Contents

Approved by USDA’s 

World Agricultural 

Outlook Board

United States

Department

of Agriculture

www.ers.usda.gov

A Report from the Economic Research Service

Abstract

Establishment of a more normal economic relationship with Cuba has the potential to 

foster additional growth in U.S.-Cuba agricultural trade. Prior to the Cuban Revolution 

of 1959, bilateral agricultural trade featured large volumes of Cuban sugar and smaller 

volumes of molasses, tobacco, and pineapple from Cuba and rice, lard, dried beans, 

wheat, and wheat flour from the United States. In 2000, the U.S. economic embargo on 

Cuba was loosened to allow for U.S. exports of agricultural products and medicine. As 

a result, the United States soon became Cuba’s leading supplier of agricultural imports. 

The remaining prohibitions on issuing credit to Cuba, however, give other exporting 

countries a competitive advantage in the Cuban market, and the United States slipped 

to being the second leading supplier in 2013 and the third leading supplier in 2014. A 

more normal economic relationship between the two countries would allow Cuba to 

resume exporting agricultural products to the United States, while U.S. agricultural 

exporters would be able to develop commercial ties in Cuba that approximate their 

business relationships in other parts of the world.

Keywords: Cuba, United States, agricultural trade, embargo, normal trade relations.

Acknowledgments

We are thankful for comments and suggestions received from a number of individuals, including Erik Dohlman, Mark Jekanowski, and Andrew Muhammad 

(USDA, Economic Research Service); and Mike Dwyer and Brian Healy (USDA, 

Foreign Agricultural Service). Andre Bradley (USDA, FAS), Jonathan Coleman 

(U.S. International Trade Commission), William Liefert (USDA, ERS), and William 

Messina (University of Florida) provided valuable peer reviews, and Kristen Stein 

(Global Trade Information Services) facilitated access to the trade statistics of Cuba’s 

trading partners. Special thanks to Dale Simms, Cynthia A. Ray, and Curtia Taylor 

(ERS) for their expert editing and design of the report.

AES-87

June 2015

Steven Zahniser, zahniser@ers.usda.gov, Bryce Cooke, bryce.

cooke@ers.usda.gov, Jerry Cessna, Nathan Childs, David 

Harvey, Mildred Haley, Michael McConnell, and Carlos Arnade

U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, 

Present, and Possible Future

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . 1

U.S.-Cuba Trade Once 

Substantial . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

U.S. Agricultural Exports 

to Cuba Resume . . . . . . . 6

U.S.-Cuba Possible 

Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

A Complicated 

Relationship . . . . . . . . . . 23

References . . . . . . . . . . . 25
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Introduction

Establishment of a more normal economic relationship with Cuba offers the potential to generate 

further growth in U.S.-Cuba trade; to foster greater productivity in the Cuban economy; to increase 

demand for agricultural imports among Cuban consumers, foodservice providers, and food manufacturers; and to allow for the resumption of U.S. agricultural imports from Cuba. Over the past 

6 months, the United States and Cuba have taken several small steps toward normalizing their 

economic relationship. In December 2014, the United States announced that it would begin discussions to re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba and that it would implement executive actions 

designed to ease the restrictions on trade, remittances, and travel with Cuba. These executive actions 

build upon similar measures taken in 2009. However, under current legislation, substantial modifications to the embargo require congressional action.1

1In this report, we define agricultural trade as encompassing those commodities and products within the Foreign 

Agricultural Trade of the United States (FATUS) classification scheme, as specified by USDA/FAS (2015b).
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U.S.-Cuba Trade Once Substantial

Past levels of U.S.-Cuba agricultural trade suggest the possible size and composition of future trade 

flows between the two countries. Before the Cuban Revolution, the United States and Cuba were 

major agricultural trading partners. During fiscal years (FY) 1956-58,2 Cuba was the ninth leading 

destination for U.S. agricultural exports and the second leading supplier of U.S. agricultural imports. 

U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba averaged $139 million per year during this period (table 1), while 

corresponding imports averaged $408 million (table 2), with both figures measured in nominal 

dollars. At current prices (calendar years 2012-14), U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba during FY 

1956-58 would amount to roughly $600 million annually, while U.S. imports from Cuba would 

equal about $2.2 billion. The large value of U.S. agricultural imports from Cuba during FY 1956-

58, as measured in 2012-14 prices, is due mainly to the sizable volume of sugar imports during that 

period and the fact that the nominal unit value for U.S. sugar imports increased by about 400 percent 

between 1956-58 and 2012-14.

Rice, lard, pork, and wheat flour were the four leading U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba in terms 

of value during FY 1956-58. Cuba was typically the largest commercial market for U.S. long-grain 

rice exports prior to the embargo, often taking more than half of U.S. annual long-grain sales and 

almost one-third of total U.S. rice exports (Efferson, 1952: 518-521; USDA, Agricultural Marketing 

Service, 1956: 16). If Cuba imported the same amount of rice today as it did then, it would be the 

7th leading destination for U.S. rice exports, even though Cuba’s annual per capita rice consumption 

was about two-thirds of what it is today.3 Consumers in pre-revolutionary Cuba generally liked the 

taste, appearance, and cooking qualities of U.S. rice varieties and were willing to pay a premium for 

them. Virtually all U.S. rice exports to Cuba prior to the embargo consisted of milled, southern longgrain rice; long-grain rice is still the dominant class of U.S. rice grown for export.4

Cane sugar, molasses, tobacco, and coffee were the four leading U.S. agricultural imports from 

Cuba during FY 1956-58.5 Past volumes of U.S. sugar imports from Cuba alone (2.8 million metric 

tons per year) rival contemporary volumes of total U.S. sugar imports from all countries (3.1 

million metric tons per year during 2012-14) (table 2). Cuban sugar exports to the United States 

are unlikely to return to the levels of the late 1950s. Nonetheless, these exports were so vital to the 

Cuban economy of the 1950s that Dye and Sicotte (2004) posit that a 1956 revision to U.S. sugar 

trade policy tightening the import quota for Cuba greatly weakened the Cuban economy just as the 

Revolution was getting underway.

2The fiscal year of the U.S. Federal Government runs from October 1 to September 30. Thus, FY 2015 began on 

October 1, 2014, and will end on September 30, 2015. FY 1956-58 were the last 3 FYs prior to the collapse of the prerevolutionary government in January 1959 and correspond to the period when the revolutionaries pressed their attack.

3Cuba averaged 56 kilograms per capita in 1957, obtained by dividing the sum of Cuba’s domestic production and 

imports of rice for 1957, as reported by Mears (1962), by Cuba’s population in 1957, as estimated by U.S. Department of 

Commerce, Bureau of the Census (2013). Cuba’s pre-revolutionary rice production peaked in 1957, as the harvest of the 

subsequent year’s main crop was interrupted by the armed conflict.

4U.S. rice exports to Cuba picked up sharply during World War II, when shipments from Cuba’s previous top 

suppliers—Burma and Thailand—were suspended due to the war. Prior to the late 1930s, the United States had been only 

a minor supplier of rice to Cuba. From the mid-1940s up until the embargo, the United States supplied the bulk of Cuba’s 

rice imports (Efferson, 1952: 518-521).

5The imported molasses was used primarily to produce industrial alcohol, according to a statement in 1960 by a USDA 

spokesperson (The Guardian, 1960).
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Table 1

U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, 1956-58 versus 2012-14

Commodity

Value

Annual average

Change 

Volume

Annual average

Change

Unit value

for period

Change 

1956-

58

2012-

14

1956-

58

2012-

14

1956-

58

2012-

14

U.S. dollars 

(millions) Percent Metric tons (thousands) Percent U.S. dollars per kilogram Percent

Total agricultural exports 

to Cuba 139.17 365.26 162 -- -- -- -- -- --

Animals and products 40.60 161.19 297 119.93 148.18 24 0.34 1.09 221

Chickens, fresh or frozen 0.16 131.00 82,637 0.16 143.09 88,015 0.98 0.92 -6

Pork 9.96 4.33 -56 14.43 1.66 -88 0.69 2.60 278

Lard 21.66 0.02 -100 78.04 0.02 -100 0.28 1.41 409

Tallow 2.74 0.00 -100 15.62 0.00 -100 0.18 -- --

Other 6.09 25.84 324 11.68 3.41 -71 0.52 7.57 1,351

Oilseeds and products 4.81 103.58 2,052 40.07 192.48 380 0.12 0.54 348

Soybean meal 1.46 59.37 3,971 30.67 112.72 268 0.05 0.53 1,008

Soybeans 0.00 44.08 -- 0.00 79.71 -- -- 0.55 --

Soybean oil 1.69 0.00 -100 5.02 0.00 -100 0.34 -- --

Other oilseeds and products 3.36 0.13 -96 4.38 0.05 -99 0.77 2.77 261

Grains and feeds 53.85 97.26 81 353.63 344.06 -3 0.15 0.28 86

Corn 0.00 72.87 -- 0.00 269.20 -- -- 0.27 --

Brewing or distilling dregs or 

waste 0.00 14.06 -- 0.00 54.91 -- -- 0.26 --

Feeds and fodder, NESOI 0.88 10.30 1,065 -- 19.91 -- -- 0.52 --

Rice 32.90 0.00 -100 165.56 0.01 -100 0.20 0.67 --

Wheat 5.74 0.00 -100 84.00 0.00 -100 0.07 -- --

Wheat flour 8.27 0.00 -100 79.68 0.00 -100 0.10 -- --

Other grains and feeds 6.05 0.03 -100 24.40 0.03 -100 0.25 0.84 238

Vegetables and preparations 15.77 0.09 -99 105.36 -- -- 0.15 -- --

Dried beans 6.44 0.00 -100 39.15 0.00 -100 0.16 -- --

Onions 2.11 0.00 -100 26.88 0.00 -100 0.08 -- --

Other vegetables and preparations 9.34 0.09 -99 66.21 -- -- 0.14 -- --

Cotton, excluding linters 3.59 1.04 -71 4.77 0.43 -91 0.75 2.44 224

Fruits and preparations 6.75 0.97 -86 16.33 0.51 -97 0.41 1.90 361

Fruit juices 2.19 0.02 -99 -- -- -- -- -- --

Other agricultural exports 

to Cuba 13.80 1.12 -92 -- -- -- -- -- --

Notes: Data for 1956-58 are for fiscal years; data for 2012-14 are for calendar years. NESOI = not elsewhere specified or indicated.

Sources: USDA/FAS (1957, 1958, 1959, 2015c).
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U.S.-Cuba relations quickly deteriorated after Cuba’s new government took power. Cuba expropriated U.S. economic assets, including farms and sugar mills, as part of its efforts to institute a 

socialist economic system, and the United States imposed economic sanctions against Cuba and 

broke diplomatic relations. An ERS report on the agricultural and food situation in early postrevolutionary Cuba (Mears, 1962) describes how Cuba switched from a market-based relationship 

with its agricultural trading partners, primarily the United States, to barter arrangements with the 

Soviet Union, China, and other countries in the East Bloc. As a result, U.S.-Cuba agricultural trade 

dropped sharply in 1960 and then disappeared almost completely by the middle of 1961.

The Mears report also describes some of the agricultural trade measures taken by the United States 

during this period. In July 1960, the United States canceled the remainder of Cuba’s sugar quota 

for 1960 and set the quotas for 1961 and 1962 at zero. Exceptions for U.S. sales of unsubsidized 

agricultural products and medicine, however, were incorporated within both the partial economic 

embargo imposed in October 1960 and the much more extensive embargo announced in February 

1962, which prohibited all U.S. imports from Cuba.6

It was not until May 1964 that the U.S. Department of Commerce revoked the general license for 

U.S. sales of food and medicine to Cuba and adopted a policy in which licenses for commercial 

agricultural sales were denied. Only humanitarian donations of agricultural products were approved 

(Krinsky and Golove, 1993: 114, as cited by Hufbauer et al., 2011: 2-3). Despite efforts by several 

6For summaries of the political and military confrontations between the United States and Cuba during the late 1950s 

and early 1960s, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian (2013a, 2013b, 2015).

Table 2

U.S. agricultural imports from Cuba, 1956-58

Commodity

Annual average Unit value

Value Volume for period

U.S. dollars 

(millions)

Metric tons 

(thousands)

U.S. dollars 

per kilogram

Total agricultural imports from Cuba 407.50 3,924.46 0.10

Sugar and related products 359.25 3,841.67 0.09

Sugar, cane 333.83 2,844.44 0.12

Molasses 25.43 997.23 0.03

Tobacco, unmanufactured 24.73 10.91 2.27

Coffee 9.55 9.28 1.03

Fruits and preparations 6.05 15.88 0.38

Pineapples, canned or preserved 3.57 12.61 0.28

Pineapples, fresh 1.90 -- --

Other fruits and preparations 0.58 3.27 0.18

Vegetables and preparations 2.62 30.14 0.09

Other agricultural imports from Cuba 5.29 16.59 0.32

Notes: Data are for fiscal years. 

Sources: USDA/FAS (1957, 1958, 1959).
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U.S. administrations to improve U.S.-Cuba relations, the ban on direct agricultural trade with Cuba 

remained in place for nearly four decades.

Restrictions on indirect trade with Cuba—including agricultural sales by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 

companies—have varied over the years. In October 1975, the U.S. Department of Treasury revoked 

the regulation that prohibited such subsidiaries from trading with Cuba and instead began to require 

licenses for such transactions (Franklin, 1997: 119-121, as cited by USITC, 2001: 2-5 to 2-6). With 

the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act in October 1992, however, the Treasury Department lost 

the authority to issue these licenses for most trade with Cuba (Ross, 2004). Prior to the law, licensed 

agricultural sales to Cuba by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms were in the neighborhood of $350 

million per year (Fletcher, 1992, as cited by Wong, 1994).
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U.S. Agricultural Exports to Cuba Resume

The current state of U.S.-Cuba agricultural trade is founded upon a major policy change implemented about 15 years ago. In October 2000, the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement 

Act (TSRA)—which authorized certain sales of food, medicines, and medical equipment to a 

number of countries, including Cuba—was signed into law. At that time, nearly a decade had passed 

since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the concomitant end to Soviet economic support for 

Cuba. In this context, the Cuban Government overcame its initial reluctance to import basic agricultural commodities from the United States in order to supplement domestic production and, when 

necessary, to respond to short-term food shortages caused by adverse weather conditions. The 

devastation caused by Hurricane Michelle in November 2001 was an especially strong factor behind 

the change in Cuba’s stance toward importing U.S. agricultural products (Messina, 2015).

TSRA’s exemptions to the embargo quickly led to the reestablishment of U.S. agricultural exports 

to Cuba (fig. 1). However, TSRA does not include a legal framework for the resumption of U.S. 

agricultural imports from Cuba. From 1960 through the mid-1990s, the U.S. economic embargo 

on Cuba was largely authorized by Executive Orders. This changed with the passage of the Cuban 

Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (also known as the Helms-Burton Act, in reference 

to the law’s sponsors, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Representative Dan Burton of 

Indiana). The Helms-Burton Act codifies the embargo (in other words, requires the embargo by 

law) and defines the conditions for suspending and then terminating the embargo. Specifically, the 

Act authorizes the President to suspend the embargo when a transition government comes to power 

in Cuba and to end the embargo altogether when a democratically elected government takes power 

Source: USDA/FAS (2015a).

Figure 1

U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba averaged $365 million per year during 2012-14

Millions of dollars

5

140

248

384

346

321

431

685

525

349 353

459

350

286

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

2001 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14

Calendar year
7

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there.7 In the absence of new legislation that modifies these provisions, U.S. agricultural imports 

from Cuba remain at zero, even though Cuba still produces many of the agricultural commodities 

that it formerly exported to the United States, such as sugar and tobacco.

Foreign agricultural sales to Cuba

U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba averaged $365 million per year during 2012-14. Exports are 

heavily concentrated in four basic commodities (table 1). Chicken meat, corn, soybean meal, and 

soybeans accounted for 84 percent of total exports during this period in terms of value. Cuba is an 

important market for U.S. broiler meat (Davis et al., 2013). On a quantity basis, Cuba ranked as 

the fourth largest export market for U.S. broiler meat during 2012-14. Frozen chicken-leg quarters, 

a relatively low-cost poultry cut, accounted for 83 percent of U.S. broiler meat exports to Cuba in 

terms of quantity during this period. Corn, soybean meal, and soybeans are all feedstuffs used in 

livestock production in Cuba. In some years during the TSRA period, U.S. agricultural exports to 

Cuba have included substantial quantities of commodities other than the four mentioned above, such 

as rice, wheat, nonfat dry milk, pork, dried beans, and soybean oil.8 U.S. restrictions on extending 

credit to Cuban buyers have made it harder for U.S. agricultural exporters to sell a larger volume 

and broader variety of commodities to Cuba.

The United States is not Cuba’s only foreign supplier of agricultural products. Export data reported 

by Cuba’s trading partners indicate that Cuba’s agricultural imports from all countries averaged 

$1.8 billion per year during 2012-14 (fig. 2). The United States was Cuba’s second leading supplier 

of agricultural imports during this period ($362 million), while the European Union (EU) ($383 

million) and Brazil ($348 million) were Cuba’s first and third leading suppliers. Together, these 

three trade partners supplied 61 percent of Cuba’s agricultural imports, with the U.S. share equaling 

20 percent. From 2003 to 2012, the United States was Cuba’s leading supplier of agricultural 

imports. The United States slipped to second in 2013 and third in 2014.

Cuba’s total agricultural imports have been trending upward over the past decade, increasing by 

94 percent between 2004 and 2014. The value of these imports was unusually large ($2.1 billion) 

in 2008, due in part to high commodity prices. In fact, the unit values of each of the top five U.S. 

agricultural exports to Cuba (fresh or frozen chicken, corn, wheat, soybeans, and soybean meal) 

increased by at least 67 percent between 2006 and 2008. Hurricane Ike also contributed to the large 

value of imports in 2008, as U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba in October and November of that year 

were larger than the corresponding months in any other year during 2001-14. Cuba’s agricultural 

imports are concentrated in grains and animal products (fig. 3). During 2012-14, the five leading 

agricultural imports in terms of value were wheat (13 percent), corn (12 percent), chicken meat (11 

percent), nonfat dried milk (10 percent), and rice (10 percent).

7Haney and Vanderbush (2005) discuss the policy context that led to the passage of the Helms-Burton Act.

8Each of these six commodities accounted for at least $10 million in exports to Cuba during at least 1 year during 

2000-11.
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5

140 248

384 346 321 431

685

525

349 353 459 350 286 217

193

224

149 154 153

165

176

149

246 338

348

369 434

57

37

23

58 103 141

171

330

166 288

385

377

326 340

310

279

257

379

516 455

620

885

473

618

710 504 812 820

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

2001 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14

Calendar year

Sources: USDA/FAS (2015a) and export data of various national governments, as cited by Global Trade Information 

Services (2015).

Figure 2

Cuba's agricultural imports have trended upward over the past decade

Millions of dollars

Rest of world

Brazil

European Union

United States

Source: Export data of various national governments, as cited by Global Trade Information Services (2015).

Figure 3

Cuba's agricultural imports from the world were concentrated in grains and animal 

products from 2012 to 2014

Nonfat dried

milk

10%

Chicken meat

11%

Wheat

13%

Corn

Rice 12%

10%

Soybeans

4%

Soybean oil

5%

Other products

35%
9

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U.S. agricultural exports limited by payment requirements 

and financial restrictions

A major inhibitor of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba is the TSRA’s restrictions on the terms of 

payment and financing. TSRA specifies that the only payment or financing terms that U.S. persons 

may provide for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba are (1) payment of cash in advance or (2) financing 

by third-country financial institutions. Moreover, TSRA underscores that nothing in its specification 

of payment and financing restrictions “authorizes payment terms or trade financing involving a debit 

or credit to an account of a person located in Cuba or of the Government of Cuba maintained on the 

books of a United States depository institution” (U.S. Statutes at Large, 2000). Many observers believe 

that this credit restriction enables other countries to compete more effectively with the United States 

for agricultural sales to Cuba, as exporters in those countries are able to leverage their sales to Cuba 

by extending credit and favorable payment terms, while U.S. exporters are prohibited from doing so 

(Messina, 2015; U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), 2007).

A ruling issued in 2005 clarifies TSRA’s restrictions on cash-in-advance payments. From the implementation of TSRA in 2000 until late 2004, U.S. exporters of agricultural products to Cuba generally believed that it was possible to comply with TSRA’s cash-in-advance option by authorizing the 

transfer of the documents necessary for transferring ownership of the goods to the Cuban importer 

just after receiving the cash payment. This meant that the cash payment would not be in place until 

sometime after the shipment had left the U.S. port. In late 2004, however, a number of U.S. financial 

institutions started to block such transactions due to their uncertain conformity with TSRA’s conditions for cash-in-advance payments. 

In February 2005, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued 

a ruling that payment of cash in advance means that the payment must be received by the seller or 

the seller’s agent prior to shipment of goods from the U.S. port at which they are loaded. Following 

this ruling, Cuba began to make payments for its purchases of U.S. agricultural products by using 

“a confirmed, irrevocable letter-of-credit ... completed with a third country bank” (USDA, Foreign 

Agricultural Service, Office of Global Analysis, 2008: 24). This change was reportedly motivated 

by concerns that the new ruling might allow agricultural shipments destined for Cuba to be confiscated in U.S. ports in conjunction with any outstanding legal claims against the Cuban Government 

(USITC, 2007: 3-5 to 3-6).

Financing by a third-country financial institution is more laborious than making a conventional 

payment directly from the buyer’s financial institution in Cuba to the seller’s financial institution in 

the United States. 9 The Cuban Government adjusted to this technique when buying U.S. agricultural products, although some U.S. agricultural commodity groups viewed the requirement of using 

third-country financial institutions as an important obstacle.10 By contrast, the U.S. prohibition on 

extending credit to Cuba’s agricultural importers continues to hamper U.S. efforts to export agricultural products to Cuba. During 2005-07, the United States exported an annual average of 124,000 

metric tons of rice, 275,000 metric tons of wheat, 6,000 metric tons of nonfat dried milk, and 33,000 

metric tons of soybean oil to Cuba. During 2012-14, however, the United States exported hardly 

9The USITC (2007: 3-8 to 3-12) illustrates the difference between these two techniques using U.S. agricultural exports 

to Cuba and to the Dominican Republic as contrasting examples.

10See, for instance, Harris (2015) and National Milk Producers Federation (2009).
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any rice, wheat, nonfat dried milk, or soybean oil to Cuba, even though Cuba purchased an annual 

average of 110,000 metric tons of rice and 75,000 metric tons of soybean oil from Brazil, 462,000 

metric tons of wheat from France, and 10,000 metric tons of whole milk powder from New Zealand 

(Global Trade Information Services, 2015).

Factors other than financial restrictions and payment requirements influence the level of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. For instance, the United States consistently exported small quantities of 

frozen pork muscle cuts and pork variety meats to Cuba over the past decade, except in 2014 when 

a number of factors made those products more expensive to potential buyers in Cuba. U.S. pork 

prices were high due to short supplies caused by the porcine epidemic diarrhea virus, and the U.S. 

dollar was particularly strong. As a result, Cuba imported no muscle cuts of pork from the United 

States and a smaller volume of pork variety meats in 2014. In addition, Coleman (2009: 6) suggests 

that Cuba’s choice of agricultural importers is the product of noncommercial factors, such as the 

Cuban Government’s desire to have a diverse set of import suppliers, to strengthen its geopolitical 

relationships with allies such as China and Vietnam, and to curry favor in specific U.S. States or 

Congressional Districts on the topic of U.S.-Cuba economic relations.

Cuba is an established exporter of sugar but few other agricultural products

Import data reported by Cuba’s trading partners indicate that Cuba’s total agricultural exports (to 

all countries) averaged $526 million per year during 2012-14 (fig. 4). The leading destinations for 

these exports were China (including Hong Kong), accounting for 45 percent of the total, and the 

EU, accounting for 36 percent. Some of these exports are not the result of stand-alone commercial transactions but are linked instead to broader trade and foreign investment deals. For instance, 

Cuba has an agreement to sell China about 400,000 metric tons of sugar each year, while China has 

extended loans to Cuba and made direct investments in Cuban oil exploration, petroleum refining, 

port development, and tourism (Frank, 2013; Rey Mallén, 2014; Menéndez, 2015). By contrast, 

Cuba’s agricultural exports to the EU—which include such commodities as sugar, tobacco, and 

natural honey—suggest a commercial relationship akin to that between the EU and other Caribbean 

countries. Cuba received preferential access to the EU market through the EU’s General System of 

Preferences (GSP) until 2013, when Cuba was recognized in United Nations statistics as an upper 

middle-income country (European Union Delegation to Cuba, 2015).

Russia is currently the third leading destination for Cuba’s agricultural exports, although Cuba’s 

agricultural exports to Russia are not much larger in value than its exports to Sweden or Belarus. 

Russia accounted for 5 percent of Cuba’s total agricultural exports during 2012-14. During the Cold 

War, the Soviet Union heavily subsidized the Cuban economy by importing sugar at well above the 

world market price (Messina, 2015), and as recently as 2001, Cuban agricultural exports to Russia 

equaled $420 million, compared with $51 million in 2014. A disagreement during the early 2000s 

regarding the repayment of loans and obligations owed to Russia appears to have soured the CubaRussia economic relationship, although reports last year suggest that this relationship is on the mend 

(Tamayo, 2014).

Sugar accounts for the overwhelming majority of Cuba’s agricultural exports to the world. During 

2012-14, Cuba’s sugar exports averaged $470 million per year, accounting for 89 percent of the 

country’s total agricultural exports. Natural honey, with exports averaging $19 million per year (3 

percent of the total), was Cuba’s second leading agricultural export. Among Cuba’s nonagricultural 

exports are several products that are manufactured using the agricultural commodities of either 

tobacco or sugarcane. Cuba has long been known for its cigars. During 2012-14, cigar and ciga-
11

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Sources: USDA/FAS (2015a), and import data of various national governments, as cited by Global Trade Information 

Services (2015).

Figure 4

China and the European Union are the leading destinations for Cuba's agricultural exports

Millions of dollars

2001 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14

Calendar year

91 96 88 111 121

195

128

189 166

229

303 280

226 211

154 137 142

157 103

104

119

100

103

85

118 173 247

146

420

281

171

173

48

30

53

68

58

45

38

36 13

51

46

53

43

50

26

46

18

67

25

21

61

76

44

74

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Rest of world

Russia

European Union

China and Hong Kong

Source: Import data of various national governments, as cited by Global Trade Information Services (2015).

Figure 5

Cuba's exports of ethanol, cigars, rum, and tafia grew substantially over the past decade

Millions of dollars

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

2001 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14

Calendar year

Ethanol (HS 2207)

Cigars and cigarettes (HS 2402)

Rum and tafia (HS 220840)
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rette exports averaged $222 million per year. These exports increased substantially during the first 

several years of the 21st century and have fluctuated since then. In addition, Cuba has reestablished 

itself as an important exporter of rum and tafia, with export value growing from $27 million in 2005 

to $91 million in 2014.11

The Cuban Rice Sector

Cuba’s diversification away from U.S. rice imports represents the loss of a lucrative export opportunity for U.S. rice growers, since Cuba has the highest per capita rice consumption of any country 

in the Western Hemisphere. Annual per capita rice supply (milled equivalent) is about 61 kilograms 

in Cuba, 49 kilograms in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, 44 kilograms in Nicaragua, and 

7 kilograms in the United States, according to Food Balance Sheets for 2011-13 from the Food 

and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2015). Today, Cuba imports about half of its 

annual rice consumption, with rice imports averaging about 435,000 tons per year during 2010-14. 

Vietnam supplies 70 percent or more of Cuba’s rice imports—mostly 5 and 15 percent broken longgrain milled rice—while Brazil supplies most of the remainder. Brazil has been a major supplier of 

rice to Cuba since 2012.

In 2013/14, Cuba produced 423,000 tons of rice (milled basis), nearly unchanged from the previous 

year but up 18 percent from 2000/01 (USDA/FAS, 2015c). Rice area, yield, and production in Cuba 

can vary by a wide margin each year due to weather and input availability. Cuba plants two rice 

crops a year. The main crop is planted in April-July and harvested in August-December. The second 

crop is planted in December-February and harvested in March-June. Crop calendars, of course, vary 

somewhat across producers, regions, and time. The largest producing Provinces are Pinar del Rio, 

Granma, and Sancti Spiritus. Some producers are able to harvest a second partial or “ratoon” crop 

from the stubble of the first crop harvest.

Cooperative farms, producers with use privileges on state-owned land, and small-scale farmers 

account for the bulk of the area devoted to rice in Cuba, according to official Cuban data for 2009 

(República de Cuba, Oficina Nacional de Estadística, 2010). Since 2009/10, rice area has averaged 

203,000 hectares per year, up from an average of 144,000 hectares during the previous 5 years. The 

Cuban Government wants to boost domestic rice production and reduce imports, especially after 

the 2007/08 price spike and export bans by some rice-exporting countries, and has received technical assistance dedicated to the rice sector from several rice-producing countries, including Brazil, 

Japan, and Vietnam.

Cuba’s field yields averaged 2.8 metric tons per hectare (rough-rice basis) from 2009/10 to 2013/14 

and have shown no signs of long-term growth since the late 1970s. Cuba’s yields are low compared 

with other rice growing countries in the region. From 2009/10 to 2013/14, rice yields averaged 4.7 

metric tons per hectare in the Dominican Republic, 4.4 metric tons in Nicaragua, and 3.5 metric tons 

in Costa Rica. Traditionally, researchers have pointed to a lack of inputs (chemicals, fertilizers, and 

irrigation infrastructure) and the continued participation of state farms in rice production as the main 

factors explaining Cuba’s lower yields (Alvarez, 2004).

11Rum is “an alcoholic liquor distilled from sugar-cane residues or molasses,” while tafia is a “drink similar to rum, 

distilled from molasses or waste from the production of brown sugar” (Oxford University Press, 2015). USDA’s definition of agricultural trade considers beer, wine, and unmanufactured tobacco to be agricultural products, but not rum, other 

distilled spirits, and tobacco products such as cigars and cigarettes.
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The Cuban Sugar Sector

Cuba’s sugar industry is much smaller than it was during the Cold War (fig. 6). At its peak, Cuba 

produced between 6.5 million and 8.5 million metric tons of sugar annually, with over 90 percent 

of production destined for export, on average. If Cuba’s current production and export levels 

equaled those of the 1980s (marketing years 1981/82 to 1990/91), Cuba would be the world’s 7th 

largest producer and 3rd largest exporter of sugar (table 3). The Soviet Union was Cuba’s leading 

customer for sugar during the 1980s; following the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, there was a 

precipitous decline in Cuban sugar production and exports. For marketing years 2012/13 to 2014/15, 

Cuba’s sugar production and exports are estimated to have averaged about 1.6 million metric tons 

and 967,000 metric tons per year, respectively.

Foreign investment from Brazil has helped Cuba to increase its sugar production over the past 

several years (Messina, 2015). In 2012, a Brazilian firm signed a 13-year agreement to manage a 

Cuban sugar mill jointly with Grupo Azucarero (AZCUBA), Cuba’s state-owned industrial group in 

the sugar sector, and a British firm signed an agreement to produce biogas using sugarcane bagasse 

and other feedstocks (Grogg, 2013; Birch, 2015). Despite the increased emphasis on producing 

distilled spirits and bioenergy from Cuban sugarcane, exports continue to be important for the 

sector. During 2012-14, exports accounted for about 52 percent of Cuban sugar production (calculated using data in table 3). Russia remained Cuba’s largest export market for sugar through 2004 

(fig. 7). Since then, China has been Cuba’s largest export market. Given its contract to supply China 

with 400,000 metric tons of sugar each year, Cuba’s annual sugar exports to China have ranged 

from about 370,000 to 438,000 metric tons over the past decade (2005-14), according to Chinese 

import data cited by Global Trade Information Services (2015). Cuba also has offset some of its lost 

sugar exports to Russia by increasing sales to the EU.

Source: USDA/FAS (2015b).

Figure 6

Cuba's role as a sugar producer and exporter greatly diminished after the Soviet Union's 

dissolution in 1991

Millions of metric tons

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Production

Exports

Marketing year
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Table 3

World sugar production and exports: Averages, marketing years 2012/13 to 2014/15

Country Production Country Exports

Thousands

of metric tons

Thousands

of metric tons

Brazil 37,417 Brazil 26,133

India 27,808 Thailand 7,298

European Union 16,475 Cuba, 1981/82 to 1990/91 7,003

China 13,088 Australia 3,301

Thailand 10,776 Mexico 2,116

United States 7,853 Guatemala 2,070

Cuba, 1981/82 to 1990/91 7,706 India 1,755

Mexico 6,712 European Union 1,571

Pakistan 5,287 Cuba, 2012/13 to 2014/15 967

Russia 4,583 Pakistan 810

Australia 4,443 Colombia 717

Guatemala 2,847 South Africa 656

Philippines 2,467 United Arab Emirates 624

Indonesia 2,233 Algeria 500

Colombia 2,200 Belarus 489

South Africa 2,190 El Salvador 438

Turkey 2,162 Mauritius 431

Argentina 2,077 Nicaragua 393

Egypt 2,027 Swaziland 371

Ukraine 1,910 Egypt 367

Vietnam 1,667 South Korea 353

Cuba, 2012/13 to 2014/15 1,592 Malaysia 310

Iran 1,340 Philippines 275

Peru 1,150 Azerbaijan 248

Japan 750 United States 236

Note: Data include both cane and beet sugar. 

Source: USDA/FAS (2015b).
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Source: Import data of national governments, as cited by Global Trade Information Services (2015).

Figure 7

Cuba's sugar exports by destination, 2000-2014

Metric tons (thousands)

433 339 460 365 462 400 400 380 408 438 370 404 426 436 428

171

169

212

155

177

63 86 125 70 119

71 70

199 314 247

2,043

1,820 1,493

727

849

185 71 159 162

143

81 46

61

23 120

59

122

196

117

150

22

67 14 126 24

18 65

175

66 135

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14

Calendar year

Rest of world

Russia

European Union

China
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U.S.-Cuba Possible Future

Two countries enjoy normal trade relations (NTR), formerly referred to as most-favored-nation 

(MFN) status, when each country provides to the other the same trade benefits that it provides 

to any other country with which it has NTR. For agricultural trade, this includes the application 

of MFN tariffs to any imports originating in the other country. In addition, countries that have 

established NTR with each other generally do not prohibit routine, short-term travel from one 

country to the other for the purposes of business or pleasure. The executive actions announced 

in December 2014 are a small step toward NTR between Cuba and the United States. While the 

executive actions modify the payment and financial restrictions governing U.S. exports to Cuba 

and provide for additional exemptions to the U.S. economic embargo, they provide no opportunities for U.S. agricultural imports from Cuba, save for the small purchases that licensed travelers 

to Cuba are allowed to bring home. Given the terms of the Helms-Burton Act, congressional 

action is required—in the absence of a democratically elected government in Cuba—to make 

more substantial changes to the economic embargo.

Establishment of NTR with Cuba is likely to have both short-term and long-term effects on U.S.-

Cuba agricultural trade. The short-term effects would be from the immediate removal of certain 

restrictions—say, the ban on U.S. agricultural imports from Cuba—while the long-term effects 

would be from the additional economic growth and reduced transaction costs stimulated by the 

policy changes. Of particular importance to agricultural trade are sectors in the Cuban economy 

that rely on intermediate and final agricultural imports—such as tourism, restaurants, food services, 

livestock production, and food manufacturing—and sectors in which Cuba specializes due to its 

resource endowments and acquired comparative advantages, such as fruit, vegetables, sugar, and 

tobacco. (For sugar, access to the U.S. market depends on U.S. sugar policy.)

Even the short-term effects of establishing NTR with Cuba are potentially large for U.S. agricultural exports. Partial-equilibrium models (USITC, 2007) suggest that if all U.S. financing and travel 

restrictions had been eliminated in 2006, U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba would have increased 

from $321 million to roughly $550 million. However, the authors of the USITC study caution 

against summing the partial-equilibrium results for each commodity to obtain the total effect of 

removing restrictions, since their models do not take into account cross-commodity substitutions. 

A separate analysis by Rosson, et al. (2010) using an input/output model indicates that U.S. exports 

to Cuba would increase by up to $365 million per year if U.S. financing and travel restrictions were 

removed, including some $327 million in additional agricultural exports, as defined by USDA.

The updated U.S. approach to Cuba

The new U.S. approach to Cuba contains several key elements that have the potential to affect U.S.-

Cuba agricultural trade, albeit in small ways.12 Several of these elements are intended to remove 

outright obstacles to bilateral trade, others are designed to reduce transaction costs, and still others 

aim at fostering greater growth in the Cuban economy. The first element is the effort to reestablish 

diplomatic relations with Cuba. In January 2015, a U.S. delegation met with Cuban officials in 

Havana to discuss a wide range of issues, and several subsequent rounds of meetings have been held 

(Whitefield, 2015). While these efforts alone do not ensure increased agricultural trade between the 

12In this section, we use a summary by Parlapiano (2014) to identify those elements within the updated U.S. approach, 

as described by the White House (2014), that are new and not implemented previously.
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two countries, they portend a more favorable economic and policy environment for bilateral agricultural trade over the medium and long term.

The second element is the relaxation of some U.S. restrictions on travelling to Cuba. Specifically, 

the U.S. Government is expanding the set of classifications of U.S. citizens and permanent residents 

who may visit Cuba under general license from the U.S. Government, requiring no special approval. 

The added classifications are:

• Public performances, clinics, workshops, athletic and other competitions, and exhibitions;

• Support for the Cuban people;

• Humanitarian projects;

• Activities of private foundations or research and educational institutes;

• Exportation, importation, or transmission of information or information materials; and

• Certain export transactions that may be considered for authorization under existing regulations 

and guidelines.13

This loosening of travel restrictions could have a small, positive impact on U.S. agricultural exports 

to Cuba by making it easier for people pursuing authorized export transactions to travel there. 

However, other export restrictions that are still in place, most notably the limitations on financing 

and credit, are likely more onerous than the previous set of travel restrictions. Increased travel 

involving private foundations, research or educational institutions, and the dissemination of information might not immediately result in more U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba, but could strengthen 

Cuban ties with the U.S. agribusiness and academic sectors, which could help the further development of production agriculture in Cuba.

The third element consists of additional exemptions to the embargo on U.S. exports to Cuba. New 

items authorized for export include certain building materials for private residential construction, 

goods for use by entrepreneurs in the Cuban private sector, and tools and equipment for privatesector agricultural activity. These new exemptions could also stimulate additional agricultural trade 

between Cuba and the United States. For instance, small-scale Cuban poultry producers who import 

farm equipment may increase their feedstuff imports from the United States (and other countries). 

In addition, licensed U.S. travelers to Cuba will be allowed to import up to $400 worth of goods for 

personal use, with a limit of $100 for tobacco and alcohol combined. This policy change is likely to 

result in the resumption of U.S. agricultural imports from Cuba, albeit on a small scale, to the extent 

that any agricultural products are among the goods allowed.

The fourth element is the further relaxation of U.S. restrictions on remittances to Cuba. 

Remittances are transfers of money sent by a migrant or immigrant to people in his or her country of 

13Already on the list of classifications requiring only a general license in order to travel to Cuba are: family visits; 

official business of the U.S. Government, foreign governments, and certain intergovernmental organizations; journalistic 

activity; professional research and professional meetings; educational activities; and religious activities.
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origin.14 Since 2009, the United States has placed no limits on the amount of money one can remit 

to close relatives in Cuba. The new policy approach will raise the limit on general donative remittances to Cuban nationals (except to certain officials of the government or the Communist Party) 

from $500 to $2,000 per quarter. Moreover, specific licenses will no longer be required for donative 

remittances for humanitarian projects, support for the Cuban people, and support for the development of private businesses in Cuba—nor for remittances from remittance forwarding services other 

than financial institutions.

Increased remittances to Cuba could increase consumer budgets, thereby enabling additional foreign 

agricultural sales to Cuba. Also, some remittances could be used to invest in agricultural production 

or retail establishments. Regression analysis by Romanò and Echevarría León (2015) indicates that 

remittances are a significant determinant of whether a Cuban worker in Havana will pursue legal 

self-employment (“cuentapropismo”). While the higher ceiling on remittances could allow for a 

quadrupling of U.S. remittances to Cuba (to people who are not close relatives), the extent to which 

the previous set of restrictions was a binding constraint will not be apparent until future levels of 

remittances are recorded. Already, U.S. remittances to Cuba are quite large—in the neighborhood 

of $1.4 billion to $2.5 billion per year (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere 

Affairs, 2013; Kandell, 2015).

The fifth element is a set of policy changes intended to facilitate authorized transactions between 

the United States and Cuba. The regulatory definition of the statutory term “cash in advance” was 

revised to specify that it means “cash before transfer of title.” This regulatory change addresses 

the concern that the revised definition of the term issued in February 2005 adversely affected U.S. 

agricultural exports to Cuba. The U.S. Department of Treasury’s interpretation in 2005 required 

that cash payments be made before the goods left a U.S. port, whereas the revised interpretation is 

more reflective of normal cash-in-advance arrangements.15 In addition, U.S. institutions will now be 

permitted to open correspondent accounts at Cuban financial institutions to facilitate the processing 

of authorized transactions, and U.S. credit and debit cards will be permitted for use by travelers 

to Cuba. These changes will lower the transaction costs for U.S. exports to Cuba by reducing 

the liquidity constraint of the payment method and opening new avenues for cash flows, thereby 

increasing the opportunities for trade. However, the policy changes still do not allow U.S. exporters 

to extend credit to their Cuban buyers, which places U.S. agricultural exporters at a competitive 

disadvantage with other exporting countries. By contrast, South Korea’s state-run Korea Trade 

Insurance Corporation signed a memorandum of understanding in February 2015 for a credit line 

worth $67.9 million in order to facilitate Korean exports to Cuba (Yonhap News Agency, 2015).

The sixth element concerns the intention of the U.S. Government to assist with providing internet 

access to a greater share of the Cuban population. The commercial export of certain consumer 

14The World Bank (2015b) provides a more thorough definition: “Personal remittances are the sum of personal 

transfers and compensation of employees.... Personal transfers include all current transfers in cash or in kind between 

resident and nonresident individuals, independent of the source of income of the sender (and regardless of whether the 

sender receives income from labor, entrepreneurial or property income, social benefits, and any other types of transfers; or 

disposes assets) and the relationship between the households (regardless of whether they are related or unrelated individuals). Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed 

in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by nonresident entities.”

15The U.S. Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration (2012:4) defines the cash-in-advance 

payment method as when “payment is received before the ownership of the goods is transferred.”
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communications devices, related software, applications, hardware, services, and items for the establishment and update of communications-related systems will be permitted. Telecommunications 

providers will be allowed to establish the necessary mechanisms, including infrastructure, in Cuba 

to provide commercial telecommunications and internet services. These changes are intended to 

improve telecommunications between Cuba and the rest of the world, which may also facilitate 

U.S.-Cuba trade. In addition, wireless telecommunications in the developing world is key to helping 

buyers and sellers of agricultural products to find better prices.

Finally, the seventh element updates the application of U.S. sanctions on Cuba in third countries. 

U.S.-owned or -controlled entities in third countries will be generally licensed to provide services 

to, and engage in financial transactions with, Cuban individuals in third countries. In addition, 

general licenses will unblock the accounts at U.S. banks of Cuban nationals who have relocated 

outside of Cuba, permit U.S. persons to participate in third-country professional meetings and 

conferences related to Cuba, and allow foreign vessels to enter the United States after engaging in 

certain humanitarian trade with Cuba, among other measures. The end of these restrictions may 

have unknown but positive implications for U.S.-Cuba agricultural trade.

Might a “Normal” Agricultural Trading Relationship with 

Cuba Look Like the Dominican Republic?

For U.S. exports, a more normal agricultural trading relationship between the United States and 

Cuba might resemble the current relationship between the United States and the Dominican 

Republic. As large countries in the Caribbean, Cuba and the Dominican Republic are similar 

in many ways. The populations are similar (11.1 million for Cuba versus 10.5 million for the 

Dominican Republic, according to estimates for 2015 from the U.S. Department of Commerce, 

Bureau of the Census (2013)), as is per capita income (about $10,200 for Cuba in 2010 and $12,800 

for the Dominican Republic in 2014 in terms of purchasing power parity, according to estimates by 

the Central Intelligence Agency (2015)).16

As destinations for U.S. agricultural exports, however, Cuba and the Dominican Republic differ 

in several respects. During 2012-14, U.S. agricultural exports to the Dominican Republic ($1.1 

billion, annual average) were more than triple the size of exports to Cuba ($365 million) (table 4). 

Also, U.S. agricultural exports to the Dominican Republic cover a wider range of commodities than 

exports to Cuba (table 4). Thus, a more normal agricultural trading relationship between the United 

States and Cuba might feature a much larger level of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, including 

commodities that the United States sold to Cuba during the 2000s but not recently—such as dry 

milk, wheat, rice, and dried beans—and perhaps even intermediate and consumer-oriented commodities that Cuba has never imported from the United States in large quantities.

Given the geographic proximity of Cuba and the United States, part of the increase in U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba may come from the diversion of other countries’ exports to Cuba. Import data 

for HS chapters 01, 02, and 04-24 indicate that the U.S. share of the Dominican Republic’s agricultural imports was about 45 percent in 2013 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 

Affairs, Statistics Division, 2015). By contrast, the U.S. share of Cuba’s agricultural exports was 

about 20 percent during 2012-14. Expansion of tourist-oriented food services in Cuba could also 

16Cuba’s gross domestic product (GDP) is challenging to estimate due to the presence of market and nonmarket elements in the Cuban economy. According to the World Bank (2015a), Cuba’s GDP per capita was about $6,100 in 2013, 

and the Dominican Republic’s was about $5,700, without accounting for cross-country differences in purchasing power.
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Table 4

U.S. agricultural exports to the Dominican Republic and Cuba: Annual averages, 

2012-14

Exports to the 

Dominican Republic Exports to Cuba

Product Value Volume Value Volume

Dollars 

(thousands)

Metric tons 

(thousands)

Dollars 

(thousands)

Metric tons 

(thousands)

Total agricultural exports 1,149.643 -- 365.255 --

Animals and animal products 233.699 -- 161.192 --

Beef and veal 40.351 4.584 0.041 0.042

Pork 40.700 16.363 4.331 1.663

Chicken meat, fresh or frozen 21.156 18.204 148.925 143.085

Turkey meat, fresh or frozen 10.840 4.807 1.112 0.722

Nonfat dry milk 28.131 7.779 0 0

Cheese 19.961 4.318 0 0

Other animals and animal products 72.560 -- 6.783 --

Grains and feeds 331.272 852.667 97.257 344.061

Wheat, unmilled 158.847 494.020 0 0

Corn 67.430 303.728 72.869 269.198

Prepared foods obtained by the swelling or 

roasting of cereals or cereal products, not 

containing sugar

35.828 6.155 0 0

Brewing or distilling dregs or waste 0.271 1.074 14.055 54.912

Mixed feeds, not elsewhere specified or 

indicated

1.469 1.283 10.279 19.914

Other grains and feeds 67.427 46.407 0.054 0.037

Fruit and preparations 34.322 22.522 0.973 0.511

Apples, fresh 15.363 14.363 0.104 0.087

Other fruit and preparations 18.959 8.159 0.869 0.424

Fruit juices1 13.029 9.160 0.015 0.006

Vegetables and preparations 46.850 -- 0.090 --

Dried beans 24.302 23.853 0 0

Other vegetables and preparations 22.548 -- 0.090 --

Oilseeds and products 292.231 458.598 103.584 192.478

Soybean meal 186.780 359.247 59.371 112.721

Soybean oil 64.918 68.958 0 0

Soybeans 0.345 0.624 44.083 79.710

Other oilseeds and products 40.188 -- 0.130 --

Tobacco, unmanufactured 89.898 9.027 0 0

Essential oils 10.315 0.920 0 0

Sugar and tropical products 20.337 8.402 0.063 0.009

Other horticultural products 50.553 -- 1.029 --

Other agricultural exports 27.137 -- 1.052 --

1Volume is measured in millions of liters, and unit value is measured in dollars per liter.

Source: USDA/FAS (2015a).
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boost U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba, including such products as cheese, yogurt, and higher value 

cuts of pork, poultry meat, and beef.

For U.S. imports, Cuba’s current agricultural exports to the world might be indicative of the country’s initial ability to export agricultural products to the United States. Sugar and tobacco currently 

account for about 70 percent of Cuba’s agricultural exports to the world, but it is not known whether 

future U.S. sugar policy would allow for significant imports from Cuba. Over time, Cuba is likely 

to develop comparative advantages in the production and export of certain citrus and tropical fruit 

(Kost, 2004b, 2004c), vegetables, tropical plants, and cut flowers, although this will require greater 

investment. Over the past several decades, Cuba is reported to have made strides in organic production, due in part to the decreased availability of pesticides, fertilizers, and petroleum that resulted 

from the dissolution of the Soviet Union (United Nations Environment Programme, 2015; Zepeda, 

2003; Kost, 2004a).

Rice

With establishment of a more normal trading relationship between Cuba and the United States, the 

U.S. rice industry would be likely again to sell rice to Cuba and may be able to regain a large share 

of Cuba’s import market, but only if U.S. suppliers are able to provide competitive terms of credit. 

Several factors favor U.S. rice suppliers in the Cuban market. First, the United States is a consistent, year-round supplier of the high-quality rice that is attractive to Cuban consumers. Second, the 

United States enjoys a distinct transportation advantage over Cuba’s current rice suppliers. The Port 

of New Orleans is about two sailing days away from the Port of Mariel, compared with more than 

30 days for the Vietnamese port of Ho Chi Minh City.17 This transportation advantage partially 

offsets the higher price of U.S. rice compared with rice from Vietnam. U.S. rice typically sells 

at a higher price than rice from Asian exporters because of differences in quality. As of late May 

2015, U.S. prices were about $130 per metric ton (36 percent) above prices for comparable grades 

of Vietnamese rice, but about $65 below Brazil’s prices. Because the United States is able to ship 

many smaller-sized cargoes throughout the year to ports throughout Cuba, there is an opportunity 

for Cuba to reduce the internal trucking costs associated with distributing large shipments of rice 

arriving in the Port of Mariel to local markets. Third, the United States has the potential to export 

rough rice to Cuba, which could then be fully milled there. Asia’s rice exporting countries generally 

do not allow exports of rough rice. Brazil currently exports rough rice mostly to Central and South 

America. Fourth, if Cuba opens up further as a tourist destination, demand for high-quality rice 

would increase, supporting increased U.S. sales.

Meat and dairy products

To the extent that the relaxation of trade and travel restrictions spurs economic growth in Cuba, a 

more normal trading relationship should stimulate U.S. exports to Cuba of meat and dairy products. Animal proteins are a luxury in Cuba, and exports of significant volumes of high-value meat 

and dairy products will require further growth in the disposable incomes of Cuban consumers. In 

the near term, U.S. exports of low-value muscle cuts of pork, pork variety meats, chicken leg quarters, and milk powder are more likely to increase, but this trade growth also will depend on further 

income growth. Cuban demand for imported pork, for instance, is concentrated in products with a 

17The deepwater Port of Mariel is being renovated amid the construction of an adjacent industrial zone. This project 

will cost about $1 billion and is being funded primarily by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), which is providing 

about $700 million of the financing (Wilkinson and Bevins, 2015).
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lower unit value, such as pork trim, butts, hams, and pork variety meats. Trim, butts, and hams are 

typically used as inputs into further processed pork products such as sausage and lunch meats, types 

of protein that are affordable, convenient, and attractive to consumers in upper middle-income countries such as Cuba. Fewer U.S. restrictions on travelling to Cuba could induce Cuban import demand 

for higher value meat cuts as the hotel, restaurant, and institutional sectors develop.

Sugar

A more normal trading relationship with Cuba would likely result in the establishment of some 

U.S. sugar imports from Cuba, but at volumes much smaller than during the late 1950s. The United 

States is a net importer of sugar, but most of its sugar imports come from Mexico, which has dutyfree access as part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).18 The United States 

uses a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system, instituted through the Agreement on Agriculture of the World 

Trade Organization (WTO), to manage its sugar imports from most other countries. Cuba is a WTO 

member, so if Cuba were allocated quota space within the TRQ, some level of imports would likely 

occur, depending on the size of the quota and conditions within the U.S. market.

Boughner and Coleman (2002) discuss six options for normalizing Cuban access to the U.S. sugar 

market that are compliant with U.S. obligations under its multilateral trade agreements at the World 

Trade Organization (WTO): (1) allocating quotas on a first-come, first-served basis; (2) auctioning 

the quotas; (3) redistributing the TRQ among countries, including Cuba; (4) increasing the TRQ 

to accommodate Cuba; (5) replacing the TRQ with a simple tariff; and (6) specifying the market 

access for Cuban sugar as part of an existing free-trade agreement (FTA) or a bilateral FTA with 

Cuba. If and when the United States does provide market access to Cuban sugar, it is unlikely that 

Cuban sugar production will ever achieve levels similar to those of the 1980s, which were predicated on Soviet demand. More likely is a scenario where Cuba exports some sugar to the United 

States, while focusing on the manufacture of sugarcane-based products such as rum, tafia, and 

perhaps even ethanol for both domestic and international markets.

18Although Mexican sugar exports to the United States are free from tariff and quota restrictions under NAFTA, they 

face separate quantity and price limits as part of a December 2014 agreement between the U.S. and Mexican Governments 

that suspended U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty investigations concerning sugar imports from Mexico. In April 

2015, however, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that it would resume these investigations in response to 

appeals filed by two sugarcane refining companies.
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A Complicated Relationship

The prospects for U.S.-Cuba agricultural trade depend on what policy measures the Cuban 

Government takes to foster further economic growth and development. A status quo scenario, 

in which the Government does little to modify its economic policies to complement the updated 

U.S. policy approach, is likely to result in some growth in U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. 

U.S. exporters are uncertain about the extent to which the Cuban Government will decentralize 

the decisionmaking process for agricultural imports from the United States. Currently, all such 

imports must be routed through the government-operated Empresa Comercializadora de Alimentos 

(ALIMPORT—Food Trading Company), while agricultural imports from other supplying countries 

have other options (Gonzalez, 2013; Urban, 2015). However, the Cuban Government already has 

made some of its agricultural policies more market based, replacing large state farms with smaller 

cooperative production units, allowing the development of farmers’ markets and at least one wholesale market for farmers, and securing foreign investment for the sugar sector (Messina, 2015; KurtzNicholl, 2011; Miroff, 2012; Frank, 2014).

A scenario featuring a broader opening of the Cuban economy to foreign trade and investment 

is likely to lead to more sustained growth of U.S.-Cuba agricultural trade, particularly if such an 

opening spurs income growth and the expansion of sectors that rely on imports, such as tourism, 

restaurants, food services, food manufacturing, and livestock production. The extent to which the 

Cuban Government maintains control over the economy will influence the pace of these changes. If 

the Government maintains a monopoly on official consumer and investment lending, for instance, 

the resulting allocation of financial capital may be inefficient and hamper economic growth. In 

this scenario, trade and investment still involve considerable startup costs, including time. Larger 

companies and investors are likely to have the resources necessary to navigate this process. Thus, 

the benefits of expanded trade and investment may accrue to larger firms with international experience and deeper pockets.

Still, the tourist economy and perhaps even the retirement economy are likely to expand in this 

scenario, as Cuba cultivates a reputation for being a safe place to visit and invest. Capital controls 

and the dual exchange rate would still limit the benefits that the average Cuban receives from trade 

and investment. In March 2014, the Cuban Government published the procedures that it will use to 

eliminate the dual exchange rate, but the precise date for implementing these plans has not yet been 

announced (Morris, 2015).

Alternatively, the Cuban Government could pursue more open trade and investment policies while 

favoring select groups currently or formerly associated with the Government. Tourism and imports 

would expand in this scenario, but exporters and investors would need to work through these select 

groups. Cuba’s dual exchange rate would further allow these groups to capture many of the gains 

from trade. Large U.S firms with experience in similar economies are likely to find that they can 

trade and invest in Cuba in this scenario. The extent to which this new economic activity raises the 

incomes of Cuba’s broader population would determine the impact of such growth on agricultural 

imports, particularly those of higher value.

The availability of credit will limit the pace at which the Cuban economy and Cuba’s agricultural 

trade grow. In August 2014, Moody’s lowered the credit rating for Cuba’s sovereign debt from 

Caa1 to Caa2, due to concerns about the soundness of the Venezuelan economy—which supplies 

petroleum to Cuba under favorable terms of financing—and concerns about succession planning 
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for Cuba’s leadership (Tamayo, 2014). All three of the “Caa” categories (Caa1, Caa2, and Caa3) 

are used to indicate sovereign debt that is of low quality and high credit risk. Given this perception of low creditworthiness, a boom-and-bust cycle—in which generous amounts of lending foster 

rapid growth in agricultural and nonagricultural imports, followed by difficulties in repaying these 

loans—seems unlikely.

Absent the election and inauguration of a democratically elected government in Cuba, which would 

trigger the Helms-Burton Act’s procedures for suspending and then ending the U.S. economic 

embargo on Cuba, further congressional action is needed to define the policy framework for establishing a more normal economic relationship with Cuba. Actions that might stimulate U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba include a loosening of restrictions on private-sector credit for Cuban purchases 

of U.S. agricultural products and allowing Cuba to export products (agricultural and nonagricultural) to the United States, which would enable Cuba to accumulate the foreign exchange needed to 

import more.

Over the long term, fostering growth in U.S.-Cuba agricultural trade hinges on building a foundation for a two-way relationship in trade and investment and then creating the trust to sustain that 

relationship. For agricultural trade, that foundation does not yet exist as of now. While the United 

States over the past 15 years has quickly reestablished itself as one of Cuba’s leading suppliers of 

agricultural imports, the updated U.S. policy approach to Cuba so far provides scant opportunities 

for Cuba to export agricultural products to the United States. Over the next 15 years, the challenge 

will be to provide more balanced opportunities for U.S.-Cuba agricultural trade and to continue to 

build U.S. and Cuban confidence in the emerging commercial relationship.
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