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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHIN-d

DIVISION II

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint

Petition of: 

ALBERT JAMAAL YOUNGBLOOD, 

Petitioner. 

No. 43389 -3 -II

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

WORSwICK, C. J. — In this personal restraint petition, Albert Youngblood petitions this

court to vacate his two convictions for first degree kidnapping. Youngblood was convicted of

kidnapping and robbery; he now argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his

kidnapping convictions because his conduct was merely incidental to commission of the robbery. 

Because Youngblood' s direct appeal determined the merits of his argument and he fails to show

that relitigating it would serve the interests ofjustice, we dismiss his petition. 

FACTS

Albert Youngblood, Samuel Ferguson, and John Fitzpatrick were convicted of four

counts arising from the robbery of a Shari' s Restaurant in Vancouver, Washington.' At about

5: 00 AM, two men entered the restaurant wearing hats with eyeholes cut in them. At gunpoint

Youngblood, Ferguson, and Fitzpatrick were tried jointly; however, Youngblood and Ferguson

appealed separately. State v. Youngblood, noted at 162 Wn. App. 1008, 2011 WL 2120001, 

review denied, 172 Wn.2d 1020 ( 2011); State v. Ferguson, 164 Wn. App. 370, 374, 264 P. 3d 575

2011), review denied, 173 Wn.2d 1035 ( 2012). The facts here are taken from Youngblood' s

appeal. 
No. 43389 -3 -II

they forced two employees, Javier Rivera and Roberta Damewood, to move from the kitchen and

to lie on the floor in a storage room. 

Elsewhere in the restaurant, one of the men pointed a gun at another employee, Regina

Bridges, and demanded that she open the cash register. Bridges complied, the man took money

from the cash register, and both men left. Bridges then called 911 to report the robbery. Police

officers later chased and apprehended Youngblood, Ferguson, and Fitzpatrick. 

The State jointly charged Youngblood, Ferguson, and Fitzpatrick with four counts: ( 1) 

first degree robbery ofBridges, (2) first degree kidnapping ofDamewood, ( 3) first degree

kidnapping of Rivera, and ( 4) attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. After two jury

trials, the trial court entered convictions on all four counts. Youngblood appealed to this court, 

arguing inter alia that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for kidnapping. 

Youngblood based his sufficiency of the evidence argument on the incidental restraint

doctrine applied by this court in State v. Korum, 120 Wn. App. 686, 86 P. 3d 166 ( 2004), rev' d in

part on other grounds, 157 Wn.2d 614 ( 2006). Although this court recently reaffirmed Korum in

State v. Berg, 177 Wn. App. 119, 131, 310 P. 3d 866 ( 2013)-; cross petitions for review setfor en

Banc conference, No. 895708 (Wash. Mar. 5, 2014), Divisions One and Three have declined to

follow Korum or apply the incidental restraint doctrine. State v. Grant, 172 Wn. App. 496, 498, 

301 P.3d 459 ( 2012), review denied, 177 Wn.2d 1021 ( 2013); State v. Butler, 165 Wn. App. 820, 

830 -31, 269 P. 3d 315 ( 2012). 

Before Divisions One and Three of this court declined to follow Korum, this court

transferred Youngblood' s appeal to Division One to expedite review. Order Transferring Cases, 

State v. Youngblood, No. 39721 -8 -II (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2011), at 1, 6; see RCW 2. 06. 040; 

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No. 43389 -3 -II

CAR 21( a). Division One affirmed Youngblood' s convictions in an unpublished opinion. State

v. Youngblood, noted at 162 Wn. App. 1008, 2011 WL 2120001, at * 1, review denied, 172

Wn.2d, 1020 ( 2011). 

While recognizing that Youngblood argued that " insufficient evidence exists to sustain

the kidnapping convictions" under Korum, Division One disposed of the argument by holding

that " Youngblood' s convictions for first degree kidnapping and first degree robbery do not

merge." Youngblood, 2011 WL 2120001, at * 3, * 4. In a footnote, Division One also rejected

Youngblood' s argument because the kidnappings and robbery had different victims, citing State

v. Hadovic, 99 Wn.2d 413, 424, 662 P. 2d 853 ( 1983). Youngblood, 2011 WL 2120001, at * 4

n.5. 

Youngblood petitioned for review in our Supreme Court, which denied review. 

Youngblood, noted at 172 Wn.2d 1020. This personal restraint petition followed. 

ANALYSIS

Youngblood argues that his right to due process was violated because the evidence was

insufficient to -convict him of two counts of first degree kidnapping. Youngblood cannot renew

his argument in this personal restraint petition and, accordingly, we dismiss his petition. 

