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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PAUL B.*

(SC 19197)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued September 25—officially released December 23, 2014

Glenn W. Falk, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(defendant).

Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Brian Preleski, state’s attorney, and Kevin J. Murphy, former supervisory assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

McDONALD, J. The defendant, Paul B., was convicted, after a jury trial, of two counts of risk of injury

to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a)

(2) for touching the intimate parts of two young boys

‘‘in a sexual and indecent manner . . . .’’ The defendant

appeals, upon our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, contending that the Appellate Courtincorrectly determined that:(1)the trial court

properly admitted out-of-court statements of one of the

victims through the testimony of a police officer to

provide context for the defendant’s admission to the

conduct underlying the charges against him; (2) the

trial court properly admitted out-of-court statements

of the victims as examples of their age inappropriate

knowledge through the testimony of the state’s expert;

and (3) the state did not engage in prosecutorial impropriety during closing argument by relying on this testimony.1 We conclude that the defendant’s first claim was

not properly preserved and that, even assuming the

challenged statements used by the state’s expert were

improperly admitted, any impropriety was harmless.

Finally, we are not persuaded that the defendant was

deprived of a fair trial by any purported prosecutorial

impropriety. We therefore affirm the judgment of the

Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following facts that the jury

reasonably could have found. In 2005, DA and DE, half

brothers who were then respectively eight and five

years old, resided in close proximity to the defendant’s

home. The defendant met DA and DE when they were

playing with another child, SA, whom the defendant

occasionally babysat, outside of the defendant’s home.

Several weeks after the defendant met DA and DE,

he met their parents. DA and DE then began to sleep

at the defendant’s home when their parents needed a

babysitter or when other friends, including SA, were

staying overnight at the defendant’s house. Shortly

thereafter, the defendant injured his foot and was

invited by the victims’ parents to move into their home.

The defendant frequently shared a bed with DA and

DE, both when they slept at the defendant’s house and

after the defendant had moved into the victims’ home.

On occasion, the defendant wore only underwear when

the children slept with him. He also asked DA not to

wear clothes to bed and would remove DE’s clothes in

his sleep. DA and DE both occasionally felt wetness in

the bed or on themselves when they woke up. For

example, after the defendant removed DE’s clothing,

DE would wake up feeling something wet ‘‘on [his]

private.’’ Once, DE woke up and felt wetness on his

penis and saw the defendant’s face near his midsection.

The defendant also touched and rubbed both DE’s and

DA’s nipples, penises, and buttocks on multiple occa-
sions when he shared a bed with them. There also were

times when DE would feel the defendant suck on his

nipples right before he would fall asleep and he once

felt the defendant lick his neck. When the children took

showers, the defendant occasionally stayed in the bathroom and, when they were finished in the shower, he

would dry them off with a towel and help them put on

their underwear. On at least one occasion, the defendant touched DA ‘‘in a private place’’ while drying him

off. The defendant told both DA and DE that they could

not tell their parents about the defendant touching

them.

In June, 2008, DE disclosed to his grandmother that

the defendant had touched him inappropriately. After

the grandmother informed other family members about

what DE had said, the defendant was asked to leave

the victims’ home. In August, 2008, Officer Kim Parrott

of the Plymouth Police Department received a telephone callreporting the alleged sexual assault. Approximately one week later, Diane Edell, a licensed clinical

social worker, conducted a forensic interview of DE, for

which Parrott was present. Shortly thereafter, Parrott

interviewed the defendant about the conduct alleged

by DE. After Parrott’s interview of the defendant, Edell

conducted a forensic interview of DA, for which Parrott

also was present.

At trial, the state called numerous witnesses to testify

regarding the aforementioned facts, including DE and

DA, who were then respectively ten and thirteen years

old. SA, who was not a victim in this case, also testified

to corroborate the victims’ testimony regarding the

assaults that were committed in the defendant’s home

and to offer propensity evidence of similar acts that

the defendant had committed on him. Parrott testified

regarding the defendant’s response after being confronted with DE’s allegations. Over the defendant’s

objection, Parrott was permitted to testify as to the

specific statements of DE to which the defendant

responded. Edell offered an expert opinion regarding

the conduct of child abuse victims. Overthe defendant’s

objection, Edell was permitted to testify regarding statements elicited in the forensic interviews with DA and

DE that she viewed as evidencing age inappropriate

language consistent with the conduct of such victims.

