United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

March 1996 NUCLEAR

NONPROLIFERATION

Status of U.S. Efforts to

Improve Nuclear

Material Controls in

Newly Independent

States

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-270052 

March 8, 1996

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Permanent Subcommittee

 on Investigations

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

This report responds to your request that we review U.S. efforts to strengthen controls over

nuclear material in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. As requested,

unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report

until 30 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of State,

Defense, and Energy; and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We will also

make copies available to other interested parties on request.

If you have any questions concerning this report, we can be reached at (202) 512-4128 and

(202) 512-3841, respectively. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Harold J. Johnson

Associate Director, International

 Relations and Trade Issues

National Security and International

 Affairs Division

Victor S. Rezendes

Director, Energy, Resources, and

 Science Issues

Resources, Community and

 Economic Development Division
Executive Summary

Purpose Safeguarding nuclear material that can be used directly in nuclear

explosives has become a primary national security concern for the United

States and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

Terrorists and countries seeking nuclear weapons could use as little as 

25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or 8 kilograms of plutonium

to build a nuclear explosive. The seizure of HEU and plutonium in Europe

and Russia has prompted concerns about how the newly independent

states control their direct-use materials. The Ranking Minority Member of

the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Governmental

Affairs Committee, and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the

House Committee on National Security requested that GAO review U.S.

efforts to help the newly independent states strengthen their nuclear

material controls.

GAO’s report addresses (1) the nature and extent of problems with

controlling direct-use nuclear materials in the newly independent states;

(2) the status and future prospects of U.S. efforts to help strengthen

controls in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus; and (3) the executive

branch’s consolidation of U.S. efforts in the Department of Energy (DOE).

The scope of GAO’s review included direct-use nuclear material controlled

by civilian authorities in the newly independent states and direct-use

material used for naval nuclear propulsion purposes. GAO did not review

the protection, control, and accounting systems used for nuclear weapons

in the possession of the Ministry of Defense in Russia. U.S. officials believe

there to be relatively better controls over weapons in the custody of the

Ministry of Defense than over material outside of weapons.1 GAO recently

issued a report that addressed the safety of nuclear facilities in the newly

independent states.2

Background “Direct-use nuclear material” consists of HEU and plutonium that is

relatively easy to handle because it has not been exposed to radiation or

has been separated from highly radioactive materials.3

 Direct-use material

presents a high proliferation risk because it can be used to manufacture a

nuclear weapon without further enrichment or irradiation in a reactor.

1

The Department of Defense (DOD) has an ongoing program with the Russian Ministry of Defense to

enhance the security of nuclear weapons in Ministry of Defense custody during transportation and

storage.

2

See Nuclear Safety: Concerns With Nuclear Facilities and Other Sources of Radiation in the Former

Soviet Union (GAO/RCED-96-4 Nov. 7, 1995).

3

HEU is uranium enriched above 20 percent in the isotope uranium 235. An isotope is a variation of a

chemical element.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Executive Summary

Many types of nuclear facilities routinely handle, process, or store such

direct-use materials. Direct-use material can be found at research reactors,

reactor fuel fabrication facilities, uranium enrichment plants, spent fuel

reprocessing facilities, and nuclear material storage sites, as well as

nuclear weapons production facilities. Material protection, control, and

accounting (MPC&A) systems are used at such facilities to deter, detect, and

respond to attempted thefts.

The United States is pursuing two different, but complementary strategies

to achieve its goals of rapidly improving nuclear material controls over

direct-use material in the newly independent states: a governmentto-government program, and an initiative known as the lab-to-lab program.4

Under the government-to-government program, initially sponsored and

funded by the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)

program,5

 the United States agreed in 1993 to work directly with the

governments of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakstan to develop national MPC&A

systems and improve controls over civilian nuclear material. The United

States extended such assistance to Belarus in 1995. Although CTR funds

were used, DOE was responsible for implementing the program. In

April 1994, DOE initiated the lab-to-lab program to work directly with

Russian nuclear facilities in improving their MPC&A systems. The program

is limited to Russia and intended to rapidly improve controls at civilian

research, naval nuclear propulsion, and civilian-controlled, nuclear

weapons-related facilities. This program is funded jointly by DOE and the

CTR program.6

Results in Brief The Soviet Union produced approximately 1,200 metric tons of HEU and

200 metric tons of plutonium. Much of this material is outside of nuclear

weapons, is highly attractive to theft, and the newly independent states

may not have accurate and complete inventories of the material they

inherited. Social and economic changes in the newly independent states

have increased the threat of theft and diversion of nuclear material, and

4

The government-to-government program is implemented through formal agreements that establish,

among other things, rights to audit and examination by U.S. officials. The lab-to-lab program works

directly with Russian nuclear facilities and is not bound by the formal agreements. To the maximum

extent feasible, the government-to-government programs are required to use U.S. goods and services,

while the lab-to-lab program can purchase goods and services from other suppliers as needed.

5

Congress established the CTR program in 1991 to help Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus safely

store, transport, and destroy weapons of mass destruction and prevent their proliferation. See

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Helping the Former Soviet Union Reduce the Threat: An Update

(GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 9, 1995).

6

DOE is also providing assistance to upgrade four facilities that are not included in the lab-to-lab

program. These facilities are located in Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Uzbekistan.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Executive Summary

with the breakdown of Soviet-era MPC&A systems, the newly independent

states may not be as able to counter the increased threat. Nuclear facilities

rely on antiquated accounting systems that cannot quickly detect and

localize nuclear material losses. Many facilities lack modern equipment

that can detect unauthorized attempts to remove nuclear material from

facilities. While as yet there is no direct evidence that a black market for

stolen or diverted nuclear material exists in the newly independent states,

the seizures of direct-use material in Russia and Europe have increased

concerns about theft and diversion.

U.S. efforts to help the newly independent states improve their MPC&A

systems for direct-use material had a slow start, but are now gaining

momentum. DOD’s government-to-government CTR program obligated

$59 million and spent about $4 million from fiscal years 1991 to 1995 for

MPC&A improvements in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. The

program has provided working group meetings, site surveys, physical

protection equipment, computers, and training for projects in Russia,

Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. Initially, the program was slow because

(1) until January 1995, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM)

had refused access to Russian direct-use facilities and (2) CTR-sponsored

projects at facilities with direct-use materials in Ukraine, Kazakstan, and

Belarus were just getting underway. According to DOD officials, program

requirements for using U.S. goods and services and for audits and

examinations also delayed implementation. The program began to gain

momentum in January 1995 when CTR program and MINATOM officials

agreed to upgrade nuclear material controls at five high-priority facilities

handling direct-use material.6 DOE and Russia’s nuclear regulatory agency

have also agreed to cooperate on the development of a national MPC&A

regulatory infrastructure.

DOE’s lab-to-lab program obligated $17 million and spent $14 million in

fiscal years 1994 and 1995. This program has improved controls at two

“zero-power” research reactors, and begun providing nuclear material

monitors to several MINATOM defense facilities to help them detect

unauthorized attempts to remove direct-use material.7

 In fiscal year 1996,

the program is implementing additional projects in MINATOM’s nuclear

defense complex.

6

Subsequent to the conclusion of GAO’s review, DOE and MINATOM agreed to add four additional

sites to the government-to-government program and two additional sites to the lab-to-lab program.

7

A zero-power research reactor is a type of research reactor using fuel that is not very radioactive.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Executive Summary

In fiscal year 1996, the United States expanded the MPC&A assistance

program to include all known facilities with direct-use material outside of

weapons in the newly independent states. Management and funding for the

expanded program were consolidated within DOE. DOE plans to request

from Congress $400 million over 7 years for the program. However, the

expanded program faces several inherent uncertainties involving its

overall costs and U.S. ability to verify that assistance is being used as

intended. DOE is responding to these uncertainties by developing a

long-term plan and a centralized cost reporting system and by

implementing a flexible audit and examination program.

