(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. 

VULLO 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 22–842. Argued March 18, 2024—Decided May 30, 2024 

Petitioner National Rifle Association (NRA) sued respondent Maria 

Vullo—former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS)—alleging that Vullo violated the First Amendment 

by coercing DFS-regulated parties to punish or suppress the NRA’s 

gun-promotion advocacy. The Second Circuit held that Vullo’s alleged 

actions constituted permissible government speech and legitimate law 

enforcement. The Court granted certiorari to address whether the 

NRA’s complaint states a First Amendment claim. 

 The NRA’s “well-pleaded factual allegations,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U. S. 662, 678–679, are taken as true at this motion-to-dismiss stage. 

DFS regulates insurance companies and financial services institutions 

doing business in New York, and has the power to initiate investigations and civil enforcement actions, as well as to refer matters for criminal prosecution. The NRA contracted with DFS-regulated entities—

affiliates of Lockton Companies, LLC (Lockton)—to administer insurance policies the NRA offered as a benefit to its members, which Chubb 

Limited (Chubb) and Lloyd’s of London (Lloyd’s) would then underwrite. In 2017, Vullo began investigating one of these affinity insurance policies—Carry Guard—on a tip passed along from a gun-control 

advocacy group. The investigation revealed that Carry Guard insured 

gun owners from intentional criminal acts in violation of New York 

law, and that the NRA promoted Carry Guard without the required 

insurance producer license. Lockton and Chubb subsequently suspended Carry Guard. Vullo then expanded her investigation into the 

NRA’s other affinity insurance programs. 

 On February 27, 2018, Vullo met with senior executives at Lloyd’s, 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Syllabus 

expressed her views in favor of gun control, and told the Lloyd’s executives “that DFS was less interested in pursuing” infractions unrelated to any NRA business “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups, especially the NRA.” App. to Pet. for Cert. at 199– 

200, ¶21. Vullo and Lloyd’s struck a deal: Lloyd’s “would instruct its

syndicates to cease underwriting firearm-related policies and would 

scale back its NRA-related business,” and “in exchange, DFS would 

focus its forthcoming affinity-insurance enforcement action solely on 

those syndicates which served the NRA.” Id., at 223, ¶69.

On April 19, 2018, Vullo issued letters entitled, “Guidance on Risk 

Management Relating to the NRA and Similar Gun Promotion Organizations.” Id., at 246–251 (Guidance Letters). In the Guidance Letters, 

Vullo “encourage[d]” DFS-regulated entities to: (1) “continue evaluating and managing their risks, including reputational risks, that may

arise from their dealings with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations”; (2) “review any relationships they have with the NRA or

similar gun promotion organizations”; and (3) “take prompt actions to

manag[e] these risks and promote public health and safety.” Id., at 

248, 251. Vullo and Governor Cuomo also issued a joint press release

echoing many of the letters’ statements, and “ ‘urg[ing] all insurance 

companies and banks doing business in New York’ ” to join those “ ‘that 

have already discontinued their arrangements with the NRA.’ ” Id., at 

244. DFS subsequently entered into separate consent decrees with 

Lockton, Chubb, and Lloyd’s, in which the insurers admitted violations

of New York’s insurance law, agreed not to provide any NRA-endorsed

insurance programs (even if lawful), and agreed to pay multimillion

dollar fines. 

Held: The NRA plausibly alleged that respondent violated the First 

Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business

relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress gun-promotion advocacy. Pp. 8–20.

(a) At the heart of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is the 

recognition that viewpoint discrimination is uniquely harmful to a free 

and democratic society. When government officials are “engaging in

their own expressive conduct,” though, “the Free Speech Clause has no 

application.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467. 

“When a government entity embarks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others,” and thus does 

not need to “maintain viewpoint-neutrality when its officers and employees speak about that venture.” Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. 218, 234. 

While a government official can share her views freely and criticize 

particular beliefs in the hopes of persuading others, she may not use 

the power of her office to punish or suppress disfavored expression. 

In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, this Court explored 
 

 

 

 

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Syllabus 

the distinction between permissible attempts to persuade and impermissible attempts to coerce. The Court explained that the First

Amendment prohibits government officials from relying on the “threat 

of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion . . . to achieve 

the suppression” of disfavored speech. Id., at 67. Although the defendant in Bantam Books, a state commission that blacklisted certain publications, lacked the “power to apply formal legal sanctions,” the coerced party “reasonably understood” the commission to threaten 

adverse action, and thus its “compliance with the [c]ommission’s directives was not voluntary.” Id., at 66–68. To reach this conclusion, the 

Court considered things like: the commission’s authority; the commission’s communications; and the coerced party’s reaction to the communications. Id., at 68. The Courts of Appeals have since considered 

similar factors to determine whether a challenged communication is 

reasonably understood to be a coercive threat. Ultimately, Bantam 

Books stands for the principle that a government official cannot directly or indirectly coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf. Pp. 8–11.

(b) To state a claim that the government violated the First Amendment through coercion of a third party, a plaintiff must plausibly allege

conduct that, viewed in context, could be reasonably understood to convey a threat of adverse government action in order to punish or suppress speech. See Bantam Books, 372 U. S., at 67–68. Here, the NRA 

plausibly alleged that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing

DFS-regulated entities into disassociating with the NRA in order to

punish or suppress gun-promotion advocacy.

As DFS superintendent, Vullo had direct regulatory and enforcement authority over all insurance companies and financial service institutions doing business in New York. She could initiate investigations, refer cases for prosecution, notice civil charges, and enter into 

consent decrees. Vullo’s communications with the DFS-regulated entities, particularly with Lloyd’s, must be considered against the backdrop of Vullo’s authority. Vullo made clear she wanted Lloyd’s to disassociate from all gun groups, although there was no indication that 

such groups had unlawful insurance policies similar to the NRA’s. 

Vullo also told the Lloyd’s executives she would “focus” her enforcement actions “solely” on the syndicates with ties to the NRA, “and ignore other syndicates writing similar policies.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 

223, ¶69. The message was loud and clear: Lloyd’s “could avoid liability for [unrelated] infractions” if it “aided DFS’s campaign against gun

groups” by terminating its business relationships with them. Ibid. As 

the reaction from Lloyd’s further confirms, Vullo’s alleged communications—whether seen as a threat or as an inducement—were reasonably understood as coercive. Other allegations concerning the Guidance 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Syllabus 

Letters and accompanying press release, viewed in context of their issuance, reinforce the NRA’s First Amendment claim. Pp. 12–15. 