The defendant testified in his own defense and maintained that he had no recollection of touching the victims in a sexual manner. He acknowledged, however,

drying the victims off with a towel after they would

take showers and sleeping with them in their bed.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty of two counts

of risk of injury to a child, but acquitted the defendant

of one count of sexual assault in the first degree in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2). The trial

court rendered judgment in accordance with the

verdict.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, challenging the admission

of the statements of the victims introduced through

Parrott and Edell as inadmissible hearsay, as well as

the prosecutor’s comments on that evidence in closing

argument. The Appellate Court rejected the defendant’s

claims and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See

State v. Paul B., 143 Conn. App. 691, 693, 70 A.3d 1123

(2013). This certified appeal followed.

I

We begin with the defendant’s challenge to the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the trial court properly

admitted out-of-court statements made by DE attesting

to certain acts by the defendant through Parrott’s testimony. The defendant contends that, although Parrott

properly could provide context for the defendant’s

response to Parrott when the defendant was confronted

with those allegations, it was unnecessarily prejudicial

for Parrott to testify that DE had made the inculpatory

statements in the forensic interview. We conclude that,

although the defendant objected at trial to the admission of Parrott’s testimony with regard to DE’s statements, that objection was based upon a different ground

than the one raised in this certified appeal. Because

the claim before us was not properly preserved, the

defendant is not entitled to a review of the ruling on

this basis.

The record reveals the following additional facts. At

trial, the defendant objected on hearsay grounds to the

state’s questioning of Parrott regarding what Parrott

had told the defendant when she interviewed him after

DE’s forensic interview. During an offer of proof outside

the presence of the jury, Parrott testified that, during

her interview of the defendant, she ‘‘told him that DE

and DA have disclosed—that only DE was interviewed,

and it was disclosed that while [the defendant] was

living at his house, that he would sleep in the same bed

with the boys, and that he was touching their butt, their

private area, licking the private area, licking and playing

with the nipples, and DE explained peeing—that he was

peeing on them.’’ Parrott then testified that in response,

the defendant said: ‘‘[W]ell, if the boys said I did that,

then maybe I did. I just don’t remember.’’ The defendant

objected to the admission of this testimony on the

grounds that DE’s statements were hearsay and that

admitting the details of the allegations was prejudicial.

The defendant suggested that ‘‘getting out the idea that

[DA and DE] have made disclosures of a sexual nature

that included touching by [the] defendant to the children . . . is broad enough that it still allows the jury

to make a determination of the ultimate facts, without

submitting details in for the jury . . . .’’ The court overruled the hearsay objection, concluding that the references to DE’s allegations against the defendant were

not being offered for their truth, but rather only to
provide context for the defendant’s response. The court

explained that, in orderto put the defendant’s statement

in context, ‘‘[Parrott] must testify accurately as to what

specifically she asked him about.’’ The court further

concluded that allowing Parrott to testify regarding the

details of DE’s allegations was not prejudicial because

the out-of-court statements described conduct that DE

and DA had already testified to at trial. Parrott then

testified consistent with the offer of proof. The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court’s reasoning. State

v. Paul B., supra, 143 Conn. App. 710–11.

By contrast to his hearsay argument at trial, in his

brief to this court, the defendant argues that, in order

to give context to the defendant’s statement, ‘‘it would

have been sufficient for . . . Parrott to testify that she

asked the defendant ‘if he had ever licked [the children’s] nipples, or touched their chests, had he ever

licked their private area, was there any rubbing on the

butt.’ . . . It was not necessary to add the prejudicial

assertions that ‘this is what DE had explained in an

interview,’ and that [Parrott] was ‘there [to speak with

the defendant] because the boys, DE and DA, had disclosed that—at the time of the interview—that DE had

disclosed that [the defendant] had been touching them

in their bed—DE and DA.’ ’’ In the defendant’s view,

‘‘[b]y identifying the forensic interview as the source

of the allegations, Parrott unfairly conveyed to the jury

that she . . . believed DE . . . .’’ He contends that

‘‘the needless repetition of statements from forensic

interviews, especially by police officers, unfairly bolsters the state’s case and unduly prejudices

defendants.’’2

It is apparent from his argument and the authority

offered in support thereof that the defendant has challenged on appeal to this court Parrott’s identification

of the forensic interview as the circumstance in which

the out-of-court statements were made and the fact that

a police officer had reported the statements being made,

ratherthan the substance of the out-of-court statements

themselves. It is equally apparent from the trial court’s

ruling that it reasonably understood the defendant’s

arguments as an objection to the substance of DE’s

statements, not the circumstances under which the

statements were made or the reporter of those statements. Indeed, in arguing on appeal that it was improper

for Parrott to identify that DE’s statements came from

an interview, the defendant appears to be making a

belated vouching argument to bolster his claim with

regard to Edell’s testimony regarding the victims’ statements. See part II of this opinion. The defendant is

conflating two distinct objections. He cites no authority

for the proposition that the hearsay objection he made

at trial to the admissibility of the details of DE’s allegations encompasses an improper vouching claim regarding the admissibility of Parrott’s testimony as to the

source of DE’s allegations, and our research has found
nothing in support of this point.

