1 Filed 6/25/14 In re Y.S. CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re Y.S. at al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

TIFFANY S., Petitioner,

v. SUPERIOR COUR T, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent;

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Real Party in Interest. A141540
(San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. JD13-3067, 3068, 3068A-C)

In this Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 depend ency proceeding, 1 the juvenile court terminated reunification se rvices to mother Tiffany S. and set a
section 366.26 selection and im plementation hearing for July 16, 2014. Tiffany petitions for extraordinary writ relief, contending that termination of services at the six-month review was improper and that the San Franci sco Human Services Agency (Agency) failed

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.2 to provide reasonable services. We conclude both arguments lack merit, and we deny the petition.
BACKGROUND The Family Tiffany’s involvement with th e Agency dates b ack to 1998, when her first child— born when Tiffany was only 14 y ears old—was detained due to Tiffany’s incarceration. Her parental rights were terminated, and the child was placed for adoption. She subsequently had five more ch ildren, ranging in age from four to 12 years old at the time this dependency proceeding commenced. Since the initial referral in 1998, the family has been the subject of at least 18 referrals, which, according the Agency, have involved “emotional abuse, mother and father’s substa nce abuse, physical abuse of the children, neglect, educational neglect, mother’s ment al health concerns, domestic violence, caretaker absence/incapacity, mo ther and child’s positive tox screens, child abandonment
and medical and environm ental neglect.” In July 2010, a referral alleging abuse and neglect led to the filing of a section 300 petition and removal of the five children fro m the care of Tiffany and Marcelo R., the father of the four younger children. 2 After completing a substance abuse program in the fall of 2012, Tiffany reunified with her childre n, and in December 2012, the dependency was dismissed, with Tiffany receiving sole p hysical and legal custody of the children.
The Referral On February 8, 2013—just two months after dismissa l of the prio r dependency proceeding—the Agency receive d information indicating that three of the children had missed a number of days of school. When as ked why, they said th ey were worried about their mother, who had been go ne for one and a half to tw o weeks. Their father was taking care of them, although he smelled stro ngly of alcohol when he picked them up

2 Marcelo was also involved in this dependency proceeding. This writ petition was brought only on Tiffany’s behalf, however, and we therefore omit facts pertaining to Marcelo except where relevant to the issues be fore us. The father of the fifth child was not involved, as his whereabouts were unknown.3 from school. According to the reporting part y, the children were unclean, tired, and despondent. On February 15, a social wo rker interviewed Y.S., the ol dest child. She reported staying with her aunt because she felt unsafe living with her stepfather. According to Y.S., other than a few days, her mother ha d been gone since December. She said her mother was using drugs again and Marcelo wa s drinking again. According to Y.S, her
mother told her she had been kidnapped and beaten up.
The social worker also met with the five children togeth er. They confirmed they
had not seen their mother a nd did not know where she was. They also confirmed their father was drinking again, going to his brothe r’s house to drink after he dropped them off at school. He smelled like beer when he pi cked them up from schoo l, and they did not
like it when he drank because he got crazy, which scared them. That same day, the social worker met w ith Tiffany (who had apparently returned home after learning about the Agency’s invol vement) and Marcelo. Marcelo admitted drinking again, and Tiffany ad mitted prescription drug use. She had also been taking methadone but then switched to methamphetamine in order to withdr aw from methadone. Tiffany denied she had been gone since Decembe r, at the same time claiming she had left
to withdraw from methadone an d had been kidnapped by a fri end and held hostage for a week. Both parents acknowledged they had lost their jobs. At a team decision meeting on February 19, the parents expressed a willingness to engage in substance abuse services. A safe ty plan was develope d that required Tiffany and Marcelo to parent together with relaps e services and an agr eement as to who was going to care for the children. Subject to that safety plan, the children were released to their parents.