(c) The Second Circuit concluded that Vullo’s alleged communications were “examples of permissible government speech” and “legitimate enforcement action.” 49 F. 4th 700, 717–719. The Second Circuit 

could only reach this conclusion, however, by taking the complaint’s

allegations in isolation and failing to draw reasonable inferences in the

NRA’s favor. 

Vullo’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. The conceded illegality of the NRA-endorsed insurance programs does not insulate Vullo 

from First Amendment scrutiny under Bantam Books. Nor does her 

argument that her actions targeted “nonexpressive” business relationships change the fact that the NRA alleges her actions were aimed at 

punishing or suppressing speech. Finally, Vullo claims that the NRA’s

position, if accepted, would stifle government speech and hamper legitimate enforcement efforts, but the Court’s conclusion simply reaffirms the general principle that where, as here, the complaint plausibly alleges coercive threats aimed at punishing or suppressing 

disfavored speech, the plaintiff states a First Amendment claim. Pp. 

15–18. 

(d) The NRA’s allegations, if true, highlight the constitutional concerns with the kind of strategy that Vullo purportedly adopted. Although the NRA was not the directly regulated party here, Vullo allegedly used the power of her office to target gun promotion by going after 

the NRA’s business partners. Nothing in this case immunizes the NRA

from regulation nor prevents government officials from condemning

disfavored views. The takeaway is that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from wielding their power selectively to punish

or suppress speech, directly or (as alleged here) through private intermediaries. P. 19. 

49 F. 4th 700, vacated and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 

GORSUCH, J., and JACKSON, J., each filed a concurring opinion. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of 

Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 22–842 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 

PETITIONER v. MARIA T. VULLO 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[May 30, 2024]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Six decades ago, this Court held that a government entity’s “threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of

coercion” against a third party “to achieve the suppression”

of disfavored speech violates the First Amendment. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 67 (1963). Today,

the Court reaffirms what it said then: Government officials 

cannot attempt to coerce private parties in order to punish

or suppress views that the government disfavors. Petitioner National Rifle Association (NRA) plausibly alleges 

that respondent Maria Vullo did just that. As superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services,

Vullo allegedly pressured regulated entities to help her stifle the NRA’s pro-gun advocacy by threatening enforcement

actions against those entities that refused to disassociate 

from the NRA and other gun-promotion advocacy groups. 

Those allegations, if true, state a First Amendment claim. 

I 

A 

Because this case comes to us at the motion-to-dismiss 

stage, the Court assumes the truth of “well-pleaded factual 
 

 

 

2 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Opinion of the Court 

allegations” and “reasonable inference[s]” therefrom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678–679 (2009). Unless stated 

otherwise, the allegations aver as follows:

The New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) 

oversees insurance companies and financial services institutions doing business in the State. See N. Y. Fin. Servs. 

Law Ann. §201(a) (West 2012). DFS can initiate investigations and civil enforcement actions against regulated entities, and can refer potential criminal violations to the 

State’s attorney general for prosecution. §§301(b), (c)(4).

The DFS-regulated entities in this case are insurers that

had business relationships with the NRA.

Since 2000, the NRA has offered a variety of insurance

programs as a benefit to its members. The NRA contracted 

with affiliates of Lockton Companies, LLC (Lockton), to administer the various policies of these affinity insurance programs, which Chubb Limited (Chubb) and Lloyd’s of London (Lloyd’s) would then underwrite. In return, the NRA 

received a percentage of its members’ premium payments.

One of the NRA’s affinity products, Carry Guard, covered

personal-injury and criminal-defense costs related to licensed firearm use, and “insured New York residents for 

intentional, reckless, and criminally negligent acts with a 

firearm that injured or killed another person.” 49 F. 4th 

700, 707 (CA2 2022).

In September 2017, a gun-control advocacy group contacted the New York County District Attorney’s office to tip

them off to “compliance infirmities in Carry Guard.” App. 

to Pet. for Cert. 206, Second Amended Complaint ¶34. That 

office then passed on the allegations to DFS. The next 

month, then-Superintendent of DFS Vullo began investigating Carry Guard, focusing on Chubb and Lockton. The 

investigation revealed at least two kinds of violations of

New York law: that Carry Guard insured intentional criminal acts, and the NRA promoted Carry Guard without an 
Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

insurance producer license. By mid-November, upon finding out about the investigation following DFS information

requests, Lockton and Chubb suspended Carry Guard. 

Vullo then expanded her investigation into the NRA’s other 

affinity insurance programs, many of which were underwritten by Lloyd’s and administered by Lockton. These 

NRA-endorsed programs provided similar coverage and 

suffered from the same legal infirmities.

In the midst of the investigation, tragedy struck Parkland, Florida. On February 14, 2018, a gunman opened fire

at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, murdering 17 

students and staff members. Following the shooting, the 

NRA and other gun-advocacy groups experienced “intense

backlash” across the country. 49 F. 4th, at 708. Major business institutions, including DFS-regulated entities, spoke 

out against the NRA, and some even cut ties with the organization. App. to Pet. for Cert. 244. MetLife, for example, ended a discount program it offered with the NRA. On 

February 25, 2018, Lockton’s chairman “placed a distraught telephone call to the NRA,” in which he privately

shared that Lockton would sever all ties with the NRA to 

avoid “‘losing [its] license’ to do business in New York.” Id., 

at 298, Complaint ¶42. Lockton publicly announced its decision the next day. Following Lockton’s decision, the 

NRA’s corporate insurance carrier also severed ties with 

the organization and refused to renew coverage at any

price. The NRA contends that Lockton and the corporate

insurance carrier took these steps not because of the Parkland shooting but because they feared “reprisa[l]” from

Vullo. Id., at 210, ¶44; see id., at 209–210, ¶¶41–43. 

Around that time, Vullo also began to meet with executives at the insurance companies doing business with the 

NRA. On February 27, Vullo met with senior executives at 

Lloyd’s. There, speaking on behalf of DFS and then-Governor Andrew Cuomo, Vullo “presented [their] views on gun

control and their desire to leverage their powers to combat 
 

 

4 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Opinion of the Court 

the availability of firearms, including specifically by weakening the NRA.” Id., at 221, ¶67. She also “discussed an 

array of technical regulatory infractions plaguing the affinityinsurance marketplace” in New York. Id., at 199, ¶21. Vullo 

told the Lloyd’s executives “that DFS was less interested in

pursuing the[se] infractions” unrelated to any NRA business “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun 

groups, especially the NRA.” Id., at 199–200, ¶21; accord, 

id., at 223, ¶69 (alleging that Vullo made it clear to Lloyd’s 

that it “could avoid liability for infractions relating to other, 

similarly situated insurance policies, so long as it aided 

DFS’s campaign against gun groups”).1 Vullo and Lloyd’s

struck a deal: Lloyd’s “would instruct its syndicates to cease 

underwriting firearm-related policies and would scale back 

its NRA-related business,” and “in exchange, DFS would focus its forthcoming affinity-insurance enforcement action

solely on those syndicates which served the NRA, and ignore other syndicates writing similar policies.” Ibid., ¶69.

