IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsRODNEY 0. SKURDAL, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Big Horn, 

The Honorable William Speare, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Rodney 0. Skurdab, pro se, Gillette, Wyoming 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Kathy Seeley, Asst. Atty. General, Helena 

James Yellowtail, County Attorney, Hardin, Montana 

-3 I ! - :-3 

IJ- ti 

Filed: ., -, 

Submitted: November 10, 1988 

Decided: December 30, 1988 

Clerk 
Mr. Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Rodney 0. Skurdal was convicted in the Thirteenth Judicial 

District, Big Horn County, of operating a motor vehicle without a 

valid driver's license and exceeding the posted nighttime speed 

limit. 

Skurdal refuses to procure and carry a driver's license on 

various constitutional grounds. He raises twenty-eight issues on 

appeal. We have reduced those to one basic question: Were any of 

Skurdal's constitutional rights violated? 

We hold that none of Skurdalls constitutional rights were 

violated and that it is a proper exercise of the State's police 

power to require a valid driver's license before one may operate 

a motor vehicle on the public highways in Montana. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It should be noted here that the State was not required to 

file a response brief, because Skurdalls appellate handwritten 

brief was not properly filed with this Court. Skurdal appears pro 

se in forma pauperis. We have accepted Skurdalls appeal, despite 

its irregularities, because it contains frequently raised arguments 

which need to be finally settled. 

We have subdivided Skurdal's voluminous brief and have 

organized his various arguments in the following manner. 

I. The Driver's License 

Skurdal asserts that it is unconstitutional for the State to 

require him to procure a driver's license before operating a motor 

vehicle on the public highways. According to Skurdal, it violates 

his constitutional right to freedom of travel and right to use his 

private property (his car) without governmental interference. 

Lastly, he asserts that the state legislature is unconstitutionally 

encroaching on his absolute constitutional rights and that the 

judiciary is blindly accepting these laws and further encroaching 

on his rights. We disagree. 
a. Rights are not absolute 

One must begin with the basic premise that constitutional 

rights are not always absolute; rather, there are just 

constitutional safeguards which must first be met before a 

government may infringe on an individualts rights. For example, 

the private property interests Skurdal asserts are not absolute, 

but the Constitution guarantees that due process will be had before 

an infringement occurs. Even such fundamental rights as those 

guaranteed by the First Amendment are not immune from governmental 

regulation. Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward (Alaska 1982), 

655 P.2d 1293. Most noteworthy is the fact that a city may always 

impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place and manner in 

which such First Amendment rights are exercised. 

This is what Skurdal calls the encroachment of his absolute 

rights and the judiciary's blind acceptance. However, this is the 

law in this country. Agreeing with the law is not a prerequisite 

to following it. 

b. Right to freedom of travel 

The right to freedom of travel, not only is not even 

implicated in this case, it has not been infringed. At no time 

were there any constraints by the State of Montana on this right 

of Skurdal . He has at all times remained free from state 

regulation and constraint, able to leave this state and travel as 

he pleases. He was free to get on a plane and fly to New York, 

free to take a bus back to Wyoming; he existed free of any state 

interference of this right to travel. 

This notion of right to travel remains wholly separate from 

the right or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public 

highways in Montana. As was stated recently by the Utah Supreme 

Court, nappellantts assertion that the right to travel encompasses 

the unrestrained use of the highway is wrong. The right to travel 

granted by the state and federal constitutions does not include 
Skurdal's appeal is without merit. This Court has already 

ruled on that issue. "We have previously recognized the power of 

the State to regulate licensing of drivers in the interests of 

public safety." Sedlacek v. Ahrens (1974), 165 Mont. 479, 483, 530 

P.2d 424, 426. Licensing is the best means to determine that 

drivers meet a minimal standard of competence. It is a 

justifiable, reasonable and desireable exercise of the police power 

of the State. 

