IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION 

DAVID A. RANCOURT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. Case No.: 4:21cv2-MW/MAF

MYLIFE.COM, a foreign corporation,

and JEFFREY P. TINSLEY, individually

and in his capacity as an officer of 

MYLIFE.COM, INC., 

Defendants. 

________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

This Court has taken to describing the power of arbitration agreements in 

biblical terms, explaining that, like a rich man attempting to enter the kingdom of 

heaven, “[a] party wishing to escape the grip of an arbitration clause may have an 

easier time fitting a camel through the eye of a needle.”

1 Frame v. Alder 

Holdings, LLC, No. 4:18cv42-MW/CAS, 2018 WL 5905889, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 

23, 2018). In this case, a more apt analogy may be that the arbitration provision at 

issue acts as a black hole, grabbing hold of anything and anyone that passes in its 

vicinity. Here, Plaintiff, despite all his best efforts, has crossed its event horizon 

and cannot escape. 

1 See Matthew 19:24. 

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Pending before this Court is Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims, ECF No. 9, and Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition, ECF 

No. 12, as well as attached exhibits. Having considered these, this Court determines 

that Plaintiff must arbitrate his claims against both Defendants. This Court also 

determines that a stay, rather than dismissal, is appropriate. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED 

in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff shall arbitrate his claims, and this Court 

orders this case STAYED pending arbitration.

I. Background

Defendant MyLife.com (“MyLife”) sells background reports about 

individuals. ECF No. 7 ¶ 11. Defendant Tinsley is the founder, CEO, and Chairman 

of MyLife. Id. ¶ 3. MyLife makes some generalized information about an individual 

available for free online when users search for a name, while more detailed 

information is available only for a fee. Id. Plaintiff alleges that MyLife published or

communicated information about him that was false or misleading, including that he 

has “Court, Arrest, or Criminal Records.” Id. ¶ 30. But Plaintiff has no arrests or 

criminal record. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff alleges one count of negligence against both 

Defendants, and in the alternative, a claim for libel/defamation or libel/defamation 

per se. Id. ¶¶ 35-49.

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Plaintiff became a paid subscriber to MyLife on April 4, 2019, allegedly in 

the hopes of correcting the false or misleading information available about himself, 

but was unsuccessful. Id. ¶ 33. As a part of his subscription, Plaintiff agreed to 

MyLife’s terms and privacy policy at various points. ECF No. 9 at 3-5. Within those 

terms is the Arbitration Agreement, which states in part “MyLife.com® and 

[Plaintiff] . . . agree to arbitrate all disputes and claims arising out of or relating to 

this Agreement between MyLife.com® and [Plaintiff].” Id. at 5. The Arbitration 

Agreement is five paragraphs in length and also includes a provision that “[a]ll issues 

are for the arbitrator to decide, including the scope of this arbitration clause, but the 

arbitrator is bound by the terms of this Agreement.” Id. at 6. 

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit in December of 2020 in state court, after which 

Defendants removed this case, ECF No. 1, and sought both to dismiss and to compel 

arbitration, ECF No. 9. Plaintiff responded in opposition. ECF No. 12. Defendants’ 

motion is now ripe for decision. 

II. Analysis

“[T]he first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to 

determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.” Mitsubishi Motors 

Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985). Because the 

Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) embodies a “liberal federal policy favoring 

arbitration agreements,” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 

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(1991) (internal quotations omitted), this Court must approach this question with “a 

healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitrations.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l 

Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

Here, Plaintiff does not challenge the validity of the user agreement he 

completed when he became a MyLife subscriber, nor does he challenge the validity 

of the Arbitration Agreement within it. Plaintiff does not challenge that the 

agreement was in writing, as is required by the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also 

Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 2005). Nor 

does Plaintiff dispute that the user agreement involves or affects interstate 

commerce, as is necessary to trigger Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. 