Section 300 Petition Tiffany and Marcelo minimally engaged in their programs, however, and on March 14, the Agency filed a section 300 petition, alleging failure to protect the4 children. 3 The numerous allegations detailed th e parents’ drug and alcohol abuse and neglect. On May 2, the Agency file d a jurisdiction/disposition report advising that Tiffany had begun a pre-treatment program at the e nd of February. She failed, however, to complete the pre-treatment program and stopped participating in the program altogether. In April, she had a positive drug test and missed two subsequent tests. The Agency also reported that Tiffany had long history of mental health problems, having been hospitalized in 19 99 and 2001 due to emotional instability. She displayed self-destructive behaviors and had a history of suicide attempts dati ng back to 1996 or
1997. She had also been di agnosed with a mood disorder and general anxiety. In terms of “assessment/evaluation,” th e Agency summarized: “This family is before the Court today due to the mother and the presum ed father’s relapse with substance [ sic ] and their subsequent neglect of the mi nors. [¶] Despite their relapse, both Ms. S. and Mr. R. have expressed their desire to address their reco very and to maintain their family together. Although [they] expr essed desire, their action in addressing their recovery is rather pedestrian. . . . [¶] . . . Ms. S. started her pre-treatment program with the Iris Center but has since faded from particip ating in its recovery programs as well as cooperating with this Agen cy. Ms. S. drug tested once with a positive result for oxycodone, and she has since mi ssed the subsequent tests. The mother’s positive test and her missed tests coupled with her evading the undersigne d suggest that she may be continuing to use drugs. Her current wher eabouts are unknown, and the minors indicate that their mother returns home periodically to check in on them. [¶] . . . It is the undersigned’s hope that the mother would re-e ngage with this Agency and become a part of [the] support system for her family.”

3 The Agency actually filed two similar petitions: one pertaining to Y.S. and another pertaining to the four other children. This was apparently because Y.S. has a different father than the other children. The two proceedings progressed identically, and we shall refer to a single proceeding for ease of reference.5 In light of the foregoin g, the Agency recommende d the court sustain the allegations in the petition, declare the child ren dependents, order family maintenance services, and continue the matter for a six-month review. Tiffany did not appear at a May 8 se ttlement conference on jurisdiction/ disposition. In her absence, the court su stained amended allegations that she had substance abuse and psychiatric issues re quiring assessment and treatment, and that domestic violence, substance abuse, and neglect made the family home unsuitable for the children. The matter was continued for disposition on May 17. Section 387 Supplemental Petition and Detention On May 16, the Agency filed a status re port and section 387 s upplemental petition seeking a more restrictive placem ent, namely, detention of the children. As to why it was now recommending removal instead of family maintenance, the Agency explained that after the May 8 conference, it had learned th at Marcelo, who had assumed the role of primary care giver for the children, was no l onger living in the ho me, despite that the safety plan required Tiffany and Marcelo to co-parent. Acco rding to the Agency, Tiffany
claimed Marcelo had been dr inking excessively since December and was physically abusing her and emotionally ab using Y.S. Tiffany told the Agency she intended to file for divorce and had a new boy friend who had moved into the family home. According to the Agency, the boyfriend had an extensive crim inal record and appear ed to be an active
addict. Once the Agency became aw are of these developments, it had worked with Tiffany to develop a revised safe ty plan, pursuant to which sh e agreed to submit to drug testing, attend a relapse prevention class, ensu re the children’s school attendance, and not leave the children alone with Marcelo. Desp ite Tiffany’s consent to the plan, she failed to attend a relapse prevention class, missed a drug test, and failed to get the children to school on at least two different days. In li ght of these changes, on May 14, the Agency
had removed the children from the home an d placed them in foster care. The Agency concluded by no ting that the children had previously been removed from the home in the 2010 dependency procee ding, only to be returned home and then6 removed again. The children did not, as the Agency put it, “d eserve” this “roller coaster.” Accordingly, the Ag ency indicated that “the pare nts would need to demonstrate a prolonged period of successf ully engaging with their serv ice requirements before any thought of returning the minors to th e parents could be contemplated.” At the May 17 detention hearing, the cour t ordered the children detained with the parents to receive visitation, and continued the matter for a July 10 settlement conference regarding jurisdicti on and disposition. Jurisdiction and Disposition In a July 1 jurisdiction/disposition repor t, the Agency repo rted the following efforts to facilitate Tiffany’s reunification with her children: it had referred her for drug testing, a substance abuse assessment and ev aluation, a psychological assessment and therapy, and domestic violence support servic es; supervised visitati on with her children; and provided a list of paren ting education referrals. Tiffa ny had not, however, submitted to drug testing, undergone a substance abuse assessment, or begun her recovery treatment program. In fact, she had not availed herself of any services other than visitation or made any steps towards alleviating the circumstance s that led to the Agen cy’s involvement. The Agency believed her failure to drug test co mbined with her lack of attendance in the relapse prevention program suggested she contin ued to abuse substances. Accordingly, it recommended the court declare the children depe ndents and order reuni fication services. The Agency proposed the following serv ice objectives for Tiffany: show her ability and willingness to have custody of her children; obtain resources to meet the needs of her children and provide a safe home; c onsistently, appropriately, and adequately parent her children; comply with all court orders; comply with the conditions of the visitation plan; stay sober a nd demonstrate her ability to liv e free from alcohol and drug dependency; comply with all required drug te sts; maintain stable and suitable housing; and comply with medical or psychological treatment.
