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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

AUGUSTA SANDINO CHRISTIAN

NAMPHY, DREAM DEFENDERS, 

NEW FLORIDA MAJORITY, 

ORGANIZE FLORIDA, and FLORIDA

IMMIGRANT COALITION,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 4:20-cv-00485-MW

RON DESANTIS, in his official capacity 

as Florida Governor, and LAUREL M. LEE, 

in her official capacity as Florida Secretary

of State,

Defendants.

_________________________________/

THE STATE’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION

TO THE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

BACKGROUND

If voting is the beating heart of democracy, as this Court has said, then any 

changes to the voting process should be carefully considered and made with a steady 

hand; each strand of muscle and sinew must be accounted for in the final analysis.

And here, it is the Plaintiffs’ burden to make such an accounting. They fail to do so. 

Director Matthews’s declaration provides the relevant background concerning 

the voter registration system and its role in Florida’s election system:

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The online voter registration system supplements the 

various other ways that a potential elector can register to 

vote in Florida. An applicant can register: by submitting 

an application by mail or in person to their Supervisor of 

Elections; through the Department of Highway Safety and 

Motor Vehicles when applying for, renewing, or updating 

a driver license or identification card; through a voter 

registration agency when applying for, renewing, or 

updating services or assistance from that agency; through 

each qualifying educational institution, which provides the 

opportunity to register at least once a year; or through the 

Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission when 

applying for, renewing, or updating licenses with that 

agency.

Federal law permits Florida to choose a “book closing” 

date (deadline for registration) up to 30 days prior to 

election day. Florida has chosen to set its book closing date 

29 days prior to election day. Book closing for the 2020 

General Election was October 5, 2020. About 26 states 

have book closing between 20 and 30 days prior to 

election day. The book closing dates vary based on things 

like the particular state’s number of electors and potential 

electors, early voting dates, and capability to process 

applications.

Supervisors of Elections need time between book closing 

and the election to finalize their list of registered electors 

before voting starts. In Florida, there were 13,891,370 

voters registered as of book closing for the 2020 Primary 

Election. Any new registrations must be completed prior 

to the start of voting, which in Florida, can be as early as 

15 days before Election Day. It is my understanding that 

49 of the 67 Supervisors will begin early voting on 

October 19. 

Voter registration applications need to be processed in the 

order received. It is not unusual for multiple applications 

to be received from various sources for the same applicant. 

Applicants do not necessarily remember that they already 

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submitted an application when they bought a fishing 

license, or submitted an application to a third party voter 

registration organization at the farmer’s market, or 

otherwise, prior to submitting another application through 

the online voter registration system. Each of these 

applications have to be processed.

Florida law gives Supervisors of Elections 13 days to enter 

applications. This contemplates a last minute crush of 

applications, which is typical. No matter when the 

deadline is, people tend to wait until the last minute. 

Florida’s book closing on October 5, allows Supervisors 

to enter all applications received by that deadline the day 

before early voting starts on October 19 and notify the 

voter of their status (by sending a registration card). Voters 

must be notified of their status within 5 days of registration 

entered into the system. This all ensures that voters do not 

show up to vote before they are actually registered and on 

the voter rolls. People would otherwise lose faith in the 

system. Some voters may already experience this because 

of the extension of book closing to October 6. Further 

extension will just exacerbate that problem. Even with 

electronic poll books, the registration list must be finalized 

and loaded onto the book days prior to making its way to 

the early voting or polling place location.

If a voter’s application has not yet been processed by the 

time they show up to vote, they must vote a provisional 

ballot that will be counted once their registration can be 

confirmed. This adds time at the polling place which, even 

prior to the COVID-19 pandemic was less than ideal. 

ECF 23-1.

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ARGUMENT

I. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO STANDING.

As the Eleventh Circuit recently reiterated, the Plaintiffs must establish 

“(1) an injury in fact that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 

defendant and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision” to invoke federal 

jurisdiction. Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 957 F.3d 1193, 1201 (11th Cir. 2020) 

(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Neither the 

Mr. Namphy nor the Organizational Plaintiffs can satisfy this “irreducible 

constitutional minimum.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) 

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). For that reason alone, they are not entitled to a 

preliminary injunction and their complaint should be dismissed.

