Unknown to what degree l/3-G

Hypercalclurla table 3-1

No data. Potential for postflight problems

table 3-1 would enhance exercise benefits for main- (fractures, etc ) unknown

taining skeletal Integrity and control of hypercalcluria after l-yr O-G flight

Fluid Shifts, See column 3, See column 3, No data. Unknown to what degree l/3-G No data. Severity of fluid and electrolyte

Decreased Fluid/ table 3-1 table 3-1 would Influence fluid/electrolyte balance

Electrolyte Levels

loss and postflight orthostatic Intolerance

after a l-year weightless flight after 2 years of O-G flight unknown Beneficial effect of l/3-G exposure unknown

Decreased Red See column 3, See column 3,

Blood Cell Ma

No data. Unknown to what level of recovtable 3-1

No data

table 3-1 ery l/3-G would influence RBC mass loss

experienced after a 1-year weightless

flight

Neurological See column 3, See column 3, No data Unknown whether a l-yr O-G No data. Unknown to what degree

Effects table 3-1 table 3-1 flight would precipitate significant post- changes in locomotion/movement patterns

flight disequillibrium upon reaching l/3-G and equililbrium would occur (after 2-yrs of

and possible Interfere with Mars surface O-G flight and l/3-G surface stay) and time

exploration activities initially needed to readjust to 1-G Earth

conditions

Combined, 0-G/Reduced-0 See column 3, See column 3,

Confinement Effects? table 3-1 table 3-1

Immune Changes No data Unknown whether Iongduration No data.

l/3-G would significantly Influence the immune system after a l-year weightless

flight

Isolation, Ccnfinment,

Remoteness Effects

Psychological/ No data Unknown to what degree long- No data Unknown to what degree long- No data Unknown to what degree Iong- No data

Sociological term remoteness from Earth combined term remoteness from Earth combined term remoteness from Earth combined

with a dangerous environment and in- ‘with a dangerous environment and in- with a hostile/dangerous environment and

creasing communication lag-time would creasing communication lag-time would significant Earth communication Iag-time

Influence psychological/sociological Influence psychological/sociologlial would Influence psychological/soclologlca!

behavior. behavior. behavior.

Space Envionment

Radiation No data on long-term effects of free space No data on 6-mo. exposures to free space No data on long-term physiological effects

Exposure

No data. Increased potential for cancer

radiation on humans. Galactic cosmic ra- radiation on humans. Advantage In this of Mars radiation environment Galactic - Induction, genetic mutations, and cataract

diation and possibility of solar particle scenario is that crew duration/exposure is cosmic radiation and possibility of periodic formation later In Iife, depending on dose

events may expose crew to high energy significantly reduced over the conventional

heavy Ion particles, protons, electrons,

solar particle events may expose crews to and type of radiation encountered

propulsion scenario of 1 yr Shielding and high energy heavy Ion particles, protons, throughout mission

neutrons, x-rays Shleldlng/countermen- countermeasures needed during transit. electrons, neutrons, x-rays Effective monisures needed. Shelter and monitoring for Shelter and monitoring for SPE needed toring and shleiding strategies would be

SPE needed. regardless of shortened transit time needed.

SOURCE: See table 3-1 for referenm IFat.
Table 3-4-Medical Consequences From Exposure to Space Flight Factors (Mars Mission)

(Artificial-G transits, l/3-G surface stay scenario)

Artiflcial-G Transit (w/exercise)

(6-12 mo. depending on Propulsion)

Inflight Problems

Long-Duration Surface Stay (Artiificial-G Transit/Return to Earth)

(More than 2 wks at l/3-G) Postflight Problems

Mainly 0-G/Reduced-G Effects

Muscle See column 5, No data Unknown to what degree l/3-G would Induce No data. Theoretically, return to a 1-G environment durChanges table 3-1 muscle mass or strength loss. Unknown how beneficial ing transit should restore any loss In muscle mass or

exercise would be to preserve adequate muscle mass strength Induced by reduced gravity of l/3-G.

and strength In l/3-G.

Cardiovascular See column 5, No data. Unknown to what degree 1/3-G could Induce

Deconditioning

No data Theoretically, return to a 1-G environment durtable 3-1 cardiovascular deconditioning. Unknown how beneficial ing transit should restore to normal the cardiovascular

exercise would be to preserve desired cardiovascular deconditioning Induced by reduced gravity of 1/3-G.

function.

Bone Loss, See column 5, No data. Unknown to what degree l/3-G would Influence No data. Theoretically, return to a 1-G environment durHypercalciuria table 3-1 bone Integrity Unknown how beneficial exercise/phar- ing transit should start the restoration process of any

macological measures would be In preserving skeletal bone mineral loss Induced by reduced gravity of l/3-G.

status,

Fluid Shifts, See column 5, No data. Unknown to what degree 1/3-G would Influence No data Theoretically, return to a 1-G environment durDecreased Fluid/ table 3-1 fluid/electrolyte balance. ing transit should restore any fluid/electrolyte loss inElectrolyte Levels duced by reduced gravity of 1/3G.

Decreased Red See column 5, No data. Unknown If l/3-G would Induce a level of RBC No data Theoretically, return to a 1-G environment durBlood Cell Mass table 3-1 mass loss. ing transit should restore any RSC mass loss Induced by

reduced gravity of 1/3-G.

Neurological See column 5, No data. Unknown to what degree transition from rotat- No data, Unknown to what degree transition from rotatEffects table 3-1 ing to non-rotating environment would influence locomo- ing to non-rotating environment would Influence locomotion, equilibrium, and coordination initially upon reaching tion, equilibrium, and coordination upon reaching Earth”s

the Martian surface. gravity initially.

Combined 0-G/Reduced, Confinement Effects

Immune Changes See column 5, No data. Unknown whether Iong-duratlon 1/3-G would

table 3-1

No data.

significantly Influence the Immune system after a 6-12

month flight In a closed environment,

Isolation, Confinement,

Remoteness Effects

Psychological/ No data. Unknown to what degree long-term remoteness No data. Unknown to what degree long-term remoteness No data

Sociolological from Earth combined with a dangerous environment and from Earth combined with a hostile/dangerous environincreasing communication lag-time would Influence ment, post-rotation neurological adjustments. communipsychological/sociological behavior. cation Iag-time would influence psychological/sociological behavior.

Space Envionment

Radiation No data on long-term effects of free space radiation on No data on long-term physiological effects of Mars radi- No data. Increased potential for cancer induction, genetExposure humans. Galactic cosmic radiation and possibility of ation environment. Galactic cosmic radiatlion and possi- ic mutations, and cataract formation later In Iife, dependsolar particle events may expose crew to high energy bility of periodic solar particles events may expose crews ing on dose and type of radiation encountered throughheavy Ion particles, protons, electrons, neutrons, x-rays. to high energy heavy ion particles, protons, electrons, out mission.

Shielding/countermeasures needed. Monitoring and neutrons, x-rays. Effective SPE monitoring and shielding

shelter for SPE required. strategies would be needed.

SOURCE: See table 3-1 for reference Ilst.
UTable 3-5– Medical Consequences From Exposure to Space Flight Factors (Mars Mission)

(O-G and artificial-G abort scenarios)

Attn.-cl Abort o-G Abort (Advanved-Propulsion, (l-2 yrs, depend

(Conventional Propulsion, 2-yrs ) (Return to Earth) Approx. 1 yr.) (Return to Earth)

Inflight Problems

on propulsion) (Return to Earth)

Postflight Problems lnflight Problems Postflight Problems Inflight Problems Postflight Problems ~

Mainly O-G/Reduced-G

Effects

Muscle No data. No data. Sea column 3,

Changes

See column 4. See column 5, See column 6,

table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1

Cardiovascular No data. No data.

Deconditioning

See column 3, See column 4, See column 5, See column 6,

table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1

Bone Loss, No data. No data. See column 3, See column 4, See column 5, See column 6,

Hypercalciuria table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1

Fluid Shifts, No data No data, See column 3, See column 4, See column 5, See column 6,

Decreased Fluid/ table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1

Electrolyte Levels

Decreased Red No data No data See column 3, See column 4, See column 5, See column 6,

Blood Cell Mass table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1

Neurological No data No data.

Effects

See column 3, See column 4, See column 5, See column 6,

table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1

Combined O-G/Reduced,

Confinement Effects?

Immune Changes No data No data. See column 3, See column 4, See column 5, Sea column 6,

table 3–1 table 3-1 table 3-1 table 3-1

Isolation, Confinement

Remoteness Effects

Psychological No data on psychological and No data No data on psychological and No data. No data on psychological and No data. Some stress may ocSociological sociological aspects of a long- sociolcgical aspects of a longduration abort of a space

sociological aspects of a longduration aborted space

cur In transitioning from a rotatduratlion aborted space ing to a non-rotating environmission. mission. mission ment (vestibular and biomechanical readjustments).

Space Envionment

Radiation No data on long-term (2-yr)

Exposure effects of free space radiation

on humans. Galacti cosmic

radiation and possibility of

solar particle events may expose crews to harmful radiation

which may exceed recommended Iimits. Shielding,

countermeasures, SPE shelter

and monitoring needed.

No data. Increased potential No data on long-term effects

for cancer induction, genetic of free space radiation on

mutations, and cataract forma- humans Galactic Cosmic radition later In life depending on ation and pessibility of solar

dose and type of radiation particle events may expose

encountered throughout abort crews to harmful radiation.

mission. Shielding, countermeasures,

SPE shelter and monitoring

needed.

No data Increased potential No data on long-term (2-yr) ef- No data increased potential

for cancer Induction, genetic facts of tree space radiation on for cancer induction, genetic

mutations, and cataract forma- humans, Galactic cosmic radi- mutations, and cataract formation later In Iife depending on ation and possibility of solar tion later in life depending on

dose and type of radiation en- particle events may expose dose and type of radiation

countered throughout abort crews to harmful radiation encountered throughout abort

mission. which may exceed recom- mission.

mended Iimits (especially In

the 2-yr scenario). Shielding,

countermeasures, SPE shelter

and monitoring needed.

SOURCE: See table 3-1 for reference list
Chapter 4

Scientific Exploration and Utilization of the Moon

UNDERSTANDING THE MOON

Except for the Sun, the Moon is humanity’s

most familiar celestial object. Following a complicated apparent path through the night sky,

waxing and waning on a 29-day cycle, urging

Earth’s tidal ebb and flow, the Moon has been the

subject of sacred and poetic wonder and scientific examination for millennia. Ancient astronomers tried but despaired of satisfactorily characterizing its complex motions analytically. Galileo

contributed to the scientific revolution of the early 17th century by noting from telescopic observations that the Moon had mountains and craters.

Because these forms threw shadows as the relative position of the Sun changed, Galileo deduced

that the Moon was composed of Earthlike materials1 — in other words, it could and should be

studied like the Earth.2 Galileo also noted later

that although the Moon constantly keeps the

same face toward Earth, it also appears to wobble

slightly from moonrise to moonset, enabling

Earth observers to see somewhat more than 50

percent of the surface.

Through the 18th and 19th century, astronomers examined the Moon with ever greater resolving power as telescopes grew in capability.

Early observers took Galileo’s suggestion that the

Moon was analogous to Earth to the point that

they thought it might be habitable and concluded

that the Moon might have an atmosphere, great

seas, and riverbeds. They named the broad dark

places on the lunar surface “Maria,” thinking

they contained water.

By the 20th century, astronomers understood

that Earth’s companion had little or no atmosphere and was incapable of sustaining life without major support systems. Beyond generating

maps of the visible surface, their primary activity

was to catalogue and closely examine lunar craters. Some scientists felt that the many lunar craters resulted from volcanic activity. Others, who

argued that the craters came from outside bombardment, saw the heavily cratered Moon as possessing along-term record of asteroidal and cometary bombardment of the Earth-Moon system.

Most astronomers ignored the Moon until the

prospect of reaching it with spacecraft became a

reality in the 1960s. Not only could astronomers

and geologists then view it close up from lunar

orbit, including the mysterious farside, but they

could look forward to the return of samples for

detailed laboratory study on Earth. The geological structure, formation, and evolution of the

Moon soon became of great interest, in part because scientists began to recognize that asteroidal or cometary impacts played a significant role

in Earth’s geological history.4

Between 1%1 and 1%8, the United States sent

28 automated spacecraft to study the Moon, and

to select landing sites for automated and piloted

landers. Thirteen of these proved unsuccessful.

The Soviet Union launched 23 lunar spacecraft

between 1959 and 1975 (table 4-l). A Soviet

spacecraft, Luna 2, became the first to reach the

lunar surface on September 12, 1959. Luna 3

made the first photograph of the farside of the

Moon. Although the photograph was extremely

crude and indistinct, it and the other Soviet firsts

IGalileo, “me Staq Messenger,” in Stillman Drake, Jr., Discoveries and Opinions of Ga2ifeo (New York NY: Mchor ~ks, 1957).

z~y A. Williamson and philip Chandler, III, “’l%e Promise of Space and the Difference It Makes: The Search for Golden Age,” CU~mra~

Futures Research, vol. II, No. 2, 1983.

%e world’s space programs have made possible, among others, the development of the scientific specialty of planetary geology.

%is interest accompanied a fundamental change in the scientific understanding of Earth’s geological processes with the development of

plate tectonic theory.

-49-
50) ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

Table 4-1 -Successful Soviet Lunar Missions

Spacecraft Encounter Date Mission Event

Luna 2 Sept. 12, 1959 Moon strike Struck Moon at 1 W, 30N.

Luna 3 Oct. 10, 1959 Moon flyby Photos of farside after flyby at 6,200 km.

Zond 3 July 20, 1965 Moon Passed Moon at 9,200 km. System test; taking

pictures, then flew as far as orbital path of Mars.

Luna 9 Feb. 3, 1966 Moon Soft landed on Moon at 7.1 N, 64.3 W;

returned pictures.

Luna 10 Apr. 3, 1966 Moon orbiter First object to orbit Moon; studied lunar

magnetism and radiation.

Luna 12 Oct. 25, 1966 Moon orbiter Transmitted 15 m resolution pictures of portions

of the Moon.

Luna 13 Dec. 24, 1966 Moon Soft landed on Moon at 18.9 N, 62 W; returned

pictures.

Luna 14 Apr. 10, 1968 Moon orbiter Studied lunar gravitational field.

Zond 5 Sept. 18, 1968 Moon Circumlunar, recovered, landed Indian Ocean.

Man precursor.

Zond 6 Nov. 13, 1968 Moon Circumlunar, 2,420 km from Moon, Man precursor.

Zond 7 Aug. 11, 1969 Moon Circumlunar, 2,200 km from Moon, Aug. 11.

Man precursor.

Luna 16 Sept. 20, 1970 Moon Automated return of soil sample to Earth.

Zond 8 Oct. 24, 1970 Moon Circumlunar, passed 1,120 km of Moon. Man

precursor.

Luna 17 Nov. 17, 1970 Moon lander Landed Lunokhod roving surface vehicle 756 kg,

after orbiting Moon.

Luna 19 Oct. 1, 1971 Moon Orbiter Only. Returned pictures.

Luna 20 Feb. 18, 1972 Moon Orbited Moon, then soft landed. Sample

returner.

Luna 21 Jan. 16, 1973 Moon Orbited Moon, landed Lunokhod 2 roving

Iaboratory (840 kg) at 26.5 N, 30.6 E.

Luna 23 Nov. 2, 1974 Moon Orbited Moon, landed at 13.5 N, 56.5 E to drill

for soil sample. Sample return failed to launch

because drill damaged.

Luna 24 Aug. 19, 1976 Moon Orbited Moon, landed at 21.7 N, 62.2 E to drill

sample. Sample return.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Adminlstratlon

made an important political point and spurred

U.S. efforts to best Soviet accomplishments. The

first U.S. spacecraft to come near the Moon was

Pioneer 4, which passed within 37,300 miles in

March 1959, but the United States proved unable

to reach the Moon with a functioning spacecraft

before Ranger 75 returned more than 4,000 photographs of the lunar surface before crash landing

in the Ocean of Storms on July 28, 1964.

THE APOLLO PROGRAM

The U.S. lunar research effort carried out as

part of the Apollo program has provided lunar

scientists with a rich source of data about the

Moon and its physical processes that enhance our

scientific knowledge of the origins and evolution

of the solar system (box 4-A). These data have

vastly improved our scientific understanding of

sRanger I through Ranger 6 failed for a variety of reasons. See R. Cargill Hall, Lunar Zmpact: A History Of Project Ranger (Washington, Dc:

U.S. Government Printing OffIce, 1977), for a detailed histoxy of these spacecraft and their builders.
Chapter 4–Scientific Exploration and Utilization of the Moon ● 51

the Moon and its evolution. The United States

had planned from the first years of National

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

the Ranger series of automated lunar probes to

photograph the Moon’s surface up close and the

Surveyor series to make soft landings, photograph their surroundings and return data on the

surface properties. When President John F. Kennedy announced the Apollo program in May

Robotic Spacecraft

. Ranger – The Ranger series6was designed

to photograph selected areas of the Moon at

many different resolutions as the spacecraft

sped toward a crash landing on the lunar

surface. After a long string of launch and

other failures, Rangers 7,8, and 9 took thousands of images of the Ocean of Storms, the

1%1, NASA restructured these science programs Sea of Tranquility, and the Crater Alphonto support the effort to place humans on the sus (table 4-2).

Moon. Robotic spacecraft prepared the way for

the first footprints on the Moon.

Box 4-A-Science Accomplishments of the Apollo Program

. Carried out in situ geological and geophysical exploration at six landing sites.

● Returned 385 kilograms of rock and soil samples from six landing sites.

. Emplaced six geophysical instrument stations that carried out measurements of seismicity, heat flow,

crustal properties, local fields and particles, and other phenomena.

. Carried out orbital remote sensing experiments, collecting data on crustal composition, magnetic

fields, gas emission, topography, subsurface structure, and other properties.

. Obtained extensive photographic coverage of the Moon with metric, panoramic, multispectral, and

hand-held cameras during six landing and three nonlanding missions.

. Carried out extensive visual observations from lunar orbit.

. Visited and retrieved parts from Surveyor III, permitting evaluation of the effects of 31 months’ exposure to lunar surface conditions.

. Carried out extensive orbital photography of the Earth with hand-held and hard-mounted multispectral cameras, providing verification of LandSat multispectral concept.

. Emplaced laser retroreflectors at several points on the lunar surface, permitting precision measurement of lunar motions with an accuracy of several centimeters.

. Emplaced first telescope on the Moon, obtaining ultraviolet photographs of the Earth and various

celestial objects.

. Obtained samples of the Sun by collecting solar wind-implanted ions with surface-emplaced aluminum foil.

. Carried out astronomical photography from lunar orbit.

. Carried out cosmic ray and space physics experiments on lunar surface, in lunar orbit, and in EarthMoon space.

SOURCE: Paul D. Lowman, Jr., NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, 1991.

IIncludes on~ Apollo missions; Gemini, Skylab, and Apollo-Soyuz mission results not included.

6~m&r 3 ~hrough Rn&r9. NSA designed Ran~~ 1 andl to go well beyond lunar orbit to aCCUI’nUhMc2 WiriOUs data about the Wce en~ronment between the Earth and the Sun.
52 Ž Exploring the Moon and Mars

Table 4-2-Summary of Ranger Missions

Spacecraft Launch date Comments

Ranger I

Ranger II

Ranger Ill

Ranger IV

Ranger V

Ranger VI

Ranger Vll

Ranger Vlll

Ranger IX

Aug. 23, 1961

Nov. 18, 1981

Jan. 26, 1982

Apr. 23, 1962

Oct. 18, 1982

Jan. 30, 1964

July 28, 1984

Feb. 17, 1983

Mar. 21, 1983

Intended to fly out beyond Moon’s orbit for particle and field studies

(to 804,500 kilometers). Launch vehicle malfunction placed it in low-Earth

orbit (180 kilometers), but spacecraft functioned properly.

Identical to Ranger I, with same results.

Designed to return pictures of the Moon. Missed Moon and went into

heliocentric orbit.

Mission same as Ranger Ill. Struck back side of Moon; returned no data.

Mission same as Ranger II and IV. Missed Moon and entered heliocentric

orbit.