That police power was recognized by the United States Supreme 

Court as early as 1837 when it stated that Itstate and local 

governments possess an inherent power to enact reasonable 

legislation for the health, safety, welfare or morals of the 

public.fit Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge Co. (1837), 11 

Peters 496. That the states currently possess that police power 

is unquestioned. Polk v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board 

(Okla. 1966), 420 P.2d 520. Montana recognizes that such police 

power exists even when the regulations are an infringement of 

individual rights. State v. Rathbone (1940), 110 Mont. 225, 241, 

100 P.2d 86, 92. Skurdal is aware that this issue was raised and 

rejected by this Court in 1986 when he, himself, was here before. 

Skurdal v. City of Billings (Mont. 1986), 730 P.2d 371, 43 St.Rep. 

2036, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1902, 95 L.Ed.2d 508, reh. denied, 

107 S.Ct. 2492, 96 L.Ed.2d 383 (Skurdal I). We will not entertain 

his argument on this issue again and will deem any further pursuit 

of this issue frivolous. 

However, because his legal research is incomplete and his 

analysis flawed, we feel the need to fully discuss his claims to 

reach a final resolution of these arguments. Many of our sister 

states as well recently have decided similar cases with near 

identical arguments. This is obviously a growing school of thought 

which has been misguided. 
the ability to ignore laws governing the use of public roadways." 

City of Salina v. Wisden (Utah 1987), 737 P.2d 981, 983. 

c. Operating a motor vehicle: right or privilege 

Many states have recently debated under similar circumstances 

whether it is a privilege or a right to drive on state highways. 

Predictably, Skurdal argues that it is an absolute right. We 

disagree. 

The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway is 

not a fundamental right; it is a revocable privilege that is 

granted upon compliance with statutory licensing procedures. City 

of Salina, 737 P.2d at 983; State v. Svendrowski (Mo.App. 1985), 

692 S.W. 2d 348, 349; Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Schaejbe (Tex. 

1985), 687 S.W.2d 727, 728; State v. Coyle (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 

185, 470 N.Ed.2d 457, 458, 14 O.B.R. 203; Mackler v. Alexis (1982), 

130 Cal.App.3d 44, 181 Cal.Rpt. 613, 622-623; State ex rel. Hjelle 

v. A Motor Vehicle, Etc. (N.D. 1980), 299 N.W.2d 557, 562; Smith 

v. Cox (Utah 1980), 609 P.2d 1332, 1333. 

Whether it is termed a right or a privilege, one's ability to 

travel on public highways is always subject to reasonable 

regulation by the state in the valid exercise of its police power. 

Gordon v. State (1985), 108 Id. 178, 697 P.2d 1192, 1193, appeal 

dismissed, 474 U.S. 803, 106 S.Ct. 35, 88 L.Ed.2d 28 (1985), reh. 

denied, 474 U.S. 1097, 106 S.Ct. 874, 88 L.Ed.2d 912 (1986). 

Our motor vehicle codes were promulgated to increase the 

safety and efficiency of our public roadways. It enhances rather 

than infringes upon the citizen's right to travel. Citv of Salina, 

737 P.2d at 983. The privilege properly may be revoked for 

noncompliance, sections 61-5-105, -201, and -205, MCA, and such 

would not be an infringement of the revokee's right to travel. 
11. Liberty Interests 

Skurdal claims that his right to liberty as guaranteed by the 

Constitution was violated when the Montana Highway Patrol stopped 

his vehicle and detained him personally. We disagree. 

Skurdal was stopped by Officer Joseph Coughlin after the 

officer visually observed Skurdal's vehicle traveling at a high 

rate of speed and confirmed that with his radar equipment. After 

being unable to produce a valid driver's license and unable to post 

the necessary bond, Skurdal was arrested. 

The officer had probable cause to stop the Skurdal vehicle. 

Probable cause that Skurdal had committed an offense consisted of 

the officerls visual observation, confirmed by the radar reading. 

See also section 61-8-703, MCA, arrest without a warrant in radar 

cases. Thus, Skurdal was properly stopped. Such a lawful and 

proper stop can in no way be construed as a violation of Skurdal's 

constitutional rights. 

a. "Free man status1' 

We reject Skurdal Is argument that he is a "free man" exempt 

from the laws because he has "no contracts1' with either the state 

or federal governments. Skurdal is a llpersonll as defined by 

section 61-1-307, MCA, and bound by the statutes in Montana which 

he violated. Consent to laws is not a prerequisite to their 

enforceability against individuals. Citv of Salina, 737 P.2d at 

983. No persons in Montana may exempt themselves from any law 

simply by declaring they do not consent to it applying to them. 

