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INCREASING OUR NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS

IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 23, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement . 2

Cohen, Hon. William S., former Secretary of Defense, chairman, and chief

executive officer of the Cohen Group, Washington, DC .................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16

Enzi, Hon. Mike, U.S. Senator from Wyoming, prepared statement and informational letter ...................................................................................................... 9

Hecker, Dr. Siegfried S., senior fellow, Los Alamos National Laboratory,

Los Alamos, NM ................................................................................................... 33

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 36

Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared statement ..... 6

Letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell, dated April 18, 2002 .................. 7

Menges, Dr. Constantine C., senior fellow, The Hudson Institute, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 43

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48

Article from the Washington Post, July 29, 2002, entitled ‘‘Russia, China

and What’s Really on the Table’’ ................................................................. 55

(III)

(1)

INCREASING OUR NONPROLIFERATION

EFFORTS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 2002

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:27 a.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Joseph R. Biden,

Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Bill Nelson, Lugar and Enzi.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

Over the past 2 years, the Committee on Foreign Relations has

held a series of hearings outlining the threat posed by weapons of

mass destruction to U.S. national security. We have listened to witnesses testify on a broad array of threats from the hypothetical

smallpox attack on the United States to the potential dangers

posed by dirty bomb and improvised nuclear devices.

We have also held two closed hearings for the Senate as a whole,

on the last two subjects. In the course of these hearings, one simple

fact has stood out: That is, there are many sources for weapons of

mass destruction. And it can take years to obtain or build them.

But there is one place that has it all, and that place is Russia. It

is far from our only problem. But when we talk about confronting

the nonproliferation challenges head on, we have to look at Russia.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, a massive military infrastructure geared toward a global confrontation lost its purpose overnight. Huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile material, poisonous chemical munitions, and illegally produced biological pathogens were no longer needed. As the culture of centralized control

withered away in the newly democratic Russia, the security and

safeguards for weapons storage facilities and laboratories began to

weaken. Weapons scientists, who had devoted their careers to the

Soviet state, were left to drift and forced to moonlight to make a

living.

To the lasting credit of two of my colleagues, Senators Nunn and

Lugar, and aided and abetted by our former Secretary before us

when he was here in the Senate, Senator Cohen, they recognized

the threat posed by a collapsing superpower with thousands of nuclear weapons. They led the way in creating a set of programs

known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction to help Russia and

other states in the former Soviet Union secure and destroy nuclear

warheads, missile launchers, and other strategic delivery systems.

In 1996, they were joined by Senator Pete Domenici in establishing the lab-to-lab programs under the Department of Energy to

2

secure Russia’s nuclear materials and help its weapons scientists

find socially useful concerns—or careers, I should say.

Next month we will celebrate the 10th anniversary of the NunnLugar programs. And as we mark that occasion, we have to face

the sobering reality that much more has to be done. Let us take

a quick look at what still exists. As a matter of fact, in the interest

of time, we will not take a quick look, except to suggest just a couple of broad things.

Approximately 1,000 metric tons of excess highly enriched uranium, enough to produce 20,000 nuclear weapons, remains; approximately 160,000 tons of excess weapons grade plutonium; approximately 40,000 tons of declared chemical weapons. And, according to a recent Carnegie Endowment study, a population of 120,000

scientists and skilled personnel in Russia’s nuclear cities, where 58

percent of them were surveyed, are forced to moonlight at second

jobs. And 14 percent have indicated a desire to work abroad.

A little more than a year ago, this committee heard from former

Senator Baker and former White House counsel Lloyd Cutler as

they presented findings on the Blue Ribbon Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs in the former Soviet Union. I risk

making myself hoarse by repeating it, but the primary finding is

this, and I quote, and I will end with this, ‘‘The most urgent unmet

national security threat to the United States today is the danger

that weapons of mass destruction or weapons useable material in

Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nations and

used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.’’ I say to my colleagues: We are fortunate today to have a very,

very first-rate set of witnesses, none whom we know better or have

greater respect for than our first witness, the distinguished former

Senator from Maine and former Secretary of Defense.

In 1974, Time magazine singled out Bill as one of America’s 200

future leaders. Others were in that list, but few proved Time magazine to be as correct as Bill Cohen did.

I welcome you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for being here. And it

is really very good to see you. The floor is yours.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Over the past two years, the Committee on Foreign Relations has held a series

of hearings outlining the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to

U.S. national security. We have listened to witnesses testify on a broad array of

threats, from a hypothetical smallpox attack on the United States to the potential

dangers posed by ‘‘dirty bombs’’ and improvised nuclear devices.

In the course of these hearings, one simple fact has stood out. There are many

sources for weapons of mass destruction, and it can take years to obtain or build

them. But there’s one place that has it all. That place is Russia. It’s far from our

only problem, but when we talk about confronting the nonproliferation challenge

head on, we must begin with Russia.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, a massive military infrastructure geared toward

a global confrontation lost its purpose overnight. Huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons

and fissile materials, poisonous chemical munitions, and illegally-produced biological

pathogens were no longer needed. As the culture of centralized control withered

away in a newly democratic Russia, the security and safeguards for weapons storage

facilities and laboratories began to weaken. Weapons scientists, who had devoted

their careers to the Soviet state, were left adrift and forced to moonlight to make

a living.

To the lasting credit of two of my colleagues, Senators Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar

immediately recognized the threat posed by a collapsing superpower with thousands

3

of nuclear weapons. They led the way in creating a set of programs known as Cooperative Threat Reduction to help Russia and the other states of the former Soviet

Union secure and destroy nuclear warheads, missile launchers and other strategic

delivery systems. In 1996, they were joined by Senator Pete Domenici in establishing lab-to-lab programs under the Department of Energy to secure Russian nuclear materials and help its weapons scientists find socially useful careers.

Next month, we will celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar programs.

As we mark that occasion, we must also face the sobering reality that much remains

to be done. Let’s take a quick look at what still exists in Russia today, a decade

after the Soviet Union fell:

• Approximately 1000 metric tons of excess highly enriched uranium, enough to

produce roughly 20,000 nuclear weapons. • Approximately 160 metric tons of excess weapons grade plutonium. • Approximately 40,000 metric tons of declared chemical weapons. • According to a recent Carnegie Endowment study, a population of 120,000 scientists and skilled personnel in the Russian nuclear cities where 58% of those

surveyed are forced to moonlight at second jobs and 14% have indicated a desire

to work abroad.

A little more than a year ago, this Committee heard from Senator Howard Baker

and former White House counsel Lloyd Cutler as they presented the findings of a

blue ribbon task force on U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union. I risk making myself hoarse, but let me once again repeat their primary

finding:

The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States

today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable

material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation

states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.

To address this critical threat, the Baker-Cutler report had called for the United

States to spend $30 billion over the next eight to ten years to secure and/or neutralize all nuclear weapons-usable material located in Russia and to prevent the outflow of Russian scientific expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction.

And that is why I decided to call this hearing today. Working with my colleagues,

I plan to make a strong push during this session for expanded funding for U.S. nonproliferation assistance to Russia. Before we do that, however, we need to focus any

increased funding on specific objectives. Simply throwing money at the problem is

not a solution.

I know that Secretary Cohen and our other witnesses will have their own creative

proposals to share with the Committee. I would also like to solicit their thoughts

on the following ideas, which have emerged during the past year:

(1) Accelerating the pace of the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting

program so that we will not have to wait until the end of the decade before all

Russian fissile material is stored at securely guarded facilities. As of 2001, comprehensive security upgrades had been completed at only 37 out of 95 nuclear

sites in the former Soviet Union. Expanding the MPC&A program will allow us

to implement comprehensive upgrades at more Russian sites.

(2) Expanding the scope and the pace of the 1993 Highly Enriched Uranium

(HEU) Purchase Agreement so that the United States purchases processed nuclear fuel from additional Russian stocks of highly enriched uranium. Today,

Russia is obligated to down blend 500 metric tons of HEU, or approximately 30

metric tons per year, for eventual sale in the United States to commercial nuclear reactors. There is no reason why we cannot double that total amount to

1000 metric tons to further reduce a proliferation risk. After all, one metric ton

of HEU is sufficient to produce approximately 20 nuclear weapons.

(3) Providing greater financial assistance to jump-start the destruction of Russian chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Russia has

declared approximately 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons at seven storage

sites across the country. I applaud the Administration’s request for a significant

increase in the FY 2003 budget request for these efforts, but we may need to

do more. We also need to pressure our European allies, in particular, to step

up to the plate with further support for this effort.

(4) Expanding programs like the International Science and Technology Centers and Bio Redirect to provide more Russian weapons scientists with greater

opportunities for collaborative projects with Western counterparts. I have suggested that we should organize Russian biological scientists into a public health

corps to clean up dangerous former test sites, develop and produce new vaccines, and defeat multi-drug resistant tuberculosis and other diseases.

4

Apart from new proposals, we should also consider new funding mechanisms. Senator Lugar and I have worked to develop the authority for the President to offer

‘‘debt-for-nonproliferation’’ swaps to the Russian Federation. In exchange for our forgiveness of part or all of the Russia’s official Soviet-era debt obligations to the

United States, Russia would in turn use these proceeds for mutually agreed nonproliferation programs. It is our hope that a U.S. offer along these lines will encourage similar initiatives on the part of our European allies, who carry the vast majority of Russian debt.

Let me clarify one issue. When I refer to Russia as having one-stop shopping for

weapons of mass destruction, I do not mean to slander the Russian government or

the Russian people. Frankly, I think we have been very lucky that the overwhelming majority of Russian scientists and military officers are real patriots and

recognize the perils of cooperating with foreign governments and terrorist groups.

Given the economic misery and porous security in Russia over the past decade, we

should all be grateful that large-scale defections of materials or personnel to foreign

nations have not occurred. With our help and assistance, the Russians are mounting

a noble effort to keep a tight noose on weapons of mass destruction. Both we and

they can do more, however, and al-Qaeda’s efforts are a reminder that we must do more. At the same time, I am glad the Administration is engaged in a frank dialogue

with Russia on the need to curb its cooperation with Iran in the nuclear and missile

fields, which do raise serious proliferation concerns. That conversation must continue, and I am hopeful the United States and Russia can reach some initial understandings before next month’s meetings between the two Presidents.

Our first witness today will be the Honorable William S. Cohen, the former Secretary of Defense and a former member of this body for eighteen years. In 1974,

Time Magazine singled out Bill as one of ‘‘America’s 200 Future Leaders.’’ I think

the past quarter of a century has borne out the wisdom of that prediction. As Secretary of Defense in the last Administration, Bill was among the first to recognize

the likelihood of a potential terrorist attack against the U.S. homeland involving a

nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. He has worked with Russian leaders on the

implementation of Nunn-Lugar programs. I look forward to his insights on how we

can move to the next level of cooperation.

Dr. Siegfried ‘‘Sig’’ Hecker, a Senior Fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Dr. Constantine Menges, a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, will appear on our second panel. Dr. Hecker served as Director of the Los Alamos lab from

1985 to 1997 and participated in some of the initial ‘‘lab-to-lab’’ exchanges between

the United States and Russia during the early 1990s. Last summer, Dr. Hecker published an article on ‘‘An Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia’’ and offered a number of intriguing proposals. I hope that Dr. Hecker will expand

on these proposals and give us a sense of which ideas deserve immediate action in

the next year. Dr. Constantine Menges has previously served as a Professor at the

George Washington University, where he directed the Program on Transitions to

Democracy and initiated a project on U.S. relations with Russia. He has also served

on the National Security Council and as a National Intelligence Officer.

With that, I turn to our ranking member for today, Senator Lugar.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. Let me yield to the Senator from Indiana for a statement.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for

your comments about Cooperative Threat Reduction.

I join the witnesses that we saw last year, Senator Baker and

Lloyd Cutler, believing that the No. 1 national security threat facing our country is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

and their means of delivery.

The problem we face today is not just terrorism. It is the nexus

between terrorists and these weapons of mass destruction. There is

little doubt that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda would have used

those weapons of mass destruction on September 11, if they had

possessed them. It is equally clear that they made an effort to obtain them.

Victory in this war must be defined not only in terms of destroying terrorist cells in this or that country. We must also undertake

the ambitious goal of comprehensively preventing the proliferation

5

of weapons of mass destruction. For many years, I and others have

promoted the concept of a multi-layer defense. And this first layer

of defense must target the most likely source of proliferation,

namely, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the former Soviet

Union.

Efforts to prevent the leakage of weapons of mass destruction

from falling into the hands of rogue nations and terrorist groups

are cheaper and more effective than responses after transfer. Nevertheless, we must also prepare for the leakage of these dangers

and their possible use against American targets. This requires us

to prepare to interdict weapons and materials abroad and at our

borders and respond to an attack here at home through consequence management efforts.

Finally, I believe a complete defense must include missile defenses. I have spent considerable time over the last decade working

to advance this multi-layer defense. In 1991, with former Senator

Sam Nunn of Georgia, we introduced the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative

Threat Reduction legislation. The program was designed to assist

the states of the former Soviet Union in dismantling weapons of

mass destruction and establishing verifiable safeguards against

their proliferation.

For more than 10 years, Nunn-Lugar has been the country’s

principal response to disintegration of the custodial system guarding the Soviet weapons legacy. Nunn-Lugar has also been used to

upgrade the security surrounding dangerous substances and to provide civilian employment to tens of thousands of Russian weapons

scientists. Unfortunately, complete Russian accountability and

transparency in the chemical and biological arena has been lacking.

And this has resulted in the administration’s request for a waiver

for a certification requirement that Russia is committed to arms

control goals.

This has led to a freeze on new dismantlements and nonproliferation projects in Russia. This is a dangerous situation. I am

hopeful the Congress will quickly respond by granting this waiver

on the supplemental appropriation bill. But we must also be clear

with Russia that full transparency and accountability must be

forthcoming with respect to former Soviet stockpiles of weapons of

mass destruction.

Last month I introduced legislation to permit and facilitate the

Secretary of Defense’s use of Nunn-Lugar expertise and resources

when nonproliferation threats around the world are identified. Beyond the former Soviet Union, Nunn-Lugar-styled programs aimed

at weapons and dismantlement and counter proliferation do not

exist. The ability to apply the Nunn-Lugar model to states outside

the former Soviet Union would provide the United States with another tool to confront the threats associated with weapons of mass

destruction.

My bill is designed to empower the administration to respond to

both emergency proliferation risks and less urgent cooperative opportunities to further nonproliferation goals. The precise replication

of the Nunn-Lugar program will not be possible ever.

And clearly, many states will continue to avoid accountability.

When nations resist, other options must be explored. When governments continue to contribute to weapons of mass destruction

6

threats facing the United States, we must be prepared to apply diplomatic and economic power, as well as military force.

The experience of Nunn-Lugar in Russia has demonstrated the

threat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary

outcomes based on mutual interest. No one would have predicted

in the 1980’s that American contractors and DOD officials would be

on the ground in Russia destroying thousands of strategic systems.

And if we were to protect ourselves during this incredibly dangerous period, we must create new nonproliferation partners and

aggressively pursue any nonproliferation opportunities that appear.

I believe increasing the administration’s flexibility in dealing

with these threats is the first step down that road. And I can

think, as you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, of no better witness

to those efforts the United States has been implementing in the

former Soviet Union than former Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen.

Secretary Cohen was personally engaged in these efforts

throughout his tenure at the Pentagon. He is a great leader, and

I want personally to thank him for his leadership of these vitally

important programs. And I join you in looking forward to his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And before we begin, I will ask unanimous consent that an opening statement by Senator Helms be put

in the record at this point, as well as a letter, he has asked to be

put in the record, a letter he sent to Secretary of State Powell.

[The prepared statement of Senator Helms and letter follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JESSE HELMS

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your scheduling this important hearing today; and I

appreciate the distinguished witnesses for agreeing to come and assist in our evaluating the significant matter of U.S. nonproliferation assistance to Russia.

President Bush has taken many steps during the past year in moving the United

States toward a new relationship with Russia, and thereby beyond the legacy resulting from the confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Since the first Cooperative Threat Reduction project began the dismantling of

Russia’s excess nuclear infrastructure nearly a decade ago, there have been numerous successes—missiles destroyed, bombers dismantled, submarines disassembled,

and nuclear warheads downloaded and safeguarded.

But the success of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program spurred expansion

into broader areas that, while significant, have been nonetheless difficult to verify,

such as securing nuclear materials, eliminating chemical and biological weapons,

and stemming the flow of scientific expertise out of the former Soviet Union.

While all of the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs have experienced fraud,

waste, and abuse, these newer initiatives also ran into a Russian bureaucracy that

has consistently denied the United States access to essential information, and in

doing so gave little confidence in the Russians’ commitment to reducing the threat

of proliferation.

The President has decided—and rightly so—that he cannot certify to Congress

that Russia is committed to complying with its relevant arms control agreements,

particularly the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

While I happen to believe that nonproliferation assistance programs in Russia can

benefit U.S. national security interests, we cannot direct our energies toward preventing potential proliferation while turning a blind eye to the actual proliferation

that is ongoing. I am referring specifically to Russia’s continued nuclear and ballistic missile assistance to Iran.

According to the most recent National Intelligence Estimate, Iran is likely to possess an ICBM by mid-decade, and could potentially have a nuclear weapon by the

end of the decade. This is a chilling prospect.

At the same time, Russia is providing Iran with advanced conventional weaponry

that could help Teheran sink U.S. warships and shoot down allied planes in the PerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:12 Sep 26, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 81833 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
7

sian Gulf. Because of Russian aid, Iran will soon present a clear and direct threat

to the United States and to our friends and interests in the region.

Russian proliferation to Iran is a must among the central issues of the upcoming

meeting in Moscow between Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin. I have recently written a letter to Secretary Powell—which I ask to appear in the record of this meeting today.

The letter urges the administration to put the issue of Russian proliferation to Iran

at the top of the agenda.

I look forward to hearing today’s witnesses’ on these matters, as to how we might

take action to rectify them.

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC, April 18, 2002.

The Honorable COLIN L. POWELL

Secretary of State

Washington, DC, 20520

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

With the May Summit between Presidents Bush and Putin rapidly approaching,

I do hope that this meeting will provide the opportunities to outline a firm and coherent strategy to stop the proliferation of missile technology, nuclear materials and

expertise being sent by Russia to Iran.

Additionally, Moscow’s reluctance to full compliance with its arms control commitments (such as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions) raises serious

doubts about not only its attitude regarding long-term U.S.-Russian relations, but

its intentions as well.

I am confident that you are greatly concerned, as am I, about the Intelligence

Community reports regarding illicit transfers to Iran continuing—if not increasing— despite protests from our government and contrary statements by senior Russian officials. I’m confident that you saw the National Intelligence Estimate that, unless

Russian assistance is curtailed, Iran could attempt to launch an ICBM in the next

few years.

A similar estimate can be applied to the Iranian nuclear weapons program, which

also is benefitting from Russian assistance (albeit under the cover of peaceful nuclear cooperation).

Mr. Secretary, I fear that unless all Russian assistance is stopped, Iran will

present a clear and direct threat to the United States (as well as to our friends and

interests in the region) through the combination of long-range missiles and nuclear

warheads.

Moreover, ongoing reports by the Intelligence Community and independent experts, coupled with the Administration’s decision not to certify that Russia is complying with its arms control commitments, gives me great concern about the extent

of Russia’s biological and chemical weapons (BW and CW) research efforts, production facilities, and stockpiles.

Needless to say, I applaud the Administration’s wise decisions (1) to withdraw

from the ABM Treaty and (2) to restructure our nuclear forces. I also support the

President’s desire for a new relationship with Russia, so essential to America’s security in the 21st Century. However, it makes no sense to build missile defenses and

more flexible strategic forces on one hand, while ignoring the sources of the threats

we are trying to deter and defend against on the other.

Similarly, it makes no sense for the United States to fund threat reduction programs helping Russia meet her international obligations if Moscow continues to pursue illicit WMD programs with freed-up Russian funds. Russian proliferation to

Iran, and its dangerous BW and CW programs, must be central issues at the upcoming summit in Moscow, and integral to any agreement reached between our two

countries.

As the United States begins to forge this new relationship with Russia, our resolve and commitment to these issues through sound policies and strategies employing the full-range of diplomatic and economic tools at our disposal irrespective of

political exigencies is essential.

Mr. Secretary, a note and/or a telephone call from you should be most helpful.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

JESSE HELMS

The CHAIRMAN. Did you want to make a brief comment?

Senator ENZI. May I?

8

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Senator ENZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that a full

copy of my statement be made a part of the record—— The CHAIRMAN. It will be.

Senator ENZI [continuing]. As well as a letter, an informational

letter, that I handed out.

I am pleased that you called this hearing. The proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, as well as the unauthorized sharing

of weapons-grade technologies are significant threats to national

security. As you know, I recently visited Russia to discuss export

controls and nonproliferation. The main objective of my trip was to

have a new U.S./Russia working group that would expand legislative cooperation between our countries, in order to better control

weapons of mass destruction technology.

Growing up during the cold war, if anybody would have told me

that at some point in my life I would sit down across the table from

Russians and talk about cooperation, I would not have believed it.

I have done that. We have a letter of agreement.

The main points of the letter are the ones with the bullets on

them: Improvement of export control legislation and its implementation and enforcement in both countries; facilitation and reinforcement of the spirit of cooperation between Russia and U.S. legislators following the events of September 11, 2001; creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between the Russian

and U.S. legislators crucial for joint resolution international security problems.

And the letter is not only signed by me, but it is also signed by

Vladimir Melnikov, who is the Chairman of the Committee on Defense and Security of the Federation Council, and Nikolay Kovalev,

who is the Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Security of the

State Duma. So I was able to meet with both the Duma and the

Federation, I had some great discussions and I learned a lot.

We went through our export control legislation, looked at the

final pieces of the export control legislation they are putting together, which are not final pieces, but for them they are final

pieces. There is a lot of work that needs to be done. If we sell items

that have dual use technologies and we keep them out of the hands

of bad actors, but the Russians do not, we do not have security.

And they recognize that.

Of course, the way the Russians put it is that if they have technologies that they keep out of the hands of bad actors, but we sell,

the world is not safe either.

We also talked about deemed exports. And I was fascinated to

learn that they have 20 closed cities over there. These closed cities

house 30,000 nuclear physicists, engineers, and scientists, who are

not allowed to leave those cities. And for us to visit or anyone else

to visit those cities, you have to apply at least 2 months in advance

for a visa, and it has to fit into a 2-year plan of visitations to those

places.

But they have 30,000 engineers that are interested in getting

into the new economy. And there are countries around the world

with their hands outstretched to receive these nuclear armament

engineers to do work for them. And it presents a tremendous challenge for us and the Russians to make sure that those people, the

9

people, do not fall into the wrong hands, let alone the weapons, let

alone the weapons technology and all of the parts that go with

that. I found that to be one of the most scary things that I ran into

over there.

I also sat down and visited with some small businessmen, small

businessmen that could be employing some of those same people.

But I have to tell you: Russia has a long way to go yet for free enterprise. But I think that as fascinated as I was in talking with the

Russians, these people were pretty fascinated to be talking to a

Western capitalist about free enterprise.

The CHAIRMAN. From Wyoming.

Senator ENZI. Yes, from Wyoming.

And small business over there, I think, hold some of the answers

to these closed cities, but the answers include some of the need for

export controls. We also talked about some of the inventions they

are working on, one of which is a floating nuclear reactor that

would be put at Vladivostok. And if you think about the tsunamis

and typhoons that could hit that and some of the dangers that

could be prevalent in it, we have a lot of things that we need to

talk about. But I am glad that we established some realm of cooperation there.