A personal restraint petition will be granted only ifthe petitioner is under an unlawful

restraint. RAP 16. 4( a); In re Pers. Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 16, 296 P. 3d 872 ( 2013). 

But a personal restraint petition is not a substitute for a direct appeal. In re Pers. Restraint of

Hagler, 97 Wn.2d 818, 824, 650 P. 2d 1103 ( 1982). There are limits on the use of a personal

restraint petition to collaterally attack a conviction. Hagler, 97 Wn.2d at 824. 

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No. 43389 -3 -II

As a threshold issue, the State argues that Youngblood may not renew his sufficiency of

the evidence argument because it was resolved in his direct appeal. We agree. 

A personal restraint petition cannot renew an issue that was raised and rejected on direct

appeal unless the interests ofjustice require relitigation of the issue. In re Pers. Restraint of

Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 671, 101 P. 3d 1 ( 2004). An issue was raised and rejected on direct

appeal ifthe direct appeal determined the issue' s merits adversely to the petitioner. Davis, 152

Wn.2d at 671 n.14 ( citing In re Pers. Restraint ofTaylor, 105 Wn.2d 683, 687, 717 P.2d 755

1986)). 

A. Youngblood' s Direct Appeal Was Rejected on the Merits

Youngblood concedes that his petition advances " one of the same arguments that he

asserted in his direct appeal," but he claims that Division One' s opinion failed to determine the

merits of this argument. Pet. at 7. Thus, Youngblood appears to assert that he is entitled to

renew the argument in his personal restraint petition. We disagree. 

In support of his claim that Division One failed to determine the merits of his argument, 

Youngblood asserts that Division One based its decision on merger principles and ignored his

sufficiency of the evidence argument. We disagree. 

In its entirety, Division One' s consideration of Youngblood' s argument was as follows: 

Sufficiency ofthe EvidenceMerger

Youngblood first argues that " the first degree kidnapping counts were

incidental to the robbery and no separate conviction may . be imposed and

enforced." Appellant' s Br. at 17. He therefore maintains that because the

kidnappings were done solely to facilitate the robbery and were not independent

crimes, insufficient evidence exists to sustain the kidnapping convictions. 

Youngblood relies on State v. Korum, 120 Wn. App. 686, 86 P. 3d 166

2004). There, the State charged the defendant with several kidnapping charges

stemming from a conspiracy to rob drug dealers in a series of home invasions. 

Korum, 120 Wn. App. at 689. The perpetrators restrained the victims with duct

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No. 43389 -3 -II

tape while searching the homes and stealing drugs, money, and other valuables. 

Korum, 120 Wn. App. at 690 -92. The court determined that this restraint of the

victims did not constitute separate kidnappings. "[ W]e hold as a matter of law

that the kidnappings here were incidental to the robberies.... ". Korum, 120 Wn. 

App. at 707 ( footnote omitted). 

But in State v. Louis, 155 Wn.2d 563, 571, 120 P. 3d 936 ( 2005), the court

held that first degree kidnapping, even when incidental to a first degree robbery, 

does not merge with a robbery conviction. In Louis, while robbing a jewelry

store, the defendant bound the two owners' hands and feet, covered their eyes and

mouths with duct tape, and forced them into a bathroom. The jury convicted him

of one count of first degree kidnapping and one count of first degree robbery for

each victim. 

On appeal, Louis argued that his convictions for kidnapping and robbery

merged because the kidnappings were simultaneous and incidental to the robbery. 

The court determined the crimes do not merge because proof of one is not

necessary to prove the other. It reasoned that proof of kidnapping is not necessary

to prove first degree robbery, and proof of first degree kidnapping requires only

the intent to commit robbery, not the completion ofrobbery. Louis, 155 Wn.2d at

571. Because Louis controls, Youngblood' s. convictions for first degree

kidnapping and first degree robbery do not merge.

5

5 Furthermore, the victims of the kidnappings in this case were different from the

victim of the robbery. Under similar facts, the court rejected this same argument

in State v. Hadovic, 99 Wn.2d 413, 424, 662 P. 2d 853 ( 1983). We likewise reject

it here. 

Youngblood, 2011 WL 2120001, at * 3 -4 & n.5 ( alteration in original). 

Although Division One' s analysis largely relied on merger principles found in Louis, its

footnote rejected Youngblood' s argument on sufficiency of the evidence grounds by citing

Hadovic, 99 Wn.2d at 424. Youngblood, 2011 WL 2120001, at * 4 & n.5. In Vladovic, our

Supreme Court rejected an appeal of kidnapping convictions on both merger and sufficiency of

the evidence grounds. 99 Wn.2d at 418 -22, 424. It is clear from the page cited in the

Youngblood footnote that Division One applied Hadovic' s sufficiency of the evidence holding. 