A. MR. NAMPHY.

Contrary to his affidavit, it appears that Mr. Namphy has been a registered 

Florida voter for almost three years. According to Amber Marconnet, the Assistant 

Director of the Division of Elections for the Florida Department of State, “Augusta 

Sandino Christian Namphy became a registered voter on November 1, 2017, and 

submitted record updates on October 8, 2018, and September 20, 2019, 

respectively.” ECF 23-2. He was “issued voter identification cards on November 2, 

2017, October 15, 2018, and October 5, 2019.” Id. Critically, “Augusta Sandino 

Christian Namphy remains a registered voter as of today.” Id.

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The same is true of declarant Kyle Redula. Id. He “became a pre-registered 

voter (available to 16 and 17-year old registrants) on April 20, 2016.” Id. He

“became an active registered voter in January of 2018.” Id. He “was issued a voter 

identification card as recently as July 21, 2020, and previously on January 25, 2018.”

Id. And critically, “Kyle Redula completed an Online Voter Registration update on 

October 6, 2020, at 2:57 p.m. changing his party affiliation,” and he “remains a 

registered voter as of today.” Id.

For that reason, there is no individual in this case who has the constitutionally 

required injury-in-fact to maintain this lawsuit, and the only individuals referenced

have received all the relief requested in the complaint. Without an injury to redress, 

there can be no Article III standing. 

B. THE ORGANIZATIONAL PLAINTIFFS

Although “an organization has standing to sue when a defendant’s illegal acts 

impair the organization’s ability to engage in its own projects by forcing the 

organization to divert resources in response,” Arcia v. Sec’y of Fla., 772 F.3d 1335, 

1341 (11th Cir. 2014), none of the Organizational Plaintiffs have satisfied this test.

“‘[T]o support or oppose a motion for a preliminary injunction,’ a party must 

present ‘[e]vidence that goes beyond the unverified allegations of the pleadings and 

motion papers.” Interface, Inc. v. J&J Indus., No. 4:13-cv-47-WSD, 2013 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 158609, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2013) (quoting Charles Alan Wright et al., 

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Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949, at 237 (3d ed. 2013)). And although “a 

district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be 

admissible evidence for a permanent injunction,” it may only do so “if the evidence 

is ‘appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding.’” 

Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995) 

(quoting Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1986)). In other 

words, the plaintiff’s evidence must bear some indicia of reliability.” Interface, Inc., 

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158609, at *7.

1

In contrast, “[b]are pleadings and attorney 

argument . . . are not evidence and do not satisfy the plaintiff's burden.” Id. (citations 

omitted).

The declarations Plaintiffs offer wholly fail to establish that any of the 

organizations, or their members, have suffered any cognizable injury, “irreparable”

or otherwise. Across the board, the declarations fail to establish that any eligible 

Florida voter was unable to register before the extended deadline. Instead, they recite 

online reports, phone calls, messages from colleagues or investigations indicating 

problems with Florida’s online voter registration website on October 5, and then end 

with conclusory and speculative allegations of a need for more time to advise

1 See also Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 357 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281 (D.D.C. 2005) 

(“When moving the court for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs bear the burdens of 

production and persuasion. To meet these burdens, [plaintiffs] may rely on evidence 

that is less complete than in a trial on the merits; however, the evidence [plaintiffs] 

offer must be credible evidence.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 

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hypothetical prospective registrants of the extended deadline. See ECF 3-2 

(Declaration of Nialah Summers); ECF 3-3 (Declaration of Andrea Mercado); ECF 

3-4 (Declaration of Stephanie Porta); ECF 3-5 (Declaration of Maria Rodriquez). 

The only other declarations submitted by Plaintiffs are those of their counsel 

and two out-of-state lawyers for a non-party advocacy group, all of whom simply 

regurgitate information from online reports, twitter posts, texts, and investigations 

indicating problems with the OVR site on October 5. None ever acknowledge the

extension of the registration deadline. See ECF 3-9 (Declaration of Adam Lioz); 

ECF 6-1 (Declaration of Blair Bowie); and ECF 9-2 (Declaration of Hayden 

Johnson). None of this purported evidence establishes irreparable harm. 