I would like for my full statement to be in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The entire statement will be placed in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Enzi and informational letter follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MICHAEL B. ENZI

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased you called this hearing. The proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction as well as the unauthorized sharing of weapons-grade

technologies are significant threats to our national security. As you may know, I recently visited Russia to discuss export controls and nonproliferation. I believe today’s hearing is timely and an important issue for the Committee to address. As

we all know, nonproliferation is not a new issue and neither are the threats posed

by unsafe and unsecure nuclear technologies.

The main objective of my trip was to form a U.S.-Russia working group that

would expand legislative cooperation between our countries in order to better control

the transfer of weapons of mass destruction technology.

I am pleased to share with everyone on the Committee a copy of the agreement

signed by the Chairman of Russia’s Federation Council Committee on Defense and

Security and the Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Security. It

is my hope that our agreement to form a joint working group will help maintain

an open dialogue between our countries. As you will note in the agreement, Russian

officials do recognize the threat posed to international security by terrorism and the

need for more effective export control regulations.

I believe if both the United States and Russia produce an item that can be detrimental and aid proliferation and only one of the countries restricts its sale, countries who are bad actors can wind up with dangerous items. I have been working

on the reauthorization of the Export Administration Act (EAA) which would modernize our export controls. Russia recently adopted its own export control law to regulate the transfer of certain technologies. Russian officials, however, have had problems implementing and enforcing many aspects of their export controls legislation.

With EAA pending in the U.S. House of Representatives and Russians unable to implement their legislation, it is imperative that the United States enact its own legislation and work with Russia to control the export of items designed for civilian use,

but which can have military applications.

While in Russia, I traveled with a highly intelligent professor from the University

of Georgia in Athens, Mr. Igor Khripunov. Mr. Khripunov is an expert in international trade and security. When discussing the status of the military and related

technologies, Mr. Khripunov points out that, ‘‘This desperate situation is caused not

only by underfunding and economic dislocation, but also by lack of motivation and

moral values that were supposed to replace the communist ideology.’’ The situation

10

faced by Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, combined with the low moral values of those seemingly in charge of Russia’s military technologies, led to a very dangerous status for nuclear safety and security.

While I am very pleased that Russian legislators see the need to deal with export

controls, cooperation in this one area will not address all of the threats posed by

weapons of mass destruction. The threats come in a variety of areas and threaten

international safety and security in a number of ways.

One such threat is the lack of qualified people to handle nuclear technologies.

Each year, both the United States and Russia have fewer and fewer nuclear engineering schools. This leaves both our countries with fewer and fewer experts who

can help us address the permanent threats created by having nuclear technologies.

We need to have people highly educated in nuclear engineering to work on the safety of the nuclear facilities and the security of the nation. In the United States, we

can begin developing programs where students receive funding for school in exchange for working for the U.S. Department of Energy or the National Security

Council. We have the opportunity and the ability to create and re-enforce an educated group of experts whose knowledge and experience will help protect our nation.

In Russia, the continued isolation of the so-called ‘‘closed cities’’ creates another

security threat. Scientists and experts in these cities do not currently have opportunities to advance their ideas. By offering these experts a business opportunity, their

knowledge can be utilized to achieve better economic possibilities. Small business

development should be brought to these Russian cities to encourage the scientists

to use their ideas to enhance their personal economic status and their families’ well

being. It would also prevent the experts from seeking employment or support from

a party that should not have access to their knowledge.

This brings up another significant threat to international security: the sharing of

highly sensitive nuclear information and machinery with nations who pose a threat

to international stability. Our view on many countries differ from the Russian view.

Based on our cloudy history, we cannot be surprised. We cannot, however, sit back

and allow dangerous technologies to be shared with adversarial nations. Again, only

by working with our Russian counterparts to encourage Russian scientists to remain

in Russia and not share information with rogue nations, can we help ensure the

technologies will not be given away.

As non-proliferation is discussed, we must also address recent missile-defense related issues. To address the threats of the 21st century, we need a new concept of

deterrence that includes both offensive and defensive forces. Today, the list of countries with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles includes some of the

world’s least responsible nations. These nations seek weapons of mass destruction

to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the United States and other responsible

nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world. When rogue

nations such as these gain access to this kind of technology, it illustrates just how

important it is for us to protect our nation and our troops abroad. In the less predictable world of the 21st century, our challenge is to deter multiple potential adversaries not only from using weapons of mass destruction, but to dissuade them from

acquiring weapons of mass destruction and missiles in the first place.

I believe that the limited national missile defense system that the United States

is contemplating is not aimed at the Russian offensive capability. The U.S. has been

willing to provide Russia with information about what our thinking is, what our development prospects have been for missile defense, and also to engage them in cooperative kinds of activities, because in many respects, the threats that the United

States is concerned about from rogue states are threats that are likewise faced by

Russia.

I support President Bush’s willingness to work with Russia to craft a new strategic framework that reflects our nations’ common interests and cooperation. I believe the new strategic framework should be premised on openness, mutual confidence, and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area of missile defense.

This framework should allow both countries to share information so that each nation can improve its early warning capability and its capability to defend its people

and territory. Furthermore, the framework should focus on cooperation to strengthen and enlarge bilateral and multilateral non- and counterproliferation measures.

I believe these missile defense capabilities are not an alternative or substitute for

traditional deterrence, but rather an essential means to enhance deterrence against

the new threats of today, not those of the past.

While much press has been given to missiles and military technology, some

threats to international security can come from seemingly domestic areas, like energy. As we all know, the energy debate in the United States has been highly contentious. Representing a state like Wyoming with many natural resources, I was

very curious about Russia’s energy future. Coal, which is a staple of Wyoming’s

11

economy, has been a substantial part of Russia’s energy resources. While the United

States considers technologies like clean coal, I was shocked when the Russian representatives informed me of the possibilities of how to address Russia’s future energy needs. In areas like Vladivostok, they are considering using floating reactors!

Imagine the safety and security issues of such a energy source. The reactors would

literally float in the dock of Vladivostok.

This example is a prime reason the United States must remain actively involved

with our Russian counterparts on the issue of non-proliferation. If the Russian government can find no way, other than floating nuclear reactors, to address its energy

needs, the United States and the international community must be prepared to

help.

The United States had been involved in Russia attempting to halt the dissemination and proliferation of nuclear knowledge. There is, however, much more to be

done. In their Annual Report to Congress, the National Intelligence Council noted,

‘‘Through Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program, the United States continues to assist Russia in improving security at nuclear facilities.’’ Unfortunately,

upon my return from Russia, I found out that all new program funding from the

United States is being held until certification of Russia’s compliance with the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. While I understand the need for cooperation certification and I applaud the State Department for doing its job, I do not think this

is the appropriate time to send this message to the Russian government. According

to the State Department, Congress passed the legislation for the Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program without including a presidential waiver. I hope my colleagues

will support the presidential waiver included in the President’s fiscal year 2002

emergency supplemental appropriations legislation. I also hope President Bush and

the State Department will take all available steps and find a way to certify Russia’s cooperation as soon as possible.

As President Bush prepares to travel to Moscow in May, I know non-proliferation

will be an issue high on the agenda. It is my hope that as a legislative body, we

can continue to support the President’s efforts while also addressing the threats of

proliferation with our Russian counterparts. Thank you, once again, Mr. Chairman,

for your willingness to discuss this threat to our national safety and international

security.

SENATOR MICHAEL ENZI,

UNITED STATES SENATE,

Moscow, April 5, 2002.

INFORMATIONAL LETTER

The Russian and U.S. parties recognize the grave threat to humankind posed by

militant religious extremists, nationalistic terrorist organizations, and criminal

groups seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Of particular concern

to the modern world is the emergence of international terrorism. One of the key elements in combating this threat is effective export controls in conjunction with international cooperation and enhancement to the existing WMD nonproliferation regimes.

The meetings conducted between Vladimir Melnikov, Chairman of the Committee

on Defense and Security of the Federation Council, Nikolay Kovalev, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Security of the State Duma (Russian Federal Assembly),

and U.S. Senator Michael Enzi, point to a similarity in the positions of the two

countries on a range of issues regarding WMD nonproliferation, export controls, and

strengthening international stability.

As a result of the exchange of opinions, the parties have reached an understanding of the need to pursue further discussions among representatives of both

countries’ legislative bodies involving, if necessary, representatives of the executive

branch, non-governmental organizations, and industry, regarding the following:

• Improvement of export control legislation and its implementation and enforcement in both countries;

• Facilitation and reinforcement of the spirit of cooperation between the Russian

and U.S. legislators following the events of September 11, 2001;

• Creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between the Russian and U.S. legislators, crucial for joint resolution international security problems.

In accordance with the above, the parties consider strengthening and enhancing

ties between the legislators of the Russian Federation and the United States of

12

America, and participation of representatives of the executive branch and nongovernmental organizations to be long-warranted and urgent, and agree on joint

meetings and negotiations seeking positive solutions in combating international terrorism and WMD proliferation, as well as in cooperation for the development of legislative and normative mechanisms for advanced technology transfers.

VLADIMIR MELNIKOV, Chairman,

Committee on Defense and Security,

Federation Council.

NIKOLAY KOVALEV, Deputy Chairman,

Committee on Security,

State Duma.

MICHAEL ENZI,

United States Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. And I must say to you, Senator, I am really personally enthused with your interest and passion in this and your

work. And I thank you for it.

Bill.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. COHEN, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE

OFFICER OF THE COHEN GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you for inviting me

to testify, Senator Lugar, Senator Enzi. I regret that Senator

Helms is not here, because I wanted——

The CHAIRMAN. He sincerely wanted to be here, but he is unable.

Mr. COHEN. I know that to be the case. I had hoped to see him.

This is the first time I have had a chance to testify before this

committee since leaving public office myself. It may be the last opportunity I will have before he enters the private world with me.

But I wanted to say, at least for the record, how much I enjoyed

my service with Senator Helms, both as a Senator but also when

serving as Secretary of Defense. I know that most people in this

body understand that he is a man of great tenacity. What many

may not understand is that he is also a man of great gentility. And

I think he has treated this institution with the reverence it certainly deserves.

And I know that everyone who has ever served with him would

understand what contribution he has made, even though we did

not always agree, for example. He always deferred to each and

every one of us with great consideration for our roles and our

rights.

And I can tell you, as one of his colleagues, I used to have that

spinal shiver whenever he stood up on the floor and said, ‘‘This

Senator sends an amendment to the desk and asks for its immediate consideration.’’ We never quite knew what it was going to be,

but we knew it would be strongly debated.

In any event, Mr. Chairman, again I thank you.

I would like to say also something else for the record about the

Chairman. His devotion to this issue is not something of mere

passing concern. Along with Senator Lugar, I would indicate that

Joe Biden goes back a very long way. And I cite a personal experience, which I have not discussed before. And it goes back to 1984,

when I worked with Senator Nunn when I was a member of the

13

Senate Armed Services Committee and helped develop something

called the Guaranteed Nuclear Build-down.

I published an article, along with Senator Nunn, in the Washington Post. President Reagan endorsed the concept immediately.

And then I set off to go to Moscow to try and persuade the Soviet

counterparts, so to speak, that this was the way in which we

should proceed into the future as far as modernizing our nuclear

forces while reducing the levels that we had in our respective inventories.

I did not really want to go alone, because it would look as if it

was simply a Reagan Republican initiative that would be immediately rejected by the Russians—or the Soviets, I should say. I

went to Senator Biden. And even though he had a commitment in

Wilmington, Delaware, within 24 hours, he immediately agreed to

fly to Moscow overnight, attend the meetings just so he could represent to the Soviet representatives that this was not a partisan

issue, that this was an issue that affected certainly our countries,

but most certainly our respective parties.

After flying all night to go to that meeting, he turned around and

kept his commitment to his constituents in Delaware.

And it is something, Mr. Chairman, that has stayed with me in

terms of your long-standing devotion to this issue. So when you

called to invite me to testify, I would never hesitate.

All of you have already summarized the need for my testimony.

Frankly, I would submit it for the record and try to summarize it

very quickly, because I know that you have a vote scheduled, I believe, at 11:15. And I will try to just summarize them and—— The CHAIRMAN. But you know the Senate. That could be two.

Mr. COHEN. It could. And there could be back-to-back amendments, and we would never get back.

So I will try to summarize. I know you have several witness to

follow me.

On the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, I think it is perhaps the premier issue that we have to address today. The levels

of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons available throughout

the world, but most particularly in the former Soviet Union, are

truly staggering.

And when you think about one of the initial successes of the

Nunn-Lugar legislation, the fact that nuclear weapons were eliminated from three former Soviet republics, in Belarus, in Ukraine,

in Kazakhstan, it is naturally assumed that, taken as a given, this

was an inevitable result of the breakdown of the Soviet Union. It

was not. And it was Nunn-Lugar who led the effort in eliminating

these weapons from these three countries.

And I have laid out in my testimony the option of thinking about

what the world would look like if that had not occurred. And I will

not take the time here this morning to elaborate on it. But I think

all of us would understand that the world might be somewhat different, and there might be greater tensions were it not for NunnLugar and the impetus it gave to eliminating as much of the nuclear stockpile as we could under those circumstances.

You pointed out the numbers are pretty clear, Mr. Chairman,

500 air launch cruise missiles, 400 ICBMs, 300 submarine launch

ballistic missiles, 200 nuclear tunnel tests, and 100 long-range

14

bombers. Those are very significant numbers. But there is a lot

more that needs to be done. And I think September 11 has focused

our attention on this with greater and greater intensity.

Al-Qaeda is dedicated to acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Osama bin Laden has made that very clear. As you know, during

my tenure in the Clinton administration, we launched an attack

upon some terrorist camps in Afghanistan back in 1998. We killed

a number of terrorists. We missed Osama bin Laden.

We also hit a facility, the Shifa facility, in Khartoum. And I

know that there were a number who questioned the advisability of

that. But there was no doubt in my mind and no doubt in the

minds of other policymakers that Osama bin Laden was dedicated

then, as he is now, to acquiring chemical, biological, indeed even

nuclear, materials. And so we struck that plant, as well as the

striking of the terrorist camps at that time.

And I think that since that date it has become even more imperative that we intensify our efforts to reduce the amount of nuclear,

chemical, and biological materials that would be available to these

terrorist groups, because they know that the fastest route to acquiring them is not to develop them indigenously and not necessarily to link up in some kind of a partnership with a country,

but basically to buy them or steal them.

And you have material in the former Soviet Union. You have as

much as 1,000 metric tons of highly enriched uranium. You have

anywhere from 150 to 200 metric tons of plutonium. And it is a

fairly frightening prospect, when you think about the levels of security, or lack thereof, in the former Soviet Union, when these materials might be easily obtained by al-Qaeda or by other terrorist

groups.

And if you read the Washington Post this morning, you will see

that there is a discussion on one of the more recent people who

have been apprehended that that is indeed what they have in

mind, is to explode a radiation bomb, as such, and to kill as many

Americans as they possibly can through the use of that kind of device. So it is important that we continue the Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program.

I also think it is important that we not link it to other issues.

And I know, as one who has served in this body, how important

human rights, the human rights issue, is. But the first human

right in my judgment is that we have a right to life. And the second one is that we have the right to expect that we live in liberty.

But the notion that we would tie this particular program inextricably to the human rights issue or a failure on the part of Russia

to live up to our standards to an exacting degree, I think puts us

in a position of jeopardizing the continuation of the lives of thousands, if not millions, of people.

So I would hope that we would not tie the Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program inextricably to our insistence on human rights.

We still should insist upon human rights whenever we can, but

that should not be the dispositive issue when you are dealing with

something of mass casualties on a fairly wide basis, and perhaps

even globally.

15

No. 2, we should try to keep the program as flexible as possible,

to give the Secretary of Defense as much flexibility as you can consistent with maintaining proper oversight responsibilities.

I know, Senator Enzi, you come from a background in which you

look at numbers. And you have a very scrutinizing eye in terms of

the disposition of assets and so forth. We should look very carefully

at how these funds are used.

But I think the need for greater flexibility is also in order. And

there were many times when I was serving as Secretary of Defense

that I felt the constraints legislatively placed upon the discretion

actually imposed greater hardship and put us more in jeopardy by

not having that kind of flexibility.

I think other approaches that have been suggested, such as debt

forgiveness, also is very important, again looking at ways in which

we can be as creative as possible to encourage the Russians to help

dispose of those materials or to secure them.

And the use, as Senator Lugar has proposed, even beyond Russia—there may be circumstances in which there are other countries

where these nuclear materials or chemicals or biologicals may be

present. And the Secretary of Defense would need some flexibility

in responding to an emergency type of situation and then, of

course, responding to Congress, again in its oversight capacity.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by simply pointing out that the

clock is ticking. This is not an overly dramatic statement, certainly,

by me. I could go back and point to some fiction writing, you know,

‘‘one minute before midnight.’’ It is 1 minute before midnight, if

you think in terms of historically and the universal clock, and it

is ticking.

We do not have a lot of time in which to reduce the nature of

the threat that is out there. And every moment that we hesitate,

every moment that we fail to do whatever we can to reduce the

amount of nuclear materials, chemical, biological, in existence, we

come closer to that kind of armageddon that we all want to avoid.

We know that there are groups that we do not know about who

have great ambitions and grave intentions. And I think September

11 taught us that a known enemy can hit us in unexpected ways.

But the apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo and the American terrorist, Timothy McVeigh, they taught us that totally unknown enemies can be lurking in our midst, pursuing evil on a massive

scale.

And one of the most striking things about the Aum Shinrikyo is

that it built an international network of financing and technical experts in Japan, in Russia, in the United States, and elsewhere.

They raised over $1 billion, and they pursued nuclear, biological,

and chemical weapons. And yet we only became aware of the group

after the second chemical attack.

So those who seek to harm us on a massive basis, they know that

the quickest route, once again, is to gain a capability lying in the

disorder and even the poverty or destitution that still characterizes

much of the Russian establishment responsible for securing those

nuclear weapons and that material that is biological and chemical.

And this makes it incumbent on us to spare no effort to stop

them. And we do not have a moment to lose, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]

16

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. COHEN, FORMER SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE COHEN GROUP

This is the first time I have appeared before this committee since leaving office,

and it will probably be the last time I do so before Senator Helms joins me as a

private citizen. Senator Helms has had a remarkable career. Few people have exercised the powers of a Senator with greater influence on U.S. policy for the things

in which he believed. The world knows well that he has been tenacious. But few

outside this institution have appreciated that even more than tenacious, he has

been gracious. While we have not always agreed with each other on substance, he

has always been a gentleman of civility who has respected his colleagues and the

important role of this institution.

After he retires from this body, many who share his views will miss him for his

passionate and effective advocacy of his beliefs. Others who have differing views will

miss him for agility and wit in debate. But all of us who have had the opportunity

to call him ‘‘my dear colleague’’ will miss his personal warmth and gentlemanly spirit that he displayed to us day in and day out when we served together.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss what is perhaps the

premier national security issue facing our country: as President Bush and Senator

Lugar have put it, keeping the world’s most dangerous weapons out of the hands

of the world’s most dangerous people.

While our counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts have many facets, a

key one has been the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

History will view the CTR program as one of the most successful defense programs our Nation has ever undertaken.

It has facilitated the complete denuclearization of Belarus, Ukraine, and

Kazakhstan, something that is frequently noted but almost universally under-appreciated because it is taken as a given, an inevitability. But it was not inevitable. At

the time, there were voices in those countries, and even prominent voices in the

U.S., calling for those countries to retain the nuclear arsenals on their soil.

Imagine what the world would be like if Mr. Lukasheriko were in possession of

a small nuclear arsenal. Or that, in the wake of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear

tests, Kazakhstan had decided that it needed to maintain and modernize a nuclear

force. Or that the periodic bouts of political and economic tension between Moscow

and Kiev had occurred in the shadow of nuclear tensions.

Would the world be a safer place? Would our efforts to stem the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction have been enhanced or undermined? Would Russia’s

internal political situation have developed with greater or lesser trouble than has

been the case, with extreme nationalism an ever stronger force?

I think the answer is in each case is that American security interests would be

worse off, possibly much worse.

And all of this is beyond the straightforward calculation that the CTR program

has helped to destroy:

• nearly 500 nuclear ALCMs;

• over 400 ICBMs;

• nearly 300 SLBMs;

• nearly 200 nuclear test tunnels; and

• nearly 100 long-range bombers.

As a result of this unprecedented destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles, thousands of nuclear weapons that had been aimed at America have been deactivatated.

And programs are moving forward to securely store both nuclear weapons and

fissile materials, as well as reduce the risk that scientists and others with technical

expertise in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are not enticed to sell their

skills to those seeking such weapons.

The importance of this last point has been highlighted by September 11. We have

known for some time that terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, have been seeking

WMD capabilities.

I and my colleagues who served in the Clinton Administration discussed this at

length when we attacked a terrorist leadership meeting in Afghanistan, killing a

number of terrorist operatives and very nearly killing Usama bin Laden, and destroyed the al Shifa facility in Khartoum, which we believe had links to both Usama

bin Laden and to the Iraqi chemical weapons program. Not everyone listened.

But such wishful thinking is not possible after September 11 and after American

troops found al Qaeda documents confirming their desire for such weapons.

Enemies of the United States, both countries and terrorist groups, are working

hard to lay their hands on weapons of mass destruction, and particularly in the case

of terrorist groups there is no doubt that they would use them. Those pursuing

17

these weapons know that the fastest route to obtaining them is to acquire weapons

or weapon materials from the enormous stockpiles that still sit in Russia and other

countries of the former Soviet Union, or to hire technical experts from the former

Soviet Union, large numbers of whom continue to struggle to care for their families

and face great temptation to sell their talents to the highest bidder.

In this sense, ensuring a flexible, well-funded CTR program is among the most

important responses we can make to the tragedy of September 11.

Before I am accused of being a member of the choir, let me note that I have not

been an uncritical supporter of the Nunn-Lugar program. In fact, a few of you may

recall that the original Nunn-Lugar program was rejected in the Senate Armed

Services Committee when it was first proposed in 1991, and that I was among those

opposing the original version at that time.

One reason was that it would have provided job training and housing benefits to

Soviet officers at a time when such benefits were not being provided to American

military personnel being released from service in the biggest U.S. military drawdown since Vietnam. Another reason was that I felt there were inadequate assurances that U.S. assistance to the Russian nuclear weapons establishment would not

simply serve to subsidize ongoing Russian nuclear weapon programs.

After revising the proposal to address these concerns, we adopted the Nunn-Lugar

CTR legislation.

DO NOT LINK CTR TO OTHER ISSUES

I still believe care is needed to assure ourselves that our CTR assistance is being

used to reduce the threat, and well-drafted legislative conditions can contribute to

that. At the same time, we should recognize that so long as the CTR program is

fulfilling its mission of reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction, then

they are in our national interest—and we only harm ourselves if we condition CTR

assistance on Russian behavior in other areas.

While Russian behavior on human rights, Russian actions in Chechnya, Russian

debt repayment and many other issues merit our attention, it would be contrary to

our own interests to withhold CTR assistance if Russian behavior in these other

areas falls short of what we would like.

A fundamental fact is that CTR is a U.S. defense program, it is not foreign aid.

That is why the Defense Department has supported funding much of it within the

‘‘050’’ budget function for national defense. It is why the Bush Administration, after

a careful review of the program, has wholeheartedly endorsed it.

THE NEED FOR FLEXIBLE AUTHORITIES

Similarly, while Congress has the responsibility to oversee how these funds are

spent, excessive restrictions can interfere with the effectiveness of the program, and

in doing so may pose a threat to our security.

Secretary Rumsfeld has complained about the limited flexibility the Secretary of

Defense has in managing defense programs due to legislated constraints. I am not

unsympathetic to his concern. There were certainly times when I would have liked

greater flexibility to deal with emergency situations.

