UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

CINDY HARRISON, as legal 

guardian of Robert Gene Wells,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:21cv19-TKW-MJF

TOMMY FORD, in his official capacity

as Sheriff of Bay County, Florida, and 

RICK ANGLIN, in his supervisory capacity,

Defendants.

_________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON FEDERAL CLAIMS 

AND REMANDING STATE LAW CLAIMS TO STATE COURT

This case is before the Court based on Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment (Doc. 52). Upon due consideration of the motion, Plaintiff’s response in 

opposition (Docs. 60), Defendants’ reply (Doc. 64), Plaintiff’s sur-reply (Doc. 71), 

and the evidence submitted by the parties,1the Court finds for the reasons that follow 

that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the federal claims and that the 

state law claims should be remanded to state court. 

Parties

Plaintiff is the sister and legal guardian of Robert Gene Wells.

1 Collectively, the parties submitted over 2,000 pages of evidence. See Docs. 48-1 through 

48-75, 49, 50, 54, 61-1 through 61-55, and 63-1.

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Mr. Wells is cognitively and physically disabled as the result of a car accidents 

in 2015 and 2016. He has low intellectual functioning, impaired speech patterns, 

and memory difficulties. He also has difficulty walking and uses a walker to get 

around.

Defendant Tommy Ford (Sheriff Ford) was, at all times pertinent to this case, 

the Sheriff of Bay County. He was ultimately responsible for the operation of the 

Bay County Jail (the Jail) as the “chief correctional officer” (CCO) of the Bay 

County Correctional System, although he had the authority to—and did—delegate 

those duties.

Defendant Rick Anglin (Warden Anglin) was, at all times pertinent to this 

case, the highest ranking official at the Jail, and in his capacity as Major of Judicial 

Services, he was delegated the duties of the CCO. Warden Anglin “command[ed] 

the Jail” and was responsible for establishing the Jail’s policies and procedures at 

the Jail, but his decisions were subject to review by Sheriff Ford.

Undisputed Material Facts

In October 2016, Mr. Wells was booked in the Jail after being arrested for 

possession of methamphetamine with the intent to sell (a second-degree felony)2and 

several misdemeanors. He was released on bond, but he was re-arrested after he 

failed to appear in court.

2

 See §893.13(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat.

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When Mr. Wells was re-booked into the Jail in August 2017, he was given a 

“medium” custody classification based on his charges and his prior criminal 

convictions.3 That classification authorized Mr. Wells to be placed in an open bay 

dorm.

Mr. Wells was housed in general population dorms without any incident until 

October 2017 when he was transferred to the Florida State Hospital after the state 

court found him incompetent to proceed.

Mr. Wells was returned to the Jail on April 27, 2018. Upon his return, Mr. 

Wells was placed in the segregation dorm—the C Dorm—which houses inmates 

who need to be separated from the general population for their own safety or the 

safety of other inmates or jail staff.

The C Dorm was comprised of four pods: C-1, which was for protective 

custody; C-2, which was suicide precaution, C-3, which was administrative and 

disciplinary segregation; and C-4, which was behavioral observation.

Mr. Wells was initially housed in the C-4 pod, but he was moved to the C-2 

pod on May 22, 2018, and three days later, he was moved to the C-1 pod.

There is no evidence that Mr. Wells exhibited behaviors that required the type 

of close observation (and the resulting loss of privileges) that was provided in the 

3

 Mr. Wells’ prior convictions include drug offenses, robbery, child abuse, and battery, but 

those offenses predated his injuries.

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other pods in the C Dorm, and it is undisputed that he was placed in the C-1 pod for 

his own protection (because of his disabilities) and because he needed a low bunk.

Inmates Diontez McCoy and Travis Bell were also housed in the C-1 pod

when Mr. Wells was moved into that pod.

McCoy was being held on charges of possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon and second-degree murder, and he was housed in the C-1 pod because he was 

“tied to a recent high-profile murder.” McCoy was initially given a “medium” 

security classification, but his classification was increased to “high” after the murder 

charges were added. 