On April 19, 2018, Vullo issued two virtually identical

guidance letters on DFS letterhead entitled, “Guidance on

Risk Management Relating to the NRA and Similar Gun

Promotion Organizations.” Id., at 246–251 (Guidance Letters). Vullo sent one of the letters to insurance companies

and the other to financial services institutions. In the letters, Vullo pointed to the “social backlash” against the NRA

and other groups “that promote guns that lead to senseless

violence” following “several recent horrific shootings, including in Parkland, Florida.” Id., at 246, 249. Vullo then 

cited recent instances of businesses severing their ties with

the NRA as examples of companies “fulfilling their corporate social responsibility.” Id., at 247, 250. 

—————— 1According to the complaint, other affinity organizations offered similar insurance policies, including the New York State Bar Association, the 

New York City Bar, and the New York State Psychological Association, 

among others. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 207–208, Complaint ¶36. 
Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

In the Guidance Letters’ final paragraph, Vullo “encourage[d]” DFS-regulated entities to: (1) “continue evaluating 

and managing their risks, including reputational risks, that 

may arise from their dealings with the NRA or similar gun 

promotion organizations”; (2) “review any relationships 

they have with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations”; and (3) “take prompt actions to manag[e] these 

risks and promote public health and safety.” Id., at 248, 

251.2 

The same day that DFS issued the Guidance Letters, 

Vullo and Governor Cuomo issued a joint press release that 

echoed many of the letters’ statements. The press release 

included a quote from Vullo “‘urg[ing] all insurance companies and banks doing business in New York’” to join those

“‘that have already discontinued their arrangements with 

the NRA.’” Id., at 244. The press release cited Chubb’s decision to stop underwriting Carry Guard as an example to

emulate. The next day, Cuomo tweeted: “‘The NRA is an 

extremist organization. I urge companies in New York

State to revisit any ties they have to the NRA and consider 

their reputations, and responsibility to the public.’” Id., at 

213, Complaint ¶51.

Less than two weeks after the Guidance Letters and 

press release went out, DFS entered into consent decrees

with Lockton (on May 2), and Chubb (on May 7). The decrees stipulated that Carry Guard violated New York insur-

—————— 2The financial-regulatory term “reputational risk” is “ ‘the risk to current or projected financial condition and resilience arising from negative 

public opinion,’ which ‘may impair a bank’s competitiveness by affecting

its ability to establish new relationships or services or continue servicing

existing relationships.’ ” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27– 

28, and n. 10 (quoting Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller’s Handbook, Examination Process, Bank Supervision Process 28

(Sept. 2019)). DFS monitors the reputational risk of regulated institutions because of its potential effect on market stability. See Brief for 

Respondent 6. 
 

 

6 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Opinion of the Court 

ance law because it provided insurance coverage for intentional criminal acts, and because the NRA promoted Carry 

Guard, along with other NRA-endorsed programs, without 

an insurance producer license. The decrees also listed other 

infractions of the State’s insurance law. Both Lockton and 

Chubb admitted liability, agreed not to provide any NRAendorsed insurance programs (even if lawful) but were permitted to sell corporate insurance to the NRA, and agreed

to pay fines of $7 million and $1.3 million respectively. On 

May 9, Lloyd’s officially instructed its syndicates to terminate existing agreements with the NRA and not to insure 

new ones. It publicly announced its decision to cut ties with

the NRA that same day. On December 20, 2018, DFS and 

Lloyd’s entered into their own consent decree, which imposed similar terms and a $5 million fine. 

B 

The NRA sued Cuomo, Vullo, and DFS. The only claims

before the Court today are those against Vullo—namely,

claims that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing

DFS-regulated parties to punish or suppress “the NRA’s 

pro-Second Amendment viewpoint” and “core political 

speech.” Id., at 231, ¶91, 234, ¶101. The complaint asserts

both censorship and retaliation First Amendment claims, 

which the parties and lower courts have analyzed together.

Vullo moved to dismiss, arguing that the alleged conduct

did not constitute impermissible coercion and that, in the 

alternative, she was entitled to qualified immunity because 

she did not violate clearly established law. 

The District Court denied Vullo’s motion to dismiss the 

NRA’s First-Amendment damages claims. The court held 

that the NRA plausibly alleged that “the combination of 

[Vullo’s and Cuomo’s] actions . . . could be interpreted as a 

veiled threat to regulated industries to disassociate with 

the NRA or risk DFS enforcement action.” NRA of Am. v. 

Cuomo, 525 F. Supp. 3d 382, 402–403 (NDNY 2021). That 
 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

threat, the court said, crossed a First Amendment line. The 

District Court concluded that Vullo was not entitled to qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage. 

The Second Circuit reversed. It concluded that Vullo’s 

alleged actions constituted permissible government speech 

and legitimate law enforcement, and not unconstitutional 

coercion. The Second Circuit determined that the Guidance 

Letters and accompanying press release were not unconstitutionally coercive because they “were written in an evenhanded, nonthreatening tone and employed words intended

to persuade rather than intimidate.” 49 F. 4th, at 717. The 

court found it significant that Vullo “did not refer to any

pending investigations or possible regulatory action” and

alluded only to business-related risks “amid growing public 

concern over gun violence.” Ibid. As for Vullo’s meeting 

with the Lloyd’s executives, the court admitted that the allegations presented a “closer call.” Id., at 718. Nonetheless, 

just as with the consent decrees, it found that Vullo “was

merely carrying out her regulatory responsibilities.” Id., at 

718–719. The Second Circuit also held that, even if the 

complaint stated a First Amendment violation, the law was 

not clearly established, and so Vullo was entitled to qualified immunity. 

The NRA filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking 

either summary reversal or review of the First Amendment

and qualified immunity holdings. This Court granted certiorari on only the first question presented whether the 

complaint states a First Amendment claim against Vullo.