Principal Findings

Nature and Extent of the

Problem

Much of the 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and 200 metric

tons of plutonium produced by the Soviet Union is outside of nuclear

weapons; this stockpile of material is expected to grow rapidly as Russia

proceeds to dismantle its nuclear weapons. According to DOE, this material

is located at 80 to 100 civilian research, naval nuclear propulsion, and

civilian controlled nuclear weapons-related facilities. It is considered to be

highly attractive to theft because it is (1) not very radioactive and is

therefore relatively safe to handle and (2) in forms that make it readily

accessible to theft, such as items stored in containers that can easily be

carried by one or two persons, or in components from dismantled

weapons.

Nuclear materials in the newly independent states are more vulnerable to

theft and diversion than in the past. Soviet-era control systems relied

heavily on (1) keeping nuclear material in secret cities and facilities,

(2) closely monitoring nuclear industry personnel, and (3) severely

punishing control violations. Closed borders and the absence of a black

market for nuclear material also lessened the threat of diversion. Without

the secrecy and heavy security of the Soviet system, facilities in the newly

independent states must now rely to a greater degree on other control

systems such as manual, paper-based tracking systems—which cannot

quickly locate and assess material losses—and on labor-intensive physical

protection systems that lack monitors for detecting attempts to steal

nuclear material from a facility. In addition, the newly independent states

may not have complete and accurate inventories of their nuclear materials

because the Soviet Union did not conduct complete and comprehensive

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Executive Summary

physical inventories at their nuclear facilities. Some of the facilities GAO

visited in March 1995 did not have a comprehensive inventory of their

nuclear materials on hand.

Initial Efforts to Improve

Control Systems in the

Newly Independent States

Had a Slow Start

Until January 1995, MINATOM refused to grant CTR technical experts access

to direct-use facilities, limiting the program’s efforts to a low-enriched

uranium fuel fabrication line. This obstacle was removed in January 1995

when MINATOM agreed to allow access to five facilities with direct-use

material. In July 1995, the CTR-sponsored program made progress in

controlling direct-use material by installing physical protection equipment

and providing training at a MINATOM facility that includes an HEU fuel

fabrication line. The Kazakstani, Ukrainian, and Belarussian governments

have been more willing to allow the United States to help upgrade MPC&A

systems at their direct-use material facilities. However, CTR-sponsored

projects in these countries are just beginning, and improvements to

controls over their direct-use materials will not be completed until the

middle of 1996 at the earliest.

Working directly with institutes and operating facilities, DOE’s lab-to-lab

program has completed the first phase of an MPC&A project at a MINATOM

zero-power research reactor that will eventually computerize its inventory

system for thousands of kilograms of direct-use material and upgrade its

MPC&A systems. DOE’s program has also upgraded controls at a zero-power

research reactor in Moscow containing about 80 kilograms of direct-use

material by (1) increasing physical protection for the reactor building,

(2) implementing a computerized material accounting system, and

(3) installing access control equipment. The lab-to-lab program has also

deployed nuclear material monitors at three MINATOM nuclear weapons

facilities and two civilian research facilities. Additional monitors were

being shipped as GAO concluded its review.

United States Expands

MPC&A Assistance

The executive branch has decided to consolidate MPC&A assistance in DOE.

In September 1995, the President directed DOE to develop a long-range plan

to improve MPC&A systems at all facilities in the newly independent states

handling direct-use material by the year 2002. The President also

transferred funding and management responsibilities for the CTR MPC&A

program from DOD to DOE in fiscal year 1996. However, DOE faces several

inherent uncertainties in managing an expanded assistance program over

the next 7 years. For example, while DOE estimates that the program will

require $400 million to upgrade 80 facilities with direct-use material, it

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Executive Summary

faces uncertainties in both the number of facilities to be covered (which

could range to more than 100) and the cost per facility (ranging from

$5 million to $10 million per facility). Because of these uncertainties,

program costs could range from $400 million to over $1 billion. In addition,

DOE’s ability to directly assess program progress and confirm that U.S.

assistance is used for its intended purposes may be limited because the

Russians may limit the measures that can be used for these purposes at

highly sensitive facilities.

DOE Is Responding to

Program Uncertainties

DOE is taking steps to ensure that the program is successful and that U.S.

funds are well spent.

• DOE is developing a long-term plan for the expanded program that

consolidates the program plans for the government-to-government and

lab-to-lab programs. According to DOE, the plan establishes objectives,

priorities, and timetables for implementing projects at the 80 to 

100 facilities in the newly independent states. DOE has drafted the plan;

however, the plan had not been issued at the time GAO concluded its

review in January 1996.

• DOE is developing a consolidated centralized program cost-reporting

system intended to provide DOE with current financial status for

government-to-government and lab-to-lab projects. The information should

be useful in responding to changing budgetary requirements for the

program.

• DOE is implementing a flexible audit and program evaluation approach to

provide some assurances that assistance is used only for its intended

purposes. Under the approach, the United States will pay Russian

laboratories for services and equipment upon completion of clearly

defined delivered products and will use a series of direct and indirect

measures to evaluate program progress and effectiveness. DOE expects to

issue a report on assurances obtained by the lab-to-lab program in

March 1996. 

Recommendations GAO is making no recommendations in this report.

Agency Comments In commenting on this report, the Departments of Energy and State

generally agreed with GAO’s assessment of the U.S. effort to improve

nuclear material controls in the newly independent states. The Department

of State offered additional editorial comments that have been incorporated

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Executive Summary

into the report where appropriate. DOD officials also agreed with the facts

as presented in this report, but expressed concern about how the report

portrays the relative success of the government-to-government and

lab-to-lab programs. These officials stated that the programs are

complementary approaches to achieving the goal of improving controls

and accountability over direct-use nuclear material in the newly

independent states. GAO agrees and has modified the report accordingly.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Page 9 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

12

What Is Direct-Use Material? 12

How Is Nuclear Material Controlled? 12

How Is the United States Assisting the Newly Independent States

to Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls?

14

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 15

Chapter 2 

Nature and Extent of

Nuclear Material

Control Problems in

the NIS

17

Nature and Extent of the Problem 17

Soviet-Era Nuclear Material Controls 18

Current Status of Nuclear Material Controls at NIS Facilities 20

Reports of Diversion of Direct-Use Material 24

Chapter 3 

Current Status and

Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the

NIS

26

U.S. MPC&A Assistance Programs in the NIS 26

Prospects for MPC&A Upgrades Are Improving 37

Chapter 4 

DOE Faces

Uncertainties in

Managing an

Expanded U.S.

Assistance Program

39

The Expanded Program 39

Uncertainties Faced by an Expanded Program 39

DOE Responses to Program Uncertainties 40

Agency Comments 42

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of State 44

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Energy 45

Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report 46

Tables Table 3.1: U.S. Assistance for CTR-Sponsored Governmentto-Government Programs

29

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Contents

Table 3.2: U.S. Assistance for Lab-to-Lab Programs 33

Figures Figure 2.1: Examples of Small, Disk-Shaped Fuel Elements to Be

Inventoried

21

Figure 2.2: A Russian Radiation Measuring Instrument Used to

Identify the Uranium and Plutonium Content of Fuel Elements

23

Figure 3.1: Current CTR Government-to-Government Projects in

Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus

28

Figure 3.2: Current Lab-to-Lab Projects 32

Figure 3.3: Lab-to-Lab Cooperative Efforts at the Kurchatov

Institute in Moscow

34

Figure 3.4: Lab-to-Lab Cooperative Efforts at Arzamas-16 36

Abbreviations

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

GAN Gosatomnadzor

HEU highly enriched uranium

KGB Komityet Gosudarstvyennoj Byezopasnosti

MPC&A material protection control and accounting

MINATOM Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy

NIS newly independent states

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Direct-use nuclear material is essential for building nuclear weapons. The

diversion or theft of such material can enable terrorists or countries to

build nuclear weapons without investing in expensive nuclear

technologies and facilities. One way of deterring and detecting theft is by

instituting nuclear material control systems on a national level and at

facilities handling direct-use material.

What Is Direct-Use

Material?

“Direct-use nuclear material” consists of highly enriched uranium (HEU)

and plutonium that is relatively easy to handle because it has not been

exposed to radiation or has been separated from highly radioactive

materials.1

 Direct-use material presents a high proliferation risk because it

can be used to manufacture a nuclear weapon without further enrichment

or irradiation in a reactor. According to the International Atomic Energy

Agency, approximately 25 kilograms of HEU or 8 kilograms of plutonium is

needed to manufacture a nuclear explosive, although the Department of

Energy (DOE) suggests the amounts needed to build a weapon may be

smaller.