All too often, DOD leaders find themselves forced to combine funds from scattered

small pots of money to meet critical national security requirements, sometimes to

the anxiety of department lawyers.

DOD has repeatedly sought greater flexibility in managing the CTR program and

for various counter-terrorism efforts. I would urge the Armed Services Committees

and Congress to give favorable consideration to such proposals, while safeguarding

the Senate’s understandable concern that these funds not be diverted to other purposes.

Also, I would urge support for Senator Lugar’s legislation to expand the scope of

the CTR program to activities in countries outside the former Soviet Union when

the Secretary of Defense believes it appropriate. This would be especially valuable

in urgent situations requiring immediate action, where it might be difficult to cobble

together the necessary authority and funding in time. But it also would be useful

in less urgent situations.

One of the things that has become apparent in recent years is the invalidity of

the old proliferation model of either indigenous development or direct sale from one

country to another. Instead, just as development and supply chains of legitimate industry have globalized, so have they for WMD and missile proliferation.

A missile program in a rogue state, for example, might involve a complex web of

technical assistance and missile equipment coming from several countries, both

former Soviet and non-Soviet countries, all aiding an indigenous development effort

18

in exchange for cash, access to missile test data to support the suppliers own missile

programs, or even reciprocal assistance on WMD weapon programs.

We should seize any opportunity to punch holes in this complex supply chain,

whether the opportunity presents itself in former Soviet countries or elsewhere. And

so I strongly encourage you to act upon Senator Lugar’s bill and, in doing so, provide as much flexibility as possible to the Administration without compromising

your oversight responsibilities.

Finally, I would urge an open mind to other, perhaps more controversial, approaches intended to enhance the security of Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear

material and other WMD. Senator Biden, with Senator Lugar, has proposed a structure to forgive debt if it resulted in greater funding for such material security efforts. The Russian Energy Ministry, the Clinton Administration and others worked

on a concept in which Russia would establish an international spent nuclear fuel

repository provided that the revenues would fund efforts to protect nuclear weapon

material.

While I am not in a position to discuss such ideas in detail, I believe that we

should not rule out anything out of hand if it could be structured in such a manner

as to significantly increase the safety and security of WMD materials.

CONCLUSION

The CTR program represents a race against the clock, but a rather peculiar one

in which we do not know all the players or the rules by which they are playing and

we do not know how much time remains before someone who wishes us ill obtains

WMD capabilities. But what we do know is that there are enemies of America diligently seeking to acquire nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons and

that they would not hesitate to use such weapons on the American people.

We know that Usama bin Laden and al Qaeda have actively sought such capabilities and have threatened to use them if they acquire them.

We know that there are other extremist Islamist terrorist groups hostile to the

U.S. that will seek to fill the void as al Qaeda is dismantled.

We know that others, whether we call them ‘‘rogue countries’’ or ‘‘states of concern,’’ have pursued such capabilities for decades, and in some cases, are willing to

sell any capability they may have to the most attractive bidder.

And we know that there are groups we do not know about with great ambitions

and grave intentions. September 11 taught us that a known enemy could hit us in

an unexpected way. But the apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo and American terrorist

Timothy McVeigh taught us that totally unknown enemies can be lurking in our

midst pursuing evil on a massive scale. One of the most striking things about Aum

Shinrikyo is that it built an international network of financing and technical experts

in Japan, Russia, the U.S. and elsewhere that raised over a billion dollars and pursued nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and yet we became aware of the

group only after its second chemical attack.

Those who seek us harm on a massive scale know that the quickest route to gaining such a capability lies in the disorder and destitution that still characterizes

much of the Russian establishment responsible for securing nuclear weapons and

material, biological weapons and agents, and chemical weapons and agents. And

this makes it incumbent on us to spare no effort to stop them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

We will go just 5 minutes, a shot back and forth, in case you

have to leave. And interrupt, Dick, if you have any add-ons to what

I ask.

Let me address the first question first. And that is the argument

that has been used against Nunn-Lugar, or expansion of NunnLugar types of initiatives, which is basically to say that with the

cooperation of the Russians we are going to go to them and pay to

have them eliminate and/or stop doing something that is bad, that

is against our interest. And the argument used in plain language

is: They will take that money that they would have had to use for

that and use it for something else that is fungible.

And there has been an argument made, and it was raised by you,

concerned by you, initially back in 1991, I guess it was.

Mr. COHEN. Right.

19

The CHAIRMAN. What would they do, if we give x number of dollars to help them destroy alchems or whatever else? Would they

just take that money and go ahead and invest it in another program, or would they invest it in programs for other countries?

Now, most of that has sort of dissipated in the sense that there

has sort of been an emerging notion that, ‘‘Look, if there is x number of ICBMs aimed at the United States, then my choice is I get

to destroy them, and that money may be taken to build a shortrange weapon; I am still better off, I mean, in the worst case scenario.’’

But what is your sense now about whether or not the money that

we invest as a Nation in threat reduction in Russia is, in effect,

creating an opportunity for the Russians to then spend, even

though we can account for that money being spent for that purpose, they will take money they would have had to spend to build

a chainlink fence around a chemical weapons site or put bars on

a window or whatever, and they will do something against our interest with it?

Would you speak to me a little bit about your thinking after having been Secretary of Defense?

Mr. COHEN. The fact is that they could take the money they otherwise would spend for security and spend it on other items. For

example, if we contribute this amount of money to the CTR program, you could argue that they would then turn around and build

other types of military capabilities, or they might use it to help pay

for housing, which was not included in the CTR program, or for

various retirement benefits, et cetera.

I think the answer to the question is: We have an entirely different relationship with Russia today than we had back in 1991

and really until the past year, since September 11. Everything has

changed, if you look at the world after September 11. I mean, Senator Enzi pointed out it is astonishing that he would think that he

would be able to sit down across from Russians after what he went

through in growing up as a child. All of us, I think, could make

that same statement.

But the fact is that since September 11, you have seen a geopolitical shift that is perhaps unmatched in historical terms with

us having a relationship with Russia, with Russia saying ‘‘You can

put bases without our objection into Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. We

will work with you on this anti-terrorist campaign.’’

A lot has changed, for their own self-interest, to be sure. They

have a self-interest in aligning themselves in this war against terror, because they are also the potential victims. They have been

victims.

In fact, I was in Moscow when one of the apartment buildings

was blown up. And I went on television, state-wide television, so

to speak, in Russia the day after it happened to say that we should

join with Russia in combating terrorism, because they were at risk

and we were at risk.

So September 11 has changed that. Now you have the potential

for the same nuclear materials ending up in the hands of people

who will threaten Russia just as much as they will threaten us. So

there is a different dynamic at work today.

20

Do we always have to be on guard? Yes. Do we always have to

insist that certain standards be met and that we have certain

measurements that we can make; and is there a possibility it could

be used for other things? The answer is yes. But to the extent that

we establish a relationship with Russia, to the extent that groups,

Senator Lugar, Senator Enzi, yourself and others, continue to ‘‘engage’’ the Russians, we have a much greater chance of working together cooperatively to reduce the mutual threat than if we sit

back and say, ‘‘Well, yes, they could use it for this, and we are only

easing their burden.’’ But the fact is, as long as those piles of nuclear materials are out

there and as long as al-Qaeda and other groups are seeking to get

their hands on it, we are all in danger.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me conclude by saying to you: I do not

think any of us in 1991, myself included, thought that in the year

2002 the estimate for the Russian military budget, the entire Russian military budget, would be $5 billion. I mean, you know, think

of that. Their entire estimated budget, and assume we are off by

150 percent, is $30 billion.

I would respectfully suggest to those who worry about fungibles,

there is nothing to fund you out there. These boys are in real trouble. If we spend $200 million on cooperative threat reduction, it is

not like they have $200 million to go spend on anything else. We

are talking about an incredibly, incredibly limited budget here. And

I think——

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman, the great irony is that during the

cold war, we feared Russian strength. In the post-cold war, we fear

their weakness.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we are right on both scores.

Mr. COHEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And by the way, I have been here too long, because I was just handed a note. I am getting prophetic. The 11:30

vote has been moved to 2:30.

Mr. COHEN. Well, in that case, I will read my entire statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure it is not because I said it.

Senator LUGAR. It is, though.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. It is because you said it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It is bad news for you. You are going to have to

stay a little longer, Bill.

Senator LUGAR. Secretary Cohen, I want to continue with the

chairman’s thoughts about the fungibility issue, because, really,

this is the major attack upon cooperative threat reduction sort of

year-in, year-out. Someone has a new discovery that somehow the

Russians are using our money for unintended purposes.

As you know the cooperation we have enjoyed with Russia is totally counter-intuitive. Would you have guessed a decade ago that

Russian military leaders would invite American contractors and

military into nuclear facilities, leaving aside the chemical and the

biological, to discuss dismantling of their weapons. Now one of the

reasons they did so, is because of concerns they had about safety

and security of their own forces.

If accidents were to occur, a lot of Russians would die as opposed

to anybody else that the weapons might be intentionally used upon.

21

The sheer expertise and expense of dismantling these weapons

and then storing the fissile material are very, very difficult propositions. As the chairman has pointed out, they reside in a country

that was near bankruptcy. Now even at this point—and the figure

that I got in preparation for the hearing was that the Russian military budget is now the equivalent of $7.5 billion in the current

year.

But it may be, as the chairman suggested, the higher figure. But

nevertheless, we are talking about $7.5 billion or this higher figure

as compared to our budget of roughly $390 billion. Most Americans

have never quite grasped the enormity of that difference. But that

is why it is important to point out.

And I would say that, as we proceed with our war on terrorism,

we should be concerned that every chemical facility have a fence

around it; and not only a fence, but some reasonable security. And

so are the Russians.

But the Russians raise the question, ‘‘How are we going to pay

for it? We have officers that have pensions that are not getting

paid, hundreds of thousands of them. We have all kinds of dependencies from the past that are totally unfunded. And we have political problems with our citizens in a democracy. Now you have a

problem worrying about the al-Qaeda coming in and taking out

chemical weapons, but we have a problem just simply of keeping

our government alive.’’ And it is a serious problem.

Now there could be those in the Congress or the administration

that would say, ‘‘Well, that is their tough luck. After all, if they

cannot protect those weapons at Shchuchye, where, as you know,

two million chemical weapons are lying on shelves in old buildings,

guarded by systems provided by the United States. Hopefully, we

are on the threshold of destroying some of those before somebody

carts them away.

Unfortunately in order to get to that point, we had to convince

some of our countrymen that it is a good idea to destroy them and

that we ought to spend some money doing that, and enlist the Norwegians and the British and the Canadians and the Germans, as

we have been doing. And they have been pledging to provide assistance and cooperation with the United States.

One of the problems we face is that one day our country is very

excited about the possibilities of being attacked, and al-Qaeda

might appropriate some of these weapons and kill a lot of Americans right here in the United States. But on other days, we are

quibbling as to whether we ought to give the Russians $5 million

to put a fence around a chemical weapons plant where all the stuff

was created. It may not yet be in Iraq or Iran right now, but the

Russians do have it now and we must do what we can to eliminate

the threat before it proliferates.

I believe the No. 1 national security threat facing the United

States is the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

As a result, we must go after the weapons very vigorously, while

we have, a relationship that is qualitatively different with President Putin and with others and Mr. Pak, who now heads the chemical situation, yearning for assistance. I have taken Mr. Pak to

breakfast with members of our own House of Representatives to try

22

to at least illuminate what is possible if our two countries cooperate.

Now having said that we had a good hearing with Howard Baker

and Lloyd Cutler. They provided a good timetable and a cost. I

think $30 billion was the sum that they recommended over 10

years to respond to this treat.

But this did not necessarily excite anybody to begin doing these

things. That is one purpose of this hearing.

And I applaud the chairman again. And I applaud him for having you and the distinguished witnesses that will follow, because

we need to have revival meetings to appreciate that this is still a

dangerous world. All of this is still out there and really requires

persistence.

So, you have answered my question. You said at the initial

stages of the Armed Services Committee in 1991 you raised some

of these questions. The debate on the floor of the Senate, all kinds

of stipulations were put on Nunn-Lugar as to how to stop the

spending, and pretty well succeeded for a while. It was quite a

while before this got on track.

And you will recall from your own experience there were some

years it was cumbersome; we were following the money so closely

to make sure not a dollar got lost that none of it got spent. The

appropriation ran out. They took it off the table, and we are back

at it again.

So I appreciate very much your testimony. I do not have a question. I just have applause for you and for the chairman for getting

this revival meeting going again, which I think is timely.

Mr. COHEN. Let me respond to your non-question. First of all,

this notion, this argument that is being made, this—even before I

am before this committee, this is not a foreign aid program. This

is a national defense program. This is not charity. We are taking

action to reduce the threat to the American people.

Now a few years ago, I went on one of the television programs

and held up a 5-pound bag of sugar and—— The CHAIRMAN. It had dramatic impact.

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. I tried to point out that if you took just

5 pounds of anthrax, and you distributed it during a day in which

the wind conditions were right, with the right kind of dispersal

mechanism, you could wipe out a large percentage of the city the

size of Washington, DC. There are hundreds of tons of anthrax in

existence.

Now imagine if bin Laden or an al-Qaeda or Islamic jihad or others acquire pounds, if not tons, of anthrax and have it distributed,

once again, either through the mail or some other mechanism. How

long was the Senate shut down last year with just a small amount

of anthrax? Now let us assume that it is distributed on a very wide

basis with multiple terrorist actions taking place across this country. How long would that shut down so many of our operations?

So this is not charity, and it is not foreign aid. It is national defense. And so to those who argue that we are simply giving money

away when the Russians should be doing it, the fact is that they

do not have the capacity right now.

And I will make another argument. I am not trying to—I always

try to look at this through the eyes of the opponent, so to speak.

23

But if you were a Russian general today, and you said, ‘‘Well, let

me think about this. The United States has a budget of $390 billion, roughly. NATO has been enlarged by three. It might be enlarged by five, six, possibly eight or nine other members. We are

now talking about the Baltics being included in NATO membership, not to mention the southern tier of Europe. The United States

has embarked on a national missile defense program. There are

bases in the central Caucus, in Georgia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,

and elsewhere,’’ well, I would have some question about the U.S.

intentions at this point.

So are there elements inside the Russian military who are very

concerned about the United States still? And the answer is yes.

How do we overcome that, or do we need to overcome that? Now

we can try to beat them down even further, but I will tell you from

my own judgment, Russia will be back at some point. The Russian

people are very talented. The intellectual quotient is very high.

They have vast natural resources. They have a strong history, as

a matter of fact. So they will come back at some point.

The question is how they come back. Will it be as a full integrated partner in the international community, or as an inwardlooking, nationalistic, militaristic power? And so we have a—assuming we can all make it to that point, assuming all those piles

of nuclear material and anthrax and all the other things that have

been developed do not fall into hands other than Russian.

We have an opportunity to work with them over a period of time

in order to make sure that as we all evolve in the future, that our

relationship is one that is cooperative and collaborative, rather

than antagonistic, which is not to say that we are never going to

have disagreements with Russia. We have them with our allies all

of the time, but we are able to sit down and somehow work out and

rationalize those differences in ways that are at least peaceful.

So it is not foreign aid. It is for defense. I point out that 80 percent of the money being spent on Nunn-Lugar is going to U.S. contractors. So most of the money is going to us, in that sense.

Mr. Chairman, I simply point out that we cannot afford—if you

look at that in very simplistic terms, you have piles of dangerous

material on the other side of this fence which has large, gaping

holes in it. And we have enemies who are seeking to get their

hands on that before we do, who will use it to destroy us.

I do not think we can afford to sit back and say, ‘‘Well, the Russians may benefit in some other way and use the money that is

being used to reduce that threat in ways that might pose a danger

to us down the line.’’ I do not think we can afford to wait that long

and to use that argument to defeat this program.

The CHAIRMAN. Very important point to emphasize here in the

context of the revival, as my friend from Indiana said.

You served on the Intelligence Committee and as Secretary of

Defense. You controlled a significant part of the Intelligence Committee, the Defense Intelligence Agency. We have sat on the Intelligence Committee. I think all of us have. We have known for a

long time—we have not been able to say, but we can say now because it happened—there are individuals and groups attempting to

purchase, purchase by whatever means, the talent in terms of the

personnel, wholesale constructed weapons, nuclear, chemical, bioVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:12 Sep 26, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 81833 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
24

logical, raw products like refined—that is a contradiction in

terms—anthrax.

There is a bazaar out there. People are walking up to the table.

There have been people arrested because there are sting operations

in effect out there. This is not something that is a hypothetical.

The American people should understand: People are attempting to

purchase weapons.

And last—and I am going to ask my staff for the quote, it came

from a closed hearing, but the quote is from the general literature.

There is some quote in effect from a famous nuclear scientist that

says, in effect: Anybody who thinks it is easy to build a sophisticated nuclear weapon is wrong. Anyone who thinks that it is difficult, it is impossible, to build a crude nuclear weapon is wrong.

And I will get the exact quote.

The only thing that keeps some of these outfits or individuals

from building a nuclear weapon, is having the material, not the

material to construct the casing, not the material to make it go

boom—I cannot get any more specific than that—but the actual enriched uranium or plutonium, the weapons grade material. And

there is tons of it.

I will conclude with this: I was telling this to my mother, whom

you know, Bill, is a very bright lady, incredibly well read, 85 years

old and, as they say, sharp as a tack, watches everything on C–

SPAN. And I come home, and she is now, because my dad is ill,

living with us. So I came home after a hearing, oh, a couple weeks

ago, just before the recess.

And she said, ‘‘Why would they not spend the money to build a

fence?’’

And I started the explanation. She said, ‘‘Joey, that’s biting our

nose off to spite our face.’’

Ever hear that expression, biting your nose off to spite your face?

‘‘We will teach those Russians. We are not going to help them build

that damn fence,’’ figuratively speaking. ‘‘We will show them.’’

It is yours, Mr. Enzi. It is your floor.

Senator ENZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I come from that part of the United States that has sacrificed its uranium industry in order to be able to use up that highly enriched uranium from that part of the world. It is important

that we do that, and it is part of the plan.

I want to mention, too, that when I went to Russia, I was accompanied by three professors from the University of Georgia, two of

whom grew up in the Soviet Union. The third one was from the

United States but had spent a great deal of time in education in

Russia. So all three of them spoke Russian.

And, of course, all of the conversations over there were through

interpreters. And I was so glad that I had some interpreters from

the United States. Their culture has changed, but their vocabulary

has not been able to catch up with the changes. They have not had

words for ‘‘management’’ and ‘‘contracts’’ and ‘‘corporations.’’ Those

parts I could understand, because they have adopted the English

version. Management is management. So they just took the same

word and made it——

The CHAIRMAN. Like my neighborhood.

25

Senator ENZI. Their word for ‘‘security’’ and ‘‘safety’’ is the same.

And those are two absolutely different responses. And had I not

had some interpreters with me that had the U.S. perspective of it,

there could have been a lot of difficulties in the discussion when

it came to security and safety.

One of the things we have been trying to do here, of course, is

to get a State Department liaison in the Senate part of the building, much as we have the military liaisons. And I hope the committee will help me to push for them to get some space, so that we

have easier capability, when we get foreign visitors, to be able to

get interpreters, for one thing, people to sit in on the meeting who

have a broader background on what is happening.

There were a lot of instances where my interpreters were able

to jump into the interpretation and add in a little more depth, so

that they understood exactly what we were talking about, instead

of having some of the confusion.

One of the points that was helpful was when we were talking

about the ‘‘evil axis,’’ Iran and Iraq and North Korea. And I have

to say, they are very sensitive on that in Russia. I was surprised

that they were most sensitive about North Korea, more so than

Iran. Now that is one of the things that I and the interpreters

picked up from the lengthy discussion we had about what could be

done with those countries to make sure that technologies they are

getting are not going to be harmful to the Russians or to us.

And, Mr. Secretary, I was wondering if you could share with us

what the United States could do to persuade, from your perspective, Russia to stop the transfer of sensitive nuclear missile technologies to Iran and North Korea? Are you aware of any sticks or

carrots that we could employ to do that?

How do we resolve investing more money in nonproliferation programs in Russia while witnessing this continued proliferation? Any

ideas on what we can do with those countries?

Mr. COHEN. Well, for one thing, we have to continue to deal with

the Russians in a cooperative fashion. I know the word ‘‘engagement’’ initially was not well embraced or enthusiastically embraced

by the administration, but I do not know another word for it,

whether it is dialog, discussion, collaboration.

I think engagement really does summarize what we have to do,

which is to work with the Russians to say, ‘‘There has to be a better option than you gaining revenues from the sale of ‘commercial

nuclear technology’ to a country like Iran that we are satisfied is

dedicated to acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the means

to deliver them. There has to be a better way in terms of your relationship with the United States and the West than transferring

similar technology to the North Koreans.’’

They might point out, for example, that it is a bit inconsistent

on our part, since we have a program with the North Koreans to

help develop their capability to produce commercial nuclear power.

And they might say ‘‘You are operating on a different standard

here.’’

But, of course, the Bush administration might say ‘‘You are right,

and we want to cease and desist from that assistance to North

Korea.’’

26

But it does put us in a somewhat awkward position to say that

they should not be transferring commercial technology. Our fear is

that that level of technology—and this is for the experts to testify

to—but that level of technology could be converted for military

uses. And that is an issue of concern to us.

But I think the only answer to that is to try to engage them more

actively in other pursuits with the United States on a trade basis.

Senator ENZI. They did mention, of course, that they were working on export controls and were further ahead than we were on getting their legislature passed.

Mr. COHEN. Well, you know, the fact of the matter is that they

are looking for ways to acquire revenues any way they can that is

consistent with their national interest.

What we have tried to persuade them, and will continue, I assume, is that transferring sophisticated technology to Iran, Iraq, or

North Korean could pose a long-term threat to them, as well as to

us. And therefore, we have a joint interest in trying to prevent that

from taking place. ‘‘And are there not ways that we can work together to find some other avenue or stream of revenue for you to

help build your economy while reducing the threat, the long-term

threat, to both of our countries’’?

Senator ENZI. We did find that the small businessmen that I met

with have utilized some of those engineers in different ways than

they are used to happening. They found a way to add more sugar

to sugar beets. And they found a way to keep chemicals from leaking into their water systems. And they have gotten some of the engineers excited about working on those kinds of projects for profit.

But profit is still a difficult motive for them to adjust to. Making

a living, they are used to. Getting perks, they are used to. But

making a profit, they are not.

Mr. COHEN. Well, this is something that is going to take perhaps

generations. The Russians, certainly in the last century, have not

had any experience with profit. From imperialism to communism

and now to a democratic capitalism, it is new for them. And it may

take some time before that is ingrained.

So the question for us is how do we work with them, because our

livelihood and our lives are at stake as well in this particular endeavor.

If I could take just a few more moments of your time, Senator

Enzi, to respond to what both Senator Biden and Senator Lugar

have said. And I come back to this whole issue of, is this really in

our interest to do that? I think all of us are familiar with the sort

of steps that we take when we talk about national security, deterrence, first line of defense.

Then we go to crisis management. Then we go to consequence

management. And all of us are familiar with what we are trying

to do. Now, what happens if, and CSIS, the Center for Strategic

International Studies, at a program last year ran an experiment

called Dark Winter with the release of a smallpox virus in multiple

sites and what would happen under those circumstances. So it is

all involved in consequence management.