Mission to return closeup photos of Moon before crashing into surface. No

pictures returned.

Mission to return closeup pictures of lunar surface; 4,304 pictures of lunar

surface; 4,304 pictures returned of Sea Clouds. First successful Ranger.

Returned 7,137 pictures of Seas of Tranquility and high land area west of

the sea.

Returned 5,814 pictures of Crater Alphonsus and vicinity.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

●

●

Surveyor — The Surveyor program was designed to test the technology for soft lunar

landings, survey potential future landing

sites, and return scientific data about surface properties of the Moon. Five out of

seven Surveyor spacecraft successfully

reached the lunar surface, photographed

their surroundings, and, using a teleoperated scoop to acquire surface samples, carried out measurements on chemical composition and mechanical properties of the

lunar soil (table 4-3). Among other things,

the Surveyor spacecraft tested the bearing

strength of the soi17 and demonstrated that

it would support a crew-carrying lander.

Lunar Orbiter — Five Lunar Orbiters provided nearly 100-percent” photographic coverage of the Moon at surface resolutions of 1

to 500 meters (table 4-4). Photographic data

from the Lunar Orbiters ruled out several

sites thought possible for an Apollo landing,

as they revealed far too many craters. Precise tracking of the orbiters also yielded

measurements of the nearside lunar gravity

field, demonstrating the existence of dense

concentrations of mass below the lunar surface. These “mascons,” as they were

dubbed, later had to be taken into account

in calculating the orbit of the Apollo lunar

landers.

Astronauts on the Moon

Apollo astronauts, supported by extensive geological training8 and a team of professional geologists in Mission Control, conducted field studies

on the Moon, bringing back samples of particular

interest for study in laboratories on Earth. The six

lunar missions returned a total of 385 kilograms

of lunar material.

Astronauts collected surface rocks, but also

brought back cores of subsurface lunar material,

made by pushing a coring tube into the surface

and mechanically drilling to depths of 3 meters at

three different places. Analysis of the lunar samples, which are basically similar to rocks on

Earth, has shown that some rocks are as old as 4.6

Y&tronomer ~omas Gold had ~stulated that the Moon’s constant bombardment by micrometeoroids might have created a thick lunar

dust that would make travel by humans or rovers extremely difficult or even impossible. Although the lunar surface contains a significant dust

layer, it is compact enough to pose no major hindrance to navigation.

a~tronaut Harrison Schmidt, who roamed the Moon on the Apollo 17 mission, holds a Ph.D. in geology. Other astronauts received field

training prior to flight.
Chapter 4–Scientific Exploration and Utilization of the Moon ● 53

Table 4-3-Summary of Surveyor Missions

Spacecraft Launch date Comments

Surveyor I May 30, 1966 Successful soft lunar landing in Ocean of Storms. Primarily on engineering

test. Returned 11,237 pictures.

Surveyor II Sept. 20, 1966 During midcourse maneuver, one of three engines malfunctioned, causing

spacecraft tumbling. Communications lost 5-1/2 hours prior to impact on

Moon southeast of Crater Copernicus.

Surveyor Ill Apr. 17, 1967 Successful soft lunar landing in Sea of Clouds. Returned 6,315 pictures. First

soil scoop.

Surveyor IV July 14, 1967 All communications with spacecraft lost 2.5 minutes prior to lunar impact.

Surveyor V Sept. 8, 1967 Successful soft lunar landing in Sea of Tranquility. Returned over 19,000

pictures. Alpha scattering experiment provided data on composition of lunar

soil.

Surveyor VI Nov. 7, 1967 Successful soft lunar landing in Central Bay region (Sinue Medii). Returned

30,065 pictures. First lift-off from lunar surface moved 2.5 meters to new

location for continuing experiments.

Surveyor Vll Jan. 7, 1968 Successful soft lunar landing on ejecta blanket adjacent to Crater Tycho.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Table 44-Summary of Lunar Orbiter Missions

Spacecraft Launch date Comments

Lunar Orbiter I Aug. 10, 1966 Returned 207 frames of medium and high resolution of pictures. Commanded

to impact Moon on Oct. 29, 1966.

Lunar Orbiter II Nov. 6, 1966 Returned 211 frames, Commanded to impact Moon on Oct. 11, 1967.

Lunar Orbiter Ill Feb. 5, 1967 Returned 211 frames; photographed Surveyor 1. Commanded to impact

Moon on Oct. 9, 1967.

Lunar Orbiter IV May 4, 1967 Returned 163 frames. Commanded to impact Moon on Oct. 6, 1967.

Lunar Orbiter V AUg. 1, 1967 Returned 212 frames. Commanded to impact Moon on Jan. 31, 1968.

SOURCE. National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

billion years, or as old as Earth, but most formed

from 4 to 3 billion years ago. Lunar rock samples

contain ample oxygen bound in the silicate minerals that form them, but no hydrogen, except for

solar-implanted atoms in the regolith. This

means that the Moon likely contains very little

water. 9 The lunar samples also contain relatively

few mineral species compared to rocks on Earth.

The astronauts’ samples show that the predominant rock in the dark lunar maria is similar to

basalt. Missions to the lighter-colored lunar highlands reveal that they contain an exceptionally

high abundance (compared to Earth) of a calcium-rich rock called anorthosite, suggesting that

the bulk composition of the upper lunar crust is

quite unusual by terrestrial standards. The entire

surface of the Moon is covered by a fine-grained,

fragmented material called regolith, made from

repeated meteoroid impacts, which have pulverized and mixed the upper surface. To date, the

available data do not allow scientists to confirm

or deny whether the Moon was formed at the

same time as Earth but separately, or the Earth

and Moon were once part of the same planetary

body. l0 Study of existing lunar samples continues. As scientists examine the samples with ever

more powerful techniques, the samples reveal additional details of the Moon’s history.11

%e extreme shortage of water on the Moon could have important consequences for human crews, which would have to bring their own

water, transport enough hydrogen to make water from oxygen extracted from lunar reeks and Earth hydrogen, or extract hydrogen from the

regolith.

lo~though the question of the origin of the Moon has not been definitively resolved, most lunar scientists favor the theow that the M~n

was created when the Earth suffered an impact with a “planetesimal” body roughly the size of Mars, after separation of Earth’s core and mantle.

llstua~ Ross ~ylor, ~nW Science.- A Rmt-Apo[[o View (New York, NY: Pergamon press, Inc., 1975).
54 ● Exploring the Moon and Mats

. Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Apollo 16 on Moon. Apollo astronaut John W. Young works at Lunar Roving Vehicle on left. Lunar Module at right. APOIIO 16 was

the fifth NASA voyage to carry people to the Moon.

In addition to doing field geology, and return- distance between the Earth and the surface of the

ing lunar samples, each Apollo crew left an ex- Moon. Among other things, lunar laser-ranging

periment package on the Moon12 that returned provided data on the orbital dynamics of the

data to Earth on lunar seismic activity, the solar Moon, and demonstrated that the distance bewind, the Moon’s magnetic field, the lunar atmo- tween the Moon and Earth is slowly increasing.

sphere, and heat flow from the interior. Data

from these instruments allowed scientists to detect thousands of moonquakes, measure heat

flow, and to estimate the thickness of the lunar

crust, but not to confirm the presence or absence

of a metallic core.

The crews of Apollo 11, 14, and 15 left laserranging reflectors on the Moon that allowed scientists on the Earth to measure precisely the

Apollo astronauts also took thousands of photographs of the lunar surface from orbit with a

variety of cameras. These high-quality photographs constitute some of the highest resolution

images of the lunar surface. However, they did

not provide complete coverage of the Moon, as

they were taken from equatorial orbit. Only about

20 percent of the Moon was under the ground

track of Apollo missions. None reached above 30

 Experiment Package 
Chapter 4–Scientific Exploration and Utilization of the Moon ● 55

degrees N (north) latitude. In addition, because

Apollo crews focused their efforts on the illuminated portions of the Moon, most of which faced

the Earth at the time, they made relatively few

observations of the farside. The astronauts also

initiated global geochemical/geophysical mapping from orbit, using instruments capable of

remotely sensing a small number of elemental

constituents and determining the Moon’s magnetic properties.

The Apollo program provided one important

but largely unanticipated benefit to the world–

the views of Earth from lunar orbit—which

showed it for the first time as a single system.

Those photographs also emphasized how vulnerable our planet looks from the outside, and are

often used today to convey a sense of Spaceship

Earth and global unity.

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Apollo 16 view of a near full Moon on the far side,

photographed by the Fairchild Metric Camera from the

Apollo 16 Service Module, Feb. 28, 1972.

THE SOVIET LUNAR PROGRAM

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union had a

strong robotic program aimed at achieving several spaceflight firsts and in gathering scientific

data. In addition to launching the first spacecraft

to reach the Moon and to photograph the farside

of the Moon, the Soviet Union made the first soft

landing on the Moon and launched the first lunar

orbiter. In 1970, more than a year after the United

States landed men on the Moon, the Soviet spacecraft, Luna 16, returned soil samples to Earth.

Later that year, Soviet engineers successfully

landed the Lunokhod rover on the Moon, which

became the first rover on a planetary body to be

operated from Earth.

The Soviet Union also expended major efforts

to land cosmonauts on the Moon, but failed in

building the necessary heavy-lift launcher to accomplish the task. Its last mission to the Moon

was August 1976, when Luna 24 landed, drilled a

sample of the lunar surface, and returned to

Earth with the sample. Although a number of

Soviet scientists would like to continue the scientific study of the Moon, study of Venus and Mars

have received greater priority in recent years.

SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVES

Despite the substantial gains made in lunar

science during the Apollo program, scientists still

have a relatively rudimentary understanding of

the Moon, its origins and evolution. Only about

40 percent of the Moon has been imaged at sufficient resolution for scientific study.13

The Moon is worth studying for its own sake.

But because a substantial portion of Earth’s history is closely tied to the history of the Moon, and

because Earth and Moon share the same solar

system neighborhood, detailed study of the Moon

would also assist in understanding the geologicall14 and climatological history of Earth. The

Lunar Exploration Science Working Group

 completes its mission in the Mars will be more completely mapped than the 

 “comparative and the Origin of Continental Drift,” Research, pp.

171-195.

292-888 - 91 - 3 : 3
56 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

(LExSWG) 15 has developed a broad science

strategy for the Moon.

16 The following briefly

summarizes these scientific themes:

●

●

Formation of the Earth-Moon system — Determining the chemical composition of the

Moon in comparison to the composition of

Earth’s mantle would help solve the question of whether the Moon formed from the

impact of a giant body with Earth or directly

from accretion out of the primordial material. That in turn will affect scientists’ understanding of Earth’s early history.

Thermal and magmatic evolution of the

Moon — The Moon evolved quickly after

formation. The Apollo data revealed that

the Moon melted early in its history. When it

cooled, it formed a low-density crust atop a

denser mantle. Some scientists believe that

a small metallic core may be present. Because the Moon’s volcanic, tectonic, and

other geological activity was not vigorous

enough to erase the evidence of the Moon’s

early formation, the lunar crust is likely to

provide important clues to the early evolution of Earth, and also Mars and Venus.

These planets have experienced enough

weathering and geologic activity to erase

many obvious signs of their early evolution.

A survey from orbit using high-resolution

spectroscopic sensors will provide estimates of the composition of the lunar crust

and its spatial diversity, but understanding

its origins will require obtaining samples

from the Moon’s ancient highlands. Returning samples from the youngest lava flows, as

determined by the count of lunar craters in

these flows, would provide information

about their ages. Seismometers, heat flow

probes, and magnetometers on the surface

would help determine the Moon’s internal

structure and thermal properties.

●

●

●

Bombardment history of the Earth-Moon system — Mars, Venus, the Earth, and the

Moon all display evidence of bombardment

by large and small external objects (meteoroids, comets, and asteroids). Once volcanism ceased on the Moon, bombardment

became the primary agent of surface

change. Hence, the Moon contains a nearly

complete record of its impact bombardment history, from the micrometeoroids

that continually pound the surface, to the

asteroids that formed the largest craters.

Overlapping by the ejected material from

successive volcanoes may also have preserved an undisturbed record of the early

micrometeoroid influx. In addition to providing insights concerning the numerical

density and range of sizes of bombarding

objects, the lunar surface contains a statistical record of the like bombardment of

Earth.17 Hence such studies might assist in

understanding the periodic extinctions of

some species of life on Earth, which some

scientists believe result from cometary or

asteroidal impacts.

18 Observations from orbit and rock samples from many relatively

young craters would provide the necessary

data.

Nature of impact processes — Despite considerable progress in studying how and why

craters and their deposits form, scientists

lack a complete understanding of the dynamics of cratering. High-resolution reconnaissance data from orbit would allow lunar

scientists to formulate working hypotheses

about the geological evolution of a region,

which could be used to guide future sampling studies.

Regolith formation and evolution of the

Sun — Regolith, the blanket of broken rock

and soil that covers the Moon, results from

the impact of external objects with the lunar

surface. The impacts both dig up the origi15~wG is composed of scientists from NASA, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the universities.

lbLunar ~loration Science Working Group, A Planetaiy Science Strategy for fhe Moon, draft, Sept. 28, 1990.

17Richard A.F. Grieve, “Impact Cratering on the Earth,” Scientific American, April 1990, Pp. 66-73.

18walter ~verez and Frank &ro, ~(~at caused Maw ~inction?” fj’cienfific~rican, october 19!)0, pp. 78-84.
Chapter 4–Scientific Exploration and Utilization of the Moon • 57

nal surface and redistribute previously

created regolithic material. Charged particles from the solar wind and galactic cosmic rays continuously strike the regolith,

embedding themselves in it. Thus, the regoIith carries a historical record of the Sun

and cosmic radiation. Regolith would also

provide the material for building a lunar

base. Detailed study of the regolith from

many different locations at different depths

would therefore provide scientists with data

about the history of the Sun and add to their

understanding of the regolith’s potential for

use as a construction material. All of the

lunar samples returned by the Apollo flights

are from the regolith. Although these samples have contributed immeasurably to our

knowledge of the lunar surface, they provide

only a glimpse of the history of the Sun and

of the complicated processes that produce

the regolith.

More complete understanding will depend on gathering large-scale chemical

composition data from a lunar orbiter and

detailed chemical and physical study of

samples from a variety of sites at several

depths. Because the uppermost layers of the

regolith react strongly with foreign material

e.g., gases, properties of these layers change

as soon as they are placed in a spacecraft,

which carries with it a variety of gases or

gas-producing materials. To study the processes that produce these reactive grains,

scientists will likely have to study them in

situ at a lunar outpost, where contact with

nonlunar gases and other materials can be

closely controlled.

Nature of the lunar atmosphere — contrary

to popular belief, which holds that the

Moon has no atmosphere at all, the Moon

possesses an extremely rarefied atmosphere. Its density, composition, and possible origin are poorly known. The lunar atmosphere is extremely fragile and could be

destroyed by significant robotic or human

activity. l9 Hence, if this atmosphere is to be

studied at all, it will be important to characterize it very early in a program to return to

the Moon.

FUTURE ROBOTICS MISSIONS

The Galileo Spacecraft

On its way to make extensive observations of

Jupiter, the Galileo spacecraft has recently provided stunning observations of parts of the farside of the Moon. Galileo was launched toward

Jupiter on October 18, 1989, from the shuttle

Columbia. Because the upper-stage engine used

to boost Galileo from low-Earth orbit to Jupiter is

not powerful enough to take a more direct route,

mission scientists have routed Galileo past Venus

and the Moon and Earth20 to benefit from a

so-called gravity assist. 21 Galileo passed the

Moon on December 8, 1990, allowing mission

engineers to check out its sensors and other systems and to provide new data about portions of

the lunar surface never examined with multispectral data (box 4-B). Galileo’s sensors, which include ultraviolet, visual, and infrared sensors, examined the Orientale Basin, only a portion of

which can be seen from Earth, and confirmed the

existence of a large farside basin, called the

South-Pole Aitken Basin, which could only be

inferred from previous data.

Lunar Observer

The first detailed plans for a polar-orbiting

spacecraft to survey and analyze the chemical

and physical properties of the Moon were developed at the Goddard Space Flight Center22 and

19 Richard R. Vondrak, “creation of an Atificial Lunar Atmosphere,” Nature, vol. 248, No. 5450, Apr. 19, 1974, pp. 657,659.

zf)Galileo ~11 paw near Earth again on Dec. 8, 1992.

Zlcharlene M. ~demon, ttGa]i]eo Encountem fiflh and Venus,” The P/anetaV Repofi, vol. 11, March/April 1991, pp. 12-15.

z~~dard Space F1ight Center, ~nu Po[ar Ohlter Interim Technical RePo~, GSFC Report No. X-703-75-141, May 1973.
58 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory23 in the 1970s. A tus in the reports of the Space Science Board’s

Lunar observer spacecraft received further impe- Committee on Planetary and Lunar ExploraBox 4-B—Return to the Moon With Robotic Advanced Sensors: Lessons From Galileo

In December of 1990, the Galileo spacecraft completed its first flyby of the Earth-Moon system to

acquire part of the necessary energy boost for its journey to Jupiter. Although Galileo instruments are

optimized for the environment of the outer solar system, and lunar science was not included in original

mission objectives, it was recognized that the fly-by geometry would allow several sensors to provide new

and unique lunar data. In particular, digital multispectral images could be obtained for the first time for

portions of the unexplored lunar farside and the western limb. The scientific focus was expected to center

on the multi-ring Orientale Basin, the youngest and exceptionally well-exposed 900-km impact basin on

the western limb.

Galileo carries a Solid State Imaging (SSI) camera that uses a CCD (charge coupled device) array

detector with seven filters covering the extended visible spectral range (0.4 to 1.0 microns). Even though

the fly-by period was brief and relatively small amounts of lunar data were obtained, the Galileo encounter with the Moon had two distinct advantages that allowed this small amount of new data to provide

important discoveries. First, from the Apollo and Luna missions we have samples of lunar rocks and soil to

analyze in our laboratories. From this “ground truth,” we know the composition of several sites on the

lunar near side and have identified diagnostic properties of materials that space-borne instruments can

detect to provide compositional information for unexplored areas. Second, the geometry of the encounter

allowed multispectral images to be obtained for the western nearside, the western limb, and half of the

farside. This sequence provided nearside calibration with a direct link to “ground truth” compositional

information, which in turn provided a solid interpretative foundation for farside data.

Several surprises were apparent even in preliminary analyses of the Galileo SSI images. The synoptic

image of the western limb shown in the opposite photo illustrates one of the most obvious. The Orientale

Basin is near the center of the image, the nearside is on the right, the farside on the left. Even the raw data

provide evidence for the remarkable basin of the southern farside that is estimated to be twice the size of

the Orientale Basin. Two sets of concentric basin rings can be seen on the western edge of the image. The

interior of the basin extends to the south pole and is dark, which subsequent photometric analyses show to

be due to an inherently low albedo of basin materials. The existence of this huge basin, called the “SouthPole Aitken Basin,” was suspected from fragments of earlier information obtained largely during Apollo.

The SSI images provide significant new evidence for what is now the largest documented basin on the

Moon. Furthermore, compositional analysis of the SSI multispectral data indicates a distinct mineralogical anomaly (enrichment of minerals) associated with the entire South-Pole Aitken basin of the farside.

As the scientific content of these data is analyzed in more detail, some of the obvious lessons of the

Galileo encounter are that the lunar crust is quite heterogeneous at all scales and that the lunar samples

provide an immense advantage in using data returned from remote sensors with confidence. A more sublime result is that the post-Apollo Moon still contains many surprises waiting detection and recognition

with more advanced detectors on robotic spacecraft.

SOURCE: Prepared by Carle Pieters, Brown University, 1991. Authors include M. Belton [’Ram Leader], C. Anger, T Becker, L

Bolef, H. Breneman, M. Carr, C. Chapman, W. Cunningham, M. Davies, E. DeJong, F. Fanale, E. Fischer, L. Gaddis, 1?

Gierasch, R. Greeley, R. Greenberg, H. Hoffmann, J. W. Head, I? Helfenstein, A. Ingersoll, R. Jaumann, T V Johnson,

K Klaasen, R. Koloord, A. McEwen, J. Moersch, D. Morrison, S. Murchie, G. Newkum, J. Oberst, B. Paczkowski, C.