Section 342 Amended Petition On July 9, the Agen cy filed an amended petition purs uant to secti on 342 petition, alleging section 300, subdivision (b) failure to protect, as follows: “since the last petition7 was sustained on 5/8/13, the mother has failed to comply with the safety plan made with the [social worker], in that the mother has fa iled to submit to substance testing, has not attended relapse prevention, has not ensured the children’s timely attendance at school, and has brought her boyfriend to live in the home. The boyfriend has an extensive criminal record and appears to be an active drug addict.” It also alleged that Marcelo was actively drinking and unable to sa fely care for the children.
At a settlement conference the next da y, the Agency withdrew the May 30 section 387 supplemental petition, proceeding with the section 342 petition in its place.
The court continue d the matter to August 21 for a se ttlement conference on jurisdiction and disposition. On August 14, the Agency filed an addendum report in which it informed the court that Tiffany had “done little” to address th e issues that led to the detention of her children, summarizing, “Since their removal, Ms. S. is visiting with the minors but nothing much else. This Agency has re ferred the mother to drug testing, drug
assessment/evaluation and indi vidual therapy. However, the mother has not engaged in
these services at the last re porting period. On Friday befo re the writing of this report, Ms. S. continued to express that she would submit to drug testing and drug assessment by the following week as well as pa rticipate in therapy.” The so cial worker further detailed that Tiffany had been “elusive” in meeti ng with him and had “not engaged in the necessary services to mitigate the safety factors.” Tiffany did not appear at the August 21 disposition conference. The court
amended and sustained the a llegation in section 342 petiti on, renewed the children’s dependency status, ordered th eir continued detention in foster care, and ordered
reunification services. It continued the ma tter to February 20, 2014 for a six-month review and August 19 for a 12-month review.
Six-Month Status Review On January 31, 2014, the Ag ency submitted a six-month status review report in
which it recommended termination of reunification services. It reported that Tiffany still
had done little to address the issues that le d to the removal of her children, having8 “participated in a few supervised visits but nothing much else.” And, in fact, her
visitation record was not that stellar: “The Mother was provided supervised visitations . . . . The visits were appropri ate and the minors were reported to always be excited and engaged with the Mo ther during the visits. Afte r the Mother failed to show up/participate in visits for 3 consecutive week s, the visitation [provider] terminated her services. The undersigned attempted on se veral occasions to engage the Mother in supervised visits and made referrals to Ba yview YMCA for visitations, but the Mother failed to follow through and engage.” The Agency informed the court that Tiffany’s mental health continued to be a concern. Despite having a documented hist ory of hospitalizations due to “emotional instability,” as well as a histor y of suicide attempts and ot her self-destructive behaviors and a diagnosis of a mood disorder and gene ral anxiety, Tiffany had not complied with the requirement that she participate in individual therapy. Concerning Tiffany’s substance abuse, the Agency advised that on November 28, 2013, Tiffany had entered a 21-da y detoxification program at the Joe Healy project, prior to which she had admittedly been using methamphetamines and heroin. She was expected to complete the program on Decemb er 19 and enter a drug treatment program that same day, but she checked herself out th ree days early. The social worker had had no contact with Tiffany since December 5, and her whereabouts were unknown at the time of the report. Given Tiffany’s continued struggle with subs tance abuse and mental health issues, her failure to engage in court ordered servic es, and her inability to demonstrate that she could develop the capacity to place the child ren’s best interests above her own, the Agency recommended termination of servi ces and the setting of a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing w ith a permanent plan of adoption.