But then it evolves into questions about preemption. And it is

something that we have to give serious consideration to, as we are,

as a matter of fact, in Iraq. As you discuss what is going to be our

27

policy toward Iraq, we are saying, here is a country dedicated to

acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear weapons and the means to

deliver them. And should not we seek to remove Saddam Hussein

and his regime and to prevent that from ever taking place? So it

is a form of preemption that we are considering right now with

Iraq.

Is this not another form of preemption that we are talking about,

that we are seeking to preempt an attack upon the United States

with a willing partner, that we provide the money? Think about

how much money we are going to spend if an attack takes place.

And I am making no commentary at this particular point in terms

of what our policy is or should be or one that might take place. But

how much would be involved if we were to militarily take down

Saddam Hussein’s military infrastructure?

This is a small fraction of what would be involved in such an endeavor. And it has equally, if not much greater, consequence to

allow that much material to sit unguarded or underguarded to the

future of this country.

I see the Nunn-Lugar program as a preemption of sorts, that we

are preempting an attack upon the United States by groups that

are dedicated to killing us and to use the most massive means at

their disposal to produce these kind of casualties. And that comes

in the form of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons. So this is a program of preemption by non-military means

with a cooperating partner in the form of the former Soviet Union.

Senator ENZI. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize. What I was trying to get here with

the staff is to put a lot of this in perspective, what you said, Mr.

Secretary. And we will not keep you much longer.

If I add up what most folks would look at and think of as threat

reduction-type programs, they are the programs relating to nuclear

weapons, the programs relating to chemical weapons, and the programs relating to biological weapons. And they range from the

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program—I just want

to list a couple of these—to the Materials Production Control and

Accounting Program, the MPC&A Program, the U.S./Russian Plutonium Disposition Effort, the Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase

Agreement, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention and the Nuclear Cities Initiative, two separate programs, the International

Science and Technologies Centers, the Bioreduction Program, and

the Export Control and Border Security Assistance. They all relate

to these issues.

As I calculate it, based on funding levels for this coming year

that would allow us to, in effect, fully fund on a level that, within

10 years, we would make significant progress in dealing with,

again, the 17,000 to 22,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons

that remain in the Soviet Union, in Russia, 160 metric tons of

weapons grade separated plutonium, approximately 1,000 metric

tons of highly enriched uranium, 10 nuclear cities with 120,000 scientists and skilled personnel, and so, 60,000 scientists and personnel in the biological weapons programs, et cetera.

28

You take all these potential places for mischief, and if we were

to fully fund—I will submit this for the record—I will not bore you,

because you know all this.

[The following information was supplied by committee staff.]

• $167 million in additional funding per year to accelerate the pace of the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program so that we will not

have to wait until the end of the decade before all Russian fissile material is stored

at securely guarded facilities.

• $250 million per year to finance an expansion of the Highly Enriched Uranium

Purchase Agreement to buy more processed nuclear fuel down-blended from Russian

stocks of highly enriched uranium. Doubling the size of that program from 500 metric tons of HEU to 1000 metric tons would safeguard enough material for 20,000

nuclear weapons—material that terrorists could readily use, if they got their hands

on it.

• $200 million in additional funding per year to incentivize and assist Russia in

moving faster on its plutonium disposition under the August 2000 U.S.-Russian

agreement, possibly to include additional plutonium beyond the original 34 metric

tons agreed upon.

• $67 million in additional funding to help jump start Russia’s chemical weapons

destruction as called for under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

• $125 million in additional funding for International Science and Technology

Centers/Bio Redirect to engage more Russian scientists in collaborative projects; one

idea is to organize them into a massive public health effort to research and treat

drug-resistant TB and other infectious diseases.

• $100 million per year to help replace plutonium burning reactors in Russia and

Kazakhstan and begin securing radioactive sources in the former Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. But if we were to fully fund to the level that we

were able to get what was envisioned by each of these programs

finished within the timeframes when the agreements were made,

we would have to add roughly another $900 million to the—I am

going to refer to them all as threat reduction, and that encompasses everything. We would have to add roughly another $900

million to the total threat reduction effort underway, which right

now includes in fiscal year 2003 roughly—how much is the administration asking for?

STAFF MEMBER. They are asking for $1.6 billion.

The CHAIRMAN. Asking for $1.6 billion. So $2.5 billion total

spending on everything relating to threat reduction out of a budget,

including the Department of Energy’s portion that relates strictly

to defense, of somewhat in excess of $380 billion.

We are talking about a relatively small percentage here of the

total amount of the budget. The total is, I am told by my staff,

three-quarters of 1 percent or equally in a plus-up of one-quarter

of 1 percent of our total defense spending. And the reason I raise

this is—and I realize we have varying degrees of agreement and

disagreement on the utility, the efficacy, and the soundness of

seeking a national missile defense. And I am not trying to juxtapose them as a tradeoff.

I know my friend from Maine supports national missile defense.

My friend from Wyoming, I do not know, but I suspect he supports

a national missile defense program. Senator Lugar supports one.

And I think he is waiting to see the detail of it, like I am. I am

the least enthusiastic about it, depending on exactly what it is. I

am not opposed to it. I voted for over $100 billion in my 30 years

here for research on national missile defense.

29

But regardless of what position we all take, just to juxtapose

this, in terms of an immediate threat to the United States of America in the near term, the idea that out of a close to $400 billion,

$380 billion probably, counting, you know, maybe as high as $390

billion on what you count as defense related, that we are not prepared to spend, that we are not prepared to spend $2.5 billion to

fully fund all these programs, I find close to mindless. I mean, I

really do.

It is not like Senator Lugar and myself—and I do not want to

put words in Senator Enzi’s mouth, but Senator Enzi is obviously

very concerned about this—are asking for there to be gigantic

tradeoffs here. It is not like I am saying to the administration,

‘‘Look, if you fully fund this, you are not going to be able to maintain the end strength of the military. If you fully fund this, you are

going to have to drastically cut back the conventional weapons program. If you fully fund this, you have to shelve national missile defense.’’

The idea of putting additional silos in Fort Greely, Alaska, in the

near term versus doing this in the near term, I do not think are

even remotely comparable in terms of our security.

And so I wonder, because you are an incredible—I mean, you and

I have been personal friends for 30 years or, to be precise 28 years.

You were elected in 1974.

Mr. COHEN. In 1972.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1972. I was—actually 30. I am wrong. I was

right the first time.

One of the things I have found out about you is you have the

ability, Bill, more than most with whom I have ever worked in or

out of the government, to be able to get a sense of what is moving,

what pieces are moving on the board here, in terms of national politics, international politics, the public opinion.

What do you think is the reluctance? Am I missing something

here? Is there some underlying concern beyond fungibility that prevents us from doing what I think—if you had been on Mars the last

30 years, you got dropped back on Earth today, and they laid out

to you the players on the globe and what the threats were, I mean,

I cannot imagine anybody, whether they were a right wing conservative or a left wing pinko, whoever they were, saying, ‘‘Hey, wait

a minute. $380 billion, $2.5 billion, deal with all these programs to

fully fund’’—why would you not do that? What is going on?

Mr. COHEN. OK. I——

The CHAIRMAN. And I realize I am asking you to be a political

commentator here, but I know you too well and know how smart

you are. What is your——

Mr. COHEN. Well, I do not want to assume the role of any kind

of a national psychotherapy either, but——

The CHAIRMAN. No. I know that. But I would like you to just

think out loudly.

Mr. COHEN. First of all, we have been dealing with a country—

we are coming out of this post-cold-war world with them as well.

There are still a lot of lingering doubts. For example, I think some

who are not here today would say, ‘‘Is not Russia simply pleading

poverty, when in fact they have much more resources available to

30

them than they are fessing up to?’’ That would be one sentiment

that probably could be reflected on the part of some.

‘‘Are they not just using Uncle Sam? Are they not taxing our people when, in fact, they should be cutting back on whatever else

they are expending their resources for in developing either new

ICBMs or counters to the national missile defense program or

whatever it might be? Are they not just using us to fund those programs? Are they not just going to divert this money to other purposes? Are we not subsidizing a dying Russian military?’’

Then the question would be, ‘‘Why do we not just let them sink

into the primordial ooze of history?’’ That is a sentiment that runs

at least in some segments of our society.

The answer to that, I think, is: They are not going to go away.

They are not going to sink into history. They are brilliant people,

who—if there is anything we have learned about them over the

years, it is, when it comes to ‘‘their national security,’’ they will

sacrifice everything else in the process. So they are not going away.

They are going through a very difficult period of time now. And

the question for us to answer is: Is it better for us in the long term

to try to help them regain their economic status, to help evolve that

particular country in a way that is consistent with our own ideals

and our own democratic processes and our commitment to democratic capitalism, or is it better to let them sink as low as they can,

feeding their own internal nationalism, their frenetic contempt for

the United States, their fear, as I tried to outline?

If you are looking at it through a Russian eye to say, ‘‘We are

looking at what the United States is doing, and they are getting

pretty close. And they are building a national missile defense system. And they say it is not against us, but who knows what 5 or

10 or 15 years might be with the ability of the United States to

have space-based systems to counter our ICBM program,’’ et cetera.

You could make a case that there are elements inside of Russia

today that see us as an enemy, a long-term enemy, as well as a

short-term one, in which they need to rebuild their country to defeat that. What we have to do is to say: Is there a way that we

can reach across this divide that we have had over much of the

20th century, and to find a way to help lift them up into a level

of prosperity?

And with that prosperity comes the interest of preserving that

and promoting it. And as long as we can continue to engage them

in a constructive way, that has the chance of reducing the fears on

the part of some in their society from spreading and becoming a

majority opinion, turning inward and using their vast size, the 11

times zones that we have talked about, and using those natural resources with whatever assistance they can find from wherever they

can find it, using those in ways that are disadvantageous to the

United States.

So I come back to this point. We tend to go from oscillating between what Alan Greenspan might call geopolitical irrational exuberance in terms of what our relations should be to one that is

manic depressive. And what we have to understand is that Russia

will be a powerful country in the future. When that takes place remains to be seen. I have no doubt that it will take place. They will

31

regain, if not all of their power, then a good part of their power because of their intuitive capabilities, indigenous capabilities.

What we have to do to reduce tensions between us and to have

a better relationship is to work with them. As I indicated to Senator Lugar and Senator Enzi, this is a program of preemption. This

is a preemption program. We are preempting terrorists from getting those assets that they currently have. And it is in our interest

to do that.

I think that the more discussion, whether you call it a national

revival, Senator Lugar, whether we call more and more hearings

to raise this level of concern to the American people, if we, once

again, weigh what it will cost to take down Saddam Hussein’s capability, just weigh that in these programs and say, ‘‘There is much

greater chance that terrorists will get access to these materials in

the former Soviet Union and we know will use them against us,

causing untold billions of damage, as well as massive loss of life,’’

then this is a small investment by any standard.

This is a mere—I hate to use the word ‘‘bagatelle’’ because it will

be taken out by the Wall Street Journal as someone saying Cohen

has lost his ability to calculate here. But it is a small amount of

money compared to the amount of damage that will be done to us

in terms of lives and in terms of our economic livelihood if we fail

to do this.

Now the other argument is: There is no guarantee. There is no

guarantee, if we do all of this, that that will present.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

Mr. COHEN. There may, in fact, be some loss of these revenues.

There may be some diversion. But in terms of what the risk and

the consequence is to failing to act in promoting this program, I

think that anyone, anyone of common sense, would look at this as

a pretty good investment. It is a pretty small downpayment in

terms of ensuring our security compared to what the consequences

are if we do not.

The CHAIRMAN. In the Maine tradition, you have been a great

Senator and held a significant Cabinet post. This is my concluding

question.

In the Baker-Cutler report, they made reference to a lack of coordination between U.S. nonproliferation programs as one key impediment to greater success. Senator Lugar and myself and others,

we introduced with Senator Hagel the Nonproliferation Assistance

Coordinating Act last year—I am not asking you to, since you have

not seen the legislation, comment specifically—to provide greater

coherence in existing U.S. efforts.

Drawing on your experience as the Secretary of Defense, can you

give us a sense about whether we should have a coordinating body?

I am just giving you the context in which I ask the question.

And if you want to comment, then please do, but a sense of the

level of the coordination between the various departments and

agencies on nonproliferation assistance that you experienced. I

mean, you sat there, you know, at the top of the pyramid. Is there

a need for greater coordination? I am sure there are other ways

than what Senator Lugar and I have proposed. Or is it pretty well

coordinated? Do you feel pretty confident about it?

32

Mr. COHEN. Well, I agree with what Senator Baker and Lloyd

Cutler concluded in their analysis. There is not sufficient coordination amongst agencies. And I tried certainly with setting up the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agency and tried to consolidate. But

there are still many gaps.

And I think any mechanism that can be devised to get greater

coordination is going to make the program that much more efficient.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator ENZI. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. I thank

the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I found those quotes I referenced.

I am just going to read them.

One says: ‘‘Those who say that building a nuclear weapon is easy

are very, very wrong. But those who say that building a crude nuclear device is hard, they are even more wrong.’’

The second quote is an alternative version that came from the

American Physical Society meeting in Albuquerque. And it said,

‘‘Those that think it’s easy to build a plutonium implosion bomb are

very, very wrong. But those who say that it’s hard to fashion a uranium gun bomb are even more wrong.’’ And by the way, a uranium

gun bomb could, if able to be done, could easily generate a one kiloton explosion. Nagasaki or Hiroshima was six kilotons, to put this

in perspective.

Nobel prize winner Dr. Louise Alvarez did write to the effect

that—and I will paraphrase the following sentence. I do not have

the exact quote, but it is close to this. It says: Making an implosion

bomb is one of the most difficult jobs in the world. But making a

uranium gun bomb is one of the easiest. You could almost do it by

dropping one piece of uranium on another.

Now that is a paraphrase. I want to make that clear.

The bottom line here is: It is hard, but it is far, far, far, far, far

from impossible. And we know full well what has been attempted,

what people are attempting to do.

Mr. COHEN. Just remember what——

The CHAIRMAN. Those two Pakistani scientists were not on vacation in Afghanistan.

Mr. COHEN. I was just going to say, just remember how dedicated

bin Laden and his legions are. They are determined to destroy this

country, to inflict as much damage as they possibly can. We have

seen the consequences of just a small amount of anthrax going

through the mail.

If you think about the hundreds of tons in existence and the creative ways in which that might be distributed and dispersed, you

can see what could take place just with anthrax itself, not to mention what would happen if you had nuclear materials that could be

constructed, either to have a nuclear explosion or a radiological explosion.

This is something that really cannot wait. Again, Nunn-Lugar

and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is not the panacea

for everything. It may not ultimately succeed in preventing our

worst nightmares. But I think the absence of it will accelerate the

future in ways that we will not want to see.

33

The CHAIRMAN. I cannot thank you enough, Mr. Secretary, for

being here. And I know you will be available for us if we ask for

more help. And we will be asking, I am sure, as time goes on. It

is great to see you. And thank you for coming.

Mr. COHEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We now have as our second and concluding panel

two esteemed scientists. And I thank them for being here.

Dr. Siegfried Hecker is a senior fellow at Los Alamos National

Laboratory. And Dr. Constantine Menges is a senior fellow at the

Hudson Institute.

Dr. Hecker served as the Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1985 to 1997 and participated in some of the initial

lab-to-lab exchanges between the United States and Russia during

the early 1990s. Last summer Dr. Hecker published an article on

‘‘An Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia’’ and

offered a number of intriguing proposals. I hope that he will expand on some of those proposals and discuss them with us today

and give us his sense of which ideas deserve our immediate attention.

Dr. Constantine Menges has previously served as a professor at

George Washington University, where he directed the program on

Transition to Democracy and initiated a project on U.S. Relations

with Russia. He has also served on the National Security Council

and as a national intelligence officer.

With that, I turn to Senator Lugar, if he would like to make any

comment.

Senator LUGAR. I welcome the witnesses and look forward to

your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. And why do we not proceed in the order in which

you were called? Doctor, if you would begin, I would be happy to

hear what you have to say.

STATEMENT OF DR. SIEGFRIED S. HECKER, SENIOR FELLOW,

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY, LOS ALAMOS, NM

Dr. HECKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Lugar, very nice to see you again.

As you said, Mr. Chairman, I have two statements for the record.

And what I had planned to do was summarize them briefly. But

because of the hour, I will try to summarize them even more briefly. But I do want to state at the outset, much as Secretary Cohen

did, how much I personally appreciate the leadership that both of

you have shown in this very, very important subject.

And I know, Senator Biden, that the March 6 hearing that you

held on radiological terrorism, and I think what you also called

basement nukes, really should be required reading for people on

that subject. It was very, very educational.

And, of course, Senator Lugar is very well known not only in this

country, for cooperative threat reduction, but the place where I

travel a lot, which is in Russia, including in the closed cities.

In the extensive paper that I have offered for the record, I try

to tackle the issue of solutions. You have very well outlined the

problems. And the solutions are quite specific. As you saw, there

are two tables. The tables are based on a methodology of looking

34

1The paper referred to can be accessed at the following Web site: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/

vol08/82/heck82.htm

at the following. First, define what sort of relationship we want to

have with Russia.

When I wrote this paper in August of 2001,1 that was not clear.

So I actually wrote it for three potential scenarios, one of not

friend, not foe, which is, I think, where we were then, to potential

ally. And I said the best we probably could get to was what I call

the France model, which is an independent-minded ally. And the

third was reemerging adversary.

I think that situation has been cleared up since last August because of the tragic events of 9/11 and also the decision made by

President Putin to ally himself with the United States. So clearly,

we should be looking in my tables at the ally scenario.

But then also, in looking at a hierarchy or risk, I thought it was

important to set priorities because, as you have already indicated,

the U.S. programs in this arena are not necessarily terribly wellstructured and coordinated. And so I offer a hierarchy of nuclear

risks from the very worst that could happen to things that are still

important. And the bottom line is that I believe we need a comprehensive strategy to tackle the entire set of nuclear issues in

Russia.

I also believe that there is no single silver bullet to solve this

problem. I also believe strongly that what you had just indicated,

Mr. Chairman, the importance of funding, that money is essential.

In other words, it is necessary, but it is not a sufficient condition.

Today how we run these programs, how we actually work with

the Russians is at least as important as how much money we put

in these programs. And in fact, and I outline this in my written

statement, we have lost our way from the early days of remarkable

cooperation between the nuclear complexes of Russia and that of

the United States to the last 4 or 5 years, during which that spirit

of partnership has essentially drifted away.

And I personally believe that we will not make the progress that

you have called for so far this morning without reestablishing a set

of common objectives. After all, the materials that you talked

about, the dangers that you talked about, these are Russia’s responsibilities. They are their responsibilities; they cannot delegate

those responsibilities. All we can do is help. We cannot dictate. We

cannot buy our way into the Russian nuclear complex.

And so structuring how we run these programs is absolutely crucial to making progress. Nevertheless, the solutions that I outline,

I think, are still as applicable today as when I wrote them. However, in the written statement I also update, let us say, the scenario of risks that I view today; that is, nuclear risks in the world

after 9/11.

The single thing that really hits me is that today, as we look at

the urgency of problems, there are nuclear risks outside of Russia

that are actually more urgent today than those within Russia. Now

as I also state, the risks and vulnerabilities within the Russian

complex remain high because, although we have made much

progress through the Nunn-Lugar program, through the lab-to-lab

35

programs, the fundamental problems have not been resolved in the

10-years that we have been working together.

But as we look today, the problems are also international. And

I lay out—and actually, Senator Lugar, this was inspired by your

effort and your speech in December, where you talked about broadening the solution to look at the international problem. There are

three pieces to the strategy.

First and foremost, we should make sure that the nuclear weapons themselves are safe. And that means in the five nuclear powers, as well as in India, Pakistan, and Israel, for example. That we

must develop rigorous what we call MPC&A—and that is the Materials Protection Control and Accounting programs—not only in

Russia, but wherever those materials might be. I mean weaponsuseable materials. That means materials that are originated in either the defense programs of a country or those that are part of

the civilian programs.

And particularly the ones I am concerned about today are materials associated with research reactors around the world. As a result of President Eisenhower’s initiative for Atoms for Peace in

1953, these were distributed around the world. And of course, the

International Atomic Energy Agency has responsibility.

But as we look at the security of those materials today, especially

in light of the concerns that you mention about gun-type weapons,

that means highly enriched uranium, and that is what is in many

of these research reactors, that needs reconsideration today.

The commercial nuclear power situation is one where today I feel

quite comfortable that we have adequate safeguards. But many

people believe that the way to the future in energy is more nuclear

power. And even if we do not believe it ourselves, let me tell you,

the Russians do. There is hardly a day that passes that you do not

read in the newspaper of yet another deal of Russia with some

country to build a commercial nuclear power station. So if there is

an expansion of commercial nuclear power, we must also be certain

that those materials are guarded.

And then the third piece to the overall integrated international

strategy is the one that you adequately covered in the March 6

hearing. This is not new, but it has really been brought to our attention since 9/11. And that is the threat of radiological terrorism.

And that is not just weapons-useable material to make a bomb, but

to scatter radioactive materials either through some sort of a dirty

bomb or radiological dispersal device.

The CHAIRMAN. If I could interrupt you just for a second. I am

not—I have no personal knowledge of this, just reporting on a report, though, on Sunday in the Washington Post. According to—I

mean, today. Was it the Post—in the Post today that Abu Zubaida,

the highest al-Qaeda operative allegedly, told U.S. interrogators on

Sunday that al-Qaeda was working on a dirty bomb radiological

weapon and that they ‘‘know how to do it.’’

Dr. HECKER. Let me just—I can summarize to some extent the

bottom line of your hearing on March 6. And that is that a dirty

bomb is not a weapon of mass destruction. It is a weapon of mass

disruption. And there are things that can be done to avoid that disruption, because it comes from fear and panic. There are lots of

things that can be done.

36

There are also, then, things that can be done in terms of getting

rid of or controlling these materials worldwide. And I believe that

should be part of an international program now that we have had

the events of 9/11.

So that is what I have laid out in my statements. I just wanted

to briefly reiterate those points. And, of course, I will be happy to

answer any questions that you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hecker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. SIEGFRIED S. HECKER, SENIOR FELLOW, LOS ALAMOS

NATIONAL LABORATORY

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to share my views about what can be done to increase our nonproliferation efforts in the Former Soviet Union. Many of the questions raised in your letter of invitation are covered in detail in my Summer 2001

Nonproliferation Review article on nuclear cooperation with Russia. With your permission, I would like to enter it into the record. In my written statement, that I

would also like to enter into the record, I address how the nonproliferation risks

have changed since September 11. I will summarize my statement this morning.

Specifically, I want to make three points.

First, the risks and vulnerabilities in the Russian nuclear complex remain high.

Fortunately, in the ten years that have passed since the dissolution of the Soviet

Union, nothing really terrible has happened in the Russian nuclear complex. Most

of the credit must go to the Russians, although initial progress made by cooperative

programs sponsored by the United States had a significant positive impact. However, many opportunities were missed to build a lasting partnership and to tackle

the root causes of the problem.

Second, following the tragic events of 9/11 and President Putin’s decision to ally

Russia with the West, we should ask Russia to join with us in a new cooperative

effort to reduce the threat of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by improving nuclear security worldwide, and to redouble her own efforts to improve nuclear security within Russia. Today, the nuclear security challenge outside

Russia is even more urgent than that within Russia itself. The events of 9/11 and

the recent violence in the Middle East have heightened our concerns about nuclear

security in South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

Third, to keep nuclear weapons, their constituent materials, and other dangerous

radioactive materials out of the wrong hands worldwide, we should mount an intense, comprehensive international nuclear security initiative with three thrusts: 1)

Ensure rigorous security and control of nuclear weapons in each of the five nuclear

weapons states, as well as in India, Pakistan, and Israel; 2) Develop and enforce

rigorous protection, control, and accounting for all weapons-usable nuclear materials

whether designated for peaceful or defense purposes, and 3) Address the threat of

radiological terrorism by developing effective security, control, and disposition measures for radioactive materials. Improving security at nuclear facilities to protect

against sabotage is an important part of this third thrust.