Pieters, C. Pilcher, J. Pluchak, J. Pollack, S. Postawko, S. Pratt, M. Robinson, R. Sullivan, J. Sunshine, and J. Veverka.

23 Jet propulsion Laboratory, Mission SUWTW q for Lunar Polar Orbite~ JPL Dec. 660-41, September 1976.

60. Exploring the Moon and Mars

tion24 and the NASA Advisory Council’s Solar

System Exploration Committee.25

The focus of scientific objectives and the capabilities of instrumentation for a polar orbiting

lunar spacecraft have evolved substantially since

the spacecraft was first proposed. Technologies

developed over the last two decades allow far

more sophisticated global, regional, and local

questions to be addressed with advanced sensors.

Some of the greatest technical advancements

have been in detector technology and electronics.

Lunar science provides an excellent application

for these technologies—the lunar environment is

static and the Apollo samples on Earth provide

important “ground truth” information for several

areas studied remotely.

NASA had planned to start design work on the

Lunar Observer spacecraft (box 4-C) in fiscal

year 1991. However, as a result of severe budget

pressures, Congress removed $15 million for advanced studies related to Lunar Observer from

NASA’s planetary exploration budget for fiscal

year 1991. NASA used about $1 million to complete spacecraft studies of the relative benefits

and drawbacks of using various instruments and

configurations for a lunar orbiter.

Other Possible Missions

Various robotics missions to the Moon are now

under consideration. These include a network of

small instruments, similar to the MESUR probes

being studied for Mars, both small and large

Box 4-C—Lunar Observer

Lunar Observer is a proposed spacecraft designed to make detailed compositional and geophysical

observations of the Moon’s surface from a lunar polar orbit. Data from this spacecraft would constitute the

first global assessment of the Moon’s composition and surface properties and form the foundation for

scientific exploration of the Moon. In addition, data from the Lunar Observer could assist in selecting the

best sites for establishing a lunar base or for siting a prototype lunar observatory.

Science Objectives

The following science objectives could be met with the appropriate complement of scientific instruments

●

●

●

●

●

●

aboard an orbiting spacecraft:

estimate the composition and structure of the lunar crust in order to model its origin and evolution;

determine the origin and nature of the lunar magnetic field and estimate the size of the core;

estimate the refractory element content of the Moon by measuring the mean global heat flow;

determine the nature of impact processes over time and how they have modified the structure of

the lunar crust;

determine the nature of the lunar atmosphere and its sources and sinks; and

assess potential lunar resources.

SOURCE: Lunar Exploration Science Working Group, A P/anefary Science Strategy for the Moon, draft, Sept. 28, 1990; G.L Parker

and KT. Neck, “Lunar Observer: Scouting for a Moon Base,” presented at the Space Programs and lkchnology Meeting,

Sept. 25, 1990; AIAA paper 90-3781; Office of Technology Assessment.

zoNational Rewarch Council, Space Science Board Committee on planeta~ and Lunar EXP]OEitiOIl, s~a@Y forfiPloration Offie znnerplan-

.

e?s: 1977-1987 (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1978), pp. 71-74. This study noted the following p~mary scientific objectives

- .

for a lunar polar orbiter: 1) determine global and regional chemistq of the lunar surface; determine global and regional heat flow through the

surface; 3) determine whether the Moon has a metallic core and explore its nature.

MN~A A~soV Council, So]ar Sbtem ~loration Committee, p/aneraV Exploration Through Year 2@~: A core fio~am (Washington*

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983); NASA Advisoty Council, Solar System Exploration Committee, P[aneta~ Exploration Through

Mar 2000: Scientific Rationale (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988).
Chapter 4–Scientific Exploration and Utilization of the Moon ● 61

rovers, and the emplacement of small astronomical telescopes.

WORKING ON THE LUNAR

SURFACE

In his speech of July 20, 1989, President Bush

proposed that the Nation return to the Moon “to

stay.” In other words, the United States should

establish a permanently staffed lunar base. Proponents of a lunar base suggest various uses for it:

●

●

●

Conduct continued scientific exploration of

the Moon – A lunar laboratory would allow

scientists to continue their study of the

Moon.26 Working in the lunar environment

would allow much more flexible study of

lunar geology and the lunar atmosphere. As

noted earlier, scientists on the Moon could

use robotic rovers to conduct field research

while they supervise the rovers’ activities

from a protected, underground laboratory.

Use the Moon as an astronomical platfonn –

The Moon would provide a stable, nearly

atmosphere-free platform for conducting

astronomical research (box 4-D).

Use the Moon to learn about living and working in space – Administration policy calls

for expanding the human presence into

space. As Earth’s nearest neighbor, the

Moon provides a stepping stone to Mars

and the rest of the solar system.

On the Moon, scientists could learn more

about the human reaction to long-term low

gravity (about one-sixth Earth gravity).

They could also learn how to work in an

extremely hostile environment, building

habitats and laboratories, and conducting

scientific research about human reactions

to lunar conditions. They might also investigate the properties of plants and small animals raised on the lunar surface.

Exploit resources found on the lunar surface

— Several individuals have suggested mining the lunar surface for resources to use

either in near-lunar space, or to return to

Earth. For most resources, the costs of mining the Moon and returning them to Earth

would be prohibitive. However, for a resource such as Helium-3,27 which might

eventually find use infusion reactors, if they

ever prove economical,28 lunar mining

might prove worthwhile.29 If substantial infrastructure were to be placed on the Moon

or in near-lunar space, lunar mining would

likely be economically preferable to launching material from Earth’s surface.30 However, for the foreseeable future, lunar mining does not seem to be cost-effective.

z%. Jeffrey ~ylor and paul D. Spudis, Geoscience anda L.unar Bme, NASA Conference Publication 3070 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1990).

z7Helium atoms with one le~ neutron than the vastly more common Helium-4.

Z8U.S. Congrex, office of ~chnology Assessment, Star power: The U.S. and IntemationaI Quest for Fusion EneW, OTA-E-338 Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1987).

flJ.F. Santatius and G.L Kulcinski, “~trofuel: An Ener~Source for the 21st Century,” Wuconsin fiofessionalEn@ eer, September/October

1989, Pp. 14-18.

JOFor enmple, the pr~uction of Owgen on the Moon to breathe and to use for propellant would quickly become cost+ ffective for IOng-te~

human stays on the surface.
62. Exploring the Moon and Mars

Box 4-D-Advantages and Drawbacks of Using the Moon for Astronomy

Advantages

Compared to sites on Earth or in Earth orbit, the Moon possesses several advantages as a base for

pursuing observational astronomical research. The following summarizes the most important ones for

optical and radio astronomy. In order to determine the effectiveness of any particular lunar observatory,

astronomers would have to make a detailed comparison of advantages, drawbacks, and costs of each proposed system compared to Earth- or space-based alternatives.

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

•

●

Ultra-high vacuum. 1 The virtual absence of an atmosphere on the Moon means that the many atmospheric distortions caused by dust, aerosols, refraction, and scintillation that limit the resolving

power of Earth-bound telescopes do not occur. In addition, the near vacuum of the lunar surface

would allow telescopes to observe the entire electromagnetic spectrum unencumbered by the absorbing qualities of Earth’s atmosphere.

Stable solid surface. The rigidity of the lunar surface and its low incidence of seismic activity (10-8

that of Earth) allow relatively simple, low-cost telescope mountings to be used. Those same qualities make possible the construction and operation of interferometers involving many independent

radio and optical telescopes. This is particularly important for optical telescopes, as the stability

requirements vary inversely with the wavelength of light.

Dark sky 1 Even the darkest terrestrial night reveals some air glow, which degrades the most sensitive optical measurements. When the Moon is in the night sky, light scattered by Earth’s atmosphere interferes markedly with optical observations. Because the Moon has no scattering atmosphere, with proper optical shielding, it should be possible to observe even when Earth and/or the

Sun are above the horizon. In contrast, terrestrial telescopes, and those in low-Earth orbits (e.g.,

the Hubble Space Telescope), collect data only about one-fourth of the time.

Cold sky. 1 Not only does Earth’s atmosphere scatter visual light, causing, for example, the sensation of blue sky, it also scatters infrared radiation, including the very long wavelength radiation

known as the thermal infrared. This region of the electromagnetic spectrum has become extremely important in recent years, especially for detecting hot regions of star formation, and for very cold

stars that are reaching the end of their evolutional path.

Absence of wind.l Protective structures surrounding earthly telescopes must be rigid enough to

stand high winds. The absence of wind on the Moon means that structures need carry only static

and thermal loads, which would make them much lighter and easier to construct. The lunar equivalent of telescope domes might simply be lightweight, movable foil shades to protect from dust,

and from Sun and Earth light.

Low gravity. Because the Moon only has one-sixth of Earth’s gravity, lunar structures can be much

less massive to carry the weight than Earth-bound structures. The presence of some gravity means

that debris and dust fall quickly to the surface rather than tagging along, as they would do in space.

Rotation. The lunar “day,” its period of full rotation, lasts approximately 30 Earth days. Such a slow

rotation rate allows observers to keep telescopes pointed in the same direction for long periods

and permits the long integration rates required for extremely faint sky objects.

Distance from Earth. The 400,000-kilometer distance between the Earth and the Moon weakens

the electromagnetic noise generated on Earth by a factor of 100 compared to a radio observatory in

geosynchronous orbit. Radio observations on the Moon will be very little affected by radio emission from Earth.

Lunar farside. Despite the distance from Earth, reception in some radio frequencies would nevertheless be affected by noise generated by activities on Earth. The farside of the Moon is permannently oriented away from Earth. Siting a radio telescope on the lunar farside would permit the

reception and discrimination of very faint radio signals in some critical radio bands.

l~lescoFs in geostationaw orbit also share in these advantages.

Continued on rtexf Paae
Chapter 4–Scientific Exploration and Utilization of the Moon ● 63

Box 4-D–Advantages and Drawbacks of Using the Moon For Astnonomy-Continued

Useful landforrns. The surface of the Moon has numerous symrnetrical craters that would be suitable

for use as astronomical telescopes, similar to the world’s largest radio telescope-the 300-meter

dish at Arecibo, Puerto Rico.

Relative absence of competitive uses of the surface. For a long time, the surface of the Moon is likely to

have few competing uses.

Drawbacks

Siting radio and optical telescopes on the lunar surface also possesses major disadvantages compared

to space-based or Earth-based systems. Many of these disadvantages would fade away if a permanent lunar

colony of sufficient size to support astronomy were established for other reasons, e.g., to study the longterm effects of low gravity conditions on humans, or to support lunar mining. In addition, if robotic emplacement were to prove cost-effective, these drawbacks would also diminish.

Distance from Earth. The great distance from Earth to the Moon would make logistics and repair

more difficult and therefore much more costly.

High projected costs. Providing transportation to and from the Moon for people and equipment

would be extremely costly. In addition, the costs of establishing a lunar base and constructing observatories in the hostile lunar environment would be great. As lunar crews became more accustomed

to working on the Moon, the latter costs would likely decrease.

Potential for competing systems. Some of the advantages of a lunar observatory also apply to telescopes situated in geostationary orbit. In addition, spacecraft designers have more than two decades

experience designing and building spacecraft that operate in geostationary orbit. Telescopes located in geostationary orbit would likely compete economically with telescopes located on the

Moon. The highly successful International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUE) provides a clear example of

such economic competition. IUE was built at a cost (1991 dollars) of about $250 million and

launched in 1978. It still provides high-quality ultraviolet data for hundreds of astronomers per

year.

Unknown practical details. Living and working in space has always been much more difficult and

costly than foreseen when systems are planned. The lunar surface is unlikely to be different.

Cosmic ray protection. Earth’s magnetic field protects its surface and near-Earth space from cosmic

rays and particles from the solar wind. The Moon has no such field. Hence, both instruments and

humans need to have special protection from these highly damaging particles.2

Micrometeoroid protection. Sensitive surfaces, e.g., optical mirrors, will have to be protected from

the damaging impacts of micrometeoroids that constantly rain down on the lunar surface. However,

spacecraft in low-Earth orbit suffer from the effects not only of micrometeoroid material, but also

artificial orbital debris.3

Need for substantial habitats for human operators. Humans will need pressurized quarters for living

and working on the Moon. They will also need considerable protection from lethal doses of charged

particles from cosmic rays and from the occasional solar flare.

Lunar dust. Lunar observatories will need protection from Lunar dust, which, when disturbed,

tends to adhere to surfaces with which it comes in contact.

SOURCES: Harlan J. Smith, “SomeThoughtson Astronomy From the Moon,” in Michael J. Mumma, Harlan J. Smith, and Gregg H.

Linebaugh,Astrophysicsfiom the Moon, American Institute of Physics Conference Proceedings,vol. 207 (New York, NY:

American Institute of Physics, 1990), pp. 273-282; Jack O. Bums, Nebojsa Duric, G. Jeffrey Eiylor, and Stewart W.

Johnson, “Observatories on the Moon,” Scientific American, vol. 262, No. 3, 1990, pp. 42-49; Office of lkchnology

Assessment.

@bsematories located in geostationary orbit, which is outside Earth’s protective magnetic shield, also require such protection.

3u.s. congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Orbiting Debris: A Space EnvironmentaZProblem, OTA-BI’-ISC-72 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1990).
64 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars
Chapter 5

Scientific Exploration of Mars

UNDERSTANDING MARS

The planets have fascinated humankind ever

since observers first recognized that they had

characteristic motions different from the stars.

Astronomers in the ancient Mediterranean called

them the wanderers because they appear to wander among the background of the stars. Because

of its reddish color as seen by the naked eye, Mars

drew attention. It has been the subject of scientific and fictiona13 interest for centuries.4 In recent

years, planetary scientists have developed increased interest in Mars, because Mars is the

most Earthlike of the planets. “The study of Mars

is [therefore] an essential basis for our understanding of the evolution of the Earth and the

inner solar system.”5

Planetary exploration has been one of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s

(NASA) primary goals ever since the U.S. civilian

space program was started in 1958.6 As the next

planet from the Sun beyond Earth, and the subject of intense ground-based observations prior

to the first satellite launch, Mars has received

particular attention. After sending three Mariner

spacecraft on Mars “flybys” in the 1960s,7 NASA

successfully inserted Mariner 9 into an orbit

about Mars8 

on November 13, 1971. It was the

first spacecraft to orbit another planet (box 5-A).

For the first 2 months of the spacecraft’s stay in

Mars’ orbit, the most severe Martian dust storms

ever recorded obscured Mars surface features.

After the storms subsided and the atmosphere

cleared up, Mariner 9 was able to map the entire

Martian surface with a surface resolution of 1

kilometer.9

Images from Mariner 9 revealed surface features far beyond what investigators had expected

from the earlier flybys. The earlier spacecraft had

by chance photographed the heavily cratered

southern hemisphere of the planet, which looks

more like the Moon than like Earth. These first

closeup images of Mars gave scientists the false

impression that Mars was a geologically “dead”

planet, in which asteroid impacts provided the

primary agent for altering its surface geology.

Mariner 9 showed instead that Mars also had

huge volcanoes, complex fault zones, and an enormous canyon some 2,800 miles long just south of

the equator, named Vanes Marineris by the

NASA spacecraft team.10 Detailed examination

of numerous channels and valleys suggests that

l~e tem c~planet~t derives from the Greek word meaning to wander.

~bservations of Mars dominated the scientific interest of Percival Lowell, founder of Lowell Observatory. He popularized the incorrect

notion that the surface of Mars was covered with canals, a claim first advanced by Giovanni Virginio Schiaparelli in 1877.

JFor e=mple, the inteW]anetaV invade~ of H.G. Wells’ 1897 novel War o~lhe Worlds were suppo~d to have come from Mars. firlY in this

centuty, Edgar Rice Burroughs wrote an entire series of adventure novels set on Mars.

dsee John Noble Wilford, Man Bec~m (New York, NY: Knopf, 1990), for a highly readable historical summary of the interest in Mars by

Western civilization.

sNational Re~arch Council, Space Science Board Committee on Planetary and Lunar @loration, SZrategY for fiplorah”on of tie znner~/anets: 1977-1987 (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1978), p.43.

%I%e National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was signed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on July 29,1958, and became law on Oct.

1, 1958.

TMannem 4, 6, and 7 successfully returned sufiace images and other data. Manner 3 failed before reaching the Planet.

8N~A planned t. ~nd ~.identical spacecraft t. Mare) in part to provide redundancy in ca~ one spacecraft failed. Placing the tWO SpaC&

craft in different orbits would have allowed the two to provide a complete survey of the planet relatively quickly. However, the first spacecraft,

Mariner 8, was lost when the Centaur stage on the Atlas-Centaur launch vehicle malfunctioned shortly after liftoff.

%l%is implies that objects equal to or greater than about 1 kilometer diameter could be distinguished on the images. In practice, the ability

to resolve surface features also depends on other factors, e.g., the viewing conditions, surface contrast, and processing capabilities.

lo~ard Clinton well and Linda Neumann ~el], On Mare: Exploration of the Red Planet 1958-1978 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics

and Space Administration, 1984), pp. 288-297.

-65-
66 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

Box 5-A – Findings of Mariner 9

Mariner 9 reached Mars in late 1971 and became the first spacecraft to orbit Mars. During the first

several weeks of its orbital stay, Mariner 9 encountered a dust storm that completely obscured the surface.

Over time, however, the spacecraft provided a complete record of the surface features on Mars at resolutions of 1 to 3 kilometers, which allowed NASA and the U.S. Geological Survey to compile a topographic

map of the planet. About 2 percent of the surface in specific areas was imaged at 100- to 300-meters resolution. Mariner 9 discovered massive volcanic mountains, deep channels that reveal evidence of fluid flow in

the distant past, and layered sediments in the polar regions. Mariner 9 revealed a hemispherical global

dichotomy (half the planet has craters dating from the early history of the planet, while the other half has

few craters).

observations of the cloud systems revealed westerly winds in winter and easterly winds in the summer, weather fronts, lee wave clouds, ice fogs, and other atmospheric meteorological phenomena. Mariner 9 observations led to the realization that Mars has experienced both secular and periodic (cyclic)

climate changes.

An infrared interferometer spectrometer evaluated the extremely small amount of atmospheric water vapor, and demonstrated that it exhibits strong seasonal variations. The Mariner 9 ultraviolet spectrometer showed that the amount of ozone in the atmosphere, which is found only in the polar regions,

vanes with the seasons. It is greatest during the winter, when it reaches some 2 percent of the ozone in

Earth’s atmosphere, and falls to zero in the Mars summer. The virtual lack of ozone allows ultraviolet

light to reach the Martian surface and destroy any organic compounds present in the soil.

SOURCE: W.K. Hartmann and O. Rasper, The Discoveries ofMariner 9, NASA SP337 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1974); Michael C. Malin, Arizona State University, 1991.

flowing water was once common on Mars.ll Some The Viking program launched two spacecraft

scientists speculate that before this water disappeared from the surface, it may have made life

possible. 12

The scientific arguments for finding evidence

of extinct or existing life on Mars had been noted

as early as 1959.13 However, only after the Mariner 9 images were available did scientists have

direct evidence of the past existence of water that

might have supported life. This finding lent additional support to those scientists interested in

searching for evidence of extinct or present life on

Mars and spurred development of life-seeking

instruments on the Mars Viking spacecraft that

were then in the design stages.

toward Mars in 1975. 14 They were carried into

orbit by two Titan III launch vehicles on August

20, 1975 and September 9, 1975, respectively. After searching the surface with high-resolution

cameras to select safe landing sites, the Viking

craft landed on the surface in 1976, photographed

the surroundings, analyzed the soil, and tested for

evidence of life (box 5-B). The test for life on Mars

was inconclusive, although nearly all scientists

agree that it showed that no living organisms

existed at the Viking sites. 15 These tests, however,

made the unexpected discovery that Martian soil

in the vicinity of Viking landers is highly reactive

llMichael H. Cam, “Mars: A Water-rich Planet,” lcarus, vol. 68, 1986, pp. 187-216; “Water on Mars,” Nature, vol. 326, 1987, Pp. 30-35.

l~hristopher R McGy and Carol R. Stoker, “The E@ Environment and Its Evolution on Mars: Implications for Life,” Reviews o~Ge~PhY~-

ics, vol. 27, No. 2, 1989, pp. 189214.

lssee the Summaw histow of the early search for life on Mars in ~ell and fiell, op. cit., footnote lo) Ch. 3.