In other words, the Plaintiffs are wrong when they assert that “[t]he State has

not extended the OVR deadline to compensate for the lost time, essentially denying 

the right to vote to thousands of Floridians, including the Individual Plaintiff and 

Organizational Plaintiffs’ members and constituents.” ECF 3, at p. 26. The earliest 

that any of Plaintiffs’ declarants allege problems with the OVR site on October 5, 

2020, was “approximately 2:00 to 3:00 p.m.” ECF 9-1, at ¶4 (Declaration of 

Redula).2 Thus, even if accepted as true, and construed in the light most favorable to 

2 Cf., ECF 15-1(Declarant Namphy: “We started trying to register around 8:30 

p.m.”); ECF 3-2, ¶8 (Declarant Summers: “At or around 6 p.m. . . . .”); ECF 3-3, ¶11 

(Declarant Mercado: “on or around 5:45 or 6:00 p.m.”); ECF 3-4, ¶ 14 (Declarant 

Porta: “At approximately 5 p.m. . . . .”); ECF 3-5 (Declarant Rodriguez: “on or 

about October 5, 2020, the OVR site went down from 3:30 pm to 6:00 pm and then 

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Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs’ evidence suggests that the purported issues with the online 

voter registration site lasted no more than ten hours; yet, it is undisputed that the 

Secretary extended the registration deadline for nineteen hours (until 7 p.m., on 

October 7, 2020), and took pains (along with Governor DeSantis, Vice President Joe 

Biden, and numerous other individuals and entities, including the Plaintiffs’ counsel

in this case) to ensure that any eligible individual who experienced difficulty 

registering had notice of the extension. See ECF 22. 

Simply put, after realizing the emergent situation, the State took immediate 

action to ensure that all eligible voters would have the chance to use the online voter 

registration website to register to vote. It worked feverously to address the 

technological issues, it extended the deadline in a way commensurate with the time 

of the difficulty, and it did everything in its power to ensure that Floridians were put 

on notice of the extension. And these efforts appear to have succeeded; the Plaintiffs 

offer no evidence of any issue whatsoever with the online voter registration site 

during the extended period. The Plaintiffs cannot point to a single person who could 

not register during the extension already provided. For this reason, the 

Organizational Plaintiffs cannot maintain standing under either an associational or 

an organizational theory. And for that reason, the claims fail. 

again, from 8:15 pm to 9:37 pm.”); ECF 3-9, at ¶2 (“On the evening of October 5, 

2020 . . . .); ECF 9-2, ¶4 (Declarant Johnson: “On October 5, 2020, starting at 

approximately 5:00 p.m. . . . .”). 

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II. THE PURCELL DOCTRINE BARS THIS CASE FROM 

PROCEEDING

At its core, the Purcell Doctrine exists to prevent judicially created voter 

confusion when regulations are challenged close to an election. Specifically, and 

according to the Supreme Court, “orders affecting elections, especially conflicting 

orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain 

away from the polls.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006). Naturally, “[a]s 

an election draws closer, that risk will increase.” Id. at 5.

The Presidential Election has already begun. Across the State, County 

Supervisors of Elections have enlisted platoons of individuals to ensure that, during 

a year presenting challenges unlike any previously experienced, Floridians will have 

the opportunity to cast their ballots safely and effectively. For that reason, neither 

Leon County Supervisor Mark Earley nor Okaloosa County Supervisor Paul Lux 

believe that the voter registration deadline should be extended a second time. The 

former has averred that he is “concerned that another extension of the voter 

registration deadline will confuse voters and thereby undermine confidence in the 

election,” especially since “[t]his extension would come after a gap where 

registration was closed.” ECF 23-3. “Based on [his] experience in elections 

administration,” Supervisor Earley further averred that “another extension under the 

circumstance will confuse voters,” which will “result in misinformation after the 

length and reasons for the extension,” especially since “there is already a substantial 

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amount of misinformation about the November General Election.” Id. Supervisor 

Lux stated bluntly that he “oppose any further extension of the voter registration 

deadline,” given the immense amount of work that he and his staff much accomplish 

in the precious little time left before the Election. ECF 23-4.