I. 1991–2002: IMPORTANT PROGRESS, BUT ALSO AN OPPORTUNITY LOST.

The attempted coup in August 1991, and the attendant uncertainties about the

control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, underscored a vital concern: how Russia manages and protects her nuclear assets will affect our security and potentially threaten

our people and assets around the world. In the years that followed, the threat of

‘‘loose nukes’’ and the ‘‘clear and present danger’’ posed by Russia’s large and poorly

secured stock of weapons-usable materials—plutonium and highly enriched uranium

(HEU)—emerged as vital national security issues for the United States whose solution required cooperation with Russia.

I had the opportunity to witness the new environment in February 1992 as one

of the first Americans to visit the Russian nuclear weapons complex. This visit occurred only two months after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. I was struck by

how the Soviet Union’s strength—an enormous nuclear weapons complex, huge

number of weapons and weapons-usable materials—had suddenly turned into a liability because Russia could no longer afford them or secure them adequately. In

spite of popular reports to the contrary, Russian nuclear weapons appeared to be

adequately protected, at least as long as the military organizations responsible for

security maintained the high level of discipline that had distinguished them for

many years.

37

The security of nuclear materials, however, was of great concern as Russia made

a wrenching transition from a centrally controlled police state to a more open, democratic form of government. During Soviet times, the nuclear complex had an admirable record of nuclear security. Now, however, the upheaval of political, economic,

and social structures in Russia created unacceptable nuclear security vulnerabilities

in Russia and for the rest of the world. A much more rigorous nuclear safeguards

system in which modern technology and practices are combined with personnel and

physical security was urgently needed to replace Soviet guns, guards, and gulags.

As we now look back over the last decade, the good news is that nothing really

terrible happened in the Russian nuclear complex in spite of the enormous hardship

endured by the Russian people. The early years were marked by surprising cooperation between our governments in the nuclear area, through unilateral actions on

both sides (most notably, the presidential initiatives in the fall of 1991) and through

the initial implementation of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)

program. By the end of 1996, the CTR program helped the newly independent states

of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus return to Russia the nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union. Much of the strategic missile and nuclear weapons infrastructure in these states was destroyed. Technical assistance was rendered to

Russia to protect nuclear weapons in transit. Some vulnerable nuclear materials in

Kazakhstan were removed to safety in the United States. Construction of a large

modern, safe storage facility for excess Russian fissile materials was begun. And,

a landmark agreement led to the conversion of weapons-grade uranium to low enriched uranium (LEU) reactor fuel sold to the U.S. nuclear power market (the socalled HEU/LEU deal).

In parallel, the informal scientific network (lab-to-lab cooperation) established between U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists during our first visit to Russia ten years

ago began to tackle problems such as nuclear materials safeguards that were stalled

or moving very slowly in formal governmental diplomatic channels. In June 1994,

with the strong encouragement of then Under Secretary Charles Curtis, I signed the

first contracts for cooperative nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting

(MPC&A) with Russian defense and civilian nuclear institutes on behalf of the Department of Energy. In addition to strong backing from Mr. Curtis and others the

Executive Branch, a bipartisan coalition in Congress, led by Senator Pete Domenici,

provided both political and financial support for the lab-to-lab MPC&A activities.

With their support and the remarkable spirit of cooperation based on mutual respect and shared objectives between the U.S. and Russian laboratories, we were

able to break the logjam and rapidly accelerate improvements in nuclear safeguards

in Russia. Senator Domenici’s leadership in building support for the lab-to-lab program also extended into many related threat reduction programs and was instrumental, along with that of Senators Nunn and Lugar, in establishing the comprehensive and wide-ranging cooperative threat reduction programs that have accomplished so much over the last decade.

However, most of the credit for avoiding disaster in the Russian nuclear complex

must go to the Russians—most importantly to the loyalty and patriotism of the Russian nuclear workers. Their discipline under conditions of personal hardship was remarkable. We must also credit the leadership of the nuclear complex during and

right after the transition, specifically former Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor N.

Mikhailov, and First Deputy Minister, Lev D. Ryabev, as well as the directors of

the nuclear institutes and enterprises. Their actions early in the transition managed

against difficult odds to sustain the complex through those turbulent times and prevented it from fragmenting into even more dangerous and desperate entities. Also,

although their decision to keep the most sensitive defense facilities and towns (socalled nuclear cities) closed undoubtedly had several distinct motivations, in retrospect, it was the right decision from the standpoint of nuclear security. Although

this restrictive approach hampered much-needed business development, defense conversion, and downsizing efforts in these cities, it helped protect nuclear materials

and nuclear secrets. Civilian nuclear facilities and some defense sites located in

open cities generally experienced a more abrupt and difficult transition. In fact,

these facilities along with the Russian Navy posed by far the greatest immediate

proliferation risk. Several confirmed thefts of nuclear materials, albeit of small

quantities, in the early 1990s highlighted the vulnerability of the Russian nuclear

complex.

Much of the initial success in the MPC&A program must be credited to the partnership approach between the Department of Energy laboratories and the Russian

facilities and to the remarkable access the laboratories had to Russian nuclear facilities. I believe that only a self-declared ‘‘hawk’’ such as Minister V.N. Mikhailov

was capable of providing the requisite political cover and he had the clout with Russian security services to enable this progress. In fact, he opened the door for the

38

first American visits to the Russian nuclear weapons laboratories shortly after he

led the Russian scientific delegation to the 1988 Joint Verification Experiments and

the subsequent nuclear testing talks at Geneva. During the ramp-up of the MPC&A

program in the mid-1990s, the U.S. side was able to make a convincing case to the

Russians that the program was in their interest. In spite of the fact that Russian

security services took control of the program, progress was rapid because of the

strong partnership between U.S. and Russian institutes and the fact that the Russian institutes acted as the intermediaries to some of the key sensitive sites in the

Russian complex. For example, the Kurchatov Institute was the lead laboratory for

the Russian Navy to help it address some of the most urgent nuclear materials

vulnerabilities.

The bad news is that the problems in the Russian nuclear complex were much

greater and more pervasive than either Russians or Americans realized ten years

ago. The Russian nuclear complex in 1992 was vastly oversized and overstaffed for

post-Cold War defense requirements, and had been in difficult economic straits for

years. Yet, unlike in the United States, dramatic downsizing of the Russian complex

was believed too risky by its government. Such downsizing was painful in the

United States, but was ameliorated by significant increases in federal environmental budgets at DOE nuclear sites, an innovative community and worker transition program, and by a healthy U.S. economy. In Russia, on the other hand, the

closed cities were embedded in a country with a bankrupt federal government whose

governing institutions were collapsing. Laying off workers in the closed cities risked

serious social unrest. Opening up the cities for business development posed a major

proliferation risk. Consequently, the Russian government chose to proceed with a

slow but deliberate conversion-in-place program. Such an effort would have been difficult under conditions of a healthy economy and was extraordinarily difficult for

these isolated cities in a chaotic national economy. U.S. programs designed to help

the Russian nuclear complex conversion received inadequate support from Congress.

Moreover, some of the initial efforts were misguided and elicited strong negative reactions from the Russian side. Some of the problems been rectified during the past

year and substantial progress is now being made in some of the programs that experienced difficulties earlier.

Today, serious concerns about security of weapons-usable materials in Russia and

the other states of the former Soviet Union remain because progress slowed dramatically in the second half of the 1990s as mistrust replaced cooperation. What

went wrong? Why did we miss the chance to help Russia further improve nuclear

security in its complex and put our relationship with Russia on firmer ground? I

believe that some of our leaders were slow to recognize that we truly were threatened more by Russia’s weakness than her strength. Consequently, instead of developing and maintaining an integrated strategy based on such an overriding guiding

principle, the executive agencies and Congress independently developed their own

projects resulting in a patchwork quilt of programs. Although each may have been

useful and justified on its own terms, overall strategic direction was missing and

little effective coordination existed, either with Russia or within the U.S. interagency community. Some programs pushed by the U.S. side ran counter to Russia’s

national security interests or energy strategy, forcing Russia to choose between her

national interest and receiving much-needed financial assistance. Moreover, the

overall political relationship between our countries was severely strained by NATO

expansion, the bombing of Serbia, national missile defense, and disagreements over

Iran, Iraq, and Chechnya.

Concurrently, partially to placate a skeptical Congress, executive agencies dramatically changed the execution of key nuclear materials security programs with

Russia. They began to take a confrontational line with Russian counterparts, replacing partnership with a unilateral, bureaucratic approach that insisted on intrusive

and unnecessary physical access to sensitive Russian facilities in exchange for U.S.

financial support. During a trip this March, I was told by one of my Russian colleagues: ‘‘The nuclear materials arena is very sensitive for the Russians. Despite this

sensitivity, the American side constantly tried to get access everywhere and to obtain

sensitive information. This must have been motivated by various reasons (implying

that Russia suspected an intelligence motivation). This American desire for extensive

information and access backfired. It caused the strengthening of the security services—back to their previous role and prominence.’’ I believe that the Russian bureaucracy and security services made a strong comeback on their own for other reasons, but the change in tactics on the U.S. side made matters worse and accelerated

the trend. Furthermore, it eroded the spirit of partnership and nearly depleted the

bank account of trust and good will. Consequently, progress in nuclear materials

protection in key Russian nuclear defense facilities has slowed substantially in recent years. The jury is still out whether or not the recently signed access agreeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:12 Sep 26, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 81833 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
39

ments will put us back on a more productive path, but we hope they will be a

springboard for repairing the damage of the last few years and returning to a pattern of genuine cooperation. Thanks to congressional action, the current funding for

the MPC&A program is plentiful. However, we must not make the mistake of trying

to buy our way into the Russian facilities. Instead, we must re-examine our common

objectives, re-establish the spirit of partnership, and together tackle the remaining

challenges in the Russian nuclear complex.

During the past five years, several other cooperative threat reduction programs

ran into similar difficulties as U.S. and Russian objectives progressively diverged.

The HEU/LEU purchase deal, which initially provided the Russian complex much

of the funds for conversion of its facilities, has been on the ropes periodically for

several years. The plutonium production reactor conversion project was ill conceived

from the outset and had to be overhauled several times. Progress on implementing

the plutonium disposition agreement in a timely manner remains elusive. And the

proposed moratorium on civilian fuel processing never got off the ground. Meanwhile, the financially desperate nuclear ministry aggressively marketed its civilian

nuclear technologies around the world, including to potential proliferant states such

as Iran. Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran has greatly alarmed the U.S. government and seriously hampered many of the U.S.-Russian cooperative programs. Concurrently, the partial recovery of the Russian economy based mostly on the global

rise of energy prices and the August 1998 devaluation of the ruble changed the economic situation in the nuclear complex for the better, giving Russia greater independence from U.S. financial support.

So, as we look back over the past decade, much has been done to help Russia deal

with the clear and present danger resulting from the turmoil in its nuclear complex

following the breakup of the Soviet Union. And although Russia avoided the worst

during this difficult transition, the United States lost a promising opportunity to

help shape the future direction of Russia’s nuclear enterprise and together with

Russia to build a new era of global security. Neither side focused on the historic

opportunity to jointly reduce the nuclear dangers. Before 9/11 the window of opportunity appeared to be closing, both because Russia did not need our money as desperately as before and because the security services were once again closing up the

complex.

II. POST 9/11: ANOTHER CHANCE TO BUILD A PARTNERSHIP

The tragic events of 9/11 combined with President Putin’s decision to ally Russia

with the West in the struggle against terrorism provide another chance to build a

partnership. The terrorist attacks crossed the threshold of inflicting mass casualties

and underscored our vulnerability to the nexus of terrorism and mass destruction.

Therefore the statement made by Presidents Bush and Putin at their Crawford

Ranch meeting last November—‘‘Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction’’—should form the basis of a new partnership

against the threat of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Because of the events of 9/11, this threat is now more urgent than that posed by the

Russian nuclear complex. We should now challenge Russia to work with us side by

side to tackle the most urgent international nuclear dangers. We should re-examine

the highly debatable proposition that Russia is the world’s greatest proliferation

threat, and we should place the Russian threat, important as it is, in its proper perspective among the full spectrum of threats. Although significant differences are

bound to remain in U.S. and Russian security objectives, we have much more to

gain than to lose by cooperation, especially in the nuclear arena.

The events of 9/11 call for a greater sense of urgency in dealing with international

nuclear security matters. For example, the fragile nature of Pakistan’s government

and that divided nation’s strong anti-Western sentiments heighten our concerns

about the security of its nuclear weapons and materials. This situation is exacerbated by the tense situation in Kashmir, and has the potential of a spillover to India

and its nuclear arsenal. The renewed violence in the Middle East highlights longstanding concerns about the potential, sooner or later, for nuclear conflict in that

region. It is especially important to thwart the nuclear ambitions of Iraq and fran.

The war in Afghanistan highlights the need to keep nuclear weapons and materials

out of Central Asia. Fortunately, the Nunn-Lugar program facilitated the return of

nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan to Russia, but dangerous weapons-usable nuclear

materials remain in Kazakhstan. A renewed joint U.S. and Russian commitment to

nonproliferation and export controls may also help to hold in check North Korea’s

nuclear ambitions and prevent other states or groups from obtaining nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia can play separate but supportive roles to effectively and quickly help enhance nuclear security around the world.

40

To deal with the likelihood that some weapons-usable materials are already in

dangerous hands, the United States and Russia should now prepare to respond

jointly to potential nuclear terrorist incidents or threats. Such preparations may include sting operations against suspected targets to recover missing materials and

joint emergency response exercises spanning the gamut from disabling nuclear devices to mitigating the consequences in case of nuclear attacks. The well-intended

‘‘Atoms for Peace’’ program promoted nuclear research reactors in countries of the

world that now do not have the financial means or political stability to maintain

and protect them. Together we should accelerate work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to expedite the conversion of weapons-grade fuels at all

reactors and the removal of reactors from countries that are judged willing or can

be persuaded to give them up.

The events of 9/11 have also brought our vulnerability to radiological terrorism

into starker focus—dispersing nuclear materials (without a nuclear explosion) or

sabotaging a nuclear facility. Although the consequences of a radiological act are

dramatically less than a nuclear detonation, the likelihood of such an event is also

much greater because of the relative ease of obtaining suitable materials—which include nuclear waste, spent fuel, and industrial and medical radiation sources. Together, our countries should lead efforts to counter radiological terrorism.

Although international vulnerabilities represent the most urgent nuclear concerns

today, many of the vulnerabilities in the Russian nuclear complex resulting from the

dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent economic hardship remain.

Therefore, it is imperative that Russia redouble her efforts to safeguard her own nuclear materials. This responsibility is an inherently governmental function of the

Russian Federation. It cannot be delegated; it cannot be compromised. The United

States can only offer to help, we cannot dictate; we cannot demand. We must rebuild

the spirit of partnership that characterized initial cooperation. The threat of international terrorism offers another chance to rebuild this partnership because the

United States and Russia have common objectives to counter this threat and both

bring substantial skills to the table. Also, the activities under the new partnership

should be viewed as less threatening by Russia or accusatory toward Russia and

should allow us to restore good will and trust.

Such a partnership should allow the United States to restructure nuclear cooperation with Russia, putting in practice the belief that we are threatened more by Russia’s weakness than her strength. We should first focus our efforts to help Russia

downsize its complex and to become self sufficient in all aspects of safety and security of its complex—its nuclear weapons, its nuclear materials, and its nuclear experts. This effort should be considered a transitional phase with the objective of

helping the Russian Federation develop its own modern, indigenous MPC&A system. We should not impede progress by insisting on unnecessarily intrusive physical

access to sensitive Russian facilities. Instead, our support should be focused on helping the Russian Federation develop and implement its own system, while ensuring

ourselves that U.S. money is spent properly and effectively.

Beyond this transitional phase, we should strive to develop an equal partnership—one without money changing hands—to jointly lead international efforts to

fight terrorism and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Such

a partnership should include a commitment to reduce all nuclear dangers worldwide

while promoting the beneficial contributions of nuclear technologies. In fact, the

5Oth anniversary of President Eisenhower’s ‘‘Atoms for Peace’’ initiative in December 2003 provides an opportune occasion to announce a truly new vision and new

partnership that reflect the dramatically different political environment of today.

III. AN OUTLINE OF A U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP TO FIGHT NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND

PROLIFERATION

To meet the urgent concerns highlighted by the events of 9/11, we should begin

immediately to build a partnership on the foundations of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

legislation and the lab-to-lab cooperation. I briefly outline the three components of

a joint U.S.-Russian initiative to fight nuclear terrorism and proliferation.

1. Rigorous security for nuclear weapons

The events of 9/11 prompted a reexamination of the security controls for nuclear

weapons by each of the five nuclear weapon states. We can assume that the same

occurred in India, Pakistan, and Israel. Concerns over the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials in these countries have been increased dramatically by

the war in Afghanistan and the resulting tensions in Pakistan, the ethnic unrest

and terrorist activities in India and Pakistan, and the escalating violence in the

Middle East. The United States should do everything in its power to work with all

41

of these states to prevent the loss of control of nuclear weapons and its devastating

consequences.

The five nuclear weapon states could share the lessons learned from their own

reexaminations of nuclear weapons security. They could share ideas and information

on recommended practices and standards for nuclear weapons security. They should

take additional steps if necessary to demonstrate to the world, without divulging

sensitive details, that their weapons are secure. Such cooperation falls within the

bounds of historical relations of the United States, Great Britain and France, and

to a lesser extent Russia. During the Cold War, there was virtually no interaction

with the Soviet Union on matters of nuclear weapons security, but in recent years

a substantial cooperative effort has been mounted with Russia under the NunnLugar program. Some preliminary work has also been started on safety and transparency. Although delicate, these efforts should all be accelerated and expanded. Cooperation and transparency should be explored, including revisiting the possibility

of an agreement for cooperation that would permit limited sharing of certain kinds

of classified information under carefully established rules and procedures.

Any dialog with China on nuclear weapons security would require delicate diplomacy. China adopted the old Soviet model of security, which is effective only in a

tightly controlled, closed society—a model that may not work in the China of tomorrow. The initial U.S. contacts in the mid-1990s that focused on security of civilian

nuclear materials were suspended late in the decade as result of the furor over potential Chinese nuclear espionage. Now, however, heightened concerns over nuclear

security call for a re-evaluation of limited, focused dialog with China on nuclear security. Exchanges focusing on the security of civilian nuclear materials could be revisited before attempting to deal with defense materials or the security of nuclear

weapons themselves. Such exploration must, of course, be done within the context

of the larger U.S.-China security relationship.

The most striking and urgent nuclear security concern today is the security of nuclear weapons and materials in Pakistan, coupled with closely related concerns in

India. The U.S. government has opened a limited dialog with both countries on

these matters. For many years, any sort of cooperation with, or assistance to, the

nuclear programs of Pakistan and India was out of the question, because of nonproliferation imperatives. Now, a reassessment is unavoidable. Clearly, it is in the

interest of the international community that India and Pakistan implement rigorous

nuclear safeguards in their nuclear weapons programs. But there is a fine line between helping them avoid disaster and tacitly appearing to approve their nuclear

weapons status and programs, in effect undermining the nonproliferation regime.

The U.S. government must re-examine where to draw that line. At a minimum, we

must do what we can to make sure India and Pakistan each devote adequate attention to the issue and that they take a sufficiently broad, systematic approach to

matters of nuclear security (both for weapons and for materials). Given that, they

can probably do the job themselves. Similar dialog is necessary with all countries

where this threat exists.

2. Rigorous protection, control, and accounting for all weapons-usable nuclear materials whether designated for peaceful purposes or for defense programs

To be successful in this endeavor, we must first and foremost finish the job we

started with the Russian nuclear establishment to help it protect its vast storehouse

of nuclear materials. I described above how these programs should be restructured

to help Russia build and implement a modern, indigenous MPC&A program. One

of the key components of getting the job done is the consolidation of the number

of sites—addressing hundreds of tons of material, not just the few tons being addressed in the existing material consolidation and conversion effort—and a continued reduction of the total amount of material (through programs such as the HEU/

LEU purchase and disposition of excess weapons plutonium).

Second, we have unfinished business in the other states of the former Soviet

Union. As mentioned, the Nunn-Lugar program helped to return Soviet nuclear

weapons from the newly independent states of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus.

However, weapons-usable materials remain, most of which are no longer needed for

their original purpose. So, now we must tackle the more difficult job of converting

or removing all unneeded weapons-usable materials from these and all other newly

independent states. Until that can be accomplished, all materials must be protected

by a rigorous nuclear safeguards system.

Focusing on weapons-designated materials is not sufficient. Weapons-usable uranium and plutonium are also fuel and/or byproducts of the civilian nuclear fuel

cycle. Although most current commercial power reactors in the world use uranium

enriched only to 3 to 4% uranium-235 (the weapons-usable isotope), they produce

plutonium that can be (and in some countries is) separated from the spent fuel.

42

Moreover, smaller reactors such as those used for research are often fueled with

uranium enriched to more than 20% uranium-235 (the IAEA threshold for weaponsusable uranium). Commercial power reactors today enjoy a very good record of nuclear materials safeguards. This problem will become more challenging as more reactors are built around the world, especially in some less stable nations. The IAEA

plays an important international role here. With sufficient vigilance this problem

can be adequately addressed even in a future with increased nuclear power.

The situation with research reactors (and other nuclear research facilities) is more

problematic. The ‘‘Atoms for Peace’’ program encouraged the export of research reactors to all parts of the globe. In retrospect, reactors, often fueled with HEU, were

in some cases located in politically unstable, technologically unprepared, and economically disadvantaged countries (currently 43 countries, including Uzbekistan,

Ghana, and Algeria, for example). The IAEA and the U.S. government have encouraged the conversion of research reactors from HEU to LEU (an agreement was recently reached with Uzbekistan, for example). However, the current effort is insufficient in light of the concerns raised by the events of 9/11. A large number of these

reactors (many of which are no longer operable) should be shut down, decommissioned and the nuclear materials withdrawn completely. A significant number of reactors or nuclear research facilities are located in the states of the former Soviet

bloc; states that can no longer afford them or adequately provide for their security.

Solutions to these problems are urgently needed and will require an expensive effort

and difficult choices. Among the major challenges is dealing with the spent fuel and

radioactive waste. Solving these problems will require strong leadership from the

United States, Russia and other reactor-exporting countries working closely with

the IAEA.

The IAEA should have a major role in the effort to enhance the security of nuclear

materials in civilian applications worldwide. The Nuclear Threat Initiative has

pointed the way, through its monetary contribution announced in Vienna in October

2001. The U.S. government pledged a matching contribution in November when Energy Secretary Abraham addressed the IAEA Board of Governors, and other countries have followed suit. But a great deal of heavy lifting will be necessary to translate these initial steps into a meaningful action-oriented program on the worldwide

scale that is needed. Congress will need to take strong action. And the Executive

Branch must follow through with major bilateral and multilateral efforts to enlist

the strong support of other countries. In parallel, the United States and Russia

could lead a campaign to down-blend all of the world’s HEU not required for legitimate purposes to less than 20%, thereby eliminating its proliferation danger. There

is much less need for HEU today than was envisaged in the early days of nuclear

power.