Youngblood, 2011 WL 2120001, at * 4 n.5 ( citing Hadovic, 99 Wn.2d at 424). Thus Division

One determined the merits of Youngblood' s sufficiency of the evidence argument. 

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B. The Interests ofJustice Do Not Require Relitigation

Because Division One rejected Youngblood' s sufficiency of the evidence argument on

the merits, his personal restraint petition cannot renew the argument unless relitigation of the

issue would serve the interests ofjustice. See Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 671. We hold that the

interests ofjustice do not require relitigation in this case. 

The petitioner bears the burden of showing that relitigation of an issue would serve the

interests ofjustice. Taylor, 105 Wn.2d at 689. Although this test "` cannot be too finely

particularized, "' the interests ofjustice may be served by relitigating a purely legal question

when there has been an intervening change in the law or the petitioner has some justification for

failing to raise a crucial point in the direct appeal. Taylor, 105 Wn.2d at 688 -89 ( quoting

Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16 -17, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 10 L. Ed. 2d 148 ( 1963)). 

Youngblood claims that the interests ofjustice would be served by allowing him to

relitigate his argument in a court applying " clearly established Division [Two] case law," 

namely, this court' s decisions in Korum, 120 Wn. App. 686, and In re Pers. Restraint ofBybee, 

142 Wn. App. 260, 175 P. 3d 589 ( 2007) Pet. at 7 We disagree. 

The Court ofAppeals is one court having three divisions.' RCW 2. 06.010, . 020. This

state' s lower courts must give effect to mandates issued by the Court ofAppeals. Thompson v. 

Lennox, 151 Wn. App. 479, 490, 212 P. 3d 597 ( 2009) ( citing Ethredge v. Diamond Drill

Contracting Co., 200 Wash. 273, 276, 93 P. 2d 324 ( 1939)); see RAP 12. 2. In turn, the Court of

2

The Washington Constitution vests judicial power in "a supreme court" and " a court of

appeals," using the singular noun to refer to one court. WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 30; accord

RCW 2.06. 010 ( establishing " a court of appeals "). In contrast, the Washington Constitution also

vests judicial power in plural "superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as

the legislature may provide." WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 

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No. 43389 -3 -II

Appeals is bound to apply Washington law as interpreted by the Washington Supreme Court. 

State v. Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 487, 681 P. 2d 227 ( 1984). There is no such thing as " Division

Two case law," separate from Court of Appeals case law; instead, Washington law controls in

every division of the Court ofAppeals.3 See Gore, 101 Wn.2d at 487. 

Here, Youngblood exercised his constitutional right as a criminal defendant to appeal his

conviction. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. But Youngblood fails to show that the interests of

justice would be served if his appeal were considered by the division or the threejudge panel

most receptive to his arguments. 

Additionally, the interests ofjustice do not require relitigation because Youngblood' s

sufficiency of the evidence argument would not succeed on its merits. To resolve a procedural

question raised in a postconviction personal restraint petition, it may be necessary. to " peek at the

merits" ofthe petitioner' s argument. See Phillips v. Seiter, 173 F. 3d 609, 610 ( 7th Cir. 1999) 

considering whether, in the interests ofjustice, a habeas petition should be dismissed or merely

transferred to the appropriate court). Because the procedural question presented here turns on

the interests ofjustice, a peek at the merits is appropriate: 

Youngblood' s argument would fail on its merits despite this court' s decision in Korum. 

Youngblood argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of kidnapping because the

kidnappings were merely incidental to the robbery. But Youngblood was convicted of

kidnapping Rivera and Damewood; in contrast, the victim of the robbery was a different person, 

Bridges. Youngblood, 2011 WL 2120001, at * 1 n.2. As a matter of law, a kidnapping is not

3

Anticipating situations in which "there is a direct conflict among prevailing decisions of panels

of the court [of appeals]," our legislature has provided for our Supreme Court to resolve such

conflicts. RCW 2. 06. 030( e). 

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No. 43389 -3 -II

merely incidental to a robbery when the kidnapping and the robbery have different victims. See

Hadovic, 99 Wn.2d at 424; Korum, 120 Wn. App. at' 704 n. 14. Accordingly, Youngblood' s

argument would fail on the merits. 

Youngblood fails to carry his burden to show that the interests ofjustice would be served

by relitigation of his sufficiency of the evidence argument. See Taylor, 105 Wn.2d at 689. 

Therefore he cannot renew the argument now. See Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 671. Because there are

no other grounds on which to conclude that Youngblood is unlawfully restrained, we dismiss his

personal restraint petition. See Yates, 177 Wn.2d at 16. 

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2. 06.040, it is so ordered. 

Worswick, C.J.