Many types of nuclear facilities routinely handle, process, or store

direct-use material. Besides nuclear weapon production facilities,

direct-use material can also be found at research reactors, reactor fuel

fabrication facilities, uranium enrichment plants, spent fuel reprocessing

facilities, and nuclear material storage sites. Most civilian nuclear power

facilities are of less concern because they use low-enriched or natural

uranium as fuel, which would require additional enrichment before the

fuel would be suitable for nuclear weapons. While these reactors produce

plutonium in spent reactor fuel, such fuel is dangerous to handle because

it is highly radioactive. Spent reactor fuel also requires reprocessing

before it is suitable for nuclear weapons.

How Is Nuclear

Material Controlled?

Nuclear materials are controlled to prevent and detect their theft. Nuclear

material can be stolen or diverted by (1) outside individuals or groups,

such as terrorists attempting to break in and steal nuclear material;

(2) inside individuals or groups, such as one or more employees that have

access to nuclear material; and (3) combinations of insiders and outsiders.

A nuclear material control system consists of three overlapping

components—material protection, material control, and material

1

HEU is uranium enriched above 20 percent in the isotope uranium 235. An isotope is a variation of a

chemical element.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

accounting. Together they compose a set of procedures, personnel, and

equipment that address both insider and outsider threats.

Material protection systems are designed to limit access to nuclear

material by outside individuals and prevent the unauthorized removal of

material from a facility by inside individuals. Nuclear facilities protect

their material by (1) installing fences with sensors and television cameras

to delay, detect, and assess unauthorized intrusions; (2) posting armed

guards at entry and exit points; (3) establishing a protective response force

that can react to unauthorized intrusions; and (4) installing nuclear

material monitors to detect attempts to remove material from a facility.

Nuclear facilities also assess the reliability of personnel with access to

nuclear material by conducting background checks and continuously

monitoring their behavior.

Material control systems contain, monitor, and establish custody over

nuclear material. Nuclear facilities control material by (1) storing material

in containers and vaults equipped with seals that can indicate when

tampering may have occurred, (2) controlling access to and exit from

nuclear material areas using badge and personnel identification

equipment, and (3) establishing procedures to closely monitor nuclear

materials.2

 Nuclear facilities also designate custodians to be responsible

for nuclear material in their possession.

Material accounting systems maintain information on the quantity of

nuclear materials within specified areas and on transfers in and out of

those areas. They employ periodic inventories to count and measure

nuclear material by element and isotopic content. Nuclear facilities use the

inventory and transfer data to establish nuclear material balances, which

track materials on hand and the flow of material within a specified area.

The material balances are closed periodically by reconciling physical

inventory with recorded inventories, correcting errors, calculating

inventory differences and evaluating their statistical differences, and

performing trend analysis to detect protracted theft of nuclear material.

Nuclear facilities in the United States are capable of updating material

accounting data within 24-hour periods. Some U.S. facilities with more

modern nuclear accounting systems are capable of updating material

accounting data within 4 hours.

2

One such procedure is to require two or more authorized persons to be present when nuclear material

is accessed. Another procedure is to use closely monitored television cameras to maintain surveillance

over nuclear material.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

In addition to facility systems, the United States and most other countries

have established national material protection, control, and accounting

(MPC&A) systems. These systems include regulations governing procedures

for nuclear material protection control and accounting, inspection

requirements to ensure that the systems are implemented properly, and

tracking systems to provide information on the location and disposition of

nuclear material nationally. In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission and DOE have promulgated regulations on controlling nuclear

material.

How Is the United

States Assisting the

Newly Independent

States to Improve

Their Nuclear

Material Controls?

The United States is pursuing two different, but complementary strategies

to achieve its goals of rapidly improving nuclear material controls over

direct-use material in the newly independent states (NIS).3

 Under the

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program,the U.S. Department of

Defense (DOD) entered into agreements with the governments of Russia,

Ukraine, and Kazakstan in 1993 to rapidly improve nuclear material

controls over civilian nuclear material and develop national MPC&A systems

in these countries. On June 23, 1995, DOD entered into an agreement with

the Ministry of Defense in Belarus to improve controls over its civilian

nuclear material. DOE implements the programs under these agreements.4

As a complementing strategy, DOE initiated a program in April 1994 of

MPC&A cooperation with Russia’s nuclear institutes, operating facilities,

and enterprises. This initiative, known as the lab-to-lab program, brings

U.S. and Russian laboratory personnel directly together to work

cooperatively on implementing MPC&A upgrades at Russian nuclear

facilities. The purpose of the lab-to-lab program is to rapidly improve

MPC&A at civilian, naval nuclear, and nuclear weapons-related facilities

handling direct-use material in Russia. The program is jointly funded by

DOE and the CTR program.

3

Other related U.S. efforts include the International Science and Technology Center’s Project 40, the

Cooperative Threat Reduction program sponsored Russian storage facility and Project Sapphire.

Project 40 will develop an upgraded approach for safeguarding complex sensitive nuclear fuel cycle

facilities. The storage facility will incorporate MPC&A elements into its design. Under Project

Sapphire, the United States transferred approximately 600 kilograms of weapons grade HEU from

Kazakstan to the United States.

4

The CTR program was established by Congress in 1991 to help the newly independent states safely

secure, transport, store, and destroy weapons and weapons material and prevent weapons

proliferation. The program is conducted with the four states that inherited nuclear weapons when the

Soviet Union dissolved: Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine. See Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Helping the Former Soviet Union Reduce the Threat: An Update (GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 9, 1995).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) review the nature and extent of problems with

controlling nuclear materials in the NIS; (2) determine the status and future

prospects of U.S. efforts to help strengthen controls over direct-use

nuclear material in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus; and (3) assess

plans for consolidating these efforts in DOE. While seven NIS inherited

direct-use nuclear material, we focused on the four countries that have

been the primary recipients of U.S. assistance—Russia, Ukraine,

Kazakstan, and Belarus.

The scope of our review included direct-use nuclear material controlled by

civilian authorities in the NIS and direct-use material used for naval nuclear

propulsion purposes. We did not review the protection, control, and

accounting systems used for nuclear weapons in the possession of the

Ministry of Defense in Russia. U.S. officials believe there to be relatively

better controls over weapons in the custody of the Ministry of Defense

than over material outside of weapons.5

 We also did not include in our

review the upgrades at four sites funded by DOE that were not part of the

lab-to-lab program. We recently issued a report that addressed the safety

of facilities in the NIS.

6

To meet our objectives, we reviewed U.S. assessments of the nature and

extent of nuclear material control problems in the NIS; pertinent program

documents, including agreements between DOD and the Russian Ministry

of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), the Ukrainian State Committee on Nuclear

and Radiation Safety, the Ministry of Defense of Kazakstan, the Ministry of

Defense of Belarus, and between DOE and Gosatomnadzor (GAN); program

plans; trip reports; quarterly progress reviews and State Department

cables; and program budget, obligation, and expenditure data for the

CTR-sponsored government-to-government program and for DOE’s lab-to-lab

program. We also discussed with DOE plans to consolidate U.S. MPC&A

assistance in DOE.

We interviewed officials from DOD, DOE, the Department of State, the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National Laboratories (including Los

Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore), the Pacific Northwest

Laboratory, the National Security Council, and the National Academy of

Sciences. We also interviewed nonproliferation specialists from the

5

As part of the CTR program, DOD has an ongoing program with the Russian Ministry of Defense to

enhance the security of nuclear weapons in Ministry of Defense custody during transportation and

storage.

6

See Nuclear Safety: Concerns With Nuclear Facilities and Other Sources of Radiation in the Former

Soviet Union (GAO/RCED-96-4 Nov. 7, 1995).

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Monterey Institute of International Studies. In Russia, we interviewed

officials from MINATOM, Gosatomnadzor (the Russian nuclear regulatory

agency), the Kurchatov Institute, the Institute of Physics and Power

Engineering, the Elektrostal Machine Building Plant, the MINATOM nuclear

weapons laboratories Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, and the Kazakstan

Atomic Energy Agency.