Director Matthews similarly warns that “[t]o extend the deadline (again) 

would divert resources from what [the supervisors] should now be focused on—

processing vote-by-mail requests (which must be turned around in 2 days) and voteby-mail ballots, followed by additionally setting up and administering early voting, 

and other election administration activities.” ECF. 23-1. 

This case fits within the heartland of the Purcell Doctrine. Given the steps the 

State has taken to account for the technical difficulties experienced by those trying 

to register on October 5, and the havoc that would ensue if the Court were to reextend the once-extended deadline, the Court should deny the Plaintiffs’ request for 

a preliminary injunction. 

III. GOVERNOR DESANTIS IS NOT A PROPER PARTY.

The Governor is not a proper party to this litigation and thus this action against 

him should be dismissed. The Governor has not waived his sovereign immunity 

guaranteed under the Eleventh Amendment, and the Plaintiffs fail to plead any 

exception. See, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908). The Governor’s 

“general executive power” is “not a basis for jurisdiction in most circumstances.” 

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Women’s Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 949-50 (11th Cir. 2003); 

Harris v. Bush, 106.F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276-77 (N.D. Fla. 2000). Rather, where 

courts have permitted narrow Ex Parte Young exceptions to state sovereign 

immunity, it is when state officers are directly “responsible for” a challenged action 

and have a “connection” to the unconstitutional act at issue. Luckey v. Harris, 860 

F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Support Working Animals, Inc. et al. 

v. DeSantis, 2020 WL 1991479 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2020) (dismissing the Governor 

where he has no direct role in implementing a challenged state law). 

As this Court has already determined, the Governor is not a proper party in 

election-registration disputes because his “office [does] not ‘connect[] him with the 

duty of enforc[ing]’ a voter registration extension[.]” Florida Democratic Party v. 

Scott, 215 F.Supp.3d 1250, 1255 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2016) (quoting Ex Parte Young, 

209 U.S. at 161). Here, Florida Statutes do not charge the Governor with the direct 

responsibility for implementing election laws or the state’s online registration 

system. Therefore, he is not a proper party and should be dismissed.

IV. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION.

The Eleventh Circuit has long held that “[a] preliminary injunction is an 

extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly 

establishe[s] the ‘burden of persuasion’” as to each of the four familiar prerequisites. 

McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting All 

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Care Nursing Service, Inc. v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th 

Cir. 1989)). To prevail, then, the Plaintiffs must show that (1) they have “a 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits”; (2) they will suffer “irreparable 

injury . . . unless the injunction issues”; (3) “the threatened injury . . . outweighs 

whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the” Defendants; and (4) “if 

issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Siegel v. LePore, 

234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). They have failed to do so.

A. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF 

THEIR ANDERSON-BURDICK CLAIM.

The Anderson-Burdick test asks the Court to “weigh ‘the character and 

magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights . . . that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’

against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 

imposed by its rule,’” considering “‘the extent to which those interests make it 

necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 

(1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). The Supreme 

Court has long defined “the right to vote” as “the right to participate in an electoral 

process that is necessarily structured to maintain integrity of the democratic 

system.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (emphases added). 

This clarification is crucial. “Common sense, as well as constitutional law, 

compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring 

elections.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. In recognition of this point, the Supreme Court 

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has also long held that “there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are 

to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany 

the democratic processes.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (emphasis 

added). “[T]he State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to 

justify” voting restrictions, Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, so long as they are on the 

whole “reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory,” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.

“[E]lection laws,” moreover, “‘invariably impose some burden upon 

individual voters,’” New Ga. Project v. Raffensperger, No. 20-13360-D, 2020 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 31405, at *5 (11th Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 

433), and Florida’s online voter registration deadline is no exception. “That means 

strict scrutiny is not required for every voting regulation,” and the Court should not 

apply that standard here. See id. “[T]o say otherwise would ‘tie the hands of States’

as they seek ‘order, rather than chaos’ in their elections.” Id. (quoting Burdick, 504 

U.S. at 433).