See 601 U. S. ___ (2023).3 

—————— 3Vullo argues that the Court must dismiss the case as improvidently 

granted because the Court deprived itself of jurisdiction by limiting its

review to the First Amendment question and declining to review the Second Circuit’s alternative holding that Vullo is entitled to qualified immunity. See Brief for Respondent 21–24. Not so. In this case, “[a]n order

limiting the grant of certiorari does not operate as a jurisdictional bar.” 

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U. S. 235, 247, n. 12 (1981). Because the 
 

8 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Opinion of the Court 

II 

As discussed below, Vullo was free to criticize the NRA 

and pursue the conceded violations of New York insurance

law. She could not wield her power, however, to threaten

enforcement actions against DFS-regulated entities in order to punish or suppress the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy. Because the complaint plausibly alleges that Vullo 

did just that, the Court holds that the NRA stated a First 

Amendment violation. 

A 

At the heart of the First Amendment’s Free Speech

Clause is the recognition that viewpoint discrimination is

uniquely harmful to a free and democratic society. The 

Clause prohibits government entities and actors from

“abridging the freedom of speech.” When government officials are “engaging in their own expressive conduct,”

though, “the Free Speech Clause has no application.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467 (2009). The 

government can “‘say what it wishes’” and “select the views 

that it wants to express.” Id., at 467–468 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 

833 (1995)). That makes sense; the government could 

barely function otherwise. “When a government entity embarks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a particular 

viewpoint and rejects others,” and thus does not need to

“maintain viewpoint-neutrality when its officers and employees speak about that venture.” Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. 

218, 234 (2017).

A government official can share her views freely and criticize particular beliefs, and she can do so forcefully in the 

—————— 

Second Circuit is free to revisit the qualified immunity question in light

of this Court’s opinion, the NRA still could obtain “ ‘effectual relief ’ ” on 

remand. Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013). In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the resolution of the First Amendment 

question is merely advisory. 
 

 

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Opinion of the Court 

hopes of persuading others to follow her lead. In doing so,

she can rely on the merits and force of her ideas, the 

strength of her convictions, and her ability to inspire others.

What she cannot do, however, is use the power of the State

to punish or suppress disfavored expression. See Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 830 (explaining that governmental actions seeking to suppress a speaker’s particular views are 

presumptively unconstitutional). In such cases, it is “the 

application of state power which we are asked to scrutinize.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 

463 (1958).

In Bantam Books, this Court explored the distinction between permissible attempts to persuade and impermissible 

attempts to coerce. There, a state commission used its 

power to investigate and recommend criminal prosecution 

to censor publications that, in its view, were “‘objectionable’” because they threatened “youthful morals.” 372 U. S., 

at 59–62, 71. The commission sent official notices to a distributor for blacklisted publications that highlighted the 

commission’s “duty to recommend to the Attorney General” 

violations of the State’s obscenity laws. Id., at 62–63, and 

n. 5. The notices also informed the distributor that the lists 

of blacklisted publications “were circulated to local police 

departments,” and that the distributor’s cooperation in removing the publications from the shelves would “‘eliminate 

the necessity’” of any referral for prosecution. Ibid. A local 

police officer also conducted followup visits to ensure compliance. In response, the distributor took “steps to stop further circulation of copies of the listed publications” out of

fear of facing “‘a court action.’” Id., at 63. 

The publishers of the blacklisted publications sued the

commission, alleging that this scheme of informal censorship violated their First Amendment rights. The commission responded that “it d[id] not regulate or suppress obscenity but simply exhort[ed] booksellers and advise[d] 

them of their legal rights.” Id., at 66. This Court sided with 
 

 

10 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Opinion of the Court 

the publishers, holding that the commission violated their 

free-speech rights by coercing the distributor to stop selling 

and displaying the listed publications.

The Court explained that the First Amendment prohibits

government officials from relying on the “threat of invoking

legal sanctions and other means of coercion . . . to achieve 

the suppression” of disfavored speech. Id., at 67. Although

the commission lacked the “power to apply formal legal 

sanctions,” the distributor “reasonably understood” the 

commission to threaten adverse action, and thus the distributor’s “compliance with the [c]ommission’s directives 

was not voluntary.” Id., at 66–68. To reach this conclusion, 

the Court considered things like: the commission’s coordination with law enforcement and its authority to refer matters for prosecution; the notices themselves, which were 

“phrased virtually as orders” containing “thinly veiled 

threats to institute criminal proceedings” if the distributor

did not come around; and the distributor’s reaction to the 

notices and followup visits. Id., at 68. 

Since Bantam Books, the Courts of Appeals have considered similar factors to determine whether a challenged

communication is reasonably understood to be a coercive

threat. Take the decision below, for example. The Second 

Circuit purported to consider: “(1) word choice and tone; (2)

the existence of regulatory authority; (3) whether the 

speech was perceived as a threat; and, perhaps most importantly, (4) whether the speech refers to adverse consequences.” 49 F. 4th, at 715 (citations omitted).4 Other Circuits have taken similarly fact-intensive approaches, 

—————— 4The NRA posits a three-factor test that looks to: (1) the actor’s authority; (2) the content and purpose of the actor’s communications; and 

(3) the reactions of the recipient. Brief for Petitioner 26. The NRA concedes, however, that its test is the same as the Second Circuit’s, as it 

considers the fourth factor in the Second Circuit’s test of “ ‘whether the 

speech refers to adverse consequences’ ” to be an “aspect of the inquiry

into the content and purpose of the communication.” Id., at 27, n. 8. 
Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

utilizing a multifactor test or a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. See, e.g., Missouri v. Biden, 83 F. 4th 350, 

380 (CA5 2023) (“[T]o help distinguish permissible persuasion from impermissible coercion, we turn to the Second

(and Ninth) Circuit’s four-factor test”); Kennedy v. Warren, 

66 F. 4th 1199, 1207 (CA9 2023) (applying the Second Circuit’s “useful non-exclusive four-factor framework”); Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F. 3d 229, 230–232 (CA7 2015) 

(considering the same factors as part of a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis); R. C. Maxwell Co. v. New Hope, 735 

F. 2d 85, 88 (CA3 1984) (same). The Courts of Appeals that 

employ a multifactor test agree that “[n]o one factor is dispositive.” 49 F. 4th, at 715; accord, Kennedy, 66 F. 4th, at 

1210 (explaining that the absence of direct regulatory authority is not dispositive). 

