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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

TONY GARCIA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 5:21-cv-22-RV-MJF 

WELLPATH MEDICAL, et al.,

Defendants.

 / 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed an 

amended civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 13). Upon review of 

the complaint, the undersigned recommends that this case be dismissed as malicious, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1), for Plaintiff’s abuse of 

the judicial process in failing to disclose his litigation history completely and 

honestly.1

 

1

 The District Court referred this case to the undersigned to address preliminary 

matters and to make recommendations regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. 

Loc. R. 72.2(C); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 
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I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Tony Garcia (DC# W54977), is a Florida prisoner confined at Santa 

Rosa Correctional Institution. (Doc. 13). Garcia initiated this lawsuit on December 

21, 2020, by filing a civil rights complaint in the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida. (Doc. 1). The case was transferred to this District Court 

on January 20, 2021. (Doc. 5). 

On January 29, 2021, this court ordered Garcia to file an amended complaint 

on the Northern District’s civil rights complaint form. (Doc. 9). The court mailed 

Garcia the proper form. (Id.). Garcia filed his amended complaint on April 21, 2021. 

(Doc. 13 at 1). Instead of completing the court’s typewritten form, Garcia copied the 

form in his own handwriting, and completed the form. (Id.). Garcia’s handwritten 

complaint is identical to the Northern District’s complaint form in all material 

respects. 

Garcia’s amended complaint names approximately thirteen Defendants. (Id. 

at 1-17).2

 Garcia claims that the Defendants violated his Eighth-Amendment rights 

from May 2018, to the present in the following ways: (1) three correctional officer 

Defendants used excessive force on Garcia; (2) a medical Defendant failed to 

2

 Garcia lists fifteen Defendants on the second page of his complaint, but provides 

information for only thirteen Defendants. (Compare Doc. 13 at 2 with Doc. 13 at 5-

17). 
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provide adequate medical care for Garcia’s elbow injury sustained during the use of 

force; (3) other medical Defendants failed to provide adequate medical care for 

Garcia’s unrelated internal bleeding; and (3) a medical Defendant and two 

correctional officer Defendants, separately, filed false disciplinary charges against 

Garcia. As relief, Garcia seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory 

damages and punitive damages. (Id. at 27-28). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Screening of Garcia’s Amended Complaint 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104–134, 

110 Stat. 1321 (1996), was enacted in “an effort to stem the flood of prisoner lawsuits 

in federal court.” Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); 

see Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) 

(“Recent years have witnessed an explosion of prisoner litigation in the federal 

courts.”). Under the PLRA, a federal court is required to screen a prisoner complaint 

to determine whether the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

(analogous screening provision of in forma pauperis statute). 

Courts may “oblige prisoners to supply available information concerning prior 

lawsuits that concern their incarceration.” In re Epps, 888 F.2d 964, 969 (2d Cir. 

1989). When a complaint form requires a plaintiff to list his litigation history, and 
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the plaintiff’s statements are made under penalty of perjury, a plaintiff’s affirmative 

misrepresentation regarding his litigation history constitutes abuse of the judicial 

process warranting dismissal of the case as “malicious.” See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir. 

1998) (holding that dismissal of an action without prejudice as a sanction for a pro 

se prisoner’s failure to disclose the existence of a prior lawsuit, where that prisoner 

was under penalty of perjury, was proper), abrogated in part on other grounds by 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007); see also, e.g., Sears v. Haas, 

509 F. App’x 935, 935-36 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that dismissal of prisonerplaintiff’s case for abuse of the judicial process under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) was 

warranted where the prisoner failed to disclose cases he previously filed); Harris v. 

Warden, 498 F. App’x 962, 964-65 (11th Cir. 2012) (same); Jackson v. Fla. Dep’t 

of Corr., 491 F. App’x 129, 132-33 (11th Cir. 2012) (same). 

B. Garcia’s Reponses to Questions on the Complaint Form 

Garcia’s amended complaint responds to questions on the complaint form that 

require him to disclose his litigation history. (Doc. 13 at 18-20). The first question, 

Question (A), asks: “Have you initiated other actions in state court dealing with the 

same or similar facts/issues involved in this action?” (Id. at 18). Where there are 

parenthetical areas to mark either a “Yes” or “No” answer to Question (A), Garcia 

marked “No,” and disclosed no cases. (Id.). 
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 The second question, Question (B), asks: “Have you initiated other actions in 

federal court dealing with the same or similar facts/issues involved in this action?” 

(Id.). Where there are parenthetical areas to mark either a “Yes” or “No” answer to 

Question (B), Garcia marked “No,” and disclosed no cases. (Id. at 18-19). 

 The next question, Question (C), asks: “Have you initiated other actions 

(besides those listed above in Questions (A) and (B)) in either state or federal court 

that relate to the fact or manner of your incarceration (including habeas corpus 

petitions) or the conditions of your confinement (including civil rights complaints 

about any aspect of prison life, whether it be general circumstances or a particular 

episode, and whether it involved excessive force or some other wrong)?” (Id. at 19). 

Where there are parenthetical areas to mark either a “Yes” or “No” answer to 

Question (C), Garcia marked “No,” and disclosed no cases. (Id.) 

 Lastly, Question (D) asks: “Have you ever had any actions in federal court 

dismissed as frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim, or prior to service? If so, 

identify each and every case so dismissed.” (Id.). Where there are parenthetical areas 

to mark either a “Yes” or “No” answer to Question (D), Garcia marked “No,” and 

disclosed no cases. (Id. at 19-20). 

