### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Ma y 4, 200 4 S es sio n

MA RGO FR ESHWA TERv. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -27089 W. Otis Higgs, Jr., Judge

No. W2003-01343-C CA-R 3-CO - F iled Septem ber 1, 2004

The pe titioner, Marg o Fr eshwater, was convicted of first deg ree murder in 1969. He r convic tion was

a f f i r m e d o n d i r e c t ap p e a l

. S e e F r e s h w a t e r v

. S t a t e , 4 5 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 4 6 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 6 9 )

. In 2003, she filed a p et i t i o n for writ of err or cor am nobis, alleg ing that new evide nce e x isted that proved he r innoce nce, a s well as complaining of violations of Br ady v. Mary land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), a nd juror misconduct that oc curr ed at tria l which nec essitated a hea ring and ultimately

a new trial. Prior to a hearing
, the t rial court g rante d a mot ion to dismiss the petition because the pe tition was, inter a lia, filed outside the statute o f l imitations . The pe titioner seeks a reve rsal of the trial court’s de cision on appea l. Be cause due process requires the tolling of the s tatute of limit ations for fi lin g the pe tit ion fo r w ri t of e rr or c or a m no bis wi th r e sp e c t to the pe tit ion e r’ s c la im o f p re vio us ly withheld exculpatory

evidenc e, we reve rse the judg ment of t he trial court and rema nd the m atter f or an evide ntiary

hearing on the peti t i on. As to the rema ining a lleg ations of juror misconduc t, we conclude those alleg ations could have and should have been addre ssed in a post-conviction petition and ar e now time-ba

rre d. Thus, we aff

irm the portion of the trial court’s order dismiss ing the part of the pe tition for writ of er ror c oram nobis pertaining to those c laims.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court is Aff irm ed in Par t, Re ve r se d in P ar t a nd R e m ande d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON , and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.

R o b er tW

. R i t ch i e a n d S t ep h en R o s s J o h n s o n , Kn o x v i l l e, T en n es s ee fo r t h e a p p el l an t , M ar go Fr eshwater.

Paul G. S ummers, Att orney Gene ral & R eporte r; J

. Ross Dy er, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; Will iam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and John Campbell, Assist ant District Attorney Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.W hi l e i ncarcerat ed in M ississip p i, t he p et i t i o ner was i n a cel l next t o M r. B o x, an accused ro b b er, and M r. 1

N ash. T he p et i t i o ner was i nt i m at e wi t h M r. B o x on several o ccasi o ns and the t wo ha d num erous c o nvers at i o ns ab o ut
t he m urd er o f

t he l i q uo r st o re c ash i er d uring t he se enc o un t ers. M r. N ash w as pre sen t o n a t l ea st o ne o f t he se o cc asio ns. M r. B o x b e c a m e a ke y w itne ss fo r th e p ro se c u tio n a t t ria l.

-2- OP IN ION

Fa ctual B ackg round

The pe titioner and Glenn William Nash, a Me mphis attorney , wer e indicted in Mar ch of 1968 for f irst deg ree murder and felony murder in the death of Hillman C. Robbi ns, Sr., a ca shier of the Square D L iquor S t o re in Memphis. Mr. Nash took money from the r eg ister prior to taking the victim to the back room of the store whe re his hands wer e tied behind his ba ck. The victim was shot multipl e times in the hea d wi t h b o th a .22 ca liber pistol and a .38 ca liber pistol. After tra veling throug hout the Southeast, the petitioner and Mr . Nash we re e ventually arr ested in Mississippi

.
Mr. Nash w as later found incompetent to stand trial. He has neve r bee n tried and the char g es ag ainst him were ultimately dismiss ed on the ba sis of a spee dy trial violation. The petitioner, on the other ha nd, was tried in Shelby Countyin ear ly

1969. After

a trial on the m erits, t he petitioner w as found g uiltyof first deg ree murder.

At trial, the petitioner maintained that her pa rticipation in the robbery

and subseque nt flight with Mr. Nash we re the result of dure ss and coe rcion. The prosec ution offer ed evide nce that the victim had been shot with a .22 caliber pistol. Ther e wa s testimonyintroduced, throug h J ohnny B ox, that th e pe tit ion e r p os se sse d a .2 2 c a lib e r w e apo n. As a re su lt o f this te sti mon y , th e Sta te 1
arg ued that the pe titioner was responsible for shooting the victim with the .22 caliber wea pon. The petitioner’s testimony , on the other ha nd, indicated that she knew nothing of Mr. N ash’s plan to rob the liq uo r s tor e or sh oo t the c a sh ie r an d tha t she c oo pe rate d with Mr . Na sh on ly be c a us e sh e wa s in fe ar f or he r l if e . Sh e ma int a ine d tha t Mr. Na sh ins truc te d he r to exit the liq uo r sto re prior to the tim e that the victi m was killed and that she did not fire a g un. She denied that she was in any way an
acc omplice. Afte r being found g uilty of first deg ree murder, the petitioner was sentenc ed by the jury to a ninety -nine y ear

sentenc e and se nt to the Tennesse e Prison for Women in Nashville.

