NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KENETTE A. PAREDES,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,
and EDGARD PAREDES, Sr., Plaintiff,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, dba Department of the Navy, The Navy Exchange Mall at Pearl Harbor,
Defendant

- Appellee,
and JOHN DOES, 1

- 10; et al.,
Defendant. No. 22

- 15459
D.C. No. 1:19

- cv - 00161

- WRP

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Wes R. Porter, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted June 9, 2023 * *

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

JUN 15 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 Honolulu, Hawaii Before: BADE, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
This case , brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346,
arises from a slip and fall accident on a recently mopped floor in the food court of the Navy Exchange at Pearl Harbor. Following a four

- day bench trial, the district
court found that Plaintiff Kenette Paredes failed to establish D efendant United States’ negligence, and that Par e des’s contributory negligence was greater than any negligence by the government and thus barred her recovery. On appeal, P a redes challenges the district court’s factual findings and its legal conclusio n tha t state and federal workplace regulations , while relevant, are not dispositive in determining whether the government was negligent. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

. We review the district court ’ s
factual finding s for clear error and reverse only if “ on the entire evidence ” we are

“ left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. ” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 573 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “ Wh ere there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
fact finder ’ s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. ” Id. at 574. We

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).3 review the district court ’ s legal conclusions regarding the standard of care de novo.
See Miller v. United States , 58 7 F.2d 991, 994

− 95 (9th Cir. 1978). We affirm.
1. The district court did not clearly err in its negligence determination
because there is an adequate basis in the record for each of its factual findings

. First , t he district court ’ s determination as to th e size of the mopped area was supported by the evidence, there is no indication the district court failed to consider
relevant evidence , including the “length axis” of the mopped area , and the court ’ s credibility findings were proper

. Reversal is not warr anted merely because Paredes disagrees with the district court’s conclusion that the mopped area was “relatively small.” See Anderson , 470 U.S. at 574

. T he district court’s determination regarding the cone’s location was also supported by the evidence. Second, Paredes’s contention that the district court failed to consider all relevant evidence is not supported by the record. The court explained its

reaso ning, which was supported by the record, and stated that it reviewed all the testimony and exhibits presented , which included discussions about additional warning measures. Third, the court’s finding that Paredes was not credible is supported by significan t inconsistencies in Paredes’ s testimony

. Given these inconsistencies, the deferential review of the district court’s credibility determinations, and Navy Loss Prevention/Safety Investigator Jessica Cardenas’s consistent testimony , which was4 credited by t he district court, the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.
See id

. at 575

. Fourth , the district court properly considered testimony from the
government ’ s experts, and Paredes ’ s argument on appeal based on a purported logical contradiction in the testimony is unpersuasive. Thus, Paredes has not
demonstrate d that the district court clearly erred in making any of the se challenged
factual findings.
2. Paredes argues that the violation of state and federal workplace regulations sh ould have been used as evidence of negligence and that, because there is no dispute that the government failed to comply with such regulations, the government was negligent per se. The district court correctly held that state and federal workplace regulat ions are relevant, but not dispositive, in determining whether the government was negligent under Hawaii law

. 1 See, e.g. , Michel v. Valdastri, Ltd. , 575 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Haw. 1978) ; Pickering v. State , 557 P.2d 125, 127 (Haw. 1976); see also Robertson v. Burlington Northern R. Co. , 32 F.3d 408, 410

− 11 (9th Cir. 1994). The district court therefore did not err by considering applicable state and federal workplace regulations but ultimately concluding that ,

1 Because the alleged tort occurred in Hawaii, that state’s law governed this action. See Pacheco v. United States , 21 F.4th 1183, 118 7 (9th Cir. 2022)

.5 “in relation to all other evidence,” Paredes was adequately warned of the potential
risk.
3. The district court ’ s conclusion that Paredes ’s contributor y negligen ce was greater than any negligence by the government was not clearly erroneous for
the same reasons supporting its finding on the go vernment’s negligence

. AFFIRMED.