Bell was being held on charges of child molestation and he was being housed 

in the C-1 pod because the nature of his charges put him at risk of harm if he was 

housed in the general population. Bell was given a “high” security classification 

because of the nature of his charges.

On June 13, 2018, Mr. Wells was using his walker to go to the shower in the 

C-1 pod. He was not wearing pants because he had soiled himself. 

As Mr. Wells was walking to the shower, Bell placed a rubber glove that he 

got from McCoy on the end of a broom that was leaning up against the wall in the 

common area of the pod. Bell then ran up behind Mr. Wells, shoved the broom into 

his buttocks. Bell then ran off and replaced the broom against the wall. Mr. Wells 

did not react to the assault and he kept walking towards the shower. 

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The entire incident was captured on video and only lasted about 30 seconds, 

from the time that Bell directed McCoy to get the glove to when Bell replaced the 

broom against the wall. The actual assault lasted less than five seconds. The video 

shows that the assault was fairly unremarkable and not particularly violent, but it 

was criminal and should not have happened.

Mr. Wells did not report the incident to Jail staff, but after another inmate

reported the assault, an investigation was conducted. Mr. Wells initially told the 

investigator that the incident did not occur, but after the investigator reviewed the 

video and saw the incident, Mr. Wells provided a sworn statement that Bell “poked 

[him] in the butt” and that he “tried to” insert the broom into his anus.

After the incident, Mr. Wells was moved to the C-3 pod for his protection. 

Shortly thereafter, pursuant to a state court order, Mr. Wells was transferred to the 

Florida State Hospital for an evaluation regarding involuntary civil commitment.4

A week after the incident, Mr. Wells told staff at the Florida State Hospital 

that another inmate had placed a broom handle between his legs but that there had 

been no penetration. A medical examination was conducted and no injury was 

observed.

4

 The state court’s order was signed on the day of the incident and received by the Jail the 

day after the incident, but there is no evidence that the timing of the order had anything to do with 

the incident at issue in this case.

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Bell and McCoy were both criminally charged based on the incident. Bell 

was charged with sexual battery and McCoy was charged with principal to sexual 

battery. They both ultimately pled no contest to reduced charges.

The Jail has procedures to prevent, detect, report, and investigate incidents 

involving inmate sexual abuse and sexual harassment, as required by the Prison Rape 

Elimination Act (PREA).

5

From 2016 to the date of the incident at issue in this case, there were only 

three substantiated PREA incidents at the Jail and none of those incidents occurred 

in the C-1 pod and none involved Bell or McCoy. Bell was identified in a PREA 

report—as the victim, not the aggressor—but that report was unsubstantiated.

There is no evidence that Bell or McCoy made any specific threats against

Mr. Wells before the incident at issue in this case.

6

There is no evidence that incidents like the incident in this case ever occurred 

in the C-1 pod, much less that such incidents were common. Indeed, the evidence 

is undisputed that the C-1 pod has very few issues with inmate violence. 

5

 Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (2003) (codified as amended in 34 U.S.C. §30301, et 

seq.).

6

 The Court did not overlook that the inmate who reported the incident told the investigator 

that Bell constantly picked on Mr. Wells by “joking around calling his name and getting him riled 

up,” but there is no evidence that this conduct involved physical threats or that Jail staff was aware 

of this conduct.

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Neither Sheriff Ford nor Warden Anglin was personally involved in any of 

the classification or housing decisions related to Mr. Wells, Bell, or McCoy.

Classification decision are made by a “classification counselor” pursuant to a 

standard procedure. Among other things, the procedure provides that “dangerous 

felons shall be housed separately from misdemeanants.” The procedure also 

includes criteria for housing of “special needs inmates”—i.e., those who present a 

threat to the staff, other inmates, medical reasons or threat to themselves—and it 

provides that housing for inmates with medical needs “will be based on a 

combination of needs and his/her security designation.”

Procedural History

In September 2020, Mr. Wells filed a complaint against Sheriff Ford and 

Warden Anglin in state court asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983, Florida 

common law, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

7

 

Defendants removed the case to this Court in January 2021 based on federal question

and supplemental jurisdiction and thereafter filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion was denied as moot after Mr. Wells filed an 

amended complaint. See Doc. 14.