We note that the state has not argued that the defendant failed to preserve the claim raised before this

court, but instead has defended the merits of the Appellate Court’s decision, which only addresses the substance of the statements at issue as nonhearsay.

Nonetheless, the preservation requirement is intended

to protect, inter alia, judicial resources. See State v.

Calabrese, 279 Conn. 393, 408 n.18, 902 A.2d 1044 (2006)

(preservation requirements ‘‘ ‘serve to alert the trial

court to potential error while there is still time for the

court to act’ ’’). We therefore will decline to address an

unpreserved evidentiary claim even in the absence of

such an objection by the opposing party. Accordingly,

we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to review

of the claim raised on appeal. See State v. Jorge P., 308

Conn. 740, 753, 66 A.3d 869 (2013)(‘‘In orderto preserve

an evidentiary ruling for review, trial counsel must . . .

articulate the basis of the objection so as to apprise

the trial court of the precise nature of the objection

and its real purpose, in order to form an adequate basis

for a reviewable ruling. . . . Once counsel states the

authority and ground of [the] objection, any appeal will

be limited to the ground asserted.’’ [Internal quotation

marks omitted.]).

II

We next turn to the defendant’s claim that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court’s admission of the victims’ out-of-court statements through the

testimony of the state’s expert, Edell, as nonhearsay.

The defendant contends that allowing Edell to testify

as to the victims’ out-of-court statements as a basis for

her expert opinion that they had used age inappropriate

language consistent with child abuse victims constituted an impermissible backdoor to using the statements for their truth.3 He further contends that it was

unnecessary for Edell to quote the victims’ out-of-court

statements in order to support her opinion and that

doing so unfairly bolstered the victims’ trial testimony

and added a significant noncumulative detail to that

testimony. The defendant claims that this error caused

harm that could not be remedied by a limiting instruction. We conclude that, even assuming arguendo that

the admission of the statements was improper, it was

not harmful because that evidence did not substantially

affect the verdict in this case.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. Edell testified regarding methods of interviewing

child sexual assault victims and the dynamics of child

sexual abuse. On redirect examination, the prosecutor

asked Edell: ‘‘What were the factors that you were particularly observing in regard to DA and to DE and SA

. . . that you were looking for to try to, you know,

make sure that this was a valid disclosure?’’ Edell

responded first by discussing general factors regarding
disclosures by child victims of sexual assault, without

referencing either victim or stating that either victim

demonstrated any particular factor. Edell mentioned

that, when a child exhibits age inappropriate sexual

knowledge, it may be indicative of a valid disclosure

of sexual abuse. The prosecutor asked for an example

of age inappropriate sexual knowledge that DE or DA

displayed during Edell’s interview of them. She replied:

‘‘ ‘He put his tongue in my belly button.’ That’s not

something that eleven year old kids know about. ‘He

sucked on my nipples.’ DE talked about his licking his

penis.’’ The defendant then objected to the admission

of these statements on the basis of hearsay.

After overruling the defendant’s objection, the trial

court immediately gave a limiting instruction. In its

final jury charge, the court again instructed the jury to

consider evidence that had been admitted for a limited

purpose only for that purpose and for no other purpose,

and, at the defendant’s request, specifically noted that

the testimony that ‘‘DE reported [that] the defendant

licked his penis’’ was admitted for the limited purpose

of providing context to Edell’s testimony and was not

to be considered for its truth.

As this court has previously explained: ‘‘[T]o the

extent that we assume impropriety in the trial court’s

evidentiary [rulings], [w]hen an improper evidentiary

ruling is not constitutional in nature, the defendant

bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was

harmful. . . . [W]hether [the improper admission of a

witness’ testimony] is harm[ful] in a particular case

depends upon a number of factors, such as the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s

case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points,

the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted,

and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s

case. . . . [T]he proper standard for determining

whether an erroneous evidentiary ruling is harm[ful]

should be whether the jury’s verdict was substantially

swayed by the error.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osimanti, 299 Conn. 1, 18–19, 6 A.3d

790 (2010).