At the end of his amended complaint, Garcia wrote: “I Declare under Penalty 

of Perjury That the Foregoing Statement of Fact, Including All Continuation Pages, 

Are True And Correct.” (Id. at 28). Garcia then signed his name. (Id.). Thus, Garcia 
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has in effect stated that at the time he signed his amended complaint on April 21, 

2021, he had not initiated any other action in federal court that related to the 

conditions of his confinement. 

C. Garcia’s Omission 

 The court takes judicial notice that, at the time Garcia filed his amended 

complaint in this case on April 21, 2021, he had initiated another civil action in this 

court that required disclosure. On March 21, 2021, Garcia filed a civil rights 

complaint in this Court against the Warden of Santa Rosa CI, claiming that the 

conditions of his confinement violate the Eighth Amendment because he was refused 

a workable “handicap toilet.” See Garcia v. Leavins, Case No. 3:21-cv-00514-LCHTC. That lawsuit remains pending. The lawsuit is attributable to Garcia because it 

bears his DC number: W54977. Garcia was required to disclose this lawsuit in 

response to Question (C), because it relates to the conditions of his confinement. 

Garcia did not disclose the case. (Doc. 13). Garcia’s omission violates his duty of 

candor to this court. 

D. Materiality of Garcia’s Omission 

 Courts have recognized that information regarding a plaintiff’s litigation 

history is useful to the court: 

[I]t allows efficient consideration of whether the prisoner is entitled to 

pursue the current action under the “three strikes” provision of the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act; it allows consideration of whether the 
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action is related to, or otherwise should be considered in conjunction 

with or by the same judge who presided over, another action; it allows 

consideration of whether any ruling in the other action affects the 

prisoner’s current case. All of these things are appropriately considered 

in connection with the preliminary review of such a complaint under 

the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 

Spires v. Taylor, Case No. 3:00-cv-249-RH (N.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2000) (Order of 

Dismissal). Also, this “information may assist a court in identifying suits that are 

repetitious of prior or pending lawsuits and hence frivolous . . . .” Epps, 888 F.2d at 

969. “Every lawsuit filed, no matter how frivolous or repetitious, requires the 

investment of court time . . . .” Procup, 792 F.2d at 1072. 

 “Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation 

to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out 

Article III functions.” Procup, 792 F.2d at 1073; In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 

1254, 1261-62 (2d Cir. 1984). Similarly, courts have “a responsibility to prevent 

single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by 

others.” Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074. Requiring prisoner-plaintiffs to disclose their 

record of litigation serves all of these compelling interests. Thus, to conserve judicial 

resources and effectively manage their dockets, courts are well within their 

discretion to require in forma pauperis prisoner litigants to disclose their litigation 

history. See Smith v. Psychiatric Sols., Inc. 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(noting that district courts have “unquestionable authority to control their own 
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dockets; this authority includes broad discretion in deciding how best to manage the 

cases before them”).

Additionally, because prisoner-plaintiffs generally proceed pro se, the 

information helps the court determine the plaintiff’s litigation experience and 

familiarity with the legal terrain. The time spent verifying the cases a plaintiff has 

filed but failed to identify can be considerable. 

 Here, Garcia falsely responded to a question on the complaint form as detailed 

above. Garcia knew that the disclosure of his other case was required. A penalty is 

warranted both to deter Garcia from such conduct and to deter others from similar 

misrepresentations and material omissions. See Jones v. Warden of Statesville Corr. 

Ctr., 918 F. Supp 1142, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“The knowing failure of a pro se 

litigant to admit to the filing of prior related complaints in answer to questions on 

the civil rights complaint form is conduct subject to sanctions by the court.”). 

E. The Appropriate Sanction is Dismissal Without Prejudice 

“[F]ailure to comply with court rules requiring disclosures about a plaintiff's 

previous litigation constitutes an abuse of the judicial process warranting dismissal.” 

Sears, 509 F. App’x at 936. The court should not allow Garcia’s false response to 

go unpunished. See, e.g., Redmon v. Lake Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 414 F. App’x 221, 226 

(11th Cir. 2011) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing 

without prejudice prisoner’s amended complaint for abuse of the judicial process; 
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prisoner’s amended complaint failed to disclose a federal lawsuit he filed after his 

original complaint but before his amended complaint). If Garcia suffered no penalty 

for his untruthful response, there would be little or no disincentive for his attempt to 

evade or undermine the purpose of the form. An appropriate sanction for Garcia’s 

abuse of the judicial process in not providing the court with true factual statements 

or responses is to dismiss this case without prejudice. See Rivera, 144 F.3d at 731; 

Redmon, 414 F. App’x at 226; see also, e.g., Reynolds v. Lowery, No. 18-10856-F, 

2018 WL 4206932, *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 2018) (holding that “the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in dismissing” the prisoner-plaintiff’s “complaint as 

malicious, based on his failure to accurately disclose his prior litigation history”); 

Schmidt v. Navarro, 576 F. App’x 897, 899 (11th Cir. 2014) (same). 

 No lesser sanction would deter this type of conduct. For example, providing 

Garcia an opportunity to amend his complaint to disclose the additional lawsuit 

would equate to overlooking his abuse of the judicial process, because that course 

of action would entail no penalty. See Hood v. Tompkins, 197 F. App’x 818, 819 

(11th Cir. 2006). 

III. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully 

RECOMMENDS that: 
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1. This case be DISMISSED without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), for maliciousness and abuse of the judicial 

process. 

2. The clerk of the court be directed to enter judgment accordingly and 

close this case file. 

 At Pensacola, Florida, this 26th day of May, 2021. 

/s/ Michael J. Frank 

Michael J. Frank 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES 

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must 

be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and 

Recommendation. Any different deadline that may appear on the 

electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only and does not 

control. An objecting party must serve a copy of the objections on 

all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate 

judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report and 

recommendation waives the right to challenge on appeal the 

district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.