We must all abide by the valid laws, even the ones with which we 

do not agree, or justice will be served against us for the 

violation. Accepting Skurdal's assertion of exempt status is an 

invitation to anarchy. We decline that invitation. 
b. Private automobile, noncommercial use 

We reject Skurdal's claim that because he owes nothing on his 

car (private property) and is not engaged in commercial travel, his 

liberty interests are infringed by stopping his vehicle. That 

claim is baseless in Montana, and we find no law in any other 

jurisdiction to support it either. We will not entertain it 

further. 

111. Miranda Warning 

Skurdal asserts that his constitutional rights were also 

violated because he was not given a Miranda warning after he was 

stopped. Skurdal is wrong, as we pointed out in his last case in 

this Court. That issue was squarely decided by us in Skurdal I, 

where we stated: 

The United States Supreme Court has held that 

there must be a custodial interrogation before 

the Miranda warning need be given. Custodial 

interrogation does not occur at a traffic 

stop. . . 

730 P.2d at 374. 

We need not discuss this argument further. 

IV. Right to Counsel 

Skurdal claims that his constitutional right to counsel was 

violated when he was not granted court-appointed counsel and was 

not appointed the counsel of his choice. We disagree. Skurdal 

wished to have an advisor, a personal acquaintance who was not a 

lawyer, help contest the State in his trial on these two traffic 

tickets and have the government tax dollars pay for it. 

In his argument, Skurdal misconstrues this right as being 

absolute and pertaining to any counsel, not necessarily legal 

counsel. Skurdal is wrong on both counts. 

Section 46-8-101 (3) , MCA (1985) , provides that appointment of 

counsel for misdemeanor charges such as these is discretionary with 
the trial judge. This statute provides for such appointment "in 

the interests of justice.fg The Attorney General for the State of 

Montana has taken the position that appointment of counsel in 

misdemeanor cases is mandatory, assuming indigency, "unless the 

judge has weighed the seriousness and gravity of the offense and 

precludes imprisonment upon conviction, and informs the defendant 

of this before trial.n A.G. Op. No. 36. This opinion is based on 

the United States Supreme Court case of Arsinger v. Hamlin (1972), 

407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530. 

Thus, the crux of the issue is whether, after a determination 

of indigency, Judge Speare determined that these charges merited 

incarceration if convicted. Obviously, from the record and from 

the sentence he imposed, he did not entertain seriously 

incarceration as an appropriate sentence. His denial of courtappointed counsel was therefore proper. 

Lastly, on this subject, no one has the constitutional right 

to counsel of choice. State v. Hartford (1982), 133 Ariz. 328, 651 

P.2d 856. Those who require counsel are guaranteed the effective 

assistance of counsel, thus nullifying any need or right to choose 

among those qualified lawyers. ~ppointment of counsel is clearly 

a choice for the trial court. 

CONCLUSION 

We commend Skurdal on his efforts and participation in his 

government. We defend his right to hold a differing political and 

legal opinion. However, we repeat that the issues herein raised 

are now settled, and any further appeal of them in this Court will 

be deemed frivolous. 

We decline to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals as per 

the request of the Big Horn County Attorney based on Skurdal I, 

supra. We do not reach the issue of what sanctions are appropriate 

for frivolous appeals as made by pro se litigants. 
Finally, we do not reach Skurdal's question of whether Federal 

Reserve Notes are lldollars.ll His quarrel with the federal monetary 

system has no relevant bearing on any of the contested issues in 

this case regarding Skurdalls criminal liability. We hold that 

Skurdal may promptly pay his $350 traffic fine to Big Horn County 

in any form of lawful United States money. 

Judgment affirmed. 

/ 

We concur: 

/7 

i:, ,,./&47~ 

#@ Justices