We conclude that the defendant did not prove harm

in the present case. The state presented a strong case.

Importantly, rather than unequivocally denying that he

had engaged in the conduct alleged, the defendant made

numerous inculpatory statements in his own testimony

and to others that were presented to the jury. Parrott

testified that the defendant had admitted in his interview that ‘‘maybe’’ he had engaged in the conduct that

provided the basis for the crimes for which he was

convicted, but did not remember doing so. Similarly,

when the defendant was asked during his direct examination whether he had ever touched DA inappropri-
ately, he responded: ‘‘Not to my knowledge—well,

unless I was drying him off with the towel.’’ Furthermore, the defendant admitted that it was ‘‘possible’’

that, while sleeping in bed with the children, he had

rubbed DE’s buttocks for ‘‘a couple of seconds’’ and

with ‘‘[n]o particular purpose.’’ And when asked

whether he ‘‘would rub DE’s penis,’’ the defendant

responded, ‘‘I doubt that.’’ The jury reasonably would

have concluded that a person with an ordinary memory

would remember whether he had sexually touched

young children. The fact that the defendant proved to

have a good memory of many other far less consequential events during both his interview with Parrott and

his own testimony demonstrated that the defendant did

not suffer from an impairment to his memory.

Additionally, the jury heard detailed descriptions of

the defendant’s conduct from DA, DE, and SA, rendering Edell’s testimony regarding the victims’ statements

cumulative. For example, DE described how the defendant would ‘‘suck . . . [o]n my chest’’ and that, when

he woke up at night, he felt it ‘‘right on [his] nipples.’’

DE further described how he woke up one night and

felt wetness on his penis and that, at the time, the

defendant was facing toward him, with his face near

his midsection. Although DE did not use the phrase

‘‘[he] licked my penis’’ in his testimony, the jury could

have inferred that fact from his testimony. Furthermore,

all three children testified consistently regarding the

defendant’s conduct and corroborated each other in

material respects including the location, nature, and

timing of the defendant’s touching.

Finally, the court instructed the jury immediately

after the admission of Edell’s testimony that it was not

to consider the out-of-court statements for their truth.

‘‘[A] trial court’s limiting instructions about the

restricted purpose for which the jury may consider[certain] evidence serve to minimize any prejudicial effect

that such evidence otherwise may have had . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cutler, 293

Conn. 303, 314, 977 A.2d 209 (2009), overruled in part

on other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91

A.3d 862 (2014); see also State v. Iban C., 275 Conn.

624, 643, 881 A.2d 1005 (2005) (‘‘as a general matter,

the jury is presumed to follow the court’s curative

instructions in the absence of some indication to the

contrary’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). We also

note that ‘‘such instructions are far more effective in

mitigating the harm of potentially improper evidence

when delivered contemporaneously with the admission

of that evidence, and addressed specifically thereto.’’

State v. Favoccia, 306 Conn. 770, 816, 51 A.3d 1002

(2012). In the present case, the trial court gave a limiting

instruction immediately following the admission of the

contested statements, again during the final jury charge,

and, at the defendant’s request, specifically addressed

the comment that the defendant contends was most
prejudicial.

We are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument

that the jury’s note to the court during its deliberations,

which asked whether ‘‘licking penis’’ constitutes penetration, demonstrates that the jury considered Edell’s

testimony for its truth and therefore necessarily was

harmful. Penetration was an element of the sexual

assault charge on which the jury returned a verdict of

not guilty. Moreover, State v. Miguel C., 305 Conn. 562,

579, 46 A.3d 126 (2012), on which the defendant relies,

is inapposite in that the testimony improperly admitted

in that case was the only way in which the jury learned

of an alleged confession by the defendant. This court

recognized that ‘‘confessions have a particularly profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may

justifiably doubt [the jury’s] ability to put them out of

mind even if told to do so.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 581. In the present case, Edell’s testimony

was notremotely as incriminating as the alleged confession at issue in Miguel C., and it merely corroborated

the testimony that DA and DE had already provided.