Section 388 Petition On February 20, 2014, the Agency filed a section 388 petition, seeking to change
the order for reunification services to one terminating parental rights, vacating the 12-month review hearing, and setting a se ction 366.26 selecti ng and implementation9 hearing. The petition was based on the Agen cy’s representation that Tiffany “has had minimal contact with the [A]gency, has failed to comply with court ordered services and
has failed to demonstrate that she has or can de velop the capacity to keep the minors’ best interes[ts] above her own. [¶] The father has stated that he thinks adoption is in the best
interest of his children. De spite his compliance with servi ces, he is still not in a position to provide for the children on a permanent basis.” 4
Contested Six-Month Review and Section 388 Petition Hearing On March 10, 2014, the court held a cont ested hearing on the six-month review and the Agency’s section 388 petition. Social worker Blai r Roe was the only witness to testify. Roe authored the January 31 status report and confirmed that since she wrote the report, Tiffany had not provided her with any dr ug test results, participated in therapy, or visited with her children. Tiffany’s last vi sit with her children was on December 5, when
Roe took her to a visit. Roe believed th at on January 30, 2014 , Tiffany had entered a drug treatment program at the House of Grace with a recommended length of participation of 14 months. On cross-examination, Roe testified that Tiffany’s case manager at the House of Grace told her Tiffany was attendi ng weekly meetings that c overed parenting issues and drug and alcohol abuse. She had been drug testing semiweek ly for the past five weeks, although Roe had not requested the results of those tests. Tiffany’s case manager told Roe that Tiffany was motivated in treatment and was showi ng a positive attitude toward

recovery. Roe also confirmed Tiffany attended a detox program from November 28 to December 16, 2013. While in the program, Tiffany had reache d out to Roe, seeking help getting into an inpatient program directly from the detox program because she was
concerned she would be unable to maintain her sobriety if she did not go directly into a

4 Marcelo had engaged in reunification se rvices and was largely compliant with his case plan, although he still struggled with sobriety. Despite his progress, he believed it to be in the children’s best interest for them to move towards a stable, permanent life with the fost-adopt family.10 program. Roe made arrangements for Tiffa ny to check into the House of Grace on December 19—the day she was scheduled to check out of the Joe Healy detox program—
but she checked out of the detox program three days early. As to visitation, Roe confirmed that Ti ffany visited her children at least twice a month from May to October. She then missed visits for three consec utive weeks, so the visitation provider terminated her services. Roe made a referral for visitation at a different facility, but Tiffany failed to follow up on it. When Tiffa ny did visit with her children, however, they were happy to see their mother and exhi bited signs of being
bonded with her. Wh ile in her detox program, Tiffany had requested visitation, which request Roe accommodated. And Tiffany had contacted Roe in February to set up visitation, but the arrangements were sti ll in process because of Tiffany’s 30-day blackout period and logistical challenges due to the children’s Contra Costa County placement.
Roe also confirmed that she met w ith Tiffany monthly from September to December 2013, providing her with referrals for various services. Roe acknowledged that many of the referrals were for programs in which Tiffany had participated in the prior dependency, but she deni ed Tiffany had expressed an un willingness to participate in the programs because she had already done so. She also did not recall Tiffany seeking
out services on her own. Ro e did speak with a community pastor who assisted Tiffany with obtaining services, helping her get into the detox program and a methadone clinic. Roe was uncertain whether the pastor help ed Tiffany get into the House of Grace, although she acknowledged Tiffany got into the program without th e Agency’s further