The amended complaint (Doc. 13) asserts seven claims: a §1983 “failure to 

protect” claim against Sheriff Ford in his official capacity (Count I); a §1983 “failure 

7

 42 U.S.C. §12181, et seq.

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to protect” claim against Major Anglin in his supervisory capacity (Count II); a 

§1983 deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Sheriff Ford in 

his official capacity (Count III); a §1983 deliberate indifference to serious medical 

needs claim against Major Anglin in his individual capacity (Count IV); common 

law negligent training (Count V) and negligence (Count VI) claims against Sheriff 

Ford in his official capacity; and an ADA claim against Sheriff Ford in his official 

capacity (Count VII). Sheriff Ford answered the amended complaint and Warden 

Anglin responded to the amended complaint with a motion to dismiss the claims 

against him under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court granted Warden Anglin’s motion in part 

and dismissed Count IV. See Doc. 22. Warden Anglin thereafter answered the 

amended complaint and the parties engaged in an extended period of discovery. 

In July 2021, the case was stayed at the parties’ request due to Mr. Wells’ 

incompetency until an appropriate representative could be appointed to prosecute 

the case on his behalf. See Doc. 31. The stay was lifted in October 2021 after 

Plaintiff was appointed as Mr. Wells’ legal guardian. See Doc. 35. Plaintiff was 

thereafter substituted for Mr. Wells as the named plaintiff pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 25(b). See Doc. 73.

After discovery closed, Defendants jointly filed a motion for summary 

judgment on all the remaining claims in the amended complaint. The motion was

fully briefed and is ripe for ruling. No hearing is necessary.

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Summary Judgment Standard

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue of fact is “material” if it would change 

the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine” if the 

record evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find in favor of the non-moving 

party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 324 (1986), and where (as here) the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof 

on an issue at trial, the moving party may meet its initial burden by simply “showing 

... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case,” id. 

at 325 (internal quotation omitted). Once the moving party meets its burden, the 

non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and identify evidence of record showing 

a genuine factual dispute for trial. Id. at 324; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“When the moving party has 

carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show 

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (footnote omitted).

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pennington v. City of 

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Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). The Court’s role at the summary 

judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence, but rather to “conclude whether [the 

evidence] is so one-sided that the result of any trial is inevitable.” Turner v. Phillips, 

2022 WL 458238, at *4 (11th Cir. Feb. 15, 2022).

Analysis

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the remaining 

claims because (1) as to the §1983 claims, there is no evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could find that they or their policies were deliberately indifferent to 

Mr. Wells’ safety or his medical needs; (2) as to the ADA claim, there is no evidence 

that Mr. Wells was denied any benefit or otherwise discriminated against based on 

his disability; and (3) the state law claims are barred by sovereign immunity. The 

Court agrees with Defendants with respect to the federal claims, and based on the 

disposition of those claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over the state law claims.

§1983 Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Ford (Count I) and Warden Anglin (Count III) 

were deliberately indifferent to his safety and that Sheriff Ford was deliberately 

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indifferent to his serious medical needs (Count II). Each claim will be discussed in 

turn, starting with the “failure to protect”8claim against Sheriff Ford.

Failure to Protect – Sheriff Ford (Count I)

The failure to protect claim against Sheriff Ford is against him in his official

capacity, which means that it is a Monell9claim against the Sheriff’s Office. See 

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 

To overcome Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim, 

Plaintiff must show that there are facts from which a jury could find “(1) that [Mr. 

Wells’] constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the [Sheriff’s Office] had a 

custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; 

and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 

F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, the Court need not address the third element 

because, as discussed below, there is no evidence from which a jury could find either 

of the first two elements.

8

 A claim that prison officials inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by acting with 

deliberate indifference to an inmate’s safety is commonly referred to as a “failure to protect” claim. 

See Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2021).

9

 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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Constitutional Violation

With respect to the first element, it is well established that prison officials 

have a constitutional duty10 to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other 

prisoners. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). However, merely 

negligent failure to protect an inmate from being attacked by another inmate is not 

enough to establish a constitutional violation and impose liability under §1983. See 

Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986). Instead, to establish a 

constitutional violation, the inmate must establish that prison officials were 

“deliberately indifferent” to a substantial risk of harm—which requires the officials’ 

knowledge of a “strong likelihood” of injury, not just a “mere possibility” of injury. 

Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990).

In the context of a failure to protect claim, the inmate must establish that 

prison officials were subjectively aware that there was strong likelihood that (1) the 

inmate was the target of a specific threat or (2) inmates were under a regular and 

constant threat of violence due to the dangerous conditions of the prison. See Estate 

of Owens v. GEO Group, Inc., 660 F. App’x 763, 769-771 (11th Cir. 2016). 

10

 This duty arises under the Eighth Amendment with respect to convicted inmates and the 

Fourteenth Amendment with respect to pretrial detainees like Mr. Wells—but the applicable 

standards are the same. See Balbin v. Latin, 2022 WL 426508, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2022)

(citing Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996)).

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Here, there is no evidence that Bell or McCoy threatened Mr. Wells prior to 

the incident giving rise to this case and, as a result, there is no evidence that Jail 

officials were aware that Bell or McCoy posed a particularized risk to Mr. Wells’ 

safety. Merely because Bell and McCoy were classified as “high” security inmates 

is not enough to establish that they posed a particularized threat to Mr. Wells. See 

Gross v. White, 340 F. App’x 527, 531 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Carter v. Galloway, 

352 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that “jail officials’ 

generalized awareness that an inmate was a violence-prone troublemaker was not 

enough to show that they were subjectively aware that he posed a substantial risk of 

serious harm to the plaintiff”).

Likewise, because there is no evidence that there had been any similar prior 

incidents in the C-1 pod, there is no evidence from which the jury could find that the 

conditions that Mr. Wells was subjected to in that pod were so extreme that “serious 

inmate-on-inmate violence was the norm or something close to it.” Marbury v. 

Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Johnson v. Lang, 2022 WL 

2734421, at *3 (11th Cir. July 14, 2022) (citing Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. 

Toombs Cnty., 400 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that 

“[e]xtreme levels of prisoner-on-prisoner violence may create a substantial risk of 

harm” but “‘occasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another’ are insufficient 

to establish this element”); Estate of Owens, 660 F. App’x at 771 (explaining that 

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“in order to succeed on a ‘prison conditions’ theory, a plaintiff cannot rely simply 

on ‘occasional [or] isolated attacks by one prisoner on another’ but rather must prove 

‘confinement in a prison where violence and terror reign’” (quoting Harrison v. 

Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1299 (11th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original))).

The Court did not overlook Plaintiff’s argument that Jail staff was deliberately 

indifferent to Mr. Wells’ safety by leaving a broom unattended in the common room 

of the C-1 pod. However, there is no evidence that the broom had ever been used 

by an inmate to attack another inmate and there is no evidence that Jail staff were 

subjectively aware that there was a strong likelihood that the unattended broom 

posed a substantial risk of harm to Mr. Wells. See King v. Anderson, 2014 WL 

2504549, at *8-9 (M.D. Ala. June 2, 2014) (grating summary judgment against

inmate who was attacked by another inmate with a broom because there was no 

evidence that the broom had previously been used as a weapon and, thus, the 

defendant officers had no reason to believe that there was strong likelihood that the

broom posed a substantial risk of danger).

Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to establish that Mr. Wells’ constitutional rights 

were violated by the Jail officials’ alleged failure to protect him from being attacked 

by Bell and McCoy.

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Policy or Custom

With respect to the second element, Plaintiff claims that Sheriff Ford has a 

policy of ignoring the needs of mentally and physically disabled inmates by housing 

them with violent felons. The problem with this argument is that the evidence fails 

to establish the existence of such a policy. In fact, the evidence establishes that the 

Sheriff’s Office has a classification policy requiring “dangerous felons [to] be 

housed separately from misdemeanants” and the policy also provides that the

housing determination for inmates with medical needs “will be based on a 

combination of needs and his/her security designation.” Plaintiff does not argue that 

this policy, as written, is facially unconstitutional.