Ultimately, Bantam Books stands for the principle that a

government official cannot do indirectly what she is barred 

from doing directly: A government official cannot coerce a 

private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on 

her behalf. See, e.g., 372 U. S., at 67–69; see also Backpage.com, 807 F. 3d, at 231 (holding that the First Amendment barred a sheriff from “using the power of his office to 

threaten legal sanctions against . . . credit-card companies 

for facilitating future speech”); Okwedy v. Molinari, 333 

F. 3d 339, 344 (CA2 2003) (per curiam) (holding that a religious group stated a First Amendment claim against a borough president who wrote a letter “contain[ing] an implicit 

threat of retaliation” against a billboard company displaying the group’s disfavored message); cf. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. 

v. Meese, 939 F. 2d, 1011, 1016 (CADC 1991) (“[W]hen the 

government threatens no sanction—criminal or otherwise—we very much doubt that the government’s criticism

or effort to embarrass the [intermediary] threatens anyone’s First Amendment rights”). 
 

 

12 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Opinion of the Court 

B 

The parties and the Solicitor General, who filed an amicus brief supporting vacatur, agree that Bantam Books provides the right analytical framework for claims that the 

government has coerced a third party to violate the First 

Amendment rights of another. They also embrace the lower 

courts’ multifactor test as a useful, though nonexhaustive, 

guide. Rightly so. Considerations like who said what and 

how, and what reaction followed, are just helpful guideposts

in answering the question whether an official seeks to persuade or, instead, to coerce. Where the parties differ is on 

the application of the Bantam Books framework. The NRA 

and the Solicitor General reject the Second Circuit’s application of the framework, while Vullo defends it. The Court 

now agrees with the NRA and the Solicitor General. 

To state a claim that the government violated the First 

Amendment through coercion of a third party, a plaintiff 

must plausibly allege conduct that, viewed in context, could

be reasonably understood to convey a threat of adverse government action in order to punish or suppress the plaintiff ’s 

speech. See 372 U. S., at 67–68. Accepting the well-pleaded 

factual allegations in the complaint as true, the NRA plausibly alleged that Vullo violated the First Amendment by 

coercing DFS-regulated entities into disassociating with

the NRA in order to punish or suppress the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy.

Consider first Vullo’s authority, which serves as a backdrop to the NRA’s allegations of coercion. The power that a 

government official wields, while certainly not dispositive,

is relevant to the objective inquiry of whether a reasonable 

person would perceive the official’s communication as coercive. See id., at 66–67. Generally speaking, the greater and 

more direct the government official’s authority, the less

likely a person will feel free to disregard a directive from

the official. For example, imagine a local affinity group in 

New York that receives a strongly worded letter. One 
 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

would reasonably expect that organization to react differently if the letter came from, say, the U. S. Attorney for the

Southern District of New York than if it came from an outof-state school board. 

As DFS superintendent, Vullo had direct regulatory and

enforcement authority over all insurance companies and financial service institutions doing business in New York.

See N. Y. Fin. Servs. Law Ann. §§202, 301. Just like the 

commission in Bantam Books, Vullo could initiate investigations and refer cases for prosecution. Indeed, she could 

do much more than that. Vullo also had the power to notice

civil charges and, as this case shows, enter into consent decrees that impose significant monetary penalties.

Against this backdrop, consider Vullo’s communications 

with the DFS-regulated entities, particularly with Lloyd’s. 

According to the NRA, Vullo brought a variety of insurancelaw violations to the Lloyd’s executives’ attention during a

private meeting in February 2018. The violations included 

technical infractions that allegedly plagued the affinity insurance market in New York and that were unrelated to 

any NRA business. App. to Pet. for Cert. 199–200, Complaint ¶21; accord, id., at 207–208, ¶¶36–37; id., at 223, 

¶69. Vullo allegedly said she would be “less interested in

pursuing the[se] infractions . . . so long as Lloyd’s ceased

providing insurance to gun groups, especially the NRA.” 

Id., at 199–200, ¶21. Vullo therefore wanted Lloyd’s to disassociate from all gun groups, although there was no indication that such groups had unlawful insurance policies 

similar to the NRA’s. Vullo also told the Lloyd’s executives 

she would “focus” her enforcement actions “solely” on the

syndicates with ties to the NRA, “and ignore other syndicates writing similar policies.” Id., at 223, ¶69. The message was therefore loud and clear: Lloyd’s “could avoid liability for [unrelated] infractions” if it “aided DFS’s

campaign against gun groups” by terminating its business

relationships with them. Ibid. 
 

14 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Opinion of the Court 

As alleged, Vullo’s communications with Lloyd’s can be

reasonably understood as a threat or as an inducement. Either of those can be coercive. As Vullo concedes, the “threat 

need not be explicit,” Brief for Respondent 47, and as the 

Solicitor General explains, “[t]he Constitution does not distinguish between ‘comply or I’ll prosecute’ and ‘comply and 

I’ll look the other way,’” Brief for United States as Amicus 

Curiae 18, n. 7. So, whether analyzed as a threat or as an 

inducement, the conclusion is the same: Vullo allegedly coerced Lloyd’s by saying she would ignore unrelated infractions and focus her enforcement efforts on NRA-related 

business alone, if Lloyd’s ceased underwriting NRA policies

and disassociated from gun-promotion groups.

The reaction from Lloyd’s further confirms the communications’ coercive nature. Cf. Bantam Books, 372 U. S., at 

63, 68 (noting that the distributor’s “reaction on receipt of a

notice was to take steps to stop further circulation of copies 

of the listed publications”). At the meeting itself, Lloyd’s

“agreed that it would instruct its syndicates to cease underwriting firearm-related policies and would scale back its

NRA-related business.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 223, Complaint ¶69. Minutes from a subsequent board of directors’

meeting reveal that Lloyd’s thought “the DFS investigation

had transformed the gun issue into ‘a regulatory, legal[,] 

and compliance matter.’” 2 App. to Pet. for Cert. 29 

(Sealed). That reaction is consistent with Lloyd’s public announcement that it had directed its syndicates to “terminate all insurance related to the NRA and not to provide

any insurance to the NRA in the future.” App. to Pet. for 

Cert. 224, Complaint ¶72; accord, id., at 306, ¶20 (consent 

decree memorializing commitment not to underwrite, or 

participate in, NRA-endorsed programs). 