Idorginally planned for launch in 1973, the Viking launches were slipped to 1975 as a result of a severe budget squeeze.

l~is conclusion is based not only on the biology experiments but other experiments that attempted to detect organic material in the soil.

The conclusion that life does not exist at the Viking sites cannot be extended to other sites on the planet where conditions more conducive

to life, e.g., hydrothermal vents, might exist.
Chapter 5–Scientific Exploration of Mars .67

Box 5-B – Findings From the Viking Mars Landers

NASA sent two Viking spacecraft to Mars in 1975, which reached Mars orbit in 1976 after nearly a

year in transit. Upon reaching Mars orbit, the orbiters surveyed the surface at high resolution to select the

best landing sites for the Viking 1 and 2 landers. Both landers separated from their parent craft and executed soft landings at different sites in July and September, 1976, respectively. Viking 1 landed at a site on

Chryse Planitia at 22.3 North latitude, 48.0 degrees longitude. Viking 2 landed at the same longitude on

Utopia Planitia 25.4 degrees North of Viking 1. The orbiters then began to relay visual images and other

data from the landers back to Earth. Although both orbiters and landers were expected to complete their

missions within a few months, they lasted far beyond their design lifetimes and continued to transmit data

to Earth for several years.

The Viking landers took the first closeup photographs of the surface and transmitted panoramic

views of the rocky Martian landscape. They also documented the weather throughout their lifetime on the

surface, finding that atmospheric temperatures ranged from a low of –120 degrees Celsius (about the

freezing temperature of carbon dioxide, the major constituent of Mars’ atmosphere) to a high of -14 degrees Celsius. The landers experienced dust storms and measured the daily barometric pressure (about 1

percent of the barometric pressure on Earth).

The Viking orbiters determined that the north polar ice cap, which lasts through the northern summer, is water ice. They also mapped about 97 percent of the surface. They further showed that the climate

in the northern and southern hemispheres differs greatly, as a result of the summer dust storms that originate in the south.

Although a search for life on Mars was the primary experiment for the landers, neither found evidence of life or of organic compounds in the soil. Mars appears to be self-sterilizing. At present, the combination of ultraviolet light that saturates the surface, and the extreme dryness of the soil prevent the formation of living organisms

Orbiter 2 ended its mission on July 25, 1978; Orbiter 1 reached the end of its useful life on August 7,

1980. NASA received the last data from Lander 2 on April 11, 1980 and from Lander 1 on November 11,

1982.

SOURCE: “The Viking Project,” Geophysical Reviews, vol. 82, pp. 3959-3970; NASA/ Jet Propulsion Laboratory Fact Sheet on Viking.

 credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

First panoramic view by Viking 1 from Mars, showing a rook-strewn surface. The blurred spacecraft component near left center of

the left-hand image is the housing for the Viking sample arm, which had not yet been deployed. The spacecraft component in the

center of the right-hand image are color charts for lander camera calibration.
68 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

chemically, favoring rapid destruction of organic

molecules. 16

Although those who had hoped to find evidence of life on Mars were disappointed in the

Viking findings, the evidence of water in an earlier stage of Mars evolution continues to intrigue

scientists, both because of what it means for the

geological and climatological evolution of Mars,

and for evidence concerning the origins of life. In

addition, the observations of Mariner 9 and Viking raised a broad variety of questions concerning the formation and evolution of the planet.17

Viking I and II were the last U.S. spacecraft to

visit Mars. Since the mid-1970s, NASA has pursued investigations of the massive planets beyond

Mars 18 and the mapping of Venus by the Magellan spacecraft.19 These investigations have radically changed our understanding of the surfaces

and atmospheres of these planets.

CURRENT SCIENTIFIC

OBJECTIVES

Well before the President announced his proposal for human exploration of the Moon and

Mars, the scientific community had spent years

studying the next steps in the detailed examination of the planets and concluded that because of

its proximity and similarity to Earth, Mars should

receive special attention. The Committee on

Planetary and Lunar Exploration (COMPLEX)

of the National Academy of Sciences Space Science Board in 1978 recommended that “the triad

of terrestrial planets, Earth, Mars, and Venus,

should receive the major focus in exploration of

the inner solar system for the next decade. This

priority has not changed over time. The ultimate

goal in this exploration is to understand the present state and evolution of terrestrial planets with

atmospheres. The comparative planetology of

these bodies is a key to the understanding of the

formation of the Earth, its atmosphere and

oceans, and the physical and chemical conditions

that lead to the origin and evolution of life.”20 The

NASA Advisory Council’s Solar System Exploration Committee (SSEC) in 1983 also recommended that a detailed study of Mars should

receive priority. 21 These studies led to a proposal

for a spacecraft to carry out a detailed study of

Mars’ atmosphere and surface from a polar orbit. 22 The resulting spacecraft, which is called

Mars Observer,23 is scheduled for launch in September 1992 aboard a Titan III launcher. The

SSEC in 1988 reaffirmed the emphasis on Mars

by recommending a Mars sample return mission

before the end of the century.24

The geological, hydrologic, and atmospheric

histories of Mars are long, and apparently complicated. Elucidating these scientific stories will

require an extended exploration program. AllbNoman H. HoroM~, “me Biological Question of Mars;” and Gilbert V Lain and Patricia A. Straat, ‘A Reappraisal of fife on Mars;”

in Duke B. Reiber, The NASA Mars Conference, vol. 71 in the American Artronautica[ Society Science and Technology Series (San Diego: Univelt,

1988), pp. 177-185; 186-208.

ITSee, for enmp]e, the extensive set of issues in Duke B. Reiber, op. cit., footnote 16.

lg~e so.called Grand Tour of the outer planets by the Voyager spacecraft resulted in exciting new findings about the planets Jupiter, Saturn,

Uranus, and Neptune, their rings and their moons.

IQNASA launched Mage]]an toward Venus on the space shuttle Atfantis in May 1989. It arrived at Venus in August 1990. ne Mageilan spacecraft has returned highly detailed radar images of the cloud-covered Venusian surface using a synthetic aperature radar.

zONational Research council, Space Science Board Committee on Planetary and Lunar ~loration, Strategy for fiploration of the znnerplanets: 1977-1987 (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1978), p. 34.

ZINASA A~so~ Council solar s~tem ~]oration Committee, PlanetaV Exploration Through Year2000: Part One: A Core Program (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1983).

22A spacecraft in ~]ar orbit peri~lcal]y crosses the North and South Poles as the planet rotates beneath. By appropriately matching the

spacecraft’s optics with its altitude, it is possible to image the entire planet in a specified number of orbits, just as the polar-orbiting meteorological satellites image Earth.

zsIt was Originally termed the Mars Geoscience and Climatology Orbiter.

24N~A AdGsoY council, ptanelay fiploration ThroU& Yearlooo: scientific Rationa[e Washington, DC: U.S. Government tinting OffiCe,

1988), pp. 83-85.
Chapter 5–Scientific Exploration of Mars ● 69

though our current understanding of Mars suggests a number of intriguing questions, future

research on the planet, both from orbit and by in

situ studies is likely to provide many surprises

and lead to whole new lines of questioning. Current questions of scientific interest concerning

Mars can be summarized under four broad categories: 25

1.

2.

The formation of Mars – Insights into the

formation of Mars will be derived from

chemical and physical information revealed

by analyzing surface materials and by estimating the thickness of the crust, mantle,

and core, and determining their densities.

Better understanding of the conditions that

existed during the formation of Mars would

assist scientists in understanding the formation of the entire inner solar system, including the Moon and Earth. Because many of

the data required for understanding the formation and the evolution of a planet are the

same, and acquired by the same instruments, specific data requirements are discussed in the next paragraphs on the evolution of Mars.

The geologic evolution of Mars – From its

formation to the present, Mars has undergone many changes in its surface structure

and composition. Like its sister planets, Venus and Earth (and the Moon), Mars has

experienced continuous bombardment by

meteoroids, asteroids, and comets. Also,

like Venus and Earth, it has had a long and

complicated history of volcanic activity. In

addition, the surface has been extensively

modified by wind and water action. Despite

these similarities, Earth and Mars are very

different. Clues as to why the two planets

evolved so differently will be found in the

morphology of the surface, in the composition, lithology, and distribution of the surface materials, and in the structure of the

planet’s interior.

Estimates of composition, physical structure, and distribution of surface materials

can be acquired by remote sensing from

orbit. The morphology of the Martian surface is now known roughly at a resolution of

200 meters. Mars Observer will photograph

small areas at a resolution of 2 meters. However, detailed studies of chemical composition, mineralogy, and ages of surface materials would require relatively sophisticated,

mobile 26 analytical stations on Mars27 

and

the return of samples to Earth. Samples and

surface measurements are required to calibrate the orbital remote sensing data. Samples are also required on Earth because

many of the crucial measurements, e.g., determination of ages, isotopic ratios, and

percentages of trace elements, can be done

only in the most sophisticated laboratories

here on Earth. Moreover, scientists cannot

predict in advance what measurements

would be most important. Having samples

available on Earth allows scientists to return repeatedly to the samples with different instruments and make appropriate

measurements as their understanding

evolves.

Determination of the gravity field and

topography, coupled with seismic data, and

other types of depth sounding, will allow

scientists to determine the internal density

of Mars and how it changes with depth and

surface position. This is crucial for determining not only the gross structure of the

planet, such as the thickness of the crust and

how it varies with location, but also local

structures such as ice deposits.

-is discussion derived primarily from Mars Science Working Group, A Strategy for the Scientific Exploration of Mazs, Draft, September

1990.

Zbor a ne~ork of stations.

zT~eW instruments would be much more sophisticated than the instruments aboard the Viking spacecraft, particularly in sample acquisition

and handling.
70 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Mosaic of pictures from Viking Orbiter 1 shows the northeast margin of the Tharsis Ridge, the youngest volcanic region of Mars. An

area of intense crustal faulting can be seen at left, and a cluster of volcanic mountains with Prominent summit caideras is visible at

3.

right. The volcanoes range from 65 kilometers to 400 kilometers across.

Climate change – Observations of the Mar- er, unknown mechanism is responsible.

tian surface by Mariner 9 and by the Viking

spacecraft, which show numerous channels

and dry river valleys apparently caused by

water erosion, suggest strongly that the

Martian climate has changed radically over

time. Liquid water is unstable everywhere

on the Martian surface under present climatic conditions. It will either freeze or sublime. Determination of the amount of volatile compounds in the surface28 soil and

rocks would help determine whether the climate did indeed change, or whether anothSpectrometers aboard Mars Observer will

provide a global assessment of the inventory

of surface volatiles, but detailed studies

from the surface would allow scientists to

assess whether water in some form29 might

still exist as ice below the surface.

Previous data on the Martian atmosphere

has enabled atmospheric scientists to create

atmospheric circulation models in order to

understand daily and seasonal variations of

the atmosphere. Additional seasonal data

 by the ice, hydrated and carbonated minerals, and phosphorus, and nitrogen, in the ‘Oil and 

 in the of ice, or bound in 
Chapter 5–Scientific Exploration of Mars ● 71

Figure 5-1 –A View From the Martian North Pole Shows the Location

of the Two Viking Sites

Viking 2 landing site

47.96° N

225.77° w .

 Utopia

Planitia North Pole 

150o

120o 9 00 

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

acquired both from orbit and on the surface

would enable scientists to begin to understand the mechanisms that cause onset of

dust storms, and other large-scale atmospheric phenomena.

Scientists have postulated a much thicker

atmosphere of carbon dioxide and nitrogen

for early Mars. By closely examining sites of

early meteoritic bombardment, which may

retain important clues about the atmosphere of early Mars, scientists hope to test

this hypothesis. High concentrations of carbonates and nitrates in the soil would suggest that the planet held a thicker atmosphere containing carbon dioxide and

nitrogen. Carbonates would also confirm

evidence of liquid water earlier in Mars’

evolution.

4. Search for life – The question of whether

life existed on Mars at some time in the past

has drawn the attention of both scientists

and laymen for centuries. Liquid water is

essential to life as we know it. The apparent

presence of lakes and rivers on Mars at one

time implies warmer climates and suggests

that conditions necessary to the formation

of life might have existed at some time in the

past. Did life start and then die out as conditions on the planet changed? The Viking

results indicate that life is very unlikely

today. Not only was no life detected, but also

no organic molecules. Apparently the soil

oxidizes and destroys complex organic molecules. However, the prospects for life in the

distant past, when water was abundant at

the surface, are different. Indeed, past condition on Mars may have been similar to

those on Earth when life started here. Biologists conclude, therefore, that the most

promising place to look for past life is in

ancient sediments that formed when clima292-888 - 91 - 4 : QL 3
72 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

atic conditions might have been more favorable.30 Because of the possibility of past life,

some scientists hypothesize that life might

have survived to the present in specialized

niches, e.g., volcanic hydrothermal vents,

and that the Viking spacecraft looked in the

wrong places.31 They believe that more definitive life-seeking experiments need to be

done before the planet is irretrievably contaminated with terrestrial organisms.

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

This mosaic of the Mangala Vallis region of Mars was taken by

Viking Orbiter 1. The central region of the mosaic contains

vast channel systems that appear to have been carved by

running water in the distant past. Numerous impact craters

also appear in the image.

PLANNED AND POTENTIAL

ROBOTICS MISSIONS

Scientists have proposed a number of observations of Mars from a distance or missions to the

surface in order to collect scientific data on the

planet. In addition to identifying new areas of

inquiry, data acquired from orbit about Mars

would assist in guiding the selection and design of

future Mars investigations, including both robotic and human missions. However, only in situ,

local measurements can tackle some questions.

For example, the investigation of seismic activity,

which allows scientists to determine elements of

its internal structure and how it changes over

time, would require instruments on the planet.

Detailed investigations concerning the composition and age of Martian material would require

the return of samples for study on Earth. “Thus,

the global and in situ studies of the planet and the

return of Martian material are complementary

components of an overall program of investigation; each of the components is absolutely necessary.” 32 A recent examination by the Mars Science Working Group reiterates the importance of

this three-pronged approach — global, in situ,

and sample return studies.33 Missions either in

preparation or proposed are summarized below:

● Observations by Hubble — The wide field

and planetary camera on the Hubble Space

Telescope is now being used to make longterm observations of Mars from Earth orbit, providing low-resolution, but useful,

synoptic data of the atmosphere and surface of Mars throughout the Martian year.34

Although the wide field and planetary cameras are limited in resolution because of the

errors in figuring the Hubble’s primary mirror, these data will provide an important

 Environment and Its Evolution on Mars: Implications for Reviews of Geophysics, vol. 27, No. 2, 1989, pp. 189-214.

 Wharton, Jr., and Simmons, “Early Martian Environments: the Antarctic and Other Analogs,” Advances in Space Research, vol. 9, 1989, No. 6, pp. (6)147-(6)153.

 Science Board Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration, 5, 

 Group, A for the Scientific Exploration of Mars, Draft, September 

 release, Mar. 18, 
Chapter S–Scientific Exploration of Mars .73

●

●

baseline for later observations from Mars

polar orbit.

Mars Observer — Mars Observer can be

expected to provide data relating to many

scientific questions about Mars (box 5-C).

After it arrives in the vicinity of Mars in

1993, it will go into a Mars polar orbit, which

will allow the Mars Observer Camera

(MOC) to image the entire planet.35 M OC

will be capable of viewing locations anywhere on the planet, at resolutions between

300 meters and several kilometers, within

any given 24-hour period. It will be able to

acquire an image of the entire planet at any

resolution between 2 and 7.5 kilometers per

picture element in a single 24-hour period,

limited only by the data rate returned from

the spacecraft. MOC will be able to image

the entire planet at a much higher 300 meters per picture element in 7 to 28 days,

depending on the data rate.

MOC is presently scheduled to cover

about 0.5 percent of the planet at resolutions between 1.5 and 12.0 meters per picture element, using its high resolution optics. During an extended mission (should

one be authorized), it would be possible for

the MOC to map the entire planet at 12

meters per picture element in about 600

days, again depending on the possible data

rate and the allocation of other spacecraft

resources. The ability of an orbiting spacecraft to make observations of deep scientific

importance of a planetary surface are exemplified by the results from the Venus Magellan spacecraft36 and the Viking orbiters.37

Mars ’94 – The Soviet Union currently

plans to send an orbiter to Mars in 1994. As

it approaches Mars, the orbiter will deploy

two small meteorology stations and two

dartlike penetrators that will drop to the

surface. The orbiters will make a variety of

remote sensing observations complementary to those on Mars Observer. The penetrators will analyze the soils and make seismic

measurements. In 1996 or later, the Soviet

Union plans to send another spacecraft,

which will deploy a balloon contributed by

France, and a small rover, designed and

built by Soviet engineers. The balloon is

designed to inflate during the day and float

above the planet. At night, cooling temperatures will cause it to drop down to the surface where an attached instrument package

can gather surface data.

Mars Environmental Survey (MESUR) –

The proposed MESUR mission 38 arises out

of an interest in designing a flexible, relatively inexpensive means of providing in situ

data on weather, seismic activity, and chemical and physical properties of the Martian

soil at various locations on the planet. It

would make use of Delta II launch vehicles

to send several Martian probes every 2

years, potentially starting in 1998. The

probes would be designed as small, spin

stabilized, free-flyer spacecraft, based on

technology developed primarily for Pioneer

Venus and Mars Viking spacecraft. As conceived, four MESUR probes could be

launched on each Delta II launch vehicle,

and would separate shortly after release

from the launch vehicle for the long journey

to Mars. When they arrived at Mars, they

would use a parachute and airbag to land on

the surface, where each would deploy an

antenna to communicate with a communications relay orbiter sent separately. It

would also be possible to transmit data dis~e ~ro~~ct that Mars Observer would still function after a Mars year in orbit is high. Therefore, the spacecraft could be expected to

continue to collect data after completing its primary mission. Processing and storing the mass of data from these observations will be a difilcult

and complex task.

scRichard A. Kerr, “Magellan Paints a Portrait of Venus,” Science, Vol. 251, 1991, pp. 1026-1027.

SIG, A. Soffen, “me Viking project,” Journal of Geophysical Reviews, VO~. 82, pp. 3g5%sg70.

38scott Hubbard and Robert Haberle, The Mm &vlronmnta[sumq (JfEsuR): sta~s RepOfl, NASA Ames Research Center, Feb. 25,1991.
74 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

Box 5-C — Mars Observer

The Mars Observer spacecraft will provide detailed information about the surface of Mars and its

atmosphere. Originally termed the Mars Geoscience and Climatology Orbiter, the concept for Mars Observer arose from study of the items of greatest scientific interest on Mars. NASA plans to launch Mars

Observer toward Mars in September 1992 aboard a Titan III launch vehicle. It should arrive in August

1993, where it will remain in a “parking orbit” until December, when it is lowered into a circular mapping

orbit 380 kilometers above the surface. It will then begin systematic observations of Mars at a variety of

surface resolutions. A polar orbit will allow a suite of instruments aboard the spacecraft to collect data

over the entire surface of the planet during its planned 687-day (one Martian year) mission lifetime.

Scientific objectives:

●

●

●

●

●

determine elemental composition and mineralogical character of the Martian surface;

measure the global surface topography;

measure the gravity field;

measure the magnetic field and establish its nature; and

develop a synoptic database of climatological conditions (alterations of atmospheric dust, volatile

materials) throughout a seasonal cycle.

Planners expect this mission to provide data that would allow planetary scientists to characterize

Mars as it currently exists and create the framework for investigating its past. The data will lead to abetter

understanding of the geological and climatological history of Mars and the evolution of its interior and

surface. It will also give planetary scientists the necessary data for comparing Mars with Venus and Earth.

Mars Observer instrumentation:

Instrument Scientific objectives

Gamma-Ray Spectrometer and Determine elemental composition of Mars surface.