On di rec t appea l, this Court aff irmed t he conviction. See Freshwater v. State, 453 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969) . I n that appeal
, t h e p et i tioner cha lleng ed the suff iciency of the evidenc e, stateme nts made by Mr. Box a s inadmissible he arsay , jury instructions, he r sentenc e, the introduction of a photog raph of the dec ease d, and the te s t i m o n y o f t h e victim ’s son. See id. The petitioner also alle ged that newly discovere d evidenc e existed which would have chang ed theT h e ne w ly d isc o v e re d e v id e n c e in the d ire c t ap p e a l re la te d to th e d isc o v e ry o f ev id e n c e tha t M r. B o x w a s p a id 2

for h i s t es t i mon y by t h e St at e a n d di d not r el at e at a l l t o t h e cl ai m of n ew l y di s cov er ed ev i den ce a s a l l eg ed i n t h e pet i t i on fo r w rit o f er ro r c o ra m no b is.

-3- outcome of he r trial. This Court determined that none of the pe titioner’s alleg ations had merit. The 2 opinion, written by J udg e R ussell, determined that the j ury was “well justified” i n determining that

the def endant c ased the liquor store in question with N ash earlier in the day , drove him to that st ore that night t o t h e ex cl usion of other liquor stores pa ssed in route, waited upon a

customer while N as h wa s i n t he bac k with the victim, had in her possession a .22 ca libre pistol and b u l l et s , an d the victim was shot with both a .38 calibre pistol and a .22 calibre pistol. S he drove the g etaway car , lived with Nash as man and wife as they

trave led all over

the southeast spending the fruits of the robber y , an d never

at any time did any thing c onsistent with non-involvement or

c oe rc e d in vo lve me nt rig ht u p to the tim e that bo th we re arr e ste d a s the y le ft a bu s in Missi ss ippi. She didte sti fy , w ith ou t c or ro bo ratio n, that sh e tr ie d to le a ve Na sh in Chatta no og a . Wh e n f

ina lly arr e ste d, sh e de nie d he r true ide nti ty , an d d id a bs olu te ly nothing c onsistent with being a true victim of coe rcion.

I d. at 448-49.

On Octobe r 4, 1970, less than a y ear afte r th e p et i t i o ner’ s conviction was a ffirme d, she

esca ped fr om th e T en n essee Prison for Women. The petitioner r emained at larg e until May 19, 2002, when she was a

pprehe nded and a

rre sted in Columbus, Ohio. During the 32 y ear s following her e scape , the petitioner be came a mother and g randmother and wa s marrie d twice. A ft er leg al p ro ce ed i n gs i n Oh i o , t h e p et i t i o n er wa s ex tra d i t ed t o T en n es s ee

. S h e l at er p l ed gu i l t y t o t h e c h ar ge of esc ape.

On F e b ru ar y 6
, 2 0 0 3
, th e p e ti ti o n e r f il e d a p e ti ti o n f

o r w r it o f e rr o r c o r a m n obis. I n that petition, she claimed that prior to the 1969 trial, her attorney reque sted any

written st atements that she made to any

witnesses that we re r educe d to writing, inc luding the w ritten statement o f “a ny informer once held in the DeSoto County [Mi ssissippi ] Jail.” Unknown to the petitioner’s c ounsel at the time of trial, tria l counsel for the prosec ution refe rre d the re quest to the Executive Assistant Attorney Gene ral who instruc ted trial counse l for the pr osecut i o n t o refuse to provide the e ntire
stateme n t o f

M r

. B o x to th e d e f

e n s e b e c a u s e M r

. B o x “ w a s n o t a la w

- e n f o r c e me n t o f

f ic e r o f the State of Tenne ssee, a nd the statement was not made in Tenne ssee.” Appar ently , Mr. B ox made

sever al statements to authorities in w hich he rec ounted his conver sations with the petitioner and Mr. Nash while inc arc erated in the DeSoto County , Mississ ippi jail. Portions of these statements wer e g iven to the petit ioner during discovery
, including the last pag e of Mr. B ox ’s statement, whic h was produce d to and utiliz ed by the def ense c ounsel i n cross-e x amining Mr . Box at trial. Howeve r, a portion of Mr. B ox ’s handwritten statement that containe d statements made by Mr. Nash to Mr. B ox
was ne ver turne d over to defe nse counsel. That st atement was discovere d in 2002 by curr ent counse l fo r the pe tit ion e r a nd on e of the orig ina l pr os e c uto rs du ri ng a re vie w of the Di stric t A tto rn e y ’s c a se-4-