Other allegations, viewed in context, reinforce the NRA’s 

First Amendment claim. Consider the April 2018 Guidance 

Letters and accompanying press release, which Vullo issued on official letterhead. Cf. Bantam Books, 372 U. S., at 
Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

61–63, and n. 5 (discussing notice issued in “official Commission stationery”). Just like in her meeting with the

Lloyd’s executives, here too Vullo singled out the NRA and 

other gun-promotion organizations as the targets of her call 

to action. This time, the Guidance Letters reminded DFSregulated entities of their obligation to consider their “reputational risks,” and then tied that obligation to an encouragement for “prompt actio[n] to manag[e] these risks.” App.

to Pet. for Cert. 248, 251. Evocative of Vullo’s private conversation with the Lloyd’s executives a few weeks earlier, 

the press release revealed how to manage the risks by encouraging DFS-regulated entities to “‘discontinu[e] their 

arrangements with the NRA,’” just like Chubb did when it 

stopped underwriting Carry Guard. App. to Pet. for Cert. 

244. A follow-on tweet from Cuomo reaffirmed the message: Businesses in New York should “‘consider their reputations’” and “‘revisit any ties they have to the NRA,’” 

which he called “‘an extremist organization.’” Id., at 213, 

¶51.

In sum, the complaint, assessed as a whole, plausibly alleges that Vullo threatened to wield her power against 

those refusing to aid her campaign to punish the NRA’s 

gun-promotion advocacy. If true, that violates the First 

Amendment. 

C 

In holding otherwise, the Second Circuit found that: (1) 

the “Guidance Letters and Press Release are clear examples

of permissible government speech”; and (2) the Lloyd’s

meeting was “legitimate enforcement action” in which Vullo

was “merely carrying out her regulatory responsibilities” by 

offering “leniency in the course of negotiating a resolution 

of the apparent insurance law violations.” 49 F. 4th, at 

717–719. The Second Circuit could only reach this conclusion by taking the allegations in isolation and failing to

draw reasonable inferences in the NRA’s favor in violation 
 

16 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Opinion of the Court 

of this Court’s precedents. Cf. Iqbal, 556 U. S., at 678–679; 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 570 (2007).

For example, the Second Circuit failed to analyze the

Guidance Letters and press release against the backdrop of

other allegations in the complaint, including the Lloyd’s

meeting. Moreover, as discussed above, the complaint alleges that Vullo made a not-so-subtle, sanctions-backed

threat to Lloyd’s to cut all business ties with the NRA and

other gun-promotion groups, although there was no sign

that other gun groups also had unlawful insurance policies. 

See supra, at 13. It is also relevant that Vullo made this 

alleged threat in a meeting where she presented her “desire

to leverage [her] powers to combat the availability of firearms, including specifically by weakening the NRA.” App.

to Pet. for Cert. 221, Complaint ¶67; id., at 223, ¶69 (alleging Vullo hoped to enlist DFS-regulated entities in “aid[ing]

DFS’s campaign against gun groups”). Given the obligation

to draw reasonable inferences in the NRA’s favor and consider the allegations as a whole, the Second Circuit erred in 

reading the complaint as involving only individual instances of “permissible government speech” and the execution of Vullo’s “regulatory responsibilities.” 49 F. 4th, at 

717–719. 

For the same reasons, this Court cannot simply credit

Vullo’s assertion that “pursuing conceded violations of the 

law,” Brief for Respondent 29, is an “‘obvious alternative 

explanation’” for her actions that defeats the plausibility of 

any coercive threat raising First Amendment concerns, id., 

at 37, 40, 42 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U. S., at 682). Of course, 

discovery in this case might show that the allegations of coercion are false, or that certain actions should be understood differently in light of newly disclosed evidence. At 

this stage, though, the Court must assume the well-pleaded 
 

 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

factual allegations in the complaint are true.5 

Moreover, the conceded illegality of the NRA-endorsed insurance programs does not insulate Vullo from First 

Amendment scrutiny under the Bantam Books framework. 

Indeed, the commission in that case targeted the distribution and display of material that, in its view, violated the

State’s obscenity laws. Nothing in that case turned on the

distributor’s compliance with state law. On the contrary, 

Bantam Books held that the commission violated the First 

Amendment by invoking legal sanctions to suppress disfavored publications, some of which may or may not contain

protected speech (i.e., nonobscene material). See 372 U. S., 

at 64, 67. Here, too, although Vullo can pursue violations

of state insurance law, she cannot do so in order to punish 

or suppress the NRA’s protected expression. So, the contention that the NRA and the insurers violated New York 

law does not excuse Vullo from allegedly employing coercive

threats to stifle gun-promotion advocacy.

Vullo next argues that this case does not involve unconstitutional coercion because her challenged actions in fact 

targeted business practices and relationships, which qualify as “nonexpressive activity.” Brief for Respondent 32. 

The argument is misplaced. That Vullo “regulate[d]” business activities stemming from the NRA’s “relationships

with insurers and banks,” ibid., does not change the allegations that her actions were aimed at punishing or suppressing speech. In Bantam Books, the commission interfered 

with the business relationship between the distributor and 

—————— 5Vullo also argues that she is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for her enforcement actions. See Brief for Respondent 25–28. 

Putting aside whether a financial regulator like Vullo is entitled to such 

immunity in the administrative context, because Vullo did not raise this

defense below with respect to the First Amendment claim (or even with

respect to allegations unrelated to the consent decrees), the Court declines to consider that argument here in the first instance. 
 

 

18 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Opinion of the Court 

the publishers in order to suppress the publishers’ disfavored speech. 372 U. S., at 66–71. Similarly, in Backpage.com, a sheriff interfered with a website’s business relationships with payments-service providers in order to

eliminate the website’s “adult section” (if not the website

itself ). 807 F. 3d, at 230–232, 235–236. In that case, the 

sheriff wanted to “suffocat[e]” the website, “depriving the

company of ad revenues by scaring off its payments-service

providers.” Id., at 231. “The analogy,” the Seventh Circuit

explained, “is to killing a person by cutting off his oxygen 

supply rather than by shooting him.” Ibid. So too here. 

One can reasonably infer from the complaint that Vullo coerced DFS-regulated entities to cut their ties with the NRA

in order to stifle the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy and advance her views on gun control. See, e.g., supra, at 12–15; 

App. to Pet. for Cert. 221, 230–235, Complaint ¶¶67, 87–

105. Vullo knew, after all, that the NRA relied on insurance 

and financing “to disseminate its message.” Id., at 231, ¶92; 

see id., at 203–204, ¶¶28–29.6 

Lastly, Vullo falls back on the argument that a ruling in

the NRA’s favor would interfere with the government’s ability to function properly. She claims that the NRA’s position, if accepted, would stifle government speech and hamper legitimate enforcement efforts. This argument falls flat

for the simple reason that it requires the Court to accept

Vullo’s limited reading of the complaint. The Court does 

not break new ground in deciding this case. It only reaffirms the general principle from Bantam Books that where, 

as here, the complaint plausibly alleges coercive threats 

aimed at punishing or suppressing disfavored speech, the 

plaintiff states a First Amendment claim. 