assistance. Roe also acknowledged that Tiffany had experienced some medical issues in the previous six months, including miscarryi ng a twin pregnancy. And she was aware Tiffany’s sister had been shot. Roe agreed that Tiffany was supportive of the children’s current foster family, and supported their placement with that family under a guard ianship. The children all reported feeling safe, stress-fr ee, happy to be together, a nd bonded with their foster11 family. Roe acknowledged that 13-year-old Y.S. had expressed a strong desire to reunify with her mother, althou gh on other occasions she had also voiced a desire to be adopted by the foster family. And Y.S. was doing “r eally well” in her current school, forming healthy relationships, keeping up her grades, and avoiding “girl drama” that existed at her prior school. Following the presentation of evidence, th e court heard closing arguments, with counsel for Tiffany arguing first. Concedi ng that the court can terminate reunification services at any time, counsel argued that th ere exists a presumption that services should be provided for 12 months and that the primar y goal is family reunification. She noted that Tiffany was taking steps to “[get] her life back together” and address her relapse, having completed a detox program and followi ng that with “a very intensive inpatient program” in which she was ve ry motivated. This was not, she submitted, a situation where the parent disappeared for six months. Rather, Tiffany visited at least two times a
month for the first six months and once in De cember, and had been requesting visits since she entered the treatment program. Additiona lly, the children were very bonded with Tiffany and would benefit from additi onal reunification services. Counsel for the Agency argued, on the other hand, that section 388, subdivision (c)(1)(B) authorized the court to terminate servic es at the six-month review when the action or inaction of the parent crea ted a substantial likelihood that reunification would not occur. And, he submitted, the ev idence demonstrated that there was not a substantial probability that Ti ffany could reunify if services were extended to the 12-month review, particularly given that sh e was in the beginning stages of a program that would last up to 14 months. Counsel for the children agr eed with the Agen cy that it would be “pretty much impossible” for Tiffany to reunify in the next few months. And gi ven the “long history of the case” and that Tiffany had been “in a nd out of the children’s lives,” he argued it was appropriate to terminate services. Tiffany’s counsel disputed th e Agency’s representation th at the court had to find there was a substantial probability of return in order to continue se rvices, claiming that12 standard applied only to children who were three years old and under. Instead, she argued, the court had to determine there was “a bsolutely no likelihood” of reunification,
and she submitted the evidence did not show that to be the case. Counsel for the Agency agreed that the court did not have to find a substantial probability of reunification in or der to continue services. He argued, however, that the
court could terminate services where the in action of the parents creates a substantial
likelihood that reunification will not occur. After hearing arguments, the court stated that it had the discretion to terminate services at that point, and it went on to do so, explaining:
“I commend mother for what she is accomplishing thus far. But my view is that it is too little, too late. And I am of the view that reunification, likelihood is extremely low. “We have a lot of failure to participate in services. And the visits have been minimal. There have been a few supe rvised visits, but that’s been it.
“I am aware that the child ren are in a placement that wants them, they are all together as I understand it. And I know that was exceedingly important to the father, as I recall, and I believe it is simila rly important to mother that they are there together. And that they seem to be well cared for and safe in this placement, and that this family appears to be very interested in having all of th ese children with them on a permanent basis. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [T]he Court finds that co nditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300, or such conditions ar e likely to exist if supervision were withdrawn. And that a retu rn of the children to the parents would create
a substantial risk of detriment to the safe ty, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. “And the facts upon which a decision that a return would be detrimental is based [on] the continuing challenges that mother has to address, her substance abuse. . . . “And at this time I am terminating re unification services for both parents.
“And I will find that reasonable efforts have been provided or offered designed to aid the parents in overcoming the problems th at led to the initial removal and continued custody of the children, and that their placem ent is necessary and appropriate. And that13 the Agency has complied with the case plan by making reas onable efforts to return the
children to a safe home and to complete whatever steps ar e necessary to finalize their permanent placement.
“I will find that mother’s efforts duri ng this period have been minimal to
moderate.” With that, the court grante d the Agency’s section 388 petition to change order, vacated the 12-month review hearing, and se t a section 366.26 permanency hearing for July 16, 2014. This timely writ petition followed.
