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******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v

. PAUL B.* (SC 19197)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Vertefeuille, Js. Argued September 25—officially released December 23, 2014 Glenn W. Falk, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant). Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Brian Preleski, state’s attorney, andKevinJ. Murphy, formersupervisoryassistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).Opinion McDONALD, J. The defendant, Paul B., was convicted, after ajury trial, oftwo counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2) for touching the intimate parts of two young boys ‘‘in a sexual and indecent manner

. . . .’’ The defendant appeals, upon our grant of certification, from thejudgment oftheAppellate Court, contendingthattheAppellateCourtincorrectlydeterminedthat: (1)thetrialcourt properly admitted out-of-court statements ofone ofthe victims through the testimony of a police officer to provide context for the defendant’s admission to the conduct underlying the charges against him; (2) the trial court properly admitted out-of-court statements of the victims as examples of their age inappropriate knowledge through the testimony ofthe state’s expert; and (3) the state did not engage inprosecutorial impropriety during closing argument by relying on this testimony.1 We concludethatthe defendant’sfirstclaimwas not properly preserved and that, even assuming the challenged statements used by the state’s expert were improperly admitted, any impropriety was harmless. Finally, we are not persuaded that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial by any purported prosecutorial impropriety. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The record reveals the following facts that the jury reasonably could have found. In 2005, DA and DE, half brothers who were then respectively eight and five years old, resided in close proximity to the defendant’s home. The defendant met DA and DE when they were playing with another child, SA, whom the defendant occasionally babysat, outside ofthe defendant’s home.
Several weeks after the defendant met DA and DE, he met their parents. DA and DE then began to sleep at the defendant’s home when their parents needed a babysitter or when other friends, including SA, were staying overnight at the defendant’s house. Shortly thereafter, the defendant injured his foot and was invitedbythevictims’ parentsto move into theirhome.
The defendant frequently shared a bed with DA and DE, both when they slept at the defendant’s house and after the defendant had moved into the victims’ home. On occasion, the defendantwore onlyunderwearwhen the children slept with him. He also asked DA not to
wear clothes to bed and would remove DE’s clothes in his sleep. DA and DE both occasionally felt wetness in the bed or on themselves when they woke up. For example, after the defendant removed DE’s clothing, DE would wake up feeling something wet ‘‘on [his] private.’’ Once, DE woke up and felt wetness on his penis and sawthe defendant’s face nearhis midsection. The defendant also touched and rubbed both DE’s and DA’s nipples, penises, and buttocks on multiple occa-sions when he shared abed withthem. There also were times when DE would feel the defendant suck on his nipples right before he would fall asleep and he once feltthe defendant lickhis neck. Whenthe childrentook showers, the defendant occasionally stayed inthe bathroom and, when they were finished in the shower, he would dry them offwith a towel and help them put on their underwear. On at least one occasion, the defendant touched DA ‘‘in a private place’’ while drying him off. The defendanttoldboth DAand DE thatthey could not tell their parents about the defendant touching them.
In June, 2008, DE disclosed to his grandmother that the defendant had touched him inappropriately. After the grandmotherinformed otherfamilymembers about what DE had said, the defendant was asked to leave the victims’ home. In August, 2008, Officer Kim Parrott of the Plymouth Police Department received a telephonecallreportingtheallegedsexualassault.Approximately one week later, Diane Edell, a licensed clinical socialworker, conductedaforensicinterviewofDE, for which Parrott was present. Shortly thereafter, Parrott interviewed the defendant about the conduct alleged by DE. After Parrott’s interview ofthe defendant, Edell conductedaforensicinterviewofDA, forwhichParrott also was present. Attrial, the state callednumerouswitnessestotestify regarding the aforementioned facts, including DE and DA, who were then respectively ten and thirteen years old. SA, who was not avictim inthis case, also testified to corroborate the victims’ testimony regarding the assaults that were committed in the defendant’s home and to offer propensity evidence of similar acts that the defendant had committed on him. Parrott testified regarding the defendant’s response after being confronted with DE’s allegations. Over the defendant’s objection, Parrott was permitted to testify as to the specific statements of DE to which the defendant responded. Edell offered an expert opinion regarding theconductofchildabusevictims. Overthedefendant’s objection, Edellwaspermittedtotestifyregardingstatements elicited in the forensic interviews with DA and DE that she viewed as evidencing age inappropriate language consistent with the conduct of such victims.
The defendant testified in his own defense and maintained that he had no recollection of touching the victims in a sexual manner. He acknowledged, however, drying the victims off with a towel after they would take showers and sleeping with them in their bed.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty of two counts ofrisk of injury to a child, but acquitted the defendant of one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2). The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict.The defendantappealedfromthejudgmentofconviction to the Appellate Court, challenging the admission of the statements of the victims introduced through Parrott and Edell as inadmissible hearsay, as well as the prosecutor’s comments on that evidence in closing argument. TheAppellate Courtrejectedthe defendant’s claims and affirmedthejudgment ofthe trial court. See State v. Paul B., 143 Conn. App. 691, 693, 70 A.3d 1123 (2013). This certified appeal followed.
I
Webeginwiththe defendant’s challengetotheAppellate Court’s conclusion that the trial court properly admitted out-of-court statements made by DE attesting to certain acts by the defendant through Parrott’s testimony. The defendant contends that, although Parrott properly could provide context for the defendant’s responseto Parrottwhenthe defendantwas confronted with those allegations, it was unnecessarily prejudicial for Parrott to testify that DE had made the inculpatory statements in the forensic interview. We conclude that, although the defendant objected at trial to the admission of Parrott’s testimony with regard to DE’s statements,thatobjectionwasbaseduponadifferentground than the one raised in this certified appeal. Because the claim before us was not properly preserved, the defendant is not entitled to a review of the ruling on this basis.
The record reveals the following additional facts. At trial, the defendant objected on hearsay grounds to the state’s questioning of Parrott regarding what Parrott had told the defendant when she interviewed him after DE’sforensicinterview. Duringanofferofproofoutside the presence of the jury, Parrott testified that, during her interview of the defendant, she ‘‘told him that DE and DAhave disclosed—that only DE was interviewed, and it was disclosed that while [the defendant] was living at his house, that he would sleep in the same bed withthe boys, andthathe was touchingtheirbutt, their private area, lickingtheprivate area, lickingandplaying withthenipples, andDE explainedpeeing—thathewas peeing onthem.’’ Parrottthentestifiedthatinresponse, the defendant said: ‘‘[W]ell, if the boys said I did that, thenmaybeI did. Ijustdon’tremember.’’ The defendant objected to the admission of this testimony on the grounds that DE’s statements were hearsay and that admitting the details ofthe allegations was prejudicial. The defendant suggested that ‘‘getting out the ideathat [DA and DE] have made disclosures ofa sexual nature that included touching by [the] defendant to the children