See ECF No. 9 at 11-12. In fact, Plaintiff concedes that he “does not disagree with 

Defendant’s assertions that arbitration agreements generally are presumptively 

valid, that the arbitration provision at-issue is in writing, or that the parties’ 

transaction in this case involved or affected interstate commerce.” ECF No. 12 at 4. 

He simply argues that “by its plain language, the arbitration clause at-issue does not 

apply to or cover” Plaintiff’s claims before this Court. ECF No. 12 at 1. Thus,

according to Plaintiff, this Court is not called to determine the validity of a contract, 

but simply its relevance to this matter. But while Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration 

Agreement is irrelevant here, Defendants respond that the clause delegates this

“gateway” issue to the arbitrator, and it is to this question that this Court now turns.

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A. Who Decides the Scope of the Arbitration Agreement?

The Arbitration Agreement that Plaintiff agreed to on April 4, 2019 states that 

it applies to “all disputes and claims arising out of or relating to this Agreement 

between MyLife.com® and [Plaintiff].” ECF No. 9 at 5. By this plain language, the 

Arbitration Agreement would not appear to be relevant to Plaintiff’s claims, which 

are explicitly and exclusively made as to Defendants’ conduct “that occurred 

through and including April 3, 2019.” ECF No. 7 ¶ 34. It is entirely unclear to this 

Court how alleged negligence or defamation by Defendants, through publishing 

information about Plaintiff to third parties prior to April 4, 2019, could arise out of 

or relate to a user agreement Plaintiff signed on April 4, 2019. According to a 

straightforward reading of the simple terms by which the Arbitration Agreement sets 

out its own scope, it does not apply to this matter. 

However, if straightforward readings were determinative of legal questions, 

law school would be a lot shorter than three years. As able as this Court may be to 

state the obvious, Defendants argue that it is not this Court’s role to do so. Rather, 

the Arbitration Agreement includes the clause that “[a]ll issues are for the arbitrator 

to decide, including the scope of this arbitration clause . . .,” ECF No. 9 at 6.

Defendants argue that even when it is obvious that an arbitration agreement does not 

apply to a dispute between parties, a court must compel arbitration so that an 

arbitrator can be the one to state the obvious. 

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“An agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent 

agreement the party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the 

FAA operates on this additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any other.” 

Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70 (2010). As a matter of 

contracting, “parties can agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’

such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement 

covers a particular controversy.” Id. at 68-69. Ambiguity in a contract regarding 

“who should decide arbitrability” triggers a presumption in favor of a judicial—

rather than an arbitral—forum, thereby reversing the presumption that pertains to 

arbitration generally. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-

45 (1995). Thus, courts should not assume that parties agreed to arbitrate a gateway 

issue unless there is “clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]” evidence that they did. See id.

Here, the language in the Arbitration Agreement that “[a]ll issues are for the 

arbitrator to decide, including the scope of this arbitration clause, . . .” is functionally 

the same as other provisions that the Eleventh Circuit has held to “clearly and 

unmistakably evince[] the parties’ intent to arbitrate all gateway issues.” Jones v. 

Waffle House, Inc., 866 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2017). Given this binding 

precedent, it falls to the arbitrator to decide whether Plaintiff’s claims are within the

scope of the Arbitration Agreement in this matter. 

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Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration is 

GRANTED in part as to both of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant MyLife. But, 

because Plaintiff also argues that this Court cannot compel him to arbitrate his claims 

against Defendants Tinsley, a non-signatory, this Court must now decide whether 

Defendants can compel Plaintiff to arbitrate Counts I and II in their entirety—both 

of which Plaintiff brings against MyLife and Tinsley jointly. 

B. Must Plaintiff Arbitrate Claims Against a Non-Signatory?

State law controls whether a non-signatory may enforce an arbitration clause. 

Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009); see also GE Energy 

Power Conversion Fr. SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 

1637, 1643 (2020) (“The ‘traditional principles of state law’ that apply under 

Chapter 1 include doctrines that authorize the enforcement of a contract by a 

nonsignatory.”). Here, the user agreement specifies that the parties chose California 

law to govern. ECF No. 9-2 at 6. Thus, this Court must enforce the arbitration clause 

even as to claims against non-signatories if California law requires it do so.