3. Expand security measures to radioactive materials for radiological terrorism

Radiological dispersal devices (often referred to as ‘‘dirty’’ bombs) that spread radioactive materials without a nuclear detonation are weapons of mass disruption

rather than weapons of mass destruction. The disruption resulting from the 9/11 attacks had a devastating ripple effect, both economically and psychologically, across

the entire nation. Had the attack also involved the dispersal of dangerous amounts

of radioactive material in a populated area, the resulting disruption would have

been significantly greater. We must improve our efforts to avoid and respond to radiological terrorism.

The source materials for radiological terrorism are highly diverse and relatively

accessible, much more accessible than weapons-usable nuclear materials. Materials

for radiological devices include all radioactive materials of the nuclear fuel cycle

(both civilian and military) as well as radiation sources used in medical and industrial applications. They vary enormously in their radiotoxicity and their lethality.

Moreover, radioactive materials from the nuclear fuel cycle (including fresh fuel,

spent fuel, and nuclear waste) are present in dozens of nations, and radiation

sources are present in most nations of the world. If and when Al Qaida or other

terrorist organizations decide to use radiological weapons, there is little doubt—

under current conditions—that they will be able to obtain them. In addition, sabotage of nuclear reactors or other fuel-cycle facilities poses a serious potential threat.

Securing radioactive materials that constitute a radiological threat presents an

enormous challenge. Even in the United States, where extensive government regulations control the handling and transportation of radioactive materials, the security

of such materials, in light of new, post 9/11 concerns, needs more attention. For example, as of 2001, close to 5,000 orphaned radiation sources (sources without a current owner) were identified in the United States. Prior to 9/11, the orphan source

problem was recognized and the steps and the resources required to solve the probVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:12 Sep 26, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 81833 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
43

lem were well understood, but there was no sense of urgency. Post 9/11, there is

little excuse for delay.

Annually, more than 200 radiation sources are reported stolen, lost, or unaccounted for in the United States alone. Internationally, 110 countries do not even

have adequate regulations controlling such materials. We must challenge our experts now to devise a way to deal with this problem internationally. We should explore establishing an aggressive international orphan source program. In some countries or for new problems, we may want to focus on information exchange and sharing best practices and standards. Also, we must strengthen our capability to respond

to acts of radiological terrorism, if and when they occur. Effective response can

greatly reduce the harm from a radiological event. One of the most important aspects of homeland security against radiological threats will be to inform the public

concerning the real hazards before an incident occurs. If one can clearly communicate the fact that radiological weapons are not weapons of mass destruction, then

we may be able to avoid mass disruption.

A high priority radiological security initiative should include both a domestic and

an international component. The domestic part would necessarily involve the various agencies with responsibilities and expertise in this area, under the coordination

of Governor Ridge’s office. The international component should build on the capabilities and experience of the IAEA, which has already assembled the basic building

blocks of a comprehensive international program. However, Congress and the Executive Branch must act aggressively, through bilateral as well as multilateral channels, to enlist strong international support and commitment.

Mr. Chairman, I want to close my remarks by restating my three main themes.

1) We are fortunate that a major disaster in the Russian nuclear complex has been

avoided in the 10 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, risk and

vulnerability of the Russian nuclear complex remains high because we lost a grand

opportunity to help Russia build its own, sustainable nuclear safeguards system and

to develop a partnership for greater global security. 2) Post 9/11, we have another

opportunity to rebuild the partnership by focusing on the fight against international

terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 3) I briefly outlined the

three elements of a program to meet the urgent concerns of today and I described

the opportunity that we have to build a better, more strategic partnership with Russia in the spirit of revisiting the ‘‘Atoms for Peace’’ initiative at its 50th anniversary

next year.

Thank you Mr. Chairman for giving me the opportunity to share my views on

these important issues.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Menges, welcome.

STATEMENT OF DR. CONSTANTINE C. MENGES, SENIOR

FELLOW, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. MENGES. Senator Biden, it is a pleasure to be with you and

you, Senator Lugar.

I have been working on the Soviet Union and issues of Soviet

and Russian foreign policy for more than 35 years. And I am

pleased to have had the opportunity to serve my government three

times. And I commend the enormous leadership you both have

shown in this whole matter, this important matter of the control

of weapons of mass destruction that are on Russian territory. And

I think the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has been one of

the most important initiatives, one of the most farsighted that the

Senate has launched. And I think it has been extremely—and I

support it completely.

My focus in the testimony that I prepared for you, and I summarize briefly in my overview of what we should do, but my focus has

been not on the question of weapons of mass destruction on Russian territory, but on Russia’s transfer of weapons of mass destruction, components, and expertise on ballistic missiles, to regimes the

United States of America correctly considers hostile.

44

2The chart referred to is on page 54.

And I have a very, I think, nicely summarized, one-page chart 2

in my testimony of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, and the transfer

of weapons of mass destruction materials, chemical, biological, nuclear ballistic missiles by China and Russia—our report dealt with

both China and Russia—derived entirely, may I say, from the U.S.

Government sources, from U.S. Government intelligence reports

that are declassified, that themselves are the result in my view of

a farsighted and sensible congressional view to have the intelligence community of the United States report on this regularly on

a biannual basis.

So I will begin with a brief statement on what Russia is doing

and has continued to do year after year after year. I think it is important to focus on that.

Russia has continued to provide for North Korea significant assistance with its chemical and biological weapons of which it has

large stocks capable of killing hundreds of thousands that it has integrated into its combat doctrine for use against our ally, South

Korea. Russia has also provided significant help with North Korea’s ballistic missile program.

And North Korea in turn, as you know, has provided significant

help, as the Rumsfeld Commission documented, to many other hostile terrorist-supporting states in other countries with their missiles and other programs.

In the case of Iran, which the Department of State calls the most

active supporter of state terrorism in the world as a regime, in its

annual report, Russia has provided significant help with its development of chemical and biological weapons, of which it now has

large stocks, as well as with its help for nuclear weapons.

And this continued after September 11, 2001, regrettably, as we

saw when Secretary of State Powell visited in November 2001 in

Moscow. He brought the issue up, and once again, as has happened

year after year since 1995, the Russian Government turned aside

the concerns of the United States about Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.

Russia has also provided major help with the development of

Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, the medium-range and the longrange ballistic missile, the 9,200-mile range missile, the 9,200-mile

range missile, which can reach us directly, which, of course, is a

variation of the North Korean 9,200-mile missile.

Finally, Russia has provided major help to Iraq in its development of large stocks of chemical weapons, biological weapons, unknown in the matter of its nuclear weapons from the intelligence

community point of view, and help with its ballistic missile program.

Now I take those three countries because they are three of the

terrorist-supporting regimes that are significant and important and

I think pose a direct threat to us. And I would say that I would

simply like to place on your agenda of concern, the agenda of concern of the U.S. Government and our public policy, that while it is

very important to help Russia control weapons of mass destruction

on its territory, it is, I would say, of equal importance to reduce the

spread of these weapons and the transfer to regimes that are hosVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:12 Sep 26, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 81833 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
45

tile and that we know intend to do the people of the United States

harm.

We know that those regimes intend to harm us. We also know

that they are intending to harm our close allies, South Korea,

Israel, regional allies. And, of course, I think it is important to

point out they also pose a direct threat to Russia and to Russia territory. And this is where I come to the question, ‘‘Well, what do we

do? What should we do in terms of public policy?’’ I offer in the concluding two pages of my testimony an overview

in broad terms of what we should do and then eight specific steps.

Let me categorize the broad terms.

First, I begin with information. And here, Senator Lugar, I think

again you are absolutely right. We have to dramatize for our citizens, for our public—you both are correct—the threat that these

weapons pose, both on Russian territory and the threat that they

pose when transferred to these hostile regimes. We have to make

this much more a matter of discussion and concern. I think that

is the first thing we have to do.

I think, second, we have to control the spread of U.S. technology.

That is, we have to be more effective in terms of our programs to

maintain and guarantee the security of our own military and dualuse technology under U.S. law.

Third, I believe we need to reestablish effective export controls.

I think it was a mistake to dismantle the COCOM system that had

worked so well for many years and denying a dual-use and advanced military technology to potentially hostile powers, or to proliferating powers. And I think we have to reestablish that, and I

offer some particular examples.

Fourth, I think it is very important to move beyond words with

Russia. And here I want to—I began my testimony in the written

form with the perspective on our approach to Russia since the unraveling of communism, which I think has been exactly correct. I

think there has been bipartisan consensus since 1991 and 1992, led

by you both, if I may say, that we want to see and help Russia to

develop as a pluralist political democracy, a market-oriented economic system, and to control these weapons. Those have been our

three fundamental purposes. They have been good purposes and

correct purposes. They continue. They should continue.

I believe there has been progress in Russia. I have just completed a book on U.S. relations with Russia and China. So I have

examined the internal political evolution, as well as the foreign policy of Russia in some depth. I think that is progress, but there is

a mixed picture, as we well understand, internally in Russia.

Nevertheless, I think our assistance program should continue.

However, it is important to put this in perspective. Since 1991/

1992, our bilateral assistance, according to the latest executive

branch reports, has totaled more than $35 billion to Russia, of

that—to the former Soviet Union—and about $18 billion to Russia

alone. And that is about evenly divided between grant assistance

and insurance and commercial loans and so forth.

At the same time, the United States has supported the very large

program of multilateral assistance. And, of course, many of our

democratic allies have provided assistance. Based upon the available data, the democracies, the major democracies, have provided

46

Russia since 1991/1992 to the present about $150 billion in assistance. This is extremely generous. It is significant. The money

comes, as we all understand, from the working men and women of

all the democracies.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, does that count—is that $150 billion

total, including us, or is that—— Dr. MENGES. Yes, it includes us. It includes our $35 billion bilateral. And that includes, also, some of the debt forgiveness and debt

restructuring. So that is about $150 billion. So there is a lot of

money that has been provided, a lot of—— The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry to—I want to just make sure I understand. And that is since——

Dr. MENGES. Since 1992.

The CHAIRMAN. Since 1992. Thank you very much.

Dr. MENGES. Yes. And that also includes all the cooperative

threat reduction funds and the bilateral assistance.

I did—by the way, a few years ago, I did an assessment of our

aid over the first 6 years. And I testified on that before the Senate—I was pleased and honored to do so—on just how we have

done, what we have done with it, how it has worked so far, and

so forth. That was quite a task, as you could imagine. And I think

we could do better, as in everything we do in life.

But keeping with that in mind, with the fact that we have and

are providing a lot of assistance to Russia, I think it is now time

to go beyond words and say in a polite, but firm, way to the Government of Russia, ‘‘We have asked you to stop this selling and

transfer of weapons of mass destruction, components and expertise

year after year after year, through two Presidents, two administrations, and it continues. And it continues after September 11, 2001,

unfortunately, in the new context of a more cooperative relationship.’’

Now I would suggest that it is time to consider reducing U.S.

economic assistance. Not cooperative threat assistance, because I

agree with you both, this is part of our defense, this is in the

strong interest, but to reducing the assistance in direct proportion

to the added cost to the United States and its major allies of defending against the military threats resulting from Russia proliferation.

I think this is the time to do this. That is a difficult number to

estimate. We understand that. But it can be done, and I think it

is time to do that.

Now that is where my testimony ends in terms of the overall approach. But I would like to add another thought, which I have also

published in the past and talked with many Russian leaders about.

And I discuss it in my book.

And that is, I am also—I believe in disincentives and being practical and tangible, but I also believe in incentives. And we understand that one of the major priorities for Russia and for President

Putin is to help the Russian economy develop. And it seems to me

that it should be possible for the industrial democracies, which

have a combined GDP of roughly $30 trillion, to put together—that

is a lot of money, $30 trillion GDP combined—to put together a

grant program for Russia on the order of $10 billion to $15 billion

a year. A grant program, not a World Bank program, not a loan

47

3The article referred to is on page 55.

program, but a grant program for the development of consumer

production industries in Russia, consumer production——

The CHAIRMAN. That is a good idea.

Dr. MENGES [continuing]. And tie that into conversion of the defense sector; and put that grant program together with cooperation

as a kind of a Marshall Plan, as it were, in which Russia’s—the

professed need to earn this money from the transfer of the weapons

of mass destruction, components and expertise is put aside. But

Russia would have to fulfill the conditions.

What cannot continue to go on, in my view, is for Russia to receive the funds and never to comply with the requests that are reasonable.

And so my view is that Secretary Cohen is right in response to

Senator Enzi’s question ‘‘What do we do?’’ that dialog is where it

should start. And I think part of the dialog also has to be to make

tangible and practical to the Russians, looking at the ready eye of

the missiles and other things, how dangerous this is for them.

After all, a number of these are Islamic regimes. One never knows

where they are going to go with their hostility.

Russia is dealing with the Islamic movement in Chechnya and

has 70 million to 90 million Islamic population. There is a lot going

on in the former Soviet Union and in Russia itself. And it is contrary to Russia’s interest to building up these dangerous weapons

near its borders, that actually can reach it in direct terms before

they can reach us.

But beyond dialog, I think we also need to do the other things

I have just mentioned. So I would just summarize: Information to

inform our public and leaders about the problem much more actively; the control of U.S. technology; reestablish export controls in

an effective way; overall economic disincentives for Russia; cutting

the assistance in other domains, not cooperative threat reduction,

unless this transfer stops; and finally, propose also an incentive,

design and propose an incentive program; but there would have to

be complete compliance.

In my book I talk about this. And I describe a situation where

I think the administration of the program would have to be by

American officials on Russian territory, who would take the $9 billion or $15 billion and allocate it in grants themselves, would monitor that it really goes to civilian production, that it really involves

defense conversion; and, if not, that it is cutoff immediately, so that

there cannot be this lag of a year or two to find out what is going

on. There would have to be sort of conditions. But I think the grant

program could be very attractive.

In conclusion, I think it is important to understand, as we look

at our relations with Russia, that there are good opportunities for

an improvement in relations, a continuing improvement in relations, as we go forward. And I believe, as I indicate in the article

in the Washington Post, from the Washington Post that I have attached,3 on the Russia/China relationship, that part of having a

good relationship with Russia is understanding the new relationship it has with China and being realistic about what that means.

48

1 Constantine C. Menges Ph.D., a Senior Fellow with the Hudson Institute, served as Special

Assistant for National Security Affairs to the President and as National Intelligence Officer with

the CIA. His forthcoming book is 2007: The Preventable War: The Strategic Challenge of Russia

and China. [Contact tel. #s 202/974-2410 or 202/223-7770]

You may have noted, Senators, that very few people in Washington have discussed the fact that in June of last year, Russia and

China signed the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement establishing a

security alliance among Russia, China, and four Central Asian

countries. They also, Russia and China, also signed for the first

time since 1950 an alliance agreement in July, a bilateral alliance

agreement.

Now I believe that the strategy that Russia and China are both

following toward us is to have a two-level relationship; one to be

normal and civil in relations with the United States and to obtain

tremendous amounts of economic benefits, Russia through assistance and trade, China through the one-way trade it has had, which

has led, as you know, to a Chinese surplus from 1990 to 2000 of

$720 billion with the industrial democracies, $480 billion with us

alone. So that has worked very well for them at one level.

At the second level, I believe Russia and China have decided, as

we see this in the annual summits and I discuss it in my new book

called ‘‘The Preventable War, the Strategic Challenge of Russia and

China,’’ I believe that they have decided that they want to limit the

United States, and they want to do this in as discreet a way as possible.

But regrettably, I believe the proliferation, the transfer of these

weapons of mass destruction to these regimes hostile to the United

States and its allies, are part of this method, are part of this method of limiting the United States and the world, doing it discreetly,

doing it indirectly.

And I believe we, too, should have a two-part strategy toward

Russia and China, a normal civil relationship at one level, but on

the other level a realistic relationship, which involves certain conditions on the economic benefits they obtained from the United

States, so using our economic benefits as a positive instrument to

in fact ensure a future of peaceful relations with both countries and

both powers. And I think we can do that, and I think it would

make all the difference, if we would now move to that kind of approach.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, doctor.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Menges, including additional material, follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONSTANTINE C. MENGES,1 PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, THE

HUDSON INSTITUTE

RUSSIA AND THE TRANSFER OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

U.S. Purposes and Assistance

Following the unraveling of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation in 1992, presidents and political leaders in both major parties in

the United States have supported a large program of assistance for Russia. The purposes have been to encourage a transition to ever more broad based and stable political democracy together with a market oriented economy and to assist Russia in controlling and reducing its large arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons,

other weapons of mass destruction, and its ballistic missiles. These were seen by

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2 U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the Newly Independent States

of the Former Soviet Union, Department of State, January 2001. 3Speaker’s Advisory Group on Russia, Christopher Cox, Chairman, Russia’s Road to Corruption, U.S. House of Representatives, September 2000. 4 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Executive Summary, Washington, DC July 15, 1998. 5From FBIS, World News Connection, cited in Constantine Menges, ‘‘China, Russia, Iran and

Our Next Move,’’ The Washington Times, February 10, 2002. 6Patterns in Global Terrorism, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2001.

the leaders in the United States and Russia as being in the interests of both countries since a more democratic and market oriented Russia would more likely be

peaceful internationally and provide for greater prosperity and well-being for its citizens. From 1991 until the end of 2000, the United States has provided more than $35 billion in bilateral assistance to all 15 post-Soviet republics: $17 billion in direct

funding together with an additional $18 billion in commercial financing and insurance. Russia has received more than $17 billion including $8 billion in direct funding and $9 billion in commercial financing and insurance.2 This funding continues.

At the same time, the United States has joined with the other major democracies

to provide an estimated additional $120 billion in economic assistance through bilateral programs and international financial institutions.3 Further, on several occasions the democracies have canceled or generously refinanced more than $40 billion

of Russia’s external debt. Therefore, we can estimate that as of this time total expenditures and grants by the United States and its democratic allies in assistance

for Russia have been worth more than $150 billion dollars since the unraveling of

the Soviet Union.

This is an important starting point for considering Russia’s continuing transfer

of components and expertise for weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles to launch them. It is often said that these highly dangerous transfers have occurred because Russia and various Russian weapons manufacturing organizations

need and want the funds they derive from these transfers. The question facing the

current leadership of the United States is whether it is the national interest to continue the many forms of economic assistance for Russia even though its government

either denies or fails to stop the proliferation.

Russian Proliferation

For more than a decade, there has been bipartisan agreement among U.S. presidents and the political leadership in Congress that the U.S. and its allies are gravely threatened by the continuing transfer of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles to dangerous regimes such as those in North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and

Libya, among others. Those dictatorships support international terrorism, threaten

U.S. regional allies, and year after year have demonstrated by their words and actions, that they intend to threaten and if possible harm the people of the United

States.

In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Congress decided that the Clinton Administration

needed to act more effectively to stop proliferation and that this might occur if the

intelligence agencies were required to provide biannual classified and unclassified

reports to Congress on this major issue. As a result, the unclassified reports have

become a means through which the legislature, citizens and experts could inform

themselves about an activity that is largely conducted in secrecy, with some degree

of deception and frequent denial.

In 1997 the U.S. Congress established a bipartisan Commission chaired by the

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld to examine this question. It had access to all available

government information and produced both a classified and an unclassified report.

As an example of the dangers deriving from this proliferation, the Rumsfeld Commission predicted in 1998 that Iran could have an intercontinental range ballistic

missile able to reach the U.S. ‘‘within five years’’ 4. Informed experts believe Iran

could have its own nuclear weapons within two years; if so Iran might then be in

a position to launch or threaten a nuclear attack directly against the U.S. as well

as Israel. In December 2001 a senior Iranian cleric publicly threatened to ‘‘totally

destroy’’ Israel when Iran has its own nuclear weapons.5

The latest annual U.S. Department of State report identifies Iran as ‘‘the most

active’’ state supporter of terrorism in the world.6 Starting in the early 1980s, Iran

has provided training, weapons and other aid for Hezbollah and Hamas, terrorist

organizations attacking Israel. This continuing Iranian indirect war of terrorism

against Israel was again revealed in January 2002 when Israel captured fifty tons

of weapons and explosives on a freighter, the Karine A. Its Palestinian captain admitted that the Palestinian Authority had obtained the weapons from Iran, and

50

7Menges, ‘‘China, Russia, Iran,’’ op. cit. 8 Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat

to 2015, Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate released in January 2002 and Central

Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating

to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30

June 2001, released January 30, 2002. 9 Bill Gertz, ‘‘Letter Showed Gore Made Russian Deal,’’ Washington Times, October 17, 2000,

A-1. 10 John M. Broder, ‘‘Despite Secret ‘95 Pact by Gore, Russian Arms Sales to Iran Go On,’’ New

York Times, October 13, 2000, A-1.

many of the weapons containers bore Iranian markings. These terrorist supplies included about 3,000 pounds of C-4 explosives, which could be used by suicide bombers against civilians.7

The unclassified government intelligence reports on proliferation conclude that

Russia and China are the two countries that have been most consistently active in

transferring weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile components and expertise to hostile regimes.8 The following table is drawn from the most recent unclassified CIA report, released on January 30, 2002. It concludes that Russia has

done the following:

• for Iran—assistance in building its stocks of chemical, biological weapons, with

its nuclear weapons program, as well as with its mid range ballistic missile and

its planned ICBM, the 9200 mile Shahab 4/5;

• for Iraq, major assistance in building its large stocks of biological and chemical

weapons, as well as aid for its short range (370 miles) ballistic missile;

• for North Korea—provided major assistance in building its large stocks of chemical and biological weapons, as well as major assistance in building its No-dong

medium range ballistic missile and aid in building its 9200 mile intercontinental ballistic missile, the Taepodong.

Background on Russia’s Current Transfers of Weapons of Mass Destruction

It is a fact of international politics that virtually all the Soviet-linked anti-U.S.

dictatorships of the cold war era outside Europe survived during the 1990s. These

include Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, Cuba—all of which have been judged

by the United States government to be states which support international terrorism.

The Middle Eastern anti-U.S. regimes, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria continue to seek to

build weapons of mass destruction for possible use against the United States as well

as against U.S. allies such as Israel and the Persian Gulf oil states.

These are the states which during the 1990s have been supported by Russia and

China politically and with weapons transfers at ever increasing tempo. In the congressionally-mandated public reports, the Director of Central Intelligence has indicated that Russia and China are the countries which provide the largest number

of conventional weapons and the most weapons of mass destruction to these and

other hostile regimes.

The Soviet purpose in working for 30 years with these regimes in the Middle East

was essentially to use them and their hostility against Israel and its alliance with

the United States as a means of helping radical pro-Soviet groups gain control of

the Middle East oil wealth. This included unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the

moderate Persian Gulf oil regimes—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates.

The Soviet view was that with radical pro-Soviet regimes in charge of those oil resources and Europe and Japan depending on these for about 70 percent of their energy supplies, it would be possible to neutralize Europe and Japan by imposing political conditions such as leaving NATO and other U.S. security alliances on further

supplies of Middle Eastern oil to Europe and Japan.

In the 1990s, Russia and China sold weapons to the anti-U.S. regimes in the Middle East to earn hard currency, to support their own military producers and also

to establish closer relations and build up these regimes as another means of

counterbalancing the United States. In addition to China’s transfer of weapons of

mass destruction to these countries, starting in 1994, Russia began to sell a large

number of weapons to Iran along with nuclear weapons-related equipment which reportedly led a 1999 U.S. government analysis to conclude, ‘‘if not terminated, can

only lead to Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.’’ 9 The conventional

weapons Russia sold to Iran during the 1990s included many aimed at the U.S.

Navy including three submarines, a variety of long-range guided torpedoes for the

submarines, a large number of anti-ship mines, as well as tanks and armored personnel carriers.10

Years after the event, reports revealed that in 1995 Vice President Gore had entered into a secret agreement with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin of Russia that the

51

11 As cited by Bill Gertz, op.cit., October 17, 2000. 12Tyler, ‘‘U.S. and Russia to Complete Talks on Arms Control Pact,’’ New York Times, December 11, 2001, A13. 13 ‘‘China’s President Visits Iran,’’ UPI, April 18, 2002. 14See C. Menges, ‘‘China, Russia, and What’s Really on the Table,’’ Washington Post, July 29,

2001 [This article is attached].