. . . is broad enough that it still allows the jury to make a determination ofthe ultimate facts, without submitting details in forthejury

. . . .’’ The court overruled the hearsay objection, concluding that the references to DE’s allegations against the defendant were not being offered for their truth, but rather only toprovide contextforthe defendant’sresponse. The court explainedthat, inordertoputthedefendant’sstatement in context, ‘‘[Parrott] must testify accurately as to what specifically she asked him about.’’ The court further concluded that allowing Parrott to testify regarding the details of DE’s allegations was not prejudicial because the out-of-court statements described conduct that DE and DA had already testified to at trial. Parrott then testified consistent with the offer ofproof. The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court’s reasoning. State

v. Paul B., supra, 143 Conn. App. 710–11. By contrast to his hearsay argument at trial, in his brief to this court, the defendant argues that, in order to give context to the defendant’s statement, ‘‘it would have been sufficient for

. . . Parrott to testify that she asked the defendant ‘if he had ever licked [the children’s] nipples, or touched their chests, had he ever licked their private area, was there any rubbing on the butt.’

. . . It was not necessary to add the prejudicial assertions that ‘this is what DE had explained in an interview,’ and that [Parrott] was ‘there [to speak with the defendant] because the boys, DE and DA, had disclosed that—at the time ofthe interview—that DE had disclosed that [the defendant] had been touching them in their bed—DE and DA.’ ’’ In the defendant’s view, ‘‘[b]y identifying the forensic interview as the source ofthe allegations, Parrott unfairly conveyed to thejury that she