file. The undisc losed portion contained a confession made by Mr. Nash to Mr. Box that he wa s the only shooter of the victim. The coram nobis petiti on alleg es that the suppre ssion of this evidence

wa s a vio la tio n o f B ra dy

v. Ma ryla nd , 3 73 U. S. 8 3 ( 19 63 ), be c a us e the e vid e nc e wa s o bv iou sly

e x c u l p a t o r y i n n a t u r e a n d s h o u l d h a v e t h u s b e e n t u r n e d o v e r t o t h e d e f e n s e i n r e s p o n s e t o d i s c o v e r y.

The pe tition for writ of er ror c oram nobis also alleg es that a juror fr o m t h e 1969 trial
contac ted cur

rent c ounsel for the petitioner. That juror apparen t l yclaimed that the jury watche d television newsca sts in the evening s during the cour se of the t rial, and that it was sug g ested, during these ne wsca sts, that, among other things, the petitioner fired a .22 caliber pistol during the r obbery

a n d t h a ts h e h a d p r e v i o u s l y b e e n c h ar g e d w i t h t h e m u r d e r o f a t a x i d r i v e r

i n D e S o t o C o u n t y, Mississ ippi. Further , the petition alleg ed that a bailiff broug ht daily newspa pers into the jury

are a and that the juror s rea d these ne wspape rs during the cour se of the trial.

I n response to the alleg ations in the petition for writ of e rror cora m nobis, the St ate f

iled a
mot ion to d ism iss ba se d o n t he on e -y e ar s ta tut e of lim itatio ns fo r c or a m no bis re lie f c on ta ine d in Te nn e sse e C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 2 7

- 7

- 1 0 3

. T h e tr i a l c o u rt h e l d a h e ar i n g o n t h e m o t i o n to dismiss , at which the trial court he ard a rg ument from counse l for both the petitioner and the State. The trial c ourt g rante d the m otion to dismiss
, determining that the petitioner failed to file her pe tition within the one-y ear

statute of limitations and failed to demonstrate that due proc ess re quired the tolling of the statute of

limit ations. This appea l followed.

An a ly sis

O n ap p e a l
, t h e p e t i t i o n e r

c h a l l e n g e s t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s d i s m i s s a l o f t h e p e t i t i o n

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, she ar g ues t hat: (1) the trial court improper ly dismiss ed the pe tition wit hout a hea ring ; (2) the tria l
court e rrone ously

fou n d t h at t h e petitioner w as at fa ult in failing to pre sent at the prope r time the issue of Mr. B ox ’s statement c ontaining N ash’s stateme nt that he was the only shooter; (3) the trial court incor

rec tly deter mined that Mr. Nash’ s confe ssion as t he sol e shooter w as not new e vidence of inn oc e nc e ; a nd(4 ) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr on e ou sly

dis mis se d th e c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio ns a sse rt e d in the petition. The S tate counters t hat “the law does not support the petitioner’s c laims” and c oram nobis relief is not appr opriate f or the c onstitut ional violations alleg ed by the petitioner.

Relief by petition for writ of e rror

coram nobis is provided for in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated

se c tio n 4 0- 26 -1 05 . T hat st a tut e pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art :

[t ]he relief obta inable by

this proc eeding shall be confine d to error s dehors the r ecor d and to matters that we re not or c ould not have been litigated on the trial of the case , on a motion for a ne w trial, on appe al in the nature of a w rit of er ror, on writ of err or, or in a ha

beas c orpus proc eeding . Upon a showing by the def endant that the defe ndant was w ithout fault in failing to prese nt certain evidenc e at the pr oper time,

a writ of err or cor am nobis will li e for subsequently or new ly discovere d evidenc e relating to matter s which we re lit igated at the t rial i f t he judge determines that such-5-

e vid e nc e ma y

ha ve re su lte d in a

dif fe re nt j ud g me nt, ha d it be e n pre se nte d at the tr ia l. The issue shall be tried by the co u rt wi t h o ut the intervention of a jury , and if the decision be in fa vor of the pe titioner, the judgme nt complained of shall be set aside and the de fenda nt shall be g rante d a new trial in that cause

.