—————— 6Vullo’s boss, Governor Cuomo, also urged businesses to disassociate 

with the NRA to put the organization “into financial jeopardy” and “shut

them down.” App. 21 (Aug. 3, 2018, tweet). 
 

 

 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

III 

The NRA’s allegations, if true, highlight the constitutional concerns with the kind of intermediary strategy that

Vullo purportedly adopted to target the NRA’s advocacy.

Such a strategy allows government officials to “expand 

their regulatory jurisdiction to suppress the speech of organizations that they have no direct control over.” Brief for 

First Amendment Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner 8. It also allows government officials to be more

effective in their speech-suppression efforts “[b]ecause intermediaries will often be less invested in the speaker’s 

message and thus less likely to risk the regulator’s ire.” 

Ibid. The allegations here bear this out. Although “the 

NRA was not even the directly regulated party,” Brief for

Respondent 32, Vullo allegedly used the power of her office 

to target gun promotion by going after the NRA’s business 

partners. Insurers in turn followed Vullo’s lead, fearing 

regulatory hostility.

Nothing in this case gives advocacy groups like the NRA

a “right to absolute immunity from [government] investigation,” or a “right to disregard [state or federal] laws.” Patterson, 357 U. S., at 463. Similarly, nothing here prevents 

government officials from forcefully condemning views with 

which they disagree. For those permissible actions, the

Constitution “relies first and foremost on the ballot box, not 

on rules against viewpoint discrimination, to check the government when it speaks.” Shurtleff v. Boston, 596 U. S. 

243, 252 (2022). Yet where, as here, a government official

makes coercive threats in a private meeting behind closed 

doors, the “ballot box” is an especially poor check on that 

official’s authority. Ultimately, the critical takeaway is 

that the First Amendment prohibits government officials 

from wielding their power selectively to punish or suppress

speech, directly or (as alleged here) through private intermediaries. 
 

20 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Opinion of the Court 

* * * 

For the reasons discussed above, the Court holds that the 

NRA plausibly alleged that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated entities to terminate their

business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or

suppress the NRA’s advocacy.

The judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit is vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.7 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 7On remand, the Second Circuit is free to reconsider whether Vullo is 

entitled to qualified immunity. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 22–842 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 

PETITIONER v. MARIA T. VULLO 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[May 30, 2024] 

JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring. 

I write separately to explain my understanding of the

Court’s opinion, which I join in full. Today we reaffirm a 

well-settled principle: “A government official cannot coerce 

a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on 

her behalf.” Ante, at 11. As the Court mentions, many

lower courts have taken to analyzing this kind of coercion 

claim under a four-pronged “multifactor test.” Ibid. These 

tests, the Court explains, might serve “as a useful, though 

nonexhaustive, guide.” Ante, at 12. But sometimes they 

might not. Cf. Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, 598 U. S. 175, 

205–207 (2023) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment). Indeed, the Second Circuit’s decision to break up its analysis 

into discrete parts and “tak[e] the [complaint’s] allegations 

in isolation” appears only to have contributed to its mistaken conclusion that the National Rifle Association failed 

to state a claim. Ante, at 15. Lower courts would therefore 

do well to heed this Court’s directive: Whatever value these 

“guideposts” serve, they remain “just” that and nothing 

more. Ante, at 12. “Ultimately, the critical” question is 

whether the plaintiff has “plausibly allege[d] conduct that,

viewed in context, could be reasonably understood to convey 

a threat of adverse government action in order to punish or

suppress the plaintiff ’s speech.” Ante, at 12, 19. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 

JACKSON, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 22–842 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 

PETITIONER v. MARIA T. VULLO 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[May 30, 2024] 

JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring. 

Applying our decision in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 

372 U. S. 58 (1963), the Court today explains that a “government official cannot coerce a private party to punish or 

suppress disfavored speech on her behalf.” Ante, at 11. I 

agree. I write separately to stress the important distinction

between government coercion, on the one hand, and a violation of the First Amendment, on the other. 

I 

Coercion of a third party can be the means by which the 

government violates the First Amendment rights of another. But the fact of coercion, without more, does not state 

a First Amendment claim. Rather, in addition to finding

that the government has crossed a line from persuasion to 

coercion, courts must assess how that coercion actually violates a speaker’s First Amendment rights. 

Our decision in Bantam Books provides one example of 

how government coercion of a third party can indirectly 

bring about a First Amendment violation. As the majority

explains, ante, at 9–10, Bantam Books held that a Rhode 

Island commission’s efforts to coerce intermediary book distributors into pulling certain publications from circulation

violated the First Amendment rights of the books’ publish-
 

 

2 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

JACKSON, J., concurring 

ers, 372 U. S., at 61–62, 66–67. Even though the state commission had not itself “seized or banned” any books, “the 

threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation” against the distributors

“directly and designedly stopped the circulation of publications in many parts of Rhode Island.” Id., at 67–68. 

Essentially, the State’s threats to third parties—the 

distributors—erected through private hands an “effective

state regulation . . . of obscenity.” Id., at 69. And the government could not escape responsibility for the distributors’ 

actions merely because the commission did not itself seize

any books. See id., at 66–67. 

Notably, however, the government’s coercion of the distributors into doing its bidding was not—in and of itself—

what offended the First Amendment. Rather, by threatening those third-party conduits of speech, the state commission had effectively “subject[ed] the distribution of publications to a system of prior administrative restraints” lacking 

the requisite constitutional safeguards. Id., at 70. Put another way, by exerting pressure on a third party, the State 

had constructed a “system of informal censorship.” Id., at 

71. 

The lesson of Bantam Books is that “a government official

cannot do indirectly what she is barred from doing directly.” 

Ante, at 11. That case does not hold that government coercion alone violates the First Amendment. And recognizing

the distinction between government coercion and a First

Amendment violation is important because our democracy 

can function only if the government can effectively enforce

the rules embodied in legislation; by its nature, such enforcement often involves coercion in the form of legal sanctions. The existence of an allegation of government coercion

of a third party thus merely invites, rather than answers,

the question whether that coercion indirectly worked a violation of the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. 
 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 

JACKSON, J., concurring 

II 

Whether and how government coercion of a third party

might violate another party’s First Amendment rights will 

depend on the facts of the case. Indeed, under our precedents, determining whether government action violates the

First Amendment requires application of different doctrines that vary depending on the circumstances. Different 

circumstances—who is being coerced to do what, and why—

may implicate different First Amendment inquiries. 