In addition, we toured facilities at the Kurchatov Institute and the Institute

of Physics and Power Engineering, located in the Russian Federation, to

obtain information on current MPC&A systems implemented at these

facilities. We visited sites in Russia that have been the recipients of U.S.

assistance efforts, including the Elektrostal Machine Building Plant, the

Kurchatov Institute, and the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering.

We also witnessed the demonstration of a model MPC&A system at

Arzamas-16.

Our review was conducted between November 1994 and January 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 2 

Nature and Extent of Nuclear Material

Control Problems in the NIS

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia and six other NIS inherited

hundreds of tons of direct-use nuclear material. Much of this material is

thought to be located at 80 to 100 civilian, naval nuclear, and nuclear

weapons-related facilities, mostly in Russia. However, U.S. and NIS officials

do not know the exact amounts and locations of this material. Much of it is

highly attractive to theft because it is relatively safe to handle and is not in

weapons. U.S. officials are concerned that social and economic changes in

the NIS have increased the threat of theft and diversion of nuclear material,

and with the breakdown of Soviet-era MPC&A systems, the NIS may not be as

able to counter the increased threat. While as yet there is no direct

evidence that a nuclear black market for stolen or diverted nuclear

material exists in the NIS, the seizures of gram and kilogram quantities of

direct-use material have increased these concerns.

Nature and Extent of

the Problem

The Soviet Union produced up to 1,200 metric tons of HEU and 200 metric

tons of plutonium. Much of this material is outside of nuclear weapons,

and the stockpile of material outside of weapons is expected to grow

rapidly as Russia proceeds to dismantle its weapons. The material is

considered to be highly attractive to theft because it is (1) not very

radioactive and therefore relatively safe to handle and (2) in forms that

make it readily accessible to theft, for example, in containers that can

easily be carried by one or two persons or as components from dismantled

weapons. This material can be directly used to make a nuclear weapon

without further enrichment or reprocessing.

Most of the material is located in Russia. Los Alamos National Laboratory

has identified five sectors in the Russian nuclear complex that handle

direct-use material.

• Nuclear materials in weapons. (This material is largely in the custody of

the Ministry of Defense.1

 )

• The MINATOM defense complex, which contains large amounts of nuclear

material removed from dismantled nuclear weapons and stockpiles of HEU

and plutonium produced for the nuclear weapons program.

• The MINATOM civilian sector, which includes a number of reactor

development institutes such as the Institute of Physics and Power

1

A U.S.-Russian government-to-government agreement concerning technical exchanges on warhead

safety and security was signed in December 1994. Also, in 1995 a CTR-sponsored DOD and Ministry of

Defense Nuclear Weapons Security Group was formed to coordinate assistance and cooperation to

enhance the security of nuclear weapons in the custody of the Ministry of Defense during

transportation and storage and to facilitate discussion and information sharing on this and related

issues under the Cooperative Nuclear Weapons Security Program. Nuclear material in the custody of

the Ministry of Defense was outside the scope of our review.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 2 

Nature and Extent of Nuclear Material

Control Problems in the NIS

Engineering at Obninsk, as well as organizations, such as the Elektrostal

Machine Building Factory, that produce nuclear fuels and materials for

civilian applications. (Some of these institutes and enterprises do both

civilian and defense work.)

• Civilian research institutes outside of MINATOM, which include the

Kurchatov Institute and facilities run by the Academy of Sciences, the

Ministry of Science, and the Commission on Defense Industry. (Most of

these institutes possess only small quantities of materials, although some,

such as the Kurchatov Institute, possesses several tons of direct-use

material.)

• The naval propulsion sector, which includes the Navy and the Ministry of

Shipbuilding. (This sector comprises stockpiles of HEU used in submarines

and icebreakers.)

Other NIS with facilities that handle direct-use material include Belarus,

Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Generally, the

nuclear facilities in these countries are operated by their respective atomic

energy ministries or academies of science and involve nuclear research

centers, research reactors, and, in the case of Kazakstan, a plutonium

breeder reactor.

Soviet-Era Nuclear

Material Controls

The Soviet Union controlled nuclear materials since the beginning of its

nuclear program in the 1940s. The Soviet approach to controlling nuclear

materials placed a heavy emphasis on internal security, which

corresponded to the political and economic conditions within the Soviet

Union. It placed less emphasis on accounting procedures, which were

used to monitor production, rather than to detect diversion or ensure the

absence of diversion.

The Soviet Union located its nuclear weapons complex in closed secret

cities. The cities were separated from other urban areas, self-contained,

and protected by fences and guard forces. Personnel working in the Soviet

nuclear complex were under heavy surveillance by the KGB. Personnel

went through an intensive screening process, and their activities were

closely monitored. In general, facilities would control access to nuclear

material using a three-person rule, requiring two facility staff members and

at least one person from the security services to be present when material

was handled. The Soviet-era control system enforced severe penalties for

violations of control procedures.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 2 

Nature and Extent of Nuclear Material

Control Problems in the NIS

According to U.S. national laboratory officials, the Soviet system

accounted for nuclear material, although it was not complete, timely, or

accurate. Facilities paid close attention to end-products to meet

production quotas and paid less attention to the use of completely

measured material balances to track net gains and losses of materials as

they were processed or handled. The Soviet system relied on manual,

paper-based systems that made tracking material time-consuming. They

also used standard estimates of rates of loss for materials that could be

held up in processing equipment, such as pipes, rather then measuring

actual losses. According to DOE, in these respects, the Soviet system of

accounting was similar to that used in the early days of the U.S. nuclear

program.

According to Russian officials, traditional Soviet approaches to nuclear

material controls were generally effective because (1) the Soviet Union

was a closed society (separated by a robust iron curtain) with strict

controls over foreign travel by its citizens, (2) internal security within the

Soviet Union was quite rigid and strict discipline was carried out when

controls were violated, and (3) there was no black market in nuclear

materials within the country.

Social and Economic

Changes May Increase the

Threat of Theft and

Diversion of Nuclear

Material

Social and economic changes in the NIS have increased the threat of theft

and diversion of nuclear material, and Soviet-era MPC&A systems may not

be able to adequately counter the increased threat. The major nuclear

facilities in the MINATOM weapons complex are no longer secret, and access

to these facilities, along with the other nuclear facilities in the NIS, has

increased. According to a U.S. government assessment, (1) the difficult

economic situation has led to a loss of prestige for nuclear workers,

(2) inflation and late payment of wages have eroded the value of salaries,

and (3) pervasive corruption in society and the increasing potency of a

strong criminal element have weakened the insider protection program

based on personnel surveillance.

With these changes, Russian and U.S. officials have become increasingly

concerned about growing insider and outsider threats of nuclear theft.

According to an official from one of MINATOM’s major facilities in its

nuclear weapons complex, the insider threat at the facility has increased

due to the frustrations of the institute’s workers who had not been paid in

months. According to this official, this causes changes in their attitudes

toward their work and places pressures on their families. The outsider

threat has also increased at this facility because the closed city is now

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 2 

Nature and Extent of Nuclear Material

Control Problems in the NIS

open to businesspeople and outside workers who visit for short periods of

time. According to this official, the institutes do not have background

information on the visitors. Consequently, they have a lower level of trust

in the visitors than in the employees who have been working at the facility.

According to this official, while no nuclear material has been stolen from

this facility, other precious metals such as platinum and gold have been.

Current Status of

Nuclear Material

Controls at NIS

Facilities

With the erosion of traditional nuclear controls, current nuclear control

systems in the NIS have weaknesses that could result in the theft of

direct-use materials. The NIS may not have complete and accurate

inventories of their nuclear materials, and some material may have been

withheld from facility accounting systems. Nuclear facilities rely on

antiquated accounting systems and practices that cannot quickly detect

and localize nuclear material losses. Many NIS facilities also lack certain

types of modern equipment that can detect unauthorized attempts to

remove nuclear material from facilities.