Th e writ of e rr or c or a m nobi s is a n “e xtra or din ary pr oc e du ra l re me dy ,” fi lli ng on ly a “ sli g ht g ap in to wh ic h f ew c a se s f

a ll. ” Sta te v. Mixon , 9 83 S.W. 2d66 1, 67 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . T he “ pu rp os e of thi s
reme dy ‘is to bring to the atten tion of the court some f act unknown to the c ourt which if known

wo uldha ve re su lte d in a

dif fe re nt j ud g me nt. ’” State v. Hart, 91 1 S. W.2 d 3 71 , 3 74 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1995) (quoting State ex rel. Carlson v. State, 407 S.W .2d 165, 167 (Tenn. 1996) ). The de cision to gr ant or de ny

a petition f

or writ of er

ror c oram nobis re sts within t he sound discre tion of the trial court. Tea g ue v. State, 772 S.W .2d 915, 921 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) , overr uled on other g rounds by Mix on, 983 S.W .2d at 671 n.3.

A petition for writ of err or cor am n o b is must relate: (1) the g rounds and the nature of the newly discovere d evidenc e; (2) w hy the admissibili ty of the newly discovere d evidenc e may have resulted in a dif

fer ent judg ment had the e vidence been a dmitted at the previous tr i al; (3) the pe tit ion e r w a s w ith ou t f

a ult in f ail in g t o p re se nt t

he ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e a t th e app ro pria te time; and (4) the r elief soug ht by the petitioner. Ha

rt, 911 S.W .2d at 374-75.

A petition for writ of err or cor am nobis must u s u al l y b e fi led within one y ear afte r the judgme nt become s final. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103; S tate v. Mix on, 983 S.W .2d 661, 670 (T e nn . 1 99 9) . I t has be e n d e te rm ine d th a t a jud g me nt b e c ome s f

ina l, f or pu rp os e s o f c or a m no bis relief , thirty day s afte r t he entry of t he judgment i n the t rial court if no post-trial motion is filed, or upon entry

of an order disposing of a timely filed post-trial motion. Mix on, 983 S.W .2d at 670. The parties do not dispute that the pe tition for writ of er ror c oram nobis in the ca se her ei n was filed outside of the applica

ble statute of limitations.

Th e g ro un ds fo r s e e kin g a pe tit ion f

or w ri t of e rr or c or a m no bis are no t li mit e d to specific cate g ories, as a

re the g rounds for r eopening a post-convic tion peti t i o n. Cor a m no bis c la ims ma y

be ba se d u po n a ny

“ ne wl y dis c ov e re d ev ide nc e re la tin g to matters litigated at the trial” so long a s the petitioner also e stablishes that the petitioner wa s “w i t h o u t fault” in failing to pre sent the evide nce at the proper time. Cor a m no bis c la ims the re fo re are s ing ula rl y fa c t- int e ns ive . U nli ke mot ion s to reope n, cora m nobis claims are n o t ea s i l y resolved on the fac e of the petition and often re quire a

hearing. T he cor am nobis statute also does not contain provisions for summary dispositi on or expedited appe als.

. . . Although c oram nobis claims also ar e g overne d by

a one- y ear

statute of limitations, t he State bea rs t he burde n of ra ising the bar of the statute of limitations as an af fi rm at i v e defense. See Sands v. State, 903 S.W .2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995)

.

Har ris v. State, 102 S.W .3d 587, 592-93 (Te nn. 2003).-6-

I n the ca se her ein, the trial c ourt summarily dismiss ed the pe tition on t he basis that it was filed outside the st atute of limitations. Despite not having a hea ring in which evidenc e wa s pr e se nte d, the tr ia l c ou rt

a lso de te rm ine d th a t th e pe tit iondidno t satis fy the re qu ir e me nts of

Ha rt

. 91 1 S. W.2 d at 37 4- 75 . Sp e c if ic a lly , th e tr ia l c ou rt

op ine d th a t

there is no question that the pe titioner’s motion, filed approxim ately thirty -two y ear s afte r the judg ment was fina l in the trial court, wa s clea rly o u t s i d e the statute of limit ations. Howeve r, t he def endant c ontends that due proc ess re quires that the statute of limitations for filing her Petition for Writ of Err or Coram Nobis be tolled. This court finds no due pr ocess c oncerns which would entitle petitioner to re lief.

. . . . Mo re ov e r, thi s c ou rt fi nd s th a t c or a m no bis is n ot the app ro pria te a ve nu e to addre ss the alleg ed constitutional violations relating to juror misconduct. . . . .