Notwithstanding the existence of a facially constitutional officially 

promulgated policy, municipal liability can be established if the municipality has a 

widespread “custom or practice” that contravenes the official policy and authorizes 

the unconstitutional practice at issue. See Knight through Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 

856 F.3d 795, 819 (11th Cir. 2017). Additionally, even in the absence of a 

widespread custom or practice, municipal liability can be established based on a 

single unconstitutional decision made or ratified by the municipality’s final 

policymaker. See Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 793 (11th Cir. 1989). However, 

neither of these circumstances are present here.

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First, Plaintiff has not identified any other instances in which a disabled 

inmate has been attacked by another inmate in the C-1 pod or that it is a widespread 

practice to house disabled inmates in that pod. Second, irrespective of whether 

Sheriff Ford or Warden Anglin is the final policymaker with respect to classification 

decisions at the Jail,11 their ratification of the decision to house Mr. Wells in the C1 pod would not impose municipal policy because that decision was not 

unconstitutional for the reasons stated above. Cf. Malone v. Butler, 2012 WL 

4009345, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 20, 2012) (finding that prison officials were entitled 

to qualified immunity from a failure to protect suit by a disabled inmate who was 

sexually assaulted by his cellmate because case law did not establish that housing 

disabled and non-disabled inmates together violated a clearly established 

constitutional right), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 4009341 (N.D. 

Ala. Sept. 7, 2012).

* * *

In sum, for the reasons stated above, there is simply no evidence from which 

a jury could find that Mr. Wells’ constitutional rights were violated or that the 

Sheriff’s Office has a policy, custom, or practice of failing to protect disabled 

11

 Plaintiff argues that Warden Anglin is the final policymaker for all Jail policies because 

he has been delegated that authority by Sheriff Ford. See Doc. 60 at 3, 24. Defendants argue that 

Sheriff Ford is the final policymaker because he is the head of the Sheriff’s Office and, 

notwithstanding his delegation of certain duties to Warden Anglin, he maintains control of the Jail 

and has the authority to (and does) meaningfully review Warden Anglin’s decisions. See Doc. 52 

at 22-24; Doc. 64 at 2-4. Resolution of that dispute is immaterial to the outcome of this case.

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inmates from being attacked by other inmates. Accordingly, Sheriff Ford is entitled 

to summary judgment on the failure to protect claim in Count I of the amended 

complaint.

Failure to Protect – Warden Anglin (Count II)

The failure to protect claim against Warden Anglin is against him in his 

supervisory capacity, and it is well established that “a plaintiff seeking to hold a 

supervisor liable for constitutional violations must show [1] that the supervisor either 

participated directly in the unconstitutional conduct or [2] that a causal connection 

exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” 

Harrison, 746 F.3d at 1298. Here, there is no evidence that Warden Anglin 

participated in the decision to house Mr. Wells in the C-1 pod, so Plaintiff must show 

a causal connection between his actions and the alleged constitutional violation.

A casual connection can be established in three ways:

1) ‘when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor 

on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to 

do so’; 2) ‘when a supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate 

indifference to constitutional rights’; or 3) ‘when facts support an 

inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully 

or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop 

them from doing so.’

Dickinson v. Cochran, 833 F. App’x 268, 272 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Cottone v. 

Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003)). The standard for establishing 

supervisory liability is “extremely rigorous,” id. (quoting Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 

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Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1048 (11th Cir. 2014)), and “[t]he deprivations that constitute 

widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official [of the need to take 

action] must be obvious, flagrant, rampant, and of continued duration, rather than 

isolated occurrences,” id. (quoting Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th 

Cir. 1999)).

Here, there is no evidence of any prior incidents involving disabled inmates 

being sexually assaulted (or otherwise attacked) by other inmates in the C-1 pod that 

would have put Warden Anglin on notice that the Jail’s classification policy or the 

decisions of the classification counselors were causing widespread constitutional 

violations for disabled inmates. See Losey v. Warden, 521 F. App’x 717, 719 (11th 

Cir. 2013) (rejecting inmate’s argument that the general nature of the warden’s job 

made it plausible that the warden was aware that the inmate’s misclassification put 

him at substantial risk of harm). Moreover, as discussed above, there is no evidence 

from which a jury could find that the Jail had a custom or policy of violating disabled 

inmates’ constitutional rights by housing them in the C-1 pod with dangerous 

inmates. Finally, there is no evidence that would support an inference that Warden 

Anglin directed the classification counselors (or other subordinates) to act 

unconstitutionally or that he knew that they were acting unconstitutionally and failed 

to stop them from doing so.