The NIS May Not Have

Accurate and Complete

Inventories

The NIS may not have accurate and complete inventories of the direct-use

material they inherited from the former Soviet Union. According to a GAN

official, the nuclear safeguard system inherited from the former Soviet

Union was not a comprehensive system. The Soviet Union did not have a

national material control and accounting system and according to a

Russian laboratory official, the Soviet Union did not conduct

comprehensive physical inventories of nuclear material at its nuclear

facilities. Some of the facilities we visited, such as the Kurchatov Institute,

were in the process of conducting such a comprehensive inventory, but it

was not completed at the time of our visit. At the Institute of Physics and

Power Engineering, officials were conducting an inventory of 70,000 to

80,000 small disk-shaped fuel elements containing direct-use uranium and

plutonium at one reactor. When we visited the facility, they did not have

an exact count of the elements. Figure 2.1 shows examples of the small

disk-shaped fuel elements we observed at this facility that could be

attractive to theft.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 2 

Nature and Extent of Nuclear Material

Control Problems in the NIS

Figure 2.1: Examples of Small, Disk-Shaped Fuel Elements to Be Inventoried

Source: GAO.

U.S. and Russian officials are also concerned that some direct-use nuclear

material has not yet been discovered at NIS nuclear facilities. According to

U.S. national laboratory officials, some nuclear material may have been

withheld from facility accounting systems so that plant managers could

make up shortfalls in meeting their production quotas. According to

another national laboratory official, organizations do not always share

information with one another on the location and availability of specific

nuclear products. Russian officials are concerned that they have no real

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 2 

Nature and Extent of Nuclear Material

Control Problems in the NIS

information on the amounts or presence of some nuclear material and that

this material has yet to be discovered. According to a DOD official, HEU for a

Soviet navy reactor program that was terminated years earlier was

discovered by Kazakstani officials after the Soviet Union dissolved. This

HEU, enough for over two dozen nuclear weapons, was transferred from

Kazakstan to the United States under Project Sapphire.

U.S. officials are uncertain as to whether they have identified all facilities

within the NIS where direct-use material is located. The United States has

identified 80 to 100 facilities that handle direct-use material in the NIS.

However, according to a DOE official, there may be as many as 

35 additional facilities where such material is handled.

Material Accounting and

Control Systems Would

Have Difficulty Quickly

Detecting Diversion or

Theft

Many nuclear facilities in the NIS rely on manual, paper-based material

accounting systems that cannot quickly locate and assess material losses,

rather than computer-based systems. Nuclear facility operators have to

manually check hundreds of paper records to determine if material is

missing. In contrast, U.S. nuclear facilities use computers extensively to

maintain current information on the presence and quantity of all material.

U.S. facilities are capable of updating nuclear material accounting

information within 24 hours, and some can update material accounting

information within 4 hours.

Russian accounting systems do not provide systematic coverage of

materials through all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle.2

 According to U.S.

national laboratory officials, these systems do not adequately measure or

inventory material held up in processing equipment and pipes or material

disposed of as waste.

In addition, NIS facilities do not make full use of measured nuclear material

balances, which makes it difficult to detect thefts occurring over a long

period of time. According to a Los Alamos National Laboratory official,

these facilities typically weigh material at certain points in production and

generally measure radiation emitted from the material. These procedures,

while useful in identifying the types of material present, are less rigorous

than required in the United States because they do not measure the

quantity of material. Diversions of small amounts of nuclear material could

go undetected over time without more accurate measurements. Figure 2.2

shows a Russian radiation measuring instrument we observed being used

2

The nuclear fuel cycle refers to a sequence of operations involving supplying nuclear fuel for reactors,

irradiating fuel in reactors, and handling or storing nuclear fuel.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 2 

Nature and Extent of Nuclear Material

Control Problems in the NIS

at a facility to identify the types of material present in reactor fuel

elements.

Figure 2.2: A Russian Radiation Measuring Instrument Used to Identify the Uranium and Plutonium Content of Fuel

Elements

Source: GAO.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 2 

Nature and Extent of Nuclear Material

Control Problems in the NIS

Nuclear facilities in the NIS also use material control equipment that could

be made more resistant to tampering by insiders. For example, nuclear

material containers and vaults are sealed with a wire and wax seal system

that could be removed and replaced without detection. In contrast, in the

United States, material is sealed using numbered copper seals that are

controlled and crimped, making them much more resistant to tampering.

Material Protection

Systems Lack Modern

Equipment

Material protection systems at NIS nuclear facilities have weaknesses that

could result in the inability to detect insiders or outsiders trying to steal

nuclear material. In the United States, sites handling direct-use material

are protected by two fences; various sensors designed to delay and detect

intruders as they approach a facility; and television cameras, which allow

facility personnel to assess the nature of the threat. The nuclear facilities

we visited in Russia for the most part did not have such equipment. For

example, during our visit to the Kurchatov Institute, we noticed that a

concrete fence protecting the main facility was crumbling. The fence

appeared to lack television monitors or other sensors. A fence used to

protect another site at the institute with large quantities of direct-use

material did not appear to have any sensors or television cameras to detect

intrusion and had vegetation that could obscure intruders or those leaving

the facility.

We toured another site at the Kurchatov Institute where several hundred

kilograms of direct-use material were present. Although the site was

within the walled portion of the institute, there was no fencing or other

intrusion delay and assessment system around the site. Although we were

accompanied by an institute official who had cleared our visit with

security personnel, we were able to gain access without showing

identification. One unarmed security guard was posted within the building.

In contrast, during a visit to a Sandia National Laboratory facility in New

Mexico, we were required to show identification and display security

badges while we visited a facility with large amounts of direct-use

material. This facility had numerous armed guards inside and outside the

site.

Reports of Diversion

of Direct-Use Material

According to U.S. officials, there is no direct evidence that a nuclear black

market linking buyers, sellers, and end-users exists for stolen or diverted

nuclear material in the NIS. However, the seizure of gram and kilogram

quantities of direct-use material in Russia, Germany, and the Czech

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 2 

Nature and Extent of Nuclear Material

Control Problems in the NIS

Republic have increased concerns about the effectiveness of MPC&A

systems in the NIS.

The first case involving the theft or diversion of direct-use material

appeared in Russia in 1992. According to U.S. officials, the more

significant cases included the following:

• From May to September 1992, 1.5 kilograms of weapons grade HEU were

diverted from the Luch Scientific Production Association in Russia by a

Luch employee. According to a nonproliferation analyst, the material was

diverted in small quantities about 20 to 25 times during the period. The

employee was apprehended en route to Moscow.

• In March 1994, three men were arrested in St. Petersburg trying to sell 

3.05 kilograms of weapons-usable HEU. According to U.S. officials, Russian

media articles claim that the material was smuggled out of a MINATOM

facility located near Moscow in an oversized glove.

• On May 10, 1994, 5.6 grams of nearly pure plutonium-239 were seized by

German officials.

• On August 10, 1994, 560 grams of a mixed-oxide uranium plutonium

mixture were seized at Munich Airport from a flight originating from

Moscow.

• On December 14, 1994, 2.72 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium were

seized by police in Prague.

U.S. officials stated that they have not uncovered any direct links between

buyers of direct-use materials and end-users that would use the material

for weapons purposes. However, the cases are troubling for several

reasons.

• The cases are the first to involve gram and kilogram quantities of

direct-use material.

• They show that individuals are willing to take high risks to traffic in

smuggled direct-use material.

• While scientific analysis cannot pinpoint which facilities the material

seized in Europe originated from, the criminal investigations suggest that

the material may have come from the NIS.

• The detection of nuclear smuggling so far has been by chance, rather than

by reliance on physical protection control and accounting systems, or

customs checks at the borders of the NIS.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

The United States is pursuing two different, but complementary strategies

to achieve its goals of rapidly improving nuclear material controls over

direct-use material in the NIS. The CTR-sponsored government-togovernment program, which works directly with the NIS, is only now

beginning to improve controls over direct-use material because (1) until

January 1995, Russia’s MINATOM was reluctant to cooperate with the U.S.

program because of security concerns and (2) work at non-Russian

facilities with direct-use material is in the early stages of implementation.