Ha vin g fo un d th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a s f a ile d to fi le wi thi n th e app lic able statut e of lim itatio ns a nd ha vin g fu rthe r f ou ndthat th e de fe nd a nt h a s f a ile d to de mon str a te that he r i nte re st in pr e se nti ng he r c la ims is ou tw e ig he d by the g ov e rn me nt’ s in te re st in preve nting litigation of stale c l ai m s , i t i s not nece ssary for this court to further examine the merits of the pe titioner’s alleg ations. Howeve r, this co u rt n o t es t hat [the ] pe tit ion se e ms to be fu nd a me nta lly fl a we d un de r the stand ard s se t f orth b y Ha rt

. I nitially , it is unclear whe ther or not the statement o f Na s h alleg edly made to B ox
wer e unknown to the de fense during the orig inal trial. . . .

Ha rt a lso re qu ir e s the pe tit ion e r to de mon str a te that sh e wa s wi tho ut fa ult in failing to present the c laims. This court finds it unlikely that it wa s the intention of

ou r S up re me Cou rt

to r e wa rd de fe nd a nts , who du e to the ir ow n c ri min a l a c tio ns , f

a il to present timelyclaims, by providing them with relief unde r a w rit of er ror c oram nobis . . . .

Finally , under H art, the defe ndant m ust demonstrate that a diffe rent judg ment “may have r esulted” if the new e vidence wer e pre sented to the jury . As noted, g iven the fa ct that the alleg ed testimony
, even if acc epted by the jury
, would not c hang e the culpability

of the de fenda nt, it is unlikely that the def

endant could demonstrate a “re asonable probability ” that a differ ent judgme nt w ould ha ve resulted ba sed upon the new e vidence

.
As we be g in our ana ly sis, we must init ially determine if the claims advanc ed by the petitioner

are appropriately

addre ssed by

cora m nobis relief

. The State arg ues that the petitioner’s a lleg ations of violations of Br ady v. Mary land and juror misconduct are not appropriately addre ssed in a cor am
n o b is p r o c e e d in g

. Sp e c if

ic a ll y , c it in g K in n a ir d v

. St a te , N o

. M 2 0 0 0

- 0 0 0 3 7

- CC A

- R3

- PC
, 2 0 0 1 WL 881371 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Aug

. 7, 2001), t he S tate arg ues t hat “a petition for writ of

err or cor am nobis is not the appropriate reme dy by which t o s ee k relief

from constitutional err ors such as that a sserted unde r B rady v. Mary land.”-7-

I n Kinnaird, a

post-conviction proceeding , this Court evaluated a claim in which the defe ndant alleg ed that the State violated his c onstitut ional rig hts under B rady by withholding various pie c e s o f e xcu lpatory

e vid e nc e . 2 00 1 WL

8813 71 , at *1 . T he de fe nd a nt h a d r a ise d is su e s w ith

re sp e c t to the wi thh e ld e vid e nc e in a mot ion fo r new tr ia l a nd , s ub se qu e ntl y , in a pe tit ion fo r w ri t of e rr o r co ra m nobis. The trial court denied the motion for ne w trial and this Court, in State v. Her shell Kinnaird, No. 01C01-9404- CC-00149, 1995 W L 382612, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, June 28, 1995), found that the is sue of the B rady violations had been pr eviously raised in the motion for new trial and that relief under the coram nobis statute was there fore not available. The de fenda nt raised these issues for th e t hird time in his petiti on for post-c onviction relief. O n appea l from the denia l of post-conviction re lief, this Court commented

[d] espite his prior unsucce ssful attempt to obtain relief on this issue, the De fendant

a g a in c o mp lain e d ab o u t th e St a te ’ s f a il u r e to d is c lo s e

. . . [t h e e xc u lp a to r y e v id e n c e ]. Th e c or a m no bi s court

pr op e rl y fo un d th a t th is i ssu e ha d b e e n p re vio us ly raise d in the motion for new trial and that relief under the coram nobis statute was ther efor e
no t a va ila ble

. . . . On app e a l f

ro m th e c or a m nobi s cou rt ’s ruling , th is C ou rt a lso reje cted the D efe ndant’s B rady claim on this issue, holding that “[c]oram nobis is not a for um for the de termination of a c onstitut ional issue.”

Kinnaird, 2001 WL

881371, at *5.

We ag ree that this Court determined in Kinnaird’s case that “cor am nobis is not a forum for the determination of a constit utional issue.” Howe ver, a ccor ding to the statute, coram nobis relief is appropriate for “ matters that wer e not or could not have been litig ated on the trial of the c ase, on a motion for a ne w trial, on appe al in the nature of a w rit of er ror, on a writ of error, or

in a habe as corpus pr ocee ding.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 26-105; Kinnaird, 2001 WL 881371, at *5. I n Kinnaird, the def endant ha d raised the issue of the withheld e vidence in bo t h a m o t i o n fo r new tria l and a corum nobis proc eeding and the tria l court had ma de “spe cific f indings with re spect to the . . . [ex culpatory

evidenc e] and ruled that the State’ s withholding of the statement did not justifya new trial under Br a d y