. . . believed DE

. . . .’’ He contends that ‘‘the needless repetition of statements from forensic interviews, especially by police officers, unfairly bolsters the state’s case and unduly prejudices defendants.’’2
It is apparent from his argument and the authority offered in support thereofthat the defendant has challenged on appeal to this court Parrott’s identification ofthe forensic interview as the circumstance in which the out-of-courtstatementsweremade andthe factthat
apoliceofficerhadreportedthestatementsbeingmade, ratherthanthe substanceofthe out-of-courtstatements themselves. It is equally apparent from the trial court’s ruling that it reasonably understood the defendant’s arguments as an objection to the substance of DE’s statements, not the circumstances under which the statements were made or the reporter of those statements. Indeed, inarguingonappealthatitwasimproper for Parrott to identify that DE’s statements came from
an interview, the defendant appears to be making a belated vouching argument to bolster his claim with regardto Edell’s testimonyregarding the victims’ statements. See part II of this opinion. The defendant is conflatingtwo distinct objections. He citesno authority for the proposition that the hearsay objection he made at trial to the admissibility ofthe details ofDE’s allegations encompasses an impropervouching claim regarding the admissibility of Parrott’s testimony as to the
source of DE’s allegations, and our research has foundnothing in support of this point.
We note that the state has not argued that the defendant failed to preserve the claim raised before this court, butinsteadhas defendedthe merits oftheAppellate Court’s decision, which only addresses the substance of the statements at issue as nonhearsay. Nonetheless, the preservation requirement is intended to protect, inter alia, judicial resources. See State v. Calabrese, 279 Conn. 393, 408n.18, 902A.2d 1044 (2006) (preservation requirements ‘‘ ‘serve to alert the trial court to potential error while there is still time for the court to act’ ’’). We therefore will decline to address an unpreserved evidentiary claim even in the absence of such an objection by the opposing party. Accordingly,
we concludethatthe defendantisnot entitledto review ofthe claim raised on appeal. See State v. JorgeP., 308 Conn. 740, 753, 66A.3d869 (2013) (‘‘Inordertopreserve
an evidentiary ruling for review, trial counsel must

. . . articulate the basis of the objection so as to apprise the trial court of the precise nature of the objection and its realpurpose, in orderto form an adequate basis for a reviewable ruling.

. . . Once counsel states the authority and ground of [the] objection, any appeal will be limited to the ground asserted.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).
II
We next turnto the defendant’s claim that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court’s admission ofthe victims’ out-of-court statements throughthe testimony of the state’s expert, Edell, as nonhearsay. The defendant contends that allowing Edell to testify
as to the victims’ out-of-court statements as a basis for herexpert opinionthattheyhadusedage inappropriate language consistent with child abuse victims constituted an impermissible backdoor to using the statements for their truth.3 He further contends that it was unnecessaryfor Edell to quote the victims’ out-of-court statements in order to support her opinion and that doing so unfairly bolstered the victims’ trial testimony and added a significant noncumulative detail to that testimony. The defendant claims that this error caused harm that could not be remedied by a limiting instruction. We conclude that, even assuming arguendo that the admission of the statements was improper, it was notharmfulbecause that evidence didnot substantially affect the verdict in this case. The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. Edelltestifiedregardingmethods ofinterviewing child sexual assault victims and the dynamics of child sexual abuse. On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Edell: ‘‘What were the factors that you were particularly observing in regard to DA and to DE and SA

. . . that you were looking for to try to, you know, make sure that this was a valid disclosure?’’ Edell responded first by discussing general factors regardingdisclosures by child victims of sexual assault, without referencing either victim or stating that either victim demonstrated any particular factor. Edell mentioned that, when a child exhibits age inappropriate sexual knowledge, it may be indicative of a valid disclosure of sexual abuse. The prosecutor asked for an example of age inappropriate sexual knowledge that DE or DA displayed during Edell’s interview ofthem. She replied:

‘‘ ‘He put his tongue in my belly button.’ That’s not something that eleven year old kids know about. ‘He sucked on my nipples.’ DE talked about his licking his penis.’’ The defendant then objected to the admission of these statements on the basis of hearsay.
After overruling the defendant’s objection, the trial court immediately gave a limiting instruction. In its finaljury charge, the court again instructed thejury to consider evidence that had been admitted for a limited purpose onlyforthatpurpose andforno otherpurpose, and, at the defendant’s request, specifically noted that the testimony that ‘‘DE reported [that] the defendant licked his penis’’ was admitted for the limited purpose of providing context to Edell’s testimony and was not to be considered for its truth.
As this court has previously explained: ‘‘[T]o the extent that we assume impropriety in the trial court’s evidentiary [rulings], [w]hen an improper evidentiary ruling is not constitutional in nature, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful.

. . . [W]hether [the improper admission of a witness’ testimony] is harm[ful] in a particular case depends upon a number of factors, such as the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony ofthe witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, ofcourse, the overall strength ofthe prosecution’s

case.