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Under these circumstances, there is no basis to hold Warden Anglin liable in 

his supervisory capacity for the incident in which Mr. Wells was assaulted by Bell 

and McCoy.12 See Doc. 22 at 8 (denying Warden Anglin’s motion to dismiss the 

failure to protect claim in Count II of the amended complaint but noting that this 

claim may not withstand summary judgment “if it turns out that Warden Anglin was 

not subjectively aware that [Mr. Wells] was vulnerable to attack due to his 

disabilities or that Bell and McCoy had an ‘agenda’ to harm [Mr. Wells]”). 

Accordingly, Warden Anglin is entitled to summary judgment on the failure to 

protect claim in Count II of the amended complaint.

Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs – Sheriff Ford (Count III)

Prison officials can be liable under §1983 for deliberate indifference to an 

inmate’s serious medical needs. Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Wells has serious 

medical needs since he has mental deficiencies and difficulty ambulating, but 

Plaintiff does not argue that Mr. Wells was not provided appropriate medical care or 

treatment for those needs. Instead, Plaintiff claims that Sheriff Ford was deliberately 

indifferent to Mr. Wells’ medical needs because “he should have been housed in the 

medical unit or the behavioral observation unit of the [Jail] rather than in protective 

custody.” Doc. 13 at ¶59.

12

 Based on this disposition, the Court need not assess whether Warden Anglin was entitled 

to qualified immunity because the constitutional right he was alleged to have violated was not 

clearly established.

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This is essentially a claim of misclassification and, thus, is effectively the 

same as the “failure to protect” claim asserted in Count I. See Doc. 22 at 4-5 

(dismissing the identical deliberate indifference to serious medical need claim 

against Warden Anglin because “Plaintiff did not cite—nor could the Court find—

any case law for the proposition that a deliberate indifference to a serious medical 

need claim can be based on the misclassification or failure to protect the inmate 

rather than the failure to provide necessary medical care or treatment”). Indeed, it

is noteworthy that in her response in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ argument that Sheriff Ford was 

entitled to summary judgment on the deliberate indifference to medical needs claim 

in Count III of the amended complaint because that claim “is the same claim asserted 

against Sheriff in Count I, a claim for deliberate indifference based on 

misclassification, or a failure to protect.” Doc. 52 at 37. Thus, it appears that 

Plaintiff has abandoned this claim. See Est. of Miller v. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., 

Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (“[A]rguments not raised in 

response to a summary judgment motion are considered abandoned.”) (citing 

Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1291 n. 3 (11th Cir.2009)).

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above with respect to Count I, Sheriff Ford 

is entitled to summary judgment on the deliberate indifference to medical need claim 

in Count III of the amended complaint. 

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ADA Claim

“[A] disabled prisoner can state a Title II-ADA claim if he is denied 

participation in an activity provided in state prison by reason of his disability.” 

Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1081 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Pa. Dep’t

of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998)). To establish such a claim, Plaintiff 

must show that Mr. Wells is (1) a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he 

was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s 

services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the 

public entity; and (3) the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination was by 

reason of [his] disability.” Id. at 1083. 

Prison officials must accommodate an inmate’s disability, but the 

accommodation “need not be ideal; instead, it need only be reasonable and 

effective.” Arce v. Louisiana, 226 F. Supp. 3d 643, 651 (E.D. La. 2016) (citing Wells 

v. Thaler, 460 Fed. App’x. 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2012)). Moreover, “a correctional 

facility is afforded deference in its determination of an appropriate accommodation.” 

Id.

Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Wells a qualified individual and that the Jail is 

a public entity, but Sheriff Ford argues that there is no evidence from which a jury 

could find that Mr. Wells was denied any “program, service, or activity” or otherwise 

discriminated against because of his disability. The Court agrees.

