Continuing the Commitment: Agricultural

Development in the Sahel

August 1986

NTIS order #PB87-117644
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Continuing the Commitment: Agricultural Development in the Sahel—Special Report, OTA-F-308 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, August 1986).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 86-600555

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
Foreword

In 1985, rain came to the Sahel and provided partial relief from its latest drought.

For the moment, hunger in West Africa is largely forgotten. However, many questions remain unanswered regarding why this area remains so poor and so vulnerable after nearly a decade of development assistance.

In June 1985, the Technology Assessment Board approved the requests of three

congressional committees and five Board members that OTA address some of these

questions as part of our study of low-resource agriculture in Africa. Although OTA’s

full study will not be completed until late 1987, we agreed to provide an earlier

report focused on development in the Sahel. This special report examines the record

of assistance to nine nations of the Sahel in West Africa, explores the lessons learned

in a decade of efforts, and suggests policy implications for more effective U.S. assistance there and elsewhere in Africa. The report emphasizes the technical and

institutional factors that constrain development in one of the poorest regions in

the world. The committees that requested the study are: the House Select Committee on Hunger, the House Science and Technology Committee (the Subcommittee

on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research, and Environment), and the House

Agriculture Committee. Of OTA’s Technology Assessment Board, Senators Hatch,

Kennedy, and Pen and Representatives Evans and Udall requested this study. Also,

the House Foreign Affairs Committee supported this work.

This report draws on the expertise of a large number of people. In particular,

we appreciate the assistance provided by approximately 100 Sahelian scientists,

decisionmakers, and farmers and herders with whom we spoke, Also, we are grateful

to workshop participants, the advisory panel, and additional reviewers who helped

us determine the scope of the work and reviewed it to ensure its accuracy. Of course,

OTA remains responsible for the analysis and the report does not necessarily

represent the views of individual members of the advisory panel.

Director

 
Low-Resource Agriculture in Africa Advisory Panel

Mary Anderson, Chair

Consultant in International Economic Development

Bridges Project, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

Eugene Adams

Vice Provost for International Programs

Tuskegee University

Tuskegee, AL

Haidari Amani

Senior Lecturer

University of Dar es Salaam

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Leonard Berry

Provost and Vice President for Academic

Affairs

Clark University

Worcester, MA

David Brokensha

Director

University of California Study Center for

the United Kingdom and Ireland

London, United Kingdom

Cornelia Flora

Professor

Department of Sociology, Anthropology and

Social Work

Kansas State University

Manhattan, KS

Jake Halliday

Director

Battelle-Kettering Laboratory

Yellow Springs, OH

The Reverend Thomas Hayden*

Director Social Concerns Department

Society for African Missions

Washington, DC

Michael Horowitz

President and Director

Institute for Development Anthropology

Binghamton, NY

Goran Hyden

Professor

Department of Government

Dartmouth College

Hanover, NH

Joseph Kennedy

Director of International Development

Africare

Washington, DC

David Leonard

Associate Professor

Department of Political Science

University of California

Berkeley, CA

Shem Migot-Adholla

Associate Research Professor

Institute of Development Studies

University of Nairobi

Nairobi, Kenya

Elliot Morss* *

Acting Director

Center for Asian Development Studies

Boston University

Boston, MA

Bede Okigbo

Deputy Director General

International Institute of Tropical

Agriculture

Ibadan, Nigeria

Robert Rodale

Chairman of the Board

Rodale Press, Inc.

Emmaus, PA

John Scheuring

Team Leader

International Crops Research Institute for

the Semi-Arid Tropics

Bamako, Mali

*Resigned as of June 24, 1986.

iv

**Resigned as of April 24, 1986.
Anita Spring

Associate Dean

College of Liberal Arts

University of Florida

Gainesville, FL

Aart van Wingerden

President

Double Harvest, Inc.

Fletcher, NC

Garth Youngberg

Executive Director

Institute for Alternative Agriculture

Greenbelt, MD

Executive Branch Liaisons

Cheryl Christensen

Branch Chief for Africa-Middle East

Economic Research Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Washington, DC

Howard L. Hill

Assistant Director for Inter-Governmental

Climate Programs

National Climate Program

U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Rockville, MD

Marcus Winter

Chief of Agriculture and Rural

Development Division

Africa Bureau

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

John Zarafonetis

Coordinator of African Food Systems

Initiative

U.S. Peace Corps

Washington, DC
Low-Resource Agriculture in Africa

OTA Project Staff

Roger C. Herdman, Assistant Director, OTA

Health and Life Sciences Division

Walter E. Parham, Food and Renewable Resources Program Manager

Phyllis N. Windle, Project Director

Analytical Staff for the Special Report

George Scharffenberger, Contractor

Kathy Desmond, Contractor

Allen Ruby, Research Analyst

Chris Elfring, Editor

Additional Analytical Staff

Beckie

Bruce J. Horwith, Analyst

J. Kathy Parker, Analyst

Administrative Staff

Erickson, Administrative Assistant

Nellie Hammond, Secretary

Carolyn Swann, Secretary

vi
Contents

Chapter Page

l. Summary and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Sahel Development Program and the Club du Sahel/CILSS

Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Poverty and Increasing Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Decade of Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Applying the Lessons: The Agency for International Development . . . . . . . 8

Sahelian and Donor Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Other U.S. Actors in the Sahel.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Findings and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Is Further Support for the Sahel Development Program Justified?.. . . . . . . 12

Can a More Effective Partnership Be Created? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Is the Strategy Commensurate With the Commitment? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Is AID Working Against Itself? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Can Diverse Actors With Diverse Strengths Work Together? . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

2. AID’s Sahel Development Program and the Club/CILSS Framework . . . . . . . . . 21

The U.S. Commitment to Club/CILSS: The Sahel Development Program. . . . 22

The Club/CILSS Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Evolution and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3. The Sahel: Diversity and Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The Sahel Yesterday . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Societies in Transition in the Sahel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Pastoral Systems in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Changing Social Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Social and Economic Development of Sahelian Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Profile of Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

The Sahel in the World Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

The Growing Gap Between Food Production and Food Requirements. . . . . . 41

A Diverse and Changing Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

A Harsh Environment: Climate, Rainfall and Soils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Impact of Human Activity on the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

4. A Decade of Lessons: Technologies Past and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Disappointments and Accomplishments.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Why Technology Failed To Solve the Problems and

More Promising Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

An Inadequately Understood Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Poorly Appreciated Socioeconomic Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Guidelines for Sahelian Agricultural Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

The Integration of Traditional Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

5. A Decade of Lessons: Policies and Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Modes of Development and Development Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Participation: Leaving Out the Ones That Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Short-Term, Product-Oriented Project Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Complexity of Project Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Making Research More Appropriate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

vii
Chapter Page

Policy Disincentives and the Potential for Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Agriculture’s Low Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Cereals Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Food Aid and Export Subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Encouraging Effective Marketing and Removing Constraints on

Private Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Land Tenure and Regulation of Access to Natural Resources . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Fiscal and Institutional Reform and Recurrent Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Limitations of Policy Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Beyond the Lessons: Critical Issues To Be Addressed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

The Balance Between Irrigation and Rainfed Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Food Production and Export Crops.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Strategies for the Livestock Sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Population Programs: The 50 Million People Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Production and Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Issues and Priorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

6. Applying the Lessons: The Agency for International Development . . . . . . . . . . 95

Incorporating the Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Evolving Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

AID’s Revised Sahel Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Implementing the Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................100

The Internal AID Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........100

Constraints on the Congress-AI. Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..104

Development Assistance and Foreign Policy Objectives in the Sahel .. ...107

7. A Catalog of Other Actors in the Sahel . . . . . . . . . . ........................111

African Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................112

Sahelian Government Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...112

Nongovernmental Sahelian Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........114

U.S. Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........117

U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....117

The Peace Corps... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................121

African Development Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...123

American Private Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....125

Other U.S. Federal Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........127

Multilateral and Bilateral Donors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....,128

Size of Programs and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................129

Project Size and Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............130

Sectors Where Funders Operate . . . . . . . . . ............................130

Types of Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................131

A Variety of Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............132

A Diversity of Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........133

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....137

Appendix A: Appendix Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................145

Appendix B: Other Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........151

Appendix C: Additional Reviewers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................152

Appendix D:OTA Field Visits-November 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......153

,.
Appendix E:

Appendix F:

Page

The Sahel Development Strategy Statement—Executive Summary .158

Assessment of the Sahel Development Program—Executive

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........162

Tables

Table No Page

2-1, U.S. Bilateral Assistance to the Sahel, 1976-86, ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., , ... , , . 22

3-1.

3-2,

3-3.

3-4.

3-5.

3-6.

5-1.

7-1,

7-2.

7-3.

7-4,

A-1.

A-2.

A-3

A-4,

A-5.

A-6.

A-7.

The Sahel: Social and Economic Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Agriculture-Related Social and Economic Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Major Exports and Share of Export Earnings, 1980-82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Debt of Sahelian Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Land Distribution by Climatic Zone and Suitability of Soils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Sustainable and Actual Numbers of People in the Sahel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Agricultural Exports and Imports as a Percent of Total, 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations in the Sahel . .....................117

The Peace Corps in the Sahel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....,122

Collaborative Research Support Programs Active in the Sahel . ...........128

Top 10 Donors to Sahelian Member Countries, 1975-83 ..................129

General Commitments Trend by Different Donors From 1975 to 1983:

DAC Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........145

General Commitments Trend by Different Donors From 1975 to 1983:

Multilateral Institutions (Non-OPEC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........145

General Commitments Trend by Different Donors From 1975 to 1983:

OPEC Countries and Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............146

Who Finances What in Certain Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......146

Sectoral Breakdown and Trend of Commitments From 1975 to 1983 .. ....147

U.S. Aid to the Sahel, Fiscal Years 1975 to 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......148

Amount Spent on Public Law 480 Commodities for the Sahel, 1977-86 ....149

Figures

Figure No. Page

1-1.

3-1.

3-2.

3-3.

3-4.

3-5,

3-6.

3-7.

3-8.

3-9.

3-1o.

CILSS Countries of West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Commodity Price Trends for Peanuts, Cotton, Rock Phosphate, and

Iron Ore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Growing Debt Burden of Sahelian Nations, 1974-83 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Index of Total Food Production in the Sahel, 1960-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Index of Per Capita Food Production in the Sahel, 1960-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Sahel Grain Imports by Commodity, 1966-84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Sahel Grain Imports, 1967-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Total Amount of Food Grains Available in the Sahel, 1967-84 . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Ratios of Food Aid, Grain Imports and Grain Availability in the Sahel,

1967-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Climatic Zones in the CILSS Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Percentage Share of Wood in the Sahel Countries’ Supply of Energy,

Mid-1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
.

In the Sahel, we walked on rock-hard crops when the current farmer s

were children. Now the land seemed so infertile, the work to reclaim it so laborious, and

the odds against success so high, that we wondered at the farmers’ perseverance. Why not

go south, like so many had already done? One peanut farmer in Burkina Faso answered,

We have a proverb. If a tree has strong, deep roots, it lives through the dry season, even when

it loses all its leaves. I will stay and improve this land because my roots are in the soil. We dream

that our children will return like the leaves when the land iS better.”
Chapter 1

Summary and Options

SUMMARY

Drought has long been a fact of life in the

Sahel region of West Africa. When the rains

fail, as they did for 5 years beginning in 1968

and again from 1980 to 1984, crops wither, livestock die, and people suffer. International relief efforts had funneled over $360 million of

emergency aid to the Sahel by 1974, but dealing with that immediate crisis would not prevent future problems in the region (37). The real

challenge for both Sahelians and the international assistance organizations was to avoid future crises.

One important question that arose was how

best to coordinate the multitude of assistance

efforts, donors, and recipients. And what balance should be struck between relief, recovery,

and development? Thus was born the Club du

Sahel/CILSS framework (see box A)–the Club

du Sahel being a loosely structured association

of donors and Sahelians, and CILSS being an

intergovernmental organization representing

the countries of the Sahel. Together, donors and

Sahelians agreed to commit themselves to a coordinated and sustained effort for development

in the Sahel region, striving for a time when

the region’s people could be assured a stable

and sustainable food supply. The United States

has played an important role in this approach.

The Sahel Develepment Program1

and the Club du Sahel/CiLSS

Framework

The Sahel Development Program (SDP) was

created in 1977 by an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. SDP institutionalized the

‘In this study the phrase “Sahel Development Program” or

“SDP” refers to the U.S. program authorized and appropriated

under Sections 120 and 121 of the Foreign Assistance Act. SDP

is the U.S. development assistance program affiliated with the

Club/CILSS framework. Economic Support Funds (ESF) and Pub

lic Law 480 Food for Peace assistance to the Sahel are not considered part of this program.

U.S. commitment to the unique Club/CILSS

framework of development assistance—a coordinated, long-term, multinational effort by

major Western industrialized nations in support of the CILSS group of severely droughtaffected West African States.

The Club/CILSS framework evolved from international public reaction to a tragic series of

drought years (1968 to 1973) in the Sahel that

left tens of thousands dead, decimated livestock

herds, exacerbated environmental degradation,

and disrupted already fragile economies. Club/

CILSS set goals to increase self-sufficiency in

food under conditions of ecological balance and

sustainable growth in the region and to reduce

vulnerability to drought by improving agricultural production significantly and stabilizing

the environment. The scale and complexity of

the challenge required a commitment to a

“generation” of cooperation and financial

assistance.

Both CILSS and the Club have evolved over

the past decade. However, the mandate and

operations of CILSS have remained controversial. Although CILSS was created largely as a

mechanism to increase aid flows, by the late

1970s it increasingly sought responsibility to

implement its own regional projects. But CILSS

performance often has been mediocre. Its effectiveness has been constrained by inconsistent member support, uneven leadership, and

inadequate technical and managerial capabilities. In the past year, CILSS member states

have agreed to limit its mandate to that of a regional think tank and to streamline the organization’s structure.

The Club du Sahel has played a significant

role in tripling the flow of aid directed to the

Sahel. Donors have contributed $15 billion in

assistance since 1975. The Club also provided

key sector analysis and helped bring the issues

of the environment, recurrent costs, and cereal

3
4

kina Faso.

policy reform to the attention of both donors

and Sahelians. The Club still suffers from some

lack of coordination but its role in fostering information sharing and coordination has been

appreciable. While the Club’s problems are less

serious than CILSS’s, the Club also suffers from

fluctuating support from its sponsors, the uneven quality of its analysis, and disappointing

responses from donors and Sahelians following studies and discussions. Few Sahelians participate directly in Club Secretariat work. Despite the shortcomings of the Club and CILSS,

the multinational approach embodied in their

framework continues to be a unique and positive characteristic of the Sahel effort and this

approach does increase the effective use of individual donor and Sahelian resources.

U.S. contributions to the Sahel development

effort, through SDP development assistance

funds, Economic Support Funds (ESF), and

Public Law 480—Food for Peace, have

amounted to $1.4 billion between 1976 and

1986. SDP involves three distinct though related

elements:

1.

2.

3.

the distinct line item funding mechanism

and Agency for International Development

(AID) management structure created by the

1977 legislation;

U.S. support for the multinational and regional aspects of the Sahel effort through

the Club/CILSS framework; and

the specific strategies that guide the development and implementation of U.S. assistance programs to the region.

U.S. humanitarian and political and economic

interests in increased food security, development, and stability in the Sahel have changed

little since the original SDP commitment. Although the region has few strategic resources

and offers little prospect of commercial opportunity for U.S. business for the short term, it

borders a strategically important and more turbulent North Africa. The majority of the Sahelian States are nonaligned, but take pro-West,

moderate positions. They have growing political and cultural ties with the United States.

If the issue of food security in the Sahel is

not addressed today, the future will bring continued problems and pain.
5

Figure 1-1 .—CILSS Countries of West Africa

Cape Verde Islands

SOURCE: U.S. General Accounting Office, Can More Be Done To Assist Sahelian Governments To Plan and Manage Their Economic Development? NSIAD-85-87

(Washington, DC: Sept. 6, 1985).
6

Poverty and Increasing

Vulnerability

The Sahel strategy was designed as a regional

approach because the countries shared some

important ecological, economic, historical, and

cultural commonalities. Erratic rainfall has

plagued the Sahel for the past decade. But

drought has been a major reality in Sahelian

life for at least 2000 years. Historically, the region’s social, economic, and agricultural systems evolved in dynamic symbiosis with the

region’s harsh environments. The environmental and economic vulnerability has increased over the past century with growing external dependence during the colonial and

post-colonial periods, associated changes in

socioeconomic systems, and increases in population growth. There has been a corresponding, gradual erosion of “fall-back” strategies for

coping with drought such as a reliance on natural systems and migration. These trends have

accelerated over the past 20 years and led to

economic stagnation, rising trade deficits and

debt, financial crisis, and growing dependence

on international aid to meet national food requirements.

While some indices of health, life expectancy,

and education have shown impressive improvement, individual Sahelians, particularly people

in rural areas, face income levels and living

standards that remain among the lowest in the

world. In the past two decades, total agricultural production has increased by about 1 percent per year but yields remain low and in fact

may be decreasing in certain areas. Agricultural production per capita has declined even

more than it has in Africa as a whole (according to one estimate, 24 percent versus 16 percent) (138). Annual production and income

levels continue to be determined by the vagaries of rainfall, unstable government policies,

and inappropriate market prices,

The Sahelian environment has also come

under increased stress. Changing social, economic, and production systems as well as

drought, land degradation, and declining fuelwood supplies all contribute to the region’s vulnerability. Unless there is appreciable technological change, environmental degradation

and high population growth rates will make it

increasingly difficult to reduce the region’s

poverty.

Decade of Lessons

The Club/CILSS effort, and the U.S. SDP contribution within it, have provided modest tangible successes. Thousands of Sahelians have

received technical and managerial training; infrastructure (especially roads) has improved;

and access to health care and literacy have increased. Sahelian institutional capacity also has

improved—as illustrated by the fact that relief

efforts following the 1984 drought were much

more successful in the CILSS states than elsewhere in Africa and relatively few lives were

lost. Despite improvements, the Sahel is still

vulnerable; even with 1.2 million tons of emergency food aid in 1985, the drought added to

increased malnutrition and general economic

decline. Increased agricultural production and

environmental stabilization remain elusive

goals even as the Club/CILSS framework is onethird of the way into the “generation” of commitment.

Despite this mixed record, Sahelians and

donors say that they have learned important

lessons that can serve as a foundation for more

successful efforts. The physical and human conditions on which Club/CILSS goals were based

remain valid. And while those involved sometimes do not agree on specific actions, some

consensus has evolved regarding the nature of

many fundamental issues. The following paragraphs highlight the lessons learned in the Sahel in the past decade.

Some of the past decade’s failure to meet expectations may be the result of too much optimism regarding the existence of applicable

technologies. Many agricultural technologies

transferred from other semiarid regions to the
7

Sahel proved inappropriate to Sahelian ecological and social systems. Many of these errors

were the product of an insufficient knowledge

base regarding Sahelian natural and social systems and an ineffective integration of that

knowledge into project design and implementation, Sahelian farmers and herders were inadequately consulted and their existing technologies and adapative processes were overlooked.

As a result of these setbacks, new guidelines

are emerging for technology development and

adaptation. These include:

a focus on Sahel-specific solutions based

on increasing the existing knowledge base

and its effective use;

increased farmer and herder input and a

creative combination of indigenous and external research, technology, and management systems;

more localized research strategies tailored

to ecological and socioeconomic diversity;

and

a focus on the low-resource farmer and

herder who comprise the majority of Sahelian agriculturalists.

Agricultural technologies appropriate for the

Sahel must be low risk, low cost, sustainable,

and create substantial production increases.

Photo credit: World Bank

Throughout the Sahel, families such as this one in Mali

grow crops using low-resource technologies.

The need for sustainability is tied to the additional recognition of the need for a strong focus on conservation and improvement of the

challenging Sahel environment, especially its

tree cover, grasslands, soil, and water resources. An important complementary objective will be to slow population growth, although

social resistance and a failure on the part of

donors to understand that resistance lessen the

prospects for short-term progress. Other areas

of critical research needs that have been identified include: varietal and agronomic improvements for major cereal crops; small-scale irrigation technologies; soil fertility; agro-forestry;

food processing; agro-climatology; and animal

nutrition. In the social sciences, population dynamics, farming systems, marketing, and extension are key areas. The slow process of developing human resources, in particular, the

building of institutional capacity, is essential

to long-term sustainability. Overall, it must be

realized that technology development, adaptation, and transfer will be slower and more complex than had been assumed. Thus research efforts in the Sahel must be better organized and

coordinated among the multitude of international and national research institutions operating in the region.

How technologies are organized into programs and projects also has been a factor in the

poor performance of development assistance.

Too often, farmer participation has been more

rhetorical than real. Environmental stabilization and institutional development have been

poorly served by the short-term, productionrelated, discrete projects that have dominated

assistance to the Sahel. Project design has been

overly complex relative to both Sahelian and

donor management capacities while the burden of recurrent costs has been too great for

financially strapped Sahelian governments.

New long-term, participatory approaches which

focus on institutional development, are simple

to manage, demand few recurrent costs, and

give sufficient attention to delivery systems are

essential for a more successful strategy for the

future.

Misguided government policies are a further

factor in poor performance in the Sahel. Cereal
8

pricing policies, artificial exchange rates, inflation, debt management, low investment in

food crops, and a range of measures discouraging initiative have proven to be disincentives

to increased food production and effective distribution. In recent years, major donors have

engaged in a spectrum of dialog, incentives, and

pressure to convince Sahelian governments to

modify their policy structures. There is general

consensus on the need for policy reform and

promising major reform programs have begun

in several countries. However, so far adequate

analysis linking such measures to farmer decisionmaking is lacking and the ultimate impact

is unclear. Which segments of society are most

likely to benefit from what specific policies, and

in what timeframe? How will political factors

affect the outcome? Will policy reform alone

accomplish as much as its proponents believe?

Donor governments’ policies on such issues as

interest rates, trade, and international debt also

affect Sahel development. The effects of large

quantities of international food aid that have

poured into the Sahel, even in years of relatively

good rainfall, remain controversial. Although

better steps to determine needs and coordinate

donor response have begun under Club auspices,

donor commitment to such efforts is tentative.

If agricultural strategies are to be effective, the

broad economic policy environment, in both

Sahelian and donor countries, must be consistent with development goals.

Beyond technologies, modes of assistance,

and policies, the multinational effort in the Sahel has suffered from a lack of clarity and agreement on the definition of food security goals2

and the optimal means to obtain them. Fundamental issues with significant impact on the

Sahel’s future have yet to be addressed. What

should be the balance between investment in

rainfed agriculture and that in irrigation? What

should be the priority given to expensive river

basin development? How much effort should

2CILSS has considered this goal to mean food self-sufficiency

for the Sahel, meaning ultimately growing enough food to feed

themselves. Food self-reliance, the term more commonly used

now by the Club, includes the concept of growing export crops

to earn money to import some food. Food security essentially

means providing the people of the Sahel with long-term, dependable access to food.

go into developing staple food crops relative

to export crops? Despite the particularly poor

results of past livestock efforts, is the current

de facto abandonment of that sector by donors

justified? How should more effective livestock

approaches be organized? Should resources be

directed toward the better-watered south or

toward the more drought-vulnerable north?

Which groups of people should be targeted—

the poorest farmers, the most progressive,

women? Each of these choices requires different strategies and has major implications for

individuals or groups within each nation. Unless priority is given to addressing these issues,

bilateral and multilateral assistance will be less

than optimally effective.

Applying the Lessons: The Agency

for International Development

AID’s effectiveness in applying the lessons

of the past decade in the Sahel faces constraints

in four areas:

1. the ambiguity of AID’s regional Sahel

strategy,

2. internal institutional characteristics of

AID,

3. the nature of AID’s relationship to Congress, and

4. the role of development assistance in overall U.S. foreign policy.

These problems are not unique to the Sahel—

they diminish the effectiveness of many AID

activities—but they are particularly acute in the

Sahel because of the level and special multinational characteristics of the U.S. commitment there.

The evolving strategies, experiences, and lessons accumulated by AID have paralleled those

of the other countries participating in the multinational effort in the Sahel. The most recent

AID SDP strategy statement (125)3 is grounded

in basic Club/CILSS goals but it also has incorporated many of the lessons learned in the past

decade. It places priorities on agricultural research and production, policy reform, health

3

See app. E containing the Executive Summary of AID’s 1986

Country Development Strategy Statement for the Sahel.
9

and family planning, training, infrastructure,

conservation, and environmental protection

and it calls for a balanced and focused program

“to identify and bring about the necessary policy and institutional environment to enable development to proceed. ” The strategy supports

“coordination of all donor and Sahelian programs . . . through the Club/CILSS coordination efforts” (125).

But AID’s SDP strategy is ambiguous in several areas and its implementation sometimes

is not consistent with the past decade’s lessons

and existing congressional mandates on foreign

assistance. The document does not provide

guidance for the strategic choices necessary to

allocate resources most effectively. The changing focus toward policy dialog, institutional development, and infrastructure—though consistent with the lessons learned—could signal a

retreat from direct assistance to the poor, depending on how that focus is implemented. Despite the high priority given to agricultural research, AID has no Sahel-specific research

strategy. AID has not seriously addressed the

issues of effective farmer participation and attention to the specific role of women in Sahelian

production, processing, and distribution systems. Although the United States is the largest

single donor of food aid, there is little effective

integration of food assistance into overall assistance strategies, During recent years, AID has

reduced its multilateral assistance in the Sahel

in favor of direct country-to-country assistance,

AID has dismantled its Sahel regional planning

team and taken a less active role in Club/CILSS

activities.

AID’s effectiveness in implementing its strategy also is constrained by internal institutional

characteristics. The numbers and skill levels

of AID’s staffing in the Sahel have not been

commensurate with the level of U.S. commitment. Although French language and Sahelspecific technical skills have improved, they are

still inadequate. The proportion of managers

to technicians is high and too few personnel

have appropriate skills in agricultural sciences,

macro- and micro-economic analysis, and human resource development, The use of outside

contractors, particularly from U.S. universities,

has increased the talent pool, but quality is still

uneven, turnover is high, and institutional

learning is limited. Sahelian staff are often underused and AID contact with beneficiaries and

counterparts is often inadequate.

AID’s program and project design systems

are cumbersome, slow, inflexible and often

directed toward short-term, physical objectives

rather than longer term development goals. Sahelian input, be it governmental or local, is often

pro forma. Sectoral analysis, project identification, design, approval, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation are poorly linked and

the latter two ineffectively used. The incentive

system is biased toward the designer and obligator of funds rather than those who effectively

implement projects. These factors contribute

to a lack of accountability for program results.

AID’s subregional management structure for

the Sahel adds a layer of management that

sometimes complicates relationships between

the AID-Washington office and the field missions and between the Sahel management unit

and other offices within AID. However, the

measure of autonomy granted to SDP because

it is separately funded insulates it somewhat

from short-term policy shifts and internal struggles over allocation of resources. The separate

management structure within AID also facilitates regional coordination with the Club/

CILSS.

The third institutional constraint affecting

AID’s performance in the Sahel concerns AID’s

relationship with Congress. Congress played

an important role in the original U.S. commitment to the Sahel and has continued a high level

of interest and support. Nonetheless, aspects

of the Congress-AID relationship actually constrain the attainment of foreign assistance goals

and the implementation of the SDP. Congressional policy mandates to AID under the Foreign Assistance Act and other legislation are

cumulative and without priority. While each

may be desirable in itself and the impact of

many (e.g., basic human needs, the environment, women in development, child welfare)

has been at least partially effective, their number and frequency of changes hamper the de-
10

velopment of consistent, long-term strategies.

Consequently, these mandates may not be taken

seriously and may result in creatively written

justifications rather than effective programs.

In another area of concern, procurement and

financial controls are often unrealistic relative

to West African realities, and they do more to

increase costs, create delays, and tie up both

AID and Sahelian management time than to accomplish their intended purposes.

The Sahel Development Program is only one

of a number of U.S. Government activities that

affect the Sahel. Food aid, agricultural price

supports, policies on international debt, trade

and interest rates have impacts on the Sahel

that many experts consider more significant

than development assistance. Each of these policy issues is dealt with by different committees

of Congress and different executive agencies.

Resulting policies are often inconsistent with

SDP goals.

The exercise of congressional oversight

responsibilities has added to AID’s already inordinate paperwork. Further, it has not been

effective in meeting congressional information

needs and it has had only limited impact on

AID’s performance. Congress’ over-attention

to management detail—for instance, requiring

notification of minor project funding or timing changes—not only increases paperwork, it

also limits the agency’s flexibility to respond

to evolving needs and opportunities. The working relationship between Congress and AID

does not reflect the spirit of partnership with

which SDP was begun and which is essential

to justify continuing levels of U.S. commitment

to the Sahel.

The role of foreign assistance within U.S. foreign policy creates a fourth set of constraints

in attaining more specific development objectives. The SDP was born of the U.S. commitment to humanitarian concerns and long-term

social and economic development. A long-term,

multinational approach was deemed to be the

most effective U.S. strategy to achieve those results. The exercise of short-term foreign policy objectives (e. g., political or commercial

objectives) can and has conflicted with the longterm perspective. Increased bilateralism, the

use of conditionality with respect to political

stances rather than development performance,

and assistance tied to U.S. commercial interests limit the effectiveness of U.S. commitments

not only in the eyes of Sahelians but also those

of other donors.

Sahelian and Donor institutions

Building on the lessons learned during the

past decade to improve the development and

application of technologies and make strategic

choices will not happen automatically. Development efforts in the Sahel will continue to be

shaped by individuals and also by the characteristics of both the Sahelian and donor institutions that implement the multitude of programs and projects. On the Sahelian side,

despite some progress, institutional capacity

remains a major constraint to effectiveness in

governmental agencies. Sahelian nongovernmental organizations, including the private sector, have diverse strengths but most have low

management capacity and only local impact,

Strategies that call for these groups to take over

functions that are now imperfectly carried out

by governments should be based on a realistic

assessment of their abilities. Increased attention to institution-building of all types will continue to be an essential component of donor

assistance programs.

Among multilateral and bilateral donors, diverse strengths, weaknesses, types of assistance, and methods of operation are also realities. Given the complexity of needs in the Sahel,

an appropriate role should be sought for each.

For example, the World Bank has begun to take

an effective lead role in policy reform; France,

the United States, and the World Bank are involved in agricultural research; the French,

Americans, and Germans are active in forestry;

and the OPEC countries, the World Bank, and

the European Economic Community have provided substantial resources for transportation

and infrastructure projects. The International

Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the

Dutch, and a multitude of private voluntary

organizations are particularly geared to local
11

action with low-resource producers. A degree

of specialization, possibly along the lines attempted by the Coordination for Development

in Africa group (CDA)4 for Africa as a whole,

could improve efficient use of resources. To

be effective this would require much higher

levels of coordination than are currently the

case.

Each organization has its own internal characteristics that affect its ability to participate

in the strategic directions called for by the past

decade’s experiences. Therefore the United

States needs to make a more careful analysis

of the strengths and weaknesses of its various

institutional partners in the Sahel in order to

identify the comparative advantages of each in

relation to AID’s development strategy. This

analysis must be ongoing and flexible because

strengths and weaknesses change over time, as

will elements of the strategy. U.S. funding and

coordination efforts need to be based on this

analysis. For example, the United States has

strong technical skills that give it an especially

important role in supporting Sahelian agriculture.

Other U.S. Government departments and

agencies (e. g., Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Export-Import Bank) are also

involved in decisions that affect the Sahelian

nations in ways that can complement or contradict AID strategies. The level and special nature of the U.S. Sahel commitment again justifies additional efforts to maximize consistency.

U.S. private sector investment currently plays

a minor role in the Sahel. The reasons for this

low level, such as the current risks of investment, language and cultural barriers, and competition posed by the better geographically and

historically placed Europeans, especially

France, will continue to limit the potential for

the short to medium term.

Other U.S. Actors in the Sahel

In addition to AID, a multitude of public and

private U.S. organizations operate in or affect

the Sahel. The Peace Corps, the African Development Foundation, the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration, and a wide range

of American private voluntary organizations

have programs in the Sahel. Despite the level

of overall U.S. commitment to the Sahel, few

of these other actors have developed Sahelspecific strategies. And while the independence

of each is essential to preserve their uniqueness and complementarily, better coordination

of strategies and appropriate collaboration in

implementation would increase the overall impact of U.S. assistance.

Photo credit: U.S. Peace Corps

4The CDA is a coordinating mechanism consisting of seven

large donors representing over half the development assistance

to Africa. Within the group, the United States has been assigned

the lead role in coordinating donor activities relating to agricultural research and health.

The United States provides various types of assistance

to Sahelian countries and future options are equally

varied. Rose Bray boy is a Peace Corps volunteer from

Massachusetts; she is helping Senegalese women

make composted fertilizer from local materials.
12

FINDINGS

Is Further support for the Sahel

Development Program Justified?

Finding: A continued Sahel Development Program has the potential to provide greater food

security, sustained economic growth, and a

restored environment for the people of the Sahel. In doing so, it also can serve U.S. longterm interests. These objectives can only be

reached by modifying both the strategy and

its implementation. Current relatively high

funding levels and U.S. commitment can be

justified only if such modifications are made.

Option: Congress can continue the SDP as a discrete element within AID’s authorization and appropriation and as a separate management structure within AID contingent on modifications in

its strategies and their implementation. In the

event that AID does not modify the program effectively, Congress can end SDP’s special status

and/or reconsider its funding levels.

The Sahel receives among the highest per capita levels of U.S. development assistance of any

of the regions of the world. The SDP’s separate congressional appropriation and its distinct management unit within AID underscore

the U.S. commitment, favor more consistent

funding, encourage congressional and AID attention, focus on long-range strategies, and foster coordination with other donors. But they

also increase workloads for both Congress and

AID, add to management (complexities, and reduce flexibility for managing the reduced resources available. The performance of SDP over

the past decade raises legitimate questions as

to whether this special status and commitment

to the Sahel continues to be justified. What is

the likelihood of its future success?

The past decade in the Sahel has resulted in

modest tangible accomplishments. But major

successes have been less obvious. The past decade’s experience has revealed a more difficult

path than originally foreseen, although it has

also revealed an unexpected resiliency in the

region’s natural and human resources. Technologies to significantly improve Sahelian agricultural production do not now exist so there

AND OPTIONS

is little likelihood of a Sahelian “Green Revolution.” But payoffs are beginning to be realized and the foundation that has been built in

the Sahel provides cautious optimism for the

future—a future where higher levels of Sahelian

food security can be achieved and where environmental degradation can be reduced. But it

is a vision of the future that is attainable only

if the lessons of the past decade are heeded.

The accomplishment of Club/CILSS goals will

not be determined by donors. Development in

the Sahel is the task of Sahelians. They, however, have neither the financial resources nor

the skills to do it alone. The manner in which

Sahelians and donors have worked together is

a unique and increasingly promising feature

of the Sahel effort. In that partnership, many

Sahelian leaders have recently made difficult

and politically risky decisions in such areas as

policy and fiscal reform and the improved allocation of limited investments. Sahelians have

shared and learned from the lessons of the past

decade. Such an atmosphere is a necessary condition to obtain positive results from external

assistance.

While donors as a group can facilitate the efforts of Sahelians, no single donor can have

such an impact. In the Club/CILSS framework,

each member possesses a portion of the responsibility and a portion of the potential. The

United States has strong technical skills and

development methods particularly appropriate

for the strategies essential for the next decade

in the Sahel. They are different skills than those

assumed in SDP’s earlier days. Rather than

capital-intensive agronomic techniques, range

management methods, and irrigation technologies, the needed expertise now include agricultural research methodologies, farming systems

and economic policy analysis, management and

organizational development, and data collection and management. The experiences of the

past decade have revealed weaknesses in the

application of U.S. resources and skills. Changes

are being made in policy statements but it is
13

unclear whether changes are also occurring in

implementation.

The nature of the challenge and level of commitment implicit in a determination to realize

Club/CILSS and SDP goals call for more than

“business as usual.” The unique aspects of U.S.

commitment to the Sahel can only succeed if

they are accompanied by realistic and focused

strategies, using approaches appropriate to the

Sahel, and human and technical resources commensurate with that commitment. Both Congress and AID have essential responsibilities

in any effort to modify existing strategies and

approaches.

Finding: U.S. support for the Club/CILSS framework and other multilateral approaches has

increased the effectiveness of U.S. and other

donor assistance to the Sahel.

Option: Congress can continue U.S. support for the

coordinated, multinational approach to Sahel development of the Club du Sahel/CILSS framework. It can encourage AID to increase its catalytic role and active involvement in these and

other appropriate coordinating mechanisms including those within Sahelian countries (e.g.,

donor roundtables, consultative groups, ad hoc

policy groups).

Option: Congress can continue to fund and actively

influence the multilateral organizations and special initiatives that have potential for significant

impact in the Sahel (e.g., The World Bank and

the International Fund for Agricultural Development’s (IFAD) special funds for Africa).

The link between SDP and the multinational

Club/CILSS framework has been one of its

unique features. The effectiveness of CILSS

continues to be problematic but on balance it

has increased donor coordination and shared

analysis, and opened a forum for discussion

between donors and Sahelians that has enhanced the use of U.S. resources. Multilateral

approaches and coordination have proven effective and will be essential to continued progress on critical aspects such as policy reform,

coherent food aid policies, and focused agricultural research. The World Bank, IFAD, and

others have set up special funds for Africa with

strong potential for effective programs in the

Sahel.

Coordination will be equally important to address the critical strategy choices yet to be

made, U.S. costs specifically related to the

Club/CILSS activities are minimal (approximately $1.2 million per year) relative to the benefits gained. Any decision to alter commitment

to SDP should consider not only the effects on

the Sahel but also on U.S. allies who joined in

establishing this effort. The United States has

been actively involved in both the Club and

CILSS, maintaining a low profile but playing

an important and catalytic role. Future efforts

to improve the performance of these institutions

need to be consistent with this long-term partnership. Support for CILSS should be conditional on its making progress toward needed

reforms, but such conditionality should not

jeopardize the ability of CILSS to build its

managerial and technical capabilities. While

support for the Club/CILSS framework can continue without a separate SDP management

structure in AID and distinct funding line item,

these two arrangements can increase effective

U.S. support of the regional framework.

Can a More Effective Partnership

Be Created?

Finding: The relationships between Congress

and AID are factors that limit the effectiveness of U.S. efforts in the Sahel.

Option: Congress and AID could work together to

improve communications on the Sahel and make

their operating relationship closer to the partnership envisioned in the original Sahel commitment. Increased informal contacts, the possibility of reciprocal intern programs in Washington

or the Sahel, congressional participation in AID

workshops on strategies and technical themes,

and increased contacts between Congress and

AID field missions are all possibilities to more

effectively share information, coordinate decisionmaking, build trust, and enhance congressional policymaking.

Option: Congress can examine the Foreign Assistance Act in an attempt to limit and prioritize its

policy guidelines and modify provisions that may
14

be contradictory or inadvertently hamper AID effectiveness. The Sahel could offer an opportunity

to establish a short list of long-term policy guidelines, streamlined operating procedures, and new

procurement, management, and reporting mechanisms. The Sahel also could be used as an opportunity to test multi-year appropriations for the

SDP budget and for modifying congressional

notification requirements.

Option: Relevant congressional committees can undertake an analysis of reporting requirements for

regular written reports, special written reports,

and for various hearings. They can eliminate

those that do not serve a justified information

function and streamline those that do. They can

provide AID with more specific guidance on their

information needs and thus increase the match

between what Congress needs to know with what

AID actually provides. AID’s annual report to

Congress on the Sahel could be given particular

attention in this regard.

The unique commitment implicit in U.S. support for the Sahel provides both the opportunity and the justification to attempt to address

the complex issue of congressional/AID relations. The current relationship between Congress and AID has been described as quasiadversarial by both sides. The result has been

a lessening of effective communication and a

retreat to a focus more on the form than on the

substance of policies and strategies. Poor communication has inhibited the development of

abetter informed Congress on relevant Sahelian

issues. This problem, however, is not unique

to discussions of the Sahel but broadly affects

AID/Congress relations.

On the congressional side, the lack of trust

has blocked consideration of multi-year appropriations for the long-term research portion

of AID’s program, limiting flexibility and adding a bias toward less appropriate short-term

approaches. It has led to increased reporting

requirements and strict enforcement in the Sahel of stringent financial control procedures

that are unrealistic given the capacities of most

Sahel countries. The burden has fallen disproportionately on already overloaded Sahelian

managers. Low-level program or project funding changes require time-consuming congressional notification. Poor communication keeps

Congress from accumulating enough detailed

knowledge to make effective policy decisions

on vital development issues.

On the AID side, the problems of its relationship with Congress translates into too much

time and energy devoted to congressional relations, and the overselling of its program, leading to unrealistic expectations in Congress,

overreaction to reporting requirements, insufficient understanding of the information needs

of Congress, and the failure to use effectively

the flexibility it has over such things as procurement regulations and the use of “no-year”

funds.

Official U.S. policies guiding foreign assistance are contained in the Foreign Assistance

Act of 1961 and its subsequent amendments.

Over the years, Congress has added new priorities and mandates (e.g., basic human needs,

environment, women in development, capitalsaving technology) through policy directives,

earmarked funds for special purposes, and required issue-specific reporting. It has rarely removed previous mandates nor ranked the importance of existing ones. The rapidity with

which new mandates are added and their

cumulative weight provide AID with little consistent guidance on U.S. objectives and priorities, limit flexibility to respond to specific local needs and opportunities, and work against

the long-term consistency required for Club/

CILSS goals.

Finally, other actions taken by Congress can

indirectly affect the effectiveness of AID development efforts in the Sahel. The influence

through Congress of domestic interest groups

whose particular “interest” may or may not be

consistent with effective development strategies can at times restrict or even conflict with

AID objectives. One example is procurement

requirements, so-called “tied aid” that requires

U.S. sources of equipment and technical expertise. In the Sahel these measures dramatically

increase the costs of operations, provide little

long-term commercial benefit to U.S. businesses, while foregoing opportunities to encourage local productive capacity and skill development. They also deter donor coordination
15

since each donor has distinct requirements responding to its own interest groups, and thus

increase the administrative burden on Sahelian

governments.

Is the Strategy Commensurate With

Finding: AID’s regional strategy statement for

the Sahel is largely consistent with the lessons of the past decade as well as with the

central thrust of the Foreign Assistance Act,

which directs AID to focus on the direct alleviation of poverty. In several respects, however, the strategy statement is ambiguous and

questions remain regarding its interpretation

and implementation. Congress has the responsibility to ensure AID’s clarity in implementation of the strategy. Means of congressional

oversight need to be modified to fulfill Congress’ intent when it created SDP.

Option: In setting policy directions and conducting oversight of SDP, Congress can select a limited list of policy priorities. These choices would

set the principal agenda for Congress discussions

with AID. Congress could also address specific

areas unresolved in the SDP strategy, such as allocation of funds to livestock and gender issues.

Option: To exercise its oversight authority on SDP,

and to recognize the desirability of a more effective working relationship with AID, Congress can

adopt a graduated approach to such an “issues

agenda. ” It could start by clearly communicating congressional policy priorities and issues to

AID. It can then use that agenda to focus hearings and reports. If Congress judges AID’s response as adequate, it could respond by relaxing

procurement, reporting, and other requirements.

In the absence of effective AID implementation,

Congress could request additional special hearings, special reports, more specific policy mandates, and strict earmarking of funds.

Option: To encourage AID to address key issues and

develop essential missing components of SDP,

Congress can request AID to explore such actions

as: reestablishing a Sahel Development Planning

Team, undertaking issue- or sector-specific studies

by AID’s Science and Technology Bureau along

the lines of the current Water Management Synthesis Project, and organizing international workshops/conferences on specific issues similar to

its 1985 conference on river basin development.

Congress can encourage AID to do analysis by

limiting new project starts until these strategy issues are addressed, while maintaining current appropriation levels necessary to fund the analysis

process and ongoing programs worthy of continued support.

AID has learned a great deal from its experiences in the Sahel. Its 1984 Sahel strategy document effectively outlines the disappointments

of the past and discusses new approaches that

promise better results in the future. The results

have moved AID in directions espoused by a

broad spectrum of Sahel authorities who identify the lack of a conducive environment for

development in the Sahel as a major factor in

the poor results obtained so far. The unfavorable Sahelian environment is understood to include such elements as policy disincentives, institutional and infrastuctural weaknesses, and

the lack of appropriate technologies. Increasing portions of AID’s portfolio are being

directed to address these constraints, Nonetheless, concerns remain regarding AID’s strategy:

●

●

●

●

Depending on how it is implemented,

AID’s Sahel Regional Development Strategy could retreat from a focus on direct

assistance to the poor, Selection among

alternative measures and approaches and

the mix between “constraint removing”

and “direct assistance” will determine the

probability and length of time required to

benefit small farmers.

The strategy fails to address several key issues essential to the future direction of the

Sahel, such as the allocation of resources

between irrigation and rainfed agriculture,

between food and export crops, between

ecological zones, and between categories

of farmers. These are not questions that can

be resolved easily or quickly yet AID has

not given priority to resolving them.

In its strategy statement and in the implementation of the strategy, AID fails to adequately disaggregate its analysis on the basis of gender nor does it put adequate stress

on long-term, environmental sustainability.

The strategy needs to go further in the process of focusing U.S. assistance to the Sa-
16

hel on the basis of U.S. capacities and

strengths in relation to the needs revealed

by the past decade.

Ž Missing from the U.S. Sahel program are

a Sahel-specific research plan, a strategy

for the livestock sector, and a consistent

approach to population issues. Although

mentioned in the strategy statement, in

practice AID has yet to implement effective methods for increasing farmer and

herder participation and institution

building.

Is AID Working Against Itself?

Finding: Institutional characteristics internal

to AID are constraints to optimal development

and implementation of the U.S. Sahel strategy.

Option: There is little opportunity for specific congressional options in this area because most of

the constraints are internal AID/executive branch

management issues. But Congress can help to

bring these concerns to AID’s attention. These

criticisms are not new, yet little visible progress

has been accomplished. Once again, however, the

uniqueness of the Sahel effort and its manageable

size provide the opportunity and challenge for

AID to test new program and project design, management approaches, and more effective systems

of monitoring and evaluation. The contradictions

inherent in a regional strategy of largely bilateral

programs could be diminished by more regular

Sahel Mission Directors meetings, the reestablishment of the Sahel Development Planning Team,

the establishment of a separate regional technical support unit either within the Regional Economic Development Support Office in Abidjan

in the Ivory Coast or independently in the Sahel,

and even the option of moving regional management, currently in Washington, out to the field.

AID’s willingness to be more innovative could

be enhanced by better Congress/AID collaboration on the Sahel, by congressional restraint in

its direction and oversight of AID, and by congressional responsiveness to the costs that the

development of alternative approaches could

involve.

OTA identified three sets of institutional factors that limit AID’s effectiveness in the Sahel:

staffing, AID’s programming and design systems, and its management structure.

Although staff numbers have increased dramatically since SDP’s early days, they are still

low and and have recently been dropping relative to the number of projects because of budget reductions. Ten years of programming in

the Sahel have increased the proportion of staff

with Sahel-specific experience. Still, French,

local language, and cultural skills largely are

lacking. The proportion of high level technical

staff is low and the skill mix has not changed

with changing strategies. Turnover is high relative to the time it takes to program, design, and

implement projects so people who begin a project rarely are held accountable for results. The

de facto incentive system is biased in favor of

the designer and obligator and not the effective implementor of the project. In many posts,

local staff—the AID missions’ local “institutional memory” and source of vital cultural,

economic, political, and technical knowledge—

are underused.

AID’s systems of designing programs and

projects are cumbersome, mechanical, and ineffectively applied. They rarely link analysis

between sectors or between the national economy and small-scale producer. The separation

of the component parts of the AID project system (i.e., identification, design, approval, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation)

limits consistency, programmatic accountability, and institutional learning. It is a system that

is geared toward discrete, production-specific

projects rather than long-term programs with

more process-related goals. The system can

move with impressive speed to obligate funds

but paperwork requirements and procurement

bottlenecks leave gaps of up to 3 years between

design and project starts. The monitoring of

AID projects is limited by staff number and is

poorly integrated into project management.

AID does perform significant project evaluations but they tend to be narrow, focusing on

limited objectives instead of wider impacts and

goals. Evaluation is ineffectively fed back into

project re-design.

AID’s efficiency suffers from the size and

complexity of its operations. Separation and

poor coordination between program offices,
budgeting, technical support, and evaluation

units constrain effective AID operations. Division of authority between Washington offices

and the field and between the field missions

and contracted project personnel is often unclear, overlapping, and inconsistently applied.

The problems inherent in this lack of clarity

are amplified under SDP because it has a relatively strong regional management unit based

in Washington. Mission directors, under the

supervision of the U.S. Ambassador and responding to the requests of their particular host

government, have resisted the efforts to enforce

a regional strategy. At the same time, the special nature of the Sahel effort actually requires

a much higher degree of regional perspective

and coherence than elsewhere.

Can Diverse Actors With Diverse

Strengths Work Together?

Finding: Greater coordination and collaboration between various U.S. actors operating in

or affecting the Sahel would increase the effectiveness of the U.S. effort.

Option: Congress could request that all relevant U.S.

Government-funded agencies establish Sahel

strategies that would highlight coordination with

AID. These could include: the Department of

Agriculture (its Public Law 480 component and

its technical assistance and research programs);

the Department of Treasury (debt and lending policy); Department of Commerce (tariffs and trades)

and its National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (drought and famine warning system, technical assistance and meteorological

research); Peace Corps (village-level technical

assistance and organization); and the African Development Foundation (local organization support). Within Congress, an informal group of staff

from relevant committees could meet periodically

to discuss the consistency of actions under consideration by their respective committees and

how these actions affect overall U.S. objectives

in the Sahel.

Option: Congress could request AID to take a more

active leadership role in fostering coordination

among all US. publically funded development efforts in the Sahel. Some activities that might be

appropriate include: interagency task forces, conference/workshops on technical themes, and incountry coordinating committees. Such an effort

will work only if a means is found to ensure informality, voluntary participation, and respect for

the diversity and independence of participants.

Option: Private voluntary organizations (PVOs) offer special potential to contribute to the type of

strategies that are essential for future Sahel development. Thus Congress could request that an

appropriate PVO group such as INTERACTION,

PACT, CODEL, or others study and develop a

PVO Sahel strategy stressing coordination with

AID. The strategy could help PVOs already working in the Sahel and others considering such activities to think strategically and to increase coordination and collaboration with AID, Peace Corps,

and others. Such an effort would have to ensure

the voluntary participation and desired autonomy

of each private organization.

In addition to AID, numerous other U.S.

agencies (governmental and nongovernmental)

are either active in the Sahel or their actions

affect the implementation of SDP strategies or

broader Club/CILSS goals. Few of the U.S. public and private organizations working in the Sahel besides AID have a Sahel-specific strategy.

The current level of their coordination and collaboration with AID is variable. The diversity

of their strengths, weaknesses, approaches, and

activities provides both opportunities and risks.

As resources become more limited, it will be

increasingly important to avoid contradictory

actions or duplication of efforts. Thus improved

coordination and collaboration are critical.

Other U.S. governmental agencies have a

more indirect impact, either through their executive branch actions or by policies set by Congress. In policies and actions as diverse as U.S.

farm support, U.S. positions on international

debt burden relief, the funding of the various

components of the International Monetary Fund,

the World Bank and the United Nations affecting the Sahel, support for U.S. investment, etc.,

decisions are made that have considerable impact on the Sahel. These actions can counteract or complement U.S. development programs.

There is no mechanism for and only limited

consideration of the consistency of these diverse actions, and decisionmaking responsibility is scattered among various agencies and

multiple congressional committees.
Chapter 2

AID's Sahel Development

program and the
Chapter 2

AID'S Sahel Development Program

and the Club/CILSS Framework

IN BRIEF . . .

Congress asked the Office of Technology Assessment to study development efforts in

the Sahel as part of a larger assessment of low-resource agriculture in Africa. The Sahel

is one of the poorest regions in the world and it has been the focus of a concerted, multinational assistance effort. But after a decade of projects and financial aid, there comes a time

to take stock: just how effective has development assistance been in the Sahel and what can

be learned from those experiences?

The United States has played a major role in the Sahel, The Agency for International

Development (AID), as mandated by a 1977 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, manages

the Sahel Development program, a comprehensive, long-term approach to reaching food selfsufficiency while accelerating economic and social development. c hapter 2 looks at key aspects

of this AID program and the unique multinational Club du Sahel/CILSS framework of which

it is a part. Highlights of the chapter include:

Ž AID’s Sahel Development Program is unique among U.S. development efforts because

it is a long-term commitment to a multinational effort with a regional focus and it

receives separate line item funding within the AID budget.

● The multinational Club/CILSS framework has been controversial and its effectiveness

has been constrained by inconsistent member support. CILSS in particular has been

hampered by uneven leadership and inadequate technical and managerial capabilities.

The Club/CILSS approach, however, has served as a forum to combine and focus the

talents and resources of both donor and recipient nations.

● Despite some problems, the Club du Sahel and CILSS, with AID’s participation, have

made substantial contributions to improving the clmate for development in the Sahel,

especially in the areas of sector planning, improved coordination, and increased aid

flows.

Beginning in 1968, 5 years of severe drought

brought death and misery to the Sahel region

of West Africa. Tens of thousands of people

perished and up to one-third of the area’s livestock was lost (14). Brought to the public’s attention by the news media, this crisis stimulated unprecedented international relief efforts.

Over $360 million of emergency aid was funneled to the Sahel by 1974 (37).

In the aftermath of that tragedy, the concerns

of both Sahelian and donor officials turned

from relief to recovery and finally to long-term

development. Could future crises in the Sahel

be prevented? How? And how much would it

cost? Reflections on these questions gave birth

to a unique experiment in international development cooperation—the Club du Sahel/CILSS

framework, The nine countries of the Sahel and

their major donors joined together in a cooperative “contract for a generation. ” Its purpose:

to increase the Sahel’s dependable access to

food and lay the groundwork for long-term development. The United States has been an active participant in the creation and operations

of the Club du Sahel/CILSS framework.

21
22

THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO CLUB/CILSS:

THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PR0GRAM

By 1974, the United States had become the plan, presented to Congress in April of 1976,

largest single food aid donor to the Sahel emer- outlined:

gency relief effort, a commitment that was to the substance and sequence of a compre- grow into the U.S. Sahel Development Program 

(SDP) (136). Prior to the 1968 to 1973 drought, hensive, long-term approach to development

U.S. development assistance to the Sahel had

in support of food self-sufficiency in the conbeen limited in accordance with the Kerry Retext of accelerated economic and social development (133).

port of the late 1960s (141). This report recoin- . . 

mended that the United States confine its assis- The proposal concludes:

tance program in Africa to a limited number

of countries with political, strategic, or economic importance to the United States. But in

the years following the drought, U.S. assistance

to the Sahel rose steadily reflecting a continued

humanitarian interest by the public at large and

particularly by the Congressional Black Caucus.

. .. we are persuaded that the goals of this Sahel development program are attainable, From

both the humanitarian and technological point

of view, the long-term comprehensive development of the Sahel is a unique opportunity which

lies before us today. And the world community

can and should accept this challenge (133).

In 1977, a further amendment to the Foreign

In December 1973, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (sec. 639. B) supported U.S.

involvement in an international long-term development effort for the Sahel and provided $25

million for emergency and recovery needs. In

July 1974, Congress authorized an additional

$85 million and in late 1975 called on the executive branch to begin immediate planning for

an international Sahel program with the participation of African countries. The proposed

Assistance Act (Sections 120 and 121) formally

created SDP within the Agency for International Development (AID), thus institutionalizing U.S. commitment to the Sahel and to the

Club/CILSS framework. Development assistance to the Sahel under SDP (1978 to 1986) has

totaled $750 million (not including $91 million

in Economic Support Funds and $421 million

in Public Law 480 food aid). Total U.S. assistance to the Sahel from 1978 to 1986 has equaled

approximately $1.4 billion (see table 2-1).

Table 2-1 .—U.S. Bilateral Assistance to the Sahel, 1976-86 (millions of dollars)

Sahel Development Public Law Economic

Year Program 480a

Support Fund Total

1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1979 ......., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1982 ...., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1986 (estimated) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$ 35b

45b

50

75

75

93

94

85

103

98

77

$ 24

20

32

25

40

56

45

32

55

92

44

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

$10

18

43

20

$ 59

65

82

100

115

149

139

127

176

233

141

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $830 $465 $91 $1,386

apubllc Law 480 assistance data includes World Food Program and emergency food ald but does not !nclude ocean fre!ght Costs In flSCal year 1985. freight costs

totaled $104 milllon

bDevelopment assistance to the Sahel before SDP existed.

SOURCES Data on SDP and ESF supplied by: U S Agency for International Development, Bureau for Africa, Off Ice of Sahel and West Africa Affairs, “U S Ass{stance

to the Sahel, ” unpublished data, April 1986

Public Law 480 data supplied by: U S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Organ lzatlons, “Publlc Law 480, As.

slstance to the Sahel, ” unpublished data, April 1988
23

The phrase “Sahel Development Program”

has three usages, referring to three interrelated

components. From the administrative/management perspective, SDP is the separate funding

line item within the AID budget and the distinct management unit within AID which administers it. Second, it is a novel approach for

U.S. development assistance because it is explicit support for and participation in the multinational and regional framework of Club/

CILSS process. And finally, it also refers to the

specific goals, objectives, strategies, and programs that comprise U.S. development assistance to the countries of the Sahel as expressed

in AID’s Sahel Country Development Strategy

Statement (126). (See app. E.)

THE CLUB/CILSS FRAMEWORK

CILSS is the French acronym for the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control

in the Sahel, an organization of nine Sahelian

States originally formed in 1973 to coordinate

relief and recovery efforts.1 CILSS has been

an influential actor in the past decade’s effort

in the Sahel, but its mandate and operations

have been controversial from the start. It began as a mechanism to alert donors to the situation in the Sahel and to focus appeals for assistance but its charter also suggested that it could

play a coordinating role for drought control efforts (37).

At its first official meeting in September 1973,

CILSS presented donors with a list requesting

over 300 projects totaling $3 billion, an action

that set the tone of the early years (75). Donors

were noticeably cool to this ‘‘shopping list” approach, feeling that careful analysis of the problems should be done first as a foundation for

a coordinated strategy. Between 1974 and 1976,

while CILSS and donor countries negotiated

to determine priority projects, the major

donors–France, the United States, the World

‘The original (;11.SS members included Burkina 1+’asn (ff]rmcrl y ( J ppc r \’olta ), (;had, NI al i, \l a u rit a n ia, h’ iger, a n(l Senegal. The Gamhia and the (;ape \rcrdc Islands ~i’crc a(lln itt[~(i III

1975. In January I gt36, the C1 [,SS Con fcren(:e of Hca(i\ of St,]tc

a pp rove(] t hf; a(l m i ss i(] n () f (; u i nf; a H i ssa u.

Bank, and Food and Agriculture Organization

of the United Nations (FAO)—commissioned

a number of studies of Sahel problems and potential. The studies suggested that the Sahel did

indeed have the resources necessary to be selfsufficient in food, or at least to improve considerably its food security, by the end of the

century. It would require, however, a coordinated, long-term effort of 15 to 30 years and

$15 to $20 billion in new support. Priority, they

concluded, would have to be given to agriculture, especially food crops that had been neglected in the past (37,133).

The role and operations of the Club du Sahel

side of the Club/CILSS framework was equally

born in controversy. Both the chaos of disaster

and recovery assistance flowing into the Sahel

following the drought of 1968 to 1973 and the

potential offered by the CILSS call for a concerted Sahel program clearly indicated the need

for a mechanism for coordination among

donors and between donors and Sahelians. Yet

there was no common agreement on under

what auspices that coordination should be accomplished. FAO had established an office for

relief coordination as early as 1972 and the

United Nations Sahelian Office (UN SO) began

operations in 1974, with a focus on the environmental sector. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was also active and

along with UNSO provided early support for

CILSS. Despite the level of United Nations (UN)

activity, several donors, particularly the United

States, West Germany, and several Sahelian

countries, were against a UNDP or UNSO coordinating role. The World Bank, another logical possibility, was not interested.
24

The Black Caucus of the U.S. Congress, along ● to inform the international community on

with interested AID officials, is given credit for development prospects and needs in the

the idea to create a new coordinating structure Sahel;

outside the UN system (37). Their only condi- ● to encourage cooperation between donors

tion, included in later legislation, was that U.S. to implement projects requested by Sahelcontributions would be limited to no more than ian governments and CILSS and facilitate

10 percent of the combined effort. The major the mobilization of resources; and

problem encountered was overcoming the wariness of the French Government, whose continuing post-colonial economic, political, and

cultural ties led them to consider the Sahel as

their special sphere of influence. Eventually,

however, the French Government agreed, motivated by changes in internal politics and the

growing economic burden of the Sahelian States

on the French treasury. Thereafter, the French

began to play a leadership role in the Club du

Sahel while the United States continued a

catalytic but low key approach. Other donors

greeted the proposal with varying degrees of

enthusiasm. Canada and West Germany were

particularly cautious and until recently the

World Bank maintained primarily an observer

status. As the Club has clarified its role and

proven its value, donors have increased their

support.

The Club du Sahel is set up as a loosely structured, informal arrangement, without formal

membership—more of a forum than a development organization. More than 25 major multilateral and bilateral donors join the CILSS

member states in Club activities. It is made up

of a small Secretariat located at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) headquarters in Paris, irregular

general meetings (six have been held so far),

and a common working group (organized

jointly with CILSS) of technicians broken up

into sect oral working groups whose responsibility is to map out medium- and long-term

strategies and organize ad hoc meetings on

technical issues. Both donors and Sahelians

participate in its meetings and working groups.

The Club’s first meeting was held in Senegal

in 1976 where its purpose and mandate were

set :

● to be a forum for Sahelian nations to outline

their policies and priorities for mediumand long-term development and discuss

them with donors (37).

The strategy that evolved out of the working

groups and that was endorsed by the 1977 general meeting was based on the primary importance of food self-sufficiency and ecological balance for the Sahel. It emphasized agricultural

Photo credit U S Peace Corps

Increasing food security was one of the primary

objectives of the Club/ClLSS effort and it remains a

● to support CILSS, the principal agency for major goal of development assistance in the Sahel,

Here a Sahelian millet breeder works with

regional cooperation in the Sahel; a Peace Corps agronomist,
- . .

production; ecology and forestry; fisheries; and

the integration of new themes such as recurrent costs, cereals pricing, marketing, and storage. Its action program combined infrastructural

improvements, human resource development,

medium-term production projects, and longer

term approaches to develop irrigation potential, particularly in the major river basins. Subsequent meetings refined the strategy in the

light of experience. A 1978 meeting focused attention on the crucial fuelwood crisis and encouraged an increase in support for the forestry

and ecology sector, A revised strategy adopted

in 1980 again emphasized the environment and

its 1 ink to food self-sufficiency goals, In subsequent meetings, the recurrent cost issue, the

role of policy reform, continued coordination

problems, and the lack of progress of agricultural programs have been added to the agenda.

25

—

The 1984 revised long-term strategy, adopted

by the Club and the CILSS Council of Ministers,

reflects these changes, Its main elements are:

●

●

●

●

to encourage private initiative and limit the

extent of government intervention in the

development process;

to emphasize the need for policy reform

and the establishment of sound economic

foundations as a precondition to development;

to link the food security objective to overall development of the agriculture sector;

and

to recognize that environmental stability

is based on appropriate, integrated planning in agriculture, forestry, and livestock

sectors (123).

EVOLUTION AND CONSTRAINTS

Once donor support increased through the

Club du Sahel, CILSS began to expand its mandate and its Secretariat in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Through the Club working groups,

CILSS participated in important studies and

in preparing the 1977 Club/CILSS strategy document and subsequent revisions, CILSS increasingly played a more direct role in developing and implementing regional projects such

as a large Integrated Pest Management project,

With donor support, it created two specialized

institutions, AGRHRYMET (Sahelian Regional

Center for Agro-meteorology and Applied Hydrology) in Niamey, Niger and the Sahel Institute in Bamako, Mali. The latter was set up to

facilitate information sharing among Sahelian

researchers and to coordinate appropriate research projects. Repeating the pattern of its parent organization, the Sahel Institute also began

research efforts of its own,

The performance of CILSS, particularly in

project management and coordination, has

been mediocre. Like many regional organizations in Africa and elsewhere, it has suffered

from a lack of member support; political tension among members; and uneven leadership,

managerial, and technical skills. In the past,

member countries have not insisted on strong

accountability. From the beginning, CILSS

member countries have been slow to provide

financial assistance while the personnel assigned to CILSS had uneven qualifications.

But other problems related to support from

member nations have been more fundamental.

While welcoming the increased aid flows that

CILSS has helped foster, member governments

have been reluctant to give CILSS a coordinating role that might interfere with their sovereignty or direct access to donors. CILSS strategy and policy decisions have been poorly

reflected in the actions of member States. Nor

is the CILSS planning process integrated with

those of its members. Donors have found that

many projects contained in the CILSS “first

generation” program were not part of national

development plans or were considered low priority, Many of these coordination and followthrough problems are explained by the fact that

the CILSS Council of Ministers is for the most

part comprised of Ministers of Agriculture, Rural Development or Natural Resources; these

ministries typically play minor roles in policy
26

decisions in most Sahelian States. Also, incountry CILSS national coordinating offices

have been poorly staffed and have limited local power,

Donor support also has been inconsistent.

The original growth in the CILSS mandate was

partially supported by donors of the Club du

Sahel, Over time, major donors such as the

United States have concluded that while there

is a role for regional analysis and dialog, institutional weaknesses within CILSS and political realities make national governments the

more appropriate focus for most projects and

programs (125,132). For several years, CILSS

ignored donor criticisms but in 1985, following a change in CILSS leadership, growing

member State dissatisfaction, and increased

donor use of conditionality in their financial

assistance, CILSS agreed to revise its mandate

to become more of a regional think tank and

streamline its operations. Although too early

to be certain, it appears that CILSS has begun

much-needed reforms,

The overall positive impact of the Club du

Sahel is also not without some qualification

(137). The studies performed by the Club working groups are not all of equal quality nor have

the Club/CILSS strategies had much impact on

the strategies and sector allocations’ of either

Sahelian governments or donors. For example,

although assistance to rural development and

rainfed agriculture has grown 7,1 and 16,1 percent each year, respectively, less than onequarter of all donor assistance is going into rural development and less than half of that supports rainfed agriculture (25). Similarly, assistance to forestry and ecology is growing at an

impressive 31.5 percent annually, yet it is still

only 2 percent of total aid. (For trends in assistance to the Sahel, see app. A, table A-5.)

While coordination has been the hallmark of

Club activities, its lack remains a major obstacle to effective use of development assistance.

The partnership between the Club and CILSS

is an impressive step in development cooperation, but the Club can be criticized for taking

‘In a dekcloprnent sense, a sector is an area of’ puhlic in\restment, e.g., the forestry sector, the li~’estock scctur, etc.

the initiative and leadership away from CILSS

at times and because it has few Sahelians

directly involved with the work of the Club Secretariat. There has been difficulty translating

agreements into action because of political and

organizational pressures. For example, the

organization has been unsuccessful in encouraging donors to take action to use simplified,

standardized project documents to reduce the

burden on Sahelian governments.

It has also proven difficult to translate Clubsponsored agreements about donor coordination into clear mandates for field representatives to work more closely together. The extent

of the in-country coordination problem is indicated by the sheer number of donors and

projects. In 1983 in Burkina Faso, 29 major

donors were working on 119 separate projects,

including 13 donors active in agriculture (27).

In-country consultative groups or donor roundtables organized respectively by the World Bank

and UNDP have so far proven to be of limited

success due to a lack of clear support from

donors’ home offices. Over the past 3 years,

however, some improvement has been noted.

In Senegal and Mali, donors have effectively

coordinated strategies in working with the

respective governments on the sensitive question of policy reform. Work sponsored by the

Club on food aid coordination, though still in

embryonic stages, shows signs of progress (27).

Club/CILSS-sponsored antidesertification strategies and in-country meetings to consider how

to implement strategies and deal with other coordination issues also have promising potential.

CILSS was created to tackle common problems within a group of countries with historical and cultural commonalities and shared ecological and economic constraints,3 But shared

problems are not necessarily enough to be conducive to mutual solutions, The similarity of

Sahelian economies and production systems

means that there is very little they have to offer each other in trade to increase mutual food

security, Some authorities feel that the

subregional focus on the Sahel should be grad-

“1’he extent and rele~~an(; e to te(; hnolog} de~relopment of sinlila rit ies between Sahel states has been qua] i fied foil 0111 i n g the

de~’elopment experiences of the past de(, a(ie. Stx; (:11. 4,
-

ually shifted to include the coastal economies

to the south of the Sahel, which provide better

economic complementarily with the Sahel.

Coordination with other multilateral and regional organizations remains a problem for

both the Club and CILSS. Overlapping memberships and mandates with UNSO, UNDP,

CEAO, ECOWAS, the Conseil d’Entente, (the

last three are subregional economic coordination bodies), the NBA, OMVS, and OMVG (Sahelian river basin development authorities], and

the Organization of African Unity create duplication and lack of coordination, Institutional

rivalries have also led to lost opportunities.

The future success of the Club/CILSS may

be jeopardized as the flow of assistance to the

Sahel diminishes. Aid to the Sahel peaked in

1981 and then declined through 1983, Increases

in 1984 to 1985 are largely a reflection of emergency food aid, International economic difficulties, government budget cutbacks in most major donor countries, the drop in oil prices, and

competing demands for aid from Eastern and

Southern Africa all combine to make future

levels of assistance to the Sahel uncertain. The

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which also participates in the Club, supplied $425 million (over 20 percent of the total)

in 1981. This fell by more than 50 percent to

$200 million in 1983 and is expected to fall further (25). New U.S. commitments for Sahel development assistance have fallen from a high

of $103 million in 1984 to a projected $77 million in 1986. The Administration has requested

$80 million for 1987. Although the Canadians,

Dutch, and Italians have been increasing assistance to the Sahel, it is unlikely that these increases will compensate for the overall decline

in aid.

Despite these problems, the contributions of

the Club/CILSS process have been substantial.

The Club has had a significant impact on the

international development program in the Sahel through its regular meetings, the technical

analysis and strategy proposals of its working

group (which includes both donor and Sahelian

technicians), and the ongoing process of reflection, information collection, and dissemination.

Its major accomplishments include:

●

●

●

Sector Planning and Strategies: Sector

analysis and strategy discussions have had

substantial impacts on the content and conduct of both donor and Sahelian programs.

The Club has assisted in increasing attention on the priority of agriculture and food

production, the fuelwood crisis, the key

role of cereal policies, and the problem of

recurrent costs. Commissioned studies,

and the collection and sharing of knowledge about the Sahel, have provided a solid

beginning for an effective database on the

Sahel,

Aid Flows: Club activities have played a

key role in tripling aid flows to the Sahel.

Between 1975 and 1984, total assistance

to the Sahel totaled $14.1 billion. (See app.

A, tables A-1 through A-3.) Per capita assistance to Sahelians has averaged $44 per

person yearly, more than double that for

sub-Saharan African as a whole and four

times that for Asia (25), Increased aid for

agriculture and forestry can be at least partially attributed to Club sector analysis and

strategies. (See app. A, table A-5.)

Coordination: The Club has had a dual impact on coordination, helping foster coordination between various donors and between donors and aid recipients, Although

there is still need for improvement, the

Club has fostered an improved dialog in

development assistance. The non-threatening, less formal, “partnership of equals”

atmosphere of Club/CILSS meetings and

the fact that the dialog has continued for

over a decade have built an atmosphere of

trust regarding sensitive topics such as

recurrent costs, cereals pricing, and the reforms of CILSS. The Club has taken the

lead in discussing the coordination of food

aid and desertification and has begun organizing in-country progress review meetings

of donors and host country officials to take

stock of their efforts toward Club/CILSS

goals.
28

The Club/CILSS experience has brought to

light some important lessons (37):

• the advantages of subregional cooperation,

Ž the importance of strategic thinking,

Ž the value of donor coordination, and

● the necessity for a “contractual” framework.

The failure to heed the latter—to implement

agreed upon mutual obligations—has been perhaps the greatest weakness of Club/CILSS during the past decade. Progress in the Sahel depends on the common actions of all—Sahelian

farmers and herders, Sahelian governments,

and donors. The role of each must be identified and commitments carried out in action.

Greater “conditionality” in relationships between all partners is an essential part of improving performance in the future (38). Progress

on policy reform and the reform of CILSS are

examples of what such an approach can acOn balance the Club/CILSS approach is an

important part of U.S. and international efforts

in the Sahel. It has relatively low costs and has

made an overall positive contribution in the region, The evolving Club/CILSS mechanism has

the potential to improve the effectiveness of the

combined contributions of donors and Sahelians. The realization of that potential is, however, far from assured. It will require continued

high levels of active participation by donors and

Sahelians. Some observers feel, however, that

the U.S. commitment has diminished in recent

years. While the United States was active in

the beginning of CILSS, of late it has turned

from catalyst to critic. These criticisms have

been significant in identifying needed reforms

of both CILSS and the Club du Sahel, but some

people have questioned whether the United

States is willing to provide the resources to support implementation of the suggested reforms.

complish.
Chapter 3

The Sahel:

Diversity and

Transformation
Chapter 3

The Sahel: Diversity and Transformation

IN BRIEF . . .

The United States has played a key and catalytic role in the unique, coordinated, multinational development efforts in the Sahel. The Club/CILSS framework provided an innovative strategy to combine the talents and resources of both donor and recipient nations in

a concerted effort to strive for food security in one of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable regions. Over the past decade, inconsistent support from both donor and recipient nations, lack of coordination, management problems, and problems translating agreements into

action have constrained the effectiveness of the Club/CILSS efforts in the Sahel. Despite these

problems, the United States, through AID’s Sahel Development Program, has helped the Club

du Sahel and CILSS make substantial contributions to development.

These efforts, from the beginning, were designed as a regional approach because the

countries shared some important historical, cultural, economic, and ecological elements.

Chapter 3 outlines some of the important historical and cultural similarities and looks in

particular at the limits of the Sahelian environment and the future of food production in

the region. Highlights of the chapter include:

● The environment in the Sahel is diverse, both in the complexity of its ecological systems and in the variety of its agricultural production and socioeconomic systems. These

systems are facing a period of rapid change.

● By many measures, such as infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy, Sahelian

nations are among the poorest in the world. Dependency on a limited number of lowvalue exports, high levels of debt, and other external economic influences limit the

ability of Sahelian nations to improve the quality of life for their people.

● One indication of the region’s great vulnerability is the growing gap between food

production and food requirements in the Sahel. Over the past two decades, Sahelian

crop production has grown at approximately 1 percent per year while the rate of population growth during this time was about 2.8 percent.

● Recurrent droughts, poor soils, and other environmental factors have combined with

changing social and economic systems to exacerbate environmental degradation in

the Sahel.

A key lesson learned in the past decade is that

successful development assistance efforts must

conform to the human and physical environment. The environment in the Sahel is diverse,

both in the complexity of its ecological systems

and in the variety of its agricultural production and socioeconomic systems that have

evolved over the centuries. Thus development

efforts in the Sahel must be designed with an

understanding that the region is vulnerable, resilient, and continually changing. This chapter reviews the history of agricultural production, the current and projected situation of

poverty and development within the Sahel, the

role of CILSS countries within the global economy, the growing gap between food production and food requirements, and environmental

constraints.
32

THE SAHEL YESTERDAY

Great empires–the Ghana, Mali, and Songhai

–flourished in West Africa during the period

known as the Middle Ages in Europe, In the

heart of the Sahel, Timbuktu, Gao, and Djenne

were centers of power, wealth, and learning,

Caravans of camels brought slaves, gold, and

salt across the Sahara desert to the Middle East

and North Africa. They carried back textiles,

firearms, and the religion and culture of the

Islamic empires. Over several thousand years,

the trans-Saharan trade brought domesticated

livestock and new crops such as rice, wheat,

beans, bananas, and yams to West Africa.

People of the Sahel developed complex farming and herding systems that were adapted to

the environment. Timbuktu was one of several

thriving agricultural regions in the Sahel (66).

Farmers raised sorghum and millet, crops believed to be indigenous to West Africa, where

there was sufficient rainfall. They developed

patterns of shifting cultivation that allowed soils

to be replenished by fallow periods of up to 20

years. Other farmers irrigated crops in the

floodplains of the major rivers, including the

Niger, Senegal, and Gambia, planting different

crops as the water receded (known as flood

recession cultivation).

Herders similarly developed various pastoral

systems. Some drove their herds of cattle,

sheep, goats, and camels in no fixed pattern

to seek grazing lands (called nomadic pastoralism) in the northern areas bordering the Sahara;

others migrated with their livestock in regular

patterns (called transhumant pastoralism), often

north in the rainy season and south during the

dry season, and engaged in some cultivation

(called agropastoralism). Another traditional

system of livestock farming, sedentary animal

husbandry, developed in the southern, higher

rainfall zones, but was secondary to cultivation

there (8,50). While at times there were tensions

between the farmers and herders competing for

limited resources, more often theirs was a mutually beneficial relationship where the herders

provided milk, manure, and other animal products to the farmers in exchange for food grains

and the use of their fields after harvest (crop

residues were dry season fodder for their animals]. While both farmers and herders produced food primarily for their own subsistence,

they also produced enough surplus to feed small

nonagricultural populations as well as to survive periodic droughts,

The decline of the great African empire in

Mali in the 15th century, and the defeat of the

Songhai Kingdom by a Moroccan force in 1591,

ushered in a long period of internal instability

and raids. The Europeans arrived along the

coast in the late 15th century. The Europeans

expanded the ongoing slave trade, which

fostered these African inter-ethnic wars. Over

the course of the next four centuries, 6 million

slaves were taken from West Africa (66). Dakar,

Senegal became a center of the enlarged Atlantic slave trade in the 17th century, when

slaves were sent from Africa to provide labor

on the sugar plantations of the West Indies.

Traditional production systems, though disrupted by the wars, raids, and slave trade,

survived.

Meanwhile, African farmers gradually

adopted crops introduced by the Europeans

from the New World and elsewhere (e.g., corn,

peanuts, cotton, cassava, and fruits) (36,66). The

agricultural production systems were landextensive, but they were sustainable because

the population was small. They were also dynamic, characterized by constant innovation

and adaptation. Diversified handicraft production was also developed, including textiles

made from locally grown cotton. While the

majority of agricultural and handicraft production was for subsistence, there was surplus

enough for local and regional trade (59).

During the latter part of the 19th century, the

French conquered much of the Sahel while England established control over The Gambia. Portugal retained the Cape Verde Islands. These

changes further disrupted traditional production systems. Under colonial rule, colonies were

considered providers of raw materials to Europe and markets for its manufactured goods.

The French and British, once they gained
33

— —

administrative control of the Sahel in the 1890s,

promoted export crops, especially peanuts and

cotton, damaged local artisan industries by giving favored tax status to European goods, and

forced rural people into the cash economy by

requiring them to pay taxes in cash.

Efforts to develop export production in the

colonial period were of limited success, yet had

lasting impact on agricultural production in the

Sahel. Successes were limited to peanut production in Senegal and The Gambia (see box

B) and cotton production in Chad (59). French

policies to encourage export production included taxation, forced labor, and resettlement.

Selective investment in research and infrastructure complemented these policies. For example, French efforts to encourage cotton production in the 19th and early 20th centuries failed

(66]. But in the late colonial period French

cotton researchers made available the better

adapted ‘‘Allen” variety brought from the United

States and the French began an ambitious irrigation scheme to encourage cotton production.

While emphasizing production of export

crops, French colonial administrators gave only

modest attention to food production, which

stagnated. They justified this neglect by noting that traditional farming methods changed

little, and, except for severe drought years,

enough food was produced to feed the people.

At the same time, rice was imported to Dakar

from French Indochina and sold to the growing urban population. Since it required far less

time to prepare, was available and inexpensive,

urban residents came to prefer it to locally

produced sorghum and millet,

Newly introduced animal and human diseases also disrupted traditional systems in the

early colonial period (1890-1920) (100), but the

introduction of preventive health measures beginning in the late colonial period probably had

a greater effect because it decreased death rates

and increased population growth. The population of the Sahel increased from an estimated

9 million in 1900 to 13.5 million in 1940, and

grew to 18 million by 1960 (60). Traditional agricultural production systems adapted to some

Box B.—Peanuts: How Colonial Powers

Favored Export Crops

The story of the development of peanuts as

an export crop in Senegal and The Gambia illustrates how colonial powers favored export

crops for obvious economic reasons. Peanuts,

desired by the Europeans as a source of vegetable oil for cooking and soap, began to be exported from Senegal and The Gambia in the

1830s. Exports increased as the slave trade

was gradually suppressed, and peanuts became the dominant export in the last half of

the 19th century. Small farmers with little capital could grow peanuts using traditional tools

and methods and usually rotated them with

food grains. Wolof and Serer farmers dedicated more and more of their land and labor

to peanut production in order to obtain cash

needed to pay taxes and to purchase the goods

they no longer produced as well as new consumer goods. In addition, colonial rulers

cleared new lands for peanut cultivation by

conscripting men into forced labor brigades,

a practice not abolished until 1946 (66).

With the expansion of the French oil industry after World War II, demand increased. The

French introduced improved seed varieties

and fertilizer, and land under peanut production increased dramatically (115). In the following decades, increased population, without a concomitant intensification of peanut

production, put pressure on the land in the

Peanut Basin. Fallow periods grew shorter,

eventually giving rise to semicontinuous cultivation in some areas, and ultimately reduced

fertility and yields. Cultivators moved to new

lands, at first good lands, but later increasingly

marginal lands, sometimes disrupting the

migratory patterns of the pastoralists; others

emigrated to cities. Yet, despite some fluctuations in weather and prices, peanut exports

continued to climb, reaching their peak in

1975 to 1976 (59). Over the past decade production and exports have declined principally

due to falling returns.

of these many changes, but overall they became

less self-sufficient and sustainable.
34

Sahelian nations gained independence from

France in 1960; The Gambia won independence

from Britain in 1965 and Cape Verde from Portugal in 1975. But the trends accompanying increased production of export crops and integration into the world economy continued, with

the support of the new African governments,

the French, and providers of development assistance. Agricultural development was not given

high priority and a large portion of the external funds for agriculture were used to develop

large-scale irrigation schemes to grow rice and

sugar, two crops that often substitute for imports, While France and the United States conducted some research on sorghum and millet,

the majority of foreign aid to rainfed crops in

the 1960s went to cotton and peanuts. Meanwhile, food production systems stagnated. Total food production increased because new

lands were opened by increased numbers of

farmers, but yields began to decline in areas

where soil fertility was reduced, especially in

Senegal and The Gambia.

SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION IN THE SAHEL

Integration into the global cash economy had

profound implications for rural Sahelian societies. The gradual transition of most farmers

from generally subsistence-oriented to cash

crop production that began in the 19th century

even affected those farmer and herder households that did not cultivate cash crops for export, For example, in years with good rainfall

surplus food crops—sorghum, millet, rice, and

maize—were sold for cash. Increasingly, fruits

(e.g., mangos, oranges, bananas, pineapples);

vegetables (e. g., tomatoes, beans, onions, cabbage, etc.); and nuts (e.g., karite) were produced

for sale. Integration into a money economy also

affected off-farm work and incomes of rural

people, especially in the dry season, and the

various roles of men and women in the household and in different production systems.

Migration

One of the responses to the need for cash in

rural areas has been migration and this has resulted in considerable change in nearly every

Sahelian village, While migration is not a recent phenomena, it has increased significantly

since World War II. It reflects the inequity of

wealth and opportunity between Western nations and the Sahel, between urban and rural

areas within the Sahel, between export crop and

subsistence farmers, and between farmers and

herders (33), Cash payments sent home by

migrants are a sizable though largely unmeasured part of national income; in Mali, for instance, workers’ remittances from outside of

the country in 1983 amounted to about $36 million (147). In some areas, remittances received

in rural areas can be a more important source

of cash than agriculture, yet they are not usually invested in agriculture due to its low return.

Migration, predominantly by young men, can

be either temporary–often alternating with the

short growing season—or permanent. When

young men migrate for seasonal work to the

export crop farms, or even to the large palm

oil, coffee, and cocoa plantations in the coastal

States, the burden on women, the elderly, and

children who grow food crops at home is often

increased. However, family incomes are increased by migration, and migration is a riskreducing strategy for farm families because

even in times of drought there will be some income. Migration may occur to gain access to

new land or to exchange labor for cash on larger

farms, in cities, coastal States, or even Europe.

It may also occur as a reaction to drought and

increased pressure on the land. An example is

emigration from the densely populated Mossi

Plateau in Burkina Faso to less populated higher

rainfall zones, where river blindness is being

contained, in the southern part of the country

or northern Ivory Coast. By one estimate there

are 1.5 million citizens of Burkina Faso in the

Ivory Coast: each year 500,000 migrate for work

in the dry season, and 100,000 never return

(115) 0
35

.

Pastoral Systems in Transition

The various forms of pastoralism in the Sahel have also been affected by the transition

to a cash economy. The fattening and sale of

beef to urban dwellers using traditional marketing channels provided cash to herders, and

supplemented the food and goods they used for

trade, The numbers of animals rose rapidly because of preventive health campaigns, deep

wells, a decade of higher than average rainfall,

and growing demand during the 1950s and

1960s (59). Seasonal movement of the pastoralists has become more difficult in recent years

as farming has expanded onto rangelands and

movement across borders has been restricted.

Several large-scale irrigation schemes claimed

areas previously used for dry season grazing

or for flood recession cultivation of crops. This

restriction on the pastoralists’ mobility has increased conflicts over access to land and water

resources (69). However, the traditional cooperative relations between farmers and herders

are still common: e.g., FulBe pastoralists may

tend livestock owned by Mossi sedentary farmers

with their herds, and thus ensure themselves

use of the farmers’ pasture when they migrate

south in the dry season. Even while the traditional herding systems have been primarily oriented to subsistence, transhument pastoralists

in the Sahel are efficient users of land: a comparative study showed that transhument pastoralists in the Sahel produced more animal

protein per hectare than the market-oriented

ranches in comparable areas in the Western

United States and Australia (8).

The 1968 to 1973 and 1984 droughts decimated many herds, forcing some herders to

shift to farming (130) or migrate to the city, During the drought many were forced to sell their

animals, their only assets, at low prices to purchase food. The change was most dramatic in

Mauritania, where the combined forces of

drought, economic modernization, war, and

emancipation of slaves have forced pastoralists

to abandon their traditional way of life. Between 1965 and 1975 the nomadic proportion

of the population decreased from 65 to 35 percent (33),

In other Sahelian countries pastoralists who

formerly depended on livestock have turned to

mixed systems of crops and livestock because

the market is no longer a reliable source of grain

or to acquire recognition of land rights (69,106),

Perhaps 40 to 60 percent of livestock are no

longer in extensive pastoral production systems. Additionally, the presence of tsetse fly

and the lack of dry season fodder also constrain

sedentary husbandry in higher rainfall areas.

Despite these constraints, total herd size returned rapidly to pre-drought levels. Evidence

also suggests possible increased concentration

among herders (22,67) and new forms of ownership. The sedentarization of pastoralists is being accompanied by an increased number of

animals owned by farmers and urban investors,

A growing proportion of the traditional pastoralists can only survive by emigration or tending investors’ herds (9).

Changing Social Systems

Traditional social systems in the Sahel are

also being affected by the changes accompanying development, These changes are affecting

the interrelated and diverse systems of ethnic

groups, castes, and classes throughout the Sahel. Traditional class structures still function,

especially in rural areas, although they are

changing as the production systems on which

they were based are also being transformed (54).

For example, the farmers endowed with preferred land, especially those with large families,

have been better able to take advantage of some

of the new technologies (84). While customary

law still governs land use rights in the Sahel,

land ownership is becoming more common.

Buying, renting, and speculating in land are

occurring and large-scale farmers, merchants,

and religious leaders are acquiring land, sometimes working it under types of sharecropping

systems (28), In addition to private land acquisition, land concentration in the Sahel is also

attributed to acquisition by parastatal organizations1 in irrigation-driver development schemes

and unintentional “demographic’ land expro-
36

priation—when population increases and traditional inheritance systems lead to divisions of

land into areas insufficient for family subsistence—resulting in emigration (102) $

Development patterns in the Sahel have significantly affected the role and status of women.

Studies have demonstrated that development

often worsened the situation of African women

(7,24,114), In the past, subsistence-oriented

economies had distinct roles for men and

women, but they were closely integrated into

the family agricultural production unit. With

the introduction of the cash economy, men generally appropriated the functions relating to

cash exchange, while women were left those

relating to subsistence production. In the Sahel women play a great diversity of roles within

the household, varying with ethnic group, caste,

and class (24,1 11). The allocation of land is usually controlled by men who give preference to

the higher value cash crops that they produce

and whose cash return they control. The increased labor demands of the new technologies

for cash crops often means that women and

children spend longer hours in the fields of their

husbands or fathers as well as, in some cases,

their own fields.

Despite the long hours spent obtaining water

and fuelwood and preparing food, rural Sahelian women are increasingly entering the

cash economy, supplementing family income

in a variety of ways. They market vegetables

from gardens, food crops, homemade crafts,

and animal products (e.g., meat, leather, milk,

cheese, eggs, etc.) as well as engage in smallscale trading, especially in the dry season.

Herder women, about whom little has been researched, are generally responsible for marketing milk (68). Since much of this trade is informal, it is not included in national statistics and

is often invisible to national planners. The

money earned is used to pay taxes; pay for

celebrations and transportation; and purchase

food, textiles, medicine, school books, and other

consumer goods that are transforming rural life.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SAHELIAN NATlONS

Profile of Poverty

The Sahelian nations are among the poorest

in the world by any standard. By one often-used

measure, per capita gross national product

(GNP), they averaged about $232 in 1983, far

less than that of the developing countries as a

whole ($787) (109), Accounting for inflation the

real per capita GNP was 17 percent lower in

1983 than 1975 (26). By another measure, the

Physical Quality of Life Index, based on a combination of infant mortality, life expectancy,

and literacy, the Sahelian nations average 27

compared to 61 for developing and 96 for developed countries (109). Related important

points include the following:

● Many infants die before their first birthday, about 145 of each 1,000 born, compared with 15 in the rich nations, and 92

in all developing nations (109). Up to a third

die before their fifth birthday (125). This

means, hypothetically, that a woman must

give birth to three children to help ensure

the survival of two.

● The average life expectancy of a child born

in the Sahel in 1983 is 44 years, far less than

the averages of 59 and 74 years of children

born in the rest of the developing and the

industrial countries, respectively (109).

• Less than 15 percent of the adults in the

Sahel are literate, far below the average of

59 percent in other developing countries

(109). Less than a third of primary school

aged children are in school; enrollment of

male children is double that of female children (147).

Yet significant progress has been made in reducing some aspects of poverty in the Sahel.

Comparing these three indicators with those

of a decade ago, life expectancy has increased

approximately 5.75 years, infant mortality rates

have decreased by 25 per 1,000, and adult literacy rates have doubled (see table 3-1). However,
37 —

Table 3-1 .—The Sahel: Social and Economic Indicators

GNP

per capita Life Infant Adult Primary school

Population, Population GNP per growth rate, expectancy, mortality, literacy enrollment, 1982

mid-1 984 growth rate capita, 1983 1960 to 1982 1983 1983a ratea

(percent of age

Country (millions) (percent) (U.S. dollars) (percent) (years) (per 1,000) (percent)

Burkina Faso , 6.7

— group).

2.6 –

180 1.1 44(38) 148 (182) 9 (5-lo) 28 - -

Cape Verde . . . 0.3 2.7 210 NA 61(50) 80 (91) 37 (NA) NA

Chad . . ... . 5.0 2.1 80 –2.8 43(38) 142 (160) 15 (5-10) NA

The Gambi a 0.7 2.1 290 2.5 36(40) 200 (165) 20 (10) 56

Mali . . ... . . 7.6 2.4 160 1.6 45(38) 148 (188) 10 (5) 27

Mauritania . . . . 1.8 2.8 480 1.4 46(38) 136 (189) 17 (l-5) 33

Niger . . . . . . . . 6.3 2,9 240 – 1.5 45(38) 139 (200) 10 (5) 23

Senegal . . . . . 6.2 3.0 440 0.0 46(40) 140 (159) 10 (5-lo) 48

aNU~b~rS ,n parentheses refer to 1970 through 1975

SOURCES John Seweli, et al (eds ), U S Fore/gn Po/Icy and fhe Th/rd kVor/d Agenda 1985-86 (New Brunswick, NJ Transact Ion Books 1985) Roger Hansen, et al

The U S and World Development Agenda for Action 1976 (Washington, DC Praeqer Publlcat!ons, 1976), and Robert S McNamara, The Cha//enges for SubSaharan Africa (Sir John Crawford Memorial Lecture, Nov 1, 198;)

national averages obscure social and economic

disparities between households, especially in

rural areas.

The total population of the Sahel was 35 million in 1984, a number that has doubled in the

25 years since independence (59). Population

growth rates range from 2.1 to 3.0 in different

countries (109), and now average 2.5 percent

for the region (26), This is less than the rate of

Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (3.2 percent) (81).

Some Sahelian countries’ population growth

rates have not increased over the past 20 years

(147), in part due to emigration, and population densities are low compared to other developing countries. Yet birth rates are high;

about 47 children are born for every 1,000

women each year, compared to 14 in the developed nations, The average woman in the Sahel gives birth to 6.5 children. The World Bank

estimates that the population of the Sahel (excluding Cape Verde) will be 52 million in the

year 2000, and will almost triple to 92 million

by 2025 (81).

About one in five residents of the Sahel lives

in cities and Senegal is the most urbanized

country (see table 3-2). The average annual

growth rate of the urban population over the

past decade is nearly double the total population growth. At independence an estimated 7

percent of the population lived in the cities. Yet,

if current trends continue one-third of the population of the Sahel will be living in cities by

2000 (37). One consequence of increased urbanization is a reduction in the percentage of

people engaged in agriculture, down from 90

to 95 percent in 1960 to about 80 percent now

Table 3.2.—Agriculture-Related Social and Economic Indicators

Percent Daily calorie Annual

Percent of of total supply per capita growth rate

labor force population Annual urban as percent of Percent of GDPa

of agricultural

in agriculture in urban areas growth rate requirement from agriculture sector

Country (1981) (1983) (1973-83) (1982) (1983) (1973-83)

Burkina Faso . . . . . 82 11 4.8 79 41 1.3 -

Chad b . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 20 6.6 68 64 (1982) –2.6 (1982)

Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 19 4.4 74 46 5.0

Mauritania . . . . . . . 69 25 4.6 97 34 2.6

Niger . . ... ... 91 14 7.0 105 33 1.6

Senegal . . . . . . . . . 77 34 3.8 101 21 0.3

%DP– Gross Domest!c Product –

. ————

bsome data for Chad from World Bank World Development RePOrt f984

SOURCE World Bank World Deve/opmenf Report 1985 (New York Oxford Umvers!ty Press 1985)
38

(21). While percentages vary by country, at least

50 percent and probably more than 60 percent

of the population is dependent on rain fed agriculture, excluding Mauritania (28); and about

one-fifth of the population is principally dependent on herding (140). While the number of people working in agriculture is estimated to increase from 11 million in 1980 to 15 million

in 2000, an annual 1.4-percent increase, the

greater urban growth rate will mean that where

each farmer today must support 2.8 persons,

by 2000 each will need to support 3,6 persons

(28).

The Sahel in the World Economy

The three pillars of Sahelian exports are

rainfed agricultural products, livestock, and

minerals (see table 3-3), Sahelian exports are

not well diversified, with one or two commodities providing most of each country’s export

earnings. Senegal has been the only country to

at least partially diversify its export economy:

peanuts were 50 percent of its export earnings

in 1976 (34) but just 13 percent in 1982. Sahelian

economies thus are extremely vulnerable to the

vagaries of climate and world market prices.

The major export crops are peanuts and cotton, both rainfed crops grown in rotation with

food crops by small farmers. Peanuts, also

grown as a food crop, are an important export

Table 3-3.—Major Exports and Share of

Export Earnings, 1980-82

Burkina Faso . . . .

Cape Verde . . . . .

Chad . . . . . . . . . . .

The Gambia . . . . .

Mali . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mauritania . . . . . .

Niger . . . . . . . . . . .

Senegal . . . . . . . . .

cotton (46%),a livestock (9%)c

fish (65%),c bananas (17%)c

livestock (43%),b cotton (31%)b

peanuts (51%)a

livestock (42%),c cotton (41%)c

iron ore (57%),a fish (43%)a

uranium (81%),a livestock (11%)c

peanuts (13%),a rock phosphate (13%),a

fish (12%),a petroleum products (25%)a

a I nternatlona} Moneta~ Fund, Bureau of Statistics, International Finarrcial

Statistics Yearbook 1985 (Washington, DC” 1985), 1980-83 data for Burkina Faso,

The Gambia, and Mali, 1980-84 data for Mauritama

bFood and Agriculture Organization, FAO Trade Yearbook IW (Rome 1985),

1980-83 data,

C Food and Agriculture Organization, 1984 CourrtY Tables: Bas/c Data on the Agrf -

cu/tura/ Sector (Rome 1984) Data for I ivestock are not very reliable Sources

d!ffer on most of these statistics

today only in Senegal and The Gambia, where

they cover about 40 and 60 percent of the area

cultivated, respectively (28). Production, acreage planted, and share of export earnings

reached their peak in 1975 and have since declined due to lower prices (which declined 50

percent in real terms from 1975 to 1982), marketing difficulties, drought, soil degradation,

and competition with other food crops (59).

Cotton is an important export crop in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad. Yields per hectare

of cotton, the only crop where production has

intensified in the Sahel, increased fivefold between 1960 and 1980. Total cotton production

reached a peak in 1978 to 1979, and in some

areas both acreage and yields declined in the

early 1980s due to the war in Chad, lower incomes from cotton, and the competition with

cereals (28,59). However, in Mali and Chad cotton production reached an all-time high in 1984

in the midst of the drought. Future prospects

are clouded by the fact that world prices have

dropped steeply in the past 2 years as China

has entered the international market.

Livestock exports are very difficult to estimate accurately, but they are significant to Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger. Exports are

primarily to the West Africa coastal States

where livestock production is limited because

of the tsetse fly. The recent drought devastated

herds and exacerbated a long-term trend: the

real value of live-animal and meat exports to

the coastal countries is estimated to have fallen

50 percent in the last decade (59), On the other

hand, earnings from maritime fishing have been

steadily increasing. World market prices also

have been falling for Niger’s uranium and Senegal’s phosphate. Demand for Mauritania’s iron

ore plummeted in 1982 to 1983 (37).

In general, strong world market prices of Sahelian commodities caused production to increase in the 1960s and early 1970s; fluctuating—but generally declining–world market

prices, erratic production, and increased costs

of imports worsened the balance of trade in the

1970s and 1980s (figure 3-1). However, declining export earnings are but one major factor

in the growing debt among Sahelian countries.
Figure 3-1 .—Commodity Price Trends for

2,000

1,000

900

c 800

0 700

L 600

E

500

400

300 —

200

100

90

80

70

Peanut meal and oil

(yearly average)

1

39

Peanuts, Cotton, Rock Phosphate, and Iron Ore (constant price)

I

Peanut meal —

Peanut oil -- -

I

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

200

100

90

o

80

70

60

E 50

n

40

30

20

10

Year

Rock phosphate

(yearly average)

I I

Moroccan _

A

n

I

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

Year

Cotton

(yearly average)

80

70

60

50

40 0

L

E

10

9

8

7

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

Year

Iron ore

(yearly average)

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

Year

SOURCE: World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends 1985 Ed/t/on (Baltimore, MD The Johns Hopkins University Press 1985)
40

Others include: steep increases in oil prices;

world recession; high interest rates; increasing protectionism; and internal policies on investment, trade, prices, and exchange rates (80).

The growing national debt limits economic

growth and pressures governments to increase

export earnings (thus to stress export crops over

food crops) and borrow more heavily.

The total debt of the Sahelian nations has increased more than tenfold since 1970, rising

from $450 million to $4.9 billion in 1983 according to the World Bank or $5.6 billion according to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (26). Figure 3-2

shows this trend of rising debt. Their debt now

is equivalent to over half of the GNP and two

to four times the export earnings of the Sahelian

nations as a whole (147). (See table 3-4.) While

the total debt is relatively small, comparing debt

to GNP shows that most Sahelian nations are

more in debt than Brazil (where debt is 30 percent of GNP) or Mexico (49 percent) (147).

Mauritania has the highest debt percentage in

the world, 178 percent. By 1982, two-thirds of

the public debt of the Sahel as a whole came

from official development assistance, with great

variation between nations (ranging from 44 percent in Niger to 95 percent in Mali). From 1980

to 1982, 75 percent of new loans to the Sahelian

nations were from foreign aid (25). While confessional loans provided as aid were primarily responsible for the increase in indebtedness,

the majority of debt service is from nonconcesTable 3-4.—Debt of

Figure 3-2.—Growing Debt Burden of Sahelian

Nations, 1974.83

5.5 

5.0

4.5

1.0

0.5

0

—

—

—

1974 1976 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Year

SOURCE World Bank, World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing

Countries, 1984-85 Edition (Washington, DC 1985)

sional loans. In the mid-1980s, debt service payments average 32 percent of Sahelian annual

export earnings and are rising (26), With the

exception of Burkina Faso and Chad, the Sahelian nations have debt burdens that are unsustainable in relation to their resources and

growth prospects (26). Since 1981, Senegal has

completed five multilateral rescheduling of its

debt, Niger four, and Mauritania one (146).

Sahelian Nations

Debt service

Amount of debt

Amount

(millions of

(million U.S. dollars) Debt as percent of dollars) As percent of

Country 1970 1983 1983 GNP 1983 exports 1981 1982 GNP 1981 exports

Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 398 38 243 14 2 11

Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 136 43 128 14 0 10

The Gambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA 192 98 291 4

Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3 16

238 927 89 413 37 1 24

Mauritania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 1,212 178 330 54 7 17

Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 662 51 222 63 10 21

Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 1,693 69 232 99 4 24

SOURCES World Bank, World Development Report 1985 (Washington, DC: 1985), Club du Sahel/CILSS, Offic/a/ (leveloprnent Assistance to C/LSS Member Countr/es

In 1983 (Paris’ Organ lzatlon for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1985), Robert S McNamara, The Cha//enges for Sub. Saharan Africa, (Sir John

Crawford Memorial Lecture, Nov 1, 1985), U S Agency for International Development, Country Deve/oprnenf Strategy Statement Sahe/ FY 1988 (Washington, DC Aprtl 1984)
41

THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN FOOD PRODUCTION

AND FOOD REQUIREMENTS

Food security is a must. We must ensure that

voltaics will no longer wake up in the morning and ask themselves what they are going to

find to eat that day.

–President Thomas Sankara (90)

Burkina Faso

The Sahel faces a growing gap between food

production and the population’s requirements.

In the 1960s the Sahel, with the exception of

Senegal, was largely self-sufficient in cereals

(37). Over the past two decades, Sahelian food

crop production has increased by about 1 percent per year [22). Yet almost all increases in

production have been due to more land being

cultivated rather than to more intensive use of

the land and higher yields per hectare, Yields

per hectare of the major food crops, sorghum

and millet, are lower than in other parts of the

world. Production was also adversely affected

by two major droughts and successive years of

lower than average rainfall. The rate of population growth during this time, however, was

about 2.8 percent—more than double that of the

rate of growth in cereal crop production (37).

Thus, per capita food production has dropped

—24 percent by one estimate—since the first

half of the 1960s, and has declined more than

that of Sub-Saharan Africa (16 percent). (See

figures 3-3 and 3-4.) That estimate, by USDA’s

Economic Research Service (138), excludes four

160

150

140

130

0

0

.

II

.

110

100

90

80

Figure 3-3.— Index of Total Food Production in the Sahel,a 1960-85

I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I 1 1 I

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

Year

O Sahel + Sub-Saharan Africa

aData IS for Burkina Faso, Mall, Niger, and Senegal

SOURCE U S Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service Africa and Middle East Branch prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment February 1986
42

105

100

95

90

II

75

70

65

60

Figure 3-4.–index of Per Capita Food Production in the Sahel,a 1960-85

u

1 1 1 I 1 I I 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 1 l I l I 1 I I I I

I

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

Year

❑ Sahel + Sub-Saharan Africa

aD~ta ,s for Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Sene9al

SOURCE U S Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Africa and Middle East Branch, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1986

Sahelian countries that have even greater food

deficit problems: Mauritania, Cape Verde,

Chad, and The Gambia.

By the mid-1970s, at the time of the formation of the CILSS and the Club du Sahel, this

growing gap between food production and food

needs was recognized as a critical problem.

Achieving food security was identified as the

first priority for the new effort. However,

donors and recipients differed on what the goal

meant and how to achieve it. Sahelian nations

have traditionally stressed achieving regional

food self-sufficiency, a position reiterated in the

Lagos Plan of Action, a major policy statement

made by Organization of African Unity in 1980.

The emphasis on increasing local food production reflects an awareness of their vulnerability to drought and of the disadvantages of an

economic dependence on a few export commodities and food aid. The other emphasis,

articulated most forcibly by the World Bank

(101,153), is on achieving food security by increasing national incomes through trade. Since

sufficient food is currently produced in the

world, that argument goes, what is required is

a balancing of production for trade and production for consumption to reduce the lack of

food security caused mainly by a lack of purchasing power. Thus nations and individuals

should produce whatever provides the greatest return. The different positions, while not
43

Figure 3-5.–Sahel Grain Imports by Commodity, 1966-84

1.5

1.4

1.3

1,2

1.1

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

1966 1970

 I Ric e Whea t

1975

Year

1980

Millet/sorghum

—

—

-1-

1984

SOURCE U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service Africa and Middle East Branch, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment February 1986

mutually exclusive, affect debates over relative cereals available in the Sahel. By 1985, at the

priority between food and export crops, rainfed peak of the drought, imports provided one-third

and irrigated agriculture, crops and livestock, of the total cereal available. It is important to

and other issues that will be described in the remember that the data on food production and

next chapters, consumption in the Sahel are at best only rough

In the past two decades, the Sahel’s supply

of food grains has increasingly come to depend

on imports and food aid. The decline in per capita food production has been accompanied by

increased imports of cereals. (See figures 3-5,

3-6, and 3-7.) At the time of independence, for

instance, the Sahel (except for Senegal) received

negligible food imports, During 1976 to 1982,

a period between droughts, cereal imports fluctuated between 14 and 18 percent of the total

estimates (28). Data on imports, including both

commercial imports and food aid, are more

reliable.

Reduced foreign exchange earnings from export commodities and mounting debt—as well

as a host of other reasons ranging from the availability of surplus food from donor nations, exchange rates, and other policies—have meant

that the gap between food production and consumption was not met by commercial imports
44

Figure 3-6.–Sahel Grain Imports, 1967-85

2.2

2.0 —

1.8 —

1.6

1.4 —

c

—

0.6 -

0 . 4

0.2 —

o

1

1967 1970 1975 1980 1985

Year

+Food aid

SOURCE U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Africa and Middle East Branch, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1986

alone. (See figures 3-6 and 3-8.) Food aid, which

was largely unknown in the Sahel before 1970,

filled the gap. In 1983, food aid accounted for

85 percent of cereal imports in Burkina Faso,

80 percent in Cape Verde, 75 percent in Chad,

55 percent in Mauritania, 50 percent in Mali,

and 22 percent in Senegal (63). In 1985, half

of the cereal imports of the Sahelian nations

were confessional food aid.

Even with increased imports, the gap between availability of food and food need is not

being bridged completely. Current statistics on

food availability, even without considering uneven distribution of food, indicate an inadequate diet according to the minimum caloric

standard set by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Per capita consumption of animal products, already low, has also fallen significantly since the 1960s (59). However, cereals

comprise only a part of Sahelians’ diets and little data exist on consumption of uncultivated

foods and animal protein, In rural areas, these

are traditional backup systems and are as important as food aid in times of drought.

Subsidized imports have helped keep urban

food prices low, but they also have affected people’s food preferences, Most food imports are

rice and wheat, which reflect both surplus production in other parts of the world and increased demand for these products in urban

areas in the Sahel. These foods require less time

to prepare than do sorghum and millet. Wheat

and rice are now the staple foods in the large

cities in the Sahel, while sorghum and millet
45 —

Figure 3.7.—Total Amount of Food Grains Available (produced and imported) in the Sahel, 1967-84

6,8

6.6

6.4

t -

6.2

6.0

5.8

c

25.41 -

4.2 — u

4.0 —

3.8 —

3.6 -

3.4 . I

1

1967 1970 1975 1980 1984

Year

❑ Production + Available

SOURCE U S Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Africa and Middle East Branch, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1986

remain the staples in most rural areas. Rice is

also increasingly consumed by the better off

rural residents because it is easier to prepare

and store (2 I). This changing demand has an

impact on farmers, reducing their incentive to

grow sorghum and millet while the climate usually prevents them from growing rice and

wheat. One remedy is improved food processing technologies—to reduce women’s labor—

for traditional cereals. For example, millet

grinders are becoming popular in urban and

more prosperous rural areas and have begun

to increase consumption of millet in these areas.

A number of projections have been made of

future food needs, looking at probable trends

of both increased demand for and supply of

food, for Sub-Saharan Africa (21). All agree that

the gap will continue to widen unless there are

significant changes in either production or demand. For the Sahel, the Club/CILSS estimated

that if productivity per unit of land and per agricultural worker does not increase, the cereal

deficit, roughly 800,000 tons in an average year

at the beginning of the 1980s, will exceed 3 million tons per year by 2000. Given existing

trends, even in years of normal rainfall, approximately one-third of the cereals consumed in

the Sahel will be imports or food aid. They observe that “the present system is entering a dead

end” (28).

However, the Club/CILSS concludes that the

Sahel’s resources for cereal crop production—

principally sorghum and millet—are greater

than its needs. Internal migration and new land
46

Figure 3-8.—Ratios of Food Aid, Grain Imports, and Grain Availability in the Sahel, 1967-85

1967 1970 1975 1980 1985

Year

+ Imports as a percent O Aid as a percent

of cereals available of cereals available

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Africa and Middle East Branch, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1986

development in higher rainfall areas can help

relieve pressure on overworked land. But they

will not be enough to provide sufficient food

grains to the growing urban population unless

the rainfed cereal production systems are intensified and productivity increased through

a number of means (28). While the report does

not deal explicitly with the problem of changing urban demand, it mentions the need to protect national markets against low-cost imports.

The effect of changing urban food preferences

on demand presents a challenge to those who

seek to increase production of sorghum and millet through agricultural development projects

or policy and other reforms. Environmental

degradation, exacerbated by the drought, presents another challenge.

The Club/CILSS priority goal of increased Agricultural production in the Sahel is confood security included a commitment to halt- strained by the environment, especially low soil

ing and reversing environmental degradation. fertility, erratic rainfall, and land degradation.
47

The recent drought exacerbated ongoing damaging trends and made them more visible; cattle dying of hunger because of a lack of natural

fodder and farmers unable to grow even sorghum or millet on hard-packed fields degraded

by wind and water erosion were common

scenes.

A Harsh Environment:

Climate, Rainfall, and Soils

The climate of the Sahel is extreme: a short

rainy season, usually between June and October, characterized by often violent and unpredictable showers, is followed by a long dry

season. Rainfall is low, highly variable, and unevenly distributed. Much of the rain that falls

is not retained in the soil and runs off. There

are high temperature fluctuations between day

and night and low humidity during the dry

season—with the “harmattan,” a dry northeasterly wind, occurring from November

through February. Most important, recurrent

drought is a permanent feature of the Sahel (86).

Defined ecologically according to average

rainfall, the term “sahel” refers to the 200 to

400 km wide semiarid zone between the 200

mm and 600 mm average annual rainfall lines.

The Sahel band extends across Africa and is

located between the Sahara desert and the

savannah of higher rainfall, termed the Sudanian

zone.

2 (See figure 3-9.) In the CILSS States, the

ecological “sahelian zone” covers 27 percent

of Senegal, 39 percent of Mauritania, 40 percent of Mali, 7 percent of Burkina Faso, 50 percent of Niger, and 32 percent of Chad (86).

Of the 530 million hectares in the seven continental CILSS countries, two-thirds are north

of the northern limit of cultivation, the theoretical line beyond which rainfed agriculture

is no longer possible. Large yearly variations

of rainfall patterns, however, mean that the

ZDefinition~ of the major ecological zones in West Africa, bY

isohyets of rainfall, used by AID and CILSS, BOSTID and the

World Bank in its report on desertification (148) differ somewhat. The World Bank definitions and map, while complex, are

used here because of the availability of data about suitability of

land use (table 3-5) and sustainable populations (table 3-6).

rainfall lines (isohyets)3 only indicate an average. Soils are suitable for cultivation on about

60 million hectares—only 12 percent of the total area. About 20 percent of this was actually

being farmed in the 1970s. About 150 million

hectares are classified as rangeland, where

grazing is the best use of the land (148). (See

table 3-5.)

Soils throughout most of the Sahel are shallow and have low fertility. They especially lack

phosphorus, nitrogen, organic content, and

water retention capacity. Common problems

include: wind and water erosion, concentration of iron (laterization) and aluminum hydroxides, waterlogging, and hard clay layers (148).

Soils vary from predominantly sandy to clay.

Combined with uneven rainfall, this means that

the Sahel is diverse agroecologically, even

within a given climatic zone.

Generally—but depending on specific rainfall distribution in a given year–rainfed crop

production ceases in areas that receive an average of less than 350 mm rainfall. Millet predominates in the areas up to 600 mm, while

above 600 mm sorghum is the major grain crop

and peanuts are important exports. Maize and

cotton are grown in areas receiving above 1,000

mm of rainfall (125). About 13 million hectares

are under rainfed cultivation in the Sahel: 70

percent are under millet and sorghum; 23 percent under peanuts and cowpeas; less than 3

percent each under cotton, maize, and rice (28).

Yet 20 percent of the cultivable land is located

north of the 350 mm rainfall line (in zone III

on figure 3-9). In years when rainfall is less than

average, that land is more suitable for pastoralism. This area of shifting use is one where conflicts arise between farmers and herders, or

where herders sometimes cultivate crops given

sufficient rainfall (148). In times of drought, the

farmers and herders in these northern areas are

greatly at risk.

The Sahel region suffers periodic droughts;

major ones occurred this century in 1910 to

1914,1930,1940 to 1944,1967 to 1973, and 1980

to 1984. BOSTID, after a paleoenvironmental

3An isohyet is a line drawn on a map connecting points receiving equal rainfall averaged over an extended period of time.
48

/

/

I

\

\

\

\

\

0

/ 0

/

/

/

/ . –— —

/

/

I

0
49

—.

Table 3-5.—Land Distribution by Climatic Zone and Suitability of Soils

Zone

Saharan . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sahelo-Saharan ... . .

Sahelian . . . . . . . .

Sahelo-Sudanian . .

Sudanian. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sudano-Guinean . . . . . . . . .

.

Soil suitable for

Area Cultivation Pasture

-.

Million

Rainfall (isohyet)a

hectares Percent

less than 200 mm 296 56

200 mm to NLCb56 11

NLC to 350 mm 45 8

350 to 600 mm 55 10

600 to 800 mm 38 7

more than 800 mm 40 8

Million Million

hectares Percent hectares Percent

50 14

13 29 28 62

18 33 34 62

14 37 19 50

17 42 19 48

Total area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530 100 62 12 150 28

‘A” l~~h~~t ,~ ‘ lln~ dr’~n on ‘ map connecting points–recetvlng equal rainfall averaged over an extended period of time

bNLC—Northern Llmlt of Cultlvatlon

SOURCE World Bank, Desert/f/cat/on (n the Satrellan and Sudan/an Zones of West Afr/ca (Washington, DC 1985)

and historical review, concluded that little significant long-term climatic change has occurred

in the Sahel during the last 2,500 years, and

drought is an inherent feature of the region.

However, the present century may be the driest one in 1,000 years (86)$

There is an ongoing debate about the degree

to which human actions influence climate and

drought. According to one theory, clearing

ground cover increases the land’s reflectivity

and this together with reduced evapotranspiration inhibits cloud formation. The diminished

rainfall degrades the environment further in

a self-reinforcing process (11,86,148). Current

opinion accepts that human actions may affect

the local climate, but there is not agreement

on their effects on climate over larger areas.

Desertification is also a major concern in the

Sahel. Researchers for the World Bank concluded that it is a complex, poorly understood

process that appears to be caused by interactions between drought and human abuse of the

environment (148). Desertification can be defined as “the formation and expansion of desertlike patches around cities, villages, wells, and

other centers of concentrated activity” (87). One

form is the expansion of the Sahara desert, but

more serious is destruction of the natural resource base further south in the SaheloSudanian zone (zone IV on figure 3-9), where

crop yields are falling in many areas. Signs of

desertification include a reduction in the

amount and diversity of plant and animal species, loss of water retention capacity, lessened

soil fertility, and increasing wind and water erosion (148).

Some experts question the data available on

the nature and extent of desertification (106).

Careful environmental analyses have concluded that the natural systems are resilient,

and if the pressure is relieved they can regenerate or be rehabilitated (86,148).

By comparing actual populations with estimated carrying capacities of the land in each

of the climatic zones, World Bank researchers

concluded that the sustainable rural population,

given traditional crop and livestock systems,

is 36 million, a number greater than the present

rural population of 27 million. Some people,

however, dispute the usefulness of the concept

of carrying capacity because of its relativity to

changes in climate, technology, management,

and other factors. Degradation, while occurring in both the northern Sahel and to a lesser

extent in the better watered south, was most

serious in the middle zones. The middle zones

are where the population already exceeds the

sustainable level, and it is where trees are the

most vulnerable and over-exploited (148). (See

table 3-6.)

Impact of Human Activity

on the Environment

Traditional land use systems were generally

in equilibrium with the environment, however,

human activity began having negative impacts

on the Sahelian ecosystems centuries ago (86).
Table 3-6.—Sustainable and Actual Numbers of People in the Sahel (millions)

Crops/livestock Fuelwood

Sustainable Sustainable

Sustainable Actual rural less actual Sustainable Actual total less actual

Zone population population population population population population

Saharan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0

{

0.8

}

–0.8 0.1

{

0.8

Sahelo-Saharan . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1,0 }

– 1.7

Sahelian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 3.9 0.0 0.3 4.0 –3.7

Sahelo-Sudanian . . . . . . . . . 8.7 11.1 –2.4 6.0 13.1 –7.1

Sudanian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.9 6.6 2.3 7.4 8.1 –0.7

Sudano-Guinean . . . . . . . . . 13.8 3.6 10.2 7.1 4.0 3.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.3 27.0 9.3 20.9 31.0 – 10.1

SOURCE Jean Gorse, “Desertification in the Sahelian and Sudanian Zones of West Africa,” Unasylva: An Internatioanl Journal of Forestry and Forest Industries 37(4), 1985

Colonialism, economic development, and population increases in the 20th century have

resulted in cumulative damages to the environment. Overuse and abuse of the natural resource base by increased numbers of farmers,

herders, and city dwellers as well as by donor

and African government-supported development have taken a great toll. Tree cover, grasslands, and soils have all been harmed.

As a result, some experts conclude that human and animal pressure must be reduced to

allow the land to regenerate naturally. Various

solutions have been proposed, including encouraging migration, increasing the intensity

of agricultural production, and increasing rural incomes through other mechanisms. The

biggest technical issues to be resolved include

loss of trees, destruction of grasslands, and reduced soil fertility,

Loss of the Trees

In traditional agropastoral systems, trees provide food, medicine, fuelwood, building materials, and fodder for animals, Leguminous trees

also add fertility to the soil and prevent erosion. For example, the Acacia albida tree provides shade and increases soil fertility because

it fixes nitrogen, Its leaves and protein-rich pods

provide fodder for livestock in the dry season

and mulch for the soil. But tree cover has been

sharply reduced in the past several decades.

According to one observer, two-thirds of the

acacia trees within 60 miles of the Senegal River

in Mauritania have disappeared in the past decade (107).

Of the estimated 18 million tons of wood consumed in the Sahel annually, about 90 percent

is for fuelwood. Only 15 percent of the region’s

energy comes from sources other than wood

(29), (See figure 3-10.) The constant search for

fuelwood for cooking is one of the major factors causing the loss of trees around cities and

villages. Since obtaining household fuelwood

is often the women’s responsibility, this shortage increases the time and labor women must

spend collecting wood, Commercialization of

fuelwood and charcoal has accelerated environmental destruction. As a result of increased

population and urbanization, far more trees are

being lost than are being regenerated or replanted, despite a variety of forestry programs.

The shortage of fuelwood or alternative

energy sources especially affects the poor;

many poor families now only cook one meal

a day. In urban areas of Burkina Faso, 15 to

20 percent of a typical salaried worker’s income

is spent on firewood and charcoal; in Bamako,

Mali the figure is 30 percent. Over 70 percent

of the people of Niger face acute fuelwood scarcity (145). A 1983 Club/CILSS study concluded

that a growing regional fuelwood deficit will

occur in the next 5 to 10 years if present trends

continue (29). In all but the most southern areas,

fuelwood need already exceeds available fuelwood supplies (148). (See table 3-6, ) Six of the

eight Sahelian countries have an acute scarcity,

where available supplies are insufficient to meet

minimum requirements (145).

Other factors contribute to the loss of tree

cover. Land is being cleared to plant more
51

Figure 3-10.— Percentage Share of Wood in the Sahel Countries’ Supply of Energy, Mid-1970s

77

60

69

93

01-- — —

Cape Verde The Senegal Mauritania Mali

94

Upper Voltaa

66

Niger

Islands Gambia

aNow Burkina Faso

SOURCE Club du Sahel/CILSS, Energy in the Development Strategy of the Sahel (Parts: OECD, October 1978)

Other

84

Wood

Sahel

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

Fuel wood supplies 85 percent of the Sahel’s energy needs and its increasing scarcity alters people’s lives significantly.

crops. Shorter fallow periods and unrestrained also are cut to provide building materials or forbrowsing of animals slow or prevent regrowth. age for animals during droughts.

Trees are also lost because of fires: farmers burn

fields as part of “slash and burn” shifting cul- Destruction of the Grasslands tivation methods (a low-cost method of fertilizing the soil that is not sustainable under short Pastoralists’ traditional ways of using the land

fallow periods); herders start fires to stimulate were low density and periodic and thus helped

new growth of grasses for dry season grazing; protect the grasslands. The current problem of

and hunters burn areas to flush out game. Trees grasslands degradation is due to a number of
52

factors including: increasing numbers of livestock, concentrating herds around deep wells

(boreholes) which replaced traditional shallow

watering holes, the associated breaking down

of controlled access to water and pasture rights,

and restrictions on herders’ mobility. As farming expanded further and further into rangelands and irrigation projects were developed

along major rivers, pastoralists’ faced limited

access to dry season grazing. Therefore some

herders moved into marginal lands or congregated near boreholes and consequently overgrazed the surrounding areas.

Some experts question, however, whether

overgrazing is a major cause of desertification.

They point out other more important factors

that contribute to the degradation of the grasslands, such as expansion of cultivation into

areas better suited for pasture, fires, and extended periods of low rainfall (106). Some experts attribute the replacement of more nutritious perennial grasses with annual grasses to

overgrazing combined with a long period of less

than average rainfall (86,148). However, rangeland experts have been unable to clearly identify that such a change is occurring (48). Others

are concerned that browsing, especially by

goats, will lead to increased deforestation. Yet

goats and sheep have increased more rapidly

than cattle since 1970 because they are better

adapted to drought (86).

The processes of deforestation and grassland

degradation reduce soil fertility by reducing the

vegetative cover and making the soil vulnerable to erosion. The expansion of the area

planted in cash crops, together with the need

to produce more food for an increasing population, has shortened fallow periods, a traditional way to restore fertility. Continuous cropping depletes the soil and fertilizers are used

only on a small portion of the land, principally

that planted in cotton or irrigated crops. Continuous cropping also makes the land more

prone to erosion. In certain areas, the use of

the modern plow in place of traditional minimum tillage methods may also contribute to erosion. The use of crop residues for fuel, fodder,

or fencing and the decrease in available manure have further reduced the regenerative

process of traditional systems and reduced the

organic content of the soil. In a self-perpetuating downward cycle, these processes interact

with drought and contribute to wind and water

erosion to remove the relatively fertile topsoil

and reduce the ability of the remaining soil to

absorb and store water.
Chapter 4

A Decade of Lessons:
Chapter 4

A Decade of Lessons:

Technologies Past and Future

IN BRIEF . . .

The Sahelian environment is challenging. In the past, Sahelian farmers and herders developed a diversity of productive agricultural systems in response to their harsh environment. But changes in the last century have destabilized these traditional systems, leaving

the people increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of weather and economic forces. Changing social, agricultural, and economic systems, including a growing dependence on world

markets, as well as drought, land degradation, and declining fuelwood supplies, all contribute to the region’s vulnerability. The results are increasing poverty, food shortages, indebtedness, budget crises, and worries about the future.

The Club/CILSS effort, and the U.S. contribution to it, have provided only modest tangible successes, and technologies appropriate for the Sahelian environment have proved elusive to develop or adapt. But donors and Sahelians have learned important lessons that can

serve as a foundation for future efforts. Chapter 4 analyzes the decade’s efforts at technology

development in the Sahel and discusses guidelines for future programs. Highlights of the

chapter include:

●

●

●

Contrary to early expectations, technologies appropriate for the Sahel did not exist

and many agricultural technologies transferred to the Sahel proved to be ineffective.

Efforts to develop technologies for the Sahel were disappointing in large part because

the environment and socioeconomic systems of the region were poorly understood.

Agricultural technologies appropriate for the Sahel must be low risk, affordable, sustainable, and they must offer at least stabilized production along with the potential

for substantially increased returns. Farmers and herders need to be included in project

design and implementation and special attention should be focused on the low-resource

farmers and herders—women and men—who comprise the majority of Sahelian agriculturalists.

In general, technology development, adaptation, and transfer is more complex and

slower than had been assumed. The lessons learned through both successful and unsuccessful projects in the Sahel can serve as foundations for future efforts, and justify

a cautious optimism about the future in the region.

In 1984 and 1985, major drought again struck culture-based foreign exchange earnings dethe Sahel. Though Sudan and Ethiopia further clined significantly, adding a crippling blow

to the east were the most severely affected, the to national economies already on the brink of

CILSS countries still required 1.2 million tons bankruptcy,

of food aid (139). Relatively few people starved,

but malnutrition, increased endemic disease, After almost one-third of the 25-year timeeconomic disruption, and displacement of peo- frame set under the Club/CILSS framework, litple led to considerable human suffering. Agri- tle headway apparently has been made in at55

59-965 0 - 86 - 3
56

taining food self-sufficiency, environmental

stabilization, and economic growth. Despite the

high expectations with which the “Sahel Experience” was launched and the unprecedented

mobilization of over $15 billion in international

assistance, the situation in the Sahel remains

critical. While there have been exceptions from

year to year and from country to country, data

point to a decade characterized by declining

per capita food production, stagnant or declining yields of major crops, continuing environmental degradation, and little diminution of the

region’s high vulnerability to drought. Moreover, a 1985 CILSS study predicts continuing

deterioration and recurrent crisis in the Sahel

if the trends of the past two decades are not

radically reversed (22).

Experts have tried to attribute the ongoing

problems in the Sahel to a continuing succession of years with low and highly variable rainfall. But one of CILSS’s goals was to reduce the

region’s vulnerability to drought—a goal that

obviously has not been met successfully. In part,

Sahel experts now admit, the gap between expectations and performance is a product of unrealistic original assumptions and goals (110).

Both Sahelians and donors lacked knowledge

about fundamental ecological and socioeconomic realities and unrealistically believed that

technologies and models of development were

available or could be easily transferred and

adapted from elsewhere. Disappointment was

therefore inevitable. According to Club du

Sahel Executive Director, Anne de Lattre: “In

those early days, the Sahel program just didn’t

do its homework” (38).

On the average, the record of individual development efforts in the Sahel is poor, Programs

to develop and disseminate improved, appropriate technologies for rainfed agriculture have

failed to improve on traditional approaches

(128). Programs to develop irrigation have

proven costly, slow, and of questionable economic viability. Livestock and range management programs have offered little improvement

over existing systems. And despite the oft

repeated importance of the environment and

particularly the critical status of fuelwood resources, investment in these areas has been

costs high, and success limited,

low,

Examples of poor performances are visible

in all sectors of development. Technologies

appropriate to the Sahelian environment and

its socioeconomic realities proved illusive to

develop or adapt. Systems to deliver those technologies to farmers and herders proved inadequate. Infrastructure was a constraint; management skills were insufficient and projects were

poorly designed, The policies of the Sahelian

countries proved to be disincentives to growth.

But this litany of failures to meet overall goals

and the lack of significant impact on the key

indicators of Sahelian food insecurity mask individual project successes and positive changes

that have resulted from the past decade’s efforts by Sahelians and their international partners. A few of the successes include:

Better early warning systems, improved logistics, and far better organization and coordination of food aid on the part of both

external donors and Sahelians were all factors that helped prevent the 1984 to 1985

drought from causing a wide-scale famine

in the CILSS countries. The combined lessons of a decade of activity had resulted

in a Sahel better prepared and more capable of responding to disaster.

A significant factor in the relative success

of relief efforts in 1984 to 1985 is the greatly

improved infrastructure of the Sahel, especially its road networks. Poor maintenance,

however, is a continuing problem.

Thousands of Sahelians have received

training, increasing the long-term capacity of Sahelian institutions, Many are moving into key positions, Through the U.S.

Sahel Development Program alone, over

1,350 Sahelians received high-level training since 1978 (123).

Production of millet and sorghum nearly

doubled in Niger; maize production has expanded impressively in Senegal, The Gambia, and Burkina Faso; and cereal yields,

though on the average stagnant, have shown

some strong local increases such as those
57

in southern Mali. (22). Improved local varieties of sorghum are being used by farmers in Burkina Faso and Mali.

Coordinated donor dialog with Sahelian

governments on the crucial need for policy changes have resulted in promising reform programs in Senegal, Niger, and Mali.

Using the resources provided by Public

Law 480, the Economic Support Fund, and

the Economic Policy Initiative, as well as

its other ongoing bilateral programs, the

United States has been a major participant

in these efforts.

Cotton production, using relatively intensified methods, expanded fivefold since the

1960s and reached record levels in 1982

to 1983 and 1983 to 1984 despite low rainfall. Yields per hectare in some areas have

reached those of major world producers.

Access to education and health care has

expanded rapidly, producing major increases in literacy and life expectancy

rates. New models of primary health care,

such as those developed by the Agency for

International Development (AID) in Senegal, have succeeded in bringing health care

to rural areas and are being expanded elsewhere in the Sahel. An international program to control onchocherciasis (river

blindness) gives hope that large tracts of

underused land in southern Burkina Faso

and Mali might be farmed.

Despite the poor performance of large

irrigation schemes, a growing number

of community or individually managed,

smaller schemes show promise.

Although the livestock sector programs

have generally been judged failures, there

have been instances of success such as

improved animal health services and increased use of crop residues for fodder. In

Mali, the vaccine production unit of the

Central Veterinary Laboratory, supported

by the United States, has become largely

self-sustaining.

In Burkina Faso, farmer-level techniques

to reduce erosion and improve soil quality have been developed and are being

adopted by farmers.

● Dune stabilization in Niger, the use of animals for power in parts of Senegal, and the

success of some community reforestation

projects all provide evidence that some

new technologies are working.

These successes and others may have, at best,

slowed the decline in Sahelian production and

environmental systems. But they are the basis

for a cautious optimism about the future in the

Sahel. Though revealing a much more arduous

and perhaps slower process of technology development and exchange than had been expected, the experiences of the past decade have

not fundamentally called into question the potential of the Sahel to reach Club/CILSS goals

of increased food security.

A major change in the past decade has been

an impressive increase in Sahelians’ skills. This

is partly a product of the training and partly

the experience learned through the development efforts of the last decade. It is a learning

process shared by both Sahelians and donors,

and it has helped participants to reach a growing consensus on the nature of the most important issues facing the Sahel (110).

These lessons are beginning to be incorporated into action. Many donors, including the

European community, the World Bank, a number of private voluntary organizations, as well

as the Club du Sahel and CILSS, have been involved in major evaluations and reorientations

of their Sahel strategies similar to those performed by AID during 1983 and 1984. Some

Sahelian governments are going through the

same process.

The lessons include new perspectives and

guidelines for technology development, organization of programs and projects, and the need

for policies to allow them to work. Club du

Sahel Executive Director Anne de Lattre and

others see these shared lessons as the greatest

accomplishment of the Club/CILSS process and

an essential reason for their optimism.
58

WHY TECHNOLOGY FAILED TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS

AND MORE PROMISING APPROACHES

Many Sahel development experts now agree

that technologies to improve Sahelian agricultural production substantially did not exist at

the beginning of the Sahel effort nor do they

now (38,45,125). A good portion of the first generation of Sahel projects had been based on the

assumption that technologies already available

in the Sahel, supplemented by those transferred

and adopted from other arid areas, would be

sufficient to meet medium-term objectives. This

mistaken belief was a major factor in the poor

performance of many agricultural development

programs.

The best illustration of the disappointing results of technology transfer in the Sahel are seen

in the failed attempts to increase cereal crop

production, Improved varieties of wheat, rice,

and corn were at the heart of the Green Revolution of the 1960s in Asia and Latin America,

and it was assumed that better varieties of millet and sorghum, which represent over 70 percent of Sahelian cereal production (28), would

do the same for the Sahel, But despite nearly

a decade of effort since 1975 (in addition to over

40 years of previous French research), scientists have failed to come up with varieties that

perform significantly better than those already

in use by farmers in any but the higher rainfall

areas (128).

In retrospect, Sahel experts agree that a lack

of understanding and underestimates of the importance of key ecological and socioeconomic

factors led to the choice of inappropriate existing or imported technologies and delayed efforts to develop technologies that were more

appropriate. To a large extent, the knowledge

base on which Sahel programs were built was

inadequate. But in many instances, and increasingly so as knowledge grew with experience,

there was also a failure to integrate what was

known into choices of technical objectives

and project designs. The lessons of the past decade regarding technology development involve

therefore: 1) the identification of key ecological and socioeconomic factors, 2) the specific

knowledge regarding those factors learned

from experience, and 3) the implications of

what has been learned for future strategies.

An Inadequately Understood

Environment

The broad question of environmental degradation in the Sahel, particularly the visible

progress of desertification, is seen by Sahel experts as a high priority in the future. Recent

patterns of agricultural development are contributing factors to degradation (87,93). Increased care to avoid negative environmental

impacts in agricultural project activities and

the explicit integration of environmental limitations into long-term strategies are essential

to the development of technologies appropriate for the Sahel (22).

The rate of destruction of trees is of particular concern given the importance of the forestry

sector both in terms of domestic energy requirements and overall environmental stability.

Though policy makers have been slow to respond and past actions have been largely disappointing, authorities insist on the need for

high-priority, forestry-related development activities (37). Those failures have led to several

important conclusions for future strategies:

• the need for new approaches to replace the

large-scale tree plantation efforts using imported species of the 1970s and a better balance between plantation and communitylevel, small-scale approaches using both

better adapted imported species and local

species’ (55);

● the need for a closer association between

forestry and agriculture, to be achieved in

part by increasing farmers’ perceived interest in forestry (18) and improving institu-

‘Srniill-scale communit~ forcstrj projects, hu~jcicr, hairc

proven to he more costly than originally assumed and managw

mcnt difficulties arc not automatically solt’ed h~ this approa(,h.

i’(?r~r ] ittle rcsearc}l has heen (:on(]u(:te(i ;ihout the u]tinlatr potontia] of lo(:a] ~ariet ics in reforestation,
59

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

Deforestation can have serious environmental consequences, CARE supported this shelterbelt project i n the Maggia

Valley of Niger to prevent soil erosion and maintain crop productivity.

tional links between forestry and agriculture departments and programs; and

• the need for a parallel focus on the development and extension of conservation

technologies: for example, more efficient

charcoal production, continued work on

fuel-efficient wood burning stoves,’ brush

fire control, and the development of alternative energy sources.

The past decade has also taught a much

greater appreciation of the importance and

resiliency of natural plant and animal communities despite conditions of drought and increasing human pressure, Researchers are beginning to understand that these systems are

important sources of food and medicines, particularly during times of drought when cultivated crops fail and domesticated livestock die.

Knowledge of natural systems and their regenerative processes needs to be integrated into

development strategies, and future programs

need to include protection and development of

those systems.

The lessons of the past decade point to four

key environmental factors relevant to agricultural objectives in the Sahel:

1.

2.

3.

4,

the Sahelian climate,

its soils,

agricultural pests, and

diversity,

These lessons also indicate the need for increased attention to general problems of environmental degradation beyond agriculture,
60

The Sahelian Climate Sahelian Soils

Sparse and highly variable rainfall are the

principle characteristics of the Sahelian climate. And though still poorly understood, geological and historical evidence suggest that annual weather patterns in the Sahel are subject

to long- and short-term patterns making recurrent drought a permanent feature of the region

(86). Scientists speculate that rainfall patterns

of the past two decades could be part of an extended period of low rainfall. Unfortunately,

early decisions on the selection of improved

crop varieties and tree species for the Sahel

were based on the assumption of a return to

higher than average rainfall patterns of the

1950s and early 1960s. Therefore, unrealistic

assumptions regarding rainfall were a major

factor in the poor performance of many of the

new varieties of sorghum and millet brought

to the Sahel from elsewhere, in their lack of

responsiveness to increased fertilizer usage,

and in the failure of attempts to introduce new

forage crops and exotic fuelwood species (20).

The implications for future strategies are clear,

Drought must be accepted as a permanent and

highly probable feature of Sahelian life and be

included as a major factor in the determination of technical objectives. Given the certainty

that even under the most favorable scenarios,

at least 90 percent of Sahelian cereal production will continue to be produced under rainfed

conditions, a better understanding of Sahelian

climatology is essential (22). The 1975 creation

of the Sahelian Regional Center for Agrometeorology and Applied Hydrology (AGRHYMET) as

a specialized institution under CILSS was a positive step, but the development of AGRHYMET’s

capacity has been slow and its role is limited

to data collection. A more systematic analysis

of AGRHYMET data and data from the U.S.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency,

which has been using remote sensing to improve early warning systems for famine, is

needed to increase long-range forecasting capacity. Linking climate and agronomic information has the potential to reduce risks and

decrease the variability of agricultural production under varying rainfall (112).

The failure to appreciate adequately the low

fertility and other characteristics of Sahelian

soils was a further reason for the poor performance of many of the millet and sorghum varieties brought to the Sahel from India and elsewhere (77,98). In some instances, soil and

rainfall characteristics have combined to lead

to the poor performance of introduced varieties.

Runoff rates are extremely high in many areas

of the Sahel—up to 40 percent by some estimates (77)—due to the intensity of rainfall and

poor absorptive capacity of soils. High runoff

not only means inefficient use of what little rain

does fall but also further degradation of soils

through erosion. Compensating for poor soil

quality must bean explicit factor in agricultural

development strategies in the Sahel.

Continued research also will be needed to

classify soil types as a basis for crop breeding

and agronomic research programs, and to increase and apply knowledge regarding the composition and structure of Sahelian soils, The

complex relationships between water, soils, and

plant physiology under conditions of low rainfall still are understood inadequately, The development of low-cost strategies to increase soil

fertility and improve other soil characteristics

in low rainfall areas is challenging but critical,

Most Sahelian soils are poor in phosphorus and

nitrogen, The use of simple rock phosphates

found in several regions of the Sahel has potential for relieving the former constraint while

techniques relying on organic fertilizers or improved plant-associated nitrogen fixation may

provide alternatives to costly chemical fertilizers (98). More research is needed on both

alternatives,

Pest Problems

A wide variety of diseases and pests (e.g., insects, weeds, rodents, and birds) —many unique

to the Sahel—have also hindered attempts to

increase agricultural production, Though several large integrated pest management projects

were launched (e. g., the CILSS Integrated Pest

Management Project and AID’s Regional Food
61

.- -.

Crop Protection Project), their effectiveness

was limited3 and pest issues were not adequately addressed in many plant breeding and

agronomic programs (89), Several of the new

cereal varieties introduced were particularly

susceptible to pest damage and changing agronomic practices, such as continuous cultivation, increased weeds. In some instances, pest

problems have increased in drought years, further reducing the improvements that had been

achieved in several better-yielding varieties.

Although the extent of preharvest and postharvest losses due to pests is debated, insufficient attention has been given to determining

their extent or to developing alternatives (2).

Again, however, the need is not only to learn

more but to better integrate research results into

programs. Due to their high cost, lack of availability, and safety considerations, the use of

chemical pesticides is impractical for the immediate future except under limited circumstances.

Pest resistance as an objective in breeding programs and improved agronomic practices (e.g.,

physical removal, cropping patterns) hold the

most potential for reducing preharvest losses

due to pests.

Diversity

The most crucial characteristic of Sahelian

ecology that was underestimated in most agricultural development efforts is the number and

diversity of Sahelian soils and microclimates.

Rainfall variability over time and location is

extreme, especially in low rainfall areas. Several kilometers can make the difference between modest yields and total failure. Fertility

and other soil characteristics can also vary

within short distances. Pest problems, too, are

highly location-specific. Improved technical

packages were often developed on the basis of

assumed “average” rainfall and soil characteristics of a given area—a concept of little practical use when high variability means that the

“average” rarely corresponds to the actual conditions faced by farmers and herders. In instances where successful technologies were

based on local data, attempts to spread those

technologies more broadly have achieved poor

results (93)$

More appropriate research and development

programs require knowledge of the degree of

diversity and the frequency or probability of

any particular combination of environmental

conditions occurring. What are the different

soil types? What is the probability of a 20 percent greater or lesser rainfall on a given field?

How likely are pest outbreaks? Given the various possibilities, which ones should determine

research objectives? These are the type of questions that will need answers in the development

of new Sahel strategies. The lesson of the past

decade is that the failure to factor in diversity

can be as disastrous to development strategies

as the failure to accept the persistence of

drought.

Poorly Appreciated socioeconomic

Systems

A lack of understanding concerning Sahelian

social and economic systems was a further reason for the failure to develop technologies

appropriate to the Sahel. Over the course of the

past decade, the various actors in the Sahel have

put different degrees of effort into anthropological, sociological, and economic analysis,

The United States is considered to be one of

the leaders in this regard. The studies have been

of uneven quality and, as the knowledge base

has expanded through experience, the problem

seems to be one of ineffective integration of

socioeconomic analysis into the processes of

technology development and exchange. The lessons of the past decade underscore several key

characteristics that are essential to future

efforts.

The Influences of Poverty

Poverty is the fundamental reality facing the

vast majority of Sahelian farmers, Poor farmers

whose very survival depends on producing sufficient quantities of food are understandable}
62

reluctant to adopt technologies that increase

the risk of failure, By conducting a combination of agricultural and nonagricultural activities (including migration of individual family

members), farm households spread rather than

concentrate risk, Farmers and herders in the

Sahel are also particularly cash poor and tend

to minimize inputs, especially cash investments. In one example, a 40-percent increase

in returns was necessary before farmers would

risk adopting new technologies (57).

These high risk-avoidance and the low-input

preferences in farmer decisionmaking were not

adequately appreciated nor integrated into the

search for appropriate technologies for the Sahel. These factors were certainly significant in

the poor adoption rates of the technologies that

were introduced, In fact, many of the agricultural, livestock, and forestry technologies introduced in the Sahel actually have increased

risk (55). There are numerous examples of new

seeds, practices, and animal breeds that, while

higher yielding, were more susceptible to

drought, pests, and diseases than traditional approaches. The implications of these lessons are

that in the future, technologies must be lower

risk, lower input, and provide higher returns

if the majority of the Sahel’s low-resource

farmers and herders are to benefit (43). Particular attention to not increasing risk is, moreover,

not only necessary for better adoption rates,

but the only defensible position when dealing

with the poorest Sahelian farmers.

Labor Supply Factors

Contrary to original assumptions, labor supply has proven to be a major constraint in Sahelian agricultural production systems and in

the willingness to adopt new technologies. The

seasonal nature of Sahelian agriculture and the

lack of alternatives to human labor create labor bottlenecks at periods of peak labor need:

planting, weeding, and harvesting, Despite high

population growth, these bottlenecks have in

many cases increased because of several factors: rural-urban migration, increased school

attendance, breakdown of the traditional family production unit, and continuing high levels

of debilitating disease. Second, labor availability is influenced by competition for labor from

alternative activities. Risk avoidance strategies

spread labor among activities rather than concentrating it on increasingly risky agricultural

activities. The proportion of nonagricultural income in most rural households is high, Also,

drought and desertification have increased the

time spent in such essential activities as wood

and water collection, usually by women, and

has meant less time available for agriculture.

Thus, the limited labor supply has affected

the outcomes of development activities. A study

to determine why oxen cultivation was not

adopted in most of the Sahel showed that the

prohibitive cost was the extra labor required

to maintain the animals (39). One reason why

most irrigation schemes failed to successfully

encourage farmers to grow two successive

crops of rice was competition for labor from

rainfed agriculture or, during the dry season,

perceived better alternative income opportunities (e. g., migration to cities, vegetable production) (76). The lesson learned is that future

strategies must either be based on new technologies that do not greatly increase labor demands

or on those that provide sufficient returns and

can effectively compete for labor. There is a special need to develop technologies to increase

the productivity of labor input (e.g., improved

mechanization) and to develop broader approaches to labor supply, including labor-saving technologies in other areas such as food

processing, water and fuelwood collection, and

fuel-efficient cooking technologies, Complementary programs such as health and nutrition

improvement could also help increase the effectiveness of available labor.

The Role of Women

The past decade has also provided important

lessons regarding the importance of recognizing gender factors in most food production systems in the Sahel, In the Sahel as elsewhere,

poor project performance has often been tied

to the lack of careful gender analysis and the

failure to integrate the implications of that analysis into the development of production strategies (13,23). Agricultural extension, credit, and

other inputs usually have been directed toward
63

Photo credit: World Bank Photo credit U S Agency for International Development

Most grain is ground by hand throughout the Sahel. Therefore women, such as these from Burkina Faso, spend hours

preparing food Mechanical grinders can cut labor needs and free women’s time for other activities.

men (5). Yet women provide a major portion

of total labor input for cereal production and

also have responsibilities for food processing

and storage and household maintenance. In

cereal grain improvement projects, women’s

labor constraints are thus particularly critical

(104).

Studies of development efforts in Africa have

demonstrated unexpected results caused by the

production in Mali) have been usurped by men.

In livestock development projects, the emphasis on cattle (controlled by men) over goats and

sheep (controlled by women) and within cattle

programs on beef as opposed to milk production have benefited men disproportionately and

often decreased women’s income. The lessons

of the decade call for an expanding knowledge

about gender roles and also for better methodologies to apply that knowledge.

lack of gender focus [7,24,41 ,42,44,1 14). In- Economic Realities

creased opportunities for cash income, even in

activities traditionally reserved for women (e. g., Development efforts in the Sahel often were

rice in The Gambia and Senegal or vegetable based on faulty assumptions about the economic
64

realities facing the Sahelian households. With

few exceptions, Sahelian agricultural production involves low-input, low-productivity systems and they provide low returns. Most experts

feel that opportunities for further expansion of

such “extensive” production systems are becoming limited and that expansion of current

systems has resulted in lower yields and negative environmental effects in some areas. Therefore, many authorities feel that efforts to increase output substantially must rely on changes

in production that use a wide variety of inputs

more efficiently.

Such strategies face considerable obstacles.

Low-input, risk-avoidance strategies and the

relatively high cost and marginal production

increases of the technologies offered over the

past decade have been factors in their poor

adoption. Returns to farmers and herders from

“improved” technologies often were not worth

the investment (93). But the focus on production and inputs has missed the even more significant constraint of low market demand and

low prices. This has been particularly the case

for grains such as millet and sorghum where,

with the exception of drought years when the

farmer has little to sell anyway, demand is

limited (84).

The “food gap” at the national level has not

translated into higher demand or prices for the

cereal crops produced by most Sahelian farmers. Rather, demand has grown for imported

rice and wheat, which is competitively priced,

more easily prepared and, to many urban dwellers, better tasting. The economic rationality of

increasing millet and sorghum production

under these conditions is questionable. The

more successful adoption of new technologies

in cotton, and to a lesser degree in peanuts, has

been related to their higher economic return,

For the latter, falling world prices, the end of

input subsidies, and fixed low prices have resulted in significant reductions in areas planted.

The current precipitous drop in cotton prices

could well have a similar effect. Efforts to increase production must therefore be geared also

toward increasing income by increasing productivity (particularly labor productivity), by lowering input costs, and by expanding market

demand.

Diversity

The lack of appreciation for the great diversity in production systems in the Sahel, each

a response to a specific set of ecological and

socioeconomic factors, was a key design weakness of many livestock and crop development

activities (24,67,93), Substantial differences exist between households, ethnic groups, and

castes in crucial areas such as access to land,

labor and capital and services, gender and age

group roles, cultural designations of “acceptable” occupations, traditions of communal economic activity, the importance of agriculture

as opposed to other income sources, and rights

to surpluses produced. Project designs based

on simple models of average farm households

failed to recognize or integrate the diversity of

socioeconomic and cultural contexts represented in any given community—differences

that often determined responses to proposed

technologies. The implication for the future is

that there is a need for far more localized—or

targeted—approaches and technologies.

Guidelines for Sahelian

Agricultural Technologies

Scientists and planners working in the Sahel speak of the need to reorient the search for

agricultural technologies to respond to the lessons learned in the past decade. Most agree that

environmental and socioeconomic factors have

constrained the efforts of the past. An analysis

of these factors gives rise to several broad characteristics that should guide the search for

tomorrow’s technologies in the Sahel, Though

not a revolutionary reversal, these characteristics represent important changes that many

agricultural researchers in the Sahel are already

adopting (77), These technology characteristics

can be grouped into four categories: stability,

affordability, improved returns, and long-term

environmental sustainability.

Stability

It is the variability of rainfall rather than its

generally low levels that provides the greatest

challenge to agricultural research in the Sahel.

For example, new technologies must be able
65

to perform not only during periods of low rainfall but also when the rains are relatively high.

Considering the prevalence of rural poverty and

vulnerability, improved technologies for farmlevel food security must begin by striving to provide production stability. Several approaches

could be used to help increase production stability:

●

●

●

●

●

●

Use crop breeding programs to develop

more quickly maturing varieties that are

also resistant to moisture damage in later

stages.

Improve water management, emphasizing

techniques for reducing and concentrating run-off and increasing infiltration such

as tied ridges, contour ridges, microcatchments, and improved plows.

Develop a better understanding of Sahelspecific agro-climatology, linking prediction capabilities with agronomy,

Improve pest control and storage methods,

Develop appropriate irrigation techniques,

Small-scale irrigation traditionally has

played an important role in the stability of

Sahelian agriculture and efforts are needed

to support innovators and study the most

effective methods to realize the potential

of the Sahel’s surface and subsurface water

resources,

Use the Sahel’s diversity as an advantage,

building on traditional strategies to obtain

stability by combining a range of different

crops or even noncrop activities. Examples

include mixed cropping; intercropping of

different varieties of the same crop; introduction of new crops; mixed crop/livestock/

tree systems; nonagricultural incomegenerating projects; inland fisheries development; and technologies for improving

the output of natural systems—wildlife

ranching, artificial seeding of natural species, and improved harvesting and processing techniques,

Affordability

With few exceptions, Sahelian farmers are

low-resource farmers. New technologies generally must respond to their low-input strategies. Inputs such as fertilizer, animal power,

other forms of mechanization, improved seed,

pesticides, or improved animal health and nutrition measures will only be adopted if their

cost is low relative to their probable return. Because probable returns for cereals and most

other crops are low, technology development

must seek inputs that are correspondingly inexpensive, This pertains not only to inputs purchased with cash but also to labor and to land

where it is scarce,

Improved Returns

New technologies must be low risk, affordable, and they must also provide adequate increases in returns, Since it is likely that the value

of existing agricultural products will not increase greatly, either new, higher valued commodities will have to be introduced or the technologies used to produce existing commodities

will have to be improved to make current practices more profitable, Attempts to find new

commodities for the Sahel have been largely

unsuccessful. Experimental sunflower production in The Gambia, export production of

vegetables and fruits in Senegal and Mali, and

increases in cashew and sesame production in

several countries provide at best modest prospects. Strategies to increase demand for or enhance the competitiveness of Sahel-produced

cereal grains (e. g., improved processing and

storage technologies for millet and sorghum,

decreased subsidies for imported grains, or

more active trade protection measures and subsidies) are also possible.

Technologies need to be developed that provide food stability under low input levels while

also responding well to increased inputs and

better management. For the particularly challenging case of low-value cereal crops, substantially higher yields are possible if they are grown

in rotation with export crops such as cotton,

Higher input systems often are associated with

improved management and the residual effects

of fertilizer used on previous cash crops is significant. For example, average yields of millet

and sorghum cultivated in rotation with intensified cotton production in Mali are as much

as 40 percent higher than those in the surrounding area (20).
66

Long-Term EnvironmentaI

Sustainability

Continued environmental degradation and

stagnating or even falling yields have led Sahel experts to view long-term sustainability as

a critical criterion for new agricultural technologies. Although the evidence is controversial,

many people feel that the impact of development activities inadvertently may have decreased long-term sustainability, For example,

development activities may contribute to the

loss of soil fertility through continuous cultivation and the expansion of agriculture onto

marginal lands; increased pest problems from

monocropping; overgrazing and soil compaction from livestock concentration around deep

wells; salinization and waterlogging in irrigation projects; and increased aluminum toxicity and acidity levels where commercial fertilizers have been used continuously, Technology

development must include long-term environmental sustainability as a key research objective.

The Integration of Traditional

Technologies

The poor performance of introduced technologies has given development experts a new appreciation for the environmental and socioeconomic appropriateness of traditional Sahelian

technologies. Centuries of experience have led

to successful techniques such as mixed cropping patterns; herder migration patterns and

water management techniques; seed selection;

the use of ash as fertilizer; food storage and

processing technologies; the food and medicinal value of indigenous fruits, berries, leaves

and barks; the use of natural systems as food

reserves during drought; and other adaptations

to the environment. While most traditional production systems are well adapted to the Sahelian environment, farming and herding systems are falling behind population growth and

environmental change.

It is essential to integrate traditional and new

technologies in agricultural research. This integration can suggest low-input innovations to

help traditional production systems keep up

Photo credit: George Scharffenberger

Wild plants supplement other foods during shortages.

One former Peace Corps Director in the Sahel reports

that the fruits being gathered here are boiled for hours,

then “taste like bologna. ”

with changing environmental and socioeconomic conditions. The traditional approaches

can act as starting points to develop appropriate new technologies,

More than any individual technology, the dynamic adaptive processes by which African

farmers and herders collect information, experiment, and continually adjust their own technologies is considered to be a helpful starting

point for research and development efforts

(103). Charles Weiss, former World Bank Science and Technology Advisor, summarized the

future direction needed for technology development and selection for Africa agriculture:

For Africa’s smallholders, the major technological task is the development of improved
67

technologies which are adapted from and more patterns of work, must not require heavy frontproductive than traditional technologies and end investments or recurrent costs, and must

which are sustainable socially, ecologically, in- not place too much of a burden on the limited

stitutionally, and economically. This means managerial abilities of government officials or

that they must be suited to ecological condi- African small farmers (143).

tions of Africa, should not disrupt traditional
Chapter 5

A Decade of Lessons:
Chapter 5

A Decade of Lessons:

Policies and Choices

IN BRIEF . . .

Overall, efforts to develop technologies for the Sahel have been disappointing, This is

in large part because the environment and socioeconomic systems of the region are inadequately understood. Guidelines for future technology development, however, can be drawn

from these disappointments. For the future, technology development must include a focus

on solutions appropriate to the Sahel; increased farmer and herder input; a creative combination of indigenous and external research, technology, and management systems; more localized research strategies tailored to ecological and socioeconomic diversity in the Sahel; and

special attention to the low-resource farmers and herders who comprise the majority of Sahelian agriculturalists. In general it must be realized that technology development, adaptation, and transfer will be slower and more complex than had been assumed. AID and other

participants in the Club/CILSS framework are beginning to incorporate these lessons into

their planning and activities.

Technology development, however, is only one part of development assistance. The past

decade has also taught many lessons related to the importance of how assistance is designed

and implemented, and how the policies of donors and recipients affect the outcome of development efforts. Chapter 5 examines characteristics that have contributed to the poor results

of the past and opportunities for future efforts. Highlights of the chapter include:

● Four general institutional problems contributed to the poor results in the Sahel: the

lack of effective participation by the intended recipients of the assistance; the inadequacy of a short-term, product-oriented approach; the complexity of project design;

and the inappropriateness of much of the research conducted.

● Misguided Sahelian and donor policies are a further factor in the poor performance

in the Sahel. Cereal pricing policies, artificial exchange rates, poor debt management,

low investment in food crops, indiscriminate food aid, and a range of measures discouraging initiative have proven to be disincentives to increased food production and

effective distribution. If agricultural strategies are to be effective, the broad economic

policy environment in both Sahelian and donor countries must be consistent with development goals.

● Beyond technologies, modes of assistance, and policies, the multinational effort in

the Sahel has suffered from a lack of clarity and agreement on the definition of food

security goals and the optimal means to obtain them. Many fundamental issues, such

as the balance between investment in rainfed or irrigated agriculture, have yet to be

resolved.

71
72

-. —.

MODES OF DEVELOPMENT AND

Our policy is that the point of aid is to eliminate aid,

–Thomas Sankara, President of Burkina Faso (90)

The experiences of the past 10 years have

taught the importance of how technologies are

combined and then applied in programs and

projects. The methods used in designing and

implementing development activities are as diverse as the participants involved. Within that

diversity, however, several characteristics of

the institutional actors have contributed to the

poor results of the past decade. Four problems

stand out: the lack of effective participation by

those to whom projects were directed; the shortterm, product-oriented project approach of

most efforts; the complexity of project design;

and inappropriate research.

Participation: Leaving Out

the Ones That Count

As happened elsewhere in Africa, development strategies in the Sahel were built on the

assumption that technologies to increase smallscale farmer and herder productivity would

come from outside those production systems,

African governments and international donors

alike saw traditional farmers and herders as inherently conservative, even backwards. They

viewed traditional cultures as obstacles and

their technologies as inefficient (67,103). But

planners failed to appreciate the advantages of

traditional systems and the systems introduced

from Western conditions have caused problems

(58). In retrospect, many experts view the lack

of effective farmer/herder participation in all

phases of project design as a significant factor

in poor project results.

The lack of recipient input explains the inappropriateness of many technical approaches

promoted in Africa (10,103). Who but farmers

themselves could best have explained the rationality of their decisionmaking, their cultural

value systems, village and farm level economies, and the diversity of patterns of social

organization? Even where such input was

sought, perceptual biases shared by most “exDEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Photo credit: George Scharffenberger

Local farmers and herders are experts whose knowledge

often has not been tapped, and development assistance

has been less effective as a result.

perts,” foreign and African, often hid or distorted the realities of the poor (19). The traditional knowledge of farmers and herders

regarding such things as natural forest systems,

effective plant associations, and pasture characteristics was a valuable resource that was left

largely untapped.

But development observers believe that the

lack of effective participation has had a more

fundamental negative impact beyond the lost

opportunity for more accurate information. Experience in the Sahel and elsewhere points to

the conclusion that the extent to which farmers

and herders are involved in technology selection and development and the conceptualization, design, implementation, monitoring, and

evaluation of projects greatly influences the

likelihood of success (67,116). The failure to include Sahelians was a failure to build on their

motivation, energy, creativity, demonstrated

entrepreneurial skills, and proven resilience.

The disappointing results of the past can only

be reversed if farmers and herders are given

a more central and responsible role in project

decisionmaking. The top-down, implicitly paternalistic underpinnings of many development
73

efforts in the Sahel need to be replaced with

less hierarchical, more service-oriented structures and partnerships, According to an official of Burkina Faso’s agricultural research institution: the farmers themselves should define

the problems and suggest solutions. There is

too much condescension, What is needed is to

build a partnership between donors, national

institutions, and farmers.

Creative methods need to be developed to improve the two-way flow of information between

farmers and herders and development agencies

(both Sahelian and donor) as well as means to

implement what have been up until now largely

rhetorical calls for increased farmer participation and responsibility. The community development approach of the 1960s and 1970s was

both ineffective and ineffectively applied. Redefinitions of the role of the extension agent,

increased farmer input in determining research

objectives, and alternative participatory research methods integrating farmers as participants are all required (57).

Beyond information flows, the question of increasing farmer and herder responsibility in

development projects is even more crucial and

unquestionably more difficult, Logic and experience demonstrate that only when farmers

and herders see their own interest in and feel

“ownership” of projects can they be successful. This is especially the case in the realm of

environmental protection where the divergence

between perceived private interest on the part

of farmers and herders and public good in the

eyes of government or donor officials is great.

Because rigid enforcement of conservation

rules is impractical on economic grounds, the

only means to reconcile the two is to change

perceptions and support appropriate solutions

through participatory approaches,

Achieving effective participation is highly

problematic. Divergence between rural interests and those of urban classes; economic and

social differentiation between rural households

and within households; and conflicting interests between farmers and herders, different ethnic groups and different clans all complicate

the task of organizing participatory development models. And while many see the potential in better organized farmer and herder

groups as effective partners for development

(58), the political implications of better organized, more vocal farmer groups raise questions

about whether the governments of most Sahelian States would be likely to accept such a

change. Despite these challenges, a shift in

responsibility is essential. As a Club/CILSS

strategy paper observed:

Producers should cease being dependent,

assisted persons and take their future fully into

their own hands; by contrast, the development

organizations should progressively limit their

role to provide groupings with the assistance

and services they require, while granting them

more decisionmaking power (28).

Short-Term, Product-Oriented

Project Approaches

Most donor-assisted efforts in the Sahel (other

than those of the French) have been organized

into discrete, short-term (2- to 5-year) projects. *

Objectives are commonly set (and reinforced

through monitoring and evaluation) in terms

of quantifiable results—in theory to indicate

progress toward less tangible goals. A number

of factors have converged to favor this type of

programming including various institutional

and political pressures (Sahelian and donor) for

rapid, quantifiable results; the original emphasis on technology transfer for which this mode

of assistance seemed appropriate; donors’ desire to control use of their resources; and a desire for flexibility in the event that progress was

unsatisfactory.

The nature of the development challenge in

the Sahel is such that the goals and many objectives of the Sahel effort can only be achieved

on the basis of a sustained, cumulative, longterm effort. Contrary to early assumptions, the

Sahel effort has required more extensive adaptation and development of new technologies

than originally assumed. It takes an average of

‘Club du Sahel estimates put the percentage of total aid to th{’

Sahel in nonproject assistance (e. g., te(’b 11 i(:al assista n(:~;, rew;a rc h, sc ho] a rsh ips, food aid, balance of i]ay’men ts, and b~l d get

~[l[)~)ort) at 34,1 per(; ent from 1975 to 1983 (25),
74

10 years of continuous work to produce a new

crop variety and another 5 to 10 years to gain

its widespread adoption—a process poorly served

by short-term project aid (45). While in practice many research and extension projects have

been renewed or followed by similar efforts,

there have often been significant delays and

continuity has suffered, Other major effects of

the

●

●

●

●

●

●

short-term project approach include:

Insufficient Data Collection/Analysis: Developing an understanding of year-to-year

variations in rainfall and the seasonal nature of production systems requires extended periods of observation. Time constraints mean that insufficient field data

are collected prior to final design,

Lack of Systems Approach: Short timeframes and required quantifiable outputs

encourage simplified models of farming

systems that focus on the individual sectors rather than the relationships between

them. In the field, this limits flexibility.

Lack of Focus on Institutional Development: Short-term projects and evaluation

based on quantifiable indicators encourage

foreign technical assistance to take control

and favor physical outputs over capacitybuilding goals. Rather than working through

existing institutions, the tendency has been

to add new organizational structures that

are rarely sustainable following project

completion.

Inefficient Use of Training: Training components of many short-term projects have

had key African technicians or managers

leave as expatriate project personnel arrive,

then return to take over later with little

hands-on experience or support.

Bias Against Sustainable Technologies:

Short-term objectives and evaluation criteria bias technology choices toward quick

production without consideration for longterm environmental or institutional sustainability.

Increased Coordination Difficulties: The

discrete project approach amplifies coordination difficulties and has tied up key Sahelian management and technical staff in

responding to multiple and often overlapping or inconsistent donor administrative

and program demands (85,134).

The past decade has confirmed that it will

not be easy to achieve Club/CILSS goals. “Technology transfer” has become technology development, much of it dependent on first building the basic knowledge base. Participatory

approaches to development take time to

organize and implement. The poverty of the

majority of farmers and herders and their attitudes toward risk and innovation indicate the

need for slow, gradual intensification of production systems. Efforts such as river basin development, because of cost and complexity, are

inherently long-term. Sahel specialists agree

that these long-term needs require programs

and projects with a corresponding perspective.

They feel that current project length and the

various biases toward short-term, productrelated results need to be changed to longer,

more flexible programs with objectives related

to broader, long-range impact and systemsbased strategies. The long timeframe has implications for project financing as well. For example, longer payback periods will require

increased grant or confessional elements of

financing.

A related error in many Sahel project designs

was to overestimate the capacity of Sahelian

institutions, Shortages of managerial and technical skills, planning experience, financial control systems, and the ability to absorb recurrent costs translated into the inability of

Sahelian institutions to either fulfill their roles

within development activities or to sustain

those efforts after a project’s end. In many instances, Sahelian roles in donor-sponsored

projects involved the delivery of crucial component technologies and inputs such as extension advice, credit, mechanization services, fuel

and maintenance for irrigation pumps, veterinary services, seeds, fertilizer, and crop protection services. The lack of effective delivery

systems was among the principle reasons for

poor performance of agriculture-related development activities, In many instances, assistance

actually made weak institutions even less effective, The massive influx of aid and the de-
75

—

mands of multiple projects often overwhelmed

the capacity of already weak administrative and

technical services (4,127,134).

After reflecting on the lessons of the past,

many experts consider the commitment to longterm development in the Sahel as a commitment to institution-building, i.e., to increasing

the capacity of Sahelian institutions (formal,

nonformal, governmental, nongovernmental,

regional, national, and community) to take on

the tasks of agricultural and rural development,

Indeed, some consider the lack of more improvement in institutional capacity as the greatest failure of efforts in the Sahel (57). But institutional development is complex and poorly

understood, particularly in the context of informal institutions at the village level. Institutional development requires learning through

experience, and this requires both opportunist y

and time. It is poorly served by rigid or standardized formulas, short-term projects, disjointed project-specific training courses, or

technical assistants who take over while Sahelians watch from behind.

Several Sahel development authorities point

to the long-term institutional relationships between American universities and research institutions in India as being major factors in developing the capacities of Indian institutions

to play the key role they did in the Green Revolution in that country, Though similar efforts

were tried in Nigeria in the 1960s and are currently being introduced in Cameroon, they have

not been a part of the Sahel effort. The language

barrier places a major practical constraint on

non-francophone donors such as the United

States.

AID’s support for the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) in Mali is, however, an example

of success in institution-building. Although AID

support is continuing, the CVL’s vaccine production service is now largely self-sustaining,

It has taken over 12 years of ongoing support

but is an example of the slow but sustainable

progress that is possible with such a commitment, The lesson for the future is that institution-building–the long slow process of building capacity—must be a significant element of

M

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

AID’s support for the Central Veterinary Laboratory in

Mali has been long-term and it is now paying off

because the laboratory is self-sustaining in

vaccine production

all development strategies if Club/CILSS goals

are to be realized.

Complexity of Project Design

The problems of the short-term, discrete

project approach are amplified when project

designs are overly complex. First generation

Sahel agricultural programs attempted to develop and d inseminate combinations of interdependent technologies delivered to the farmer

as “packages. ” But the package approach

proved to be disappointing in the Sahel for several reasons: often some elements of the package were less well researched or even unavailable, the total level of resource investment

(usually capital and labor) was only appropriate for the wealthier farmers, and the standardization of packages was poorly suited to the

diversity of ecological and socioeconomic contexts (93,126). Projects tended to be ‘‘overdesigned” in the guise of rigor. Assumptions,

goals, and objectives were overly optimistic,

Many designs were overly detailed and inflexible, which required unjustified levels of intervention in local systems and gave little al-
76

lowance for farmer initiative or change.

Consequently, the proportion spent on technical assistance in total project costs has been

excessively high. Often the result was expensive, top heavy, and difficult to administer

projects predestined not to meet objectives. An

AID livestock project is typical: $13 million of

$17.5 million is devoted to foreign technical

assistance.

The problems associated with the complexity of project design were multiplied in the

so-called integrated rural development (IRD)

projects that became popular in the mid-1970s.

Promoted by the World Bank, IRDs attempted

to address a broad spectrum of farmer needs

more or less simultaneously: food and cash crop

production, animal husbandry, forestry, health,

education, water supply, community development, and others. Theoretically, it was an advance to recognize the diversity of concerns

facing farmers, but the integration of the various components was never achieved. Inadequate analysis of socioeconomic data; narrow

disciplinary perspectives of scientists working

on the projects; and the fact that the responsibility for different components fell on different, often competing government agencies,

combined to turn most IRDs into administrative

nightmares. They became rural development

smorgasbords, as an uncoordinated succession

of extension agents, community development

workers, and technicians vied for farmers’ attention and scarce resources. Other donors, too,

lacked clear and specific strategies and became

overextended into multiple program, sector,

and geographic areas (128).

The Sahel Development Planning Team summarized the results of development assistance

projects in the Sahel this way:

. . . projects tended to result in an enlarged government superstructure; to require more skilled

management staff than most countries had to

offer; to foster myopic views of “progress” at

the top (so many plows, so many bags of fertilizer delivered) and confusion at the farmer

level (were debts to be repaid or not?); and to

generally box agricultural development into a

series of discrete efforts with artificial, often

overly optimistic, timeframes, inhibiting rather

than promoting increasingly productive use of

farmers’ resources (126).

The challenge identified by past experience

is thus to move to new modes of assistance more

consistent with the nature of the Sahel and the

long-range goals of food security, environmental stabilization, and economic growth.

Alternatives that focus on broader goals and

objectives for different economic sectors, in

which several donors participate, are one option. An example is the current cooperation on

policy reform. Other forms of longer term program assistance (e.g., budget support, food aid,

long-term technical assistance, etc.) are also options to explore. Projects will continue to have

an important role, but they should be based on

effective Sahelian participation at all stages.

They should be longer term, more flexible, and

focused on increasing capacity and sustainability as well as production, In addition, they

should make realistic demands of the managerial and resource capabilities of both Sahelians and donors.

Making Research More Appropriate

Given the importance of research in the Sahel effort, it is important to determine how it

should be organized to be more effective and

how it can best integrate the lessons of the past

decade. Many of those lessons have already

changed some research goals to bring them

more into line with Sahelian ecological, social,

and economic realities. But other questions remain. How much research is justified? What

are the research priorities? How do current research methods need to be modified? How

should research be organized among the numerous institutions involved?

How Much Research Is Justified and

What Are the Priorities?

In general, the objective of research and development is to accelerate the rate at which scientific knowledge is transformed into site-specific technology thereby improving the tested

menu of alternative technologies available to

farm families (49).
77

-.

What kinds of agricultural research are most promising? Many authorities now seek to improve reliable local practices,

such as these sorghum silos in Burkina Faso.

A major conclusion drawn from examining

the experiences of the past decade is that the

scientific knowledge base about the Sahel, its

ecology, and its natural and human systems is

inadequate. But financial resources for all development activities are likely to be limited for

the foreseeable future, so it is crucial to decide

how much fundamental research is needed and

how much research should be devoted to applying the research results already available.

Some experts believe that substantial technological breakthroughs are not possible for Sahelian agriculture and that resources would be

better invested in the application of the few improved technologies that already exist, But

many agree that the existing research findings,

particularly in the social sciences, have not been

adequately integrated into development programming and design, Most feel that a greater

emphasis on research—both basic and applied

—is essential.

Before research priorities can be set, overall

development strategies have to be more clearly

determined. Critical research areas include: improved low-resource varieties and agronomic

practices for millet and sorghum, water and soil

management, agroforestry, food processing,

animal nutrition, inland and coastal fisheries,

and small-scale irrigation systems. The failures

of the past indicate the need for more extensive social science research generally but particularly in participatory methods, farming systems, population dynamics, marketing, and

extension techniques. And importantly, there

is great need for a better integration of the social and physical sciences.

How Should Methods Be Modified?

The absence of effective farmer and herder

participation in agricultural research is both

a cause of failure and a missed opportunist y. But

moving beyond that general agreement to concrete methods for increasing farmers’ roles in

research is much more controversial. Defining

research objectives, refining hypotheses on

which research is based, suggesting possible

solutions, and testing and adapting results are

all areas for increased farmer and herder in-
78

put. Many experts feel that the focus of research

must shift from the research station to the

farm—a view for conducting research that is

called the farming systems research (FSR) perspective. In addition to farmer participation,

FSR has the benefit of including the “whole

range of bio-technical and socioeconomic research and analyses which place at the center

of the analysis, factors affecting the welfare of

the farm family” (49). But FSR and participation are not necessarily synonymous. French

researchers have used on-farm methods for decades in the Sahel but their success has been as

limited as more traditional research approaches. Critics claim that such methods are

not necessarily examples of participation, but

can be examples of using farmers as research

tools (19).

In the American version of FSR, farmers in

theory have more flexibility and control but the

actual implementation has been inconsistent,

The interdisciplinary basis of FSR has also

proven difficult to achieve in practice by scientists often unable to escape their individual

disciplinary perspectives, FSR is slow and labor-intensive and therefore costly. When used

as one component of a short-term project which

seeks quantifiable results, the temptation too

often has been to take control from the farmer.

While more adapted to the diversity of Sahelian

environmental and socioeconomic systems,

findings tend to be location-specific. Though

intellectually appealing, some question whether

such a level of disaggregation in research is

justified on economic grounds. In theory, FSR

is designed to bridge the gap between research

and the farmer—as a support to the role that

under traditional agricultural development

models is assigned to extension agents. The

weakness of extension services in the Sahel and

the tendency of many externally financed and

managed FSR programs to be poorly integrated

with national research efforts have resulted in

FSR often falling between research and extension rather than bringing the two together,

Farmers in theory have input into the definiservices in the Sahel have been ineffective in

this regard because of limited training, support,

and supervision. Where extension has been

used and supported, as in several of the cotton

projects, success in bringing farmers and researchers together has been much greater (84),

The much more challenging task of tapping into

and supporting farmers’ own research, seen by

many as an important facet of research, has yet

to be adequately attempted in the Sahel.

How Should Research Tasks Be Divided

Among the Many Research Organizations

Active in the Sahel?

A multitude of actors are involved in research

and agricultural training in the Sahel, and coordination is a problem (40), At least four International Agricultural Research Centers of

the international agriculture research system

are working in the Sahel (IITA, ICRISAT, ILCA

and WA RDA).2 Regional projects sponsored

under various auspices (e. g., Organization of

African Unity, CILSS) in topics such as integrated pest management, climatology, and food

grain research and development are also underway, along with research efforts by individual

Sahelian States. The French operate a branch

of their own research network in the Sahel. Research in many donor-sponsored projects is

conducted fairly autonomously from Sahelians.

Important questions arise: Is the division of

responsibilities between different levels of research and extension clear and is it optimal?

How best can these efforts be coordinated?

A wise way to identify priority research needs

is to work directly with farmers and herders.

In most cases, this occurs through extension

agents. Priorities are passed on to national researchers who, if they do not have the facilities

to respond, in turn pass them on the international centers, The international centers perform primary research, the results of which go

back to national researchers for field testing

and further adaptive research before being

‘IITA is the International Institute for ‘I”ropic; a] Agriculture.

tion of research goals through the extension ICRISAT is the International Crops Research Institi]te for the

Semi Arid Tropics. ILCA is the International I,i\resto{; k Centre service, Extension services should be the link for Africa, WARDA is the West African Rice [le~e]opment Assobetween farmers and research, But extension (; i at ion.
79

brought out by the extension agent to the

farmer,

There is general agreement that, apart from

the extension services, the national level research institutions are the weakest link in the

chain. Some experts feel that greater in-country

efforts by the international centers and regional

groups are required at the country level to overcome this weakness. Others argue that resources

should be devoted to building the capacities of

the national institutions themselves because national researchers must be involved in or have

the capabilities to perform basic research in order to be effective in adaptive research.

Sahelian and French scientists are generally

more critical than U.S. scientists of the International Agricultural Research Center model

and argue that investment in the international

centers has siphoned resources from national

institutions, They propose networking between

national programs as an alternative means of

building the “critical mass” of research efforts

needed to achieve significant results. But the

costs of building research capacity at the national level is high and many countries lack adequate management ability. Thus AID has based

its strategy to support African agricultural research on building capacity in a limited number of institutions, each serving an ecological

region. For the Sahel, AID has selected Senegal as the country whose research institutions

would receive aid, assuming that its results will

be adapted for other Sahelian States (122). Each

of these approaches has validity.

The critic, 1 research needs for the Sahel and

the resource constraints that research faces call

for coordination among the various parties as

they work to create models for research. The

reality of each Sahelian State desiring its own

research capacity, the long-term desirability of

building local capacity, and the diversity of ecological conditions among and within countries

are factors that argue against the practicality

and effectiveness of focusing efforts in just one

country or bypassing national institutions in

favor of efforts by international research

centers or independent research by donors.

More appropriate technologies and better development methods are essential if future efforts in the Sahel are to be more effective than

those in the past. But these alone will not be

sufficient. According to the 1983 AID assessment of its Sahel program:

Overshadowing all good intentions were (and

are) central government policies and philosophies which inhibit individual initiative, are

disincentives to production, misallocate resources, improperly train, subsidize, urbanize,

discourage trade, overregulate and misdirect

development. . . . The effect was and is an environment which compromises and makes more

difficult and expensive successful completion

of critical primary sector development projects

(128).

Most of the policies that reduced the effects

of agricultural development efforts were manifestations of the centralized orientation of the

newly independent Sahelian States and the implicit urban bias of their government policies.

They were built on highly centralized administrative and economic structures that were inherited at independence and were supported

not only by the more politically vocal segments

of society but, at least in the 1960s and 1970s,

by much of the donor technical assistance the

Sahel nations received.

Agriculture’s Low Priority

Following the then-popular theories of economic development, agriculture in the Sahel

was viewed by the new governments (and their

foreign advisors] as a source of support for industrialization and growth. Government monopolies controlled the purchase of export

crops from farmers at prices often considerably below the world market price. The price
80

difference was used to provide the State with

financial surpluses in hard currency. The socalled “stabilization” funds thus generated

were de facto taxes on the agricultural sector

used to finance government operations in industrialization and infrastructure development,

or to subsidize prices for imported cereals consumed by the urban population. The proportion of government operating and investment

budgets going into agriculture has been consistently below agriculture’s 34,6 percent average share in gross national product (22). And

within agriculture, a much higher proportion

of support has gone into research, extension,

inputs, and marketing for export and import

substitution crops than to food crops.

African leaders have realized this inadequate

public investment in agriculture as a major policy failure and have set a target of 20 to 25 percent of total public investment by 1989 (91,92).

Among donors, agriculture’s priority has also

been low despite strategy statements to the contrary. Between 1975 and 1983, direct donor

assistance to rainfed agriculture in the Sahel

represented only 9.3 percent of the total (only

half of which was for food crops) with an additional 7.6 percent going to irrigated agriculture

and 6.9 percent to river basin development. Yet

22 percent of donor support went to food aid

and balance of payments support. The value

of the food aid provided was more than double

the support for rainfed food crop production

(25) (see table A-5 in app. A).

The use of government or parastatal agencies to provide inputs to Sahelian agriculture

(e.g., credit, fertilizers, extension advice, and

irrigation) has been another area where the real

needs of the poor farmers and herders are given

second priority to other interests. Parastatals’

inefficient management and swollen personnel rosters have provided farmers and herders

with ineffective support. Parastatals absorb

large portions of the government and donor

funds invested in agriculture. Farmers are

charged for the services of these agencies

through lowered commodity prices and direct

fees, further reducing their returns and thus

their incentive to adopt new methods or to increase production, For example, in one irrigation project in Mali, the ratio of government

workers to farm families has at times approached one to one. Farmers sometimes pay

up to 20 percent of their rice harvest (e. g., 400

kg of rice per hectare with average yields of

2,000 kg per hectare) for services that some experts describe as “nothing.” The remaining rice

is sold to the parastatal agency responsible for

the project at a fixed price below the market

level,

Cereals Policies

In the often volatile post-independence political climate, the major threat to regimes in

power came from the urban population. Thus,

the new governments concentrated services

such as schools and health care facilities in urban areas. Low income and high unemployment in urban areas also encouraged governments to keep costs of living low to maintain

political stability. This has translated into cheap

food policies for the cities. Though some attempts were made to use local cereal production for this purpose,] throughout the 1960s

and 1970s urban food supply was increasingly

assured through subsidized imports, artificially

high exchange rates, preferred customs treatment, and controlled prices. The low relative

price of imports and changing preferences for

wheat and rice have shrunk the demand for locally produced cereals,

The importance of improved cereal policies

is clear, but the specifics of what those policies

should be are less clear, Several nations of the

Sahel (e.g., Senegal, Mali, Niger, and The Gambia) are taking steps to remove subsidies for imported cereals and flour, and to increase or do

away with fixed prices for locally produced

grains. In Burkina Faso and Mali, cereal marketing boards are being reorganized. Whether

these measures will ultimately increase demand

for local grains is uncertain. High production

levels during the 1985 to 1986 season have created low prices in Sahelian grain markets, and

‘1 n Mali, forced cereal deliveries ~1’cre tried wh ilc clscl~’here

there ~~’crc attempts to fix i)rices and enforce go~wrnment purchasin~ monopolies. The latter had ]itt 1(; effect (lLIe to the 1nefii -

c ienc it?s of the pu rc has i ng entities and the i n~f!n u it j’ o f f a rmcrs

to a~’oid them.
81

Sahelian governments do not have the financial resources to maintain high producer prices.

Continued urban preferences for rice and

wheat and the volatility of the residual market

for millet and sorghum are likely to limit significant increases in demand and thus will continue to limit incentives to farmers.

Food Aid and Export Subsidies

Other nations’ policies also contribute to

lower demand for Sahelian cereals, The agricultural policies of major cereal exporters (especially production and export subsidies) (15) and

high levels of food aid are factors in lowering

demand for domestic cereal production. In the

Sahel, food aid has provided as much as 5 percent of aggregate cereal grain supply even in

higher rainfall years. In 1985, this rose to 20

percent. The extent to which food aid directly

competes with locally produced grain is debated, but indirectly, its long-term presence in

local food markets reinforces changing tastes

for cereals either not grown (wheat) or inefficiently grown (rice) in the Sahel. Though studies

have tried to determine the impact of food aid,

their conclusions are ambiguous and there has

not been a comprehensive study of food aid effects specifically in the Sahel (63,78,129). The

potential for harm, however, indicates a need

for careful, Sahel-specific study and particularly for care in determining how much food

aid is appropriate and how it should be used.

This problem is difficult to address politically.

Commenting on the contradictory effects of

food aid on long-term development, the 1983

AID evaluation of its Sahel program observes

that:

While most concede that these imports [of

food aid] are dangerously distorting to the domestic cereals sector and that they help create

dependency, their short-term utility frequently

prevails over desired independence (128).

AID has been slow to systematically address

the potential disincentive effects of food aid.

For example, in belated response to the 1979

Bellmen Amendment to Section 401(b) of Public Law 480, AID has recently provided its field

missions with guidelines to assess issues of

price disincentive and availability of storage

for food aid (121).

As with other areas of policy reform, a multinational approach to food aid as is currently

being attempted under Club du Sahel auspices

is probably the most promising effort possible

(27). Improved monitoring and more effective

early warning systems being organized collectively by donors and Sahelians are required not

only to determine urgent need when it does

arise but to minimize overreaction and resulting disincentive effects.

While food emergencies must be determined

on a local basis, they should be responded to

in the context of national or regional strategies.

In situations of established need, food aid

should be the last recourse. A first step toward

mobilizing support of this principle is cautious

donor responses to “triangular” food aid, where

donors provide cash to purchase surplus food

in other portions of the same country, region,

or elsewhere in Africa (27). This would provide

incentives to African farmers and facilitate the

establishment of broader cereal markets in the

region. Though major donors have expressed

some support for this approach in emergencies,

they have much less enthusiastically accepted

the use of “triangular” food aid to cope with

ongoing structural food shortages.

Encouraging Effective Marketing

and Removing Constraints on

Private Initiative

It is necessary to remove marketing constraints if farmers are to take advantage of increased prices. Many Sahelian marketing monopolies for export crops are being dismantled

or restructured, Possible improvements in marketing systems to increase local economic activity include: transportation (particularly rural

road systems, removal of restrictions on private transporters, and improvement of waterbased transport where appropriate); market information systems; development of cooperatives; and storage facilities. Many authorities

favor removing subsidies on agricultural inputs

such as fertilizer and agricultural machinery
82

because they see these as inefficient and costly.

In several Sahelian countries, such subsidies

have been reduced or eliminated but the result

has been a sharp decline in input use. Other

experts, pointing out the need to reduce farmer

risk if sustainable, intensified production

changes are to occur, favor the short-term continuation of selective subsidies (16). They feel

that subsidies on designated inputs will result

in more specific and quicker responses than

less focused increases in producer prices.

Various other constraints to private initiative

could also be removed. Reduced government

controls on cereal marketing could be extrapolated to a broad range of potential private sector activities affecting agriculture and rural

development--e.g., agricultural input distribut ion, credit, transportation, and local processing (1 25]. The spontaneous success of private

millet grinding operations illustrates the potential of the small-scale private sector when controls are absent. The extent to which such activities should be “liberalized” or “privatized” and

the current capabilities of the private sector to

take them over are subject to considerable debate. Yet general agreement exists on the benefits to be gained from lessening restrictions

on independent economic operators, be they

individuals, formal cooperatives, or less formal

producer groups.

Land Tenure and Regulation of

Access to Natural Resources

Reforms in land tenure and other legal and

informal systems determining access to and

control of natural resources are policy questions needing better analysis. A major constraint to effective analysis of the impact of land

tenure and resource access is the lack of knowledge of the traditional rules and customs that

are often more influential in determining use

patterns than formal laws. Evidence of rapid

changes and of disruption in what may have

been the environmental balance in these traditional systems as the result of drought, the

growth of the market economy, the introduction of new public domain laws, and increased

population pressures underline the urgency of

these aspects of policy. Programs to encourage

farmers and herders to invest in upgrading the

fertility of their land, to plant trees, or to begin

community controlled fuelwood plantations or

natural brush regeneration projects are influenced by these questions of future access and

ownership. Equitable methods for determining

rights to land in irrigation projects, and for compensating those who lose access to land due

to the construction of irrigation systems, are

particularly crucial as river basin development

plans proceed. These are complex problems

both technically and politically. They will require different answers for different land uses,

and land reform programs should be designed

carefully so they do not create new inequities.

Fiscal and Institutional Reform and

Recurrent Costs

Sahelian governments’ support for the agricultural and rural development sectors has been

undermined by fiscal crises and institutional

weaknesses. Overstaffed civil services, ineffective management, corruption, outdated revenue laws, and inefficient tax collection systems

have combined with general economic decline

to increase government deficits from 1.4 to 12.6

percent of Gross Domestic Product in 1975 to

between 9.6 and 22.0 percent in 1984 (22). Technical assistance to help Sahel governments improve their revenue systems and encourage

them to tackle the sensitive task of reducing

government staff are essential parts of future

donor assistance.

Donor attention to the question of recurrent

costs, a further important contribution of the

Club/CILSS process, has highlighted the negative impacts of donor assistance on Sahelian

fiscal health and has increased sensitivity to

the still controversial subject of how much aid

can be successfully absorbed by a country, the

so-called “absorptive capacity” for aid (4). Since

recurrent costs are one important factor affecting absorptive capacity, most donors have responded by agreeing to fund some recurrent

costs (125). However, some experts caution that

such a practice creates a “delusional system

that can never be financed by domestic resources” (45). Recurrent costs should be
83

financed only if the Sahelian institutions realistically can be expected to take them over in

the long term.

Limitations of Policy Reform

Policy reform in the Sahel is a necessary but

still insufficiently understood precondition necessary to carry out the strategies envisioned under the Club/CILSS framework. While the need

for an economy less encumbercd by government regulation and monopolies and the need

to increase incentives to farmers are generally

accepted by most Sahel specialists, the details

of what exactly should replace current policies

and how those incentives should be structured

is controversial. To be effective, they must be

based on careful analysis of data rather than

abstract theories or ideology. Microeconomic

data and analysis o f Sahelian production systems and of the linkages between macrolevel

policies and microlevel responses are inadequate. Within countries, the impacts of particular policy changes are likely to be different o n

different groups (6,45). The diversity of economies across the Sahel means that reform programs will hate to be care fully tailored to each

individual situation. Group interests, often

powerful ones, arc at stake and the political

risks are considerable. The extent to which the

private sector can be expected to take over

many of the functions currently being performed by governments and parastatals must

be realistically assessed. Where appropriate,

private sector development and support activities may be necessary to ensure that such roles

are fulfilled effectively,

The lack of more active African participation

in the process of policy reform analysis is a

missed opportunity to share perspectives on the

need for specific reforms and is a constraint

to those reforms being ultimately adopted. Reforms determined by external donors and

forced on Sahelian governments lead to minimal commitment, yet strong commitment is essential to sustain the reform process in the face

of inevitable political resistance,

Policy reform strategies are not panaceas,

They are necessary but not sufficient conditions

for the type of future envisioned for the Sahel

under the Club/CILSS framework. Policy reforms must be carefully integrated with broad

strategies. Within broad policy directions, there

are many choices to be made that will determine the ultimate impact. I t makes little sense

to develop strategies for agricultural dc\elopment calling for significant

helian research and extension

programs are to be gutted by

or policy reform,

increases in Saprograms if those

budget cutbacks

BEYOND THE LESSONS: CRITICAL ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED

While reflection on the lessons learned from

the past decades has helped create consensus

on what issues and broad directions for the future are most important, there is much less

agreement on the relative importance to be

given each component, on how the parts relate to each other, and on how those general

directions should be translated into specific actions. The early stages of the Club/CILSS effort often gave precedence to the mobilization

of resources over the setting of priorities,

Almost a decade into the “contract for a generation , the issues have become clearer. The

reality that resources are limited—environmental, technological, managerial!, and especially financial-means that important choices

will have to be made. The choices made today

will have implications reaching far into the future. Selecting one option may effectively eliminate others. Proposals for massive river basin

development along the Senegal and Gambia

Rivers, for instance, involve major environmental and economic choices that could well

foreclose the possibility of returning to previous production systems. The remainder of this

chapter will be devoted to highlighting a few

of these outstanding critical issues,
84

The Balance Between Irrigation and

Rainfed Agriculture

The priority to be given to the development

of irrigation is perhaps the most crucial issue

to be resolved as the Club/CILSS program enters

its second decade, Though providing far less

than requested by Sahelians, donors nonetheless have invested nearly $1.8 billion in irrigation and river basin development since 1975

(25). But donors must now consider what portion of future investment is appropriate for irrigation and how irrigation investment should

be allocated between different irrigation approaches.

The catastrophic drought from 1968 to 1973

sparked calls to develop the Sahel’s considerable irrigation potential to “drought proof” the

region. Although estimates vary, the irrigation

potential of the Sahel is considered to be as high

as 2.3 million hectares. Only 75,000 hectares

were under controlled irrigation in 1977 (30).

With such potential for expansion, Sahelians

and many donors felt that increased irrigation

was vital to attain food security and possibly

create surpluses for export.

Experience with irrigation over the past decade, and particularly with large-scale schemes,

has been disappointing (30,125). Costs for bringing new land under irrigation have been high

(as much as $10,000 per hectare) even without

counting the costs of the major engineering

works that would be required for future expansion. Operating costs have been higher than anticipated, in large part because of inefficient

management by parastatal agencies. Productivity of irrigated areas has been highly variable but generally is lower than expected, Water

management has been poor, engineering designs sometimes faulty, and maintenance often

nonexistent. One study found that for every hectare of new land going into irrigation almost

as much land was being withdrawn, mostly due

to improper management (30), Original costbenefit calculations assumed two crops per

year, but this has proven difficult to attain. Expansion of irrigation also has created substantial socioeconomic disruption (e.g., concentration of land rights, loss of access to land for

women, loss of water and pasture access for

herders, the loss of traditional flood recession

farming, and the problems associated with large

resettlement schemes) and has given rise to

fears of probable negative environmental impacts (e. g., increased water-borne disease; possible destruction of fish, wildlife, and plant communities; salinization and waterlogging of soils)

(76).

Given the potentially mushrooming costs and

low productivity of irrigation efforts so far,

some critics suggest that the considerable resources going into irrigation might be better

used to address the constraints of dryland agriculture. Irrigated cereals production received

almost three times more donor assistance than

rainfed cereals production from 1975 to 1983,

even though 95 percent of cereal production

comes from dryland farming or traditional irrigation systems (25). Critics point out that,

given the nature of the Sahel’s major watersheds,

even irrigation will be subject to the effects of

drought. However, proponents of higher irrigation investment, including most Sahelian

governments, still see irrigation as a key element in food security (22). They counter that

the limited potential for significant technological advance in dryland agriculture and the everpresent factor of recurrent drought make irrigation the only solution for avoiding continual

dependence and cyclical tragedy. They feel that

the technological basis for improved performance of irrigation already exists and that the

less formidable tasks of improving management

of irrigation systems and reducing social and

environmental costs can be addressed. Irrigation, they point out, is a slowly maturing investment. The poor performances of the past

indicate the need for patience and more determination if Club/CILSS goals are to be met.

The management issues, particularly in

choices between different approaches to irrigation, are key elements in the debate over what

priority should be given to irrigation. Smallscale irrigation schemes are receiving growing

attention as a means of overcoming the limitations of large-scale approaches (83,116), Although still modest in their productivity, smallscale approaches using simple pumps and even
85

manual water lifting devices are seen by many

as cost-effective because the overhead costs of

massive engineering works are avoided and

management problems are reduced. Others

point out, however, that the movement toward

small-scale approaches does not in itself solve

all the problems of larger schemes and in fact

may have problems of its own. Engineering

problems exist in scaling down known irrigation technologies while the problems of coordinating water use for a multitude of small users

are complex. While most agree that large irrigation schemes have been unsuccessful, many

feel that the problem is less one of project scale

than management scale. Poorly managed smallscale irrigation projects also have failed.

Over the past decade, many Sahelian farmers

adopted a wide variety of simple irrigation systems using wells, recessional and flood plain

flooding, and permanent and seasonal swamps,

But these traditional African forms of irrigation have been largely ignored by Western

donors. For instance, little effort has gone into

improving the 250,000 hectares currently under recessional and swamp irrigation (60). Also,

the Sahel’s considerable yet still insufficiently

explored groundwater resources remain largely

untapped.

The answers to questions regarding irrigation’s priority in overall Sahel strategies cannot at this point be resolved. Experience over

the past decade has raised sufficient doubts

about the economic, social, and environmental

viability of proposed large-scale irrigation and

river basin development approaches to indicate

the need for considerable caution before proceeding. The comparable costs and probable

benefits of alternative irrigation approaches

and investment in dryland agriculture are

equally uncertain. The promising potential of

smaller scale systems requires focused investigation to provide policy makers with much

clearer information.

Food Production and Export Crops

Similar sets of issues and choices surround

the development of rain fed agriculture. Of particular importance is the optimal balance between investment in cereal crops and in export

or import-substitution crops. Experts agree that

both colonial and immediate post-independence

agricultural strategies were biased in favor of

export crop production—a bias that most Sahel observers agree has inhibited progress in

expanding traditional cereal production. Certainly redressing the imbalance between food

and export crops is important, but few experts

see it as a simple question of switching totally

from one to the other. What should be the optimal mix?

Many authorities argue that a strong role for

export crops in agricultural strategies is still

justified. Following economic principles of

comparative advantage, they theorize that Sahelian countries could have access to more food

by developing export crops or other products’

in which the Sahel is relatively more productive and then using export receipts to purchase

the food needs that are unfilled by local production. They point out that the largest and

fastest growing portion of the “food gap” is actually rising demand for wheat and rice and

these are grown in small quantities and relatively inefficiently in the Sahel. Expansion of

irrigated rice production is particularly’ uneconomical given the high costs of production relative to rice’s price on the world market,

The fact that agriculturally based exports account for 14 to 83 percent of total foreign exchange earnings in various countries in the Sahel and that food imports are an important part

of total imports means that increased export

production in the Sahel can help meet food

security and also increase total foreign exchange earnings (see table 5-1).

The current debt crisis has turned increased

foreign exchange earnings (and the reduction

of foreign exchange costs) into a vital part of’

strategies for short- to medium-term financial

survival. Increasing foreign exchange earnings

is also required for successful implementation

of strategies to improve food production. Important inputs to intensify agricultural production (fuel, fertilizer, equipment, and irrigation
86

Peanut production shaped the history of the Sahel and remains a major source of exports. Debate regarding the relative

balance between food and export crop production focuses on crops such as peanuts.

Table 5-1 .—Agricultural Exports and Imports

as a Percent of Total, 1983

Agricultural exports Agricultural imports

as a percent of as a percent of

total exports total imports

Burkina Faso . 830/o 19 ”/0

Cape Verde . . . 19 29

Chad . . . . . . . . 63 10

The Gambia . . 54 31

Mali . . . . . . . . . 77 25

Mauritania . . . . 14 42

Niger . . . . . . . . 21 12

Senegal . . . . . . 29 27

SOURCE Food and Agriculture Organization, 1985 Country Tables Basic Data

on the Agricultural Sector (Rome” 1985)

infrastructure, etc. ) presently have to be imported. Balancing its call for greater emphasis

on food production, the World Bank’s influential work, Accelerated Development in SubSaharan Africa, encouraged African States to

intensify efforts to diversify and increase agricultural production for export (153).

However, strategies with high export crop

components should be approached with some

caution because of the deterioration in the international market for the principal Sahelian

agricultural exports. For example, peanut
87

prices have been low generally and during the

last cropping season the world price for cotton dropped drastically. The potential is limited

for major diversification into other more profitable or more reliable export production. While

no one argues for complete self-sufficiency,

critics of the World Bank prescription argue

that export-biased strategies result in continued

high dependence on forces beyond the control

of each count r}’ and therefore high risk (12).

The use of straight cost/benefit analysis to determine rates of return does not sufficient y account for the ‘‘dependency’ factor. While it is

true that world cereal supplies, at least for the

medium-term, appear to be sufficient to fill the

gap between Sahelian food production and consumption and that food aid is likely to remain

available, Sahelians believe that too great a reliance on external sources for food reduces their

independence and increases vulnerability. The

high priority they give to irrigation is largely

a product of that perspective. The assertion that

demand for millet and sorghum is largely residual due to growing preference for wheat and

rice can also be challenged. Improved methods for processing and storing millet and sorghum, and an end to subsidized prices for

wheat and rice, could increase demand for local commodities.

The issue of optimizing investment strategies

between food crops and exports is further complicated by the fact that in reality the two production systems are often highly linked. Peanuts are both an export and food crop. In most

cases, cereal and export crops are grown by

the same households and thus are integrated

into single management systems. Intercropping

of export and food crops is often practiced. Programs to develop one affect the other. In southern Mali, for example, the after-effects of fertilizer use on cotton has significantly raised the

yields of the cereal crops grown in rotation with

cotton. Throughout the Sahel, farmers involved

in successful intensification programs on export crops appear to use better agronomic practices and have better yields on food crops than

those who do not take part in those programs

(20). Investment choices between food and export crops must therefore be based on a much

more thorough understanding of household

production systems as well as more explicit

agreement on overall goals.

Strategies for the Livestock Sector

Efforts to improve the productivity of Sahelian livestock systems over the past decade

have been largely unsuccessful (46,58,67,130).

As a result, major donors such as the United

States and the World Bank are evaluating those

experiences. The United States has concluded

that there is little that can be done to improve

existing pastoral systems (125). Even though it

is a priority to Sahelians, AID is limiting new

programming in the livestock sector.

How much investment in the livestock sector is justified? The lack of success in past livestock programs and an emerging recognition

of higher land-use efficiency in traditional

transhumant systems (8) have led many experts

to agree with Club du Sahel officials in their

statement that: “it is perhaps unreasonable to

look for greatly increased production from Sahelian herders” (37). They point to how little

is known about current systems, particularly

pastoral systems, and their complex social and

cultural underpinnings.

But what really is the problem: a lack of

knowledge or a lack of application of the knowledge that is already there? In most donor research strategies, livestock have been given low

priority (58), Yet livestock is the source of livelihood for up to one-fifth of the Sahel i an people,

and it contributes 22 percent of Gross Domestic Product (125). Thus the livestock sector cannot be ignored,

Developing livestock strategies can be complex because of the diversity of livestock systems in the Sahel. The problems and opportunities for livestock development among

59-965 0 - 86 - 4
88

extensive pastoral systems are very different

from those of sedentary animal husbandry systems further south. Development of strategies

for the former is hampered by a lack of agreement on the relationship between pastoral livestock production and environmental degradation, While experts agree on the importance of

optimizing range management as part of environmental strategies, there is considerable disagreement on the extent of current degradation,

its causes, and preferable solutions. Most believe that total herd size is increasing above the

present capability of remaining natural pasture

to sustain them. Their solutions tend to focus

on programs to decrease herd size in the Sahel

zone by increasing off-take rates, by encouraging migration to the south, and by integrating

livestock into crop production systems (130).

They also seek to improve the management of

grasslands and water resources through a wide

range of activities (e.g., improved forage crops,

water management on pasture land, reseeding

using natural systems, fencing) but these latter projects have largely failed.

Some authorities focus on traditional grazing rights as a “tragedy of the commons” argument where free access to communal land encourages abuse by the individual herder (97).

These claims are countered by those who argue that traditional systems of water and graz- Photo credit: World Bank

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

Livestock, such as goats, sheep, and cattle, are an important feature of Sahelian agriculture but many questions remain

regarding effective assistance to herders.
89

ing rights did in fact control access but the problem is now the disruptions to those systems

caused by the spread of cultivation, political

interference, and the establishment of semipermanent public-access watering points (67), Although a return to previous management systems is unrealistic, decentralized systems

where herders control rangeland and water are

seen as the best alternatives (69). Others see improved animal health and marketing possibilities as the best means to increase the productivity and reduce the negative environmental

impacts of livestock.

The current confusion over what should be

done in the pastoral subsector has convinced

many that the greatest potential lies with encouragement of increased mixed farming systems in higher rainfall areas (27,50). Sociocultural factors and animal health and nutrition

constraints are key obstacles to expanded and

more productive mixed farming. Animal nutrition is particularly problematic given the reduced grazing areas and lower nutritional value

of grasses in the higher rainfall areas. These

zones are where tsetse fly and other animal

health problems are also greatest. Success in

projects encouraging mixed farming activities

has so far been limited, but increased numbers

of cattle are being purchased by farmers. Given

the potential benefits to both livestock and crop

production (improved forage, animal power,

improved soil fertility, etc. ) under the more intensified management systems, proponents feel

that such strategies should be the principal focus for future livestock programs.

Other important questions regarding overall

livestock sector strategies remain largely unanswered. How much emphasis should be

placed on small ruminants versus cattle? How

much on meat production versus milk production? These options have implications not only

on total production and productivity of the livestock sector but also on who will benefit most,

How should livestock development be integrated into a broader strategy of resource

management? Several experts feel that governments and donors should reserve the northern

sections of the Sahel for extensive pastoral systems (148) while concentrating crop intensifying production activities further south.

The importance of Sahelian livestock systems

is undeniable. But the donor programs have so

far failed to give it much priority or sufficient

resources. A more concerted emphasis on livestock, on the development of specific strategies

for the diversity of systems under which animals are produced, and the integration of those

strategies into overall food security strategies

would appear essential in the pursuit of Club/

CILSS objectives.

Population Programs:

The 50 Million People Question

A further critical issue to be addressed in the

Sahel is that of population. The demographic

realities are sobering. If current rates of increase continue, by the year 2000 the Sahel will

have 50 million inhabitants, nearly double what

it had in 1973. Growth of this magnitude challenges food production tremendously. In Senegal, for example, it is estimated that development of the nation’s entire irrigation potential

over the next two decades would do little more

than keep up with the food needs that result

from national population growth.

Are the high population growth rates a cause

of hunger in the Sahel? Although few experts

see population growth as a primary cause of

the African crisis, high population growth rates

do put great pressure on Sahelian countries to

expand food production, employment, and income (61). In some areas high growth rates have

led to reductions in fallow periods, and increased the cutting of trees and brush for fuelwood, thus contributing to environmental degradation. Growing populations also strain the

capacity of governments to provide health, education, and other services. In times of drought,

large populations are particularly at risk.

But to a great extent, population growth rates

are an outcome and not a cause of the Sahel’s

social and economic realities, They are the

products of low productivity and poverty. Although reduced over the past two decades, child

mortality rates in the Sahel remain among the

highest in the world. Children provide a high
90

proportion of agricultural labor. The importance of labor as a constraint in many agricultural production systems and the obligations

of children to care for their parents in old age

combine to reinforce high fertility patterns. In

some urban settings, traditional customs and

values that had acted to restrain fertility rates

are breaking down as societies face rapid social transformation. High fertility rates are associated with high infant and maternal mortality. They also affect women’s well-being and

productivity.

Many of the population-related problems in

the Sahel are largely problems of high rates of

urban population growth—not enough jobs, not

enough services, and the growing demand for

imported foods. In the medium and long term,

however, unless population growth slows or

agricultural technologies advance sufficiently,

the capability of rural agriculture to feed the

people of the Sahel will be exceeded on a much

wider scale than today.

Attempts to address the population issue face

several constraints. Disagreements exist between the perspectives of donors and Sahelian

officials on the nature of the population issue.

Many Sahelians believe that the importance of

labor in Sahelian agricultural systems makes

high population growth essential to increased

production, i.e., each new child might represent a new mouth to feed but he or she also

represents two hands to work. They feel that

the best way to lower population growth rates

is to attack poverty. There is evidence, however, that these attitudes are slowly changing.

Several Sahelian countries were among those

who adopted the Kilimanjaro Program of Action on Population in 1984 which called for ensuring the availability of family planning services to all. Both the Lagos Plan of Action and

a recent CILSS/CEA report highlight the constraints of high population growth rates. In The

Gambia and Mali, family planning activities

have been implemented in urban areas, though

with modest results (22), and Burkina Faso is

in the process of considering a major population initiative (105).

Still, the Sahel has a long way to go. Modern

contraceptive methods are practiced by less

than 1 percent of the population (147). The lack

of success so far is largely due to a poor understanding of socioeconomic, cultural, and religious dimensions of the issue. Data on fertility

patterns and on reasons for fertility decisions

necessary for program development are severely lacking. Education for both men and

women is a likely starting point (142). But reaching agreement on what the specific role and

priority of population programs should be in

overall strategies will require a concerted effort of both Sahelians and donors,

Production and Equity

Many of the critical issues to be addressed

in the Sahel relate to a debate in development

theory which contrasts strategies for increased

production with those for increased equity. In

the 1970s, dissatisfaction with the “trickle

down” approach to development, where

growth generated by leading industrial sectors

was assumed to eventually increase general

welfare, resulted in calls for more povertycentered approaches, The desire for a new focus led to alternatives that called not only for

growth but growth with equity. Embodied in

the “New Direction” legislation for U.S. foreign assistance and in the World Bank’s espousal of the “basic human needs” approach,

the focus was on the poorest and least advantaged. Not only was it suggested that equity objectives were not inconsistent with growth but

that indeed, a focus on equity might even be

an optimal strategy for accelerating growth.

Many of the strategic issues currently facing

the Sahel come down to choices between options that are related to the debate between

growth of production versus reductions in poverty. Should Sahel strategies focus on geographic areas or groups with the greatest potential for higher production? Or should they

instead be directed toward the poorest and most

vulnerable? And to what extent are the two approaches mutually compatible?

Geographic Area

What geographic strategy is best—drawing

a defensive “Maginot Line” against desertification in the Sahel or abandoning the most se-
91

verely affected sections of most Sahelian States

and focusing on the better rain fed areas (105).

The former strategy would focus resources on

environmental protect ion and restoration to

halt desertification and work to develop agricultural and livestock technologies for the low

rainfall zones, Some experts feel that people

in more severely affected areas may be more

receptive to innovation because of the urgency

of their situation (7).

Others, however, are skeptical. Not only are

the technical and logistical challenges in the

northern regions likely to be costly and complex, but the pace of environmental change is

fast and technologies are not productive enough

for farmers to outpace declining productivity

(74). The costs of concentrating efforts in the

better-watered southern parts of Sahel i an countries are considerably lower and the potential

for short to medium increases in production

are greater.

But what about the large numbers of people

in the north? To benefit from new technology,

can they or will they move to the south? For

those who will not or cannot resettle, what will

be their fate? Irrigation offers some potential

because many of the better irrigation possibilities are in the north, But there is an equityrelated aspect of the irrigation versus rainfed

agriculture argument. Even if the maximum

area of land were brought under irrigation, it

could accommodate only a portion of the total

rural population. How will the food security

of the rest be covered in years of poor rainfall?

And what of equity? Ratios of investment to

production over the past decade have been 60

times higher for irrigation than for rainfed agriculture (25). Is such a disparity justified?

Should Assistance Be Aimed at Rural

Subgroups?

If so, which ones? The past decade has shown

the existence of a higher level of socioeconomic

differentiation in the Sahel than had been assumed. Some people feel that the successful

technologies of the past decade have benefited

the better-off groups while having little or possibly negative effects on the poorest segments

of rural society, The absolute poverty of most

farmers and herders has meant that even lowcost techniques have been within the means of

only a small minority. If the poorest are to be

“targeted” it will require a further scaling-down

of technology and, in some cases, programs designed specifically for particularly disadvantaged groups.

But does targeting the poorest work? Many

experts say no, that the potential for increasing yields among the poorest farmers is very

small. Low cost, improved technologies are not

available nor likely to be developed. The poorest

farmers are already too vulnerable and should

not be asked to increase their risk through innovation. Thus some experts believe that small

farmer strategies should continue to be geared

toward the middle range of farmers who, still

poor by most standards, are the only ones who

have the means and the security to innovate.

Encouraging these farmers, while allowing

poorer farmers to continue with existing technologies, would increase total production and

also bring indirect benefits to poorer farmers,

such as part time employment on the farms of

the innovators (84). Special attention to the

poorest or any other group is unlikely to result

in increased production if it is not based on

a careful assessment of their ability and potential to use effectively the increased resources.

Many experts feel that targeting does not work

because the more powerful are able to win back

the advantage through other means.

In the case of women, however, the experience of targeting has been at least partially successful. Studying eight large agricultural development projects in the Sahel, Kathleen Cloud

(23) has concluded that:

A

Both equity and efficiency are served by projects that take explicit account of men’s and

women’s roles in agricultural systems and design realistic ways of providing them with productivity increasing resources.

broader study of aid programs for the World

Bank comes to the same conclusion (17).

To be more effective, targeting can be indirect, Choices in research for crops that are

produced and consumed by the poor offer opportunities to focus resources on poverty-
92

millet and sorghum as opposed to cotton, goats

and sheep as opposed to cattle, and milk production as opposed to meat production. A focus on food processing technologies would

have a potentially large impact on women, In

policy reform, too, choices made in the specifics

of price decontrols, in the scale of private sector enterprise to be supported, in land tenure

laws, grazing rights, and fuelwood taxes have

differential impacts on different socioeconomic

groups and these can be used to reinforce an

equity or antipoverty strategy. Better data and

improved methods for social cost/benefit analysis of specific policy reforms—which groups

gain and lose—could help ensure that policy

reform in

the poor.

fact does have positive impacts on

Issues and Priorities

Many issues remain to be addressed as development strategies change to reflect the lessons of the past decade, Each issue is associated with a broad range of opinion, Many of

these differences of opinion occur because we

lack adequate knowledge about the Sahel and

about the development process.

But for many of the issues, the different opinions on how to proceed reflect differences in

objectives. On the Club/CILSS goal of “food selfsufficiency, surface agreement between

donors and the CILSS states masks subtle but

significant differences. Those differences in

turn lead to divergent responses to such basic

issues as the relative priority given food versus

export crops or irrigation development versus

rainfed agriculture. Similar confusion has resulted because different donors set different objectives to meet major goals, At what level is

the objective of “food security” to be applied?

Is food security primarily an issue for the growing urban population or is it interpreted to refer to all Sahelians, including rural people in

years of drought. How are growth and equity

to be balanced?

Whether all those involved agree or not,

choices will be made. Who will make these

choices? On what basis and in what institutional context will they be made? Will the

unique regional cooperation among Sahelians

and the international dialog between donors

and Sahelians be a major factor in shaping

them? The progress made so far in clarifying

the issues of what needs to be done is remarkable. But the process of addressing the remaining issues will set the stage for future success

or failure and will determine the shape of the

Sahel of tomorrow.

Sahel experts are frank about the mistakes

of the past and insistent on the need to learn

from those mistakes. Adjustments in strategy

are already taking place. But they must also address a host of questions and issues that so far

have been left unanswered.
Chapter 6

Applying the Lessons: The Agency
Chapter 6

Applying the Lessons: The Agency

for International Development

IN BRIEF . . .

The experiences of the past 10 years have taught important lessons about how technologies are combined and applied in development programs and projects. Four problems stand

out: the lack of effective participation by the intended recipients of the assistance; the inadequacy of a short-term, product-oriented approach; the complexity of project design; and the

inappropriateness of much of the research conducted to support development efforts. Although more appropriate technologies and better development methods are essential if future efforts in the Sahel are to be more effective than those of the past, it is equally important

to ensure that the policy environment is supportive. Low priority for agriculture, inappropriate cereals policy, constraints on the private sector, and the need for fiscal reform have all

hindered development. Appropriate policy reform alone is not sufficient to obtain food security for the people of the Sahel, but it is a necessary part of the process.

The challenge for future development efforts in the Sahel is to move to new modes of

assistance that are more consistent with the nature of the Sahel and the long-range goals

of food security, environmental stabilization, and economic growth. The United States can

continue to play a key role in this multinational development effort if it can incorporate the

past decade’s experiences into a more effective strategy. Chapter 6 examines how AID has

responded to the lessons learned in the past decade in the Sahel. Highlights of the chapter

include:

●

●

●

●

The most recent revision of AID’s Sahel development strategy (1984) shares many basic

Club/CILSS goals and it has incorporated many of the lessons learned in the past decade. It places priority on agricultural research and production, policy reform, health

and family planning, training, infrastructure, and environmental protection. It also

calls for continued coordination of all donor and Sahelian programs.

AID has not seriously addressed the issues of effective farmer and herder participation or given adequate attention to the importance of women in Sahelian agricultural

systems. To date, the gap between rhetoric and reality is substantial.

AID’s effectiveness in applying the lessons of the past decade faces constraints in four

areas: 1) the ambiguity of AID’s regional Sahel strategy, 2) internal institutional characteristics of AID, 3) the nature of AID’s relationship to Congress, and 4) the lack of

agreement about the role of development assistance in overall U.S. foreign policy.

These problems are not unique to the Sahel—they diminish the effectiveness of many

AID activities—but they are particularly acute in the Sahel because of the level and

special multinational characteristics of the U.S. commitment there.

95
96

INCORPORATING THE LESSONS

Evolving Strategies

The United States was a major actor in developing the multinational Club/CILSS framework and has continued to play an active role

in the evolution of its strategies. The Agency

for International Development’s (AID) Sahel

Development Program objectives and strategies

have largely paralleled those of the Club/CILSS.

A 1976 AID proposal to Congress outlined a

broad, phased approach to obtaining increased

food security and building a foundation for

long-term growth in the Sahel. AID concluded:

While the return of normal rains in 1974

helped overcome the immediate emergency, it

was clear that this region could not return to

its traditional system and hope to survive. Food

production had to be modernized, Traditional

livestock systems, which existed on otherwise

unprofitable lands, had to be modified to permit greater conservation of the rangelands. Indeed, whole new farming systems need to be

introduced so that farmers could afford to benefit from more of the advantages of modernization. Only in this way could the area become

capable of meeting its own basic needs for food

and development (133).

Under the proposed program, the short-term

phase of the strategy, 1976 to 1980, was to include immediate application of existing technologies in crop production, protection, and

storage; use of information from small-scale efforts in larger integrated rural development,

dryland farming, regional range management,

and livestock production projects; infrastructure studies; health care and training programs;

studies to prepare longer term, river basin development projects; and training and institution-building. The medium-term phase, 1980 to

1990, was to focus on expanding the productive capacity of dryland farmers, adding new

technologies, expanding commercial activity,

and continuing preparation for the long-term

projects, The final phase, 1990 and onward,

would tap the larger resources of the region,

particularly the river basins, in a move toward

food self-sufficiency and self-sustaining economic growth.

To support this strategy, AID developed a

broad, multisector project portfolio in each of

the Sahelian countries and was actively involved

in the development of the Club and regional

institutions such as CILSS and the Senegal,

Gambia, and Niger River Basin development

organizations. Projects in agricultural research

and extension, crop protection, livestock and

range management, integrated rural development, forestry, health, small-scale irrigation,

and river basin development predominated.

Training, much of it at U.S. universities, was

a major component of many projects.

The experiences and lessons AID learned in

the Sahel in implementing that program are

similar to those of the larger Club/CILSS experience. 1 Through experience, AID learned

that much of its short- and medium-term strategy was based on inaccurate technical and institutional assumptions, The “extension” focus

of most projects failed for want of appropriate

technologies or of effective systems to deliver

them to farmers and herders. AID came to recognize the shortcomings of complex design

through experiences in integrated rural development projects in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger,

and Senegal. Though many experts still believe

its response was inadequate, AID has been a

leader in emphasizing the long-term danger of

the environmental problems in the Sahel and

was active in reforestation and conservation,

This taught many lessons about the difficulty

and high cost of large-scale approaches and

spurred the increased use of pilot community

forestry and agro-forestry alternatives, AID also

was active in highlighting the issues of recurrent costs and cereal policies. Although AID

has remained active in the Club/CILSS process, its original enthusiasm and active support,

particularly for CILSS, has moderated following that organization’s less-than-hoped-for record, AID instead has shifted its attention to

bilateral approaches.

‘See the executive summary of AID’s 1983 SDP evaluation

(app. F).
97

The specific impact of AID’s Sahel Development Program (SDP) is difficult to separate from

the overall multidonor effort. Although AID’s

participation in the Club/CILSS framework was

influential, AID programs represent less than

10 percent of all donor assistance to the Sahel.’ AID’s record in individual country programs and projects is similar to that of the entire donor community. Overall, AID projects

often have fallen short of their objectives but

they have not done significantly better or worse

than others. There have been some accomplishments, but AID has shared in a general failure

in livestock and rangeland management, dryland farming, and integrated rural development. It has been most successful in aspects

of training, socioeconomic data collection, reforestation, rural health, and though the final

impacts are yet to be seen, in recent agricultural research and policy reform efforts. Like

its partners in the Sahel effort, many of AID’s

greatest accomplishments have been the lessons

it has learned about the nature of the development challenge and about identifying the issues

that donors and recipients in the Sahel must

address for the future.

AID’s Revised Sahel Strategy

In 1984, AID modified its Sahel strategy to

respond to a series of internal and external

evaluations. The “Fiscal Year 1986 Country Development Strategy Statement” 3 for the Sahel

explicitly attempts to incorporate the lessons

of the past decade’s experiences (125). Consistent with other major donor thinking, the strategy speaks of food “self -reliance’ ’-the goal of

meeting food needs through a combination of

production and trade, rather than food “selfsufficiency” as had earlier been the goal for the

multinational effort. The revised strategy statement embodies several additional modifications: 4

“I’he LJnited States has, howmer, contributed 26 percent of

all food aid and 16 percent of total donor effort in dryland agriculture. (See table A-4 in app. A.)

‘Th]s document is actual]} a regional de~wlopment strategj

sta tern ent hut the c o~’er t i tl e o f the document was i ncorrec tl~’

prlntcd as the Sahel “Countrj” I)e\elopment Strateg}’ Statement.

The executive summarj of the 1$)84 strategy 1s contained in

a [)1). E

an increased role for economic stabilization and policy reform using policy dialog,

Economic Support Funds, or Public Law480 resources;

a continued emphasis on increased food

production as the primary goal but new effort to ensure that other activities (such as

health, education, and forestry) are consistent with and complement strategies to increase food availability;

an increased priority for research (especially in agriculture, forestry, livestock,

water management, and the environment)

in recognition of the inadequacies of existing technologies;

a decrease in livestock programs for pastoral production systems;

a cautious but systematic approach to irrigation development focusing on smallscale systems and rehabilitation of existing systems;

an increased importance given to the role

of the private sector; and

more focused project portfolios with fewer

sectors and fewer pr-ejects.

These and the other provisions of AID’s new

strategy are consistent with the conclusions

drawn by other Sahel authorities from the past

decade’s experiences. But more detailed analysis of the Sahel strategy and AID’s subsequent

submissions to Congress raise questions about

the extent to which several aspects of the SDP

have actually incorporated the lessons of the

past decade. Several important issues are inadequately addressed in the statement and the

manner in which others are to be implemented

is left ambiguous.

A Return to Trickle Down?

AID’s current strategy for the Sahel focuses

on creating a better “environment” for development programs to work. It includes increased

financial incentives to Sahelian governments

to support policy reform, for example, to soften

the impact of things such as urban food price

increases, with the hope that the ultimate impact of the reforms will “trickle down” to benefit the entire population. The strategy also calls

for programs to increase local productive ca-
98

Photo credit: U.S. Peace Corps

Policy reforms are an important part of AID’s revised Sahel development strategy. One goal is to ensure that marketplace

food prices reward farmers adequately.

pacity through infrastructure and institutionbuilding activities and increased research in

a wide range of sectors.

The way such “constraint removing” development strategies are organized, however, can

have very different impacts on the lives of the

poor majority which AID is directed by Congress to help. Is the new AID strategy a departure from existing strategies that focus on direct assistance to the poor? Which prices are

to be adjusted? Whose standard of living will

be maintained? Which institutions are to be supported, which roads built, which crops researched? Each of these questions illustrates

the type of critical choices that can have very

different impacts on the poor. Is the focus to

improve the development “environment” primarily to increase aggregate economic production rather than reduce poverty? Neither the

consensus of development experts nor the lessons learned in the past indicate that it is desirable to return to the “trickle down” development

theories of the 1960s. But AID’s Sahel strategy

lacks guidance on this issue and bolsters fears

that the current administration’s aid policies

are a general retreat from assistance to the poor

(88).

The Role of the Farmer and Herder

The AID strategy document continues to direct activities toward small agriculturalists and

mentions the need for greater farmer participation in research and other activities, but it

is unclear about how the role of those farmers
99

is to be defined or about which farmers are to

be included. The crucial strategy question of

how to balance the search for higher economic

production with greater equity is not addressed

or even acknowledged as a problem, There is

no mention of the demonstrated importance of

gender analysis as an essential element in all

project activities. The call for farmer and herder

participation can mean many different things

and i n AI D’s Sahel strategy its meaning is unclear. While the strategy acknowledges the efficiency of traditional production systems, there

is no discussion of how those traditional technologies could he better integrated in future

technology development and diffusion.

Addressing the Issues

The AID strategy fails to address many of the

critical issues identified in the previous chapter. How are increasingly scarce resources to

be allocated between irrigation and dryland

agriculture, between food and export crops, between different ecological zones or socioeconomic groups? How should the livestock sector be approached? How are population issues

to be addressed? What pattern of international

trade relations should the Sahelian States pursue and what portion of food security should

be filled by trade? SDP officials in Washington

and the field recognize the importance of these

issues but the strategy does not give high priority to their resolution. Each issue involves

choices which, by their nature, must be made

by Sahelians. But donors, collectively and individually, have a responsibility within the

Club/CILSS partnership to help in the data collection and analysis necessary to support these

choices.

Setting U.S. Priorities

AID’s strategy supports the overall goal of increased food production, but provides no guidelines for setting priorities within that goal.

While claiming that AID is narrowing the range

Photo credit U S Peace Corps

Al D’s strategy for development in the Sahel leaves some critical issues unresolved, for example, how the United States

will assist herders,
100

of projects under SDP and withdrawing from

sectors where its expertise or management capability has proven too limited, the strategy

statement does not indicate what those areas

are or how they are to be determined. The list

of critical areas provided in the program’s 1985

report to Congress is extensive and does not

indicate a narrowing of focus. The United

States has strengths in water resource development, socioeconomic data collection and

analysis, macroeconomic policy analysis, agroclimatology, research methodologies, forestry,

fisheries, food processing, and other areas

needed in the Sahel. A more systematic matching of those strengths with specific program

priorities would enhance the AID strategy.

While addressing the need for activities in every

sector to be consistent with the goal of increased food production, the strategy itself fails

to integrate its discussion of sector activities

into a systematic whole, The absence of adequate emphasis on the interrelatedness of activities at both the national and the farm level

could lead to a continuation of the unconnected

program approaches of the past, There is a particular need to take advantage of the opportunities and flexibility provided by “program

assistance” such as Economic Support Funds,

food aid, and more general technical assistance

to complement project activities. More effective integration of food aid into global agricultural sector strategies is essential,

Lack of a Systematic Approach

Setting priorities is clearly important, but so

is establishing links among the components.

IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY

AID’s new strategy contains inherent ambiguities that could potentially create problems

and inconsistencies as it is implemented. The

impact of the new strategy will depend on how

it is implemented. Many elements suggested

in chapter 4 and embodied in AID’s new strategy have been part of AID’s professed strategies since the beginning of the Sahel effort. The

importance of farmer participation, the need

to look at agricultural productivity in the context of environmental sustainability, the key

variable of “risk perception” among farmers,

the importance of institutional development

and others are to be found in program descriptions, project documents, and evaluations

throughout the 1970s. While AID, like other

donors, has been gaining experience and expertise, the gap between stated strategies and actual performance—between rhetoric and reality—is often wide.

AID officials and observers frequently suggest that the key to increasing AID’s effectiveness in the Sahel is less a question of refining

its strategies than of removing the obstacles that

block those strategies from becoming viable

programs and projects. Observers both inside

and outside AID identify several institutional

characteristics that may partly explain the

gap between strategy and implementation. Although these factors are interrelated, they can

be categorized into those specific to AID internally, those that are the product of AID’s relationship with Congress, and those more generally related to AID’s role within U.S. foreign

policy.

The Internal AID Context

Characteristics internal to AID that observers

feel constrain its effectiveness in the Sahel include staff issues, factors that limit direct contact with farmers, elements of its programming

and project design systems, and tensions between centralized and decentralized decisionmaking.
101

-.

AID staff in the Sahel has been limited in both

quantity and quality. In 1974, only Senegal and

Niger had full AID missions and only 25 American staff served the entire region. By 1978, that

number expanded to 96 and by 1984 there were

130 direct-hire American positions (125,134).

But despite the speed with which AID missions

grew, inadequate staffing of field missions was

still cited as a major cause for the failure of food

production projects (127). Contrary to the recommendations of internal audits, staff levels

in most Sahel missions have been reduced and

plans call for further reductions, Not only have

staff shortages affected AID’s effectiveness, but

the prospects of further reductions could preclude the more labor-intensive analysis and ongoing management required for participatory

and institution-building activities, Staff shortages could force the agency to emphasize programs with fewer management demands (e.g.,

economic stabilization, infrastructure, and agricultural projects in more accessible, betterwatered areas) rather than basing those decisions on considerations related to implementing its strategy,

The lack of appropriate skills and Sahel-specific experience of many AID technicians and

programmers involved in the development of

AID’s early Sahel programs were factors in the

design errors of those programs. The lack of

Sahel-specific expertise was particularly constraining:

AID’s development effort initially had little

information and understanding of the physical, institutional, and policy environment in

which economic improvement was to take

place (125).

U.S. expertise in arid land agricultural technologies proved largely inapplicable for technical and socioeconomic reasons, though many

mistakes were made before this was realized.

Much of AID’s Sahel staff is trained in general

program areas rather than in specific technical fields. The proportion of generalists within

AID is rising and technicians complain that

they have little input into major decisions,

The lack of French-speaking programmers

and technicians has compounded the staffing

problem, resulting in: 1) major communication

problems with Sahelian partners, 2) coordination difficulties with other donors, and 3) difficulty in using the wealth of experience and data

collected by the French during the century of

their presence in West Africa,

AID direct-hire staff are only a part of the total personnel that AID uses in its Sahel operations. A variety of contractors (individuals,

universities, consulting firms, and private

voluntary organizations) perform tasks ranging from logistical support to the design, implementation, and evaluation of AID projects.

While the use of contract personnel has increased the pool of skills available to AID, it

does not necessarily resolve staffing problems.

Contract personnel, particularly early on, did

not have significantly greater Sahel experience

or French skills than did AID direct-hire staff,

Costs are high (between $100,000 to $150,000

per year for each contractor) and outside personnel answer to institutions that often have

different objectives and agendas (65). More importantly, the use of short-term outside consultants reduces institutional learning within AID

and can limit the use of integrated strategies.

AID also hires local staff, but this pool of expertise is poorly tapped. Local staff often are

the informal institutional memory of AID missions, but they are usually occupied with routine work and are infrequently used to help with

program development and management. This

wastes the potential their special perspective

could offer and misses an opportunity to increase their skills in a form of internal institution-building,

A decade of experience in the Sahel has

greatly improved American expertise within

AID, in universities, and among consultants,

The village-level work experience of the Peace

Corps has proven an effective training ground.

But the turnover inherent in 2-year tours and
102

the division of responsibilities between directhire and contract personnel have inhibited consistent institutional learning. The lack of ability to speak French continues to be a problem,

partly because U.S. universities have been experiencing declines in French language study.

Also, U.S. universities not only appear to be

experiencing declines in enrollment in agriculturally related programs (with the possible exception of agricultural economics) but the training they provide is relevant to U.S. agricultural

systems, Thus AID is likely to face a continuing problem obtaining a future supply of appropriately trained staff for the Sahel program.

Contact With Farmers and Herders

A strong need for a high degree of dialog between donors and Sahelians exists at every

level. Cultural and linguistic barriers, far beyond French language skills, face AID staff and

contractors in the pursuit of that dialog. While

dialog is difficult enough at the level of national

development agencies, the communication gap

increases at the village level where the official

languages (French, English, or Portuguese) are

rarely spoken and where cultural differences

are the greatest. In addition to linguistic and

cultural skills, such a dialog requires desire,

time, and a broad, open-minded perspective.

Institutional dynamics within AID limit the

extent and effectiveness of contacts with

farmers and herders. Staff shortages, limited

travel budgets, and overburdening paperwork

are seen as particularly important in limiting

contacts. The lifestyle of most members of the

official donor community, the majority of whom

live in prosperous enclaves within capital cities, increases the perceptual gap between them

and the rural poor (19). Some Europeans in the

Sahel feel that AID mission personnel are unnecessarily cut off not only from farmers but

also from government officials, “They tend to

keep to themselves, ” was a comment made by

several otherwise sympathetic observers,

Weakness in Program and Project

Design Processes

Over the years, AID has developed a complex system for determining its strategies and

designing its programs and projects. Some aspects of these systems limit the potential for

the type of long-term, integrated, flexible programming needed in the Sahel. OTA has identified weaknesses in six areas:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Project Selection: The method by which

AID develops individual country strategies

may not provide the kind of micro-level

data collection and analysis needed to select good projects.

Analytical Skills: High level analytical skills

to do the economic, environmental, or social analysis called for in program design

are often lacking. As a result, “formula”

solutions are substituted in place of countryspecific programming. The diversity and

complexity of the Sahel is often overlooked.

Organization of Components: Sectoral

analysis and project identification, design,

approval, and implementation, as well as

monitoring and evaluation, are performed

by different groups and individuals, and

increasingly by contractors external to

AID. While there are benefits from different perspectives and independent monitoring and evaluation, the lack of connection

between stages in a project leads to inconsistency and lack of accountability, especially among those responsible for program

and project design. The separation is mirrored in AID’s Washington management

structure. Technical support, program,

evaluation, and budgeting are located in

different offices (even in different buildings), with insufficient coordination among

them.

Evaluation and Monitoring: Poor linkage

exists between evaluation activities and

other parts of the system, so the lessons

of failure and success are often not used

to modify programs or design new activities. Evaluation tends to take an “audit”

approach based on narrowly defined and

quantifiable objectives rather than on questions of broader impact. In principle all

projects include ongoing monitoring, but

in practice these receive insufficient resources. By the time problems are discovered, it is often too late to correct them (1 27)

often making project management, in fact,
103

crisis management. Furthermore, evaluations have been used more to identify failures than to document reasons for successes. They are not used sufficiently by

the agency to institutionalize learning.

Timing: Despite efforts to improve the situation, projects often are not implemented

until 3 years after their initial identification. In the meantime, many of the important assumptions and agreements on which

they were based may no longer be valid.

The lack of design flexibility makes adaptat ion to changes difficult.

Project Design: During the early phase of

SDP, AID reward structures were oriented

to large prograrn size and rapid obligation

of funds. Long-time, AID observers bemoan

the fact that AID still favors the designer

and the obligator of funds over the project

implementor r and manager. The result is

a bias toward large-scale, complex projects,

with inadequate attention to field realities

or management capabilities within AID or

the host country.

1983 survey of Sahel AID missions reported

design problems contributed to project

difficulties in 24 of 25 projects. Two-thirds of

the projects were judged to have been overly

ambitious (128). The size and complexity of

projects waS identified as one of six reasons

for the failure or poor performance of all seven

food production projects studied in another internal AID audit ( 127).

Regional Strategy v. Country

Programs

when SDP began, the concept of a coordinated, 10 rig-term, subregionally focused program with a separate budget and management

was new to AID. It was controversial from the

start and it highlighted the already problematic

relationship between Washington and the field,

Some AID Sahel field staff feel that AID is

overly centralized in its decisionmaking. Attempts to mold country programs to correspond

with a regional strategy, particularly in the early

days, exacerbated that problem. What does a

regional strategy signify? What is its relations i p to A I D’s Africa strategy? How should the

individual country staff participate in the elaboration of the regional strategy? To what extent

and by what mechanisms were individual country programs to be made consistent with that

strategy? What would be the balance between

resource allocation to regional act it’ i ties as opposed to country programs”? The answer to each

of these questions has varied over the course

of SDP’s history,

Tensions between the individual field missions and regional management have existed

from the program’s beginning, To many in the

field, even though SDP was the basis for creating AID missions in the Sahel it was basically a

Washington and Paris-based idea that never became a reality to the missions. It was fairly

idealistic and early SD P-generated regional

projects often bore little relationship to the

AID mission directors’ perception of country

needs. While the regional approach to programming is appealing in theory, it is difficult in

practice, Country mission staff worked with national governments that were often less than

enthusiastic about shifting resources to regional

organizations. AID missions in the Sahel are

u rider the supervision of ambassadors whose

mandates are national, not regional and who,

because the United States had few other interests in the countries, often became much more

involved in AID programming than a ambassadors elsewhere.

Several aspects of AI D’s regional Sahel approach have been downplayed in the past 4

years. Contrary to the recommendations of the

1983 SDP assessment, Al I) has disbanded the

multidisiplinary regional planning team, based

in Bamako, Mali. that was charged with providing support to country missions and with spearheading the formulation of regional strategies.

The proportion of regional programs (versus

bilateral) within the Sahel budget has dropped

from 40 percent in the early 1980s to under 30

percent in 1985 and is projected to decline further over the next 4 years (125). Much of the

funding for river basin development is being

folded back into bilateral accounts.

The decision to lessen the regional nature of

SDP has been based on what AID considers an

i report ant lesson of the past decade. To a large
104

extent, this decision reflects greater realism

about the limitations of regional development

efforts. But, to a lesser extent AID risks losing

some of the potential that the regional perspective and the Club/CILSS framework have in

making the most effective use of all donor resources, While stressing the continuing importance of international coordination through the

Club/CILSS framework and related structures,

AID has pulled back from active support of African regional institutions. AID’s current approach is to “think regionally while implementing programs nationally” given that power and

sovereignty continue to rest in the nation States

(125),

How much these changes are changes of approach rather than changes in the level of commitment to the Sahel or to the multinational

nature of the Sahel effort is unclear. They are,

however, consistent with other changes in U.S.

foreign assistance, which is generally moving

toward increased bilateralism (88). U.S. criticisms of CILSS have been important in that organization’s recent reform. Continued U.S. support is needed to maximize those gains and to

facilitate the limited but positive potential role

that CILSS has to play.

Constrain-s on the

Congress-AID Relationship

A second set of institutional factors that limit

AID’s effectiveness in implementing its Sahel

strategy involves the manner in which AID and

Congress work together. It includes the effects

of a generally poor working relationship between the two and the specific mechanisms by

which Congress tries to influence AID’s policies. The formulation of the U.S. commitment

to the Sahel began in a close working relationship between Congress and AID (37). That partnership has not, however, translated into a

sustained, working relationship in the implementation of the Sahel program. Once the commitment was made, relations with Congress regarding SDP have been largely consistent with

the pattern of Congress-AID relations generally—a relationship that both sides have described as ineffective and, at times, bordering

on the adversarial.

The timeframe and cost of the original U.S.

commitment to the Sahel was not universally

supported in AID or in Congress. In order to

gain its acceptance, the concept was presented

with expectations for dramatic short-term results. Unrealistic congressional expectations

were in part the result of mistaken assumptions

about the availability of technologies but they

are also in part due to the language in which

the Sahel program had been presented, In the

words of AID field staff: “the program was certainly oversold. ”

Some authorities speculate that the lack of

more effective communication and the systematic overselling of AID programs in justifying

its budget works against Congress developing

a more sophisticated understanding of the longterm nature of the development process and

this ultimately generates unattainable goals for

AID field staff. The problematic relationship

between Congress and AID inhibits the impact

the United States has in achieving Club/CILSS

goals. Short-term funding cycles, multiple policy mandates, procurement and financial regulations, and the conflicts created from divided

congressional responsibilities on matters that

affect the Sahel all contribute to the lack of effectiveness.

Funding

SDP receives funds as part of the annual congressional appropriation for foreign assistance.

Lack of a strong domestic constituency for foreign assistance and the complexity of the foreign appropriations bill, which includes funding for a broad range of military and economic

assistance programs, multilateral agencies, and

other U.S. programs operating abroad, and the

controversial nature of many of these elements,

have made it difficult to pass funding bills. In

7 out of the last 9 years, funding has been

through stop-gap continuing resolutions. Annual budget cycles inhibit achieving consistency

and the long-range strategies required for effective programs in the Sahel.

In principle, the major advantages of the SDP

portions of Sahel funding’ are the fact that

‘This does not include Econc)mic Support Funds or Puhlic

I,aw-480 resources which are funded separately.
105

they have been appropriated on a “no-year” ba- quire longer term, reasonably stable commitsis, i.e., once authorized they do not have to ments. Policy mandates also act to diminish

be obligated that fiscal year, and funds cannot local flexibility to adapt programming to spebe reassigned to other programs except for dis- cific local needs and host country priorities.

aster assistance. The defensive relationship

with Congress, however, has given rise to fears @procurement and Financial Controls

within AID management that future funding

will be reduced unless appropriated funds are

spent quickly, As a result, AID has chosen not

to use the no-year funding provision. The yearly

budget cycle puts added pressure on AID to produce quick results to justify continuing funding levels. The overall effect of the budget process is thus biased toward short funding cycles,

quick obligations, and short-term projects.

Mutiple Mandates

Overall policy guidance on the objectives and

focus of U.S. foreign assistance programs are

embodied in the Foreign Assistance Act of

1961. A substantial amendment in 1973 defined

the “New Directions” for foreign assistance that

called on AID to focus its development assistance programs on the poor majorities in the

poorest developing countries. While the new

policy eventually did have a major impact on

AID programming, Congress/AID dialog on

these New Directions has not been easy (137).

It has been complicated by a series of amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act that have

mandated a succession of additional, more specific new policy directions such as women in

development, family planning, infant survival,

the use of private voluntary organizations, the

environment, capital-saving technology, and

others.

AID’s attempts to appear responsive to these

directives have led to frequently changing priorities. Succeeding administrations, seeking to

place their own stamp on foreign assistance

programs, have added additional and at times

contradictory directives to the field. As new

mandates have been added, the old ones remain

and confusion about the direction of programming grows. Field staff see the problem not in

the correctness of any individual policy approach but rather in the rapidity with which

the policies have changed. These changing sigThe procurement and financial controls placed

on AID by Congress have also constrained

AID’s operations. The general requirement to

use U.S.-produced equipment and other project

inputs is a particularly sore spot in the Sahel,

For historical as well as geographical reasons,

most of the Sahel’s trade ties are to France and

Europe. Congressionally mandated AID requirements to use American equipment have

proven ineffective in stimulating new markets

for U.S. goods, a major objective of such measures, Meanwhile, they have complicated and

even hindered project operations, Delivery time

of U.S. equipment has been long and inoperative U.S. vehicles, pumps, and other equipment

litter the Sahel for want of spare parts, maintenance skills, or operating funds, Medicines

used in important AID village-level primary

health care programs often come with doses

written in English, In addition, these “buy

American” requirements have led to the use

of inappropriate capital-intensive technologies.

The United States is not the only donor with

such requirements. Efforts at coordination in

multinational project development often have

been delayed and in some cases stymied by conflicting procurement regulations. The requirement by each major donor to purchase equipment at home also increases the administrative

burden on the Sahelian institutions that must

deal with the variety of equipment. So-called

“tied aid provisions” for equipment and technical assistance have greatly increased the total cost of aid, and, from the perspective of the

Sahelian recipients, greatly diminished its value

to them. Again, the defensive relationship between AID and Congress has resulted in AID’s

not using its authority to waive tied aid in some

areas of procurement.

Financial control has always been a major

area of congressional oversight on AID, The

rapid expansion of aid programs in the povertynals disrupt programs that by their nature re- stricken and administratively weak Sahel and
106

AID’s inadequate field staff resulted in a predictable amount of mismanagement and some

cases of misappropriation (134). In 1981, following a series of negative audits, Congress

enacted a section of the Foreign Assistance Act

that required the AID Administrator to determine that Sahelian countries have adequate

controls over assistance funds. While the resulting measures, and particularly the accompanying efforts to improve management skills

under the Sahel Regional Financial Management Project, have improved an admittedly unacceptable situation, many observers feel that

they have gone too far. The strictness of the

new regulations is seen to be unrealistic given

current Sahelian managerial and cultural realities. It has caused set-backs in the “partnership” between U.S. and Sahelian officials, has

tied up both AID and Sahelian staff in excess

paperwork, and has eliminated the potential

positive impact of more active participation by

smaller Sahelian businesses and PVOs. While

proper financial control is unquestionably important, a better balance between financial control and development objectives would facilitate AID’s work in the Sahel.

Congressional Coordination

SDP is just one of many U.S. programs and

policies that affect the Sahel. U.S. decisions on

food aid, domestic agricultural price supports,

trade policy, interest rates, and overseas investment, as well as positions on international debt

and finance as expressed through U.S. participation in the International Monetary Fund, the

World Bank, and other agencies, have varying

degrees of direct or indirect impact on the Sahel, Policies affecting the value of the dollar,

international cereal prices, interest rates, food

aid, and debt may affect the poor of the Sahel

more than development assistance. These policy areas are usually dealt with by different congressional committees where the potential conflict or complementarily with other actions

regarding the Sahel is rarely considered. Although better coordination between the executive branch agencies that implement these programs and policies is crucial, better internal

congressional coordination focusing on ways

to minimize “taking away with one hand what

we give with the other” would greatly enhance

the coherence and impact of the U.S. commitment to the region.

Congressional Tools for Influencing AID

Policies

Congress uses a variety of methods to enforce

its policy directives to AID, such as requirements for periodic written reports, congressional inquiries, legislative requirements for

procurement regulations, special reports, testimony, GAO audits, and congressional notification for program or budget changes. Many

AID staff feel that the major impact of congressional mandates and oversight is a substantial

increase in paperwork and bureaucratic hurdles. Some estimate that they spend up to onefourth of their time responding to congressional

inquiries or fulfilling internal administrative

requirements. Requirements for technical or

congressional notification for minor changes

in project funding or timing, while not overly

burdensome, do create extra paperwork and

hinder the flexible design systems needed in

the Sahel. Private voluntary groups working in

the Sahel and funded by AID report similar frustrations.

But AID/Washington may compound the

problem by trying to anticipate Congress and

by systematically going one step beyond congressional requirements. Some characterize the

agency as “always looking over its shoulder”

in its relationship with Congress, using field

data to justify its budget requests rather than

as a basis for developing its programs. They

contend that the field serves Washington’s

needs rather than the other way around.

The impact of congressional policy mandates

are often less than reported. Field staff have

learned to present what they are doing in whatever terms are called for by current policy. Mandated targeting of specific groups, such as

women or the rural poor, or special program

considerations such as environmental impact

or health, can result in tacked-on components

or paragraphs in project documentation rather

than concrete integration into program design.
107

The number of such mandates and the administrative burden they bring discourage field staff

from embracing the spirit of such directions

and more creatively implementing them. Stressing the uniqueness of each situation, field staff

rankle at the rigidity of some measures such

as current requirement that at least 12 percent

of funds pass through private voluntary organizations (PVOs). AID staff did not disagree

with the positive role that PVOs can play but

they stressed the variability in PVO performance and in opportunities for collaborating with

them. They questioned the wisdom of basing

decisions on general quotas rather than on careful analysis of needs and opportunities in a specific country.

Many AID staff are frustrated that the partnership between Congress and AID that gave

birth to the Sahel program in the mid-l970s has

not been carried through i n operations, Compared to other programs within AID, the SDP’s

special budgetary and management provisions

and the continuing congressional interest in the

Sahel are an advantage in these times of tight

budgets, but that special status may be eroding. Congressional/AID relations could be a

source of opportunity, but instead they are seen

by many as reducing AID’s ability to be effective in fulfilling the U.S. commitment.

Development Assistance and

Foreign Policy Objectives

in the Sahel

Foreign aid generally lacks strong domestic

support, so U.S. development assistance is often

justified in terms of U.S. “national interest. ”

Those national interests are multiple-strategic,

political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian.

The interests most referred to in backing a [J. S.

commitment to the Sahel are largely the last—

humanitarian.

This is not to say that the expansion of the

Sahel program has been without other motives.

The Sahel drought was seen by some as an opportunity to make inroads into French political and economic dominance in the zone. Increasing domestic political influence among

Americans respond generously to calls for famine

relief, especially when children are threatened with

starvation. Broader humanitarian concerns such as

long-term development assistance usually receive little

public support.

black Americans also challenged the State Department and AID to take Africa more seriously

and end the neglect that had characterized

America’s relationships with Africa. Though

the benefits to U.S. firms have been lower and

less permanent than hoped for, tied aid provisions and especially food aid brought sizable

economic gains back to the United States. The

moderate political stances of Senegal and Niger are of at least some importance. Senegal

has been a particular} helpful moderating

voice in African and international arenas. It

has participated in peace-keeping activities in

the Middle East, Zaire, and Chad. Nonetheless,

the primary justification for U.S. support of

SDP was built on the outpouring of public opinion following the 1967 to 1973 drought.

Since the change in administrations in 1981,

the increased bilateralism in foreign assistance

and its use to support U.S. political positions

has led to fears that the primary basis of the

U.S. development assistance to the Sahel might

be changing from that of long-term develop-
108

ment to short-term political interests. Several

AID staff members felt that in the past, the Sahel Development Program had the advantage

of being insulated from most political factors.

That seems to be decreasingly the case. In the

1984 Sahel Strategy Statement, political and

strategic interests in Sahel are mentioned explicitly:

U.S. contact with the Sahel is compassionate but also pragmatic, the latter particularly

with regard to Senegal, Niger, and Chad where

we have compelling political/security interests.

U.S. political concerns in these and other Sahel

countries are inter-woven with numerous international and domestic factors, economic considerations and humanitarian interests, All

have a bearing on the achievement of U.S. objectives in the Sahel and the Sahel Development

Program has a key role to play in accomplishing these goals (125).

Though the nature of the political and security interests is not elaborated, it presumably

involves growing U.S. concern with the destabilizing force of Libya in light of its troop

involvement in Chad and alleged involvement

with dissident groups in several Sahelian States.

In another example of the change to more

political uses of AID’s Sahel assistance programs, the State Department mandated cuts in

project funding to the new government of Burkina Faso in 1983 following a series of pronouncements and actions considered unfavorable by the United States. New funding for the

Burkina Faso AID program dropped from $11.2

million in 1982 to $300,000 in 1984 and $40,000

in 1985,6 As part of the cut, AID canceled one

of the most successful forestry projects in the

Sahel. Burkina officials and donors working in

Burkina Faso were disappointed and frustrated

at so blatant a disruption of long-term assistance

in support of short-term political objectives. The

view that the United States is unreliable in its

development assistance could undermine the

development of effective partnerships not only

with Sahelians but with the other donors within

the multinational development community.

Mixing political and security considerations

with developmental goals creates contradictions that often serve neither. In the Sahel, the

relatively low level of security, political, and

economic interests in relation to the humanitarian and the exceptionally long-term nature

of the challenge make it essential to focus on

development to the greatest extent possible.

U.S. national interests in the Sahel are best

served by effective development programs.

“These figures are for bilateral economic assistance under

SIIP. Food aid increased during the drought years to $12.4 million in 1984 and $19.6 million in 1985. The Peace Corps remained

in Burkina Faso throughout this period, See tables A-6 and A-7

in app. A.
Chapter 7

A Catalog of Other Actors

in the Sahel
Chapter

A Catalog of Other Actors in the Sahel

IN BRIEF . . .

The United States was a major actor in developing the multinational Club/CILSS framework and has continued to play an active role in the evolution of its strategies. In recent

years, AID has made important, major policy revisions in its Sahel program in an attempt

to incorporate the lessons learned in the past decade, but some important issues have been

left inadequately addressed and AID’s strategy is ambiguous in certain areas. AID’s effectiveness is constrained by three other factors as well: internal institutional characteristics

of AID, the sometimes adversarial nature of AID’s relationship with Congress, and the lack

of agreement about the role of development assistance in overall U.S. foreign policy.

AID is only one of many actors in the Sahel development effort. An array of African

institutions, U.S. agencies other than AID, and various multilateral and bilateral donors have

direct and indirect effects on development in the Sahel. Chapter 7 reviews the roles, strengths,

and weaknesses of some of these institutions. Highlights of the chapter include:

●

●

●

●

●

Africans and African institutions must play the fundamental role in development in

the Sahel, though their strengths must be supplemented and their weaknesses addressed.

Donors can complement and enhance these efforts.

U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) can offer special development skills. PVOs

generally can provide small-scale, low-cost, flexible approaches and often operate effectively at the grassroots level. However, the quality of PVO efforts often can be uneven, they may lack technical skills, and they sometimes have limited impact.

The Peace Corps and the African Development Foundation share many of the strengths

and limitations of PVOs. However, both of these organizations have begun new initiatives that incorporate many of the lessons of the past decade.

U.S. private sector investment currently plays a minor role in the Sahel and its role

is likely to remain limited for the short to medium term because of investment risks,

language and cultural barriers, competition from Europeans, and policy-related constraints. Policy reform could enhance the climate for U.S. private sector involvement

in development in the Sahel, but reform alone would not change the situation substantially.

At the heart of the Club/CILSS framework is a commitment of donors to work together

with the countries of the Sahel in a long-term, coordinated approach to development.

Each of the different participants has its own specific agenda and characteristics (both

strengths and weaknesses) that affect its ability to contribute effectively in the Sahel

strategy. A more concerted attempt is necessary to identify and build on the diversity

of the many donors and recipients.

The ongoing processes by which strategies an effect on how people within the institutions

in the Sahel are being changed to reflect the carry out their roles,

lessons of the past decade are being addressed

by thousands of people in hundreds of institu- By understanding the strengths and weaktions. The internal characteristics of these in- nesses of these institutions, policy makers can

stitutions and their relationships to society have increase the likelihood that their strategies will

111
112

-. —

translate into successful development. Too egies for the Sahel would be incomplete withoften, donors focus their efforts on technical out examining several major categories of inand economic analysis and overlook the equally stitutions, both Sahelian and donor, and the

important analysis of institutional, social, and obstacles and opportunities their institutional

political realities. Any discussion of future strat- environments provide.

AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

African institutions are central to the success

of development assistance in the Sahel. Yet the

weaknesses of African governmental and

parastatal institutions have hampered their ability to carry out development programs and this

has been one factor in the poor performance

of the past decade. A fundamental premise of

international assistance, and specifically of the

partnership between donors and Sahelians in

the Club/CILSS framework, is that the commitment is finite in both time and levels of resources. Assistance is intended to complement

the strategies of Sahelians themselves. Thus a

long-term commitment to building up the capacity of these institutions is an important element in revised donor strategies,

Sahelian institutions (government or private,

regional, national, or local) exhibit a wide range

of characteristics that influence their abilities.

They face many constraints but observers with

long experience in the Sahel believe that many

positive changes have taken place since independence. A number of promising institutions

and organizations have yet to be integrated into

official development strategies, so the future

holds continued new potential. The complexity of the constraints facing all institutions and

the lack of clear analysis on how to optimize

the contribution of each reinforce the need for

devising improved ways to coordinate efforts

based on a shared set of strategic directions.

Sahelian Government Institutions

A wide range of government institutions are

involved in the design and implementation of

agricultural and rural development strategies

in each Sahelian nation. These include national

political organizations, local administrations,

technical agencies, and parastatals of many

forms. Their specific roles and relative powers

vary from country to country. It is difficult to

generalize, but these institutions do share some

common characteristics that affect their abilities to successfully implement programs and

projects.

Lack of Skills and Experience

The majority of Sahelian States are just 25

years old. While Africans had some roles in

colonial administrations, they rarely held positions of major responsibility, Between 1952

and 1963 only four university graduates in agriculture were trained in Francophone Africa

(47). Although the countries have made impressive advances in education and training, there

remains a great need for training opportunities for Africans (4). Many senior agricultural

researchers are expatriates. Sahelian educational

systems, based on French colonial models, are

often lacking or inappropriate. But training provided to Sahelians in institutions outside the

Sahel is also often inappropriate.

One difficulty faced by many new institutions, but particularly acute in research, is the

necessity of first filling administrative positions. Often the best technically trained Sahelians are not doing research, they are placed

in administrative positions for which they have

little training or interest, A recent analysis of

management in African agricultural projects

indicated that bad policies and poor organization seemed to be the key constraints--not lack

of skilled personnel, It recommended organizational and management assistance, policy reform, and action-oriented training (65).

The Legacies of Colonial Administration

Significant differences existed between the

approaches of different colonial administrations, but overall they were largely based on
113

hierarchical, authoritarian models, more designed for economic, political, and social control than for development. Those models tended

to foster farmers’ dependence on government

personnel and programs. Like their predecessors, Sahelian administrations tend to be highly

centralized. Lower officials operating in rural

areas have limited decisionmaking authority.

And systems of rewards throughout the developing world tend to move the most qualified,

motivated people to the capital city while the

rural areas get less experienced and less competent personnel. Francophone systems of agricultural research and extension, which emphasized basic research and export crops for better

endowed farmers, continue to influence the national agricultural institutions that operate

today (56).

Colonial administrative structures were often

based on values that differed from traditional

Sahelian values, particularly in the areas of individual responsibility and accountability. For

Sahelians, de facto incentive systems are based

more on personal or group loyalty than on performance. The absence of effective sanctions,

the acceptance of certain levels of graft, and

the pervasiveness of “clientelism” are all

manifestations of alternative systems of rule

within Sahelian institutions (35).

Lack of Resources

The past 15 years have brought Sahel governments to the point of financial collapse, The

causes are multiple. Revenues have declined

because of diminishing budget support from

the former colonial powers, The drought-reduced export crops and drops in world market

prices also contributed to declining revenues,

Expenses, meanwhile, have remained high with

overstaffed civil services, heavy investment in

unproductive infrastructure, growing debt service burdens, and the operating deficits of most

parastatals. The lack of priority given to the

agricultural sector in the past was exacerbated

as budgets tightened in the late 1970s and early

1980s. The result has been paralysis in many

rural development operations—especiall y extension programs—with few resources to replace the deteriorated equipment, little to support recurrent costs such as fuel and supplies,

and difficulty paying salaries (4). Projects often

could not be sustained after donor funding

ended because Sahelian governments could not

pay for recurrent costs. Strapped for resources

and crippled by poor morale, these institutions

cannot perform as expected.

Obstacles From the Outside

A recent General Accounting Office report

concluded that the poor capabilities of Sahelian

governments to plan and manage development

efforts is a significant factor in their slow

progress toward economic development (134).

The study also found, however, that internal

weaknesses are often compounded by the heavy

administrative workload imposed by the large

number of donors and projects. For instance,

last year there were at least 18 village water

supply programs, with as many donors, operating in Mali, each with different equipment

and different approaches to training and recurrent costs (57).

Some experts feel that the management performance of Sahelians has been relatively good,

considering their institutional weaknesses and

the many responsibilities involved in managing nearly $15 billion in development assistance

over the past decade, Sahelian institutions did

much better helping identify needs and delivering emergency food supplies during the 1984

to 1985 food emergency than they had during

1972 to 1973, evidence of the growth of their

administrative capacity, Thus it appears that

Sahelian institutions will be able to be increasingly effective in the future.

Despite these problems, several trends provide opportunities to increase the effectiveness

of Sahelian institutions and increase their capacity to implement development strategies, As

the number of university-educated Africans increases, more Sahelian staff will be available

to take administrative positions in government

and parastatal institutions, Also, staff who have

accumulated valuable experience working on

past donor-supported projects are increasing.

These more skilled staff will help the institu-
114

tions become more effective partners in development activities.

A new generation of Africans, more highly

educated than their predecessors, is coming to

power in both political and administrative

realms. These young leaders are dynamic, pragmatic, and sophisticated in dealing with rural

development issues. Additional positive trends

that might help increase the effectiveness of Sahelian institutions include: relative political stability (with the exception of Chad); the growth

of democratic institutions (political parties, labor unions, and legal systems in various countries); increasing national identity and overall

decrease in ethnic and geographical divisions;

growing acceptance by Sahelian leaders of the

necessity of policy reform and their initial success in implementing politically risky austerity

programs.

Nongovernmental Sahelian

Institutions

Nongovernmental institutions in the Sahel

have great potential to play key roles in the development and implementation of future strategies for agricultural and rural development.

Extremely diverse, nongovernmental institutions, including formal and informal ones, village level and national bodies, often have more

legitimacy with farmers and herders than government institutions. Their direct grassroots

associations put them in a strong position to

facilitate local participation and tap the benefits of traditional knowledge and agricultural

systems.

At the same time, however, many of these institutions display the same managerial, technical, and organizational problems as public

sector institutions. Their relatively greater effectiveness results largely because they are

small and insulated from major development

programs and projects. However, this presents

one important drawback: because these institutions are small and generally lack national

impact, increased support will likely have only

limited effects. It is also expensive and comPhoto credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

Small stone dikes can trap water, halt soil erosion, and

increase crop production. AID supports this work in

Niger. In Burkina Faso, an indigenous PVO works with

the regional government and a British PVO to help

farmers improve the same technology and to share it

with farmers in other regions of Burkina Faso and

several other countries.

plex to use such diverse, widely dispersed institutions.

Nongovernmental groups must be considered

within their political and economic context.

Giving greater roles to alternative local nongovernmental groups can cause conflicts with

groups currently holding economic and political power. A greater understanding of the dynamics of each of these groups and of the context in which they operate is necessary to

determine their potential role in the implementation of future development strategies. While

the diversity of nongovernmental groups makes

generalizations difficult, it is useful to consider

the merits of four basic types of institutions:

the traditional hierarchies, the indigenous community self-help groups, African private volun-
115

tary organizations (PVOs), and the African private sector.

Traditional Power Structures

The colonial and postcolonial experiences of

the Sahelian nations have reduced the importance of many precolonial social and political

structures, but some remain important in modified forms (e. g., the traditional chieftaincies),

and others has been enhanced through links

to the postindependence state (e. g., the Muslim Brotherhoods of Senegal). In the past, these

structures have not been major actors in donorsponsored agricultural development programs

in the Sahel. But they have a potential role to

play because they have influence in rural areas

and a n ability to mobilize people around such

issues as protection of the environment and

controlled grazing on communal pasture (86).

Additionally, such structures can provide improved access to traditional knowledge systems.

These potential benefits, however, must be

measured against some risks. Many experts see

these traditional hierarchies as inegalitarian

and working with them could exacerbate existing inequalities (60). The new government

of Burkina Faso, for example, is moving to limit

the power of the traditional chiefs. Nonetheless, the potential seems to justify more consideration of some traditional groups; one of

the lessons learned in the past decade is that

it is important to build on existing strengths,

including local leadership structures and incentive systems. In the Dire ́ zone of Mali, for instance, a Taureg Deputy has used his traditional

position to settle pastoral refugees devastated

by drought and introduced mixed sedentary

farming and livestock production.

Community Self-HeIp Groups

Community groups have long been major recipients for assistance from international private voluntary organizations. Whether defined

along family lineage, political, village, male/

female, age group, or ethnic lines, forms of

communal groupings exist in most Sahelian

countries. Many of these groups were formed

because of high labor requirements under traditional production systems or the need to mobilize resources at times of disaster or for ceremonial obligations. Their forms and methods

have evolved and multiplied with changes in

village economies and social systems. For example, groups have expanded the use of collective fields and communal gardens thus increasing the output of the available land and

providing more income. To reduce individual

risk and cash outlays, self-help groups often

share tractors, plows, wells, and other sizable

investments.

Community groups have had a much smaller

place in most direct official bilateral or multilateral aid programs. To an extent, this is because it is difficult and costly for major donors

such as the Agency for International Development (AID) to develop and implement programs

at the village level. Another reason, however,

has been that Sahelian governments have been

unwilling to support such direct approaches,

often seeing such community groups as threats

to their centralized administrations. Official

donor efforts to increase cooperation or incorporate these groups into larger rural development programs have met with varying degrees

of success, However, the failure of many past

agricultural development activities and the

search for alternatives focused on participation

have increased interest in informal village-level

institutions and have resulted in a loosening

of controls on village-level groups in several

countries,

Despite their potential, however, problems

have arisen in the relationship between community groups and donors, Generally donors

lack effective programming methods to work

with community groups. Donors sometimes actually compete to fund projects and hastily organized village groups appear with no other

raison d’etre than to receive such funding. Sudden influxes of funds and supplies often have

undermined the strengths of existing groups,

encouraged internal dissension, reduced in-
116

dependence, and substituted a “welfare mentality” for their original self-help orientation.

Sahelian Private Voluntary

Organizations

Sahelian PVOs have proliferated recently.

Different from community groups in their origins and larger in scope, most are organized

on religious, ethnic, or geographical lines. The

majority were formed during the past decade

and suffer from the same lack of management

and technical skills as their government counterparts, Because they have a potential ability

to mobilize important constituencies, they have

come into conflict with centralized bureaucracies and political groups.

Nonetheless, African PVOs are expanding

their role as effective intermediaries between

external donors and community groups. In several countries (Senegal, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso) they have formed into loose coordinating federations to share information, and

eventually, resources. Often governments and

externally based PVOs have encouraged and

supported this move. Despite their growing

strength and potential, the success of many

such groups is based on the dynamism or skills

of one or a few individuals. Their impact is

often as limited as that of more traditional community groups and designing programs to support them is equally difficult. In several cases,

their initiative and management capacity has

been overwhelmed by well-meaning donors trying to do too much too fast. Yet their potential

to mobilize people and resources at the village

level, linking them with resources from the outside, is an important strength to consider in designing an overall assistance effort.

The African Private Sector

A major change in donors’ development approaches over the past 5 years has been a new

emphasis on the role of the African private sector. In policy dialog, donors such as the World

Bank and AID are encouraging Sahelian governments to remove restrictions on their indigenous private sector and let it handle some

functions and services currently provided by

government agencies.

The Sahel private sector has shown vibrancy,

creativity, and success even under government

restriction (84). One example is the rapid development of small-scale private cereal milling

operations over the past 5 years. Many experts,

however, see actions to increase the capacities

of the private sector (e. g., training, credit programs, and careful subsidies) as being as important as removing restrictions.

Others, however, question how far and how

fast the private sector will be able to respond

(6) or even whether data are available to make

such an analysis (45). Private sector development is uneven among Sahelian States, being

best developed in Senegal. Government controls have produced a private sector profile

where the majority of firms are very small. The

relatively few larger firms often owe their position to State support rather than to higher efficiency.

The private sector is being encouraged to replace many parastatals, but not all the parastatals are equally inefficient, Many of the public

sector functions that donors are encouraging

Sahelian governments to give to the private sector involve activities that, due to high risk, geographical isolation, low profitability, or high

initial investment, are beyond the financial or

management capabilities of existing firms,

Others see the private sector as unlikely to provide even the minimal levels of subsidies essential to encourage farmers to adopt intensified practices. Finally, some experts point to

the lack of success of past small business development projects as evidence of the contradiction inherent in asking relatively inefficient

public sector organizations (be they Sahelian

or donor) to increase the efficiency of the private sector.

Finally, many small farmers and herders have

a long history of distrust of private grain merchants and traders—who because of their virtual monopoly would purchase agricultural

products at low prices following harvest, and

then resell them to the farmers at far higher
117

prices in later months. Similarly, the consumer tinue. From the farmers’ point of view, the govgoods these private traders provided in rural ernment parastatals provided at least some

areas were highly priced. The imperfect mar- hope of protection from unscrupulous private

ket conditions that fostered these abuses con- entrepreneurs.

U.S. ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to the Agency for International

Development (AID), many other U.S. organizations, public and private, are active in the

Sahel. These include private voluntary organizations (PVOs), the Peace Corps, the African

Development Foundation, private businesses,

and other agencies of the U.S. Government.

Each has different objectives, activities, and organizational strengths and weaknesses. Coordination among the various public agencies could

be enhanced by careful analysis of how each

institution can most effectively join in a comprehensive, better coordinated development

strategy. While the autonomy of private agencies and businesses is important, improved coordination with the directions agreed on in the

Club/CILSS process would bring many benefits. Specific analysis of the key U.S. institutions operating in the Sahel can help facilitate

the development and implementation of more

effective Sahel strategies.

U.S. Private Voluntary

Organizations

PVOs are nonprofit organizations established

by private citizens with a philanthropic purpose and they act to complement official assistance working in the Sahel. InterACTION, an

association of over 100 U.S. PVOs working in

international development, rehabilitation, and

relief, commissioned a survey of 150 U.S. PVOs

whose efforts account for 80 to 90 percent of

PVO aid to Africa and found that these U.S.

PVOs participated in many projects of varying

sizes in the Sahel (table 7-I).

Interaction estimates that 10 to 15 percent

of the $460 to $600 million spent in Africa by

U.S. PVOs in 1984 was spent in the Sahelian

countries (144). Initial estimates are that spendTable 7-1 .—U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations

(PVOs) in the Sahel

Number of Number of

Country PVOs projects

Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 82

Cape Verde. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 12

Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 30

The Gambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 39

Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 84

Mauritania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 34

Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 46

Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 100

SOURCE: InterACTION, Diversity in Developmenf U S Voluntary Assistance to

Africa Summary of Findings (New York InterACTION-American Council for Voluntary International Act Ion, 1985)

ing doubled in 1985 as a result of an outpouring for famine relief.

PVOs show a diversity of goals, activities,

funding sources, and memberships. They collaborate in a number of major coalitions: PACT

(Private Agencies Collaborating Together; 5 of

the 19 member agencies of this international

consortium are based in Latin America and

Africa), CODEL (Coordination in Development,

an ecumenical consortium of 40 religious-based

PVOs), and InterACTION. Some work only in

Africa, like Africare; others, such as CARE,

Save the Children, and Oxfam, have European

affiliates,

In 1984, PVO projects in Africa were divided

among the following sectors: community development (23 percent); refugee, famine, and

disaster relief (14 percent); food production and

agricultural development (12 percent); medicine and public health (12 percent); family planning and population (8 percent]; education (7

percent); water (6 percent); small enterprises

and income generation (4 percent); construction (4 percent); nutrition (3 percent); social wel-
118

fare (3 percent); and environment (1 percent)

(72).

The amount of public funding of PVOs increased after 1981 when the U.S. Congress directed the Agency for International Development to make available at least 12 and up to

16 percent of AID’s development and disaster

assistance funding to PVOs. The response to

the recent drought increased the amount of both

public and private funds available to U.S. PVOs

working in the Sahel. In 1985, Congress increased the PVO earmark from 12 to 13% percent for fiscal years 1986 to 1989. Congress defined PVOs as organizations obtaining at least

20 percent of their annual funding for international programs from nongovernmental sources

(131). However, funding available to PVOs

through AID’s Sahel Development Program

(SDP) account has declined from a high of

nearly $25 million in fiscal 1985 to less than

$12 million in fiscal year 1986 (71).

In 1984,60 percent ($270 million) of all U.S.

aid to Africa from PVOs was funded by the U.S.

Government. Nearly half of PVO aid to Africa

($220 million) was food aid, including the costs

of ocean freight for the Public Law-480 Food

for Peace Program. About 10 percent of PVO

aid ($50 million) was derived from U.S. AID

grants and contracts. Private cash contributions

amounted to about 20 percent ($100 million)

of the total. The private share was 30 percent

of the total when in-kind gifts (e.g., medicines)

and services are included (72). The largest two

PVOs, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and

CARE, together provided two-thirds of all PVO

aid to Africa. They received 70 to 80 percent

of their resources from the U.S. Government,

mostly Public Law-480 commodities and transportation costs. These ratios of government to

private funding for PVOs in Africa are probably similar to the ratios applicable in the Sahel, but specific breakdowns are not available.

The increase in public funding available to

U.S. PVOs has created dilemmas for their members and African counterparts (108). PVOs desire to maintain independence in their African

activities whether or not they accept public

funding. Some PVOs, for example, apply for

AID grants to support projects designed by

themselves. Yet, increasingly, they also apply

for contracts to do AID-designed work. Some

fear that the latter activities will either distort

or conflict with their other efforts. Other PVOs,

for example, the American Friends Service

Committee and Oxfam-America, have elected

not to accept any U.S. Government funding because they are reluctant to depend on the U.S.

Government financially for a variety of philosophical and other reasons.

Views differ regarding the efficacy of current

AID support of PVO activity in the Sahel. Several AID staff questioned the policy of earmarking a percentage of funds specifically for PVOs

because this requirement contributes to AID’s

inflexibility. Also, PVOs do not always have the

best record or expertise in the priority areas.

PVOs frequently complain about the length of

time required for AID funding approval and

about procurement restrictions (tied aid) that

require them to purchase U.S. equipment and

services, often to the detriment of the project.

While most PVOs now agree that their primary goal should be long-term development,

many of their resources continue to be dedicated to short-term relief and distributing food

aid. Even those PVOs that normally do not distribute food, like the Mennonite Central Committee and Church World Service, did so during the 1984 drought. This demonstrated one

of the strengths of the PVOs: their ability to

move quickly to implement relief programs

when the need arises. CRS and CARE, the

largest distributors of Public Law-480 commodities, distinguish between distribution of

emergency food aid for relief and their development programs using Food for Work, but

they stress the complementarily of the two programs (79).

With the return of rain to the Sahel in 1985,

PVOs are reassessing their immediate and longterm work. A large number are moving from

relief to rehabilitation and development. Many

are using Food for Work, private funds, or a

combination of private and public funds (Africare) to support projects to increase agricultural

production and restore the environment, such
119

— — .

as antierosion projects or small-scale irrigation

projects.

Some PVOs question the role of food aid in

development, especially since late 1985 when

U.S. surplus commodities competed with locally produced grain for storage and were said

to depress the price of local grain. In response,

PVOs such as Church World Service in Senegal and Freres des Hommes in Paris are planning ways to develop “triangular food aid”

where they purchase African-produced food

crops, store them, and sell them in food-deficit

areas, This provides relief but, at the same time,

increases market incentives for small farmers,

Other PVOs are seeking ways to improve grain

storage and reduce price fluctuations. For example, several PVOs have established grain

banks in villages where they help local communities purchase locally produced grains at

harvest and store them in the village for later

resale below rising market prices before the

next harvest to bypass private grain merchants.

However, the success of these efforts often depends on government cereal policies.

PVO Opportunities and Limitations

Alternative Approaches to Development.—

Many of the unrealistic expectations and mistakes in the Sahel were common to programs

of both official and private agencies working

with small farmers. In contrast to official assistance, PVO programs are said to be more participatory, people-to-people rather than government-to-government. In theory, most stress

bottom-up rather than top-down development,

and reach the poorest of the poor. Without the

many political constraints of official aid, PVOs

can often work in countries or areas where official bilateral aid programs cannot, and use more

experimental approaches. However, there is a

need for careful case-by-case evaluation of the

strengths and weaknesses of PVOs so they can

be more effective in the future (113). While this

evaluation is only beginning to be conducted

(72,120), most observers agree that the PVOs

have benefited many poor people, and that they

often have more freedom than official groups

to attempt alternative approaches to development.

Small Scale.—PVOs have the advantage of

being able to work with smaller projects, many

on a village level. In addition, they are able to

distribute relatively small amounts of money

and test pilot approaches. Most provide some

technical assistance and funding for materials,

but require that the village supply labor. While

some PVOs limit the scale of their projects because of limited resources, others receive large

sums from public or private sources and reallocate them to several projects or an activity

carried out in a number of locations. One good

example of this is the series of small-scale irrigation projects carried out by Africare.

Many PVOs have learned that they can work

effectively at a level above the village level, and

in turn increase their impact in the villages.

Some groups, like the Overseas Education Fund

in Senegal and the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee in Burkina Faso, have worked

with national-level Sahelian PVOs. Thus PVOs

also have an ability to strengthen local, regional,

and national institutions—and also can contribute to implementation of SDP strategies on

these levels.

Direct Access to Farmers and the Rural

Poor.—Most PVOs prefer to work at the grassroots level with local indigenous organizations.

Many stress village-level agricultural and rural development programs. While PVO headquarters are usually in the capital city, field staff

either travel to the villages or live in smaller

towns. Some PVOs employ African staff who

are from ethnic groups or rural areas where

projects are implemented. Some PVOs have

staff members who have worked in the Sahel

for a number of years, and speak fluent French

and an African language. This experience and

ability to use staff outside the capital city helps

PVOs overcome the common urban bias of

many assistance organizations. However, not

all PVO staff are equally skilled. Many need to

give more emphasis to less visible and well-off

groups. Nevertheless, direct access to farmers

gives PVOs a good opportunity to obtain ac59-965 0 - 86 – 5
120

curate data so policy makers can be better able

to judge the impact of their decisions,

Lower Costs.—U.S. PVOs are usually able to

implement projects at lower costs than other

U.S. groups for a number of reasons: 1) the pay

scales of their U.S. staff are lower than those

of other U.S. officials, consultants, or university personnel; 2) they often implement projects

using volunteer labor; and 3) their administrative costs generally are lower. U.S. PVO activities, however, may have higher costs than those

of African organizations, especially when tied

aid requirements or relatively costly U.S. personnel are involved,

Flexibility.—PVOs often are not as bureaucratic as official assistance agencies. They typically have simpler, less centralized decisionmaking processes and lack many political

constraints. Often the country director has authority to implement projects and flexibility in

managing them. PVOs have been praised for

their altruism and open-minded acceptance of

African realities. However, many PVOs complain about constraints connected with projects

funded by AID. Specifically, PVOs feel that the

need to design projects in detail long before they

are funded and the bureaucratic difficulty of

changing them midstream, as well as the length

of time required to approve and actually fund

projects, all act to hinder their flexibility and

effectiveness.

African Institution-Building.—Most U.S.

PVOs, like official donors, believe in acting in

partnership with Africans. But since U.S. PVOs

often have access to human, material, and financial resources that Sahelians do not, it can

be difficult to establish a mutual relationship.

Thus PVOs are not always as effective as they

could be in helping build institutional capabilities in the Sahel.

Most PVOs are oriented to work with nongovernmental organizations and do not provide

resources to governmental entities. In an effort

to run programs efficiently, PVOs sometimes

bypass public officials who they perceive as ineffective or they set up parallel structures to

public programs, thus undermining the effectiveness of those programs. African public officials have complained about the lack of communication and coordination with PVOs,

especially when the PVOs were setting up village organizations or projects that competed

with public agencies, indigenous institutions,

or other PVOs. This competition reduces the

effectiveness of local and regional institutionbuilding.

While U.S. PVOs often hire Africans as staff,

they infrequently work as true partners with

indigenous private organizations. This may be

due to the fact that the local PVOs are not structured the way U.S. PVOs are structured: the

indigenous PVO maybe working with only one

ethnic group, or in certain areas, or it may not

have a full-time staff or compatible financial

accounting system. There are, of course, cases

where PVOs have worked successfully with local organizations. For example, in Burkina

Faso, the Centre d’Etudes Economique et Sociales de l’Afrique Occidental provides training for village leaders working with Africare

and CRS projects. In several Sahelian countries

U.S. PVOs belong to coalitions of international

and indigenous PVOs. Yet there are difficult

issues of project control, funding constraints,

and operating styles to be resolved. The relationship becomes especially delicate when a

U.S. PVO channels U.S. AID funds to a local

PVO. Several observers mentioned the harmful effect of too much money being made available to local PVOs: the natural growth of these

groups was being distorted, new national PVOs

were springing up overnight and volunteerbased groups were pressured to hire staff.

Finally, the desire to have measurable results

to show its members or financial supporters

can create a situation where the staff of the U.S.

PVO do much of the work themselves, rather

than supporting the efforts of the local group

to carry out the project. This pressure to produce quantifiable results often constrains PVO

effectiveness in building local capacity, In the

African view, the major role of the outside

PVOs in Africa is to support and build the capacity of the African PVOs (70).

Impact of Projects.—One commonly voiced

criticism of the work of PVOs is that the small
121

scale of their activities limits their overall impact. PVOs are aware that there has been little

evaluation of the impact of their projects; they

acknowledge that it is difficult to judge the

cumulative impact of their work or replicate

successes (120). They note that too often PVO

projects do not have strong marketing or economic development components nor do they

take into account recurrent costs, which limit

sustainability. Lack of local involvement in the

design and implementation of projects and the

lack of local “ownership” of the project are key

constraints to sustained impact.

To increase their impact, some PVOs are

learning to plan strategically and to work in

coalitions. A current topic of discussion in these

groups is the role for PVOs in policy reform.

While there is little disagreement that macroeconomic conditions and policies can cause the

best-run projects to fail, most PVOs feel that

the policies and programs of African governments and overall political conditions favorable to development are needs that the U.S. PVOs

cannot address directly (72). Others feel that

PVOs with local experience and credibility,

especially those with successful economic development records, are in a good position to

provide data and advocate policy changes that

would benefit the poor. In some cases, PVOs

are engaging in policy reform on a local level.

For example, a windbreak project sponsored

by CARE in Niger resulted in local resolution

of tree tenure and land management reforms,

areas not yet included on AID’s policy reform

agenda (120). Some authorities note that the

long-term effects of empowering local organizations will eventually result in significant social, political, and economic change. The view

of African PVOs is that a principal role of outside PVOs is to seek changes in the policies of

their own countries conducive to development

in Africa (70).

Lack of Technical Skills.–Traditionally,

PVO staffs have not had a high level of technical expertise, Not surprisingly, PVOs have

made the same technical mistakes as the official programs regarding food crops and livestock in the Sahel. Some see their role as one

of diffusion of technology rather than development since their strength is at the grassroots

level. However, it is now generally accepted

that promoting the adoption of new agricultural

technologies takes a high degree of technical

skill as well as cultural sensitivity and socioeconomic understanding. In the past, this lack

of technical skills has created problems, For

instance, the lack of a research orientation by

PVO staff implementing a highly successful

project in Burkina Faso (reclaiming eroded

land) make it less likely that others can duplicate the project. A recent AID study of PVO

efforts worldwide concluded that the lack of

resources to collect baseline data before and

measure effectiveness after implementation, together with the absence of mechanisms for

sharing lessons learned from successes and

failures, were key PVO weaknesses (120).

Concern also exists that the distinction between PVOs and for-profit consulting firms is

becoming blurred by the increased government

funding available to the PVOs. For example,

the AID contract process encourages PVOs to

hire more technically qualified people but some

are now sending people without the experience,

language skills, and local understanding that

normally are PVO strengths.

Many of the characteristic strengths of the

PVOs can be used to increase their effectiveness in achieving some of the key objectives

of Sahelian development. Their limitations can

be compensated for with careful, coordinated

planning that includes an honest analysis of

their specific strengths and weaknesses in a

country or sector. However, to better achieve

this there is a need for documentation and careful evaluation of PVOs’ successes and failures

in the Sahel. AID and PVOs should study their

past performance in the Sahel—e.g., cost of tied

aid requirements, funding delays, lack of logistical support, problems caused by AID’s project

design and monitoring requirements—and use

this information to improve AID’s ability to

work more effectively with PVOs.

The Peace Corps

The Peace Corps has volunteers and programs in six of the nine countries of the Sahel
122

(Chad, Cape Verde, and Guinea Bissau are excluded). The goals of the Peace Corps—to foster development on a people-to-people basis,

promote understanding of the United States in

developing countries, and American understanding of developing country societies—are

achieved through a variety of programs. The

numbers of volunteers and the major programs

in each of the Sahelian countries in 1985 are

shown in table 7-2.

A number of the projects that volunteers are

engaged in relate directly to low-resource agriculture including work in agricultural research,

young farmer education, agricultural extension,

agroforestry and reforestation, wood stoves,

animal husbandry and health, agricultural

credit and marketing, wells, small-scale irrigation and vegetable gardening, wildlife, game

ranching, range management, seed production,

rice production, fisheries, and beekeeping (95).

In addition, many staff within AID, the multilateral institutions, and the PVOs working in

the Sahel are former Peace Corps volunteers.

Their knowledge of the local culture, language,

and country condition was an important consideration in their selection and gives them a

unique perspective on their new tasks. In 1982,

more than 10 percent of the AID work force

were former Peace Corps volunteers (124).

peace corps Opportunities and

Limitations

The Peace Corps shares some of the same institutional opportunities that PVOs enjoy: smallTable 7-2.—The Peace Corps in the Sahel

Number of Major Peace Corps

Country volunteers program areas

Burkina Faso . . . . 75 Teaching English,

agricultural education,

reforestation

The Gambia . . . . . 55 Health, nutrition, forestry

Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Woodstoves, water,

teaching English

Mauritania . . . . . . 48 Agricultural extension,

health education

Niger . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Education, nutrition,

forestry, health

Senegal . . . . . . . . . 95 Rural development,

forestry, health

Total . . . . . . . . . 478

SOURCE Peace Corps, Africa Region Briefing Book (Washington, DC: April 1985)

Photo credit: U.S. Peace Corps

This Peace Corps volunteer from Delaware works on

village gardening, nutrition education, and fuel-efficient

stoves in Mauritania.

scale projects, direct access to the farmers and

rural poor, and flexibility in programming. As

an independent government agency with a

worldwide program, the Peace Corps has less

flexibility and is not as free of political constraints as many of the PVOs. However, the

peace Corps’ funding base is more secure and

predictable than many PVOs.

Begun in 1984, a Peace Corps program called

the Africa Food Systems Initiative was set up

to be “a long-term (10 year) collaborative effort

assisting up to 12 African nations in their struggle to reverse the decline in per capita food production and attain self-sustaining food systems”

(96). Two of the four pilot countries involved

are in the Sahel: Mali and Niger. Building on

past Peace Corps experience, teams of volunteers will work in activities designed to resolve

problems of preproduction (land preparation,

water supply, inputs, agroforestry, animal

power, and implements); production (introduction of improved varieties and agronomic practices, fisheries, husbandry, and gardening); and

postproduction (processing, preservation, storage, marketing, and distribution). Most work

will be carried out on the village level.

The Africa Food Systems Initiative builds on

the trend to recruit more technically qualified

volunteers, while maintaining the traditional

strength of the Peace Corps on the community,
123

grassroots level. Its implementation will affect

recruitment, training, and programming.

The Africa Food Systems Initiative also builds

on a growing collaboration between the Peace

Corps and PVOs and AID. The collaboration

with PVOs has taken many forms: volunteers

assist PVO projects in their free time and have

been assigned to work on PVO projects. For

example, a fisheries Peace Corps volunteer

helped Africare establish a co-op in Niger. Africare, Partnership for Productivity, and

Aprovecho Institute have used Peace Corps

volunteers to carry out collaborative projects

in the Sahel (124). PVOs have provided materials and funding in response to volunteer requests. There are formal and informal systems

of information-sharing between the Peace

Corps and PVOs. Sometimes AID funding of

PVOs is also used by the volunteers working

on their projects.

Since the mid-1970s, increasing numbers of

peace Corps volunteers have been assigned to

work directly with AID projects. Collaboration

of the Peace Corps with AID has its risks as

well as benefits. The risk is that local people

might come to identify the Peace Corps with

an agency whose mission is more directly

linked to U.S. foreign policy. The benefits are

increased financial and technical resources

available to the Peace Corps and grassroots outreach for AID. AID has developed two “fast

funding” mechanisms for community-level development projects which are being used by

volunteers in the Sahel: the Ambassador’s Self

Help Fund ($50,000 to $100,000 depending on

the country and year for commodity procurement for self-help projects) and the Small

Project Assistance Program (a $40,000 fund in

each country to support community self-help

efforts identified with the assistance of

volunteers).

Institutionally, the Peace Corps shares several limitations with PVOs—those dealing with

overall impact and technical personnel. Institutional communication and coordination problems with the African government entities are

less than those encountered by PVOs. Because

of the short-term nature of the volunteer assignments, and emphasis on local community organization, local capacity-building is enhanced

by Peace Corps programming. However, because volunteers stay for short tours of duty

(normally 2 years) Peace Corps programming

has the built-in limitation of being short term

and lacking continuity. This high turnover also

helps account for the lack of an institutional

memory and written record of over 20 years

of Peace Corps village experience in the Sahel,

Such a documentation of the accomplishments

and lessons learned would provide valuable information for those planning programs and

activities in the Sahel.

The Peace Corps does not have a Sahel-specific development strategy or regional administrative structure for the Sahel. The Peace

Corps staff in Washington have responsibility

for a mix of Sahelian and West African coastal

nations; the Country Directors meet on a much

larger regional basis. This administrative structure prevents the Peace Corps from developing coordinated subregional programming and

training strategies that could better use scarce

resources and extend the impact of the Peace

Corps effort. Despite these limitations, the

Peace Corps has the potential to continue to

provide an important contribution to development in the Sahel according to the strategy objectives described earlier.

African Development Foundation

The African Development Foundation (ADF)

is designed to support local self-help development efforts. Congress authorized the establishment of the foundation in 1980 to fill the gap

between official U.S. assistance programs and

the needs at the grassroots level by delivering

assistance directly to people in rural communities and urban slums. Wholly supported by

public funds, the ADF funds small projects designed, implemented, managed, and evaluated

by Africans, who are required to include the

poor in this process to the maximum extent

possible.

The foundation began operations in fiscal

year 1984. When two officials resigned in the

first year, Congress requested the General

Accounting Office to evaluate ADF’s capacity

to carry out its mandate. There was congressional pressure to fund quickly and develop a
124

number of policies and strategies before fulltime staff was hired. The congressional awarding of “no-year” money was critical for the early

survival and growth of the ADF. ADF now

seems to be on its feet (135) with core staff in

place and funding proceeding according to its

5-year plan.

In the first 12 months of operation slightly

over $1 million was awarded to 13 projects in

7 African countries. While both grants, loans,

and loan guarantees are permitted, only grants

have been made. Grants have ranged in size

from $700 to $250,000, with an average size of

$70,000. The foundation is active in 14 countries in Africa, and has funded 70 projects.

Eleven projects have been funded in the Sahel

in Mali and Niger. The foundation will begin

work in Senegal and Mauritania in 1986. A review of the projects funded in the Sahel shows

that they take an integrated, local approach: several are helping transhument herders make the

transition to sedentary herding and include

complementary activities such as vegetable

gardening or poultry raising; others involve

integrated village development projects with

mixed livestock and food production, irrigation,

and other social services; and three are women’s income-generating cooperatives.

ADF Opportunities and Limitations

ADF has some of the same institutional opportunities as the PVOs: smallness of scale, direct access to the poor, lower costs, and flexibility (l). It also shares with the PVOs and Peace

Corps the limitations regarding smallness of

scale and impact, and these are accentuated

because it is so new,

However, the approach to development taken

by ADF differs from that taken most often by

both the other official programs and PVOs because it provides direct support to local community groups. While ADF does have funding

criteria, its congressional mandate enables it

to support development strategies and programs designed by Africans—rather than preselecting priorities and designing strategies and

projects with passive participation by Africans.

It is based on the assumption that development

is essentially an indigenous, self-directed process and that the role of outside assistance is to

support it,

In addition, African groups funded by ADF

are supported through local African technical

assistance, authorized to purchase equipment

and supplies on the local market, and are audited by African accounting firms selected by

the foundation. In waiving tied aid requirements, Congress’ intent was to strengthen African capabilities.

Because it provides direct support to local

self-help efforts, often business enterprises, local capacity-building is central to ADF’s mandate. Its first priority is to work with village

organizations, and its second priority is to work

with African intermediary organizations to provide technical assistance to the local groups,

thus strengthening both. Several of its funding

criteria are also designed to strengthen local

capacity: ADF requires that the poor participate in project design, implementation, management, and evaluation, as well as garner benefits from the project; funding is limited to a

maximum of 5 years to reduce dependency; and

ADF does not fund core salaries to increase the

chances of sustainability.

An important limitation on ADF’s contribution is its low priority in U.S. official development assistance. ADF was appropriated a total of $8,5 million between 1980 and 1985 and

an additional $3.87 million in fiscal year 1986

(out of a total of $15 billion for foreign economic

and military assistance). However, because of

the previous money made available, the Foundation’s fiscal year 1985 budget was $4.5 million and the fiscal year 1986 budget is programmed at $6.1 million.

The ADF mandate is clearly consistent with

many of the elements of the development approaches needed in the Sahel. However, the degree to which ADF projects actually achieve

these objectives, and the wider impact of the

projects it supports, have not yet been subject

to careful evaluation because funding started

so recently,
American Private investment

A number of donor agencies, including the

World Bank, AID, and several European

donors, have given increased attention to the

role of external private investment in Third

World development. Nonetheless, even though

there is some U.S. investment in the Sahel, the

potential for significant increases is extremely

limited for the short to medium term, Tourism

offers some potential for increased foreign investment, for example, in Senegal and The

Gambia, but the net benefits of tourism to the

local economy are reduced by the sector’s high

demand for scarce foreign exchange–e.g., both

to build and maintain the hotels and by negative social effects. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), which offers financing and insurance to U.S. investors to cover

exchange of local currency into dollars and

losses due to expropriation and war or revolution, has not financed any projects in the Sahel but has insured five investors in the Sahel:

four in Senegal and one in Niger. In Senegal

OPIC is insuring Mobil’s oil refinery, Citibank,

and two pharmaceutical projects of WarnerLambert/Park Davis; in Niger, OPIC is insuring Citibank.

There has also been some activity in Sahelian

nations by the Export-Import Bank, which supports U.S. exporters by enabling foreign buyers,

including governments, to purchase American

goods under various financing mechanisms.

However, the Bank does not consider the Sahel as very promising for private investment

and has limited its support to providing shortterm credit for private sector purchases in several countries,

OPIC and Export-Import Bank-supported

projects are the only primary U.S. investments

i n the Sahel. Most potential investors feel they

can make more money elsewhere. Using the

same logic as Sahelian farmers who chose not

to accept proposed agricultural packages—

businessmen feel there is not enough profitability in Sahel investment opportunities to offset

the risk.

Beyond the obvious linguistic and cultural

obstacles to increased U.S. private investment

125

in the Sahel, most of the major constraints to

increased investment in and trade with the

Third World identified by American business

respondents to a Fowler-McCracken Commission Survey are relevant to the Sahel (82). The

following policy-related constraints are of particular significance to U.S. business investors:

●

●

●

●

Complex investment Codes of the Sahelian

Countries: Based on French models of

heavy State intervention, regulation, and

control in the private sector, Sahelian investment codes are accompanied by a level

of bureaucratic and legal procedure unacceptable to most American investors.

Restrictions on Ownership and Repatriation of Profits: Most Sahelian States require

majority local partnerships and/or significant public sector interest in most investment categories and restrict the repatriation of profits.

Complex Labor Relations Legislation and

Relatively High Wage Rates: Minimum

wage legislation, social security benefits,

pension requirements, and the forms and

practices of labor relations make labor relatively high-cost for the skill level it represents.

Political Instability: Perceptions of political instability create a major disincentive

to foreign investment in the Sahel, Since

1980, the civil war in Chad with Libyan involvement, coups in Mauritania, an attempted take-over in The Gambia, and the

anti-capitalist rhetoric of the current government in Burkina Faso have increased

these uncertainties.

Despite efforts to alter disincentives, Sahelian

and donor governments alike have been unsuccessful in attracting much new investment, or

even, in some cases, of retaining past levels.

The overall decline of Sahelian economies, both

from production shortfalls and donor-encouraged (or imposed) austerity programs, has certainly been a factor in what amounts to a substantial net disinvestment in the area by private

capital since 1980. Other more structural constraints limit external private investment and

will continue to do so even if the economies
126

improve and policy obstacles are removed.

These include:

●

●

●

●

●

Poor Infrastructure: The lack of adequate

roads, ports, airports, railways, access to

inexpensive and reliable water and power

limit private opportunities in the Sahel.

Lack of Skilled Labor: General education

levels, literacy, and technical skills remain

lower in Africa than in almost any developing region, The costs of sending and supporting foreign management and skilled labor are increasingly high.

Small Market Size: The population and size

of African States, their poverty, deficiencies of marketing systems, customs differences between States, export restrictions,

and costs all cut the market size for African enterprises, limiting efficiencies of

scale and eroding potential profitability.

Underdeveloped Local Private Sector: The

indigenous private sector in many Sahelian

countries is poorly developed and this

limits opportunities for collaboration and

joint ventures.

Lack of Raw Materials or Access to Them:

With few exceptions (phosphate in Senegal, iron in Mauritania and potentially in

Senegal, uranium in Niger, and the principle industrial agricultural products: cotton, peanuts), the Sahel has few raw materials of industrial interest on which to build

industry. At the same time, port and customs constraints and transportation problems for the land-locked states limits the

economic viability of bringing in raw materials from the outside.

Little private capital currently flows into the

Sahel and it is offset by outflows repaying past,

external, private investment, For the low-income countries of Africa, outlays for repayment

of principal of private nonguaranteed loans exceeded funds from new loans by $74.1 million

between 1981 and 1984. If interest payments

are included in this calculation, African outlays exceeded funds from new loans by $279.8

million for this period (151). Accepting a basic

premise of the liberal free-market system, i.e.,

that capital will flow to the areas of greatest

opportunity, private investors see their potential role in Sub-Saharan Africa and particularly

the Sahel as more limited than development theoreticians would hope. The basic factors that

underlie these perceptions on the part of businessmen are unlikely to change in the short to

medium term. Thus, it does not seem that at

this time U.S. private business investors are

likely to be significant participants in the Sahel.

The many constraints to increased private investment notwithstanding, there are a variety

of prospects for economic development within

the Sahelian countries, and between them and

the coastal States, that donor agencies can

support—and perhaps even recruit the assistance of U.S. business in the long term. Some

of these opportunities are small scale, building on existing enterprises, The strategy for

achieving improved food security includes finding ways of increasing nonfarm incomes of both

rural and urban people. Agriculture-related industries can create links with farm-level agriculture production. Certain U.S. PVOs, such

as Partners for Productivity and Technoserve,

are already involved in this area, Alternative

sources of outside private investment may be

better suited to these types of activities than

are the larger U.S. multinational businesses. Private, church, and corporate foundations are

starting alternative investment funds, For example, the Ecumenical Development Cooperative Society and Women’s World Banking

make loans and equity investments in smallscale economic ventures in Sub-Saharan African nations on confessional terms, Corporate

social responsibility groups may be recruited

to provide financial or technical support. In the

short term, there is a need to collect information on sources of private funding in the United

States that could be used by PVOs and others

working in the Sahel,

In addition, some people interested in increasing U.S. private investment in developing countries recommend increasing the role

of OPIC. Possibilities include restoring funding for direct financing of projects and investment feasibility y studies—but targeting them to

support the strategies necessary in the Sahel.

Both could be helpful in developing long-term
business development strategies for investors

interested in the Sahel.

Other U.S. Federal Agencies

Coordination problems increase with the

number of actors involved, especially when

each has a different goal and perspective. While

a certain amount of diversity in approach is to

be expected among U.S. Government agencies

whose work affects the Sahel, agreement on an

overall development strategy for the region

would help increase the impact and avoid waste

of public funds. Improved awareness by each

of the actors of the objectives, strategies, and

programs of the others could help improve matters. AID, because of its participation in the

Club/CILSS process, is in a particularly good

position to take more active leadership in trying to improve coordination among the U.S.

Government agencies with programs affecting

the Sahel.

Although AID and the State Department play

the major policy roles in development assistance to the Sahel, other Federal agencies make

important contributions. The U.S. Department

of Agriculture, particularly because of its role

in influencing policy for large amounts of food

aid, is key among the other U.S. Federal agencies. In addition to its departments with jurisdiction over food aid, other USDA departments

and programs which have valuable contributions to make to Sahelian development include:

the Office for International Cooperation and

Development in training and technical assistance (this office managed the Sahel Manpower

Development Program); the agricultural research programs supported by the Agricultural

Research Service, the Cooperative State Research Service, and the Forest Service; and the

Economic Research Services,

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the Department of Commerce

has used its expertise in climate assessment in

support of Sahelian development. Through

such techniques as satellite imagery and data

collection from Sahelian countries, NOAA

compiles rainfall and crop production data used

in a Famine Early Warning System run in con127

— —. .

junction with AID. However, present techniques better estimate crop productivity per

acre than total production. NOAA also supports

the Sahelian Regional Center for Agrometeorology and Applied Hydrology (AGHRYMET) located in Niger.

Because of its role in relation to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, the

Treasury Department is also an important U.S.

actor. Monetary policies and debt issues of Sahelian countries in particular are affected by

its actions. OPIC has already been mentioned,

as has been the Export-Import Bank. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget, because of its key role in allocation of public funds

for all other agencies, is another key actor.

Insofar as AID funds the activities of various private organizations, including U.S.

universities and private firms, such as consulting firms, it clearly has a role in coordinating

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

NOAA, along with AID, supports the Sahelian Regional

Center for Agrometeorology and Applied Hydrology

near Niamey, Niger.
128

their individual efforts. For example, through

the Board for International Food and Agricultural Development, AID supports agricultural

research efforts of U.S. universities. Especially

important are those of the Collaborative Research Support Programs (CRSPs) in which

U.S. universities work together with research

institutions in developing countries. The CRSPs

active in the Sahel are: sorghum/millet, peanut,

bean/cowpea, and tropical soils. (See table 7-3.)

This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. If AID

is to take a leadership role in improving coordination among U.S. agencies active in the Sahel, one of the first steps would be a careful

identification of the various U.S. programs that

either currently do—or could have—bearing on

more effective achievement of the strategic

directions described earlier. Coordination

could occur both in-country and in Washington.

Table 7-3.—Collaborative Research Support Programs

(CRSPs) Active in the Sahel

CRSP Countries U.S. universities

Sorghum/millet . . Burkina Faso Kansas State University,

The Gambia Purdue University, and

Mali Texas A&M

Niger

Senegal

Peanut . . . . . . . . . Burkina Faso University of Georgia and

Niger Texas A&M

Senegal

Bean/cowpea . . . Senegal University of California

at Riverside, University of

California at Davis, and

University of Arizona

Tropical soils , . . Niger Texas A&M

SOURCE: U.S. Agency for International Development, Board for International

Food and Agricultural Development, May 1986.

MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL DONORS

In addition to understanding Sahelian institutions, it is important to examine the Sahel’s

partners in development—the international

donors. The aftermath of the Sahelian drought

of 1968 to 1973 witnessed not only more than

a trebling in donor assistance but also an unprecedented proliferation of the number of external organizations involved. They are bilateral

and multilateral, governmental and private;

they provide technical assistance, loans, grants,

training, commodities, or merely good will. The

diversity of these organizations is great—from

their goals and objectives, to their strategies and

methods of operation. Given their great investment in the Sahel and the influence they collectively have on development activities, the

characteristics of these donor organizations

have fundamental implications for the implementation of Sahel development strategies.

In 1984, total official development assistance

(ODA) committed to the CILSS countries was

$1.9 billion: about 69 percent of the assistance

was through bilateral channels and 31 percent

through multilateral agencies (32). After steadily

rising through the 1970s, total ODA peaked in

1981, declined through 1983, and rose nearly

to its 1981 level in 1984 because of increased

levels of emergency food aid (26). The United

States contributed 9 percent of the total ODA

from 1975 to 1983;1 however, the U.S. commitment of $274 million in 1984 was 14 percent of the total. (Club statistics include all U.S.

aid, not just development assistance under the

SDP.) Including its contributions to the multilateral organizations, the United States is an

important but not predominant donor in the

Sahel. (See table 7-4 and app. A tables A-1

through A-4.)

At the heart of the Club/CILSS framework is

the commitment of the donors to work together

with the CILSS countries in a coordinated approach to achieve Sahelian development. While

the various donors have a diversity of strengths

and resources, some of them are more important in relation to the regional strategies than

others. The number and diversity of actors increases coordination problems and the potential for duplication and conflicting priorities,

However, the diversity of strengths also enIData regarding ODA in this section is from Club du Sahel/

CILSS, Official Development Assistance to CILSS Member Countries in 2983 (Paris: OECI), 1985) un]ess otherwise noted.
129

Table 7-4.—ToP 10 Donors to Sahelian Member

Countries, 1975-83 (U.S. dollars)

Millions of Percent of

Donor U.S. dollars total aid

France. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,247 18

European Economic Community . . 1,540 13

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,067 9

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,041 9

World Bank/International

Development Association . . . . . . 998 8

Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 792 6

United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 609 5

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554 5

The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439 4

African Development Bank . . . . . . . 411 3

Total of top 10 donors . . . . . . . . 9,698 80%a

Total commitments, 1975-83....12,201

NOTE In 1984 $192 btlllon was the total committed

aof total Of flclal Development Assls!ance

SOURCE Club du Sahel/CILSS, Off/c/a/ Deve@ment Assistance to CILSS

Member Counfnes In 1983 (Paris Organization for Economtc Coop

eratlon and Development 1985)

hances the ability to deal effectively with the

various challenges of Sahelian development (the

interrelated technical, policy, and institutional

issues), at various levels (farm, village, national,

and regional levels).

The different multilateral and bilateral donors

active in the Sahel have different institutional

strengths and weaknesses arising from different purposes, perspectives, and histories. There

are important differences in size of programs,

scale of programs and projects, sectors within

which each operates, types of assistance provided, and approaches to development.

Size of Programs and Trends

Decisions about the total resources to commit to recipient countries are made independently by each donor as are many other decisions

regarding types of assistance and approaches

to development.

The largest bilateral donors from 1975 to 1983

were France, the Federal Republic of Germany,

the United States, and Saudi Arabia. The largest

multilateral programs were those of the European Economic Community (EEC), the World

Bank’s International Development Association

(IDA), the U.N. agencies–World Food Program

(WFP), U.N. Development Program/Food and

Agriculture Organization (UNDP/FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development

(IFAD), and the African Development Fund of

the African Development Bank (ADB).

France remains predominant among the

donors in the Sahel, continuing its historical,

cultural, and economic ties with its former colonies, Many French expatriates are involved in

governmental and parastatal bodies as technical advisors and Sahelian governments receive

a sizable portion of the external assistance under the French Assistance and Cooperation

Fund (FAC). Recognizing the increasing costs

of maintaining its influence over the region after independence, France successfully pursued

a strategy to involve other European donors in

providing assistance, especially through the

EEC.

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC), who together with their multilateral institutions are another significant set

of donors, also have historical, cultural, and political ties with the Sahelian nations including

membership in the nonaligned movement and

pan-Islamic movements. Petroleum income influences OPEC’s levels of funding: after peaking in 1981 at $425 million, OPEC funding declined to $300 million in 1982 and leveled off

near $200 million in 1983 and 1984 (15 percent

and 12 percent of total ODA in 1983 and 1984).

While the OPEC nations are reducing their

assistance, others are increasing theirs, in part

as a response to the drought. Some bilateral

donors, for example the Canadians and Dutch,

are increasing their assistance. Other donors

new to the Sahel, such as Italy, Japan, and some

PVOs, are now designing aid programs. Some

donors are active only in Sub-Saharan Africa;

for example, the Economic Development Fund

(EDF) of the EEC and the ADB. Other donors

conduct programs throughout the world but

give special status to the Sahel, such as France

and the United States. Some donors concentrate the majority of their resources in one country: Sweden to Cape Verde, England to The

Gambia, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to

Mauritania. Senegal has received the most

assistance (from 1974 to 1982); The Gambia,

Cape Verde, and Chad have received the least.
130

Project Size and Scale

The regional development strategies in the

Sahel include a role for both large- and smallscale projects. Certain donors fund large programs and projects, including the World Bank,

IFAD, the OPEC nations, and AID. Because

some types of projects or programs require

larger amounts of funds, such as capitalintensive infrastructure (roads, dams and river

basin development), balance of payments and

budget support, food aid, multisector (integrated) rural development, funders who emphasize these projects tend to be the larger

donors who make large commitments. The

lending institutions generally make larger commitments than grant-making ones: the French

Central Fund for Economic Cooperation, ADB,

and IFAD make large average commitments.

However, some grant-making institutions, such

as AID and EEC’s EDF, have a tendency to

make larger grants than others.

Size of commitment and scale of project generally show a positive correlation. Large

projects, however, can impede local development. For example, large sums of money sometimes can be counterproductive for small,

community-based, approaches, According to

one analysis of the World Bank’s effort to implement a poverty-oriented approach, the need

to move large amounts of money was a major

constraint to its success (3), IFAD is unique in

its attempts to resolve the tension between

large- and small-scale approaches: it commits

large amounts of money to projects carefully

designed and monitored for impact on a small

scale and local level, AID also has attempted

to resolve this tension by providing large grants

to U.S. PVOs for similar projects in a number

of villages.

Sectors Where Funders Operate

Various donors concentrate their resources

on different sectors (see table A-4 in app. A).

Most of France’s funds from 1975 to 1983, for

instance, were for technical assistance, budget

support, and rainfed and irrigated agriculture.

During the same period the United States concentrated on food aid, rainfed agriculture, multisector rural development, and technical assistance. The OPEC nations primarily supported

transportation and other infrastructure, multisector rural development, and balance of payments and budget support. EEC focused on

food aid, balance of payments support, infrastructure, and multisector rural development.

By coordinating complementary activities,

donors can obtain greater impact and use resources more efficiently (17), For example,

France provides as much funding for agricultural research as the United States, but places

most of its funds and technical expertise in the

national agricultural institutions, with a small

part going to the international research institutions. This is the reverse of U.S. support. The

need for more effective collaboration between

the national and international agricultural research institutions reflects a need for closer collaboration among donors,

In each of the sectors, several bilateral and

multilateral donors predominate, For example,

the World Bank/IDA and the United States have

major programs in forestry and ecology. Since

the mandate of the United Nations SudanoSahelian Office (UNSO) was expanded in 1978

to help 19 African nations combat desertification (working together with the U.N. Environmental Program), most of the projects UNSO

now supports in the Sahel deal with conservation issues.

Donors’ priorities change over time, New

commitments to river basin development and

livestock have been declining recently, while

support for food aid and rainfed and irrigated

agriculture have been increasing (see table A5 in app. A). The World Bank’s increased emphasis on agriculture and rural development

in the 1970s was an integral part of its Basic

Human Needs Approach; now its published research and policy statements also stress other

issues, including policy reform, population, and

environment, However, donors’ stated priorities may differ from the actual allocation of resources, The Club/CILSS strategy stresses forestry and environment in its policy statements,

yet these areas receive less than 2 percent of

the funds allocated. Most major donors call for

direct assistance to small farmers, while the ac-
131

tual allocation of funds supports large-scale

projects with only indirect benefits for farmers.

For example, the greatest amount of IDA loans

to the Sahel from 1975 to 1983 were for transportation and infrastructure ($276 million) and

irrigation projects ($121 million; see table A-4

in app. A), while agricultural projects stressed

export and irrigated, import-substitution crops.

Types of Assistance

Donors provide different general types of

assistance to countries or sectors within

countries—grants, loans, food commodities,

and technical assistance. Certain donors may

prefer some types of assistance while recipients may prefer others. Assistance from multilateral organizations or aid packages from several donors can provide the flexibility to match

available assistance with the needs of recipients.

A number of institutions award grants: EDA

of EEC, France’s FAC, AID, and the UNDP.

Others provide loans: e.g., the World Bank,

France’s CCCE, IFAD, and ADB. In the Sahel,

more development assistance has been in the

form of grants than loans. However, the trend

is for an increasing portion to be loans: the 1980

to 1983, 3-year average of ODA provided to the

CILSS countries was 65 percent grants and 35

percent loans, but the annual percent of grants

declined from 67 to 62 percent during this time.

France, for example, provided two-thirds of its

assistance in 1983 in loans (through CCCE) and

one-third in grants (through FAC).

Most development lenders make loans both

at market rates and on better-than-market, concessional terms, but only loans on discounted

terms (e.g., loans by IDA of the World Bank and

African Development Fund of ADB) are considered part of development assistance. Because of their poverty, the Sahelian nations usually receive confessional loans from these

institutions; Senegal is the only nation that has

received nonconcessional loans from the World

Bank.

Even though confessional terms delay the impact, these loans eventually must be repaid.

While the multilateral lending institutions play

a major role in designing the projects they fund,

the Sahelian governments face the greater

financial risk of whether or not the projects

succeed, The lending institutions’ first goal is

ensuring that previous loans are repaid, a perspective that may lead to some conflict with

the Sahelian countries’ development priorities,

Related tensions exist between donors with

differing amounts of grant and loan funds for

a certain country or sector, between concessional and market rate lenders, and between

lenders whose mandates require short-term

payback and those with “softer” terms. This

situation clearly calls for increased collaboration among donors on a country-by-country basis. Until now, however, donor discussions on

debt primarily have related to debt rescheduling.

Another form of assistance is to provide commodities, especially food aid, which may be distributed by recipients as emergency food, used

in Food-for-Work type programs, or sold by Sahelian governments at subsidized or market

rates. Donors may give commodities free of

charge or sell them on confessional terms to

Sahelian nations. The United States and other

nations provide food aid through bilateral and

multilateral channels. The United States, the

U.N. WFP, and EEC are major providers of this

type of aid in the Sahel. Food aid totaled 14 percent of ODA to the Sahel in 1983, before the

height of the drought, and 40 percent of it was

provided by WFP. WFP, which provided 60 percent of all U.N. assistance to the Sahel in 1983,

distributes commodities received from the

United States and other nations. At one time,

its food assistance included animal feed (important for the pastoralists in the Sahel) but this

is no longer the case (55). In its analysis of trends

over the past decade, the Club/CILSS concluded

that food aid had grown even in years of normal rainfall, an annual average rate of growth

of 7 percent from 1975 to 1983. This shows that

the food aid is increasingly accepted as normal and that commodities are being used more

as a form of budget support and less for emergency aid (25). The major drawback of this type

of aid is its possible negative effect on incentives for domestic food production.
132

The actual extent of these negative impacts

is controversial. In a recent survey of food production and food policies in 20 Sub-Sahara African nations, including all the CILSS nations

but The Gambia, the Congressional Research

Service was unable to find any empirical studies

on the effect of food aid on recipient government agricultural policies or on prices received

by farmers (63). The role of food aid in relation

to Sahelian agricultural development, especially in relation to food policy reform, needs

to be carefully evaluated. In this area, as in so

many others, there is also a need for concerted

effort among the donors.

Many donors, including France, the United

States, and FAO, also provide technical assistance. Technical assistance is usually classified

as a grant or loan even if the money is used

to pay salaries and expenses of a person from

a donor country, a practice that recipients feel

reduces the value of such aid. The quality of

foreign technical assistance to the Sahel has

been mixed and the costs are very high. Questions can be raised as to its appropriateness,

especially regarding the lack of Sahel-specific

experience of outside experts, and the degree

to which this limits institutional development

of the recipients.

The UNDP provides U.N. funds and coordinates U.N. projects in Sahelian countries with

technical assistance provided by other U.N.

agencies, often FAO. Some projects are implemented by a U.N. agency, but financed bilaterally. In addition, the technical assistance may

be in the form of assistance to raise funds from

other sources. For example, UNSO, set up in

1973 to coordinate assistance of the U.N. agencies in the CILSS countries and help the Sahel

recover after the drought, identifies projects

supported by the African governments and then

finds other bilateral or multilateral donors to

fund them. While its administrative costs are

borne by UNDP, it acts as a broker with an array of funders (including other African nations)

rather than as a funder itself.

Many donor countries, like the United States,

provide all of these types of assistance, sometimes through different agencies. In addition,

there are other forms of assistance, such as loan

guarantees and equity investments, and differences in how they are provided. Some donors

prefer to be the sole funder of a large, visible

project while others prefer to co-finance

projects with other donors; I FAD, for example,

has co-financed half of its projects with the

World Bank.

Faced with such an array of actors and mechanisms of support, Club du Sahel Executive Secretary Anne de Lattre concludes that the best

starting point for donor coordination is:

. . . to introduce low-key, technical coordination mechanisms at the country level starting

with various sectors [e. g., irrigation, reforestation) where responsible nationals and donors

can discuss ongoing projects, try to solve pending problems, and use their experience to plan

more successful initiatives (38).

A Variety of Strengths

Donors possess a variety of strengths in the

substantive areas of the overall development

strategy directions that are needed in the Sahel. Some PVOs and the Peace Corps, as well

as volunteers from other nations, are commonly

perceived to have a comparative advantage in

grassroots or village level work. The World

Bank and United States are considered strong

in macroeconomic analysis and policy reform

while the United States and France are experienced in agricultural research. The United

States and West Germany have skills and experience in forestry; the Dutch are strong in

small-scale irrigation. Of course, at any given

time in a specific country, the strengths of the

personnel available in assistance organizations

will vary.

However, the perceived strengths need to be

reviewed critically. For example, a concern exists regarding the process by which analysis

for the World Bank’s recommendations for policy reform is carried out, This is particularly

important because the Bank is seen as providing the lead for AID and other donors that lack

the World Bank’s capability for economic

analysis.
133

Reasons for the World Bank’s relative

strengths in policy reform include the advantage it has as a multilateral organization and

because of its relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), though there is

concern about lack of coordination between the

World Bank and IMF (17,99), Because of the

Bank’s centralized structure, most of the economic analysis is done by the Bank’s economists in Washington, where 94 percent of the

Bank’s staff work (3). Criticisms are often heard

that economic analysis is based on generalizations, untested beliefs such as the efficacy of

the private market, and that these are applied

to all countries without much sensitivity to social and economic costs to the people or political costs to the government of a specific

country.

So far, policy reform theories are largely untested in the Sahel. One official in a French development agency suggested that some economic advice is derived more from ideology

than analysis, This criticism has been directed

at the United States, the World Bank, and other

donors supporting policy reform and who make

it a condition of their assistance.

A Diversify of Approaches

Donors take different approaches regarding

degrees of centralization and intensity of management, whether they employ a top-down or

bottom-up approach, and degrees to which their

programs are influenced by other goals such

as political or commercial interests. Some assistance programs are very centralized, with the

vast majority of their staff in headquarters (e. g.,

World Bank/IDA and I FAD), while others have

a number of field offices and large numbers of

staff in the Sahel (e. g., AID, UNDP, and FAO).

Some donors (e.g., France) combine centralized

approaches with field staff. Whether these

differences are advantages or not is hard to

judge. Some see the small number of World

Bank field staff as an institutional constraint

preventing implementation of the Bank’s professed poverty alleviation policy; but it also can

be seen as an advantage over AID in that once

the Bank funds projects, it is not closely involved in their implementation (105). Management approaches also vary, Different donors

require different numbers of people to administer a given amount of money, with those that

fund large, capital-intensive loan programs generally requiring smaller numbers of field staff,

Some programs and projects are more management-intensive than others, For example,

one of the strategic elements described as important in previous chapters is the need for local participation and village level programming. Development, support, oversight, and

evaluation of these types of programs require

significant amounts of staff time in relation to

sums disbursed. The benefits of such an approach for achieving the goal of providing more

effective assistance to Sahelian food security—

on the national, regional, and individual level—

argue against further cuts in field staff and for

relieving field staff of some requirements, They

also argue for greater use of Sahelian staff and

organizations, perhaps on a contractual basis,

and PVOs. They also indicate a need for a reduction or simplification of a number of reporting requirements for the local-level project implementors.

Another basic difference in approach is the

degree to which a particular donor espouses,

and then implements, a top-down or bottomup approach to development. Many PVOs, the

Peace Corps, IFAD, and the African Development Foundation, for example, espouse a

bottom-up approach. On the other end of the

spectrum are highly capital-intensive, largescale, top-down government-oriented funding

programs that favor infrastructure and balance

of payments. The rural development strategies

of the large funders, including the World Bank

and AID, encourage bottom-up, participatory

development. However, their size and institutional characteristics constrain their ability to

develop and implement programs based on

those goals.

Another difference in approach among

donors is the degree to which they are influenced by goals unrelated to development. The

Dutch program, for example, has been characterized as more development oriented and less
134

tied to commercial interests than other bilateral

programs. The political pressures of groups

such as American and European farmers, Italian engineering firms, and Japanese and U.S.

automakers, often result in policies that lessen

the effectiveness of development assistance, For

example, tied aid requirements limiting the recipient to procure goods and services in the

donor country affected 43 percent of bilateral

ODA from DAC countries in 1982 to 1983.

These requirements not only reduce the value

of the assistance but also result in the introduction of inappropriate technologies. While most

of the European donors have tied aid requirements similar to the United States, the OPEC

nations and multilateral agencies do not (147).

An oft-cited advantage of multilateral aid is

that it is not tied to the commercial or shortterm political objectives of individual nations

(57,147), although others challenge both of these

assumptions (3,94,99). A greater proportion of

multilateral funding goes to low-income countries than does bilateral aid. Most bilateral funds

go to middle income developing countries,

often for nondevelopmental purposes (147).

Bilateral aid is an increasing percentage of total U.S. assistance.

Within the diversity of donor organizations

and forms of assistance, each has relative

strengths and weaknesses. The scope of the

challenge in the Sahel is broad enough so there

is a role for each, Since no one donor can meet

all the needs, collaboration is essential to maximize the impact and make the best use of

scarce resources. An effective U.S. strategy

should be based on a determination of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various

institutional actors and forms of assistance.

Such an analysis must begin by considering

U.S. institutions and the potential they have for

contributing to the Sahel.

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Appendixes
Appendix A

Appendix Tables

Table A-1 .—General Commitments Trend by Different Donors From 1975 to 1983, DACa Countries

(thousands of U.S. dollars)

Donors 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 2,230 $ 38 — — — —

Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Finland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

France . . . . ..., . . . . . . . . . .

Ireland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . .

Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . .

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

West Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . .

370

7,536

66,789

3,490

177.194

800

2,510

8,347

1,130

1,970

4,047

6,925

71,322

137,423

1,152

24,252

41,901

5,632

19

277,675

290

46,864

57,914

8,718

5,761

18,324

24,768

123,244

135,802

$ 833

21,591

10,730

19,160

519

319,216

29

710

38,747

86,883

3,969

16,384

11,967

8,798

130,111

93,509

$ 2,904

24,161

69,727

2,116

618

384,068

2,550

26,590

49,437

1,851

2,962

38,556

6,830

143,322

209,760

$ 15,887

38,820

7,306—

302,281

—

25,270

23,058—

8,365

22,661

7,210

144,360

164,517

$ 17,237

65,147

23,564—

144,099

33,843

30,425

63,535

151

8,268

28,362

11,175

139,357

44,341

Total DAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $492,083 $772,354 $763,156 $965,452 $759,735 $609,504

= Not available

aDAC_The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

SOURCE” Club du Sahel/CILSS, Official Development Assistance to CILSS Member Countries in 1983(Pans.Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,

1985)

Table A-2.–General Commitments Trend by Different Donors From 1975 to 1983,

Multilateral institutions (non.OPECa) (thousands of U.S. dollars)

Donors 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

international Development Association/

World Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 78,700 $110,100 $122,000 $166,300 $93,200 $127,000

European Economic Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61,793 240,194 180,063 239,224 202,474 152,921

African Development Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,554 44,302 34,326 58,641 73,713 51,174

International Fund for Agricultural

Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,650 22,400 19,702 10,986 13,000

Cultural and Technical Development Agency . . . 320 2,546 2,025

West African Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

— —

5,814

International Monetary Fund Trust Fund . . . . . . .

— —

22,445 — —

Total multilateral aid(l) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $166,367 $410,792 $389,073 $483,867 $380,373 $344,095

Total United Nations (2)...... . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,607 78,082 101,227 97,790 72,020 110,304

Total(1) + (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $216,974 $488,874 $490,300 $581,657 $452,393 $454,399

= Not available

%PEC–The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

SOURCE: Club du Sahel/CILSS, Of f/cia/ Deve/opn?enf Ass/stance to C/LSS Member Countries In 1983 (Paris” Organization for Econornlc Co.operat Ion and Development,

1985)

145
146

Table A-3.—General Commitments Trend by Different Donors From 1975 to 1983,

OPECa Countries and Institutions (thousands of U.S. dollars)

Donors

Algeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Arab Bank for Economic Development

in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Arab Fund for Economic and Social

Development of the United Nations. . . . . . . . . .

Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African

and Arab Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Islamic Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Kuwait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OPECa Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SAFAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1975

$2,426

—

—

—

—

900

—

29,242

8,242

1,810

—

7,500

12,900

20,868

14,008

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

— $ 2,000 $ 100 — $ 4,500

15,009

31,390

17,600 — 326 $ 9,000

$ 35,000 — — 6,671

— — — —

50

950

15,442

55,574

30,130

110

30,600

1,000

—

35,000

9,097

85,706

—

13,030

17,750

—

46,610

6,000

40,460

34,680

—

48,181

24,212

136,002

1,400

—

59,520

—

—

102,221

53,751

8,113

26,371

—

34,000

3,300

—

67,930

13.263

—

41,060 — —

—

116,788

31,449

—

160,064 11,098

50.552 —

Total OPEC countries and financial

institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $97,896 $361,420 $248,243 $425,713

%PEC—The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countnes.

$301,831 $195,853

SOURCE” Clubdu Sahel/CILSS, Officla/ Deve/oprnenf Ass/stance foC/LSSfden?ber Courrtfiesifl 1983(Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operatton and Development,

1985)

Table A-4.—Who Finances What in Certain Sectors (total commitments, 1975.83)

Millions of Millions of

U.S. dollars Percent U.S. dollars Percent

Balance of payments support:

OPECa 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technical assistance:

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

290

253

75

48

42

13

776

92

57

38

62

7

5

3

EECb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Food aid and emergency

assistance:

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Multisectoral rural development

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IDAC 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Irrigated farming:

IDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Budget support:

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rainfed agriculture:

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

23

10

9

9

146

144

119

114

51

16

16

13

13

6

344

299

135

121

113

Ecology-forestry:

IDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

437

183

150

109

103

88

33

14

11

8

8

7

33

32

23

22

15

17

16

12

11

8

Transport and infrastructure:

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

454

276

236

136

108

29

17

15

9

7

121

119

102

90

18

17

13

15

240

208

30

47

40

IDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

%PEC–The Organization of Petroleum ExDortina Countries

bEEc–EUrOpea~ECOnOmlC Community. ‘

 -

CIDA—lrltematlOnal I)ewdopment AssociationlWorld Bank.

SOURCE” Club duSahel/CILSS, Officia/ Deve/opmentAssisfance to C/LSSMemberCountriesin 1983(Paris0 rgantzation forEconomicCo-operation and Development

1985)
147

Table A-5.—Sectoral Breakdown and Trend of

Commitments From 1975 to 1983

Percent of Growth

total a a i

d trend

Nonproject assistance:

● Development assistance

(technical assistance,

research, scholarships) . .

● Operating assistance

(including balance of

payments and budget

support) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Food aid, emergency

assistance . . . . . . . . . .

Project assistance:

. Rainfed agriculture. . . . . . . . . .

• Irrigated agricuIture . . . . . .

. Major river basins (OMVS,

C

OMVG

d

) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Reforestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● Infrastructure (transport,

telecommunications, urban

development) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● Education and training . . . . . .

. Water supply

(rural and urban) . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Health . . . . . . . . . . .

. Industry and tourism . . . . . . . . .

12.4 down

11.0 down

10.7 up

9.3 up

7.6 up

6.9 27.4 Up down

2.4 down

1 .2 up

1,5 up

19.6 up

4.9 up

3.8 down

3.0 up

2.9 up

2,0 down

aAverage I 975.83 commitments blt ,~ estimated that half of these commitments are for food production, i e 45

percent

cThe Senegal River Basin Development Authority

dThe Gambia River Basin Development Authority

SOURCE” Club du Sahel/CILSS, Of fwial Development Assistance to C/LSS

Member Counfr/es in 1983 (Pans Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1985)
148

Table A-6.—U.S. Aid to the Sahel, Fiscal Years 1975 to 1985 (millions of U.S. dollars)

Country 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

Burkina Faso:

Economic assistance . . $ 5.3 $ 1.6 $3.4 $ 11.4 $ 15.9 $ 9.2 .% 14.1

Food aid . . . .

$ 11.2 $ 0.3

3.6 3.6 8.1 8.3

$ 2.8

9.5 12.2 15.1 6,8 7.2 $ 16.1 6.5

Peace Corps . . . . . . . 0.7 1.0 1,0 1.0 1.3 1.6

Military assistance. ... 0.1

1.5 1.5 — — — — 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 * *

Total . . . . . . $9.5 $6.2 $12.5 $20,7 $ 27.0 $22.9 $30.8 $ 19.7 $ 9.0 $ 17.7 $ 10.8

Cape Verde:

Economic assistance . $4.0 $ 1.0 $2.3 $ 8.0 $ 2.9 $ 3.1 $ 3.6 $ 3.5 $ 2.2 $ 2.0 $ 2,0

Food aid . ... ... . . 0.1 2.1 3.2 3.4 4.5 2.7 3.0 2,5 2.7 4,5 0.7

Peace Corps ... ... . . — — — — —

Military assistance. .,

— — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4.1 $ 3.1 $5.5 $ 11.4 $ 7.4 $ 5.8 $ 6.6 $ 6.0 $ 4.9 $ 6.5 $ 2.8

Chad:

Economic assistance . . $3.9 $2.2 $6.6 $ 11.2 $ 4.5 $ 0.2 – $ 3.7 $ 2.0 $ 11.0 $ 14.0

Food aid . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.9 5.3 6.8 6.2 3.6 – 2.5 3.2 5.0 1.4

Peace Corps . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0,8 0.9 1.4 0.7 – – – – – –

Military assistance. — — — — — — — * 2.2 5.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 4.8 $3.9 $12.8 $ 19.4 $ 10.0 $ 3.8 – $ 6.2 $ 5.3 $ 18.2 $ 20.6

The Gambia:

Economic assistance . . $0.7 $0.1 $ 1.3 $ 4.5 $ 4.7 $ 5.6 $ 1.2 $ 3.9 $ 3.7 $ 4.6

Food aid . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 $ 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.8 2.0 1.3 1.1 0.4 3.3 0.7

Peace Corps . . . . . . . . . 0,2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0

Military assistance. . . . — — — — — — — — — — —

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 1.9 $ 1.3 $ 1.2 $ 2.8 $ 5.9 $ 7.5 $ 7.7 $ 3.1 $ 5.1 $ 7.9 $ 6.3

Mail:

Economic assistance . . $13.3 $3.8 $10.0 $ 10.1 $ 16.6 $ 15.5 $ 14.5 $ 9.6 $ 9.9 $ 11.6 $28.5

Food aid . . . . . . . . . . 8.9 0.2 5.3 1.4 0.6 – 0.8 4.3 11.1 1.5

Peace Corps . . ..., . . . 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.9

Military assistance. . . . — — — — 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $22,7 $4.6 $10.6 $ 16.1 $ 19,1 $ 17.4 $ 16.0 $ 12.0 $ 15.5 $24.4 $ 32.1

Mauritania:

Economic assistance ., $ 1.7 $ 0.7 $ 1.7 $ 6.0 $ 6.3 .$ 2.7 $ 8.5 $ 6.3 $ 5.1 $ 4.9 $ 9.4

Food aid . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 4.1 1,7 2.9 1.7 8.0 6.2 3.4 6.0 7.5 4.5

Peace Corps . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.5

Military assistance. . . — — — — — — * * 0.1 0.1 0.1

Total ...,...,.. . $4.3 $5.1 $ 3.6 $ 9.2 $ 8.7 $ 11.6 $ 15.8 $ 11.2 $ 12.6 $ 14,1 $ 15.5

Niger:

Economic assistance $0.2 $ 7.8 $6.7 .$ 10.6 $ 10.9 $ 9.5 $ 13.7 $ 13.0 $ 21.0 $26.4 $ 25.0

Food aid . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.8 4,2 0.4 2.8 0.1 1.0 1.4 2.1 0.8 0.5 –

Peace Corps . . . . . . . 1.2 1,6 1.3 1.4 1.9 2.2 2.4 2,7 2.3 2.4 2.6

Military assistance.. — — — — — — 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.2 5.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 9.2 $13.6 $8.4 $ 14.8 $ 12.9 $ 12.7 $ 17.4 $ 17.8 $ 24.0 $31.5 $ 32.8

Senegal:

Economic assistance . . $6.3 $ 2.1 $8,7 $ 8.7 $ 15.0 $ 10.0 $ 14.8 $ 16.2 $ 19.1 $34.6 $ 37.1

Food aid . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.7 2.9 11,2 5.9 15,1 18.6 12.8 12,3 14,7 4.6

Peace Corps . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1 2,0 1.8 1.9 2.0

Military assistance,

* ● 8.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0,4 2.5 3.5

Total ..,...... . . . . . $ 9.4 $6.3 $21.1 $21.6 $22.8 $27.2 $35.7 $ 31.3 $33.6 $53.7 $47.2

Sahel regional:

Economic assistance $13.5 $9,4 $8. 9 $ 9.7 $ 7.9 $ 21.6 $22.2 $33.2 $32.7 $40.3 $22.9

Food aid . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 – – – – – – – 0.2 – –

Peace Corps ...... ., — — — — — — — — — _ _

Military assistance. ,.. — — — — — — — — —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . $13.5 –

$9.4 $ 8.9 $ 9.7 $ 7.9 $21.6 $22.2 $ 33.2 $ 32.9 $40.3 –$22.9

Grand totals . . . . . . . . $79.2 $53.5 $84.6 $125.7 $121.7 $130.4 $152,2 $140.5 $142.9 $214.3 $191,0

“Less than $50,000

NOTE” Food aid” is regular Public Law 480 and does not include emergency assistance, which amounted to about $50 million in fiscal year 1984 and $190 million

in fiscal year 1985. This table appears as calculated by AID

SOURCE: U.S.Agency for international Development, Bureau for Africa, Office of Sahel and West Africa Affairs, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,

April 1986.
149

Table A-7.—Amount Spent on Public Law 480 Commodities for the Sahel, 1977-86 (in thousands of U.S. dollars)

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

Burkina Faso:

Total ., ., 7,940 8,144 8,596 11,473 13,916 5,963 6,876 12,419

Title I and III:

Market value . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Title II

Money spen t 7,940 8,144 8,596 11,473 13,916 51963 6.876 12,419

Predicted: Total : : : : . . .

Food ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Freight . . . . . . .

Cape Verde:

Total .. ,. 2,391 2.150 2,852 1,357 3,733 2,294 2,444 3,361

Title I and III:

Market value . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Title II:

Money spent 2,391 2,150 21852 1,357 3,733 2,294 2,444 3,361

Predicted Total ’ . ..,

Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Freight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chad:

Total, 4,223 4,446 4,076 1,750 20 2,275 2,351 5,284

Title I and III

Market valu e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Title II:

Money spent. 4,223 4,446 4,076 1,750 20 2,275 2,351 5,284

Predicted: Total

Foo d

Freight .

The Gambia:

Total 672 839 764 1,558 1,100 1,374 288 3,416

Title I and III: 

Market value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Title II:

Money spent 672 839 764 1,558 1,100 1,374 288 3.416

Predicted Total .“

Food . .

Freight: . :

Mali:

Total 38 2,980 1,150 483 600 1,410 2,221 7,169

Title I and III: 

Market valu e 0 0 0 0 600 600 0 0

Title II:

Money spent 38 2,980 1,150 483 0 810 2221 7169

Predicted Total. .

Foo d

Freight .

Mauritania:

Total 1,664 2,258 1,111 6,795 6,501 2,448 4,905 8,570

T/t/e/and// /

Market valu e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Title II:

Money spent , 1,664 2,258 1,111 6,795 6,501 2,448 4,905 8,570

Predicted Tota l

Food . .

Freight . .

Niger:

Total 255 2,039 92 1,087 1,141 2,498 303 795

Title I and III: 

Market valu e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Title II:

Money spent 255 2,039 92 1,087 1141 2,498 303 795

Predicted Total “. : . . . .

Food . . . . . . . . .

Freight” :

1986

1985 (estimated)

19,663

0

19,663

29,428.3

17,400.5

12,027.8

1,880

0

1,880

2,315.0

1,533.0

7820

17,805

0

17,805

39,0118

19,0615

19,9503

2,533

0

2.533

3,2904

2,6334

657.0

23,991

0

23,991

38,0712

19,4361

18,6351

6,602

0

6,602

17,5336

710403

10.4933

15,573

0

15,573

57,8879

20.9077

36,9802

6.7891

0

a

*

10,3056

6.7891

3,5165

3,0823

0

a

*

4.1591

3,0823

1,0768

3,8161

0

a

5,318.5

3,8161

1,5024

1,0952

0

a

*

1,5400

1,0952

4448

9,9585

0

a

20.009.1

9,9585

10,0506

26554

0

a

3,900.0

26554

1,2446

6,5730

0

a

11,187.8

6,5730

4,6148
Table A-7.—Amount

1977

Senegal:

Total ............ . . . . . 2,94 8

Title I and Ill:

Market value ... ... ... 0

Title II:

Money spent.... . . . . . 2,948

Predicted: Total . ., . ., . . .,...,.., ..,

Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Freight . . . . . . . . . .

Total for eight countries 20,131

Spent on Public Law 480 Commodities for the Sahel, 1977-86

(in thousands of U.S. dollars)-Continued

. —

1986

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 (estimated) — —

9,419 5,969 15,750 29,119 26,372 12,266 13,872 3,966 10,243.7b

0 0 7,000(111) 17,100 24,100 7,000 0 0 5,500

9,419 5,969 8,759 12,019 2,272 5,266 a

13,872 3,986

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . 11,528.2 7,838.2

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,973.8 4,753,7

.. .. . . . .. 4,554.4 3,084.5

32,275 24,610 40,262 56.130 44.634 31.654 54,886 92.033 44.213.3

aData not yet avatlable.

bcombines the prediction for Title II with the payment for Titles I and Ill (Sene9al 19~)

NOTES” Title I and Ill are combined except where noted

Title II includes World Food Program (WFP) and Emergency Supplements

Title II does not include ocean freight except where noted in 1985 and 1988 In these 2 years, only the market value of the commodities IS used to calculate

the final totals in order to maintain consistency

Data from 1977434 IS money actually spent on commodities

Data from 1985-86 includes money projected to be spent on commodities and ocean freight as well as what actually was spent on food commoditie in 1985

SOURCE U S Agency for International Development, Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, Off Ice of Food for Peace, April 1986
Appendix B

Other Contributors to the Special Report

on Development in the Sahel

Sahel Development Working Group I Sahel Development Working Group II

Philip Boyle

Vienna, VA

Vincent Brown

Devres, Inc.

Washington, DC

Donald Ferguson

OICD/TAD

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Washington, DC

Jeff Gritzner

Board on Science and Technology for

International Development

National Academy of Sciences

Washington, DC

Claude Blanchi

West African Projects

The World Bank

Washington, DC

Jim Hradsky

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

David Shear

Organization for Rehabilitation Through

Training

Washington, DC

Christine MacCallum

Overseas Education Fund

Washington, DC

Melinda Smale Vito Stagliano

Chemonics U.S. Department of Energy

Washington, D.C. Washington, DC

Dean Treadwell C. Payne Lucas

Moundsville, WV Africare

Robert Wilson

Washington, DC

Africare

Washington, DC

Robert Winterbottom

International Institute for Environment and

Development

Washington, DC

151

59-965 0 - 86 - 6
Appendix C

Additional Reviewers of the

Special Report on Development

in the Sahel

The following people reviewed drafts of this report. In addition, members of the assessment Advisory

Panel and participants in the two OTA Working Groups also reviewed drafts.

Ellsworth Amundson, Deputy Director

AFR/Sahel West Africa

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Albert R. Baron

Project Director for Sahel Evaluation Project

Devres, Inc.

Washington, DC

Ambassador Robert O. Blake

International Institute for Environment and

Development

Washington, DC

Jerry Cashion

African Development Foundation

Washington, DC

Thomas Catterson

AFR/TR

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Dennis Chandler, Director

AFR/Sahel West Africa

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Kathleen Cloud

INTERPAKS

University of Illinois

Urbana, IL

Anne De Lattre, Director of the Secretariat

Club du Sahel

OCDE/OECD

Paris, France

Forest Duncan

FVA/PPE

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Ted Galdi

Foreign Affairs Division

Congressional Research Service

Library of Congress

Washington, DC

Sherry Grossman

AFR/DP

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Benjamin H. Hardy

Equator Bank Limited

Hartford, CT

Ray Meyer

S&T/Agricultre/RNR

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Arlene Mitchell

USDA/OICD

Technical Assistance Division

Washington, DC

Wilford Morris

Department of Agricultural Economics

Purdue University

Lafayette, IN

Leonard Robinson, President

African Development Foundation

Washington, DC

Irving Rosenthal

Organization for Rehabilitation Through

Training

Washington, DC

Glenn Slocum

Club du Sahel

OCDE/OECD

Paris, France

Abe Waldstein

Great Falls, VA

152
Appendix D

OTA Field Visits-November 1985

Much of the material in this special report was gathered during extensive interviews with the following

authorities.

GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: NATIONAL AND BILATERAL

Bernard Bachelier

Delegu pour l’Afrique

Centre de Cooperation International en Recherche

Agronomique pour le Developpement

Paris, France

Byron Bahl

U.S. Agency for International Development

Banjul, The Gambia

John Bailis

Agriculture Development Officer

U.S. Agency for International Development

Dakar, Senegal

Jim Bingen

Institut Senegalais

Dakar, Senegal

Jean Le Bloas

de Recherche Agricole

River Basin Development Office

U.S. Agency for International Development

Dakar, Senegal

Pieter Van Blom

Chef du Project ARPON, L’Office du Niger

Segou, Mali

Michel Casse

Directeur de Developpement Rural

Ministere de la Cooperation

Paris, France

Gene Chiavoroli

Mission Director

U.S. Agency for International Development

Bamako, Mali

Albert Compaore

Directeur de l’Amenagement

Forestler et du Reboissement

Ministere de l’Environment

Ougadougou, Burkina Faso

Beatrice Damiba

Ministre de l’Environment et

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Tourism

Baudouin de Marcken

U.S. Agency for International Development

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

P. Dolo

Chef Section du Recherche sur Cultures

Vivrieres et Olioageneuses (SRVCO)

Bamako, Mali

Ollo Cherubim Hein

Organization Regionale du Developpement

Ouahigouya, Burkina Faso

David Hunsberger

USAID/River Basin Development Office

Dakar, Senegal

Marguerite Kabore, Chief

Madame Zare Fanta

Foyers Ameliores

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Francis Kan

Crop Protection Specialist

Casamance Project

U.S. Agency for International Development

Dakar, Senegal

Boubacar S. Kante

Chef de la Division Technique

Operation Haute Val1ee

Bamako, Mali

Herbert Miller

Mission Director

U.S. Agency for International Development

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

MBaye NDoye

Directeur

Department Productions Vegetales

Centre Nationale de Recherche Agricole

Bambey, Senegal

The Honorable Leonard Neher

U.S. Ambassador

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

153
154 —

Jean Luis Neumann et

Monsieur George d’Andlau

Caisse Centrale pour la Cooperation

Economique

Paris, France

Richard Newberg

Agriculture Project Officer

U.S. Agency for International Development

Bamako, Mali

Issouf Ouebraogo

Ministre du Development

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Emmanuel Salmon-Legagneur

Ministere de la Cooperation

Paris, France

Zana Sanogo

Direction Recherche Agronomique

Institute d’Economique Rurale

Bamako, Mali

Wally Sedogo

Bureau de Programmation

Institut Burkinabe pour la Recherche

Agronomique et Zootechnique (IBRAZ)

Min. de l’Education Superieur

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Emny Simmons

U.S. Agency for International Development

Bamako. Mali

Mamado Sissako

Assistant Agriculture Development Officer

U.S. Agency for International Development

Bamako, Mali

Roy Stacy

Mission Director

U.S. Agency for International Development

Harare, Zimbabwe

Lamine Traore

Project Chef

Semi-Arid Food Grain Research and

Development

Bamako, Mali

Pieter Van Blom

Chef Du Pro jet ARPON

Bamako, Mali

GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS:

MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL

Mr. Bonte-Freidheim

Director

Division of Agricultural Operations

Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

Mahamane Brah

Executive Director

Comite Permanent Inter-Etas de Lutte Contre

La Secheresse clans le Sahel (CILSS)

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

H. Braun

Chief

Fertilizer and Plant Protection Division

Food and Agriculture Organizations

Rome, Italy

Donald S. Brown

Vice president

International Fund for Agricultural

Development

Rome, Italy

Alioune Camara

Coordinator of the Sahelian Research and

Documentation Center

Institut du Sahel

Bamako, Mali

Gilbert Child

Senior Officer

Wildlife and Protected Area Management

Forest Resources Division

Forestry Department

Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

M. Collet

Delegue du Fends European, du Developpement

Bamako, Mali

G. d’Avout

Deputy Director

Division of Agriculture Operations

Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy
155

Sinalou Diawara

Hydrologist

United Nation Sahel Office

Bamako, Mali

Hans Eriksson

United Nations Sudano-Sahelian

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Michael Furst

World Bank Representative

Bamako, Mali

Michel Grolleau

Club du Sahel

OCDE/OECD

Paris, France

Eva Jansson

United Nations Sudano-Sahelian

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Ann de Lattre

Director of the Secretariat

Club du Sahel

OCDE/OECD

Paris, France

Frederick Lyons

Representant Resident A joint

Office

Office

Programme Des Nations Unies Pour de

Developpement

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Andre Martens

Club du Sahel

OCDE/OECD

Paris, France

Dr. Peter J. Matlon

Dr. Romaya

Dr. Lohani

The International Institute for Research in the

Semi-Arid Tropics

Kamboinse Research Station

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Nora McKeon-Armando

Peoples Participation

Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

J.P. Nastorg

Chief

World Food Program

Rome, Italy

A. N. Ngongi

Chief

East and Southern Africa Branch

Project Management Division

UN/FAO World Food Programme

Rome, Italy

David Norse

Senior Policy and Planning

Agriculture Department

Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

Sam Olowude

Project Officer for East Africa

International Fund for Agricultural

Development

Rome, Italy

Jean-Marc Pirudell

Club du Sahel

OCDE/OECD

Paris, France

Dr. Mario Rodriguez

Director

Dr. Vas Aggarwal

Dr. Hulugalla

Dr. Diallo

Dr. Joseph Suh

International Institute of Tropical Agriculture

Semi-Arid Food Grain Research and

Development

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Andrew Rogerson

World Bank Representative

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Dr. Shetty

The International Crops Research Institute for

the Semi-Arid Tropics

Bamako, Mali

Dr. Sindogo

IBRAZ

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Fironz Sobhani

Habib Kraiem

Jean Etienne Yango

United Nations Sahel Office

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
156

Derek H. Sutton

Agricultural Engineering Service

Agricultural Services Division

Agriculture Department

Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

Tarekegne Taka

Chief

Regional Bureau for Africa

Field Program Development

Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

Mama Garba Tapo

Banque Mondiale Bank

Bamako, Mali

Harry W. Underhill

Water Resources, Development and

Management Service

Land and Water Development Division

Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

Harmut J. von Hulst

Chief

Agricultural Engineering Service

Agricultural Services Division

Food and Agriculture Organization

Assistant Resident

Lillian Baer

Representative Rome, Italy

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Guy de Bonneville

Africa Consultants, Inc.

Dakar, Senegal

Steve Brown

Director

Catholic Relief Services

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Robert Chambers

Institute of Development Studies

University of Sussex

Brighton, United Kingdom

Charles Condamines

Freres des Hommes

Versailles, France

Lionel Derenoncort

Church World Service

Dakar, Senegal

Gilbert Edu

Diabate Anadou

Ouedrago Boureima

Africare

Ouahigouya, Burkina Faso

Debbie Fredo

Overseas Education Fund

Dakar, Senegal

Jacques Giri

Strategie, Energie, Environnement,

Developpement

Paris, France

Directeur E’Etudes

Societe D’Etudes pour le Developpement

Economique et Social

Paris, France

Jeffrey L. Gray

Representative

Africare

Bamako, Mali

Martin Greeley

Institute of Development Studies

University of Sussex

Falmer, U.K.

Olu Karib

Coordinator

Africare

Food for Work Program

Ouahigonya, Burkina Faso

Sandy Laumark

Director

CARE

Bamako, Mali

Marc Levy

Secretaire General

Group de Recherche at d’Echanges

Technologiques

Paris, France

Michael Lipton

Institute of Development Studies
157

University of Sussex

Falmer, U.K.

Richard Longhurst

Institute of Development Studies

University of Sussex

Falmer, U.K.

John Morse

Mennonite Central Committee

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Mazide N’Diaye

Director

Resean Africain du Developpement Integre

Dakar, Senegal

Mathieu Ouedrago

OXFAM

Ouahigouya, Burkina

Nichel Ouedraogo

Faso

Noumouni Ouedraogo, et

Nebnoma Sawadogo

Association International dite Six S (Se Servir

de la Saison Seche en Savane et au Sahel)

Ouahigouya, Burkina Faso

Paul Richards

Department of Anthropology

University College London

London, United Kingdom

Roger Riddell

Overseas Development Institute

Regent’s College

London, United Kingdom

Gill Shepard

Overseas Development Institute

London, U.K.

Mary Tiffon

Overseas Development Institute

London, U.K.

Sahr J. Tongu

Resident Representative

Africare

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

C.A. van Diepen

Soil Scientist

Centre for World Food Studies

CABO

Wageningen, Netherlands
The Sahel Development

Statement -Executive

Appendix E

Strategy

Summary

The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (AID) Sahel Country (Regional) Development Strategy

Statement, published in April 1984 for use in fiscal year 1986, was developed by the Sahel Development

Planning Team in Bamako, Mali and the Washington Sahel Office and incorporated the lessons AID had

learned in the region. Below is the executive summary from the statement.

The SaheI Development Strategy

Statement

Executive Summary

The multi-donor Sahel Development Program

(SDP) encompasses the combined efforts of much

of the world’s donor community in eight countries:

Chad, Niger, Mali, Upper Volta, Senegal, The Gambia, Mauritania, and Cape Verde, It was initiated

in 1976, following several years of emergency

drought relief and reconstruction in the Sahel, In

1978 Congress formally created AID’s contribution

and commitment to the program with the proviso

that U.S. participation be limited to ten percent of

the total annual donor commitment. The goals of

the SDP are food self-reliance under conditions of

sustained economic growth in a restored and stabilized environment. At that time, the program as

termed “a Contract for a Generation, ” acknowledging a 20- to 30-year timeframe for the participants

to achieve their goals. While AID is committed to

these same objectives, the U S. commitment is subject to continuous review.

The economies of the Sahel countries which border on the Sahara Desert are based predominantly

on subsistence, dry-land agriculture. The fundamental obstacles to the development of this region

lie in the determination and implementation of the

necessary technical means needed to increase per

capita agricultural production. To achieve this goal

in the primitive conditions of the Sahel it is necessary to develop its physical, human, and institutional infrastructure. Most of the 35 million people

in these eight countries are illiterate, widely dispersed, and dependent on low-yielding agriculture

and pastoralism. There is as yet no available alternative technology which could be applied to rapidly improve food production.

Between 1976 and 1982, the Western and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries aid

donors committed approximately $8 billion to rehabilitation, budget, and balance of payments support, food aid, and development investment in the

Sahel, (An appreciable quantity of Eastern Bloc resources, mostly for military purposes, was also contributed.) For its part, AID committed $600 million

in development assistance plus $300 million in Public Law 480 food, and $10 million in Economic

Stabilization Funds (ESF).

During this interval, cereals and livestock production regained their pre-drought levels and the average quantity of cereals output modestly increased,

Yet rainfall has continued to be markedly less than

the annual averages experienced during the predrought decade of the 1960s. The absolute drought

has persisted in certain places (Cape Verde and

Mauritania) and returned periodically in others. In

certain respects, the region’s dependency is actually worse given the high rate of population growth

(2.5 to 3.0 percent annually) and the major disruptions, e.g., the oil shocks and world recession,

within the global economy.

The net effect of the experience of 1976 to 1982

has been, at best, very slow growth of average individual incomes, declining per capita production,

and a net deterioration in the financial condition

and short-term economic prospects of the Sahel

countries. Sahelian external debt and annual debt

service have increased; export earnings have declined; fiscal imbalances exacerbated; and the overall dependency of these countries on external, concessional resources has dramatically increased.

To cope with the harsh natural conditions of the

Sahel combined with the distressing international

economy of recent years has been an Olympian requirement; to have recovered from the devastation

of the initial drought, to have developed the capacity

to withstand continuing drought, to have achieved

real per capita improvement, however limited, and

to have undertaken substantial basic measures for

development and future improved production are

the achievements of the Sahel States and the donor

effort to date. Much of the multi-donor aid to the

Sahel has been directed toward current consumption and economic stabilization. This type of aid

will probably be required for several years. But the

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focus of the development effort has been to address

the Sahelian production systems, some of the most

primitive in the world and which are exacerbated

by an exceptionally harsh environment extremely

lacking in natural advantages.

AID’s development effort initially had little information and understanding of the physical, institutional, and policy environment in which economic

improvement was to take place. The acquisition of

data was painful, costly, and time-consuming. However, systems were set up within the program to

provide a continuous and increasing flow of data

and to accumulate it as efficiently as possible. At

the same time, AID mounted pilot investment initiatives to assure the availability of the variety of

resources needed to achieve the program goals. It

also began efforts to establish conducive official policies and public and private institutions, to provide

training ranging from general literacy through all

types of relevant technical specialties, to construct

infrastructure, and to supply equipment.

The idea of the coordinated Sahel program is to

maximize the effect of all donor and indigenous efforts in development by first agreeing on priority

objectives and then seeing to the most advantageous

application of all available resources. By organizing in a variety of ways under the auspices of the

cooperative institutions established to implement

the program, i.e., the CILSS (The Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought in the Sahel) and the

Club du Sahel (organization of the donors), the efficiencies of coordination in the Sahel are being realized. It has worked to provide information and research, to share institutional resources and scarce

personnel, to mount parallel actions where individual efforts would have been inadequate, to resolve

issues which threatened the success of everyone’s

effort, and to minimize contradictions and redundancies, Thus, while this cooperation is far from

perfect, it has yielded tangible and substantial

benefits.

In early 1984 development in the Sahel is in its

early stages, Economic transformation of this region will only be realized over an extended period

and then only if systematic and deliberate support

is assured. In 1982 to 1983 and extending into 1984,

AID, the Club, the CILSS and individual Sahelian

countries carried out a number of assessments, audits, and evaluations in order to identify progress,

problems, and required adjustments, These have led

to and will continue to yield improvements, for AID,

in the type and extent of AID initiatives; for the program, in coordination and focus; and for CILSS,

in the efficient use of resources. This introspection

has

ery

has

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revealed that the Program has achieved recovand prevented the recurrence of disaster and

made some progress toward intermediate development targets. But there have also been a number of false starts and some tactical approaches have

had to be revised. It has become clear that the Sahelian governments, because of limited financial resources (the recurrent cost problem), are not able

to contribute as much to development as had been

expected. Moreover, many of the initial development actions were too diverse or not consistent with

the program priorities that shortages of indigenous

skills were undercutting all initiatives.

A number of corrective measures have already

been taken to address these issues, most importantly, the community has come to understand that

hopes for rapid improvement in production and incomes based on implementation of better technologies are not realistic at this time because effective

techniques in the Sahelian environment are not

known or are too costly. In addition, we have found

that we are obliged to assist to a much greater extent than anticipated with current consumption,

economic stabilization, policy reform, and human

capital formation.

The Strategy for the AID Program

We assume a continuing annual aggregate of

donor assistance to the Sahel, in 1983 terms, of

about $1.5 billion and an AID program of about $90

to $100 million in development assistance (1983

dollars) plus Public Law 480 commodities and some

ESF. We will have to help with the immediate problem at sustaining current consumption levels and

financial and economic stability by applying some

of our resources to help with balance of payments,

budgetary support, and food imports, The economic

stabilization measures will be used to affect substantial reform in official policies, institutions, and

practices where such adjustments are determined

to be required for effective implementation of economic development. We will use local currencies

generated from stabilization aid and food sales to

finance local costs associated with improved production.

Given AID’s own institutional priorities and

strengths, we will focus our overall Sahel program

and individual country programs in a few selected

areas, consistent with our management capabilities.

Priorities will be agricultural research and production, policy reform, health and family planning,

training, infrastructure, conservation, and environmental protection. Not all of these initiatives need
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be undertaken in each Sahel country because of

funding and management limitations.

Given the agriculture production priority, AID

will devote a preponderant share of its resources

to dryland and irrigated food cultivation and animal husbandry. Regarding the latter, livestock are

a very important resource for the Sahel. After extended research and trial interventions, we have

become convinced that traditional practices of pastoralism are well adapted to the Sahelian circumstances. However, there are significant opportunities for services and investments which will help

improve the efficiency and aggregate output of livestock products. Animal health services can be improved through known technology and veterinary

techniques. The pastoralists have proven their

willingness to purchase these benefits when they

are available. In addition, surveys have revealed

substantial areas of underused range and fodder

because of the absence of nearby water points.

Hence, AID’s interventions in the pastoral areas of

the Sahel will focus on health delivery and water

points development, as well as on assisting the

institutions which provide these services and training. In the agriculture areas, AID encourages mixed

farming and animal traction and will undertake

selective research into the cultivation of fodder particularly in conjunction with farm management and

crop rotation.

After many trials of a variety of technical interventions, we still do not know enough about alternative varieties, technologies, or systems of production to implement any broad-scale reform in rain-fed

food cultivation in the Sahel. It is true that there

have been limited successes with innovations such

as animal traction; special varieties of cereals; and

new crops, e.g., maize; and water management.

These adaptations are implemented when they appear to be appropriate. In addition, there will be

continuing attention given to paced training and

expansion of extension services, food crop protection, supply of production inputs, improvement of

marketing and distribution, and policy reform.

However, because the knowledge required to improve agricultural production adequately to achieve

the program goals is not yet available, the first

priority must be agricultural research. This research

will require training; close collaboration with the

farmers themselves; and intensive biological and

technical investigation of promising alternatives of

varieties, techniques, fertilizers, and farming systems. Concurrently, we will undertake to develop

training institutions, the agricultural infrastructure

already installed, and that enabling infrastructure

needed to open up production possibilities.

Our investigations have convinced us that the

most likely evolution of rain-fed agricultural production will not yield the output goals and schedule we have set for the program. This production

will inevitably be hostage to periodic severe drought.

It is therefore advisable and necessary to undertake

a major effort in irrigation development to exploit

the considerable volumes of river water which now

pass through the Sahel unused. While much irrigation is currently practiced, only about 10 percent

of the potential is being exploited. AID and others

have hesitated to undertake major efforts in irrigation because of the expensive infrastructure required, the technical sophistication involved in the

operation, and the dismal experiences with many

initiatives to date. Yet, irrigation development is required to realize the region’s production potential

and assure food security and we are convinced that

these problems can be overcome. We propose to

proceed deliberately, to acquire the necessary

knowledge in selected pilot investments, to rehabilitate infrastructure in place, and to gradually expand the activity as our competence improves.

Development of human resources is sine qua non

for economic improvement. Overall literacy in the

region does not exceed 20 percent. Unfortunately

AID has neither the expertise (for this predominantly traditional French system) nor the resources

to address the overall education requirement. But

we do foresee devoting an order of 15 to 20 percent

of our resources to a variety of training initiatives

which will assure the expertise required by our own

development activities to improve the capability of

those who work with our and the overall development program, provide the knowledge required by

the farmers and other target beneficiaries of our program and, selectively, contribute to general educational planning and education.

Activities in public health and the integration of

family planning services into the public health systems contribute to the productive capability of the

populace. They are also necessary humanitarian

measures in a truly threatening and unhealthy environment, and address the demand side of the food

sufficiency objective. The most effective interventions will be those which exploit the investment already made in institutions and personnel by helping organize the system better and by providing

basic implements, medicines, contraceptives, infrastructure, and financial resources. The efficiency

of purchase and distribution of pharmaceuticals will

have pervasive systemic importance. Assistance

and training to provide better planning and information in the health ministries will also have broad

beneficial impact. The major service delivery inter-
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ventions will be in the improvement or creation of

maternal/child health clinics, the provision of services for oral rehydration (ORT), immunization

against childhood diseases, and the implementation

of rural health systems (pilot rural health worker

projects). All the foregoing may include research

and surveillance components. AID’s health and

family planning activities in any one country will

comprise only one or a few of the above because

of our limitations of personnel and resources,

Our contributions to environmental stabilization

and energy conservation are through forest management, protection of the woodlands, reduction

of fuelwood consumption, plus erosion control and

soil conservation, There is continuing and accelerating degradation which stems principally from the

cutting of trees and brush for fuel, There is yet no

accessible solution to the fuelwood problem. Consequently, we are forced to employ measures which

are useful in themselves but will only slow and not

reverse deforestation, These actions include: 1) reform of official practices in management and regulation of the woodlands; 2) research to discover a

means to appropriately counteract degradation; 3)

training of researchers, teachers, and forest managers; 4) development and popularization of fuel

conserving wood stoves (a process which has very

promising near-term possibilities); 5) scientific management of natural forests; and 6) soil conservation

and water management. While during the planning

period there will be a constraint of limited absorption capacity in this sector, AID will press interventions to the optimum considering the fundamental

importance of success in reversing environmental

degradation.

A Balanced Program

The variety of actions required for a competent

program of agricultural production must be implemented as a coherent whole. First, we will have to

identify and help bring about the necessary official

policy and institutional environment to enable development to proceed. Training and education will

be implemented as components of projects or will

be designed to generate those talents required for

the success of the production program, Public

health interventions will occasionally be linked to

agricultural initiatives or be located in those areas

in which AID has undertaken other activities. Livestock and conservation activities are frequentl y

integral to crop cultivation, etc. AID has learned

in the SaheI to focus its efforts physically and

sectorally to ease management and to exploit complementarities.

Comprehensive and coordinated agricultural development will be achieved through the coordination of all donor and Sahelian programs. This is

accomplished through a system (still in evolution)

of frequent discussion of activities, collaborative

research, and information exchange at all levels

through the Club/CILSS coordination efforts.
Assessment of the

ProgramAppendix F

Sahel Development

Executive Summary

The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (AID)"Assessment of the Sahel Development Program” was developed by the Sahel Development Planning Team in Bamako,

Mali, and published in March 1983. The Assessment identified the lessons learned from

AID activities in the region and was the basis for the 1984 Sahel Country (Regional) Strategy Statement. Below is the Executive Summary from the assessment.

Executive Summary and Conclusions

The present draft responds to a request from

AA/AFR, F.S. Rudy, to AFR/SWA for an assessment

of the Sahel Development Program which considers, interalia, “how it relates to the original objectives and what changes should be made now in view

of political and economic developments in the Sahel” since its inception. The assessment finds that,

despite problems encountered in their pursuit, the

original objectives of the Sahel Development Program remain sound and feasible. AID’s contribution to the multidonor effort should be sustained

at its present proportional level.

As a result of the drought emergency of 1973, the

United States, other donors, and the Sahelians developed a comprehensive strategy which attracted

a large and sustained volume of resources as well

as a strong commitment to long-term development

of the region. The international community spent

an estimated $1 billion on drought relief and postdrought rehabilitation from 1973 through 1974.

From 1973 through 1982 the United States–through

disaster assistance, Public Law 480, and the Development Assistance budget—has committed an equal

amount of resources to the Sahel region.

The program in the Sahel is one of the best examples of international cooperation for development.

A responsive organizational structure was devised

to coordinate a large number of bilateral and multilateral development initiatives. The system is far

from perfect, yet it has credibly addressed many

of the basic problems of the region.

AID programs have been growing since the first

reconstruction assistance of 1973 and 1974. The

composition and orientation of AID’s Sahel Development Program (SDP) has evolved significantly.

Most of its weaknesses are traceable to the urgency

which impelled the early development of the program and the deployment of appropriated funds at

a pace which strained AID and host government

management systems, A number of projects sought

to stimulate medium-term food production increases based on over-optimistic judgments about

the availability of technical packages, the capabilities of cooperating institutions, and the financial

capacity of Sahelian governments. In addition, the

program spread rapidly into forestry-ecology, primary health, women’s roles, various kinds of training, village water supply and several areas of the

livestock sector. The emphasis was on responding

as directly as possible to the basic needs of target

populations. However, many of the initial activities involved institutional development aspects, and

later projects have been primarily oriented to such

objectives. Numerous studies and analyses were

also carried out—especially within the CILSS/Club

structure—that today influence policy. Early assumptions about technology were often hedged

with investments in research. The results of these

varied efforts have been mixed, but on balance

highly positive. The quality and effectiveness of the

program has steadily improved as we have learned

from experience to better understand the Sahelian

cultural, administrative, institutional, and physical

environments.

AID’s SDP constitutes an important and proportionally appropriate component of the expanding

multidonor development program. If the current

level of effort is maintained in real terms, the

CILSS/Club strategy goal of food self-sufficiency

with environmental stability and self-sustaining economic growth is an achievable goal, For this reason and because of the importance of AID’s role

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163

in the agricultural and rural development sectors,

AID’s contribution should increase proportionately

with the overall donor effort. These resources must

be coordinated within a regional, multidonor framework that allows for change and flexibility in response to the lessons of experience.

Lessons Learned

1. Technical production packages are still inadequate for all but some areas in higher rainfall zones.

Selected technological improvements such as animal traction or certain new crop varieties have

found useful application within specific agro-climatic zones and in certain farming systems, but on

the whole, the available technical packages have not

provided a basis for large-scale efforts to increase

food production. This indicates the need for more

emphasis on agricultural research and that most

area-focused food production and integrated development projects need to be phased out or substantially redesigned and reoriented toward economically and technically valid goals.

2. Agricultural research systems directed at developing new production technologies must be

strengthened, refocused on farming systems, and

selectively expanded. While it is important that international and regional crop-oriented research be

strengthened, it is also essential that the development of adequate national systems be given priority. Promising cultural practices and crop varieties

coming out of international work must be evaluated

in the various regional agro-climatic zones and

tested under farm conditions, The research networks must ultimately produce superior technical

packages for each agro-climatic zone, This implies

a great deal of increased attention and careful programming of additional resources for agricultural

research.

3. Our efforts to date have not placed enough emphasis on the development of agricultural production systems and forging strong linkages between

their crucial elements. This implies a need for careful assessment of existing systems and selective targeting of institutional development assistance to foster the development of adequate production support

systems within a 10 to 15 year time horizon. There

is a subsidiary need for agriculture-oriented education and human resources development strategies

at the regional and national levels.

4. Government agencies, including parastatals,

should restrict themselves to roles that cannot be

appropriately allocated to the private sector, However, for historical reasons, and often in association with AID, Sahelian governments are currently

relying on parastatals to furnish goods and services

which ultimately should be handled by the private

sector, In such cases we need to help the governments to formulate plans for the orderly transfer

of such functions to the private sector. On one side,

governments and AID must disengage from paying parastatals’ operating expenses and phase out

subsidized provision of goods and services so that

the private sector can compete, On the other hand,

positive strategies are required to enable the private and cooperative sectors to take up input and

produce marketing functions abandoned by governments.

5. Notwithstanding the success achieved in the

CILSS/Club context in the pursuit of policy dialog,

our programs at the national level have suffered

from inadequate concern with the resolution of policy constraints to economic, and particularly agricultural, development. We should continue and

reinforce efforts now underway to focus AID and

other donor programs in ways that will induce essential reform.

6. River Basin and irrigation development must

continue to be pursued on a steady basis so that river

basin planning frameworks and socioeconomically

sound irrigation models will be available to permit

an acceleration of the pace of investment in irrigated agriculture over the next 15 to 20 years.

7. The forestry and environment component of

the program continues to be inadequate and the decline of the woodlands continues. Most research,

training and the conservation measures underway

should continue and our level of effort in these areas

should be increased substantially. We should, at the

same time, seriously investigate the attributes of a

major effort to establish plantations for urban fuelwood supply .

8. Further livestock production activities should

be initiated only when we are sure of the technology

being introduced, and it is clear that these offer economic returns superior to alternative agricultural

investments. Other initiatives in the livestock sector should be limited to the development of socioeconomically and technically sound solutions to

problems affecting productivity and producer

incomes.

9. Notwithstanding all our good intentions to the

contrary, AID has taken on too many separate

projects and these have been too widely dispersed

both geographically and sectorally. There is a need

to limit project selection to the Sahel development

strategy priorities of food self-sufficiency and ecological balance within the framework of suitably

comprehensive long-term strategies.
164

10. The Sahel financial management problem as

well as other difficulties we have had in implementing our program serve to remind us that we must

plan and design our programs with scrupulous and

realistic attention to the financial and administrative capabilities of Sahelian institutions and our

own management resources. This means that we

will have to select our institutional development involvements with great care, recognizing that human

resource and financial constraints will often dictate long-term commitments and support of recurrent costs. We must find ways of facing up to the

need to maintain adequate staff strength to manage our programs in the field.

1, A CDSS-type strategy is required for the development of the Sahel as a region. Based on analyses

of the broad options, it would lay out a program

for the phased development of: a) the institutional

capabilities and programs in the agriculture and forestry/ecology sectors; and b) the irrigated agriculture capacity required to help achieve food selfsufficiency, through trade as well as domestic production, by the year 2000. Unlike the present Regional Development Strategy Statement (RDSS), the

new strategy would address resource allocation issues in light of economic and technical analyses of

the various trade-offs such as that between rainfed

and irrigated agriculture.

2. Project selection must be guided strictly by the

dictates of bilateral as well as regional program

strategies in pursuit of food self-sufficiency and ecological balance by the year 2000. This implies vigorous development of agricultural and forestry/ecology sector strategies, complemented by derived

program priorities in human resources, health, and

other supporting sectors.

3. The staff resources and the role of the Sahel

Development Planning Team (SDPT) must be

strengthened. To the present complement should

be added an agronomist knowledgeable of irrigated

as well as rainfed systems, a river basin development specialist and a Deputy Director (Deputy Regional Development Officer or Program Officer).

The latter is required to assure that the long-term

planning and other functions of the team are consistently pursued despite the heavy travel schedules

of the team members and Director, The SDPT

should be charged with analyzing and commenting on the feasibility and priority of all PIDs and

all strategy documents submitted by Sahel Missions.

The persons responsible for AID liaison with the

CILSS Secretariat and the Sahel Institute should

function as members of the SDPT. The SDPT have

PM&R budgetary resources sufficient to carry out

or commission studies required for strategy development.

4, The SDPT should be transferred to Ouagadougou so that its long-term planning studies and analyses can be carried out in collaboration with the

CILSS Secretariat and be fed consistently into the

deliberations of sector working groups both at this

regional level and at the national level.

5. We need to continue and strengthen our efforts

in financial and program management. This requires:

—an assessment of AID Sahel program management capacities and requirements in the field;

—stricter review and criteria for financial management and accounting capabilities in every

project, including the provision of technical

assistance where necessary; and

—a second generation of initiatives to strengthen

program management capacities at the regional

and national levels;

—greater use of private sector accountants in design, implementation, and monitoring of the Sahel program and projects;

—increased audit coverage of the program.

6. A review should be conducted of the SDP

project portfolio in order to identify projects which

need to be revised or phased out in light of the

assessment findings, the Mission’s current program

strategies and the current RDSS.

o