. . . [T]he proper standard for determining whether an erroneous evidentiary ruling is harm[ful] should be whether the jury’s verdict was substantially swayed by the error.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osimanti, 299 Conn. 1, 18–19, 6 A.3d 790 (2010).
We conclude that the defendant did not prove harm in the present case. The state presented a strong case. Importantly, rather than unequivocally denying that he hadengagedinthe conductalleged, thedefendantmade
numerous inculpatory statements in his own testimony and to others that were presented to the jury. Parrott testified that the defendant had admitted in his interview that ‘‘maybe’’ he had engaged in the conduct that provided the basis for the crimes for which he was convicted, but did not remember doing so. Similarly, whenthe defendant was asked during his direct examination whether he had ever touched DA inappropri-ately, he responded: ‘‘Not to my knowledge—well, unless I was drying him off with the towel.’’ Furthermore, the defendant admitted that it was ‘‘possible’’ that, while sleeping in bed with the children, he had rubbed DE’s buttocks for ‘‘a couple of seconds’’ and with ‘‘[n]o particular purpose.’’ And when asked whether he ‘‘would rub DE’s penis,’’ the defendant responded, ‘‘I doubt that.’’ The jury reasonably would have concludedthat aperson with an ordinarymemory would remember whether he had sexually touched young children. The fact that the defendant proved to have a good memory ofmany other far less consequential events during both his interview with Parrott and his owntestimony demonstratedthatthe defendant did not suffer from an impairment to his memory. Additionally, the jury heard detailed descriptions of the defendant’s conduct from DA, DE, and SA, rendering Edell’s testimony regarding the victims’ statements cumulative. For example, DE described how the defendant would ‘‘suck

. . . [o]n my chest’’ and that, when he woke up at night, he felt it ‘‘right on [his] nipples.’’ DE further described how he woke up one night and felt wetness on his penis and that, at the time, the defendant was facing toward him, with his face near his midsection. Although DE did not use the phrase ‘‘[he] licked my penis’’ in his testimony, the jury could haveinferredthatfactfromhistestimony. Furthermore, all three children testified consistently regarding the defendant’s conduct and corroborated each other in material respects including the location, nature, and timing of the defendant’s touching. Finally, the court instructed the jury immediately after the admission ofEdell’s testimony that it was not to consider the out-of-court statements for their truth. ‘‘[A] trial court’s limiting instructions about the restrictedpurposeforwhichthejurymayconsider [certain] evidence serve to minimize any prejudicial effect that such evidence otherwise may have had