Neutron Detector

Mars Observer Camera Obtain daily global synoptic views of Martian clouds

(optical wavelengths; 7.5 km, 480 m, and and surface; monitor surface and atmospheric

1.4 m surface resolution) features at moderate resolution; examine surface

areas of interest at high resolution.

Thermal Emission Spectrometer Determine and map composition of surface features

(Michelson interferometer operating at (minerals, rocks, and ice); study atmospheric dust;

infrared wavelengths) measure thermophysical properties of surface;

determine atmospheric characteristics.

Pressure Modulator Infrared Radiometer Map thermal structure of atmosphere in three

dimensions over time; map atmospheric dust and

condensates; map seasonal variations of atmospheric

pressure and vertical distribution of water vapor;

monitor polar radiation balance.

Mars Observer Laser Altimeter Provide a global topographic grid to precision of 30

meters; measure selected areas to precision of 2

meters.

Continued on next page
Chapter S–Scientific Exploration of Mars ● 75

Box 5-C — Mars Observer- Continued

Instrument Scientific objectives

Spacecraft Radio Subsystem Use radio system to determine atmospheric

properties; characterize small-scale structure of

atmosphere and ionosphere; develop a global, highresolution model of Mars gravitational field;

determine both local and broad-scale densitystructure and stress state of Martian crust and

upper mantle.

Magnetometer and Electron Reflectometer Establish nature of Mars magnetic field; map Martian

crustal remnant field; characterize solar wind/Mars

plasma interaction.

Mars Balloon Relay Use buffer memory of Mars Observer Camera to

relay data from Soviet/French balloons expected to

be deployed over Mars in late 1995 (Mars ’94

spaceprobe).

Operations and Data Analysis

Mars Observer will generate many millions of bytes of data per day. The NASA Deep Space Network

will gather the spacecraft data and transmit them to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Space Flight

Operations Center in Pasadena, California. However, the various science teams supporting the mission

will be located throughout the United States and the world. They will be connected electronically to JPL.

Mission data will be stored in a project database.

SOURCE: A.L Albee and D.F. Palluconi, “Mars Observer’s Global Mapping Mission,” J%, vol. 71, No. 39, pp. 1099,1107, Sept.

25, 1990.

rect to Earth at a very slow rate, should Even if several units failed, the remaining

communications with a relay orbiter fail.

A network of perhaps 20 instrumented

landers would enable two scientific approaches not possible by other means: 1)

simultaneous measurements at many widely separated sites for global seismic and

meteorological measurements; 2) a variety

of measurements at diverse and widely separated surface sites, including surface

chemistry and highresolution imaging. The

network approach would also allow mission

managers to keep the funding profile relatively flat over several years, which has programmatic advantages.

Because instruments would be located at

a number of sites, the MESUR experiment

as a whole would be less prone to failure.

units would still provide useful information:

Because it could use existing launch vehicles

it would require no new launch system. Because the project would extend over several

Martian launch windows, information obtained from the preceding mission could be

used to enhance selection of the following

study sites. In addition, if funding permitted, the various subsystems could be improved, or altered over time to gather additional data.

● Rover — A rover, or collection of small rovers,

39 on the surface of Mars could execute

a variety of scientific tasks, from simple

observation to sample collection and analysis. Instruments mounted on a rover could,

for example, analyze the Martian soil, which

Sgsee, e.g., David R Miller, “Mini-Rovers for Man Exploration,” Proceedings o~zhe Viiion-21 Sywosium, Cleveland, OH, APril 1990.

292-888 - 91 - 5 : QL :
76 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

●

might be toxic to humans.40 Rovers could

also be used in characterizing and selecting

sites for a possible visit by human crews41

and, as noted earlier, they could provide

support to human crews on the surface.

With funding from NASA, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory has studied rover technologies for over two decades and has produced

a six-wheeled rover,42 and the Field Robotics Laboratory of Carnegie Mellon University has demonstrated a six-legged “Ambler,” 43 both of which can navigate across

rugged terrain semiautonomously. The

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Artificial Intelligence Laboratory has explored

the use of minirovers for exploration.% The

design and cost of an actual rover mission

would depend on the ability of robotics engineers to improve the rover’s ability to navigate autonomously,45 and reduce the size

and weight of rovers to make them capable

of being launched on existing launch vehicles and deployed on the surface with existing technology.

Sample return – Scientists who study Mars

express a high level of unanimity on the

importance of returning samples from the

surface of Mars.46 They note that the samples returned from the Moon have transformed our scientific understanding of the

formation of the Moon and its subsequent

evolution. Although it is possible to design

and develop instruments to carry out limited experiments on the surface of Mars,

returning samples to Earth for laboratory

analysis is far more productive. First, it is

difficult to design robotic in-situ experiments that would be flexible enough to take

into account surprises found in Mars surface material.

Returning samples to Earth allows them

to be examined by hundreds of investigators

using a wide variety of scientific techniques.

Samples are a permanent acquisition and

can be used over a long period to answer

questions that arise as we learn more about

the geology of Mars. Radioactive age dating,

for example, is of fundamental importance

and can only be done in a laboratory with

returned samples.

The experience of examining the lunar

samples has demonstrated that scientific

techniques have improved and evolved over

time, allowing investigators to answer questions of the lunar samples that would have

been unanswerable 20 years ago. Some powerful techniques, e.g., ion-probe microanalysis, and several mass-spectrometric techniques for determining ages of samples, did

not even exist 20 years ago. Mars is much

more complicated than the Moon, geologically, and will require more extensive study.

To be most effective in understanding the

geology of Mars and the evolution of the

planet, a sample return mission would have

to gather samples from several locations. It

should also gather both surface and subsurface rocks, as the surface soils are suspected

to be quite different in composition and

chemistry from the rocks.

Q~e high ~eacti~~ of Mafiian soil might endanger human life if breathed, even though human explorers will be encased in spacesuits- ‘e

probability is high, for example, that fine Martian dust could find its way into habitation areas. Hence, its properties should be better understood.

QIDonna S. pi~rotto, “site Charactetition Rover Missions,” presented at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Space

Programs and lkchnologies Conference and Exhibit, Huntsville, AL, Sept. 25-27, 1990.

QzJet ~opulsion Laboratory, NASA P[anetay Rover Program, JPL 1990 AnnuaI Technical Repoti (Pasadena, CA: Jet propulsion ~boratoqt

Jan. 15, 1991), p. 5.

QsEric fiotkov, John ~res, Martial Hebefi, Bkeo Kanade, lbm Mitchell, Reid Simmons, and William Whittaker, “Ambler: A bgged planetary Rover,” 1990 Annua/ Research Review, the Robotics Insitute, Carnegie Mellon University, pp. 11-23, 1991.

*.M. Angle and R.A. Brooks, “Small Planetary Rovers,” MIT Artificial Intelligence Laborato~, Cambridge, MA, Apr. 27, 1990.

QSAutonomy costs more, but is likely t. make it ~=ible to o~rate a rover on the surface of Mars despite communications delays Of UP tO

40 minutes.

46JameS L G~ing, Michael H. Cam, and Christopher 1? McKay, “The Case for planeta~ Sample Return Missions: 2. Histow of ‘am~”

Eos, vol. 70, No. 31, Aug. 1,1989, pp. 745, 754-5; Mars Science Working Group,A Strategy for the Scientific Exploration of Mars, Draft, September 1990.
Chapter 6

Automation and Robotics Research and Development

Except for the six Apollo excursions on the

Moon, all planetary exploration by the United

States and the Soviet Union has been carried out

with automated or partially automated systems.

However, these spacecraft had only limited capacity to act autonomously,l in other words, to

evaluate conditions and make decisions on their

own; they also had limited capability for teleoperation. Mission controllers programmed them to

carry out a specific set of tasks in a specific sequence. As computers have grown smaller and

more powerful, automation and robotics (A&R)

engineers have increased their capability to design and build semiautonomous mechanical systems capable of performing a wide variety of

tasks with minimal direction from mission controllers. A&R experts can now envision, within

the next decade or two, the development of both

large and small robotics systems capable of traversing a planetary surface, observing the terrain,

manipulating and analyzing rock samples, and

selecting from the many available samples particular ones to return to Earth for detailed analysis.

Such systems would be able to perform a variety

of tasks, e.g., construction, equipment installation, and maintenance, telerobotically.

The many engineering disciplines that contribute to A&R are undergoing rapid evolution. If

properly managed, they could provide major advances in A&R over the next 30 years, leading to

machines capable of assuming a substantially

greater share of the human-machine partnership.

In the near term, A&R could provide gains in

productivity and potential fiscal savings in servicing and maintaining space station Freedom. 2 As

noted by the Advisory Committee on the Future

of the U.S. Space Program, advanced A&R could

contribute to the U.S. space program in many

areas.

3

AUTOMATION AND ROBOTICS

APPLICATIONS

The basic capabilities involved in space A&R

are shared with many other existing or potential

A&R applications. For the Moon and Mars,

today’s A&R research efforts are focused on remotely controlled (teleoperated), and semiautonomous manipulation and mobility. If aggressively

pursued, these developments can be expected to

provide robots with greater strength, dexterity,

and range of motion than humans possess. Improvements in teleoperation, in particular, would

extend and enhance human presence in hostile

environments. 4 A&R systems of various kinds

are most commonly used in manufacturing and in

areas hostile to humans e.g., toxic or radioactive

cleanup.

The nuclear power industry has made significant use of mobile robots for working in highradiation environments.s The Electric Power Research Institute and the Department of Energy

are funding the development of robots for maintenance of nuclear reactors and cleanup of nuclear wastes. Using advanced robot technology in

Iu.s. Planetaw e~loration spacecraft have had a small degree of autonomous capability, for example, in the automatic recognition of 10SS

of star lock and procedures for recovering to a 3-axis intertidally stabilized mode and pointing the communications antenna toward Earth. The

lack of this capability in the Soviet Phobos spacecraft contributed to their failures: Ben Clark, Martin Marietta Corp., personal communication,

1991.

zWilliam F. Fisher and Charles R. fice, space station Freedom External Maintenance Task Team, Final Report (Houston, ~:

Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, July 1990); Mitre Corp., The Assessment of the Pozentia/ for Increased Productivity,” March 1990.

sAdvisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, Repoti of the Advisory Co~”ttee on the Future of tie U.S. SPace fio~am

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1990), pp. 6 and 31.

%Ilomas B. Sheridan, “Merging Mind and Machine,” Technology Review, October 1989, pp. 33-40.

SJ.T ~vett and D. ~~r, “’Ihsk Requirements for Robotic Maintenance Systems for Nuclear Power plants,” Report to the Department of

Energy, University of ‘I&mat Austin, August 1989.

-77-
78 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

In the future, the heavy equipment and service

industries can be expected to rely on A&R technologies to carry out dangerous and/or highly

repetitive tasks where a high degree of autonomy

is required.8 For example, the mining industry

could make use of autonomous vehicles to haul

Earth for short distances in open-pit mines, or

teleoperated mobile devices to extract minerals in

deep shafts. Teleoperated robots are now used for

toxic waste cleanup.9

The Air Force, Navy, and Army are all investigating the use of A&R technologies for a variety

of tasks in hazardous environments, and for repetitive tasks requiring skills in sorting, manipulating, etc. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is supporting basic A&R

research for a wide variety of defense applications. l0 A&R technologies can serve important

functions for support and for combat.

A recent report by the Air Force Studies Board

of the National Research Council examined A&R

systems for Air Force primary and support operations. It noted such applications as aircraft servicing, refueling, and assembly; handling munitions; aircraft systems diagnostics; and

inspection. It also noted the potential use of A&R

systems for a variety of space-related tasks, including spacecraft repair and servicing, and refueling. 11 Figures 6-l and 6-2 list these technologies and estimate their state of readiness for

applications.

The applications of A&R to underwater tasks

have many similarities to space applications, especially in the areas of robotic manipulation.12 In

 of University of at Austin, Communication, 

 and Experiences With Remotely Controlled and Robotic Devices at 

Proceedings of the American Nuclear Society Meeting on the Materials Behavior and Plant Technology, Washington, DC, November 1988.

 Robotics Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, communication, 

‘Ibid.

 Advanced Research Projects Agency, communication, 

 Research Force Board, Advanced Robotics for Air Force (Washington, National Academy

of Sciences, 1989).

 Graham Jeffrey, Force and Motion Mechanisms for Manipulator Proceedings,

 Marine Society, San Diego, CA, 1985, pp. 92-95; Graham S. “Advanced Manipulator Concepts and Applications,” Proceeding, Marine Society, San Diego, CA, 1983, pp. 72-81.
Chapter 6–Automation and Robotics Research and Development ● 79

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Chapter 6–Automation and Robotics Research and Development ● 81

conjunction with Deep Ocean Engineering, the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) Ames Research Center is developing a

telepresent underwater system13 for use in Antarctic research.14 Earlier use of a remotely operated, underwater vehicle to support research in

Lake Hoare, Antarctica was highly effective.15

Because of these crosscutting applications of

A&R technology for underwater, defense, and

industrial applications, it will be important to

foster supportive relationships in developing

technologies for the specific applications.

A&R applications for manufacturing, while

important commercially, now only provide a tiny,

constrained niche for the development of robotic

technologies. The fried-based manipulators generally used in manufacturing applications can be

used in only a narrow range of highly structured

tasks. A&R experts face several unsolved problems in extending this technology to unstructured

applications. For example, there is no general

method for controlling a robot’s motions when its

hand or tool encounters strong, unpredicted

forces or torques in the environment. Today, robot manipulators are still extremely limited when

compared to the human hand.

SPACE AUTOMATION AND

ROBOTICS TECHNOLOGIES

Robotics in space can assist in a variety of tasks

including: exchange of orbital replaceable units;

handling of scientific experiments and manufacturing processes; assistance in rendezvous and

docking; repair; supply and maintenance of platforms; refueling; and assembly of structures. Until recently, NASA’s Flight Telerobotic Servicer

(FTS) was being developed for servicing space

station Freedom. 16 The FTS program provides a

testbed for the development and testing of various teleoperated technologies that would extend

human capabilities in space. The space shuttle

carries the Canadian Remote Manipulator Arm,

which astronauts use to perform such manipulative tasks as retrieving and deploying satellites,

while they remain inside the shuttle.

The following list of technology elements pertains primarily to space A&R. Each of them have

been developed and tested at various levels of

readiness for spaceflight. Continued progress in

these areas is critical for the development of autonomous spacecraft, planetary rovers, and analytical devices capable of supporting scientific

exploration of the Moon and Mars. The robotic

exploration of the Moon and Mars will require

improvements in technologies that extend perception, cognition, and manipulation in an autonomous mode. Such improvements should materially chance the human-machine partnership for

exploration.

. Mobility — Laboratories in NASA and several universities are pursuing both wheeled

and legged robotic locomotion. For example, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)

has constructed a six-wheeled roving vehicle

(“Robby”) capable of autonomously navigating a path around obstacles from point A

on a rugged terrain to a predetermined

7 point B.l Under contract to NASA, the

Robotics Institute of Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) has designed and built a sixlegged, 15-foot-high walking robot called

lsphilip J. W1]OU, “Repo~: A Wleprewnt Undenvater Remotely Operated Vehicle System,” report to the NASA Ames Research Center

(San Leandro, CA: Deep Ocean Engineering, Jan. 22, 1991).

14D.TC ~demen, cop Mcfiy, R.A. Wharton, and J.D. Rummel, “’1’ksting a Mars Science Outpost in the Antarctic Dry ValleYs,’’Ad~ance~

in Space Research, 1991, in press.

l~e remotely operated vehicle allowed e%rimentem to conduct reconnaissance on the bottom of the lake and to plan their research, thus

freeing them to concentrate on the most important tasks in the limited amount of time they had underwater (about one-half hour per dive);

Steven W. Squyres, David W. Andersen, Susan S. Nedell, and Robert A. Wharton, Jr., “Lake Hoare, Antarctica: Sedimentation Through a

Thick Perennial Ice Cover,” Sedimentology, in press.

161n early 1991, the~was domgraded t. a technolow demonstration project within the Office of Aeronautics, Exploration and lkchnology. Its future is uncertain, but ITS will no longer support space station operations and maintenance.

17Jet fiopulsion ~boratory, NA&f l%met~ Rover pro~am, JPL 1990 Annual ‘Ikchnical Repoti, Jan. 15, 1991.
82. Exploring the Moon and Mars

the Ambler. The Ambler combines perception, planning, and real-time motion control, and is capable of navigating boulderstrewn terrain.18

Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) have concentrated

on developing microrovers that employ six

legs to “crawl” across the landscape like

insects.19 They represent a radical departure from the larger rovers, both in their size

and their modes of navigation (see Technology Issues, below).

Researchers have demonstrated all three

types of mobile robots in the laboratory and

under field conditions. However, they need

considerably more experimentation and

testing before mission designers can determine which avenue would be most fruitful

for planetary exploration. Other approaches to mobility on Mars have been

considered as well, including airplanes, balIoons,20 and small, suborbital rockets.

Mobility in space will be equally important in many missions. Staging and executing a mission to Mars, for example, would

require assembling independently launched

subsystems on orbit. Researchers at Stanford University have concentrated on experimental development of new concepts for

freeflying robots in a weightless environment, having fully cooperating arms capable of deft manipulation, either gas-jet or

push-off body motion control, and the capability to respond to commands to “fetch,

carry and attach.”21

Manipulative dexterity and tactile sensors —

Robotic manipulation systems will eventually be capable of dextrous manipulation far

beyond human capability: very long arms

could have a pair of short arms at their ends,

which in turn may have still smaller arms,

agile wrists, and finally, hands with fingers.

Such a system is essential in space. Stanford

researchers have pioneered the experimental development of well-controlled, long, very

flexible arms that carry very quick minimanipulators at their end capable of per-

 Mitchell, Reid Simmons, and Red Whittaker, “Ambler: A l-egged 

Rover,” 1990 Annual Research Review, Robotics Carnegie Mellon University, 1991, pp. 11-23.

 Freedman, “Invasion of the Insect Robots,” March pp. 

 and France to a balloon on Mars later this decade to provide mobility for a package of 

 Unman Robert Cannon, Jr., in of a Robot. ” In 

of the Meeting, San Francisco, CA, December 1989.
Chapter 6–Automation and Robotics Research and Development .83

●

forming delicate force-controlled tasks with

high precision and agility.22 Robotics engineers in several laboratories have built various kinds of tactile sensors and manipulators of three and four fingers. JPL and CMU

engineers have coupled them with automated vision systems capable of recognizing and selecting among pebbles in a heap.

They have also begun to develop specialized

automated tools for handling and examining geological specimens.23

Navigation and path planning — The development of autonomous navigation and path

planning has proved much more difficult

than investigators had first expected two

decades ago. The decisions humans take for

granted when driving a vehicle along a highway or on a rough dirt road involve sophisticated perceptive and cognitive processes

that take years to develop. Vehicles that

navigate autonomously must be able to recognize a path, guide the vehicle, avoid stationary and moving obstacles, maintain a

safe speed, and respond to emergencies.

In 1990, at JPL, the six-wheeled experimental vehicle Robby has demonstrated,

using onboard power and machine vision

and computation,24 its capability to traverse rugged natural terrain at very low

speeds. In 1991, Robby demonstrated semiautonomous speeds of 80 meters per hour.

Future development will focus on increasing

Robby’s speed to 2 to 3 kilometers per day.

Using a neural network controller, researchers at the Robotics Institute at CMU

have achieved the ability to “teach” a vehicle to drive autonomously along a highway, gravel, and dirt roads, and even paths

25 at speeds of 20 to 40 miles per hour. Vehicle speeds are currently limited by computing speed and available computing algorithms. Much faster speeds can be expected

in the future as computers increase in capability and researchers develop new methods

of navigating obstacles. Although automated vehicles, using artificial intelligence

methods for cognition, now provide some

capability for exploration, goal seeking, and

obstacle avoidance, they are still in the research stage, and have relatively limited capabilities. In particular, they have difficulty

responding appropriately to situations unforeseen by their designers.

JPL has shown that it is now possible in

the laboratory to plan a path of activity by

decomposing it into its component tasks

and to predetermine the path of a robot arm

to avoid obstacles and reach a preassigned

goal or object.