DISCUSSION
The Juvenile Court Order Terminatin g Reunification Services Was Proper In her first argument, Tiffa ny challenges the court’s termination of reunification services. She and the Agency disagree, however, on the applicab le standard of review we are to apply to this issue. According to Tiffany, we review an order terminating
reunification services and setti ng a section 366.26 permanency hearing for substantial evidence. The Agen cy contends, however, that in term inating services, the court granted the Agency’s section 388 pe tition to change order, which we review for abuse of discretion. Our opinion in In re Derrick S. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 436 ( Derrick S .) reconciles this apparent conflict. Seven-year-old Derrick was detained from his mother’s care due to her substance abuse and neglect. The juvenile court ordere d reunification services and approved a case plan requiring the mother to complete a drug treatment program. Prior to the six-month review hearing, the social services bureau subm itted a status report advising that the mother had not entered a drug treatment progr am, had not participated in the services offered under her case plan, and had a warrant out for her arrest. ( Derrick S., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 440–441.) Despite this, the bureau was “g uardedly optimistic”
about reunification and recommended additiona l services. Derrick, on the other hand, submitted a brief urging the court to terminat e services and set an early section 366.26 permanency hearing. ( Id. at pp. 441-442.)14 At the six-month review hearing, the c ourt acknowledged the mother had “ ‘done little if anything’ ” to comp ly with her case plan. ( Derrick S., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 443.) Nevertheless, it denied Derrick’s request to terminate services because it believed section 361.5 (and form er rule 1460 of the Californi a Rules of Court) required it to grant the mother an additional six months of reunification services. ( Id. at pp. 439, 443.) On an appeal by Derrick, we reversed. ( Derrick S., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 439.) We explained that section 361.5 cr eates a “dual-track approach” to reunification based on the minor’s age, providing 12 months of reunification services for a child who was three years of age or older at the time of removal, and six m onths of reunification
services for a child who was under the age of three. ( Id. at pp. 444–445.) We went on to note, however, that “none of these time peri ods is immutable” because “there is no absolute right to receive the maximum amount of statutorily fixed services in any and all circumstances.” ( Id. at p. 445.) Instead, we expl ained, a section 388 petition may be used to request termination of a parent’s reunification services prior to the 12-month mark. ( Ibid. ) And the court may exercise its discre tion to terminate services “in the rare
case when ‘the likelihood of reunification is ,’ for whatever reason, ‘extremely low.’ ” ( Id. at p. 448.)
As Derrick S. thus instructs, the juvenile court here had the discretion to terminate services to Tiffany at the six-month mark, a decision that we review for abuse of that
discretion. This decision must be based on a finding that the like lihood of reunification was extremely low, a finding we review for subs tantial evidence. With this standard in mind, we turn to the record before us, and conclude that the court’s order terminating services and setting the section 366.26 permanency hearing was sound. This dependency proceeding commenced in February 2013, when the Agency received a referral that three of Tiffany’s ch ildren were not attending school and were unclean, tired, and despondent. This was a mere two months after Tiffany had reunified with the children following a prior depend ency proceeding necessi tated by her substance abuse. Despite that Tiffany’s drug problems had previously led to the removal of her15 children from her care, Tiffany did not promptly engage in relapse prevention services. In May 2013, after three months of failed attempts at fam ily maintenance, the children were once again removed from Tiffany’s care. Tiffany was referred to a wide range of services to address her ongoin g substance abuse and mental he alth concerns, but she still failed to engage in services to ameliorate these problems.
Not until the end of November—nine mont hs after the Agen cy’s involvement began—did Tiffany finally take a step to address her substance abuse problem by entering a detox program. While this was a step in the right direction, she did not complete the program, instead checking herself out early and failing to enter the inpatient drug treatment program the Agency had lin ed up for her. Tiffany finally entered a residential treatment program in January 2014— 11 months after the Agency received the initial referral and just two months before the six-month review hearing was scheduled. Tiffany was to complete a 14-month progra m, making reunificati on by the 12-month mark “pretty much impossible. ” As the juvenile court aptly described it, Tiffany’s attempt was “too little, too late.” On this reco rd, we easily conclude substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that the likelihood of reunifica tion was extremely low. And given this well-supported finding, we conclu de there was no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s termination of services. The Juvenile Court’s Finding That the Agency Provided Reasonable Services Is Supported By Substantial Evidence Tiffany alternatively argues that the Agency failed to provide reasonable services. We review the juvenile court’s finding of r easonable services for substantial evidence. ( Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 998, 1018; In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 439.) Substa ntial evidence is “evidence wh ich is reasonable, credible and of solid value . . . .” ( In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.) Applying this standard here, we conclude th e juvenile court’s finding that the Agency provided Tiffany