. ” 2 0 0 1 WL 8 8 1 3 7 1
, a t * 5

. M o r e o v e r , w e a ls o n o te th a t Kin n a ir d w a s d e c id ed

sever al months a fter the supreme court’s decision in Workman, y et the Kinnaird opinion does not

re fe re nc e or

c ite Wor

kman e ve n th ou g h Wo rkma n d e a lt w ith a sim ila r i ssu e - a

c or a m no bis pr oc e e d i n g p r e d i c a t e d o n e v i d e n c e t h a t w a s u n a v a i l ab l e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s tr i a l du e to

a lle g e d s up pr e ssi on by the Sta te . Se e Ki nn a ir d, 20 01 WL 88 13 71 , at *1 -* 4. We f

e e l th is s e ri ou sly calls into question the Kinnaird’s p anel r eliance on the ea rlier Kinna ird dec ision that determined Br ady violations are not appr opriate for coram nobis relief . See Kinnair d, 2001 WL 881371, at *6 (re ly ing on Kinnaird, 1995 WL 382612, at *4, to conclude that alleg ations of B rady violations are not appropriate in a cor am nobis proce eding ).

I n th e c a s e h e r e in
, th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s a ll e g a ti o n s o f th e n e w ly d is c o v e r e d e v id e n c e in th e c o n te xt of vio la tio ns of

B ra dy v. Ma ryla nd
, we re no t, a nd c ou ld no t ha ve be e n, lit ig a te d p re vio us ly . D e sp ite the petitioner’s discove ry reque st for state m ents of Mr. B ox prior to trial, the e x istence of the-8-

evidenc e wa s not discovere d until S eptember of 2002 whe n curr en t counsel for the petitioner a nd

on e of the orig ina l pr os e c ut ors re vie we d th e Di stric t A tto rn e y ’s c a se fi le fr om the orig ina l tria l. Further, at least one r eporte d case from this Court, St ate v. Workman, 111 S.W.3d 10, 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002), discusses cor am nobis relief in the context of suppressed exculpatory evidenc e that also might a mount to new evidenc e of innoc ence

. The alleg ations of j uror mis conduct, on the other hand, c ould have be en discove red by the petitioner and raised in a post -convic tion petition. Theref ore, w e dete rmine that the a lleg ations of juror misconduct do not amount to new e vidence of innoce nce w hich would have res ulted in a dif fe re nt j ud g me nt h a d it

be e n p re se nte d at tria l. S e e Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 26 -1 05 ; se e a lso State

v. Doy le Hart, N o. 02C01-9612-CC-00451, 1997 WL 56313, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, Sept. 10, 19 9 7 ); Kenne th C. S tomm v. S tate, No. 03C01-9110- CR-00342, 1992 W L 97081, at *1 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. a t K no xvill e , M a y 12 , 1 99 2) (s ta tin g that “ [t]he [co ram no bis] pro ceedi ng is confine d to error s outside the rec ord and to matters which wer e not and could not have be en litigated at trial, the motion for ne w trial, appe al, or upon post-c onviction petition.”); State v. J ames D. “Sonny ” Ya

rbroug h, No. 01C01-9001-CC-00012, 1990 WL 109 1 0 7
, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Aug . 3, 1990) (noting that the reme dy of err or coram nobis is also not available on matter s that we re o r could have been litig ated in a post-c onviction proce eding ). Thus, re g ardle ss of our decision as to the rema inder of the allegations, the petit ioner’s claim of j uror mis conduct is wa ived by failing to assert it in a timely petition f or post-conviction re lief. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 102.

Be cause we ha ve determined t hat t he petiti oner’ s alleg ations of newly discovere d evidenc e
are app ro pria te ly

a dd re sse d in a

pe tit ion fo r writ of e rr or c or a m nobi s, the ne xt ste p inou r ana ly sis is to determine whe ther the statute of limit ations should be tolled in the case here in. I n Workman

v. State, 41 S.W .3d 100 (Tenn. 2001), a case relied heavily upon by the pet i t i o n er , t h e Tennessee Sup re me Cou rt

re vie we d a c a se in wh ic h the pe tit ion e r wa s den ie d a he ari ng on his pe tit ionfo r w ri t of e rr or c or a m no bis be c a us e the s ta tut e of lim itatio ns fo r f

ili ng ha d p a sse d. Simi lar t o th e c a se here in, Workman soug ht cora m nobis relief based on claims that new e vidence , unavailable during his trial, would show that he wa s actua lly innocent of c apital murder

.