The DOE lab-to-lab program, which works directly with Russian nuclear

facilities, has improved controls over direct-use material at five facilities

during its first full year of implementation.1

Despite the slow start, the prospects for U.S. efforts to enhance MPC&A in

the NIS are improving. Russia and the United States agreed in June 1995 to

add five high-priority sites that have large amounts of direct-use material

to the CTR-sponsored government-to-government program. In Kazakstan

and Ukraine, the CTR-sponsored MPC&A program is progressing steadily

with improvements at several sites with direct-use nuclear material. DOE

also signed an agreement with GAN, the Russian nuclear regulatory agency,

in June 1995 to cooperate on the establishment of a national nuclear

materials control and accounting system in Russia. DOE’s lab-to-lab

program is also expanding to cover MINATOM nuclear weapons facilities.

U.S. MPC&A

Assistance Programs

in the NIS

Both DOD’s CTR-sponsored government-to-government program and DOE’s

lab-to-lab program were designed to demonstrate MPC&A technology at

model facilities and facilitate the transfer of MPC&A improvements to other

nuclear facilities in the NIS. The CTR-sponsored program works with the

governments of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus to upgrade

civilian MPC&A at selected facilities and develop regulations, enforcement

procedures, and national material tracking systems. DOE’s lab-to-lab

program works directly with Russian nuclear facilities to upgrade their

MPC&A controls.

The two programs differ in their strategies to improve MPC&A in the NIS. The

CTR-sponsored program is implemented by DOE through direct

government-to-government agreements between DOD and the respective

Ministries responsible for atomic energy in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan,

and Belarus. The agreements and their amendments specify the total

amount of funds available to the programs in each country, identify the

1

The five facilities where controls over direct-use material have been improved are the Kurchatov

Institute, the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, Chelyabinsk-70, Arzamas –16, and Tomsk-7.

All are located in Russia.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

types of facilities that will participate, establish the roles and

responsibilities of the participating organizations, and establish rights to

audit and examination by U.S. officials. To the maximum extent feasible,

the CTR-sponsored MPC&A programs use U.S. goods and services.

DOE’s lab-to-lab program, in contrast, is implemented directly with Russian

nuclear facilities. DOE’s national laboratories participating in the program

sign contracts directly with their Russian laboratory counterparts, and

DOE’s national laboratories can purchase goods and services from U.S.,

Russian, or other suppliers as needed. The program includes complete

MPC&A upgrades at specific facilities, or the rapid deployment of a

particular MPC&A element, such as portal monitors, as needed.

CTR Government-toGovernment Program

Status

The CTR-sponsored government-to-government program is funding projects

in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus for improving civilian nuclear

material controls at selected model facilities and developing regulations,

enforcement procedures, and national material tracking systems. Figure

3.1 shows the location of current CTR-sponsored government-togovernment projects.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

Figure 3.1: Current CTR Government-to-Government Projects in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus

Kazakstan


Caspian


Sea

Black


Sea

Kiev

Ukraine Moscow

Barents


Sea

Arctic 

Ocean

Kara


Sea

Bering


Sea

Sea of


Okhtosh

Russia

Krasnoyarsk

Sea of


Japan

Techa Ob'

Ob'

South Ukraine
 Yenisey

Power 


Plant

Sevastopol

Kharkiv

Luch

Elektrostal

Semipalatinsk

Ulba

Government-to-Government Projects

Obninsk

Dmitrovgrad

Mayak

Almaty

Aktau

Don

Volga

Sosny 


Research


Center

Belarus

Sources: DOE and GAO.

In Russia, CTR funds have supported MPC&A upgrades for a low-enriched

uranium fuel fabrication facility and a training center. In Ukraine and

Kazakstan, the program has funded site surveys at facilities that use

direct-use material and lower priority material and assisted national

authorities in establishing MPC&A regulations and reporting systems. In

Belarus, the program has funded a site survey at a facility using direct-use

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

material and is assisting the Belarussian government in establishing MPC&A

regulations and a reporting system.

Since the beginning of the CTR-sponsored program in 1991, DOD has

budgeted $63.5 million for government-to-government MPC&A assistance,

obligated $59.2 million, and spent $3.8 million. The government-togovernment program has provided working group meetings, site surveys,

physical protection equipment, computers, and training for projects in

Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. As of January 1996, none of the

projects have been completed. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of CTR

government-to-government program funds among Russia, Ukraine,

Kazakstan, and Belarus.

Table 3.1: U.S. Assistance for

CTR-Sponsored Governmentto-Government Programs (fiscal years

1991-95)

Dollars in millions

Country Budget Obligations Expendituresa

Russiab $30.0 $27.5 $2.0

Ukraine 22.5 21.5 0.7

Kazakstan 8.0 7.6 1.1

Belarus 3.0 2.6 0

Total $63.5 $59.2 $3.8

aOur prior work found that DOD’s expenditure data can significantly understate the value of work

performed to date. Although we were unable to obtain data on the value of work performed for the

government-to-government program, our prior report found that the value of work performed for

CTR projects was almost double the expenditures reported by the program. See Weapons of

Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union: An Update

(GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 9, 1995) p.10.

bThe $30 million budgeted and $27.5 million obligated for Russia does not include $15 million in

fiscal year 1995 CTR funds for MPC&A upgrades implemented under DOE’s lab-to-lab program.

By July 1995, the CTR-sponsored government-to-government program had

started to improve physical protection at a facility with direct-use material.

The slow pace of the government-to-government program in Russia can be

attributed to two major obstacles. The first obstacle involved difficulties in

negotiating agreements with MINATOM to obtain access to sites handling

direct-use material. The United States proposed to MINATOM in March 1994

that demonstration projects be initiated at two HEU fuel fabrication

facilities. The U.S. position was that including these facilities would

support nonproliferation objectives. MINATOM rejected the U.S. proposal

saying that the inclusion of direct-use material was a sensitive and delicate

issue and that experience in cooperating on low enriched uranium

facilities would be needed before expanding to direct-use materials. As a

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

result, the United States agreed to fund only one project in Russia, the low

enriched uranium facility at Elektrostal. Recently, physical protection

equipment was installed in the building housing the low enriched uranium

fuel line. The same building also houses an HEU fuel fabrication line, which

will be protected by this equipment. In the summer of 1994, the United

States proposed a quick-fix approach to upgrade MPC&A at Russian

facilities with direct-use material. Under this approach, the United States

would provide expedited assistance to upgrade nuclear material security

at key Russian nuclear facilities. Russian officials were not supportive of

the approach citing concerns about providing the United States access to

sensitive nuclear facilities.

The second obstacle was MINATOM’s resistance in recognizing the role of

GAN as a nuclear regulatory entity and GAN’s own lack of statutory authority

for oversight and enforcement of nuclear regulations. According to State

Department officials, GAN was often at odds with MINATOM about the

ongoing transition of regulatory authority to GAN. Also, GAN was unable to

assert its regulatory role because it lacked legislative authority to regulate

facilities with nuclear materials. In addition, despite a decree issued in

September 1994 by the Russian President, that named GAN as the lead

agency in overseeing the security of nuclear materials in Russia and

ordered MINATOM to work with GAN on this issue, there are still disputes

over authority between ministries that have not been resolved.

In Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus, the CTR-sponsored government-togovernment program is working to improve MPC&A systems at nuclear

facilities, develop national MPC&A systems, and help them prepare for

International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards pursuant to the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty. However, CTR-sponsored projects are just

beginning, and improvements to controls at the first facility handling

direct-use materials will not be completed until mid-1996 at the earliest.

In Ukraine, the program has completed a site survey for the Kiev Institute

of Nuclear Research, which uses direct-use material for fuel in a research

reactor and has started delivering access control equipment. The program

is also in the process of conducting a site survey at the Kharkiv Institute of

Physics and Technology, which also contains direct-use material. The

program is also implementing an MPC&A project at the South Ukraine

Power Plant, which is a lower priority site because it uses low enriched

uranium for fuel. Work at the Kiev Institute is expected to be completed by

mid-1996, and work at the other sites is expected to be completed by the

end of fiscal year 1997. The program has also established a computer

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

network for the State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety to

facilitate the creation of Ukraine’s national nuclear database.

In Kazakstan, the focus of CTR-funded work has been on the Ulba Fuel

Fabrication Plant, a low-priority site that produces low enriched uranium

fuel elements for power reactors. The program also conducted site surveys

for research reactor sites at Semipalatinsk and Almaty and for a breeder

reactor at Aktau. DOE expects the program in Kazakstan to be completed

by the end of 1997.

