NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KENETTE A. PAREDES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

and 

EDGARD PAREDES, Sr., 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, dba 

Department of the Navy, The Navy 

Exchange Mall at Pearl Harbor, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

JOHN DOES, 1-10; et al., 

Defendant.

No. 22-15459 

D.C. No. 1:19-cv-00161-WRP 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Wes R. Porter, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 9, 2023**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JUN 15 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: BADE, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

This case, brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, 

arises from a slip and fall accident on a recently mopped floor in the food court of 

the Navy Exchange at Pearl Harbor. Following a four-day bench trial, the district 

court found that Plaintiff Kenette Paredes failed to establish Defendant United 

States’ negligence, and that Paredes’s contributory negligence was greater than any 

negligence by the government and thus barred her recovery. On appeal, Paredes 

challenges the district court’s factual findings and its legal conclusion that state 

and federal workplace regulations, while relevant, are not dispositive in 

determining whether the government was negligent.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s 

factual findings for clear error and reverse only if “on the entire evidence” we are 

“left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 

fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 574. We 

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
3 

review the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the standard of care de novo.

See Miller v. United States, 587 F.2d 991, 994−95 (9th Cir. 1978). We affirm.

1. The district court did not clearly err in its negligence determination

because there is an adequate basis in the record for each of its factual findings. 

First, the district court’s determination as to the size of the mopped area was 

supported by the evidence, there is no indication the district court failed to consider 

relevant evidence, including the “length axis” of the mopped area, and the court’s 

credibility findings were proper. Reversal is not warranted merely because 

Paredes disagrees with the district court’s conclusion that the mopped area was 

“relatively small.” See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. The district court’s 

determination regarding the cone’s location was also supported by the evidence.

Second, Paredes’s contention that the district court failed to consider all 

relevant evidence is not supported by the record. The court explained its 

reasoning, which was supported by the record, and stated that it reviewed all the 

testimony and exhibits presented, which included discussions about additional 

warning measures.

Third, the court’s finding that Paredes was not credible is supported by 

significant inconsistencies in Paredes’s testimony. Given these inconsistencies, the 

deferential review of the district court’s credibility determinations, and Navy Loss 

Prevention/Safety Investigator Jessica Cardenas’s consistent testimony, which was
4 

credited by the district court, the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous. 

See id. at 575.

Fourth, the district court properly considered testimony from the 

government’s experts, and Paredes’s argument on appeal based on a purported 

logical contradiction in the testimony is unpersuasive. Thus, Paredes has not 

demonstrated that the district court clearly erred in making any of these challenged

factual findings.

2. Paredes argues that the violation of state and federal workplace 

regulations should have been used as evidence of negligence and that, because 

there is no dispute that the government failed to comply with such regulations, the 

government was negligent per se. The district court correctly held that state and 

federal workplace regulations are relevant, but not dispositive, in determining 

whether the government was negligent under Hawaii law.

1 See, e.g., Michel v. 

Valdastri, Ltd., 575 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Haw. 1978); Pickering v. State, 557 P.2d 

125, 127 (Haw. 1976); see also Robertson v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 32 F.3d 

408, 410−11 (9th Cir. 1994). The district court therefore did not err by considering 

applicable state and federal workplace regulations but ultimately concluding that, 

1 Because the alleged tort occurred in Hawaii, that state’s law governed this 

action. See Pacheco v. United States, 21 F.4th 1183, 1187 (9th Cir. 2022).
5 

“in relation to all other evidence,” Paredes was adequately warned of the potential 

risk.

3. The district court’s conclusion that Paredes’s contributory negligence 

was greater than any negligence by the government was not clearly erroneous for 

the same reasons supporting its finding on the government’s negligence.

AFFIRMED.