SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5761-14T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANTONIO D. HALL,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

Submitted March 14, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Reisner and Rothstadt.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, 

Indictment No. 14-07-2030.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Marcia Blum, Assistant Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Antonio D. Hall appeals from a judgment of 

conviction entered after he conditionally pled guilty to one count 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

July 6, 2017
2 A-5761-14T4

of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (handgun), 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). Pursuant to his plea agreement, two other 

charges were dismissed, and he was sentenced to a five-year term 

of imprisonment, subject to a three-and-one-half year period of 

parole ineligibility, in accordance with the Graves Act, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-6(c). On appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion to 

suppress the weapon – a handgun – arguing "the police had neither 

probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to conduct an 

investigatory stop." We disagree and affirm. 

The facts adduced at defendant's suppression hearing can be 

summarized as follows. On March 21, 2014, at approximately 10:30 

p.m., Camden County Police Officer Jordan Plitt,1 his partner, 

Officer Joe Olivo, and five other officers were patrolling the 

South Camden area of Chesapeake and Hartford Streets, a 

residential, high-crime neighborhood. They drove marked patrol 

vehicles and wore uniforms that clearly identified them as police 

officers. From approximately fifteen feet away, Plitt observed 

defendant standing alone on a street corner, wearing a balaclava 

– a face mask that left only defendant's eyes unobscured – and a 

hooded sweatshirt with the hood pulled up. Defendant's clothes 

 

1 Officer Plitt was the only witness testifying at the suppression 

hearing.
3 A-5761-14T4

hung disproportionately to the left. When defendant spotted the 

patrol vehicles approaching, he placed his left hand in his pocket 

and began to "blade" the left side of his body away from officers.2 

Plitt's "training and experience" led him to suspect defendant was 

trying to conceal a weapon. 

Plitt testified that defendant began to walk towards a house 

on the corner. The house was dark except for the porch light and 

was surrounded by a fence and front gate. Plitt parked and exited 

the patrol vehicle. When defendant reached the house, he began 

"frantically . . . bang[ing] with a closed fist on the front door." 

Plitt stood beyond the front gate and asked defendant if he lived 

at the house.3 Defendant ignored his question and continued 

knocking on the door. Plitt asked defendant to come down and talk 

to him. With his hand still in his left pocket, defendant turned 

and walked towards the gate. Mere feet from Plitt, defendant 

"placed his right hand on the gate and hurdled it -- jumped right 

over it and began to flee." 

Plitt and Olivo gave chase. The remaining officers began to 

get into their vehicles to provide back up. However, the foot 

 

2 The term blading describes an attempt to conceal a part of the

body by turning it away from an observing officer.

3 Officers later determined defendant did not live at the 

property. 
4 A-5761-14T4

chase lasted only half a block. As Plitt was "closing the distance 

about to tackle him," defendant removed his hand from his pocket, 

revealing a silver handgun. Although the lighting was dark, Plitt 

testified he was close enough to clearly see the weapon. Defendant 

threw the handgun, and Plitt tackled him. Plitt testified, 

defendant "wasn't able to throw [the handgun] too far," so it was 

within arm's reach. As Plitt struggled to apprehend him, defendant 

"began to reach [for the gun] . . . [,] so [Plitt] struck him in 

the face[,] and [Olivo] secured the weapon."

In deciding defendant's suppression motion, the judge found 

Plitt to be credible, noting he answered all questions 

consistently. The judge concluded that, considering Plitt's 

"training regarding firearm possession," the officer had a 

"reasonable articulable suspicion supported by the facts on the 

record that this defendant could have been carrying a weapon."

Specifically the judge cited to defendant's presence in a "highcrime area at 10:34 p.m. at night," "the sagging of an object on

the left side of the defendant's body, the walking away, the 

observations that the officer himself made, the frantically 

knocking at a door[,] coupled with the taking off running when the 

officers approached defendant." The judge noted the door defendant

was frantically knocking upon was part of "a gated home," and his 

presence on the property "could've been a trespass." Based on 
5 A-5761-14T4

these considerations, the court concluded there was justification 

for the investigatory stop. 

On appeal, defendant argues: 

POINT I

BECAUSE THE POLICE HAD NEITHER 

PROBABLE CAUSE NOR REASONABLE 

SUSPICION TO CONDUCT AN 

INVESTIGATORY STOP, THE GUN SEIZED 

FROM DEFENDANT AS A RESULT OF THE 

UNLAWFUL STOP SHOULD HAVE BEEN 

SUPPRESSED.