In Belarus, the program is upgrading MPC&A systems for direct-use material

at the Sosny Research Center in cooperation with Sweden and Japan,

helping Belarus develop national regulations, and preparing the

government for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The

program has completed a site survey and delivered access control

equipment and interior sensors to Sosny. DOE expects the program in

Belarus to be completed by the end of 1996.

Lab-to-Lab Program Status The lab-to-lab program is funding projects in Russia to improve MPC&A at

sites within nuclear facilities, demonstrate MPC&A technologies, and deploy

MPC&A equipment on an as-needed basis. Figure 3.2 shows the location of

current lab-to-lab projects.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

Figure 3.2: Current Lab-to-Lab Projects

Caspian


Sea

Black


Sea

Moscow

Barents


Sea

Arctic 

Ocean

Kara


Sea

Bering


Sea

Sea of


Okhtosh

Russia

Sea of


Japan Tomsk-7

Techa Ob'

Ob'

Yenisey

Institute of Inorganic Materials

Institute of Automatics

Kurchatov Institute


Chelyabinsk-70

Obninsk

Arzamas-16

Mayak

Don

Volga

Laboratory-to-Laboratory Projects

Institute of Physics


and Power Engineering

Eleron

Sources: DOE and GAO.

The lab-to-lab program has completed pilot projects at the Kurchatov

Institute in Moscow and the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering

and has demonstrated a model material control and accounting system at

Arzamas-16, a MINATOM nuclear weapons facility. In addition, the program

has deployed nuclear portal monitors around a nuclear site at

Chelyabinsk-70, a second MINATOM nuclear weapons facility, the Kurchatov

Institute, the Institute of Automatics, the Institute of Physics and Power

Engineering, and Arzamas-16. Table 3.2 shows obligations and

expenditures for the lab-to-lab program.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

Table 3.2: U.S. Assistance for

Lab-to-Lab Programs (fiscal years

1994-95)

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Budget Obligations Expenditures

1994 $2.1 $2.1 $1.6

1995 15.0 15.0 12.7a

Total $17.1 $17.1 $14.3

aAccording to a national laboratory official, in fiscal year 1995, DOE advanced and spent

$8.2 million of its own funds for the lab-to-lab program, while waiting for a transfer of $15 million

from the CTR program. Of the $15 million transferred from DOD to DOE, DOE spent $4.5 million

on the lab-to-lab program in fiscal year 1995 and carried over $10.5 million into fiscal year 1996.

The pilot project at the Kurchatov Institute improved MPC&A for a reactor

site containing about 80 kilograms of direct-use material. The

improvements included a new fence, sensors, a television surveillance

system to detect intruders, a nuclear material portal monitor, a metal

detector at the facility entrance, improved lighting, alarm communication

and display systems, an intrusion detection and access control system in

areas where nuclear material is stored, and a computerized material

accounting system.

Figure 3.3 shows the types of improvements we observed during our visit

to the Kurchatov Institute reactor site in March 1995.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

Figure 3.3: Lab-to-Lab Cooperative Efforts at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

At Obninsk, the program has upgraded MPC&A systems for a research

reactor facility that houses several thousand kilograms of direct-use

material.2

 The program is providing a computerized material control and

accounting system; entry control; portal monitoring systems; a vehicle

monitor; and bar codes to be attached to the discs, seals, and video

surveillance systems. In addition, the program will assist the facility with

taking a physical inventory and performing radiation measurements to

quantify the amount of material present. The first phase of this project was

completed in September 1995.

A pilot demonstration project was also completed with Arzamas-16 in

March 1995. This project demonstrated MPC&A technologies that could be

applied to MINATOM nuclear weapons facilities and the CTR-sponsored fissile

material storage facility. Using U.S.- and Russian-supplied equipment, the

demonstration consisted of computerized accounting systems; a system to

measure nuclear materials in containers; access control systems; a

monitored storage facility using cameras, seals, and motion detector

equipment; and a system to search for and identify lost or stolen material.

Although this project did not have a direct or immediate impact on

protecting direct-use material, it has led to greater interest in participation

in the lab-to-lab program by MINATOM defense facilities. Figure 3.4 shows

U.S.- and Russian-supplied equipment that we observed in use during the

March 1995 Arzamas-16 demonstration project.

2

This material is especially attractive to theft because it is in the form of 70,000 to 80,000 small disks

containing HEU and plutonium, along with other material.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

Figure 3.4: Lab-to-Lab Cooperative Efforts at Arzamas-16

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

The lab-to-lab program is also rapidly deploying nuclear material portal

monitors to Russian institutes, enterprises, and operating facilities.

Starting in June 1995, the lab-to-lab program assisted Chelyabinsk-70 in

deploying two nuclear material portal monitors and a vehicular portal

monitor at the entrances to a key nuclear site. This effort was in response

to increased concerns of Chelyabinsk officials about controlling access to

the site. Nuclear material portal monitors have also been installed at an

engineering test facility at Arzamas-16 and at one of the main entrances to

the Institute of Automatics, where the monitors are undergoing testing and

evaluation. The lab-to-lab program has also started delivering portal

monitors to Tomsk-7. The program officials have signed a contract to

install monitors at all portals at Tomsk-7.

Prospects for MPC&A

Upgrades Are

Improving

While the CTR-sponsored government-to-government program has gotten

off to a slow start controlling direct-use material, the U.S. government is

making progress in expanding participation in the program to more

facilities with direct-use material in the NIS. The lab-to-lab program is also

expanding its outreach to additional facilities in Russia that require MPC&A

upgrades, and DOE officials have been approached by the Russians to

expand their efforts to other facilities.

CTR Government-toGovernment Program

Expands Its Projects to

Direct-Use Sites in Russia

In January 1995, the United States and Russia agreed to expand the

CTR-sponsored government-to-government program to facilities using

direct-use material. An agreement was signed in June 1995 at the

Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting to add five direct-use facilities.3

These are high-priority facilities because they handle large amounts of

direct-use material. They include the HEU fuel fabrication line at the

Elektrostal Machine Building Plant, the Scientific Production Association

Luch in Podolsk, the Scientific Research Institute for Nuclear Reactors in

Dmitrovgrad, the Mayak Production Association, and the Institute of

Physics and Power Engineering at Obninsk for a nuclear training

laboratory and MPC&A improvements in addition to those underway in the

lab-to-lab program.4

3

The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission was created in 1993 to overcome trade barriers in the energy

sector but has expanded into other areas, including business development, space, environment,

science and technology, health, and defense diversification.

4

Subsequent to the conclusion of our review, DOE and MINATOM agreed to add six additional sites to

U.S. MPC&A programs.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 3 

Current Status and Future Prospects for

U.S. Assistance to the NIS

Lab-to-Lab Program Is

Expanding Into MINATOM

Facilities

The lab-to-lab program plans to implement MPC&A projects at several

MINATOM nuclear weapons complex facilities during fiscal year 1996 and

continue work at the Kurchatov Institute and the Institute of Physics and

Power Engineering at Obninsk. The lab-to-lab program has signed

contracts to upgrade MPC&A systems at Tomsk-7, Chelyabinsk-70, and

Arzamas-16. The program at Tomsk-7 includes deployment of nuclear

material portal monitors, development of an automated material control

and accounting system for an HEU facility, development of an access

control system for a sensitive facility on site, and implementation of a

rapid inventory system for uranium and plutonium in containers based on

the technology demonstrated in fiscal year 1995 at Arzamas-16. At

Chelyabinsk-70, the program plans to enhance MPC&A at a reactor facility

handling large amounts of direct-use material.