I n Workman, the supreme court found that, in a varie ty of contexts, due proce ss may require tolling of a n applicable statute of limitations. I d. at 103. The W orkman court relied, in part, on the due proc ess consider ations discussed i n Bur ford v. State, 845 S.W .2d 204 (Tenn. 1992) . Workman, 41 S.W .3d at 102. Specifica lly
, the Bur ford court rec og nized that “ befor e a state may terminate a

c la im f or failu re to co mpl y wi th pr oc e du ra l r e qu ir e me nts su c h a s st a tut e s o f l imi ta tio ns , d ue pr oc e ss
re qu ir e s th a t po te nti a l li tig a nts be pr ov ide d a n o pp ortun ity fo r the presenta tio n o f c la ims a t a meaning ful time and in a meaningf ul manner” and that, “unde r t h e cir cumstance s of a pa

rticular c ase, application of the statute may not affor d a re asonable opportunity to have the c laimed issue heard and dec ided.” I d. (quoting Bur ford, 845 S.W.2d at 208).

I n determining what sort of opportunity is “rea sonable,” t h e court c oncluded that “[i] dentification of the prec ise dictates of due proc ess re quir es co n s i d eration of both the-9-

g overnme ntal interests involved and t he private intere sts affe cted by the offic ial action. . . .” Wor kman, 41 S.W. 3d a t 10 2. I n B ur fo rd
, the priva te int e re st a t sta

ke wa s the a c c us e d’ s o pp ortun ity to attack his convic tion and incar cer ation on the g rounds that h e wa s d ep rived of a constitutional rig ht via a post-convic tion petition; the g overnme ntal interest re prese nte d b y th es ta tu te o f li mi tations was the pr evention of stale and g roundless cla ims. I d. T h e co u rt in Burf ord dete rmined, af

ter weig hing the competing interests in that case , that the ac cused’ s interest in mounting a constitutional attack upon his c onviction and incar cer ation outweig hed the State’ s interest in preve nting the lit ig a tio n o f s ta le a ndg ro un dle ss c la ims

. Using that same a

n a ly s is
, th ecourt in Workman weig hed the g overnme ntal interests involved

a g a ins t th e private int e re st s affectedby the of fi c ia l a c tio n a ndde c ide d th a t, i f the pr oc e du ra l ti me bar w as applied, Workman could have been put to death without r ece iving an opportunity to have the merits of his claim eva luated by a co u rt o f t h i s state. I d. at 103. I n other wor ds, the court determined that due proc ess pre cludes a pplication of the statute of limitations t o bar c onsideration

o f ap e t i t i o n f

o r w ri to f e rr o r c o ra mn o b i s i n ca s es wh er e t h e d ef en d an t ’s i n t er es ti n o b t ai n i n g a hearing to pr esent ne wly

discovere d evidenc e, which may establish actua l innoc ence , far outweig hs any g overnme ntal interest in pre venting the liti gat ion of stale cla ims. I d. The supre me court conclude d that Workman was entitl ed to a hearing to evaluate the claims conta ined in his petition for writ of err or cor am nobis, notwithstanding the fac t that he filed his petition thirteen months afte r discoverin g t h e new ly

discovere d evidenc e. I d. I n considering the delay , the court remar ked that the tim e wi thi n w hic h Wo rkma n’ s p e tit ion wa s f ile d d id n ot e xce e d the reas on able op po rtun ity aff orded by d u e p roce ss, espec ially

in case s such as Workman’s whe re the evidenc e in issue may show ac tual innocenc e of a capital of

fense . I d. at 103-104.

Contrary to Workman, the petitioner’s case does not involve a capital offe nse. Yet a sente nce of nin e ty -n ine y e ars ’ i nc arc e ratio n is i n o ur op ini on a

su ff ic ie ntl y sig nif ic a nt p e ri odof

tim e to

war rant similar treatment for purpose s of due pr ocess analy sis. Moreove r, t his Court has applied the doctrine se t forth in Workman to non-capital c ases. See State v. Ratliff, 71 S.W .3d 291, 296-97 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)

. Returning to the due process issue, we observe that the petitioner, similarly to the defe ndant in Wo rkma n, ha s r a ise d s e ri ou s q ue sti on s r e g ard ing wh e th e r s h e , in f a c t, mur de re d H ill ma n Ro bb ins
, Sr. The petition alleg es that counse l for the de fendant was not provided with, and did not know of
, the portion of the statement made by Mr. B ox which conta ined Mr. Na sh’s admission that he was the sole shooter. H ad that confession been available to her counsel at the t ime of trial, the pe titioner arg ues, the c onfession would have corr oborate d her testimony that she knew nothing of Mr. Na sh’s plan to rob and murde r Mr. Robbi ns. The stateme nts were obviouslyexculpatory in nature a s they

corr oborate d the testimony of the pe titioner.