United States would not implement sanctions required by the Gore-McCain Nonproliferation Act of 1992 if Russia promised to stop selling these conventional weapons to Iran. This surprising revelation led Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and

Senator Jesse Helms to write President Clinton on October 13, 2000 saying, ‘‘please

assure us . . . the Vice President did not in effect sign a pledge with Victor

Chernomyrdin in 1995 that committed your Administration to break U.S. law by

dodging sanctions requirements.’’ 11 In fact, Russia did not stop selling such weapons. Despite U.S. diplomatic protests, Russian weapons transfers continued into the

years 2001 and 2002.

The New Russia-China Alliance After September 11, 2001

Although Russia has cooperated in important ways with the United States since

the massive terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, there is no evidence that Russian transfers of components and expertise for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles have changed in any significant degree. In November 2001 it was reported that Secretary Powell raised these issues in his visit to Moscow without any

success.12 Nor is there any sign that the several summit meetings between Presidents Putin and Bush have led to any marked decrease in Russian proliferation activities.

To the contrary, Russian President Putin has publicly stated that the U.S. should

take no action against Iraq, Russia has continued to work to have the sanctions

against Iraq lifted, and Russia has indicated that it continues to have a close relationship with the clerical dictatorship in Iran.

It is important to understand that the United States faces a new strategic situation as a result of the June 2001 Russia-China treaty establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) involving six countries and the July 2001 RussiaChina bilateral alliance treaty. Together the countries of the Shanghai Pact, as it

is referred to by President Jiang Zemin of China, have a population of 1.5 billion,

they control thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and these combined conventional military forces number 3.6 million.

Iran hopes to join the Shanghai Pact soon. This may have been discussed during

the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Iran on April 18, 2002.13 Reports are

that at the coming June 2002 Shanghai Pact summit Russia and China might agree

on adding Iran while China would also like to add Pakistan, and Russia reportedly

wants India in the Shanghai Pact as a participant. If all these joined, the Shanghai

Pact could include about 2.8 billion people and it might become much more than

the current mostly paper alliance.14

My analysis of the new Russia-China strategic relationship suggests that its current negative effects, from the U.S. perspective, include:

1. Russia and China both transfer expertise and components for weapons of

mass destruction and ballistic missiles to North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and

have not reduced this after September 11, 2001;

2. Russia continues selling its avanced weapons to China which aims these

at U.S. forces in the Pacific—about $18 billion have already been sold and $30

billion more are scheduled for the next four years;

3. The political and military-to-military relationship with China is strengthening authoritarian groups within Russia.

Possible Constructive U.S. Actions

The U.S. needs to be more effective in dramatizing how this proliferation of weapons of mass destruction might result in immense tragedy for countries near these

hostile regimes such as those in Europe, South Korea, Israel and other friendly

states in the Middle East as well as countries more distant such as the United

States. In addition, the U.S. should become more effective in preventing the theft

and illegal export of its own advanced military or dual use technology, should move

to reestablish effective international export controls to keep such technology from

potentially hostile regimes and from proliferating states such as Russia and China,

and should reduce its economic support for Russia until it halts this dangerous activity.

In terms of specific actions and steps to accomplish these purposes, the United

States should allocate the skilled manpower and budget resources necessary to:

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15Sen. Richard Shelby, Intelligence and Espionage in the 21st Century, Washington D.C.: The

Heritage Foundation, May 18, 2001, 1. 16 U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns from the People’s Republic of China, Washington D.C., May 25, 1999. 17 Ibid, 6. 18 Brooks Tigner, ‘‘EU Hopes Code of Conduct Will Cool Missile Proliferation,’’ Defense News,

July 9-15, 2001, pp. 1, 4. The U.S. should resist such liberalization, but cannot effectively do

so when violating the spirit of the rules itself by aiding China’s missile program through satellite launchings. 19 Reps. Dan Burton, Curt Weldon and Dana Rohrabacher wrote the Secretary of Defense in

May 2001 to express their support for an effective DTSA, see Bill Gertz, Roman Scarborough,

‘‘Inside the Ring,’’ Washington Times, June 15, 2001, A 12. The investigative reporter, Kenneth

R. Timmerman, (Selling Out America, Ex Libirs, 2000, Chapter 8) wrote that a high technology

area of California could be called ‘‘China’s 22nd province’’ because there were hundreds of such

front companies for the Chinese military and military production system with offices there,

many listing no telephone numbers or having any of the facilities for normal business operations.

1. Maintain the integrity of and control over classified information within the

U.S. government and among all U.S. contractors with sensitive military technology information;

2. Significantly improve and expand U.S. counterintelligence operations in

order to prevent, deter, and defeat Russian, Chinese and other espionage operations. From 1975 to 2000, more than 127 U.S. citizens were convicted for spying, most on behalf of the Soviet Union/Russia, some for China.15 The repeated

spy scandals of the 1990s and the compendium of information in the bipartisan

report produced by the Select Committee chaired by Representative Christopher

Cox on successful Chinese military espionage led the Congress to instruct President Clinton to improve U.S. security.16 This resulted in Clinton signing a Presidential Decision Directive on Dec. 28, 2000 on ‘‘U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness-Counterintelligence for the 21st Century.’’ Instead of the ‘‘piecemeal

and parochial’’ approach in place up to then it urged, in the words of Sen. Richard Shelby, then Chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the U.S. Senate,

a ‘‘more policy driven . . . proactive . . . approach to identifying . . . the information to be protected enhanced information sharing between counterintelligence

elements.17 The administration of President Bush should make this a major priority.

3. Terminate all launches of U.S. satellites on the rockets of Russia, China

or any other foreign country except for close U.S. allies. Such launches give a

country the experience, technology and additional financial resources to bring

about important improvements in its military ballistic missile capabilities since

the systems are so similar—this is fundamentally contrary to U.S. national security interests. The EU is drafting a new code of conduct on missile proliferation to be introduced in 2002. While still urging advanced states to ‘‘exercise

the necessary vigilance’’ when aiding other country’s space launch programs,

the new language would be more lenient than the current restriction under the

MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) rules.18

4. Military exchanges with Russia and China should focus on building understanding and relationships among the participants and should help foreign military personnel understand the truth about U.S. international purposes and activities. These should not involve the transfer of military skills from the United

States to these other countries.

5. The U.S. must restore the full, objective functioning of the elements of the

Department of Defense (such as the Defense Technology Security Administration [DTSA]) and the intelligence community responsible for the review of the

potential military sensitivity of U.S. defense technology exports.19 The ‘‘export

virtually everything’’ approach of the Clinton Administration resulted in pressures on and a weakening of these organizations. In the present and future they

must be fully staffed by competent professionals who are able to provide independent analyses of the national security implications of possible military/dual

use technology exports.

6. The United States should expel all companies which function as fronts for

any military or intelligence related entities in Russia, China or any other nonallied state.

7. Establish and restore an effective multilateral entity such as the Coordinating Committee on Trade with Communist Countries (COCOM) that for so

many years served to prevent the U.S. and its main allies from exporting military technologies to the former Soviet Union and its allied states. In 1999, the

U.S. Congress urged that this step be taken in view of the relative ineffectiveness of the existing multilateral organizations such as the Nuclear Suppliers

53

20 CSIS, Study Group on Enhancing Multilateral Export Controls for U.S. National Security,

Washington, DC April 2001, 1. 21 Ibid.

Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the

Wassanar Arrangement of Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.20 In April 2001 a bipartisan congressional study group, involving leading members of both the House and the Senate recommended improving the

U.S. export control process and also working to strengthen ‘‘multilateral export

controls based on . . . enhanced defense cooperation with close allies and

friends.’’ 21 This provides a good basis for making rapid progress in this little

known but very significant domain of international policy.

8. Last and perhaps most important—link current U.S. economic aid to Russia ending its proliferation. Since years of requests to Russia to end this dangerous transfer of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile expertise

and components have produced very few results, the time has come for the

United States to inform Russia in a polite but clear way that U.S. economic support for Russia will be reduced in direct proportion to the additional costs to

the United States of defending its allies and people against the ever more serious threats resulting from these weapons in the arsenals of the hostile dictatorships. During the first year that would probably suggest a minimum reduction

of 20% in direct bilateral assistance and perhaps comparable reductions in U.S.

support for international financial assistance and measures to relieve or stretch

out payment of Russia’s approximately $150 billion foreign debt.

In international politics, words and declarations alone often do not bring about

improvements changes in the negative actions of foreign governments. It is time for

the United States to act with seriousness of purpose to persuade Russia to completely terminate its continuing proliferation of components and expertise for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

54

North Korea, Iran and Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction and Ballistic Missiles*

Country Type of Weapon Model (Range in Miles)

Assistance from:

Numbers China Russia

North Korea Chemical major major large stocks 1

Biological major major large stocks 1Nuclear Unknown Unknown 1 to 5Ballistic Missile Hwasong 5/6 (175-425) 2 No No at least 500

Nodong (900) 3 Yes major 12–100Taepodong (9200) 4 Yes Yes in development

Iran Chemical Yes Yes large stocks 1

Biological Unknown Yes in developmentNuclear Yes Yes no, intends to developBallistic Missile Shahab 1/2 (175-425) 2 No No 600+

Shahab 3 (900) 3 major major in developmentShahab 4/5 (9200) 4 major major in early development

Iraq Chemical Unknown major large stocks 1

Biological Unknown major large stocks 1Nuclear Unknown Unknown in developmentBallistic Missile Al-Hussein (370) 2 No Yes Unknown

Likely Taepodong 4 No No Intends to buy upon

end of UN sanctions

1 ‘‘large stocks’’ mean that each nation keeps enough warheads of this kind to kill several hundred thousand civilians or soldiers. 2These missiles are variants of the Soviet SCUD. Hwasong 5/6 are North Korean variants. Shahab-1/2 are the Iranian names for the Hwasong 5/6, which it

purchased and produces. Al-Hussein is the Iraqi name for its own indigenous variant of the SCUD. 3The Nodong is designed to hit Japan, including the U.S. bases there. The Shahab-3 is a modification of the Nodong intended to hit Israel and the Gulf States. 4The Taepodong is under development, but the U.S. government believes that the final version will be an intercontinental missile capable of hitting the United

States.

Sources for the Table:Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to 2015, published January 9, 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2001, published January 30, 2002.Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001.* This table is taken from North Korea, Iran, and Iraq: Building Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Weapons and Ballistic Missiles, Briefing Note from the Russia,

China Security and Democracy Project, Hudson Institute, March 2002.

55

[From the Washington Post, July 29, 2001]

RUSSIA, CHINA AND WHAT’S REALLY ON THE TABLE

(BY CONSTANTINE C. MENGES)

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s surprise agreement last week to begin a discussion with the United States on offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces

was widely praised. And indeed, it was good news. Putin’s willingness to talk might

in time produce the ‘‘new framework for peace’’ that President Bush seeks—although, as national security adviser Condoleezza Rice correctly cautioned, talking

does not guarantee final agreement.

But it was only part of a larger picture. This is the same Putin who on July 16

signed a treaty of cooperation with Chinese President Jiang Zemin at their summit

in Moscow.

While the treaty states that it ‘‘is not aimed at any third country,’’ it explicitly

seeks to promote a ‘‘new international order.’’ This is the phrase China and Russia

use to describe international politics when the United States no longer has or seeks

what they call ‘‘unilateral military and security advantages.’’ Since their first meeting a year ago, Putin and Jiang have met eight times to coordinate what the new treaty describes as their ‘‘work together to preserve the global strategic balance.’’ The two events clearly illustrate a dual-track strategy of Russia and China toward the United States. That strategy should worry the White

House.

First, the two countries maintain a sense of normal relations with the United

States and other democracies so that they will continue providing China and Russia

with vitally needed economic benefits. (Bush noted that he and Putin had also discussed ‘‘economic cooperation’’ and that he would send Treasury Secretary Paul H.

O’Neill to Moscow ‘‘to discuss a wide range of topics.’’ These might include concessions on Russia’s $150 billion foreign debt. Meanwhile, China’s yearly trade surplus with the United States is about $85 billion—and growing.)

Second, Russia and China are using mostly political and covert means to oppose

the United States on security issues and to divide America from its allies. This was

the preferred KGB approach when Putin served there (1975-1991), and this has

been China’s approach during the Jiang years.

This month’s China-Russia summit followed a little-noticed agreement signed on

June 15 by the presidents of China, Russia and four former Soviet Central Asian

republics establishing a political-military coalition, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Jiang called it the ‘‘Shanghai Pact,’’ perhaps intending to evoke the former

Warsaw Pact. He said that these six countries had agreed on political, military and

intelligence cooperation for the purpose of ‘‘cracking down on terrorism, separatism,

extremism’’ and to maintain ‘‘regional security.’’ Moscow said the agreement would

improve ‘‘global security.’’

Then, for the first time in its history, China agreed to participate in joint military

exercises, with its fellow Shanghai Pact members this fall. Together, the Shanghai

Pact countries have a population of 1.5 billion; they control thousands of strategic

and tactical nuclear weapons, and this combined conventional military forces number 3.6 million. Iran, Mongolia and Turkmenistan hope to join the pact soon. They

would add another 78 million people and bring the combined military forces to nearly 4.2 million.

Such an arrangement could grant protection to Iran, which continues to support

terrorist attacks against Israel and other states. Iran recently sent 8,000 katyusha

rockets to Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon. Iran could also link the Shanghai Pact

with the Middle East, where Russia and China already provide political and military support to Syria, Libya and Iraq—three former Soviet allies that might also

be welcomed into the pact. In addition, Putin reportedly hopes that India will join,

while China would like Pakistan to participate. If all these countries became part

of the Shanghai group, it would include 40 percent of the world’s population and

could still be open to North Korea, Cuba and the pro-Castro Chavez regime in Venezuela, which in May became a ‘‘strategic partner’’ of China and of Iran.

Judging by its initial public response, the Bush administration may believe that

these new treaties are nothing more than symbolic acts—or it simply may not have

taken the time to explore this issue fully. The July treaty, according to State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, ‘‘is a treaty of friendship, not an alliance. It

doesn’t have mutual defense in it or anything like that.’’

That view ignores two facts: first, mutual defense is implicit in the treaty, which

states that ‘‘if a threat of aggression arises,’’ the two sides ‘‘will immediately hold

consultations in order to eliminate the emerging threat’’; and second, China and

Russia have another agreement for mutual defense in the Shanghai Pact, a point

56

well made by a senior Chinese official who said candidly that the July treaty did

not explicitly include military cooperation ‘‘because we have ample agreements on

that issue.’’ The new China-Russia treaty marks a complete turnabout from 1992 and 1993,

when the previous president George Bush and Russian president Boris Yeltsin met

three times and agreed on the need for changes in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

of 1972 to permit missile defense against third states. Back then, Russia spoke of

strategic partnership with the United States and kept communist China at a distance. After 1996, because of pressures from communists and ultra-nationalists in

Russia and the failure of the Clinton administration to follow through on some of

the Yeltsin-Bush initiatives, Russia and China formed a strategic partnership,

which China steered increasingly in an anti-U.S. direction.

Putin has said this month’s China-Russia treaty was Jiang’s idea, and it seems

clear that the Shanghai group was as well. Over the past five years, the China-Russia alignment has had many negative effects on the United States. Russia has accepted much of China’s anti-U.S. world view, and the relationship with China has

strengthened authoritarian tendencies within Russia. The two countries have frequently issued joint statements opposing missile defense for the United States or

its Asian allies. And the Russia-U.S. discussions proposed in Genoa are unlikely to

change that. Moreover, Russia has sold about $18 billion in advanced weapons to

China; some $30 billion more are scheduled for the next four years, all aimed at

U.S. forces in the Pacific. Chinese and Russian aid to Iran, Libya and North Korea

includes expertise and components for weapons of mass destruction and expertise.

Evidence of the potential new military risks to Washington and its allies came

this past February in the form of Russian military exercises that included largescale simulated nuclear and conventional attacks against U.S. military units ‘‘opposing’’ a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, according to a report based on U.S. intelligence

published in the Washington Times. But significant challenge to the United States,

at least early on, is more likely to come from Chinese-Russian political and covert

actions aimed at reducing Washington’s international role. Consider the recent defeat of the U.S. proposal for ‘‘smart sanctions’’ against Iraq: First China extracted

economic concessions from Washington in return for not using its veto in the U.N.

Security Council to stop the U.S. plan. Then Russia stepped in with a veto.

Broader examples of Russian-Chinese political cooperation may well include actions to oppose or delay U.S. missile defense plans; to intimidate and lure Taiwan

into accepting China’s terms; to continue the North Korean partial or pseudo-normalization; and to use Chinese economic opportunities for financially pressed Japanese businesses, in tandem with the possibility of Russian territorial concessions,

to persuade Japan to begin moving away from its U.S. security alliance.

Two months ago, Russian and Chinese officials announced they would coordinate

policy toward Colombia and Cuba. Russia and China have political and military relations with Cuba as well as electronic monitoring bases aimed at the United States.

This joint policy might well include more help for Castro as he works with the Chavez regime to support anti-U.S. radical groups seeking to take power in Colombia

and other Latin American countries, now even more fragile due to the global economic slowdown. Jiang and Putin might see this as a way of keeping the United

States occupied near its borders and less involved in Eurasia.

The Clinton administration ignored early signs of strategic cooperation between

Beijing and Moscow. There is no need for a public sense of crisis at this stage, but

the Bush administration should avoid repeating that mistake. It should give the

China-Russia axis its immediate attention.

The CHAIRMAN. This may surprise you: I agree a great deal with

what you have to say about the relationship as well. I find particularly intriguing and, I would think, especially today worthy of serious, serious, not just discussion, but planning on the part of this

administration or any successor administration to deal with the

prospect of your putting together among the industrial nations a

multi-billion-dollar grant program for the express purposes you

have stated.

You probably know, because you have testified, and I think not

inaccurately, in the past about the spottiness of our efforts to provide assistance to the emerging ‘‘democracy of Russia.’’ I am the

guy that wrote that first piece called the Seed Program that became the Freedom Support Act in the Bush administration.

57

I found that—knowing what I know now, I think I would have

drafted it differently. I think probably President Bush, knowing

what he knows now, George the first, President Bush, might have

done it differently.

This has been a learning experience. Hopefully, our learning

curve is going to get sharper here. But I do not want to take your

time now, but possibly either in person or on the phone—to followup with you on this large notion and idea you have. And I am

curious as to whether or not you have gotten any response to the

idea from any of your contacts within the administration.

Now, granted, I do not say this as a criticism, because there has

been obviously a preoccupation of late within the administration.

But it is an intriguing notion to me.

I also want to suggest to you that when President Putin was

here last—I cannot remember whether Senator Lugar was in the

room or not; there were several of us—I asked him a question

about Iraq and why did he not understand that after at least 50

years, and probably closer to 80, of a very spotty, if not hostile, relationship with the Muslim minorities within the former Soviet empire, why he did not think that Moscow might just as easily be a— or find themselves the victim of some of the initiatives that Russia

was helping Iran with?

And he was somewhat irritated in his response. He said something to the effect, and I am paraphrasing, Do you not think I understand that a longer range missile is equally as likely, if not

more likely, to strike Moscow than New York some day?

I followed up with, ‘‘Why?’’ I mean, there was initial hostility to

my question. Because Senator Lugar and I had proposed a debt-fornonproliferation swap here and the possibility of, although some of

this has already been done in Germany, the possibility with Japan,

Germany, other countries with whom there is a much larger debt,

outstanding debt, that Russia absorb from the former Soviet Union.

As you know, the due bill is coming due. So far, the Russians

have met their obligations. But in 2003 and 2004 there is, in effect,

a balloon payment coming up. They need very badly to have the

World Bank and the IMF and others continue to essentially, my

words, not literally applicable, but for those that are listening,

grade their bonds highly, so that they can be lent to and/or get assistance.

It seems to us there is a real possibility here. And I raised that

with him. I said, ‘‘Would you be interested?’’ And he first launched

into—how can I phrase it?—a response that was not particularly

friendly. But as he spoke in Russian, you could see him starting

to calculate this and realized I was not trying to be polemic with

him; I was trying to figure out a way.

He warmed up to the idea but then made the following statement, which gets me to my question. He said essentially, ‘‘We do

not want to be told with whom we can trade. And our single most

significant bilateral relationship we have in terms of trade surpluses is with Iran now.’’

Now maybe that is not exactly what he said, but that is the point

he was making; and that there are others, other bilateral trade relationships with Iran that do not relate to technology and weapons

technology and capability.

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My question is this: Any part of what seems to be a

counterintuitive continuation of a relationship on weapons with

Iran, is any part of that, in your view, related to the thinking on

the part of the Russians that that need be done in order to have

access to markets for non-defense-related items, or do you know?

Dr. MENGES. Yes, Senator, I think so. I am sure the uranium

theocracy tries to make that point, ‘‘Well, if you do this, we will

look more favorably on other aspects of trade with you.’’ I think

that is undoubtedly used.

And, of course, President Putin has been very explicit about the

concern about repayment of the Iraqi debt to Russia. You know, he

has looked at this in monetary terms quite a bit. And yet we know

he has a very strategic mind. And in fact, I am very happy that

you raised that question with him.

And certainly the events in Chechnya, the tragedy there, and the

degree of hatred that has evolved against Russia there, that could

also directly impact other Muslim peoples in the former Soviet

Union and in Russia, and has to be a major concern.

And that relationship to the regimes, the clerical regimes of

other radical groups, the Saddam Hussein regime, which is totally

willing to work in any way that will work against its major enemy,

the United States, and Israel and so forth, all has to—it is the kind

of thing in which I think if he would talk with you both some more,

I could see you raising the kinds of issues that would have a big

impact.

There is always—as we know, in decisionmaking in every country, there is always a coalition of interest groups that come together. And so you have the military industrial complex that does

its—you know, has its relationships. And you have the trading

groups. And you have the geopolitical thinkers, who say, ‘‘Well, this

is part of containing the United States.’’ And we have a special relationship, the people who think, ‘‘Well, we have to appease them.’’

So there are lots of different motivations that come together.

But all this happens in the absence of the United States creating

any consequences, because words by Secretary of State Powell at

a meeting are not consequences. And so that is why I think it is

time to create consequences. And so—that is why I think it is time

to create consequences, either positive, as I think your debt swap

idea is a superb idea of positive, or in terms of reducing opportunities economically.

The CHAIRMAN. I would also suggest, it seems to me that with

a little bit of imagination, we should be able to generate a win-win

relationship with Russia on Iraq. They are owed, I quoted $8 billion to them. I think he responded $9 billion or whatever. And as

you know, there are contracts that have been acquired for by

Gazprom to be able to develop fields which they cannot get into to

develop, and that they are estimating are worth tens of billions of

dollars.

And I do not know why it would be so difficult to walk and chew

gum at the same time here. The fear of taking down Saddam, I

think, on the part of the French and the Russians—and someone

mentioned the French model are different, but they do relate to

economic interests.

59

And it seems to me that there ought to be a way to deal with

that. But that is, as they say in my business, above my pay grade.

We cannot make foreign policy. We can encourage folks, but—— Dr. MENGES. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hecker, I would like to move to you, if I may.

How can we best recreate those positive conditions that you cited

on proliferation cooperation that in your testimony you have indicated have been absent for the last 4 years, or—I think you said

4 years, but in the recent past?