The lab-to-lab program is also pursuing new initiatives with Russian

nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facilities and the Russian

navy. In August 1995, representatives of the four Russian nuclear weapons

assembly and disassembly facilities (Avangard, Penza-19, Sverdlovsk-45,

and Zlatoust-36) met to discuss possible joint work to improve MPC&A at

their facilities. U.S. technical experts have also met with officials from the

Russian naval fuel sector and the Kurchatov Institute to discuss

cooperative work to improve MPC&A at Russian naval facilities. The

Russians have proposed a list of eight potential areas of cooperation for

improving MPC&A at the naval facilities and have recommended that the

joint work be conducted with the participation of the Kurchatov Institute.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 4 

DOE Faces Uncertainties in Managing an

Expanded U.S. Assistance Program

In fiscal year 1996, the United States substantially increase its MPC&A

assistance program to include all facilities in the NIS known to contain

direct-use nuclear material. With the increase, the executive branch has

consolidated management and funding responsibilities for the

DOD-sponsored CTR government-to-government program and the DOE’s

lab-to-lab program within DOE. The expanded program faces several

uncertainties involving the number of facilities to be assisted, costs, and

ultimate effectiveness. DOE is developing responses to each of these issues.

The Expanded

Program

The executive branch has acted to address the problem of quickly

improving MPC&A at NIS facilities by proposing a multiyear program to help

the NIS strengthen their controls over direct-use materials. In

September 1995, the President directed DOE to prepare a long-range plan to

enhance nuclear material controls by the year 2002 at the 80 to 

100 facilities in the NIS handling direct-use material. The President also

transferred responsibility for funding and supporting new

government-to-government projects, which was the responsibility of the

CTR program, from DOD to DOE in fiscal year 1996.1 DOE will also continue to

manage the lab-to-lab program.

DOE plans to request from Congress $400 million for the program over 

7 years. DOE requested $70 million in fiscal year 1996 and plans to continue

requesting $70 million per year through fiscal year 1999, then reducing the

request to $50 million a year until 2001, and to $20 million in 2002. DOE

plans to work at up to 15 facilities per year. DOE and national laboratory

officials estimate that the cost per facility will range from $5 million to

$10 million, on the basis of DOD’s and DOE’s experiences to date working at

a limited number of sites at several facilities in the NIS.

Uncertainties Faced

by an Expanded

Program

As DOE prepares to undertake the much larger task of managing the

expanded program, it will face several uncertainties that can affect

program implementation.

• As previously stated, DOE does not know how many facilities may

ultimately require assistance. Currently, U.S. officials do not know where

all the direct-use material is located. According to a DOE official, the United

States may need to include as many as 35 additional facilities beyond the

1

However, financial management responsibilities for CTR-funded projects undertaken in fiscal years

1994 and 1995, including DOD’s fiscal year 1995 funding for the lab-to-lab program, will remain with

DOD.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 4 

DOE Faces Uncertainties in Managing an

Expanded U.S. Assistance Program

80 to 100 facilities currently envisioned to achieve its goal of enhancing

controls over all direct-use material.

• DOE is uncertain about the total costs of the program. The cost of the entire

program could range from $400 million to over $1 billion based on the

estimate that the number of facilities that may require assistance could

range from 80 facilities to as many as 135 facilities, and that per project

costs could range from $5 million to $10 million.2

 Project estimates could

vary as the program expands to different types of facilities, or if the NIS

consolidate their stockpiles of direct-use material.

• DOE may have difficulty directly verifying that U.S. assistance is used for its

intended purposes because the Russians may limit direct measures that

the United States may use at highly sensitive facilities. DOE plans to

provide assistance to sensitive MINATOM defense facilities. While DOE is

attempting to negotiate the use of direct measures, such as audit and

evaluation procedures wherever possible, the Russians may deny the use

of such direct measures in certain facilities.

DOE Responses to

Program

Uncertainties

DOE is currently developing responses that could address these program

uncertainties, including developing a long-range plan, a consolidated

cost-reporting system, and a flexible strategy for auditing and evaluating

program progress. These responses had not been completed at the

conclusion of our review.

Long-Term Plan In September 1995, the President directed DOE to develop a long-term plan.

According to a DOE official, the plan will include strategies, priorities, and

costs for the work at the 80 to 100 facilities where the U.S. plans to

provide assistance. The U.S. strategy is to gain commitments from the

Russians for work at facilities where direct-use material is present: the

MINATOM defense facilities, MINATOM civilian research facilities, civilian

research institutes, and the naval propulsion sector. DOE’s priorities are to

(1) improve controls at facilities in the NIS handling direct-use material,

(2) help the Russians develop and deploy current MPC&A equipment and

technology to these facilities, and (3) assist the NIS in developing a national

MPC&A regulatory system. DOE estimates that the fiscal year 1996 budget for

the lab-to-lab program will be $40 million, the government-to-government

program will be $15 million, cooperation with GAN will be $10 million, and

cooperation for securing Russian naval nuclear fuel will be $5 million.

2

According to a national laboratory official, these estimates are based on work completed at a limited

number of facilities.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 4 

DOE Faces Uncertainties in Managing an

Expanded U.S. Assistance Program

According to a national laboratory official, supporting plans are also being

developed by the national laboratories. For example, the lab-to-lab

program has developed a unified U.S.-Russian plan for work at MINATOM

defense facilities. The plan provides objectives, priorities, a list of facilities

to receive MPC&A enhancements, and approaches for providing assurances

that equipment and other support are used for intended purposes and for

protecting sensitive information. Similar plans for the MINATOM civilian

sector and the independent nuclear facilities are also being developed.

Centralized Cost-Reporting

System

DOE is developing a centralized cost-reporting system for the

government-to-government and lab-to-lab programs. Currently, DOE does

not have a consolidated source of information on the obligations and

expenditures for the two programs. While DOE program managers receive

quarterly financial information from reports prepared by the national

laboratories, there is no central point within DOE where data for the

government-to-government program and lab-to-lab program are

aggregated. A centralized consolidated cost-reporting system will provide

DOE managers with current financial and project status information. This

would be useful in responding to changes in program requirements and

costs and revising program budget requests to reflect operating

experiences at facilities in the NIS.

Flexible Approach to Audit

and Program Evaluation

Because the United States places a high priority on preventing diversion of

nuclear material, the executive branch has agreed, in principle, on the

need for flexibility in pursuing adequate arrangements for ensuring that

U.S. assistance is used as intended. The arrangements include formal audit

and evaluation rights negotiated as part of government-to-government

agreements and flexible arrangements developed by the national

laboratories to be applied to the lab-to-lab program.

Under government-to-government agreements, which provide basic rights

and responsibilities for the government-to-government program, the

United States is allowed to conduct audits and examinations during the

period of the agreements upon 30 days advanced notice. These agreements

give U.S. personnel the right to visit sites receiving U.S. assistance. DOD

and MINATOM signed an additional agreement on Administrative

Arrangements for the Conduct of Audits and Examinations of Assistance.

Using these arrangements, DOD conducts audits and examinations of all

CTR-funded assistance and will include MPC&A assistance.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 4 

DOE Faces Uncertainties in Managing an

Expanded U.S. Assistance Program

In contrast, the lab-to-lab program, which works directly with Russian

nuclear facilities, is not covered by the formal government-to-government

agreement with Russia. However, the annex to the lab-to-lab program plan

outlines guidance for ensuring that assistance is used as intended. The

annex specifies various management controls, such as making progress

payments to Russian laboratories only for specific delivered products, and

only after U.S. laboratory officials have evaluated the product against the

contract to ensure that payments to Russian laboratories are only used for

their intended purposes.

The annex also provides a series of direct and indirect measures to

determine if U.S. assistance is improving nuclear material controls. Some

measures for program success include tracking the amount of nuclear

material covered by strengthened safeguards that can be directly assessed

through visits to facilities and exchanges of photographs, video tapes,

records, and documents to show implementation of an improved system

and more limited access on a controlled basis to the facilities.

Agency Comments The Departments of State and Energy generally agreed with the report.

Their comments are presented separately in appendixes I and II. The

Department of State provided editorial comments, which have been

incorporated in the text as appropriate. DOD officials also agreed with the

facts as presented in this report, but expressed concern about how the

report portrayed the relative success of the government-to-government

and lab-to-lab programs. These officials stated that the programs are

complementary approaches to achieving the goal of improving controls

and accountability over direct-use nuclear material in the NIS. We agree

and have modified the report accordingly.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Page 43 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

Gene Aloise

Charles T. Bolton

Mary Alice A. Hayward

Julie Hirshen

F. James Shafer

(711098)(170262) Page 46 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 6015

Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100