reasonable reunification servic es was amply supported. Reunification services, which play a criti cal role in dependenc y proceedings, must be tailored to the particular n eeds of the family. (§ 361.5; In re Alanna A. (2005)16 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 563; David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 793.) We thus judge the reasonableness of the Agen cy’s reunification efforts according to the circumstances of each case. ( Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App.4th 1158, 1164.) To support a finding reas onable services were offere d or provided, “the record should show that the supervis ing agency identified the prob lems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas wh ere compliance proved difficult . . . .” ( In re
Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) The se rvices need not be “t he best that might be provided in an ideal world” but, rather, mu st be “reasonable under the circumstances.” ( In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) At the outset of this dependency case, the Agency identified Tiffany’s substance abuse, mental health concerns, and neglect of her children, along with violent relationship between her and Marcelo, as the bases for it s involvement. Tiffany agreed to participate in substance abuse services, but she minima lly engaged in that program, commencing but not completing a pre-treatment program befo re dropping out altogether. Shortly thereafter, she had a positive dr ug test, missed two subsequent tests, and failed to attend relapse prevention class. Given Tiffany’s failure to address her s ubstance abuse issues, the children were then detained. The Agency referred Tiffa ny for drug testing, a substance abuse assessment and evaluation, a psychological assessment and therapy, and domestic violence support services, and provided a list of parenting educatio n referrals, services designed to assist Tiffany in eliminating the problems that led to the dependency. When Tiffany finally entered into a detox program nine months after the Agency’s initial involvement, the Agency arrange d for her to check directly into an inpatient substance abuse treatment program on the day of her di scharge from the detox program. Tiffany, however, checked herself out of the detox pr ogram before completion and dropped out of contact with the Agency.17 The Agency also arranged visitation commencing when the children were removed in May 2013. Tiffany visited twice monthly for si x months, and then missed visits for three consecutive weeks, resulting in the termination of vi sits by the visitation provider. The Agency attempted to reengage Tiffany in vi sits, referring her to a different visitation provider, but Tiffany failed to follo w through on that referral. When Tiffany was in a detox program in D ecember 2013, she requested vis itation with her children, and the social worker arranged for a visit. Tiffa ny also requested visitation once she entered the House of Grace inpatient treatment progr am, and Roe testifie d at the six-month review hearing that the Agen cy was in the process of ar ranging visitation, a process complicated by Tiffany’s 30-da y black out period and the child ren’s placement in Contra Costa County. Despite this lengthy list of services th e Agency provided to assist Tiffany in alleviating the concerns that led to the de pendency, Tiffany nevertheless complains that the only referrals the Agency gave her “w ere for programs that she had already participated in during the previous depende ncy and were not successful in helping her with long term sobriety.” But Roe testified th at Tiffany never objected to the referrals or requested that she be referred to different programs than those in which she had previously participated. And this argument al so ignores the fact th at the programs were successful in helping Tiffany eliminate the conc erns that led to the 2010 dependency, as
she was reunified with her five childr en with the help of those referrals. Tiffany also complains that the Agency was aware of her miscarriage and her sister’s shooting but did not take “these events into account or [alter] the services offered to [Tiffany] in light of these traumatic ci rcumstances.” There is no evidence in the record, however, that Tiffany expressed any need for a change in services in light of these events, nor does she suggest what different services the Agency should have offered. Tiffany also suggests that the Agency faile d to provide adequate visitation, noting that she received only one vi sit in December and nothing after that. She fails to acknowledge, however, that her visitations we re terminated in the fall of 2013 because
she missed visits for three consecutive weeks a nd then failed to follow up on a referral to18 a different visitation provider. Once in a detox program in November and December 2013, the Agency arrang ed a visit at Tiffany’s request. Tiffany then left that program prematurely and dropped out of contact with the Agency. Only in February 2014, after she had entered an inpatient treatment program , did she once again request visitation and, according to Roe’s testimony, the Agency was in the pr ocess of making visitation arrangements. This record simply does no t support Tiffany’s claim that the Agency’s provision of visitation services was inadequate. In short, this is not a case where the Agen cy failed to provide reasonable services. Rather, the Agency pr ovided reasonable services, and Tiffany simply failed to avail herself of them. We thus conclude the ju venile court’s reasonabl e services finding was supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION The petition of mother Tiffany S. for extr aordinary writ relief is denied on its merits. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(h)(1) .) This decision is final as to this court forthwith. ( Id. , rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

_ ____________ ____________ Richman, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Kline, P.J.

_____________ ____________ Brick, J. *

* Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.