And my question is this that relates to that: Is it because we

have fundamental policy disagreements unrelated to nonproliferation that have caused this to occur—i.e., the withdrawal from the

ABM treaty, expansion of NATO, other broader issues—or is it

something that you think is happening inside the Soviet scientific

establishment and military establishment that suggests that it is,

for strategic reasons within Russia, less advantageous to cooperate?

I mean, can you give us a sense of why you think this has occurred?

Dr. HECKER. It is a combination, and let me try to lay them out

in the order I see them. First, it starts with what you just mentioned. At the strategic level, the difficulties between our governments over the last 3 or 4 years related to the issues of ABM Treaty, the bombing of Yugoslavia, et cetera.

The next level is the one you were just discussing, and that is,

the disagreements over Iran. Any nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran has made them, if anything else, more difficult.

The next level, I would say, is one within Russia. And that is the

re-emergence of the Russian security services. It turns out, right

after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, they were sort of scattered in all directions. And that allowed much of that earlier cooperation, both in the military, as well as in the nuclear complex

between the scientists. It took a few years for the security service

to pull themselves back together. And let me just say: Today, it is

much more difficult to get into those closed cities than it was to

get in 10 years ago for me. So that is the third.

The fourth level, which actually is the one that we can fix the

easiest, is that we have lost the sense of partnership. And that is

recognizing that these are their materials and their facilities. They

have to safeguard them. And all we can do is help.

And so the program execution over the last 3 to 4 years has gone

in the direction of essentially saying, ‘‘We will pay you, but you will

do it the way we will tell you to do it.’’ And that simply does not

work. They are not going to let us into their sensitive closed facilities.

So the issue boils down to—and that is what it has been the last

two, two-and-a-half years, is requiring physical access of Americans

in sensitive Russian facilities versus a system of assurances. ‘‘Is there not some other way,’’ the Russians would say, ‘‘that we

can assure you that your money is spent well and we are actually

making these upgrades?’’ That is really the key today, because at

least at the top level—I think President Putin has fixed that for

the time being. Iran still remains a problem.

But in this latter case, there was essentially a 2-year standstill

or, let us say, a significant slowdown in defense programs related

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to MPC&A. There was a very important agreement signed in September of last year to allow better access. And hopefully, that will

spring some of these things loose.

However, along with that there has to be this change in approach

back to saying, ‘‘This is a partnership. We are going to help you

do the job, and we will all be better off if you protect your materials.’’

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Hecker, you have been on the scene with the MPC&A program an other department efforts and have testified to the merits

of continuing these programs and projects. And I agree with you

generally, that the last 2 years have been difficult.

On the other hand, it is an ambivalent situation, at least I found

from my own experience. By that I mean a good number of persons

in either a chemical or a biological facility, scientists, people who

have been running the show for quite awhile, have really personal

needs to visit with Americans. Much has been made in the Judy

Miller book of Andy Weber, this remarkable person with the Cooperative Threat Reduction program now, and his work in helping

Americans to gain access, particularly in chemical and some biological facilities. And that has been a part of my experience that

may be an off day with regard to the bureaucracy.

But still, we are invited to come because the facilities are in terrible shape. They are run down. The material is in dangerous condition. The scientists are in disarray, strange commercial enterprises juxtaposed to weapons of mass destruction. And these Russians are worried about this. And this sort of gets to your first

point, this question of how to forge the cooperative attitude, sometimes literally on the ground at the time that physically you are

there and you have an opportunity to visit with the right people,

and they say, ‘‘OK. Come along, and I will show you something.’’

I think that is important. I do not know how you foster that specifically, except I salute our people in cooperative threat reduction

or on the ground, Jim Reed and Tom Kuenning, various other people, who are physically there a good part of the time. And I wish

that somehow we were able to pay more attention to them, that

their work sort of permeated higher realms in the Pentagon either

in the last administration or this one. But we try to do that.

What I am curious about and sort of interweaving what you have

said with what Dr. Menges has said—because the Iran problem is

one that everyone in our government has thought about and we

continue to seek a solution. For years all of us have had a mission

to ask, ‘‘Why are you doing this?’’

Now for a while, it was total denial. Then more frankness came

in this cooperative spirit. And they said, ‘‘We need the money. It

is as simple as we need the money. We are bankrupt. You have to

understand that. Our programs are in disarray. The Duma does

not appropriate money for us. Furthermore, in a spirit of democracy, we do not control everything anymore. You have to understand there are entrepreneurs who are out there doing these

things. It is not a totalitarian state. Now could we control the enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:12 Sep 26, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 81833 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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trepreneurs better? Perhaps. But on the other hand, they are useful in their own ways.’’

Clearly, the Russians have been ambivalent about this. This gets

to Dr. Menges’s point. This has helped guide Senator Biden and me

in our work in thinking about the debt swap situation. There finally has to be some reason why the Russians would consider other

alternatives. I think President Bush and President Putin, in their

new relationship, have been starting to have a dialog about: What

is to happen to the Russian economy? How constructively can

something occur there? This is of considerable interest to President

Putin, not an obsession, but very strong priority.

I understand, there is sort of a dialog going along there. But

from time to time, people have suggested that if we are serious

about this, we are going to have to think of reasons why the Russian economy develops in a normal way, as opposed to these dangerous sales to Iran or Iraq or China or so forth.

Now there could be people in the Russian hierarchy, whether

they are in the military or nationalists and so forth, who still, as

you suggested, want to control the relationship with the United

States, want to control our ability to permeate the whole situation.

We saw a little bit of that at the beginning of the September 11

dialog, when some Russians were quoted as saying ‘‘Americans are

simply not going to be permitted to do very much in Uzbekistan or

Tajikistan. This is off limits.’’ And then President Putin says something else, ‘‘This is a war against terrorism. In fact, we are together.’’

Now you suggested, Dr. Menges, that rather than this being an

ad hoc basis of the Biden-Lugar loans and so forth—and which

some have criticized us for giving away debt owed to Germany or

others, which is considerably greater than that owed the United

States in our program—that we may approach this in a straightforward way, that there be a fund, free enterprise fund or what

have you.

In fairness, President Bush back in the earlier administration

and some of his people had some ideas, Jim Baker and others,

about doing a lot of this. It all sort of got frittered away in terms

of enthusiasm as we became disillusioned with the lack of Russian

reform or overt acts by Russians. They were purely hostile.

So the Congress began to strip away one thing after another that

might have addressed the commercial situation and the reform

business, until we finally got down to the Nunn-Lugar program as

the core part of the relationship. Well, that is not enough, although

it is important. There has to be some hope out there for something

more.

In your dialog on this subject what do you believe is the political

possibility of this in this country, quite apart from the views of

other countries. If we began to work with Russia on normalizing

commerce, but they continued to go to Iran for the money, would

we stop the fund, because it is not clear to me, in visiting with

some of our European friends that they are eager to be that abrupt.

As a matter of fact, they have relations with Iran and Iraq. And

in part, it is because of the money. It is debt and commercial relationships.

62

So to internationalize, this gets beyond merely the Russian problem, but likewise our most intimate NATO friends or others and

their willingness to be hard-nosed about this. Absent that, it seems

to me we are back almost to a bilateral dialog with President

Putin, in which we finally offer a good enough deal that he says,

‘‘OK, I understand, and we are going to stop Iran and Iraq because

this deal is superior.’’ Well, we have not come to that point. And in fact, the proposal

has not come to the Congress at all. And if it did, if we are having

a small problem on fungibility of the Nunn-Lugar funds, imagine

the kind of debate if we talk about $10 billion of U.S. taxpayer

funds doing this sort of thing in Russia, and people saying, ‘‘My goodness, you folks really have been snookered. You have $10 billion out there, and the Russians are now building a super missile.

And they have you again.’’ How do we overcome fungibility, the NATO allies? Are these aspects of your program that you have considered, as you have written or visited with your colleagues?

Dr. MENGES. Well, Senator Lugar, I think the answer is, in one

word, ‘‘comprehensiveness.’’ I think there has to be a holistic look

at this. And I was suggesting about $10 billion among all the industrial democracies.

Senator LUGAR. Yes.

Dr. MENGES. So the U.S. share might be $1 billion. It might be

closer to the $900 million for the full funding or so for the testing

programs. But aside from the particular amount of money, the

point is really the important one, that this is an opportunity, a

grant for, let us call it, the consumer enterprise fund, something

like that. So the production has to be consumer production.

And it has to be done in the context of a holistic relationship

with Russia, in which the security and the political aspects, the

proliferation aspects, are all considered together; and there is a

shared agreement that is on a piece of paper that is signed, and

there are consequences spelled out for not carrying through the

agreement. And the consequences are in fact implemented by the

United States and its partners in fact.

I think there is a problem—we have a problem with implementation of consequences. We tend not to do so. And therefore, year

after year governments, well, feel it does not matter what we say,

what we sign. We could just forget about that and go on from

there.

So I think there is a possibility of doing this. And the opportunity for Russia is enormous, because, as we know, the dollars do

not translate one to one. It is $10 billion, when scientists are earning $100 a month and not $10,000 or $8,000 a month, as they are

here. It is sort of a 20 to 1 ratio in terms of purchasing power and

what it means and what it can do for the people of Russia.

And this is President Putin’s highest priority. And he does not

want to accept the World Bank loans and the IMF loans and get

back into the debt cycle. So I think there is an opportunity now,

and in fact I think you two are just among the people who could

lead the way in proposing these kind of ideas because it does link

directly to our fundamental national security interests in stopping

and doing both with the weapons of mass destruction on Russian

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territory and stopping the transfer to these hostile regimes, which

clearly menace us.

By the way, we are—it is through divine providence, I think, so

far that they have not transferred them. They, the regimes, have

not transferred them to some of the terrorist groups. I mean, that

has not happened so far and obviously could happen, which I think

argues for the urgency of helping the good people in those countries

replace the regimes. And I might just say to Senator Biden’s

point—and do it soon.

I might say to Senator Biden’s point about the Russian economic

interest and Iraq, I think it is an important one. And I think it can

be addressed by the Iraqi National Congress. And I know the leadership. And I think they are sensible people. It seems to me they

could simply declare that they will honor previous debts, they will

honor contracts. And if they succeed to government, as of the heads

of moderate constitutional government in Iraq, that they will have

a good relationship with Russia, a trading relationship, a normal

relationship. They will give Russia the opportunities for exploration; France, the same; and other countries, perhaps the same.

I know that they would be happy to do that. And I think if we

had a clear political strategy, as well as the verbal strategy that

seems to be in the air, then one would be moving toward a situation where the Iraqi National Congress and other representatives

of a new, moderate constitutional government for Iraq would make

those overtures and I think then maybe clear the way internationally to their moving toward ending the enormous danger, I think,

represented by that regime.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I share the enthusiasm that Senator Biden

expressed on hearing your ideas. And my questions are merely to

try to refine them. I think this is an area that we really ought to

think about very seriously for the reasons you have suggested, and

even given all the hurdles that I might perceive.

I want to take the chance with Dr. Hecker here to ask a technical question, because your work in the accounting aspect for

these weapons of mass destruction has really been profound.

There remains considerable disagreement on how much remains

and where, which is almost bound to be the case given the stashes

all over, given all the laboratories and storage sites. I remember

earlier on, one of the small Nunn-Lugar grants were for some computers, in which people actually began to register some data, so

that it was not kept in ink and paper in various locations around

the place.

But how goes this situation? What sort of a handle do we have

in terms of mutual confidence as to how much material that deals

with weapons of mass destruction is, in fact, in Russia presently?

Dr. HECKER. In the end, we do not know. And the reason we do

not know is because the Russians still keep that information classified. That is, they keep information about the specifics of the nuclear material classified.

For example, what we call the isotopics of plutonium—how much

of the different isotopes are in their nuclear weapons systems—the

chemistry, the places where they are located, the quantities where

they are located are classified? So ‘‘we do not know’’ is the bottom

line.

64

From a Russian standpoint, one of the programs we tried to start

is actually to help them to get to know how much they have. And

I am not being facetious because in the United States we did not

know either necessarily. You know, these are industrial materials.

You work with them. You chemically process them. You do not just

keep them locked up in a safe. You make them, and then you work

with them.

So we had a program in the United States, and we published a

report in the 1996 timeframe called ‘‘Plutonium, The First 50

Years.’’ We went back and said, ‘‘Look, this is how much we have

produced. This is how much we have put in the atmosphere. This

is how much we have put in the ground. This is where we think

it is. This is how much is not actually accounted for, because it is

lost in processing.’’

And so I worked with the Russians to begin a program like that.

We called it the Plutonium Registry. And they said, of course,

‘‘Well, you cannot do this on our classified materials.’’ And I said,

‘‘OK, we will do it together on the civilian materials, and then you

use the methodology to do it on your own classified materials.’’

I think anything we can do in that direction would be extremely

helpful so the Russians can use these themselves. The problem we

have always gotten into is we tend to push one step too far. And

we want to get into the areas that they consider sensitive and classified. And so then often the progress stops.

But the bottom line is that right now there is a slight benefit to

the fact that the security services have reestablished themselves.

These places are more secure today than they were a few years

ago. Now, you know, that has its detriments. If you are going to

try to convert these facilities, then it makes it that much more difficult.

Many of the easy targets that were there have been taken care

of. Particularly, in my own opinion, the Russian nuclear navy and

the highly enriched uranium was the most vulnerable at one time.

And significant improvements have been made. Actually, some of

the civilian facilities were very vulnerable. And significant improvements have been made.

But what we need to look at is the long term, the whole mentality of how to do nuclear safeguards. And that still remains to be

done. So the answer is, there is lots there. We are in much better

shape. They are in much better shape today than they were 10

years ago. But the job is not done.

Senator Lugar, if I may offer one comment on your dialog on

Iran, and Senator Biden. When I asked the Russians this same

question, my colleagues in the nuclear weapons complex ‘‘Why do

you do this with Iran,’’ they first of all say, ‘‘It is not just a matter

of money.’’ So it is more complicated.

They say there are three principal reasons. The first one is

money. The second one is what they do for that money provides

jobs for the very people that they are worried about, the nuclear

workers And in this case, thousands of jobs, not just a handful that

we tend to establish with our programs. And that keeps down the

turmoil in their nuclear complex.

65

The third thing it offers is prestige. You know, they want to export nuclear reactors all around the world. And they want to demonstrate that they can do this.

The other aspect, of course, from a political standpoint is that

they view, as has already been said, Iran as a strategic trading

partner. You know, to us it is a rogue state.

So as they look, then, at the risks versus the benefits, they come

up with a different answer. The one thing that we do, which has

us stuck right now, is we fail to differentiate between those things

that are done by the Russians in Iran that represent a true proliferation danger versus those that do not represent such a great

danger. And specifically, as I point out in my paper, when it comes

to a nuclear power plant, we have said ourselves that we are willing to put some in North Korea, that we can manage that proliferation risk. However, what the Russians also did because of their entrepreneurial institutes or people, and the Iranians very much

pushed for this, is to develop the capabilities for the rest of the fuel

cycle. And that is a no-no from a proliferation standpoint.

So I think we must differentiate more specifically as to what is

truly a nonproliferation problem and what can be managed. And I

have not seen that distinction made sufficiently to break this roadblock. That is just my own opinion.

Senator LUGAR. That is very, very helpful.

Mr. Chairman, I conclude just by saying that Dr. Hecker has offered an anti-fungibility argument, namely that the Russian security now is improved. They are doing more of it themselves, as a

result. And it is an interesting problem, perhaps less open because

of all of this. But nevertheless, for those who are worried about

United States funds being transferred to the Russians, they apparently are deciding to use it on security, my hope is the same as

yours, that they will find out how much they have. So if something

is missing, they have some idea what they have lost. The real fear

has been they really would not have any idea in some of these situations. And therefore, all of the strange arguments about the nuclear suitcases and other items which might have been stolen is

difficult, because no one really knows; and until they know they

could not share it with us, even if they wished to do so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We survived 50 years in a hostile relationship on

these issues. I am quite confident—I would love to have them to

have that capability, even if I did not know what the results were,

because I am confident we can survive much better with an emerging democracy that has this control. So however the heck they get

the control, I feel better for it, even though it is through the reemergence of a security apparatus.

And I turn to recognize my friend from Florida, who has a keen

interest in this overall subject matter. I knew he was an astronaut.

I knew he was a man of many talents. But I was recently in Florida with a fellow who looked like something right out of a novel,

who was wearing alligator boots and a hat, you know, this cowboy

hat. He would not call it a cowboy—no, no, no, no. This fellow lives

in the middle of the Everglades. I do not know where. He wrestles

alligators and is a very successful businessman as well.

66

He started to talk about my friend, our friend, from Florida, he

said, ‘‘This guy Bill Nelson is a great guy. And he goes through the

Everglades with me. He has been out there. He goes out at night

with me,’’ et cetera.

So from now on, in the tradition of Fritz Hollings, who gives us

all nicknames, I am referring to the Senator from Florida as the

Swamp Fox.

So I yield now to the Senator, who I knew as an astronaut, who

I knew as an accomplished legislator, but I never knew that he

knew the Everglades as intimately as this gentleman, who I know

knows the Everglades intimately. He invited me to come along, and

I said I would rather go to space.

But at any rate, I yield to my friend from Florida.

Senator NELSON. Would you go in the Everglades with me sometime?

The CHAIRMAN. With you, I would, as long as you are the one

jumping out and wrestling the alligator.

Senator NELSON. I have better sense than that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Lugar.

The issue that I wanted to pursue here is the proliferation outside of Russia. And, Senator Lugar, your legislation, with your permission, I want to be a cosponsor.

Senator LUGAR. Great.

Senator NELSON. I think it is very important. And what I wanted

to ask for, because of the hour, just a quick commentary on your

reflection upon what more the United States can do. Let me tell

you about what I discovered on a trip that my chairman had authorized for me to take to Central Asia and the Middle East.

In Uzbekistan, out in the Aral Sea, is the former Soviet anthrax

and other bacteriological production. And the Aral Sea is

evaporating. And the most recent international team that went out

there to see it found all these tire tracks all around it. And this

thing is unguarded. And there is no telling the anthrax spores that

are buried, the carcasses that may be infected with plague that are

buried. That is one thing.

And then we go on to Pakistan, and we specifically talk to President Musharraf. And then we go to India and talk to Prime Minister Vajpayee and talk to them about reducing tensions, as their

two nuclear armies are facing off each other. And so here is another area that we clearly have an interest in, that there is not a

proliferation of those two countries. In that case, nuclear; in the

other case, bacteriological.

Your comments, please.

Dr. HECKER. I agree with you completely, Senator Nelson. And

that is why I laid out in my written statement the fact that today,

say post-9/11, we realize that those type of problems that you have

just brought up are actually more urgent than the serious problems

that are left in Russia and need to be addressed.

You made a good case for Uzbekistan and the biological weapons

program. In my paper, I lay out on the nuclear side the equivalent

challenge in Kazakhstan. You know, thanks to Nunn-Lugar, and as

the chairman had already indicated, we got the weapons back from

Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus into Russia; in my opinion, the

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single greatest accomplishment of the nineties in terms of nonproliferation.

However, we did not get the weapons-useable materials back

from those countries. And the greatest amount is left in

Kazakhstan. And should you visit some of the places in

Kazakhstan, nuclear places, you would find the same situation that

you just indicated, whether it is the former Soviet test site or nuclear reactors. Fortunately, in some of the reactors, as part of the

MPC&A program, some of those upgrades were made. However,

there is also—on the Caspian Sea, there is an old Soviet-style reactor that produced a lot of plutonium.

There are weapons-useable materials left in Kazakhstan. Our job

is not done. Because of the concerns in Central Asia, those should

be addressed in a comprehensive and urgent fashion.

Then you go on to a reactor in Uzbekistan. You have a reactor

in Belgrade. You have reactors in much of the former Soviet Union.

Many of those had highly enriched uranium as the fuel. There are

programs, spotty programs, either through the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Department of Energy, for those reactors,

for reactors in Ghana, in Algeria, in places in the world that today

you say, ‘‘Why do we have reactors there, and why do we have, you

know, potentially weapons useable material?’’ I think we need to look at that and develop a comprehensive

strategy and figure out how we go after that proliferation risk. I

think it is very important, and it is very serious.

Dr. MENGES. Senator, I share your concern. And I think it is a

very important one, the issues you brought up. I think when you

look at India and Pakistan—I will not deal with the Central Asian

countries—it is important to note how it is that it came to the fact

that in 1998 both powers tested nuclear weapons and now are soon

to have them deployed. And, of course, we have just seen this very

significant face-off between them from mid-December 2001 until

the present to some degree. It really has not resolved.

So the example of how serious the proliferation problem is—and

that, of course, brings me to China, because it is the Peoples’ Republic of China that has been the major source of the weapons

technology for Pakistan. It has been part of its strategy to encircle

India and to intimidate India. And that has been public. It is in

the CIA reports, the unclassified CIA reports, that we can read as

citizens. You have their classified information and reports.

I think it really brings us to the fact that as we look at this issue

of the transfer of weapons of mass destruction, we have to look at

both Russia and China and pay serious attention and can give serious thought to, again, giving both powers reasons not to continue

doing this.

Senator NELSON. All right. Mr. Chairman, with your permission,

Admiral Fargo is here, and I need to visit with him.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to end right now, but I also want

to set the record straight. My staffer pointed out to me that when

I said the exploration deal with Iraq was Gazprom, it is really

Lukoil. I was wrong. It is not Gazprom; it is Lukoil that has the

contract. And I thank Dr. Haltzel for that.

Also, one of the reasons why I have been concerned, Dr. Menges,

in light of your last point—and I am not looking for a response

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now. We are going to have some hearings on this as we go along.

And with your permission, we may very well invite you back. I

know that is the bad news. You impressed us both, and we may

ask you back. It is like contributing and finding out you are on the

list.

But one of the reasons why I am a little concerned about the way

the Nuclear Posture Review has been formulated, even though

there is not a lot that is fundamentally new from the last administration, is it seems to give a green light to the possibility of renewed nuclear testing, which I find to be disquieting for the very

reasons, doctor, you just pointed out.

The nations most likely to benefit the greatest from that, from

re-engaging the nuclear testing and would be given an absolute

green light, in my view, internationally if we began it, if we did it,

talk about risk benefit analysis, is China. And I am very concerned

that we do not send the wrong signals here.

But at another time I might ask you both, and at a minimum,

with your permission, be able to pick up the phone or ask to meet

with you privately to talk with you about that. And I am not making a generic criticism of the Nuclear Posture Review. If I look at

it, there is not a whole lot that is fundamentally new in there. It

is an emphasis that I am a little concerned about. But I just raise

that for your thoughts at a later date.

I cannot tell you how much I appreciate both of your efforts. And

I will conclude by saying: Every once in a while we get asked questions by school children or college students or the press, who do not

follow the specifics, that are more looking at profile kinds of approaches to the Congress or to the Senate or the individual Senator. And we often get asked the question, ‘‘What is the single most

valuable asset America has?’’ And that goes right along with the

‘‘Senator, do you have a bodyguard’’ question. I do not, by the way.

None of us do.

And after I point out that our single greatest asset is our ideas

and our values embodied in our Constitution, the single greatest

physical assets we have—and you reinforce it, doctor—is the National Institute of Health and our laboratories. I cannot think of—

if this were a Monopoly game, the last thing in the world I would

trade—I would give up the Senate office buildings, I would give up

the accoutrements of the Capitol, before I would give up those two

institutions.

And they are a product of you, and you are a product of them.

I just wish Americans had a better understanding of just what an

incredible, incredible set of assets those laboratories are and the

men and women who work there.

But I just wanted to state that, as they say, for the record. And

I cannot thank you both enough. And as you know from experience,

we will continue to trespass on your time and call upon your expertise.

We are adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:57 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

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