[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 17-10764

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-24154-CMA

ALPHONSO L. LEE, JR., 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, 

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, ELEVENTH JUDICIAL 

CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, 

Jeffrey Rosinek, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(August 31, 2017)

Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Alphonso Lee, Jr., a Florida Prisoner, appeals pro se and in forma pauperis

the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred by 

dismissing his case as time-barred because the statute of limitations should have 

been tolled due to a continuing violation of his rights. 

We review de novo a district court's sua sponte dismissal for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 

(11th Cir. 2006). Pursuant to § 1915A, district courts are required to screen civil 

complaints filed by prisoners against governmental entities or employees, and 

dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous, fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or seeks relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A similar provision appears in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for in forma pauperis complaints. Pro se pleadings are held to a 

less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an attorney and are liberally 

construed. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). 

Although we show leniency to pro se litigants, we will not rewrite a deficient 

pleading in order to sustain an action. Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 

1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014).

We also review questions concerning the application of a statute of 

limitations de novo. Harrison v. Digital Health Plan, 183 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th 

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Cir. 1999). Because § 1983 does not have a statute of limitations of its own, 

statute of limitations issues are governed by the forum state’s general personal 

injury statute of limitations in each case. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 

1175, 1188 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-250 

(1989)). Florida’s four-year statute of limitations therefore applies to § 1983 

claims arising in Florida. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). 

The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or should know 

that they have suffered the injury that is the basis of the complaint, and knows or 

should know who inflicted the injury. Id. 

The continuing violation doctrine allows a plaintiff to sue on an otherwise 

time-barred claim when additional violations of the law occur within the statutory 

period. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 

2006). We have distinguished between the continuing effects of a discrete 

violation, which do not extend the limitations period, and the continuation of a 

violation itself, which does extend the time period. Id. at 1335. Furthermore, we 

have limited the continuing violation doctrine to situations in which a reasonably 

prudent plaintiff would have been unable to determine that a violation occurred. 

Id. If an event should have alerted a reasonable plaintiff to assert his rights, then 

the plaintiff cannot rely on the continuing violation doctrine. Id.

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The district court correctly determined that Lee’s claim was time-barred 

because he filed it far outside of the applicable four-year statute of limitations. See 

Chappell, 340 F.3d at 1283. The continuing violation doctrine did not apply 

because his claim dealt with the continuing effects of one violation rather than 

continued violations, and because a reasonably prudent plaintiff would have been 

aware that the alleged violation occurred within the statute of limitations. See

Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1335. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal 

of Lee’s complaint. 

AFFIRMED.

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