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statev. Cutler, 293 Conn. 303, 314, 977 A.2d 209 (2009), overruled in part
on other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014); see also State v. Iban C., 275 Conn. 624, 643, 881 A.2d 1005 (2005) (‘‘as a general matter, the jury is presumed to follow the court’s curative instructions in the absence of some indication to the contrary’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). We also note that ‘‘such instructions are far more effective in mitigating the harm of potentially improper evidence when delivered contemporaneouslywiththe admission of that evidence, and addressed specifically thereto.’’ State v. Favoccia, 306 Conn. 770, 816, 51 A.3d 1002 (2012). Inthepresentcase, thetrialcourtgavealimiting instruction immediately following the admission ofthe contestedstatements, againduringthefinaljurycharge, and, at the defendant’s request, specifically addressed the comment that the defendant contends was mostprejudicial.
We are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument thatthejury’s note to the court during its deliberations, which asked whether ‘‘licking penis’’ constitutes penetration, demonstrates that the jury considered Edell’s testimony for its truth and therefore necessarily was harmful. Penetration was an element of the sexual assault charge on which the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Moreover, State v. Miguel C., 305 Conn. 562, 579, 46 A.3d 126 (2012), on which the defendant relies, is inapposite in that the testimony improperly admitted in that case was the only way in which thejury learned of an alleged confession by the defendant. This court recognized that ‘‘confessions have a particularly profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt [the jury’s] ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 581. Inthe present case, Edell’s testimony
wasnotremotelyasincriminatingasthe allegedconfession at issue in Miguel C., and it merely corroborated the testimony that DA and DE had already provided.
We recognize that it is problematic that Edell quoted the children’s allegations in support of her conclusion thatthe children hadmade whatthe prosecutorcategorized as a ‘‘good disclosure.’’4 We are not convinced, however, that her statements substantially affected the verdict. Although the victims’ credibility was a central issue in this case, the defendant’s admission that ‘‘maybe’’ he committedthe crimes charged andthe corroboration by SA rendered the victims’ credibility less central to the case. See State v. Iban C., supra, 275 Conn. 631–32, 645–46 (because ‘‘the victim’s credibility
was not nearly as central to the state’s ability to obtain
aconviction’’where defendantconfessedtoacts constituting risk of injury, admission of expert testimony vouching for complainant’s credibility was harmless). Moreover, whether the victims used age inappropriate language is a matter on which the jurors might have appliedtheircommon knowledge. Inlight ofall ofthese factors, we concludethatevenifwe assumethatEdell’s testimony as to the challenged statements was improperly admitted, the defendant has not demonstrated that its admission was harmful.
III Finally, we address the defendant’s claim ofprosecutorial impropriety. The defendant contends that the prosecutor who tried this case made improper statements during his rebuttal argument by relying substantively on the victims’ out-of-court statements admitted for a limited purpose through Edell’s testimony. The defendantarguesthatthese improprieties deprivedhim of a fair trial and that his conviction should therefore be reversed. The state responds that the argument at issue either responded to assertions in the defendant’s closing argument or addressed uncontested facts inevidence. We conclude that, even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor’s statements in whole or in part
were improper, the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.5
The record reveals the following additional facts. In his closing argument, defense counsel advanced the theory that the allegations were a result ofcoaching or misunderstanding. He argued that the victims’ grandmother had contaminated the victims’ disclosures by repeatedly asking DA and DE whether the defendant had touched them inappropriately. He contended that any touching by the defendant was not of a sexual nature. Defense counsel further argued that DA, DE, and SA contradicted each other in their testimony.
In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor made the following remarks, the emphasized comments indicating those to which the defendant has objected on appeal: ‘‘But my point is—you know, you might say, Oh, [the victims’ grandmother] did the right thing as a grandparent. You know, there was something weird about what was going on in that house. And every once in a while

. . . would say, You know, anything going
on there? Is there—is he touching you inappropriately? And, of course, the answer most of the time was, no. But then there was that one point when DA—DE was finally able to say, You know, I—something that did happen, and here—and he—remember, she described how he laid onthe ground and he demonstrated it. This wasn’t the words from [their grandmother] that was beingchanneledsomehowthroughthischild.Andwhen DE

. . . was interviewed by

. . . Edell, again, [the grandmother] wasn’t present there

. . . [in] their interview, and what was told there. And have you heard about anymajorinconsistencies thatweregivenfrom that point [until] today?’’ (Emphasis added.) Later, the prosecutor stated: ‘‘[D]o you remember

. . . Parrott, Officer

. . . Parrott from the Plymouth Police Department? And do you remember that she went to [the defendant’s] house? And when did she go to his house? Three days after DE had told

. . . Edell what had happened in that bedroom and in that bed.’’ (Emphasis added.) The prosecutor further argued that DE had no reason to lie to Edell and that ‘‘there’s no mistake’’ that what DE had disclosed to Edell was ‘‘of

a sexual nature.’’
As we have frequently stated, in analyzing a defendant’s claim of prosecutorial impropriety, ‘‘we ask whether the prosecutor’s conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial ofdue process.

. . . The fairness ofthe trial and not the culpability of the prosecutor is the standard for analyzing the constitutional due process claims of criminal defendants alleging prosecutorial [impropriety].’’ (Citationsomitted; internalquotationmarksomitted.) Statev. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 539–40, 529 A.2d653 (1987). ‘‘[I]n conformity with courts in otherjurisdictions, [this court] has focused on several factors. Among them are the extent to which the [impropriety]
was invited by defense conduct or argument

. . . the severity of the [impropriety]

. . . the frequency of the [impropriety]

. . . the centrality of the [impropriety] to the critical issues in the case

. . . the strength of the curative measures adopted

. . . and the strength of the state’s case.

. . . Regardless of whether the defendant has objected to an

. . . [impropriety], a reviewing court must apply [these]

. . . factors to the entire trial, because there is no way to determine whether the defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial unless the [impropriety] is viewed in light of the entire trial.