And here, the burden is not as dire as the Plaintiffs would have it, especially 

in light of the extension provided by the Secretary of State. As noted above, the 

Secretary extended the deadline once already, this extended deadline allowed the 

only individuals referenced in this litigation to register, and the Plaintiffs have shown 

this Court nothing to suggest that the extension failed to fully alleviate the purported 

burden on anyone’s right to vote. 

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In contrast, the State’s interest in leaving intact the extended online voter 

registration deadline is compelling (even though its interest need not rise to that 

level). As the Eleventh Circuit recently underscored, election-related deadlines 

animate numerous interests, such as “conducting an efficient election” and

“maintaining order.” New Ga. Project, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 31405, at *9. Both 

interests would suffer tremendously if the Court extended the voter registration 

deadline beyond the extension the State already provided. 

According to Leon County Supervisor of Elections Mark Earley:

I am concerned that another extension of the voter 

registration deadline will confuse voters and thereby 

further undermine confidence in the election. This would 

be the second extension of the registration deadline. This 

extension would come after a gap where registration was 

closed. Based on my experience in elections 

administration and talking to average voters day to day, 

another extension under the circumstances will serve to 

reinforce the confusion and mistrust voters have 

surrounding this election, further strengthening the 

rampant misinformation and disinformation campaigns 

that are already undermining the November General 

Election. 

Based on my experience, I also expect any extension of 

the registration deadline to add to the call volume at my 

office. My staff and I have already been inundated with 

telephone calls at a rate that far exceeds any past election 

cycle because of the misinformation endemic to this 

election cycle. I cannot add more staff - we are busting at 

the seams already while trying to maintain some 

semblance of social distancing working under these 

incredible stress levels. 

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Finally, as detailed in the letter provided by the President 

of the Florida Supervisors of Elections association, of 

which I am the Vice President, the Secretary’s extension 

of the voter registration deadline because of technical 

issues on October 5, 2020 was an appropriate extension. 

We received 313 new registrations through the online 

system on October 5, 2020. We received 295 new 

registrations through the online system on October 6, 

2020; 56 people either registered for the first time or 

changed their registration information in person on 

October 6, 2020. These numbers are consistent with new 

registrations at the end of registration in past elections. If 

the argument being made is that the extension needed 

more publicity to be effective, I disagree. 

ECF 23-3. And according to Okaloosa County Supervisor of Elections Paul Lux:

My staff and I are in the midst of the General Election. We 

have innumerable tasks that require us to put in long hours. 

Among other things, we are mailing ballots, receiving 

completed ballots, and counting ballots; we are planning 

for the start of early voting on October 19, 2020; we are 

answering voter inquiries, and there have been many this 

election cycle; we are training poll workers; and we are 

inputting voter registration form that we have received 

(and will continue to accept voter registration forms that 

arrive as late as October 11, 2020 consistent with existing 

Florida law). 

Moving the voter registration deadline yet again will 

impose additional responsibilities on my staff and me. My 

staff and I would have to process additional registration 

materials and upload it onto our electronic poll books 

within 13 days of whenever the new deadline ends; 

provide voter registration cards to the new registrants; and 

reconcile our voter rolls with the State’s voter rolls at some 

point beyond the current October 12, 2020 deadline. Any 

additional extension will almost certainly result in added 

call volume; current call volume has already exceeded 

expectation because of the tone and tenor of the election 

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cycle. Any additional extension will add to the call 

volume. Because of the pandemic and related social 

distancing requirements, adding still more staff is not a 

viable option at this time. 

Finally, based on my experience in election 

administration, a subset of voters will always miss 

whatever deadline is set. For this subset of voters, no 

extension of time will help. The extension already 

provided was adequate as detailed in the FSE’s letter to the 

Secretary of State. 

ECF 23-4.

During the extension the State already provided, approximately 50,000

Floridians submitted material using the online voter registration website; 70,099

Floridians did so on October 5, 2020. ECF 23-5. These numbers are consistent with 

the numbers before the 2018 general election, where 25,176 and 60,624 submissions 

came through the website in the final two days respectively. ECF 23-5. To suggest 

that the State’s extension was inadequate—without any contrary evidence—is thus 

empty rhetoric. 

Florida Democratic Party v. Scott, 215 F. Supp. 3d. 1250 (N.D. Fla. 2016), 

does not compel a different outcome. There, “in excess of a hundred thousand 

aspiring eligible Florida voters were” expected to “register[] to vote in the final week

of voter registration” when “Hurricane Matthew not only forced many of those 

voters to evacuate the state, but also foreclosed the only methods of registering to 

vote: in person or by mail.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, the online voter registration 

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site issues affected eligible individuals for several hours—the site was never down 

as reflected by Mr. Maynor’s declaration. See ECF 23-5. Other avenues to register 

also remained open, such as printing, and putting in the mail, a paper application. 

Critically, in Florida Democratic Party, the Court extended the registration deadline 

for two days to account for the five days that Hurricane Matthew affected voter 

registration efforts. Here, the Secretary already extended the deadline in excess of 

the time that the online voter registration website experienced difficulties. 

Nor do the two unpublished, out-of-jurisdiction, district court orders to which 

the Plaintiffs direct the Court’s attention help the Plaintiffs. Both addressed electionregulation challenges premised on the COVID-19 pandemic, so neither is relevant. 

See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, No. 20-CV-249-WMC, 2020 WL 

5627186 at *17 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2020); Mi Familia Vota v. Hobbs, No. CV-20-

01903-PHX-SPL (D. Ariz. Oct. 5, 2020). What is relevant, however, are the 

proclamations of both the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit 

that, even during a year posing unprecedented challenges, “lower federal courts 

should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election,’” New Ga. 

Project, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 31405, at *11 (quoting Republican Nat’l Comm. v. 

Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020)), because “the States” must 

be allowed “to run their own elections.” Id. Underscoring this point is the Eleventh 

Circuit’s observation that, “[s]ince March, the Supreme Court has reviewed, by our 

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count, seven emergency motions related to district court injunctions of state election 

laws due to COVID-19,” and “[i]n six of those cases it has stayed the injunction or 

declined to vacate a stay issued by the circuit court.” Id. “[I]n the one case where the 

Court denied the application for a stay, it did so only because the state officials and 

the plaintiffs had already agreed to settle the case.” Id. (citing Republican Nat’l 

Comm. v. Common Cause R.I., No. 20A28, ---S. Ct. ----, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3632, 

2020 WL 4680151, at *1 (U.S. Aug. 13, 2020)).

* * *

The extended online voter registration deadline the Plaintiffs challenge is 

reasonable, neutral, nondiscriminatory, and critically important for maintaining 

election integrity in one of the Nation’s most populous States during a Presidential 

election year. And as extended, it accounts for the unfortunate technological 

difficulties experienced near the statutorily imposed deadline. It therefore survives 

Anderson-Burdick balancing.

B. THE PLAINTIFFS WILL NOT EXPERIENCE HARM, IRREPARABLE OR 

OTHERWISE, IF THEIR REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS 

DENIED.

“A showing of irreparable injury is the sine qua non of injunctive relief.”

Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “even if Plaintiffs 

establish a likelihood of success on the merits, the absence of a substantial likelihood 

of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief 

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improper.” Id. As discussed above, the Plaintiffs are manifestly unlikely to succeed 

on the merits of their challenges. And because they have not made any showing that 

any voter risks disenfranchisement under the extended registration deadline, they 

will experience no harm, irreparable or otherwise, if their motion for a preliminary 

injunction is denied. 

C. THE PLAINTIFFS’ REQUESTED RELIEF WOULD HARM THE STATE FAR 

WORSE THAN IT WOULD BENEFIT THE PLAINTIFFS.

The Eleventh Circuit has recently made the self-evident point that the State 

has “a substantial interest in avoiding chaos and uncertainty in its election 

procedures.” Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 2018). Declarations from 

election officials underscore that relief in this instance would add to the noise and 

the workload during this election cycle. “Call it what you will—laches, the Purcell 

principle, or common sense—the idea is that courts will not disrupt imminent 

elections absent a powerful reason for doing so.” Crookston v. Johnson, 841 F.3d 

396, 398 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2006)). Or as 

the Eleventh Circuit recently said, “lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter 

the election rules on the eve of an election,” an admonition especially applicable 

when the election has already begun with hundreds of thousands of ballots cast. New 

Ga. Project, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 31405, at *11 (quoting Republican Nat’l Comm. 

v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020)), because “the States” 

must be allowed “to run their own elections.” Id.; see also Diaz v. Cobb, 541 F. 

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Supp. 2d 1319, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (noting that the weeks leading up to an election 

“are the most tumultuous times in a Supervisor’s office” and identifying the 

catalogue of tasks that must be accomplished for a successful election).

As a more general matter, “any time a State is enjoined by a court from 

effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of 

irreparable injury.” New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 

1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); accord, e.g., Maryland v. King, 567 

U.S. 1301, 1301 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); Hand, 888 F.3d at 1241. At 

present, the Plaintiffs collectively ask the Court to rewrite or dispense with several 

provisions of duly enacted Florida Legislation. Given that the Plaintiffs are largely 

in control of whether their ballots will be counted in August and November, the 

balance plainly tilts in favor of leaving intact Florida’s election regulations.

D. THE PLAINTIFFS’ REQUESTED RELIEF WOULD PROFOUNDLY HARM 

THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

Finally, as the Supreme Court has long recognized, “a due regard for the 

public interest in orderly elections support[s]” a “decision to deny a preliminary 

injunction.” Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1944-45 (2018). The consistent 

theme that threads together all of the State’s arguments in this filing is this: Florida, 

like the rest of the Nation, must play its oversized role in selecting the next President 

of the United States. Judicially overhauling a critical Florida election deadline might

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sabotage, perhaps irreparably, Florida’s efforts to maintain normalcy during this 

profoundly abnormal election cycle. 

CONCLUSION

The Plaintiffs bear a heavy burden here. They have not met it. Their request 

for a preliminary injunction should be denied.

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Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Mohammad O. Jazil

MOHAMMAD O.JAZIL (FBN 72556)

HOPPING GREEN & SAMS, P.A.

119 South Monroe Street, Suite 300 

 Tallahassee, FL 32301

(850) 222-7500

(850) 224-8551 (fax)

mjazil@hgslaw.com

/s/Bradley R. McVay

BRADLEY R. MCVAY (FBN 79034)

 General Counsel

Florida Department Of State

R.A. Gray Building Suite, 100

500 South Bronough Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Phone: (850) 245-6536

Fax: (850) 245-6127

brad.mcvay@dos.myflorida.com

Counsel for Secretary Laurel M. Lee

/s/ James W. Uthmeier

James Uthmeier (FBN 113156)

Deputy General Counsel

Executive Office of the Governor

The Capitol, PL-05

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001

(850) 717-9310

James.Uthmeier@eog.myflorida.com

Dated: October 7, 2020 Counsel for Governor Ron DeSantis

Case 4:20-cv-00485-MW-MAF Document 24 Filed 10/07/20 Page 22 of 24
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULES 

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing complies with the size, font, and 

formatting requirements of Local Rule 5.1(C), and that the foregoing complies with 

the word limit specified in Local Rule 7.1(F). Specifically, this brief contains 4,997

words, excluding the case style, signature block, and certificates. 

/s/ Mohammad O. Jazil

MOHAMMAD O.JAZIL

Case 4:20-cv-00485-MW-MAF Document 24 Filed 10/07/20 Page 23 of 24
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served 

to all counsel of record through the Court’s CM/ECF system on this 7th day of 

October, 2020.

/s/ Mohammad O. Jazil

MOHAMMAD O.JAZIL

Case 4:20-cv-00485-MW-MAF Document 24 Filed 10/07/20 Page 24 of 24