The State a

rg ues that the pe titioner did not “avail herse lf” of the sy stem and is thus preclude d from now g aining the bene fit o f t h e l ate discovery of the e vidence . The State c laims that “the pe tit ion e r c a nn ot s ho w that it wa s n ot h e r f

a ult in f a ili ng to b ri ng the c la im a ny tim e ov e r the pa st 33 y ear s . . . the only

explanation that the claims we re n o t b ro u gh t until Februa ry 2003 is that the-10-

petitioner wa s at fault” be cause she was a fug itive, the petitioner had not discover ed the suppre ssion of the stateme nts of Mr. B ox by the conc lusion of her trial and direct appea l, and did not discover th e e v id e n c e u n ti l th e ti me f o r f il in g a p e ti ti o n f o r w r it o f e rr o r c o r a m n o b is h a d a lr e a d y

e xp ir e d

. We disag ree . The de lay

in obtaining the e vidence is not attributable to the fault of the pe titioner or her attorney s. Despite the fac t that the petitioner esca ped from prison and rema ined at l ar ge f o r over thirty y ear s, the petitioner’s tria l counsel spec ifically reque sted the written state ment of “a ny informer once he ld in the DeSoto County[Mi ssissippi ] J ail” as p ar t o f a d iscovery reque st. That inf orma tio n w a s n ot p ro vid e d to the pe tit ion e r at tria l. T he fa c t th a t the pe tit ion e r e sc ape d fr om j a il and re mained a f

ug itive for many y ear s does not chang e the fac t that the evidenc e wa s withheld by the Sta te . E ve n if

the pe tit ion e r h a d n ot e sc ape d w e ha ve no re a so n to be lie ve thi s e vid e nc e wo uld ha ve be e n d isc los e d v olu nta ri ly . Ind e e d, if

the S tat e’s po sit ionin this app e a l w e re to p re va il, criminal defe ndants, in or der to pr otect their rig hts to file a cor am nobis petition, would be require d in eve r y c a s e to e xa mi n e e v e r y

p r o s e c u ti o n f

il e f o ll o w in g th e ir

c o n v ic ti o n s in o r d e r

to d e te rmine wh e the r exc ulp a tory e vid e nc e wa s with he ld. We cann ot be lie ve thi s is so me thi ng the State re a lly wants. “[T]he State’s finality interest is seri ously

compromised whe n the prosec ution has suppressed

e vid e nc e in v iol a tio n o f i ts c on stitu ti on al du ty a ndis d ir e c tly

re sp on sib le fo r c a us ing the de la y in finality .” Ha

rris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 602 (T en n

. 2 0 03) (Ande rson, J . dissenting) (citing Sample v. State, 82 S.W .3d 267, 276 (Tenn. 2002) ).

Acc ording ly , we de termine t h at du ep r ocess pr eclude s summary dismiss al of this claim base d up on a statut ory tim e ba r, a nd that the pe tit ion e r he re in is e nti tle d to a he ari ng to e va luate the c la ims contained in her petition for writ of error coram nobis relating to the newly discovere d evidenc e. No court in this S t at e has a ctually held a he aring to evaluate the streng th of the cla ims asserted in the petition. The petitioner is e ntitled to a “re asonable opportunity afte r the e x piration of the limitations period to prese nt [her] claim i n a meaningf ul time and manner.” Wil liams v. St ate, 44 S.W.3d 464, 471 (Tenn. 2001)

.

Conclusion

Ac c or din g ly , w e c on c lud e that th e d e c isi on of the tr ia l c ou rt

dis mis sin g the po rt ion of

the writ of e rr or c or a m no bis a lle g ing the dis c ov ery of new e vid e nc e sh ou ld b e re ve rs e d a ndthe c a se
rema nded for

a hea ring. At the hea

ring , the petitioner will have the opportunity to establish that there is a “re asonable probability ” that the ne wly discovere d evidenc e may have r esulted in a differ ent judg ment if the evidenc e had bee n admitted at the pre vious trial. See Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-26-105; W orkman, 111 S.W.3d at 18. I f she make s this showing, and if she also establishes that she “w as without fault” in fa iling to present the newly discovere d evidenc e at the a ppropriate time, she will be entitled to a new tria l. I d.; see a lso W orkman, 41 S.W.3d at 104; Mix on 983 S.W .2d at 673. Further, we aff

irm the portion of the trial c ourt’s dec ision dism issing the portion of the petition relating to the al l egations of juror misconduct as those a lleg ations should have bee n broug ht in a post-conviction proc eeding

. Acc ording ly
, the j udg ment of t he trial court is affirme d in part, re verse d in part, and r emande d for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.-11- ___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE