NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT

 PB2002-916303

NTSB/RAR-02/03

DERAILMENT OF UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD TRAIN

QFPLI-26 AT EUNICE, LOUISIANA, MAY 27, 2000

7450

Railroad Accident Report

Derailment of Union Pacific Railroad Train QFPLI-26 

at Eunice, Louisiana, May 27, 2000

NTSB/RAR-02/03

PB2002-916303 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7450 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted April 2, 2002 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2002. Derailment of Union Pacific Railroad Train QFPLI-26

at Eunice, Louisiana, May 27, 2000 . Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-02/03. Washington, DC.

Abstract: On Saturday, May 27, 2000, about 11:48 a.m., central daylight time, 33 of the 113 cars making

up eastbound Union Pacific Railroad train QFPLI-26 derailed near Eunice, Louisiana. Of the derailed cars,

15 contained hazardous materials and 2 contained hazardous materials residue. The derailment resulted in

a release of hazardous materials with explosions and fire. About 3,500 people were evacuated from the

surrounding area, which included some of the business area of Eunice. No one was injured during the

derailment of the train or the subsequent release of hazardous materials. Total damages exceeded $35

million.

The major safety issues identified in this investigation are track conditions on the Union Pacific’s

Beaumont Subdivision and the effectiveness of the Union Pacific’s track inspection activities, including

management oversight.

As a result of the investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes safety recommendations

to the Federal Railroad Administration, the Union Pacific Railroad, and the Association of American

Railroads.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine,

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To

purchase this publication, order report number PB2002-916303 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Railroad Accident Report

Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Track and Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Hazardous Material Tank Cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Train and Operations Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Personnel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Conductor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Site Description and Track Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Location of Derailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Speed Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Signal System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Postaccident Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

UP Inspection of Beaumont Subdivision Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Hy-Rail Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Walking Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Other Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Oversight of Track Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

FRA Inspection of Beaumont Subdivision Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Joint Bars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Bond Wires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Beaumont Subdivision Track Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Jointed Rail in Mainline Tracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Rail Joints as a Cause of Derailments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

The Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Mechanical Suitability of Joint Bars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

UP Track Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Frequency of Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Contents iv Railroad Accident Report

Adequacy of Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Inspection Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Walking Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Oversight of Track Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

UP Management Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

FRA Track Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

AAR Recommended Practices for Key Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Environmental Remediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Appendixes

A: Investigation and Public Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
v Railroad Accident Report

Executive Summary

On Saturday, May 27, 2000, about 11:48 a.m., central daylight time, 33 of the 113

cars making up eastbound Union Pacific Railroad train QFPLI-26 derailed near Eunice,

Louisiana. Of the derailed cars, 15 contained hazardous materials and 2 contained

hazardous materials residue. The derailment resulted in a release of hazardous materials

with explosions and fire. About 3,500 people were evacuated from the surrounding area,

which included some of the business area of Eunice. No one was injured during the

derailment of the train or the subsequent release of hazardous materials. Total damages

exceeded $35 million.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the May 27, 2000, derailment of Union Pacific train QFPLI-26 was the failure of a set of

joint bars that had remained in service with undetected and uncorrected defects because of

the Union Pacific Railroadís ineffective track inspection procedures and inadequate

management oversight. 

The major safety issues identified in this investigation are track conditions on the

Union Pacificís Beaumont Subdivision and the effectiveness of the Union Pacificís track

inspection activities, including management oversight.

As a result of the investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes

safety recommendations to the Federal Railroad Administration, the Union Pacific

Railroad, and the Association of American Railroads.

1 Railroad Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Synopsis

On Saturday, May 27, 2000, about 11:48 a.m.,1 33 of the 113 cars making up

eastbound Union Pacific Railroad (UP) train QFPLI-26 derailed near Eunice, Louisiana.

Of the derailed cars, 15 contained hazardous materials and 2 contained hazardous

materials residue. The derailment resulted in a release of hazardous materials with

explosions and fire. (See figure 1.) About 3,500 people were evacuated from the

surrounding area, which included some of the business area of Eunice. No one was injured

during the derailment of the train or the subsequent release of hazardous materials. Total

damages exceeded $35 million.

Accident Narrative

At 6:00 a.m. central daylight time on May 27, 2000, a two-person train crew

consisting of an engineer and conductor went on duty at Beaumont, Texas, to take UP

freight train QFPLI-26 to Livonia, Louisiana. (See figure 2.) Train QFPLI-26 was a runthrough train,2

 and the crew received the train directly from the inbound crew. The train

1 All times referenced in this report are central daylight time.

Figure 1. Looking west at accident scene.
Factual Information 2 Railroad Accident Report

was made up of 3 locomotives, 87 loads, and 26 empties, and it departed Beaumont

without the locomotives or cars being changed. According to the train consist,3

 56 cars

required hazardous material placards. Of these, 40 cars were loaded, and 16 contained

residue.4

 The train carried several types of hazardous materials, including numerous

liquids and flammable gases. According to the train-dispatching records, the train arrived

at Beaumont at 6:02 a.m. and departed at 8:17 a.m.

During the next 3 1/2 hours, the train traveled about 109 miles. The engineer and

conductor told Safety Board investigators that during this time, the trip was without

2 Train QFPLI is a regularly scheduled freight train that originates in Freeport, Texas. On the day of the

accident, train QFPLI-26 stopped at Beaumont only to change crews. (See the ìTrain and Operationsî

section of this report for more information.)

3 A train consist is an organized list of the train cars, indicating the location of all of the cars and other

equipment. A consist also provides hazardous materials information.

4 Residue is the hazardous material that remains in a tank car that has been unloaded but has not been

cleaned or purged. In tallies of loads and empties, a residue car is counted as an empty.

Figure 2. The Union Pacificís Beaumont Subdivision

Galveston

Angleton

Freeport

Bay city

Wadsworth

ArcolaAlvin

Algoa

La Port

Baytown

Spring

Cleveland

Conroe

Lafayette Lake

CharlesIowa

Junction

Alexandria

Livonia

Baton 

Rouge

Port Allen

Lettsworth

Kinder

Orange

Port

Author

Beaumont

Silsbee

De Quincy Eunice Opelousas

Navasota

Texas

Louisiana

New 

Iberia

KCS

CNIC

NS

CSX

Rosenberg

HOUSTON

Dayton

Dobbins

Eagle

Lake

Sealy

New

Orleans

Mississippi

Louisiana

UP

UP

UP

BNSF

UP

BNSF

Lufkin

UP

UP

BNSF

Morgan City

0 50 100

Scale in Miles

G U L F

o f

M E X I C O

UP

UP

UP

Tenaha

BNSF

BNSF/UP

Not all Railroads are Shown

UP's Beaumont Subdivsion

Other UP Lines and Other Railroads
Factual Information 3 Railroad Accident Report

incident. The engineer said that he had had no difficulties with brakes or slack action5 and

that the train was a ìgood handling train.î

The engineer said that between milepost (MP) 556.75 and MP 557.0, he slowed

the train from 40 to 25 mph to comply with a temporary speed restriction that had been

imposed because of track conditions. He said that after the rear car was beyond the

temporary speed restriction, he accelerated the train back to the designated track speed of

40 mph. According to engineer statements and event recorder data, the wayside signals

were displaying a clear signal,6 the locomotive throttle was in the eighth notch, and the

train was moving about 40 mph7

 as it approached Bridge 567.9, a nine-span precast

concrete bridge. (See figure 3.)

5 Slack in a train can be expressed as the difference between the length of the train when it is

compressed and when it is stretched. Train slack can be affected by the free movement between couplers and

the amount of play in the draft gear. Excessive train slack will affect train handling and can sometimes be of

concern.

6 A clear signal indicates that a train may proceed at track speed. Trains receiving a clear signal will

not be diverging at the next signal location and will not have a signal more restrictive than approach at the

next signal.

7 According to the lead locomotive event recorder data, the speed varied between 39 and 41 mph. The

event recorder on the second locomotive indicated a constant speed of 40 mph.

Figure 3. Location of the derailment.

190

190

13 91

757

13

29

To Beaumont

Direction of Travel

Derailment occurred 

on Bridge 567.9

To

Livonia

Bayou Des Cannes
Factual Information 4 Railroad Accident Report

The engineer stated that as his train approached the bridge, he saw a section of

misaligned or broken rail about 50 feet in front of the locomotive. The defect was in the

south rail, which was the rail under the engineerís side of the cab. The conductor, who was

sitting on the opposite side of the locomotive, said he did not see the misalignment in the

rail but he heard the engineer say they were about to pass over a broken rail, and he felt the

engine pitch toward the south side. Both crewmembers reported the sound of a ìthudî as

the locomotive passed over the spot where the engineer had seen the misalignment. As the

train passed over the defect, the train derailed and separated, which placed the train brakes

in emergency.8

The engineer said that he felt an increase in the trainís rolling resistance, and then

he saw the cars derailing and piling up behind him, instantly producing fire and smoke.

The engineer said that he immediately contacted the UP train dispatcher in Spring, Texas,

on the locomotive radio. According to the transcript of the call, the engineer told the

dispatcher that the train had derailed and that there was a fire. The engineer asked for

urgent emergency assistance and said he believed the train had passed over a broken rail.

With the train in emergency braking, the lead locomotive stopped at MP 568.1, and

after a brief moment of discussion, the crew decided to uncouple the three locomotive

units from the train. After the conductor separated the last locomotive from the first car of

the train, the engineer moved the locomotives eastward to a grade crossing at MP 568.75

and waited for emergency crews to arrive.

Postaccident investigation revealed that all three locomotives and the first nine

cars passed over the location of the reported track defect without derailing. The rear truck

of the 10th car derailed, and the train separated behind this car. Of the 33 cars that

derailed, 17 were hazardous materials cars. Two contained a residue of thiapentanal; one

each contained acrylic acid, dichloropropane, dicyclopentadiene, molten phenol, and

pentanes; two each contained toluene diisocyanate, methyl chloride, and hexanes; and

four carried a corrosive liquid. Five additional hazardous materials cars did not derail but

were exposed to the heat of the fire. The five included three cars loaded with styrene

monomer and two thiapentanal residue cars. The derailed freight cars that carried no

hazardous freight included covered hoppers carrying plastic pellets and other cars carrying

feed, dyes, and glycol.

Emergency Response

The St. Landry Parish 911 Center received the first call at 11:48 a.m. The call came

from someone at the Eunice Country Club with a cellular telephone. The caller stated that

a train had derailed, that a tank car was on fire, and that there was a cloud of black smoke.

8 Train brakes are applied in response to reductions in trainline air pressure. Normally, the locomotive

engineer initiates a reduction of trainline air pressure, but a broken or disconnected trainline (such as occurs

when a train separates) results in an instantaneous loss of air pressure that causes an application of the

emergency brakes.
Factual Information 5 Railroad Accident Report

The 911 operator transferred the caller to the Eunice Police Department and remained on

the line while the caller told the police the location of the fire. The caller informed the

Eunice Police Department that the fire was in the area of the railroad tracks behind the

country club. The police dispatcher told the caller that the Eunice Fire Department had

been dispatched.

The UPís Risk Management Communications Center received the initial

notification at approximately 11:49 a.m. and notified the local police, fire, and emergency

medical services within 2 minutes. The UP Police Department was notified and began to

respond within 10 minutes of the initial notification. Within 30 minutes, the UPís

environmental and hazardous material personnel had begun to respond.

The St. Landry Parish 911 operator called the Louisiana State Police and the

Louisiana State Police Hazardous Materials Unit. The 911 operator also contacted the

sheriffís offices of St. Landry Parish and Evangeline Parish.9

 By 11:55 a.m., the Eunice

police and fire departments had arrived on scene and had begun to evacuate the immediate

area. About 12:15 p.m., the Eunice police and members of the St. Landry Parish Sheriffís

Office expanded the evacuation to include all people within a 1 mile radius of the

derailment.

The Louisiana State Police established a command post at Eunice High School at

2:11 p.m. The command post was subsequently relocated at 4:15 p.m. to a Louisiana State

University campus in Eunice.

The emergency response organizations that responded to the incident included the

Louisiana State Police Troop I, the Louisiana State Police Hazardous Materials Unit, the

Eunice Police Department, the Eunice Fire Department, the St. Landry Parish Sheriffís

Office, the Evangeline Parish Sheriffís Department, the Acadia Parish Sheriffís

Department, the Acadia Ambulance Service, the Basile Police Department, the Mamou

Police Department, the UP Police Department, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

At 8:00 a.m. on Sunday, May 28, a St. Landry Parish official declared a state of

emergency and extended the evacuation area to 2 miles east of the derailment. The

boundaries of the evacuated area varied over time. At its largest, the evacuation area was 2

miles to the east, 1 mile to the north, 1/2 mile to the south, and 2 1/2 miles to the west. At

9:50 a.m., the Eunice police reported that the evacuation had been completed.

At 5:30 a.m. on Monday, May 29, the command post was moved from the

Louisiana State University campus to Eunice Junior High School. That afternoon,

Evangeline Parish evacuated residents who resided 2 1/2 miles west of the derailment.

During the following days, law enforcement officers escorted residents of the evacuated

area to their homes so they could get food and medicine and could care for their animals.

UP police told Safety Board investigators that 22 UP officers were in the Eunice area to

assist the local police where necessary, including patrolling the evacuated areas at night.

9 The boundary between St Landry Parish and Evangeline Parish is about 0.4 mile west of the location

of the derailment.
Factual Information 6 Railroad Accident Report

At 4:00 p.m., on June 1, the evacuation area was reduced to 1/2 mile. The majority

of the residents returned to their homes, and businesses were reopened. At 6:00 p.m. on

June 2, the Louisiana State Police released the accident site to the Louisiana Department

of Environmental Quality.

UP officials told Safety Board investigators that the railroad provided assistance to

residents who were affected by the evacuation. Investigators observed UP representatives

processing requests for assistance by local citizens. Such assistance included

compensation for hotels, meals, clothes, and other expenses.

Injuries

No one was injured during the derailment of the train. Safety Board investigators

visited local hospitals and asked hospital staff members to identify anyone who had been

treated for ailments related to the fire or release of hazardous materials. The investigators

found no indication that anyone had gone to the facilities with complaints related to the

derailment. UP officials told the investigators that they did not have any evidence that

anyone had received medical treatment for injuries sustained as a result of the evacuation

or the release of hazardous materials.

Damage

Track and Structures

The UP determined track damage to be $988,617. The derailment destroyed about

1,200 feet of the main track. Much of the damaged track material, track ballast, and sub

ballast was contaminated by the hazardous materials and was removed from the site. The

derailment destroyed most of the bridge, which accounted for $877,177 in structure

damages.

Three private fiber optic cables ran along the UP right-of-way. One cable was

partially severed in the derailment. All three cables were rerouted around the derailment

site in preparation for the ground excavation that was anticipated during the hazardous

materials mitigation and wreck-clearing operations.

Equipment

The UP estimated that the monetary damage to the railroad equipment exceeded

$1.87 million. Lading damage was estimated to be in excess of $2 million. The cost of

wreckage clearing was about $700,000.
Factual Information 7 Railroad Accident Report

Hazardous Material Tank Cars

All of the hazardous materials involved in this accident were being transported in

tank cars. The derailment and the resultant fire and explosions destroyed all of the cars

that were in the general pileup.

The derailment involved five pressure tank cars (four class DOT 105J and one

class DOT 114J). All of the pressure cars survived the derailment without being breached;

three of those failed in the resulting fire. Of the 12 non-pressure tank cars, 7 were

breached during the derailment.10

In general, pressure tank cars are designed to provide greater damage protection

through use of increased wall thickness and head shields. They are used to transport

flammable gases and other materials determined by the U.S. Department of Transportation

(DOT) to present the greatest hazards if released during transportation. Pressure tank cars

are also required to have a thermal protection and a pressure relief system that will allow

the car to survive a pool fire for 100 minutes, which allows time for emergency responders

to evacuate the area. Witnesses stated that in this accident, the first of two major

explosions occurred 1 hour and 43 minutes after the derailment and fire. The two

explosions likely involved the two tank cars filled with methyl chloride (a flammable gas).

Both of these cars were found torn in half, and portions of the cars were found to have

been thrown from 50 to 700 feet from their original resting positions. (See figure 4.)

10 Hazardous materials in pressure tank cars: methyl chloride (2 cars); pentanes; and toluene

diisocyanate (2 cars). Hazardous materials in non-pressure tank cars: acrylic acid; 1, 2 dichloropropane;

molten phenol; dicyclopentadiene; hexanes (2 cars); corrosive liquid, NOS (4 cars); and 4, thiapentanal

residue (2 cars).
Figure 1. Figure 4. Wreckage 

Figure 4.

Dye

CCBX 7086

4 Thiapentanal 

1/2 Methyl Chloride

Tank Car "A"

Direction of Travel

1/2 Methyl ChlorideTank Car "A" in Woods

The point of derailment

No Scale Track andBridge Damag

Covered Hoppers UTL X 641252

Dicyclopentadiene

CCBX7112

GA TX 73584 Feed

TILX 220020

Feed

1/2 MethylChloride Car "B"

CCBX 70974 Thiapentanal

SHPX

202922 Cor. Liq NOS

955 ACFX20

Cor. Liq. NOS

Dye

Dye

Cor. L TLCX 77017 iq. NOS

TLCX 77050 Cor. Liq. NOS HMAX 268221/2 PSPX 33722 Pentanes

DONX 84374 Toluene Diisocyanate

PROX 76473 Molten Phenol

DOWX Plastic

66453 Pellets

ACFX 9416

4

1, 2 Dichloropropane

DOWX 84375 Toluene Diisocyanate

DOWX Plastic 20889 Pellets DBCX Acrylic 468 Acid

1/2 MethylChloride Car "B"

1/2 PSPX 33722Pentanes

1/2 MethylChloride Car "B"

GATX 67199 Glycol

DCBX Plastic

324 Pellets DCBX Plastic 328 Pellets DCBX Plastic 322 Pellets 

PSPX 23547 Hexanes PSPX 23503 Hexanes
Factual Information 9 Railroad Accident Report

Non-pressure tank cars are intended to carry materials considered by the DOT to

present a lesser hazard if released in transportation. These cars generally do not have the

same wall thickness as the pressure tank cars, and most are not required to have thermal

protection or head shields. The non-pressure tank cars on train QFPLI-26 carried

flammable liquids, corrosives, and a poisonous solid (molten phenol). Several of these

cars released their contents after being crushed and/or punctured during the derailment.

Environment

Damage to the tank cars caused by the derailment and by the subsequent fire

resulted in the release of most of their contents. The tank cars released about 43,700

gallons of flammable gas, 944,150 pounds of corrosive liquids, and 167,685 gallons of

miscellaneous flammable liquids and poisons. To eliminate the risks posed by damaged

cars that were still loaded with hazardous materials, one car of acrylic acid and two cars of

toluene diisocyanate were explosively breached by emergency responders. Most, if not all,

of the released product from these three cars was burned.

Some hazardous material was recovered during the cleanup. About 7,500 gallons

of corrosive liquid were recovered from one tank car, and some phenol was recovered

from pits near the derailment site. During the excavation of the site, the Louisiana

Department of Environmental Quality directed that the UP remove contaminated soil,

burned trees, and water. Records provided by the Louisiana Department of Environmental

Quality11 list 71,140 tons of contaminated soil, 1,593 tons of contaminated and burned

trees, and 1.68 million gallons of contaminated water that were removed from the site.

These materials were sorted according to their chemical contamination and sent to suitable

facilities for disposal as hazardous waste. The testing and monitoring of the site will

continue under the direction of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. The

UP estimated the cost of the environmental damage and cleanup at more than $26 million.

Train and Operations Information

The derailment occurred on the Beaumont Subdivision, a component of the UPís

Southern Region. The Beaumont Subdivision is one of the 30 subdivisions listed in the

UPís Houston Area Timetable. This trackage was formerly owned and operated by the

Missouri Pacific, with the ownership of the right-of-way being absorbed by the UP on

December 22, 1983, when the UP and the Missouri Pacific merged.

The Beaumont Subdivision extends westward from Gulf Coast Junction, near

Houston, Texas, (MP 378.0) to Livonia, Louisiana, (MP 621.0) a distance of 243 miles. It

is primarily a single-track railroad and has 20 passing sidings for the meeting and passing

of trains. Train operation is controlled by centralized traffic control (CTC)12 and is under

11 These figures were given to the Safety Board totaling the amount of materials recovered as of

December 2001.

12 Centralized traffic control is a block signal system that uses wayside signal indications to authorize

train movements. The train dispatcher has the ability to control trains by displaying controlled signals and

lining track switches from a centralized, remote location.
Factual Information 10 Railroad Accident Report

the direction of the UP train dispatcher in Spring, Texas. All engines on the accident train

were equipped with standard radios for communication with the train dispatcher.

Because it is more efficient to ìfleetî trains that operate in the same direction on

the mostly single-track subdivision, trains that operate on the Beaumont Subdivision are

generally eastbound trains. Although there are no limitations or restrictions to the

operation of a westbound train on the subdivision, this type of ìone-wayî operation avoids

the process of trains that are of opposing directions having to wait for one another in

sidings. Westbound UP trains between Livonia and Beaumont generally operate over a

joint UP/Burlington Northern Santa Fe Subdivision, which parallels the UPís Beaumont

Subdivision to the south.

Twelve freight trains pass through Eunice on an average day. In addition, two local

freights pass through town each day, placing and pulling cars at local industries. No

regularly scheduled passenger trains operate on the Beaumont Subdivision.

In 1998, the annual gross tonnage on the Beaumont Subdivision was about 18.29

million gross tons. In 1999, the Beaumont Subdivision handled a gross tonnage of about

22.13 million gross tons, or 21 percent more than in 1998.

The UP operates a train with the symbol ìQFPLIî each day of the week except

Monday. The train originates at the UP yard in Freeport, Texas, and terminates at the UP

facility in Livonia. Because of the various chemical-related industries that are located

along the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana, a QFPLI usually carries hazardous materials.

The UP provides all train crews with a consist that provides hazardous materials

information and emergency response information for the materials being transported in the

various cars of the train. The consist for QFPLI-26 identified the train as a ìkeyî train,

which requires special handling considerations because of the hazardous materials

transported. The consist information for each hazardous materials car included the

commodity, the car identification, emergency contact information, and the location of the car

in the train.

Investigators found that the placement of cars carrying hazardous materials

conformed to the UPís hazardous materials instructions. The UP also requires that a key

train have an operable end-of-train telemetry device.13 According to the UP special

instructions and the UPís ìInstructions for Handling Hazardous Materials,î a key train

must not exceed 50 mph. The exact order and identification of the cars that were listed in

the computer-generated consist was verified by an AEI14 reader in Beaumont.

The Association of American Railroads (AAR), in AAR Circular No. OT-55-B,

Recommended Railroad Operating Practices for Transportation of Hazardous Materials,

13 An end-of-train telemetry device, or EOT, transmits to the lead unit (head-end locomotive) the brake

pipe pressure at the rear of the train and other pertinent information. Brake pipe pressure can also be

displayed on a digital readout on the flashing rear-end device itself.

14 AEI is an abbreviation for ìautomatic equipment identification.î This is a system of car identification

by wayside scanners that records the identification of the cars of a passing train. Such information can be

used to update the exact order and identification of the equipment in a train. It is commonly used to generate

an accurate train consist.
Factual Information 11 Railroad Accident Report

defines and recommends limits on key trains and key routes. The AAR defines ìkey trainî

as follows:

Any train with five tank car loads of Poison Inhalation Hazard [PIH] (Hazard zone

A or B) or 20 car loads or intermodal portable tank loads of a combination of PIH

(Hazard zone A or B), flammable gas, Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosives (Class A), and

environmentally sensitive chemicals.[15]

UP train QFPLI-26 did not meet the AAR definition of a key train but, as noted

above, the train did meet the UPís definition and was handled accordingly.

The AAR defines ìkey routeî as follows:

Any track with a combination of 10,000 car loads or intermodal portable tank

loads of hazardous materials, or a combination of 4,000 car loadings of PIH

(Hazard zone A or B), flammable gas, Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosives (Class A), and

environmentally sensitive chemicals, over a period of one year.

UP stated that the route from Freeport, Texas, to Livonia, Louisiana, was a key

route.

The train consist indicated that the train was 6,708 feet in length and had a gross

weight of 11,999 tons. Three locomotive units were on the head-end of the train. The lead

locomotive was the UP 3909, an EMD (manufactured by the Electromotive Division of

General Motors) SD40-2 that is rated at 3,000 horsepower. The two following units were

manufactured by General Electric and owned by the Norfolk Southern Railway. Each of

them is rated at 4,000 horsepower. The middle unit was NS 8766, a GE C40-8, and the last

unit was NS 8738, a GE C40-9. The trailing unit was isolated,16 and the diesel engine was

shut down at the time of the derailment. The train had an operating two-way end-of-train

telemetry17 device.

Operating crews of the trains on the Beaumont Subdivision were governed by the

General Code of Operating Rules, Fourth Edition, effective April 2, 2000; the UP air

brake and train handling rules; and the safety rules. Other instructions and references

included the UP ìSystem Timetable,î the ìHouston Timetable No. 1,î the UPís system

special instructions, and the UPís ìInstructions for Handling Hazardous Materials.î Train

crews were also governed by the applicable general orders and the instructions from the

train dispatcher.

15 AAR Circular OT-55 was modified to revision C on October 20, 2000, and to revision D on August

23, 2001. Revision D incorporates the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high -level radioactive waste

and updates the list (provided with the circular) of poison inhalation hazard materials and environmentally

sensitive chemicals that are subject to OT-55.

16 An isolated locomotive is set up so that it may be moved in a train but will not produce tractive

effort. An isolated locomotive will not provide dynamic braking, but all aspects of the pneumatic braking

systems (automatic, independent, and actuating) will function in unity with the other locomotive(s). The

diesel engine of an isolated locomotive may or may not be operating.

17 A two-way end-of-train device is capable of initiating an emergency brake application at the rear of

the train upon receiving a signal from the head end.
Factual Information 12 Railroad Accident Report

Automated train records note the passage of trains by certain locations. These

records indicate that QFPLI-26 passed the timetable station of Hub, MP 544.4, at

11:03 a.m., about 45 minutes before the derailment. Using the recorded times for two

other trains as they passed Hub, investigators added 45 minutes to the ìHub timesî to

approximate the times that the two preceding trains had passed through the Eunice area.

(Both trains, according to the train dispatching records, were eastbound, as is the usual

practice.) One train was an intermodal train, IHONO-26, with 26 cars, that passed through

Eunice about 2:10 a.m.; the other train was a miscellaneous freight train, QDYLIX-26,

with 103 cars, that passed through Eunice about 4:22 a.m. According to UP officials,

neither train reported a track defect or rough ride when it passed over the point at which

the accident train subsequently derailed.

Personnel Information

UP crew dispatching records indicate that the conductor had been off duty for at

least 8 hours and that the engineer had been off duty for at least 10 hours before reporting

for duty at 6:00 a.m. on the day of the accident. Both men had had the required amount of

time off duty before beginning their tours of duty and were in compliance with the Federal

hours-of-service law.

After the accident, both crewmembers were toxicologically tested as required

under 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 219, Subpart C, ìPost-Accident

Toxicological Testing.î The results for both employees were negative.

Engineer

The 53-year-old engineer began his railroad career as a brakeman with the

Missouri Pacific Railroad in Dequincy, Louisiana, on June 30, 1978. He attended the

Missouri Pacificís school for locomotive engineers in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1980 and

was promoted to locomotive engineer in March 1981. He has worked as an engineer since

then and came to the UP following its merger with the Missouri Pacific.

Under 49 CFR Part 240, all locomotive engineers must be certified. Records

indicate that the engineer had most recently attended a safety and operating rules class and

successfully passed an examination on the General Code of Operating Rules on November

11, 1998. His last physical exam was on June 3, 1999. His most recent check-ride before

the accident was on May 6, 2000. He had most recently attended training in a locomotive

simulator on May 19, 1999. During the 2 years before the accident, he attended six UP

training classes, five of which were safety-related.

Conductor

The 28-year-old conductor began his railroad career with the UP in August 1997

and became a conductor on November 24, 1997. Records indicate that he had most

recently passed an examination on the General Code of Operating Rules on January 12,
Factual Information 13 Railroad Accident Report

1999. Training records indicate that he had attended numerous training classes and had

passed an examination on hazardous materials on August 20, 1997. His last physical exam

was a preemployment exam on July 15, 1997.

Site Description and Track Information

Location of Derailment

The derailment occurred in St. Landry Parish, about 2 miles west of the downtown

section of Eunice, and about 0.4 mile east of the St. Landry Parish and Evangeline Parish

line. The cars derailed in an area that was generally flat and marked by a mixture of farm

fields and woods. To the north of the derailment was a section of deciduous woods. To the

south of the derailment area was the wooded property of the Eunice County Club,

including a golf course, swimming pool, and Lake Eunice. A driving range that was

several acres in size was to the southeast, adjacent to the country club.

The pileup of cars was centered around a bridge over a tributary that emptied into

Bayou Des Cannes. The track in this area had an approximate compass direction of

east-west, which matched the east-west direction that was specified in the timetable.

Milepost numbers increased from west to east. The bridge, which had nine spans and was

made of precast concrete, was 189 feet long and had a maximum height of about 12 feet

above the waterway. The eastern end of the bridge was at MP 567.9. The alignment of the

track was tangent for several miles west of the bridge and remained tangent over the

bridge. At MP 568.0, the track began a 1-degree curve to the right. The grade of the rightof-way in the Eunice area was undulating, and track gradients were 0.4 percent or less.

The track was level at the point of the derailment. The track was on an earthen fill about

12 feet above the ditch line at the east end of the bridge.

The track at the accident location was jointed track supported with granite ballast

that was approximately 18 inches deep under the crossties. The 115-pound rail was

manufactured in 39-foot lengths and joined together with two 36-inch joint bars (one on

each side of the rail joint) that had 3 bolts per rail end. The manufacturerís stamping

identified the rail as 115 RE CC CF&I, rolled in January 1951. The double-shoulder tie

plates were 8 inches wide and 13 inches long. Six-inch chisel-cut track spikes secured the

rail and tie plates to the crossties. The spiking pattern varied between 2 to 4 spikes per tie

plate. When two spikes per tie plate were used, one spike was on the field side18 and one

spike was in the gage side19 in the rail holding position. When four spikes per tie plate

were used, there was an additional spike in the gage-side rail holding position and one

additional spike on the field-side plate holding position. Wooden crossties were installed

with an average spacing of 19.5 inches, yielding 24 crossties per rail length. Every third or

fourth tie was box anchored.20

18 The field side of a rail or rail joint is the side toward the outside of the track.

19 The gage side of a rail or rail joint is the side toward the center of the track.
Factual Information 14 Railroad Accident Report

Three fiber optic cables were located on the UPís right-of-way in the area of the

derailment. Two cables were on the south side of the track, and one cable was on the north

side of the track. No other utilities were on the UP right-of-way.

Speed Restrictions

The maximum speed (for non-key trains) on the majority of the Beaumont

Subdivision was 60 mph; however, a maximum timetable speed of 50 mph was specified

between MP 544.8 and MP 588.5, approximately corresponding to the 44-mile segment21

of the subdivision that used jointed rail. (The balance of the subdivision used continuous

welded rail, or CWR. See the ìJointed Rail in Main Tracksî section of this report for more

information on CWR versus jointed rail.)

To supplement and update timetable instructions, the railroad issues general orders

that contain specific instructions to operating crews. Such instructions cover a wide range

of operating considerations, including train speed, track speed, and the required speed of

equipment in various situations. A general order for the Beaumont Subdivision specified a

maximum allowable train speed of 40 mph between MP 544.8 and MP 589.0,22 which

corresponded with the jointed rail portion of the subdivision and included the accident

area. Because the track had a maximum allowable operating speed of 40 mph for freight

trains, the track was required to meet the Federal Railroad Administrationís (FRAís)

requirements for class 3 track.23

Signal System

The signal system in use on the Beaumont Subdivision displayed wayside signal

indications to the operating crews of trains. The signal system components pass an electric

current through the rails to determine whether the track is clear of trains or occupied by

railroad equipment. Because of the electrical current carried in the rails, the signal system

also detects continuity of the rails and rail joints. A disruption in the electrical circuit

could be associated with a break in the rail or a break in a bond wire at a rail joint.24 A

wayside signal can display a clear indication only if the two consecutive blocks in

advance of the signal are clear of trains and have no loss of rail continuity. The engineer

and conductor of the accident train said that they had observed a clear indication at the last

signal before the derailment and that previous signal aspects had also displayed a clear

indication. Safety Board investigators examined the signal system for information that

20 The term box anchored indicates that rail anchors are applied on both sides of the tie, resulting in a

rectangular box pattern.

21 The actual location of this jointed rail was between MP 544.3 and MP 588.5.

22 UP officials informed Safety Board investigators that this speed restriction is reissued annually in the

spring to coincide with the change to daylight savings time. This particular general order was effective May

10, 2000.

23 The track safety standards, contained in the CFR, allow for increased train speed as the track meets

increasing standards of construction, maintenance, and inspections. Freight trains can operate at a maximum

speed of 10 mph on class 1 track, 25 mph on class 2 track, and 40 mph on class 3 track. Succeeding higher

classes of track allow for higher train speeds.

24 A bond wire bridges the rail joint to provide electrical continuity from one rail section to the next.
Factual Information 15 Railroad Accident Report

could be used to determine whether the signal system had detected a loss of continuity of

the rails before the arrival of the accident train. No loss of continuity was detected.

Except for a section of automatic block signals and yard limits, train movements

on the greater part of the Beaumont Subdivision are governed by the signal indications of

the CTC system. The CTC system controls train movements through the use of threeaspect color light signals, displayed singularly or in combination, along the track wayside.

The wayside signals are controlled by Electro Code 2 and Electro Code 4 electronic coded

track circuits. Signals are arranged for train movement in either direction. On the

Beaumont Subdivision, the signal system is operated with the help of a computer-aided

dispatching (CAD) system to assist the train dispatcher.

Postaccident Inspection

Equipment

Two days after the derailment, the 69 rear cars of the accident train were moved

from the accident site to Basile, Louisiana, where they were given a mechanical inspection

and an initial terminal air brake test. Investigators found that there was no air brake

leakage. They did discover two mechanical defects: one worn composition brake shoe and

a car with air brakes that released on the rear of the car.25 They also noted that the seven

east cars were covered in soot from the fire.

The head nine cars were moved from the accident site about 1/2 mile eastward,

where they were given a roll-by inspection, a mechanical inspection, and an initial

terminal air brake test. The roll-by inspection was performed as the cars were pulled from

the wreckage; there was no evidence of any component dragging, binding, or fouling. No

air brake train line leakage was noted during the air test.

In the general pileup area, investigators observed wheels, axles, and other car parts

that exhibited visible evidence of having been deformed by the heat of the fire. Heat and

explosive forces had visibly damaged the tank car shells. Safety Board investigators

examined the several derailed cars at the east end of the derailment; those cars had

departed the roadbed to the south and had escaped the direct effects of the explosions and

fire. No preaccident defects were identified on these cars.

Signals

During an inspection from MP 569 to a signal control point near MP 572,

investigators found all signal units and signal bungalows to be locked and secured.

Investigators found no indication that any of the signal equipment had been vandalized or

tampered with. Testing indicated no grounds or short circuits on any of the equipment, and

no obstructions were identified that would hinder a train crewmemberís ability to see the

25 The brakes did apply on the car; however, after a time, the truck-mounted brake on the rear of the car

released.
Factual Information 16 Railroad Accident Report

wayside signals. The investigators looked at the track connections and insulated joints and

found three broken bond wires. At the control point, track circuits were verified, and

investigators used track shunts to simulate train movements as a method of testing the

system. Switch and signal locking tests were also performed. All electric lock locations

were tested and verified. Signal indications were found to correspond with one other.

The UP signal maintenance, inspection, and test records indicate the equipment

was in working condition and listed no exceptions that would prevent the signal

equipment from operating properly. Investigators reviewed the records of the most recent

testing of the signal equipment in the vicinity of the accident. Postaccident data was also

obtained from the CAD computer log at the control center in Spring. The records and data

revealed some anomalies with the signal system, but none that would have had a bearing

on the derailment.

Wayside defect detectors were located approximately every 10 to 15 miles along

the Beaumont Subdivision. The last two defect detectors that the train passed before the

derailment were at MP 546.7 and MP 558.8. The detectors were designed to detect

overheated journals and dragging equipment and had radios that enabled them to transmit

information about the trains that passed. Each defect detector had an event recorder.

Safety Board investigators examined the downloaded data from the detector stations and

noted that neither detector had recorded any defect when train QFPLI-26 traveled over it.

Track

Investigators examined the accident site and found that a major portion of the track

structure was totally destroyed by the pileup of the cars and the resulting fire and

explosions. The bridge was severely damaged, and only the western end remained

standing. Trees near the roadbed showed evidence of blast and fire damage.

The engineer stated that he had seen a misalignment in the south rail just before

passing over it, but he said he was not sure if the misalignment was at a rail joint or if it

was due to a broken rail. After the derailment, the recovered sections of rail were arranged

in a linear fashion; the relative order was determined by matching ends of the rails and

joint bars. Some of the rails had been bent and twisted by the extreme heat, and

postaccident overstress fractures were found. Investigators could find no evidence of a

preaccident rail failure.

In jointed rail territory, the individual rails are joined to one another by joint bars.

(See figure 5.) The Beaumont Subdivision used a common form of rail joint that consists

of two joint bars plus six track bolts, nuts, and spring washers. Two joint bars, one on each

side of the rail ends, are considered to be a pair. Oval-shouldered track bolts, typically 1

inch in diameter, are arranged in an alternating pattern through holes in the joint bars and

rail. When the bars are matched up to form a rail joint, one on the gage side and one on the

field side of the rail, the bolts are tightened and the joint bars are drawn toward each other,

squeezing them toward the side of the rail. In addition to joining the rail ends together, the

joint bars act as a beam that distributes over several adjacent ties the downward vertical

load that is imposed on the rail joint by the weight of the train.
Factual Information 17 Railroad Accident Report

During the postaccident inspection of the derailment area, portions of two broken

joint bars, still bolted to the end of a section of the south rail, were found on the bridge at

about the fourth span. Each joint bar portion had a break in the transverse plane at the

center of the joint bar, near the end of the rail. Later, portions of another pair of broken

joint bars were found. These bars also had remained bolted to a piece of rail and had

breaks in the transverse plane at the center of the joint bar. The fractured surfaces of the

two pairs of broken joint bar pieces matched one another in both the location of the broken

surfaces and the type of fracture.

When investigators examined the second pair of broken joint bar pieces and the

rail to which the bars were bolted, they discovered that the top corner of the end-face of

the rail exhibited visible evidence of having been deformed by impact.26 This rail end-face

deformation was consistent with the deformation and appearance that would have been

caused if railroad wheels had hammered the blunt end of the receiving rail instead of

rolling over the top of it. This type of deformation can occur when a misalignment or gap

between the two rails allows the wheels to drop below the surface of the delivering rail

and hammer against the end of the receiving rail as they roll over the end corner of the rail.

Both broken joint bars and the rail ends to which they were attached were sent to the

Safety Boardís Materials Laboratory for further examination. (See the ìTests and

Researchî section of this report for more information.)

On the day after the derailment, Safety Board investigators inspected the track

west of the derailment site with a Hy-Rail vehicle.27 A walking inspection was conducted

Figure 4. Sketch of a typical joint bar.

26 The word ìbatterî is sometimes used to describe this type of deformation. In this instance,

ìdeformationî is used to describe marks and indentations that result from wheels passing over the end face

of the rail when the rails are separated by a greater distance than is normally expected.

Bond Wire

115-Pound Rail in 39-ft Lengths

Outside Joint Bar

Inside Joint Bar

Track Bolts

Figure 5.
Factual Information 18 Railroad Accident Report

east of the derailment site. During the walking inspection, joint bars with visible vertical

cracks were found. Subsequent inspections during the following days identified additional

cracked and broken joint bars on either side of the derailment area. (See table 1.)

The investigators noted that the cracks they found in the joint bars were not visible

to a track inspector using a Hy-Rail vehicle. An inspector driving such a vehicle across a

rail joint could see only the tops of the two joint bars on the driverís side and the joint bar

on the gage side of the track on the passenger side. The joint bar on the field side of the

track on the passenger side of the vehicle was not visible.

27 A Hy-Rail vehicle is a maintenance-of-way highway vehicle, in this case a pickup truck, that is

equipped with flanged wheels that can be lowered to allow the vehicle to travel along the railroad tracks.

Table 1. Track defects noted in the accident area.

Joint bar defects found by UP track maintenance crews east of the derailment location

Inspection Date

Milepost 

Locations Miles Inspected

Number of 

Cracked Bars

Number of 

Broken Bars

05/28/00 561.25 to 566.0 4.75 54 1

05/29/00 552.0 to 561.25 9.25 65 2

05/30/00 544.49 to 552.0 7.51 97 1

Joint bar defects found by UP track maintenance crews west of the derailment location

Inspection Date

Milepost 

Locations Miles Inspected

Number of 

Cracked Bars

Number of 

Broken Bars

05/28/00 570.4 to 571.8 1.4 12

05/29/00 571.8 to 576.25 4.45 35 2

05/30/00 576.25 to 578.5 2.25 21

05/31/00 578.5 to 586.5 8.0 66 3

06/01/00 586.5 to 588.2 1.7 16 1

Joint bar defects found by FRA chief inspector west of the derailment location

Inspection Dates

Milepost 

Locations Miles Inspected

Number of 

Cracked Bars

Number of 

Broken Bars

06/06/00 06/07/00 568.0 to 574.76 6.76 27

Total of Inspections and Defects Found

Inspection Dates

Total Miles 

Inspected

Total Number of 

Cracked Bars

Total Number 

of Broken Bars

Total Number of 

Defective Bars

05/28/00

Through 06/07/00

46.07 393 10 403
Factual Information 19 Railroad Accident Report

The vehicle the track inspector used during his track inspections was a 1996

Chevrolet 1-ton super-cab pickup truck with Fairmont Hy-Rail equipment. Although

forward visibility will vary somewhat depending on the seat adjustment and the height of

the driver, an inspector in the driverís seat cannot see a track component that is less than

about 28 feet in front of the vehicle. With a newer model of pickup truck (having a shorter

hood), the track component is not visible unless it is at least 19.5 feet in front of the

operator. With a flat-front inspection vehicle, an operator can see a track component at a

distance of about 9.5 feet.

On May 28, after the track conditions were initially observed by the track group,

the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) chief inspector inspected the track between

MP 573.3 and MP 573.45 for compliance with the Federal track safety standards. He

discovered seven track defects, including two cracked joint bars, three locations of

defective track ties, and two locations of insufficient bolts.

On May 29, the FRA chief inspector reviewed the UPís track inspection records

for the period January 1 to May 26, 2000. They revealed that the track inspector had

identified defective switch ties28 at the east end of Lawtell, MP 585.0, on March 11, on

April 8, and on April 15, but that the inspector had not taken remedial action as required

by 49 CFR 213.233(d).29 Because of the lack of remedial action, the FRA chief inspector

reported a violation on his inspection report. On May 31, 2000, Safety Board investigators

and FRA personnel did a walking inspection and identified the defective switch ties that

the track inspector had previously reported. The chief inspector reported a violation

because the ties had still not been repaired.

Safety Board investigators and FRA personnel also inspected the track at the east

end of an interlocking and siding switch between MP 573.4 and MP 573.7. The FRA chief

inspector reported a joint with insufficient track bolts, a tread portion of a frog that was

worn beyond allowable limits, and eight loose guard bolts on the north-side guard rail.

In addition to the track groupís walking inspections, the UP track maintenance

crews conducted a 5-day walking inspection of the joint bars on the 44 miles of jointed rail

territory. They discovered 376 defective joint bars, of which 366 were cracked and 10

were broken. After the UP had replaced the defective joint bars, the FRA chief inspector

conducted a walking track inspection between MP 568 and MP 574.8. He found an

additional 27 cracked joint bars and 42 rail joint locations that lacked effective crossties.

28 Switch ties support switches and turnouts and are longer than standard ties, commonly reaching

lengths of more than 16 feet.

29 Title 49 CFR 213.233(d) states, ìIf the person making the inspection finds a deviation from the

requirements of this part, the inspector shall immediately initiate remedial action.î
Factual Information 20 Railroad Accident Report

UP Inspection of Beaumont Subdivision Track

Routine track inspections are normally conducted by walking the tracks or by

riding along the track in a Hy-Rail vehicle. Other inspections, such as those intended to

identify internal rail defects or to check track geometry, are performed using specially

equipped rail cars.

Hy-Rail Inspections

Federal regulations (49 CFR Part 213) set the requirements for track geometry and

inspections. As noted earlier, in the area of the derailment, trains traveled over the

Beaumont Subdivision at 40 mph, a speed that required class 3 track. Federal

requirements for inspections of class 3 track stipulate that the track be inspected twice per

week with at least one calendar day between inspections.30 The UPís general practice

called for the mainline track on the Beaumont Subdivision to be inspected six times per

week.

The UP track inspector explained that his inspection territory consisted of about 84

miles of the Beaumont Subdivision, from MP 507 to MP 590.75, which he inspects using

a Hy-Rail vehicle. He stated that he tried to inspect the main track four times a week and

explained that he normally inspected the main track on Saturdays, Sundays, Mondays, and

Tuesdays. He used Wednesdays for yard track inspections. A relief inspector, usually the

track foreman, inspected the track on Thursdays and Fridays, the regular track inspectorís

off days. The inspector said that he usually traveled from west to east because the majority

of train traffic operated in that direction. (An inspection vehicle that proceeds in the same

direction as the train traffic generally experiences fewer delays.) When performing an

inspection, the inspector observes the track, searching for defective track components or

changes in track geometry. The track inspector stated that he did the track inspections at

speeds between 20 and 25 mph on CWR track and between 15 and 20 mph on jointed rail.

Safety Board investigators examined track inspection records for the jointed rail

territory of the Beaumont Subdivision. Investigators discovered that during the week

before the derailment, the records itemized three separate instances of broken joint bars.

According to the records, each instance involved a rail joint in which both joint bars had

broken, as had been the case with the joint bars later found near the derailment.

In the first instance, which was on May 20, 1 week before the derailment, the UP

track inspector found a pair of broken joint bars at MP 579.1. In the second instance, 4

days before the derailment, the track inspector found a rail joint in which both joint bars

had broken at MP 571.1, about 3.1 miles east of the derailment location. In the third

instance, 3 days before the derailment, the track inspector discovered a rail joint at which

both joint bars were broken at MP 587.1, about 17 miles east of Eunice. According to

track inspection records, a total of 128 cracked or broken joint bars had been discovered in

the 5 months before the derailment.

30 This requirement is for track that had more that 10 million gross tons of traffic in the preceding year.

In 1999, the Beaumont Subdivision carried in excess of 22 million gross tons.
Factual Information 21 Railroad Accident Report

The relief inspector inspected the track on Thursday, 2 days before the derailment,

and on Friday, the day before the derailment. He did not note any track defects on

Thursday. On Friday, he replaced some track bolts at MP 575. He also inspected the

switches at Lawtell, MP 585.0, and Powel, MP 573.6. He did not note track defects at

either location.

Walking Inspections

In addition to the Hy-Rail inspections, UP policy required that the subdivisionís

track be walked annually and visually inspected for cracks and breaks. The UP manager of

track maintenance stated that the annual walking track inspections had been instituted

before he was assigned to the Beaumont Subdivision in April 1997. He stated that he let

the track inspector determine how and when to do the walking inspections. Inspectors

were not required to keep written records of the dates or locations of their walking

inspections.

The chief engineer stated that in early 2000, he had issued oral instructions that the

walking inspections of all track, whether in jointed rail territory or CWR territory, be done

twice a year instead of once. He stated that he had instituted the walking inspection

program after the UP reported to the FRA that a derailment in California had been caused

by a pair of broken joint bars. He was unsure of exactly when he had issued the

instructions, and other maintenance-of-way employees interviewed by investigators were

also unsure of the exact date of the origin of this instruction.

The chief engineer did not require that written records be kept of the dates or

locations of the twice-yearly walking inspections. The UP track inspector told the Safety

Board that while no written record of the walking inspections was kept, if a cracked or

broken joint bar was found during the walking inspection, that finding would be recorded

on the track inspection form.

The track inspector stated that his most recent walking inspection before the

accident was on January 3, 5, and 12, 2000. On those 3 days, the investigators found, the

track inspector had inspected 10 miles of track. He stated that during the walking

inspection, he had had track workers following behind him to make repairs.

The relief inspector stated that he had done his last walking inspection in

December 1999. He said he had inspected 7 miles of track, from MP 572 to MP 565, and

had found more than 20 cracked joint bars. This 7-mile segment of track included

MP 567.9, the location of the derailment.

Since the Eunice derailment, the UP has increased the frequency of its walking

inspections of jointed track. The chief engineer told investigators that he now requires that

jointed rail territory that carries over 10 million gross tons and has class 2 or higher track

be inspected on foot four times a year. He also said that the locations of the walking

inspections must be recorded on the inspection reports.
Factual Information 22 Railroad Accident Report

Other Inspections

The line on which the derailment occurred was a key route by both AAR and UP

definition. In its Recommended Railroad Operating Practices for Transportation of

Hazardous Materials, the AAR states:

Main Track on ëKey Routesí must be inspected by rail defect detection and track

geometry inspection cars or any equivalent level of inspection no less that two

times each year; and sidings must be similarly inspected no less than one time

each year.

The UP chief engineer told investigators that on the Beaumont Subdivision, the

rail was inspected for internal defects twice a year. The UP had done the last rail

inspection for internal defects on the main track with its DC-9 test car on April 11 and had

found five rail defects. According to its summary report of rail detector car results on the

Beaumont Subdivision for 1999, the UP, using rail test cars, had conducted internal rail

inspections on April 20, July 22, and October 12. According to the UP record of rail

service failures,31 one rail failure was found between MP 567 and MP 568. No rail failures

were found between MP 568 and MP 569.

On February 2, 2000, the UP did a track geometry inspection between MP 556 and

MP 584 and did not find any track geometry defects within the area of the derailment.

Oversight of Track Inspections

The manager of track maintenance had almost 30 years of railroad service and had

been promoted to positions of increasing responsibility. He had been the manager of track

maintenance of the Livonia Service Unit, which included the Beaumont Subdivision,

since April 1997. His territory consisted of about 277 miles of track. He told investigators

that he had Hy-Railed over the Beaumont Subdivision about a month before the

derailment. He also told investigators that the track inspector was a hard worker and that

he did a good job.

UP track inspectors on the Beaumont Subdivision are not dedicated exclusively to

the inspection of track; they are also expected to make repairs to track defects if they are

qualified and equipped to do so. Track inspectors are expected to replace defective joint

bars that they find during their inspections. More extensive repairs are performed by

maintenance crews.

The manager of track maintenance told investigators that he reviewed the records

of daily track inspection at the end of each month but that he did not scrutinize the records.

He also had conversations with the track inspector when the inspector found larger

maintenance problems that he could not solve by himself; in such instances, the manager

of track maintenance arranged for other track employees to make the repairs.

31 A service failure is the occurrence of a broken rail or a rail defect being discovered under normal

operating conditions or routine track inspections.
Factual Information 23 Railroad Accident Report

FRA Inspection of Beaumont Subdivision Track

Investigators examined the data gathered by the FRAís T-10 test car32 as it had

traveled over the Beaumont Subdivision on April 10. No track geometry defects were

noted for class 3 track within the area of the derailment. This inspection car is not

designed to inspect individual track components such as joint bars.

The FRA track inspectors had inspected the track on the Beaumont Subdivision on

January 26 and 27, 1999, and had done a follow-up inspection on March 16, 1999. These

were the last FRA inspections before the accident. The FRA regional administrator had

arranged for the January inspection to be sure that the main track complied with FRA

regulations because a special train hauling napalm for the military was expected to use the

track. Two FRA track inspectors inspected the Beaumont Subdivision independently, one

between MP 507 and MP 569, the other between MP 569 and MP 578.

Between MP 507 and MP 569, the FRA track inspector reported six locations with

defective ties. The inspector also wrote on the inspection report that ìties are weak and

marginal in various locations between Kinder and Eunice, LA.î Between MP 569 and MP

578, the track inspector reported three locations with defective ties and five locations with

cracked or broken joint bars. A note on the inspection report reads ìweak tie condition

between milepost 569 and milepost 578.î The ties must support the load that is imposed

on the rail and joint bars in the area of the rail joint and transmit this load to the ballast

with diminished unit load. Tie spacing, weak ties, or missing ties may place a bending

load on the joint bar and rails and require the adjacent ties to distribute the additional load

to the ballast.

The FRA track inspector who did the March follow-up inspection inspected the

track between MP 556 and MP 591. He stated that he did the follow-up to see whether the

conditions that he had reported in January had been corrected and to inspect other

locations. He stated that the previously reported defects had been repaired but that he

found defective tie conditions at 11 other locations. He identified cracked joint bars at two

locations.

Safety Board investigators also examined the FRA inspection reports for 1997 and

1998. The reports noted that the Beaumont Subdivision was FRA class 4 track with an

operating speed of 50 mph. Most of the observed track defects were defective joint bars,

improper cross-level elevation (the relative heights of the two rails), and insufficient or

loose track bolts. The reports did not note weak tie conditions.

The investigators also examined the FRA track inspection reports for 1995 and

1996. The FRA track inspector had noted numerous track defects. No problematic defects

were noted in the immediate area of the derailment. Most of the reported track defects

were deviations in cross-level, crossties not effectively distributed over a 39-foot segment

32 The T-10 test car utilizes electronic sensing technology to record eight critical track measurements

for each linear foot of track. The T-10 can objectively identify problems in track gage, surface, and

alignment and can accurately locate problematic conditions that are difficult to detect by visual inspection.
Factual Information 24 Railroad Accident Report

of rail, no effective support crossties within the prescribed distance from a joint, missing

track bolts, and cracked/broken joint bars.

The FRA regional chief inspector stated that depending on what was observed

from a Hy-Rail truck, an FRA inspector might decide to return for a follow-up walking

inspection. He had done a walking inspection during the 1996 inspections of the

Beaumont Subdivision. According to his inspection reports, he had found 36

cracked/broken joint bars. At two locations, he had found rail joints in which both joint

bars were cracked.

According to the track safety standards in 49 CFR 213.121(c): ìIf a joint bar is

cracked or broken between the middle two bolt holes it shall be replaced.î The track can

remain in service, at 10 mph, for a period of 30 days while repairs are made.

Tests and Research

Joint Bars

The broken joint bars that were found at the accident scene were shipped to the

Safety Boardís Materials Laboratory for further examination. An overall view of the rail

pieces is shown in figure 6. The examination of the rail, joint bars, and bond wires

included optical and scanning electron microscopy and energy dispersive x-ray

spectroscopy of the fracture surfaces. The microstructures of each joint bar were

examined, and a chemical analysis was performed on the joint bar on the field side.

Raised characters on each joint bar identified the bars as having been

manufactured in 1951 by the Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation. Although some of the

fracture surface was obliterated by postfracture damage, a portion of the remaining

fracture surface of each joint bar showed the chevron patterns and radial marks that are

typically found in overstress fractures. From these markings, the initiation of the

overstress region in each bar could be traced to a relatively smooth, dark region with a

curving boundary, which is typical of fatigue.

On the field-side joint bar shown in figure 7, the fatigue region was on the upper

portion. A portion of the boundary was visible on the east surface, as indicated by the

dashed line. Ratchet marks were visible on the west surface, indicating multiple origins at

the top of the bar in the area marked by bracket ìO.î The depth of the fatigue region was

approximately 0.813 inch. On the gage-side joint bar shown in figure 8, the fatigue region

was on the lower gage-side corner of the bar. For each mating surface shown in figures 7

and 8, a dashed line indicates the fatigue boundary, and bracket ìOî indicates the fatigue

origin area. The depth of the fatigue region was approximately 0.308 inch.
Factual Information 25 Railroad Accident Report

Figure 5. The accident joint bars. The east and west sections of the joint 

bars are indicated by ìEî and ìW.î The location of the bond wires is indicated 

by ìB.î The bond wires are on the field side (outside) of the joint.

Figure 6. The field side (outside) joint bar from the accident 

joint. The area of the fatigue crack boundary is shown as a 

dashed line. The letter ìOî indicates the fatigue origin area.

Figure 6.

Figure 7.
Factual Information 26 Railroad Accident Report

An examination of the surface of the fractured areas of the joint bars revealed that

both fractured surfaces displayed evidence of contact damage to the mating fractured

surface. In general, the greater damage was on the field side of the west surfaces and on

the gage side of the east surfaces, indicating that the separated joint bars had shifted in

relation to each other after they had fractured.

Investigators chemically analyzed for carbon and phosphorus the field-side joint

bar material that had been sampled approximately 2 inches west of the fracture surface.

The result was 0.499 percent carbon and 0.014 percent phosphorus. According to the

AREA (American Railway Engineers Association) Manual for Railway Engineering,

ìSpecifications for High-Carbon-Steel Joint Barsî (1969), the carbon content must be

greater than 0.45 percent, and the phosphorus content in the finished bar must be less than

0.05 percent. The phosphorus and carbon levels of the tested material met those

specifications.

Safety Board investigators measured the hardness on a cross-section of the

accident joint bars.33 The AREA manual requires that the steel used in joint bars have a

minimum tensile strength of 85,000 pounds per square inch (psi). The investigators found

that the corresponding tensile strengths were 121,000 psi for the joint bar on the gage side

and 112,000 psi for the joint bar on the field side.

Figure 7. The gage side (inside) joint bar from the accident joint. 

The area of the fatigue crack boundary is shown as a dashed line. 

The letter ìOî indicates the fatigue origin area.

33 The Wilson Conversion Table was used to convert hardness to the estimated tensile strengths

corresponding to the measured hardness values.

Figure 8.
Factual Information 27 Railroad Accident Report

The pair of broken joint bars found at the derailment exhibited visual indications

that the fracture surface of both failed joint bars originated at a previously formed fatigue

crack. After the derailment, more than 400 defective joint bars were identified and

removed from the Beaumont Subdivisionís 44-mile stretch of jointed track. Two hundred

of these defective bars were transported to the UPís research and development laboratory

in Omaha, Nebraska, for examination and testing under the supervision of Safety Board

staff. The majority of the defective joint bars had fatigue cracks across the center of the

bar, roughly parallel to the rail ends. This type of defect is similar to the fatigue cracks that

were found to have existed before the total failure of the pair of broken joint bars that were

found at the location of the derailment.

The purpose of the Omaha testing was to determine the relative strength of joint

bars that were found to have fatigue cracks of various lengths in the center. Investigators

also tested the strength of a new, as-manufactured, joint bar and of a nondefective joint bar

that had been in service for about 48 years.

During testing, these joint bars were mounted in a fixture that was designed to

replicate the direction and location of the bending forces that a joint bar is expected to

withstand in normal use. In the test, a hydraulic press was used to create bending forces

that would exceed those normally found in the field so that the strength of the bar could be

measured. In individual testing of a new joint that had never been in service, the bar

deformed under a peak load of 120,000 pounds. In individual testing of a nondefective

joint bar that was manufactured and had been in service since 1952, the bar deformed

under a peak load of 110,000 pounds. Neither bar cracked or broke under testing.

In addition to the nondefective joint bars, Safety Board staff selected 17 other joint

bars with varying types of fatigue cracks and had them tested in a manner that subjected

them to bending forces that could be measured. Three of the defective bars were tested

individually, as were the two nondefective bars. These three bars fractured, with little or

no deformation, under peak loads of 34,200 pounds, 43,400 pounds, and 16,600 pounds.

The remaining 14 defective bars were paired and tested as a unit. Of the 14 paired bars, 8

fractured during testing with little or no deformation. These bars fractured under peak

loads ranging from 16,000 to 138,000 pounds, with an average peak load at failure of

about 79,375 pounds.

Rail

As shown in figure 6, the top surface of the end face of the east rail ìEî showed

damage consistent with receiving rail end deformation, and the gage side of the head was

rounded. The web portion of the rail end face was deformed on the gage side, and the

corner of the gage side of the base was missing. The top surface at the end face of west rail

ìWî was rolled over. This type of damage is consistent with trailing rail end deformation.

Bond Wires

Bond wires are attached to the ends of each rail at a rail joint to connect the rails

electrically. With all of the rails ìbondedî in this fashion, segments of track make up
Factual Information 28 Railroad Accident Report

circuits in the railroad signal system. A break in a rail or a broken bond wire can cause the

signal system to detect an interruption in the circuit.

The Safety Board laboratory used optical microscopy to examine the separated

ends of the wires to determine whether the wires had been broken before, or had been

broken by, the derailment. Examination of the wires attached to west rail section revealed

that most of the ends were necked adjacent to the fracture surface, which is typical of

ductile overstress fracture. For the wires attached to east rail section, examination revealed

that the shorter wires also appeared necked. The longer wires appeared to be flattened near

the end, consistent with a longitudinal compression of the wire.

Other Information

Beaumont Subdivision Track Maintenance

Recently Completed Maintenance. Larger maintenance projects on the

Beaumont Subdivision included the 1998 installation of 20 miles of 133-pound CWR

between MP 608.5 and MP 588.5, which is east of Eunice. In mid-1999, 88 carloads of

ballast were distributed between MP 544.5 and MP 590.0, which corresponds to the 44-

mile portion of jointed track between MP 544.3 and MP 588.5.

After the ballast was spread, the track was surfaced. In addition to the surfacing,

some of the road crossings were improved. In 2000, before the derailment, the UP

installed 116 crossties to break up defective tie clusters and repaired an additional 21

battered rail joints.

Planned Maintenance. The UP maintains a long-range plan, called a ì5-year

plan,î for major capital work in track maintenance. The plan is predominantly concerned

with rail and tie replacement. During any particular 5-year period, projects may be

accelerated or deferred. Adjustments are made according to changing conditions. The

chief engineer explained that the planned projects are usually selected in the spring. He

added, ìThen, in December, we follow up with another planning conference where we

look out the 5 years.î The projects are prioritized according to relative necessity and the

changing conditions.

The chief engineer told investigators that the 5-year plan, as of May 2000, did not

include a tie replacement program for the Beaumont Subdivision. Such a tie project for the

subdivision had been discussed, however. The chief engineer informed investigators that

after the derailment, an average of 1,200 crossties per mile had been replaced on the

Beaumont Subdivision. After the new crossties were installed, the jointed rail was

replaced by CWR.

Jointed Rail in Mainline Tracks

Rail used for mainline railroad tracks can be divided into two types: CWR and

jointed rail. For mainline tracks with heavy traffic, CWR is the most common, although a
Factual Information 29 Railroad Accident Report

significant number of heavy-use mainlines continue to use jointed rail. Jointed rail was

used exclusively before technological advancements made possible the installation and

welding of rails into seamless 1/4-mile sections. Most welded rail track also has some

joint bars,34 which have the same characteristics and fastening methods as the joint bars

found in jointed track. After the accident, the UP replaced the Beaumont Subdivisionís 44

miles of jointed rail with CWR.

The UP Senior Director of Derailment Prevention stated that by the end of 1999

(the last year of record before the derailment), the UP had 33,078 miles of mainline track.

The track comprised 23,698 miles of CWR and 9,380 miles of jointed rail. As of the end

of 2001, the UP had 32,682 miles of mainline track, including 6,688 miles of jointed rail.

Other large railroads were surveyed to determine the amount of jointed rail on their

mainline tracks at the end of 2001. The Burlington Northern Santa Fe had 29,043 miles of

mainline track, which included of 5,026 miles of jointed rail. CSX had 19,043 miles of

mainline track, including 4,295 miles of jointed rail. The Norfolk Southern had 21,807

miles of mainline rail, of which 3,114 miles were jointed rail.

Rail Joints as a Cause of Derailments

The Nationís railroads reported to the FRA that there were 48 broken joint bar incidents 

that caused derailments between 1995 and 1999. A search of the FRA database resulted in 

the information shown in table 2, which lists the number of derailments that are caused by 

broken joint bars.

34 Joints are commonly found near turnounts and special track work. Insulated joint bars are installed at

certain locations to isolate the electric circuits used for railroad signal systems and grade crossing warning

devices. Temporary joints are commonly installed during maintenance activities and are welded at a later

time.

Table 2. Accidents that were reported to the Federal Railroad Administration that were 

attributed to broken joint bars compared with total train accidents.

Year Total No. of Accidents

No. of Track-Caused 

Accidents

No. of Accidents Attributable to 

Broken Joint Bars

1995 2,459 856 6

1996 2,443 905 16

1997 2,397 879 9

1998 2,575 900 8

1999 2,768 995 9

2000 2,983 1,035 12

2001 3,134 1,094 11
30 Railroad Accident Report

Analysis

General

The engineer and conductor were qualified in their operational responsibilities and

were familiar with the territory. The event recorders indicate no abnormalities with train

handling or other operational considerations. The train was traveling eastward, in good

weather, with a proper wayside signal indication and was operating about 40 mph, which

was within the specified speed limit for the track. Postaccident testing of the train

crewmembers for alcohol and specific drugs was negative. Therefore, the Safety Board

concludes that there was no evidence of alcohol or drug use, and weather, train crew

qualifications, and the operation of the train were not factors in this accident.

The engineer told investigators that he had no difficulties with brakes or slack

action and that all equipment had worked normally. The train had passed over wayside

defect detectors 21.2 miles and 9.1 miles before the derailment. The detectors were

designed to detect overheated journals and dragging equipment and had event recorders,

both of which indicated that the train had no defects. An examination of the records that

indicated the placement of loaded and empty cars in the train and the maximum car

weights revealed nothing that contributed to the severity of the derailment.

Investigators examined the locomotives and freight cars that did not derail and did

an air brake test. No defects were found that could have caused or contributed to the

derailment. A mechanical inspection of the derailed cars that were not involved in the

general pileup revealed nothing that could have caused the accident. Explosions and fire

damaged most of the derailed equipment in the general pileup, and the damage was so

extensive that determining the mechanical condition of the cars before the derailment was

not possible. However, because of the number of cars that derailed in advance of the

general pileup, any causal mechanical defect would probably have been in the first several

cars to derail, and not in the general pileup of destroyed cars. The 10th car, the car that had

remained coupled to the head end of the train after the derailment, was thoroughly

examined and had no significant defects. The wheels, trucks, and couplers of the 11th,

12th, and 13th cars were also inspected, and no causal defects were identified. The Safety

Board therefore concludes that the mechanical condition of the cars in the train did not

cause or contribute to the derailment.

The engineer and conductor of the accident train informed Safety Board

investigators that they observed a clear signal indication at the last signal before the

derailment, and that prior signal aspects had also displayed a clear indication. A wayside

signal can only display a clear indication if the two consecutive blocks ahead are clear of

trains and have no loss of rail continuity. Safety Board investigators examined and tested

the signal system and found it to be functioning properly. The Safety Board therefore

concludes that the signal system in the accident area did not contribute to the accident.
Analysis 31 Railroad Accident Report

The derailment involved 5 pressure tank cars and 12 non-pressure tank cars

carrying various hazardous materials. All of the pressure cars survived the derailment

without being breached, although three of those failed in the resulting fire. These cars had

greater wall thickness than non-pressure cars and were equipped with head shield and

thermal protection. Based on the fact that the first explosion was reported to have occurred

103 minutes after the derailment, the three pressure tank cars that failed exceeded the

required minimum 100-minute exposure to fire before failing. Of the non-pressure tank

cars, seven were breached during the derailment. The level of damage sustained in this

accident by both pressure and non-pressure tank cars is consistent with that found in

similar accidents involving a derailment at relatively high speed (in this case, about 40

mph).

The Accident

The engineer of the accident train said that he had seen a track defect in the south

rail just before passing over it. The conductor, although he had not seen the defect, stated

that he had felt the engine pass over a track abnormality. Both employees heard an unusual

sound as the engine passed over the location where the engineer had reported the defect.

According to the transcripts of the emergency radio broadcast to the train dispatcher just

after the derailment, the engineer had indicated that the train had passed over a broken rail.

During wreck-clearing operations, a rail with pieces of two broken joint bars

attached to its east end was found on the south side of the bridge. The following day,

investigators located a similar rail with broken pieces of joint bars attached. Metallurgists

at the site indicated that the two pairs of broken joint bars matched, which was later

reaffirmed by a closer examination at the Safety Boardís Materials Laboratory.

Investigators were more confident that the broken pair of joint bars had played a

role in the derailment after observing that the top corner of the end face of the rail

exhibited visible evidence of having been deformed by the impact of wheels moving over

the top corner of the rail end. This is significant in that it demonstrates that the separated

rail and joint bars had, for a time, remained in place while the wheels of a moving train

passed over them. Such damage would not have been present if the joint bars had broken

as a result of forces generated during the derailment.

Based on the engineerís statements, on the physical evidence exhibited by the

broken joint bars and the damage to the end face of the rail that is consistent with wheel

impact, and on the laboratory examination of the joint bars, the Safety Board concludes

that the joint bars found at the point of the derailment had broken before the arrival of the

accident train, which allowed the rail to become misaligned. The joint bars had most

probably failed when the previous freight train had passed through the area. Just as a

number of the cars of the earlier train had been able to pass over the misaligned rails

without incident, the 3 locomotives and first 10 cars of the accident train passed over the

track defect without derailing. Investigators believe that the 11th car was probably the first
Analysis 32 Railroad Accident Report

to derail and that it pulled laterally on the trailing end of the 10th car, causing it to also

derail.

Mechanical Suitability of Joint Bars

Many of the joint bars in the 44-mile section of jointed rail territory of the

Beaumont Subdivision were removed because of cracks that were detected during

inspections following the accident. To determine the mechanical suitability of the joint

bars, a series of mechanical tests was conducted to determine whether the steel from

which the joint bars were made was substandard or had flaws or defects that may have

contributed to the cracking. The results of the tests showed that the material properties

were not substandard. During laboratory testing, the strength of a new joint bar was

compared with that of a noncracked joint bar that had been in service for some 48 years.

The strength of the materials was found to be similar. But testing also showed that even a

small crack in the center of the joint bar significantly reduced the barís strength.

Investigators found no material defects at the origin areas of the fractured surfaces.

Chemical composition was within specifications, and hardness results indicated that the

approximate tensile strength was also within specifications. The failures in the accident

joint bars resulted from metal fatigue.

UP Track Inspections

Frequency of Inspections

Trains were operated at 40 mph in the area of the derailment, and Federal

regulations specify that for a speed of 40 mph, the track must meet the track safety

standards for class 3 track. Regulations require that for the annual tonnage supported by

the Beaumont Subdivision, class 3 track must be inspected twice a week at intervals of at

least one calendar day. During its investigation, the Safety Board found that the UP was

inspecting the mainline track of the Beaumont Subdivision six times a week.

Adequacy of Inspections

Observing track from a moving inspection vehicle is the most common method of

inspecting track; however, this method is inadequate for detecting defective joint bars.

When the track inspectorís vehicle is operated in an eastward direction, as was the case

generally for the Beaumont Subdivision, the inspector cannot see any part of the outside

joint bar on the south side of the track, nor can he see any part except the tops of the two

joint bars on the north rail. Even those joint bars that can be partially seen by the inspector

may have small fractures that are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to see from a

moving vehicle.
Analysis 33 Railroad Accident Report

Investigators found that in the 5 months before the derailment, UP track inspectors

had detected and replaced 128 defective joint bars. However, after the derailment, various

walking inspections of the entire 44-mile section of jointed rail revealed 403 defective

joint bars, indicating that regular track inspections had resulted in a significant number of

defective joint bars remaining undetected.

As evidenced by the numerous joint bars that were found with fatigue cracks of

varying lengths, a joint bar with a fatigue crack can remain in service for some time before

failing completely. And although fatigue crack growth rates will vary depending on the

type and frequency of forces exerted upon the joint bars, a fatigue crack, once initiated,

can be expected to grow until it causes complete failure of the bar. Laboratory

examination of the pair of broken joint bars found at the derailment site revealed that the

fractures in those bars resulted from fatigue cracks, and while it cannot be determined

when the cracks were initiated, they were certainly evident in the bars for some time

before the bars failed in this accident. The Safety Board concludes that the UP track

inspection procedures in use before the derailment were inadequate in that inspectors

identified only a small proportion of the cracked or broken joint bars on the subdivision,

with the result that defective joint bars that should have been replaced were allowed to

remain in service.

Inspection Reports

After each inspection, the UP track inspector or the relief inspector completed a

daily track inspection report form. Although the completed form itemized the various

times and the location of the track inspection, the form did not specify whether any part of

the inspection was a walking inspection. The form listed the types and locations of repairs

that the inspector had made and the locations of the track deficiencies that he could not

correct. The Safety Board considers that the daily track inspection report has value, both

as a record of track abnormalities and as a means of allowing supervisors to evaluate track

conditions as well as review inspection activities and repairs made by the inspectors.

Investigators who reviewed track inspection records made before the derailment

and compared them with the results of a walking inspection of the 44-mile section of

jointed rail after the derailment found a serious disparity between the condition of the

track as listed on the track inspection reports and the actual condition of the track.

In addition to the defective joint bars, investigators became aware of defective

switch ties that were itemized on track inspection reports 6 weeks before the derailment,

on March 11, April 7, and April 15. These switch ties remained in service,

notwithstanding the six inspections per week for the 6-week period between April 15 and

the derailment on May 27. The FRA chief inspector also located areas of defective

crossties and joint bolt defects.

After the derailment, a thorough inspection of the jointed rail territory revealed

track conditions that did not meet the requirements of class 3 track, and these conditions

had likely existed for some time. As noted earlier, the inspection method used by UP track

inspectors was inadequate to detect the significant number of cracked or broken joint bars
Analysis 34 Railroad Accident Report

in the inspection area, and Federal rules require that such defective bars be replaced if the

track is to maintain its class 3 classification and be approved for 40 mph operations.

Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that had the track of the Beaumont Subdivision

been properly assessed, trains would not have been permitted to operate at a speed of 40

mph until appropriate repairs were made.

Walking Inspections

Early in 2000, the UP chief engineer issued oral instructions that the number of

walking inspections of all joints, whether in jointed rail territory or CWR territory, be

increased from once to twice yearly. He said he had made the change primarily to increase

the chances of finding defective joint bars. Neither the regular track inspector nor the

relief inspector had used the railroadís track inspection reports to document the times and

locations of their walking inspections. The track inspector referred to some of his own

written notes and stated that his last walking inspections were in January 2000. With no

written notes, the relief inspector relied on his memory and provided the milepost

locations of his most recent walking inspections. He stated that his most recent track

inspections were in December 1999 and had included the area of the derailment. Safety

Board investigators totaled up the miles of track that were itemized by the track inspector

and relief inspector and found that a walking inspection had taken place on 17 miles of

track during the months of December and January.

The manager of track maintenance told investigators that it was up to the

inspectors to determine how and when to do the walking inspections and that they were

not required to keep records of those inspections. The Safety Board notes that without a

written record of the time and location a walking inspection is made, it is difficult or

impossible to determine exactly when and where a walking inspection has occurred. As a

consequence, track inspectors may inadvertently duplicate walking inspections in some

areas while neglecting others completely.

Since the derailment, the UP has added to the Union Pacific Engineering Track

Maintenance Field Manual the requirement that jointed rail territory that carries more

than 10 million gross tons and is class 2 track or higher be subject to quarterly walking

inspections. Included in the manual is an explanation of the proper method of inspecting

rail joint bars and the requirement that the dates and locations of walking inspections be

recorded on the track inspection reports. Also, since the derailment, track inspectors have

been required to record the date and locations of their walking inspections on the

inspection reports.

Oversight of Track Inspections

UP Management Oversight

Despite inspection methods that were generally inadequate to identify all defective

joint bars, enough defects were noted to demonstrate that defective joint bars were a
Analysis 35 Railroad Accident Report

frequent and persistent problem on the subdivision. For the 2-month period before the

derailment, there were numerous records of defective joint bars and of joint bars with

missing or defective bolts. For example, in the week before the derailment, the UP track

inspector found three rail joints at which both joint bars had broken, which is the same

type of failure that was found at the location of the derailment.

The manager of track maintenance told investigators that he reviewed the track

inspection reports at the end of each month, but he did not scrutinize them. Had he done

so, he may have noted the recurring problems associated with joint bars. The three broken

pairs of joint bars that were found and replaced just days before the derailment should

have alerted management to the potential for other occurrences of total joint bar failure.

This is especially true given that, as noted above, joint bars normally provide evidence,

such as cracks, of impending failure before complete failure actually occurs. Managers

who reviewed the track reports closely would have been aware that track inspections were

not always identifying weakened joint bars in time to prevent future failures and potential

risk to trains. The Safety Board therefore concludes that if UP management had

thoroughly examined track inspection reports, they may have determined that track

inspections were not identifying joint bar defects that could, over time, lead to complete

joint bar failure.

The Safety Board believes that the UP should change its track inspection programs

to ensure that managers are making use of all available information about track condition,

including railroad and FRA track inspection reports, to identify trends or problem areas

and to monitor the effectiveness of daily track inspections.

FRA Track Inspections

The FRA track inspectorís duties include monitoring the accuracy of the railroad

track inspectorsí reporting of track conditions. The FRAís records for the 5 years

preceding the accident document a history of weak tie conditions and cracked joint bars in

the jointed rail section of the Beaumont Subdivision. During a walking inspection in 1996,

the FRA discovered 36 broken joint bars and identified areas with weak crossties. FRA

inspectors inspected the track in January 1999 and discovered areas with insufficient

crossties and defective joint bars. An inspector returned for a follow-up inspection in

March 1999 and found that the situation had been corrected; however, he found defective

tie conditions at 11 locations and 2 cracked joint bars.

Although the FRA did not conduct a regular track inspection on the Beaumont

Subdivision in the 13 months before the derailment, it did do a track geometry car

inspection 47 days before the derailment. The track geometry car did not detect an unusual

amount of poor track surface or alignment. The car did not, and was not designed to,

detect track component defectssuch as fatigue cracks in joint bars or defective

crosstiesthat did not affect track geometry.

The Safety Board notes that hazardous materials can be expected to traverse most

mainline rail routes. However, certain lines, like the Beaumont Subdivision, are known to

support a high volume of hazardous materials. The FRA had inspected Beaumont
Analysis 36 Railroad Accident Report

Subdivision track in 1999 because the military was planning a shipment of napalm. But

other, possibly equally hazardous, products are routinely transported over the subdivision,

and these materials can constitute a serious risk to the public if they are transported over

track that does not comply with the Federal track safety standards. The Safety Board

concludes that the frequency and type of track inspections routinely performed by the

FRA on the Beaumont Subdivision were inappropriate given the fact that this was a key

route that carried large volumes of hazardous materials. Therefore, the Board believes that

the FRA should modify its track inspection program to incorporate the volume of

hazardous materials shipments made over the tracks in determining the frequency and

type of track inspections.

AAR Recommended Practices for Key Routes

UP officials stated that the route from Freeport, Texas, to Livonia, Louisiana, was

designated a key route because of the types and volumes of hazardous materials carried

over it. The AAR, in its Circular No. OT-55-B, Recommended Railroad Operating

Practices for Transportation of Hazardous Materials, states that mainline track on key

routes ìmust be inspected by rail defect detection and track geometry inspection cars or

any equivalent level of inspection no less than two times each year.î

As noted earlier, inspections conducted by UP and FRA inspectors using special

cars designed to detect internal rail defects or variances in track geometry did not and

could not identify cracks or breaks in joint bars that did not affect track geometry. The

Safety Board concludes that inspections of jointed rail using rail defect detection or track

geometry cars are inadequate to identify the types of joint bar defects that led to this

accident. The Safety Board therefore believes that the AAR should revise the guidance in

its Circular No. OT-55 to recommend that all key routes be subjected to periodic track

inspections that will identify cracks or breaks in joint bars.

Emergency Response

The Eunice Police and Fire Departments arrived on the scene within about 7

minutes of the accident. The local responders acted quickly, decisively, and effectively in

the early stages of the response. After State responders arrived, the local residents were

quickly and effectively evacuated. The evacuation area was enlarged as the situation

warranted and remained flexible as the circumstances changed.

The Louisiana State Police established a command post near the scene less than

2 1/2 hours after the derailment. The emergency response information was exchanged

efficiently, and emergency agencies assembled at the scene quickly. The Safety Board

notes that the UPís train consist contained the required hazardous materials information.

In interviewing the train crewmembers and the local emergency responders who were first
Analysis 37 Railroad Accident Report

to arrive at the scene, investigators detected no fault with the postaccident actions of the

train crew or the information that was contained in the train consist.

As part of the response, three tank cars were explosively vented, and emergency

responders burned the released material. The evacuation zone was reduced as the risk

posed by the hazardous chemicals was lessened and a more thorough inspection of the site

could be performed. Five days after the derailment, the evacuation area was reduced to 1/2

mile, and the majority of residents returned to their homes. The Louisiana State Police

maintained control of the derailment scene until turning it over to the Louisiana

Department of Environmental Quality 6 days after the accident. The Board concludes that

the emergency responders to the accident responded quickly and handled the accident

effectively.

Environmental Remediation

Most of the hazardous material was not directly recovered. Except for some

corrosive liquid and some phenol, most of the hazardous material was consumed by fire or

leaked into the soil. Contaminated soil was removed from the site as part of the

remediation activities. After being removed from the site, the various contaminated

materials were sorted according to their chemical contamination and sent to a facility that

could handle it. The testing and monitoring of the site will continue under the direction of

the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality.
38 Railroad Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. There was no evidence of alcohol or drug use, and weather, train crew qualifications,

and the operation of the train were not factors in this accident.

2. The mechanical condition of the cars in the train did not cause or contribute to the

derailment.

3. The signal system in the accident area did not contribute to the accident.

4. The emergency responders to the accident responded quickly and handled the

accident effectively.

5. The joint bars found at the point of the derailment had broken before the arrival of the

accident train, which allowed the rail to become misaligned.

6. The Union Pacific track inspection procedures in use before the derailment were

inadequate in that inspectors identified only a small proportion of the cracked or

broken joint bars on the subdivision, with the result that defective joint bars that

should have been replaced were allowed to remain in service.

7. If Union Pacific management had thoroughly examined track inspection reports, they

may have determined that track inspections were not identifying joint bar defects that

could, over time, lead to complete joint bar failure.

8. Had the track inspection of the Beaumont Subdivision properly assessed the condition

of the track, trains would not have been permitted to operate at a speed of 40 mph

until appropriate repairs were made.

9. Inspections of jointed rail using rail defect detection or track geometry cars are

inadequate to identify the types of joint bar defects that led to this accident.

10. The frequency and type of track inspections routinely performed by the Federal

Railroad Administration on the Beaumont Subdivision were inappropriate given the

fact that this was a key route that carried large volumes of hazardous materials.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the May 27, 2000, derailment of Union Pacific train QFPLI-26 was the failure of a set of

joint bars that had remained in service with undetected and uncorrected defects because of

the Union Pacific Railroadís ineffective track inspection procedures and inadequate

management oversight.
39 Railroad Accident Report

Recommendations

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety

Board makes the following safety recommendations:

To the Federal Railroad Administration:

Modify your track inspection program to incorporate the volume of

hazardous materials shipments made over the tracks in determining the

frequency and type of track inspections. (R-02-13)

To the Union Pacific Railroad:

Change your track inspection programs to ensure that managers are making

use of all available information about track conditions, including railroad

and Federal Railroad Administration track inspection reports, to identify

trends or problem areas and to monitor the effectiveness of daily track

inspections. (R-02-14)

To the Association of American Railroads:

Revise the guidance in your Circular No. OT-55, Recommended Railroad

Operating Practices for Transportation of Hazardous Materials, to

recommend that all key routes be subjected to periodic track inspections

that will identify cracks or breaks in joint bars. (R-02-15)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

MARION C. BLAKEY

Chairman

CAROL J. CARMODY

Vice Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member 

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

Adopted: April 2, 2002

41 Railroad Accident Report

Appendix A

Investigation and Public Hearing

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the Eunice, Louisiana,

accident during the afternoon of May 27, 2000. An investigative team was dispatched with

members from the Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; and Chicago, Illinois; offices.

Groups were established to investigate railroad operations, track, mechanical, signal, and

hazardous materials issues.

Participating in the investigation were representatives of the Federal Railroad

Administration, the Union Pacific Railroad, the Eunice Police Department, the Louisiana

State Police, and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality.

No public hearings were held.