Under California law, one must generally “be a party to an arbitration 

agreement to be bound by it or invoke it.” Westra v. Marcus & Millichap Real Est. 

Inv. Brokerage Co., 129 Cal. App. 4th 759, 763 (2005) (citations omitted). “ ‘The 

strong public policy in favor of arbitration does not extend to those who are not 

parties to an arbitration agreement, and a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a 

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dispute that he has not agreed to resolve by arbitration.’ ” Id. However, nonsignatories who act as agents of signatories are “entitled to the benefit of arbitration,” 

the same as their principals. Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 999, 

1004 (Ct. App. 1975) (citations omitted); see also Westra, 129 Cal. App. 4th at 767 

(2005) (quoting Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club 186 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1319 (1986)

(overruled on other grounds)). 

Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Tinsley in Counts I and II are 

clearly entangled with Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant MyLife. Each count in 

the complaint is made against both Defendants, and Plaintiff barely distinguishes 

between them. See, e.g., ECF No. 7 ¶¶ 41-43. Plaintiff introduces Defendant Tinsley 

as the founder, CEO, and Chairman of Defendant MyLife, and states that he has 

“transacted business, including without limitation through and/or on behalf of 

Defendant MyLife, in Gadsden County, Florida and throughout the United States.” 

Id. ¶ 3. Given the entanglement of these claims and given the provision under 

California law for agents of signatories being “entitled to the benefit of arbitration,” 

Berman, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 1004, this Court will compel Plaintiff to arbitrate his

claims against Tinsley. Thus, Defendants’ motion to dismiss and to compel 

arbitration is GRANTED in part as to Counts I and II in their entirety, against both 

Defendants. 

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C. Must This Court Stay or Dismiss?

Once this Court determines that it must refer a lawsuit to arbitration, Section 

3 of the FAA states that it “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of 

the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the 

agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with 

such arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. The Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held 

that section 3 only allows courts to stay, not dismiss, cases referred to arbitration. 

See Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2004); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. 

Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 417 F.3d 727, 732 n.7 (7th Cir. 2005); Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. 

Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1994). But the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 

Circuits have held that section 3 also allows for dismissal. See Choice Hotels Int’l, 

Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709-10 (4th Cir. 2001); Alford v. 

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992); Sparling v. 

Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988).

However, the Eleventh Circuit has not explicitly weighed in on this question. 

See Valiente v. Holiday CVS, LLC, No. 20-CV-20382, 2020 WL 2404701, at *2 

(S.D. Fla. May 12, 2020). But Eleventh Circuit precedent strongly suggests this 

Court should stay this action rather than dismiss it. See Bender v. A.G. Edwards & 

Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The district court properly found 

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that the state law claims were subject to arbitration, but erred in dismissing the claims 

rather than staying them.”).

The Eleventh Circuit certainly has upheld district court orders dismissing 

cases subject to arbitration. Valiente, 2020 WL 2404701, at *2. But “[o]n its face, 

Section 3 appears to leave the Court with only one option when it determines that an 

issue in a suit is ‘referable to arbitration: . . . the Court ‘shall . . . stay the trial of the 

action.’ ” Ruiz v. Millennium Square Residential Ass’n, No. 1:19-CV-03765 (TNM), 

2020 WL 3103900, at *9 (D.D.C. June 11, 2020) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3). This Court 

agrees that stay means stay. 

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, ECF 

No. 9, is DENIED in part, and this Court orders this case STAYED pending 

arbitration. 

For the reasons stated above,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, ECF No. 9, is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

2. This Court compels the parties to arbitrate all claims in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint. 

3. The case is STAYED pending arbitration.

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4. The parties shall file a notice informing this Court of the arbitrator’s 

decision in this case within 10 days of that decision. 

SO ORDERED on March 16, 2021.

s/Mark E. Walker 

Chief United States District Judge

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