We recognize that it is problematic that Edell quoted

the children’s allegations in support of her conclusion

that the children had made what the prosecutor categorized as a ‘‘good disclosure.’’4 We are not convinced,

however, that her statements substantially affected the

verdict. Although the victims’ credibility was a central

issue in this case, the defendant’s admission that

‘‘maybe’’ he committed the crimes charged and the corroboration by SA rendered the victims’ credibility less

central to the case. See State v. Iban C., supra, 275

Conn. 631–32, 645–46 (because ‘‘the victim’s credibility

was not nearly as central to the state’s ability to obtain

a conviction’’ where defendant confessed to acts constituting risk of injury, admission of expert testimony

vouching for complainant’s credibility was harmless).

Moreover, whether the victims used age inappropriate

language is a matter on which the jurors might have

applied their common knowledge. In light of all of these

factors, we conclude that even if we assume that Edell’s

testimony as to the challenged statements was improperly admitted, the defendant has not demonstrated that

its admission was harmful.

III

Finally, we address the defendant’s claim of prosecutorial impropriety. The defendant contends that the

prosecutor who tried this case made improper statements during his rebuttal argument by relying substantively on the victims’ out-of-court statements admitted

for a limited purpose through Edell’s testimony. The

defendant argues that these improprieties deprived him

of a fair trial and that his conviction should therefore

be reversed. The state responds that the argument at

issue either responded to assertions in the defendant’s

closing argument or addressed uncontested facts in
evidence. We conclude that, even assuming arguendo

that the prosecutor’s statements in whole or in part

were improper, the defendant was not deprived of a

fair trial.5

The record reveals the following additional facts. In

his closing argument, defense counsel advanced the

theory that the allegations were a result of coaching or

misunderstanding. He argued that the victims’ grandmother had contaminated the victims’ disclosures by

repeatedly asking DA and DE whether the defendant

had touched them inappropriately. He contended that

any touching by the defendant was not of a sexual

nature. Defense counsel further argued that DA, DE,

and SA contradicted each other in their testimony.

In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor made the

following remarks, the emphasized comments indicating those to which the defendant has objected on

appeal: ‘‘But my point is—you know, you might say,

Oh, [the victims’ grandmother] did the right thing as a

grandparent. You know, there was something weird

about what was going on in that house. And every once

in a while . . . would say, You know, anything going

on there? Is there—is he touching you inappropriately?

And, of course, the answer most of the time was, no.

But then there was that one point when DA—DE was

finally able to say, You know, I—something that did

happen, and here—and he—remember, she described

how he laid on the ground and he demonstrated it. This

wasn’t the words from [their grandmother] that was

being channeled somehow through this child. And when

DE . . . was interviewed by . . . Edell, again, [the

grandmother] wasn’t present there . . . [in] their interview, and what was told there. And have you heard

about any major inconsistencies that were given from

that point [until] today?’’ (Emphasis added.)

Later, the prosecutor stated: ‘‘[D]o you remember

. . . Parrott, Officer . . . Parrott from the Plymouth

Police Department? And do you remember that she

went to [the defendant’s] house? And when did she go

to his house? Three days after DE had told . . . Edell

what had happened in that bedroom and in that bed.’’

(Emphasis added.) The prosecutor further argued that

DE had no reason to lie to Edell and that ‘‘there’s no

mistake’’ that what DE had disclosed to Edell was ‘‘of

a sexual nature.’’

As we have frequently stated, in analyzing a defendant’s claim of prosecutorial impropriety, ‘‘we ask

whether the prosecutor’s conduct so infected the trial

with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a

denial of due process. . . . The fairness of the trial and

not the culpability of the prosecutor is the standard

for analyzing the constitutional due process claims of

criminal defendants alleging prosecutorial [impropriety].’’(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 539–40, 529 A.2d
653 (1987). ‘‘[I]n conformity with courts in other jurisdictions, [this court] has focused on several factors.

Among them are the extent to which the [impropriety]

was invited by defense conduct or argument . . . the

severity of the [impropriety] . . . the frequency of the

[impropriety] . . . the centrality of the [impropriety]

to the critical issues in the case . . . the strength of

the curative measures adopted . . . and the strength

of the state’s case. . . . Regardless of whether the

defendant has objected to an . . . [impropriety], a

reviewing court must apply [these] . . . factors to the

entire trial, because there is no way to determine

whether the defendant was deprived of his right to a

fair trial unless the [impropriety] is viewed in light of

the entire trial. . . .

‘‘This does not mean, however, that the absence of

an objection at trial does not play a significant role

in the application of the [foregoing] factors. To the

contrary, the determination of whether a new trial or

proceeding is warranted depends, in part, on whether

defense counsel has made a timely objection to any

[incident] ofthe prosecutor’s improper[conduct]. When

defense counsel does not object, request a curative

instruction or move for a mistrial, he presumably does

not view the alleged impropriety as prejudicial enough

to jeopardize seriously the defendant’s right to a fair

trial.’’(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Maguire, 310 Conn. 535, 560–61, 78 A.3d

828 (2013).

We conclude that none of the factors that we have

identified weighs in the defendant’s favor. Indeed, for

the reasons discussed in part II of this opinion, the

state’s case was quite strong independent of the testimony by Edell of the victims’ statements from the forensic interviews. Accordingly, we conclude that the

prosecutor’s few vague references to Edell’s testimony

were not so severe as to have ‘‘infected the trial with

unfairness.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Fauci, 282 Conn. 23, 50, 917 A.2d 978 (2007). Therefore, the defendant’s claim of prosecutorial impropriety

must fail.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline

to use the defendant’s full name or to identify the victims or others through

whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes

§ 54-86e.

1 We have reversed the order of the first two certified issues to dispose

at the outset of the claim that we deem unpreserved. See State v. Paul B.,

310 Conn. 909, 76 A.3d 626 (2013). Although the certified issue is framed

broadly enough to encompass that claim, such broad framing does not

excuse the defendant from meeting our long-standing preservation requirements, which we address in part I of this opinion.

2

In his brief to the Appellate Court, the defendant intertwined his argument regarding Parrott’s references to the forensic interview with an argument that was consistent with the objection he made at trial to the admission

of the details of DE’s allegations. He argued that ‘‘[t]he state could have
achieved its purpose of putting the defendant’s answers in context without

alluding to the forensic interviews or quoting the victims directly.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Paul B., Conn. Appellate Court Records & Briefs, February Term, 2013, Defendant’s Brief p. 27. The Appellate Court, however, did

not address the defendant’s claim regarding Parrott’s references to the

forensic interview. See State v. Paul B., supra, 143 Conn. App. 710–15.

3 The defendant relies on concurring and dissenting opinions in Williams

v. Illinois, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 2221, 183 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2012), for the

proposition that any time an expert conveys an out-of-court statement to

the jury as a basis for her opinion, the statement is offered for its truth and

is therefore inadmissible hearsay. In Williams, a confrontation clause case,

Justice Clarence Thomas, in his concurring opinion, and four dissenting

justices essentially adopted this view. See id., 2257 (Thomas, J., concurring);

id., 2268–69 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also 2 K. Broun, McCormick on

Evidence (6th Ed. 2006) § 324.3, p. 419. We note that the court in Williams

was interpreting Illinois rules of evidence and the case therefore provides

little guidance for this court. Moreover, because we conclude that any

impropriety in the admission of Edell’s testimony was harmless, we need

not determine in the present case whether, as a blanket rule, an expert’s

reliance on an out-of-court statement as the basis for her opinion automatically converts the statement into inadmissible hearsay. See footnote 4 of

this opinion (addressing vouching concerns raised by expert’s use of

such statements).

4 The state acknowledges that, in light of this court’s decision in State v.

Favoccia, supra, 306 Conn. 803, which was decided after the trial in this

case, this testimony was improper because it constituted indirect vouching

forthe credibility ofthe victims. The state argues, however,thattheAppellate

Court properly determined that, because the defendant did not lodge a

vouching objection at trial, such a claim is unreviewable. See State v. Paul

B., supra, 143 Conn. App. 700–701. The defendant does not raise a separate

vouching claim on appeal before this court, but we consider whether the

testimony had that effect to the extent that it is relevant to the question of

whether the admission of the statements, if improper, was harmful.

5 The state argues that the defendant’s prosecutorial impropriety claim

is not reviewable on appeal because the Appellate Court construed the

defendant’s claim as only challenging the prosecutor’s references to the outof-court statements admitted through Parrott’s testimony. We disagree that

the claim should not be reviewed. Our review of the record reveals that the

defendant did challenge the prosecutor’s references to both the testimony

of Parrott and Edell, but the Appellate Court limited its review to the prosecutor’s references to Parrott’s testimony. State v. Paul B., supra, 143 Conn.

App. 715, 718–19. Although the defendant did not file a motion forreconsideration to address the overlooked argument, he argued in his petition for

certification that the Appellate Court ‘‘misse[d] the point that the prosecutor

had no right to repeat DE’s allegations of abuse from the interview with

. . . Edell . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.)