1. BECAUSE THE POLICE DID 

NOT ORDER HALL TO STOP, AND ONLY 

ASKED HIM TO TALK TO THEM, THEY 

INITIATED A FIELD INQUIRY, NOT AN 

INVESTIGATORY STOP.

2. THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE 

REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR AN 

INVESTIGATORY STOP.

3. THE "PLAIN-VIEW" 

EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY.

We review a motion judge's factual findings in a suppression 

hearing with great deference. State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 

(2016). In our review of a "grant or denial of a motion to 

suppress [we] must uphold the factual findings underlying the 

trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by 

sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Gamble, 218 

N.J. 412, 424 (2014); see also State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 

440 (2013). We defer "to those findings of the trial judge which 
6 A-5761-14T4

are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see 

the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing 

court cannot enjoy." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 223, 244 (2007) 

(quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). We owe no 

deference, however, to the trial court's legal conclusions or 

interpretation of the legal consequences that flow from 

established facts. Our review in that regard is de novo. State 

v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015); State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 

327 (2013).

Applying these standards, we find defendant's arguments to 

be without sufficient merit to warrant extensive discussion in a 

written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), and affirm substantially for the 

reasons articulated by the motion judge in her oral decision, 

adding only the following comments.

We conclude that the evidence adduced at the suppression 

hearing established that the police officer had a particularized 

and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying an 

investigatory stop of defendant. An investigatory stop, also 

called a Terry4 stop or an investigatory detention, "occurs during 

a police encounter when 'an objectively reasonable person' would 

feel 'that his or her right to move has been restricted.'" State 

 

4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 

(1968). 
7 A-5761-14T4

v. Rosario, ____ N.J. ____,____ (2017) (slip op. at 18) (quoting 

State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002)). An investigatory 

stop "must be based on an officer's 'reasonable and particularized 

suspicion . . . that an individual has just engaged in, or was 

about to engage in, criminal activity.'" Id. at 18-19 (quoting 

State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002)). 

When reviewing whether the State has established a valid 

basis for an investigatory stop, we "give weight to 'the officer's 

knowledge and experience' as well as 'rational inferences that 

could be drawn from the facts objectively and reasonably viewed 

in light of the officer's expertise.'" State v. Citarella, 154 

N.J. 272, 279-80 (1998) (quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 10-

11 (1997)). Facts that might seem innocent when viewed in 

isolation can sustain a finding of reasonable suspicion when 

considered in the aggregate. Stovall, supra, 170 N.J. at 368 

(citing Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 279-80). "[A] group of 

innocent circumstances in the aggregate[, accordingly,] can 

support a finding of reasonable suspicion." Ibid. 

Applying these principles, we find Plitt formed a reasonable 

and particularized suspicion defendant had engaged in, or was 

about to engage in, criminal activity based upon the aggregate of 

his observations. Plitt saw defendant standing on a corner in a 

high-crime area, see State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 26 (2004)
8 A-5761-14T4

(considering an area's reputation for crime a relevant factor when 

assessing reasonable suspicion), wearing a balaclava and clothing 

that hung disproportionately to the left and, when defendant 

noticed Plitt, he attempted to conceal the left side of his body,

blading. Pursuant to Plitt's training and expertise, his 

observations indicated defendant might have a concealed weapon. 

See Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 279 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted) (holding "courts are to give weight to 

the officer's knowledge and experience"). Upon observing Plitt, 

defendant began frantically banging on the front door of a nearby 

house. State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 29 (2010) (considering 

defendant's nervous actions as a factor supporting reasonable 

suspicion); Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 250 ("nervousness and 

conflicting statements, along with indicia of wrongdoing, can be 

cumulative factors in a totality of the circumstances analysis 

that leads to a finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion 

of ongoing criminality"). 

Based on the totality of these circumstances, Plitt was 

justified in conducting an investigatory stop, even before 

defendant ran away. Defendant's flight provided "an additional 

factor that heighten[s] the level of reasonable articulable 

suspicion already engendered by [defendant's] antecedent actions." 

Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 281; see also State v. Tucker, 136 
9 A-5761-14T4

N.J. 358, 409 (1994) (concluding flight, when combined with other 

evidence of criminal activity, can justify a suspect's detention 

or arrest).

The denial of defendant's suppression motion was supported 

by sufficient credible evidence, and it was legally correct. We 

have no cause to disturb defendant's conviction.

Affirmed.