Internal representation — When communications delays become longer than a few

minutes, mission controllers experience severe limitations in their ability to control an

instrument on a distant body, particularly if

the instrument is roving the surface. Hence,

if the robot has the capability to form an

internal representation of its own location

and status, and of updating the representation with sensory inputs, it can operate on

its own for a significant portion of the time.

Additional commands can then be sent to

the robot several times a day, if necessary.

Such supervised autonomy may be the only

ZZE. Schmiti and R.H. Cannon, “Initial Experiments on the End-Point Control of a Flexible One Link Robot,” ZnzemationalJouma/ ofR*tics Research, vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1984; Wen-Wei Chiang, Raymond Kraft, and Robert H. Cannon, Jr., “Design and Experimental Demonstration

of Rapid, Precise End-Point Control of a Wrist Carned by a Very Flexible Manipulator,” The International Journal of Robotics Research, vol.

10, No. 1, February 1991, pp. 30-40.

ZJet ~opulsion ~boratoV, IWO &f@h@JpLAutomtion and Robohcs, January 1991; T Choi, H. Delingette, M. De~uis, Y. Hsin) M.

Hebert, and K Ikeuchi, “A Perception and Manipulation System for Collecting Rock Samples,” Pmc. of the NASA Symposium on Space Operations, Applications, and Research, Albuquerque, NM, June 1990.

zQErann Gat, Marc G. S1ack, David R Miller, and R. James Firby, “Path Planning and Execution Monitoring for a planetary Rover,” J+oceedings of the IEEE Robotics and Automation Conference, Cincinnati, OH, May 1990, pp. 20-25.

~Dean A. pomerleau, “Efficient ~aining of Artificial Neural Networks for Autonomous Navigation,” Neural Computation, VO1. 3, No. 1)

‘Rxrence Sejnowski (cd.), 1991.
84 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

way of controlling a robot on the surface of

Mars from Earth.

. Vision and perception sensors — Passive stereo vision and active microwave, infrared,

or laser rangefinders have both been tested

in the laboratory. The rangefinders tend to

have larger power requirements than passive stereo vision and need to be qualified

for use on the Martian surface. However,

they require less computing power and provide more reliable three-dimensional information. Other perception sensors, e.g.,

those that could test the load-bearing capability of the soil, are in the very early stages

of development.

Operator interface and mission operation —

The successful completion of a robotic mission will depend in large part on the development of intelligent software and other

systems to enable mission controllers to interact with distant robots, having increasing

autonomous capability. Engineers at Stanford University have developed an intuitive

graphical interface that allows the operator

to indicate the desired robotic movement

and connection of objects. The tasks are

then executed autonomously by a pair of

cooperating robot arms. The system at

Stanford has been operated from Washington, DC.26 Equally important areas of research include the development of techniques to provide the operator with a sense

of “virtual reality,” executive and system

simulation software, and force and torque

reflection.

Automated noncontact instruments — Both

human and robotic missions could make

use of these technologies, which include

spectrometers, imaging spectrometers, elementary particle detectors, radars, and microwave detectors. Although these are well

developed for remote sensing from orbit,

. .

●

they should be adapted for use in close

range. JPL has demonstrated software for

efficiently processing data in real time. This

software would permit the robot to execute

conditional commands, e.g., search commands, that depend on ongoing exploration.

Computem — Experiments at JPL and other

laboratories indicate the need for onboard,

space-qualified computers capable of executing tens of millions of instructions per

second (MIPS) to operate large rovers that

navigate autonomously. An additional 50 to

100 MIPS-equivalent would be needed for

specialized vision processors. Robotics will

benefit substantially from advances in computers developed for other uses.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES

The application of A&R research to the exploration of the Moon and Mars, as well as to industrial, defense, and other applications will require

legislative, oversight, and appropriations attention to several crucial technology issues:

. Interdticiplinary concerns — A&R draws on

a large number of other, rapidly changing

engineering disciplines. Robotics traditionally relies on knowledge in such disciplines

as mathematics, materials science, dynamics, electromechanical energy conversion,

control theory and control engineering,

computer engineering, sensor technology,

industrial and operations engineering. It

draws increasingly on advances in artificial

intelligence technology, real-time computing systems and programming methods,

simulation technology, and computer networking methods and technology. Despite

some significant improvements in A&R as

a result of these interactions, artificial intelligence and robotics are generally treated as

separate disciplines rather than as one overall discipline that focuses on the develop-

~bstanley A. Schneider and Robert H. Cannon, Jr., “Experimental Object-Level Strategic Control with Cooperating Manipulators.” In The

Proceedings of the ASME l+%zter Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, December 1989.
Chapter 6–Automation and Robotics Research and Development ● 85

ment of intelligent systems to define and

carry out a variety of well-defined tasks.

Robotics for exploring the Moon and

Mars requires advances in the three broad

areas of machine perception, cognition, and

action, which in the past have developed in

relative isolation. For example, machine

perception, which requires a variety of sensors, has evolved from applications such as

photo interpretation and manufacturing

part recognition, which involve the sensing

of still images. These applications, which

involve only minimal time constraints,

therefore require comparatively simple

technology. Machine cognition has evolved

as artificial intelligence technology, applied

to purely cognitive tasks that are also not

constrained by time. Machine action has

evolved in robotics and control technologies, usually coupled with simple sensor

technology (as opposed to complex perception, which would require sensing and cognition in real time).

The addition of a requirement that robotic devices operate in real time adds a significant constraint into the development of

these technologies. Because these areas

have evolved relatively independently, A&R

experts have relatively little experience with

integrating techniques, methods, and hardware developed in each area into an intelligent, functioning whole.27

Systems integration — Because robots are

complex systems that integrate perception,

cognition, manipulation, control, human interaction, and must accommodate system

architecture, error detection and recovery

mechanisms, and mission planning, systems integration techniques assume a crucial role in making them function effectively. At present, the absence of systematic

techniques for creating complete robot

archetypes in which the characteristics of

interacting subsystems can be fully accommodated is a barrier to actualizing robots of

the future. In addition, the design, manufacture, and operation of individual components has not reached a high level of

maturity.

The scale of the problem faced by robotics engineers can be seen in an analogy to an

automobile. 28 Automobile systems have

matured over many years. The brakes, electrical systems, transmissions, and so forth

are well understood. Furthermore, the

transmission system interacts little or not at

all with the brakes. Hence, improvements in

the braking system can be pursued with

little regard for its possible affects on the

transmission system. In most robotic systems, however, even small changes in one

subsystem, e.g., an acuator, may require

changes in another subsystem.

Operation of the automobile provides

another insight into the difficulty of crafting

systems integration techniques. A human

driver must constantly monitor the vehicle,

sensing internal and external conditions,

controlling the automobile in real time despite uncertainty concerning what lies

around the next bend, and correcting control errors along the way. A robotic operator

must do the same. The robotic system must

cope with uncertainty in control (sensors

never report exactly the state of nature) and

with uncertainty in control (the robotic

mechanism never performs exactly the issued command). Each of the subsystems

must tolerate errors and mistakes committed by other subsystems. Furthermore, it

must do so in real time, because the automobile is moving. Given the current state of

robotics technology, all contingencies for

robotics systems must be anticipated and

accounted for by designer beforehand.

.-Zysuch integration is beginning, e.g., at Stanford University, where teams in aerospace robotic control and in artificial intelligence areworking

closely together to solve problems of mutual interest.

~Enc ~otkov, Robotics Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, persona] communication, May 1991.
86 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

●

●

Existing robots have little capability for responding to unforeseen circumstances and

for learning from experience.

The role of artificial intelligence – Intelligent

systems (artificial, or machine intelligence)

should play a major role in the development

of robots. If properly implemented in a system architecture, intelligent systems provide the user with the capability to “use,

modify, create, and exploit models” of

29 They provide the which they are a part.

“brains” of a robotic device that ideally

allows it to approach a problem with flexibility.

Areas of artificial intelligence and control

engineering that can assist the development

of effective A&R devices (table 6-1) include:

human/machine interfaces; overall systems

architecture, including the computational

environment, languages, operating systems,

and network interfaces; verification and validation of critical technology elements, e.g.,

software and processing elements; and the

capability for evolutionary growth of the

system architecture.

Technology strategies – The current intellectual ferment in A&R technologies may offer

opportunities for organizing missions in

novel ways. For example, until recently,

most scientists assumed that a Mars rover

would be a relatively large vehicle (hundreds

of kilograms) that would require a large

amount of computing capacity to traverse

the Martian surface. Although such a rover

could carry a number of tools and use part

of its computing power for scientific analysis, because it would be required to do so

many tasks, NASA could probably provide

funding for only one or two such rovers.

Scientists would therefore suffer the risk

that a failure in one or more major subsystems would destroy most or all of the misTable 6-1 –Technological Challenges for

Intelligent Systems

● Improvements in multiple sensor integration, processing,

and understanding.

. Development of distributed knowledge-based systems

that can cooperate with each other in real-time distributed

operational environment.

. Improvements in systems architecture and integration

including the development of intelligent user interfaces,

real-time fault management, and a high-performance,

real-time computational environment.

● Improvements in systems verification and validation.

. Development of focused testbed and flight demonstrations.

SOURCE: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Ames Research

Center, 1991

sion. In addition, although a single rover

might traverse many tens of kilometers, it

would be unlikely to be able to explore a

relatively small region of geographical

interest.

In the last few years, A&R researchers

have experimented with small rovers30 and

have suggested that sending many of these

would increase the chances of acquiring significant scientific data. Several micro- or

minirovers could be transported on existing

launch vehicles to different locations, making possible broad coverage of the planet.

Some researchers have expressed concern

that small rovers would be unable to carry

enough computing power to store or generate a map of their location in order to navigate safely among obstacles. However, if the

small rover were given the capacity to move

across the landscape without an internal

map, the necessary computing capacity

would decrease dramatically. Researchers

at MIT have built legged small rovers based

on so-called subsumption architecture,

which requires no prior instructions about

how to navigate.31 These rovers are given

only a set of rules about the order in which

to move their “legs.” Hence, they act more

~Eberhard Rechtin, .S’ysterns Archilecting: Creating and Building Complex System (New York, NY: ~entice Hall 1991), P. 100.

30 Davjd R Miller, “Mjnj-Rovers for Mars Exploration,” Proceedings of the Viion-21 Symposium, Cleveland, OH, April 1990.

slDavjd H. Freedman, “Invasion of the Insect Robots,” Discover, March 1991, pp. 42-50.
Chapter 6–Automation and Robotics Research and Development .87

I

Photo credit: California Institute of Technology

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Experimental minirover, named Tooth, developed by the Jet

Propulsion Laboratory. Tooth is capable of carrying out a

limited number of tasks, operating either under command

or autonomously.

like insects than higher level animals, making their way across the landscape by trial

and error rather than by carrying an internal map and making decisions about which

way to move. Provided with appropriate optics and sensors, they can nevertheless traverse the landscape.

Many A&R experts argue with this approach, pointing out that to do useful work

on the planet, rovers would need internal

guidance, which would require considerable computing capacity, unless they were

operated from Earth remotely .32 They

would also have to carry adequate electrical

power and instrumentation (optics and

electronics), which would be difficult or im-

●

possible in mini-or microrovers. Even carrying adequate vision and telemetry systems

might severely strain the capacity of small

rovers. As computers grow smaller and

smaller and A&R engineers learn how to

build smaller and lighter mechanical systems, they may be able to build rovers with

sufficient computing capacity to do useful

planetary reconnaissance and analysis in

several regions.33 Providing adequate electrical power to small rovers will prove a

challenge, because existing batteries can

carry only a limited amount of power compared to their weight and size, and solar

power requires both storage batteries and a

relatively large solar panel. A Radioisotopic

Thermoelectric Generator (RTG), which

could be used on a large rover, would be too

heavy and bulky for a small one.

Communications delays – Communications delays between the Earth and Moon (3

seconds) and between Earth and Mars (6 to

40 minutes) would introduce significant

complications to the operation of robotic

devices on the Moon or Mars directly from

Earth. Research has shown that delays of

the order of seconds can be accommodated

by using a combination of machine vision

and modeling of the environment in real

time. 34 Hence, it appears likely that A&R

engineers will learn how to overcome the

time delays associated with the teleoperation of a rover on the Moon and having it

carry out a complex set of tasks.35

The time delays inherent in communicating with Mars will require building much

more autonomy into rovers or other robotic

devices, or require considerably more patience and reduced scientific expectations.

For example, after assessing the surround-

 the times could make such research 

 for international collaboration, as the the European 

Agency, and Japan are all considering employing rovers to explore the Moon and Mars.

 Richard Michael Projecting and Coordinating Intelligent Action at a

Distance,” IEEE Transactions on Robotics and Automation, vol. 6, No. 2, April 1990, pp. 146-158.

 demonstrated the tasks in the when they drove the

Lunakhod rover many kilometers across the lunar surface.
88. Exploring the Moon and Mars

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Artist’s conception of a core sample (center) undergoing

analysis after being obtained from the planetary surface by

coring bit (shaded device left of center).

ings of a Mars rover, the human geologist on

Earth could direct the rover to move around

or over large and small obstacles to a specified location in the landscape, pick up a

rock sample, examine it in several wavelengths, send the resulting data back to

Earth, and wait for further instructions.

These actions require the robot to be much

more autonomous than existing ones. After

the robot has accomplished that set of tasks,

the geologist would be in a position to determine whether the sample should be retained

for further examination or discarded. If the

geologist decides to retain the sample, he or

she might instruct the robot to analyze it

further, or place the sample in a bin for

eventual return to Earth. The scientist and

the rover could then repeat their close collaboration in another promising geographical area. In this way, the distance between

Earth and Mars would only slow up, not

seriously impede, the robotic exploration of

Mars.

Flexibility and resilience — Flexibility and

the ability to adapt to new situations are two

qualities often cited as characteristic of human exploration. Robotic spacecraft also

share these characteristics to some extent

and have demonstrated the ability to tolerate some software and hardware deficiencies. For example, in the late 1970s, software

engineers were able to work around a potentially crippling loss of one of the receivers

and the failure of the frequency lock circuit

on the other aboard the Voyager spacecraft.

Because it was possible to reprogram the

tiny memory (only 4 kilobytes) within Voyager, it went on to return startling images of

the outer planets and their moons.36 More

recently, the Magellan spacecraft, which is

generating a detailed radar map of the surface of Venus, began to spin slowly out of

control.37 With the help of ground controllers who developed means of working

around the problems, the spacecraft was

able to recover and continues to send crisp

radar images to Earthbound scientists.38

The fact that ground controllers have

been able to overcome such difficulties results in part from good spacecraft design,

which incorporates redundancies and multiple paths for decisionmaking, but also

from clever and insightful manipulation of

the spacecraft’s software. By building in

more sophisticated fault-tolerant capability

and self-healing processes, in both hardware and software, future spacecraft can be

made even more flexible and may require

less oversight from controllers on Earth.

 “Advances in Space Robotics,” Presented at the 40th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Spain, Oct. 7-13,1989. also points out that, “Reprogrammability has made it possible to improve the precision of the spacecraft

trajectory, as more information on the ephemeris of planets and satellites was acquired during the mission and to enhance the performance

of the instruments by developing on the ground and then transmitting to the onboard computer better algorithms for image coding and for

motion compensation of the scan platform. ”

 Sharp Images, but Computer Problems 

 Aug. 27, 1990, p. 29.

 paints a portrait Of Science, vol. 251, 1991, pp. 1026-1027.
Chapter 6–Automation and Robotics Research and Development ● 89

Tomorrow’s challenge is to design and

build an equivalent level of flexibility, resilience, and fault tolerance39 in machines that

will experience direct mechanical contact

with the environment. With few exceptions, 40 most spacecraft have had to deal

only with celestial mechanics and longrange gravitational forces. The precise positioning and motion of the spacecraft platform has occurred in free space, with no

mechanical contact with the surface.

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR

A&R RESEARCH AND

DEVELOPMENT

Resolving these issues will require basic technology development and testing at both the subsystem and system level. It will also require consistent funding. One of the most important

concerns expressed to OTA staff by project managers both within NASA and externally was the

inconsistent pattern of funding for robotics programs.

41 programs would be started, begin to

provide useful results, and then be canceled

abruptly. Although technology research programs may commonly experience a certain lack of

stability as research priorities change, sometimes

abruptly, the United States is unlikely to see major progress in the development of A&R technologies until they are taken much more seriously.

The United States has the capability and the

resources to implement a highly competitive

A&R program. However, it presently lacks the

structure to carry one out. An integrated A&R

program to serve government needs could engage

the capabilities of the universities, government

laboratories, and industry. For example, universities could efficiently conduct basic research and

then, in cooperation with the appropriate government laboratories, participate in further refinement and demonstration of technology feasibility

and readiness. Promising technologies could then

be handed over to development centers and aerospace industries for final development, validation, and implementation. If A&R programs in

government laboratories and industry were more

tightly coupled, A&R technologies would have a

higher chance of finding their way into industrial

applications and commercial ventures.42

In some respects, A&R technologies were

oversold in the 1980s because the technology

seemed more simple, tractable, and mature than

it was. Continued technology development, and

experience with successful systems, could raise

public awareness of the utility of A&R systems

and create a setting in which A&R engineers can

be more innovative in applying them to space and

Earthbound applications. There are many possible blendings of perception, cognition, and action

at a distance. For example, we might employ teleautonomous systems that can operate autonomously most of the time, but easily be brought

under teleoperated control when necessary.

Greater understanding of both the promise and

limits of A&R technologies would assist development of such systems. Tying the development of

new robotic technologies to specific planetary

projects, such as emplacing scientific instrument

packages on the Moon, or exploring the surface of

Mars, should help focus the development of new

technologies.

39 Robotics engineem find continuing challenge in providing fault tolerance for mechanical structures that is equivalent to the fault tolerance

now being incorporated in computer software.

dOFor ~nmple, Viking spacecraft on Mars, and the Lunakhod rover on the Moon.

dl~though inconsistent funding may not be unique to NASA’S A&R program, it has hampered efforts within NASA to exploit the capabilities

of A&R technologies.

dzAt present, the aerospace industry is not closely coupled to other industries. Hence, effective technolo~ transfer to the broader manufacturing and service industries will require sustained effort.
Chapter 7

Costs of the Mission From Planet Earth

As a proposed new program with significant

long-term costs, the Space Exploration Initiative

(SEI), or Mission from Planet Earth, will come

under careful scrutiny by Congress. Estimates by

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the aerospace industry suggest

that the total expenditure over a 30- or 35-year

period for establishing a lunar base and mounting a crewed Mars mission, including robotics

missions, could reach a range of $3001 to $550

billion 2 (1991 dollars), which would make it the

most costly program in NASA’s history.3

However, at this early stage in the long process

of planning the components of a Mission from

Planet Earth, which could include a variety of

optional paths,4 any estimates of costs are necessarily extremely uncertain. As the Committee on

Human Exploration of Space of the National Research Council pointed out, they “are likely to

remain so for some time.”5 Costs depend critically on the range and scale of planned activities,

their schedule, and on a multitude of other factors—some well known, some only dimly perceived, and some as yet totally unrecognized. The

ability to predict costs will therefore depend

heavily on new information developed in the

course of the program. Cost estimates also depend on the projected costs of developing new

technologies and manufacturing the systems critical to the success of the various projects within

the overall plan.

At this early stage of planning for a Mission

from Planet Earth, when the many program options available are still under discussion,6 few of

the systems have been defined well enough to

estimate costs, even loosely. The models used to

estimate costs are notoriously unreliable in projecting the costs of systems incorporating new

technologies because the models depend on past

development experience. The more familiar designers are with the technology, the more accurate are the cost estimates.7 For example, NASA

and the Department of Energy may wish to pursue development of nuclear energy as the propulsion mode for transporting humans from Earth

orbit to Mars, because, if successful, nuclear propulsion could dramatically reduce the transit

time between the two planets. Yet the probable

costs for developing nuclear propulsion are very

poorly known because the development process ,

contains a significant number of unknown costs.

The costs of an interplanetary vehicle powered by

nuclear propulsion are also poorly known. Detailed design studies could reduce the cost uncertainties, but only marginally, until additional

technology development is done.

If, after pursuing development of nuclear propulsion technologies, the total development costs

seem too great, NASA might decide instead to

use chemical propulsion, which is much better

known, to transport people to Mars, even though

the journey could take much longer. Yet the costs

I~er 30 Yearn, Genera] Dynamics Space Systems Division) “Lunar/Mars Initiative Program Options–A General Dynamics Perspective,”

Briefing Report, March 1990.

Zunpublished estimates develo~d by NASA for its study entitled, Repoti of the 90-DaY Study on Human E#oration of tie M~n and MLWS

(W%hington, DC: NASA, November 1989). This estimate, which was for a 35-year period beginning in 1991, includes a 55-percent reserve,

and would fund a permanent lunar base and robust human exploration of Mars.

3By comparison, the Apollo program cost about $116 billion in 1991 dollars.

4NASA, Repoflof~e 9@Dws&~on Hunuzn Exploration of the Moon and Mars (Washington, DC: NASA, November 1989); Synthesis Group,

America at the Threshold (Washington, DC: the White House, June 1991).

SNational Research Council, Committee on Human Exploration of Space, Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA 90-Dw S@Y

and Altemahves (W%hington, DC: National Academy Press, 1990), p. 31.

%ee, e.g., Synthesis Group, op. cit., footnote 4.

Tues. Congress, Office of Wchnology ~xment, Reducing L.uunch Operations Costs: New Technolo@es ~d tictices, OTA-~-ISC-28

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988), app. A.

-91-
92 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

of an interplanetary vehicle propelled by chemical fuel are also uncertain. Nearly every system in

an exploration program faces similar development choices and uncertainties.

Further, in a large project, the development of

new technologies is interlinked. New technologies

are not “in place” until they are integrated into

the rest of the system. Unexpected delays in developing and testing a new launch system, for

example, would delay an entire project, even if

other technologies were ready. Problems even

with supporting technologies and systems may

nevertheless delay the project. For example, many

payloads designed for launch on the space shuttle

had to wait for several years to be launched after

the loss of Challenger, because to redesign and

alter them for launch on expendable launch vehicles would have entailed substantial extra cost.8

Hence, it is far too early to judge the total costs of

exploratory missions to Mars using either robotics spacecraft or human explorers.

As NASA develops alternative plans for a Mission from Planet Earth, it should examine carefully which technologies would lead to lower overall costs (including development, manufacturing,

and operational costs). Some technologies, e.g.,

those for space transportation, could have broad

application in the space program, and would

therefore contribute to overall development of

U.S. efforts in space. Others, e.g., space nuclear

power and nuclear propulsion, would assist in a

drive to expand the human presence beyond

Earth orbit, but would have less application elsewhere.

COST ISSUES

Comparing Robotic and

Crew-Carrying Costs

Because of the large uncertainties in making

cost estimates for the Mission from Planet Earth,

comparisons between a set of robotic missions

and human missions are also highly uncertain.

However, experience with previous space projects provides some guidance. Several OTA workshop participants estimated that, based on their

experience with developing and managing various space projects, specific robotic exploration

projects might cost one-tenth to one-hundredth

as much as human exploration.

These differences are the result of greater

weight for human missions, the need for life-sustaining systems, and the need to provide for crew

safety. However, comparisons between the costs

of carrying out missions using only robots and the

costs of crew-carrying missions can be deceiving

because the two kinds of enterprises would often

accomplish different objectives.

The overall mission strategy would also have a

major effect on the costs of either robotic or

crew-carrying missions. For a Mars mission, it

would, for example, depend on whether human

crews would expect to work and live largely in

habitats on the Martian surface while sending

robotic rovers out to explore, whether crews

would themselves do most of the exploring, or

whether they would remain in orbit about the

planet controlling rovers on the surface.

It is possible at this stage to reach very limited

conclusions about total costs of both robotics and 

human exploration by examining several major

systems that would be required as elements of the

overall architecture of a Mission from Planet

Earth. Figure 3-1 in Chapter 3 presents technologies in eight categories that may be needed to

mount robotics exploratory ventures, develop a

permanently occupied lunar base, and send a

human crew to Mars. This figure reveals two major conclusions. First, human exploration of the

Moon and Mars would necessitate development

of some nine new critical technologies, each one

of which could cost several billion dollars to develop. For example, the development and testing

of a new Earth-to-orbit space transportation system (the National Launch System) could cost

81t ~o~t be~een $3o and $4o million t. reconfigure the Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE) satellite for launch on an e%ndab~e 1auncher

after Challenger was lost.
Chapter 7–Costs of the Mission From Planet Earth ● 93

about $11 billion (1988 dollars), including facilities.9 Second, robotics missions would require far

fewer expensive new technologies and systems.

With the possible exception of aerobrakingl0 for

a Mars mission,ll robotics exploration (sample

return mission) would require the development of

few major new technologies beyond automation

and robotics (A&R) technologies, though several

listed would clearly increase the chances of

successful completion of certain scientific missions, and others would provide considerable leverage in accomplishing some science objectives.

In attempting to understand cost comparisons

between missions that would use robotic technologies on the Moon or Mars and those that would

use crews, Congress could ask NASA to present

the costs and cost uncertainties12 as well as the

benefits and drawbacks of various alternatives.

Congress could then decide whether the estimated costs justified expending tax dollars.

Schedule

Each project carries with it an optimal timetable for completion that results in minimum costs.

Trying to push technology and organizations too

fast results in higher total costs. Stretching out

the schedule or delaying it once started also result

in higher costs. Because the risks of incurring

higher than optimal costs increases with the size

of the project, the Nation might be well advised to

break up the Mission from Planet Earth into a

series of relatively small projects,13 each with its

own objectives and schedules. Such a strategy

should make budgeting easier and reduce the risk

that any one project would suffer being delayed,

especially given the extremely long timescale for

the Mission from Planet Earth. However, under

these circumstances, the overall plan would have

to be extremely flexible to account for unexpected

successes or delays. If everything works out, a

fully integrated approach is much less costly than

a flexible one. But a flexible approach allows

plans to change as budgets and national priorities

change over time.

As noted earlier, the OTA workshop concluded that the scientific objectives for exploring

the Moon and Mars could be pursued on a wide

variety of timetables, depending on the availability of technology and funding, and scientific progress. Launch opportunities for Mars occur about

once every 2 years. Launches to the Moon can be

carried out several times a month. Hence, scientific missions can be planned and executed as new

information indicates new questions to ask. However, political or other objectives may suggest a

particular timetable, such as the date of 2019 that

the Bush administration has proposed for landing a crew on Mars, which is 50 years after the

first Apollo landing. Given a timetable, planners

can produce an overall system architecture to fit

within it.14 An architecture based on political

considerations may not accomplish the full range

of possible scientific objectives, in part because

planners experience considerable temptation to

cut scientific objectives in order to meet a predetermined schedule, especially when stretching the

schedule would result in higher overall costs.

gManufactufing and owrations costs would be at least $70 million per copy (1988 dollars). U.S. Congress, Office of ~chnolosy *essment,

Access to Space: The Future of the U.S. Space Transportation System, OTA-ISC-415 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990),

p. 36.

IOAerobraking makes use of the Martian atmosphere to slow down an interplanetary vehicle to the point that it can be captured by Mars’

gravitational field. A very massive interplanetary vehicle would either have to use aerobraking or cany sufficient fuel to slow it for capture by

Mars.

llFigure 3-1 lists aerobraking as a Ctitica] technology for returning samples from the surface of Mars. However, the strength of its importance

for such a mission depends directly on how the mission is carried out. A robotics rover mission using small rovers would not necessarily need

aerobraking. Such a mission could be accomplished with existing technology.

l~e amount of cost uncefiain~ pro~des a measure of the cost risk involved.

lsplanetav projects, by their nature, tend to be rather large and take several years to plan and complete. Delays in major subsystems or in

supporting systems, e.g., space transportation, can introduce substantial delays in such projects. Nevertheless, it may be more cost-effective

in the long run for project leaders to resist the temptation to load many different objectives onto a single project.

IQSee, e.g., the ~tem architectures e~mined in the Synthesis Group, America at the Threshold Washington, DC: The white Hou*~ ‘Une

1991).
94 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

Operational Costs

The operational costs for exploration, whether

robotic or human, could be very high. Such costs

are notoriously hard to judge, as they depend

heavily on the success engineers have in developing systems that require relatively little continuing oversight. For example, when the space

shuttle was under development, planners expected operational costs to be high in the initial

operational stages, but to decrease steadily as

operators gained experience with its many subsystems. 15 @cl. time, yearly operational costs of

the shuttle have actually increased16 and NASA

has been unable to decrease the per-flight operational cost by increasing the flight rate.17 In part,

the wide disparity between expectations and reality in operational costs results from the fact that

when budgets became tight as the shuttle was

under development, items that would have reduced long-term operational costs, but required

near-term development, were often cut from the

shuttle budget. The result was a series of nearterm reductions at the expense of long-term continuing costs. 18 For systems designed to support

humans, safety considerations lead to numerous

design improvements after a system has been

built, which also increases costs.

As planning for the Mission from Planet Earth

proceeds, it will be important for planners to

examine carefully the operational costs of each

project within the overall plan, including robotic

ones, and determine whether operational costs

can be reduced. By reducing the number of personnel required, A&~ technologies could be

used to control costs. In the Shuttle program, for

example, the large number of contractors and

NASA employees required to refurbish and

launch each orbiter, and to follow the missions

while in progress, is a major contributor to overall

mission costs. l9

Reducing Costs

As noted, costs will also depend on new technologies that might be developed during the

program. Actual costs could be higher or lower depending on the technological hurdles encountered and the cost reducing effects of technological and management innovations. Many of the

A&R technologies being developed to reduce

manufacturing costs on aircraft assembly lines,

or to reduce the costs of launch vehicles, may

have particular utility for the Mission from Planet

Earth .

2 0

The proposed Mars sample return mission

provides an illustrative example. Early studies

suggested that the costs of sending spacecraft to

Mars to return a sample to Earth might reach

about $10 to $15 billion.21 Yet recent studies suggest that miniaturized robots and simplified objectives might make it possible to mount a more

limited sample return mission for much less

cost.

22 For example, small robots could be

launched on Delta or Atlas launch vehicles, which

are available today from commercial launch service companies. Because many small robots

could be sent to several different locations and

landed using existing technology, they could potentially sample wider regions than a single rover

collecting samples from the surface. Even if several small rovers were to fail, the remaining ones

would still carry out their missions, reducing

15Ad~SoV Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, Report of the Advisory Co~”ztee on the Future of tie U.S. sPaCe R%?arn

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1990).

16NASA out]a~ for space shuttle o~rations have increased about 17 percent per year since 1988. Projected outlays for fiscal Year 1991

equal $2.79 billion.

ITu.s. Congress, Office of ~chnology Assessment, Reducing Luurwh Operations Costs: New Technologies and Ractices, ~A-TM-lSC-28

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988).

181bid., pp. 5-6.

191bid., p. 40.

201bid., p. 4.

21’’Mars Rover Sample Return, Tkchnical Review, Final Report, vol. 5,” Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Sept. 22, 1988.

22Da~d p Miller, “Mini-Rove~ for Mars @loration, “ Proceedings of the Viion-21 Symposium, Cleveland, OH, April 1990.
Chapter 7–Costs of the Mission From Planet Earth ● 9.5

overall mission risk compared to a single rover/

sample return mission. Yet, small robots may not

be able to carry the computing capacity necessary

to do intricate tasks,23 or tasks requiring the use

of heavy equipment.

In attempting to reduce costs, the overall management approach may assume as much or more

importance as the technologies used. For example, project managers of the Strategic Defense

Initiative Organization Delta 180 Project found

that “decreasing the burden of oversight and review, and delegating authority to those closest to

the technical problems, resulted in meeting a

tight launch schedule and reducing overall

costs.”

24 Determining whether these or similar

techniques are appropriate to reducing costs in a

high-cost, high-risk robotic or crew-carrying mission would require careful study. However, experience with earlier planetary projects suggests the

following maxims for project development: 25 1 )

keep the entire project as simple as possible; 2) do

as much testing as possible before launch; 3)

provide adequate funding reserves for unforeseen problems; 4) avoid complex software and

complex internal processes; and 5) keep science

payloads to the requirements.

PAYING FOR THE MISSION

FROM PLANET EARTH

Returning crews to the Moon and exploring

Mars would have a major impact on NASA’s

yearly budget, and could adversely affect the

funding of NASA’s other activities. To support the

Missions to and from Planet Earth, and the various programs to which NASA has already committed, the Report of the Advisory Committee on

the Future of the U.S. Space Program recommended 10-percent real growth in NASA’s overall

budget over a period sufficient to pay for the

Mission from Planet Earth as well as other NASA

activities. 2 The National Research Council

Committee on Human Exploration of Space recommended growth of NASA’s budget by a “few

l0ths of percent in GNR”27 During the years of

highest spending on the Apollo program

(1%4-66) NASA spent about 0.8 percent of the

GNP.28 However, the United States was then in

the middle of a “race to the Moon,” and beating

the Soviet Union to it was a national priority. No

such race exists today.

Significant pressures on the discretionary portion of the Federal budget will make obtaining a

real growth rate in NASA’s budget of 10 percent,

or increases of a few tenths percent of the GNP,

extremely difficult, unless our national priorities

change. 29 NASA’s budget submission for fiscal

year 1991 included a total of $%2.8 million for

activities cited in the budget summary as related

to SEI. Of that amount, about $188 million was

targeted to support new activities.30 In passing

the Appropriations Bill for the Department of

Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies,31 Congress deferred consideration of the proposed SEI as a result of “severe

budgetary constraints which limit the agency’s

ability to maintain previously authorized projects

ZsComputing capaci~ per weight and volume has decreased dramatically over the last 30 years. If existing trends continue, computing capacity

may not be a limiting factor.

Z4U.S. Congress, Office of Rchnology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costr: New Technologies and fiactices, ~A-~-ISC-28

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988), p. 14.

~Scott Hubbard, Jet Propulsion Laborato~, personal communication, 1991.

zbAdvisov Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, op. Cit., footnote 15, P. 4.

zTIn 1990, NASA’S budget was about 0.18 percent of the GNR

~National Research Council, Committee on Human E@oration Of Space, op. cit., footnote 5, P. 31.

~David Moore, Statement before the Committee on Space, Science, and Technology, U.S. HOU* of Representatives, Jan. 31> 1991’

30Forfiscal year 1991, N~A placed other Ongoing activities in the SEI Categoqr to demonstrate that many of its efisting activities were already

directed toward the goals of SEI.

SIH.R. 5158, which became Public hW 101-5O7.
96. Exploring the Moon and Mars

and activities.”32 NASA received about $584 million. NASA’s budget submission for 1992 contains $94 million in support of identified SEI

activities.

In funding the many elements of the Mission

from Planet Earth, or SEI, it will be important to

maintain a balance of activities in space. Since

the Apollo days, NASA’s projects devoted to

“manned” activities have received the lion’s share

of NASA’s budget. Recently, that share has increased. In fiscal year 1990, for example, activities

for people in space consumed about 70 percent of

NASA’s budget.33 Space scientists and other observers of the U.S. space program have raised the

concern that the SEI might increase the proportion of funding applied to human activities in

space to the detriment of space science, the Mission to Planet Earth and other NASA space projects. 34

Both the National Research Council’s Committee on Human Exploration of Space35 and the

Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S.

Space Program36 have recommended fencing

funding for the rest of NASA's activities from

funding for a Mission from Planet Earth. The

Advisory Committee specifically recommends

“that the civil space science program should have

first priority for NASA resources, and continue

to be funded at approximately the same percentage of the NASA budget as at present (about 20

percent).” 37 However, the administration and

Congress may find it difficult to maintain funding

for NASA's base programs if the funding for SEI

leads to an even larger percentage of NASA's

budget than its endeavors to support people in

space now command. Schedule and other delays

in such activities would necessarily lead to cost

overruns that could “squeeze out” funding for

other civilian space activities.

SZU.S. House of Representatives, Conference Report toAccornpany H.R. 5158, (M. 18, 1990, p. 44. The report went on to say, “It is inevitable

in the conduct of the Nation’s civil space program that such human exploration of our solar system is inevitable.”

SSUP from about 65 ~rcent in the 2 previous years. U.S. Congress, Office of Wchnology Assessment, Access ZCJ Space: The Fumre of tie U.S.

Space Transportation System, OTA-ISC-415 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 5.

sQRobert L Park, “~ter 30 years of Dreams, a Wake-Up Call for NASA,” The Scientist, May 27, 1991, pp. 11, 13.

ss’~~e committee believes that it is imw~ant for the funding support for HEI ISEI] and other major initiatives to continue to be distinct

from that for the remainder of the NASA budget, to avoid eroding the base of other essential space and aeronautical capabilities.” National

Research Council, Committee on Human Exploration of Space, Human Exploration ofSpace:A Review of NASA 90-Day SZu+ andAllematives

(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1990), p. 32.

S6A~SoV Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, OP. cit., footnote 15.

371bid., p. 25.
Chapter 8

International Competition and Cooperation

When the United States was building its civilian space program, political competition with the

Soviet Union acted as a goad to enhance U.S.

technological capabilities, especially in space. In

part, U.S. officials worried that the Soviet

Union’s successes in launching large spacecraft

demonstrated its ability to field ballistic missiles

capable of landing nuclear weapons on the

United States. The demonstration of U.S. technological leadership by leading in civilian space

activities soon became an important part of U.S.

motivation for any proposed new activity.1 In

1%1 the Kennedy administration and the 85th

Congress took U.S. leadership a step farther by

funding a program that soon established acrossthe-board preeminence in space activities. Not

only did the United States demonstrate its preeminence in activities involving human crews, it

established strong programs in planetary exploration, meteorological satellites, and land remote

sensing. The United States also spearheaded the

development of the communications satellite industry, which today is still the only fully commercial space enterprise.2

Beginning in the 1970s, other nations, especially Japan and the European countries, have been

demonstrating their increasing capabilities in

space technology. They are now able to challenge

the United States in space applications and in

3 certain areas of space science. As a result, the

United States has seen the steady loss of its position as the dominant supplier of space-related

goods and services in the world market. Hence,

the grounds of competition have shifted away

from political competition for global status to

economic competition with our traditional allies.

America’s challenge for the 1990s and beyond will

be the construction of effective mechanisms to

enhance the U.S. economic position.

Despite the strong competitive foundation, the

U.S. space program has also had a long history of

encouraging cooperative activities. 4 During the

1960s, the 1970s, and even into the early 1980s, the

United States organized cooperative activities —

in part to enhance its leadership position. Under

those circumstances, most U.S. cooperative efforts were generally unequal partnerships in

which the United States could set the foundation

and terms of the cooperative venture. In part, the

United States could do so because the Soviet

Union offered little competition for cooperative

programs. The secretive nature of its space program, and the relatively immature level of its

technology made the Soviet Union unable to offer

much of interest to technologically advanced potential partners.

Although the capacity of the countries of Europe and Japan to challenge U.S. firms means

that they will likely continue to gain market share

for commercial goods and services, it also means

they make more effective partners in cooperative

ventures. In some areas of technology other countries lead; hence the United States would gain

technologically from cooperating. For most cooperative projects, the combination of skills each

party would bring would greatly enhance the

project’s outcome.

The Soviet Union’s continuing experience in

supporting a human presence in space on the

Salyut and Mir space stations, in launching a variety of launch vehicles, and its long-term interests

in planetary exploration, coupled with much

IIndced the ~o]e of leadership is codified in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Public ~w 85-568). “me aeronautical and

space acti~ties of the United States shall be conducted so as to contribute materially to.... The preservation of the role of the United States

as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology... (42 U.S.C. 2451, Sec. 102c(5)).

zNumerous ~ommuni~tions satellites have also been built for civilian government uses.

3u.s. congress, OffIce of ~chnoloU~xment, 1ntemahonal CmPrafion andco~etihon in U.S. Civilian spmeACtiVitie.r, OTA-ISC-239

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), ch. 4.

%e National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 mandates international cooperation (42 U.S.C. 2451, Sec. 102 c(7)).

-97-
98 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

greater openness about its space activities, now

make it a potentially attractive partner for cooperative science and technology projects.5 The Soviet Union is also seeking to attract partners for

commercial ventures and is willing to arrange

highly competitive terms for such cooperation.