. . . ‘‘This does not mean, however, that the absence of
an objection at trial does not play a significant role in the application of the [foregoing] factors. To the contrary, the determination of whether a new trial or proceeding is warranted depends, in part, on whether defense counsel has made a timely objection to any [incident] oftheprosecutor’simproper [conduct]. When defense counsel does not object, request a curative instruction or move for a mistrial, he presumably does not view the alleged impropriety as prejudicial enough to jeopardize seriously the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’’ (Citationsomitted; internalquotationmarksomitted.) State v. Maguire, 310 Conn. 535, 560–61, 78 A.3d 828 (2013).
We conclude that none of the factors that we have identified weighs in the defendant’s favor. Indeed, for the reasons discussed in part II of this opinion, the state’s case was quite strong independent of the testimonybyEdellofthevictims’ statementsfromtheforensic interviews. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor’s few vague references to Edell’s testimony
were not so severe as to have ‘‘infected the trial with unfairness.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Fauci, 282 Conn. 23, 50, 917 A.2d 978 (2007). Therefore, the defendant’s claimofprosecutorialimpropriety must fail.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the otherjustices concurred.

* In accordance with our policy ofprotecting the privacy interests ofthe victims ofsexual abuse and the crime ofrisk ofinjury to a child, we decline to use the defendant’s full name or to identify the victims or others through whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

1 We have reversed the order of the first two certified issues to dispose at the outset of the claim that we deem unpreserved. See State v. Paul B., 310 Conn. 909, 76 A.3d 626 (2013). Although the certified issue is framed broadly enough to encompass that claim, such broad framing does not

excuse the defendant from meeting our long-standing preservation requirements, which we address in part I of this opinion.

2 In his brief to the Appellate Court, the defendant intertwined his argument regarding Parrott’s references to the forensic interview with an argumentthatwas consistentwiththe objectionhemade attrialtothe admission of the details of DE’s allegations. He argued that ‘‘[t]he state could haveachieved its purpose ofputting the defendant’s answers in context without alluding to theforensicinterviews orquotingthevictims directly.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. PaulB., Conn. Appellate Court Records & Briefs, February Term, 2013, Defendant’s Briefp. 27. The Appellate Court, however, did not address the defendant’s claim regarding Parrott’s references to the forensic interview. See State v. Paul B., supra, 143 Conn. App. 710–15.

3 The defendant relies on concurring and dissenting opinions in Williams

v. Illinois, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 2221, 183 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2012), for the proposition that any time an expert conveys an out-of-court statement to thejury as a basis for her opinion, the statement is offered for its truth and is therefore inadmissible hearsay. In Williams, a confrontation clause case, Justice Clarence Thomas, in his concurring opinion, and four dissenting justices essentiallyadoptedthisview. See id., 2257 (Thomas, J., concurring); id., 2268–69 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also 2 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence (6th Ed. 2006) § 324.3, p. 419. We note that the court in Williams

was interpreting Illinois rules of evidence and the case therefore provides little guidance for this court. Moreover, because we conclude that any impropriety in the admission of Edell’s testimony was harmless, we need not determine in the present case whether, as a blanket rule, an expert’s reliance on an out-of-court statement as the basis for her opinion automatically converts the statement into inadmissible hearsay. See footnote 4 of this opinion (addressing vouching concerns raised by expert’s use of such statements).

4 The state acknowledges that, in light of this court’s decision in State v. Favoccia, supra, 306 Conn. 803, which was decided after the trial in this case, this testimony was improper because it constituted indirect vouching forthecredibilityofthevictims. Thestateargues,however,thattheAppellate Court properly determined that, because the defendant did not lodge a vouching objection at trial, such a claim is unreviewable. See State v. Paul B., supra, 143 Conn. App. 700–701. The defendant does not raise a separate vouching claim on appeal before this court, but we consider whether the testimony had that effect to the extent that it is relevant to the question of whether the admission of the statements, if improper, was harmful.

5 The state argues that the defendant’s prosecutorial impropriety claim is not reviewable on appeal because the Appellate Court construed the defendant’s claim as only challengingthe prosecutor’s references to the outof-court statements admitted through Parrott’s testimony. We disagree that the claim should not be reviewed. Our review ofthe record reveals that the defendant did challenge the prosecutor’s references to both the testimony ofParrottandEdell,buttheAppellate Courtlimiteditsreviewtotheprosecutor’s references to Parrott’s testimony. State v. Paul B., supra, 143 Conn. App. 715, 718–19. Althoughthedefendantdidnotfileamotionforreconsideration to address the overlooked argument, he argued in his petition for certificationthattheAppellate Court ‘‘misse[d] thepointthattheprosecutor had no right to repeat DE’s allegations of abusefrom the interview with

. . . Edell

. . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.)