J. S52001/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

ISIAH WILLIAMS, : No. 2643 EDA 2015

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, July 15, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0003519-2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 19, 2017

Isiah Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following his conviction in a 

waiver trial of unlawful possession of a firearm, firearm not to be carried 

without a license, and carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia.1 

The trial court sentenced appellant to 5 to 10 years’ incarceration on the 

unlawful possession of a firearm count and 5 years of consecutive probation 

for carrying a firearm without a license. The trial court imposed no further 

penalty on the remaining count. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the following:

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6108, respectively. 
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On March 10, 2014, at approximately 

8:35 p.m., Officer Antoine Wesley and his partner, 

Officer Colon, stopped a black Hyundai Sonata driven 

by [appellant] in the area of 2900 N. 2nd Street. 

Officer Wesley observed [appellant] driving the 

vehicle “at a high rate of speed.” He and his partner 

activated their lights and sirens and pulled over 

[appellant’s] vehicle. [Appellant] was the only 

occupant. Officer Wesley smelled a strong odor of 

burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle and asked 

for license and registration. [Appellant] failed to 

produce a driver’s license and could only produce a 

Budget rental agreement, which alerted 

Officer Wesley to conduct a live stop of the vehicle. 

At that time, [appellant] was operating the vehicle 

with keys in the ignition that could also open the 

trunk. A subsequent inventory search of the trunk 

revealed a black and red book bag containing a 

handgun and a plastic sandwich bag.[Footnote 1] 

Police found six .32 caliber rounds inside the gun and 

22 different caliber rounds inside the plastic bag. 

[Appellant] did not possess a valid permit to carry 

such a handgun.[Footnote 2] Officer Wesley then 

arrested [appellant] for firearm violations.

[Footnote 1] Both counsels stipulated 

that analysts at the ballistics lab had 

tested the hand[gun], finding it to be 

operable.

[Footnote 2] Both counsels stipulated 

that [appellant] was prohibited from 

possessing a firearm under 

18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6105.

Brittney Boyd and Akeem Williams testified as 

defense witnesses. Ms. Boyd, [appellant’s] wife, 

testified that the Budget rental agreement was under 

her name. She rented the car for a month, but only 

drove it for two weeks before she lent the car to 

[appellant’s] brother, Akeem Williams. She was not 

present in the vehicle on [the] day in question. 

Mr. Williams testified that on that day, [appellant] 

picked up the rental car from him in the morning. 
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He had no intentions to borrow the car from 

Ms. Boyd after that day. He testified that before 

[appellant] was arrested, he had used the rental car 

to help a friend move, and his friend placed bags in 

the trunk. Both Ms. Boyd and Mr. Williams testified 

that on that day, [appellant] was supposed to pick 

up his children from school before returning the 

rental car.

As a result of this stop, Officer Wesley cited 

[appellant] for two summary offenses under the 

Motor Vehicle Code: failure to drive at a safe speed 

pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3361 and operating a

vehicle without a license pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] 

§ 1501(a). On May 14, 2014, a Municipal Court 

Judge found [appellant] guilty in absentia of these 

two summary offenses. The Commonwealth also 

charged [appellant] with three violations of the 

Uniform Firearms Act pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] 

§[§] 6105, 6106, and 6108. On February 23, 2015, 

the trial court found [appellant] guilty of all three 

charges concerning a Violation of the Uniform 

Firearms Act[].

Trial court opinion, 11/23/15 at 2-4 (citations to notes of testimony and trial 

court record omitted).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient 

as a matter of law to support the conviction for 

carrying a firearm without a license 

(18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106), persons not to possess 

firearms (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105), and carrying a 

firearm in Philadelphia (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108), 

where the evidence of record did not establish 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] 

constructively possessed a firearm recovered 

in the trunk of a rental car which was rented 

by another person and used by several other 

people?
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[2.] With respect to the charges of carrying a 

firearm without a license (18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6106), persons not to possess firearms 

(18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105), and carrying a firearm 

in Philadelphia (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108), was the 

verdict against the weight of the evidence and 

so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s 

sense of justice where the Commonwealth’s 

evidence at trial consisted of the fact that a 

firearm was recovered from inside a back pack, 

inside the trunk of a rental car which was 

rented by a person other than [appellant] and 

used by several other people?

[3.] Did the trial court erred [sic] when it denied 

[appellant’s] motion seeking dismissal of the 

charges against [appellant] based upon 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110[, the compulsory joinder 

statute]?

Appellant’s brief at 6-7.

Appellant first complains that the Commonwealth failed to produce 

sufficient evidence to support his convictions because it failed to establish 

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant constructively possessed the 

firearm that police recovered from the trunk of the rental car that appellant 

was driving.

Our standard of review for a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence is well settled. We must 

view all the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the verdict winner, giving that party the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. 

Additionally, it is not the role of an appellate court to 

weigh the evidence or to substitute our judgment for 

that of the fact-finder.

Commonwealth v. Alford, 880 A.2d 666, 669-670 (Pa.Super. 2005), 

appeal denied, 890 A.2d 1055 (Pa. 2005), quoting Commonwealth v. 
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Gruff, 822 A.2d 773, 775 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1143 

(Pa. 2004) (citations omitted).

Because the firearm was not found on appellant’s person, the 

Commonwealth was required to prove that appellant constructively 

possessed the firearm. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426, 430 

(Pa.Super. 2012).

Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic 

construct to deal with the realities of criminal law 

enforcement. Constructive possession is an 

inference arising from a set of facts that possession 

of the contraband was more likely than not. We 

have defined constructive possession as conscious 

dominion. We subsequently defined conscious 

dominion as the power to control the contraband and 

the intent to exercise that control. To aid 

application, we have held that constructive 

possession may be established by the totality of the 

circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa.Super. 2004) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). “In order to prove that a defendant 

had constructive possession of a prohibited item, the Commonwealth must 

establish that the defendant had both the ability to consciously exercise 

control over it as well as the intent to exercise such control.”

Commonwealth v. Harvard, 64 A.3d 690, 699 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). “An intent to maintain a conscious dominion may be inferred from 

the totality of the circumstances, and circumstantial evidence may be used 

to establish a defendant’s possession.” Id.
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Here, Officer Wesley testified that he observed appellant driving at a 

high rate of speed. (Notes of testimony, 2/23/15 at 9.) For that reason, he 

and his partner pulled appellant over. (Id. at 9-10.) After pulling appellant 

over, Officer Wesley smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana coming from 

the inside of the car. (Id. at 10.) Officer Wesley also observed that 

appellant was the only person inside the vehicle. (Id. at 9.) At that point, 

appellant could not produce a driver’s license or vehicle registration. (Id. at 

10.) Officer Wesley then learned that appellant was driving a vehicle that 

was rented to someone else and that appellant was driving that vehicle 

without a valid driver’s license. (Id.)

Officer Wesley then conducted a vehicle inventory. (Id.) The officer 

opened the trunk of the vehicle with the keys that appellant had in his 

possession and which appellant also used to operate the vehicle. (Id. at 

12-13.) Inside the trunk of the vehicle, Officer Wesley found a book bag 

containing a gun loaded with 6 live rounds, together with a plastic bag 

containing 22 different caliber rounds. (Id. at 10.)

At trial, appellant presented two defense witnesses in an attempt to 

demonstrate that the gun may have belonged to someone else. Appellant’s 

wife testified that she rented the vehicle, but that she loaned it to appellant’s 

brother. (Id. at 25.) Appellant’s brother testified that he used the vehicle 

to help his friend move and that his friend placed items in the trunk of the 
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car shortly before he turned the car over to appellant. (Id. at 37-39.) 

Appellant did not offer his brother’s friend as a witness.

Appellant’s brother further testified that shortly after his friend placed 

the items in the car, he turned the car over to appellant on the morning of 

March 10, 2014. (Id. at 42.) Appellant’s wife testified that appellant picked 

up their children after school that day and was then to return the rental 

vehicle. (Id. at 28.) Appellant was pulled over at approximately 8:35 p.m. 

(Id. at 8.) Appellant offered no evidence to explain his whereabouts 

between the time he allegedly picked up his children from school and the 

time police pulled him over.

Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence was 

sufficient to establish constructive possession. The trial court, sitting as 

fact-finder, could reasonably infer that appellant had both the ability and 

intent to control the firearm because appellant exercised control over the 

vehicle by driving the vehicle, being its only occupant, and possessing the 

keys that operated the vehicle and that also opened the trunk where the gun 

was stored. Moreover, the trial court found the defense witnesses’ 

testimony to be incredible for lack of common sense and failure to explain a 

significant time gap. The fact-finder exclusively assesses witness credibility 

and may choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 39 (Pa. 2011). Therefore, 

appellant’s sufficiency claim lacks merit.
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Appellant next complains that the verdict was against the weight of 

the evidence because the Commonwealth failed to prove constructive 

possession of the firearm.

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. Because the trial judge has had the 

opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, 

an appellate court will give the gravest consideration 

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial 

judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination 

that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for 

granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s 

conviction that the verdict was or was not against 

the weight of the evidence and that a new trial 

should be granted in the interest of justice.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations 

omitted; emphasis omitted).

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the 

finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence and to determine the credibility of 

the witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute 

its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we 

may only reverse the . . . verdict if it is so contrary 

to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2011).

Appellant specifically complains that the verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence because “the only evidence linking [appellant] to the gun 

was the fact that both he and the gun were located in the same vehicle.” 

(Appellant’s brief at 33.) The Commonwealth, however, presented the 

testimony of Officer Wesley which, if believed, established that appellant 
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constructively possessed the firearm because he exercised control over the 

vehicle and, therefore, the gun because he was the sole occupant of the 

vehicle, and he possessed the keys necessary to operate the vehicle and 

open the trunk where police found the gun. Although appellant presented 

two defense witnesses, the trial court found their testimony wholly incredible 

for lack of common sense and failure to explain a significant time gap. In its 

opinion, the trial court also noted that both defense witnesses -- appellant’s 

wife and his brother -- had a strong motive to lie and fabricate evidence. 

(Trial court opinion, 11/23/15 at 9.) The trial court, sitting as fact-finder, 

was free to determine witness credibility. See Devine, 26 A.3d at 1146. 

We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. See id. 

Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that the verdict was not against 

the weight of the evidence and did not shock one’s sense of justice.

Finally, appellant complains that the trial court erred when it denied 

his motion to dismiss under the compulsory joinder statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 110. Specifically, appellant complains that because he was convicted of 

the summary traffic offenses of failure to drive at a safe speed and operating 

a vehicle without a license2 prior to being convicted of the firearms 

violations, the compulsory joinder statute barred his subsequent prosecution 

for the firearms violations. Preliminary, we note that appellant’s conviction 

for possession of a firearm prohibited was graded as a second-degree felony, 

 

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361 and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501(a), respectively.
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his conviction for firearms not to be carried without a license was graded as 

a third-degree felony, and his conviction for carrying firearms in public in 

Philadelphia was graded as a first-degree misdemeanor.

The compulsory joinder rule bars a subsequent prosecution if each of 

the following test prongs is met:

(1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or 

conviction; (2) the current prosecution was based on 

the same criminal conduct or arose from the same 

criminal episode; (3) the prosecutor in the 

subsequent trial was aware of the charges before the 

first trial; and (4) all charges [are] within the same 

judicial district as the former prosecution.

Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted; 

bracket in original).

Here, no dispute exists that appellant’s prosecution on the summary 

traffic offenses resulted in convictions, that his subsequent firearms 

prosecutions were based on the same criminal conduct or arose from the 

same criminal episode, and that the Commonwealth knew of the firearms 

charges before the summary trial. In light of this court’s recent en banc

decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto, A.3d , 2017 WL 3776631 

(Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc), however, appellant fails to satisfy the fourth 

Reid test prong.

In Perfetto, 2017 WL 3776631 at *11, this court held that where, as 

here, a defendant’s summary traffic offense was to be heard solely in the 

Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division pursuant to its jurisdiction in 
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accordance with Pa.C.S.A. § 1302(a.1)(1)(i), a prior disposition of that 

summary traffic offense in traffic court does not bar a later prosecution of 

other criminal charges that arose in the same judicial district and at the 

same time as the summary traffic offense because Section 1302 carves out 

an exception to compulsory joinder and directs that the summary traffic 

offense is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the traffic court. Consequently, 

appellant’s subsequent prosecution on the firearms violations was not barred 

by compulsory joinder.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/19/2017