The political advantages of competing with the

Soviet Union in space have greatly diminished,

and are being replaced by a growing realization

that cooperation would help support the Soviet

Union’s transition to a market economy, and assist Soviet political stability as it experiments with

democratic reform. On the other hand, the current Soviet economic crisis affects its ability to

fund space activities and may make it difficult for

Soviet scientists to engage in large cooperative

projects.

As space projects grow in cost and technological complexity, the need for efficient, cost-effective use of resources argues for an international

division of labor. During the 1990s, the United

States faces the challenge of developing new

cooperative mechanisms, based on the new global economic and political realities. That challenge

will require U.S. policymakers to alter significantly modes of thinking that derive from the era

of the cold war. For example, in future cooperative projects with the United States, Japan and

Europe are likely to require increasingly greater

voice over the terms of the project. For the Mission from Planet Earth, the United States will

have to resolve the apparent tension between its

wish to carry out ambitious, and costly, projects

on its own and the attraction of seeking foreign

participation in order to: 1) reduce costs for each

participant, 2) increase overall technological capabilities, 3) expand its opportunities for involvement in wider variety of disciplines, and 4) extend

its political influence. The United States will also

have to consider the opportunity that cooperation in U.S.-led projects gives for our partners to

increase their competitive posture.

COMPETITIVE CONCERNS

How the United States invests in its space program will affect other segments of the economy.

Investments made in technologies that could spur

industrial development and increase America’s

international competitiveness would be most welcome in today’s economy.6 As noted earlier, during the 1990s and into the next century, the United

States is unlikely to have any competitors in sending human crews to the Moon and Mars. However, we can expect other nations, including Canada, France, Germany, and Japan, to have a

strong interest in developing the technologies required for robotics spacecraft and probes. Many

of these technologies have a close relationship

with increasing productivity in the manufacturing and service sectors.

Although the United States invented robots

and still leads in many areas of research, in other

countries robotics technologies have assumed a

greater role in the economy. Canada, France,

Germany, Italy, and Japan, in particular, have 7

targeted automation and robotics (A&R) technologies for development for industrial and governmental use. In some areas, such as manufacturing, 8 their efforts well exceed U.S. capabilities.

Several OTA workshop participants expressed

concern that the U.S. space program has not

invested adequately in A&R technologies. Canada, France, Germany, and Japan have implemented programs that direct investment on A&R

space technologies toward the common goal of

supporting their industrial base.

5u.s. Congress, Office of ~chnology Assessment, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space, OTA-TM-STI-27 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, July 1985), ch. 4.

6u.s. ba]ance of Paments to the rest of the world make the United States the world’s greatest debtor nation.

?Andrew ~mer and Ruth Simon, “why Japan Loves Robots and We Don’t,” Forbes, Apr. 16, 1990, pp. 148-153; William ~ Wittaker and

lhkeo Kanade, Space Robotics in Japan (Baltimore, MD: Japanese lkchnology Evaluation Center, 1991).

Ssee e g , the ~nes Of articles on the impacts of robotics on manufacturing in the special issue of Techno/o@a[Forecmtingand socia~change~

vol. 35: April 1989.
Chapter 8–International Competition and Cooperation .99

Canada

Canada has used its involvement in the space

shuttle system, for which it provided the Canada

Arm, and the space station, for which it is providing the Mobile Servicing System and Special Purpose Dextrous Manipulator, to build its capabilities in A&R. The Canadian A&R program has

three integrated elements that are focused toward

one common goal: the development and implementation of the robotic system for space station

Freedom. 9 They are divided into three phases:

● Near Term (baseline) – Mobile Servicing

●

●

quirements for the space station during assembly, maintenance, and operations.

Mid Term – Advanced Technology Program. Canadian objectives include the enhancement of the basic robotic system with

higher performance capabilities to support

its future growth. Examples of such technologies include real time collision prevention

and avoidance, and advanced vision. The

additional capability should lead to reduced

costs and increased crew productivity.

Far Term – Strategic Technologies in Automation and Robotics. Canadian objectives

include: 1) the development of strategically

important A&R technologies for potential

incorporation into the Canadian Mobile

Servicing System over its lifetime by contracting out research to industry; and 2) the

support of national economic development

through encouraging commercialization of

the developed technologies.

Europe

Germany, Italy, and France have expressed

considerable interest in developing robotics technology for use in space. For example, the German

Aerospace Research Establishment (DLR) is

building the Space Robot Technology Experiment, ROTEX, which will fly in the next German

Spacelab mission (D-2) aboard the space shuttle,

scheduled for 1992. ROTEX is a small, six-axis

robot that will be used to verify an array of robotic tasks in space. It is designed to perform a

variety of preprogrammed tasks, but also under

control of astronauts and by remote control from

Earth, using 3-dimensional stereo computer

graphics and stereo television. ROTEX will:1°

. verify joint control under microgravity;

. demonstrate and verify the use of ROTEX

handcontrollers;

 Advanced Committee, Automation and Robotics for the Space Station Freedom and for

the U.S. Economy,” Memorandum 103851 Field, Research Center, National Aeronautics and Administration, May 1991), C.

 J. and B. Concepts for Space and Underwater Applications,” Proceedings 

the Space and Sea Colloquium, European Space Agency, Paris, France, Sept. 24-26, 1990, pp. 151-61.
100 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

●

●

demonstrate and verify the use of humanmachine interfaces that also allow for teleoperation from Earth; and

verify the execution of a variety of tasks in

space, e.g., making plug-in connections, assembly, and catching free-flying objects.

DLR is also working on lightweight robots and on

a variety of A&R methods to increase productivity in space. It expects many of these methods to

have Earthbound applications.

Robotics experts at the French space agency,

Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), are

exploring the potential for an “automatic planetary rover,” and have established partnerships

with other French laboratories working on both

terrestrial and undersea mobile robots.11 The

program is in its early stages and is focused on

developing robotic devices for scientific exploration of Mars: sample analysis, establishment of

geophysical profiles, and deployment of autonomous stations, for possible Mars deployment in

A.D. 2000.

Japan12

Japan has especially targeted A&R for research & development investment, as it expects

these technologies to provide increased productivity in a variety of areas. It also expects to reduce

its operations costs for crew-carrying missions by

employing A&R technologies, as well as create

A&R devices for robotic missions. The National

Space Development Agency (NASDA) funds the

Space Robot Forum, a group that brings together

members from government, industry, and academia to recommend directions for space robotics.

It has urged the development and extensive use of

so-called third-generation robotics systems that

operate with little human intervention.13

Japan is developing a first-generation, 9.7-meter-long robot arm for use with its Japan Experimental Module (JEM) for the international

space station Freedom. It will carry a smaller arm

and gripper at the end to provide greater dexterity. The Forum has suggested developing a space

station in the 21st century that would be operated

by robots controlled from Earth.

Japan has also expressed interest in exploring

the Moon and exploiting lunar resources. Individuals at the Japanese space agency, NASDA, have

examined the potential for developing a lunar

base, using lunar materials for construction.14

COOPERATIVE OPPORTUNITIES

As noted in an earlier OTA report, “U.S. cooperative space projects continue to serve important political goals of supporting global economic

growth and open access to information, and increasing U.S. prestige by expanding the visibility

of U.S. technological accomplishments. ”l5 A return to the Moon and an exploration of Mars

present a range of possible cooperative activities

with other nations. Because the costs for intense

planetary exploration are likely to be very high,

international cooperative activities could reduce

U.S. costs and increase the U.S. return on its

investment for exploration. A well-conceived

cooperative program could also establish the

United States as a leader in exploration.16 A

broadly based cooperative exploration program

llDenis J.p Moura, “Automatic pkinetq Rover: The French Mars and Lunar Rover Preparatory Program,” CNES briefing charts, March

1991.

lzwi]liam L Wittaker and ~keo ~nade, Space Robotics in Japan (Baltimore, MD: Japanese ‘lkchnology Evaluation Center, 1991).

IJFirst.generation robotic devices would work ]arge]y by teleoperation. Second-generation devices are those that do simple tasks on their

own; third generation robotic devices would be nearly autonomous. William L Wittaker and ‘Ihkeo Kanade, “Japan Robotics Aim for Unmanned

Space Exploration,” IEEE Spec&um, December 1990, p. 64.

1~. Iwata, “~chnical Strategies for Lunar Manufacturing,” IAA-88-588, Presented at the 39th Congress of the International Astronautical

Federation Meeting, Bangalore, India, Oct. 8-15, 1988.

15u.s. Congress, Office of ~chno]ogy Assessment, International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, op. cit., footnote

3, p. 7.

lbJohn M. ~gsdon, “Leading Through (operation,” Issues in Science and Zchnoloo, summer 1988, pp. 43-47.
Chapter 8–International Competition and Cooperation ● 101

with varied levels of participation, whether it was

primarily robotic or employed human crews,

would also enable the United States to encourage

less developed countries to enhance their own

science and technology base. However, cooperative projects must be carefully structured to keep

costs within bounds. Otherwise, the numerous

management interfaces and the differences in

cultures may vastly increase total costs for a

project. 17

In the past, most of the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration’s (NASA) cooperative

activities have been bilateral, in large part because bilateral cooperation is much simpler and

therefore less costly to manage than multilateral

cooperation.

18 They have also generally been

bounded in time. Yet increasingly the size and

duration of projects have led to the need for a

more flexible position. While some projects are

appropriate for a bilateral approach, others, because of their size, complexity, or duration, may

require a multilateral approach.

Even if, for international legal purposes, the

individual agreements are better arranged between pairs of nations, the day-to-day interactions are likely to be multilateral, rather than

bilateral in scope. For example, although the

agreements of the United States with Canada, the

European Space Agency (ESA), and Japan concerning Freedom are bilateral agreements, in designing, building, and operating the space station,

representatives of the four parties must meet and

coordinate with each other primarily as a group

in order to carry out their business most efficiently. Hubble Space Telescope also requires continuing management interaction among the nations

involved. 19

The need for a broader level of cooperation has

led to several suggestions for an umbrella organization or mechanism to coordinate and manage

large, international space projects.20 Such suggestions have always had to face the concern that

the ensuing bureaucratic arrangements could become extremely complicated and that individual

nations could begin to lose control over their own

projects. They could also lead to high overall

program costs related to need to involve more

organizations, each with its own agenda and

scientific goals, in the process. The multilateral

Inter-Agency’ Consultative Group (IACG) has

been suggested as a possible model for future

cooperative ventures because it was able to circumvent these drawbacks.21

Prior to the passage of Comet Halley through

the inner solar system in 1986, the ESA, Japan,

the Soviet Union, and the United States formed

the IACG to coordinate their efforts to observe

Comet Halley from space (box 8-A). The IACG

organization was deliberately kept informal and

simple in order to minimize bureaucratic impediments and to focus on scientific tasks. It operated

on the understanding that the IACG would serve

only in an advisory capacity to the member agencies. In addition, there would be no exchange of

funds and minimal technology transfer.22

The IACG provides an attractive model because it is relatively simple, and because it scored

a major success in the Halley encounter. Each

cooperating entity brought a particular strength

to the joint project in the form of a spacecraft or

IT~e fate of the Mars Observer Visual and Infrared Mapping Spectrometer is particularly instructive. Removed from the Mars Observer

payload in order to save money, it was later resurrected to fly on the Soviet Mars ’94 mission as a joint U.S./Soviet/French/Italian effort. It

became overly complicated and the U.S. financial share of the project eventually grew greater than the original instrument would have cost

on Mam Obsewer. The United States eventually had to cancel its involvement, deeply disappointing U.S. scientists and international partners

alike. Steven Squyres, Cornell University, 1991.

M~4N~A Prefem bilateral relations over projects that might involve three or more countries or organizations.” U.S. congress, Office of ~chnology Assessment, UNISPACE ‘82:A Context forIntemational Cooperation and Competition, OTA-TM-KC-26 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1983), p. 68.

19J~n Johnson-Free=, c~ang-ng Pafiem of hfemationaf Cooperation in Space (Malabar, FL orbit ~k CO., 1990), ch. 9.

201bid.

llKenneth s. pede=n, “me Global Conteti: Changes and Challenges,” Economics and Technolo8 in U.S. Space poli~> Molb MacauleY

(cd.) (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1986), pp. 173-198.

22Joan Johnson-FreeSe, chu@ng pa~em of Znlemational Cooperation in Space (Malabar, FL orbit Wk CO., 1990), ch. 15.
102 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars

Box 8-A–The Inter-Agency Consultative Group (IACG)

Delegates from the European Space Agency (ESA), Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States

met in Padua, Italy, in 1981 to discuss ways of coordinating their efforts to observe Comet Halley from

space. E.A. Trendelenburg, director of scientific programs for ESA and Roald Sagdeev, director of the

Space Research Institute of the Soviet Union had earlier urged that those nations with Comet Halley

projects could maximize their scientific return by working directly together rather than through a broadbased organization, such as the International Committee on Space Research (COSPAR). Other officials

agreed and formed the IACG to coordinate their efforts to observe Comet Halley from space.

The IACG’s initial meeting resulted in three working groups that met as often as necessary to generate recommendations related to the flight projects and to allocate specific tasks before, during, or following the Halley encounter. Although the United States sent no probe to the comet, in cooperation with the

International Halley Watch, it provided critical positional data on the Comet and the space probes. In

order to give the European Giotto space probe the best possible chance to image the nucleus of Halley,

accurate observations of both the comet and the probe were necessary. The United States used the Deep

Space Network to track the two Soviet Venera probes as they passed by Halley on March 6 and 9, 1986, on

their way to Venus.1 The resulting observations enabled scientists to reduce considerably the positional

uncertainty of the comet’s path, and made it possible to guide ESA’s Giotto accurately into the outer part

of Comet Halley. Representatives from all organizations involved met regularly to coordinate their activities, yet the United States at that point had no formal cooperative agreement with the Soviet Union.*

l~is was Called the Pathfinder concept.

zIndeed, Roald Sagdeev, fomer director of the Soviet Institute of Space Sciences, once quipped that “during the Halley obsemations, the United States acted as subcontractor to the European Space Agency” in supplying data about Venera’s position.

SOURCE: Joan Johnson-Freese, Changing Patterns of Zntemational Cooperation in Space (Malabar, FL Orbit Book Co., 1990),

ch. 15.

equivalent capability; the result from the whole At the present time, the only countries to demwas much greater than the sum of its individual

parts. The IACG, which began as an experiment,

is continuing and will focus on cooperating in

space science. One of the reasons it worked well is

that cooperative ventures with few interfaces are

much easier to arrange and manage.

The United States might wish to cooperate on a

wide variety of projects related to the exploration

of the Moon and Mars.x The extent to which the

IACG or an organization modeled after it would

be successful for such purpose, would depend in

part on whether it could maintain simplified

management interfaces. Of greater importance is

the question of who the potential partners might

be.

onstrate a strong interest in sending human crews

to Mars are the United States and the Soviet

Union. No other country has the launch vehicles

or other infrastructure necessary to land crews on

the Moon. In large part, they have not invested in

the means to launch and support human crews

because other countries have different economic

and political goals. However, Japan has an active

program to study the Moon with robotic instruments,~ and European scientists within ESA

have studied the scientific opportunities for exploring Mars” and the Moon.X The Soviet

Union is planning a robotic exploratory mission

to Mars in 1994 and considering a later sample

return mission to Mars. The Soviet missions are

zsBruce c. Mumay, “can Space &@oration Survive the End of the Cold War?” The planet~ RePo~, May/June 1991.

24Shigebumi Saito, “Japan’s Space Policy,” Space Policy, August 1989, pp. 193-200.

zSEUropean Space Agency, M&sion to Mars: Repoti of the Mars Exploration Stm$ Team (Paris, France: European Space Agency, January

1990).

2~e European Space Agency report is now in progress.
Chapter 8–International Competition and Cooperation ● 103

aimed in part at preparing the way to send

humans to Mars sometime in the next century.

The Soviet Union has for years contemplated

launching a lunar orbiter27 and has studied the

potential for returning a lunar sample from the

farside of the Moon, but has no mission under

planning. Hence, based on demonstrated interest, the strongest opportunities for the United

States to initiate cooperative projects for at least

the next decade would be on robotic ones. All

three major entities –ESA, Japan, and the Soviet

Union might be interested in participating.

During the early part of the next century, cooperation with the Soviet Union on sending human

crews to and from Mars might also be attractive,28 if the Soviet Union can survive its current

economic and political crises,29 and the United

States can resolve its own economic difficulties.

Given the high costs of supporting human crews

in space and Japan’s and ESA’s experience with

space station Freedom, Japan and the European

countries might be highly resistive to such cooperation for many years.30

The following examples illustrate the range of

potential projects that might be possible:

● Life sciences research — Cooperating on life

sciences work with the Soviets could be

highly fruitful for both parties. Soviet scientists have collected considerable data on the

reactions of humans to the space environment.31 However, in the past they were reluctant to share life sciences data, in part,

because the data were considered militarily

sensitive. Soviet scientists are now able to

share more of their data on weightlessness

●

●

and other life sciences issues. NASA is now

cooperating with the Soviet Union in a variety of life sciences areas, including standardization of measurements, use of U.S.

equipment on board Mir, and exchange of

biological specimens.32 The two countries

could extend their opportunities to collect

high-quality long- and short-term reactions

to the space environment by agreeing to fly

astronauts and cosmonauts on each others’

space vehicles.

Astronomy from the Moon — Making astronomical observations from the Moon might

be an especially fruitful area in which to

cooperate, at a variety of levels. The major

space-faring nations also have strong programs in astronomy and would likely have

an interest in cooperating on designing and

placing observatories of various sizes on the

Moon. In order to keep initial efforts as

simple as possible, it might be possible for

each participating entity to design and build

its own telescope, each with different capabilities. Such a program could even involve

countries that lack an independent means

to reach the Moon. For example, it could

involve countries of Eastern Europe that

have the scientific expertise to do serious

astronomical research but lack the rockets

and money to launch their telescopes.

Small rovers on the Moon or Mars — Several

small rovers could be sent on a single

launch. In a cooperative program, each cooperating entity could build its own small

rover, perhaps specialized to gather specific

data. Here again, each country could conzTNicholas L Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1990 (Colorado Springs, CO: lkledyne Brown Engineering, Febmary 1991), PP. 123-124.

28,~senior so~et space of~cials outline P]an for Joint Mars Mission,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, NOV. 19, 1990> P“ 67; Burton

I. Edelson and John L McLucas, “U.S. and Soviet Planetary Exploration: The Next Step is Mars, lbgether,” Space Policy, November 1988,

pp. 337-349.

~’AWre~ive Sotiet Space ~ogram ~reatened by Budget, Policy Changes,” Aviation Week and Space Technolo9, Mar. 18* 1991,

pp. 153-154.

s~e many delays and restructuring of space station Freedom have angered our Partners.

SIA.D. Egomv, A.I. Grigonev, and V.V Bogomolov, “Medical Support on Mir,” Space, vol. 7, No. 2, April/May 1991, pp. 27-29.

32A 1987 agreement established a Joint Working Group in Space Biology and Medicine, which shares data acquired on Mir and the SpaCe

Shuttle.
104 • Exploring the Moon and Mars

●

tribute according to its own capabilities. If

one small rover failed, its failure would not

interfere with the ability of the others to

succeed.

Use of Soviet Energia — As Western experience with the Soviet space program grows

and confidence improves, the United States

could envision closer cooperation with the

Soviet Union. For example, the Soviet

Union possesses the world’s only heavy-lift

launch vehicle, capable of lifting about

250,000 pounds to low-Earth orbit. It has

offered to make Energia available to the

United States for launching large payloads.

In the near term, the Soviet offer could as-

●

Us.

sist in developing U.S. plans to launch large,

heavy payloads, e.g., fuel or other noncritical components of a Moon or Mars expedition. If these cooperative ventures succeeded, they could be extended to include the use

of Energia to launch other payloads, perhaps even a joint mission to the Moon or

Mars.

Cooperative network projects — Europe and

the United States are both exploring the use

of instrumental networks on Mars to conduct scientific exploration. Each cooperating entity could contribute science payloads, landers, or orbiting satellites to

gather data for a joint network project.

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1991 - 292-888 : QL 3