In Bantam Books and many cases applying it, the coercion and First Amendment inquiries practically merge. 

This is because those cases tend to follow a similar fact pattern: The plaintiff claims that the government coerced a distributor, purveyor, or conduit of expression—like a billboard company, television station, or book retailer—to shut

down the speech of another party that relies on that distributor, purveyor, or conduit to spread its message.* Coercing

an entity in the business of disseminating speech to stop

disseminating someone else’s speech obviously implicates

the First Amendment, insofar as it may result in censorship

similar to the prior restraint identified in Bantam Books. 

But, in my view, that censorship theory is an awkward fit

with the facts of this case. According to the complaint, Vullo

coerced various regulated entities to cut business ties with

the National Rifle Association (NRA). See ante, at 3–5. The 

—————— 

*See, e.g., Okwedy v. Molinari, 333 F. 3d 339, 340, 342–344 (CA2 2003) 

(per curiam) (billboard company); R. C. Maxwell Co. v. New Hope, 735 

F. 2d 85, 85–88 (CA3 1984) (same); American Family Assn., Inc. v. City 

and County of San Francisco, 277 F. 3d 1114, 1119–1120 (CA9 2002) (television stations); Kennedy v. Warren, 66 F. 4th 1199, 1204–1205 (CA9 

2023) (online book retailer); Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Meese, 939 F. 2d 

1011, 1013–1016 (CADC 1991) (convenience stores carrying pornographic magazines); Hammerhead Enterprises, Inc. v. Brezenoff, 707 

F. 2d 33, 34–38 (CA2 1983) (department stores carrying satirical board

game); VDARE Foundation v. Colorado Springs, 11 F. 4th 1151, 1156– 

1157 (CA10 2021) (resort hosting advocacy group conference). 
 

 

 

4 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

JACKSON, J., concurring 

NRA does not contend that its (concededly unlawful) insurance products offered through those business relationships 

were themselves “speech,” akin to a billboard, a television 

ad, or a book. Nor does the complaint allege that Vullo pressured the printer of American Rifleman (a longstanding 

NRA periodical) to stop printing the magazine, or coerced a

convention center into canceling the NRA’s annual meeting.

See VDARE Foundation v. Colorado Springs, 11 F. 4th 

1151, 1157 (CA10 2021). In other words, the effect of Vullo’s

alleged coercion of regulated entities on the NRA’s speech

is significantly more attenuated here than in Bantam Books 

or most decisions applying it. It is, for instance, far from 

obvious that Vullo’s conduct toward regulated entities established “a system of prior administrative restraints” 

against the NRA’s expression. Bantam Books, 372 U. S., at 

70. 

Of course, as the majority correctly observes, none of that

means that Vullo may target with impunity the NRA’s

“‘nonexpressive’” activity if she is doing so to punish the

NRA for its expression. See ante, at 17. But it does suggest

that our First Amendment retaliation cases might provide 

a better framework for analyzing these kinds of allegations—i.e., coercion claims that are not directly related to

the publication or distribution of speech. And, fortunately 

for the NRA, the complaint in this case alleges both censorship and retaliation theories for how Vullo violated the 

First Amendment—theories that, in my opinion, deserve 

separate analyses.

 “‘[A]s a general matter,’ the First Amendment prohibits

government officials from subjecting individuals to ‘retaliatory actions’ after the fact for having engaged in protected

speech.” Houston Community College System v. Wilson, 595 

U. S. 468, 474 (2022) (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U. S. 

391, 398 (2019)). “[A] plaintiff pursuing a First Amendment 

retaliation claim must show, among other things, that the

government took an ‘adverse action’ in response to his 
 

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 5 

JACKSON, J., concurring 

speech that ‘would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.’” Wilson, 595 U. S., at 477 (quoting Nieves, 587 

U. S., at 399). Although our analysis has varied by context, 

see Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 585 U. S. 87, 96–99 (2018), 

we have generally required plaintiffs claiming First 

Amendment retaliation to “establish a ‘causal connection’ 

between the government defendant’s ‘retaliatory animus’ 

and the plaintiff’s ‘subsequent injury,’” Nieves, 587 U. S., at 

398 (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U. S. 250, 259 (2006)).

Requiring that causal connection to a retaliatory motive

is important, because “[s]ome official actions adverse to . . .

a speaker might well be unexceptionable if taken on other 

grounds.” Id., at 256. In this case, for example, analyzing 

causation matters because much of Vullo’s alleged conduct,

if not done for retaliatory reasons, might otherwise be legitimate enforcement of New York’s insurance regulations. 

How a retaliation analysis should proceed in this case

was not addressed below, so the Court rightly leaves that 

question unanswered today. But, importantly, any such

analysis requires more than asking simply whether the government’s actions crossed the threshold from permissible

persuasion to impermissible coercion. The NRA concedes 

that, at the very least, our burden-shifting framework from 

Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), 

likely applies. See Reply Brief 16–17. Should that test govern, the NRA would have to plausibly allege that a retaliatory motive was a “‘substantial’” or “‘motivating factor’” in 

Vullo’s targeting of the regulated entities doing business 

with the NRA. Mt. Healthy, 429 U. S., at 287. Vullo, in 

turn, could rebut that allegation by showing that she would

have taken the same action “even in the absence of the 

[NRA’s] protected conduct.” Ibid.; see Lozman, 585 U. S., 

at 96 (“[E]ven if retaliation might have been a substantial 

motive for the board’s action, still there was no liability unless the alleged constitutional violation was a but-for cause 

of the employment termination”). 
 

6 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

JACKSON, J., concurring 

* * * 

The NRA’s complaint advances both censorship and retaliation claims, yet the lower courts in this case lumped

these claims together and ultimately focused almost exclusively on whether Vullo’s conduct was coercive. See ante, 

at 6–7. Consequently, the strength of the NRA’s claim under the Mt. Healthy framework has received little attention 

thus far. On remand, the parties and lower courts should

consider the censorship and retaliation theories independently, mindful of the distinction between government 

coercion and the ways in which such coercion might (or

might not) have violated the NRA’s constitutional rights. 

That analysis can and should likewise consider which First

Amendment framework best captures the NRA’s allegations in this case. See, e.g., VDARE, 11 F. 4th, at 1159– 

1175 (separately analyzing censorship and retaliation 

claims).