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Plaintiff does not clearly articulate what program, service, or activity Mr. 

Wells was allegedly denied by his placement in the C-1 pod, and even if placement 

within a particular area of a jail is a “program, service or activity” (and it is not clear 

that it is), the undisputed evidence establishes that the reason Mr. Wells was placed 

in the C-1 pod was to accommodate his disability-based need to be segregated from 

the general population and to have a low bunk. The fact that Mr. Wells’ need for a 

low bunk could possibly have also been accommodated in another pod in the C Dorm

does not mean that his placement in the C-1 pod was an unreasonable 

accommodation for Mr. Wells’ disabilities because it is undisputed that his 

privileges and movement would have been more restricted than they otherwise 

needed to be if he been housed in another pod in the C Dorm. Cf. Olmstead. V. L.C. 

ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999) (“Unjustified isolation [of disabled 

individuals in custody] is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability.”) 

Moreover, as discussed above with respect to the §1983 claims, there is no evidence 

from which a jury could find that Mr. Wells’ housing assignment was made with 

deliberate indifference to his disabilities—which is a prerequisite for recovering 

compensatory damages under Title II of the ADA. See Silberman v. Miami Dade 

Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1134 (11th Cir. 2019).

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In sum, there is no evidence from which a jury could find that Sheriff Ford 

violated Mr. Wells’ rights under Title II of the ADA. Accordingly, Sheriff Ford is 

entitled to summary judgment on Count VII of the amended complaint.

State Law Claims

The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in Counts 

V and VI of the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). However, 

based on the disposition of the federal claims, the Court is not required to retain 

jurisdiction over those claims. See 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3) (“The district court[] may 

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [a state law claim] if . . . the district 

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction .... ”). Indeed, 

the Eleventh Circuit has “encouraged” district courts to dismiss any remaining state 

claims when the federal claims have been disposed of prior to trial. See Raney v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004).

When deciding whether to retain or decline supplemental jurisdiction under 

§1367(c), the district court is to consider the Gibbs13 factors: judicial economy, 

convenience, fairness, and comity. See West v. City of Albany, Ga., 830 F. App’x 

588, 597 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millenium Labs., Inc., 803 F.3d 

518, 532 (11th Cir. 2015)). Here, although interests of judicial economy weigh in 

favor of retaining jurisdiction because the summary judgment arguments on the state 

13

 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

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law claims have been fully briefed, interests of comity weigh strongly against 

retaining jurisdiction because the resolution of the state law claims involve nuanced 

issues of state sovereign immunity and the potential application of the “undertaker 

doctrine” that the state courts are better suited to address. The other Gibbs factors—

convenience and fairness—are neutral because both parties are citizens of Florida 

and the state court in which this case was originally filed is an equally convenient 

and fair forum for the parties.

The Court recognizes that this case has been pending for nearly two years at 

this point and that remanding the state law claims to state court will further delay the 

final disposition of the case. However, the delay should be minimal because the 

summary judgment motions on the state law claims are fully briefed and ripe for 

resolution by the state court upon remand. See Parcesepe v. Geo Grp., Inc., 2021 

WL 5033986, at *7 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2021) (“Although the Court recognizes that 

remanding the state law claims back to state court may delay the final disposition of 

this case, it should not require much if any additional work on behalf of the parties 

(and no duplication of work by the state court) because discovery is complete and 

the motion for summary judgment is fully briefed and ready to be decided.”).

Accordingly, because the Gibbs factors weigh against retaining jurisdiction

over the state law claims, the Court will remand those claims to the court from 

whence they came.

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Conclusion

In sum, for the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 52) is GRANTED

with respect to the federal claims in Counts I, II, III, and VII of the 

amended complaint. Count IV was previously dismissed. See Doc. 22.

2. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state 

law claims in Counts V and VI and those claims are REMANDED to 

the Circuit Court for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Bay 

County, Florida.

3. The Clerk shall enter partial final judgment in favor of Defendants on 

Counts I, II, III, IV, and VII and then close the case file.

DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of August, 2022.

__________________________________

T. KENT WETHERELL, II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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